Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia

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Commission d'enquête sur le déploiement des Forces canadiennes en Somalie

The Somalia Experience in Strategic Perspective

Implications for the Military in a Free and Democratic Society

a study prepared for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia

Berel Rodal

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Preface

Canada has long enjoyed a privileged security situation. We have been sheltered from war — at least until the advent of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them at long ranges — by our separation from other continents by vast oceans, and enjoyed the protection afforded first by the British Navy, and then the United States. It was as a matter of choice that Canadian governments contributed with other, like-minded nations to the collective defence of our freedom, values, and interests, in two world wars, in the Korean War and in the North Atlantic Alliance. Canada's defence posture was never dictated by the need to counter the particular dispositions of an enemy. Our choices have been policy choices, made in the context of a community of shared values and interests, alliance, and collective security.

The period is one of historic change. An international system based on sovereign states, in place since the mid-17th century, is changing. The United Nations, established to ensure the security of states and protect state sovereignty, is increasingly dedicating itself to promoting the rights of human beings and communities. The military function, among the most traditional of functions and dimensions of statecraft, is changing too, in response to changes in the ways in which societies relate to each other, to changes in conceptions of community, rights, and security, and technological development.

This study proceeds from the proposition that the Somalia deployment and the events examined by the Commission have something to tell us about the nature of the policy choices facing the Government of Canada in sustaining effective and relevant armed forces on the cusp of the 21st century. The study is both a research essay and the author's analysis of, and reflections on, the events in the light of his own experience, and discussions with a variety of individuals from foreign and defence policy, military, and broader public policy backgrounds, senior Canadian figures and others.

The aim of this study is neither to go over the ground which the Commission will have covered in its hearings far more thoroughly, nor to offer a detailed design of defence policy and organization. The aim, rather,

has been to help establish the broader strategic and policy framework for the Commission's findings, to draw the wider inferences of 'the Somalia affair', and to focus on the issues germane to preventing the recurrence of such problems.

The focus of the study has therefore been on the developments in the domestic and international environment which are affecting the demands for, and on, the armed forces of the industrialized democracies; the experience in employing armed forces in the new environment; and on the lessons being learned and issues for policy germane to the purposes of the Inquiry. The aim is to draw lessons for Canada, but the exploration is not confined to the Canadian situation and Canadian experience. Different as the democracies may be in important respects — the United States is a (or rather, *the*) Superpower, Britain has long experience in counter-insurgency, France has its particular strategic orientations and interests — the author believes that the trends, dynamics, and directions described basically apply to all free and democratic societies.

The themes of the study relate to armed forces broadly, but more particularly to land forces, and, more particularly still, to peace and stability operations — their place in the strategic scheme of things, their dynamics, significance, and implications. The Somalia experience invites reflection on the new strategic environment and, in relation to this environment, on Canada's purposes, and options; on the dimensions and significance of societal change, and of evolving concepts of rights and their ambit; and on the rationale and conditions for maintaining and employing armed forces.

The author believes that we are in a period of strategic transformation — more accurately, perhaps, in a strategic pause — and that it is hardly sensible to expect or prudent to plan on the basis that the main function of the armed forces of the democracies in future will be peacekeeping and other kinds of humanitarian operations. Analyzing the implications of strategic and technological trends — the dimensions and implications of the "Revolution in Military Affairs", for example — is beyond the scope of this study. Assessing the dynamics and implications, for Canada particularly, of the pressures for (and against) military intervention in the affairs of other societies, however, raises issues which are at once strategic and structural, cultural and political, functional and operational. There has been discussion for some years of the need for Canada to become more selective in taking on peacekeeping responsibilities, mainly because of resources constraints. Military intervention of the kinds now called for, however, affect Canadians and others more deeply than has been the case since Canada's engagement in World War II and Korea. This study

addresses – too briefly, the author realizes very well — the dynamics and implications of this new and evolving context. Though focused on the role and dynamics of peace operations, the present study relates to the context and orientation of defence more broadly, though central themes remain beyond its scope.

The study begins by looking at the changed international strategic conditions following the end of the Cold War era, to gain insight into the factors shaping the present and future environment in which Canada (and Canada's partners and allies) might be called on to employ force. Chapter II treats the experience of Canada and the democracies in responding to the new conditions, examining the change in the scope and nature of peace operations, and the marked increase in the recourse to armed intervention. A principal observation, or conclusion, of these sections is that however selective about intervening democratic governments may wish to be, situations have been arising and may be expected to arise in which, whether because of the presence of television cameras and NGOs, or because, if left to fester, a situation threatens to foster wider instability or to export refugees, disease, crime, and terrorism, there will be heavy domestic and international pressure for military intervention. In such circumstances, refusal to intervene to mitigate great suffering and violation of human rights when the means to act appear to be available will often be politically, as well as morally, unsustainable.

Chapter III assesses the lessons being learned, and the issues for policy. The principal conclusion drawn is that peace operations may be expected to involve significant degrees of compellent force, and require highly prepared, and properly led militarily effective forces, guided by modernized doctrine, trained and organized to operate in support of and in close coordination with civil authorities, and with a clear understanding of the central importance of the maintenance of legitimacy, in the theatre of operations, internationally, and domestically.

Chapter IV aims to identify the societal changes and developments in national attitudes, policies and legislation germane to raising, organizing, and deploying armed forces and to maintaining both military effectiveness in the new conditions and understanding and support for defence. The principal conclusion drawn is that the armed forces must be able to protect Canada's interests, but at the same time also to reflect and foster those values, norms and rights central to Canadians and increasingly important (though hardly the only) factors shaping the response of the democratic community to international affairs. In an important sense, the armed forces of Canada and the majority of the democracies — the land forces

in particular — essentially operate in defence of the values, institutions, and shared interests of the democratic community as a whole, rather than essentially in defence of the national territory.

It is not the author's view that the military in Canada and other democracies is or ought to be seen as a special kind of benevolent society, and soldiers as human rights constables or social workers. Paradoxically enough, it may be the requirements of the new peace support operations which call for renewed attention to be paid to the traditional functions of military leadership, ethos, and individual and unit combat motivation. At the same time, a commitment to peace operations puts a premium on the democratic character or representativeness of the armed forces, because the public expects this of forces deployed to protect human rights and the interests of the democratic community, and because officers and soldiers must themselves be conscious of these values if they are to be expected to be effective in protecting and fostering them abroad.

The final chapter reviews and assesses the lessons learned from the experience of the new peace operations, and those of the Somalia experience, suggesting areas and issues for further study, reflection, and action in reshaping the government and the Canadian Forces. These relate, *inter alia*, in the case of government, to determining the when and how of intervention, and to providing guidance, oversight, and resources to the military; and, in the case of the military, to developing the systems, organization, capabilities, leadership, and ethos needed to meet the challenges of the new century.

The author has benefited from the wisdom and experience of a wide variety of individuals. He would like to acknowledge and thank, in particular, the friendship and advice of Bernard Thillaye, and of John F. Anderson, Ed Healey, Peter Sharfman, Professor Joseph Magnet, Dan Loomis, Freda Paltiel, and Gerald Wright, and of Ramsay Withers, and the Honourable Mitchell Sharp. He would like to acknowledge, as well, the help of colleagues in the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS); of Bruce Berkowitz — this study was originally to be a collaborative project; of Richard Haass; of Greg Treverton and the RAND Corporation; and of Hans Binnendijk and the Institute for National Security Studies at the National Defense University in Washington. He is indebted to the Commission Secretary, Stanley Cohen, for his guidance and help, and to Commission staff, including notably Linda Cameron, and the Director of Research, David Pomerant. Faults, of course, are entirely those of the author.

Introduction

The reaction of Canadians to the actions of elements of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG) in Belet Huen in March 1993 has been remarkably strong and sustained. In conjunction with matters which have come to light or occurred since,[1] the shocking incongruence between the behaviour of the members of the Airborne unit in Belet Huen in March 1993 and Canadians' conception and expectations of peacekeeping forces, has created the impression of a troubled Canadian military. Sadly, events have overshadowed the accomplishments of the Canadian Forces in Somalia. The majority of Canadian soldiers performed professionally, with restraint and humanity. Starving people were fed, the wounded tended, anarchy mitigated, hospitals and bridges built.[2]

In fact, there are a number of ways of seeing, and explaining, the events in Belet Huen. The events may be perceived as a breakdown of discipline and leadership in one sub-unit of the Airborne 2 Commando or in the unit itself. Breakdown of discipline is not uncommon in armies. It happened in the units of other nations deployed in Somalia — Belgian, Tunisian, Pakistani, Italian and others.[3] Somalia was difficult and frustrating. Soldiers arrived with a mission to feed the starving[4] only to find themselves at risk, the targets of attack, hostility, and banditry. The political, social, and physical environment was highly stressful.[5] Soldiers were unprepared for the heat, dust, lack of water, and insects, or for the poor food, hygiene, living conditions, isolation, and uncertainty.[6] The head of the Somalia Working Group at National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) noted the rising level of frustration among members of the CARBG and the systematic and progressive erosion of the values and attitudes of the members of the CARBG vis-à-vis Somalis and the mission — culminating in the breakdowns of discipline in March.[7]

The events — again, in conjunction with related or other developments, such as the harsher punishments meted out to the lower ranks, what appeared to be the reluctance of senior officers to take responsibility, allegations of cover-ups, the events leading to the disbanding of the Airborne Regiment, DND's approach to managing the media or the Commission —

may also be seen as the result of a structural problem. They may be seen as reflecting a problem within the army, indicating that something is amiss in the way in which Canada produces soldiers, army officers and NCOs, or with how the Armed Forces as an institution operates, as having to do, perhaps, with the underlying rationale shaping the culture, orientation, and values of the Armed Forces. The *Globe and Mail* expressed such a view, when it observed that because the Airborne was "an elite combat unit, [it] was the wrong unit to send to Somalia. In that case, if the failure of the Airborne was systemic, then as the best of the army, its failure may require a deeper assessment of the state of Canada's military."[8]

The sense of public opinion has been increasingly to link the Somalia affair with broader questions about the state of the Canadian Forces.[9] Canadians have for some time accepted peacekeeping as part of Canada's vocation, as a defining feature of Canada's image and international personality.[10] A positive and valued Canadian role in peacekeeping is an important element in how Canadians think of themselves. Promoting international peace, peacekeeping and conflict mediation, for example, were judged priorities for Canadian foreign and security policy in a major study conducted in 1995 as part of the federal government's foreign and defence policy review.[11] Members of the Canadian Forces too appear to identify with peacekeeping in an important way.[12] Professional surveys of public opinion and academic studies[13] have for some years similarly identified peacekeeping as a central element of Canada's international personality and vocation.

The author believes that the shock and strong public and governmental reaction which followed the revelation of the events in Somalia, which on the face of it seemed to go well beyond the scale of the events taken by themselves, have to do with the affront to public morality and the wounding of a central Canadian image. These events may be seen as a summons to examine and change conceptions, systems, and institutions which may be out of tune with changed needs and realities.

The period since the collapse of Communism and the Soviet Union has been one of momentous change. The conflict which has occupied most of this century, that between the Western democracies and the great totalitarianisms, Nazism, then Communism, has had immense political, economic, societal, and spiritual influence. The conflict was the organizing force and spirit of world politics. It created military establishments and arms industries of unparalleled size and power. The dividing line between East and West seemed and served as the critical fault-line dividing humanity. A 'Third World' emerged, with the 'non-aligned' 'developing' nations taking

the East–West divide as their point of reference. The end of the Cold War made it natural and necessary for the allies and Canada to re-examine the basics of national policies in the domains of international security and defence policy — and beyond, to think in terms of a different shaping spirit of world politics.

Rethinking basics has not come easily, especially for defence establishments which think, organize, and manage in terms of powerful traditions and relatively long planning horizons. Aims cannot be so broad as to make consequential force planning impracticable. It has been difficult to refashion, in a fundamental way, systems, processes, and institutions which appear to have served the global community, the country, and many regional and local communities reasonably well. The international setting is changed, but it has been difficult to judge where dramatic change is needed and where adjustments will do. Governments must meanwhile also persuade the public, anxious to redeploy resources to social and domestic purposes, that government is properly and wisely adjusting structures created to meet the needs of World War II and the Cold War.

Significant changes are nevertheless under way in thinking about the military, and in military thinking and practice, in relation and response to:

- dramatic technological change, promising a revolution in military affairs;
- tightening budgets, and intensifying competition for resources; and
- changes in the scope and nature of the roles and missions of armed forces, with increased emphasis on peace or stability operations in multinational coalitions, and on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

The last raises important operational and organizational issues, but also deeper issues having to do with evolution in the fundamental purposes and nature of armed forces in democratic societies. Armed forces are still understood as necessary to 'defend the nation', but this is coming to mean something additional to and different from its historical, traditional meaning. The evolution is such that 'defence', in the Western democracies, at least, in addition to its deterrent function, increasingly is coming to be about the defence and promotion of a broader community; of values and norms; and the fostering of an international order.

This concept of international order rests more on multilateral management of a liberal political and economic system, of law, and of universal human rights than on the defence or acquisition of territory as historically

understood.[14] Implied is the idea of an evolution in the basic aims, standards, and measures of military forces, with respect to missions other than those which concern dealing with the potential military threats to the country and its allies, to be sure. This can be a centrally important qualification, especially for countries in special situations, such as the United States on one hand, and Israel on the other. In other than for such cases — again, very important ones — there is in progress a certain movement, in the case of ground forces in particular, from an organizing focus on defeating an enemy and on the destruction of enemy forces, from a focus on military operations as an end in themselves, to one which encompasses assistance in creating a political environment for stability, peace, international law and human rights, protecting civilians and societies,[15] and keeping losses and suffering to a minimum — one's own losses, and the losses of others, including adversaries.

CHAPTER ONE

The Changed Strategic Landscape

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AFFECTING THE DEMANDS FOR AND ON ARMED FORCES OF INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES

One can think of the century in terms of a long and a shorter one, thinking of the period from the outbreak of World War I to the fall of the Berlin Wall as a distinct historical, near-century period. We have emerged from this distinct era of world wars, and have entered into a major transition, in strategic terms the third for Canada and the democracies in this century. The changes have been momentous — the end of empires, those of the Japanese, British, French, and now the Russian; the end of the great ideological conflict between the democracies and totalitarianism (though anti-democratic regimes and forms of totalitarianism persist); and a pause at least in the reliance for security on the nuclear balance of terror.

World War I was followed by the enshrinement of the principle of self-determination, by the League of Nations, and by Fascism, Communism, economic depression and dislocation, and World War II. World War II was followed by the United Nations, decolonization, the Cold War, the European Community and by the success of Asian states and by dramatic economic growth, even if uneven. It was the general expectation — hope certainly was high — that with the end of the Cold War and the central ideological conflict, tensions, including ethnic tensions, would dampen, the need for recourse to armed force would diminish, and old conflicts would be solved, or muted.

Great Power political and military competition was no longer the driving force of the international system. The main source of external support for regional conflict was gone. There was a single superpower, the United States. The USSR and then Russia was prepared to co-operate with the United States to limit and manage regional conflict. The United Nations seemed closer than ever to working as originally intended. The

Western model and market pluralism had triumphed, and served as by far the most attractive course for others to follow or adapt. The U.S. administration thought in terms of, and went on record about, a 'new world order' in which states would not threaten to use, or use, force to advance interests or resolve conflict, and in which governments would advance human rights, democracy, and market pluralism.[1]

The reality has been much less tidy — much less tidy than was hoped and expected, and indeed, less tidy than the situation and system one had grown accustomed to during the Cold War. Because war involving nuclear-armed powers meant immense risk, the possibility of war had to be kept very low. The conflict at the core of the Cold War courted destruction on a scale unmatched in history. It fueled regional conflicts and proxy wars. Nevertheless, conflicts and relationships were controlled and structured. Both the United States and the Soviet Union followed careful rules to minimize the risk that they might find themselves in armed confrontation, either directly, or indirectly by being manipulated into confrontation by their clients and regional interests.[2] The risk that miscalculation, misunderstanding, or manipulation by others might lead to escalation constrained both superpowers, which in turn constrained the allies and clients dependent on their support and protection.

Winston Churchill in 1953 offered what he described as the "odd thought" that the very destructiveness of nuclear weapons might breed restraint, and that the "annihilating character"of nuclear weapons might bring an utterly unforseeable security to mankind.[3] The resulting tightly organized structure did bring stability, however dangerous, stultifying, and for many, brutal.

To be sure, the period between the end of World War II and the collapse of the Soviet Union was a bloody one, for all the architecture of deterrence and focus on strategic stability. It is estimated that some 40 million people were killed in more than 125 wars in the Third World since the end of World War II. Clearly, conflicts were not impossible, but were generally confined and limited to a much greater extent than might have been the case otherwise,[4] especially after the Soviet Union acquired the hydrogen bomb and the means to deliver nuclear weapons at long ranges. The ending of the Cold War brought down this structured order.

Loosening Constraints on Violent Conflict

The collapse of the framework of centralized alliance and the fracturing of the system of blocs meant a number of things. The special features of the Cold War, particularly the development of and reliance on the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons and the integration of nuclear weapons into the force structures and military doctrines of the adversaries, had served to control, confine, and structure actors and conflicts. The end of the Cold War has resulted in the diffusion of political authority, diminished political control, and the proliferation of centres of decision making. This has had the effect of loosening constraints on action by states and groups, increasing the potential for problems — for example, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait at one level, and the civil wars in the Balkans and the Caucasus on another. A variety of unresolved ethnic and other local conflicts placed in the deep freeze re-emerged, alongside a host of other problems, either new or in germination during the 'nuclear peace'.

Proliferation of Old and New Sources of Conflict and Insecurity

Outside the community of industrialized democracies, the new world order has been long on new and short on order, at least of the kind envisaged by President Bush. There has been progress in moving towards the peaceful resolution of a number of difficult conflicts such as those in South Africa, Nicaragua, and Guatemala, and between Israel and some of its neighbours and the Palestinians. Nonetheless, "The sources of conflict and war are pervasive and deep", observed the then Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*,[5] published in the aftermath of the first meeting of the Security Council at the level of Heads of State and Government in January 1992. The spectre of nuclear war arising out of superpower conflict across the East–West divide in Europe is no longer the principal security preoccupation, but few would conclude that international security is a concern of the past.

Traditional sources of threat to national interests and to international security have not disappeared with the end of the Cold War. War, border disputes, ethnic hatred, religious and nationalist extremism, economic and other forms of interstate rivalry, terrorism, and crime are all still with us. The end of the Cold War has brought new problems — new states and boundary conflicts, new inter- and intra-state conflict, and population displacement, refugees, and humanitarian crises. Interdependence and technology, the proliferation of technologies of mass destruction in particular,

expand the scope and form of such problems. Killing and dying for blood and soil, or heaven, remain powerful motivations, it would appear, with greater reach than before.

The most dangerous kind of conflict, wars among 'great powers', seems the least likely form of conflict for at least the intermediate term. It would be imprudent to rule out such conflict entirely, however, in view of the internal instability of great powers; of misunderstandings, for example, over the U.S. role and engagement in Asia; or of perceptions of changing balances at a time of great economic and technological change. For President Chirac of France, the perspective was one of a 'strategic pause' of which one should take prudent advantage.[6]

Conflicts among regional powers however are judged to be more likely to occur with the weakening of Cold War constraints, as such powers and rogue or insular states such as North Korea, Iraq, Libya, and Iran move to exert greater influence or hegemony and to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Western security planning and diplomacy have been directed to buttressing regional counterweights and creating buffers, to strengthening the focus on economic issues and fora for discussion and exchange, and to enhancing the capacity to act if necessary. U.S. policy has been based on the need to deter potential belligerents and contain regional problems — ideally, in conjunction with allies. To this end, U.S. military planning provides for forces capable of responding to two major regional conflicts (MRCs), or major regional contingencies, simultaneously. NATO has been rethinking its role, and the major allies have been reshaping their forces to respond more effectively to such and other contingencies.

The Resurgence of Nationalism, and Ethnic, Communal, and Boundary Conflict. One of the most striking features of the passing of the Cold War has been the resurgence of conflicts based on nationalism and ethnicity. Whether attributable to the end of the Cold War, or to other factors, including political and economic modernization, this phenomenon is the subject of much current debate. Scholars and strategists reflect on the modalities and significance of the erosion of multinational states, on nationalism becoming the dynamic and organizing principle for states and societies in various parts of the world, and on the best strategies for containing or managing ethnopolitical conflict.[7] It remains that the end of the Cold War with its erosion of empire has been accompanied by the eruption and exploitation of historical claims, of long-standing ethnic, political, and boundaries issues, by an emphasis on 'ethnoscapes' — historic homelands and sacred soils[8] — by expressions of grievances and demands for redress.

The most severe conflicts have been communal ones, conflicts within states which have been, or might become, severe enough to induce intervention. Intervention might be required on humanitarian grounds; because of the risk of spreading; or because if left untreated, the situation, over time, could undermine international stability and security. Figure 1 displays the dramatic growth in the share of domestic conflicts in UN Peacekeeping Operations and Good Office Missions between 1974 and 1994.

Figure 1: UN Peacekeeping Operations and Good Office Missions, 1974-1994



Few of today's 170 states are ethnically homogenous. Only half or so are populated by ethnic groups making up 75 percent of the state. Yugoslavia was made up of five nationalities, four principal languages and two alphabets, and three religions. Conflicts about identity have a number of dimensions and many layers — transnational (e.g., Islam), national, religious, ethnic and racial, and linguistic.

Ethnopolitical civil wars are in train in Angola, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Burundi, Chechnya (for the moment abated), Croatia, Georgia, Ingushetia, Kashmir, Myanmar, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Turkey, among other such conflicts. In his 1994 presidential address to the International Studies Association, Ted Robert Gurr listed 50 "serious or emerging"ethnopolitical conflicts in 1993–1994, 13 of which had each caused more than 100,000 deaths.[9]

The Role of 'Threats without Threateners': Population Growth, Migration, Environmental Degradation, and Water Scarcity. There has been considerable debate about 'threats without threateners', notably those arising from environmental degradation, population growth and migration, and water scarcity. Environmental issues are increasingly important as factors underlying border conflicts, cultural and racial clashes, war, and other forms of strife, adding to the stresses which make societies ungovernable, threatening the political and physical viability of communities, and heightening the risk of conflict and war.

There is increasing study, commentary, and concern[10] that environmental causes will become central factors in a self-sustaining process of impoverishment, repression, and mass movement. The impact of environmental degradation on habitat, economy, and polity exacerbates the pressures of population imbalance, and increases the potential for conflict both directly and indirectly. Population growth in turn is a central factor in aggravating environmental decline, reducing the productivity of land and availability of water, and accelerating economic decline. The resulting transboundary migration of large groups affect the internal stability of societies in regions already prone to internal and interstate conflict. Reversals in the developmental prospects of important regions, such as the Indian sub-continent, triggered by climatic disorder, would be of central importance geopolitically.

Population growth is and will continue to be concentrated in the Third World, economic growth and employment opportunity in the industrialized countries. (Though this risks oversimplification: growth has been dramatic in China and the Asian 'tigers' including Taiwan, Thailand, and

Malaysia, for example.) The World Bank and the United Nations estimate[11] that by 2025, only three of the industrialized democracies will be among the 20 most populated countries in the world. Ethiopia will have twice the population of France, Iran will be as populous as Japan. Third World cities are burgeoning, with the population of Mexico City expected to reach over 25 million, of Tehran over 17 million. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) estimates that a billion people in the South live on $1 per day. Fundamental political, economic, and international change is causing movements of people on a scale large enough to affect societies worldwide.

The trend in developed host countries, including Canada and the United States, is increasingly to tighten restrictions on immigration. The military has already been employed and may come to be needed in a more extensive way to prevent mass movement/migrations.[12] There have been clear signs of a backlash to the reality or the prospect of mass migration in destination countries, whether Hong Kong and Thailand, or France, Italy, and Germany. Forcible repatriation has been undertaken by the United States, France, and Hong Kong, among others.

Water, truly a 'vital interest', is of critical importance, and its availability for consumption, agriculture, and industry is likely to become increasingly problematic as a result of pollution, depletion, and population growth. For most countries, the most important sources of supply lie outside their frontiers. According to UN sources, some 50 countries have 75 percent or more of their territory falling within multinational river basins; over one third of the world's population lives within such basins, a rich potential source of conflict.

Protection of the environment as a global priority could well become a serious source of conflict between Third World and developed countries.[13] In the absence of real progress on sustainable development and international agreement on environmental protection, including agreement over the pace and cost of changes to deal with climatic and environmental issues, massive, complex changes in the earth's ecology and environment could well give rise to direct threats to stability and peace by their impact on the political and strategic environment of relations between the industrialized democracies and the developing world. Environmental degradation could give rise to conflict directly or as a result of the recourse to projection of armed force by the industrialized world to intervene in mismanaged, ecologically critical areas — or to curb violence resulting from climatic change. Environmental protection might well seem to populations in the North to necessitate and to legitimate intervention in Third World countries, if the habitability of the planet seems at stake, or to protect the rain forest.

The Mutating State and Collapsing States. The strongest states are increasingly having to share authority with a variety of actors — indeed, the rise of non-state participants and international institutions to prominence in the affairs of countries and on the global stage is one of the more dramatic features of the new international system.[14] Money, information, resources, culture, and pollution shape the lives of people and communities with far less regard to state boundaries and state authorities than was the case a generation or even a decade ago. To a significant extent this is a result of the shift from the state to the market, the globalization of corporate activities and of financial and currency markets, all powerfully enabled by the revolution in information and communications technology. States without popular legitimacy or social support often survived during the Cold War on the basis of the patronage of one of the superpowers and an international system and norms designed to foster stability and state sovereignty. Deprived of this external support and unable to meet societal needs and expectations, a number of states have been in various stages of collapse since — Somalia being one example, Afghanistan, Liberia, Bosnia (though a special case), Haiti, Sierra Leone, and Zaire are others — as legitimate authority, law, and societal coherence degenerate.[15]

States too weak for governance, legitimacy, economic success, and international co-operation foster instability and threaten to generate problems for neighbours, by stimulating the flow of refugees, arms, and contraband, and by involving kindred groups in the conflict, as in the case of the countries bordering Rwanda and Burundi, notably Zaire.

Terrorism and Transnational Crime. The threat and reach of terrorism and the growing reach and sophistication of transnational crime undermine vulnerable societies and increasingly threaten the national interests of the democracies, not least by endangering international order and undermining states' and societies' sense of security and order.

U.S. President Bill Clinton formulated the issue in broad outline at the conclusion of the Peacemaker's/Anti-terrorism Summit in Sharm a-Sheikh, in March 1996:

> It is not easy for democratic societies to defeat organized forces of destruction. The end of the Cold War means that there will, in all probability, and we hope, be less conflict among nation states. There will be more conflict in the future by people who organize themselves for illegitimate means, through terrorism, and who try to access dangerous weapons — traditional, biological and chemical weapons; who try to use the forces of organized crime and the money they can get from drug trafficking to build a network of destruction, if you

will, that can cross the boundaries of nation states. I believe this is a problem... . This is today Israel's problem, it's the Middle Eastern problem, but it will be the principal security problem of the future, and I think we had better get after it...[16]

Terrorism and international crime imperil the fabric and legitimacy of states, and add to the circumstances in which international intervention may be required. While a source of conflict in itself, terrorism increases the potential for conflict by creating a climate in which terrorist action will be seen as justifying military action, with or without the co-operation or approval of local governments, especially if terrorists gain access to weapons and means of mass destruction. Action or intervention might be needed to counter or punish terrorist atrocities, to rescue hostages, or to act against states supporting terrorism or not acting strongly enough against it.

