CONTENTS

3 EDITOR’S CORNER
4 LETTER TO THE EDITOR

DEFENCE PROCUREMENT
5 Understanding Defence Procurement
   by Charles Davies

STRATEGIC PLANNING
16 Being ‘Left of Bang,’ or Proactive: The Future Place of Capacity Building in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces
   by Peter J. Williams

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
25 The Art of Being a Soldier-Diplomat ~ From an Implicit Role to an Explicit Function
   by Francis Clermont

GREEN/SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE BUILDING
36 An Investigation into Sustainable Building Evaluation Strategies for Use within the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence
   by Nicholas Vlachopoulos and Tina Basso

CANADIAN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
44 Past, Present, and Future: The Evolution of Canadian Foreign Intelligence in a Globalized World
   by Michael Tierney

VIEWS AND OPINIONS
55 Leadership by Example: What makes a good (or bad) squadron commander?
   by Bill Carr
58 From Tripoli to Bamako, in the Wake of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb…
   by Charles Branchaud

COMMENTARY
65 BOOK REVIEWS

Canadian Military Journal / Revue militaire canadienne is the official professional journal of the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence. It is published quarterly under authority of the Minister of National Defence. Opinions expressed or implied in this publication are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Armed Forces, Canadian Military Journal, or any agency of the Government of Canada. Crown copyright is retained. Articles may be reproduced with permission of the Editor, on condition that appropriate credit is given to Canadian Military Journal. Each issue of the Journal is published simultaneously in print and electronic versions; it is available on the Internet at www.journal.forces.gc.ca.

ISSN 1492-465X
Editor-in-Chief
David L. Bashow
(613) 541-5010 ext. 6148
bashow-d@rmc.ca

Translation
Translation Bureau, Public Works and Government Services Canada

Publication Manager
Claire Chartrand
(613) 541-5010 ext. 6837
claire.chartrand@rmc.ca

Commentary
Martin Shadwick

Editorial Advisor
Michael Boire

Oversight Committee
Chairman
Major-General J.G.E. Tremblay, Commander, Canadian Defence Academy (CDA)

Members
Mr. David L. Bashow, Editor-in-Chief, Canadian Military Journal (CMJ)
Colonel Marty Courmoyer, representing Chief of the Air Staff (CAS)
Dr. H.J. Kowal, Principal, Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC)
Commander Hugues Canuel, representing Chief of the Maritime Staff (CMS)

Brigadier-General A.D. Meinzinger, Commandant Royal Military College of Canada (RMCC)
Major Andrew Godfroy, representing Chief of Staff Land Strategy
Colonel Mark Gendron, Director Canadian Forces Military Law Centre (CFMLC), Canadian Defence Academy (CDA)
Ms. Hanya Soliman, representing Chief of the Defence Intelligence (CDI)

Editorial Board
Dr. Douglas Bland
Major (ret’d) Michael Boire
Major Sylvain Chalifour
Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Douglas Delaney
Dr. Rocky J. Dwyer
Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) Michael Goodspeed
Major-General (ret’d) Daniel Gosselin
Major John Grodzinski
Dr. David Hall
Professor Michael Hennessy
Colonel Bernd Horn
Professor Hamish Ion
Philippe Lagassé
Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) David Last
Dr. Chris Madsen
Dr. Sean Maloney
Professor Brian McKercher
Dr. Paul Mitchell
Dr. Nezih Mrad
Dr. Scot Robertson
Professor Stéphane Roussel
Chief Warrant Officer C.J. Thibault
Colonel (ret’d) Randall Wakelam

NOTE TO READERS
As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations are translated from their original language, the abbreviation [TOQ] at the end of the note, which stands for “translation of original quote”, indicates to the readers that the original citation can be found in the published version of the Journal in the other official language.
Welcome to the Spring 2015 edition of the Canadian Military Journal. Given that it is the Spring edition, the birds should be chirping and the grass greening up, but that is far from the case as I pen these words in late-January. The majority of the Great White North remains within the icy grasp of Winter, which shows no signs of abating. Oh well… At least the nose-diving oil prices have helped some of our fine citizens cope with the heating bills for a little less coin of the realm.

Quite a variety of articles and opinion pieces this time out… Leading off, defence procurement expert Charles Davies takes a critical look at the factors that determine what equipment or capability is required in a given circumstance, and then he tackles the acquisition or procurement process itself. Davies concludes that the process is “…subject to a number of complex and largely immutable factors, irrespective of the business model employed,” and that while the objective of his article was not to advocate for a particular solution, but rather, it was “…to explain the wider context of defence procurement and describe its underlying machinery with a view to encouraging a better informed debate.”

Next, Colonel Peter Williams of Canada’s Strategic Joint Staff argues that fiscal realities and the ever-changing global geo-political environment require Canada’s military to take a hard look at the way it foresees doing business in future. Defence ‘belt tightening’ by both Canada and its allies is now a way of life, and Williams opines that capacity building, the training of foreign militaries to better enable a given nation facing a crisis “…to build up its own indigenous forces before such an event occurs rather than having to send in our own (i.e., Canada’s) forces after the fact might be the answer. His specific aim is to “…examine the extent to which military capacity building should become a key and explicitly-stated mission for the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in future.” Williams is followed by military educator Francis Clermont, who reviews the ongoing transformation process of the Canadian Non-Commissioned Members Professional Development system, and therein, “…demonstrates the necessity for the institution to further develop and incorporate more cognitive, intellectual, and communication skills and competencies in its common and fundamental Professional Development (PD) training and education system to reflect the nature of the tasks CAF members are called upon to carry out as professional soldiers.”

On an entirely different subject, Nicholas Vlachopoulos and Tina Basso offer a critical analysis of what would be considered “…appropriate green building/sustainable development strategies for new construction and large renovation projects, and to examine their suitability for the CAF and the DND.” In so doing, the authors review the unique nature of the CAF and its Sustainable Development (SD) policies, determine relevant SD factors, establish an SD framework, identify areas for improvement of SD infrastructure, address shortcomings, and propose a sustainable building protocol. Specifically, they also call for the creation of a “DND-specific Sustainable Building Strategy,” to be used when designing policy, and not just “…for the design of infrastructure itself.”

The last of our major articles comes from a civilian postgraduate student, Michael Tierney, who revisits the decades-old debate as to whether Canada should “…establish a foreign intelligence agency which collects human intelligence (HUMINT) similar to the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), or the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS). Tierney maintains that his purpose herein “…is to examine Canada’s previous and current foreign intelligence capabilities, and to analyze how Canadian foreign intelligence has changed and will continue to change in the future.”

Two very different opinion pieces in this issue… Lieutenant-General Bill Carr, a very distinguished Second World War veteran who later became the first Commander of Air Command, graces our pages with what character traits he believes are the embodiment of superior Air Force leaders at the squadron command level. General Carr also offers his opinions as to what, based upon his considerable personal experience obtained both under fire and in peacetime, constitutes bad leadership. Sic itur ad astra… The final opinion piece was written by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Branchaud, currently J5 Plans Africa at Joint Operations Command Headquarters, recounting his personal experiences and impressions of what was happening in the area when he served in Tripoli, Libya, in support of the regional Defence Attaché in 2011 and 2012 in the wake of the Arab Spring.

Our resident defence commentator, Martin Shadwick, is taking a very brief hiatus this time out, but he will be back in full force and fine form for the Summer issue. Finally, as usual, we close with a number of book reviews for our readers’ recommended consideration.

Until the next time.

David L. Bashow
Editor-in-Chief
Canadian Military Journal
The article by Major Patrick Perron in the Autumn 2014 issue (Vol. 14, No. 4) entitled *Space Weather Situational Awareness and Its Effects upon a Joint, Interagency, Domestic, and Arctic Environment* is timely. Our growing concern about Arctic shipping and Russian aggressiveness demand more consideration of matters concerning the High Arctic, including radio communications.

Major Perron may wish to know about the weekly report on solar activity and radio communication effects that is published by the American Radio Relay League (ARRL). It is quite extensive, and includes both past and predicted solar activity, as well as speculation by experienced amateur radio operators on likely future effects. Access can be had at http://arrl.org/bulletins, for both members and non-members of the ARRL.

Charles Hooker  
Major (ret’d)  
Royal Canadian Corps of Signals
Understanding Defence Procurement

by Charles Davies

Colonel (ret’d) Charles Davies is a former logistics officer who served for four years as the strategic planning director for the Materiel Group of the Department of National Defence (DND), and for three years as the senior director responsible for materiel acquisition and support policy in the department. Between 2010 and 2012, he also chaired the Main Group of the NATO Committee AC/327, which is responsible for strengthening standardization and interoperability in systems life cycle management among the Alliance, member nations, and partners. He retired in 2013 following a 42-year military and public service career.

Introduction

There is a view in many quarters that defence procurement is ‘broken,’ or at least in need of significant reform, and various solutions have been proposed to fix it. There is also, however, a contrary view that defence procurement is functioning exactly as intended, with appropriate checks and balances in place to ensure proper consideration of operational, economic, industrial, social, political, and other relevant factors in decisions. Those who hold to this perspective say that any adjustments that may be required are incremental, and the current government is essentially taking this latter approach under its Defence Procurement Strategy.

Unfortunately, much of the debate is not well-informed about the fundamental nature of defence procurement, and how it forms an essential, integral element of the wider Defence Program. It is also not well understood that the problems typically highlighted by critics have two very different aspects: the quality of decision-making within the procurement machinery; and the effectiveness and efficiency of the machinery itself. Both good and bad decisions can come out of either good or bad machinery, but experience suggests that bad machinery will tend to push an organization more frequently towards bad decisions than good, and will certainly make reaching and executing all decisions more difficult, time-consuming, and expensive.

This lack of awareness of machinery issues is perhaps understandable because Government of Canada (GoC) procurement mechanisms are an opaque mystery to most people, and even those working inside them can find them a bewildering maze. Nevertheless, understanding the machinery is key to any successful reform of defence procurement. Accordingly, the primary focus of this article is the machinery of defence procurement, with a view to encouraging a better informed discussion of how to improve outcomes.

To add further complexity, it is also necessary to begin the discussion by making a distinction between two major activities that come together in the execution of defence procurement: determining what capability or equipment will be acquired; and the acquisition process itself. Although these two things often run concurrently, and frequently intersect, they are, in fact, distinct processes involving different considerations. Much of the public debate tends to surround the first activity, challenging the basic requirement in the context of other national priorities, debating cost estimates, or challenging the selected solution. Although important, this is not where the real systemic problems are to be found. However, it is an appropriate point of departure for discussion.
Determining Requirements

Nations have infinitely scalable options in terms of the defence capabilities they elect to acquire, maintain, and employ. They range from full combat capabilities across the air-land, maritime, cyber, and space environments, to the simple maintenance of domestic constabulary forces, or even no defence forces at all. Modern defence capabilities are invariably complex, and, once established, they require sustained investment to maintain. They are easy to lose, either by deliberate policy decision or through neglect, and very difficult and expensive to resurrect once lost. Governments and capability planners therefore must take a very long-term view when deciding which ones to build and sustain, and which ones to eliminate.

They receive plenty of advice on this from widely divergent sources with similarly diverse points of view. That advice reflects various levels of thought and analysis, from uninformned opinion, to well-researched, peer-reviewed academic studies. Ultimately, however, it is the government of the day that determines, in competition with other national priorities, its level of ambition for acquiring and maintaining defence capabilities.

Under the National Defence Act, the Minister of National Defence (MND) is responsible for deciding what equipment will be issued to the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). In other words, the Minister theoretically has exclusive authority to define the requirement, and is the approval authority for the technical and operational aspects of a given procurement. In practice though, a number of other government decision mechanisms constrain this authority, and for major acquisitions the final decision on what equipment to buy will normally be taken by Cabinet on the basis of many considerations. Advice will, of course, be provided to ministers by military planners and departmental officials, but there may also be consultations with other interested parties and advisors. The current government has stated its intent to further strengthen the mechanisms supporting such wider deliberations in several ways, including establishment within DND of a third-party challenge function for military requirements. These broader inputs to decision-making reflect the fact that major defence procurements are always highly politicized.

The advice ministers receive from defence officials is developed within a Capability-Based Planning system grounded in a set of standard force planning scenarios that reflect what are considered to be the most likely range of military mission tasks over the planning period, given our current understanding of global and domestic trends. These scenarios are developed and maintained by the Chief of Force Development in consultation with academic, scientific, policy, and military experts. They are used to support analysis of the relative value of potential investments in maintaining, updating, or acquiring defence capabilities (i.e., is 'Capability A' of greater value across a range of mission scenarios than 'Capability B'?). Not surprisingly, given the relatively small size of the CAF and many different kinds of possible future mission tasks, multi-role platforms will often be considered to provide the most cost-effective solutions for Canada.

In addition to the application of the professional judgement of experienced CAF commanders and staff to its requirements analysis, DND tries to assure rigour and objectivity in its methodology by applying advanced Operations Research tools and a comprehensive and growing simulation capability to it, particularly for major platforms. These tools are continuing to develop in sophistication as the supporting technologies mature and lessons are learned from the operational and acquisition program experiences of Canada and other nations.

Finally, and despite what may seem to be implied in recent controversies surrounding certain acquisition programs, DND also takes a comprehensive approach to determining the cost of acquiring and sustaining defence capabilities in order to assure their long-term affordability within the assigned budget envelope, which is not infinite. The requirement to determine the full life cycle costs of any proposed acquisition is mandated by Treasury Board, and it is well established in departmental policy. The policy is supported by a number of guides and manuals designed to assist project sponsors in preparing sound, defensible estimates to support decision making. Here again, DND continues to refine and strengthen its costing policies and mechanisms.

Notwithstanding the very significant effort DND makes to put objective, fact-based foundations under its requirements analyses and recommendations, it remains an imperfect science because it is a forward-looking process, and the future can never be accurately predicted. Also, there will always be many views on what the future will hold, and precisely what defence solutions will be needed. These views are shaped by diverse individual experiences, interests, and perspectives. Consequently, Canadian governments will never have unanimous support for their decisions on major defence capability acquisitions. No Western nation ever does.

Defence Materiel Context

Defence procurement is an important strategic Government of Canada activity that is, nevertheless, but one component of a broader program designed around the support of military operations and the full end-to-end life cycle management of defence materiel assets. As defined in the Treasury Board Policy on the Management of Materiel, life cycle management is the "... effective and efficient management of assets along the entire continuum from the identification of a requirement to the disposal and replacement of the asset acquired to meet the requirement. The phases of life cycle management include assessing requirements; analyzing options; planning acquisition; acquiring; operating, using, and maintaining; and disposing and replacing." The objective of the policy is "...that materiel be managed by departments in a sustainable and financially responsible manner that supports the cost-effective and efficient delivery of government programs."
A key tenet of the policy is that decisions are taken on the basis of a whole-life view of the equipment, and full life-cycle cost implications are properly considered right from the point of planning for the acquisition. The intent is to avoid making decisions, based upon a primarily short-term view. For example, what might be considered a good decision in an acquisition project to adopt a particular technical solution that enables the system to be delivered on time and on budget could be a bad decision from a full life cycle perspective if another solution with higher up-front costs would have been significantly cheaper to operate, and thus, had a lower lifetime cost of ownership.

The Policy on the Management of Materiel is especially important to DND as its defence materiel business represents a large, core element of the Defence Program. It is also important to the government as DND is its largest materiel manager. The Department manages over $50B worth of machinery, equipment, and vehicles of all types (including ships and aircraft), representing some 74 percent of the Federal Government total, and $6.5B worth of inventory, representing 87 percent of the Federal Government total. If DND fails in its management of materiel assets, the impact upon Canada’s public accounts is enormous.

While for most government departments and agencies, the acquisition and management of materiel is an Internal Service (meaning an enabler to the conduct of business rather than a core element of it), in National Defence that is not the case. The Defence Program is designed around delivery of a number of specific outcomes for Canada that are unique to DND and the CAF:

- The Provision of sound advice to the government on defence policies, capabilities, and potential CAF missions;
- The Creation and sustainment of defence capabilities in accordance with defence policy and government direction;
- The insurance of appropriate states of readiness of those capabilities, consistent with government direction and allocated resources; and
- On order, the undertaking of missions with those capabilities, including establishing the conditions necessary for mission success.

Defence capabilities, in turn, comprise varying combinations of four core elements that must be present in appropriate balance and fully integrated in order to deliver any meaningful strategic, operational, or tactical effects. These are:

- Personnel (primarily, but not necessarily exclusively, CAF Members), including their recruitment, training, organization, management, and care;
- Major defence equipment, such as ships and aircraft, as well as other equipment, information systems, supplies, and services needed by the CAF to conduct operations and to train to be ready for those operations;
- Essential defence infrastructure needed for operations, readiness, and training, such as dockyards, airfields, and training facilities; and
- Military doctrine and the professional body of military knowledge required to knit the other elements together into effective force elements; to plan and command assigned operations; to adapt quickly to changes in operational, technological, geopolitical, or other conditions; and to sustain the nation’s defence institution over the long term.

Thus, equipment and its life-cycle management, including its acquisition, is a core element of the Defence Program, virtually equal in importance for most defence purposes to the recruitment and training of CAF personnel.

Defence equipment is managed within DND in a holistic end-to-end Equipment Program Management framework developed over several decades and designed specifically for the unique needs of the CAF. The framework is, of necessity, more similar to those of other Western defence organizations than other departments of the Government of Canada. Its business processes reflect a number of international standards, notably the NATO Policy for Systems Life Cycle Management and its associated implementation guides, and ISO Standard 15288 System and Software Engineering – System Life Cycle Processes, upon which the NATO policy is built.

**Defence Procurement**

Within this broader materiel management context, defence procurement is the process of acquiring equipment, supplies, and services for the purpose of delivering defence capabilities, and for sustaining them throughout their service existence, including during operations. Essentially, defence procurement is a recurring ‘do-loop’ in the life cycle management of materiel and the wider operations of DND and the CAF. As such, it is a mission-critical enabling process that needs to be very well integrated with those wider functions.

---

**Figure 1**

---

Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 2015 • Canadian Military Journal
All GoC procurement is required to be “…conducted in a manner that will meet operational requirements in the most cost-effective manner and provide equal opportunity to tender…” and is further expected to be “…consistent with and supportive of such national objectives as industrial and regional development, aboriginal economic development, the environment and other approved socio-economic objectives.”15 In order to achieve these multiple objectives, Treasury Board requires that most acquisitions over $2M be reviewed in advance and approved through interdepartmental procurement review processes.16 All significant defence procurement is therefore subject to review and challenge by various departments, each looking at the file from different perspectives and with different views about how the competing priorities should be balanced. While most files proceed relatively quickly through this review process, when disagreements between departments do arise, there is no effective mechanism for promptly resolving them, and no approved Government of Canada defence industrial strategy to guide deliberations.17 Some procurements can therefore be considerably delayed while acceptable compromises are worked out among the departments.

Most of the public debate around defence procurement gives the impression that it is a fairly homogeneous activity focused upon major platform acquisitions, but in reality, it is not. It involves much more than the acquisition of hardware, and it is driven by different requirements in response to widely differing circumstances, as illustrated in Figure 1.

Policy-driven procurement is generally deliberately planned in an atmosphere where there is time to fully consult interdepartmentally and consider how best to obtain optimum national benefit from each major expenditure. The procurements most people focus upon tend to be policy-driven equipment acquisitions and their accompanying long-term in-service support contracts. Mostly hidden from view are tens of thousands of smaller purchases of goods, services, and construction projects.

Operations-driven procurement, particularly that undertaken to meet immediate mission support needs, is different. It has to be executed quickly if operations are to be successful, and imperfect solutions delivered on time are usually vastly preferable to perfect ones delivered late.

Unfortunately, processes designed for high-profile, politically sensitive, policy-driven procurements are not well-suited to prompt and efficient processing of smaller routine acquisitions, and hard experience in a number of CAF operations has shown that they can be a major hindrance to rapid execution of operationally-urgent purchases. The routine machinery of government procurement is simply not designed with military operations in mind.18 Accordingly, defence procurement needs different approaches to meeting different requirements in different situations.

