

# IN HARM'S WAY

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## THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH: Perspectives from the Field



Edited by  
Commander Dave Woycheshin



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**Perspectives from the Field**



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It is important to recognize the support of the Canadian Defence Academy and the Canadian Defence Academy Press. In particular, Mélanie Denis of the Canadian Defence Academy must be recognized for her expert guidance in producing this volume. I would also like to express my thanks to the 17 Wing Publishing Office in Winnipeg, Manitoba, for producing a high-quality, professional product.



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## FOREWORD

I am delighted to introduce the newest addition to the seminal CDA Press series, *In Harm's Way*. The book, *The Comprehensive Approach: Perspectives from the Field*, is representative of what we at CDA Press have striven to achieve over the years, namely capturing the unique Canadian military experience. From the inception of the Press in 2005, we have been committed to creating a distinct and unique body of Canadian leadership and operational literature and knowledge that will assist leaders at all levels of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to prepare themselves for operations in a chaotic and complex security environment. Although experience is a great teacher, not everyone can participate in all operations or events. Therefore, learning through vicarious experience, that is, the experience and knowledge of others, is equally important to professional development and the Press makes this possible.

Moreover, CDA Press has also endeavoured to provide a vehicle to share knowledge and research within the Department of National Defence (DND), as well as within other government departments and allied nations. Additionally, the Press has been a means of educating and informing the public with respect to the contribution of CAF and its service personnel to Canadian society and international affairs. Indeed, this book marks the 116th title produced by CDA Press since 2005. In fact, many CDA Press titles are core texts in many CAF professional development institutions, as well as in military learning institutions of our allied nations. CDA Press titles are also found in the Parliamentary Library and most Canadian universities.

As such, the value of CDA Press has been enormous. It has provided a mechanism that has furnished us as Canadian military professionals to study our own leaders and operations, instead of using American or British examples. It has allowed us to analysis and discuss world events and international missions through the prism of Canadian military culture and experience. In essence, it has developed, expanded and grown the Canadian military operational and leadership body of knowledge.

And, *The Comprehensive Approach: Perspectives from the Field* builds on the foundation that has been built. It provides insight into a very challenging topic – that of military civilian cooperation. The post-9/11 period with its persistent conflicts throughout the globe, particularly a number of raging insurgencies, created a security environment that required the close marriage

of those entities responsible for development, governance and security. Although on the surface this proposition seems easy enough, its implementation has always proven difficult. Differences in cultural, philosophical and methodological approach, as well as interagency rivalry, all have historically conspired to make the comprehensive approach, or whole-of-government approach, or the “3D” (i.e. Diplomacy, Development, Defence), all titles given to describe the concept over the years, extremely difficult. This volume, importantly, provides insight, by actors from all relevant sectors, on the comprehensive approach to operations from a practitioner’s perspective. It brings out the challenges, lessons, observations and results achieved when all actors work together to a common goal.

Finally, I would also like to use this opportunity to say farewell to the Press. This title represents the last volume that I have overseen as the Editor-in-Chief of CDA Press. I wish to pass on my thanks to Mélanie Denis, the CDA Press Program Manager who was with me when we created the Press in 2005 and remains in her appointment to carry on the important work of the Press. Also, I wish to thank the team at 17 Wing Publishing Office, Major Phil Dawes, Michael Bodnar, Evelyn Nymoen and Adrienne Popke, the technical team that has taken the raw manuscripts and transformed them into elegant books, for their stellar support.

In closing I wish to reiterate the importance of this latest addition to the CDA Press collection. I believe you will find this book both interesting and enlightening. As always, we welcome your comments.

Bernd Horn  
Colonel, OMM, MSM, CD, PhD  
Editor-in-Chief, CDA Press

# INTRODUCTION

*Commander Dave Woycheshin*

The mission to Afghanistan is Canada's best example of the comprehensive approach to operations in action. With the end of the mission to Afghanistan, the structures that were put in place to support the comprehensive approach have been dismantled and the staffs from the different organizations involved have gotten back to their usual routines. The valuable lessons learned are becoming lessons forgotten and risk becoming lessons that will have to be relearned in the next mission. The purpose of this volume is to capture some of the lessons learned about the comprehensive approach to operations from a wide variety of perspectives. The breadth and scope of the Afghanistan mission is reflected in the content of this volume: the bulk of the chapters relate to our experience in Afghanistan, with a few chapters dedicated to our experiences other than Afghanistan.

There are a number of different experiences from the Afghanistan mission in the present volume. These include chapters from military and civilian personnel who worked with Task Force Kandahar (TFK) and with Regional Command (South), TFK's higher headquarters. The perspectives of the civilian authors are especially germane: they were members of what was then called the Canadian International Development Agency and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (now amalgamated into the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development), two of the main players in the comprehensive approach. A unique perspective is provided by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) Assistant Commissioner (Retired) Graham Muir, who served in Afghanistan as the Canadian Police Commander. The Afghanistan section is rounded out by the perspective from Operation (Op) ATTENTION, Canada's commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training Mission – Afghanistan, which was the final phase of Canada's mission in Afghanistan.

The perspectives from operations other than Afghanistan vary widely in terms of type, scope and historical era. These include operations in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Haiti, Op PODIUM in support of the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games, and Canada's contribution to training missions in Africa and the Middle East. In addition to his experience in Afghanistan, Assistant Commissioner (Retired) Muir also gives his perspectives as an RCMP officer serving in the former Yugoslavia and in Haiti.

The present volume is not intended as an exhaustive study or an academic analysis of the comprehensive approach. The Canadian Forces Leadership Institute has been developing a guide to aid leaders in comprehensive approach operations and their publications on the subject provide a distinctly Canadian point of view.<sup>1</sup> The International Military Leadership Association has also published a volume on the comprehensive approach, with a noteworthy chapter by Cedric de Conig of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (*Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt*) on factors that constrain the comprehensive approach.<sup>2</sup> The experiences in this volume do present some overarching themes and, despite the variety of experiences, have some common elements.

## THE MANDATED AND THE AD HOC COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

One of the main differences between operations in Afghanistan and most of the other operations described in this volume is that the comprehensive approach was mandated by the Government of Canada for the mission in Afghanistan (the comprehensive approach was also mandated for the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics). This is in contrast to earlier missions in which the participants had defined roles and had no impetus to perform outside of their roles. It can be argued that the lack of a comprehensive approach was a contributing factor to the massacre in Rwanda, where the outcome could have been different if there had been more flexibility and cooperation between the organizations and actors involved. In some cases, a comprehensive approach develops in an ad hoc manner, usually instigated by an enlightened leader.

Common to both the mandated and the ad hoc comprehensive approach is the requirement to build relationships and understanding among the participants. In mandated operations like Afghanistan and Op PODIUM, organizations that do not normally work closely together were ordered to work together. They had to learn how to work together. This requires learning who's who in an organization, who has the decision-making authority, how decisions are made, where the decisions are made (this was a concern in Afghanistan where some decisions could be made locally by some organizations and others had to be made by organizational headquarters in Canada). Even fundamental things like learning how meetings are run in different organizations can make a difference in working together successfully.

The same learning process is necessary in an ad hoc comprehensive approach. In these situations, the participants are not necessarily determined in advance and the relationships have to be developed on the ground. The disaster relief operations in Haiti are a good example of developing relationships and learning how to get things done under extreme circumstances. Actions that would normally be straightforward were complicated and required negotiation, cooperation and compromise. For example, the U.S. military was in charge of the Port-au-Prince airport, which necessitated negotiating priorities for Canadian aircraft and determining alternate means of shipping supplies into Haiti. Dealing with Haitian civil authorities was complicated by the chaos in the aftermath of the disaster. The ability of the local civil authorities to perform their normal tasks was greatly diminished, requiring that alternate means had to be planned and executed.

## THE ENLIGHTENED LEADER

A common theme in the chapters of this volume is that an individual's understanding and ability to function in a comprehensive approach environment is vital to operating effectively. In earlier operations, in which there was no mandate to operate in a comprehensive approach manner, the decision to cooperate with other actors was left to the discretion of the individual leaders. Lieutenant-General Michel Maisonneuve's chapter on his experience in the former Yugoslavia clearly shows that an enlightened leader who understands both his environment and the other players in that environment can benefit from instituting an ad hoc version of the comprehensive approach. However, Rwanda illustrates that enlightened leaders alone are not sufficient: cooperation is required from all the participants to contribute to mission effectiveness.

Even in operations where the comprehensive approach is mandated, enlightened leadership is required to help ensure that all parties work together. Colonel Acton Kilby's chapter can be used as primer for what an enlightened leader can accomplish in a very complex comprehensive approach environment. A key lesson from his approach is to establish a common vocabulary so that participants from different organizations all have a common understanding and "speak the same language". When an individual who has only worked in one organizational environment goes to work in another environment, he/she realizes how much of his/her communication is unique to his/her home environment. Communications are based on a common understanding developed through common training and experience.

## WORKING WITH OTHERS

Typically in discussing the comprehensive approach, the perspective of military authors is to describe what it is like to work with civilian organizations and the perspective of civilian authors is to describe what it is like for a civilian to work with the military. The broader lesson that can be used by both civilians and military members is how to work with organizations other than their own. For operations like Afghanistan, the military was the dominant organization with the biggest physical presence, the most resources, and often had the most autonomy. Civilians had to fit themselves into the military environment and military members had to, at a minimum, learn how to tolerate a civilian presence, and, in the best cases, learn how to incorporate civilian capabilities into achieving mission objectives. In other operations, the roles are reversed, with civilian organizations in the lead and the military members having to learn how to fit in.

An important issue discussed in Colonel Kilby's chapter is that different organizations often have different goals. To achieve the overall objectives, these goals must be aligned as much as possible. Some of this alignment can be achieved by establishing a common vocabulary described above. Each organization communicates its goals and strategies with the other organizations and a common understanding is established. In her chapter, Anne Lavender discusses how difficult it can be to set common goals in practice in her discussion of the fundamental differences between the goals of counterinsurgency and the goals of development. In essence, the goals of counterinsurgency are for quick effects, while the goals of development are measured, over the long term. It is possible for these goals to be aligned, but it involves an understanding of counterinsurgency by the development expert (in this case, Anne Lavender from the Canadian International Development Agency) and an understanding of development by counterinsurgency experts (in this case, Brigadier-General Milner and members of his TFK staff). It is just as important to recognize that in some cases the goals cannot be aligned, and that everyone still has to work together as professionals despite disagreements.

Through its training and experience, the Canadian military is prepared to work autonomously on operations. This contributes to the impression that the Canadian military has the most to learn when it comes to working with others in comprehensive approach operations. An important lesson for military members is that civilian organizations have strengths in areas that the

military does not. Enlightened leaders not only use these strengths to achieve their own goals, but help to ensure that all members of the comprehensive approach team can work toward achieving their goals. Marla Frketich's chapter provides many salient suggestions for incorporating different organizations into a cohesive team.

## SUMMARY

As part of the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute project to produce a comprehensive approach guide for leaders, I had the opportunity to interview many members of military and civilian organizations who were highly experienced working with the comprehensive approach. I found that every organization is professional, every organization is committed to achieving its objectives, and every organization wants to do good. In order to achieve their objectives, every organization has a planning process and a decision-making process. It is important for anyone working in a comprehensive approach environment to realize that each organization does these processes in their own way. The chapters in this volume indicate what can be accomplished when people overcome their differences to achieve their objectives using the comprehensive approach to operations.

## ENDNOTES

- 1 The most recent publication is Dr. Bill Bentley and Dr. Grazia Scoppio, *Leading in Comprehensive Operations*, CFLI Monograph 2012-02, (Kingston ON: Canadian Defence Academy, Canadian Forces Leadership Institute, 2012). Work in this area is ongoing and more publications are expected.
- 2 Commander Dave Woycheshin and Miriam de Graaff (editors), *The Comprehensive Approach to Operations: International Perspectives* (Kingston ON: CDA Press, 2013).



# CHAPTER 1

## UNFATHOMABLE: THE ROAD TO THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

*Colonel Bernd Horn*

Having joined the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) in the early 1980s, at the height of the Cold War, the idea of working with other government departments (OGDs), civilians, particularly non-governmental organizations (NGOs), was simply unfathomable. Facing off against the Soviet threat, soldiering was seen as the serious business of military professionals and anything less than high intensity warfare was clearly a waste of everyone's time. As such, civil-military affairs was viewed as a distraction from real soldiering, something to be pushed to the margins. However, the fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of 1989 and the onset of the post-Cold War era and the dramatic change to the security environment that it entailed turned this paradigm upside down. The new millennium pushed the requirement of working with others even further, to the point where eventually it became clear to most military personnel that the comprehensive approach was not only recommendable, but an actual necessity in the new contemporary operating environment (COE). Nonetheless, it was a long, difficult road. For most in the military, for an amazingly long period of time considering the COE, accepting the necessity of the comprehensive approach was a hard sell. It was simply unthinkable.<sup>1</sup> But as always, necessity forced the issue.

### THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH: A DEFINITION

Initially, it is important to delineate what is meant by the comprehensive approach. CAF doctrine explains it as:

A philosophy according to which military and non-military actors collaborate to enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation. The actors may include joint or multinational military forces, Canadian government departments and agencies (whole-of-government), other governments (e.g. foreign, provincial and municipal), international organizations

(e.g. NATO and the United Nations), non-governmental organizations (e.g. CARE, OXFAM), private sector entities or individuals.<sup>2</sup>

Ideally a comprehensive approach involves all organizations involved in an operation, theatre and/or working relationship, having:

- a common aim / unity of effort (i.e. synchronizing activities to achieve the common objective);
- a common situational awareness;
- an interoperable planning process;
- a common benchmarking system to measure progress / effectiveness / success;
- protocols to share / exchange information; and
- an interoperable communication system.

The comprehensive approach concept has also been known by previous monikers such as the “3D” approach (i.e., Defence, Diplomacy and Development) and the Whole-of-Government (WoG) approach.

## **THE COLD WAR: “LEAVE IT TO THE MILITARY PROFESSIONALS”**

Philosophically, the comprehensive approach seems eminently logical. Yet, in practice it has proven to be monumentally difficult. Much of the problem is rooted in organizational culture, which shapes attitudes, behaviours and values.<sup>3</sup> During the Cold War, in retrospect a far simpler and predictable time, the focus was on countering the Soviet menace. The fear of Soviet expansion and a high intensity war that could lead to nuclear Armageddon always seemed to be present. During this period the military's role was clear: safeguard the West through military power. As such, governments generally left it to the military professionals to implement that mission. National security and the active Soviet espionage campaigns, which often were made quite public once compromised, reinforced the need for a heavy cloak of secrecy on all things military. This conveniently allowed the military to stay in its own bubble and shun transparency and disclosure.

Even peacekeeping during the Cold War reinforced the paradigm of isolation. Peacekeepers were only employed when both antagonists agreed to a

cessation of hostilities and to the presence of a third party United Nations (UN) presence. The role of the UN force was to monitor the ceasefire or peace agreement. Their employment was always within a prescribed boundary, normally a buffer zone between the two former warring parties. The operating environment was very simple. Each side was clearly delineated by its front line and all participants were in easily identifiable national uniforms. There were set protocols, clear chains of command and communication networks. There was no press and the UN bureaucrats located in headquarters were too busy attending social events, shopping at the duty free shopping outlet, or counting their inflated UN salaries to be bothered with visiting the buffer zone. Importantly, there were few, if any, civilians to deal with. Occasionally, such as in the case of Cyprus, there were a few requests to visit property "frozen in time" in the buffer zone or to cultivate fields that were similarly now "trapped" inside the demarcation zone. But even in these instances there was a clear process to follow and with time these activities became an entrenched routine, if not a drill. However, for all intents and purposes, there was next to no interaction with non-military entities and to suggest otherwise was simply crazy talk.

This is not to say there was no provision for civil-military cooperation (CIMIC). CIMIC is a military function that supports a commander's mission by establishing and maintaining coordination and cooperation between a military force and the respective civilian entities in a given area of operation. Clearly, the aim of CIMIC is to achieve the necessary levels of cooperation between civil authorities and the military to improve the probability of successful operations. In terms of the Cold War, this was seen as largely working with host nation governments to control refugee traffic so that the envisioned multitudes of humanity streaming West to avoid the invading Soviet hordes would not interfere with NATO troop movements deploying to their forward defensive positions to block the Soviet advance.

From the peacekeeping operations perspective, CIMIC was seen as important for contracting purposes. The CIMIC officer, whose status was normally below that of the Welfare Officer (responsible for ensuring the recreation and welfare program were in place), was normally an officer the unit could "spare." In essence, first all the "hard" (i.e., operational and key staff positions) would be filled. Then, any other important staff position would be filled, and then, if any officers were remaining, they would be slotted into the CIMIC and welfare officer positions. The point being, it was not a sought after or prestigious position since the function was seen largely as a distraction

and was normally given to an individual who the seniors felt was expendable to operations (i.e., real soldiering).

This is not to say that military personnel did not care about their surroundings or the welfare of those around them. On almost every tour, platoons, companies and/or the unit as a whole would undertake humanitarian and developmental projects. They would normally find a school, orphanage or community project and give generously in time, material and/or money. However, the initiatives were always ad hoc and generated from the grass roots level. Soldiers would donate money and solicit support from their families at home who would send money, clothes, school supplies, books, whatever the need may be. They also utilized spare material, their tools, and expertise to build or repair infrastructure. But all of these efforts were done internal to the military. The mere thought of collaborating with other agencies was normally not even considered, as it was in the realm of the unknown.

### **THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD: STUMBLING INTO COOPERATION**

By the beginning of the 1990s the simplicity of the Cold War quickly became a memory. The sanctity, and arguably comfort, of the Cold War era disappeared almost overnight with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the decline, if not complete collapse, of the Soviet Empire. The new security environment, marked by complexity, ambiguity, a myriad of enemies and threats embedded in failed and failing states and an ever present media, overloaded a traditional, conservative and intellectually inflexible military that tended to see the world in terms of absolutes. Peacekeeping operations changed dramatically. The traditional Chapter VI missions, as represented, for example, by the decades long deployment by the UN Forces in Cyprus (UNFYCYP), came to an abrupt halt.

Peacekeeping operations were no longer static. Moreover, they were no longer conducted in isolation, or with the agreement of all parties. Significantly, they were now exponentially more dangerous. Furthermore, a whole new lexicon was developed that now spoke of peace support operations that encompassed peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacemaking missions.<sup>4</sup> The dynamic, fluid and combative nature of the new security landscape also spawned a new concept entitled the “Three Block War,” which argued military forces were required to conduct humanitarian, peacekeeping and warfighting operations,

potentially all on the same day, all within three city blocks.<sup>5</sup> Simply put, military forces deployed on peace support operations were required to have a wide range of skills in addition to combat capability.

This new operating environment shattered the previous isolation of military operations. Conflict, and the humanitarian disasters they created, required more than just the application of military power. Failed and failing states required assistance with restoring governance, the rule of law and rebuilding entire economies. Reconstruction and development were key. In addition, the influx of NGOs, International Agencies (IA) and UN agencies to try and fill the voids was massive. Moreover, the host nation population and various levels of government, as well as its security apparatus, also became active players in the operational arena. Finally, to exacerbate the complexity, there was an invasive media that could report on events and fire the information around the globe faster than the chain of command could verify or deny any allegation or report.

Intuitively, the need for cooperation among the myriad of players to ensure all the levers of governance, reconstruction, development and security were well synchronized across the board was recognized. What was missed by the military, as well as all the other actors, was the requirement to work together. Although most would agree that security without governance is meaningless, and governance without development is unsustainable, and development without security is unsupportable, no one seemed able to connect the dots. Everyone still attempted to go it alone for as long as possible. At play were years of ignorance, mistrust, stereotypes, hidden agendas and competing / incompatible organizational cultures. A number of personal experiences in the Former Yugoslavia in 1992-1993 bore this out.

### **Experiences from the Former Yugoslavia**

In December 1992, as part of a Canadian battlegroup deployed on the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mandate, I was forward deployed to take command of the battlegroup advanced headquarters (HQ) that was situated in a large parking lot in Banja Luka in the Bosnian Republic of Serbia. The advanced HQ element consisted of approximately 100 Canadian troops and a Dutch signals component that numbered about 50. Although not much in the way of a fortified camp, it did have some strength in numbers and a double row of concertina wire around its perimeter. Upon my arrival, I touched base with the local representative of the UN High Commissioner

for Refugees (UNHCR). The individual was an American woman, who had previously served with the US Peace Corps. I introduced myself and told her that she was welcome at our camp any time, particularly if things continued to deteriorate. At the time, the UN was involved in a sabre rattling exercise with the Serbian political leadership.

I was immediately berated and lectured by the UNHCR representative. I was told that humanitarian organizations such as UNHCR were here long before the military arrived and would be here long after the military left. She made it clear she did not need military help, nor would she ever want it. I simply acknowledged her position, told her the invitation stood nonetheless and left. Interestingly, the UNHCR representative decided to visit our camp the day after my invitation. Within the next few days she stopped by on a number of occasions to share meals with the soldiers. She confided in me that she was stunned at how friendly, polite and well educated the soldiers appeared. Her stereotype of the military goon was almost shattered.

What I had not realized, as my chain of command decided not to tell me until I was on the ground in Banja Luka for 48 hours, was that the UN was ramping up air strikes as a means of forcing the recalcitrant Serbian leadership to abide by the UN Security Council resolutions. As a result, the atmosphere became threatening. Banja Luka was home to at least two Bosnian Serb corps and a major air base. Our presence in the middle of a concentration of Serbian military forces on the eve of potential UN action was not welcomed by our "hosts."

However, central to this chapter was her final visit. She arrived early in the morning with a stranger I had not met. She gave me a walkie-talkie as she introduced the UNHCR security advisor. Apparently, the UN had decided on a wholesale pull-out of UN personnel and troops the next day in preparation for air strikes. It was to be a coordinated simultaneous withdrawal out of the Serb controlled territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina so that the Serbs would not be able to take concerted action to stop it. The UNHCR decided to jump the gun by 24 hours so they could get their people out first and avoid any negative Serb action when the general UN withdrawal order was given the following day. The irony was overpowering. The woman who had days earlier scolded me on the military's transient nature was now asking me to cover her, and potentially come and get her if she ran into trouble as she made a run for it, leaving her local staff behind to face the wrath of the Serbian authorities, and potentially tipping off the Serbs that something was afoot and making it

more dangerous and difficult for the remainder of us. This type of behaviour only reinforced the mindset in the military not to work with civilians.

Another experience that solidified the dysfunctional relationship during the period between military and other agencies centred around a task my rifle company received to set up a temporary refugee camp in Kostajnica, in December 1992. The actual site was located in the Danish sector. When I arrived, I touched base with the Danish rifle company deployed there to coordinate our arrival and task. Apparently, they had done similar tasks before but refused this one because of the unreliability of the humanitarian organizations they worked with. We were soon to relive their experience the hard way.