Drug cartels and interests now represent a challenge to political, national (and human) security in many producer countries, as police, courts, the army, government and democratic processes are manipulated and suborned by groups, often with links to insurgents. At press time for this study, the United States government was giving serious consideration to 'de-certifying' Mexico as a partner (and as eligible for U.S. funding) in the effort to fight narcotics smuggling.[17] The Mexican government a few days before had announced the dismissal of General Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo, the head of Mexico's national anti-drug agency, along with a number of other officials, for ties to Mexico's drug cartels. These cartels are held to be responsible for corruption of the Mexican political system on a massive scale, and for a large number of assassinations of leading political figures, churchmen, magistrates, members of the police, military, and public, and of U.S. anti-narcotics agents. So long as narcotics offer much higher rates of return than legitimate economic activity, the international drug trade is unlikely to be much reduced, leading to Western pressures to force restrictions in supply, and possibly to military intervention. Such intervention has occurred in the form of U.S. forces to assist national forces, as in Columbia, or invasion, as was the case in Panama in December 1989 (when U.S. forces in Operation Just Cause invaded Panama to remove General Manuel Noriega from office and to arrest him).

Proliferation of the Means of Violence. Accompanying the increasing incidence of and potential for conflict is a growing capacity to inflict harm in conflict, within and across borders. There is a growing risk that

weapons of mass destruction might come to be used in regional wars or in acts of terrorism. There has been a very considerable diffusion of the means of force.[18] Large stocks of weapons of all kinds are available, and many people are trained and available to use them. The proliferation of the means of violence extends from conventional to chemical, biological, and nuclear systems, and the means to deliver them, including ballistic missiles. There is easier access to nuclear materials, technology, and computing capability, for non-state actors as well. All are difficult to police and control. The nature and pace of the proliferation of the means of destruction are such that more than 25 states already possess or are developing weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them.

There are new incentives for states to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The increased technological sophistication of conventional weapons makes it difficult for Third World and indeed other states to maintain forces they would regard as adequate for their needs, whether in connection with regional ambitions, or because they wish to constrain what they see as an increasing preparedness and capacity of the West or the international community to intervene, whether to maintain stability, to protect human rights or the environment, to maintain access to resources, or to respond to terrorism.

The barriers to access to weapons of mass destruction are much lower, as well, as a result of the international diffusion of science and technology, and indeed of weapons-related technology directly by industrial sales and clandestinely as a result of the break-up of the Soviet Union. States resent, resist, and work to frustrate policies which would deny them technologies available to others, especially technologies which would permit them to protect and assert themselves against more advanced countries or which also have important non-military, commercial applications. Authoritative intelligence estimates are that within 15 years or so some 50 states will possess one or more of atomic, biological, or chemical weapons, and that 20 of these will have the capability to produce such weapons indigenously.

The existing control regime is porous. Iraq was able to develop and maintain an extremely ambitious and highly diversified proliferation program, in spite of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime and periodic International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. The United States Director of Central Intelligence estimated in 1993 that an ICBM threat to North America from the Third World would materialize in as little as 10 years. In fact, means of delivery need not be that sophisticated: they can and have included car bombs, bombs aboard aircraft, and human

bombs. Damaging attacks of this kind (with conventional explosives) have been experienced in the past year or so in Beirut, Colombo, Buenos Aires, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, London, and New York.

Greater Scope and Latitude for Intervention by Third Parties, and Growing Pressure for Use of Armed Forces

A major feature of the changed strategic landscape is the much greater scope and latitude for intervention, including under the legitimating auspices of the United Nations or regional organizations, and a concomitant and growing pressure for use of armed forces. This has been and is likely to be the case even as the governments of important powers, including Canada, aim to be more selective in deciding on whether and when to intervene (as in the very recent cases of Zaire and Albania). With the framework and constraints of the Cold War removed, it has become possible for the West, and the United States as the sole remaining superpower, to use force more readily in and against states than was possible or prudent during the Cold War. The comparison is striking if one considers the latitude enjoyed by the coalition during Desert Storm/the Gulf War,[19] in comparison with the need for the United States to calculate continually the likely responses of the USSR and China to actions against North Korea or North Vietnam.

The Role of New Technology. New technology makes intervention easier (though not necessarily easy), permitting a wider range of approaches and options, and lessening risk. Emerging Precision Guided Munitions (PGM) and Remotely-Piloted Vehicle (RPV) technologies, for example, expand opportunities to act by enabling more effective, better targeted, more discriminating use of firepower, lessening the exposure of personnel and systems to danger and lessening collateral damage. New information and communications technologies mean that military forces in the field can be much better informed, and more effectively employed and directed, than was possible even two years ago. In Bosnia, for example, the Intelink system provides 'real time' access, by means of commercial, light laptop computers, to text, voice, video, and imagery information from anywhere of relevance, to U.S. military, intelligence, and Foreign Service officers in remote locations in the field. Such new weapons technologies as Shortstop, a system developed to protect U.S. troops during the Gulf War, provides an electronic protection umbrella utilizing radio frequency (RF) energy to cause incoming mortar and artillery shells to detonate prematurely, before

reaching their targets. Miniaturized, field-deployable units are now in Bosnia, providing protection from an important source of danger.

Lessening exposure to risk and collateral damage is all the more salient a consideration in view of the role and presence of the media. Maintaining the domestic and political consensus for interventions is especially difficult in the case of military operations to restore or maintain stability abroad, to provide relief during conflict, or to protect human rights. There are emerging norms, rationale, and doctrines relating to such interventions — discussed below — but as yet no clearly established or accepted strategic framework, nor a consensus on national interest. In each of the principal democracies, the domestic constituency is fragmented, and marked by a variety of participants influencing and shaping foreign policy.[20] In situations and causes which are uncertain, there is less latitude to pursue controversial policies, to risk the lives of the country's men and women and to incur costs. Traditional Canadian peacekeeping has had relatively low cost in terms of lives, in fact. In more than 30 separate peacekeeping operations in which Canada has been engaged prior to the Bosnia and Somalia deployments, Canada suffered several hundred military casualties, including in the order of 90 dead, and inflicted very few as well. (Though one should take note of current reports that significant numbers of Canadian troops deployed in Bosnia-Herzegovina returned to Canada suffering from serious psychological disorders, some described as grave. This should be counted as a serious cost.)

Impact of the Media. Conflicts cause great suffering. Thirteen to 15 of the more than 50 ethnic conflicts now under way have caused more than 100,000 deaths each, a further 20 more than 10,000 deaths each, and 25 conflicts more than 100,000 refugees each.[21] Such conflicts and the distress they cause are now covered by media to a far greater extent[22] and with greater immediacy than was the case even five or 10 years ago. Confronted with such suffering, members of the media themselves, and political, church, and voluntary groups are able to arouse opinion in favour of action on the part of national governments and the international community. When it appears that the means to act to prevent further pain are available, in ready military transportation, relief, and medical services as well as combat capabilities, governments will find it politically and morally difficult to refuse to intervene.

This appears to be the case not only because of wider public awareness and greater operational feasibility, but also because of the evolution of norms. Broader notions of human rights, their ambit and application, have emerged.

And new principles of and for international security have been developing, and gaining adherence, especially since the end of the Cold War.

The Emergence of a Developing Set of New Principles of International Security

Like the ending of other great conflicts which wrought momentous change, the end of the Cold War has accelerated the elaboration of, or at least the search for, new principles for international security. The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 and the Westphalian system followed the Thirty Years' War of 1618–1648. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the Concert of Europe followed the French Revolution and the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars which had caused upheaval in Europe from 1789 to 1815. The Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations followed World War I; the San Francisco Treaty and the United Nations followed World War II. The Cold War did not end with the military defeat of one of the adversaries, at least not in the conventional sense, nor in a post-war peace conference and treaty. It ended, rather, with the collapse of the dynamic and the framework which had fueled and sustained it. Nevertheless, principles, based on concepts of security as a common interest and on human rights, in development during the Cold War (and which accelerated its demise), are being given serious attention and application in the orientations and practices of the governments and the military forces of democratic countries, and in international institutions, even if fitfully and uncertainly.

There is intellectual ferment, the debate is not always a coherent one, there is a certain untidiness, and disagreement about labels,[23] but the main themes are that security needs to be conceived and organized less, or less centrally, on the basis of states and territoriality (without neglecting the need to provide for deterrence and defence against threats to the integrity and interests of the state), and more on the basis of the security of individuals, societies, and indeed the planet — and on the idea, even if vague, of an international civil society,[24] with human rights at its core.

During World War I and in the post-war arrangements, human rights were practically conceived as applying to a small fraction of the population of the planet. The war had been fought 'to make the world safe for democracy', but not to make the world democratic. It was more than 10 years after the end of the war before women were deemed legally to be 'persons' in Canada.[25] Nazi Germany's Nuremberg Laws[26] were 16 years away.

The consequences of defining and, more important, applying human rights too narrowly were made painfully evident by the course of Fascism. Human rights have since increasingly come to be defined as in principle applying universally, though it took a considerable number of years after World War II before human rights in democracies came to be thought of as applying in concrete ways to the poor as well as to the middle class, and as applying to women in the economic as well as in the formal political sphere.

At the same time, security has been increasingly coming to be defined more broadly, from being centred on nations, to broader systems of like-minded states, and to the international system itself; and from nations, to individuals and communities; and from a focus on the military to broader dimensions of security.

These developments have been fed by a number of streams: those flowing from the dynamic of the Cold War conflict itself; from the creation of a community of successful and powerful democratic states; and from growing interdependence — the internationalization of political, economic, and social life.

During the Cold War, human rights and democratic values, and the lack of respect for rights in the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc, came increasingly to be stressed by the West. The theme of human rights figured prominently in the unfolding of the Helsinki process from 1975. The objective was to improve security and confidence in Europe. For the Soviet Union the centrepiece was recognition of the post-World War II borders in Europe and the political and security arrangements which related to them. For the West, gaining Soviet agreement to the principles of human rights and other humanitarian provisions was central. Indeed, the Helsinki process linked security and human rights directly. The provisions of the Final Act were organized into three 'baskets' — Basket One related to security arrangements in Europe; Basket Two, co-operation in economics, science and technology, and the environment; and Basket Three, co-operation in humanitarian and other fields. Human rights were in Basket One[27] as part of the security provisions, rather than in Basket Three.

The organization of the West — in the Atlantic Alliance, in the extended alliance of old and new democracies, including Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, among others, and in such bodies as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) — was meanwhile evolving into a community committed to managing trade, security, and other matters co-operatively. It was a community within which war had become unthinkable and the idea of employing armed forces for territorial acquisition quaint.

In the view of the author, defence in the industrialized democracies has come to mean less defence of national territory than defence of a shared civilization, values, and interests. There has developed a broad consciousness that crises and other important developments in some parts of this community affect markets and the business climate or the environment, in others. To a greater or lesser extent, interdependence has been commonly accepted. Ordinary people have much greater contact with people and developments elsewhere, directly, or through the media. Information about events in other countries, economic interdependence, and cultural interpenetration have grown together, measured by the growth of media, increase in travel, trade, imports, or international student exchanges and studies programs.

Government itself has changed. Public opinion in its various forms has greater weight as evidenced by the importance attached to polling by both governments and opposition. The locus of political action has become more diffuse, with responsibilities now encompassing not only national authorities but regional and local governments, associations and other groups, and international bodies. There is a greater expectation that governments must adhere to universal norms and be held to standards of behaviour with regard to human rights. Such expectations are widespread in democracies, but spreading elsewhere as well, for example, in the creation of the human rights watch groups and public demonstrations from China to Argentina. Charities, religious groups, and humanitarian organizations present on-the-ground help, in conjunction with media coverage, to create or reinforce pressure for action where domestic governments may be reluctant to assume the risks and burdens of intervention.

Expansion of the Concepts, Regime, and Applicability of Rights

Human rights have emerged as the organizing idiom of the political culture of the West, and indeed beyond, even though there remains a vast gap between the adumbration of rights and their application in practice. Human rights now apply, however imperfectly in many cases, to hundreds of millions in the former USSR and Eastern Europe, and to the millions formerly subjected to apartheid in South Africa. There has been an explosion, since the establishment of the United Nations but more particularly in recent years, in human rights law, international human rights standards-setting, international treaties and conferences, and the interpenetration of international and national systems. International instruments include such documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the Convention

on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention); the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Helsinki Accords; and various treaties against torture and racial discrimination, treaties defining, protecting, and advancing the rights of women, indigenous peoples, minorities, and children.[28]

There is also development in the field of international humanitarian law, and international law respecting human rights in situations of armed conflict.[29] A particularly important aspect of this development is the evolution of the concept of a right or even a duty to intervene in the domestic situations of sovereign states violating or unable to protect human rights of their residents.[30] The interest in avoiding recourse to war, to limit the occasions or pretexts for going to war, produced a long-standing strategic and legal tradition which emphasized respect for the sovereignty of states. The UN Charter in article 2(4) reads that "All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state...". Article 2(7) adds that "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state".

A new tradition is emerging, however, shaped by the Nuremberg war crimes judgements and the UN Declaration on Human Rights, by the experiences of the Cambodian and other genocides and horrors decades after the defeat of Nazi Germany; and by the Helsinki/CSCE process provisions affirming human rights the state could not abridge. The result, in conjunction with the factors discussed above, is a developing doctrine to the effect that while, in general, national sovereignty should be respected, such respect should not preclude intervention by third parties in such cases as the situation of the Kurds in Iraq or the Tutsis in Rwanda, or of mass starvation, as was the case in Somalia. A series of voices — the then Secretary-General of the United Nations in his *An Agenda for Peace*, and Bernard Kouchner, then France's humanitarian aid minister — came increasingly to be heard in support of *le devoir d'ingérence* in such situations, or to act to protect global stability, or to punish the perpetrators or supporters of terrorist crimes.

Since 1990 the Security Council has declared situations that constitute "a threat to international peace and security" 61 times, as compared to six times in the previous 45 years[31] — surely reflecting not a dramatically increased threat to peace but, rather, the various changes shaping the new era — the new freedom for the United Nations to act after the Cold War,

and the broadened concept of what is the business of the international community.

The actions taken since 1991 with respect to Iraqi Kurds, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia (and the establishment of the War Crimes Commission dealing with the former Yugoslavia, even if there has been near total failure to act against suspected and indeed indicted war criminals on the ground) owe a great deal to these dynamics. The post-Desert Storm intervention to help the Kurds in Northern Iraq, without the consent of Iraq, was clearly humanitarian in purpose — even though the express justification was based on Security Council Resolution 688 (1991) focused on "restoration of peace and security".

Security Council Resolution 794, passed December 3, 1992, represented only the third time the Security Council had authorized action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The other cases were the authorization of the military response to North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950, and the response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1991. It was also the first peace enforcement intervention under Chapter VII. Chapter VII resolutions authorizing forceful interventions were originally intended to confront armed aggression. In the case of Somalia, the Security Council authorized the use of force "on behalf of civilian populations". In Haiti, Chapter VII was used again (Security Council Resolution 940, 31 July 1994), to deal with a classically domestic situation but one which was now judged in terms of its involving suffering and violation grossly incompatible with international or universal norms.

Indifference to major human rights and humanitarian crises may be becoming less and less of an option, despite the inclination of national authorities to be both cautious and selective about engagement. The UN had a very difficult time in trying to find countries to contribute to the Rwanda mission (and again in Burundi),[32] but attention by global media — the era is marked almost as much by the rise of CNN as by the end of the Cold War — eventually overcame this disinclination to get involved, albeit not in a timely enough way. Bringing suffering home to audiences is particularly important in relation to bringing about intervention in conflicts in which inflicting pain and agony on the innocent is so often a direct aim of those making war.

The new strategic landscape, then, is one characterized by loosened constraints on conflict, the proliferation of sources of conflict and insecurity, and proliferation of the means of violence. At the same time, there is greater scope and latitude for intervention by third parties, and growing pressure for using armed forces in service of new and emerging principles

of international security, based to a significant extent on expansion of the concepts, regime, and applicability of rights. A central lesson of the experience of both Yugoslavia and Rwanda is that fundamental rights, even if internationally acknowledged, placed at the centre of the political stage, and supported by human rights activism, do need real protection. They are liable to be grossly violated in the absence of effective political bulwarks domestically and the availability and deployment of deterrent force. A close observer of the situation of human rights in Africa very recently observed in this regard that:

> The failings of human rights activism in Rwanda are profound. From the beginnings of political liberalization in 1990 until the unleashing of the genocide, Rwanda had an exemplary human-rights community. Seven indigenous human-rights NGOs collaborated closely with their foreign friends and patrons, providing unrivalled documentation of the ongoing massacres and assassinations. In January 1993, they invited an International Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights Violations, which named some of those responsible. They predicted massive atrocities unless named perpetrators were called to account. But there was no primary movement that could underpin the activists' agenda, no political establishment ready to listen to their critique and act on it, and no international organizations ready to take the measures and risks necessary to protect them.... On April 6, 1994, the Hutu extremists called the bluff of the human-rights community and launched their final solution.... The only mistake the extremists made was to lose the war with the Rwandese Patriotic Front.[33]

In the author's view, the period is one of transition, in which norms and values centred on universal rights hold sway at one level, while more traditional concepts and demands of *realpolitik* and national interest will often determine whether and how vulnerable populations will be offered protection in particular situations. The situation in Central Africa in December 1996 demonstrates the complexities and difficulties of taking action even when there is a decision to do something. The post-Cold War international order is not one in which Canada and other democratic states can dispense with the need to rely on traditional strategic planning and instruments, but it is one in which new factors, global concerns, and broadened conceptions of security and human rights play increasingly central roles, creating new demands for and on the armed forces of the democracies.

CHAPTER TWO

Responses to the New Conditions

EXPERIENCE IN EMPLOYING ARMED FORCES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ENVIRONMENT

The Allies' Reponse

The period since the end of the Cold War has witnessed a marked increase in the use of armed forces in multilateral peace operations. The armed forces of the NATO allies have been used in more circumstances and in more varied forms since the end of the Cold War than during it.[1] More peacekeeping operations were undertaken in the four years after 1989, indeed, between 1991 and the end of 1994 (21 new missions established) than in all of the previous history of the UN. The costs of UN peacekeeping doubled between 1992 and 1994, to some US$3.3 billion. In its first 40 years, the United Nations conducted 13 relatively small peace operations — with the 1960–1964 Congo operation as something of an exception. Appendix C to this study displays peacekeeping and peace operations since 1947, together with Canada's contribution.

Peace operations have become not only more numerous, more than doubling since 1988, but also different in character from traditional peacekeeping observation and classical intercession missions. They have become more demanding, more intense, and involving compellent force and intervention in local situations. Peace operations under United Nations (and other multilateral) auspices previously had involved, for the most part, "classical, consensual peacekeeping"[2] — operations conducted with the consent and co-operation of the parties, conducted by lightly armed forces authorized to use their weapons basically only in self-defence, stationed to act as buffers and monitors after the fighting, and governed by the imperatives of non-involvement in the dispute itself and strict impartiality between the conflicting parties. Former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali noted in 1995, in his *Supplement to An*

Agenda for Peace, that of the peace operations deployed before 1988, one in five related to intra-state conflict. Sixty-two percent of peace operations mounted since 1988 have concerned internal conflict, and 82 percent since 1992.[3]

The period is one of change and uncertainty — strategic, doctrinal, terminological. The very term 'peacekeeping' has been undergoing change[4] as peace operations increase in number, auspices, intensity, scope, complexity, character, and cost. United Nations peacekeeping and peace support operations in Cambodia between 1991 and 1993 involved some 22,000 military, police, and civilian personnel from 32 nations, cost over US$2 billion, and involved disarming warring parties, repatriating refugees, organizing elections, supervising ministries, and clearing mines. Operations in Somalia involved some 27,000 personnel from 23 countries. The current Operation Endeavor/IFOR deployment in Bosnia involves some 60,000 military personnel, and additional civilians.

Operations have come to involve preventive deployments and compellent interventions, the enforcement and maintenance of embargoes and sanctions against belligerent parties, the denial of air movements and maintenance of no-fly zones, the provision and protection of disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, the establishment and maintenance of zones in which populations are kept under international protection, the supervision of elections and operations of ministries, the supervision of mistrusted administrations, policing the police, protecting minorities, creating conditions conducive to political accommodation and national reconciliation, and political and social reconstruction. They have involved heavily and lightly armed forces, police, and civilians. Canadian engagement has included, other than our armed forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Elections Canada, the Red Cross, and a variety of non-government organizations (NGOs).

The period has featured interventions other than those under UN auspices, such as those conducted by the United States or under U.S. auspices in Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, Haiti, or Sierra Leone, with many of the same characteristics and features as those conducted under UN auspices.

No authoritative doctrine has emerged establishing the broad purposes of the armed forces of the democracies and guiding their deployment and use, along the lines of the doctrine of containment during the Cold War. That doctrine, "to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world", in the words of one of its principal architects, George Kennan,[5] provided a clear basis for military planning and for

elaborating roles and missions. The key, of course, was an enemy with dispositions and military capabilities needing to be countered. It is natural in the different conditions which obtain today that there should not be a tidy and elegant doctrine in place: the reality itself is disorderly, the challenges amorphous and varied.

There is, however, a central thread which runs through the policies and statements of Canadian and other NATO governments over the last few years, and which is colouring the development of military doctrine, organization, and practice. This thread involves the view that conflicts will erupt which will need to be contained; that some conflicts represent a moral challenge that cannot be ignored; and that in an interconnected world, conflicts have the potential to affect others, or to spread. It is in the interests of each of the democracies and of the community of democracies to promote and spread liberal (and market-oriented) democracy for humanitarian reasons, because democracies are more peaceable, and because it is in their national and collective interests to trade freely with the world. These themes are expressed in various ways in ministerial or other authoritative governmental statements, whether Canadian, American, British, French, or Australian. Thus Canada's 1994 Defence White Paper asserts that:

> However horrendous the impact for the local populations caught in the middle of civil wars, the absence today of adversarial relations among the world's great powers suggests that these conflicts are more likely to be contained. At the same time, Canada cannot escape the consequences of regional conflict, whether in the form of refugee flows, obstacles to trade, or damage to important principles such as the rule of law, respect for human rights and the peaceful settlement of conflicts. Even where Canada's interests are not directly engaged, the values of Canadian society lead Canadians to expect their government to respond when modern communication technologies make us real-time witnesses to violence, suffering and even genocide in many parts of the world. Thus, Canada continues to have an important stake in a peaceful and stable international system.[6]

National interests and strategic objectives are being operationally defined more broadly than ever, to include the fostering of democracy, securing human rights, relieving suffering, propping up collapsing states — to contribute to an international order from which we benefit by means of interventions defending stability, law, human rights, and humanitarian aims. The result has been a greatly expanded concept of, and need for, peace operations and pressures for the use of armed forces for a variety of new purposes. The core roles of the armed forces of Canada and the principal

NATO allies remain: to maintain the freedom and territorial integrity, and to contribute to the protection of the interests of their nations; to contribute to internal security; and to insure against external threats to themselves and allies. The armed forces of Canada and the principal NATO allies are now also charged with and are, or have been, engaged in:

- maintaining a capacity to intervene/participate in major regional contingencies;
- non-combatant evacuation operations;
- disaster relief;
- humanitarian assistance;
- peacekeeping;
- peace enforcement;
- counter-terrorism;
- counter-crime;
- counter-narcotics;
- refugee control;
- security assistance; and
- democracy and nation-building support.

Many of these additional roles are or have become traditional. At the same time, however, the world has become something of a laboratory for a new style of military (or, more correctly, civil–military) intervention, to deal with breaches of the peace, humanitarian challenges, nation-building, peacekeeping, and compellent peace enforcement — all tried in a less structured way in Somalia, and in a more developed form in Bosnia.

Peacekeeping as it was after the 1956 Suez crisis was a by-blow of Cold War operations, in terms both of its logic and the nature of the deployments. Military forces were deployed to freeze situations[7] — to keep apart allies in actual or potential conflict, to prevent conflicts from escalating into East–West confrontations, and to enable the process of political settlement to proceed. The forces engaged, typically to supervise cease-fires and the withdrawal of troops, symbolized the United Nations and the major powers behind it, their resources, and credibility. Peacekeeping was consensual and non-threatening. The activity was regarded by the armed forces of the major nations as an adjunct to their real duties, which were those of the warrior. Peacekeeping of this kind was also forgiving. As already mentioned, total casualties in more than 30 different commitments involving tens of thousands of Canadians over 45 years amounted to approximately 100 killed (many of which were accidents), including 10 in the former Yugoslavia.[8]

The focus of interventions since 1989 has been on operations involving the use of force, but in which the objective has not been to defeat an enemy or to (re)gain territory — the Gulf War/Desert Storm is the exception — nor to interpose forces between parties after the cessation of hostilities, in the manner of classic peacekeeping, like Cyprus or UNEF. The experience since the end of the Cold War has been of military operations to bring about conditions for the achievement of more complex and subtle political objectives. The military requirements have been more demanding, calling for larger numbers of more capable and flexible forces. Indeed, Somalia was a turning point in setting lessons and in establishing a framework and ways of thinking about the nature of intervention. The Somalia deployment developed from an operation to feed starving Somalis in December 1992 to an operation that included fights with hostile clans, the killing in an ambush of 24 Pakistani troops, U.S. pilots dragged through the streets of Mogadishu and the deaths of 18 U.S. Army Rangers in a firefight.

Somalia was followed by the helplessness of United Nations forces in Rwanda, with the genocide of Tutsis and the torture and murder of Belgian paratroopers deployed under UN command in Kigali. Belgian paratroopers were shown on television around the world tearing at their UN berets in anger and frustration as they were being evacuated, denied the ability to intervene or act to prevent the slaughter of desparate civilians who had turned to the Belgian troops for protection.

The most striking illustration, perhaps, of the dynamics and nature of the new demands for and on forces with the shift from peacekeeping to peace enforcement came with the situation in Bosnia in and following the spring and summer of 1995. Three hundred and fifty UN blue berets were taken hostage by the Bosnian Serb army on May 31st. In July, Dutch UN soldiers were shunted aside as Bosnian Serbs took the UN-designated 'safe areas' of Srebrenica and Zepa and proceeded to massacre several thousand Moslem soldiers and civilians. Croatian forces took the Krajina, including areas designated as being under UN protection.