The approach to managing procurement risk also needs to vary. Normal policy-driven procurements carry with them, by and large, risks that are similar to most other government purchasing: financial, political, process, program, technology, and so on. Operations-driven procurements carry all of those and frequently others, such as risk to life, limb, health, security, and potentially, even mission success. The consequences of failure in a deployed mission can be catastrophic at a number of levels: political, diplomatic, and national security, to name but a few. While it may be unlikely that a single procurement delay or failure would trigger such a major consequence, the cumulative impact of recurring poor procurement outcomes will inexorably increase these risks.

The CC-177 Globemaster III project is one of a number of defence procurements that have been completed on time and on budget. A fifth CC-177 was recently purchased to augment the fleet downstream.
An added challenge in defence procurement is the technological complexity of many defence systems and the consequent cost and difficulty of developing, producing and operating them. This has significant implications for how some procurements are managed. Depending upon where a system is in its development cycle, program costs may be very easy or very difficult to accurately define. The cost and delivery schedule for a mature system already in service with one-or-more nations can usually be very precisely determined, and contracting for the acquisition can be done very quickly. This was the case, for example, with the acquisition of four C-17 strategic airlifters which was completed on time and on budget within 18 months of the decision to purchase.19

On the other hand, if a system is still in development or requires significant non-recurring engineering work to adapt or modify, very different, risk-managed, approaches are required. Projects of this kind typically go through a number of phases, with major decision ‘gates’ at the end of each. This may include: a pre-definition phase, where multiple concepts or technologies are evaluated; a definition phase, where options are refined, technology, program, or other risks are resolved, and the preferred solution identified; and an implementation phase, where the selected option is delivered. Final program cost estimates and delivery schedules cannot realistically be determined until the end of the definition phase, and even then, it may be prudent to earmark significant contingency funding in the implementation phase to address residual risks and unexpected issues. With respect to these projects the purchaser almost invariably has to shoulder, or at least share, the inherent risk burden with the supplier if the capability is going to be successfully delivered.

Defence procurement is also done across highly diverse marketplaces. Complex weapons, such as combat aircraft, are developed and produced in relatively small numbers by a very few suppliers because of the large and sustained technology investments required. These systems also have very long service lives, so sales opportunities are relatively few and far between. As a result, there is a continuing long-term global trend of consolidation in industries producing advanced low-volume, high-cost defence systems. Manufacturers are also increasingly protective of the Intellectual Property they generate through their investments, and they are continuously looking for ways to extract greater value from it over the service life of the equipment. This can have a significant long-term impact upon in-service support strategies and costs.

At the same time, National Defence is also a buyer of standard products available in very competitive high-volume, low-cost marketplaces, for example, office supplies, construction materials, or commercial vehicles. Procurement of these kinds of products lends itself very well to simplified buying processes, and significant volume price benefits may be achievable through the use of common department-wide or government-wide purchasing mechanisms.

Finally, defence procurement is unique in government in terms of the sheer volume of business. In addition to the tens of thousands of small procurements it executes itself annually under delegated authorities, National Defence also processes tens of thousands of procurement transactions with its primary Common Service Organization, Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC), each year. These include: contract requisitions; contract Task Authorizations; requests to establish Standing Offers, Supply Arrangements, and other instruments; and many other transactions. DND alone represents roughly half of the business of PWGSC’s Acquisitions Branch, and no other department comes close to its procurement volumes.

At a number of levels, then, defence procurement has conditions, requirements and characteristics that are unique in government and “one size fits all” processes cannot be universally effective in meeting them all.
Legal, Policy and Program Frameworks

By statute, defence procurement is a Government of Canada activity involving many departments and agencies. Their respective roles are specifically defined in legislation, in particular:

- Section 10 of the *Defence Production Act*, which gives the Minister of Public Works and Government Services exclusive authority to buy or otherwise acquire “defence supplies” on behalf of the Government; and Section 12 of the same *Act*, which gives the Minister responsibility for managing Canada’s defence industrial capabilities;
- Section 36 of the *National Defence Act*, which gives the Minister of National Defence exclusive authority to determine defence equipment requirements; and Section 4 of the same *Act* which gives the Minister responsibility for the management of defence resources, programs, and operations;
- Section 7 of the *Financial Administration Act*, which gives the Treasury Board wide powers to define Government administrative policies, set limits on ministers’ authorities, and oversee departmental programs and plans; and
- Section 4 of the *Department of Industry Act*, which gives the Minister of Industry responsibility in areas such as industry, technology, science, intellectual property, and small business, all of which have direct and indirect connections to defence procurement.

It is notable that Parliament has defined separate legal authorities for procurement of non-defence and defence goods. Both authorities are exclusively assigned to the Minister of Public Works and Government Services, but acquisition of non-defence goods is conducted under the *Department of Public Works and Government Services Act* and acquisition of “defence supplies” is done under the *Defence Production Act*, which also uniquely confers significant powers on the minister to set contract terms and define the business relationship between defence contractors and the Crown. However, those powers are only rarely used, and at the structural level, the same standard policies and business processes tend to be applied to all Government of Canada procurement. Also, within PWGSC, Industry Canada and Treasury Board Secretariat the same structures execute both defence and non-defence acquisitions interchangeably, albeit with certain parts of each organization perhaps having more of a focus on one than the other. The government’s 2014 Defence Procurement Strategy does not introduce any significant changes to this standardized business approach.

The various players are connected through a number of interdepartmental bodies supporting procurement-related policy consultations and coordination of government-wide initiatives. There are also bodies that facilitate collaborative management of specific procurements and there is the previously mentioned interdepartmental procurement review framework. However, end-to-end control of the government’s procurement machinery – the regulating of its overall throughput and the management of system performance – has no formal mechanisms. What integrated system management can be said to exist is a largely organic, informal framework of bilateral and multilateral relationships among individuals at many levels.

How Canada evolved to this business model is worth a short exploration.

**Historical Background**

The current machinery for defence procurement evolved from a Cold War construct set up in the 1950s by officials who had very recently guided the country through the Second World War. For Canada, like its allies, the war had been fought as a total national effort, personally led by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, in particular, his War Cabinet of key ministers. There were several ministers responsible for different aspects of the National Defence portfolio, but their focus was the gargantuan task of recruiting,
organizing, and training enough men (and women in more limited numbers) for the large naval, land, and air forces Canada had committed to field. There was no possibility of their also managing the even greater task of marshalling the nation’s industrial, agricultural, and other resources to produce the volumes of equipment and supplies needed to be able to fight and win. That was a task assigned to several other ministers, coordinated by the Minister of Munitions and Supply, C.D. Howe.

With the start of the Cold War, many of the politicians and senior officials who had engineered victory in the Second World War were still in government, and when faced with the need to re-arm the country again, they adopted a model derived from the one that had been successful previously. The *Defence Production Act* came into effect in 1951. It established the Department of Defence Production with broad powers to oversee the Cold War rearmament of Canada, and to organize and manage the national defence industrial base, which then included substantial Crown-owned and private sector factories and other installations producing everything from warships and combat aircraft to ammunition. C.D. Howe, who had overseen Canada’s massive wartime production effort, was the first Minister of Defence Production.\(^{25}\)

However, the Cold War was not the Second World War, and the magnitude of the effort undertaken by Canada was much more modest. It became even more so over the years as a ‘shooting war’ threatening Canada’s interests seemed less and less likely, and successive governments determined that there were other priorities for the nation’s energies and resources. At the same time, the very form and functioning of the Federal bureaucracy came under review on multiple occasions as the changing exigencies and expectations of a modernizing society required new responses from government.

In 1963, with the main rearmament effort largely completed, the Minister of Industry assumed the powers of the Minister of Defence Production.\(^{26}\) This practice remained in place until 1968, when a separate minister was again appointed\(^{27}\) in the context of a significant transformation of government at the end of the 1960s. Under this restructuring, in 1969, the Department of Defence Production was disbanded, and in its place, but still with the full powers of the *Defence Production Act*, the Department of Supply and Services was created,\(^{28}\) bringing defence and non-defence government procurement under the same umbrella.

As some have suggested, the shutting down of the national dream. The Avro Arrow, while in many ways sophisticated and innovative, was doomed to become an expensive defence procurement non-starter as an indigenous advanced jet fighter interceptor in 1958.
By 1987, the Government had divested itself of its last Crown-owned manufacturing facilities with the privatization of Canadian Arsenals Ltd.\textsuperscript{29} In 1993, the Department of Supply and Services and the Department of Public Works were administratively merged.\textsuperscript{30} The merger was formalized in law in 1996 with the coming into effect of the \textit{Department of Public Works and Government Services Act}.

The long transition from the post-war Department of Defence Production, through its temporary alignment with the Department of Industry, and then full merger with what is today PWGSC, mirrored the long and gradual process of reducing the size and capabilities of the CAF, the defence industrial capabilities of the nation, and the relative scale of Canadian defence acquisitions.

The 1990s were marked by the introduction of substantial cuts in defence spending in Canada and among our allies. In 1989, Canada’s defence budget was $12B.\textsuperscript{31} Due to a multitude of factors, including a burgeoning federal debt crisis, between 1990 and 1998, the government reduced DND’s funding by 33 percent. Proportionately, it was then the largest defence budget reduction experienced by any NATO nation,\textsuperscript{32} and it had a debilitating effect upon DND and the CAF. As the Department focused all the resources it could upon maintaining core military capabilities, while at the same time conducting a number of significant overseas operations, new defence acquisition programs were slashed. For nearly a decade, few major complex procurement programs ran, and this, combined with the encouraged departures of large numbers of experienced project managers and procurement specialists, stripped DND of much of its capacity to manage complex acquisitions.

All this changed on 11 September 2001. Following 9/11, it was clear that a significant reinvestment was required, and successive governments have continued to spend significantly on defence. DND, in turn, has worked hard to rebuild its capacity to manage complex acquisitions. As illustrated in Figure 2, even through the global financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent recession, Canadian defence budgets, although not untouched, have been maintained at their highest levels in decades.\textsuperscript{33} Coupled with the adoption across government of accrual funding for major capital acquisitions,\textsuperscript{34} this is providing far more resource flexibility than National Defence has had at any time since the early Cold War. While future governments may reverse the past decade’s overall growth in the defence budget, defence procurement is clearly going to remain a significant Government of Canada business activity for the foreseeable future, and the present government has made implementation of its Defence Procurement Strategy a priority.

**Current State of Defence Procurement**

For some time now, in the face of a significantly expanded defence acquisition program, all of the departments involved in the process have struggled to meet government, Parliamentary, industry, and public expectations for agility and responsiveness in procurement. Consequently, criticism has continued to mount. At the same time, there is a renewed focus on integrity and accountability in government. With the passing of the \textit{Federal Accountability Act} in 2006, Parliament and the government set out strong expectations for openness, transparency, auditability, and accountability. Unfortunately, both the expectations for greater responsiveness, and the demand for greater accountability are difficult to meet in defence procurement, given the legal and institutional complexity Canada has established around it. The multiplicity of Ministerial points of authority complicates process, and it inherently disperses accountability. It also invites a high degree of variability in the business interactions among the players, meaning that individual procurement outcomes often tend to be more dependent upon personalities and relationships than upon any common, consistent interdepartmental business processes. The absence from the business model of an effective system-level performance management framework further obscures accountability, undermines effective oversight, and makes it difficult to discipline the execution of transactions, or identify and fix the true sources of procurement delay and poor outcomes.

Many commentaries, studies, and reports of varying quality have been written on defence procurement over the past two decades, from both outside and inside government.\textsuperscript{35} All have identified problems of some kind with the current model. In addition,
both the Auditor General and DND internal auditors have publicly documented many specific procurement-related issues, pointing to problems with the basic machinery.\textsuperscript{36} While none of these reports has comprehensively examined the problem from end-to-end, in aggregate, they clearly make a case for change of some kind. The current government’s response to this is its Defence Procurement Strategy. Although primarily aimed at industrial outcomes, the strategy does include a few measures aimed at trying to make the existing business model work more effectively. However, it very much remains to be seen whether these will have substantive effect.

A number of other Western nations have undergone systemic reform of their defence materiel management programs in recent years, including the procurement function. Most have adopted models that integrate equipment acquisition and support within an end-to-end full life cycle management process framework, consistent with the international best practices reflected in the NATO Policy for Systems Life Cycle Management and ISO Standard 15288 System and Software Engineering – System Life Cycle Processes.

The experience of two countries with deep historical and cultural ties to Canada is of some interest. Creation of the Australian Defence Materiel Organisation and the UK Defence Equipment & Support Organisation within their defence institutions has proven to be a significant undertaking for both nations. Their experience demonstrates that this kind of transformation takes time, perhaps a decade, to fully implement and optimize.\textsuperscript{37} Further, it shows that the creation of a single organization responsible for the acquisition and whole-life management of defence equipment does not, by itself, guarantee program success or alter the fact that the selection, acquisition, and management of defence capabilities is a government-level responsibility. The model does, however, recognize that defence equipment is a core element of military capability that is virtually equal in importance to military personnel. It also provides a framework for enabling governments to more readily standardize and optimize business processes, systems, tools and training; and for ensuring that consistent approaches are applied to meeting wider national policy objectives – in other words, for getting the machinery right. It does this by institutionalizing two important measures:

• Recognizing at the government level that the procurement and life-cycle management of common commodities and defence-unique systems are very different functions, the latter requiring the adoption of purpose-designed, integrated business machinery aligned to defence capability management and operations; and
• Establishing a single point of accountability and authority for the procurement and life cycle management of defence materiel. This includes responsibility for ensuring that: a full-life view is applied to all spending decisions; there is ongoing standardization and continuous improvement of end-to-end policies, processes, systems and tools; effective performance management is implemented; appropriate supporting defence industrial strategies and capabilities are developed and maintained; wider government objectives are respected; and government oversight is strengthened.

Interestingly, Canada has recently adopted a model very similar to this for the management of Federal Government IT systems. Shared Services Canada has been given full end-to-end responsibility for acquisition, life cycle management and operation of common IT hardware and software, including responsibility for procurement.\textsuperscript{38} This is presumably in recognition of the fact that the procurement, operation, and life cycle management of IT systems is a unique business, and perhaps, reflective of a desire to establish clear accountability for delivering an important Government of Canada capability.

The government has chosen a very different approach for defence materiel. Its Defence Procurement Strategy maintains the institutional segregation of the procurement function, and indeed, it contains no mechanisms for strengthening the critical relationship between procurement on the one hand and military operations and the effective life-cycle management of defence equipment on the other.\textsuperscript{39} It remains to be seen whether the strategy can answer the many criticisms of how defence procurement is done in Canada.

Conclusion

Defence procurement is subject to a number of complex and largely immutable factors, irrespective of the business model adopted. These include:

• The inevitably controversial nature of many defence requirements;
• The centrality of materiel to defence capabilities and consequent need to seamlessly connect procurement to equipment life cycle management, the force generation of integrated capabilities, and the conduct of operations;
• The diversity of defence needs and operational circumstances;
• The unique risk profiles of many defence procurements;
• The technological complexity of many systems;
• Marketplace diversity; and
• The business volumes involved.

While the context and basic nature of defence procurement may be inherently complex, it does not necessarily follow that the governing legislative and policy framework, or the business machinery, have to be so. The current Canadian model certainly is, with its multiple points of ministerial accountability, but that alone does not establish a case for change. The case is to be found more in the considerable objective evidence, including recurring audit reports,
that there are indeed problems with the fundamentals. There is also wide public belief that the system is not working well, but the issues that come to public attention and fuel that belief are not necessarily representative of the whole business of defence procurement. We need to be sure that in making changes we are fixing the right problem, and that we get the basic machinery right.

In reviewing the success or otherwise of the Defence Procurement Strategy, and determining whether further incremental or substantial change is needed, the government and Parliament will need to consider two basic questions:

- Which business model is most inherently biased towards effective and efficient decision-making, management and control; effective delivery; continuous improvement; and consistent, successful response to the full range of conditions and requirements of military operations? In other words, which model gives Canada the best basic machinery to support good decision-making and reliable program execution; and

- Which model will most consistently enable timely and sound government decisions concerning the optimum balance among national policy objectives, including: maintaining appropriate defence capabilities; obtaining best value; and obtaining desired social, economic, commercial, and industrial effects from defence spending?

The real challenge is “getting it right the first time.” If we look to other Western middle powers that have faced the same questions, most have chosen a model that establishes a single point of accountability and authority for integrated management of defence procurement and the full life cycle support of equipment within their defence institutions, often overseen by a specific minister within the defence portfolio. No nation has reached the level of excellence in delivery it wants, but most of the organizations concerned are still maturing and dealing with significant legacy issues, so the jury is still out. The new Shared Services Canada model resembles this end-to-end approach, and it will be interesting to see how well it succeeds. Conversely, the government’s Defence Procurement Strategy represents a very different view of both the problem and the solution, and only time will reveal how successful it will be.

The objective of this article was not to advocate for a particular solution, but rather to explain the wider context of defence procurement and describe its underlying machinery with a view to encouraging a better informed debate. In exploring the business environment, it has been difficult to avoid identifying obvious problems with the current model, and looking at least superficially at how other nations do the function, but these explorations have been incidental to the main discussion.

Whether Canada chooses to stay with the modified status quo as represented by the 2014 Defence Procurement Strategy, adopt a model similar to what some other nations are doing, or choose another path entirely, it is important that the decision be grounded in a good understanding of the context within which defence procurement is conducted and the many complex factors affecting it. Further, any new machinery built to manage the function must be designed with a clear understanding of the true weaknesses of the existing model, and based upon a coherent concept that does not see procurement as a discrete activity, but one that is integral to the conduct of military operations, the maintenance of ready defence forces, and the efficient and effective life-cycle management of defence systems and capabilities – including the support of an appropriate defence industrial base. Finally, both those who argue that the current system is broken and those who say that it is functioning exactly as intended need to anchor their cases, and any proposed changes, on the many complex foundational underpinnings of defence procurement, not just its publicly visible superstructure.

The most up-to-date rendering of the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS). On 16 January 2015, the federal government signed a contract with Irving Shipbuilding to manufacture five-to-six AOPS at a total cost of $3.5 Billion.

2. For a complete description of DND’s capability based requirements planning process, see Department of National Defence (2010). Capability Based Planning Handbook Version 6.2. (Unnumbered Chief of Program publication).


5. See the Capability Based Planning Handbook.


10. i.e., Department of National Defence (2011).


14. These elements of capability are described here in a manner that is different from what appears in DND’s Program Alignment Architecture and annual reports to Parliament because those documents are primarily focused upon resource commitments and expenditures. The maintenance of professional knowledge within DND and the CAF, although a critical and indeed defining element of defence capability, does not involve major direct expenditures, and so is not accorded significant mention in financial plans and reports.


16. Ibid.


18. For example, Public Works and Government Services Canada has set its service standard for awarding contracts valued between $400,000 and $1,000,000 at 100 working days from receipt of the requisition from the client department. It aims to meet that standard 80 percent of the time. Procurement service standards are accessible at: http://www.tpsgcpwgsc.gc.ca/sc-cs/nsmmr-ossr/2014-2015/page-4-eng.html.


20. The term “defence supplies” as defined in the Defence Production Act essentially means all goods purchased for defence purposes, up to and including major platforms, such as ships and aircraft.

21. i.e., the Treasury Board Advisory Committee on Contracting, and PWGSC’s Client Advisory Panel.

22. i.e., the Major Crown Project Interdepartmental Oversight Committee, the PWGSC-led Defence Procurement Secretariat and the ministerial and Deputy Minister working groups on defence procurement.

23. The new Defence Procurement Secretariat in PWGSC could be an enabler for some future development of a wider performance management framework but it currently has no mandate to do so.


25. Ibid., Seventeenth Ministry.

26. Ibid., Nineteenth Ministry.

27. Ibid., Twentieth Ministry.


34. Acquisition costs are amortized over the intended service life of the system. The Department of Finance advances capital funding to DND at the time of purchase, and DND repays the money in instalments year-by-year.