The task was to set up a temporary camp for no more than 12 Croatian individuals, three families, for no more than three to five days until the humanitarian organizations could make arrangements to move them to a safe location in Croatia. The families were holed up in the local police station and faced likely death if they were not moved. We quickly set up a camp and waited the arrival of the families. We were surprised when twice as many people were delivered. Despite the cold, we quickly took our own stores and did with less so that we could provide for the extra families. But, that was not the end of it. We were now trapped. Having established the camp the humanitarian organizations continued to deliver people. Our warnings that we would have to move out shortly requiring them to move the refugees as originally promised, fell on deaf ears. Five days dragged on to weeks. The growing numbers and extended period of time now taxed our logistic capability as the camp was hundreds of kilometres from our battlegroup location and the humanitarian organizations provided no support at all. Only our unit's deployment into the heart of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Danish refusal to take over the camp forced the UNHCR to action. Once again, trust was further deteriorated. And, it would only go downhill from there.

Once in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in March 1993 the commanding officer assigned me to lead the convoy to accompany French General Philippe Morillon to break the nine month siege of Sarajevo. The mission was an epic tale in itself.<sup>6</sup> However, several issues straining civil-military cooperation quickly came to light. The first was the whole issue of food and medical aid. The belligerents had come to see it as a military enabler. After every humanitarian convoy delivery into Srebrenica, the local Bosnian Muslim garrison would launch counter-attacks on the heels of the departing convoy. As a

result, the Serbs quickly shut down the convoys, creating a growing humanitarian crisis in the Srebrenica pocket.

The issue of food and medical aid empowering military capability of belligerents was a constant sore point between the military and humanitarian organizations. In most, if not all cases, the food and medical aid would be delivered in the front door of regional depots and almost just as quickly large parts of it would go out the back door to belligerent military forces or the black market. When this was discussed with the various agencies, they seemed indifferent. Their normal, almost universal, reply was that they were only responsible for delivering the supplies to the designated depots and it was the local staffs there who were responsible for ensuring the proper distribution. For many of the cynical military personnel in the various operational theatres, the strong perception that was developed was one of the NGOs and charitable organizations being able to report that “x” number of tons of aid was delivered in (insert global crisis spot), please give generously to (insert any number of charitable organization of your choice). In essence, just dump the supplies to rack up the statistics with little concern as to how they are used.

This attitude fed the mistrust. From a military perspective, the NGOs, IAs and others, were tainted by impure motives and not held to the unlimited liability clause that provided a sense of noblesse to their efforts. I certainly perceived that from the civilian perspective the military were seen as a bunch of armed goons that cared little of the larger humanitarian / development requirement and were more interested in doing “Army stuff.” To a degree, their view had some merit. Clearly, both sides did not fully understand the other. And, sadly, neither side tried to learn more about the other.

Instead, stereotypes and disconnected activity continued. Another personal example in the Former Yugoslavia is illustrative. One day during the prolonged mission to break the siege on Srebrenica, we were leaguered (i.e., tactical disposition of a large number of military vehicles to allow for protection and defence) waiting authority to try another run. All of a sudden, three civilian vehicles arrived and parked on the road beside our leaguer. Two were brand new Mazda sports cars and the third was a brand new Toyota Land Cruiser. All three had MSF (*Médecins Sans Frontières*) stickers plastered all over them. In each vehicle were two people. They had come to see if they could send three doctors into the pocket with us in our vehicles as they could not spare any of theirs. Incredibly, the three doctors to go into the pocket were not with this group of six; it was rather a large contingent to ask a

simple question. The impression of waste and lack of commitment was hard to shake. But it got worse.

The next day we were to try another attempt to break through. We agreed to take the three MSF doctors and put them in our M-113 armoured personnel carrier (APC) ambulance. When we hit a Serbian roadblock the situation quickly became volatile. In the ensuing melee, there were physical altercations to force the barrier and shots were fired. In the midst of the pandemonium, I felt tugging at my back and heard my name being screamed. I broke from my immediate focus to see two of the three MSF doctors in complete panic. They quickly told me their colleague was being taken. I looked past them and saw the hapless individual being dragged away by two Serb soldiers. Ordering them back to the APC ambulance (now too preoccupied to ask them why they had exited the vehicle in the first place) I quickly ran and physically plowed into the two Serb soldiers with such force and surprise that they released their grip on the doctor. I directed two of my soldiers to take the doctor back to the APC ambulance as I stopped the Serb soldiers from taking any further action.

The necessity to rescue the MSF doctor was an unnecessary complication in an already extremely volatile situation. It turns out the individual left the ambulance, against direction of the crew commander who felt he had no right to physically restrain a civilian, to take pictures of the chaos at the roadblock. Once the situation calmed down, the local Serb commander demanded that the individual be turned over. I refused. He finally settled for the film, which he was given.

At this time, General Morillon was able to get agreement to allow the food trucks to proceed to Srebrenica. The escalation of violence was seen as potentially creating a full blown international incident so the local Serb brigade commander decided to relent. However, under no condition would he allow my armoured escort to proceed. The doctors were given the option of accompanying the food trucks into the pocket. All three, completely shaken by the events, refused. All wanted to stay with my escort force. Amazingly, the next day, the individual who I had rescued, to save face, apparently, began to complain to anyone who would listen, that I had prevented him from going into the pocket with the food trucks. This further built up the perception of mistrust and rationale of why not to work with NGOs.

This feeling, however, was mutual. In discussing the tension between military and civilian actors in the theatre, as well as others, common themes emerge. The civilian actors always stated that they wanted nothing to do with the military since they felt that any tie would endanger them by removing their neutral / non-aligned status. Their insistence on their independence was such that they would not take, heed, or listen to advice or warnings, retorting that the military cannot tell them what to do. Frustratingly for the military, this meant that civilians venturing forth into dangerous areas could meet with misfortune. The normal reply from the civilians was that it did not matter, it would be their issue to deal with and that they would not ask for military help. However, the reality was different. Faced with death, injury or imprisonment, most people screamed for assistance. And for the military, this meant that they now had to risk the lives of soldiers to save civilians who recklessly caused their own misfortune. And, for the few hard-core civilian actors who would still not want help, the military had no choice. It would still need to risk lives because no government faced with appeals from family and friends, or potential public outrage if it came to light that citizens were in harm's way and nothing was done to help them, would fail to direct its forces to act. In the end, any commander faced with such a dilemma would do anything possible to help regardless because it is just the right thing to do.

### **Experience in Rwanda**

And so, throughout the 1990s, the tension of military and civilian actors, whether OGD, IA, NGO or other, continued. NGOs by the hundreds, if not thousands, would pop up and want to make a difference. Some were very professional, but others were not and created more chaos than help. In July 1994, I was deployed to Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide and the beginning of the cholera epidemic to assess the security requirements of the Canadian medical contingent contribution to Operation PASSAGE, fighting the cholera epidemic. The meetings between the new rebel government and NGOs who had arrived were incredible. The need for NGOs to go into the hinterlands was largely ignored. All wanted to be around Kigali. Most had nothing to bring to the table but a banner to say they were there so they could generate more calls for donations.<sup>7</sup> As an example, some wanted to provide fresh water, a very important necessity, so they approached the military to see if the military could provide transport, tents, containers and fresh water. They brought nothing to the table but demands. Credibility, from a military perspective was low.

## The Comprehensive Approach in the Post-Cold War Period

Throughout the post-Cold War period, the need for, and germination of, the concept of the comprehensive approach was there. By sheer necessity of working in a theatre of operations in a failed or failing state, with the requirement for reconstruction and development, and assistance with the building of security and governance, the military and other agencies had to begin to work together. However, in the Former Yugoslavia, Haiti and Rwanda, as three quick examples, the operating environment still allowed the different actors to operate largely on their own. There were normally host governments in place, as well as recognized security forces. This at least provided a modicum of structure and contacts to deal with. Affecting the mindsets of all actors in these operations were stove-piped roles and organizations. UN military forces had clear mandated roles to protect UN activities or to enforce mandates. Under this security umbrella, and with the ability to work with specific host nation state apparatus, all actors, on the whole, could largely work independently with only loose affiliation, coordination or discussion. As such, the comprehensive approach remained largely a concept.

## THE NEW MILLENNIUM: NECESSITY AS THE CATALYST

The evolution of the COE, and arguably peace support operations, were not yet complete. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, (9/11) led to the most dramatic, if not radical, shift in Western security policy since the end of the Cold War. It provided the rationale for two major conflicts, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as a global anti-terror campaign that has arguably fueled an extraordinary high level of anti-western sentiment in much of the Muslim world. One consequence of the new reality is that, like it or not, traditional UN peace support operations to bolster failing states or provide humanitarian assistance can no longer separate themselves from the larger global context of the conflict that is currently raging. Importantly, globalization has allowed exponential advances in communications, as well as the transfer of information and technology. These changes have fuelled the next generation of conflict.

In essence, although many threats are geographically confined, international terrorist networks (e.g., *al-Qaeda*) pose a global threat. Quite simply, their goals, operational methodologies and adaptability have shifted the nature of transnational insurgencies. They employ asymmetric strategies in attacks

following a doctrine of propaganda by deeds. They use the tactics of terrorism and guerrilla warfare in the pursuit of their objectives and have refined other disruptive techniques including suicide bombings, improvised explosive devices and mass casualty events. Additionally, as already mentioned, they exploit globalization, e.g., telecommunications, financing, internet interconnectivity, for information operations and sharing lessons learned, techniques, tactics and procedures. In addition, the proliferation of technology continues to enhance their capacity and reach. In summary, these organizations are networked, multi-layered and complex entities capable of detailed operational planning, synchronization and execution, and are continually expanding their reach.

The “so what?” is dramatic. Quite simply, no region or nation is immune. The set of actors on the international scene is now much more diverse, interconnected and ruthless. As such, some theorists have noted that we are currently engaged in Fourth Generation Warfare, where the enemy uses largely asymmetric tactics to achieve their aim; where human (non-kinetic), not technological, solutions are paramount; and where integrated operations (i.e., joint operations with all the services in the military, with law enforcement agencies, other government departments, coalition partners, allies, national and international agencies) in a long war scenario provide the best hope for success. In simple terms, the COE demands that all possible instruments available to a government are utilized in an integrated comprehensive approach (i.e. diplomatic, economic, military, informational) using a coordinated, cohesive collaborative methodology.

Within this context, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan became the fertile breeding grounds for the comprehensive approach. Necessity proved to be the greatest catalyst for the acceptance of the comprehensive approach. Unlike the 1990s, the new operating theatres were devoid of a state infrastructure or government. The enemies were often undefined and included religiously / ideologically driven insurgents, hired guns, criminals, warlords, aggrieved members of the local population, and rival state proxies. The populations were of an alien culture and did not necessarily accept Western values, motives or standards of governance. In essence, due to the nature of the belligerents, host nation population, and the conflict, civilian agencies could not operate safely or consistently without robust security. For the military, simply running around trying to kill bad guys was an endless exercise and one that did not win over the support of a skeptical host nation population. Therefore, progress could only be made working together. In theory, by providing

security for, and coordinating activities with, the other actors, the standard of living and safety of the host nation population would increase, giving them a reason, if not a stake in the system, for prompting them to support the newly installed government. As always, however, theory and practice are often worlds apart.

In August 2005, Canada deployed a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). The Americans had created the PRT construct in November 2002 as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. It became a critical component of the U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. PRTs were conceived as a way to integrate diplomats, development officials, military assets and police officers to address the causes of instability, namely, poor governance, weak institutions, insurgency, regional warlords and poverty. The 350 strong Canadian PRT copied this multi-disciplinary focus that stressed development as well as security. It became a multi-departmental effort, employing personnel from the Department of National Defence (DND), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and other Canadian police forces. Its mission was to help extend the authority of the Afghanistan government in Kandahar Province by promoting local stability and security, improving local governance structures and engaging in reconstruction activities. Specifically, the PRT was designed to:

- promote the extension of the Afghan central and provincial government;
- implement development and reconstruction programs;
- assist in stabilizing the local security environment; and
- support security sector reform.<sup>8</sup>

The PRT was an excellent example of the comprehensive approach. But, arguably, at the beginning it was not the major focus of Canada's effort in Afghanistan. After all, the CAF also deployed a large battlegroup to Kandahar Province, and its focus was strictly kinetic. In other words, as far as its commander and the Canadian Joint Task Force commanders were concerned, the battlegroup was about killing bad guys; basically, using a hammer to pound out the insurgency. The PRT was an afterthought: "Oh, there's also a PRT doing all the reconstruction and development stuff as well for those who are interested in stuff like that."

By 2008-2009, attitudes across the coalition and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) began to change. The counterinsurgency was failing. The focus on kinetic operations to kill insurgents was having limited effect. The Taliban was able to regenerate fighters faster than ISAF could kill them. The level of violence, particularly the collateral damage, and the failure to demonstrate any increase in the standard of living of the average Afghan, failed to win over the support of the local population. As costs and body counts were increasing, putting national public pressure on Western governments to show progress in the war(s) and provide a viable exit strategy, a new approach was required. Finally, when the military at long last realized that they were fighting an insurgency that required a very population-centric approach, only then did they and other actors “fully” embrace the comprehensive approach.

## FINAL OBSERVATIONS

The reluctance, from a military perspective, to embrace, nurture and grow the comprehensive approach has always been baffling. When one looks at the operational advantage of civil-military cooperation, they are staggering and can only assist the completion of the mission. Examples of these benefits include:

- Provision of information / intelligence to the commander;
- Shaping of the environment;
- Ability to influence local population;
- Provision of methods of delivering aid / assistance within an operational area;
- Provision of a conduit for continuing liaison and communication with mayors, police chiefs, governors, village representatives, school teachers, directors and students and villagers; and
- Assurance of follow-up / delivery of governmental projects / accountability.

In essence, whenever one can enhance the support of the people through a better social, economic and political environment, the result is usually greater stability and security, as well as the resulting marginalization of the enemies of the legal governing authority.

In my experience and observation, necessity normally forces cooperation. Once military and other civilian actors are forced to work together, they quickly realize that there is unity of purpose and that methods of working together (without the requirement to enforce a unity of command) is possible. This interaction also starts to tear down stereotypes and develop understanding of alternate methodologies and leadership approaches. Significantly, the farther from the field / action one travels, the more difficult it is to achieve cooperation. Without the stimuli of the immediate need and chaos of the operational theatre, bureaucratic rules, pettiness and competition over credit and budget dollars takes over. Organizational culture and stereotypes, not yet dismantled through shared experience and hardship, reign supreme and create problems for cooperation and finding solutions.

Important to the future of the comprehensive approach is a concerted effort by all actors to become more culturally astute. It is important that everyone understand the organizational cultures, decision-making processes and philosophical approaches of those they work with. To this end, early integration of all actors prior to a deployment is key so that personalities can adjust and methodologies can be worked out. In the absence of conflict, professional development and employment opportunities should be shared amongst military and civilian agencies. To be effective, consistent, long-term effort must be invested. Key for all is the understanding that the comprehensive approach is a force multiplier for everyone.

## ENDNOTES

- 1 It is important to note that OGDs, NGOs, International Organizations and other non-military organizations and entities were no better in their philosophical outlook. They were just as resistant to working with the military as the military was working with them. This was the case well into the war in Afghanistan.
- 2 Canada, Canadian Forces Joint Publication CFJP 3.0 Operations (Ottawa: DND September 2011), Glossary.
- 3 Respected sociologist Edgar Schein explains organizational culture as “a powerful, latent, and often unconscious set of forces that determine both our individual and collective behaviour, ways of perceiving, thought patterns and values. Organizational culture in particular matters because cultural elements determine strategy, goals and modes of operating. The values and thought patterns of leaders and senior managers are partially determined by their own cultural backgrounds and shared experience.” E.H. Schein, *The Corporate Culture Survival Guide* (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1999), 14.

4 The UN Charter defines the following category of operations:

Chapter VI - describes the Security Council's power to investigate and mediate disputes. In short, Peacekeeping;

Chapter VI 1/2 - describes mission defence – using force to defend UN chapter VI missions – protection of UN members and those under UN protection. Language morphed to peace support operations;

Chapter VII - discusses the power to authorize economic, diplomatic, and military sanctions, as well as the use of military force, to resolve disputes. In essence, peacemaking.

5 General Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," *Marine Corps Magazine*, January 1999.

6 See Bernd Horn, "Verging on the Absurd: The Srebrenica Relief Convoy," in Horn, B., ed., *In Harm's Way. On the Front Lines of Leadership: Sub-Unit Command*. (Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006), 17-38.

7 In fairness to the MSF, they were the only NGO not at the meetings. They were too busy operating their field hospitals in some of the worst hit areas.

8 Canada, *Managing Turmoil. The Need to Upgrade Canadian Foreign Aid and Military Strength to Deal with Massive Change*. An Interim Report of the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, October 2006, 149. The PRT in Kandahar focused on three major areas: good governance, security sector reform (including providing training and equipment to Afghan police) and reconstruction and development.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE KOSOVO VERIFICATION MISSION: “TREE HUGGERS”

*Lieutenant-General (Retired) J.O. Michel Maisonneuve*

#### INTRODUCTION

It was December 1998; I was stuck in the middle of Prizren, Kosovo. The Serbian authorities were running the province like a police state. Many Albanian Kosovars were suffering: displaced from their homes with little food, poor shelter and a lack of medicine. My conversations with the Head of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in the sector were unfruitful. He had just been “posted” from Pakistan where he had been looking after more than a million refugees, so a few hundred displaced people – white Europeans at that – did not seem to him to be as much of an “emergency” as CNN portrayed it.

In this as in any crisis, an amalgam of actors could be found in my area: the UNHCR and many other IOs (International Organizations), such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). There were also dozens of non-governmental organizations in my Area of Responsibility (AOR); some were small, somewhat akin to “Two Men and a Truck”, but all had good intentions. NGOs were famous for not wanting to be “coordinated”. They were known for wanting to retain their independence and not being too closely associated with any military<sup>1</sup> mission, and they barely recognized the UN as being helpful in this emergency. Because of their connection to the “people”, NGOs were usually the first to arrive in any theatre; they had no overhead and no bureaucracy and could (and did) deploy quickly, with much courage, to any conflict area, ready to assist the local population with shelter, food and medicine. The folks in my mission area playfully called them “tree huggers”, but they had a grudging respect for their intentions.

This is a case study of the application of a comprehensive approach to a tactical situation. Use of a comprehensive approach by a nation usually entails ensuring all elements of national power – civilian and military – can be employed in a coordinated manner to resolve a crisis. Tactically, for us a

comprehensive approach meant that we should attempt to ensure all actors in the mission area would work towards a similar end-state and not at cross purposes.

## THE KOSOVO VERIFICATION MISSION

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) was born following an agreement between Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic and former U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke. The agreement included the withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo and the verification of such by a 2000-person OSCE civilian mission. As part of the agreement were provisions for freedom of movement of KVM Verifiers and for IOs/NGOs to provide relief to the locals. The KVM organized itself quickly and deployed to all regions of Kosovo, in the process absorbing individual nations' Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Missions (KDOM), which were already on the ground. I was appointed Head of the first Regional Centre (RC), based in Prizren region, and assumed command of the United Kingdom KDOM as well as personnel who were deploying directly from OSCE nations.

The axis of effort in my AOR was to immediately make a positive difference in people's lives. This was to be accomplished through an aggressive patrolling scheme designed to show the KVM presence and therefore temper the behaviour of the parties. We liaised closely with the Serb authorities and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) representatives in our region, and we began a series of freedom of movement exercises and unannounced verification measures designed to wrest the initiative from the belligerents.<sup>2</sup> Through this program, we became closely connected to the citizens and were able to gather a significant amount of information on the current situation. The question remained of how to become as well connected to the IOs and NGOs in the AOR to ensure that we did not work at cross purposes.

### The All-Agency Coordination Centre

We had an idea: we would try to make the IOs and NGOs feel so welcome – in effect to attract them – that they could not refuse to join us at the RC HQ. We found an old abandoned factory in Prizren where we could set up our HQ.

In the RC structure, a Chief of Human Dimension looked after all aspects of humanitarian operations, including liaising with the UNHCR and the other IOs and NGOs operating in our geographical area, and with the KVM HQ. She frequently discussed our inability to get information regarding who was indeed in our area, and what they were doing. We needed some situational awareness and a way of supporting her in the coordination of the Human Dimension aspects of the mission.

I asked my Chief of Logistics to set up a room we would call the All-Agency Coordination Centre (AACC) in support of our potential partners. In this classroom-size space we placed working tables with a few computers with internet access and printers for the use of any IO or NGO. On the wall, we put maps of the AOR with known locations of minefields or restricted areas. We had a projector and screen available for briefings.

Once the room was ready, I asked my team to send out an invitation to all organizations in the area so we could have an “official dedication.” Any of my Verifiers who came into contact with an IO or NGO on the ground was to invite them to the dedication. As the international crowd rarely misses a chance to celebrate, my view was that we should make an event of it with a “*vin d’honneur*,” speeches, etc. I had one more request of my Chief of Logistics: I wanted him to put a large tree trunk in front of the AACC with a sign that read “Hugging Tree”; we would unveil the tree during the official opening. We ended up with a large number of IOs and NGOs showing up for the dedication and we were able to explain the purpose of the AACC to support our colleagues in the mission area; and the “Hugging Tree” was a popular topic of conversation.

The practical mechanism we put in place from this point on was to schedule a regular weekly meeting in the AACC where the RC HQ staff (either the Chief of Operations or Chief of Human Dimension) briefed the participants on the operational situation in the AOR and then asked each agency if they had questions or if they wished to provide an update to the group. The purpose of these sessions was to encourage the exchange of information and to provide situational awareness to all other actors in the area.

For the KVM, the IOs and NGOs were extremely useful in providing more information than the Verifiers themselves could gather. In return, the other actors could garner useful information on current KVM operations and the level of security in the AOR. Through these sessions, the different agencies

participating could also get to know each other and realize that most of their efforts were meant to lead them to the same end-state. In the case of the KVM, the aim was to save lives, while providing as much stability as possible to enable a permanent resolution of the crisis.

## LESSONS LEARNED

### **Lesson Learned: Understanding the Actors**

IOs and NGOs each have their own objective in a mission area. If you manage to get them all together, it may be possible to achieve consensus on the end-state. This could be “a safe and secure environment enabling a humanitarian response.” However, it will seldom be possible to get agreement or consensus on *how* to arrive at the objective. Nevertheless, because they will be present and will operate regardless of your desires, it is essential to understand their motivation and to develop a cooperative, even consultative, relationship with them.

### **Lesson Learned: Leadership**

Military forces continue to expound on the fact that they should not take the lead in coordinating WoG operations. This may be the case; however, it is a fact that only the military trains its personnel in formal contingency and operational planning. Other agencies (IOs and NGOs) often hire former military personnel specifically because of those skills. So we must be prepared to assume a leadership role in the planning and execution of WoG operations, even if this entails more of a mentoring approach or “leading from the back.”