These events and the incapacity of United Nations Protection Force[9] to fulfil its mandate, or indeed to provide for the protection of the protectors, led to the United States and NATO deciding on an intervention which would come to involve some 60,000 troops on the ground, one prepared to undertake robust and, in the event, decisive military action to bring an end to gross violations of human rights and deepening instability. The August 28th Bosnian Serb mortar attack on the area of the Sarajevo market which killed 37 people led to NATO bombing of Serb positions, engaging the process which led to

the Dayton Accords. As U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry put it in his analysis of why U.S. Forces were in Bosnia, delivered to the International Relations and National Security Committees of the House of Representatives on November 30, 1995, after signature of the Dayton Accords:

> The effort will define how security in Europe is going to be handled for decades to come. In effect, we will be defining what post-Cold War Europe is all about and how its security will be assured.[10]

The author believes that Secretary Perry's observation can be taken as an indication of the strategic directions being taken by the United States for its own part and in conjunction with the principal NATO allies, with regard to the orientation, policy, and military posture of the principal democracies for the post-Cold War environment in Europe and elsewhere. The common analysis is that regional or intra-state conflicts are likely to arise which will necessitate the intervention of third parties, and which will be beyond the capacity of the UN to manage. A significant set of military capabilities is being prepared, configured for intervention operations worldwide in peace, stability, and humanitarian relief operations. Large-scale, highly capable, and flexible forces are being organized, trained, and equipped for these purposes, forces which are to come under an effective and practiced command and control regime and which have been trained to work together. The Implementation Force (IFOR) is at its core an early model of such a force, the main elements of which the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany are building.

Until a few years ago, the United States did not involve its armed forces in peacekeeping/peace operations at all, other than for some special cases.[11] The subject and mission are now treated as important. Policy and doctrinal issues have been receiving serious attention. The United States Army barely dealt with the subject, until the June 1993 revision of the *US Army Field Manual for Operations*, FM 100-5, which introduced a new chapter on "Operations Other Than War" (OOTW, in Pentagon parlance). The chapter was expanded into two full manuals, one dealing with stability and support operations,[12] and another dedicated to peace operations.

FM 100-23, the *US Army Manual on Peace Operations*, issued in December 1994, begins by citing Gen George C. Marshall's observation that "we are now concerned with the peace of the entire world and the peace can only be maintained by the strong."

It reflects the view that potential threats and instability require military capability sufficiently powerful and versatile[13] "to execute national mili-

tary strategy across the full range of operations", now seen as encompassing *war*, and *operations other than war*. Peace operations — "a new and comprehensive term that covers a wide range of activities" is a central component of *operations other than war* and has to do with creating and sustaining the conditions necessary for peace to flourish. Peace operations include traditional peacekeeping as well as peace enforcement activities such as protecting humanitarian assistance, establishing order and stability, enforcing sanctions, guarantee and denial of movement, establishing protected zones, and forcible separation of belligerents.

According to the U.S. manual, peace operations comprise three types of activities:

1. ***Support to diplomacy*** including:

- peacemaking — diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlement to end disputes and resolve conflict. Military activities in support of peacemaking would include military-to-military relations and security assistance, exercises, and peacetime deployments;
- peace building — post-conflict (though not excluding pre-conflict) actions to strengthen or rebuild a society's infrastructure, institutions, economy, and confidence to help prevent a return to conflict. Military activities include participation in the restoration of civil authority, in the conduct of elections, the demobilization of fighters/belligerents, and in building/rebuilding infrastructure, facilities, and services; and
- preventive diplomacy — actions taken in advance of a developing crisis to prevent its deepening or to limit violence. Military activities may include preventive deployments, other shows of force, or higher levels of readiness, to deter belligerents, protect humanitarian relief, maintain services, or to help protect threatened minorities.

2. ***Peacekeeping***, consensual and strictly impartial (and generally under Chapter VI of the UN Charter), including:

- observation and monitoring of truces and cease-fires — involving:
  - supervision of cease-fire lines, borders, and zones, the execution of the provisions of agreements, and the exchange of prisoners, civilians, human remains, and territory;
  - investigation of complaints and violations;
  - reporting on investigations and more generally the degree to which the parties are complying with their commitments;

- negotiation and mediation; and
- liaison.

- supervision of truces — additionally involves provisions and capability for physical interposition of the supervisory forces between the disputing parties, and for operational supervision of the terms of the particular truce and matters related to it.

Stress is laid on impartiality, and on the functions of monitoring, investigation, and reporting, rather than on acting in the event of violations.

3. ***Peace Enforcement*** involves the application of military force, or the threat of its use, to maintain or restore peace, compel compliance with agreements and international resolutions, and/or to support broader efforts to resolve a conflict. It is characterized by lower levels of consent on the part of the disputing parties, and a more conditional approach to impartiality. Peace enforcement would normally be mandated under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Peace enforcement includes:
   - restoration and maintenance of order and stability;
   - protection of humanitarian assistance, including the establishment of base areas, the protection of routes/corridors for transport, and the security of delivery sites;
   - guarantee and denial of movement, whether overland, air, or sea movements;
   - enforcement of sanctions;
   - establishment, supervision, and defence of protected zones; and
   - forcible separation of belligerents, including the establishment of disengagement lines or demilitarized zones and, if necessary, reducing or eliminating the combat capability of one of the parties.

Humanitarian assistance is not included in the definition of peace operations, though it is expected that such assistance will frequently figure in peace operations.

There is a view that for soldiers to provide humanitarian relief risks confusion. A French peacekeeper, legionnaire, and paratrooper, LCol Bourgain, who served twice in Somalia, with the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit when it landed in December 1992, then at UNOSOM Headquarters, is quoted in an official French text on peacekeeping, intended for a wide international distribution:

We mustn't confuse our roles. We are first and foremost soldiers. We are not here to give humanitarian aid, but to facilitate it. If a soldier also does humanitarian work, he loses his credibility in the eyes of the adversary. His role is a dissuasive one. If a military presence is judged necessary, it is because one may need to set strength against violence. The last thing you want to do is distort its role and make it inoperative. That's why I prefer the expression 'soldier for peace' to that of 'soldier of peace.'[14]

This view notwithstanding, and whichever manual or section in which they are treated, humanitarian operations are regarded as an important mission of the armed forces of all the allies, operations for which they are trained and equipped, and for which they exercise and are deployed.

FM 100-23 makes a sharp distinction between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Though both are peace operations, and though one may think of peace operations as a continuum from operations characterized by high consent, relatively light forces, and a high degree of impartiality, to those characterized by low consent, robust forces, and a relatively low degree of impartiality, in the sense of non-involvement in the dispute, U.S. policy stresses that particular units ought not to operate along such a continuum. Generally,

[A] contingent that has been conducting operations under a PE (Peace Enforcement) mandate should not be used in a PK (Peacekeeping) role in that same mission area because the impartiality and consent divides have been crossed during the enforcement operation.[15]

The attention paid to peace operations — the care taken in the preparation of doctrine and field manuals, the centers for Low Intensity Operations and OOTW (Operations Other Than War) established, and the analytic resources dedicated to the subject — are not the only indications that the United States regards peace, humanitarian relief, and stability operations as important roles for the armed forces and for which they are likely to be needed and deployed. Airlift and other important equipment is being procured or planned with these missions in view, and specialized training is being developed (see below).

The United Kingdom, in the reorganization of its armed forces following the end of the Cold War, provides for two sorts of defence roles. Defence Role One (DR1) and Two (DR2), provide for the protection and security of the United Kingdom and its territories, and to insure against an external threat to the United Kingdom and its allies. Defence Role Three (DR3) contributes to the promotion of the UK's "wider security interests

through the maintenance of international peace and stability" and the promotion of the practices and institutions of liberal democracy.[16] The reorganization and doctrine reflect a distinction between wars of necessity, and wars of choice — expeditionary operations in support of international order, sometimes referred to as 'wider peacekeeping'. The emphasis is shifting and is expected to continue to shift to DR3 tasks.

A Joint Rapid Deployment Force (JRDF) became operational August 1, 1996, "to strengthen the United Kingdom's ability to project military forces quickly worldwide in support of our interests".[17] The JRDF is designed to be able to fulfil a wide range of combat or non-combat missions, whether mounted nationally or as part of a UK contribution to operations mounted by NATO, the Western European Union (WEU), or the United Nations. Its core will be three commando and five airborne brigades, complemented by rapidly deployable, mechanized aviation, and armoured battle groups when firepower and maneuvre are required — a significant force.

The United Kingdom's overall force structure is smaller than that maintained during the Cold War, but it is one that has been designed for, "and is better able to respond effectively to the demands of the changed security environment, especially in its emphasis on mobility, flexibility and rapid reaction".[18]

The evolution of British thinking is encapsulated in the development of a new doctrine for peace operations, and a new manual, entitled *Peace Support Operations*,[19] which is in the process of superceding *Wider Peacekeeping*. The new manual notes that while the subordination of military activities to diplomatic and political goals is hardly a new phenomenon for the army, given its imperial history[20] and experience in counter-insurgency and aid to civil authorities, it wasn't until 1969 that the army first produced guidance on the conduct of operations in support of the UN, in a short chapter in a publication on counter-revolutionary warfare. In 1988 the army produced Army Field Manual Volume V, Part 1, *Peace Keeping Operations*, "as a doctrinal response to the generally benign inter-state PK experiences of the Cold War".[21] Army Field Manual Volume V, Part 2, entitled *Wider Peacekeeping* was produced in 1995 "to address the greater challenges being more frequently posed by intra-state operations in Bosnia and the like". Wider peacekeeping was defined as "the wider aspects of peacekeeping carried out with the general consent of the belligerent parties but in an environment that may be highly volatile".[22]

The new manual is directed to "update current PK doctrine in the light of recent experience and to expand it to offer guidance for the conduct of PE".[23] The suggestion is that wider peacekeeping has become too limited:

"Wider Peacekeeping" suggests that PK techniques and force levels will suffice in a volatile environment; although a volatile environment would indicate, at best, only a partial commitment to any peace process. The ability of a military force, which is only configured for PK, to retain its freedom of action is dependent on the consent of the parties and their commitment to the peace process. Should that consent, or commitment be withdrawn the PK force will lose the ability to accomplish its tasks. Experience would suggest that in volatile circumstances of conflict, or potential conflict, the parties to the conflict are likely to perceive a reliance on consent as a weakness which they can use to their own advantage. This can result in the operation losing credibility, both with the parties to the conflict and the international community at large.[24]

Military activities in peace support operations — always, "without exception, part of a wider strategy in support of political goals" are now to be defined in terms of:

Peacekeeping (PK). Operations carried out with the general consent of the disputing parties, as part of a peace process agreed by these parties, and in support of efforts to promote security and confidence, in order to achieve a long-term peace settlement.

Peace Enforcement (PE). Coercive operations carried out to restore or maintain peace in situations of chaos, or between parties who may not all consent to intervention and who may be engaged in combat activities, in order to help create the conditions for diplomatic and humanitarian activities to support political goals.[25]

Stress is laid in the draft manual on the importance of understanding the conceptual approach to peace support operations, and the fundamentals and principles, for the successful conduct of such operations. Developing and fostering such understanding are central aims of the manual.

France is in the throes of a momentous and historic reshaping of its rationale and organization for defence, including the abolition of conscription and a move to a fully professional force, including a 55,000-60,000 army designed like the British to be highly mobile and to be able to work with coalition forces around the world. It is in significant measure with such considerations in mind that France reintegrated itself into the military structure of NATO. An integral part of the rationale is that defence, and the army particularly, no longer centres on the physical

protection of national territory (this is left to nuclear forces by way of deterrence), but now has to do in an important way with the defence of values and fostering democracy, stability, and peace abroad (and, to be sure, the defence and promotion of France's national interests). Reviewing the Bastille Day parade in Paris on July 14 (1996), French Defence Minister Charles Millon gave as the basic rationale for the restructuring of forces "the defence of international law abroad."

Germany, too, is reported to be considering reorganizing its forces to provide a mobile, highly trained, all-volunteer crisis reaction/intervention force some 50,000 strong designed to operate abroad in coalition operations along the same lines as (and in conjunction with) the French and the United Kingdom.

NATO, for its part, is reorganizing itself to be able to carry out military interventions in and beyond Europe — crisis management missions — by fielding fast-moving, highly trained and very adaptable elite forces quickly, at a distance from home bases. The Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) concept is being developed and implemented to provide deployable headquarters command and control of multinational and joint forces in contingency operations. The CJTF concept is also designed to provide the flexibility within NATO command structures to accommodate the forces of non-NATO nations in NATO operations. The IFOR deployment and the role of the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) Headquarters have been important elements in NATO's studies on implementing the CJTF concept. CJTF missions have not been specified, but are to be centred on supporting international law, democratic development and peace, and would include stopping wars in progress, and putting out fires.

Canada's Response

Canada has been a participant in virtually all the post-Cold War peace operations mounted by the UN, as well as in Desert Storm. In policy terms, parliamentary reviews and major statements of foreign and defence policy have all noted the changed international environment and the changing face of peacekeeping. The importance of the UN in Canada's conception of security is stressed, as is the need to reinforce and strengthen the UN.[26] Training for peacekeeping was given attention in the process of reviewing foreign policy, but largely in the context of providing training for UN peace operations, for international personnel, civilian and military, at the new government-sponsored Lester B. Pearson Peacekeeping Centre established in Cornwallis, Nova Scotia. The advance copy of Canadian Forces guidance

for commanders on the use of force[27] notes that the armed forces and the use of force are but one in a range of methods for advancing the objectives of national policy, and that the use of force will be conditioned by the collective objectives of alliance or coalitions. Stress is laid on the importance of rules of engagement (ROE), and of ensuring that individuals and units potentially involved in applying force have been trained, prior to deployment, in the interpretation and application of ROE.[28] However, there does not appear to have been development of a definitive government position on the use of force, other than in self-defence, for Canadian armed forces engaged in the newer forms of peace operations (or for Canadian participation in the development of the new U.S.-led and/or NATO-based intervention forces which would provide the foundations for the development of Canadian military doctrine and for the preparation of ROE themselves.

The Military Review (1/90) of the Canadian Forces' participation in peacekeeping operations carried out by DND's Chief of Review Services and which reported in April 1992 found that "There is no overall NDHQ policy instruction which covers peacekeeping operations."[29] The report and finding of the military review are treated in more detail below.

The Canadian army's new field manual for peacekeeping[30] was issued under the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff in September 1995, though a draft of the manual was in circulation in June 1992.[31] The manual refers to the continued use to be made of the International Peace Academy's *Peacekeeper's Handbook,*[32] issued in 1984: the Handbook should then have been an important source of guidance for the forces deployed to Somalia. What other framework or guidance applied or was issued, and specifically what rules of engagement obtained, would be important details to be investigated by the Commission of Inquiry. The new diversity of what is referred to as 'peace support operations' is acknowledged in the manual, which follows the UN schema of peacekeeping, preventive deployment, peacemaking, peace enforcement and post-conflict peacebuilding operations. However, the manual restricts itself to consensual, impartial peacekeeping, leaving open the matter and modalities of Canadian Forces' participation in coercive or compellent peacekeeping and operations under Chapter VII.

The manual's preface notes that:

> This manual is concerned with peacekeeping operations as conducted under **Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter.** Although this manual relates more specifically to Peacekeeping, Military Observer, Mission and Humanitarian Assistance operations, the techniques and

procedures elaborated hereto can also apply to military deployments and specialist assistance related to preventive diplomacy, Peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding missions as these operations will normally be governed by a Chapter Six U.N. mandate. As peace Enforcement is conducted under **Chapter Seven of the U.N. Charter** and has traditionally used combat operations, it will not be addressed in this manual.[33]

The manual also states that:

This manual is the main reference for peacekeeping operations conducted by the Canadian Army. At some future time a peacekeeping handbook will be developed to replace the International Peace Academy *Peacekeeper's Handbook*.[34]

The manual invites unflattering comparisons with the attention paid by Canada's principal allies to the nature and requirements of the new missions.

The UN Response

The new demands of peacekeeping have made particularly salient the importance of the UN, and its weaknesses. The dramatic increase in the number of UN peace operations, and the changes in the character of these operations have been noted. UN auspices have proven very important for the legitimacy of multinational interventions (the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia), and for sharing the burden of action or inaction, or for shifting the locus of responsibility (Rwanda).

The UN has worked to adapt the policy underpinnings of peacekeeping in the new environment. In the original January 1992 version of *An Agenda for Peace*, the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reviewed the changes under way in peacekeeping, and set out UN thinking on the subject in terms of four functions:

- *preventive diplomacy*, action to prevent disputes from arising, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit their spread when they occur;
- *peacemaking*, action to bring hostile parties to agreement, "essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter".
- *peacekeeping*, "a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace", is "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well"; and

- *peacebuilding*, "action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict".[35]

This categorization leaves out the use of force to pacify. In his March 1994 Report to the United Nations General Assembly, "Improving the Capacity of the UN for Peacekeeping", following the Somalia and Yugoslavia deployments, 'Peace Enforcement' was added to the list. In the January 1995 supplement to *An Agenda For Peace*, a somewhat different categorization was introduced, dividing peacekeeping into diplomatic and related activities focused on conflict prevention; peacekeeping; and peacebuilding. The issues of coercion in peacekeeping, and specifically the issue of peace enforcement, were left somewhat open, but unease was clearly expressed.

There is broad agreement that the ability of the United Nations to mount peace operations needs to be strengthened.[36] There have been a variety of proposals, including a significant Canadian initiative in late 1995,[37] to enable the UN to intervene more rapidly and more effectively than it is now able to, especially to contain an emerging crisis. The core issue is that of force, the role of the UN in literally "making war on war".[38] While it is possible to see peace operations as a continuum, there appears to be an inclination or judgement on the part of UN authorities to view and to treat peacekeeping and peace enforcement as very different categories and concepts.

The Secretary-General noted in his January 1995 Supplement to *An Agenda for Peace* that while the Charter empowers the United Nations,

> to take enforcement action against those responsible for threats to the peace, breaches of the peace or acts of aggression, neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present has the capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations for this purpose, except perhaps on a very limited scale. I believe that it is desirable in the long term that the United Nations develop such a capacity, but it would be folly to attempt to do so at the present time when the Organization is resource-starved and hard pressed to handle the less demanding peacemaking and peace-keeping responsibilities entrusted to it.[39]

The difficulty, however, has more to do with policy and principle in relation to using force in peace operations than with resource and management issues, important as these are. Hence the Secretary-General's expression of concern, in connection with the UN ban on military flights in Bosnia and Herzegovina airspace, about member states, authorized by the Security Council to ensure compliance with the ban, entrusting the task to

NATO. The concern relates to "the consequences of using force, other than for self-defence, in a peace-keeping context."[40]

The core of the UN conception is that impartiality is the oxygen of peacekeeping,[41] and this is the source of UN concern about the directions being taken in the peace operations of the recent past. Bosnia and Somalia proved to be very complex and troubling, with their mix of peacekeeping with coercion. A major political and operational difficulty for the UN was that Bosnia involved UN peacekeeping forces under 78 Security Council Resolutions and over 80 presidential statements of the Council to do a wide variety of things, mainly humanitarian, requiring the co-operation of the parties. At the same time, NATO and the international community, "in order to enforce a partial peace in an unresolved conflict"[42] threatened and carried out air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, a party without whose consent and co-operation the UN could not function. Peacekeeping is not conceived as the answer to aggression, or as the imposition of one's will on those who do not wish to keep the peace. The UN cannot impose peace, which requires military, financial, and political resources that the UN's member states are not willing to provide. The UN Secretariat in any event does not have the capacity to manage such resources and, again, does not expect that it would be provided with such resources in future.[43]

A fundamental aspect of peacekeeping in this UN view is alleviating the consequences of conflict — to protect and keep alive people who otherwise would have been harmed, major aims in Somalia and Bosnia. These aims, and achievements, would have been put at risk, in this UN view, if the UN operation had been associated with greater use of coercive force. Peacekeepers can work only if they have trust of both sides. If they are seen by one side as the enemy, "they become part of the problem".[44]

In this UN perspective, putting it rather sharply, there are two reference points and sets of logic: those of peace, with which peacekeeping and the requirement for consent, co-operation, and impartiality are associated, with all parties treated as partners in a common endeavour; and those of war, with which intervention, the identification of an opposition to be cowed or coerced, and more martial, less restricted rules of engagement (ROE) are associated. Peace enforcement is a form of making war without making the hard choices which war requires. It is "the military equivalent of having your cake and eating it too; of staying above the fray but entering it at moments and in areas of one's own choosing".[45] Peacekeeping is preventive, aimed at giving and leaving the local parties the space needed to get together to arrive at their own solutions.

Intervention, on the other hand, means applying force, taking and risking life, and getting involved in domestic conflict.

The response to the new conditions, then, has been one of uncertain adjustment to a 'best of times, worst of times' state of affairs — consolidation of an order of international peace and law in an expanding community of trading democracies, on the one hand; and, on the other, threatening chaos in regions of a world of ever-more-permeable borders vulnerable to population, health, and environmental pressures, economic and political dislocation, and conflict. The principal military powers in NATO and, though it is too early to say this with great certainty, NATO itself, have begun to adjust their military thinking, systems, and options to permit their armed forces to contribute — selectively, to be sure — to containing potentially dangerous conflict and protecting fundamental human rights by interventions which extend beyond traditional, limited, observation and intercession missions. At the same time, to choose to employ compellent force and to impose one's will on others' in situations other than war itself impose special requirements and choices. The next chapter addresses these burdens and choices.

CHAPTER THREE

Lessons (Being) Learned, and Issues for Policy

Military power is assuming different roles and values in the aftermath of the Cold War, shaped by the demands of the new environment and evolving in the approaches to the use of force.

While the core of the military function and profession remains the capability to conduct battles, and the principal democracies consider it prudent to retain significant levels of military capability, armed forces have always been called upon for a variety of contingencies other than national or collective defence. This is in large measure because armed forces are the one resource which is available, flexible, and equipped to prevent and counter violence and threats to peace, and to protect and rescue vulnerable populations. And yet deployment of armed forces in peace operations/interventions involving the use of compellent force is nearer to the core function of military forces (the pursuit of politics by other means, in the language of Clausewitz) than to their side-use as a conveniently available tool for non-military tasks, though the differences are important. Consideration of the changed international context and of the potential for disorder and conflict, and the experience of Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia, suggest that armed forces and soldiers will be needed for a variety of peace operations and humanitarian missions for which the capability to conduct battles will not be sufficient on its own.

The following sets out some of the principal lessons learned, or which are being learned or reinforced, from the pressures and experiences of recent years.

- Peace operations are demanding. They can no longer be planned for and handled as a by-blow of conventional combat operations. The objectives to be achieved are more subtle, complex, and require close civil–military co-ordination;[1]

- Legitimacy is a necessary condition for successfully engaging in peace operations, especially in view of the role and presence of the media and public expectations;
- Selection and training of personnel for peace operations must be regarded as important for conventional military operations, and perhaps more important; and
- Peace operations involve their own set of functional requirements — cultural, structural, operational, command, and relational.

PEACE OPERATIONS WILL OFTEN ENTAIL INVOLVEMENT IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER SOCIETIES

Peace operations of the new kind will often, perhaps characteristically, involve intervention in the internal political affairs of countries, interventions which may themselves become a source of conflict needing to be controlled and managed. Actions in support of stability in the former Yugoslavia, feeding the hungry in Somalia, maintaining regional deterrence and stability in the Persian Gulf, and combating transnational (narco-)crime in Panama all involved such involvement.

One of the principal lessons of Somalia, and one being applied in the NATO intervention in Bosnia, was that getting involved means becoming a party to and in a conflict with many dimensions. Participation may, perhaps generally will, require integrated political, economic, and military responses in a multifaceted effort, extending from providing and protecting humanitarian assistance and food to building indigenous societal capacities (ideally without mirroring the conventions and institutions of the intervenors). Studies of the UN and multinational intervention in Somalia[2] stress the distance travelled from classic, consensual peacekeeping, centred on non-involvement in the internal political affairs of the disputing parties. The studies emphasize:

- the impact on internal Somali political, social, and economic affairs of the relief effort and the military presence associated with it;
- the close links and relationships between civil and military goals; and
- the need for well-trained, well-commanded and effective military forces, linked to civil affairs expertise and which work with broader developmental efforts.

Indeed, it was the central judgement arrived at by Walter Clarke, the Deputy Chief Mission of the United States Embassy in Somalia during

Operation Restore Hope, that military intervention, including humanitarian intervention, is not apolitical. The act of intervention thrusts one deeply into local politics, and it is an illusion to think "that one can intervene in a country beset by widespread civil violence without affecting domestic politics and without including a nation-building component".[3] The view that it would be possible to restrict the impact of one's activity to the alleviation of suffering was at the heart of a major misjudgement, in Clarke's view: the United States should have but did not try to disarm belligerents who fully expected that the Americans would disarm them. That, and the U.S. indication that it would be getting out in short order gave the militia leaders clear incentive to maintain their positions, interests, and styles of behaviour, in the view of Clarke and Herbst.

Clarke and Herbst emphasize that the intervention to protect the distribution of food relief to the starving in Somalia was in fact an intervention in Somali politics and in the Somali economic system — that 'The Mogadishu line' (the need to maintain neutrality) was crossed as soon as troops were sent in",[4] and that "It is not the case that the United States intervened adroitly in a limited humanitarian mission only to have the United Nations bungle because it chose to do nation-building."[5] While RAND and some other studies[6] attach a large measure of the blame for the difficulties in Somalia to unrealistic expansion of the mission — 'mission creep' — by an over-ambitious UN, following the hand-off to the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II),[7] these studies also observe the dynamic of deepening U.S. involvement. While the U.S. commitment in Somalia began as a strictly humanitarian assistance operation, with food drops from Kenya, Operation Provide Relief became Operation Restore Hope when military force came to be used, first to get food supplies through, and then to respond to the actions of recalcitrant and adaptive Somali adversaries.

Clarke and Herbst stress that it is in the nature of interventions such as in Somalia, interventions in failed or failing states, that outside action to protect the distribution of food relief, thought of and presented as a humanitarian effort, could be nothing so anodyne. One ought not to think of the effort to feed the starving as in any way like providing humanitarian assistance in response to a natural disaster: the famine was the result of politics, of the degeneration and collapse of economy, society, and the political system. Imported relief was prized plunder, and the currency of power. Plundered food was used by militia leaders to buy loyalty and weapons. Intervention to overcome such plunder was intervention in Somali politics. Because the intervention did not go far enough, did not

disarm the Somali belligerents, the intervention came to be opposed by arms, with the development of the poisoned environment and violent incidents including those which are the subject of the Commission of Inquiry.

A broad lesson made salient by the Somali experience, then, is that intervention affects the balance in societies in conflict. Indeed, affecting the balance will either be a central aim or result in dealing with the problem of failing or fragmenting states, when for one reason or another tolerating disorder and suffering is not an option. The traditional, highly restrictive rules of engagement (ROE) characteristic of classical peacekeeping, forbidding intervention in local-on-local violence do not apply. Failure to disarm and effectively constrain belligerents amounts to favouring the best armed, and may make it impossible to defuse the conflict. Solutions are unlikely to emerge from short-term, surgical intervention by traditional military forces. Humanitarian work, itself, will often need to be protected by force.

What is needed to promote long-term reconciliation will often be at odds with the exigencies of coping in the short term by strategies of avoidance. In Somalia, action with the longer term in mind would have meant 'empowering' the unarmed. It would also have meant planning of a different kind, and better, co-ordinated intelligence. The short-term perspective suggested reaching working arrangements with and accommodating the armed, warring factions. In Bosnia, the longer term means getting involved in such difficult but central matters as bringing to justice those charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity, for example; the short term, with avoiding conflict with and accommodating parties whose co-operation or non-belligerence is needed.