38. See the Government of Canada press release of 5 February 2014, and speeches by the Minister of National Defence and the Minister of Public Works and Government Services to the Economic Club of Canada the same day, and subsequent occasions.
Being ‘Left of Bang,’ or Proactive:1 The Future Place of Capacity Building in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces

by Peter J. Williams

Colonel Williams, MSM, CD, is currently Director Arms Control Verification on the Strategic Joint Staff. From June 2012 to June 2013, he was Commander of the Kabul Military Training Centre Training Advisory Group (KMTC TAG) as part of Canada’s contribution to the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) within the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Introduction

At the time of writing, Canada has deployed Special Operations Forces to Iraq in an ‘advise and assist’ role in order to help the Iraqi security forces deal with the threat posed by the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL). In 2014, we concluded Operation Attention, Canada’s participation in the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), which delivered training and professional development support to the national security forces of Afghanistan: the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan Air Force (AAF), and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Through our involvement in Afghanistan, which lasted over a decade, members of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) were truly involved in a myriad of activities, ranging from combat, and, more recently, as part of NTM-A in capacity building of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP), collectively known as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).

Our troops returned home to a CAF family very different from the one which entered Afghanistan in the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks. While there is no doubt that our ranks are now filled with combat veterans, and that we have gained new capabilities (inter alia, M777 155mm howitzers and accompanying precision munitions, Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) capability, and strategic airlift in the form of C-17 transport aircraft), the CAF of tomorrow will not, at least in the near term, necessarily continue to enjoy the largesse which the Government of Canada (GoC) has provided it in the past in support of our operations.
Far from it. Deficit reduction remains the watchword, and concurrently, the Department of National Defence (DND) has embarked upon a Defence Renewal initiative, whereby resources for less important activities and programs will be reduced and re-invested, internally, into higher priority Defence programs. This comes at a time when the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS) is also undergoing a review, one which will impact upon the future missions and roles of the CAF.

Across government, other departments are looking at new ways of doing business. The Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD), in late-2013, published its Global Markets Action Plan (GMAP). Central to the GMAP is the concept of “economic diplomacy.” The GMAP goes on to state: “This new focus represents a sea change in the way Canada’s diplomatic assets are deployed around the world.” Doubtless, such an approach will impact upon how the DND/CAF conducts its global activities and engagements downstream.

Defence ‘belt tightening’ is not restricted to Canada alone, as our two closest allies, the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) are also looking at how to gain more ‘bang for the proverbial buck,’ or indeed, the pound sterling. Further afield, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is examining how, in an environment of shrinking budgets, it can advance its concept of Smart Defence so as to meet future security challenges. It is also fair to say that many nations, including Canada, having expended so much blood and treasure in Afghanistan, are also questioning the need for future major military interventions, and are asking themselves what the requirement is for military forces in the post-Afghanistan era. Indeed, in the post Afghanistan era, might it not be better to enable a nation facing crisis to build up its own indigenous forces before such an event occurs rather than having to send in our own forces after the fact?

The aim of this article is to examine the extent to which military capacity building should become a key and explicitly-stated mission for the DND and the CAF in future.

Canada’s Legacy in Military Capacity Building

Military capacity building is not a new task for the CAF. Our record in this field is long standing, particularly in Africa. For various reasons, our efforts there, specifically in Ghana and Tanzania in the 1960s, were not sustained. Since then, the main DND vehicle to deliver such ‘foreign military training,’ or what this author will call military capacity building, come under the Directorate of Military Training and Cooperation (DMTC) within DND’s Policy Group. According to the DND website: “DMTC develops policy and implements training programs to meet the government’s foreign and defence policy objectives. These training programs expand and reinforce Canada’s bilateral defence relations, while raising its national profile on the world stage.”

A Canadian advisor with Afghan National Army soldiers during Operation Attention.
More recently, some of our larger scale capacity building efforts have been conducted outside DMTC auspices, under named CAF operations:

- In Sierra Leone, again in Africa under Operation Sculpture, a mission which lasted over a decade, (2000-2013), which constituted Canada’s participation in the International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT), a multinational effort led by Britain to help the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone build effective and democratically accountable armed forces in compliance with the Lomé Peace Agreement;6

- In Afghanistan, under Operation Argus, (2005-2008), which constituted a team of CAF strategic military planners the Canadian Forces maintained in Kabul to help the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan develop key national strategies and mechanisms for the effective implementation of various strategies, including working with departments without a defence or security nexus. This team was called the Strategic Advisory Team Afghanistan, or SAT-A;7

- In Jamaica, under Operation Jaguar (2011), which was Canada’s contribution of a military aviation and search-and-rescue capability that supported the Jamaica Defence Force;8 and

- In Africa, this time in Mali, with members of the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM), providing training to the Malian armed forces in their fight against al-Qaeda insurgents.9
Although the aforementioned missions have concluded, the CAF, at the time of writing, is still conducting other global capacity building efforts:

- In Jerusalem, under Operation Proteus, the deployment of a CAF team to support the work of the Office of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) for Israel and the Palestinian Authority. The aim of this mission is to provide the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) with training advice and support;¹⁰ and
- As a result of events in Eastern Europe, in December 2014, Canada signed a Declaration of Intent with Ukraine to explore opportunities to conduct joint military training and capacity building.¹¹
Canada is not alone in actively supporting military capacity building. Our current efforts in Afghanistan with the ANSF are but the latest in a series of such programs dating back to the 19th Century, which have included British, Ottoman Turk, and Soviet military advisors helping to build indigenous forces in that country. The United States has long recognized the importance of such efforts, and as early as 1940, enshrined it in their doctrine for what the US Marine Corps (USMC) termed ‘Small Wars.’ Noting that after an initial intervention by US forces, once ‘domestic tranquility’ is restored:

“There is also present the obligation to restore to the foreign country it’s organic native defensive and law-enforcement powers as soon as tranquility has been secured. The organization of an adequate armed native organization is an effective method to prevent further domestic disturbances after the intervention has ended, and is one of the most important functions of the intervention since the United States armed forces may have superseded or usurped the functions of armed forces of the country concerned at the beginning of the intervention. It is obvious that such armed forces must be restored prior to the withdrawal.”

**Mandate and the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS)**

According to the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS extant at the time of writing), the then-Canadian Forces (CF), “… will have the capacity to perform the following six core missions:

- (1) Conduct daily domestic and continental operations, including in the Arctic and through NORAD;
- (2) Support a major international event in Canada, such as the 2010 Olympics;
- (3) Respond to a major terrorist attack;
- (4) Support civilian authorities during a crisis in Canada such as a natural disaster;
- (5) Lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended period; and
- (6) Deploy forces in response to crises elsewhere in the world for shorter periods."

The provision of CAF resources in a capacity building role is not explicitly stated herein, although it could be argued that it falls under Missions Five and Six, and of these two, it would appear that Mission Six would be the most likely contingency calling for such forces. Note that this mission speaks of deploying forces “… in response to…” a crisis. While it may not have been the intention of the CFDS authors to project this emphasis point, one could be forgiven for thinking that such a mission statement is more reactive than proactive.

While crises will continue to materialize with little-or-no warning, such as natural disasters, or the events of 11 September 2001, is it not more prudent, where and when it is within our capability and national interest to do so, to ensure that any future crises are anticipated, and that where and when appropriate, military forces are deployed ‘upstream’ as it were to ensure that a future crisis does not arise which could entail a major military deployment, such as is envisaged under CFDS Mission Five? Properly focused capacity building resources would enable us to do exactly that.

**Capacity Building Forces: Risks and Challenges**

The benefits of pre-emptive capacity building notwithstanding, such deployments are not without attendant risks and challenges. If the mandate of the deployed capacity building force extends beyond ‘train’ and ‘advise,’ and enters into the realm of ‘equip,’ the costs could be quite substantial once costs for the provision and sustainment of weapons, equipment, and ammunition are factored in. Capacity building forces does not automatically mean that the troops involved are armed or lack some form of integral force protection. As is the case with any military mission, a thorough threat assessment will need to be made in order to determine the level of force protection, and indeed, the medical and logistical support required in theatre, including the extent to which any of this could be provided by the host nation.

The pre-emptive nature of such forces is obviously linked to their timely deployment. Thus, a major risk is that if not deployed far enough in advance of a crisis, such forces may find themselves ill-equipped for the (potential crisis) environment in which they would now find themselves immersed. This means that at strategic levels of national defence, foreign affairs, and the executive arms of government (and this will not necessarily be easy), we will have to become much more nimble at looking ahead and in taking the necessary steps and decisions which would facilitate the deployment of a pre-emptive capacity building force. Related back to deficits identified in the current missions assigned to the CAF under the CFDS, we will need to demonstrate a greater degree of pro-activeness in anticipating crises, and, where and when required, in deploying capacity building forces in advance of them.

From a purely military point of view, capacity building forces, by their very nature, tend to be biased toward the officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) ranks, with the result that the units from which they are drawn in Canada can experience a major leadership deficit. This will likely remain the case in future for such missions, and so, judicious use will have to be made of readiness cycles, such as the CAF did for four sequential rotations of Operation Attention, in order to ensure that the loss of these leaders to overseas missions does not generate long-term detrimental effects at home.

However, if a providing nation ‘gets it wrong’ and chooses the wrong partner with whom to help build their military capacity, great embarrassment, and perhaps even worse, could accrue to the nation which provided the capacity building forces in the first place. Should the host nation forces eventually be involved in a coup, human rights abuses, or war crimes, grave accusations could be levelled at the country which helped to train and advise those indigenous forces. In this respect, Canada has been somewhat fortunate. For example, members of the Jamaican Defence Force who had been mentored by CAF members were later responsible for the successful and peaceful resolution of a hijacking incident on that island in 2009.

Capacity building can also have mixed and even fatal results. As described earlier, CAF members helped train members of the Malian armed forces. When that country fell victim to a coup, troops that had been trained and advised by the CAF were on the side of those against the coup and who tried to restore a democratically elected government. Sadly, some of those trained and advised by the Canadians were eventually hunted down and killed by the coup instigators.
Capacity Building Forces: Attractions

Without doubt, there are many benefits to employing capacity building forces in a pre-emptive manner in advance of a crisis. First, and most obviously, if one ‘does it right,’ it saves one the potential trouble of having to send in numerous and costly forces after a crisis breaks out. In particular, in the lean fiscal years ahead, and frankly, at a time when many nations are tired of long and costly military commitments, such a pre-emptive deployment could be seen as the ultimate ‘bang for the proverbial buck.’ The deployment of NATO forces to Macedonia in 2001, although not in a capacity building role per se, is generally touted as an (albeit somewhat rare) example of how pre-emptive deployment can avert a future crisis.17

By extension, deployments with a relatively smaller footprint will likely be more amenable to populations whose taxes will have to fund such missions, and who might see such a deployment as a dividend. Governments will doubtless be attracted to military options which can be delivered at a lower cost of blood and treasure. This, however does not absolve the government in question from having to explain to its citizens, including its soldiers (as indeed it should do in the case of all military expeditions) what the force in question is meant to achieve. In the case of our own government, the concepts of economic diplomacy as outlined in the GMAP, combined with the ability of the DND/CAF to deliver pre-emptive capacity building might be seen as a way to protect the investment. Thus, the DND/CAF may find that they are in future directed to conduct such missions more often than they recommended doing so in the past.

So, what is to be done?

First and foremost, among the lists of missions assigned to the CAF must be one which gives prominence to the deployment of such forces which have been advocated in this article, and unlike the current CFDS mission, one which emphasizes its proactive nature. To that end, I propose the following new mission, which would be added to the list of extant CFDS missions:

Deploy capacity building forces in advance of a crisis overseas.

In terms of where this mission would fit within the current list, it should become the new CFDS Mission Five, the first four being largely related to domestic defence, missions which must remain the primary focus of the CAF. The current CFDS Missions Five and Six would be retained.

Simple adoption of such a mission will not be easy, but I suggest it will force us to look at external defence and security matters in a new light. First, the government will need to be convinced that such a mission is really necessary. Many governments are quite content to wait for a crisis to occur, and then to respond after the fact, if it is in the national interest to do so. When faced with military advice to deploy forces in a pre-emptive manner, they will rightly ask, “Crisis? What crisis?” It will then be up to leaders within Defence to make the case that by deploying a (relatively) small force now, the necessity to deploy a much larger and costlier one later stands a greater chance of being reduced.
Our CAF doctrine will need to place more emphasis upon capacity building, a gap which currently exists in our military literature. At present, we produce advisor handbooks when required, and in such cases, we often rely upon the advice of those outside Defence for such resources, useful though they are.\(^{18}\) We need our own doctrine, based upon the experiences of the many capacity building missions we have conducted and are currently conducting.

The contribution from subject matter experts within defence should not merely come from those currently in uniform. Any successful defence organization not only knows how to command, control, generate, and employ its forces, and this is certainly where uniformed, military expertise would provide its greatest contribution, but also how to make decisions regarding policy, resource allocation, infrastructure, and so forth. This expertise can be contributed by defence bureaucrats, both serving and retired.

Having recently served in a capacity building function in Afghanistan with Operation Attention, I noted that several of my peers were serving as advisors at defence ministry level, advising Afghan officers at the three-and-four-star level. While they no doubt did great work, I often placed myself in the shoes of those senior Afghan generals and wondered how much they truly listened to some of those young colonels, particularly in a society where respect for elders is paramount. Therefore, I suggest that we should leverage the expertise of retired general and flag officers, as well as retired senior civil servants with strategic defence experience, to provide capacity building expertise at defence ministry levels. Such persons would bring excellent experience, and indeed, ‘the wisdom of years’ when dealing with their foreign counterparts, whom I would suggest would be more likely to listen to them.

This leads to the next consideration, which is that such a force should not come from Defence alone, and indeed, any capacity building efforts made by the DND/CAF must be part of a broader Whole of Government (WoG) effort. Chances are that if we identify a country or a region facing future crisis, it will likely be a case where reform is required in sectors than just the target nations’ security forces. Other departments of the Government of Canada, deploying either their own expertise or by exploiting the expertise of its retired community, could complement the DND/CAF efforts. Whether providing advice on electoral, judicial or educational reform, a WoG effort by Canada would be able to address many of the aspects of a future crisis in a timely, proactive manner. It is not for nothing that our country traditionally ranks near the top of the UN Human Development Index.\(^{19}\) Here is a way for Canada to ‘share its wealth,’ wealth which I believe would be gratefully accepted. DFATD has resources available to assist in this regard under its Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Programme (CTCBP)\(^{20}\) and the Anti-Crime Capacity Building Programme (ACCBP).\(^{21}\)

Partners in such capacity building efforts are not just to be found within our own borders, but with like-minded nations as well. As mentioned earlier, Canada is not alone in attempting to stretch scarce defence dollars. Therefore, an approach to another international partner to combine forces in a co-operative capacity building effort, before a crisis, with relatively lower costs, may receive a more favourable hearing than one would expect when
trying to form a coalition of the willing after a crisis. As NATO conducts a degree of soul searching after the termination of its current mission in Afghanistan, perhaps it will conclude that its future lies in the capacity building realm.

Most importantly, all this will require a mindset where we are focused upon anticipating crises and taking the necessary actions well in advance of them, to save us the cost of a major military intervention ‘Right of Bang,’ or lacking in proactivity. Given the work currently being done within DND/CAF under the review of the extant CFDS and Defence Renewal, and in an environment when NATO is trying to be ‘smarter’ about defence, it simply makes sense and is highly timely and appropriate to give increased prominence to pre-emptive capacity building as a core Defence mission.

A Word of Caution

At this point, the reader might think that what is being proposed is a niche role for the DND/CAF, and also for other departments of the Government of Canada. Not at all. As mentioned earlier, what is being proposed is not a reduction to the CAF mission set, but the addition of one which is more proactive than some of the missions, which are, unfortunately, more reactive in nature. To those who might think that the proposal tabled in this article envisages a CAF which should be re-structured to better facilitate the deployment of capacity building forces, I would suggest that the current structure of our environmental and special operations forces units already enables the proposition. Having spent a year in a capacity building capacity in Afghanistan, perhaps the greatest lesson I took away from the work of our team was that it was our grounding in having trained for combat throughout our careers that made us successful as advisors. Or more appropriately, “combat advisors,” as our Canadian commander styled us. Thus to those who might think that a renewed focus upon pre-emptive capacity building as a stated mission for the DND/CAF, would result in a dividend as a result of divestment of heavy platforms that are no longer needed, I would say that they have missed the point. Our current force structures will still be needed for the other CFDS missions, and it is from these units that we will continue to draw personnel to act as advisors in a capacity building role in future. That said, notwithstanding the popular image of the Canadian soldier as peacekeeper, it seems to me that there is something quintessentially Canadian about wanting to act so as to prevent conflict rather than after having to act after a conflict has started.

Conclusion

The international environment is evolving, as is the nature of conflict and the military’s role within it. In the past, when faced with crises, states have responded with extensive and costly military deployments. This may be less likely in future, and indeed, pre-emptive activities such as capacity building may come with a degree of inevitability and a relatively lower cost which will be attractive to governments. The former US Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, when addressing a class of US Army West Point Cadets
in 2011, was perhaps speaking for many statesmen when he said: “...any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined.” While the DND/CAF must always be in a position to provide options to government, including crisis response as outlined in the CFDS, a renewed and resourced focus upon pre-empptive capacity building forces as an explicitly-stated core mission for the DND/CAF, a mission we would undertake with the Whole of Government and other international partners, is one way to avoid costly post-crisis deployments and to get us to where we need to be, namely, ‘Left of Bang.’

NOTES

1. http://www.cp-journal.com/left-of-bang/ According to this website, when it is said that one is observing or taking action “Left of Bang,” one is being proactive. All the events that have to occur before ‘bang’ can take place are placed left of the bang on one’s timeline.


3. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_84268.htm?.Smart Defence is described as “...a new way of thinking about generating the modern defence capabilities the Alliance needs for the coming decade and beyond. It is a renewed culture of cooperation that encourages Allies to cooperate in developing, acquiring, and maintaining military capabilities to undertake the Alliance’s essential core tasks agreed in the new NATO strategic concept. That means pooling and sharing capabilities, setting priorities and coordinating efforts better.”


18. While training for deployment on Operation Attention, the author relied upon a Host Nation Security Force Advisor Training Handbook produced by the Centre for Cultural Learning of the Canadian Foreign Service Institute, within the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD). From discussions with members of the Canadian Forces Warfare Centre, it was confirmed that we currently have no specific CAF doctrine manuals devoted exclusively to capacity building.


The Art of Being a Soldier-Diplomat ~ From an Implicit Role to an Explicit Function

by Francis Clermont

Francis Clermont, MA, is a teacher at the Chief Warrant Officer Osside Profession of Arms Institute at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean.

Introduction

The aim of this article is to demonstrate the ways and the means for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to further pursue the ongoing transformation process of the Non-Commissioned Members Professional Development (NCM PD) system that commenced at the turn of the 21st Century. More precisely, this article will demonstrate the necessity for the institution to further develop and incorporate more cognitive, intellectual, and communication skills and competencies in its common and fundamental PD training and education system to reflect the nature of the tasks CAF members are called upon to carry out as professional soldiers.

To achieve this objective, we shall first look at the origins of the conceptual framework that have led to the modern soldier’s diplomatic characteristics and attributes, which will be defined. Then, the article will highlight examples from foreign operations where intellectual and communicative skills proved to be key for mission success, examples that should also serve as lessons learned for future endeavours in the context of NCM PD transformation and progress. Finally, the article will identify pitfalls to avoid, as well as potential paths relevant to the future of NCM PD.

The Soldier-Diplomat

A deployed soldier carries the diplomatic characteristics of the state he represents. In other words, the soldier embodies the will and executive actions of a state aimed at another state or non-state actor. In order to achieve such an objective, he/she is to be granted the capacity of acting either as a peacekeeper or as a warrior. As a diplomatic tool, the soldier must be equipped accordingly, and must have the appropriate assets and aptitudes in order to fulfill such functions and to properly execute the strategic intent to fruition. This is a sine qua non condition that the military institution has the responsibility to fulfill.

The addition of the word ‘diplomat,’ both as noun and adjective, is used here to better understand and fully define the function of the soldier in the context of a current and future battlespace
that is characterized by conditions of vulnerability, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA), and that fall into the categories of Fourth-Generation Warfare (4GWF), Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), and Asymmetric Warfare. To these contextual characteristics must be added the fact these modern operations are themselves integrated into the broader paradigm of non-traditional and decentralized structures of military command and control that the terms Comprehensive Approach, Whole of Government Approach, and Joint Interagency Intergovernmental and Multilateral Environments (JIIME) encapsulate.