### **Lesson Learned: Information Passage**

It is essential is to ensure all actors on the ground are aware of each other's presence; situational awareness must be a constant and dedicated effort. At the tactical level, we must find ways to make sure that information is passed between all actors on the ground. Information sharing will enable a more efficient operation and reduce the potential for “blue-on-blue” engagements: i.e., where more than one agency is dealing with the same issue concerning the same people in the same area. This will also reduce the possibility of confusing the people we are helping; as people in crisis, they should not have to worry about anything other than being rescued.

**Lesson Learned: Trust**

The reputation of the military among many NGOs is not good, for they do not trust what they do not know. If the military and different agencies are expected to work alongside each other, trust must be developed. The AACC provided a simple means of encouraging IOs and NGOs to come around the HQ and meet mission personnel. Through regular briefings and information exchange, trust was able to develop.

**Lessons Learned: Bees with Honey**

NGOs and IOs cannot be ordered to show up, provide their plans and locations or to adjust their operations. So the approach taken was to make IOs and NGOs feel so welcome that they could not help but want to show up. The reality is that for some smaller agencies, the provision of a desk, computer, printer and a warm place to work at no cost to them was a powerful incentive to visit the HQ and to participate in the sharing of information. However, agencies will only continue to come if they find the information interesting and the sessions useful; there must therefore be a professional approach to these sessions so they remain win-win for all participants.

**Lesson Learned: Higher Levels**

Though this case study relates to a tactical-level comprehensive approach, it is important to highlight the lessons that can be drawn at higher levels.

The first issue is to create winning conditions during peacetime. Once deployed, most actors will be content to cooperate and collaborate face-to-face. But the ideal would be for potential interlocutors to get to know each other *before* the crisis. For the Canadian government, this would imply greater collaboration between the two main departments who will be involved in an international crisis, the Department of National Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT; including the Canadian International Development Agency [CIDA]). There should be a number of Liaison Officers exchanged between the departments, not just one or two. These exchanges should be reciprocal so as to not cost positions. Joint exercises should be conducted often, and based on potential international scenarios. The Privy Council Office (PCO) should act as “higher control” in these exercises.

Similarly, there would be value in approaching major IOs and NGOs to create relationships before crises. DND could target the UNHCR, ICRC, and perhaps the larger NGOs such as Save the Children or Catholic Relief Services. Some may even be interested in exchanging staff, but certainly all should be invited to participate in joint scenarios and table-top exercises.

Kosovo was also useful in providing contrasting examples used by nations for their interventions. Countries engaging internationally deal in credit: they get credit for participating in a mission, for being a good alliance member, or for being good international citizens. At the time of the KVM, CIDA provided millions of dollars of aid to the UN for Kosovo. Because it was working through the UN and the OSCE, Canada got little credit for its important contribution. Austria, in contrasting fashion, completely organized and ran a Kosovar refugee camp in Albania to house some 3000 refugees. It was able to fly its flag above the camp, bring in whole-of-government support, and show off the camp to domestic and international media as a tangible expression of Austria's support to the crisis. A similar approach was used by Canada some years later in Afghanistan when it ran the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team.

## CONCLUSION

Using a simple strategy and an open mind, the Prizren RC of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission was able to attract all deployed actors in the AOR in order to share information and ensure a collaborative approach towards mission success. Use of an All Agency Coordination Centre was an innovative initiative that worked at the tactical level, with lessons applicable at higher levels.

## ENDNOTES

- 1 The Kosovo Verification Mission was not technically a "military" mission.
- 2 Similar to the Principle of War of "Offensive Action" or to "seize and maintain the initiative."

## CHAPTER 3

### RWANDA: FAILURE TO APPLY THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

*Major (Retired) Brent Beardsley*

#### INTRODUCTION

In 1993 and 1994, I served as the Personal Staff Officer to then Major-General Romeo Dallaire in the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), before and during the Rwandan Genocide. The genocide occurred between 6 April and 18 July 1994 and ultimately claimed the lives of approximately one million Rwandans and 14 of my comrades in UNAMIR. I was trained and developed as an Infantry Officer primarily on regimental duty in battalions or on extra-regimental duty in CAF schools or staff positions. My operational and garrison experience did not include working with civilians from DND, or other governmental, international or non-governmental organizations. Rwanda would be a first in many areas for me and one of the most significant challenges I faced was working with civilians from the UN Field Operations Division and with members of various NGOs.

UNAMIR was established by UN Security Council Resolution 872 of 5 October 1993 and was mandated to provide a climate of security essential for the establishment and subsequent successful operation of the Broad Based Transitional Government in accordance with the Arusha Peace Agreement. The Arusha Accords, between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), had ended a three-year civil war on 4 August 1993. Both parties had requested the UN to deploy a peacekeeping force to assist them in implementing the comprehensive peace agreement and thus help the country transition from war to peace, from dictatorship to democracy, and from a seriously fractured to a unified society. The mission was created and mandated as a “traditional” Chapter 6 Peacekeeping Force with Major-General Dallaire as Force Commander of a multi-national force of formed armed units and unarmed military observers from over 20 countries. The mission was led by UN political staff, supported by a UN civilian administration staff, operating in an environment with numerous NGOs and their international and national staffs.

The events that subsequently led to the failure of the mission to prevent the resumption of hostilities and the bloody genocide period have been well documented in numerous books, papers, films and documentaries and are not the subject of this chapter.<sup>1</sup> In my assessment, one of the major contributing factors to the failure of the mission was the completely dysfunctional relationship between the military mission and the civilian actors, whether UN civilian political and administration staff or NGO employees. This chapter will examine the reasons for the failed relationship between the civilians and the military with a view to providing lessons learned which may be of value to other civilians or soldiers on future missions. This will be done by examining in turn the relationship between the military force and the UN political staff, the UN civilian administration staff and a general grouping of international, national and non-governmental humanitarian and development organizations. The analysis will first cover the pre-war/pre-genocide relationships with each group and then with the relationships after the country descended into the abyss of armed conflict and genocide.

## BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

However, before an examination of the relationship can be conducted, the context of the mission must first be examined. In 1993 the UN and NGOs were under extreme personnel, financial and operational stress and pressures due to the proliferation of conflicts around the world in the immediate post-Cold War period. The so-called new world order, hoped for in the early days since the “fall of the wall”, had instead become the new world disorder as numerous conflicts were breaking out on an almost monthly basis. Croatia, Bosnia, Somalia, Angola, Liberia and Haiti were all examples of UN missions in crisis. From a handful of missions during the Cold War with less than 10,000 deployed troops to double digit missions in the early 1990s with tens of thousands of deployed troops, the UN was exhausted from the operational tempo and had exhausted its financial resources. Increasingly it could not find troop contributing nations for the new missions. The UN was billions of dollars in debt as many nations had not and were not paying their UN dues or peacekeeping assessments. During the time I spent in New York in the fall of 1993 on the Mission Planning Staff, on at least one occasion, the organization was fearful it could not meet payroll for the month and to say that fiscal crisis was the prevailing atmosphere would be an understatement.

Most nations in this early post-Cold War period were focused on reducing the size of their militaries and especially their defence budgets. They intended

to use this money to address other national priorities, like deficits in social or infrastructure spending, or government deficits and national debts. These were the optimistic days of the post-Cold War period where terms like “peace dividend” (which most nations like Canada had been collecting for 20 years on the backs of the U.S.) and “swords into ploughshares” had more impact on government policy than the increasingly violent disintegration of states around the world. Hope, isolationism and dangerous optimism were the cheap and naive operating methods preferred in the international response to the increasing anarchy resulting from state failure and intra-state conflicts that seemed to be proliferating worldwide.

In international relations, the dominant school of thought was realism, which simply defined is that states conduct their external relations based on their own self-interest. If ever there was a period where realism reigned, it was in the early post-Cold War period. When Major-General Dallaire and our team were briefed on our mission in New York, he was given three primary marching orders, which adversely affected our mission and which reflected the dominance of the realist paradigm of the day. Firstly: keep the mission cheap because no state (with the possible exceptions of Belgium, France and Rwanda's neighbours) had any vital interest, or even any interest at all in Rwanda, and therefore nations would not contribute generous funding to this mission. Secondly: keep the mission bloodless, because in the wake of the “Blackhawk Down” incident in Somalia and the rising casualty list in the Balkans, no state, especially the militarily capable, developed or western nations, had any political or public tolerance for casualties in any mission not deemed to be of vital national security importance. Finally: keep the mission on time. The Arusha Accords laid out a specific 30-month timetable of benchmarks between the parties and if there were delays the mission could fold without accomplishing its mandate, because there was weak, if any, political will behind this mission.

These marching orders adversely affected the mission as it was undermanned throughout its life (2500 vice 5000-8500 deemed necessary before the resumption of hostilities to implement the peace accords and 450 vice 5500 during the hostilities / genocide deemed necessary to protect civilians at risk). UNAMIR was under-resourced from its inception. The mission requested 200 million U.S. dollars for the mission for its 30-month life and another 200 million U.S. dollars committed to funding the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) program required by the peace agreement. The mission was provided with only 60 million U.S. dollars, a full six months after

deployment, and most of this had already been expended to deploy and sustain the force from funds borrowed from other UN missions and organizations. The DDR funding commitment was never made. In addition, UNAMIR only acquired about 60% of its equipment requirements and had no reserve stocks of water, food, ammunition, medical supplies, defensive stores, general and technical stores, or spare parts. Nations would not provide these items, demanding that the UN provide them, which the UN could not do because it did not have a budget.

A political stalemate in the early stages of the mission and the resulting deterioration in the security situation led to a massive loss of confidence in UNAMIR. This was not only by the local population, but by the leaders of the parties and the wider international community. Despite repeated pleas from the military division for funding, reinforcement and resources, these demands fell on deaf ears with the UN political and administrative leadership in New York and in the mission area. The frustration of not being provided with even the minimum amount of resources to achieve the mission, within the context of growing information about a situation which pointed directly to a resumption of hostilities and worse, resulted in a military division which was inadequately supported, overworked, underappreciated, and in many cases openly disloyal to the UN with little esprit de corps and low morale. This is not the foundation upon which to build an effective civil-military relationship and unfortunately the civilian staff, whether political or administrative, was largely viewed by the military members of UNAMIR to be disinterested in the mission, incompetent and lazy, and were held in sullen contempt by too many of the military members of the mission. In fairness, our political and civilian staff were the scapegoats in our eyes for a dysfunctional UN system and an apathetic international community. However, they did not help their case with their skills, knowledge, attitudes, actions or work ethic.

### **Military Division of UNAMIR**

Before we turn to an examination of the nature of the relationship between the military division of UNAMIR and the civilian UN political staff, the civilian UN administration staff and the civilian humanitarian / development organizations, the military division of UNAMIR must first be examined in order to display the civilian view of UNAMIR. As previously stated, the military division was undermanned and under-resourced and despite requests and pleas for reinforcement and capability, never achieved even a minimum standard of what the CAF would term operational effectiveness. UNAMIR

was a toothless tiger and this capability was recognized by all, including all of the civilian actors in theatre. As long as the parties recognized the ceasefire and the peace process on their own volition this lack of capability could be sustained. However, if the mission was confronted by one or both of the parties in an armed conflict, there was no doubt, in any objective assessment, that UNAMIR would collapse and was unsustainable.

The components of UNAMIR, the contingents, varied across the spectrum. While all were underequipped and under-supported, some contingents were well-led, well-trained, well-experienced, well-disciplined and did the best they could with whatever they were given. They were the epitome of military professionalism. Other contingents were a complete disaster. Poorly led, poorly trained, ill equipped, atrociously disciplined. They contributed little if anything to the mission, set a poor example for civilians, and would crumble under the least situational pressure. This disparity in the quality of contingents did not help the case of the headquarters staff who was constantly lobbying for more support while embarrassingly explaining why so-called professional military units were avoiding tasks, causing serious public disciplinary incidents, and demonstrating sheer incompetence in most of their tasks. In addition, in the headquarters the staff officers were also a diverse group. Most were reasonably well-trained, experienced, disciplined and hardworking, but some were next to useless. Again, it made it very hard to point at the lack of motivation, work, attitudes and actions in the civilian staff when not all of the military division could meet the standards required on operations. However, when the situation collapsed into war and genocide and the decision was taken in New York to downsize the mission, those who stayed and served under the worst and most dangerous of conditions were the best of the best and certainly set an example which should serve as a beacon for future missions in such a situation.

### **Civilian Mission Staff**

As is common in democracies and in most UN peacekeeping operations, the military force under Major-General Dallaire was subordinated to the political staff under the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) as Head of Mission. The political staff had not participated in the reconnaissance or in the mission planning for the operation (August-November 1993) as many were being redeployed from other missions like Western Sahara or Cambodia or were being engaged for employment. With this lack of information or background of experience in Rwanda, it was imperative

that the UN engage political staff who were competent in English (in order to communicate with the primarily Anglophone RPF) and French (in order to communicate with the primarily francophone government and population) in order to work effectively with both parties as all members of an impartial peacekeeping force are required to do in all of their respective tasks. The staff also needed to be capable (i.e., skilled and perceptive diplomats), unbiased and impartial with the parties and should be diverse in reflection of the composition of the international community and the UN. Instead the political staff were exclusively Franco-African (with one notable exception in Dr. Abdul Kabia of Sierra Leone), from francophone countries with close ties to France (a perceived belligerent to the conflict by the RPF) and the Rwandan Government. Its key players were exclusively francophone in language skills and from West Africa, with little to no experience in East Africa. Although I am not a diplomat, I could tell that they were not skilled diplomats. The political staff in New York, led by Boutros Boutros-Ghali, had engaged and dispatched cronies from the Francophonie instead of a balanced international political staff.

The weakness of the political staff in English resulted in most having little to no contact with the RPF to the point of deliberately avoiding meetings or delegating them all to Dr. Kabia. They were frequently seen in the company of government VIPs and known extremists at private social events. They remained as ignorant of Rwanda, its people, its geography, its history, its issues and its challenges on their final day as they were on the day they arrived in theatre. The major failure of this staff was their inability to mount an effective diplomatic effort to break the political impasse from January to April 1994. During this time, the security situation began to seriously deteriorate and increasingly information was being acquired that the country was being deliberately destabilized with a view to reigniting the civil war, with alarming warnings of the planning and preparation for mass ethnic slaughter. From their arrival in theatre, the political staff worked in isolation, jealously guarding their diplomatic domain, refusing to seek or to accept recommendations from a host of sources. They seldom if ever attempted to work with or get to know the individuals, or even their names, in the military division.

The civilian staff worked a strict 9 to 5 workday with a two-hour lunch/siesta each day. They did not work evenings or weekends and let it be known, quite clearly to the military staff, that they did not want to be disturbed during the weekends or in the evenings except in a serious emergency. This was all conducted in the presence of a military staff which was working nine to twelve

hour days, six or seven days a week. Such a work ethic was clearly visible to all staff and did not create an example, confidence or trust in the political leadership of the mission within the military division. They always voiced optimism to New York in their reports, in contrast to the dire warnings of the reports from the military division. They also overwhelmingly focused on their own personal comfort and benefits. They secured ostentatious accommodation in Kigali, which they furnished with extravagant articles and staffed with local servants. Their offices were the first to be furnished and they had first call on all equipment like radios, vehicles and computers (even though there was a severe shortage of these mission essential items in the military division). They always insisted on being driven to and from work and to and from meetings when they were quite capable of driving themselves or each other. They ordered items like a bullet proof, luxury Mercedes when the mission had no budget and was under-resourced. They spent an inordinate amount of time planning social events, trips and their vacations. Their totally unacceptable actions resulted in the unprecedented case of the UN civilian Chief Administration Officer resigning from the mission and citing his inability to establish any sort of working relationship with the SRSG and his political staff as his reason for leaving a career of UN service.

All of this was conducted in front of a military division, which was undermanned, under-resourced, working whatever hours required to try to stabilize the security situation at considerable personal risk. They were trying to achieve the assigned mission with what appeared to be little political support or direction. In summary, there was little to no relationship built between the military and the political staff (with the notable exception of Dr. Kabia, who, due to his professionalism, became the go-to guy for the entire division and was therefore the busiest man in the entire political division) before the war and genocide due to their incompetence, arrogance, self-serving attitudes and actions, and sheer apathy about the military division. Openly and in the presence of locals or the parties, the military division, led by the example of General Dallaire, was the epitome of loyalty, as it must be, but behind closed doors and in private the political staff of the mission were held in complete contempt. Due to their arrogant, self-serving intransigence, no professional or positive working relationship could be developed.

## ACTIONS DURING THE HOSTILITIES

When hostilities commenced on 7 April 1994, the political staff immediately abandoned their ostentatious accommodation and moved a matter of blocks

to the Meridian Hotel. They traveled in an escorted convoy in armoured personnel carriers, which they had demanded despite the fact the troops and vehicles were desperately needed to rescue civilian and military members of UNAMIR and other international or national persons in danger. Upon arrival at the hotel, they commandeered an entire floor of the hotel, forcing Rwandans and others out of their rooms and into the halls and other spaces in a building that rapidly became a haven and displaced persons centre. They insisted on fresh, hot food and began to drink alcohol to excess. They worked the phones until the lines were cut on 8 April and made no effort or request to come to the Mission Headquarters (which was in dire straits with electricity, water and sewage cut, overrun with displaced persons and expatriates but which had working communications to New York and was the Mission Headquarters for a mission in crisis) or assume anything resembling leadership of the mission. Everything seemed to be delegated to General Dallaire. When he went to the hotel to confer with the SRSG after the arrival of French/Belgian expatriate evacuation force on 9 April, the SRSG informed the general he was moving himself and his staff to Nairobi to "better serve the mission." He left Dr. Kabia as political advisor to General Dallaire, packed his bags and left the mission area. Within days he was fired by the UN. Occasionally some of his staff would return to Rwanda for "consultations," which consisted of Dr. Kabia and the military division briefing them on the situation. They would then return to Nairobi and we were informed that they continued to lobby the personnel department in New York for redeployment to another mission.

There was little to no political leadership in the mission during the war and the genocide, and General Dallaire, advised by Dr. Kabia, by virtue of a vacuum, became the *de facto* Head of Mission. The political leadership of the mission was added to his overburdened role of Force Commander. This situation was not corrected until the UN appointed a new SRSG during the last week of the war. This brilliant and experienced leader and diplomat immediately deployed his entire staff to the austere and desperate conditions in Kigali when he assumed his duties as Head of Mission. This second SRSG and the staff he assembled proved that the UN is capable of staffing a mission with competent, hardworking, experienced and capable political officers. The overwhelmingly positive and professional working relationship they developed in the post-war/post-genocide era was significantly better than the situation in the prewar or war period.

During the reconnaissance mission conducted in August of 1993, the UN civilian administration advisors had recommended that in order to save money,

deployment of military personnel could be saved in what the CAF terms a Headquarters and Signals Squadron. This section would normally provide communications service and support to the actual headquarters staff. General Dallaire accepted this recommendation upon the assurance that they could and would deploy the full and capable component if required by the mission. This turned out to be a terrible mistake. Further, in order to save money the civilian administration in New York made the decision to minimally man the mission. The critical positions of humanitarian coordinator, human rights coordinator and legal advisor were never manned and these vacancies directly contributed to many of the operational failures of the mission in the days ahead. The positions that were manned were staffed with individuals either capable but new to the UN, those redeploying from closing missions for the sake of a job, or by some who had professional failings and were being deployed for probationary reasons. Because the mission was known to be under-resourced, the best of the best were deploying to the main show, which was the Balkans, and in too many cases the leftovers were sent to Rwanda.

The notable exception to this generality was the communications section. This section was staffed by some of the most professional civil servants it has ever been my privilege to work with. In every section there were at least one or two fully professional civilian employees who, like the military section, were focused on mission success. I cannot say enough good about the cream and enough bad about the curd. Let it stand that the curds displayed the same unprofessional, incompetent, self-serving, arrogant and useless work ethic and actions as their political masters. The cream rapidly drifted towards the military division and a strong, professional working relationship was formed between individual military officers and individual civilian administration staff officers. Anything that was achieved in UNAMIR before the war was due to the positive working relationship which was developed based on understanding, cooperation, mutual respect and a strong desire to achieve the mission despite the issues and challenges of the day.

After the war began, unsurprisingly, the useless staffs were the first to lineup for evacuation and on arrival in Nairobi pulled in every favour or opportunity they could to be redeployed to another mission. The capable civilians reluctantly redeployed to Nairobi, but at the first chance either returned to the mission or gave us nothing but sterling support from Nairobi. The strong personal relationships built in-theatre during the peace only matured during the war. However, a logistics and administration system, like the UN system for peacekeeping operations, should not be built on whether or not some

military officers can bond with some civilian employees on a personal level, in order to accomplish their assigned tasks. The system has to be capable of functioning regardless of the individuals or personalities of those involved. In this, the UN support system of 1994 was clearly inadequate. As proven in Somalia, Rwanda and later Bosnia, the UN was incapable of managing a logistics and support system to a mission in crisis. Long overdue reforms were initiated, but whether they have resulted in an effective system, I will leave to others with current mission experience to assess.

### **RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE MILITARY DIVISION AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS**

Examining the relationships that developed between the military division and the diverse and enormous body of disparate international, national and non-governmental organizations is exceedingly difficult. This is due to the sheer number and diversity of the organizations present in Rwanda before the war. Prior to the civil war of 1990-1993, Rwanda had been the darling of the international aid and development community. The country was open for their business and it was stable despite a brutal military dictatorship. There was always a need in poor and overpopulated Rwanda (which suffered from periodic droughts resulting in famines). The country could provide an excellent quality of life to those who could afford to avail themselves of the excellent accommodations available for a price, the low cost of living and the recreational opportunities like the gorilla park, the Akagera National Park and the services available in Kigali. Despite the severe discrimination and periodic pogroms against the Tutsi people, which could be ignored as an "internal affair," and the significant amount of money and aid that was siphoned into the pockets of the elite in what has been labelled the "aid enterprise," these unfortunate realities could be ignored as "the cost of doing business."

The entire humanitarian / development community in Rwanda was well established by the time the civil war began in 1990. After the war, they expanded their operations and in so doing saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans who otherwise would have died from starvation and disease. By the time UNAMIR deployed to Rwanda, the aid enterprise was well established and entrenched and largely viewed UNAMIR as an undesirable outsider. In general, but with a few notable exceptions, they treated UNAMIR as another belligerent. Despite the fact that we wore blue berets, were working for the UN, were assisting in the implementation of a peace agreement and trying to create a security situation which would only help them in their missions,

they isolated themselves from us and virulently opposed any efforts to build a working relationship built on even minimal coordination, let alone cooperation. They refused to attend our security briefings which were held to brief them on security threats like landmines in certain areas. They refused to meet at UN HQ and insisted that any coordination could only take place at United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) facilities and under UNDP control. They refused to give us information like where their organizations were based and where they lived so that we could create emergency security plans for their protection, the protection of their aid supplies and equipment or their evacuation if necessary. Before the war, little to no working relationship was able to be built with the numerous UN, international, governmental or non-governmental organizations in the mission area. Despite numerous attempts to build some sort of working relationship focused almost exclusively on security matters, all attempts to establish coordination failed.