LEGITIMACY IS CENTRAL

Legitimacy is a necessary condition for successfully engaging in and conducting peace operations, especially in view of the role and presence of the media.

Legitimacy derives from a variety of sources. These include the perceived motivation for intervention as well as its nature and scope; the auspices of the intervention; and, most crucial, the qualities and *modus operandi* of the intervention forces, military and civil.

Legitimacy is important for the success of interventions in terms of the local situation, again, because intervention, including humanitarian intervention, is not apolitical. Intervening (as distinct from more limited peacekeeping) thrusts one deeply into local politics.

Legitimacy has an important international and domestic dimension, as well. With the exception of cases engaging important national interests of a particular country or countries, operations to be undertaken need to be accepted internationally as having been mounted in defence of universal values, and to reflect the interests of a broad coalition. It may be a somewhat cynical observation, but such consideration might have influenced the U.S.-led force deployed to Somalia in December 1992 to designate itself UNITAF (United Task Force), which gives the impression of being a UN force. While authorized by a Security Council Resolution (under Chapter VII, only the third such authorization in the history of the UN), the Unified Task Force was U.S. led, organized, and commanded rather than a United Nations force.

Legitimacy is also an important factor in domestic terms. Broad public support is essential if a country's prestige and resources are to be committed and its soldiers placed in harm's way. Goals, which need to be consistent with societal norms and objectives, must be clear, and communicated. The requirements of legitimacy make more salient the need to avoid inflicting (and suffering) avoidable casualties, brutality, and damage.

ARMED FORCES NEED TO BE SPECIFICALLY PREPARED, ORGANIZED, AND STAFFED FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

A further, related lesson drawn[8] is that it is centrally important to ensure that armed forces are properly and appropriately prepared and organized for peace operations, and that the selection and training of personnel for peace operations be regarded as important as selection and training for conventional military operations, and perhaps more important.

The measure of success of military performance in peace operations is not numbers killed, weapons destroyed, territory captured.[9] Success in peace operations has to do with assisting in the attainment of the political and humanitarian objectives of the exercise, protecting people, their human rights, and the rule of law, and retaining legitimacy. Peace operations are not well served by soldiers trained and oriented to think solely in terms of fighting the enemy, and who are not well prepared to handle the stress of situations of having to be both ready to act, and restrained, in ambiguous situations where the enemy is not clearly defined. (Though, to be sure, thousands of well-trained, disciplined combat troops have passed this test, though often not without serious psychological consequences to themselves.) This is not to say that training and preparation for peace operations replace that required for combat operations. It is, generally

speaking, additional to, and not a substitute for, training and other preparation for combat roles.[10]

In the view of these analysts, the experience of peace operations of recent years indicates their effectiveness requires the deployment of a range of military capabilities, including elite combat forces, trained, oriented, and well briefed for the particular requirements of peace operations. The approach in place to deal with situations calling for the use of armed forces in peacekeeping operations was to deploy lightly armed forces under restrictive rules of engagement, though different operations did in fact require different mixes. Where force might be required in stability operations, the approach, especially on the part of the United States during and following the Colin Powell–Caspar Weinberger era was to 'hit the ground with overwhelming forces', and to avoid committing military forces where this could not be done. A range of capabilities and skills, tailored to situations, rather than either a highly constrained presence on the one hand, or overwhelming force on the other, is now judged to be vital for successful peace operations.

The judgement is that these operations increasingly require skills and capabilities more likely to be provided by forces which are agile, quick, mobile, and highly flexible. Reshaped U.S., British, and French military doctrine and orientations reflect this emerging requirement for forces built to operate in the gray area between combat and peacekeeping — that of support for peace operations, including peace enforcement. The combat mission is focused on the destruction of an enemy. The OOTW/peace enforcement mission, while in some applications and respects like the combat mission,[11] is distinguished by the following:

- rules of engagement (ROE) which are more restrictive than those of war, but less restrictive than those associated with classic peacekeeping;
- the primacy of political objectives and political constraints;
- the need to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, to provide water, power, medical care, and sanitation to the population while in the middle of military operations; and
- above all to assist in establishing conditions for the achievement of the primary political and social objectives.

These operations are proving to be very demanding. The environment is not well defined, as it tends to be in war or traditional peacekeeping. It is difficult to know who is to be judged the belligerent, and to appreciate the link between specific operations and the overall mission requirement. The

strategic objective is not victory and termination, but to induce restraint and to cow the warring parties, to enable conciliation, resolution and settlement. It is essential for soldiers to work with and to complement diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, social, and psychological efforts. Peace operations are also media events. Soldiers, officers in particular, must understand the local and strategic context and their operational environment, including the area's history, economy, and culture, to help avoid incidents which can erode legitimacy and consent, important dimensions of 'peace' missions.

The requirements therefore are judged to be for forces with a high degree of combat capability, training, and motivation, combined with judiciousness in when and how to use force, and to deploy such forces from the beginning of an operation. (This is all the more important in view of the fact that the need for speed of deployment can often outweigh thoroughness of preparation for specific operations.) The experience of operations — paraphrasing Dag Hammerskjöld — is that peace operations may not be a job for warriors, but only trained warriors can carry it out. Peace operations call for soldiers, especially officers, with skills in warfighting, but sensitized to the political dimension, and to the complex interaction between the two. They need to be able to make the transition to full-scale military action when required, and to apply compellent force with discipline — to get adversaries to comply, while remaining inclined to prevent loss of life and damage and to remain focused on the restoration of peace and civil society.

Restraint under provocation is an imperative, the *sine qua non* of peace operations, and an acquired skill. The challenge for military authorities is to form and deploy professional, capable forces which are subject to strict discipline, but applied in such a way as not to blunt personal initiative, an essential ingredient in the small-unit formations characteristic of peace operations and in situations when casualties or other operational conditions may require individuals or small groups of soldiers to perform without hierarchical supervision. Indeed, privates may need to be able to negotiate.

Essential to such soldierly professionalism and control of the necessary martial qualities are non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and officers of high calibre.

THE VALIDITY OF 'LESSER CASE INCLUDED' CAN NO LONGER BE ASSUMED

The military review of peacekeeping conducted by DND's Chief of Review Services noted, with regard to the period up to 1992 at least, the "popular view of NDHQ and Command staffs that general military training is sufficient for personnel preparing for peacekeeping operations".[12] Whether the traditional rubric of 'lesser-case included' remains applicable or not — the idea that forces trained for high-intensity combat will be capable of lesser tasks, including those involved in peace operations — depends on the nature of training for combat. Conventional martial training is no longer by itself an adequate basis for forces to be committed to peace operations. U.S. soldiers committed to Bosnia have been rotated in training through radically different situations involving different ROE — situational training against opposition, including firefights and rescuing other soldiers, and then, protecting the perimeter of a landing area in the face of mixed crowds of civilians and militiamen. The aim has been to deploy soldiers trained and disciplined enough to deal with high-intensity conflict, and also, on the same day if necessary, to use the minimum force needed to take control of other situations. The goal is that members of the armed forces, officers in particular, be trained and able to give effect to national policy at the unit level and to be aware that any encounter could be on the evening television news or the front page of the next day's newspapers.

Peace operations place a premium on sensitivity to, and knowledge of, the local context, including appreciation of the local culture. One of the lessons to be drawn (and drawn by the various analysts referred to earlier) from the experiences in Somalia and Bosnia is that it is very important for units to be properly prepared, to know not only their purpose in broad terms, but the conditions in which they will have to accomplish them. In any event, proper briefing of troops should be the normal procedure before any kind of significant military mission. In contrast, in her report for the Commission,[13] sociologist Donna Winslow records the observations of members of the Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR) that watching CNN did not prepare them or commanders for the situation they faced in Somalia, suggesting that they were not properly briefed before departure. She records that they believed they would be welcomed as liberators by populations terrorized by warlords, as providers of security, authority, legitimacy. These expectations made being greeted by rocks, insults, and stealing particularly outrageous to them, and as Professor Winslow records, the Somalis to be seen as ungrateful, as not playing by the rules.[14]

Other qualifications or requirements noted in connection with the selection and training of personnel for peace operations have to do with the importance of aptitudes and skills relating to negotiating, public information, and the maintenance of close civil–military co-ordination. The importance of negotiating skills and techniques for the success of peace operations has been noted for many years. BGen Clayton Beattie, for example, commander of Canada's peacekeeping contingent in Cyprus during the Cyprus War period in 1974, and Director General of Policy Planning in National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) in the early 1980s, argued in those years for specialized training for peacekeepers, in considerable measure to develop and instil in soldiers and officers oriented to classic Cold War military tasks the habits and techniques of negotiation, and cultural sensitivity.[15] These skills become even more important in the context of peace operations which involve intervention in intramural conflicts which have necessitated external intervention because of their destructiveness and in which fighting and violence continue. It does not appear that Canada's military authorities made such adaptations through the period which includes the Somalia deployment. (Though, again, constructive work was done in the area of Belet Huen with local co-operation.)

Effective public information and relations with the media are fundamental, to limit misunderstanding in and of volatile situations when there is high potential for misunderstanding, and to retain legitimacy. Virtually all the studies of the employment of armed forces in peace operations devote attention to the importance of public information.

The importance and demands of close military–civil co-ordination are similarly noted in United States military doctrine, and in analyses both of the new conditions of peace operations and of the experience of Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. One of the central lessons both senior U.S. officials in Mogadishu — Ambassador Oakley and Deputy Chief of Mission Clarke — draw from the experience in Somalia is that a high degree of planning and operational effort and capability needs to be dedicated to effecting such tight co-ordination.[16] Clarke regards this as an essential condition for deploying forces in future peace operations: "[A]ny force — from one country or a group of countries — must have units trained in executing complex political-military operations".[17]

As noted above, Clarke and Herbst attributed a measure of the blame for U.S. failure in Somalia to the inadequacy of the resources deployed in support of military–civil co-ordination by U.S. military authorities. Clarke notes that because U.S. military authorities were unwilling to plan for a longer-term engagement, only 36 civil-affairs specialists were available in

Somalia, as compared with over 1,000 deployed in Kuwait after the Iraqis were expelled, and a larger number now in Bosnia. Canada fielded nine in Somalia, including double-hatted officers, though the effort was ad hoc; the need for and importance of civil–military co-ordination appear not to have been taken into account in planning and arrangements for the mission, according to Dan Loomis's review of the record on this issue.[18]

The *Wall Street Journal* recently[19] focused on the role in Bosnia of U.S. military civil affairs experts. The 353rd Civil Affairs Command, a Bronx, New York army reserve unit deployed in Bosnia and tasked with co-ordinating IFOR's mission with international civil reconstruction efforts, includes corporate and public sector managers, transportation and municipal experts, engineers, professors of finance and economics, brokers, and bankers. The unit's operations officer is Citicorp's relationship manager for Scandinavia, Finland, and the Benelux countries. The task of the unit, all of whose members have military experience, is "to help bond Bosnia together economically, physically, and politically." The unit works with the Sarajevo tram system, utilities, the agencies overseeing elections, the World Bank, and so on. The unit's work is described as being "as essential to peace as bazookas and bullets", given the centrality of non-military goals to success.

The close co-ordination between the civil and military sides of operations, essential for effectiveness, safety, and legitimacy in the new forms of intervention, has implications for the nature, demands, and requirements of soldiering; for the nature, scope, and style of national preparation for participation in multinational peace operations; and for leadership, management, and oversight of the military.

MANDATES AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)

Mandates

Analyses of peace operations in the new conditions and of the experience of the past few years underline the central importance of rules of engagement (ROE).

Perhaps the main observation with regard to mandates is that it is crucial to be clear about these. It is natural that with the focus of much of the analysis of Somalia operations on the nature and role of the UN mandate, and the attachment of blame for mission shortcomings to an over-ambitious UN agenda, a lesson commonly drawn should be that clear UN mandates are critical to mission planning.[20] However, another lesson to be

drawn from the experience of Somalia, and other interventions, is that mandates change, and need to be amenable to change. They change as conditions change in theatre and in the international environment, and as a result of experience, including the experience of engagement itself. These realities should point to the importance of planning, over plans.[21]

Again, Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst take basic issue with the view that the intervention of the outside world in Somalia developed as it did because the nature of the mission was changed dramatically in June 1993, after the U.S. turned over control to the United Nations. That view, again, was that the mission had been one of humanitarian relief, providing for the supply and protection of basic needs. The UN then transformed this into something different and far more complex and, in the event, unachievable. The mission was widened to aim at recasting Somali society and its institutions, goals beyond the UN's grasp.

Clarke and Herbst state that on the contrary:

> [A]ll the Security Council resolutions on Somalia, including the "nation-building" resolution, were written by U.S. officials, mainly in the Pentagon, and handed to the United Nations as fait accompli. Only after October 1993 did the United States try to wash its hands of an operation that it had started and almost entirely directed. As one international civil servant said, the United Nations was "seduced and abandoned" by the United States,...[22] "left high and dry to pursue sharply limited aspects of the nation-building program designed by the U.S. government 15 months earlier.[23]

Nor did American problems in Somalia have to do with operating under UN command, according to Clarke. The U.S. Rangers killed were outside the UN command structure, and were commanded by a U.S. Special Forces officer (MGen William Garrison) "who reported directly to U.S. Central Command at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida;"[24] the searches for General Aideed which led to the fatal clash "were all approved by senior American authorities in Washington".[25] Admiral Jonathan Howe, designated the Secretary-General's Special Representative to Somalia, and who had been deputy national security adviser in the Bush administration, was very much in charge. The U.S. aim was to get out quickly, and they handed the problems flowing from their intervention to a UN ill-equipped to handle them.

The lessons to be learned, then, must extend beyond asserting the importance of clearly defined mandates, important as clarity surely is. They encompass also the need to be aware of the dynamics of the interplay

of interests — those of the great powers, of the various parties in coalitions, and one's own, and how these interests and perspectives may be affected by events and context. This suggests, in turn, the importance of both policy and intelligence, of understanding the interests and vulnerabilities in play, including one's own, and the approaches and means, including also robust and independent communications, to protect or advance both the mission's and national objectives.

Rules of Engagement (ROE)

Military units require and operate under rules of engagement, written orders defining conditions for use of force. Rules of engagement are a "part of the political process by which armed forces are subordinate to the political will",[26] and a principal means by which national command authorities authorize competent commanders to act.

One of the central lessons is that ROE are especially vital in peace operations. The determination of ROE is a command decision, with its locus properly at the political level. ROE are a matter of life and death, and are critical in determining the success or failure of peace operations and the national role in them.

ROE, though a matter of "operations and command, not law",[27] are a central means of asserting the imperative of complying with and of ensuring compliance with both international and domestic law. Properly drafted ROE reflect law, operations, diplomacy, and policy. Indeed, an important aspect of ROE is that they "cannot be drafted, reviewed, or implemented without a rational analytical structure behind their formulation"[28] — encompassing, again, political considerations, national policy objectives, operational imperatives, and legal considerations.

The central purposes of ROE[29] are:

- to ensure that national policy is communicated to and will be followed by forces governed by them, in war and in peacetime operation
- to ensure that operations are conducted in accordance with international and national law;
- to ensure that operations are conducted in accordance with mission planning and strategic goals; and
- to clarify for units the nature of their mission, and to guide subordinate commanders in use of their forces.

Drafting and issuing ROE in the context of coalition operations also involves defining and agreeing on common objectives, strategy, and command arrangements.

ROE are political as well as military documents, serving a two-way function. ROE are issued to ensure that military operations advance, serve, and are consistent with policy objectives, forcing commanders and soldiers to focus on whether the particular military operation envisaged is too risky or violent, or threatens too much collateral damage. At the same time, ROE exist also to provide clear guidelines to commanders and troops, asserting and emphasizing that their role as military professionals is to carry out orders, not to make policy.[30]

To be effective, ROE have to be consistent, mutually reinforcing, and clear, as well as realistic, in the light of situation in the theatre of operations. The effectiveness of ROE depends on the extent to which they can be readily absorbed and applied, permitting military forces to know what they are expected to do, and can do in action, especially in conditions when the need to act under pressure will preclude analysis, debate, and consultation of policy and documents. Beyond this, to be effective, ROE must be understood as consistent with and integral to the missions and purpose of the peace operation and with military realities and necessities.

In the view of the author, the latter point is of central importance. It is a point which bears centrally on some of the core issues before the Commission of Inquiry. This study has stressed the changed nature and demands of the new kinds of peace operations, as different from both traditional 'blue helmet' peacekeeping, and from war. Paraphrasing Rudyard Kipling, single men in barracks don't grow into plaster saints. Experience teaches that one of the protections against misbehaviour by soldiers is high morale, which reduces the likelihood of their misconduct and increases the chances that officers will be able to control them. High morale depends, in part,[31] on having a military doctrine that fits and is seen to fit the situations soldiers face, a doctrine which is the foundation for training soldiers for the conditions in which they will operate and for the situations they will confront. Training soldiers for one set of conditions and responses, and then putting them without adequate preparation into different conditions requiring different responses risks making them confused and upset. Soldiers who are confused and upset, and at the same time heavily armed, are likelier to misbehave when stressed or given encouragement or incentive to misbehave.

Which ROE governed the activities of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG) deployed to Somalia, and when and how they were

issued, modified, distributed, and applied, were one of the important areas of detailed inquiry during hearings and examination of evidence on the part of the Commission. It seems clear that authoritative ROE relating to the Somalia deployment were not disseminated by Canadian authorities before the deployment of the CARBG, nor were these forces trained in relation to a set of ROE.[32] This state of affairs appears to reflect a broader set of conditions relating to Canadian Forces policy, planning, doctrine, training, operations, and command and control, including ROE for peace operations — to reflect how the Canadian Forces thought of and prepared for peace operations.

In his near-300 page April 1992 Final Report of his Military Review (MR1/90) of the Canadian Forces participation in peacekeeping operations[33] — reporting some eight months before the mounting of Operation Deliverance — DND's Chief of Review Services found major deficiencies in the areas of policy, planning, and command and control. With respect to policy and National Defence Headquarters' (NDHQ) instructions governing peacekeeping operations, it was found that:

> There is no overall NDHQ policy instruction which covers peacekeeping operations. There are, however, a number of instructions dedicated to specific areas of peacekeeping. Generally speaking, these instructions are outdated and uncoordinated. While many members of the staff felt that peacekeeping operations should not be treated differently than other operations, there remains the requirement for consistency, continuity and recorded procedures for the guidance of the staff. Without such policy documents there is the danger of crossed lines of communication and missing of critical details during the planning, execution and sustainment process....[34]

> The situation within each of the Commands is a reflection of the lack of policy, definitive guidance and consultation from NDHQ. There are few, if any, specific policy guidance documents at Command level which deal solely with peacekeeping operations.[35]

Policy documents are described as "isolated...outdated, uncoordinated or incomplete".[36]

In relation to the Chief of the Defence Staff's (CDS's) guidance to commanders — the Red Book, the CDS's "personal and primary operational direction to the Canadian Forces"[37] — the report observes that:

> The absence of formal documentation and subordinate direction to NDHQ staff is a violation of the criteria of "providing clear direction". There are no established lines of communication, areas of responsibility, divisions of labour or accountability. In spite of hav-

ing been involved in peacekeeping operations for several decades, there are no SOPs [Standing Operating Procedures], guidelines, or recorded procedures for the planning of peacekeeping operations.[38]

In reviewing doctrinal publications, the Chief of Review Services report notes that the staff of the Directorate of Peacekeeping Operations (D Pk O) use the *Peacekeeper's Handbook* produced by the International Peace Academy, but were nevertheless:

unable to state with any degree of certainty the official status of this manual as an accepted Canadian doctrine manual despite the fact that the manual has been assigned a National Defence Index of Documentation (NDID) number and includes on the cover page, "This document has been adopted by the CF and is issued on the authority of the CDS".[39]

The report identifies two national doctrinal publications on peacekeeping operations, 303(5) *Peacekeeping Operations: The Military Observers Handbook*, and 303(6), *Peacekeeping Operations: A Guide to the Production of SOPs for UN Military Observer Missions*, and observes that these:

have not been updated since their original publication in 1972. The doctrinal staff of CLDO [Chief Land Doctrine and Operations] stated that there was no assigned priority to revise these manuals because all peacekeeping training is based on general military training. The peacekeeping doctrine in these manuals is not consistent with the doctrine in the *Peacekeeper's Handbook*.[40]

With regard to policy on the rules of engagement or the use of force during the course of peacekeeping, the report's findings were that "No formal statement on the 'Use of Force' in peacekeeping operations has been developed or officially accepted by Canada for use within Canadian Contingents."[41]

With respect to training for peacekeeping, it was noted that:

There are no published guidelines or standards for training in preparation for peacekeeping operations.... It is a popular view of NDHQ and Command staffs that general military training is sufficient for personnel preparing for peacekeeping operations. Experience has shown that there is a requirement for specialist training is such areas as Military Observer methods, supply, finance and reorientation training for the soldier who is to be deployed in the Cyprus type situation. There is also the need for a thorough orientation training program for officers which deals with their specific mission and mandate. These training requirements should be recorded and published in the form of training guidance and standards.[42]

The report goes on to state that planning for peacekeeping operations, based on an ad hoc joint staff model, had the disadvantage of not involving all key staff members from the outset, and of not keeping commands informed of the details of operations. The arrangements for command and control of formed peacekeeping contingents are described as lacking clarity and as fragmented and inconsistent.[43]

What comes through clearly is the sense that policy, planning, and training for peacekeeping/peace operations were not regarded as priorities, potential problem areas, or needs.[44] Peacekeeping had emerged in the context of the need to manage regional conflicts which might directly or indirectly threaten what was considered to be a precarious East–West balance. Operations were conducted by forces prepared for high-intensity conflict, whose real job was considered to be elsewhere. Peacekeeping missions were seen and handled as a by-blow of Cold War operations, raising principally administrative and financial issues.[45]

In his 1994 study of Canada and peacekeeping, Joseph Jockel similarly observed that:

> During the cold war, peacekeeping for the Canadian Armed Forces was little more than a side-line to — if not at times an outright distraction from — their principal combat-related tasks. The UN's ad hoc approach to dealing with each and every peacekeeping operation was matched by the Canadian approach. The Canadian military developed very little special peacekeeping training and, until recently, almost no peacekeeping doctrine. No special peacekeeping units or formations were ever established. At National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa, each new peacekeeping responsibility was handled as just another overseas contingency operation.[46]

For their part, the board of inquiry into the activities of the CARBG and NDHQ's Somalia Working Group both noted problems and inconsistencies in relations to ROE, and not only in connection with the application of ROE. In his report as Head of the Somalia Working Group, Gen Boyle notes, *inter alia*, that,

> According to the testimony, the six pages of ROE legal definitions were considered to be of little value to commanders and soldiers in the field and yet, the COMD CJFS [Commander Canadian Joint Forces Somalia] never took it upon himself to seek legal advice or clarification from the ROE issuing authority in NDHQ.[47]

The brief for the Commission by DND on the use of force and the rules of engagement records that Canada's Land Force Command, although

using the term ROE throughout the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, "did not develop a standing ROE system or architecture".[48] Ad hoc ROE were employed on a variety of domestic and international missions, which proved inadequate, especially for combined or joint operations. Development of a joint ROE architecture was started after the 1991 Gulf War. This same brief indicates that doctrines and procedures concerning the use of force were published in 1994 (in B-GG-005-004/AF-000 Joint Doctrine for CF Joint and Combined Operations, approved for CF operations in June 1994, and B-GG-005-004/AF-005, Use of Force in CF, Joint and Combined Operations, approved by the Joint Doctrine Board in November 1994 and which "is expected to be approved by Armed Forces Council and the Chief of Defence Staff in June 1995"[49])

The Canadian Forces appears to take a technical approach to ROE, which, while sufficient, perhaps, doesn't capture their nature and dimensions. ROE are described as "Directions issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations within which armed force may be applied to achieve military objectives in furtherance of national policy".[50] Policy decisions deal with what, where, when, and why force will be used; operations orders deal with how, when, and where force will be implemented; ROE confine themselves to when force is allowable or authorized, and to what extent it is to be used.[51]

In any event, the DND briefing notes that Operation Deliverance was planned and mounted "while the Canadian ROE system was under development",[52] and that, in addition, a number of complications and difficulties were encountered:[53]

- Land Force Command did not have an ROE system or doctrine that could meet the complex legal and operational requirements of an operation of this nature nor was there a joint ROE system in existence;
- Key documents and higher direction were not available to the team drafting the ROE. The documents considered central, and missing, included:
  - the legal basis for the mission, described as "ambiguous". It was not a traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping mission, nor was the coalition at war even though the use of force was authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter;
  - an approved mission statement and mandate; and
  - a statement of Canadian political objectives.

As well, the brief includes as complicating factors that,

- "accurate and specific threat and risk assessment could not be forecasted"; and
- (the absence of the) "force commander's concept of operations".

The brief then concludes that "because of the above complications, unavailable documentation and the compressed timetable for deploying the joint force, it was not possible to provide the ROE to the deploying units during their work-ups and pre-deployment training."[54] It is not made clear when and how ROE were actually issued.

What does emerge from the brief, however, is recognition that issuing and applying ROE involve serious questions of national policy and judgements. The brief deals cryptically with the crucial problem of how the Canadian Forces is to function when operating in circumstances when international ROE obtain, noting that where there is disagreement about ROE, the CDS may consider supplementing UN ROE with Canadian ROE for Canadian personnel;[55] restricting Canadian personnel from complying with designated ROE; or withdrawing the Canadian contingent from the mission.[56]

The issues involved are important ones.[57] A number of the major powers are in fact reluctant to commit military forces to operations governed by UN ROE, which continue to relate more to classic peacekeeping than to the new mode of peace operations. In his 1993 study, *Whither UN Peacekeeping?*, Mats Berdal noted the tendency in current operations for individual contingents to interpret UN ROE in accordance with "national military experience" and appreciations, "with a consequent divergence of practice among individual battalions".[58]

OPERATIONAL MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

The new peace operations place a premium on 'jointness'. Staffs need to be organized for and focused on 'jointness' in mission execution (Allard, Haass, Taw and Peters, Oakley and Bentley, etc). Interoperability is necessary when facing organized opposition, as was the case in Somalia and in Bosnia. Interoperability is seen as problematical under classic UN arrangements. Creating an effective integrated force from a number of national forces featuring varying states of readiness, equipment, and training, and not used to working together, is a difficult challenge.

It was noted earlier in this report that there is something of a consensus, among the principal allies (though the extent to which Canada would

share in it is not clear at this point) that though the UN has an important and central role to play in actions to maintain peace, order, and good government in the international system, especially in the legitimation of such actions, the UN is not set up to deal with the operational military requirements involved in a serious way, lacking the infrastructure and funding, the structures, and the capacities to get to places quickly enough with the right forces. A central point made in connection with Desert Storm and with NATO's intervention in Bosnia is that management of the high-intensity and complex multinational operations involved or potentially involved in peace operations requires sophisticated and practiced command and control and co-ordination mechanisms and procedures. Hence the measures being taken in NATO and among the principal allies to adapt the existing common operating procedures and command and control systems and capabilities, along with their logistics, infrastructure, and forces, for peace operations and humanitarian relief interventions.