The intention of the soldier-diplomat concept is not to distort the role of the soldier or that of the diplomat, nor does it wish to replace one with the other. Also, far be it to promote gunboat diplomacy… ‘Diplomat’ serves as a reminder of the inherent and intrinsic characteristic of the soldier’s duties as a member of the profession of arms, and, consequently, the required skills she/he must master in order to fully achieve those duties. Unfortunately, such functions have remained implicit for far too long because they are often forgotten or voluntarily ignored. The ‘diplomat’ attribute therefore allows to better define and grasp this specific political-communicational function and the corollary and necessary skills, knowledge, and aptitudes the soldier must possess under current modern warfare conditions, an operational environment influenced by technological, sociological, and political factors. Throughout this article, such skills refer to contact-skills, ‘soft-skills,’ cultural intelligence, intellectual capacity, communication, negotiation and mediation skills, language skills, cognitive skills, and so on.

Origins of the Conceptual Framework

In 1974, Rikhye, Harbottle, and Egge, in their book, The Thin Blue Line. International Peacekeeping and Its Future, highlighted how important it is for soldiers of all ranks working as peacekeepers to receive, as part of their preparation for deployment, and in addition to traditional tactical training, training with respect to the skills and qualities other than those related to the use of force. According to these authors: “Tact, diplomacy, and quiet reasoning when negotiating or mediating between the contestants […] are the weapons of the peacekeepers trade […].” In this vein, the authors consider that it is equally important that soldiers receive the necessary information so that they understand the root of a given conflict and the human relations involved.

In 1993, Rudolph C. Barnes wrote an article entitled “Military Legitimacy and the Diplomat-Warrior,” which was published in the journal, Small Wars and Insurgencies. He placed emphasis upon the concept of the warrior-diplomat in order to illustrate the strategic importance of the new role of the soldier. According to Barnes, military members who have significant contacts with the local population should be as much diplomats as they are warriors. To achieve this, the soldiers must comply with the culture of the host nation, its customs, and its policies. However, Barnes’ objective was limited to avoiding the negative impact of ‘bad press’ that awaits the troops in an era of globalized communications.

Canadian Lieutenant-Colonel (ret’d) David Last contributes to setting the foundation of this new approach to soldiering and soft skills, a dimension overlooked, if not rejected for a long time by the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) institution and its traditionalist elite. In Theory, Doctrine and Practice of Conflict De-escalation in Peacekeeping Operations, published in 1997 by The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Centre, Professor Last underlined the importance of communication skills in various operations, a lesson learned through more than 50 years of experience Canada has gained in peace operations. Specifically, Professor Last speaks of “Combat skills vs. Contact skills.”

In 1999, US General Charles C. Krulak wrote a short but influential article entitled, The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War. Following the general’s canonical Three Block War concept (simultaneous tactical operations passing from humanitarian operations, to peace operations and to war fighting), and his observation that soldiers from lower ranks at the tactical level will be given more-and-more command responsibilities, and will therefore be required to take consequential actions within the strategic and political realms, I submit that we should extrapolate his idea by including all Non-Commissioned Members (NCMs) from all trades and environments, not just marines or corporals, as Krulak does. The inclusiveness of his concept,
shaking as it does the foundation of a doxa that has the officer corps on one side, and the NCM corps on the other, is, in many ways, innovative, and it demonstrates a clearer understanding of the modern challenges with which armies are now faced.

In the post-Somalia inquiry context, and, with it, the institutional shock that followed, the CAF, in order to fill the gaps identified regarding the professional development system of the NCMs, laid the foundations of a major revision, modernization, and transformation of this system, as well as some of its doctrine.

In 2002, more than 50 years after Canada’s first peacekeeping operation, and five years after the government forced its hand in the wake of the Somalia Inquiry Commission, the CAF published its first peace operations doctrine. Indeed, the commission’s report noted that training was inadequate because it was solely based upon combat.

The training plan for Operation Cordon did not adequately provide for sufficient and appropriate training in relation to several non-combat skills that are essential for peacekeeping, including the nature of UN peacekeeping and the role of the peacekeeper; the Law of Armed Conflict, including arrest and detention procedures; training in use of force policies, including mission-specific rules of engagement; conflict resolution, and negotiation skills development; inter-cultural relations and the culture, history, and politics of the environment; and psychological preparation and stress management. The failure of the training plan to provide adequately for these non-combat skills arose primarily from the lack of any doctrine recognizing the need for such training, and the lack of supporting training materials and standards.

In 2003, the CAF published Duty with Honour, a foundational and doctrinal publication that defines the Canadian profession of arms. For the first time in CAF history, this core document defines and codifies the military profession, and it sets the theoretical basis of future NCM PD.

As military operations have become more complex in recent years, the body of professional knowledge that must be imparted through professional development has expanded beyond traditional areas of study (e.g., history and international affairs) to include many other disciplines not previously regarded as relevant to military operations. Tactical competencies and individual and collective warfighting skills remain the bedrock of military expertise but are not enough in themselves to define that expertise. Military professionals today require the abilities not only of the soldier warrior, but also of the soldier diplomat and the soldier scholar.

The same year Duty with Honour was published, the CAF Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts emphasized the importance of establishing a new conceptual framework consistent with the “battle space of the future,” and the three-block war. As the study underlined, some of these blocks are “…diametrically opposed, demanding a totally different suite of skills and ability. In essence, the complex new battle space will require that soldiers become warrior diplomats.”

Also worth mentioning are the enlightening works of Deborah Goodwin of Britain’s Sandhurst Royal Military Academy. In her book, The Military and Negotiation. The Role of the Soldier-Diplomat, published in 2006, the author explored the context and the process of military tactical-level negotiation under which soldiers operate, and how soldiers must be trained accordingly. Based upon decades of experience gained by the international community in the peacekeeping business, Goodwin’s research helps to better understand and appreciate the new enhanced role of the soldier within ‘modern’ operational contexts. It is within such dynamics that, as the author suggests, we come to understand the importance for the soldier to have cultural sensitivity and to master communication and interpersonal skills, attributes that ultimately allow the soldier to have the capacity to adapt to contextual characteristics specific to modern foreign military expeditions.

In 2006, the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute published The Professional Development Framework: Generating Effectiveness in Canadian Forces Leadership. This technical report explains how and why the professional military is transiting from a Warrior + technician mode to a Warrior + Technician + Researcher + Diplomat mode, a shift that highlights the importance of cognitive skills for the 21st Century soldier, and even more so for the military leader-manager. Based upon American psychologist Stephen Zaccaro’s work, the leadership components, synthesized into five interconnected domains and elements, allow a better understanding and measuring of the significance of intellectual aptitudes for the modern soldier and their necessary institutionalization into the CAF Leader Development Framework. Of the five required skills/domains for modern leaders the report highlights, three of them are of particular interest: 1) Functional expertise and knowledge; 2) Intelligence and reasoning ability; and 3) ‘abilities’ in human relations, such as communication, negotiation, influence, and understanding.
In 2007, the CAF Directorate of Land Strategic Concepts published a study pertaining to the force employment concept for a 15-year outlook, which advocated the need for transformation with regard to soldiering. “To meet the demands of full spectrum engagement, the Land Force will produce a soldier with a broader body of knowledge and skills. Tactical competencies and individual and collective war fighting skills that have traditionally defined the soldier as a warrior will be broadened to include the ‘soldier as a diplomat,’ and ‘the soldier as a scholar.’”

In 2009, the Center for International Cooperation at the University of New York published a work entitled, Robust Peacekeeping: The politics of Force. Two of the authors wrote:

Fifteen years ago, peacekeeping was doctrinally and operationally segregated from war-fighting by major powers, perhaps to protect peacekeeping from association with war-fighting, perhaps to protect the war-fighter’s ethos or skills from being weakened by rapid or frequent exposure to the more restrained world of peacekeeping. Today, however, key major power doctrines, including those of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and India, give peacekeeping a place on a continuous spectrum of tension that has war-fighting at the other end.

Master Warrant Officer Adam Corbett sits in front of a group of soldiers from the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces during an exercise in the Sierra Leone jungle, 28 April 2007.
However, the authors raised a most relevant note of caution:

It is not at all clear, however, that soldiers are collectively capable of doing as much role-shifting, and as rapidly, as doctrine now seems to require. One could envisage such adaptation in a thirty-four-year-old Special Forces sergeant with fifteen years of experience and special education and training in winning local support for his campaign. One has more trouble seeing it in a nineteen-year-old line infantryman with a high school education and at most a year of field experience of any sort under his belt.

In 2010, documents published by the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA) pertaining to cultural intelligence, negotiation skills, and soft-skills enriched this relatively new field of research. The Non-Commissioned Members Professional Development Centre (NCMPDC), renamed the Chief Warrant Officer Osside Profession of Arms Institute in 2014, produced a video entitled The Art of Being a Soldier-Diplomat. The Experience of Canadian Non-Commissioned Members in Cyprus.

Using Operation Snowgoose as a case study, the aim of this pedagogical tool was to demonstrate the existence of traditional tactical level diplomacy tasks and other required communicational skills Canadian NCMs have had to accomplish when on mission, even though such tasks were informal. More precisely, the thesis was that notwithstanding the nature of operations in which NCMs are called upon to serve, years of experience have brought to light the fact that contact skills and soft skills are important to master in order for them to achieve their tasks.

During the same period, CDA published Cultural Intelligence and Leadership, An Introduction for Canadian Forces Leaders. Furthermore, a research associate with the Canadian Special Operations Forces Battle Laboratory, and an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Royal Military College of Canada, Dr. Emily J. Spencer, wrote: Solving the People Puzzle: Cultural Intelligence and Special Operations Forces.

An examination of the evolution of literature pertaining to soft skills seems to indicate a slow but continuous change in military philosophy and doctrine over recent decades in regard to the importance of the cognitive dimension of the soldier’s attributes, and the corollary tool set he/she must be given. It also allows one to better analyze how those in key positions related to the defence and security of states have perceived changes in the strategic environment, how they have responded to these changes, and how they have integrated or not integrated, the lessons of past operations, especially peace operations and counterinsurgency operations.

Lessons Learned from Past and Current Operations

At the tactical level, military leaders often need to interact with local populations and local leaders. Whether they are master corporals, sergeants, or warrant officers, they are likely to come into contact with the local populations and their leaders, as well as with other key stakeholders, such as NGOs and representatives of governmental organizations and departments. They will be required to influence a given situation, and to lay the foundation of conditions supporting the objectives of a given mission.

However, this interactive context between soldiers and the local populations, involving non-traditional tasks, is hardly new. In contemporary times, such tasks were visible from the onset of peacekeeping missions conducted in the aftermath of the Second World War. From Egypt to Timor, Bosnia, Cyprus, Haiti, and Afghanistan, soldiers have long had the experience of interacting with local populations as well as with their military and civilian leaders. For example, some U.S. NCOs that were deployed in Iraq could have been called upon to act as the mayor of a village. In Afghanistan, Canadian NCMs negotiated with tribal leaders, while others trained members of the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police. Such interactions will likely only increase over the coming decades within the context and nature of contemporary armed conflicts.
In February 2011, the National Post published an article, “Crossing the language divide in Afghanistan.” We learn from it that PPCLI Master Corporal Grove learned the Pashto language on his own initiative, and he did this during three rotations within the International Assistance Force (ISAF).

At nights, the soldier studied in his bunk. He spent his free time with Afghan army members and police officers, drinking chai tea and teaching them English in exchange for new Pashto phrases he carefully printed in a dog-eared notebook. By the end of his 2008 tour, the member of the PPCLI, 1st Battalion, could converse. But it wasn’t until he returned to Edmonton that his studies took off. Grove bought a computer program and sought out local Afghans to talk with. He watched Pashto videos on YouTube and covered the subtitles with his hands. He’d never learned a second language before, no classes in high school, and had no previous interest.

Master Corporal Grove explained the intention behind his initiative: “I didn’t follow any learning pattern, and military-wise there is no language training. They give us an afternoon, here and there, but it’s for the basics, like greetings or ‘Stop or I’ll shoot.’ There was no real program in place, so I did my own thing.” As Grove recalled, “For one of us to speak like them, it immediately gets us in the door. [...] In hindsight, it’s a simple thing [...] It’s a sign of respect to learn someone else’s language.”

At first glance, this article piques our curiosity, and we think: “What an exemplary soldier, self-taught and sensitive to another’s culture and language.” But what the article also reveals is that the professional development and training system did not provide him with all the tools he needed in order for him to fully perform his tasks.

Another example from which many lessons can be learned is the experience of the Second Battalion of the Royal Vingt-deuxième Regiment Battle Group (2 R22eR BG) in 2009 in the context of the counterinsurgency operations it led in the Dand and Panjaway Districts of Afghanistan. The team demonstrated innovation through its implementation of the Advance Counter-insurgency Team (ACT), also known as the ‘village approach.’

This innovative yet ad hoc approach was a ‘first’ for all NATO contingents since 2001-2002. Its objective was to come closer to and to integrate the local population. In doing so, the battle group changed the concept of force protection and the building of forresses with wide defensive perimeters that projected a negative message to the local population. To achieve this, the officer command team had to agree to delegate and decentralize leadership to NCMs in order to give them greater flexibility and speed of action. This approach raised the status of NCMs to become the pillars of these particular operations.

As noted by Major Bolduc and Captain Vachon, officers serving with the 2nd Battalion R22eR Battle Group in 2009 in Afghanistan, in their lessons learned report published in 2010: “There were enormous leadership and change-management challenges for leaders at all levels when it came to turning the combat mentality into the COIN philosophy.” As underlined by Captain Jeremie Verville, an officer serving in Company “A” of the 2 R22eR BG in the village of Belandey, such an experience met resistance at first, because “…it was contrary to the basic principles that we had been learning for a long time.” This statement and
observation is corroborated by soldiers of the 2 R22eR BG, who remember that the objective was to bring the local population to the forefront, which had the effect of exposing members of the company to risks, a principle that, according to them, “…is counter-intuitive for all soldiers. Nobody trains like that. It’s always safety, safety, safety. Our training does not take into account the relations and communications dimensions.”

Vachon and Bolduc concluded their report by underlying the fact that “…particular attention must be placed on pre-deployment training in order to promote and implement the basic COIN principles […] with the help of specialized COIN operations training (that is linguistic, cultural, sociological, anthropological, historical, and so on).” They go on to say that “[…] it is important that we adjust the current curriculum so that it reflects the actual level of our soldiers’ knowledge and skills, particularly in relation to our junior and non-commissioned officers.”

On 28 September 2010, Radio-Canada’s Le Téléjournal featured members of the R22eR training in Wainwright while they getting ready to be deployed in Afghanistan. This would be the last Canadian battalion to participate in a CAF combat mission in Afghanistan.

Master Corporal Lavallée of Company “C” admitted to the feature’s reporter that with the new strategy consisting of integrating and living among the local population, it is not something he expected to do as a soldier. “Today,” he said, “this is an integral part of basic soldiering. One must know how to negotiate, to have social skills, and to easily connect with people.” As the journalist concluded, “…the soldiers themselves are becoming actual diplomats.”

Pitfalls to Avoid and Ways Ahead

Past operational experience, as previously highlighted, should serve as insight for future operations and should indicate some appropriate paths to achieve mission success.

In order to not repeat past errors, the institution must take advantage of the lessons provided by decades of practice in peace operations and for which Canada has long been one of the global figureheads. Peace operations have helped shed light upon essential non-combat duties involving communication and cognitive skills, which, in parallel to the traditional tasks involving physical strength, are essential for the modern soldier.
As previously mentioned, the training of Canadian soldiers deployed to Afghanistan left little room for cultural and language training and education, as well as for learning negotiation, mediation, and conflict resolution techniques. A mere few hours in the six-month deployment buildup were dedicated to the history, cultures, and languages found in the region. According to soldiers that have been deployed to Afghanistan, case studies and scenarios are implausible, such as the image of white Canadian-born actors who play the role of a ‘bad Taliban.’ This manner of training discredits the original purpose of the exercise, and it undermines any similar initiative.

Canadian Major-General David Fraser, who commanded the southern region of Afghanistan in 2006, remembers having underestimated the cultural factors. “I was looking at the wrong map. I needed to look at the tribal map, not the geographic map.” He and his team, as he recalled, “…spent more time talking about non-kinetic goals then kinetics. Soldiers must be ready to pull the trigger, but more importantly, they must be ready to sit, pull out their pen and act in order to commit to the projects that the village elders wish we carry out. […] The broader the education and training we can give our young soldiers, the better prepared we can make them for the unknown.”

In 2009, American General Stanley A. McChrystal, then-ISAF Commander, criticized the mission for its lack of cultural intelligence, a concern that others, such as Generals David Petraeus and Michael Flynn, would address after McChrystal. As General McChrystal wrote in the sub-title of his 2009 *Counterinsurgency Guidance*, a troop directive he issued in the midst of numerous criticisms following the killing of many Afghan civilians by American armed forces,
“Protecting the population is the mission. The conflict will be won by persuading the population, not by destroying the enemy.” 28

The problem rests in the nature of the skills and competencies that are required. ‘Soft’ skills involve patience and a slow pace, which is in contradiction with the traditional basic training provided to soldiers that places emphasis upon speed of execution. The very terms designating the preparatory phase before soldiers take part in an operation are also quite evocative: The English term ‘build-up,’ and even more expressively, the French term ‘montée en puissance’ reflect the character, if not the main intention, of military training, namely, to develop a force capable of fighting and one possessing a rapid reaction capability. Starting from this traditional concept, the PD system needs to add and emphasize the cognitive dimension to the necessary preparation phase.

Evidence demonstrates that special attention should be paid to what is done in the spheres of peace operations, COIN, intelligence, information and psychological operations, civil-military cooperation, Special Forces, and also to what other governmental departments are doing in the field of cultural intelligence, for example, the Canadian Foreign Service Institute Centre for Intercultural Learning. A possible path could also be to extend the Peace Operations Support Centre’s expertise to all CAF members. Such resources and expertise should be considered by the CAF for future changes to be made in its PD system.

What is being done by the Allied forces in this realm could also be an avenue worthy of consideration. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) use two highly-interesting tools as part of their pre-deployment training program known as the *Regional Expertise Qualification Program-AFPAK Course*, 29 which is intended for operators deploying to Afghanistan. The first tool is a 200-page manual on the geography of Afghanistan and Pakistan, Pashto language, history, culture, and so on. The other tool is *Army 360 Afghanistan*, 30 an interactive Cultural Simulation training movie that develops the candidate’s cultural intelligence, and requires making decisions throughout the various scenarios so that the effectiveness of actions and their scope at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels may be measured. Detailed, comprehensive interactive and specific resources such as these could be developed for different theatres of operation.

The Future of NCM Professional Development

In the aftermath of the Somalia crisis, as previously described, the CAF published *NCM Corps 2020* 31 in 2002, a document supplemental to *Defence Strategy 2020*, a broader strategic framework document published in 1999, which aimed at transforming defence planning and decision-making. 32 A consequence of this transformation process was the creation in 2003 of the Non-Commissioned Members Professional Development
Centre (NCMPDC). Under the authority of the Canadian Defence Academy, the Centre is the training and education hub for all NCM leaders. The organization, now called the Profession of Arms Institute-Chief Warrant Officer Robert Osside, has the mandate to provide education and training in the fields of social sciences to warrant officers, master warrant officers, chief warrant officers, and their navy equivalents in order for them to develop and improve their intellectual and critical thinking skills. Totaling 12 to 14 weeks, these courses, that fall under levels 3-to-5 on the Developmental Periods progression scale, are obligatory leadership qualifications for warrant officer, master warrant officer, and chief warrant officer positions.

During recent decades, as exemplified by the previous works this article has highlighted, research indicates that communication and cognitive skills are increasingly seen as a quintessential asset in the modern soldier’s ‘tool box’ in the Fourth Generation Warfare (4GWF) context. Unfortunately, research and observation also seem to indicate a rather constant and common weakness in such an approach to NCM education. It seems to be less about soldiers as a whole being identified as requiring such skills, but rather as being trade specific and idiomatic to the infantry, and, even more so, to special operations forces and to counterinsurgency operations. Consequently, this delineation impacts the CAF’s training, the instruction and the education system whereby the teachings of such skills and knowledge have yet to find their full mark. The existing systemic and organic overlap between the political and the military spheres has yet to find its necessary corollary in the CAF’s PD system.