When the civil war and genocide began, most of the above organizations, with the notable exceptions of the International Committee of the Red Cross and Doctors without Borders (*Médecins Sans Frontières*), created traffic jams racing to the airport. In addition, they were screaming for rescue by UNAMIR, placing many members of the mission at extreme risk trying to locate them in the anarchy of Kigali. The fact that none of them were killed is solely attributable to the troops of UNAMIR who risked their lives to save them and evacuate them from Kigali. They abandoned their stores, infrastructure and equipment, which in most cases were used by the local army and the militia to sustain their war effort and genocide. They abandoned their local staffs, who were overwhelmingly Tutsis (they had used these organizations to obtain employment denied to them within the discriminatory rules of pre-war Rwanda). The local staffs were specifically targeted for extermination because they had close relationships with foreigners. Hundreds, if not thousands were murdered within days. Last but not least, these same individuals, who had stampeded to the airport and a route to safety, had the nerve to call from the luxury hotels of Nairobi and *demand* that we focus on protecting their organizations' locations and their local staff. By that time the sites had already been looted and destroyed, largely because before the war they had refused to tell us where they were located, and their local staffs were mostly dead, having been abandoned to their fate by their international employers. In some notable cases they could not even provide us with full names of their staff members or where they lived. At a time when the nation of Rwanda most needed these organizations, their only demonstration was that of extreme cowardice and desertion.

As most of UNAMIR was withdrawn and the war and genocide intensified, there was next to no humanitarian capability on the ground with the exception of the hospitals of the ICRC and MSF. UNAMIR controlled the airport which became the only means of transporting humanitarian aid and personnel into Rwanda. Within days, much in strict contravention to their normal *modus operandi*, the ICRC and MSF forged a working relationship with UNAMIR. We needed them to provide the humanitarian expertise and experience and they needed us for security and for access to the UN aircraft (which was two CAF Hercules; all other UN planes were contract aircraft and could not be insured, so were prohibited from flying into Rwanda) and for secure delivery of the precious aid supplies. This relationship was based on first establishing communications within the UN radio network and then building a working relationship between the leaders and the staffs on how each could support the other in the achievement of their respective missions.

We rescued wounded Rwandans and took them to their hospitals for treatment, they arranged their supplies to be delivered to Nairobi and we arranged for them to be placed on the UN flights and then either secured them at the airport or securely delivered them to their hospitals. We also maintained discreet oversight of their locations for their security and if threatened moved the force reserve to protect them. This discreet security allowed them to maintain their neutrality and permitted us to ensure their safety and subsequent successful operation. This relationship saved the lives of thousands of Rwandans who otherwise would have died of wounds, injuries, sickness or disease. We also escorted them on occasion to our protected sites so that we could provide medical support in the battle with epidemics and to provide advice on how best to run these sites, given the fact that they are the experts in this area and we were largely conducting these operations for the first time. In summary, they needed us and we needed them and neither could accomplish their mission without the support of the other. The excellent working relationship between Philippe Gaillard of the ICRC, Dr. James Orbinski of MSF and General Dallaire ensured their organizations were able to save the lives and secure over 40,000 Rwandans at risk.

The other international, national and non-governmental organizations witnessed the success and popularity enjoyed by the ICRC and MSF. I believe that they were largely shamed into rejoining the humanitarian effort. Many of the parent organizations had not given permission to their staff to evacuate. Given the daily media coverage by BBC, they were embarrassed and humiliated, and had to be seen to be doing something. What resulted was one

of the best emergency organizations ever created by the UN. It was the UN Rwanda Emergency Organization (UNREO), which admitted the humanitarian organizations to the Rwanda aid effort only if they agreed to operate by its rules. Their supplies and personnel were delivered to Nairobi, prioritized by UNREO based on need identified by UNAMIR and UN agency assessment on the ground, were transported by CAF Hercules into theatre, were secured by UNAMIR military personnel, escorted by UN military personnel and distributed by the organizations. It was the ultimate of cooperation with each organization doing what it does best and all dancing to the beat of the same drummer. The result is that hundreds of thousands of Rwandans who ultimately would have died were instead saved due to this organization and the magnificent and courageous young men and women, civilian and military, working together to do the best they could with what they had to save lives. Their sacrifices and their efforts remain one of the few bright lights of the otherwise disastrous and dismal events.

However, UNREO did not survive the sound of the last bullet in the war and genocide. When the RPF pushed the remnants of the Rwandan Army and militia across the border into Congo, on 18 July 1994 they declared a unilateral termination of hostilities. Within days the land routes opened, the airfield opened and the international, national and non-governmental organizations stampeded into Rwanda. Within weeks UNREO could coordinate nothing as this herd of cats, numbering literally in the hundreds, raced through Rwanda to get to the humanitarian disaster with the refugees in Eastern Congo. Most never even took the time to assess the needs amongst the survivors in Rwanda, who were in most cases in more desperate conditions than the perpetrators and their captives in Congo. The television cameras were in Congo and that is where they had to be to get their funding from home. General Dallaire pleaded with them to move into southwest Rwanda, where almost one million displaced persons were threatening to move to Goma and create a second refugee crisis. The so-called experts were more interested in being seen on camera in order to retrieve their tarnished reputations than they were in dealing with an ignored crisis. UNREO collapsed, cooperation largely ended, coordination became exceedingly difficult and the opportunity that peace provided to rebuild Rwanda was largely abdicated to the Rwandan people. They recognized from their experience that the promises of the international community and its agents in the international humanitarian organizations are as weak, fickle and deceptive as was their political will and effort during the genocide. The positive relationship built by necessity during the genocide did not survive its termination and largely returned to the silo efforts of each

doing their own thing while wasting resources, time and effort from their failure to coordinate or cooperate in the aftermath of the war.

## CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the experience of civil-military relations during the Rwanda Mission of 1993-1994 with a view to determining lessons learned for future operations. The first lesson is the urgent need for UN reform in the hiring, development, and termination policies of its civilian staff. We must not abandon the dream of the generation who sacrificed so much in the Second World War to create the UN as the best hope of humanity for peace, human and social development and as the primary agency to lead humanity in building a more fair, equitable, prosperous and better world. We must focus on building the UN primarily through the employment of great people. The UN civilian staff, whether political staff or civilian specialist in the administration division, must meet the standard of the best and brightest our world has to offer. They must be committed to the principles and charter of the UN and equipped with the skills, knowledge, attitudes, experience and leadership required to achieve the missions of the UN. Without great people, no organization can achieve its mission. Incompetence, lack of work ethic, lack of qualifications, inexperience, lack of skills, corruption and even criminal characteristics in UN civilians will never permit the UN to improve its capability on the ground. This is the primary lesson from Rwanda. If it is ignored, there is nothing that the military can do to build a working relationship with useless individuals and nothing will prevent future preventable disasters like Rwanda.

The second major lesson is the need for a dialogue to build a new model of a working relationship between the military and the international, national and non-governmental organizations that make up the humanitarian and development communities. First and foremost, there needs to be mutual respect of each other and the mission of each other. For the military, on a peace support operation, security is job one. We must focus all of our capabilities and efforts in providing a secure and safe environment within which the political staff can build good governance and peace, and the humanitarian and development organizations can successfully conduct their essential operations. They need the military for security and the military needs them to succeed in meeting humanitarian and development needs. If we each stay in our lanes and focus on our primary mission then we can successfully operate together. The challenge however, is when our lanes cross. When the

military tries to integrate humanitarian and development organizations into their mission objectives, the agencies believe that they will lose their independence and impartiality by being, or appearing to be, subordinated into a political and military agenda. This is the issue which must be subject to dialogue in order to gain a greater understanding through a discourse of views and requirements. Rwanda is over and is now a historical issue. We need to move forward from our collective experience and find a way to at a minimum coordinate and ideally a way to cooperate to ensure that each of us can contribute to mission success within our respective domains of security and humanitarian activity or development.

Finally, the last major lesson is the requirement for military professionalism amongst all of the military actors in a theatre. It will be impossible to build successful working relationships with the host of civilian actors, whether international or national, political or social, humanitarian or development, if the military does not approach the relationship in a truly respectful and cooperative manner. The military will not command, control, integrate, dictate or in any way direct these organizations. The arrogance, ignorance and incompetence of military personnel in their work with civilians must be eradicated. The approach should be confident, polite, respectful and humble. Commanders, staff officers and especially Civil-Military Cooperation officers who are confident, professional, articulate, and empathetic must be prepared to work with anyone who can contribute to mission success. This relationship must be based on mutual respect and appreciation of the requirements of the other party, for example, independence, impartiality and humanity in the case of the humanitarian and development world. This type of relationship, if built and nurtured, will only improve the military's ability to provide security while the other organizations provide their essential components to overall mission success. The failure to build such a relationship will doom future missions, which is what occurred in Rwanda before and after the genocide.

## ENDNOTES

- 1 For my personal account of the mission, refer to General Dallaire's personal memoir of the mission, which I co-authored with him. See Romeo Dallaire, with Brent Beardsley, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto: Random House Publishing of Canada Ltd, 2003).



## CHAPTER 4

### PERSPECTIVES ON CANADIAN ARMED FORCES LEADERSHIP IN 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS<sup>1</sup>

*Howard G. Coombs, PhD*

In today's complex security environment, it is important, indeed essential, for military leaders at all levels to thoroughly understand the intricacies of working in the context of comprehensive operations. These missions, where often the military is not in charge, require the use of a comprehensive approach in which a wide spectrum of players, stakeholders and resources are involved. The players and stakeholders are drawn from other government departments, military allies, non-government organizations and local communities. To effectively lead in such diverse environments, modern leaders cannot solely rely on their 'hard' military or technical skills. Rather, they need to develop through their careers the necessary 'soft skills' such as trust building, collaboration, conflict resolution, effective communication, flexibility, cultural awareness and interpersonal skills.<sup>2</sup>

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## INTRODUCTION

From a security perspective, effective coordination of military activities in the contemporary environment is not possible using traditional hierarchical measures of command and control. It requires structures that are inclusive, establishing and maintaining common trust and shared intent. This permits these entities to be self-synchronizing and adaptable, exercising unity of effort to accomplish a mission. These organizations are military and non-military, consisting of a mixture of information and social networks that self-adjust as a result of shared vision and common perspective. Canadian Armed Forces operations in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have certainly made military professionals aware of the necessity of using alternative approaches to deal with the dilemmas of modern conflict incorporating

all elements of national power in a comprehensive fashion. Examples from Canadian involvement in Afghanistan in 2004 and 2010-2011 provide substance to the discussion of leadership competencies required by comprehensive, or whole-of-government operations.<sup>3</sup>

One can argue that today what was once conventional is now asymmetric and *vice versa*. Militaries must combat non-state actors and disintegrating influences whose base is transnational and whose reach is sometimes global. The information warfare and other operations by the enemy are sometimes aided unwittingly or otherwise by citizens in the very states they attack. These malign influences are incredibly difficult to discern, define and defeat, posing incredible challenges to military professionals who recognize that lasting security for the populations of war-torn states cannot be achieved by military means alone. Indeed, this is not a new concept but has been long recognized by military leaders who have been involved in complex security operations, like the COIN, of recent years. This requirement was aptly captured by American defence advisor and public policy expert Sarah Sewall in 2006, as the nature of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were made apparent to their western participants:

COIN is a particularly dynamic, decentralized, and three dimensional form of warfare because the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of operation are more interdependent than in typical conventional operations and *because the end state cannot be achieved strictly by military means* [Emphasis added].<sup>4</sup>

On top of this, it is also necessary to examine the contributions of one's friends and allies to communal efforts. Military operations will take place in joint, multinational and multi-agency environments, with numerous friendly or neutral state and non-state actors. The military component will not always be the lead agency. Consequently, commanders at all levels will be faced with the dilemma of creating shared intent and common purpose amongst these diverse groups.

## CANADA AND THE WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH

Canada's Afghanistan mission also provided the initial trial of the amalgamation of defence, diplomacy and development – the 3D approach – that had been created as the expression of Canadian foreign policy in conflicted regions around 2003.<sup>5</sup> It was underpinned by the recognition of the

necessity for the Canadian Armed Forces to establish strong connections with DFAIT and CIDA to address the modern dilemmas of post-conflict environments, such as Afghanistan. The 3D approach required an increased level of interoperability between agencies that often lack a common coordinating infrastructure. The result was a dependence on building shared consensus for the establishment and a coordination of decentralized operations. It followed that the conflict in Afghanistan saw an unprecedented level of interdepartmental and interagency cooperation and coordination.

A 3D security framework created possibilities such as increased funding for development and diplomacy, decreased reliance on the military and decreased conflict between development, diplomacy and defence personnel in crisis situations. At the same time it was acknowledged that the 3D security framework brought dangers such as an increased politicization and militarization of development and diplomacy programs. Despite these concerns, this concept evolved into the ideas represented by the more all-inclusive expression “whole-of-government” and in essence remained primarily concerned with integrating all instruments of policy, regardless of department or agency, in order to produce a desired effect linked to national strategy. This can be observed in the 2008 *Canada First Defence Strategy* that mandated the Canadian Armed Forces:

...to be a fully integrated, flexible, multi-role and combat-capable military, working in partnership with the knowledgeable and responsive civilian personnel of the Department of National Defence. This integrated Defence team will constitute a key element of a whole-of-government approach to meeting security requirements, both domestically and internationally.<sup>6</sup>

This policy framework underpins all contemporary military efforts to act in a comprehensive fashion with governmental partners to deal with the challenges of the security environment.

## INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCES

Notwithstanding later evolutions, Canada's inter-governmental efforts in Afghanistan developed from nascent beginnings. The foundation of the campaign can be said to have been laid in January 2004 when then Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier, Canadian commander of the International Security

Assistance Forces (Rotation V) (ISAF V) was presented with a number of dilemmas expressed by President Hamid Karzai, who at that time was the leader of the Afghanistan Transitional Authority (ATA).<sup>7</sup> Most important of these was the lack of unified action by the myriad of governments and organizations that had resulted in less effective development and caused a weakening of potential effects. Also, as a result of the lack of a shared approach, ISAF V could not move beyond lower order, or tactical, military activities in order to achieve higher-level and enduring strategic objectives.

Hillier understood that without a coherent strategic concept in which all involved parties, military, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, donor institutions, the international community, and most importantly the ATA and Afghan people, could partake, no operational level campaign could be created. Also, he believed that “rebuilding failed states or failing states was not a security, governance or economic problem; it was all three.”<sup>8</sup> Accordingly, he used his ISAF staff and later two Canadian officers tasked from Canada to assist the ATA in articulating a strategic concept. This model was eventually released in the form of an idea paper entitled “Creating a National Economy: The Path to Security and Stability in Afghanistan.” While primarily developmental in nature, it also specified ideas that would later be used to assist with governance and security. These core ideas later emerged within the Afghanistan National Developmental Strategy (ANDS), which continues to be an overarching Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) policy document governing multiple activity streams by all contributors to the rebuilding of Afghanistan.<sup>9</sup>

This initial effort later resulted in Karzai requesting similar support from Hillier after he became Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS). The result was a small group of advisors who worked with the Afghan government in a similar fashion to the 2004 efforts. Regrettably, this “Strategic Advisory Team – Afghanistan” only ran from 2005 to 2008. This capacity building and assistance was not viewed by some as a Canadian military mission and it met its untimely demise due to international and interdepartmental politics.<sup>10</sup>

This 2004 effort demonstrated that outcomes could be realized through networked structures enabled by shared trust and common intent. It was necessary that this strategy link the ongoing activities of the multitude of agencies and militaries with a strategic idea to address the dilemmas faced by the initial Afghan administration, the ATA. Hillier’s planning staff came to the conclusion that they would have to create consensus for this idea through

the establishment of a rudimentary human-centric network, in which the composite entities shared, supported and advocated for the concept, while concurrently working in a decentralized yet coordinated fashion through the acceptance of common intent.

To create a shared awareness, understanding and, hopefully, ownership of these ideas, a concept was created that laid out initial thoughts on the creation of this network. The start state was the strategic concept and the end state was the creation of shared vision. The three major thrust lines, or lines of operations, were thought to be the ATA, the international community, and the various militaries operating in Afghanistan. These thrust lines linked entities or groups of individuals whose support was necessary. While the relationships have been described in a linear fashion, the reality was much more complex and three dimensional in nature, with these interconnections crossing lines of operation and having – for the most part – positive second and third order effects as shared vision was created.

In order to do this, the model was defined and promulgated in a form and manner that would be acceptable to the ATA. The product of this work was a short paper of about 10 pages that laid out this idea in simple terms and had the approval of the ATA. It became their property and was accompanied by a twenty minute PowerPoint briefing that was to be delivered by the Canadian staff officers who did the initial work. It was clearly understood by the authors of this work that in this distributed system, the military component was just one element of the overall campaign to achieve the desired effect. Of note, while no common information technology infrastructure existed, people to people contact and low technology communications devices, like telephones and the internet, enabled gradual establishment of acceptance and cooperation. Ultimately, a degree of success was achieved and parts of this concept were imbued within the Afghanistan National Development Strategy.

### **TASK FORCE AFGHANISTAN 5-10/TASK FORCE KANDAHAR<sup>11</sup>**

From these early beginnings, one could argue that the growth of the integrated approach to this conflict can be demonstrated by examining the work done in 2010-2011 by the whole-of-government team during Canada's last year in Kandahar. The whole-of-government mandate was incredibly important in the context of the counterinsurgency Canadians fought in southern Afghanistan. It provided impetus for the primary Canadian agencies, the

DND, DFAIT, CIDA, as well as others, to work together in a holistic fashion in order to create desired outcomes.

Canadian counterinsurgency practice in 2010-2011 reflected these precepts. the TFK, led by then Brigadier-General Dean Milner, conducted operations that were aimed at defeating the insurgent and the insurgency.<sup>12</sup> The activities required to deal with both were not synonymous and required a whole-of-government effort. It was clearly understood that any military victory achieved against the insurgent needed to be quickly followed with permanent Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) presence – both military and police – in addition to functioning governance, as well as reconstruction and development efforts linked to both provincial and national economies.<sup>13</sup> The TFK approach to counterinsurgency was more than the CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD approach first articulated in American doctrine in 2006.<sup>14</sup> It had been refined by successive rotations to a nuanced DEFINE-SHAPE-CLEAR-HOLD-BUILD-ENABLE-TRANSITION. It was necessary to (1) define the problem, (2) shape the environment, (3) clear or separate the destructive influences from the population, (4) hold through the establishment of security, (5) build capacity using governance, reconstruction and development, (6) enable the local population and (7) transition of control to host nation authorities. Due to the significant non-military component to activities across this spectrum, which increased as one moved towards TRANSITION, an integrated, whole of government team, with a common understanding of the issues and shared operating concepts to address them was necessary to succeed. This approach was captured in the TFK mission statement:

In partnership with Afghan National Security Forces, Coalition Forces and Whole of Government Partners, Task Force KANDAHAR will conduct comprehensive Counter-Insurgency operations in order to DEFEAT Insurgent influence and improve Afghan society across Governance, Development and Security lines of operation in PANJWA'I, DAND and DAMAN.<sup>15</sup>

Firstly, the requirement to prosecute this conflict with vigour and perseverance was difficult in a setting where the opposing forces were not easy to detect. Secondly, the need to coordinate and concentrate power – physical, psychological and cyber – was well understood, but extremely complicated in an environment that embraced a huge number of influences. These pressures include the activities and mandates of numerous military and non-military actors who were attempting to stabilize Afghanistan and build

national capacity in a host of areas. Milner and his staff recognized that any military victories gained must be immediately followed up with persistent security – both military and police, in the form of the ANSF, some type of functioning governance, as well as reconstruction and development efforts designed to support national and sub-national economies. In order to deal with this complexity, the Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan fought the insurgent and, more importantly, addressed the insurgency. While the former was mostly a security problem, the latter was, and is, much more challenging and requires a concerted effort in the areas of governance and development; otherwise any military success would be illusory. Local extremism required local causes of disaffection to be addressed in a holistic and focused fashion.

There were a number of “tipping points” that TFK worked towards within its whole of government approach and, in and of themselves, demonstrate the need for an integrated and interagency approach:

#### 1. Security

- Adequate numbers of capable Afghan police addressing village requirements and protecting, not preying on, the people.
- ANSF-led combined and single service operations.
- Integrated ANSF command and control responsive to the District Governor and local leaders (*maliks*).

#### 2. Governance

- Responsible and responsive district governor and staff.
- Representative and functioning district and village councils (*shuras*) and subnational (provincial) processes.
- Representatives from primary provincial ministries working at the district centre and reactive to village requirements.

#### 3. Development

- Functioning District Development Committees and village development representation leading to all development coordinated through the District Governor to meet priorities set by the district in conjunction with villages, which in turn connect to sustainable subnational and national programs.
- Working rural/urban interface – markets, transportation, etc.

Clearly from all of this it was evident that operations needed to be conducted from a whole-of-government perspective. Milner worked closely with Tim Martin, the Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK), who was also the senior civilian director of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (KPRT).<sup>16</sup> Additionally evident was the result of the closely intertwined dependencies of comprehensive operations, which produced what one can term the “paradoxical trinity” of whole-of-government operations. This meant that (1) security without governance is meaningless, (2) governance without development is unsustainable, and (3) development without security is unsupportable. TFK learned key lessons about counterinsurgency and multi-agency (and entity) interface. These included the necessity to integrate all operations and, in the networks of people and organizations, personal relationships and, most importantly, establishment of a common vision was key.

Canadian Armed Forces leaders have learned and relearned a great deal through their activities in Afghanistan. The implementation of a comprehensive Canadian intergovernmental approach to addressing the complex dilemmas of the contemporary environment has been central to any achievements that Canada has accomplished. This process has included DFAIT and CIDA, as well as other governmental organizations like the RCMP and Corrections Services Canada (CSC). The military part of counterinsurgency in the context of Afghanistan was just one piece of the puzzle and made no sense without the other parts. Based on these two experiences in Afghanistan, a number of inferences can be deduced that will assist Canadian Armed Forces members and others with leading and managing whole-of-government operations now and in the future.

### **CREATING SHARED OWNERSHIP AND IMPLEMENTATION OF OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS: “IT’S ALL ABOUT THE NETWORKS!”**

1. Humans achieve vertical compression of the levels of war. The nature of contemporary operations assists with decentralization of command through self synchronization.

Non-hierarchical liaisons between motivated key individuals in all organizations caused a compression of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. Due to the rudimentary nature of the available common information technology (cell phones and non-secure internet email), people of differing organizations did not have instantaneous and secure communications

with each other. They were forced to act on their own initiative in keeping with their understanding of the concept. Interestingly, the lack of hierarchy in non-military organizations normally increased the agility of information flow in such a fashion that senior military leaders were being briefed by civilian colleagues of events in their areas before those commanders received information from their subordinate organizations.

2. Networks are sustained through human to human contact, cellular telephones and the internet.

Even though most non-military organizations only had the most basic means to communicate, these were sufficient to provide for the establishment and sustainment of networks united by common vision and shared trust. The lack of a common information architecture hinders the passage of sensitive information, but liaisons and basic systems used appropriately are the means by which information can be passed.