The 'jointness' imperative includes also the capacity and training to appreciate the importance of, and to conduct, joint planning and co-ordinated civilian–military operations, informed by understanding that the military is not the 'sharp end', but that humanitarian relief organizations and other rebuilding, development agencies are.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SMALL-UNIT OPERATIONS

Just as success in peacekeeping operations depends on the capacity and training of personnel deployed in peace operations missions to appreciate the importance of and to conduct joint planning and co-ordinated civilian–military operations, it depends also on small-unit tactical competence, and the capacity to take decisions at lower levels. This underlines the importance of ensuring the appropriateness of personnel and training for peace operations, and of properly prepared, disseminated, and understood ROE. The fluidity of situations will often mean that responses to local situations by a small unit can bear on the prospects for success and the legitimacy of the larger intervention, whether in terms of the operation itself, or the support for it at home.

LEADERSHIP

Leadership is of permanent importance, and it is not surprising that it should be so considered in the case of peace operations. The experience of the operations of the past few years, in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former

Yugoslavia, and reflections on the new demands, suggest however that military leaders bear and must exercise responsibilities additional to the familiar duties involved in maintaining forces organized, equipped, and trained for battle, and, perhaps, to be rated against new standards. Nordics, on the one hand, and Americans, on the other, may differ in the relative emphasis placed on the requirements of peace operations. It is broadly acknowledged however that leadership will need to be expanded to take into account the changing settings, roles, and functions of armed forces, and societal expectations of the military, set into sharper relief by the expanded role of peace operations.[59]

Effective leadership — including the very important junior leadership at the platoon and section level — has never been limited to classic technical operational competence. The lesson of the experience of peace operations and analysis of the conditions which give rise to the need for them is that appreciation for the requirements of legitimacy and respect for law and human rights are increasingly integral to what military competence consists of, in democracies at least. Appreciation for the requirements of legitimacy and respect for human rights and the laws of war are matters of education, order, and discipline. It is a significant responsibility of military leadership to make this so, and for which military leaders are to be accountable when such respect is lacking.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Home Front

CHANGING GOVERNMENTAL AND SOCIETAL EXPECTATIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES

Max Weber's classic definition of the state as that human community "which (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory" makes salient the centrality of the military function, but in the context of legitimacy.[1] John Keegan makes a similar observation in *The Mask of Command*, drawn from the perspective of an overview of warfare and command:

> ...remote though the battlefield is from the marketplace and the court of law, its pre-existence, or the potentiality of recourse to it, underlie all assumptions citizens make about the order of things as they find them. Force, blind themselves to its sanctions as the right-thinking may, provides the ultimate constraint by which all settled societies protect themselves against the enemies of order, within and without; those with the knowledge and will to use it must necessarily stand close to or at the very centre of any society's power structure; contrarily, power holders who lack such will and knowledge will find themselves driven from it.[2]

Like Weber, or indeed Hobbes, Keegan emphasizes not force and power as such, but the framework and ethos shaping how force and power are harnessed and given meaning, focusing on the means by which they are marshalled and utilized and the processes by which they are invested with political values.

The relationship between the military and society has been an important subject from antiquity, from conceptions in which command and government were subsumed within each other,[3] to the creation of a distinct military class more or less successfully isolated from political power (generally less), in Rome and elsewhere, in a variety of forms. The nature of the relationship was a great issue in the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, as part

of the conflict between liberty and authority in Europe. As the historian of strategy Michael Howard points out,[4] the nature of the relationship, and debate about it, was a matter of constitutional conceptions and the strategic context, with very different traditions prevailing in Britain (and transmitted to Canada and the United States, which similarly enjoyed the luxury, in strategic terms, of being protected by barriers of sea and space) than on the European continent. For continental states with experience of the Thirty Years' War, standing armies were imperative. An enduring political issue was therefore that of how to ensure that armed forces which were needed to provide external security would not stand in the way of the development of liberties domestically.

The British, and specifically the House of Commons, with the country protected by the sea and the Royal Navy's command of it, could and did adopt a quite different tradition and approach from that of Europeans with regard to land forces, one which de-emphasized them, especially in peacetime.[5] The French Revolutionaries in their turn adopted yet a different approach, transforming the armed forces from instruments of the Crown to 'the nation in arms'. It has been some time, in the Western democracies, since the issue of civil–military relations has had to do with the struggle for power and concern about military engagement in politics. That this is so is not just a matter of the mentality of military leaders. It is a matter of legitimacy, political and economic change, and societal evolution. Military issues are not the very salient ones, nor is military power the basis or source of civil authority. Social and economic conditions are highly unfavourable to military engagement in politics, even from the perspective of military interests.

This is not to say that the issue and stakes ceased to be important, or difficult. Clemenceau was forced to observe, during World War I, that war was too dangerous a matter to be left to the generals. The advent of the nuclear era, too, has given the issue new forms, demanding a very high degree of political management and control of national and international security affairs, and of the political, economic, and technological and, for that matter, ideological dimensions of maintaining armed forces in democracies.

Nevertheless, the tendency has been to continue to think of civil–military relations in terms of defining and managing a relationship and set of institutions which combine political safety, on the one hand, and a prudent degree of military effectiveness, on the other. The issues germane to contemporary democracies have had to do, on one level, with determining the proper boundaries of military influence in the determination of resource allocation and other governmental decisions bearing on the inter-

ests of the military as an institution. They have had to do, on another level, with the relationship between military organization and the broader social structure, with how political and civilian authority on the one hand, and military authority on the other, interact with and relate to each other — with matters of command and control, accountability, and oversight. It is not a purpose of this study to review all the variety of approaches, academic or professional, to the different dimensions of the subject. The focus here is on what the author believes are the salient issues and factors which are coming to shape discussion of how the armed forces of Canada and, to a certain extent, of democracies generally, are to be organized and controlled, as a result of changes in the strategic context in conjunction with changed societal norms and changed or changing concepts of the role and value of the military.

In terms of the interests and values of democracy, thinking about the military has traditionally been a matter of ensuring that the military is controlled by political authority, of limiting the potential danger to democracy of military power, organization, ethos, and imperatives, of protecting democracy and democratic ideals from corrosion or undue influence. A favourite metaphor is that of the military as society's watchdog. The importance of the leash is stressed. Notions attached to the image are that the watchdog's instincts, teeth, and discipline need to be kept strong: inviting the watchdog into the house risks coming to treat it as a pet and leaving it confused, and perhaps something of a danger as well.

Indeed, one of the familiar debates about civil–military relations in modern democracies has been that of the extent to which, to meet the twin requirements of political safety and military effectiveness, the military should be compartmentalized, insulated from political influence, as a professional, inward-looking force. Formal processes of law and regulation would provide for its control.[6] Others[7] have argued for a higher degree of integration of the military into the social fabric. A relatively high degree of integration seems to the author both inevitable and desirable, considering both changes in societal patterns and the ever-increasing role played by advanced technology in military affairs.

Adaptation of warfare and military organization to the information age[8] can only advance this process, without necessarily erasing the difference between a soldier and an armed civilian. Marines, legionnaires, and members of other such elite combat formations, especially when living full-time in barracks, may remain exceptions to the rule, maintaining elements of a more traditional military ethos, but in their case too there is need to adapt to the requirements of war and conflict in the (at least early) 21st century, including the need for

high levels of technical sophistication and the need to work within a framework of close civil–military co-ordination (see discussion below).

It might be said that the establishment and career of the Commission of Inquiry itself, and the nature of the response to its work, offer additional support to the view that changes in the strategic context in conjunction with changed societal norms have led to or are leading to changing concepts of the role and value of the military, and that the relationship between the military and democracy may need to be considered in a new light. The issue is put in sharper focus with the increased salience of democratic values in the emerging rationale of the military, as a result of the combination (discussed in earlier chapters) of:

- the disappearance of the protracted and present external threat the armed forces had been organized to cope with since 1939 (which is not the same as the disappearance of the threat of war and coercion);
- the development of an international community of Western industrialized democracies whose members offer no military threat to each other and which is based on an order of joint management of peaceful competition;
- the emergence of a consensus, however chaotically and imperfectly expressed, on a set of concepts extending the scope of security and linking it with democratic values and human rights;
- the acceptance on the part of the principal democracies, however reluctantly, that they will need to act to contain conflicts in other countries, where suffering and violation of rights present a moral challenge that cannot be ignored, and/or where there is the potential to affect others or to spread; and
- the internal evolution of Canadian society, and that of the other Western democracies.

MILITARY CULTURE AND THE MILITARY FUNCTION IN A NEW LIGHT

The essence of the military function and of the profession of arms has been, and can be expected to continue to be, the capability to fight in battle, the capacity to employ "force not to create right but to uphold it; force to assure order, to cow rebellion at home and to subdue enemies abroad".[9]

What needs to change are the elements and characteristics required to achieve this — and, also very important, the other objectives which come to be associated with the military function and the military profession.

The new requirements of peace operations involve the armed forces, the land forces particularly, less in monitoring and observing roles, and more in actions asserting, protecting, and fostering basic rights, and democratic norms and values. The World Wars and the Cold War were fought by and on behalf of a community of increasingly like-minded nations protecting and asserting norms and values. The commitment to peace operations on the part of a coalition of the democracies (including of course Canada) puts a premium on the democratic character[10] or representativeness of armed forces, because the public, whose support the government and the armed forces require, expects this of forces deployed to provide humanitarian relief and to protect human rights, and because officers and soldiers must themselves be conscious of these values, and experience them, if they are to be expected to be effective in protecting and fostering them abroad.

The commitment to peace operations may be regarded as in itself an aspect, expression, and extension of democratic values (as well as of strategic and political rationales), and it is logical (even if not in the strictest sense absolutely necessary) that the forces prepared and trained for and employed in peace operations would see themselves as deployed to support democratic (and humane) values and that their own roles and behaviour should exemplify, advertise, and foster such values.

To the extent that peace operations become part of the rationale for the military, notably of ground forces, cognizance needs to be taken of what is required by way of orientation, doctrine, training, command, and operations. The armed forces of the Western democracies, moreover, function not only as a watchdog, but also as the embodiment and expression of democratic society. In fact, armed forces have long stood as symbols for and of their societies. It is the changing connotations of the symbol that is significant.

The military profession, while characterized by the need to meet the test of battle and by the contract of "unlimited liability"[11] which the soldier enters into, is one that has changed along with other social institutions, though, perhaps, more slowly, and at one remove.[12] The rise of nationalism and democracy in the late 18th and 19th centuries led to the concept of the 'nation in arms' and an army of conscript citizens. The military profession and military institutions have been transformed, in our own time, by the reliance for basic security on nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence; the centrality of technology, hardware, and systems; and the much reduced reliance on land forces for territorial defence (or for colonial rule). Much has been written about the focus on management and systems in the modern military, and an important degree of convergence of military

and non-military organization.[13] The term 'manned weapon' is often more appropriate than the traditional 'armed man';[14] the term 'officer' traditionally denoted a leader of men — and he or she must continue to be one — but many would now be managers trained for and focused on overseeing the design, production, financing, and deployment of systems.

In the democracies, paradoxically enough, it may be the requirements of the new peace operations that call for more attention to be paid to traditional functions of military leadership and individual and unit combat motivation. It is when lives, and basic values, are at stake that attention is focused on leadership, rather than on management, which is not to say that effective management does not often also demand leadership. What forces attention to be paid to leadership is having to act in the face of danger, and moral challenges. In his comprehensive study of combat motivation,[15] Anthony Kellett stressed the importance of morale, and for morale, of the integration and bonding of soldiers into a cohesive primary group, closely linked, in turn, to such military units as the regiment. Kellett's finding was that "unit esprit enlarges and canalizes primary-group bonds",[16] noting at the same time that there is a danger that the unit esprit and cohesiveness so important for fostering combat motivation may be antithetical to the goals of the broader institution. Appropriate doctrine, as observed above, and leadership are crucial in this regard. Kellett observes that "It is through the officer (the formal leader) that group goals and standards are brought into line with those of the army."[17]

Cohesive primary groups contribute to the effectiveness of the broader organization only when the standards the groups enforce and the objectives they promote are closely linked, and are seen to be linked, with what is taught, adumbrated, and required by formal authority. The regimental system was in some measure evolved to achieve just this.[18]

What soldiers will fight for and how they will behave in stressful and combat situations are subjects of obvious importance. Kellett, writing in the late 1970s and early 1980s, catalogued complaints about the insufficient emphasis on morale, motivation, and the requirements of and responses to the combat environment, in officer training, staff colleges, and defence establishments.[19] Morale, motivation, and discipline are multidimensional. Individual, organizational, and social factors need to be understood in conjunction with situational ones. While many factors contribute to discipline and combat motivation, Kellett's analysis is that the central factor advancing preparedness to engage in combat, willingness to fight and to remain in the firing line, has been the soldier's institutionalized role:

> The best single predictor of combat behaviour is the simple fact of institutionalized role: knowing that a man is a soldier rather than a civilian. The soldier role is a vehicle for getting a man into the position in which he has to fight or take the institutionally sanctioned consequences.[20]

The military remains different, even when the societal and strategic contexts have changed. To a certain extent one may regard the military as a classic 'distinct society.'[21] There is continued need for investment in forms of military identity, and for powerful unit cohesion. However, the formal, sustained differentiation between military and civilian worlds which may have been possible in other times and places, when the broader societal pattern was one of conformity and compliance, deference, authority, and obedience, and sustained by isolation of military establishments and closed community environments, cannot serve as the basis for a military ethos in modern conditions. In relation to the subjects of this study — the evolving strategic context; the changed conceptions of defence as having to do with the common defence of a broader community and its way of life, interests, and values, rather than with one's own territory; and the evolution of Canadian and broader society — a central management issue for both government and the armed forces becomes that of ensuring that armed forces reflect the norms and values of democratic society while retaining their effectiveness as armed forces.

One specific aspect of this continuing challenge is determining the style in which and the degree to which it is necessary to socialize the soldier in a military society separate from civil society, to strip the recruit of his or her individuality, to make him or her a team player able to respond and perform under stress. John Keegan observed, in concluding *A History of Warfare*, that:

> Politics must continue; war cannot. That is not to say that the role of the warrior is over. The world community needs, more than it has ever done, skillful and disciplined warriors who are ready to put themselves at the service of its authority. Such warriors must properly be seen as the protectors of civilization, not its enemies.[22]

The greater part which democratic values play in establishing the roles and missions of armed forces makes it natural that these values — the values of one's society, and values in relation to the mission — play an important role in ensuring compliance with discipline and command. Again, the involvement of armed forces in peace operations in support of human rights and law and in which the maintenance of legitimacy is

important places a premium on the democratic character and commitment of forces without diminishing the imperative of military virtues. Soldiers must themselves be conscious of these values, and experience them, if they are to be expected to protect and foster them abroad. Also implied is a concept of discipline as something other than machine-like obedience. The conditions of peace operations and small-unit operations, in fact, place a premium on responsible independent judgement.

Values, reflected and expressed in doctrine and reinforced by leadership, legitimate orders and purposes. The importance of appropriate doctrine, reflecting imperatives, but also values and heritage, and of positive command and control, and of leadership which is informed, caring, and determined, was stressed in this writer's discussions with former senior officers of DND and the Canadian Forces, including a number of Deputy Ministers of National Defence and Chiefs of the Defence Staff (see Annex B of this study). They were all inclined to conclude that there now needs to be serious reform of the armed forces and of Canada's approach to management of the defence function.

CHANGE IN CANADIAN SOCIETY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE ARMED FORCES

Public and governmental expectations of the military have evolved with change in the strategic arena, in Canada's defence and international orientation, and with societal change. Canada has experienced fundamental change since the formative major engagements of the Canadian Forces in World War II and Korea.

The changes in Canada's demographic make-up have been momentous. World War II and its aftermath transformed Canada into an industrialized and urbanized country. The pace of demographic change has since accelerated, giving Canada a marked multi-ethnic, multi-racial and multi-religious character. A 'White Dominion' 50 years ago, Canada is now considered to be one of the most pluralist countries in the world.[23] The Toronto area is home to nearly 400,000 residents who were born in Italy or whose parents were born there. Thirty-nine percent of the population of Toronto have been immigrants at one point in their lives. Of the 25 percent of the Canadian population in 1961 whose origins were neither British nor French, only three percent represented visible minorities. By 1991, 45 percent of Canadians reported at least one origin other than British or French, and approximately 10 percent were defined as members of visible minorities. The proportion is now closer to 20 percent in the

major cities. Of 200,000 new residents in Canada in 1990, 70 percent were considered to be visible minorities. Visible minorities are projected to make up 19.4 percent of the population of Ontario in 2006, by which time British-origin persons for the first time will no longer make up the majority of the Ontario population.[24]

There has been momentous change, as well, in the realm of values. Canada has evolved from a society characterized by 'Peace, Order, and Good Government' and a certain deference to authority, a feature of Canadian life which distinguished it from the American, to one marked by a growing emphasis on democratic, individual, and community rights.[25] Watershed political and legal expressions of these fundamental changes include post-Quiet Revolution instruments in Quebec — the Quebec Charter of Rights and Freedoms; federal Official Languages policy, and the *Official Languages Act*; federal multiculturalism policy, and the *Multiculturalism Act*; the *Canadian Human Rights Act*; and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982.

Also undergoing change during the period has been Canadians' perspective on strategic and defence matters. Canada emerged from World War II as the world's fourth military power, and played a significant role in the establishment of the North Atlantic Alliance. The Cold War and the reliance on the central nuclear balance had the effect of marginalizing the military contribution of the smaller military powers, including Canada's. Canada's emphasis in international political and security affairs came to be on mediation and the promotion of peace and development, an orientation and emphasis given impetus by the Nobel Prize awarded Lester Pearson in 1957, and by federal policies aiming to develop Canada's interests and image in the world as a dynamic, independent society, distinct from the United States. Contribution to collective defence in Europe was to a degree de-emphasized after 1969, particularly in favour of accenting the achievement of international social and economic developmental goals. For both government and public, Canada's international mission and defence personality came to be thought of as connected to peacekeeping.[26]

Peacekeeping during the Cold War era, however, was not seen by the Canadian Forces as a priority or mission with its own demanding aptitudes, preparation, and requirements, or as entailing change in the orientation of the military, mainly land forces. As discussed at various points above, peacekeeping, while a source of national pride, was treated as a by-blow of Cold War readiness and preparations for combat operations.[27]

PERSPECTIVES ON THE SOMALIA EVENTS

The Somalia events may be viewed from a variety of perspectives, yielding different sorts of insights and suggesting particular kinds of remedies. One may view the events in Somalia as the culmination of:

- orientations and practices which set elements of the army in the opposite direction from that required by governmental policy, public expectations of the forces, and the requirements of their mission;
- the ineffectiveness of a military command system overwhelmed by the demands of adapting to a variety of social, economic, regulatory, and legal changes, along with strategic change; and
- the lack of interest in and serious attention given to military affairs by the political authorities responsible for guidance and democratic control of the military.

The Army Problem

The Canadian Airborne Regiment (CAR): The army for some time had been promoting what it considered to be a military ethos and military values. It espoused toughness, 'attitude'. This was taken to extremes by rogue elements, which in turn were not properly controlled by commanders who considered and condoned rogue behaviour as initiative and audacity, failing to grasp that the role model being espoused was not a relevant one, and in fact inappropriate — in the event, disastrously inappropriate. This may be understood as the result of the isolation enjoyed or experienced by some units of the army, permitting them to create a separate society with its own intense and inappropriate ethos and identity.[28]

The board of inquiry into the CARBG noted disciplinary problems prior to and during the deployment, but found that:

> The overall state of discipline within the Battle Group during training and operations in Somalia, with the exception of those disciplinary cases currently under investigation and the number of accidental discharges, was seen by the Board as being very good, especially considering the very demanding circumstances under which the soldiers had to operate.[29]

In his assessment of the situation for the Chief of the Defence Staff, the Deputy Minister, and the Minister, MGen Boyle as Head of the Somalia Working Group was more negative. His report characterized 2 Com-

mando as having serious "systemic" disciplinary problems.[30] He noted the absence of control by non-commissioned officers (NCOs), including hesitancy to interfere in the beating of Shidane Arone, and observed "that the 'informal' leadership within 2 Cdo is so powerful as to intimidate the rightful and legitimate chain of authority within the unit".[31] In her socio-cultural study for the Commission, Professor Donna Winslow describes and treats 2 Commando's identity as "aggressive wild warriors".[32] General Boyle considered that the structure of the CAR "inherently breeds a clan mentality which may be prejudicial to cohesive command".[33]

The evidence presented to the Commission and the research undertaken by the Commission and others[34] testify to the eagerness on the part of the Regiment to deploy and to be tested, especially after the cancellation of previously anticipated deployments. Eliteness and readiness were defined by aggressiveness and combat skills. General Boyle's October 7, 1993 assessment reports the case of an officer proclaiming to the media that he was well trained for counter-insurgency operations and "can kill a man with his bare hands in less than 3 seconds".[35] One of the important issues for the Commission was that of precisely determining the nature, extent, and adequacy of the understanding of peace operations and preparation for Somalia and the requirements of the mission on the part of the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (CARBG).

General Boyle's assessment noted that the level of frustration felt by members of the CARBG increased significantly during the months of January and February 1993, noting more generally "the systematic and progressive erosion in the values and attitudes of the members of the CARBG vis-a-vis Somalis and the mission, culminating in major breakdowns.[36] This erosion was characterized as "the by-product of serious lapses in leadership".[37] The environment and conditions in Somalia were physically and psychologically difficult and, it appears, especially so for 2 Commando.[38] Professor Donna Winslow[39] and David Bercuson[40] both record that soldiers thought of themselves as coming to help feed the starving, only to find themselves at risk, the targets of attack, hostility, and banditry, and under stress because of the political, social, and physical environment.

The Forces Problem

The management, leadership, structure, and culture of the Canadian Forces can also be seen as having contributed to making the events in Somalia possible. The leadership has not found it easy to come to grips with running a military force in a new age. Operational commanders often

think of the provisions of the Charter and of other legislation protecting human rights as having made traditional discipline and loyalty a thing of the past.[41] Part of the blame for indiscipline, and indeed the display of racist or other objectionable insignia in barracks is attributed to the restrictions on NCO access to soldiers' quarters, having to respect their privacy and property rights. Officers, senior officers in particular, have been preoccupied by downsizing, re-engineering, and overtasking, and the need to respond to a variety of requirements arising from the Charter of Rights and from other federal legislation.

Morale was affected by what was seen to be the declining state and status of the Canadian Forces. There was the view, held in the army particularly, that the government's emphasis on peacekeeping and Canada's participation in virtually every peacekeeping mission undertaken since the end of World War II has distorted the raison d'être for a Canadian military and the capabilities it should maintain.[42]

There is the view, strongly held and advanced by a variety of current and past members of the Canadian Forces, that a main problem has been that of "civilianisation" of the leadership of the armed forces. A 1982 study found that "a significant number of members of the armed forces [had] come to believe that the Canadian forces [had] adopted civilian norms and standards to an unacceptable degree and that civilian (sic) public servants exercise undue influence over matters that are (or should be) exclusively military in nature".[43]

There have been resentment and frustration over what a number judge to be the negative legacy of the integration of the previously distinct headquarters of the Canadian Forces and of the Department of National Defence,[44] a legacy which is seen to consist in senior officers who no longer relate to the serving men and women. They in turn, no longer see themselves or their perspectives reflected in or represented by their senior officers, now engaged in armed forces-wide affairs rather than those of their own service and men and women. The problems arising from unification and particularly military–civil integration were seen to have been exacerbated by a variety of important changes and by continuing budgetary stresses during the 1980s. From this point of view:

> "Doing more with less", if it is possible at all, requires obvious leadership, but soldiers and junior officers seemed saddled with notional leadership. Senior officers did not demonstrate that they understood the pressures placed on units and rarely took a stand before their political masters. Officers appeared to have abandoned the primary military ethic of "loyalty downwards" in their zeal to portray their "can-do" loyalty upwards to politicians.[45]

As regards soldiers and junior officers, "...no-one valued their contribution, understood their needs, or represented their points of view.[46]

There tends to be associated with this perspective also other views,[47] in which responsibility for the events in Somalia is seen to lie in Ottawa rather than or as much as in the field, and in which Shidane Arone's murder in Somalia is seen as a sign or symbol of a crisis in command, as the result of a weakened, corrupted military ethos.[48] Senior commanders are held to have been corrupted and distanced from their soldiers. Preoccupied by careers and perks, they are seen as having abandoned traditional values, ideals, and loyalties, in particular 'loyalty down', to the welfare of their soldiers. Good soldiers are seen as having been betrayed by a bureaucratized NDHQ structure. The related thesis is that the military profession is fundamentally *sui generis*, and that soldiers are fundamentally and irreducibly different from others. Canada's existing system for command and management of the Canadian Forces is thus fundamentally flawed because it neglects that "the only people who ought to command an army are those, like themselves, who still remember that armies exist to fight wars, and that they are therefore very different from other types of human organizations".[49]

As discussed earlier, the challenge for government and high command is precisely that of how to adapt the special requirements of combat — requirements which differ by environment and function, but which have in common the basic element of motivation, discipline and obedience to command in extreme conditions — to peacetime, a rights-oriented democracy, the demands and opportunities of technology, and military operations demanding a high degree of military–civil co-ordination. Attempting to 'debureaucratize' the organization of the senior command of the armed forces by reversing integration would amount to solving the wrong problem, and risk (re)introducing an 'us–them' split, with problems blamed on the 'government' and isolating, and parochializing the military.[50] Defence is indeed unique in important respects, and this uniqueness must be properly accommodated in policy, organization, training, and operations. Defence in modern conditions, however, is also highly complex. The United States Department of Defense describes itself being about troops, armament, and military readiness, but invites observers to think about it in other ways:

> [T]he Department of Defense is obviously about troops, armaments and military readiness. Our armed forces are trained and equipped to perform whatever mission President Clinton asks of them. But there is a lot more to the department than what you see on a battlefield.

That's one way to think about DoD and probably the most important way. There are other ways, however...I'd like to give you 10 ways to think about the Defense Department:

- The world's most powerful military force;
- The world's most capable deliverer of emergency relief;
- The nation's biggest employer, and the nation's biggest employer of minorities and women;
- A large business enterprise;
- The nation's second largest health care insurer and provider;
- The world's largest educational enterprise;
- The nation's largest day care provider;
- A major supporter of research;
- A major purchaser of goods and services; and
- The world's largest equal opportunity training program.[51]

While the scale may be different in the case of the U.S. Defense Department, the nature of the function is not categorially different in Canada. One great difference, however, is the attention which is paid to defence and the armed forces by governmental authorities in the U.S. (and by the governments of Canada's principal allies) as compared with the case in Canada.

The Governmental/Political Problem

Also contributing to the failings in Somalia is the fact that Canada's national political authorities — the Cabinet, Parliament, and the civil service — have devoted little systematic, sustained attention to defence since the late 1960s–early 1970s, other than in relation to the economic and the diplomatic–promotional dimension of defence activities — defence budgetary levels, the economic impact of defence expenditures, and the role of defence activities in supporting Canada's presence and status in various councils and arenas.