On a continuous spectrum of training and education, starting at the very basic developmental periods given to all soldiers (DP1), to the highest training and education levels of the system (DP5), courses, such as and not limited to anthropology, psychology, communication, sociology, and management courses, in addition to those currently offered, should be systematically taught to all soldiers of all trades and environments, if deemed practicable. By doing so, it would allow to better develop members’ cognitive capacities, their cultural awareness skills, their cultural intelligence, and their general communication aptitudes throughout their careers.

Conclusion

The current context of modern armed conflicts and the future security environment require the NCM PD system, along with the individual and group training and instruction systems, to put greater emphasis upon ‘soft power’ and ‘soft skills’ in order to complement the weight of ‘hard power’ and combat skills. Without minimizing the fundamental importance of developing warrior skills in soldiers, it should, however, be put into perspective in light of the increased importance attributed to the cognitive skills of the soldier.

Once the preserve of officers, negotiation, mediation, and resolution of military conflicts at the tactical level are functions that NCMs have been exercising for a long time, although on an _ad hoc_ basis and in an implicit way. Such functions should be recognized and formalized as part of the NCMs core skills and, consequentially, part of their education and training. By doing so, it could also help the evolving concept of ‘command team’ to grow stronger, for if orders travel ‘from the top down,’ ultimately, tactical decisions and executions rest in the hands of the section-NCMs, in essence, the on-site tactical commanders.

If the CAF wishes to have soldiers that are well-armed physically and intellectually, the institution will have to pursue even further the transformation process of its PD system, not only to its individual and battalion pre-deployment and buildup training programs, or to the elite corps of its special forces, but also by developing a common systematic approach, a core curriculum that incorporates in-depth cognitive skills, starting at the lowest developmental periods.

Future investigations and research might also find that the development and perfection of such skills for the NCMs are quintessential, not only for them to better accomplish their operational and tactical tasks, but these skills will also be key for them to better fulfill their administrative and bureaucratic functions, duties that, contrary to typical tactical and military tasks, they will be asked to accomplish during the majority of their military careers. Finally, the mastering of such skills and professional assets could prove to be quite useful when transferred and applied to civilian careers, if and when it applies.

The ethical goal conveyed by the concept of soldier-diplomat will be achieved only once it has passed the conceptual stage and when the institution has fully recognized and accepted the new professional functions to be passed on to its NCMs. In this sense, the soldier-diplomat becomes instrumental for mission success. To achieve such shift of paradigm in any meaningful way, the institution will have to instill substantial change in its _doxa_ and its _habitus_ in regard to the education of its members, especially the NCM corps. Only then will changes be fully institutionalized and incorporated into a modern and adapted PD system, and, consequently, be of critical importance for the resolution of conflict in a manner that is in accordance with Canadian values and interests, as well as with the CAF’s ethos. Only then will the art of being a soldier-diplomat pass from an _implicit role_ to an _explicit function._
1. The author wishes to thank M. Robert Lummack, teacher at the Profession of Arms Institute-Chief Warrant Officer Oxide, for his time, comments and insight.

2. For sake of clarity, this article will be generally using the concept of Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) as the encompassing notion referring to post Second World War military operations.


15. Ibid.


18. Dr. Emily J.Spencer, Solving the People Puzzle: Cultural Intelligence and Special Operations Forces, (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2010), p. 192.


22. Information communicated to the author by soldiers that were part of to 2R2R BG/Task Force 1-09 operating under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).


The Vimy Training Quarters in Kingston is a three-storey, 5160 square metre military residential building, modeled as a modest hotel, and it is an example of a DND Green Globes Building.

An Investigation into Sustainable Building Evaluation Strategies for Use within the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence

by Nicholas Vlachopoulos and Tina Basso

Major Nicholas Vlachopoulos, PhD, CD, PEng., PE(Gr), is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Civil Engineering at the Royal Military College of Canada in Kingston, Ontario.

Tina Basso, M Sc., is a Research Associate with the Royal Military College Green Team.

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to provide a critical analysis of appropriate green building/sustainable development strategies for new construction and large renovation projects, and to examine their suitability for the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and the Department of National Defence (DND). Green/sustainable will be used to describe the infrastructure under analysis, as the two terms ‘green’ and ‘sustainable’ are used interchangeably in relevant literature. Green building/sustainable development strategies are those which address the environmental, social and economic aspects of a building in an attempt to lessen the negative impacts of the infrastructure. This investigation outlines the challenges of achieving current mainstream green/sustainable building accreditations due to the unique operating environments within the CAF. These unique environments include infrastructure in the Arctic, isolated areas, and overseas. These challenges require solutions which are specifically designed for implementation within the CAF, and not simply solutions which have been ‘imported’ from similar industries. As such, a proposed DND Sustainability Standard is outlined to assist the CAF in achieving the objectives of green/sustainable building initiatives without compromising the ability of DND/CAF to carry out regular activities. The two research areas that were investigated are:

- What are the unique requirements of the CAF with regard to green/sustainable buildings? (Part 1); and,
- What should be implemented in a sustainable development strategy for the CAF in order to achieve green/sustainable building objectives? What are the constraints of current DND policy, and how can those constraints be overcome? (Part 2)
These questions were investigated in order to illustrate the importance for the DND to consider implementing green/sustainable building strategies that are specific to DND and may be lacking in current rating systems, which would, in turn, create a Sustainability Standard; one that is more representative of the type of infrastructure DND owns and operates. The recommendations would be used to assist with the development of best practices and policies within DND with regard to green/sustainable building processes.

The scope of this study looks only at new construction within the CAF to provide insight into the DND’s decision behind mandating the use of LEED and Green Globes over other rating systems, and to establish criteria that should be included into a building assessment system, based upon the unique requirement and operations of the DND/CAF.

Background

With concern growing in regard to global warming and the depletion of the Earth’s resources, a new focus upon environmental sustainability has arisen throughout the world. DND is the largest building owner in the federal government by quantity (i.e., number of buildings), holding more than 43 percent of the federal inventory. Installations exist in every province and territory, and are located in 217 cities/municipalities. Under the purview of the Canada First Defence Strategy, over the next 20 years, DND will replace 50 percent of its existing infrastructure. Considering that the DND possesses some 21,000 buildings, 2.25 million hectares of land, 5500 kilometres of roads, and 3000 kilometres of water, storm, and sewer pipes, it can be said that the activities of the DND will impact the whole of Canada (Figure 1). These impacts may also translate into international concerns, as many of the issues are trans-boundary by nature (i.e. air quality).

Implementing a green building strategy into policy can achieve many savings, and if properly designed, it can achieve many positive results. However, meeting the requirements of the 2010 Federal Sustainable Development Strategy (FSDS) and the 2006 DND Sustainable Development Strategy (DND SDS) to achieve accreditation within generic green/sustainable building systems has proven to be a challenge, due to the suite of special purpose infrastructure possessed by the Department and the CAF, as well as the nature of CAF operations; both domestically and overseas.

Uniqueness of the DND

The following is a list of aspects related to the CAF/DND that make it unique from other commercial, office, or industrial facilities. This uniqueness poses many challenges.

- Infrastructure spans large geographic areas across Canada, including diverse climates and topography;
- High turnover rates among personnel working on the bases (posting occurs on average approximately every 2-3 years);
- A wide spectrum of specialized buildings, i.e., simulation centres, defence labs, indoor firing ranges, hangars, wash bays, and so on;
- Variety of buildings all on the same base, which must be addressed with a uniform rating system;
- Usage of public funds, requires transparency in spending;
- Adjacent areas around buildings may be used for training purposes;
- DND owns a lot of older infrastructure that needs to be replaced efficiently;
- Building longevity insinuates that the building usage will change over the course of its lifetime;
- Remote/isolated satellite facilities; and
- Structure of DND complicated. Many departments involved in infrastructure development.

"With concern growing in regard to global warming and the depletion of the Earth’s resources, a new focus upon environmental sustainability has arisen throughout the world."
History of Green/Sustainable Buildings

Green Buildings are not a new phenomenon. According to Smith et al., there were several buildings erected in the 19th and early 20th Centuries that integrated sustainable designs. After the Second World War, it was believed that, due to the abundance of cheap fossil fuel, building styles did not reflect energy efficient designs. It was not until the environmental movement of the 1970s that environmentally-conscious building designs became the focus.

Under the umbrella of sustainable development, the 1980s brought on a resurgence of green building discussions. The first environmental certification system was introduced in 1990 in the United Kingdom: the Building Research Environmental Assessment Method (BREEAM), and it was brought to Canada in 1996. In the U.S., the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC) introduced its own rating system in 1998: Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED). In 2004, the Green Building Initiative (GBI) adapted the Canadian version of BREEAM through the creation of Green Globes, and began distributing it in the U.S. market in 2005. Since that time, various other countries have adopted national Green Building Strategies (Figure 2).

Building Rating Systems were created to assess the negative consequences infrastructure has upon society by evaluating the infrastructure performance in a number of areas, i.e., energy consumption, waste production, indoor air quality, and so on, in order to improve efficiency. They are used as a tool to track performance and to provide building owners and developers with a guide to assist in building more sustainably. Based upon information from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), if the approach to constructing and operating buildings remains as the status quo, there will be major economic and environmental repercussions.

Sustainable Development and the Department of National Defence

There are several Directive Orders within the CAF that require sustainable and environmentally friendly activities/practices/procedures within all facilities owned and/or operated by the CAF. However, there is one document in particular that contains the necessary requirements to assist the CAF with modifying its practices with regard to new construction of buildings and major renovations. In 2003, DND, in its Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS) 2003, outlined a target (D1) to integrate the green building concept into the design process by having a percentage of eligible new building projects incorporate the green building concept. This target, although vague in nature, was a very important first step towards integrating green engineering into DND. The 2006 version of the SDS has taken the green building objective a step further with Strategic Commitment 2.1 (SC.2.1). This initiative aims to expand the integration of the green building concept into the design process by ensuring that all new building projects incorporate green building concepts. This latest initiative has set goals for projects valued at over $10 million to achieve a LEED ‘silver or better’ standard, and for projects valued at under $10 million to achieve a Green Globe ‘3-out-of-5 or better’ standard. Currently, there is no available information substantiating the DND’s decision to adopt LEED and Green Globes rating systems, aside from the fact that they are widely used in North America.
Triangulation (a type of Mixed-Method Research) is an approach typically used for military strategy, surveying, mapping, and navigational purposes. Triangulation in the realm of social sciences implies the use of multiple methods of research to ascertain a more accurate analysis of social phenomena. Triangulation was specifically useful for this research, as it provided the opportunity to gain information about the current status of green buildings within the CAF, and feedback and recommendations from personnel associated with the issues surrounding green buildings, as well as comparisons to existing rating systems. This allowed the research to determine something important and useful about the status of Green Buildings within the CAF. This methodology included the activities associated with the qualitative research design process found in Figure 3.

Triangulation has proven to provide many benefits when attempting to obtain reliable information. It can assist with eliminating biases, and it allows for a degree of cross-checking. It is an approach used to refine, broaden, and strengthen conceptual linkages, and it allows researchers to approach the subject with perspectives differing from their own perceptions. A Literature Review was conducted in order to help define relative concepts. It also assisted in the construction of the interview guide and established the set of categories and relationships that the interview must investigate. A document analysis was performed to gain insight into existing sustainable building rating systems, and policy documents were analyzed for ideas that would be most applicable and useful to the CAF. The last step in data collection was execution of long/semi-structured interviews, which provided the opportunity for in-depth insight into the issues at hand.

**Literature Review**

The Literature Review was conducted in order to provide a background and baseline for the study. Definition of relevant concepts were sought out to help provide a clear understanding of the research objectives, as well as a baseline for the study design. Also, it ensured that there was consistency throughout the report by establishing definitions of pertinent concepts within the context of this research, i.e., green vs. sustainable buildings. The literature review examined existing theoretical academic literature on the topics of green buildings and sustainable buildings, and the relationship between those concepts and rating systems. Search engines and library catalogues were perused using the aforementioned key words.

**Document Analysis**

The second part of the methodology consisted of an analysis and evaluation of existing green building rating systems. These rating systems included: LEED, Green Globes, DGNB, Green Star, BREEAM, and the Swedish Green Building Rating Tool. The six systems used for evaluation were based upon:

- Their prominence within North America (requirement of DND);
- Usage within countries of similar climate/geography;
- Second-generation systems;
- Utilization within a Military System; and,
- International Popularity.

Figure 3: Mixed-Method Research for CAF Research Project

### IDEA
What are the sustainable building needs of the Canadian Armed Forces?

### STUDY DESIGN
Literature Review + Document Analysis + Questionnaires

### DATA COLLECTION
Literature Review: green and sustainable buildings + Document Analysis: existing building rating systems policies.

### ANALYSIS AND FINDING
Established baseline definitions to better understand common themes through literature review. Document Analysis and Questionnaires were used to find common themes among interviewees, and in documents. Generated list of factors relevant for DND ratings systems, Choose components of systems deemed most effective for DND use.

### DISSEMINATION
Provided recommendations for DND management and sustainable building policy implementation within the CAF.

“The literature review examined existing theoretical academic literature on the topics of green buildings and sustainable buildings, and the relationship between those concepts and rating systems.”
Each of these systems was analyzed, based upon criteria included in the evaluation categories, types of indicators, weightings, and overall applicability to the CAF. Table 1 provides a cross-comparative analysis of the evaluation criteria thought to be relevant, based upon the combined results of the literature review, interviews, and observations, and to determine which rating system best addressed those specific criteria or issues. The chosen criteria were based upon applicability and relevance to the CAF, as well as to whether or not they, in fact, had a substantial impact upon the social, economic, or environmental aspects of the buildings. Indicators were selected if they said something substantial. These elements of the criteria are then suggested to be used in the Sustainable Development Strategy for the CAF. In addition to existing rating systems, other relevant documents were examined for information they provided on the state of green buildings in Canada, as well as the national policies relevant to the federal government.

### Long Interview/ Semi-Structured Interview

This phase of the methodology consisted of interviews with relevant personnel within the federal government, private companies, and those who have experience or knowledge related to the subject of green buildings. Nine participants were members of the CAF, two were DND civilians, two were independent consultants, one was a LEED member, one was a Green Globes member, and three were participants from Natural Resources Canada. These individuals can all be considered subject matter experts in a particular discipline associated with green buildings. The participants were interviewed to determine how the CAF can best achieve its sustainability targets with respect to the construction of buildings. The participants were interviewed to determine how the CAF can best achieve its sustainability targets with respect to the construction of buildings. Semi-structured interviews were selected as the mode of information gathering from respondents, due to the complexities and sensitive nature of the research topic, as it still allowed for flexibility in a collaborative communication process.

Between October 2011 and April 2012, 18 interviews were conducted. These included one focus group, four in-person interviews (including the focus group), 12 telephone interviews, and two interview guides e-mailed electronically.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Rating System of Choice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility of Criteria</td>
<td>Green Globes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance vs. Prescriptive indicators</td>
<td>Green Globes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third-Party Verification</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Design Process</td>
<td>BREEAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lifecycle Analysis</td>
<td>DGNB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greenhouse Gas Emissions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in Energy Usage in Buildings</td>
<td>BREEAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles: Reduction of GHG from Vehicle Emissions</td>
<td>LEED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encouragement of Virtual Meetings</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Quality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction in Water Usage</td>
<td>Green Star</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Health Consideration of Water</td>
<td>Swedish Rating Tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wastewater Management</td>
<td>Green Star</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials and Resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste Reduction</td>
<td>DGNB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recycling/Separation of Operational Wastes</td>
<td>BREEAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Procurement</td>
<td>Green Globes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recycling e-waste</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indoor Environmental Quality</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Quality</td>
<td>LEED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indoor Temperature Controls</td>
<td>BREEAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odourless and Low Emissions Products</td>
<td>Green Star and LEED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acoustic Comfort</td>
<td>BREEAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indoor Design</td>
<td>DGNB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Views</td>
<td>LEED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lighting Controls</td>
<td>LEED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Site Selection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Consideration</td>
<td>DGNB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Integrity of the Site</td>
<td>BREEAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location to Amenities</td>
<td>DGNB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social/Cultural Aspects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Sensitivity</td>
<td>DGNB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Impact on Adjacent Properties/ Architecture</td>
<td>Green Globes and DGNB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation/Maintenance/Architecture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioning</td>
<td>BREEAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee Awareness</td>
<td>Green Globes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>BREEAM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility of Building Use</td>
<td>DGNB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measurement and Verification</td>
<td>DGNB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building Durability</td>
<td>DGNB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life Cycle Cost Analysis</td>
<td>BREEAM and DGNB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation</td>
<td>All</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Evaluation Factors to be Included in the proposed DND Sustainable Development Rating System.
Each of the verbal interviews lasted between 25-60 minutes. In addition to the data collected, the participant’s professional background, setting, and the manner in which the questions were delivered were also taken into consideration. Participants were chosen based on their positions held within relevant government bodies (DND, NRCan, and so on), or private companies (LEED, GG, and so on). As well, using the ‘snowball’ techniques described by Berg, several of the participants were selected for interviews based on recommendations from co-workers or industry associates. Following this guide, ensured that:

- personnel associations and cultural biases were identified;
- interview procedures were conducted in a way as to obtain as much accurate information from the participant as possible;
- participants’ experience was positive; and
- the data collected was synthesized and analyzed properly.

Results

This section contains the numerous results from the data that were collected and analyzed as part of this research undertaking. The analysis of the data collected by the triangulation approach is divided into two sections, each addressing one of the research questions. These results identify all the major themes reflected by the interviews and supporting literature, regarding the essential components of a DND-specific building rating system, as well as challenges of implementing green/sustainable policies into the CAF. These results were compiled based upon the researcher’s data collected, and research into the specific operations and needs of the DND. In support of this overall objective, the results cited herein are the main results as determined through the rigorous methodology that has been applied in this research study.

Results – Part 1

Part 1 addresses the first research question and presents the results: What are the unique requirements of the CAF with regard to green/sustainable buildings? This first question aims to determine the needs of the CAF with regard to a sustainable building strategy. Figure 4 indicates the proportion of respondents who do not believe that the application of current building rating systems achieve the intended savings, or properly fulfill sustainable building philosophies. Of these respondents, an overwhelming majority are DND personnel. This indicates that within DND, the manner in which infrastructure is currently being managed is felt to be unacceptable.

Based upon interviews and supporting literature, the following section describes a series of factors that are believed to be important for inclusion in a DND specific sustainable building rating system. These factors were then compared against current rating systems, and evaluated by the way in which these rating systems applied that factor. An existing rating system (and subsequent credit/criterion) was selected that best applied each of the factors highlighted through the research (interviews, literature, and researcher’s experience). The parameters of the existing rating system credit/criterion selected were based upon their applicability to the military, ease of use/implementation, and perceived environmental, social, and economic benefits.

Based upon the conclusions drawn from Table 1, it is evident that there is not one rating system that provides DND with all the required factors/criteria in order to effectively address sustainability within their infrastructure. Table 2 further summarizes the total number of factors each system was determined to best address the needs of the DND.

Results – Part 2

This section addresses the second research questions: What should be implemented in a sustainable development strategy for the CAF in order to achieve green/sustainable building objectives? What are the constraints of current DND policy, and how can those constraints be overcome?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rating Systems</th>
<th>Number of Factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LEED</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Globes</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GreenStar</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BREEAM®</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedish Building Rating Tool</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGNB</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: The total number of factors each system most effectively addressed.
Challenges of implementing sustainable building strategies within DND were raised, due to the current practice and structure of the CAF. Any policies created within DND must account for its unique command structure as it will have a direct influence upon operations and an influence upon all long-term aspects. The command structure is based upon making quick and efficient decisions, and when there is a five-year or a ten-year sustainability plan, the current structure is limited in terms of addressing that issue, i.e. the posting system. Issues and recommendations to mitigate these issues to make strategies more effective are summarized in Table 3.