3. Interoperability takes many forms and is not dependent on a common information technology infrastructure, but rather on trust.

Interoperability between organizations of varying capabilities and resources is not based on technology but on trust built between people. These relationships are incredibly important and must be nurtured and sustained over time. A particular challenge for military personnel is handing off these connections and their history to successive deployments.

4. Common (Consensual) Intent.

Intent in networks of disparate entities must not only be common, but consensual: everyone has a vote. This is sometimes difficult for military field partners to understand as it is inimical to the mission orientation of military forces. Civilians and their agencies tend to operate in a discursive, consensual fashion and military leaders must be prepared to engage in similar mode in order to create common understanding and intent.

5. Success is effects-based.

All results had to be measured in terms of positive effects and gains. Without success, organizations could not justify continued involvement and expenditure of resources; consequently, support would begin to wane. These networks were truly a "coalition of the willing."

6. Create a “common interpretive space.”

The creation of a common working space, like a website, with mutually understood formats and language, is a positive tool for dialogue and common problem solving, as well as enhancing common perspective. For example, during the Canadian mission in Kandahar, a website known as Harmonieweb was established by the KPRT to address this function.

7. In networks lacking common information technology architecture, the speed of command is slower, but due to being actualized by common understanding and shared intent, is still faster than factionalized opponents.

While the coordination aspects of seemingly disparate networks may look inefficient and cumbersome, the self-synchronization produced by common understanding and shared intent was still faster than that of opponents. This can be attributed to the lack of unity of the disintegrating influences in Afghanistan. The insurgency is comprised of many groups, from those who were motivated by religious and political reasons of various types all the way through to criminal organizations – and some which were an amalgamation of a host of motives. As a result, while on the surface the insurgency appeared monolithic, it was far from cohesive or centrally controlled.

8. Personality is extremely important.

Hillier was able to make connections due to his personality and to gain trust at his working level; Milner had to do the same. Commanders must exert themselves to connect with their counterparts in other organizations. This is necessary in order to establish the common view of the problems posed by the environment, what success in addressing these issues looks like and, as a result, how ongoing challenges must be addressed. The most effective commanders are able to do this. Additionally, interlocutors at the staff and unit levels can greatly assist in these efforts.

## CONCLUSION

The most effective organizations on today's battlefields are those that have integrated capabilities. Teams and networks of people leveraging their parent organizations have demonstrated a high degree of success...There is little question that when you put people

from multiple agencies and coalition partner nations with the right skills together, they will be more effective.<sup>17</sup>

*Major-General Michael T. Flynn, USA (2011)*

No matter how seductive it may seem, the contemporary operating environment is not reductionist. Purely military solutions are not the solutions to the dilemmas posed by the conflicted areas of the post-Cold War world. Despite the perceived difficulty of creating common goals and objectives with organizations that do not have similar capability as ours, the exigencies of the environment demands that one does. As a result, this observation by Major-General Flynn effectively captures the imperatives of today's environment of conflict and its implications for military leaders.

Given this necessity, how does one envision these whole-of-government or interdependent operations? One can surmise that they are not reliant on time and space, or indeed, on an articulated command and control relationship, but on information-sharing enabled by trust. This information-sharing and the resultant discourse create consensus and shared visualization of approaches, objectives and goals. From military leaders, it requires not just the ability to employ violence in the pursuit of victory, but also soft cultural skills, and emotional and cognitive intelligence. It also requires the ability to assist with linking military activities that provide short term governance and development effects with the longer term sustainable programs advocated by multinational agencies and other governmental departments. Again, this is not new, and implications in the civil-military relationship during the counterinsurgency, in particular, were accurately captured by British Brigadier Frank Kitson in *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping* in which he described the British Army experience from 1945-1970:

...although an army officer may regard the non-military action required as being the business of the civil authorities, they will regard it as being his business, because it is being used for operational reasons. At every level the civil authorities will rightly expect the soldier to know how to use non-military forms of action as part of the operational plan, although once it has been decided to use a particular measure they will know how to put it into effect.<sup>18</sup>

As well, in both examples discussed, ISAF in 2004 and TFK in 2010-2011, there are reoccurring trends that span the tactical, operation and strategic levels of war and stretch into the realm of grand and national strategies. In

2004, then Lieutenant-General Hillier oversaw and assisted with the creation of a proposal for a focused program of development. This was a macro model that allowed the Afghanistan Transitional Authority to take the lead in the re-establishment of national governance in Afghanistan. The analysis recommended using overarching planning and coordination mechanisms within existent national programs with inclusive multiagency representation to oversee the implementation of this idea. This coordinating body would then be responsive to the Afghanistan Transitional Authority and have subordinate coordinating committees in the districts being developed. In this manner a cohesive and unified approach, marshalling all resources, could be taken towards regional development. It was also acknowledged that this strategy could only work if there was consensus amongst all stakeholders created by leadership from the principal Ambassadors and supported by the heads of donor organizations in assisting the Afghanistan Transitional Authority to choose regions for concentrated development, in selecting priority institution-building programs, and in distinguishing work requirements.

In 2010-2011, then Brigadier-General Milner, in conjunction with his civilian counterpart Tim Martin, encouraged the establishment and sustainment of whole-of-government mechanisms to follow up on the success of military activities. They made the connection between DFAIT, CIDA and military operations. They were extremely conscious of the need for holistic approaches to provide for lasting and durable solutions within the districts of Panjwayi and Dand. At the end of the combat mission in 2011, the Prime Minister of Canada, The Right Honourable Steven Harper, attributed the gains made in Southern Afghanistan since our first involvement in 2002 as being efforts of networks comprised of “the men and women of the Canadian Armed Forces, our diplomats, and our aid workers.”<sup>19</sup>

Make no mistake; one should not attempt to simplify these challenges. There is nothing easy about them. In order to succeed in resolving the trials of the contemporary operating environment, an integrated and interdependent approach is required from military professionals. One can reasonably opine that conflict of the type that has emerged in the wake of the Cold War will endure and the skills of military and other professionals will continue to be needed across the globe. Subsequently, as they deal with the wars and not-wars of the contemporary security environment, Canadian Armed Forces leaders must think and act within the whole-of-government framework in order to achieve any degree of enduring mission success.

## ENDNOTES

1 The ideas and materials in this chapter are partially a synthesis of the research contained in previous works: Howard G. Coombs and General Rick Hillier, "Command and Control During Peace Support Operations: Creating Common Intent in Afghanistan," in Allan English, ed., *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives – Leadership and Command* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006); Dr. Howard G. Coombs and Lieutenant-General (Retired) Michel Gauthier, "Campaigning in Afghanistan: A Uniquely Canadian Approach..." in Colonel Bernd Horn, ed., *No Easy Task* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2011); Dr. Howard G. Coombs, "Canadian Whole-of-Government Operations Kandahar – September 2010 to July 2011," *Vimy Paper* (Ottawa: The Conference of Defence Associations Institute, December 2012); Dr. Howard G. Coombs, "Perspectives on Canadian Forces Leadership in 21<sup>st</sup> Century Operations," Presentation to the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute's Educating the Leaders and Leading the Educated Symposium, Kingston, ON (29-30 September 2011); and, Dr. Howard G. Coombs, "APLN.06.03. LE Introduction to the Comprehensive Approach to Operations in a Joint, Inter-Agency, Multinational and Public Environment," Presentation to the Army Operations Course, Canadian Army Command and Staff College, Kingston, ON (31 October 2011).

2 Foreword to Canada, Department of National Defence, Canadian Defence Academy, Bill Bentley and Grazia Scoppio, "Canadian Forces Leadership Institute: Leading in Comprehensive Operations (CFLI Monograph 2012-02)," (September 2012), 1.

3 The author deployed to Kandahar with Joint Task Force Afghanistan 5-10/Joint Task Force Kandahar from September 2010 to July 2011 as a civilian advisor to the Task Force Commander. He served in Kabul in 2004 as an Army reservist working directly for the Commander International Security Assistance Forces as a strategic planner.

4 Sarah Sewall, "Modernizing U.S. Counterinsurgency Practice: Rethinking Risk and Developing a National Strategy," *Military Review* Vol. 86, No. 5 (September-October 2006): 104.

5 Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, *The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar* (Toronto, ON: Penguin Group (Canada), 2007; reprint 2008), 107-108.

6 Canada, Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, *Canada First Defence Strategy*, (2008); internet, available at <[http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/June18\\_0910\\_CFDS\\_english\\_low-res.pdf](http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/first-premier/June18_0910_CFDS_english_low-res.pdf)>, 3-4.

7 Hillier was later promoted and appointed Chief of Defence Staff from February 2005 to July 2008.

8 General Rick Hillier, *A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War* (Toronto ON: HarperCollins Publishers Limited, 2009), 389.

9 See Howard G. Coombs and General Rick Hillier, "Command and Control During Peace Support Operations: Creating Common Intent in Afghanistan," in Allan English, ed., *The Operational Art: Canadian Perspectives – Leadership and Command* (Kingston, ON: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006), 173-191.

10 See Lieutenant-Colonel Michel-Henri St-Louis, CD, "The Strategic Advisory Team in Afghanistan – Part of the Canadian Comprehensive Approach to Stability Operations," *Canadian Military Journal* Vol. 9, No. 3 (Autumn 2009): 58-67; Interestingly St-Louis commanded the last Canadian Battle Group in Kandahar. This unit prompted Nelofer Pazira, Afghan-Canadian filmmaker, to opine: "But as much as we like to look back and say we Canadians made a contribution, there never was a comprehensive plan. It was really only the last battlegroup that went out to meet and greet the locals and ask them what they need, instead of just fighting." Cited by Susan Sachs in "Newsmakers 2011: In Their Own Words '...to see Canada leave Kandahar'," *The Globe and Mail*, December 24, 2011, A11.

11 Task Force Afghanistan referred to the larger Canadian mission in Afghanistan while Task Force Kandahar was the Canadian Brigade deployed within Kandahar. The Canadian brigadier-general who commanded the latter was also the National Commander for the whole mission, inclusive of the former organization with elements outside Kandahar.

12 At the time of the writing, Milner is a Major-General who commands Canada's contribution to the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan.

13 See Howard G. Coombs and Brigadier-General Dean Milner, "Canada's Counter Insurgency in Afghanistan," *On Track* Vol. 15, No. 4 (Winter 2010), 23-27.

14 United States, Department of the Army, *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, forewords by General David H. Petraeus and Lt. General James F. Amos and by Lt. Colonel John A. Nagl, introduction by Sarah Sewall (Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 2007): 174-184.

15 Cited in Coombs, "APLN.06.03.LE Introduction to the Comprehensive Approach to Operations...", slide 29. Official responsibility for DAMAN was taken away from Task Force Kandahar soon after its arrival in Afghanistan.

16 At the time of the writing, Martin is Canada's Ambassador to Colombia.

17 Major-General Michael T. Flynn, "Sandals and Robes to Business Suits and Gulf Streams," *Small Wars Journal* (April 20, 2011): 5-6.

18 Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1971; reprint 1972), 7.

19 The Right Honourable Steven Harper, Prime Minister of Canada, Address to Task Force Kandahar, Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan, 30 May 2011.

## CHAPTER 5

### COUNTERINSURGENCY: A DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONER'S PERSPECTIVE

*Anne Lavender\**

#### INTRODUCTION

As the last Development Advisor (DEVAD) to the Task Force Kandahar (TFK) Commander and his senior staff from October 2010 to June 2011, I was privileged to witness what worked and where there were challenges in implementing ISAF's COIN operations in Kandahar province, particularly Canada's COIN operations in the districts of Panjwayi and Dand. There were nuanced differences in interpretation as well as implementation of COIN between coalition partners and there were both synergies and conflicts between the demands of COIN and development "best practice" as captured in the Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness. In terms of the lessons learned, of which there were many, likely the most important was the critical role played by local Afghan leaders in "owning" their own stabilization and development agenda. This resulted in more effective COIN efforts to root out the insurgents, and sustainable development to reduce poverty.

When I was assigned as DEVAD to Brigadier-General Dean Milner, Commander of TFK (TFK COMD), the counterinsurgency campaign in Kandahar Province was well into its 10<sup>th</sup> year. With a focus on civilian-led governance and development as part of Canada's final year of operation in Kandahar province, TFK was tasked with building the capacity of the ANSE, which included the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP), while running counterinsurgency operations aimed at stabilizing communities. This allowed the civilian agencies based at Regional Command (South) (RC(S)) and the KPRT, which included DFAIT, CIDA,<sup>1</sup> the RCMP, CSC, the United States State Department and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), to support the governance and development priorities and efforts of local Afghan government and civil

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\* The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be construed as representing the official position of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development or the Government of Canada.

society partners working at the Provincial, district and community levels. While there were obvious improvements in the security situation as a result of ISAF activity since 2001, the insurgent threat still interfered with the ability of civilian agencies to deliver governance and development programming responsive to the needs of their Afghan partners.

A WoG effort, including DND, DFAIT, CIDA, RCMP and CSC, was required in order to bring to bear a synchronized Canadian government contribution to the ISAF effort. Coordinated by PCO, Canada's civilian-military (civ-mil) WoG team in Kandahar was directed by the civilian Representative of Canada in Kandahar (RoCK), based at the KPRT, and the TFK Commander, based at RC(S). Guided by a PCO-developed set of milestones and benchmarks,<sup>2</sup> the RoCK and TFK COMD delivered on governance, development and security programming as part of a phase-out and handover to the American "surge."<sup>3</sup> The pace and scope of Canadian WoG operations was significant, involving the largest DND operation since Korea, with the Afghanistan program being the biggest bilateral aid program ever delivered by CIDA. Working closely with predominantly American ISAF counterparts, the WoG team faced many challenges in synergizing COIN and development activities within and between ISAF military and civilian actors. The vision and direction offered by TFK COMD and the RoCK ensured that Canada's WoG efforts achieved both its ISAF and Canadian priorities. While ISAF's priorities focused on supporting Afghan military and civilian partners to deliver security, governance and development services to their population, Canada's WoG team had a further objective, which was to effect an orderly handover to our American counterparts, leaving Kandahar province with our brand and reputation for effective and sustained security, governance and development programming enhanced.

## COUNTERINSURGENCY VERSUS DEVELOPMENT

The origins of the modern Counterinsurgency Doctrine lie with the British in Malaya<sup>4</sup> and the French in Algeria,<sup>5</sup> and was improved as it was deployed in a number of other insurgencies, including the Vietnam War.<sup>6</sup> The Doctrine involves a range of offensive, defensive and stability activities aimed at defeating the insurgency and assisting the local government to deliver basic services and protecting the population. Key to the COIN methodology is the emphasis on developing an "indigenous capacity" to assume security, governance and development activities.<sup>7</sup> Based on "quick-impact" stabilization

activities (such as putting in wells or rehabilitating schools), the pace and expected results must necessarily be immediate and short term, with security and stabilization activities mutually reinforcing each other through the “clear-hold-build-transfer” phases of a COIN campaign. A civ-mil WoG effort is clearly required in order to support and deliver COIN. It is also evident that key aspects of COIN overlap with development, in particular where aid agencies like CIDA or USAID focus on improving the capacity of government to deliver basic services to vulnerable, poor and often marginalized populations.

Based on the principles of aid effectiveness in the *Paris Declaration*, supplemented by the *Accra Agenda for Action* and the *Busan Partnership for Effective Development*, development interventions emphasize five key principles: Ownership, Alignment, Harmonization, Managing for Results and Mutual Accountability.<sup>8</sup> Capacity development, or developing the partner government and civil society capacity to decide, lead and implement at the national, local and community levels, is central to all development assistance efforts and key to sustainability. Effective poverty reduction approaches include elements targeting sustainable livelihoods as well as “pro-poor” programming. This is because it is people-centred, responsive, multi-level, conducted in partnership with local government and civil society organizations and, most importantly, sustainable. Development programming, consistently implemented over a period of many years, results in empowered local partners with the capacity to meet the basic needs of their populations, thereby reducing poverty. Development results, necessarily, are medium to long term, given the challenge of building local capacity.

COIN and development therefore share a similar purpose: each seeks to build local capacity to respond to the security, governance and development needs of the local population. COIN and development, surprisingly, also share a similar methodology, which is “indigenous”-led or “local ownership”. This drives community-level, bottom up security, governance and development efforts. While COIN and development share a similar purpose and even methodology, the pace and expected outcomes are quite different, resulting at times in friction between civ-mil actors in theatre. COIN requires immediate delivery of basic services following “clear-hold” in order to demonstrate to the population the value of linking with their government, rather than to the insurgency. It takes a good deal of time to improve the capacity of government to deliver services, particularly in a fragile state. For example, while it may be quite easy to follow through on a request from the district or

provincial authorities to rehabilitate a school using local contractors, it takes a good deal of time to recruit, train, and place education ministry officials and teachers in the provinces, districts and rural communities, develop the curriculum, and improve the financial systems so that teachers can be paid. While both COIN and development put the local officials in the drivers' seat, the pace and timing for sustained delivery of a basic service is quite different.

### **Counterinsurgency Versus Development in Kandahar**

The conflict between COIN and development was clearly in evidence during Roto 11 (rotation) Canada's final Roto in Kandahar during 2010-2011. With TFK shifting its focus from the entire province to Dand and Panjwayi in 2010, TFK COMD was able to focus all of Canada's military efforts there, resulting in significant progress based on effectively executing "clear-hold" security activities in Panjwayi to "build and transition" activities in Dand.<sup>9</sup> CIMIC-driven stabilization programming was ramped up, with the Canadian Armed Forces responding to priorities identified by the respective District Governors and their Development Councils. Similar to the way that CIDA operated, local government leaders at the district and community level were engaged and actively involved in setting their priorities. Also similar to CIDA, the private sector and local NGOs were used as local contractors, resulting in the rest of the coalition adopting DND's contracting process. Local ownership was essential, both for the successful execution of COIN but also to ensure that any stabilization and development investments could be sustained. Canada's approach to COIN was noted for its effectiveness by other coalition forces as well as the Afghans themselves: there were many discussions where Canada's inclusive and respectful approach to the locals was commended by senior ISAF and civilian leaders.<sup>10</sup> Canada's approach was also regularly acknowledged during working level meetings and discussions with our Afghan counterparts.




Figure 5.1: Governance Enhancements Basics

\* Please note that these acronyms are listed in the Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms on page 151.

A number of key lessons were learned during the final Roto regarding local ownership, as documented in the end of Roto reports as well as a civ-mil workshop held in February 2011.<sup>11</sup> For example, while earlier Rotos simply delivered the quick impact projects directly to the communities without involving local or district level officials, Roto 11 incorporated lessons learned and worked *with and through* local community and district level governance leaders and systems as demonstrated in Figure 5.1, a pictographic developed by CIMIC. Identified as a “best practice” in the end of Roto report by the Joint Lessons Learned team and demonstrating a solid understanding of COIN doctrine, many of TFK’s stabilization activities reinforced the connection between the people and their government. Villagers were encouraged to approach their Malik or line ministry representative to meet their needs; the military was seen as a “last resort” for financing the prioritized needs of the district. It was recognized that the lag in filling government positions had an impact on the level of responsiveness of government. However, recognizing that there were ongoing medium to long term development investments being made by CIDA and USAID to improve the capacity of government, the CIMIC team still encouraged the villagers to approach local government officials to meet their needs.

## CONCLUSION

From a development practitioner’s perspective, it was gratifying to see how well the COIN purpose and approach with regard to “local ownership” was in synergy with best development practice. This was a key lesson learned and, more importantly, the Canadian WoG (or civ-mil) approach was deemed best practice relative to the rest of our NATO partners. I was quite proud to be part of and contribute to Canada’s last Roto in Kandahar. It was certainly one of the most significant highlights of my long career. I am encouraged by DND’s efforts to institutionalize lessons learned and look forward to future involvements that build on and improve our approach to delivering on a WoG agenda established by Cabinet.

## ENDNOTES

- 1 The Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Canadian International Development Agency are now the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development (DFATD).

2 Government of Canada, "Canada's engagement in Afghanistan," <<http://www.afghanistan.gc.ca>>.

3 In the spring of 2009, President Barack Obama committed to a civilian surge as part of his broader strategy for Afghanistan (<[http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan)>, Government of the United States, White House Press Release, March 27, 2009), but with no specifics. In his televised address to West Point, he committed to send an additional 30,000 troops to Afghanistan, nearly tripling the level of US involvement (<<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan>>, Government of the United States, White House Press Release, December 1, 2009).

4 See <<http://www.cdef.terre.defense.gouv.fr/publications/...us/.../art7.pdf>>.

5 See Grigor Mathias, *Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory* (Santa Barbara CA: Praeger, 2011).

6 See Thomas Rid, "The Nineteenth Century Origins of the Counterinsurgency Doctrine," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 5 (2010), 727-758.

7 "The aim of military operations is to create a security framework that assists the host nation government and other agencies in re-asserting control throughout the country and in creating enduring solutions to the crisis. It is imperative that the civil administration be able to provide public goods and services in order that the people are given proof of the government's legitimacy and capability to govern." DND, *Canadian Land Forces Counter-Insurgency Operations Manual*, (December 13, 2008), 5-20.

8 See <<http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/parisdeclarationandaccraagendaforaction.htm>>.

9 See <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/22/AR2010102206608.html>>.

10 See <<http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/land-terre/news-nouvelles/story-reportage-eng.asp?id=5285>>, "General David Petraeus visits Panjwayi District".

11 On 24 February 2011, a workshop was convened with civilian and military members of the KPRT and TFK HQ to discuss lessons learned and best practices from field-based operations, a summary of which was recently published in the *Canadian Military Journal*. See Lieutenant-Colonel Kimberley Unterganschnigg, "Canada's Whole of Government Mission in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned", *Canadian Military Journal*, <<http://www.journal.dnd.ca/vol113/no2/page8-eng.asp>>.



## CHAPTER 6

### APPROACHING STABILITY IN SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN: THE REGION SOUTH STABILIZATION APPROACH STORY

*Colonel Acton L. Kilby*

The Region South Stabilization Approach (RSSA) emerged from a heated discussion in Fort Drum, New York, between a Canadian Army Officer, a U.S. Army Officer, a USAID agent, a Department of State agent, two U.S. government contractors and a Dutch Army Officer. None of the participants in this debate could agree on how a Governance, Development or Stabilization quality, when associated to an effect, could be measured and then resourced in a coordinated and comprehensive manner. These differing perspectives were a problem and if civ-mil coordination efforts were to be effective, a mutually agreed upon approach needed to be developed. One could write a book on the learning experienced during the 16 months of civ-mil integration effort undertaken by Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 10. However, the focus of this paper is to examine an incredibly positive outcome of this collective experience: the RSSA.