There have been very few reviews or discussions of policy. Parliament was not consulted on the deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. White Papers have been issued rather infrequently — in 1964, 1971, 1987, and 1994. The normal course over the past 20 plus years has been for the Prime Minister to meet with the Chief of the Defence Staff only as the CDS was being appointed, and on his departure. The Department of National Defence has had 11 different Ministers since 1980. The Deputy Minister of National Defence has not been regarded as being among the most senior and weighty Deputy Ministers, though accountable for over half of all federal discretionary spending and some 80 percent of major Crown projects.

CIVILIAN CONTROL AND OVERSIGHT

Are the existing arrangements for control and oversight adequate to ensure that the Canadian Forces are militarily effective and at the same time organized and able to operate in a manner that reflects and supports democratic values?

In fact, Canada's military forces are not engaged in partisan politics, but exist to serve the people and the Government of Canada, and should be fully responsive to civilian authority. The events in Somalia suggest that there is nevertheless need for strengthening command, control, and oversight of the Canadian Forces. Control and accountability of the Canadian Forces are basically to and through the Minister, Cabinet, and Parliament, as is the case for other governmental functions. Unlike the arrangements in place for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) or Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), however, no outside forms of civilian review or review mechanisms as such are in place for the Canadian Forces (which maintain an internal Chief of Review Services). The CSIS Act provides for the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC). The RCMP Act provides for two forms of civilian review:

- the Public Complaints Commission, with authority to investigate complaints and the behaviour of the RCMP, with powers like those of a Royal Commission. The Commission's recommendations are not binding on the RCMP; and
- an external review committee, to deal with employee grievances.

Unlike the Canadian Forces, however, the RCMP impinges on and provides services to the Canadian public on a continuous basis.

The Canadian Forces is subject to the oversight and auditing functions of the Treasury Board and the Auditor General, having to do principally with the management and administration of finances, assets, and personnel. The Court Martial Appeal Court, a civilian court, hears appeals from judgements of courts martial. The government may of course also appoint commissions of inquiry.

The Canadian Forces is also subject to the Constitution and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and federal statutes, whether operating in Canada or abroad. Section 3 of the Statute of Westminister, in the light of *Croft* v. *Dunphy* [1933] A.C. 156 renders indisputable that the federal Parliament can enact laws with extraterritorial effect. Sections 60 ff. of the *National Defence Act* provide for service discipline for personnel accompanying

the forces, including overseas service. Section 32 of the Charter of Rights provides that the Charter applies to the Parliament and Government of Canada in respect of all matters within the authority of the Parliament and Government of Canada. Thus, the discipline of the Charter applies to the conduct of service men and women abroad, in Somalia, since any attempt to control that conduct would be done under authority of the *National Defence Act,* which itself is constrained by Charter precepts and values.[52]

The statement by the board of inquiry into the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group deals with this as a central feature of the landscape, noting that:

> Finally, and certainly of extreme importance, is the fact that Canadian domestic law applies to Canadian Forces personnel wherever they are deployed outside of Canada. Therefore, *The National Defence Act*, and by incorporation the Criminal Code, applied to all of the personnel serving with the Battle Group and CJFS HQ in Somalia. While there was no mandate for the Board to investigate criminal activity or serious breaches of discipline, the provisions of military law did provide parameters within which to assess the standards applied to the Canadian forces training, discipline, operations and so on.[53]

The CF is also subject to review bodies and commissions, including the Human Rights Commission and the Information and Privacy Commissioners, subject to the specific exceptions/occupational requirements provided for in the particular statute.

Parliamentary committees have developed increased powers to look into the policies and programs of departments, including defence, though their capacity and inclination to do so is limited by the modesty of the resources available to them, and by the capacity of majority governments to control the agendas and activities of committees.

The existing arrangements do not provide venues or occasions for regular or periodic review of systemic issues, such as those having to do with ethos, or leadership, other than in the course of major governmental reviews of policy, or such occasions as the present Commission of Inquiry. The media have drawn attention to an apparent contrast between the approaches taken in Canada and the United States in dealing with military problems and holding leadership accountable, at least in such cases as the Tailhook sexual assaults and harassment, which affected the career of the most senior U.S. naval officer, the Chief of Naval Operations, and other senior admirals; or, more recently, the disciplinary action taken against senior air force officers responsible for safety operations, in the aftermath of the crash in April 1996 of the U.S. air force transport which

caused the death of 35, including U.S. Commerce Secretary, Ron Brown.

Central factors in a greater readiness to hold senior officers accountable in the United States, in at least these cases, are the highly public nature of the incidents, and the fact that the U.S. military is a much more important element in governance and national policy, and much more a part of everyday life in the United States than are the Canadian Forces in Canada. Indeed, the issue in Canada is less a matter of relatively weaker civilian control of the military than of weaker interest in the defence function and the forces by political and civil authorities in Canada. Canadians tend to think of themselves as peaceable, and contrast themselves with Americans, who tend to hold military leaders in high esteem — Dwight Eisenhower and Colin Powell, for example. To a degree, it is government that has distanced itself from the armed forces, a marginalization that has at least facilitated the isolation in which the Airborne's rogue culture flourished and permitted forces to be deployed in demanding situations without the benefit of national doctrine and positive command.

It may be that a greater appreciation of the new strategic context and the more demanding and serious role for armed forces in protecting and fostering democratic values and interests may serve to renew and sustain the interest of Canadians and Canadian civil and political authorities in the forces. It is such a political engagement which is the most secure basis for strengthening the relationship between Canadian society, government, and the armed forces, including relations of oversight, direction, control, and accountability.

CHAPTER FIVE

Conclusions and Observations

The Somalia events can be explained and understood on various levels, and attributed to causes of various kinds. Causation is a complex concept.[1] Clearly, beyond determining what specifically happened, and determining accountability for actions and failings, it was an important aim of the Commission of Inquiry to arrive at findings and to recommend courses of action or reflection to the government which will make the recurrence of such events and failings less likely in future.

The period since the end of the Cold War has been characterized by the advance of the ideals and institutions of market democracy in virtually all regions of the world, even if unevenly and partially in particular areas, and even if there are notable exceptions to this development. It has also been marked by the proliferation of old and new sources of conflict, a vastly enhanced capacity to inflict harm in armed conflict within and across boundaries, and by loosening constraints on armed conflict. The period has witnessed a marked increase in the use of the armed forces of the democracies in multilateral operations to contain internecine conflict, limit instability, and relieve human suffering.

The new peace operations, different in fundamental respects from classic, consensual peacekeeping, require both military muscle and subtlety; specialized preparation; and connectivity between the military, and the political and civil dimensions. Classic peacekeeping, thought of by many Canadians as something of a Canadian invention, was also viewed by the Canadian Forces as relatively undemanding, a function to be performed as a by-blow of Cold War operations and requiring no particular preparation beyond those involved in developing and deploying general-purpose combat forces. The Canadian Forces was not oriented, directed, specifically trained or led and otherwise prepared for changed conditions and needs, for new and demanding peace-support missions.

There was no development of doctrine for the new peace operations. It is doctrine which is the foundation for training soldiers for the conditions in which they will operate and for the situations they will need to confront. High morale, in turn, if it is to be a constructive force and protection against misbehaviour by soldiers, depends on having a military doctrine which fits and is seen to fit the situations soldiers face. Increasingly, these situations involve operations which are neither war nor peacekeeping, but which combine elements of both, and which have to do with asserting and protecting an international order geared to broadened applications of national interest, international security, and human rights.

While the new conditions and the missions which the military forces of the democracies are being asked to undertake imply modification in the orientation and culture of forces, of land forces in particular, it would be important not to lose sight of the fundamental purpose of the military instrument, and the continued need for this instrument and for prudent judgement.[2] Very few of the century's major events which brought about or threatened to bring about major changes in the political–military situation were anticipated and provided for in national or military planning, five and 10 years before they occurred. Such events would include World Wars I and II, the collapse of the Cold War divide, the Soviet Union, and Communism, and the Bosnia quagmire.

Nation states and their armed forces remain principal strategic actors. It would be imprudent to take for granted as the basis for long-term military planning a future in which all significant international actors are or have become non-ideological, pragmatic, materialistic, and liberal, and who see others as partners rather than as obstacles to their regional or global ambitions. There will continue to be potential for violent confrontations between states, and between states and peoples (and between peoples). Building international order while, ideally, depending on a balance of interests and a framework of law, depends still also on the sanction of force. There will continue to be a need for ready military power on the part of the democracies, to maintain the basis for deterrence and balance, for protecting national and alliance community interests, and for safeguarding peace, human rights, and the rule of law.

REORIENTING THE ARMED FORCES FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

Other than for responding to direct threats, and the protection of important material interests, however, and perhaps in such cases, too, the use and legitimacy of armed forces have increasingly to do with engaging uni-

versal human values and with serving an international order of law and human rights.

If Canada is to continue to contribute militarily to the prevention and containment of conflict, very careful attention will need to be paid — in addition to what needs to be done to adapt policy and program to other strategic, including technological, changes — to adapting both national and military policy, and the culture, training, management, and command of the Canadian Forces, the army in particular, for the requirements of armed humanitarianism, stability and peace-support operations.

The closer co-ordination between the civil and military actors in the new peace operations, essential for effectiveness, safety, and legitimacy in the new forms of intervention, has both domestic as well as theatre-operational dimensions, with implications for the nature, demands, and requirements of soldiering, for the role of values, and for management and oversight of the military.

What emerges, at the most general level, is the need to establish the basis for firmer leadership in this regard, and for some new emphases within the military, the army in particular.

Command and Control

Canadian and defence and military authorities of other countries will need to take into account that they are likely to be called upon in future to mount non-traditional peace support operations, involving coalitions and a variety of civilian institutions and organizations. Failure to conduct these peace operations effectively can have serious consequences for those in need of help, for the international institutions and coalitions involved, for Canada, and the armed forces. Effective command and control — the exercise of authority and direction by commanders over assigned forces to accomplish a mission, combining the art and science of command of men and women and control of systems and equipment — is particularly important to success in peace operations. Over-whelming military force can sometimes make up for command and control deficiencies in warfare in ways which do not apply in peace operations.

The central requirement is that command and control arrangements provide for the diversity of military forces and civilian players typically involved in peace operations. To ensure both mission effectiveness and responsiveness, and to safeguard Canada's discrete military and political interests, command and control of military forces in peace support and enforcement missions needs:

- to be informed by careful prior planning, particularly planning based on actions to be taken in the events of a variety of patterns and contingencies;
- to be both segregated from but at the same time closely co-ordinated with, and shaped and informed by, the civil, political, and humanitarian dimensions and activities associated with the mission;
- to be connected to and supported by effective national intelligence and communications capabilities; and
- to provide for the high degree of liaison, exchanges, co-ordination, communication, and flexibility required on the part of command authorities in multinational peace support and enforcement operations.

Particular attention should be paid, as well, to ROE in command and control, training, and operational contexts, as central means of ensuring that military operations advance, serve, and are consistent with policy objectives, law, and mission and operational requirements.

Redevelopment of Military Doctrine

There needs to be redevelopment of Canadian military doctrine — the fundamental principles guiding the actions of military forces in support of national objectives — for the new strategic setting and new requirements. These call for strengthened Canadian capacities to operate as well-informed, well-trained, and capable military forces interoperable with those of allies in coalition operations, and capable of independent judgement in service of national policy, if Canada is to be involved in the new stability and peace support missions in future.

Doctrine would need to take into account the special principles and requirements of peace operations, where these differ from those of war fighting, and indeed from classic peacekeeping. A critical issue is that of drawing the boundaries and distinctions between peacekeeping operations marked by full consent on the part of the local parties, and neutrality and non-involvement on the part of the peacekeepers, strictly limited in their capacity and right to use force, and those operations involving the potential for employing compellent force, cowing opposition, imposing one's will, on the other.

In effect, this is the difference between operations authorized under Chapter VI and those authorized under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It is the author's view that thinking in terms of "Chapter VI and a half" is dangerous. It is true that conflict situations will often involve considerable ambiguity, and there will be a need for flexibility and initia-

tive on the part of international political authorities and military forces in intervening to contain and resolve them. It is important nevertheless to maintain a clear distinction in doctrine (and national policy — see below) between the orientation and posture of peacekeeping, and that of compellent peace enforcement.

Doctrine should also take into account the implications for military operations of the predominance of political and international considerations in peace operations, and the need to accommodate national, coalition, and international (e.g., UN, NATO) command authorities, and a high degree of co-ordination with a variety of civilian agencies and operations. Doctrine will need to take into account, as well, less emphasis in peace operations on a number of traditional forms of initiative, and more on adaptive control, and more emphasis on transparency, as against surprise and security. A high degree of integration of doctrine at the alliance and international level may be required.

Cultural Change

In addressing the institutional transformation and the deep changes in military and service cultures which may be required, particular attention will need to be paid to:

- the special character of the profession of arms and military organizations, and the powerful roles of established identities and cultures associated with these;
- the fact that the services must change themselves, crucial as support and guidance from civilian leadership will be;
- the centrality of vision and leadership within the forces; and
- the recognition that the process of fundamental change takes time.

More attention should be devoted by DND to the study of the armed forces themselves, as is the case in the United States particularly, treating the 'soft' side of military needs and capability. This would include study of values, stresses, cultural and social realities and trends particular to or affecting the armed forces.

Training and Operational Matters

Selection and training of personnel for peace operations should be regarded as important as selection and training for conventional military operations.

Selection and training should also provide for units able to manage the military–civil co-ordination required in peace operations. There might be a particular role for the reserves in this respect, by involving reserve officers who would have had military training and whose civilian occupations would provide the expertise and experience in needed areas.

Specific steps which could be taken to reduce the likelihood that violations of the international laws of war and Canadian law will occur in future, and the legitimacy and success of peace operations put at risk, would include:

- paying more systematic and sustained attention to instruction in the laws of warfare, integrating and emphasizing training in the laws of warfare, involving both legal and combat arms (and, ideally, combat-experienced) officers;
- in relation to the responsibilities of officers, to rate officers on their ability to produce soldiers attuned to the requirements of democracy, respect for rights, and peace operations (while able to meet what is required of them in terms of war fighting);
- integrating the laws of war element into command and control procedures — drafting doctrine, policies, and tactics with greater sensitivity to these, and improving command and control procedures for ensuring and monitoring compliance; and
- instituting more careful and systematic screening and monitoring of recruits, to identify atrocity-prone soldiers (and officers).

DND has proposed, in the 1996-97 Expenditure Plan/Report to Parliament, that the effectiveness of the Defence Services Plan should be evaluated through output and outcome measures of DND's ability to contribute to the defence of Canada, contribute to international peace, and project Canadian interests abroad.[3] As part of the process, the Department is developing Business Plans,[4] which will be required to include key results and performance indicators. These should be designed to take into account the new emphases.

Planning and Analysis

Intelligent and careful planning is critical for peace operations, as it is for other military operations. To the extent that military establishments do not think that conducting peace operations is what they ought to be doing, that it is a sideline rather than their business, there could be a disinclination to

plan for such operations. Requirements and developments might then come as a surprise. This is at least in part the story of Canadian involvement in peace operations for some years, and of the Somalia deployment.

U.S. military planners now judge that there will be significant call on armed forces for operations other than war missions in future,[5] and that there would be benefit in better planning for these missions.[6] An issue is determining the basis for planning and analysis. One of the findings of a recent symposium of U.S. defence analysts on Operations Other Than War (OOTW) is that greater 'granularity' is needed than for conventional military operations. In conventional military planning, the division might be the general purpose unit, and within this unit a tank unit would be the specialist unit. Armed forces know how to train a tank unit, and how to measure its readiness. In the case of OOTW, however, it may be a company which is the general purpose force, and individuals or pairs who are the specialist units.

There is need, then, for careful and systematic planning for the new types of peace operations, enabling staffs to identify requirements and constraints, and the kinds of units, including civil affairs units, critical for particular kinds of operations. Systems would then need to be developed to measure the effectiveness of such units, and the availability and readiness of civil affairs companies, and to collect data relevant to planning of the kind and types needed.

THE POLICY FRAMEWORK: THE GOVERNMENTAL AND PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSIONS

Military culture is highly particular. The changes required must come mainly from within the services. But government must provide the framework. Canadian governments for the past two decades or so have devoted little attention to defence matters, whether in relation to adapting policy and resources to changing conditions and needs, or in relation to the oversight and management of the Canadian Forces. Canadian Prime Ministers rarely visit the troops, or meet with Chiefs of the Defence Staff, other than when appointing them. There have been nine Ministers of National Defence between 1983 and 1993 and, between 1970 and 1994, perhaps one major, sustained review (in 1986-87) of defence.

Adapting the forces and military command arrangements and culture to the new requirements requires governmental (and indeed also parliamentary and broader public) reflection on strategic issues and directions for national policy with regard to military and international security affairs.

Peace operations in the new environment will need national authorities to be more sensitive to how conditions and requirements, and the demands for and on armed forces, are evolving, than has been the case for some years. Canada prided itself, in the past, on being a participant in virtually every UN and multinational peacekeeping operation mounted. There will be more of a need for judgement, in future, about whether and how to participate in an intervention, in a variety of circumstances, engaging values and interests in sometimes complex ways. There is the difficulty of risking and losing lives to save lives in conditions other than war and when national interests are not seen to be engaged.

Judgements will need to be made in terms of criteria which may be familiar, but whose application will be more problematic than before. Criteria will continue to call for answers to such question as:

- Are the goals of proposed missions clear, and are they achievable?
- Are there no other good alternatives to intervention?
- Do the cause and interests engaged justify the risks, sacrifices, and costs?
- How is Canada best able to contribute?

Other questions could be added to this list, relating to urgency, duration, etc.

Distinctions, however, will and should be drawn among the variety of missions which the Government of Canada may be invited to or feel compelled to undertake, and which it may direct the Canadian Forces to mount. The first basic distinction, again, is that between peacekeeping characterized by neutrality and a consensual environment, and peacemaking, involving compellent force. Clarifying the terms to be used and precision in using them are important conditions for the development and communication of policy on the issues of compellent interventions in support of national and international interests, international norms, and human rights. 'Intervention' itself is not a single or simple concept: as Richard Haass points out in a recent review of the issues involved in using force, "Intervention can mean different things. Military interventions differ from one another in scale, composition, duration, intensity, authority, and, above all, objective."[7]

Haass distinguishes among interventions aiming at deterrence, prevention, coercion, punishment, peacekeeping, peacemaking, nation building, interdiction, humanitarian goals, and rescue missions, in addition to war fighting, and more or less indirect forms of intervention to provide military help to one of the parties in a conflict.

The 1994 Defence White Paper affirmed Canada's determination to continue to be engaged in multilateral action to maintain and advance international security, including in consensual and nonconsensual interventions, whether under the auspices of the UN, or of NATO or the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). A range of choices is set out,[8] and criteria (called "key principles") for the selection of missions elaborated[9] (reproduced at Appendix B). There is nevertheless a need, in the aftermath of the Somalia events and the work of the Commission, and further Canadian and international experience, including in Haiti and the aborted deployment to Zaire, for the Government of Canada to review more rigorously the choices, options, and risks for Canada involved in participating in any of the various kinds of interventions in the new conditions, to help it to choose how and when it may best contribute, selectively, to maintaining and fostering peace, stability and rights, and to help it maintain the support and understanding of the Canadian public.

There will be need, as well, for the government to better integrate the military and non-military elements and dimensions of our security and international effort. If the choice is to contribute by military means to the containment of conflict in compellent peace operations, there will be need to support the adjustment of the forces for such operations, and to be in a situation to establish responsible ROE as expressions of national policy and command, as definitive statements of Canada's commitment and role, and which serve not only to restrict, but to guide, empower, and protect. There will be need, as well, if Canada is to contribute in ways that put Canadian lives and interests and Canada's standing at risk, for an effective Canadian intelligence capability to support Canadian authorities both at home and in the field.

The 1994 Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on Canada's Defence Policy advanced a number of suggestions and recommendations bearing on strengthening the capacities of both the government and Parliament to treat defence issues. A modest suggestion in relation to process which may be particularly germane to the improvement of oversight and accountability is to institutionalize meetings between the Prime Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff, so that they may air issues of policy and operations on a regular basis, whether once a month, or four times a year.

The Special Joint Committee advanced a number of recommendations designed to strengthen the capacity of Parliament to examine and debate military policy and operations, including recommendations to create a new

standing joint committee, and to require full parliamentary debate before deployments of Canadian Forces abroad. The recommendations of the Special Joint Committee can certainly play an important and constructive role in strengthening oversight and accountability, and in advancing the adaptation of policy and the armed forces to changing circumstances.

On their own, however, implementing the recommendations is unlikely to make up for the less salient role of the military and of defence issues in Canada in comparison with the societies with which Canadians tend to compare themselves. It may be that this will change in future as more is seen to depend on the quality of the decisions taken by Canadian governments to provide for Canada's contribution to the defence of our own interests and values, and those Canadians share with our partners and allies, in a world on the brink of the best of times, and the worst of times.

Notes

INTRODUCTION

1. Including the allegations of cover-ups on the part of senior Canadian Forces and DND officers, and departmental tampering with documents relating to the events in Somalia and the Commission of Inquiry; the videos of degrading and offensive hazing rituals involving members of the Airborne Regiment; and the misconduct of peacekeeping troops in Bosnia, including at a mental hospital in Bakovici between October 1993 and April 1994.
2. See for example the April 2, 1996 testimony by WO Robert Labrie before the Commission of Inquiry (Transcript of Evidentiary Testimony, Vol. 53, pp.10644–10645), cited in D.G. Loomis, *The Somalia Affair — Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping* (Ottawa: DGL Publications, 1996), pp. 598-599; Loomis also mentions special contributions made by Canadians (p. 615), and the high praise for the performance of the Canadian contingent expressed by President Bush's special representative in Somalia, U.S. Ambassador Oakley, in his May 11, 1993 letter to the Minister of National Defence, Kim Campbell (p. 432); See also the Honours and Awards to Canadian Service personnel (also cited in Loomis, pp. 626–628, coverage of the Somalia deployment by Canadian print and electronic media included treatment of these contributions as well.
3. African Rights, Somalia, *Human Rights Abuses by the United Nations Forces in Somalia*, (London, July 1993); Belgium established a Commission of Inquiry into misconduct by Belgian Forces, which reported November 24, 1993.
4. In fact the mission, authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 794 on December 3, 1992, was to secure a conducive environment for the distribution of humanitarian aid, using such force as necessary.
5. The report of the Belgian Commission of Inquiry into Allegations of Abuse by Belgian Soldiers in Somalia (November 24, 1993) characterized the 'Somali context' in something of a rationalization for the conduct of Belgian troops, in effect, as follows:

Du fait des charactéristiques propres aux structures existant en Somalie, à la population, et à la situation socio-politique, il est extrêmement difficile de se référer aux normes en vigeur dans notre société. Surtout au début de la mission, nos troupes sont confrontées à une anarchie quasi totale, sans la moindre structure légale ou administrative, et à une situation économique et industrielle délabrée.

Un réseau complexe de clans, sous-clans, structures familiales existe tant au niveau national que local, liés par des alliances parfois changeantes, avec, régulièrement, des querelles et rivalités qui surgissent et oú des "warlords" et leur milices, mais aussi les elders, jouent un rôle important. Le climat d'insécurité qui en découle, l'état de pauvreté de la population et de beaucoup de réfugiés ainsi que le banditisme omniprésent font que pour les Somaliens, il y a apparemment une certaine banalisation de la mort (p. 26).

[TRANSLATION] Due to the specific characteristics of the infrastructure, population and socio-political situation in Somalia, it is extremely difficult to refer to the standards in effect in our society. Especially at the beginning of the mission, our troops faced almost total anarchy without any legal or administrative structure, as well as a substandard economic and industrial situation.

There is as much at the national as at the local levels, a complex network of clans, sub-clans and family structures linked by rather fluid alliances with frequent disputes and rivalries in which not only the warlords and their militias but also the elders play an important role. The resulting climate of uncertainty, the poverty of the population and of many refugees, as well as the ever-present banditry may have caused the Somali people to somewhat trivialize death.

6. Noted in a number of reports and studies, including Professor Donna Winslow's study for the Commission of Inquiry, and in David Bercuson's *Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1996) p. 232; and in the Report of the Board of Inquiry into the Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group (BOI). Annex C (p.C-6/8) treats the challenges to discipline during operations.
7. October 7, 1993, Confidential Speaking Notes for the CDS/DM, Advice to the Minister providing the assessment by the Head of the Somalia Working Group (MGen J.E. Boyle) Document book 44A Tab 8, Ref No. P173.1.
8. Paul Koring, "Somalia hearing to test allegations", *The Globe and Mail*, October 2, 1995, p. A3.

9. This indeed was Gen Boyle's expectation. By way of concluding his October 7, 1993 assessment for the Deputy Minister and the CDS (and through them the Minister), as Head of the Somalia Working Group, Gen Boyle wrote (Document book 44A, Tab 8, para 19, p.11) that:
   > The chain of events which are about to unfold within the courts and in the public domain will without a doubt inflict serious damage to the CAR, the SSF, the Army and by extension the CF as a whole. My analyses was intended to provide you with a flavour of the magnitude of the problem.
10. Pierre Martin and Michel Fortmann, in their study of Canadian public opinion and peacekeeping ("Canadian public opinion and peacekeeping in a turbulent world", *International Journal*: Vol. L, No. 2, Spring 1995, pp. 370–400) observe that although security issues are almost never at the centre of political debates in Canada:
    > [In] the area of peacekeeping, the relative quietness of the Canadian public reflects a solid and stable consensus. This consensus rests on a specific self-image, a coherent world view, and a set of distinctly Canadian values. It is this foundation which makes Canadian support for peacekeeping so durable. (p. 379)
11. Survey: Canadian Opinions on Canadian Foreign Policy, Defence Policy and International Development Assistance 1995. Conducted for Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, DND and CIDA by Insight Canada Research. The study had asked those sampled to identify "the most important contribution Canada has made to the world in the past five years or so". Thirty-nine percent of those polled named peacekeeping, as against 13% for the next highest-rated item — the provision of foreign aid, food, medicine, and emergency aid.
12. A June 1995 NDHQ survey of forces and civilian personnel indicated that some 69% of soldiers think of DND as "more than a place to work" and 62% think they are "contributing to something important"; 83% declared themselves proud of the involvement of the Canadian Forces in peacekeeping operations. (NDHQ "Military and Civilian Employee Feedback Survey", June 1995, cited in David Bercuson, *Significant Incident" Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1996), p. 103.
13. See, e.g., Martin and Fortmann, op. cit.
14. One of the recommendations made by the Special Joint Committee on Canada's Defence Policy was that the name of the Department of National Defence be changed to the "Department of Defence", to reflect the fact that "a good part of our military vocation is related to international security rather than simply the defence of Canada alone" (Final Report, p. 62).

15. Always bearing in mind Blaise Pascal's axiom to the effect that law without force is impotent. The wars in the former Yugoslavia have left some 300,000 dead and three million refugees. A more vigorous and timely international response to the crisis in Rwanda in 1992 might have prevented the massacre of hundreds of thousands of Tutsis and 'neutral' Hutus.