The results in Part 1 of this section were used to help identify the most significant building rating problems, as well as to highlight areas that require the most attention in order to minimize the environmental effects of a building. National objectives and legal requirements were also used to showcase the areas of sustainable building tools that policy developers and sustainable building users find most important. However, sustainable building tools cannot stand alone, and must be part of a wider sustainable building policy initiative through the DND.

Conclusions / Contributions

The objectives of this study were to address the following research questions:

- **Part 1** – What are the unique requirements of the CAF with regard to green/sustainable buildings?; and,
- **Part 2** – What should be implemented in a sustainable development strategy for the CAF in order to achieve green/sustainable building objectives? What are the constraints of current DND policy, and how can those constraints be overcome?

Conclusions – Part 1

The unique nature of the CAF and its Sustainable Development (SD) policies and practices were fully referred to previously in this article. The results of the interviews of the DND personnel, federal employees, and relevant experts further defined the unique requirements and policy of the CAF in this regard. Examining buildings within an SD framework from the macro-scale (holistically) to the micro-scale (CAF specific), the authors investigated the development of current sustainable building rating systems and strategies. The authors’ research has contributed to the examination of current green/sustainable building rating systems and their widespread application. The trends and themes that were thoroughly examined and determined helped contribute to the academic discourse in the field of sustainable buildings assessment. The results (i.e. the most viable and relevant components (or cited factors) of a variety of rating systems in regard to green building and sustainable development concepts) reiterate the fact that proper critical analysis, and a trans-disciplinary approach is required for selecting the most optimal rating system indicators and criteria, especially for use by the CAF and DND, with their stated unique requirements. The aim was to tackle and suggest a solution for a ‘real-world problem,’ as the tool should be used to improve the performance of buildings. Scientific knowledge from many fields needs to be collated and analysed in order to extract the most important aspects to be considered in the tool. In addition, appropriate policies and support are required to foster the progress of sustainability strategies. The following conclusions can be drawn from the results of this research:

- The unique needs of the DND were identified and investigated as to how this uniqueness affects the application and effectiveness of rating systems (Summary provided in Table 2);
- Core, Relevant SD factors/criteria were determined through a thorough, comprehensive, and international selection process that could be used as the foundation for a proposed DND sustainable buildings rating system;
- A sustainable development framework was established;
- Areas of improvement with regard to SD for DND infrastructure were identified; and,
- Research addressed shortcomings and proposed sustainable building policy protocol.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cited Issue</th>
<th>Action Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short-term policies regarding unsustainable development</td>
<td>Consideration of high turn-over rates, and long-term budgets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of ownership and accountability</td>
<td>Requirement of executives and directors to have their end of year assessments affected if they are not implementing sustainable practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of spending on pilot projects and research and development</td>
<td>Long-term budgets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Training and Education</td>
<td>Ensure clarity of policies and provide training programs to ensure proper execution of tasks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Communication</td>
<td>Creation of policy must consider all factors of building design and user group requirements. Communicate requirements to all levels and between departments (green building policies should be shared between Environment and infrastructure).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unclear Objectives</td>
<td>Ensure all parties understand terminology and concept in policies and plans. Requirement of consistent monitoring and re-evaluation of policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not flexible</td>
<td>Create a policy flexible enough to include both large and smaller infrastructure projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Incentives</td>
<td>Provide incentives for managers and directors to implement sustainable building strategies.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Issues and Required Actions for DND Building Management Plans.
Conclusions – Part 2

This research incorporated the relevant concepts of SD by addressing the components of the sustainability which highlights the applicability of these frameworks to the built environment, and their usability for practical purposes. The cited factors that were chosen and substantiated by the authors have the potential to become the standard through which SD can be not only evaluated, but practised through implementation. It also illustrates the potentialities for the framework to be used as a design tool, aiding in the mobilization of these concepts of sustainability from policy into practice. Obtaining sound feedback and input to the CAF and the DND, can, in turn, be introduced at the federal level. This can be accomplished through the creation of a DND-specific Sustainable Building Strategy. Policies which aim to advance the use of sustainability concepts within infrastructure practices should use these concepts when designing policy, and not just for the design of infrastructure itself. The current CAF LEED and Green Globes policy certainly have their shortcomings in this regard. This research has illustrated the need to re-evaluate the method of policy creation within the DND, to include more relevant and further reaching concepts of sustainability.

NOTES

4. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
Past, Present, and Future: The Evolution of Canadian Foreign Intelligence in a Globalized World

by Michael Tierney

Canadian foreign intelligence has been a topic of debate among foreign policy and security scholars since the end of the Second World War. Since 1945, the most contentious issue within this discussion has been whether Canada should establish a foreign intelligence agency which collects human intelligence (HUMINT) similar to the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), or the Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS). To this point, Canada has not instituted such an agency, even though the idea received notoriety as recently as 2006 when the Conservatives included a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service (CFIS) in their election platform. The second most controversial issue has taken root in the debate with respect to where a CFIS would most appropriately fit within Canada’s existing security and intelligence community. Many scholars argue that a CFIS would most appropriately be housed within the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development (DFATD) as a standalone agency, with fewer stating that it could be a good idea to broaden the Canadian Security Intelligence Service’s (CSIS) mandate to include a robust foreign HUMINT collecting responsibility.

While the subject of Canadian foreign intelligence has faced periodic review, scholars maintain that the literature focusing upon foreign intelligence in Canada is fairly limited. In addition, Commander Ted Parkinson, an Intelligence Officer in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), has stressed the need for more knowledge, understanding, and engagement on the topic of intelligence in Canada. In this way the field is relatively open to scholarly discussion. The purpose of this article is to examine Canada’s previous and current foreign intelligence capabilities, and to analyze how
Canadian foreign intelligence has changed and will continue to change in the future. In doing so, the article will add to the literature on Canadian foreign intelligence, supply an outline of Canada’s foreign intelligence structure and capabilities, and provide an outlook for Canadian foreign intelligence moving forward.

The article is organized into three parts. First, the literature on Canadian foreign intelligence is briefly reviewed. Second, there is discussion of Canada’s previous and existing foreign intelligence structure, capabilities, and operations. Finally, there is an assessment of how Canada’s foreign intelligence capabilities have changed in the post-9/11 era, and an analysis of how they might change in the future.

Literature Review

The existing literature on Canadian foreign intelligence primarily discusses whether Canada needs an expanded foreign intelligence presence, particularly in the area of HUMINT collection. Proponents and opponents of a CFIS have been debating the merits and pitfalls of foreign intelligence since at least the end of the Second World War. While this debate has lasted for decades, the context in which it occurs has changed considerably as the security environment has changed from one defined by Cold War to one defined by terrorism and the globalization of security threats.

Therefore, it is important to review the most recent literature on the subject in order to contextualize the current affairs of foreign intelligence in Canada.

In 2002, Martin Rudner, Emeritus Professor at Carleton University’s Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, argued that a CFIS was required to serve Canadian national interests as it would help advance Canada’s geo-strategic, economic, military, scientific, technological, environmental and social policy goals. Additionally, he emphasized that Canada needed its own HUMINT because it would give the government a full range of intelligence in dealing with global threats. In this manner, Rudner not only supported the expansion of Canadian foreign intelligence, but also advocated that Canada develop HUMINT capabilities in order to deal with the globalization of security threats. In the immediate post-9/11 era, Rudner reasoned that Canada needed to improve its foreign intelligence abilities in order to adequately secure itself and its interests. And yet, Rudner only began to bring the debate about a CFIS into the post-9/11 period.

Richard James Kott and Jerome Mellon also argued in support of a CFIS in the immediate aftermath of the 2001 terrorist attacks. According to both, Canada required its own foreign HUMINT for political, economic, and defence purposes, as well as for
counter-terrorism efforts. Kott specifically argued that Canada did not have the appropriate means to monitor terrorist groups of significant interest to its national security. He was also fearful that Canadian sovereignty would deteriorate as Canada became more reliant upon the US for intelligence support, which would eventually lead to Canada becoming perceived as a security liability. In addition, he felt that a dedicated and professionalized service would more successfully gather information required to protect national security in comparison to existing intelligence arrangements. In this way, Kott contendted that Canada did not have the foreign intelligence presence needed to protect Canadian security and interests. Mellon made similar arguments to Kott, but specifically noted that by developing foreign HUMINT Canada could more competitively negotiate trade deals, maximise limited CAF resources, more successfully monitor the proliferation of uranium and nuclear technology, and more effectively combat terrorism in order to protect itself and its allies. Thus, Mellon claimed that a CFIS would be cost-effective and would increase Canada’s international standing and national security. In this way, both Kott and Mellon agreed with Rudner’s analysis that Canada had a number of strategic reasons for implementing a HUMINT-based CFIS.

In 2006, Reid Morden, the former Director of CSIS (1988-1992) and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (1991-1994), contended that a CFIS would give Canada “a unique Canadian perspective on intelligence gathered by itself and by allies,” and that a “CFIS would allow Canada to collect information based on its own priorities.” Therefore, an increased foreign intelligence presence would protect Canada’s sovereignty and allow Canada to make decisions based solely in its national interest. Similarly, Ted Parkinson asserted that with a CFIS Canada would achieve greater independence in its foreign policymaking, pursue intelligence operations for its own ends, alleviate dependence on the biased intelligence of allied states, gain a useful bargaining chip when trading information with other countries, and improve overall governmental situational awareness in policymaking and international negotiations. In this way, proponents of a CFIS have given several reasons to support the expansion of Canadian foreign intelligence. Much of their reasoning is based upon improving the security, sovereignty, competitiveness, and international standing of Canada, and it aligns with the traditional thinking of other western countries. However, some scholars have argued against the establishment of a CFIS and their opinions have undoubtedly carried weight over the last half-century.

Yet, Canadian academic, historian, and former foreign service officer Daniel Livermore has criticized the idea of a CFIS arguing that the amount of information collected by such an agency would be small in comparison to the information Canada already has access to through open sources and diplomacy, or supplied by the intelligence services of allied states. Additionally, he has asserted that “although maintaining Canada’s network of diplomatic missions is not cheap, the covert collection of intelligence tends to be considerably more expensive” and that Canadians should not “assume that [they] could even get useful new information with greater investments in intelligence machinery [because] certain information is inherently difficult to obtain.” From Livermore’s perspective, Canada already has sufficient arrangements in place to meet its intelligence needs. Furthermore, a CFIS would be financially expensive with little return on investment in the form of new intelligence. Thus, Livermore maintains that Canada should not expand its intelligence capabilities to include foreign HUMINT.

Paul Robinson has also questioned whether a CFIS would produce sufficient intelligence to give Canada a truly independent foreign policymaking tool. He has additionally noted that Canada’s biggest concern is ‘home-grown’ terrorism, and not terrorist threats coming from overseas. Moreover, he has warned that “foreign espionage comes at a diplomatic cost and could result in illegal activity abroad.” Therefore, Robinson contends that Canada does not need to worry about establishing a CFIS because it would more likely result in the loss of Canada’s international reputation than increase its security and independence in foreign policymaking.
Livermore’s and Robinson’s concerns have helped build a strong enough case against a CFIS over the last half-century that Canada has not established such an agency to date. However, proponents of a CFIS have rebutted these points in recent years.

For instance, Ted Parkinson and John Thompson have downplayed concerns with respect to the potential diplomatic costs of a CFIS. Parkinson maintains that any diplomatic costs can be overcome with time and good management.29 Thompson points out that several intelligence agencies do not even believe that Canada does not have its own foreign intelligence service.20 Therefore, it would not hurt Canada’s reputation if it decided to establish a CFIS. Furthermore, while Thompson acknowledges that Canada does have some ability to collect foreign intelligence through existing departments and agencies, he also opines that these institutions are limited in scope and are constrained by mandate and available resources.21 Thus, some concerns pertaining to a CFIS may be unwarranted, and he believes it is still in the country’s best interest to establish a foreign HUMINT presence.

Scholars have also debated where a potential CFIS would most appropriately fit within Canada’s existing security and intelligence community. While this debate is more limited compared to the debate about whether Canada needs a CFIS at all, there are generally two suggestions brought forward: 1) create an independent agency which is operationally housed in the Department of Foreign Affairs; and 2) expand the CSIS mandate to collect foreign HUMINT. The first option is typically more popular among scholars, but there are pros and cons to both.

Reid Morden supports either option, but notes that the blending of security and foreign intelligence into the CSIS mandate would be controversial since western countries have traditionally divided those responsibilities between two separate agencies.22 However, Morden acknowledges that recently there have been significant changes in the thinking regarding intelligence practices. In particular, new models of blended intelligence services are appearing in countries like New Zealand and the Netherlands, due to the overlap between security and foreign intelligence in an era of heightened concern about globalized terrorism.23 In this manner, it is becoming normal for countries to combine responsibilities into one agency. As Canada already has a security intelligence service, it may be suitable to simply broaden its mandate.

Daniel Livermore argues against the expansion of the CSIS role. In his opinion, if Canada is going to expand its foreign HUMINT capabilities it should “...set up a Canadian foreign intelligence agency on an appropriate legislated basis, with its own budget and director, under the appropriate minister and as part of the appropriate department [DFATD].”24 Moreover, Livermore asserts that the worst decision would be to broaden the CSIS mandate, because it would “…produce the least amount of useful information for the most cost and would create the greatest potential for embarrassment to Canada.”25 Therefore, while Livermore is opposed to the creation of a CFIS altogether, the best of the remaining options is that Canada establishes a CFIS within DFATD, rather than CSIS.

Similarly, Richard Kott expresses concern about a possible broadening of the CSIS role. He states that CSIS is known internationally as a security intelligence service, and if it were to gain an expanded foreign intelligence mandate, suspicions could arise with respect to the nature of CSIS’ activities. Increased suspicion would then make it more difficult for CSIS to collect accurate intelligence abroad and could also negatively impact Canada’s foreign standing.26 Kott also argues that CSIS is bound by Canadian law, as it is predominantly a domestic security intelligence service. This constraint would make it difficult for CSIS to effectively operate overseas where information is gathered by “whatever means possible.”27 Furthermore, CSIS is required to work closely with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), so it must continue to gather intelligence in a legal manner in order to allow information acquired to be used in court.28 Thus, Kott asserts like most of the scholarly community that a CFIS would best fit in the Department of Foreign Affairs, as it is the principal consumer of foreign intelligence.29 However, there are options for the federal government to consider, along with the costs and benefits of each. While Canada has not instigated a CFIS to date, it does collect some foreign intelligence through existing departments and agencies.

Canada’s Foreign Intelligence Structure

Today, there are predominantly five organizations responsible for foreign intelligence in Canada. They are DFATD, the CAF and the Department of National Defence (DND), CSIS, the RCMP, and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE). Together, these institutions collect and assess a broad range of information, ranging from open sources (OSINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and, to a limited extent, HUMINT, in order to inform policymaking, protect national security, conduct criminal investigations, and advance Canadian military operations. Undoubtedly, Canada does not suffer from a total lack of foreign intelligence, which is why the debate about a CFIS has centred upon the establishment of a robust HUMINT collecting body. For this reason, it is important to examine the history and capabilities of the existing Canadian security and intelligence community before analyzing how Canadian foreign intelligence might change in the future.

John Thompson notes that while the Department of Foreign Affairs is not a foreign intelligence agency, it has “…a better claim to that role than many others.”30 Daniel Livermore agrees, stating that:

[Canadian] diplomats gather information from friendly interlocutors inside a variety of centres of power and influence abroad. In doing so, they do not simply duplicate open-source media reports. Rather, they specialize in interpreting a number of high priority themes based on privileged contacts with real decision-makers.31
In this manner, Livermore points out that Canada’s expansive diplomatic network collects highly sensitive intelligence, and then filters that information into the government’s decision-making process. Richard Kott explains that Foreign Affairs Canada had a Foreign Intelligence Bureau responsible for collecting, analyzing, and distributing information across Canada’s security and intelligence community until 1993. Afterwards, the Department established a Security and Intelligence Bureau, which “…supports policy and operational decisions and advises the Minister [of Foreign Affairs] on intelligence activities.” One case of DFATD’s role in intelligence collection occurred during the early Cold War in Cuba. Don Munton, author of *The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Concise History*, writes that “…diplomats based at the Canadian embassy in Havana conducted espionage in Castro’s Cuba during the 1960s and early 1970s.” During that time, Canadians collected information, both overtly and covertly, through OSINT and HUMINT operations. Additionally, until 1972, Canada conducted intelligence operations in Cuba for the United States, since the Americans had broken diplomatic ties with Cuba in 1961. American requests for Canadian foreign intelligence were especially heavy during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, and after 1963, “Canadian efforts moved even more into clandestine collection of the sort usually carried out by trained intelligence operatives, most notably on Soviet military and communications installations.” Thus, Canada is not a complete stranger to the world of foreign HUMINT collection. While it halted covert intelligence operations in Cuba in the early-1970s, DFATD continues to play one of the larger roles in collecting and assessing foreign intelligence in the Canadian security and intelligence community.

The DND and the CAF also play a prominent role in the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence, although they have a relatively narrow mandate to conduct operations abroad. Dwight Hamilton explains the importance of Canada’s military to foreign intelligence operations during the Second World War and the Cold War. He notes that during the Second World War, the Canadian and British governments jointly established Camp X near Whitby, Ontario in order to train members of Britain’s Special Operations Executive, which was a division of British Military Intelligence. It also worked alongside the American Office of Strategic Services, which was the predecessor to the CIA. After 1945, the Canadian Forces Intelligence Branch worked with...
allies to share information during the Cold War as well. In this way, the DND/CAF have worked with the foreign intelligence agencies of allied states in order to maintain international relationships and foster information sharing between allies, which has enhanced Canada's access to foreign intelligence. As Martin Rudner affirms, "Canada's own efforts in the domain of foreign intelligence are significantly augmented by exchanges of intelligence with allies and partners under various international arrangements." Yet, the DND/CAF has a responsibility to independently collect intelligence as well. For instance, J2 is Canada's defence intelligence agency. While defence intelligence is used for military purposes, particularly during missions, J2 is responsible for providing the CAF with strategic, military and security intelligence. Its activities include "...the provision of political, strategic and tactical intelligence to CAF commanders, the deployment of Intelligence, Geomatics and Imagery detachments for CAF operations, the dispatch of Intelligence Response Teams to support peacekeeping missions, and the provision of Counter-Intelligence force protection to operational missions." Thus, the DND/CAF has a foreign intelligence mandate, even if it is limited to supporting military activities. Like DFATD, the DND/CAF has one of the longest standing mandates to collect intelligence for Canada. However, the most robust foreign intelligence agency in Canada is the SIGINT-collecting CSE, which is operationally housed in Defence.

The CSE is Canada’s premier foreign intelligence agency, but it does not have a HUMINT function. Rather, the CSE has a mandate to collect SIGINT, which is offensive in nature, and to protect communications by the Government of Canada, which is defensive in nature. As Philip Rosen notes, "the CSE has its roots in cryptographic and cryptanalytical developments during World War II, especially focusing on intercepting and analyzing the communications of Germany, Vichy France, and Japan." And yet, it really came to the fore of Canadian foreign intelligence at the beginning of the Cold War when the UK/USA Security Agreement came into force between Britain, the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. As Martin Rudner points out, the UK/USA agreement is a partnership mechanism between allies for SIGINT collection, processing, and sharing. The CSE in particular was responsible for providing intelligence to the Government of Canada, UK/USA partners, and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members about Soviet military capabilities during the Cold War. The agency used and still uses a variety of methods to gather information, but Rudner highlights the fact that it utilizes Canadian foreign embassies to collect signals from host countries. This detail illustrates that the CSE not only works closely with the DND, but also with DFATD to collect information abroad. While it does not have a HUMINT capability, it is Canada’s foremost foreign intelligence agency, and it can work with DFATD, the DND/CAF, and allies to gather information which can be used by the Government of Canada in its decision making. It also works alongside Canada’s other security and intelligence organizations to protect national security and to guide investigations, both at home and abroad.