#### INTRODUCTION

The RSSA was initiated in June-July 2010 at Fort Drum, New York during the Mission Readiness Exercise preparing the U.S. Army 10<sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (Light Infantry), or 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div, as CJTF 10,<sup>1</sup> to deploy to Afghanistan as Headquarters RC(S). As part of the deployment plan, 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div HQ, in partnership with Office of the Secretary of State/Office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization,<sup>2</sup> undertook the Strategic Skills Initiative (SSI). The SSI sought to integrate civilian personnel into the HQ structure with a view to their deployment as part of a joint CJTF 10 Stability Platform, which would be an integrated team formed by the RC(S) Stability Division<sup>3</sup> with the U.S. Embassy Regional Platform-South (RP-S).<sup>4</sup> The aim was to integrate staff, develop common working tools and establish a unified structure that would coordinate the civ-mil effort in support of the RC(S) and the ISAF campaign plans.

The RSSA developed through an evolutionary process that commenced with the adoption of Stability Frameworks to function as the common civ-mil lexicon and to act as the primary tool to create a common understanding of the operating area from a Governance and Development (G&D)<sup>5</sup> perspective. Through its maturation, the RSSA developed plans to act as tools to assist civ-mil organizations in planning and synchronizing stabilization efforts from both a civilian and military perspective from the district,<sup>6</sup> through provincial, up to the regional/national level. The RSSA also supported civ-mil assessments of G&D conditions that in turn informed campaign assessments and prioritization of resources. The RSSA was neither geographically dependant, nor did it require defined resourcing because its sole purpose was to offer a framework that civ-mil entities could use to create common plans at levels above district and unit. In sum, the RSSA reconciled the distinct differences between the civilian and military organizational languages and cultures that challenged the development of common reporting, assessment and direction tools.

## FRAMEWORKS – THE CORE OF THE RSSA

CJTF 10 attempts to create a comprehensive civ-mil team identified that it was crucial to have a document which both civilians and the military could use for a common description of what the area “looked” like in terms of the G&D domains. A matrix or framework seemed the best format to offer a common point of reference from which either side could examine and assess their area of responsibility, define their needs, plan and then coordinate resourcing at levels above the district. Concurrently, the USAID District Stabilization Framework (DSF)<sup>7</sup> was examined as a possible solution to reconcile perspectives, but it proved only useful as a tactical level tool for the execution of programs at the district level and below. RSSA frameworks were developed as matrices that placed the Stability Continuum (Figure 6.1) horizontally along the top of the diagram, and the sectors of the ANDS vertically along the left of the table (Governance, Rule of Law, Health, Education, Infrastructure, Agriculture and Economics). The word-pictures developed for the matrix described, in mutually developed statements, what each Sector might resemble in relation to its placement along the Stability Continuum (e.g., Governance in Shape, Rule of Law in Clear, etc.) (Figure 6.2). The RSSA Framework could then be used by both military and civilian organizations while preparing assessments and planning actions required to progress G&D along the Stability Continuum in a unified manner. The first RSSA framework developed prior to deployment provided a common format and language that met the needs of all agencies involved in the production of joint/unified orders and instructions.




Figure 6.1: The Stability Continuum




Figure 6.2: The Basic RSSA Framework




Figure 6.3: Example Sector Framework: Rule of Law (cont'd next page)




Figure 6.3: Example Sector Framework: Rule of Law (cont'd)

As the pre-deployment period continued, the Campaign Plan's "Support the Extension of Governance and Development" line of operation was broken out into sectors that were complementary to the RSSA framework, ANDS, and the organization of Stability Division. It soon became apparent that there was a need for each Sector to have its own Framework to enable a more detailed description of each ANDS Sector. RSSA Frameworks were then developed for each Sector, maintaining the Stability Continuum along the top, with objectives for each sector and drawn from the RC(S) and ISAF Civ-Mil<sup>8</sup> Campaign Plans along the left column (Figure 6.3). These frameworks provide the baseline descriptions for what or how a given ANDS Sector should look like in relation to a specific point on the Stability Continuum, and where it would need to progress toward in response to planned actions. The descriptions offered targets, objectives and effects which assisted joint civ-mil planning and informed the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) and assessment processes at unit, brigade and regional level.

## DISTRICT PLANS – PULLING THINGS TOGETHER

In developing the RSSA frameworks, a gap was identified between the requirements identified through use of the frameworks and the enablers<sup>9</sup> needed to coordinate and execute the activities necessary to achieve desired results. A multitude of programs, projects and NGO enabled activities were already underway and available. All of these were developed for specific purposes and owned by different G&D stakeholders but without synchronization or coordination across the region. It was determined that a product needed to be developed that associated the RSSA-based understanding of the district to the multitude of programs in existence and assist in creating a common understanding of the "way ahead." A simple "District Plan" format (Figure 6.4) was developed to gather objectives, programs and tasks and then link them to relevant orders and instructions at every level. District plans also set the baseline assessment of the G&D situation that informed planning at levels above the district. The production of these plans, linked to the RSSA frameworks and a corresponding process to support assessment of G&D activity, resulted in RSSA Version 1, published by RC(S) in late November 2010.

Production of RSSA Version 1 directly informed the preparation of RC(S) orders for the winter and spring operations. Although the use of the RSSA as a tool to inform RC-level planning was successful, it also identified that the district plans required refining to better identify resources (people, money, and materiel), as well as reflect military commanders priorities and planned

actions in the district. Refinement of the district plans ensured that resources were more closely linked to operational plans and G&D activities synchronized with non-lethal targeting and influence effects.<sup>10</sup>

DISTRICT PLAN <i>(insert District)</i>											
Date:		Prepared by:									
CURRENT ASSESSMENT											
GOV		ROL		AG/EC		INFRA		HEALTH		EDUC	
6 MONTH PROJECTED ASSESSMENT											
GOV		ROL		AG/EC		INFRA		HEALTH		EDUC	
										Inner = Sufficiency (%) Outer = Projected Assessment	
Forecast Time to Transition (mths):		0-6	X	6-12		12-18		18-24		>24	
GOVERNANCE											
Provide summary of current status and intended course of action to reach sufficiency including any limiting factors											
Top 3 Priority Actions:											
1											
2											
3											
Resource Shortfalls (if any)											
RULE OF LAW											
Provide summary of current status and intended course of action to reach sufficiency including any limiting factors											
Top 3 Priority Actions:											
1											
2											
3											
Resource Shortfalls (if any)											

Figure 6.4: District Plan Template Version 1

In the process of this review of district plans, it became apparent that the same type of RSSA-based plan used at district-level was required at provincial and regional levels to support the integration of Stability Effects into national or country-wide plans and orders. Hence, by the end of April 2011, Stability Division had developed provincial and regional plans that included the following information:

- Current assessment of the province as derived from the RSSA frameworks.


- Projected assessment of where the province and districts may be on the Stability Continuum in 6 months based upon a “forward-look” evaluation of how the area may respond to the efforts of the PRT, District Support Teams (DST) and Battlespace Owners (BSO).<sup>11</sup>
- Summary of the top three influence priorities<sup>12</sup> and concrete actions to be undertaken.
- Summary of resource shortfalls (personnel, material and funding) required to support identified priorities and actions.

The RSSA plans that emerged were simple but comprehensive planning tools which facilitated an interactive, bottom-up process. In this way, the process provided good visibility into district and provincial G&D conditions and activities based upon a boots-on-the-ground perspective. Furthermore, the plans to a degree compelled military commanders to integrate their tactical plans with G&D activity at the district, as they had been active participants in the development of the RSSA plans. In their most recent form, these plans also set the initial links to Transition<sup>13</sup> by putting into motion actions and resources aimed at establishing G&D conditions that were sufficient and sustainable<sup>14</sup> – the key criteria to enable the transfer of control to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

## ASSESSING THE GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT EFFECT

Early in the deployment, it was identified that any assessment prepared in support of G&D activities must connect to the RC-level assessments process.<sup>15</sup> Therefore, to support formal assessments, the RSSA frameworks were written to deliberately nest with the formal assessments process. The linking of the RSSA frameworks to higher assessments allowed bottom-up assessments from districts to be integrated with formal assessments at higher levels. Once regional assessments were completed, they in turn informed the lower assessments and ensured consistency of assessments at each level. As the frameworks provided a consistent format and terminology across the region, it lent itself to a common military and civilian understanding of the assessment process and results. When developing the 6-month “forward look” and Transition assessments, the frameworks offered a description for each sector that informed the roll-up into more general G&D assessments required to support Transition planning and overarching campaign assessment at the national level (Figure 6.5).

MAP



ASSESSMENT

(From Previous)

Date Prepared:	CURRENT	Plus 6 Months	Plus 12 Months
Overall:			
Governance:			
Rule of Law:			
Agriculture:			
Economic:			
Health:			
Education:			
Infrastructure:			

District Advantages:

District Challenges:

Threats:

DISTRICT

Advisors and Enablers Present:

Global Representation:

Key Projects/Activities:

Top 3 Priorities:

Figure 6.5: Example Assessment Model

## LINKING PLANS TO RESOURCES UP TO REGIONAL LEVEL

RSSA Version 1 produced plans for all districts of RC(S), but it became apparent that the initial model oriented districts more toward specific BSOs, rather than to the province. Consequently, tremendous effort was required between BSOs and DSTs to coordinate actions linking districts to the provincial level. Also, with only limited stability enablers<sup>16</sup> (CIMIC elements, Special Assistance Teams, DSTs) available, there was a greater need to synchronize actions and resources in time and space, which necessitated a provincial view of the G&D environment. In addition, as development programs do not limit themselves to military boundaries or districts and link more directly to the provincial level, the need for a more comprehensive provincial plan was identified. In response, each PRT developed plans that synchronized district plans with the plans and intentions of GIRoA as expressed in the Provincial Governor's Provincial Development Plan (PDP). The PDPs commenced the process of identifying GIRoA funding through the Afghan budget process, while at the same time identifying opportunities where RSSA plans could support or reinforce Afghan plans and link efforts into other non-ISAF organizations supporting GIRoA capacity building. Hence, the provincial plan synchronized effort (not simply activities) across the province in a manner that both optimized Civ-Mil efforts, but also assisted GIRoA provincial staff to increase their capacity to manage government affairs and strengthen their functioning as a government body.

Although the RSSA provincial plans considered the G&D sectors and made assessments of each at the provincial level, to assist provincial level Afghan government specific criteria unique to the provincial level were required. In response, a special provincial framework was developed that, coupled with ANDS sector assessments, allowed a PRT to examine the provincial-level G&D structure and focus on capacity development at the provincial Line Director level. Provincial frameworks continued to use the Stability Continuum, but instead of campaign objectives used the aspects unique to support the provincial assessment criteria. Specifically, these were: Formal Structures, Effectiveness and Administrative Capacity, Key Positions, Recruitment, Connection to Districts, Connection to National Level, Credibility and Public Perception, and Provincial Level Economic Development (Figure 6.6).

	SHAPE	CLEAR	HOLD A	HOLD B	BUILD
Formal Structures	Little or no GiRoA presence	PG in place but marginally effective and largely disconnected from the population	Shura established. Minimal line department representation from critical ministries. PG minimally present in the community	Shura becoming effective. PG increasingly present in community and traveling to districts. Key line ministries represented.	Shura effective. PG effective and travels to districts and Kabul regularly. Most line ministries represented and programs functioning
Effectiveness and Administrative Capacity	GiRoA unable to provide basic services	PG can provide quick impact activities with International Community (IC) support	PG and Shura supported by IC and capable of delivering limited activities. Mobility and link to districts extremely limited	PG and Shura becoming effective and capable of managing limited activities with some support. Key line ministry staff becoming effective. Support staff in place	PG, Shura and key line ministry representatives functioning effectively with limited support. Support staff capable
Key Positions	No tashkils filled	Key tashkils identified but not filled	Some key tashkils filled but not present	Key tashkils filled and staff present. Less important tashkils identified and recruitment beginning	Key tashkils filled, staff present, and less important tashkils increasingly filled
Recruitment	No positions recruited. Provincial Governor (PG) potentially identified but not necessarily appointed	PG formally appointed. No ability to attract or recruit staff	Recruitment possible but primarily not through existing national systems – alternative method identified such as job fairs. Salary supplementation required as incentive for employment	Recruitment increasingly undertaken through appropriate national and local recruitment systems. Salary supplementation still required to retain staff	National and local recruitment systems in place and functioning

Figure 6.6: Provincial Level RSSA Framework (cont'd next page)

	SHAPE	CLEAR	HOLD A	HOLD B	BUILD
Connection to Districts	Political and administrative connections non-existent between the Provincial level and the districts	Political and administrative connections nascent and primarily limited to PG visits to cleared districts	Communication between PG and District Governor (DG) existent but irregular. Limited administrative links but line ministry representatives capable of visiting districts. Minimal links between Provincial and District line ministry counterparts. Limited budget allocation to district from Provincial Government	Communication between PG and DG regular. Administrative links improving. Line ministry representatives from the Province communicating with their district counterparts and administrative arrangements nascent. Budget allocation from Province to District improving	PG and DG links effective. Administrative links improving and budget systems working effectively. Line ministry representatives at the Provincial and District level functioning effectively
Connection to National Level	Political and administrative connections non-existent between the Provincial level and the National Government	Political and administrative connections nascent and primarily limited to formal PG appointments and directions from Kabul being disseminated	Communication between PG and National Government existent but irregular. Limited administrative links. Minimal links between Provincial and District line ministry counterparts. Limited budget allocation to the Province and limited understanding of national budgeting process.	Communication between PG and national Government regular. Administrative links improving. Line ministry representatives from the Province communicating with their National counterparts and administrative arrangements between them nascent. Budget allocation from Kabul to province improving	PG and National Government links effective. Administrative links improving and budget systems working effectively. Line ministry representatives at the Provincial, National, and District levels functioning effectively
Credibility and Public Perception	Public not aware of GfRoA or unsupportive	Public awareness of GfRoA nascent and limited to perception as tool of IC, ineffective, or untrustworthy	Public awareness of GfRoA improving. Confidence in their permanence and ability to deliver services nascent. Perceptions of corruption persist.	Public acceptance of GfRoA as permanent government. Confidence in their ability to deliver services limited but improving. Perceptions of corruption persist	GfRoA seen as legitimate in most administrative and legal functions. Credibility improving but fragile. Perceptions of corruption persist but are being challenged

Figure 6.6: Provincial Level RSSA Framework (cont'd)

At the regional level, constant change in the security situation demanded a level of responsiveness that was not normal in the G&D domain. Civilian organizations supporting G&D activities are often bound to specific programs and timelines for their G&D programs and this dynamic complicates the overall delivery of an effect and inhibits the ability to adapt rapidly to change. However, given sufficient anticipatory indicators, civilian programs can include enough elasticity to adjust and support the requirements of all organizations. This need for more protracted planning and longer lead-times was best managed at the regional level, where interaction with national agencies and international organizations could be conducted at a distance from the pressing, highly-dynamic environment of the district. The environment highlighted a need for a regional plan which could identify trends and demands, as well as synchronize resource allocation between military formations, civilian agencies and PRTs. Thus, the RSSA's Regional Plan was a mechanism used to inform regional level coordination and prioritization of resources as well as to develop demands which the regions could champion to higher HQs and external agencies for specific resources or programmatic support based upon solid analysis and supporting data from the field.

## DEFINING SUFFICIENT

The original model for progression of G&D was based upon all sectors in every district being advanced to the "Build" category on the Stability Continuum. Unfortunately, it became apparent early in the deployment that this goal was not achievable with available resources and, based upon a needs assessment, was probably not required for all districts. In addition, by January 2011, ISAF was declaring its intent to orient the campaign toward a no-later-than 2014 Transition, and this clearly indicated that we needed to adjust expectations and define "what is enough" or, more specifically, what point along the continuum would be sufficient to meet campaign objectives while supporting Transition. Hence, to shape subsequent planning cycles for both military and civilian programs, sufficient needed to be defined based upon both our understanding of how to shape the G&D environment within the time available and respect for GIRoA capacity. In addition, as time moved on, Transition was shaping itself to be less conditions-based and more time driven. Therefore, coupled with defining sufficient there was a need to try and manage the expectations of Afghans with regards to what might be achievable in the time remaining.

Considering the influence of Transition, GIROA capacity and Afghan expectations, sufficiency was defined as “the level of G&D that is able to be sustained and supported through local capacity once ISAF reduces its presence.”<sup>17</sup> Sufficiency Threshold Criteria were developed through a working group process to assist with assessments of each sector and district. The criteria were then applied and an assessment developed for each district, then rolled-up and reflected in provincial summaries where the assessment reflected “sufficient” for the Province. Sufficiency Threshold Criteria considered in this process were as follows:


- Capacity – Does the capacity of the sector represent the minimum threshold required for basic public services, public administration and rule of law to be delivered by GIROA?
- Resources – Are the resources (time, funds, and people) required to achieve the sufficient threshold proportionate to the effects achieved?
- Consistency – Is the sufficiency threshold consistent with the other lines of effort in the Campaign Plan and does it support the overall security framework and plan?
- Balance – Does the sufficiency threshold for the district contribute to provincial balance?

## **DETERMINING SUSTAINABLE CONDITIONS FOR TRANSITION**

It was evident prior to analysis of sufficiency that all districts and provinces were different and would not be positioned for Transition at the same time. This created a patch-work model for Transition where the minimum conditions (sufficient) for Transition (sustainable G&D levels appropriate to the area's capacity) would inevitably vary amongst each district and province. In addition, once the determination of sufficient conditions was made, the focus turned to defining and developing a sustainability model for those conditions. Sustainability of sufficient conditions is essential to Transition. Even where sufficient is nascent or minimal, it must be sustainable through local capacity. Defining and developing a sustainability model challenged both ISAF and international government agencies to describe how sustainability would be achieved.

To assist with Transition efforts, the RSSA developed a Sustainability Framework (Figure 6.7) for use as a guide for planning, programming and implementation of Transition along G&D lines of operation. The Sustainability Framework was designed like the Stability Frameworks. Across the top was the Transition continuum (support, mentor, enable, sustain) that was informed by ISAF and GIRoA guidance regarding the phases of Transition. The Sustainability Continuum, as with the other frameworks, identified different stages of an area's maturity as it should progress toward Transition. The horizontal axis of the Framework described in word-pictures key Transition criteria: Systems, Budget, Capacity, Intent, Relevance and PRT/DST Evolution.<sup>18</sup> The questions associated with each of the criteria that informed sustainability, which then situated a district or provinces along the continuum, were:

- Systems – How embedded is the activity into traditional or new GIRoA systems?
- Budget – Is it on budget or capable of being so, considering revenue?
- Capacity – What is the depth of capacity supporting it?
- Intent – Is the process owned by those who need to own it after transition and do they intend to prioritize it in their planning?
- Relevance – Is it relevant to local custom and practice – and importantly, is it relevant to the level of development?
- PRT/DST Evolution – What is the role is to be played by DSTs and PRTs as we move along the continuum?



	Support	Mentor	Enable	Sustain
<b>Systems</b>	Output/activity is not embedded within existing GIROA or traditional governance systems and there is no likelihood of being so	Output/activity is not embedded within existing GIROA or traditional governance systems but the relevant systems exist and can potentially include the output/activity	Output/activity is embedded within GIROA or traditional governance systems but requires minimal ongoing assistance	Output/activity is fully embedded within GIROA or traditional systems
<b>Budget</b>	Recurrent costs for output/activity not part of GIROA budget and there is no likelihood of it being put on-budget (other priorities, costs too high vis à vis revenues)	Recurrent costs for output/activity not part of GIROA budget but mainly due to poor budget execution; likely to be able to be put on budget with additional support	Recurrent costs for output/activity are within revenue expectations and budget execution is improving with limited additional support	Recurrent costs for output/activity are within revenue expectations and budget execution is sufficient
<b>Capacity</b>	Relevant local capacity must be substituted	Relevant local capacity present but not sufficient depth (one deep)	Relevant local capacity present and sufficient depth (not one deep) but requires modest additional ongoing assistance	Relevant local capacity present and sufficient depth to ensure continuation
<b>Intent</b>	GIROA/local community not sufficiently involved in proposal or design to ensure they intend to continue or maintain activity/output. Other priorities are of higher importance to GIROA or local community members such that it is unlikely they will have a sense of ownership	GIROA/local community not sufficiently involved in proposal or design but are demonstrating an intent to prioritize output/activity and will do so with additional assistance	GIROA/local community involved in proposal and design but have not shown significant intent to prioritize activity/output	GIROA/local community involved in proposal and design and have demonstrated intent to prioritize activity/output

Figure 6.7: Sustainability Framework to Support Transition (cont'd next page)

←

Highly Unstable

Stable

Secure

→

Relevance	Activity/output not sufficiently embedded in local custom, behaviour or consistent with relevant level of development	Activity/output not embedded in local customs or behaviour but does not contradict local beliefs and is not inconsistent with relevant level of development	Activity/output embedded in local custom or behaviour, is relevant to local development	Activity/output embedded in local custom or behaviour, is relevant to level of development
PRTs and DSTs	PRT and/or DST existent and offering direct support activities as well as managing IC programs that substitute service delivery/employment generation/governance in the absence of GIRoA capacity or willingness	PRT existent and/or DST existent but focusing on mentoring, consolidating gains and making efforts to ensure activities/outputs are embedded into GIRoA or local systems. Plans enacted to remove DSTs. PRT changing nature of relationship with GIRoA and local community to ensure no direct delivery of services or parallel governance systems	If DST existed, it is wound up. PRT has changed name and function to that of technical support in aid of GIRoA led and implemented activities. No direct delivery of services or activities	PRT non-existent. Any ongoing technical support to GIRoA offered through staff based in Regional Development Platform/consulate, but only through national priority programs or line ministries

Figure 6.7: Sustainability Framework to Support Transition (cont'd)

Once sustainability was situated on the framework, it required analysis to arrange actions that would contribute to the sustainability of those core effects. The framework assisted in determining a path to achieving and sustaining the conditions essential for Transition. This in turn assisted district and provincial plan development in areas that had begun the Transition process. District, provincial and regional plans then identified the core effects that would support the path to Transition as described in the Sustainability Framework. In this way, the framework aided planning and ensured integrated RSSA plans were nested in Transition plans. This Sustainability Framework took a leading role in planning and assessments once sufficient conditions were met and Transition commenced. However, to endure, advancing the Transition process necessitated the participation of the Afghans and GIRoA in the discussion to ensure the model was resourced, supportable and sustainable

beyond 2014. The inclusion of Afghans proved the most significant challenge in the process and one that CJTF-10 did not participate in due to the rotation at the end of our tour and handover to the follow-on headquarters.

## CONCLUSION

The RSSA grew from the need for a common lexicon and tool to support a shared understanding of the G&D operating environment and to support civ-mil planning. In its current form,<sup>19</sup> the RSSA continues to assist civ-mil organizations in planning and synchronizing stabilization efforts, as well as supporting assessments of G&D conditions that inform the prioritization of resources. Although the RSSA assessments used within RC(S) were less than empirical, they did embody the views of those closest to the situation. They reflected both optimism and hesitation regarding the G&D environment, which permitted organizations to shape planned actions. Linking the lower-level assessments into the ISAF campaign assessment mechanisms balanced opinion and ensured that RSSA inputs influenced the broader objectives of the campaign while allowing civilian organizations a voice in the process. The RSSA also established better connections for resources required at the district level through Provincial and Regional Plans that gathered and synchronized effort that in turn allowed stabilization efforts to be aligned in a more effective manner.