CHAPTER ONE — THE CHANGED STRATEGIC LANDSCAPE

1. As Richard Haass, President Bush's Deputy National Security Advisor, points out, no developed statement on the 'new world order' was ever delivered. At the beginning of the crisis in the Persian Gulf, President Bush, in the Congress on September 9, 1990, expressed the view, or hope, that "...a new world order can emerge...freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace." He spoke in a similar vein immediately after the Gulf War, on a number of occasions. The basic elements and view of a 'new world order' were expressed by President Bush at his valedictory address at the United States Military Academy at West Point, January 5, 1993. He spoke of an order "...of governments that are democratic, tolerant, and economically free at home and committed abroad to settling inevitable differences peacefully, without the threat or use of force". Quoted in Richard Haass, *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994), Appendix F.
2. There is a voluminous literature on this subject. Overviews are offered in John Lewis Gaddis: "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Post-War International System", originally published in *International Security*, Vol. 10, No. 4, Spring 1986, and republished in Sean M. Lynn-Jones (ed), *The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1991); Alexander George, *Managing US–Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983); Alexander George, Philip J. Farley and Alexander Dallin, *U.S.–Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Allen Lynch in his *The Cold War is Over — Again* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992) argues that the Cold War effectively ended in the 1970s because of the evolution of such firm rules and understandings between the superpowers. Among the many sources are Henry Kissinger's books, including *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994) and his memoirs, *White House Years* and *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little Brown, 1979 and 1982, respectively).

3. Quoted in Charles W. Kegley, Jr, and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (3rd ed) (New York: St Martins Press, 1989), p. 393.
4. Atomic weapons were ruled out in responding to China's massive intervention in Korea in 1951, at least in part out of concern about the USSR's reaction and not to extend the conflict beyond Korea. For all the violence of the Vietnam War, the application of U.S. power in the area remained constrained by the need not to pose too difficult a challenge to the Soviet Union; Israel's military advance in Egypt in 1973 was halted by U.S. pressure in significant measure to avoid a potential confrontation with the USSR.
5. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, July 1992), p. 2.
6. Address on reform of the armed forces, at the École Militaire, Paris, 23 February 1996.
7. Ra'anan 1991, Moynihan 1993, Gurr 1994, Kaufman 1996, *International Affairs* 72:3, 1996, Crocker, Osler, and Aall 1996, among others.
8. Anthony D. Smith, "Culture, community and territory: the politics of ethnicity and nationalism", *International Affairs,* Vol. 72, No. 3 (July 1996), pp. 445–458.
9. Gurr, Ted Robert, "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System", *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 38 (1994), pp. 347–377. See also David Binder with Barbara Crossette, "As Ethnic Wars Multiply, U.S. Strives for a Policy", *New York Times*, February 7, 1993, p. A1.
10. The author attended meetings on this subject in Washington in April 1992, organized by the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations. The meetings, which involved senior Administration and Congressional figures, aimed at and resulted in establishing closer links between U.S. national security authorities and leading U.S. scientists in environmental fields; improving access by environmental scientists to data obtained by U.S. military and intelligence sensors; and led to the inclusion of environmental monitoring in the tasking of U.S. intelligence systems. The *New York Times* later ran articles by William J. Broad on the meetings and the issues. See "Spy Data Now Open for Studies of Climate", *New York Times*, June 23, 1992, p. C1.
A variety of studies and articles have been published on the linkage between environmental and security issues, especially since the early 1990s and the development of the concepts of 'human security' (promoted by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1994) and 'extended security' in a variety of forms. Studies and articles include Astri Suhrke, "Environmental Change, Migration, and Conflict — A Lethal Feedback Dynamic?", in

Chester A. Crocker, and Fen Osler Hampson, (eds), with Pamela Aall, *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), pp.113–127; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases", *International Security* Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994) pp. 5–40; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Jeffrey H. Boutwell, and George W. Rathjens, "Environmental Change and Violent Conflict", *Scientific American*, Vol. 268, No. 2 (February 1993), pp. 38–47; Jessica Tuchman Mathews, "Redefining Security", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 2, 1989, pp.162–177.

11. See United Nations, *World Population Prospects: The 1994 Revision* (Population Division, U.N. Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 1995, U.N. Document # ST/ESA/SER.A/145); see also the World Bank, *World Population Projection 1994-95* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank, 1994).
12. By the United States in the Caribbean and along the Mexican border, France and Spain in the Mediterranean, and Thailand and others in Asia.
13. Uncertainty about the magnitude of the environmental changes in train if anything highlights the danger involved in environmental change. Too much is at stake, and too little is known. CFCs for example, a hazard to the earth's ozone layer, had been considered safe for human use. Once under way, ecosystemic change may well be irreversible, beyond the capacity of human correction or intervention. Change and impacts of such magnitude are giving rise to a concept of security which includes the health and stability of ecosystems and the consequential effects on the viability and well-being of human beings dependent on these ecosystems. A project being conducted under the joint auspices of the University of Toronto and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences — the Project on Environmental Change and Acute Conflict, reported on in *Scientific American*, Vol. 268, No. 2, p. 38) in February 1993 (Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, Jeffrey H. Boutwell, and George W. Rathjens, op cit.) — is dedicated to elaborating such a concept and to the examination of case studies demonstrating the relationships involved. Ecological imbalance leads to scarcities of water, forests, and fertile land; these scarcities contribute to dislocation, transboundary migration, and violent conflict. The assessment is that shortages will worsen with a "speed, complexity, and magnitude unprecedented in history". Conflict, moreover, will centre not just on access to non-renewable resources, but for the time importantly on those heretofore free resources held in common — the oceans and planetary atmosphere.
14. For a survey of the elements and dynamics involved, see Jessica T. Mathews, "Power Shift", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 1 (January/February 1997), pp. 50–66. This subject receives further attention in this study.

15. The Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development speaks in terms of 'the strategic threat of chaos':

    > Bosnia, Haiti, Rwanda. These troubling and unique crises in disparate regions of the globe share a common thread. They are the dark manifestations of a strategic threat that increasingly defines America's foreign policy challenge. Disintegrating societies and failed states with their civil conflicts and destabilizing refugee flows have emerged as the greatest menace to global stability.

    J. Brian Atwood, "Suddenly Chaos", *Washington Post*, July 31, 1994, p. C9. Cited in Terrence Lyons and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 3.
16. Joint Press Conference with Israel's Prime Minister Shimon Peres, March 14, 1996, transcript published in the *Jerusalem Post*.
17. See the series of articles published in the February 26, 1997 edition of the *New York Times*, including "Mexico Says Critical Report on Drugs Would Hurt Ties" (p. A1); "Secretary to Mexican Patriarch Discloses Links to Drug Barons" (p. A1); "2 Democrats Say Mexico is No U.S. Ally in Drug War" (p. A7).
18. There is considerable literature on this subject. Standard reference sources on the proliferation of conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) include the annual editions of *The Military Balance* (London: Oxford University Press, 1996) issued by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS); of the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbook; and of the UN Disarmament Yearbook.
19. Albeit an unusual case in a number of important respects.
20. A number of the chapters in the 1995 edition of the annual *Canada Among Nations* are dedicated to this theme. See M.A. Cameron and M.A. Molot (eds.), *Democracy and Foreign Policy: Canada Among Nations 1995* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1995); see also Kim R. Nossal, *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy* (3rd ed.) (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1997). These themes figured prominently in the Hearings of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canada's Foreign Policy in 1994 (whose three-volume report, *Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the Future* was published in November 1994), and in the Government's response, *Canada in the World: Government Statement*, published in 1995.
21. Drawn from data assembled and analyzed by Ted Robert Gurr in "Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 347–377.

22. Though, to be sure, selectively.
23. Again, the literature is extensive. For overviews, see Emma Rothschild, "What is Security", *Daedalus* Vol. 124, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 53–98; Stanley Hoffmann, "The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism", *Foreign Policy* No. 98 (Spring 1995), pp. 159–179, and "Report of the Conference on Conditions of World Order — June 12–19, 1965, Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy", *Daedalus* Vol. 124, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 1–26; Henry Kissinger, "We Live in an Age of Transition", *Daedalus* Vol. 124, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 99–107; Jessica T. Matthews, "Power Shift", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 76, No. 1 (January/February 1997), pp. 50–66.
24. The development of the notions of 'common security' and 'human security' as ideals was a central theme of the Common Security Commission, which urged states and the international community to move away from the concept of (armed) territorial security, to security of "people and the planet". The Commission on Global Governance, *Our Global Neighbourhood*, The Report of the Commission on Global Governance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 78.
25. In the 'persons' case. The term 'persons' in sections 23 and 24 of the *Constitution Act* (1867) was held by the Privy Council (of the United Kingdom, then Canada's highest Court of Appeal) to include women, making them eligible to sit in the Senate. (*Edwards* v. *AG Canada*, [1930] A.C. 124).
26. Statutes (the Reich Citizenship Law and the Law for the Protection of the German Blood and of the German Honour) passed by the National Convention of the German National Socialist (Nazi) party in Nuremberg on September 15, 1935. The Nuremberg Laws limited German citizenship to individuals of 'German or cognate blood' and forbade marriage and other forms of association between Jews (now subjects rather than citizens of the state) and 'Aryans', among other regulations establishing the racial regime of the German state and restricting the status and rights of Jews.
27. As Principle VII (of 10 security principles), entitled "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief". Participating states agree to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; to recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practice religion or belief in accordance with the dictates of his or her own conscience; to respect the rights of persons belonging to national minorities to equality before the law; to recognize that respect for human rights is essential for peace; to confirm the right of individuals to know and act on their rights;

and to act in conformity with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and any international agreements by which they may be bound.

28. For an overview of the subject, see Henry J. Steiner and Philip Alston, *International Human Rights in Context — Law, Politics, Morals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
29. See Theodor Meron, "The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian Law", *American Journal of International Law*, April 1996. The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals to deal with war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda are also an aspect of this development. Even though indicted war criminals remain free, and the short-term, practical effect of the Tribunals may be limited, their establishment is a strengthening of international law. Cf. Theodor Meron, "Answering for War Crimes: Lessons from the Balkans", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 76, No. 1 (January-February 1997), pp. 2–8. Meron judges that:

    > Paradoxically, while the goals specific to Yugoslavia have not been fulfilled, the tribunal has had significant success in strengthening international law.... Without the establishment of the tribunal and the example of the Tadic trial, the perception that even the most egregious violations of international humanitarian law can be committed with impunity would have been confirmed. In the Tadic case alone, the tribunal has advanced the state of the law governing international and internal armed conflicts, especially as it pertains to the conduct of hostilities and crimes against humanity (op. cit. pp. 6–7).

30. For an overview/survey of these issues from a variety of perspectives, see Françoise Barret-Ducrocq (ed.), *Intervenir? Droits de la personne et raisons d'état.* Forum international sur l'intervention, La Sorbonne, 16–17 décembre 1993 (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1994).
31. Jessica T. Matthews, "Power Shift", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 76, No. 1 (January/February 1997), p. 59.
32. As reported by Shashi Tharoor, the Special Assistant to the United Nations Under- Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations, and confirmed by other national authorities, including Canadian Ambassador David Malone.
33. Alex de Waal (co-director of the human rights organization, African Rights) in a recent article on the role and effectiveness of NGOs in protecting human rights ("Becoming Shameless — The failure of human rights organizations in Rwanda", *Times Literary Supplement,* No. 4899, February 21, 1997, p. 3.

CHAPTER TWO — RESPONSES TO THE NEW CONDITIONS

1. The NATO intervention in Bosnia was the first operational deployment or action by the Alliance since its creation. The observation is striking but also misleading. NATO forces were in constant use during the Cold War, sailing ships, flying aircraft, operating radar, warning, and control systems, and of course operating armies daily, for over 40 years.
2. Shashi Tharoor's phrase, in a paper (mimeo) given at the 37th annual meeting of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Vienna 6–9 September 1995, focused on military intervention and conflict resolution. Mr. Tharoor is the Special Assistant to the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations. Tharoor dryly observed, apropos the current uncertainty about how to think about and define 'peacekeeping', that the world was at sixes and sevens in confusion about whether UN peacekeeping was a Chapter VI or a Chapter VII matter.
3. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace* (United Nations: January 3, 1995), para 11.
4. A variety of terms have come into use, each with a somewhat different connotation, and application — peacekeeping, multifunctional peacekeeping, peace operations, peace enforcement, wider peacekeeping, stability operations, peace support, and peacebuilding, among others.
5. George F. Kennan, in "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", *American Diplomacy 1900–1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 104.
6. Canada, Department of National Defence, *1994 Defence White Paper* (Ottawa, 1994), p. 6.
7. Canada did play a significant role in the war-like Congo operation, untypical of the pre-1988–1989 period.
8. Canada, *Canada and Peacekeeping:* Backgrounder issued by the DFAIT, (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade), Ottawa, 1996.
9. General Phillipe Morillon, commander of UN forces in Sarajevo, noted that this incapacity was less one of a lack of military muscle on the ground than the restrictions imposed on UNPROFOR by the UN, the mandate, and rules of engagement too focused on self-protection rather than protection of the population. He was particularly critical of what he termed the UN's *angelisme,* the view that one could and should remain neutral. ("Where UN angels feared to tread", Interview with General Morillon published in the *Guardian Weekly,* January 21, 1996), p. 13.
10. Secretary Perry's remarks serve admirably to bring together the main themes and features of the new approach to peace operations.

11. This is true for a variety of reasons, but particularly because it feared that if it did so the Soviets would insist on being engaged as well. Hence the importance and value, for the United States, of Canada's high degree of acceptability as a peacekeeper.
12. United States, Department of the Army, Field Manual, FM 100-23 *Peace Operations,* "Stability and Support Operations", final draft dated October 1995.
13. Ibid., pp. 1–12.
14. Frédéric Pons, *The French UN Peacekeepers: 50 years of service to peace in the world,* Winnie Burstein (translator) (Paris: Éditions Haliques, 1995), p. 36.
15. United States, Department of the Army, Field Manual FM 100-23, op. cit. p. 12.
16. United Kingdom, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996 (Cmnd 3223 London: HMSO, 1996).
17. Ibid., p. 21.
18. Ibid., p. 22.
19. United Kingdom, Army Field Manual, *Peace Support Operations,* First Draft (March 1997) A copy was provided to the author by the U.K. army.
20. The manual notes that the concept of minimum force was introduced in the wake of the consequences of the bloodshed at Amritsar, India, in 1919. (p. 1–1).
21. United Kingdom, Army Field Manual, *Peace Support Operations*, pp. 1–2.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., p. 1-1.
26. Canada, "The Protection of our Security within a Stable Global Framework," in Canada in the World, Government Statement (Ottawa, 1995).
27. Canada, Department of National Defence, *Use of Force in CF, Joint and Combined Operations*, Advance Copy, Vol. 1 (B-GG-005-004/AF-005), NDHQ, April 13, 1995.
28. Ibid., pp. 2–5.
29. Canada, Department of National Defence, Chief Review Services: *Military Review 1/90, Peacekeeping Operations, Final Report* (Ottawa, April 15, 1992), p. v.
30. Canada, Department of National Defence, *Peacekeeping Operations*, B-GL-301-003/FP- 001 (NDHQ: September 15, 1995).
31. *Peacekeeping Operations*, CFP 301(3) (Ottawa, 1993).

32. International Peace Academy, *Peacekeeper's Handbook* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984).
33. Canada, Department of National Defence, *The Land Force in Peacekeeping Operations*, B-GL-301-003/FP-001, Operations Land and Tactical Air, Vol. 3, Peacekeeping Operations (Ottawa: NDHQ, September 15, 1995), p. i.
34. Ibid.
35. Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, p. 11.
36. Foreign Minister André Ouellet, when tabling Canada's report *Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations*, at the 50th General Assembly of the UN in New York, September 26, 1995; U.S. President Clinton in his 'Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World' address to the UN General Assembly, September 27, 1993; and so on.
37. Canada's report on a rapid reaction capability for the UN, tabled in the UN and in the House of Commons September 26, 1995, proposed the creation of a "vanguard corps", to allow the UN to assemble from member states a multifunctional group of up to 5000 combining military and civilian personnel to be rapidly deployable under the control of a new operational UN Headquarters upon authorization by the Security Council.
38. The expression used by l'abbé Pierre, commenting on the suffering in Sarajevo.
39. Supplement to *An Agenda for Peace*, January 1995, para. 77, p. 28.
40. Ibid., para. 79–80, p. 29. The Secretary-General's specific observation in this connection was that:

    > Much effort has been required between the Secretariat and NATO to work out procedures for the coordination of this unprecedented collaboration. This is not surprising given the two organizations' very different mandates and approaches to the maintenance of peace and security. Of greater concern...are the consequences of using force, other than for self-defence, in a peace-keeping context.
    >
    > The experience of the last few years has demonstrated both the value that can be gained and the difficulties that can arise when the Security Council entrusts enforcement tasks to groups of Member States. On the positive side, this arrangement provides the Organization with an enforcement capacity it would not otherwise have and is greatly preferable to the unilateral use of force by Member States without reference to the United Nations.

41. Shashi Tharoor's observation, at the 37th Annual Meeting of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, in Vienna, September 6–9, 1995, focused on military intervention and conflict resolution. Mr. Tharoor is the Special Assistant to the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peace-Keeping Operations.

42. Shashi Tharoor, ibid.
43. Shashi Tharoor, ibid., drawing on UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's speech to the 25th Vienna Seminar, "Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the Next Century", March 2, 1995, (Press release UNIS/SG/1310). This judgement is also implied in the Secretary-General's observations in the January 1995 Supplement to *An Agenda for Peace*, cited above.
44. Shashi Tharoor, ibid.
45. Shashi Tharoor, ibid.

CHAPTER THREE — LESSONS (BEING) LEARNED, AND ISSUES FOR POLICY

1. Again, this is not to dismiss the complexity of a number of earlier, classical peacekeeping operations, such as the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).
2. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention", *Foreign Policy*, Vol. 75, No. 2 (March/April 1996), pp. 70–85; Richard Haass, op. cit.; Terrence Lyons, and Ahmed I. Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995); Jennifer Morrison Taw and John E. Peters: *Operations Other Than War: Implications for the US Army* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995); Robert Oakley and David Bentley, "Peace Operations: A Comparison of Somalia and Haiti", *Strategic Forum*, No. 30, May 1995 (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, May 1995); Kenneth Allard, *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1995).
3. Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst: "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention", op. cit., p.78.
4. Ibid., p. 70.
5. Ibid., p. 75.
6. Taw and Peters, op. cit.
7. An important theme in these studies, the Taw and Peters study in particular, is that the conflict got to the point it did because of the nature and style of UN involvement. The aim of the UNITAF Operation was simply to provide forces and command and control to restore enough order to permit orderly food distribution. These limited goals were communicated to General Aideed. On this view, the hand-off to the United Nations in UNOSOM led to a far broader operation dedicated to nation building, disarmament, and

reforming civil governance, and to poor communications and conflict with the militia factions, leading to confusion and transformation of foreign military forces from benign operations to partisan participation in the Somali domestic conflict.

8. By analysts of the Somalia experience and other 'OOTW/Peace Operations', including Allard, op. cit., Clarke and Herbst, op. cit., Taw and Peters, op. cit., R.M. Connaughton, *Swords and Ploughshares: Coalition Operations, The Nature of Future Conflict and the United Nations* (Camberley, UK: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1993); Jonathan T. Dworken, *Rules of Engagement for Humanitarian Intervention and Low-Intensity Conflict: Lessons from Restore Hope.* (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, CRM-963-120, October 1993).
9. Which is not to say that these are the true measures of success in war, as U.S. experience in Vietnam demonstrated, for example. Success involves own objectives attained, and/or enemy objectives denied.
10. In confronting the Palestinians' *intifada*, the Israeli military authorities found that quality, highly trained combat troops, additionally trained for the specific tactical and political requirements of dealing with an uprising involving civilians, mainly youth, in populated areas, were required. These troops then needed a certain amount of retraining to recondition them for combat operations, after postings to anti-*intifada* duty. (Author's consultation with IDF General Daniel Rothschild, former Military Governor of the West Bank; also, Stuart Cohen, "How Did the Intifada Affect the IDF?" *Conflict Quarterly*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Summer 1994), pp.7–22).
11. The French General Staff ordered that French battalions posted to Bosnia be prepared to 'terrorize the terrorists' (snipers), equipping, and training marksmen with the MacMillan precision 12.7mm gun, fitted with laser range-finders, accurate to 1,100 m. Before leaving France, every marksman used 1000 cartridges in training.
12. Canada, Department of National Defence, Chief Review Services: *Military Review 1/90, Peacekeeping Operations, Final Report* (Ottawa, April 15, 1992), p. v/x. This issue is discussed at greater length below.
13. Donna Winslow, *A Socio-Cultural Inquiry into the Activities of the Canadian Airborne in Somalia*, preliminary report submitted to the Commission of Inquiry, October 1, 1995.
14. Though Dan Loomis asserts, in his book *The Somalia Affair* (op. cit, pp. 132–135), that there was a good grasp of "the essence of Somali society and culture, along with a willingness to adapt Canadian civil–military procedures to Somali realities". He cites in evidence an entry from the war diary for the Canadian Joint Task Force Somalia Headquarters covering the period 4–31

December 1992 (Document Book 23, Tab 22, War Diary Canadian Joint Task Force Somalia Headquarters, pp. 25–29. Exhibit P-72).

15. See also Clayton E. Beattie, "The International Peace Academy and the Development of Training for Peacekeeping", in Henry Wiseman, (ed.), *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Proposals* (New York: Pergamon Press for the International Peace Academy, 1983), pp. 203–217.
16. Robert Oakley and David Bentley, *Peace Operations: A Comparison of Somalia and Haiti*, Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Forum*, No. 30, May 1995 (Washington: National Defense University Press); Clarke and Herbst, op. cit.
17. Clarke and Herbst, op. cit., p. 84.
18. Loomis, op. cit., pp. 399–411.
19. "Executive Action: An Army Reserve Unit Guides Reconstruction of Postwar Bosnia — The 353rd's Bankers, Brokers Are as Essential to Peace as Bazookas and Bullets", *Wall Street Journal,* June 10, 1996, p. A1.
20. Allard, op. cit., p. 22.
21. General Eisenhower's phrase, quoted by Allard, op. cit., p. 22. The phrase attributed to General Eisenhower is "Plans are useless, but planning is essential".
22. Clarke and Herbst, op. cit., p. 73.
23. Ibid., p. 77.
24. Ibid., p. 73.
25. Ibid., p .73.
26. LCdr Guy R. Phillips, "Rules of Engagement: A Primer", *The Army Lawyer*, United States Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-248 (Department of the Army Headquarters, July 1993), p. 6.
27. Ibid., p. 27.
28. Ibid., p. 18.
29. Ibid., pp. 7–27; private interviews with defence and military authorities, including Ramsay Withers, former Commander, Canadian Forces Europe (CFE) and Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS); Richard Haass, U.S. President Bush's Deputy National Security Advisor; and G.A.S.C. Wilson, U.K. and NATO expert on ROE, among others.
30. Ibid.
31. High morale depends on a variety of factors other than doctrine, of course. Other factors would include leadership, fair and consistent discipline, recognition of and reward for outstanding performance, a sense of mission, and appreciation that a mission is worthwhile, etc.
32. Dan Loomis (op. cit., pp. 351–365 *passim*), reviewing evidence and testimony before the Commission of Inquiry, records ROE written and rewritten a number of times in haste. He notes that:

> ...the drafting exercise only started on December 7 when the CENTCOM ROE arrived with the returning liaison team and the NDHQ staff realized a set of national ROE, as opposed to the usual UN ROE, would be required almost immediately. Indeed, when the team returned on Monday, everyone began drafting ROE — the Airborne Regiment produced a pocket guide for soldiers and the Canadian Joint Task Force Headquarters (CJTF HQ) produced Commander's guidance for ROE. (op. cit., p. 351).

Loomis refers to a "shower of ROE", and judges that "confusion reigned" (p. 351).

33. Canada, Department of National Defence, Chief Review Services, op. cit. The overall aim was "to review the policies, practices and controls which are in place to enable the CF to undertake the planning, mounting, deployment, sustainment, redeployment and command and control of peacekeeping forces in an effective, efficient and economical manner", p. 1.
34. Ibid., p. v/x.
35. Ibid., p. vii/x.
36. Ibid., p. ix/x.
37. Ibid., p. 21, quoting Red Book Part I, para. 5.
38. Ibid., p. 22.
39. Ibid., p. 31.
40. Ibid., p. 32.
41. Ibid., p. 36.
42. Ibid., p. v/x.
43. Ibid., p. vi-vii/x. The DCDS response to this observation was essentially that the commander of a Canadian contingent's primary responsibility is to his force commander, under whose operational control he comes. Risk assessment on personal safety and weaponry is to be carried out by Canada prior to agreement to provide a contingent in question. Once deployed, Canada must have trust in the UN and its commanders.
However, Mats Berdal notes in *Whither UN Peacekeeping?*, Adelphi Paper No. 281 (London: Brasseys for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1993), note 77, p. 84, that although the UN does specify ROE for each mission,

> [I]t is only done in general terms. The tendency in current operations has been for individual contingents to interpret the rules in accordance with national military experience with a consequent divergence of practice among individual battalions.

44. This may be somewhat unfair as criticism. Until Somalia and Bosnia, the traditional approach seemed to work, and there undoubtedly is the attitude of "if it ain't broke don't fix it".

45. There is a view, especially in the army, expressed to the author on a number of occasions, that this situation also reflected the power of the air force and the navy (and, to a degree, armour) within the defence establishment. In this view, NDHQ was seen primarily as an organization geared to the procurement of equipment rather than the formulation of policy.
46. Joseph T. Jockel, *Canada and International Peacekeeping* (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies; Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994), p. 63.
47. *Speaking Points for the CDS/DM, Advice to the Minister: Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group Board of Inquiry— Assessment.* Assessment dated 7 October 93 by MGen J.E. Boyle, Head of the Somalia Working Group, p. 8 (Commission of Inquiry Document Book 44A Tab 8, Ref. No. P173.1). Whether the degree of blame of the Commander CFJS which is implied is justified or misplaced would be one of the elements of the overall findings of the Commission.
48. DND Brief for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *The Use of Force and the Rules of Engagement*, undated, p. 9.
49. Ibid., p. 10.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., p. 8.
52. Ibid., p. 13.
53. Ibid., listed at pp. 13–14.
54. Ibid., p. 14.
55. Mats Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping?*, Adelphi paper No. 281 (London: Brasseys for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1993), note 77, p. 84, cited above.
56. DND Brief for the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, *The Use of Force and the Rules of Engagement*, op. cit., p. 13.
57. It should be stressed, however, that in relation to the murder which took place in Somalia, the applicable rules should have been easily understood by 2 Commando. To quote John Keegan:

    > There are no circumstances, in any code of justice which the British Army recognizes, that justify the shooting of unarmed men, not convicted of capital crime by a court of law, who have fallen into one's power.

    From *A History of Warfare* (New York: Vintage, 1994), p. 54.
58. Mats Berdal, *Whither UN Peacekeeping?*, op. cit., p. 84.
59. For a range, see Gustav Däniker, *The Guardian Soldier: On the Nature and Use of Future Armed Forces* (New York: United Nations Institute for

Disarmament Research, 1995); Richard N. Haass, *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1994); Clarke and Herbst, op. cit.; Jonathan T. Howe, "The United States and United Nations in Somalia: The Limits of Involvement", *The Washington Quarterly,* Vol. 18, No. 3 (Summer 1995), pp. 49-62.