The RCMP and CSIS have important roles in collecting foreign intelligence for Canada as well. Before the creation of CSIS in 1984, the RCMP had the independent responsibility for gathering security intelligence in Canada. As the Distinguished Research Professor Emeritus at York University and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Victoria Reg Whitaker notes, the RCMP worked closely with the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) during the Cold War and exchanged information with them on an “as required” basis. In addition, RCMP officials participated in a counterintelligence alliance with the US, UK, Australia, and New Zealand in order to exchange intelligence and to discuss matters of mutual interest. They also actively used double-agents against the Soviets throughout the 1950s and 1960s. The use of double-agents and allied information would have netted the RCMP some foreign intelligence during the Cold War. Since 1984, however, CSIS has retained the mandate
to collect security intelligence in Canada and partners with the RCMP as required. And yet, while its primary responsibility is to gather security intelligence in Canada, CSIS also has a more constrained secondary mandate to collect information about the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign states.54 Even though it has a severely limited ability to operate abroad, CSIS has continually increased its covert foreign operations since its inception.55 However, it is prohibited by law from collecting non-threat-related information, or from targeting foreign government agencies.56 In this way, CSIS is not a robust foreign HUMINT collecting agency, even though it operates abroad on occasion to collect information pertaining to the immediate security of Canada. However, CSIS may be Canada’s most apparent embodiment of the blending between security and foreign intelligence in recent years. As John Thompson notes, “CSIS does everything in its power to protect Canadian citizens at home and abroad. This is done to such an extent that even warnings of assassination threats for ordinary civilians working overseas are dispensed on an individual basis.”57 Moreover, CSIS is “…a perpetually evolving organization adapting as necessary to changes in the global environment.”58 Thus, its role in foreign intelligence is likely to continue changing into the future.

The Evolution of Canadian Foreign Intelligence

The Canadian foreign intelligence community changed substantially after 2001. Specifically, Canadian intelligence agencies became more active overseas in the aftermath of 9/11.59 Increased foreign activity is partially the result of increased funding from the Government of Canada. For example, CSIS and the CSE were given budget increases from 2001 onwards in order to improve their foreign intelligence collecting capabilities.60 Additionally, the CSE was given the ability to “monitor communications to or from Canada specifically for the collection of foreign intelligence.”61 Likewise, CSIS has been required to more frequently operate abroad since 2001. According to former CSIS Director Ward Elcock (1994-2004), “…working covertly abroad has become an integral part of the Service’s operations.”62 John Thompson adds: “…as expertise has grown, CSIS’ foreign operations have expanded to tasking human sources to travel abroad, recruit foreign sources, and meet them in third countries.”63 In this way, Canada has increased its foreign intelligence presence through existing agencies over the last decade. However, these agencies continue to operate with constraints placed upon their ability to collect foreign information. For instance, while CSIS can operate abroad for security intelligence purposes, it is only allowed to collect foreign intelligence with direction from the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of National Defence. Otherwise, CSIS can only provide the government with “non-threat related information that is collected incidentally during CSIS operations.”64 The CSE has a much broader mandate to collect foreign intelligence, but it only does so through SIGINT. Nonetheless, these two agencies, alongside the rest of the intelligence community, have intensified their collaboration since 2001, especially in the realm of counter-terrorism.65 The intensification of these agencies’ collaboration illustrates that Canada has placed a heightened importance upon intelligence in recent years. It also suggests that the government has compelled its intelligence agencies to work closely together in order to increase Canada’s foreign intelligence capacity.
The war in Afghanistan has also played a significant role in changing the structure and capabilities of Canada’s foreign intelligence community. For example, the DND created a new Human Intelligence Unit within the military in 2008 to gather intelligence relating to operations in Afghanistan. In 2013, a CAF Intelligence Group was also created, which combined five separate intelligence units under a single command mandated to provide integrated intelligence to the DND/CAF. Beyond that, CSIS has conducted operations in Afghanistan, and has worked alongside Canadian Special Operations when interviewing prison detainees in that country. Thus, Canada has expanded its foreign intelligence presence in Afghanistan because it has substantial interests there. The 11 September 2001 attacks and the resulting Afghanistan conflict were key events which ultimately helped broaden Canada’s foreign intelligence capabilities. However, there are constantly evolving limits placed upon the activities that Canadian intelligence agencies can conduct abroad.

In 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada made a ruling with regard to an overseas electronic surveillance operation that CSIS wanted to conduct on ten suspects, nine of which were Canadian. The court ruled that CSIS could not carry out the mission because “…while the language of the CSIS Act could be inferred as allowing the agency to operate abroad, the inference is not clear enough to support the issuing of the foreign surveillance warrants.” Thus, CSIS faces new restrictions on its ability to operate overseas in the post-9/11 era as well. While it can gather information that is needed to combat direct threats to Canada, it still does not have a broad mandate, like the CIA or MI6, to engage in foreign intelligence collection to protect the interests and security of Canada and its citizens around the world. Nonetheless, CSIS is still Canada’s predominant HUMINT agency, and it has expanded its overseas presence as required in the globalized threat environment.

Former CSIS Director Richard Fadden testified to Parliament in 2010 about the CSIS role in Afghanistan. In his testimony, Fadden stressed that CSIS disrupted terrorists, safeguarded soldiers, and saved Canadian lives. International terrorism and Canada’s participation in Afghanistan has forced CSIS to regularly act overseas in order to protect the security of Canada and of Canadians. Moreover, since 2001, CSIS has linked security and foreign HUMINT together in what it refers to as “blended collection.” In this manner, globalization and the merging of security and foreign intelligence have made an impact upon the way that...
CSIS operates. While CSIS is not a dedicated foreign intelligence agency, it now plays a significant role in gathering information abroad. Its role in such activities may continue to expand in the coming years. As Associate Professor of History at the University of Toronto and faculty member at the Munk School of Global Affairs Wesley K. Wark points out: “In the globalized world, what couldn’t be defined as a threat to the security of Canada?”

In its 2007-2008 Public Report, CSIS stated that it had approximately 50 Foreign Officers stationed overseas in 30 countries in order to “…provide screening support to Citizenship and Immigration posts abroad, liaise and maintain relations with international partners, and collect security intelligence linked to Canada and its interests.” While the agency acknowledged that these officers were declared to host countries, it also reported that it “…sends Canadian-based officers abroad to engage in intelligence activity to fulfill requirements of the CSIS Act.” In 2009, CSIS not only detailed that it had been working in Afghanistan alongside the CAF, but also stated that it was involved in resolving the kidnappings of Canadian citizens abroad. In 2010, the Service reported that it had enhanced its capacity to collect information overseas, and that in addition to working in Afghanistan, it was working in the Pakistan region as well to support Canada’s mission there. In 2011, CSIS claimed that even though the combat mission had ended in Afghanistan, it was going to continue operations there in order to protect Canadian security and interests. While the exact nature of CSIS operations in the Middle East is unclear, the agency has undoubtedly become more active overseas since 2001. While it continues to be constrained by its mandate in the field of foreign intelligence, it will likely continue to expand its presence abroad alongside intelligence community partners.

For instance, the RCMP has increasingly played a role, albeit limited, in Canada’s foreign intelligence activities. Through its International Operations Branch, the Mounties deploy Liaison Officers to countries around the world in order to facilitate criminal investigations which have Canadian connections and to exchange information with foreign law enforcement agencies. It also houses an International Affairs and Policy Development Branch, which ensures that “…decision-making, policies and operations abroad are intelligence-led, coordinated and strategic in a rapidly changing world, and consistent with the RCMP strategic goal of ensuring a ‘safe and secure Canada’.” While the RCMP is only allowed to operate in foreign countries with the approval of host governments, it nonetheless conducts criminal investigations and collects criminal intelligence in order to protect Canada and its interests. It also has a responsibility to maintain information exchange programs with foreign law enforcement agencies, and it helps assess intelligence gathered overseas for consumption by RCMP officials, intelligence community partners, and the Government of Canada. The Algeria Gas Plant case in 2013 highlighted the RCMP’s role abroad. Such a case could also play a factor in the expansion of Canadian foreign intelligence in the years to come.

In early 2013, 32 terrorists from al-Qaeda-linked groups in Africa seized control of a Statoil/British Petroleum gas plant in Algeria. Two of the terrorists who stormed the facility were Canadian citizens, and one was later identified as a leader of the associated Panos 25700591593 by Tsuyoshi Matsumoto

Algerian soldiers stand guard at the In Amenas gas plant facility in eastern Algeria, 31 January 2013, as the Algerian government opened the site of the Algeria hostage crisis to the media for the first time since the deadly attack there by Islamist militants on 16 January.
group. After taking control of the plant, the terrorists “strapped foreigners to explosives and threatened to execute their captives and blow up the facility.” In the end, 29 terrorists and 40 gas plant workers were killed in the four-day ordeal. In the aftermath of the attack, a team of RCMP officers was deployed to Algeria to investigate and confirm any Canadian involvement in the plot. Such an example illustrates the role of the RCMP in Canadian foreign intelligence efforts. While it does not operate abroad in order to collect true foreign intelligence, it has a responsibility to investigate crimes committed by Canadians overseas. In doing so, it relays information back to Canadian officials, which can then be used for various purposes. The Algeria Gas Plant case may demonstrate a possible avenue for the expansion of Canadian foreign intelligence moving forward. This possibility is bolstered by the fact that the Algeria case is not the only recent event in which Canadians were involved in international terrorism or foreign conflicts.

In September 2013 it was reported that former ‘Toronto 18’ member Ali Mohamed Dirie had left prison and had subsequently left Canada with a false passport in order to fight alongside extremists in Syria. While in Syria, Dirie was killed. Cases such as these may cause Canadian intelligence agencies to enhance their foreign operations in the years to come. Currently, the intelligence community acts with limited capacity overseas, and HUMINT efforts have mostly been restricted to operations in Afghanistan. However, Canadians have become involved in various conflicts with different groups abroad in the recent past. Thus, an agency like CSIS may adjust its foreign intelligence activities to include operations in other areas in order to gather information important for protecting Canadian security and interests. While the responsibilities of dedicated foreign intelligence agencies certainly go beyond international terrorism, such prevalent cases in the Canadian context may allow CSIS to begin conducting more HUMINT operations overseas. Such a development would seem like the next logical step for an agency and a community which has increasingly looked to expand its foreign intelligence capabilities in the years since 9/11.

Conclusion

While other western countries created foreign HUMINT agencies during or immediately following the Second World War, Canada never followed suit. It has instead relied upon several departments and agencies, as well as agreements with allied states, to collect foreign intelligence. To increase its access to the HUMINT gathered by allies, Canada places emphasis upon collecting SIGINT through the CSE. It also allows many of its intelligence gathering institutions to operate abroad in a limited fashion. While most information comes through open sources, signals, and criminal investigations, more sensitive intelligence is also gathered for defence and security intelligence purposes.

Since 9/11, Canada’s security and intelligence agencies have become more active overseas. In addition to the CSE increasing its SIGINT collecting capabilities, CSIS, the DND/CAF, and the RCMP have enhanced their foreign intelligence presence as well. The evolving nature of the international and domestic threat environment has precipitated such change. Key events such as the 9/11 attacks and the war in Afghanistan have served as platforms for CSIS and others to begin operating abroad on a more frequent basis. As foreign and security intelligence have become overlapped in a globalized world, CSIS has also begun collecting ‘blended intelligence’ in order to protect Canadian security and interests. Restructuring and updating the intelligence community has allowed Canada more access to foreign information. Collaboration and globalization are now important concepts in the Canadian intelligence community. Yet, the institutions still face strict constraints on their ability to operate overseas.

While the intelligence community has increased Canada’s access to foreign intelligence, none of the members have a robust mandate to collect foreign HUMINT. This lack of capability will likely continue until the federal government decides to institute a CFIS, or to give a broad foreign intelligence mandate to CSIS. Neither of those decisions appears to be ‘on the horizon.’ Nonetheless, CSIS will continue to operate abroad as required as it has increasingly done since 2001. Other departments and agencies will also operate internationally to fulfill their mandates. Cases of Canadian connections to global terrorism may cause CSIS to begin conducting international missions on a broader scale. While terrorism is not the sole focus of a foreign intelligence service, such cases provide a logical next step for an agency and a community which has continually filled the Canadian foreign intelligence vacuum over the last half-century.

NOTES

5. Ibid.
9. Ibid., p. 57.
10. Ibid.
12. Morden, p. 3.
15. Ibid., pp. 2-3.
17. Ibid., p. 708.
18. Ibid., p. 713.
19. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 27.
23. Ibid.
Superintendent Joe McAllister of the RCMP looks out from a tower to survey the new Sarposh prison, 23 June 2008. He was part of a civilian police force in Kandahar, Afghanistan, supporting aid to the Afghan Police Force in the city.

24. Livermore, p. 5.
25. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p. 70.
28. Ibid., pp. 71-72.
29. Ibid., pp. 75-76.
31. Livernois, p. 2.
32. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
36. Ibid., pp. 120-124.
37. Ibid., pp. 124-130.
38. Ibid., p. 125.
39. Hamilton, Inside Canadian Intelligence..., p. 139.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid., p. 148.
42. Rudner, p. 141.
43. Ibid., p. 152.
44. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
50. Ibid., p. 149.
52. Ibid., p. 38.
Leadership by Example: What makes a good (or bad) squadron commander?

by Lieutenant-General (ret’d) Bill Carr, CMM, DFC, CD

Editor’s Note: Recently, General Carr re-submitted an opinion piece on military leadership that he had submitted to the Journal over a decade ago in response to Colonel Randall Wakelam’s excellent Autumn 2003 article (Vol. 4, No. 3) entitled Aerospace Power and Leadership Perspectives: The Human Dimension. General Carr had a distinguished wartime record as a Spitfire reconnaissance pilot, and was decorated with the Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) for his services. Later, that distinguished service became his hallmark as he progressed through the ranks to eventually become the first commander of Air Command in 1975. He was, and remains, well-placed to assess both effective and ineffective leadership traits. His wartime recollections of his squadron commander of the day, and those of a polar opposite, remain, in my opinion, just as valid today with respect to the fundamentals they represent as they did when General Carr originally penned them many years ago. For our readers, the ‘shining example’ portrayed herein was the British Wing Commander Adrian Warburton, who would amass an illustrious career in his own right as a fearless, outstanding reconnaissance pilot. For his exceptional service and leadership by example, he would be awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO) twice, the DFC three times, and an American DFC in the bargain. While General Carr’s article is ‘air’ situated, the principles of leadership he brings forward are universally applicable.

Leadership is simply the ability to inspire others to achieve goals. The leader may establish the goals, but often the achievements of others are not in his/hers hands. Yet, in the exercise of leadership, the leader perhaps manages how they are achieved. This is an oversimplification of a complex process, and usually, the view of leadership by those being led is based upon many factors, not the least of which is peer pressure.

Humans need ‘recognition,’ and it is little different in peace or war. A person needs to be seen by his contemporaries as well as his superiors and subordinates to be carrying their fair share of the load. A member must feel that their contribution is what is expected of them and is up to the level of those around them involved in similar pursuits. For the warriors specifically, they need their fellow fighters to see that they too are a worthy comrade-in-arms.

In my 39 years of military service in peace and war, I saw good leaders and bad ones. The good ones inspired me. The bad ones confused and dispirited me. Indeed, some disgusted me.

I do not profess to have a profound understanding of leadership, but I do believe that certain factors identify what the elusive subject involves. And I am firmly of the belief that leaders are developed, not trained. Managers are trained.
Some years ago, I was asked to state what I believed to be the mark of a good squadron commander. I put it in writing, and while at it, I also described a bad one that I had encountered. Upon review, I have a feeling that my thoughts on the matter might just still be valid.

I have been a member of 11 squadrons and commanded two of them, one in wartime and one in peacetime, but only one squadron commander of the nine I served and have known stands out as the ideal, because:

- He inspired people to fly to their limits (not his) and to achieve objectives with zeal even though they might get killed.
- He had courage and wisdom. His wisdom was demonstrated continuously by the manner in which he survived, and, if you listened to him, caused others to survive by making them think.
- He obviously was a superb pilot but he didn’t flaunt it, and he didn’t in all humility, think he was as good technically as many of the squadron members, and I don’t think he was…
- He demonstrated loyalty to his superiors and subordinates through being concerned about others, and not himself.
- He was sensitive to people, their foibles and their differences.
• He demanded, expected, and got the best you could give – and then thanked you.
• He did have charisma, but he was not aware of it.
• He was an innovator but tried the new idea himself, whether he invented it or not, before accepting it. If it worked, he thanked the originator in front of his peers. If it did not, he thanked them privately and told them why it did not.
• He always put his service and his people before himself, except in the matters of women and swordsmanship…
• He was not outwardly ambitious, nor, do I think, inwardly selfishly ambitious.
• He fought for and got the best for his guys, and he knew all of us individually by our first names. We respected him as an airman, a commander, and as a man.
• He would not suffer fools, and he did not condone carelessness.
• He saved many ‘weak sister’s’ lives by identifying them at the outset and ‘booting’ them from the squadron and endorsing their flying logbooks accordingly.
• He had the marks of greatness in his appearance, his approach, his ‘hell-raising,’ his stamina, his common sense, and his moral guts.
• He failed to return from a mission over enemy territory in 1944, and his remains were not identified until 2002…

Another stands out as the worst I have known:

• He could fly better than anybody else, and he told us so.
• He was selfish and ingratiating to his superiors, and he blamed others for the squadron’s poor performance.
• He knew no one by their first name, and only a few by their last.
• He used the service and his people to further his personal ambitions.
• He ‘sat on the fence’ with superiors until he decided the answer that they wanted – and then he gave it.
• He was class-conscious and would not mix or socialize with underlings.
• He would not test fly his own aircraft.
• He was a clock watcher, and, despite this, he was ‘Johnny-on-the-spot’ when the boss was around.
• He was morally dishonest. He might say one thing to a person’s face and the opposite behind his back.
• He never had an original thought, but pushed the ideas of others and gave no credit to the originator.
• I never heard him say thank you, even to the bartender…
• He retired many years ago as a wing commander, divorced, and his kids do not even know if he is still alive.
• He is not missed, but he is remembered…
From Tripoli to Bamako, in the Wake of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb...

by Charles Branchaud

The upheavals from the Arab Spring will have more than impacted upon the Maghreb Region of Africa. Of course, they very much affected Syria, and now by extension, the whole of the Middle-East, but their consequences also spread throughout the sub-Saharan region of the Sahel, bringing unexpected changes to countries that were dozing in apparent tranquility.

I arrived in Tripoli on Christmas Day 2011. The embassy had recently been reopened after having been evacuated prior to the air strikes that precipitated the fall of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi earlier in the year. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had asked the Defence to deploy an officer to Tripoli to support the regional Defence Attaché stationed in Cairo, who was going through an extremely busy period. The Arab Spring had indeed touched many of his countries of accreditation, amongst them Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. As the position had to be filled in a most immediate manner, the Director of Staff of the Strategic Joint Staff, at the time Major General Jon Vance, had selected me to fill this urgent request by Foreign Affairs.
I had not anticipated that this mission would eventually take me from one end to the other of the Saharan Desert. The effects of the fall of the Gaddafi regime were complex. The Libyan army, which had remained more-or-less on the sidelines during the civil war, was trying to rebuild itself. Not only had Gaddafi been neglecting his army for decades, he did not trust it, and he preferred hiring Sahel mercenaries to impose his will on the Libyan population. Also, Tripoli’s streets were controlled by regional militias, who identified themselves by the names of the cities where they were formed, examples being the Misurata, Tripoli, and Benghazi Brigades.

The Libyan Armed Forces were indeed in a very poor state. They had been targeted by Allied bombings, as well as having sustained much neglect by Gaddafi, who favoured his Arab Legion, an extra-national force in which the dictator had more confidence. The legion was composed of personnel from Muslim countries where Gaddafi had special interests. Thus, several Arab Legion members came from countries of the Sahel such as Niger, Burkina Faso, and Mali, and often, natives of Tuareg. A few months later, they would have a significant impact as they returned to their countries of origin with the Libyan arsenal they had kept from Gaddafi’s armouries.
My passage in Tripoli served the purpose of gathering information to better understand the intentions of the Libyan military, as they were rebuilding their armed forces. It also served the purpose of understanding the influence the militias had in each region of the country. It should be understood that many of these militias often clashed over control of a given territory – resulting in shootings and deaths, not only among themselves, but also, and more frequently, among innocent civilians.

In addition, Western states were worried about the disappearance of certain weapons. This was particularly true with respect to portable air defence missiles (MANPADS), as well as for the location and condition of the SCUD missiles that the Libyans still held in their arsenal. Therefore, part of the work also involved confirming the state and locations of these missiles. The compilation of this information, in collaboration with other Western allies and local contacts, became a full-time job.