The RSSA integrated civ-mil activities within RC(S) as well as with higher national (Afghan and ISAF) mechanisms. The RSSA work defined “Sufficiency” (what is enough), and set conditions to construct “Sustainability” models (what is able to be maintained) to support ISAF’s Transition plan in a context that was accepted by both civilian and military structures. In the end, the RSSA supported the need first identified in 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div’s pre-deployment training period: enable a better civ-mil linkage by reconciling the differences between civilian and military languages and cultures. The RSSA provided an aid for common visualization, understanding, direction and assessment that in turn helped support a more comprehensive approach. In a situation where organizational energy was best directed at solving problems with the insurgents, and not managing relationships between friendly organizations, the RSSA reduced internal friction and created an interface tool that enabled better planning and execution of stability operations. The principles that guided the RSSA’s development stand true for all circumstances, be it high-end stability operations in a war context or guiding civ-mil work in a domestic setting. By offering a simple matrix of agreed upon descriptions, the RSSA gave

a point to refer from and to, assisted in planning, and allowed for assessment of progress without getting drawn into the methods and actions of often disparate organizations. In the end, it is about getting things done, not about the credit or how it happens.

## ENDNOTES

1 Combined Joint Task Force 10<sup>th</sup> Mtn Div (LI) (CJTF 10) was the Regional Command Headquarters. CJTFs are the NATO Command structure used for command of each Regional Command (RC) in Afghanistan. RC East, South and South-West are each commanded by a HQ generated from a U.S. military Division HQ. The remaining RCs are commanded by a multinational team generated through the NATO force generating mechanism. All RCs in Afghanistan oversee more than one province of the GIROA administrative structure. Each RC is matched to the Afghan National Army's (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) regional structure based upon the operational divisions of the ANA and ANP.

2 The U.S. Secretary of State established the Office of Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in response to failures in civ-mil efforts in Iraq and indications of similar problems observed in Afghanistan. The intent was that S/CRS would act as the focal point for civ-mil integration in a manner similar to the Vietnam-era Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) program. For a good discussion of the CORDS Program see: Richard W. Stewart, "CORDS and the Vietnam Experience: An Interagency Organization for Counterinsurgency and Pacification," National War College, May 1, 2006; and the March-April 2006 Military Review – CORDS / Phoenix: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Vietnam for the Future by Mr. Dale Andrade and Lieutenant Colonel James Willbanks. Additional information regarding the Strategic Skills Initiative see: *The Complex Operations Newsletter*, Volume II, (November 2010), USA National Defence University, Center for Complex Operations.

3 Stability Division was the Stability Enterprise developed to support CJTF 10 deployment. It was a non-standard Division HQ staff enterprise that was organized into sections that reflect the ANDS sectors. In addition to standard stability operations, Stability Division oversaw Counter-Narcotics, Counter-Corruption and Reintegration.

4 The Embassy of the United States of America in Afghanistan has generated a Regional Platform to co-locate with each of the NATO Regional Commands in Afghanistan. The Regional Platforms are an extension of the U.S. Embassy into the Regional Command's area and act as a link to the U.S. Embassy for U.S. funded programs. They are not NATO Platforms and although associated to the Regional Commands, they remain independent and are not bound to work in cooperation or consultation with the ISAF command structure.

5 For purposes of this paper the term "Governance and Development" is used for simplicity, but Stabilization and Reconstruction activities should be considered implicit in the discussion.

6 Districts, municipalities (cities) and provinces are the administrative and political boundaries within Afghanistan. The Region was an ISAF command and control structure based upon the main regional groupings of Provinces in Afghanistan. In Regional Command-South, there were four provinces comprising of over 40 districts. Military organizations were generally linked at district level, but above that level, military organizations were not always matched to the governance and administrative structure of the host nation.

7 RC(S) Stability Division provided three personnel (Director, Section Lead and Staff member) to the 3-day DSF training in Fort Drum, as well as six other personnel attended DSF training delivered in Afghanistan following deployment.

8 ISAF Civ-Mil Campaign Plan was developed as a mechanism to support coordination of civ-mil effort at the national level. Although a document cited frequently by the NATO structure, it was generally not accepted or used by the national governments, UN and non-governmental organizations supporting their own programs in Afghanistan.

9 Enablers in the context of the RSSA refers to any program, project, specialist advisor (i.e. Economic Advisor), special capability (i.e. Civil Affairs Team) that is designed in either function or purpose to support G&D effects.

10 "Influence Effects" – refers to the integration of designated information-related capabilities in order to synchronize themes, messages, and actions with operations to inform national and global audiences, influence foreign audiences, and affect adversary and enemy decision-making. Linked to information operations they are the integrated employment, during military operations, of information-related capabilities in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.

11 A PRT is a unit consisting of military officers, diplomats, and reconstruction subject matter experts, working to support reconstruction efforts in unstable states. PRTs were first established in Afghanistan in early 2002. PRTs aim to empower local governments to govern their constituents more effectively. DSTs were formed to keep PRTs from being stretched too thin over large amounts of territory. They operate at the district level of government and support activities such as creating workable district development plans and forming representative community councils. DSTs seek to strengthen the district government's links with provincial authorities, ensuring the needs of the district are conveyed and that appropriate ministries address their needs. BSO is an acronym used to refer to a tactical unit and its assigned area of operations where the unit controls the conduct of operations. The term "battlespace owner" and the acronym are not doctrinally correct in any NATO nation but remains in common use.

12 See note 11 – Influence Priorities were defined through the Influence and Information Targeting process and endorsed by the Regional Command Team and civilian agency leadership.

13 Transition was defined by NATO through *Inteqal* – the Dari and Pashtu word for transition – as the process by which the lead responsibility for security in Afghanistan is gradually being transitioned from the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan National Security Forces. Although the Security line of operation has driven the process, the capacity and ability of Afghans to effectively govern and manage a post-NATO nation remains a weak component of the overall plan.

14 Definitions of “sufficient” and “sustainable” were developed through a joint RC(S) and Regional Platform South effort. Once agreed, Command RC(S) and the Director of RP-S presented the drafts to ISAF for approval. Both definitions were approved and accepted by ISAF for use throughout Afghanistan.

15 Assessments aim and purpose are described within available U.S. Military and NATO publications. In sum, the process is a deliberate method of assessing gains and progress against clearly defined criteria associated to the Campaign Plan of the force. Its primary purpose is to assess progress and trends according to the major lines of operation for the campaign.

16 Stability Enablers encompassed a wide range of organizations, programs and initiatives, all linked to unique civilian and military organizations capable of planning, managing and coordinating the unique activities relevant to the Stability effort. They are characterized by their ability to act independently, capacity to manage special resources and programs, and interact with local authorities and populations. They are limited in numbers and generally never sufficient to need. For example, RC(S) had roughly 20 Civil Affairs Teams from several nations, but needed double that to support all requirements. Likewise, the RC had over 18 high-priority districts but only 9 DSTs. This limited availability required careful coordination and synchronization to ensure they were positioned in the location where they could deliver the best effect.

17 This definition of sufficient was endorsed by ISAF following RC(S) demands for clearer guidance in preparation of Transition plans. Although “sufficient” was relatively easy to get approved, “sustainable” remained elusive and embroiled in NATO level talks with GIRoA and coalition governments.

18 Sustainability Elements: Budget, Systems, Capacity, Intent, Relevance and PRT/DST Evolution.

19 The RSSA was accepted in September 2011 as the ISAF Stabilization and Transition Tool, used throughout ISAF to manage Transition of G&D aspects related to the broader Transition mandate of GIRoA.

## CHAPTER 7

### THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH: A PERSONAL PERSPECTIVE ON LESSONS LEARNED

*Marla Frketich*

#### INTRODUCTION

“Holy \$^%, am I ever a long way from home.” That realization came the first time I followed a row of soldiers across the tarmac at Camp Mirage and onto a waiting Hercules. I was completely out of my element. No other civilian was in sight and no amount of beige cotton clothing could camouflage that fact.

This first trip to Afghanistan took place in January 2007 and was scheduled to last one week. After five years as a policy advisor at National Defence Headquarters, I was being sent to prepare the TFK for a visit of the Standing Committee on National Defence. I wandered through the headquarters as a bit of an oddity, free from identifying rank or nametag yet able to decode acronyms. Despite this, I was quickly welcomed as another member of the team, a useful source of insight as TFK faced the unfamiliar scrutiny of Parliamentarians.

In 2007 Canadian civilian advisors were relatively rare in Kandahar: a handful from DFAIT and CIDA had served primarily as advisors to military leadership; police from various forces provided advice and support to security training. While meeting the Committee, the Commanding Officer of the KPRT patiently explained to sceptical members, who pressed him on the discrepancy in numbers between military personnel and civilians, that these individuals were force multipliers. From his perspective, civilians were an essential part of the team who could interpret and help navigate the complex cultural, political and economic dynamics present in Afghanistan and ISAF. I quickly wanted to be part of that team.

My opportunity to return to Kandahar came courtesy of the 2008 *Report of the Independent Panel on Canada's Future Role in Afghanistan* (Manley Report) and its recommendation to dramatically increase the size of the civilian contribution in Afghanistan. Success in a whole-of-government recruiting drive led me to a two-year secondment to the Afghanistan Task Force at

DFAIT, and four temporary assignments of three to four weeks each with TFK and the KPRT. I deployed from August 2010 to March 2011 as a Governance Advisor at RC(S), where I had the unusual distinction of being a Canadian civilian serving first in a British-led, then in a primarily American military headquarters, all the time having an office located in a building full of U.S. State Department and (USAID) civilians.

## WHAT I LEARNED IN AFGHANISTAN

When I was asked to contribute some personal reflections for this book, I started by recalling a range of conversations with colleagues – late night chats in TFK offices, venting sessions with U.S. soldiers smoking cigarette after cigarette in the RC(S) compound, re-living glories and failures with the British governance team in a London pub, and the sometimes raw observations of Canadian civilians at a reintegration workshop and subsequent reunions. The intent was to draw out some constructive suggestions in the event of another whole-of-government deployment. I also asked several friends who had worked in Afghanistan for their thoughts. The results of this unscientific study were not surprising: pick the right people, build a team, strengthen communication, respect constraints and learn to accommodate each other. That said, I take full responsibility for the opinions below as my own.<sup>1</sup>

### Recognize the Skills the Whole-of-Government Can Bring

As someone who would never have had the opportunity to deploy unless a broad recruitment initiative was undertaken, I appreciate that the 2008 Manley Report led to a truly whole-of-government effort. A significant number of civilians deploying did so as secondees to DFAIT and CIDA, with home departments ranging from Agriculture to Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development. The DFAIT cadre included a sizable number who were not Foreign Service Officers. It may have created administrative challenges, but moving beyond a strict focus on departments to incorporating strong individuals was successful enough that it bears repeating.

Whole-of-government staffing not only makes a long engagement sustainable once a departmental recruiting pool is exhausted, it allows a broader range of experience and skill sets to be brought to bear. Knowledge of the processes and an established network of contacts within a deploying department are

critical, especially when there is a strong headquarters-to-field connection as there was in Kandahar. However, time on the ground quickly revealed that personality, flexibility and resourcefulness are just as essential. Sometimes finding the right people means looking further afield.

### **Train as a Team to be a Team**

The training offered to outgoing civilians was radically improved in the 2008-2010 time period. Civilians went from receiving little preparation to a combination of general training (for example, cultural awareness and descriptions of the hostile environment) and position-specific training (for example, intelligence training for White Situational Awareness analysts). For its part, the military actively reached out to civilian partners, inviting them to pre-deployment courses and exercises.

Unfortunately the plethora of training opportunities proved both a blessing and a curse for civilian departments. Although the understanding of these events, particularly exercises, improved over time and with the volume of postings, it was still difficult for those unfamiliar with the process to appreciate the intent and significance of milestones on the road to deployment. For DFAIT in particular, with its personnel scattered about the globe, pulling people back to Canada from overseas was disruptive and costly. As a result, early exercises often lacked civilian participants, and, when they were present, they were not always acting in the role in which they were to deploy. This put participating civilians at a disadvantage, unprepared and unable to maximize the opportunity, diminished the realism for military personal and slowed the creation of bonds necessary for success in the field. While this was gradually corrected, earlier development of combined training could improve the effectiveness of a future comprehensive approach mission.

The integration of civilians into military pre-deployment training took place not just because it was beneficial, but because it existed. The CAF made efforts to enhance the development and governance aspects of its training as more civilians participated.<sup>2</sup> However, this meant adding civilians to a training program primarily designed to meet military requirements. While such a program was necessary given the security situation into which Canada was sending its soldiers, perhaps there could be another way of facilitating combined civilian-military preparations. To enhance future training efforts, consideration could be given to bringing CAF personnel into civilian training or professional development programs. Would it not be better if those leading

planning for short-term stabilization goals had a sharper understanding of the conditions required for long-term, sustainable development? Another option would be to increase the time allocated to representatives of partner departments and agencies during pre-deployment training.

### **Consider Synchronizing Whole-of-Government Deployment Cycles**

If the whole-of-government team did manage to train together, they rarely arrived in theatre at the same time. Military headquarters and units would arrive in a limited number of chalks. Most civilians filtered in over a longer period, sometimes months before or after their military colleagues, and stayed for a differing length of time.<sup>3</sup> In addition, the military identified and trained personnel with significantly more lead time, which has implications for both planning and development of relationships. If one were to be positive, this staggering of personnel offered potential continuity. Unfortunately, in circumstances like Kandahar, where the number and resources of the military partner are so disproportionate to the others, it may be necessary to maximize integrated planning opportunities to align efforts down the road. Is it possible for civilian departments to select and make personnel available for training sooner in the event of another enduring, high-priority whole-of-government mission? Could the CAF find means to mitigate by pulling in more whole-of-government partners into planning and training events, perhaps through greater advance notice? Again, the military will likely have to engage in an education process to help partners unfamiliar with the military's pre-deployment process to better engage with it.

### **If a Plan Is Developed without Partners, Don't Expect Them to Implement It**

If nothing else is learned before launching another mission using a whole-of-government or comprehensive approach, it should be that we need to get planning right. So much unnecessary and preventable friction arose as a result of an inability or unwillingness to properly consult partners. This was something in which all partners were, to some degree, complicit. There were instances of civilians in theatre expected to implement the plans of a new military rotation, developed without any consultation or consideration for existing resource commitments.<sup>4</sup> Many civilians, and certainly most civilian organizations, struggled to determine how and when to provide input into plans in order to be most effective. Failure to engage early in the planning

process meant that, when interventions did come, they were often at a higher level and less constructive than if they had been made earlier.

Without fully appreciating what others can bring to the table and what they cannot, plans will be unrealistic and risk forming the basis for ongoing contention. Using inaccurate assumptions about what the capacity partners bring and willfully ignoring the constraints they face also significantly increases the probability of failure. Pushing through a plan written without buy-in from implementing partners undermines teamwork and risks future cooperation. Simple initiatives, like providing a two-day overview course on the Operational Planning Process, helped to give a common vocabulary to civilian and military planners. Emphasizing enhanced knowledge and the need to work together early on could help alleviate frustrations down the road.

### **“I don’t shine if you don’t shine.”**

I quoted this line from a song by The Killers during a presentation. Unconventional perhaps, but it captures the interdependence of a successful whole-of-government mission, and, on the flip side, warns against the territorial behaviour and *schadenfreude* that was never far beneath the surface in Kandahar. While the civ-mil relationship was the most susceptible to this, in times of stress it could be found along any fault line: DFAIT/CIDA, KAF/KPRT, Kandahar/Kabul, theatre/Ottawa, etc. It takes a deliberate effort to overcome these divides and create resilient bonds. It also takes constant vigilance, as one significant breach could have enduring negative repercussions.

The challenge of building bridges across divergent organizational cultures is made more difficult when individuals are pulled between their loyalty to their whole-of-government team on the ground and their responsibilities as departmental representatives. Civilians in Kandahar were often as closely tied to their respective headquarters in Ottawa as they were to their colleagues in theatre. For some this meant constantly mediating between the needs of two very different places, never fully satisfying either. In other cases civilians had a much smaller degree of devolved authority than military counterparts, affecting team dynamics.

### **Develop Clear Mandates and Accountabilities**

In Afghanistan, the military lines of command and control were clear. It was less so when considering the totality of the Canadian mission. Direct reporting

relationships could be identified, but others were fuzzy, shifting or dependent on the personalities or personal biases of individuals. Ten people who deployed to Afghanistan asked to map the relationships between district stabilization teams, provincial reconstruction teams, task forces, regional military headquarters, embassies, and national capitals would likely come up with ten different organizational charts.

Those working on the ground in Afghanistan usually developed functional working relationships out of necessity. However, they would have benefited enormously from well-defined organizational mandates and terms of reference for their positions; a mapping of the relationships is essential. People working in a complex environment need to have an understanding at the outset of what is expected of them, what tools they have at their disposal and who their partners are. It saves precious time and energy. Depending on the objectives of a future mission, a new command and control model for an integration civ-mil headquarters might be considered.

### **Create Mechanisms for Input if They Do Not Come Naturally**

The transition from one military headquarters to another could be a challenging time for civilians in theatre. Each rotation had its own character and priorities, which meant that the perceived value and importance of certain roles could change. Some civilian colleagues who were a vital and valued part of the team for one rotation suddenly found themselves marginalized, through no change in the strategic environment or the quality of their contribution. Relationships and networks were lost. Routine meetings or briefings that had been their primary mechanism to coordinate activities or provide input could be cancelled as a new battle rhythm was implemented. It sometimes took months before the reason for missing input became apparent.

Related to this is the need to identify divergent resources and authorities in order to exploit relative advantages or mitigate points of possible friction. The discrepancy in resources in Afghanistan was striking, a point driven home to me every time I had to delicately approach Commander TFK's office to ask if the senior Canadian in Kandahar could get a lift home from a meeting.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, military personnel had a near-blanket authorization to speak with media while the interaction between civilians and the press was tightly controlled. The advantage of a whole-of-government approach is to bring a greater number and diversity of resources to bear to address an issue, a

process ultimately enhanced by a greater understanding of who could do what and what they could not do. Where discrepancies in resources or accountabilities caused friction, a mitigation effort is needed sooner rather than later to prevent disputes or inefficiencies.

### **Treat People Nicely When They Return and Capture Lessons Learned**

A surprising number of my Canadian and international colleagues have left their government jobs since returning from Afghanistan. It may be that the Afghanistan experience opened their eyes to new opportunities or that their heightened threshold for stress and excitement could not be matched by working in a bureaucracy. Many of us civvies came back to jobs unrelated to our Afghanistan experience and have been challenged to carry that professional and personal growth into new positions in any meaningful way. Several were penalized for their extended absence, “out of sight out of mind” for assignments and promotions or, sadly, even keeping their jobs. Will this hamper recruitment efforts next time knowing this?

I was fortunate to work with exceptional professionals and extraordinary individuals both in Afghanistan and in the interdepartmental community in Ottawa. If Canada were to engage in another whole-of-government mission, at such risk and requiring sacrifices from such people, I believe it is the responsibility of those shaping the mission to remove every structural and cultural impediment to cooperation possible. This responsibility extends past their return, such as the recent awarding of campaign medals to Canadian civilians who had previously been deemed ineligible. The steady stream of ceremony photos on facebook and celebratory reunions makes me proud.

### **CONCLUSION**

Before I left for my deployment I would often hear people say how much or how quickly Afghanistan changed. While there may have been positive developments or trends, the most rapid and dramatic change I saw in Kandahar was how we organized ourselves: the re-drawing of the Canadian area of operations, the ebb and flow of Canadian civilians, the surge of American military and civilian resources, and the deployment and redeployment of other ISAF partners. I also saw how much the Canadian whole-of-government approach was respected by allies and partners in Kandahar,

and how every Canadian organization improved its own practices and its ability to contribute to a stronger team. Even if cultural and structural hurdles were never fully removed, the scope and pace of learning that took place was remarkable.

## ENDNOTES

- 1 In addition to being drawn from the Afghanistan experience, the characteristics of which may not be repeated, these remarks do not take into consideration the impact of the establishment of the new Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, and the effect of having a greater proportion of civilians deploying on behalf of one department.
- 2 I travelled to CFB Wainright to help develop Exercise MAPLE GUARDIAN. One of my injects was that I made them burn down a girls' school.
- 3 CIDA and DFAIT kept mostly to a one-year posting with most staff turnover taking place in the summer or early fall.
- 4 As an example of ineffective communication, I was once told by a non-Canadian officer during a planning meeting that I would have the blood of soldiers on my hands because I could not guarantee governance improvements within the time allotted to tactical operations.
- 5 This wasn't a uniquely Canadian phenomenon. There was a story that the US Senior Civilian, whose photo was at level with the Commander in the halls of RC(S), was nearly kicked off a helicopter because he, as a civilian, was deemed a lower priority than a captain returning to KAF. The Americans civilians later contracted helicopter services.

## CHAPTER 8

### ON COALITION COOPERATION: THE VIEW OF A DEPUTY COMMANDER CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION TO TRAINING MISSION – AFGHANISTAN

*Colonel Gregory R. Smith*

#### INTRODUCTION

Operation (Op) ATTENTION, Canada's commitment to the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), began in April 2011 with the deployment of the Theatre Activation Team and the Roto 0 Advance Party. This Canadian military group fell-in upon a small, pre-existing Canadian Armed Forces footprint consisting of the so-called “Kabul 100” or “K-100”, who were generally senior officers and support personnel advising Kabul-based ANSF officers as part of Op ATHENA. Meanwhile, the rest of the Canadian Armed Forces in Afghanistan were still conducting counterinsurgency operations in the Panjwayi District, Kandahar Province with a Brigade HQ, a Battle Group and many other enabling elements.

Nearly concurrent to the influx of the Canadian Contribution to Training Mission – Afghanistan (CCTM-A), the Mission Transition Task Force began transferring vast amounts of equipment to Canada and Kabul, storing supplies in vast Sea Container yards, transitioning infrastructure and conducting remediation. With Canadian support to expeditionary operations already heavily taxed, a desire to minimize the March 2014 CCTM-A drawdown and the maturity of the Coalition Forces presence in Kabul, Op ATTENTION was deliberately designed to minimize its infrastructure, logistics and manning support footprint. Still requiring all the support of a deployed Task Force, Op ATTENTION therefore heavily relied on pre-existing and very mature Coalition Forces (read American) support in Kabul, Herat and Mesar-e-Sharif.

## CANADA'S PLACE IN THE NATO TRAINING MISSION – AFGHANISTAN

With this preface I hope to have explained the somewhat unique conditions that CCTM-A found itself in Afghanistan. In Kandahar from 2005-2011 we were to a degree reliant on Coalition Forces support; in Kabul this “parasitic” relationship was very deliberate and very necessary. However, as Canada joined the 38 NTM-A members, it was clear we were not exactly sitting in the same support boat as the other nations. Reflecting Canada’s military capabilities and its national pride as an affluent, sovereign country, CCTM-A’s participation in NTM-A was as a fully capable and fully funded participant. Whereas many smaller, less capable countries decided to participate in the advising of the ANSF based on an agreement that they would be a “lift and sustain” nation (i.e., nations that participate with troops in ISAF but are unable to provide their own support), Canada signed on fully paying its bills and deploying a wide spectrum of support capabilities. Therefore, although many smaller, less wealthy countries would be supported by the U.S. financially and with many aspects of sustainment and logistics, this was not true for Canada.