CHAPTER FOUR — THE HOME FRONT

1. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation", in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds. and trans.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948, p. 78). Weber wrote:

   What is a 'state'? Sociologically, the state cannot be defined in terms of its ends. There is scarcely any task that some political association has not taken in hand, and there is no task that one could say has always been exclusive and peculiar to those associations which are designated as political ones: today the state, or historically, those associations which have been the predecessors of the modern state. Ultimately, one can define the modern state sociologically only in terms of the specific *means* peculiar to it...[namely, the use of physical force].... Of course, force is not the normal or the only means of the state — nobody says that — but force is a means specific to the state. Today the relation between the state and violence is an especially intimate one. Today...we have to say that a state is human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.... the right to use physical force is ascribed to other institutions or to individuals only to the extent to which the state permits it. The state is considered the sole source of the 'right' to use violence.
2. Keegan, John, *The Mask of Command* (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 311.
3. Keegan notes on the subject of political–military relations in Rome in the second century B.C. that:

   There was no need to apply the *dilectus* to those assigned high rank in the legions since the Roman political system, at least until then, made it a condition of candidature for elective political office, leading to that of the ruling consulate, that young men of good birth must have first completed a statutory period of duty as a tribune, of which there were six to each legion; ten years of service, or ten campaigns, seem to have been the qualifying norm. In the later empire, and particularly during the military crises of the third century AD, the imposition of the qualification would lapse, but neither republic nor empire ever shed the view that right to rule was

ultimately legitimised by ability to command in the field.
Keegan, John, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1987), pp. 267–268.

4. In a variety of places, notably in "The Armed Forces as a Political Problem", in Michael Howard (ed.), *Soldiers and Governments: Nine Studies in Civil–Military Relations* (London: Eyre & Spottiswode, 1957), pp. 9–24.
5. William Windham, an 18th-century English statesman, portrayed the armed forces of the Crown as:
   A class of men set apart from the general mass of the community, trained to particular uses, formed to peculiar notions, governed by peculiar laws, marked by peculiar distinctions.
   Quoted in Michael Howard, *Soldiers and Governments*, op. cit., p .11.
6. See, for example, Michael Howard, *Soldiers and Governments*, op. cit.; Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil – Military Relations,* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981).
7. See, for example, Charles C. Moskos and F.R. Woods, (eds.), *The Modern Military: More Than Just a Job?* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988); Charles C. Moskos, "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization", *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 4, 1977, pp. 41–50.
8. There is a growing literature on this subject, under the headings of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA) and 'Information Warfare'. See "How Wars Are Fought Will Change Radically, Pentagon Planner Says" (*Wall Street Journal*, July 15, 1994), p. 1; Theodor W. Galdi, *Revolution in Military Affairs? Competing Concepts, Organizational Responses, Outstanding Issues*, CRS Report for Congress (Washington, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, December 11, 1995); United States Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, *New World Vistas: Air and Space Power for the 21st Century* (Washington, December 1995).
9. Howard, op. cit., p.11.
10. Which does not mean that orders (other than illegal orders) are to be debated rather than obeyed. Effectiveness and safety depend crucially on command being executed, fully and immediately.
11. LGen Sir John Winthrop Hackett's phrase in *The Profession of Arms* (London: The Times Publishing Company, 1962), p. 23.
12. A theme at the heart of John Keegan's *A History of Warfare,* op. cit.
13. See the writings of Huntington, Andreski, Janowitz, and Moskos, among others, listed in Annex A.
14. It is interesting to note that the former term tends to be used in air forces and navies, the latter in armies.

15. Anthony Kellett, *Combat Motivation: The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle* (Boston and The Hague: Kluwer-Nijhoff, 1982).
16. Kellett, op. cit., p. 112.
17. Ibid., p. 103.
18. See Keegan, Kellett, and Loomis, op. cit., for example.
19. Kellet, op. cit., pp. 333 *passim.*
20. S.A. Stouffer, et al., *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 101, 1949), quoted in Kellett, op. cit., p. 334.
21. Only the *National Defence Act* maintains provision for capital punishment (Part V, sections 73–80).
22. John Keegan, *A History of Warfare*, op. cit., p. 391.
23. See, for example, Leslie S. Laczko, "Canada's Pluralism in Comparative Perspective", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 17, No. 1, January 1994, pp. 20–41.
24. Data provided by Citizenship and Immigration Canada and by the Department of Canadian Heritage, and generally based on published and unpublished data from the 1991 census. Sources include: Canada, Department of Canadian Heritage, *Canadian Diversity: Some Facts and Figures* (February 1996); *Population Projections of Ethnic Groups, Canada, Provinces and Territories, 1991 to 2006* (Nordicity Group for Department of Canadian Heritage, March 1996).
25. See, among other recent treatments of this subject, Neil Nevitte, *The Decline of Deference: Canadian Value Change in Cross-National Perspective* (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1996), and the position paper for the 1994 Parliamentary Review of Foreign Policy prepared by John Ralston Saul on values and culture ("Culture and Foreign Policy", in Vol 3, Position Papers, *Report of the Special Joint Committee Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy* (Ottawa, 1994), pp. 83–118.
26. But this was less so in the case of the Canadian armed services, the navy and air force in particular, which remained oriented towards NATO and deterrence for many years after 1969, indeed, until the end of the Cold War.
27. Which, in the larger context of the period, may have been adequate enough. Dan Loomis, however, argues in his book *Not Much Glory: Quelling the FLQ* (Toronto: Deneau Publishers, 1984) and in his book on the Somalia affair (op. cit., chapter two, particularly) that it also related to a governmental and forces policy to reorient the land forces to deal with potential domestic unrest, in Quebec specifically.
28. The perspective offered is the author's, based on discussions with a number of former senior Canadian Forces and Defence officials, listed at p. 129. As

regards the isolation of units of the army, Gen Dextrase told Deputy Minister C.R. Nixon that he had moved the Airborne to Petawawa from Edmonton "in order to integrate them back into the Army" (related to the author by Mr. Nixon in discussions relating to this study).

29. Board of Inquiry, Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group, Phase I, Vol. XI, Annex C (19 July 1993), pp. 7–8.
30. Boyle, op. cit., p. 2.
31. Ibid., p. 3.
32. Winslow, op. cit., p. 12.
33. Ibid., p. 11. A variety of problems relating to organization, command and control have been alleged in relation to the Airborne and operations of the Airborne in Petawawa in the period prior to the Somalia deployment. These relate to the structure of the Airborne and regimental loyalties, to disturbed morale and weak authority, and the ways in which regimental loyalty, command, and careers have come to be structured.
34. Cf. Winslow (op. cit.), Bercuson (op. cit.), Loomis (op cit.).
35. Boyle, op cit., p 3.
36. Ibid., p. 9.
37. Ibid., p. 9.
38. As reported by Professor Winslow (op. cit.), for example, who noted that unlike other units, 2 Commando members patrolled on foot, bringing them into more direct contact with Somalis and exposing them to greater risk. According to Professor Winslow, their food and living arrangements were also particular sources of frustration.
39. Winslow, op. cit.
40. Bercuson, op. cit., pp. 1–2.
41. Again, the perspective offered is that of the author's, based on discussions with a number of former senior Canadian Forces and Defence officials, listed in Annex B.
42. For articulation of this view see Peter T. Haydon, "The Changing Nature of Canadian Civil–Military Relations in the Aftermath of the Cold War", in *The Soldier and the Canadian State: A Crisis in Civil–Military Relations?* proceedings of the Second Annual Conflict Studies Workshop, University of New Brunswick (Fredericton, NB: Centre for Conflict Studies, 1996), p. 51.
43. Peter C. Kasurak, "Civilianisation and the Military Ethos: Civil–Military Relations in Canada", *Canadian Public Administration*, Vol. 25, No. 1, Spring 1982, p. 109, quoted in Douglas Bland, "The Government of Canada and the Armed Forces: A Troubled Relationship", *The Soldier and the Canadian State: A Crisis in Civil–Military Relations?*, op. cit., p. 27.

44. Canadian Forces Headquarters (CFHQ) was the product of the integration, started in 1964, of the three service HQs, each under its own Chief of Staff, into a single HQ under a single Chief of the Defence Staff. CFHQ as such lasted only eight or nine years (1964-1972/3) when the integration of military and civil staffs under the CDS and Deputy Minister took place in National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ).
45. Douglas Bland, op cit., p. 30.
46. Ibid., p. 32.
47. Expressed to a degree in David Bercuson's book (op. cit.), which reflects views held by a number of members of the Forces consulted by Bercuson. The view that the murder in Somalia is the product of a weakened, corrupted military ethos and command system is a principal theme of the book.
48. Again, expressed in Bercuson's book, and in a range of military writing.
49. Bercuson, op cit., p. vii.
50. A view strongly held by the senior officers and officials interviewed by the author.
51. Edward Dorn, *10 Ways to Look at the Department of Defense*. Remarks by Edward Dorn, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Washington, March 25, 1995. Published as Vol. 10, No. 36 of the Department of Defense's *Defense Issues* series, p. 1.
52. See Peter W. Hogg, *Constitutional Law of Canada*, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1996), chapter 13, "Extraterritorial Competence", and chapter 34, "Application of Charter".
53. Board of Inquiry, Canadian Airborne Regiment Battle Group, Statement by the Board, op. cit., p. 9.

CHAPTER FIVE — CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

1. Aristotle some 2,300 years ago identified four categories of causation. Using the example of the building of a house, Aristotle distinguished between the *material* cause (the stone and brick used in the building); the *efficient* cause (the activity of the builder); the formal cause (the architect's plan); and the *final* cause (the purpose to which all the activity is directed).
2. With regard to the introduction of change, Gen Sir John Hackett observed, in *The Profession of Arms*, that:

   > ...it is the business of those in responsible positions in our armed forces today to see that modification of structure to correspond to a changing pattern in society is facilitated, while careful attention is paid to the preservation of what is worth preserving. Hackett, op. cit., p. 58.

3. Canada, Department of National Defence: *1996–97 Estimates: Expenditure Plan, Government of Canada, Part III* (Ottawa, 1996), p. 34.

4. Ibid. There is a danger in overusing or misusing the term, thereby suggesting that DND is to be thought of principally as a business-engineering enterprise, whose head is naturally a CEO.
5. As evidenced by the development and publications of the new Field Manuals referred to earlier in this study, the creation of service and inter-service centres for the study and analysis of the new missions, and so on.
6. Operations research experts met January 28–30, 1997, at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida to develop analysis and modeling techniques for OOTW. Ten areas were investigated: situational awareness; impact analysis; mission definition and measures of effectiveness (MOEs); force planning and force design; determining mobility requirements; course of action (COA) development and analysis; transition planning/data tracking; communications analysis; cost analysis; and information availability/ analysis. (Military Operations Research Symposium (MORS) Workshop Agenda, 16 December 1996, and author's discussion with participating experts).
7. Richard N. Haass, "Using Force: Lessons and Choices for U.S. Foreign Policy", in Chester A. Crocker, and Fen Osler Hampson with Patricia Aall (eds.), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p. 197.
8. Canada, 1*994 Defence White Paper*, op. cit., pp. 31–33.
9. Ibid., p. 29.

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APPENDIX A

Charter of the United Nations — Excerpts

JUNE 15, 1945

CHAPTER 1: PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES

Article 1 The Purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.

Article 2

The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1, shall act in accordance with the following Principles.

1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII....

CHAPTER VI: PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

Article 33

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiations, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.

Article 34

The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

Article 35

1. Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly.
2. A state which is not a Member of the United Nations may bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purposes of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter.
3. The proceedings of the General Assembly in respect of matters brought to its attention under this Article will be subject to the provisions of Articles 11 and 12.

Article 36

1. The Security Council may, at any stage of a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 or of a situation of like nature, recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.
2. The Security Council should take into consideration any procedures for the settlement of the dispute which have already been adopted by the parties.
3. In making recommendations under this Article the Security Council should also take into consideration that legal disputes should as a general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

Article 37

1. Should the parties to a dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 fail to settle it by the means indicated in that Article, they shall refer it to the Security Council.
2. If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of settlement as it may consider appropriate.

Article 38

Without prejudice to the provisions of Articles 33 to 37, the Security Council may, if all the parties to any dispute so request, make recommendations to the parties with a view to a pacific settlement of the dispute.

CHAPTER VII: ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE, BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION

Article 39

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Article 40

In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.

Article 41

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

Article 42

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international

peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance \with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

Article 44

When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfillment of the obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.

Article 45

In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they are members.

Article 49

The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which

finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Article 51

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.

CHAPTER VIII: REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.
4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

APPENDIX B

*Key Principles for the Selection of Multilateral Peace Missions**

General Considerations. Canada's extensive experience with multilateral operations has led us to identify certain characteristics in the purpose, design, and operational conduct of a mission that enhance its prospects for success. These missions should address genuine threats to international peace and security (as, for example, in the Gulf or the former Yugoslavia) or emerging humanitarian tragedies (such as the situations in Somalia and Rwanda). They must not become ends in themselves; they must be part of a comprehensive strategy to secure long-term, realistic, and achievable solutions (such as the UN's operations in Central America).

The design of all missions should reflect certain key principles:

- There be a clear and enforceable mandate.
- There be an identifiable and commonly accepted reporting authority.
- The national composition of the force be appropriate to the mission, and there be an effective process of consultation among missions partners.
- In missions that involve both military and civilian resources, there be a recognized focus of authority, a clear and efficient division of responsibilities, and agreed operating procedures.
- With the exception of enforcement actions and operations to defend NATO member states, in missions that involve Canadian personnel, Canada's participation be accepted by all parties to the conflict.

Canada's experience—which encompasses UN, NATO, and other multilateral undertakings—also suggests that successful missions are those that respect certain essential operational considerations:

- The size, training and equipment of the force be appropriate to the purpose at hand, and remain so over the life of the mission.

- There be a defined concept of operations, an effective command and control structure, and clear rules of engagement.

* From 1994 Defence White Paper, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, pp. 28-29.

APPENDIX C

Current Canadian Contribution to Peacekeeping Operations

As of December 1, 1995, more than 1,400 personnel were deployed in 13 missions, making Canada the ninth-largest troop contributor (after France, the United Kingdom, the United States, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Norway and the Russian Federation).

Country	*Operation*	*Canadian(s)*	*Began*	*Ends*
India, Pakistan (Kashmir)	UNMOGIP	Aircraft	1949	Indefinite
Korea	UNCMAC	1	1953	Indefinite
Middle East	UNTSO	13	1954	Indefinite
Cyprus	UNFICYP	2	1964	Dec. 31, 1995
Syria (Golan)	UNDOF	216	1974	May 31, 1995 (renewable)
Sinai	MFO (non UN)	28	1986	Indefinite
Iraq-Kuwait	UNIKOM	4	1991	Indefinite
Iraq	UNSCOM	3	1991	Indefinite
Former Yugoslavia	UNPF	262	1992	Jan. 31, 1996
Cambodia	CMAC	12	1992	Indefinite
Haiti	UNMIH	550	1993	Feb. 16, 1996
Rwanda	UNAMIR	110	1993	Dec. 12, 1995
Guatemala	MINUGUA	2	1994	Mar, 28,1996

India, Pakistan	Since 1949, Canada has provided aircraft to assist in the twice-yearly movements between India and Pakistan of personnel in the UN (Kashtnir) Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Until 1979, Canada also provided military observers.
Korea	Canada contributes to the UN Command Military Armistice Commission (UNCMAC), established in 1953.
Middle East	In 1954, Canada joined the UN Truce Supervision Operation (UNTSO), which was established in 1948 to supervise the ceasefire and the general armistice between Israel and Egypt, and between Israel and Lebanon-Syria.
Cyprus	The UN Peacekeeping Force In Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established in 1964 to maintain law and order. Canada currently provides two military personnel to UNFICYP headquarters. This mission is financed by contributions from Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
Syria (Golan)	In 1974 the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) was established to supervise the cease-fire and the redeployment Israeli and Syrian forces. The Canadian contingent to UNDOF provides logistical, technical and communications support.
Sinai	A non-UN mission, Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) monitors adherence to the 1979 Camp David Accord, a tripartite agreement among Egypt, Israel and the United States. Canada has participated in MFO since 1986.
Iraq, Kuwait	Since April 1991, a Canadian team of military observers has served with the UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), stationed in the demilitarized zone on the Iraq-Kuwait border.
Iraq	Canada joined the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) in April 1991 to inspect and, if necessary, destroy Iraq's biological and chemical weapons.

Former Yugoslavia

Since March 1992, Canada has contributed one of the largest contingents to the UN forces in the former Yugoslavia. Currently, some 262 Canadian troops serve with the UN Peace Forces (UNPF) in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Canada has also served under the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR); the UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO); and UN Preventive Deployment (UNPREDEP), to prevent civil war in Macedonia.

Cambodia

Within the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), Canada provides 12 personnel to train Cambodians in demining techniques and safety standards as well as management and decision-making skills to support de-mining operations.

Haiti

The United Nations Mission In Haiti (UNMIH) was established in June 1993. The most recent deployment was in March 1995, when Canada sent 100 police officers and 450 military personnel to Haiti to help the government sustain a secure and stable environment; to professionalize the Haitian army; and to create a separate police force.

Rwanda

The UN Observer Mission in Uganda-Rwanda, in operation since June 1993, has been incorporated into the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), which was established in September 1993 to assist the interim government with transition measures leading to elections. A Canadian, Major-General Romeo Dallaire, led the mission during violence in Rwanda in early 1994. The mission is now led by Major-General Guy Tousignant, also a Canadian. There are 110 Canadian personnel now serving in Rwanda.

Guatemala

The United Nations Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) checks to see that the Agreement on Human Rights between the Government of Guatemala and the opposing rebel group is carried out. MINUGUA also co-operates with and helps strengthen institutions working for the protection of human rights in the country; and it verifies aspects of the Agreement on Identity and Human Rights of the Indigenous People.

MAJOR TROOP CONTRIBUTORS TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
(UN FIGURES TO NOV. 30, 1995)

France	8,115	Russian Federation	1,764
United Kingdom	4,976	Canada	1,406
United States	3,254	Poland	1.294
Pakistan	2,418	Sweden	1,283
India	2,084	Spain	1,266
Bangladesh	2,062	Turkey	1,177
Norway	1,791	Nepal	1.159

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS OVER THE YEARS AND CANADA'S CONTRIBUTION
(Note: Bold type indicates Canada is still contributing)

Country or Area	Short Form of Mission Name	Duration	Size of Mission	Maximum Canadian Contribution	Name of Operation and Mandate
Balkans	UNISCOB	1947-1951	Not Available	0	United Nations Special Committee On the Balkans.Observe whether Greece, Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia are complying with UN recommendations.
Korea	UNTCOK	1947-1948	30	2	United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea.Supervise elections in South Korea.
India, Pakistan (Kashmir)	**UNMOGIP**	**1949-Present**	**102**	**27**	**UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. (Kashmir) Supervise ceasefire between India and Pakistan.**
Korea	**UNCMAC**	**1953-Present**	**Not Available**	**1**	**UN Command Military Armistice Commission. Supervise 1953 armistice.**

Country or Area	Short Form of Mission Name	Duration	Size of Mission	Maximum Canadian Contribution	Name of Operation and Mandate
Middle East	**UNTSO**	**1948-Present**	**572**	**22**	**UN Truce supervision Organization. Supervise 1948 ceasefire and subsequent armistice and peace.**
Indochina	ICSC	1954-1974	400	133	International Commission for Supervision and Control (Non-UN mission) Supervise withdrawal of French forces.
Egypt	UNEF	1956-1967	6,073	1,007	United Nations Emergency Force. Supervise withdrawal of French, British and Israeli forces from
Sinai. Lebanon	UNOGIL	1958	590	77	UN Observation Group in Lebanon. Ensure safety of Lebanese borders.
Congo	ONUC	1960-1964	19,828	421	UN Operation in the Congo. Maintain law and order.

Country or Area	Short Form of Mission Name	Duration	Size of Mission	Maximum Canadian Contribution	Name of Operation and Mandate
West New Guinea	UNSF	1962-1963	1,500	13	UN Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian). Maintain peace and security for UN Temporary Executive Authority.
Yemen	UNYOM	1963-1965	190	36	UN Yemen Observation Mission. Monitor cessation of Saudi Arabian support and withdrawal of Egyptian forces.
Cyprus	**UNFICYP**	**1964-Present**	**6,410**	**1,126**	**UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus. Maintain law and order.**
Dominican Republic	DOMREP	1965-1966	3	1	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General. Observe cease-fire and withdrawal of OAS forces.
India, Pakistan	UNIPOM	1965-1966	160	112	UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission Supervise ceasefire.

Country or Area	Short Form of Mission Name	Duration	Size of Mission	Maximum Canadian Contribution	Name of Operation and Mandate
Nigeria	OTN	1968-1969	12	2	Observe Team to Nigeria. (non-UN mission) Supervise ceasefire.
Egypt, Israel	UNEF II	1973-1979	6,973	1,145	UN Emergency Force II. Supervise deployment of Israeli and Egyptian forces.
South Vietnam	ICCS	1973	1,200	248	International Commission for Control and Supervision. (non-UN mission) Supervise Truce.
Syria(Golan)	**UNDOF**	**1974-Present**	**1,340**	**230**	**UN Disengagement Observer Force.** **Supervise ceasefire and redeployment of Israeli and Syrian forces.**
Lebanon	UNIFIL	1978-Present	5,900	117	UN Interim Force in Lebanon. Confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces.

Country or Area	Short Form of Mission Name	Duration	Size of Mission	Maximum Canadian Contribution	Name of Operation and Mandate
Sinai	**MFO**	**1986-Present**	**2,700**	**140**	**Multinational Force and Observers (non-UN mission). Prevent violation of Camp David Accord.**
Afghanistan	UNGOMAP	1988-1990	50	5	UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Confirm withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.
Iran, Iraq	UNIIMOG	1988-1991	845	525	UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group. Supervise ceasefire and forces' withdrawal.
Angola	UNAVEM	1989-1991	70	0	UN Angola Verification Mission.Monitor Cuban troop withdrawal.
Namibia	UNTAG	1989-1990	4,500	301	UN Transition Assistance Group, Namibia. Assist in transition to independence.

Country or Area	Short Form of Mission Name	Duration	Size of Mission	Maximum Canadian Contribution	Name of Operation and Mandate
Nicaraqua	ONUVEN	1989	Not Available	5	UN Observer Mission for the Verification of the Electoral Process in Nicaragua.
Central America	ONUCA	1989-1992	1,000	174	UN Observer Group in Central America. Verify compliance to Esquipulas Agreement.
Afghanistan, Pakistan	OSGAP	1990-1993	10	1	Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Provide military advisory unit.
Haiti	ONUVEH	1990-1991	65	11	UN Observers for the Verification of Elections in Haiti. Monitor 1990 Elections.
Iraq, Kuwait	**UNIKOM**	**1991-Present**	**1,440**	**301**	**UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission. Monitor demilitarized zone.**

Country or Area	Short Form of Mission Name	Duration	Size of Mission	Maximum Canadian Contribution	Name of Operation and Mandate
Iraq	**UNSCOM**	**1991-Present**	**175**	**9**	**UN Special Commission. Inspect and, if necessary, destroy Iraq's biological and chemical weapons.**
Angola	UNAVEM II	1991-1994	350	15	UN Angola Verification Mission. Monitor ceasefire.
Western Sahara	MINURSO	1991-Present	375	34	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. Monitor ceasefire.
El Salvador	ONUSAL	1991-1995	622	55	UN Observer Mission in El Salvador. Monitor human rights, progress toward military reform, peace.
Balkans	ECMM	1991-Present	300	15	European Community Monitor Mission (non-UN mission). Monitor ceasefires.
Cambodia	UNAMIC	1991-1992	Not Available	103	UN Advance Mission in Cambodia. Monitor ceasefire and establish mine awareness.

Country or Area	Short Form of Mission Name	Duration	Size of Mission	Maximum Canadian Contribution	Name of Operation and Mandate
Cambodia	UNTAC	1992-1993	19,200	240	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia. Provide communications and logistical support, establish mine awareness and monitor disarmament.
Cambodia	**CMAC**	**1992-Present**	**1,600**	**12**	**Cambodian Mine Action Center.**
South Africa	UNOMSA	1992	60	0	Un Observer Mission in South Africa. Observe pre-election period. (Staffed by UN personnel only)
Former Yugoslavia	**UNPF (UNPRO FOR, UNCRO, UNPREDEP)**	**1992-Present**	**24,000**	**2,400**	**UN Protection Force. Provide aid in Bosnia-Herzegovina; observe, patrol and clear mines in Croatia; and prevent civil war in Macedonia.**
Mozambique	ONUMOZ	1992-1995	7,500	15	UN Operation in Mozambique. Provide security, monitor de-mining and ceasefires.

Country or Area	Short Form of Mission Name	Duration	Size of Mission	Maximum Canadian Contribution	Name of Operation and Mandate
Somalia	UNOSOM	1992-1993	Not available	12	UN Operation in Somalia. Headquarters personnel.
Somalia	UNITAF	1992-1993	30,800	1,410	United Task Force. Disbribute relief supplies.
Somalia	UNOSOM II	1993-1995	Not available	9	UN Operations in Somalia. Disbribute relief supplies.
Haiti	**UNMIH**	**1993-Present**	**6,800**	**600**	**UN Mission in Haiti. Implement the Governors Island Agreement.**
Georgia	UNOMIG	1993-Present	135	0	UN Observer Mission in Georgia. Monitor ceasefire agreement and investigate violations.
Liberia	UNOMIL	1993-Present	303	0	UN Observer Mission in Liberia. Monitor implementation of peace agreement.

Country or Area	Short Form of Mission Name	Duration	Size of Mission	Maximum Canadian Contribution	Name of Operation and Mandate
Rwanda, Uganda	UNOMUR	1993-1994	100	3	UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda. Verify that military supplies do not cross border into Rwanda.
Rwanda	**UNAMIR**	**1993-Present**	**5,900**	**430**	**UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda. Assist interim government with transition measures leading to elections.**
Chad	UNASOG	1994	Not Available	0	UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group. Monitor withdrawal of Libyan administration.
Tadjikistan	UNMOT	1994	17	0	UN Mission in Tadjikistan. Assist implementation of ceasefire.
Guatemala	**MINUGUA**	**1994-present**	**339**	**2**	**UN Human Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala. Verify implementation of human rights agreements and help strengthen human rights institutions.**

The Somalia Experience in Strategic Perspective: Implications for the Military in a Free and Democratic Society

Berel Rodal

This study aims to establish the broader strategic framework for the Commission's undertaking. It provides an overview of the developments in the international and domestic environment which affect the demands for and on the armed forces of Canada and other democracies, and the government's and the public's expectations of the armed forces, drawing the broad implications for governmental, defence and military policy. The author believes that the Somalia experience, including the reactions of Canadians, invites reflection on the new strategic environment, and on Canada's purposes and options; on the dimensions and significance for the armed forces of societal change, and of evolving concepts of rights and their ambit; and on the rationale and conditions for maintaining and employing armed forces on the cusp of the 21st century.

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Canadian Forces to Somalia

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