Questions were also raised by virtue of the mass displacement of 4x4 vehicles leaving Libya and heading south-west into the Saharan desert and towards the Sahel. We would soon understand the consequences of this exodus. Indeed, as we tried to analyze the impact of the non-dissolution of the militias on the new Libyan order, an issue which continues to hamper the Libyan Government. As it transpired, former Tuareg soldiers of Gaddafi’s Arab Legion fled by the ‘back door,’ and were returning to their home countries and taking arms other materiel.

In a very short time, Tuareg independence movements such, as the Mouvement National de Libération de l’Azawad (MNLA), would take charge of these returning soldiers, who, with the fall of the Gaddafi Regime, had lost their purpose. The outcome of the enrolment of returning soldiers by the MNLA, and later by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its derivatives groups (MUJAO, Ansar’Din), would be fatal for the regime of one of the Sahelian countries, namely Mali.

Mali had to this point been considered by the international community to be one of the flagships of the new African democracy. Its governance had been settled by democratic elections for some years, and Canada, like other Western countries, had invested much in this state, mainly through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). However, as is the case in many countries of the African continent, the weakness of Malian political institutions, its limited and recent experience of democratic processes, along with the influence of the trans-Saharan illegal trafficking, would cause these investments to be lost. Despite having benefited from the generosity of several countries, including Canada, training and equipment contributions, the Malian Army struggled to acquire the know-how associated with planning and conducting operations. Among other things, their Personal Administration Staff (J1) could not say accurately how many individuals they actually had in the military. This inability to tally the number of troops available not only impacted negatively upon the management of the Malian Armed Forces (MAF), but also left open opportunities for deceit and corruption.
As anticipated, soldiers of the former *Arab Legion* returned from Libya, crossed the Malian border, and assaulted army posts, laying claim on a huge part of northern Mali, leaving the local military in disarray. The Malian Army pulled back south, leaving the northern territories, known as the Azawad, in the hands of extremists.

This area, composed of the three northern provinces of Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal, is populated by fair skin and nomadic tribes, as opposed to the darker-completed and sedentary culture of the Bantu population residing in southern Mali. This ethnic divide very much splits the country in two very different culture, and as was the case throughout its history, was at the root of many inter-ethnic quarrels. As this was happening, a military coup in the national capital Bamako, headed by a Captain Sanogo, overthrew the Malian government.

This all took place sometime after the Tuareg columns of Gaddafi’s *Arab Legion* left Libya. I did not know at the time that I would subsequently meet those columns at their destination on the other side of the Saharan desert, in Mali.

As things calmed down relatively at the time in Libya, and as elections were scheduled to appoint a new government, I was asked to redeploy to Bamako, to support our regional attache for West Africa, who had been temporarily deployed in the Malian capital from his normal station in Senegal. I left Libya in late-May 2012, and after a swift reorganization in Canada, redeployed to Bamako at the end of June.

Shortly after my arrival, I established contacts at the Malian Ministry of Defence and asked for permission to move forward to the ‘Defensive Line’ established in central Mali, north of the provincial capital of Mopti. The Malian line was established approximately along the geographical limits of the aforementioned cultural divide, between nomadic and sedentary populations. In reality, it was the limit at which the rebels had stopped chasing the national army. The situation would remain stable until the Islamists broke the line nine months later, triggering the French-offensive of January 2013.

It is difficult to explain to the uninitiated, how African forces operate in both peace and conflict. They are deeply influenced by their communities of origin, their family, and their tribe, whether they are of sedentary or nomadic background. It must also be said that their security forces have been much influenced by the colonial legacy.

Additionally, impunity throughout the chain of command is common, and it has a huge impact upon military discipline. The Malian Army was corrupt and incapable of facing its challenges.
A French army officer talks to his Malian and Senegalese army counterparts where a meeting is taking place for the intervention force provided by the ECOWAS grouping of West African states in Bamako, 15 January 2013.

Tuareg Malian soldiers under the command of Colonel El-Hadj Ag Gamou patrol a street in Gao, 11 February 2013.
The Malian defensive line was established on a northwest-southeast axis just north of the city of Mopti. On paper, their defence seemed feasible, given the number of men they claimed to have deployed. However, it soon became clear that what I had been presented with had nothing to do with reality on the ground, especially at the moment of the Islamist attack in mid-January 2013.

At locations where the Malians had claimed to have battle groups in defensive positions of at least 600 men, the situation was in reality much different. Those positions were manned by ill-prepared, ill-equipped, and ill-trained small companies of less than 100 men each.

The Islamist fighters were seasoned and mobile, two qualities that the Malians lacked. Further, they were equipped with all the material they had brought back from Gaddafi’s armories, as well as the equipment that was abandoned by the Malian Army in their rout to the south during the spring of 2012.

At the beginning of January 2013, the Islamists probed the Malian defences and began their assault on 11 January, breaking the defensive line in less than 48 hours. The significance of this breakthrough is important, and it serves to explain the reality of the situation well. The Malians had had more than eight months to prepare their defence... Having realized the impact of the Malian Forces debacle, the French Government quickly intervened to defeat the Islamists.

Although there has been much speculation with respect to the objective of the Islamist attack, it is unlikely that it was meant to reach Bamako. Rather more plausible was the taking of SÉVARÉ’s airport, a landing strip whose ownership was crucial, either to deny or to support any operations to retake the north.

Regardless, the Islamist offensive highlighted the Malian lack of preparation and incapacity to react to a well-known and defined threat. The capacity imagined by the authorities proved significantly lower than their claims. The French defeated the Islamists in a swift campaign that has demonstrated their capabilities to project power in this part of the world. As this is written, the French Army has begun to withdraw troops from Mali. Their organisation in the Sahel will be reshaped, but a significant contingent will remain in Mali for the foreseeable future. The United Nations deployed a mission to Mali to replace the deficient African Force that briefly deployed in the wake of the French intervention. Left crippled, the Malian military is still unable to realistically fulfill its role. Incapable of assuming the burden of reforming the Malian Army alone, France is now leading a European Union Training Mission (EUTM) to help rebuild the Malian forces. EUTM was formed to address Malian gaps. However, even with the training support provided by the European Union in forming units to deploy north, recent events have shown that much is still to be done.
While Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has clearly been much depleted by the French engagement, elements of the organization have escaped, and they remain a threat to the stability of the region. As for the MNLA, it has reorganized and its influence is still very much felt in the northern province of Kidal, where it recently defeated a Malian offensive.

Mali held democratic elections in the summer of 2013, and after a grandiose ceremony of investiture in Bamako, President Keïta is left with serious challenges ahead of him. It will be some time before Mali can enjoy its carefree tranquility again.

Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Branchaud is currently J5 Plans Africa at Canadian Joint Operations Command Headquarters. He has served on many occasions in Africa.
Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism
by Marcel H. Van Herpen
Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014
276 pages, $82.95 (hardcover)
ISBN 978-1-4422-3136-8
Reviewed by Peter J. Williams

In my day, a rite of passage for any junior army officer was completion of the Force Mobile Command (FMC) Officer Examinations, commonly known as ‘FOE.’ There were two such exams, one on Operations, and another on Administration. You could be guaranteed that one question which was sure to appear was for the student to draw the organization chart of a ‘Fantasian’ (the thinly disguised fictional enemy, based upon the former Soviet Warsaw Pact) Motor Rifle Regiment, down to the platoon level. However, no sooner had my peers and I all passed these exams, than the Berlin Wall came down, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) then went on a string of peacekeeping/peacemaking missions in Somalia, the Balkans, and other places, and we consigned much of our knowledge about the Fantasians to the literal dust bin of history, or to whatever passed for archives in those days. And we never really looked back, Counter Insurgency (COIN), now being our watchword in the post 9-11 era.

With Afghanistan now largely behind us, it appears that for those who pine for the days of more certainty about the enemy which the Cold War represented to a degree, the actions of one Vladimir Putin, currently the President of the Russian Federation, might represent something of a long awaited (perhaps long hoped for in some quarters) return to military affairs in a more comprehensible form. In any case, once cannot deny that Russia’s actions in recent months, particularly in Ukraine, have garnered world attention, including that of the author of this book, himself the Director of the Cicero Foundation, an independent Pro-European Union (EU) and Pro-Atlantic think tank, based in Maastricht, the Netherlands. Their role is to provide a broad, global forum to discuss issues that are of central importance to European integration.1

Using the examples of the Russian military interventions in Chechnya and in Georgia in 2008, the author’s aim is to demonstrate that what he views as Russia’s colonization of neighbouring states has been a continuous process throughout its history.

The book is divided into three parts:

• Part 1 looks at the major role which empire building and expansionism played in Russia’s history, and the author takes us back to the 18th Century in order to provide his point;
• Part 2 covers the so-called “Internal War,” which Putin had to wage from his accession to the presidency in order to secure his vision for Russia’s future; and
• Part 3, the longest section, compares the two wars under consideration with other wars fought by the Soviets and their successors, including the Cold War, Afghanistan, and the First Chechen War.

While all readers might not agree with Van Herpen’s analysis, I found it somewhat difficult to refute his arguments, and indeed, his contention that Putin’s supreme political goal is to restore Russia’s so-called “lost empire.” The author goes somewhat further in stating that this new Russian imperialism had its start earlier than Putin, claiming provenance under former Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev’s concept of “limited sovereignty” and Yeltsin’s designation of Russia’s periphery as its “Near Abroad.” In the author’s view, Putin has two main aims: first, to create, or rather to restore a close union of core Slavic, former Soviet nations, and second, to create closer military and economic ties with non-Slavic, but still former Soviet states. Indeed, in agreements Putin has made with neighbouring Belarus, and by virtue of the creation of the Collective Security Treaty organization (CSTO), he is putting his intentions into action. What I found quite interesting was the author’s descriptions of the extent to which Putin co-opted the support of groups as diverse as Russian youth on one hand, and Cossacks on the other, in order to advance his goals. Where Putin ran into opposition, whether at home or abroad, he, in the authors view, at least showed no compunction in acting most ruthlessly. Van Herpen states that Putin’s goal in Georgia was regime change pure and simple, while he also suggests that Russian state authorities, and not Chechen separatists, were behind a series of apartment bombings across Russia, thus providing Putin ostensible justification for launching the Second Chechen War.
The book is obviously well-researched, containing a bibliography which includes many Russian sources. Notes, in many cases very detailed, are included at the end of each chapter. The book in many instances reads very much like a textbook, as at several points in the text, Van Herpen lists several reasons behind certain issues under consideration, and then, quite eloquently, and in some cases rather bluntly, goes on to make his point, rather convincingly in the opinion of this reviewer. If there was one omission, I believe it was the absence of any maps to place the author’s analysis in context. With all the focus upon the Ukraine at present, the average reader may be somewhat geographically challenged when trying to place the locations of other, former Soviet republics.

At the outset of the Cold War, an American diplomat in Moscow, George Kennan, wrote his famous article in the journal Foreign Affairs entitled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct.” Rarely has a journalistic article had such an impact upon foreign policy. As a result, ‘The West’ adopted the policy of ‘Containment’ against the Soviet Union for the balance of the Cold War. ‘Fast forward’ to today, and for those looking for the rationale for President Putin’s conduct, this book represents an excellent start, and I would look forward to a sequel which covers the current crisis in Ukraine. Whether the modern ‘West’ and its partners will come up with a viable strategy, beyond sanctions and low-scale military activities in Eastern Europe, in order to respond to ‘Putin’s Wars’ remains to be seen.

Putin’s Wars is highly recommended by this reviewer. It must be a popular book as well, as no sooner had I borrowed it from the NDHQ library, than they informed me that someone wanted to read it when I had finished. I was also firmly reminded that my due date stood!

Colonel P.J. Williams is currently serving as Director Arms Control Verification on the Strategic Joint Staff.

NOTES

Operation Typhoon. Hitler’s March on Moscow, October 1941
by David Stahel
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013
412 pages (HC), US$ 22.69
ISBN-10-1107035120
ISBN-13-9781107035126
Reviewed by Bernd Horn

For those ‘old school’ types who appreciate a quality old fashioned book, this one is a definite must have. Everything about it screams meticulous craftsmanship, from its appearance, layout, and paper quality, to the content inside. The book is about Hitler’s desperate bid to end the war in Russia by capturing Moscow in the fall of 1941 before the onset of the vicious winter weather and before his Eastern Army was bled dry. Operation Typhoon was the code name given to the effort, and it entailed 75 German divisions, (almost two million men), and three of Germany’s four panzer groups. In short, this book captures the full extent of the epic struggle on the Eastern Front during the Second World War, although it is focused largely upon a specific time period for one operation.

The book begins with an overview of Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. The author, David Stahel, a lecturer at the University of New South Wales in Canberra, is an expert on the Russo-German war. His expertise and depth of research is unmistakable in his latest book. He clearly lays out how the Germans grossly underestimated the size of the Soviet Army and its resiliency, not to mention the vastness of the country. Interestingly, he captures the paradox of the German belief in technology, namely, the internal combustion engine, which would allow them to push deep into Russia, and which also ingrained in them a sense of over-confidence in its ability to provide them with victory. And yet, that same technology was susceptible to the primitive landscape and infrastructure, as well as the harsh weather

Canadian Military Journal • Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 2015
BOOK REVIEWS

conditions. Incredibly, the German Eastern Army began Operation Barbarossa with approximately 600,000 military vehicles, and despite capturing thousands more, by mid-November 1941, they were down to about 75,000 serviceable vehicles. This is testimony to the severe conditions faced by the invading force.

After laying out the campaign, including ‘jaw-dropping’ statistics on the scale of conflict and its cost (i.e., numbers of combatants, vehicles, casualties, prisoners captured) the author moves on to the rationale for Operation Typhoon. In this volume, he deals strictly with its inception and the first month of its execution, namely, October 1941. His methodology is superb. He lays out a very holistic approach, from the propaganda campaign back in Germany, to the realities of the front-line battle. Stahel’s use of diary entries from frontline soldiers and officers, to senior generals, to senior Nazi officials is outstanding. He does the same, although to a lesser extent, from the Soviet perspective. This approach furnishes a very personal and dramatic flavor to the text. It also delivers insights that are not normally captured in official reports. Importantly, it captures the frustrations, fears, and realities of those that must wage war in the world as it is, rather than the sterile, disconnected world of headquarters and staffs far removed from the Clausewitzian frictions of war. The glaring gaps between the tactical / operational / strategic levels of war are illuminating.

Stahel’s focus upon the first month of the operation, (he intends to write on second volume on the follow-on months), allows him to deal with events in a very detailed manner. As such, he describes the tensions in the German high command; the frustrations of trying to advance on Moscow against a decimated Russian army, but being unable to push through the inclement weather and terrain; the continually disintegrating German army, and the panic in Moscow itself. The end product is a very detailed and comprehensive understanding of events.

The book is filled with incredible detail. Aside from the comprehensive text, it includes a glossary, table of ranks and army structures, four tables providing orders of battle, production and casualty data, a detailed index, and a 12 page bibliography of primary and secondary sources. In addition, it includes 15 high quality very detailed maps and 21 illustrations that include contemporary editorial cartoons, as well as black-and-white photographs, all of which assist in providing graphic visual support to the text.

In sum, the book is outstanding. It is well written and researched. Stahel is clearly an expert on the subject matter, and he has done an admirable job putting together the story of the opening salvo of Operation Typhoon in a scholarly yet gripping manner. I strongly recommend the book for anyone who is interested in the Second World War, the Eastern Front, or the study of military operations.

Colonel (Ret’d) Bernd Horn, OMM, MSM, CD, PhD, is a retired Regular Force infantry officer. Dr. Horn is also an adjunct professor of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, as well as an adjunct professor of history at the Royal Military College of Canada and Norwich University. He is also a Fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute.

Mon Afghanistan
by Lieutenant-Colonel Steve Jourdain
Balmes, France: Athéna Editions, 2013
283 pages, $24.95 Canada
Reviewed by Dave Blackburn

To be honest with you, I flipped through Lieutenant-Colonel Steve Jourdain’s Mon Afghanistan several times before deciding to acquire a copy. I would read a few pages here and there, then put it back on the shelf. Having served in Afghanistan in 2006, a few days after Operation Medusa and during the events that led to the loss of Chief Warrant Officer Robert Girouard, I very much doubted that this book could teach me anything about the Afghanistan experience. After all, I had seen so many patients and heard so many stories in my role as a mental health clinician during my stay and afterwards that I was not all that interested in this one. But I must have been more drawn to it than I had initially thought, because I came back to it regularly, practically every time I went to the bookstore. So, with no particular expectations, I began reading it on my own time, and I quickly became so engrossed that I could not put it down. I realized that this personal narrative, with its intensity, its truth and frankness, and the many emotions it evoked in me, was extraordinary.

The author of Mon Afghanistan is Lieutenant-Colonel Steve Jourdain, who, in 2009, commanded C Company, 2 Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment, during a seven-month operational mission in Afghanistan. He is an infantry officer who graduated from the Royal Military College of Canada and holds a master’s in war studies. Lieutenant-Colonel Jourdain’s actions and behaviour in Afghanistan had such a significant effect upon the mission and the troops he commanded that, in 2012, he was awarded the Meritorious Service Medal.

Let me begin by saying, without the slightest hesitation, that Lieutenant-Colonel Jourdain’s book is a masterful work of autobiography. The author writes unpretentiously and shares generously with his readers the long and winding road of a mission in a theatre of operations, laying out the challenges, the issues, the frustrations, the pain, the anger, and also the pride that come with commanding a company of the renowned Van Doos in a war zone. It brings prestige and honour, but also the constant pressure of representing the most decorated regiment in Canadian military
history. Lieutenant-Colonel Jourdain succeeds in putting family considerations in perspective as part of military life, and he captures all the heartbreak experienced by family members during a deployment.

The author's down-to-earth, direct and sometimes unfiltered style leads us to question ourselves and to put ourselves in the place of, and feel empathy for, the commander and his troops through good times and bad. Since I personally know a few soldiers who served under Lieutenant-Colonel Jourdain, his descriptions and explanations sometimes took on particular significance, and helped me grasp the scope of the accomplishments, difficulties, and memories that are still deeply engraved in the minds of some. When Major Yannick Pépin died, I was the head of psychosocial and mental health services for the Canadian Armed Forces Formation Europe, and I was called upon to intervene with former colleagues and friends of Major Pépin’s, who, at the time, were on assignment in Belgium. So the events recounted in the book were meaningful to me in many ways, because I was directly involved.

One aspect of this work that I think reveals the author’s exceptional leadership qualities is the space and recognition he accords to the members of his troop. Rather than taking all the credit himself, Lieutenant-Colonel Jourdain highlights the strengths of the key members of his company, and he shows how each person contributed to the group’s successes. The themes of camaraderie and teamwork are showcased.

This is assuredly not a war story. It is a profound and deeply human testimony, permeated with emotion—some positive, some negative—and a critical and analytical sense that is fitting for what could easily be called a life-changing experience. This book is alive, and it has the power to transport us, so much so that readers will live—and some, relive—an arduous mission with constant challenges. For anyone who served in Afghanistan, this story is a reality check. It helped me come to terms with many events whose import I could not understand in 2006 or in the years that followed. If you have never been to Afghanistan, it will take you on a remarkable literary journey into the day-to-day lives of soldiers deployed in a hostile area.

I strongly recommend that you read this excellent book, which brings a unique and individual sense of meaning to an extraordinary military and personal experience. It is accessible to all readers with an interest in military affairs or autobiography. I think it should become required reading for candidates at the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School and students at the Royal Military College, to help them understand what it truly means to serve in the combat arms.

Lieutenant-Colonel Jourdain and members of C Company, 2 Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment, who participated in the deployment in Afghanistan in 2009: thank you for your contribution. As you said so well yourself, remember it, because it is something of which you can be proud.

Dave Blackburn has a Ph.D in social science, specializing in the sociology of health. He teaches at the Université du Québec en Outaouais (UQO) Saint-Jérôme campus, where his research focuses upon mental health and psychosocial intervention with military personnel and veterans. He was a social work officer with the rank of major at the time of his retirement from the CAF in June 2014.