The approximately 925 strong Canadian Op ATTENTION contingent arrived in Kabul fully paying its way and brought along a wide spectrum of support capabilities including Military Police, lawyers, padres, contracting, transport, medical services (including Preventative Medicine), tactical to strategic communications, Intelligence, Lessons Learned and more. We paid or traded Equal Value Exchange (EVE) for the use of Dining Facilities, accommodation, gym facilities, laundry, etc. This Canadian support independence helped add to the overall credibility of the Canadian Armed Forces in NTM-A. Not that CCTM-A had any shortage of “martial credibility.” First, Canada was a committed and long-time member of NATO and thus was a proven middle power. Second, the Canadian Armed Forces’ recent history of operations and sacrifice in the Taliban’s hometown, Kandahar, made other members of ISAF look at Canadian soldiers with an appreciative and respectful eye. This was true collectively and individually as was proven every day as fellow members of NTM-A would bump into Canadian soldiers, sailors and airmen/airwomen with one or more previous combat tours in Afghanistan.

However, despite the Canadian Armed Forces’ contribution to NTM-A not being as a “lift and sustain” contingent, CCTM-A’s 925 or so personnel were not even remotely on the same scale as the more than one hundred thousand

Americans in both NTM-A and the ISAF Joint Command (IJC). Still, we did have a number of senior officers and Chief Warrant Officers/Chief Petty Officers First Class manning several important positions, both in the staff-focused NTM-A HQ and in training centres closer to the advising coalface, including the Consolidated Field Center, the Kabul Military Training Center and the Signals School, to name a few. The Canadian Armed Forces took part in NTM-A already proving it was tactically awesome; the challenge was to ensure that Canada was taken with equal seriousness as a national contingent as well. What follows therefore is a simple list of activities, techniques and ideas I employed to develop and maintain the Canadian contribution to NTM-A as at least an operationally important player within NTM-A and the Kabul Base Cluster.

## CULTURE IN COMMON

A first thought that greatly helped this Coalition relationship-thing from the get-go was that Canada and Canadians share common cultural or linguistic bonds with a large number of our Allies: the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and France. I found that in many ways we are closest with the Americans. Indeed, we Canadians have an advantageous position towards our American cousins: we understand and live in American culture and yet we stand on the outside and observe it. Perhaps this is why many well known now-American comedians were born in Canada: Mike Myers, Jim Carrey, Rich Little, Norm MacDonald, Russell Peters and Martin Short just to name very few. I find we speak the same (even if Americans speak a bit funny and have too many military acronyms), we share a relatively common culture (although gun control quickly separates us) and many of us live very close geographically or have visited common areas (or you can just lapse into boasting of how cold it is in Canada even if you're from Southern Ontario).

With the remaining allies, even if we don't share a continent and 200 years of war-free history, we are attached by bonds of similarity. The United Kingdom: it is one of our Mother Countries; Australia: both we and the "Land Down Under" dwell in the British Commonwealth as that big country on the other side of the world; New Zealand: kind of like Australia; and France: that other Mother Country, and my French is way better than my Bulgarian. These facts break the ice, make us think largely the same and perhaps best of all, understand each other operationally and socially.

## THE SOCIAL ASPECT

Speaking of the social aspect, in a war zone the occasional non-operational shared activity is an important aspect of Coalition Cooperation in my humble yet developing leadership opinion. Your relationship with your Allies is like the one you have with your spouse: you have to work at it. You cannot simply expect you and your Allies to get along fantastically without paying them attention, sharing activities, going out of your way to speak to them, and perhaps having dinner with them from time to time. We carried over an activity started by Op ATTENTION Roto 0: Monday night suppers with the US Task Force HYDRA. It didn't happen every week but it was a good way to maintain the relationship, discuss common problems and blow off some steam by making fun of each other. We expanded this by having them over for a few summer barbeques and also opened up a relationship with our next-door-neighbours Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) 435.

This approach worked particularly well after we were given a building by Task Force HYDRA which was discussed and agreed-to at a Monday night dinner. This infrastructure was quickly converted into a Canada House which was available to all of Camp PHOENIX and was a great social gathering spot for the base and a location for big events, including the Team Canada visit on Canada Day. There is no better way to get to know your neighbours then to invite them over for a barbeque and a near beer. Equally, taking the time and effort to participate in Fourth of July celebrations, Bastille Day, Bulgarian Army Day, Bulgarian Unity Day, Romanian Day, National Contingent Medals Parades, etc. What better way to show respect for your national partners than to participate in their national celebrations.

One of the greatest opportunities for linking-up with our Coalition partners is a crisis. Never waste a crisis. A crisis can unite or divide a Coalition Force and bring you closer to your neighbours and allies or farther away. We were in a war zone and, sadly, there will always be many tragedies to both deployed forces and to their citizens back at home. Tragedy is not a time to become isolationist or to espouse your moral relativism – get out and be with your allies. This may mean participating in Ramp Ceremonies, paying a brief but respectable office call, producing a quick hand-written note of condolence or a quick pat on the back and shoulder squeeze when you see your fellow National Task Force Commander at the Dining Facility. If you received help from other contingents on the camp, or even if there was friction over a situation, use the opportunity. We had a medical emergency that involved both

the French and US contingents. I got with them, thanked them for their assistance and ensured that they understood that I valued their personal and national friendship despite the awkward situation. Fortunately, I knew them both. The first time you have a crisis with another national contingent should not be the first time you meet your fellow Task Force Commanders.

## HANDLING DISAGREEMENTS

Nevertheless, into every relationship, a little rain must fall. Each national contingent is different due to national policy, theatre situation, forces present, etc. There will therefore be differences in national policy that must be understood and worked through. This is particularly true if you are a tenant at a base and another nation is the "Mayor". I would recommend proactive engagement on these potential friction points before they happen. You are not always going to agree (because you can't change national policy) and may only be able to agree to disagree. This was true during Op ATTENTION Roto 1 as we further formalized an agreement between Task Force HYDRA and Roto 0. In my case, I signed a written agreement with Commander Task Force HYDRA and distributed it to all Canadian Camps in the Kabul Base Cluster. I believe the Canadian commanders very much appreciated this "relationship framework" as there had been a number of Task Force HYDRA Camp Mayor/Canadian Camp Commander friction points that could not be solved at the Camp level.

Another example was the Canadian and American conflicting policies and approaches on sexual assault. With the US Forces, a complaint of sexual assault can be launched formally or informally. If it "goes" formal, then Commanders, Military Police, padres, lawyers, etc., become involved. This is very similar to the Canadian system. However, if an American complaint occurs informally, the victim is given the necessary support via padres, social workers and Sexual Assault Victim Advocates, but there is no formal pursuance of the "aggressor". There is no such system in the Canadian Armed Forces and we as commanders are required to pursue normal military or criminal justice should we hear of such a case. I discussed this with Commander Task Force HYDRA and we agreed to disagree and deal with it case-by-case if it occurred, as we each have different national policies. However, by engaging on this proactively we were aware of this friction point and had at least discussed it prior.

Incidentally, signing an “agreement” with another nation’s force was not condoned by the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command (CEFCOM) or the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC). Memorandums of Understanding are strictly signed at much higher levels and the CEFCOM/CJOC staff got quite concerned about the above agreement. I didn’t disagree with their point and indeed asked for them to provide me another tool as the document had clearly been very useful for the local Canada-US understanding. Unfortunately, I was never provided an alternative way forward. However, this staff angst never translated into a commander issue.

Another friction point or point of difference between Canadians and some Coalition partners is the maturity, military experience and flexibility of our personnel. Don’t get me wrong, I’m not saying Canadians are better than other forces in every way, however, compared to some of our partners, our soldiers and NCOs are significantly better trained and more experienced and therefore more mentally and physically flexible. I found this particularly true with lower ranking soldiers who often took part in Coalition drive teams (transport for higher ranking advisors) within NTM-A or IJC. Although NTM-A directed that all drive teams needed to be commanded by a Sergeant as a minimum, I was more than comfortable directing that for Canadians a Master Corporal was the minimum appointment. A Canadian Master Corporal may well have 10 years experience and three or more operational tours – this is not the case for many of our allies. For this reason, I had no difficulty when it came time to offer up some available Canadian soldiers to the NTM-A drive team. I had them at “Who wants some Canadian soldiers?”

Of course there are challenges with having this kind of relative quality and experience as well. Canadians were assessed very, very favourably by our Coalition allies when they worked directly with them. This meant that, in many cases, the J1 staff had to wrestle with “right-lined” Personnel Evaluation Reports (PER) to ensure they were fair across the Task Force and, equally, not immediately discredited when they hit the Merit Boards. Also, in some militaries, soldiers, Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), and officers alike are automatically written-up for Honours and Awards based on their position and responsibilities. This is clearly not the case for Canadians and again left J1s and Adjutants wrestling with an inordinate number of medals nominations for Canadians by their non-Canadian supervisors. In this instance, we drafted a letter for Commander CCTM-A asking our allies to use the Canadian system for Honours and Awards, as this at least allowed

us to better mould and manage nominations. In summary, it's great to be highly valued but it does create a number of second and third order effects for personnel management.

Despite all this great talk about Coalition spirit and cooperation, it is important to note there will be times when we can't or shouldn't simply be part of the team. There will be times when tactical issues or national policy force us to pull the "National Card." By doing this we are standing up nationally and saying we are unable or unwilling to follow a Coalition or another nation's policy. By nationally "holding our ground" we are "throwing down the Maple Leaf" and declaring national sovereignty over an issue. There is power in speaking to a nation such as the U.S. and making them understand that their tactical actions are having a negative strategic impact. It is important to relate that if they wish for Canada to continue to participate in the Coalition it is important that Ottawa does not feel tread upon by its Allies. Clearly, you don't want to pull the National Card too often or it will lose its effect and you'll likely be called upon to explain why you're bothering our strategic masters with tactical issues. For this reason, it is only the Commander that holds the national veto and you need to convince him.

## **ROLE OF THE SERGEANT-MAJOR**

As a last note I think it's important to realize command-led relationships and interaction with our Coalition partners are not limited to commander to commander. Your sergeant-major, at whatever level, can enable you enormously. Good sergeant-majors ignore paperwork and emails and are constantly interacting with the troops, sniffing-out problems and talking to people. What better way to get your foot in the door with some newly arrived Coalition Allies than have the sergeant-major meet their fellow command sergeant-major/command master chief and have a coffee. The CCTM-A sergeant-major was able to foster a very good and useful relationship with CJIATF 435, including the commander, a lieutenant-general, based on this approach. What do sergeant-majors do? I'm not always sure, however, my Army definitely doesn't work without them and relationships between Allies not involving our senior NCOs are not the same.

## CONCLUSION

Deployed operations are an ideal opportunity to think bigger than the Canadian sandbox. Working with our Coalition Allies provides a great opportunity to see how other countries deal with situations and challenges that are not that different than our own. Also, particularly when working with our American cousins, I find it an ideal opportunity to witness military affairs on a far greater scale and indeed see the operational art, Corps-level activities, and a nation truly engaged in a war. In the same vein, many of our culturally similar Coalition partners have a richer understanding of military capability as they are former world powers (for example, the United Kingdom and France), have recent but different campaign experiences, and nuanced but comparable national cultural or budgetary challenges. It was a huge opportunity to develop as a military professional and a commander.

## CHAPTER 9

### A MOUNTIE'S EXPERIENCE WITH THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

*Assistant Commissioner (Retired) Graham Muir\**

#### BACKGROUND

I am a retired Assistant Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). I retired after 36 years and one day of service. For the most part, the early part of my career was normal domestic service. The departure from the norm for me was relatively early exposure to international deployments. The first occurred in May-June of 1993, when I mustered as part of Canadian Police Contingent to the former Yugoslavia with UNPROFOR. I think that those were the early days, and we might or might not agree that it was effective from a UN perspective. It was the age of innocence lost where, between the Balkans and Rwanda and Kosovo, those missions became quite complex and much less staid than those that had preceded them.

My first deployment was when I was at the mid-career point, a staff sergeant with 20 years of service. In our way of working, if you had one mission in a faraway place, you were luckier than most. We are all volunteers and individual contributors; unlike the military, we do not deploy at the unit level. One mission is a blessing, if you are inclined towards that sort of work. I had effectively given up on further missions, notwithstanding the desire to do more of it. I was a chief superintendent running our national learning program in 2005, and there was an expressed request for another UN police commissioner, specifically a Canadian, in Haiti. My predecessor, now retired Chief Superintendent David Beer, had put in a hard year and the UN, for its own reasons, wanted another Canadian for the sake of continuity. And so when approached at that time of my service, more senior in rank with some international background, I said yes and I spent a year as the UN Police Commissioner in Haiti, June 2005 to July 2006.

I came back to National Service, International Headquarters after Haiti. By that time, I was serving at the executive level. I joined the Commissioner's

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\* This chapter is based on an interview conducted with Graham Muir by the editor.

team in 2006 as Director General Strategic Policy and Planning. As had occurred with Haiti, an opportunity presented itself. The Government of Canada requested a Canadian police commander in theatre in Afghanistan to take on the responsibility of Canada's police presence, focused predominantly in Kandahar, but with a double hatted role as part of the Canadian Permanent Mission in Kabul. I took that opportunity and that then became my last year of service. I actually retired in Afghanistan, and did not come back to active service when I returned in 2010.

## **THE UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

I think that I have a reasonably good understanding of how the Canadian Armed Forces would describe the comprehensive approach, much of which resonates with my experience. There was a time not that many years ago that co-location of assets in theatre would suffice as integration. It was then left to the devices of commanders and leaders in various levels in theatre. The art of the possible typically dictated what could be done in terms of what we now would call the comprehensive approach. In the early days, there was no doctrine, as much as it was a statement of best intent. I lived that in the Balkans. For the most part, there were no Canadian assets anywhere close. It was only towards the latter part of my tour in sector south that the Canadian Battalion came in the form of the Second Battalion Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI), Lieutenant-Colonel James Calvin's group. And it just so happened that the Medak Pocket was part of my station area.

Having been a reservist before I was a police officer, I was impressed by the CAF. I had never seen them function in the field before. By the time they arrived, I was a veteran of that particular mission to the extent that I had been on the ground as a civilian police officer living on the local economy. Our support Battalion had been Kenyan, as I recall, and by and large we worked independently. As soon as the Canadian Battalion rolled into Benkovats and that part of sector south, a wonderful range of opportunities unfolded for us collectively, both police and military. As a small example, within hours of arriving at what was to be the company location for B Company in the Second Battalion PPCLI, a bunch of drunk Serb regulars were jacking rounds into the sandbanks and killed all the company mascots. It was a bad way to get started. I had just got in my truck and ran out to the battalion to basically say how are you, good to see you. A young Major Tony Kaduck asked if I could

help get him close to the local people of authority. Within hours, without any interpreters or any assets on the field, we were able to effectively get him plugged in with the local regional Serb Battalion commander, the chief of intelligence, local chief of police, and all of that went inordinately well.

It was a bit of a game changer for the Canadians at that point, just to the extent that they could spool up quicker with some navigational aids that we already had on the ground.

As a *quid pro quo*, I could actually get some diesel for trucks, a very simple thing that was difficult for me at the time. After the Medak Pocket operation, the area became a massive crime scene. Much to the credit of the CAF, the first ones that came looking for was us, me in particular as the station commander. We took care of that investigation together as a team. But I do not want to overly romanticize this period. It was a bunch of folks on the ground. If you could find a way of getting along better, then you would do that. But it was still fairly Balkanized in terms of what could be done with the various assets within the context of that theatre and the mandate of the UN.

## THE UNITED NATIONS STABILIZATION MISSION IN HAITI

In Haiti, there was a nominal CAF presence. We had 200 Canadian cops and six Canadian military. That was an environment where you are part of the big blue machine. In 2005 and 2006, it was the largest mission of its kind. The United Nations had its lessons learned from the Balkans and Kosovo, and I think they did a reasonably good job of determining what works and what does not work. When the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (*Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti*; MINUSTAH) stood up in 2002, they purportedly wanted to deliver the best of what they described as integrated mission management. They created a doctrine, a wiring diagram, and job functions, all of the enablers which are requisite to the UN. It is a portable organizational culture in its own right. I thought that the way that they described the roles of the UN force commander and the UN police commissioner in support of the special representative of the Secretary General was right minded and sensible.

There was corporate wisdom held at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation which predicated that the role of security and public order was police related and not military. In other words, the military could do it, but it was better left to the police. That is why the deployment strategy saw a good

number of UN police, but as individual contributors. As a police commissioner, I had hundreds of UN police sprinkled all over that island, but they did not move at the unit level. The contingents would come in, the Americans, the French, the Canadians, and we would have a team lead over here and it would be a Frenchperson this month and six months later we turned it over to a Portuguese person. The best way to describe it was that it was a multinational police force. The key roles and positions would be staffed the same way as you would staff any organization, cognizant of national balance and politics.

For the public order maintenance part of the mission, they posted in foreign police units. A foreign police unit is effectively a company of gendarmes like police, typically from countries that have gendarmeries. They just post in the entire company, complete with APCs and everything from 50 calibre machine guns down to water cans, to gas and sticks and shields and helmets. I had two battalions of foreign police units. I had two companies from Jordan, two companies from Pakistan, one from China, one each from Nepal, Senegal, Nigeria. I had something like 1,500 guys. Interestingly enough, the Brazilian force commander was less than subtle about how covetous he was of those assets. He said I needed to attach those commands to him. I might be convinced that was the right thing to do, but not just because he said so. This is where culture plays a huge role in these environments. He knew that I was a “peer” with respect to our reporting relation to the Secretary General’s special representative. But when he looked at my shoulder, he saw a colonel, and he is a four star general. We had to find our way to a workable relationship and division of labour that was commensurate with our responsibilities within that executive team.

I would like to think I behaved as well as I could have in the circumstances. Given the operational exigencies before us with respect to safety and security and access to the slums, there was enough work to do. The discussion over assets is doctrinal, and it is not your doctrine, it is UN doctrine. So you do not just get to have your way. That is why they have a senior military advisor and a senior police advisor at UN headquarters in New York. The Haitians can go from sublime to savage in a nanosecond. A group of 200 becomes 2,000, 2,500, and 4,000 and 6,000 and then they are burning shit in the street and whacking each other with machetes and beating us up. So I would not have my guys protecting a piece of property which may hold some tactical advantage, when we needed the operational flexibility to move to the source of the threat. That is what cops do.

Aside from the Canadian police that were there, Canada's presence, notwithstanding the amount of money that we have spent on that island, was understated in the extreme. I could not unravel the way the Canadian Embassy, and our CIDA colleagues in particular, sprinkled their magical fairy dust of money around the island. When I would deal with the Canadian Government and my colleagues within the Embassy, I wanted to talk to the guy who had the purse strings. I told them that there were ways of exploiting opportunity here that we were missing. That was a different set of discussions that were almost outside the role of my command responsibility in the UN. You are actually stepping out of that role and trying to leverage some bilateral influence from the resources that Canada might apply.

## AFGHANISTAN

With our mandate in Afghanistan, we have probably experienced historically unprecedented times in terms of Canada's commitment to the comprehensive approach. The federal government of Canada committed to a Cabinet committee on Afghanistan, a wiring diagram which included key departments – the Department of National Defence and the CAF as first among equals, DFAIT, CIDA, and the RCMP to a lesser extent – all of which became the focus of effort in Afghanistan. That is the cascading effect that happened when the government said that it wanted a comprehensive approach in this theatre of operation.

### Role of the Canadian Police Commander

The position of Canadian Police Commander was a first. They did not have one of those before. They just put a bunch of Canadian police on the ground and they effectively became deployable assets, for the most part in Kandahar. We had a young inspector there who was just trying to do his best to make sure that a small number of Canadian police could deliver some benefit over time without there being any script. The idea of the Canadian Police Commander was to put a Canadian police officer sufficiently senior to be able to wear two hats well. The first hat – and that was my actual duty posting – was with the Canadian permanent mission in Kabul. I did not work for the Canadian Ambassador. I worked with the Canadian Ambassador in the same role that a Defence attaché would work. I was the Canadian Police advisor to the ambassador, accountable to the commissioner in Ottawa. In terms of my role in theatre, I was part of the executive team of the Canadian mission. It was

understood that I would take any and all opportunities I could to connect Canada and its policing obligations to the Afghan Minister of the Interior directly, to enable the civilian police team to contribute to capacity building and the ANP.

My second role was in Kandahar. We had a small number of folks working with the Task Force Commander and his team. For example, we had a good fellow with the J5 operations planning role. We had people involved in joint intelligence analysis and that sort of thing. But the heaviest level of effort for us was staging a range of training activity out of the KPRT that were intended to make a difference with the ANP. When I got there, I did not believe that we were making much of a difference. That is why they sent me there. It did not take long for me to figure out that there was a better way of delivering on what I would call a civilian police value proposition. I needed to demonstrably connect Kabul to Kandahar from the Minister of the Interior straight to the Provincial Chief Police to resource and enable the kind of things that needed to occur in Kandahar. It was like NATO was trying to push far too much volume down a too narrow pipeline, and the pipeline is all busted and full of holes.

### **Goals of the Canadian Police Commander within the Comprehensive Approach**

I remember my very early impressions of joining that team in Afghanistan. I was pleased to learn that we actually had seven stated strategic priorities. Even before I arrived in Afghanistan, I knew where my lane was. My contribution was part of capacity building with Afghan security forces and was scripted in terms of what needed to occur with respect to the ANP within that context. At the strategic level, I was encouraged to see that because I was fairly well immersed in having to manage at the strategic departmental level in Canada. I was likewise pleased to see metrics, the markers that would be reported back to Canada in relation to how well we were doing in the field.

I am not so sure that we were nimble enough and flexible enough to redefine some of the metrics that we chased. Nonetheless, it was better to have been disciplined in the pursuit of performance indicators than to have had none whatsoever. On the ground in Afghanistan, what I found was probably best in class in terms of how key actors delivered on their respective roles as leaders in a comprehensive approach.

If you declare that you are going to move markers with respect to the development of ANSF, police and military combined, you have to know what that looks like. You must describe, if not the end state, then channel markers along the way, what it looks like as you approach success and competency metrics. That approach for us was sufficiently robust so that a story could be told at the strategic level, at the operational level, where senior operational command staff worked, and at the tactical level, where the young men and women do the business. That approach was sufficiently robust that you could align the level of effort against a known set of objectives. From our perspective, I knew which one of those seven strategic priorities I needed to exploit. I did not have the means at the time, but I certainly had enough strategic focus to know how to run that play. By the time a year had been spent we had that level of effort explained operationally and tactically. I would suggest we had fairly good results in terms of moving those security forces towards a set of what I would call behaviours: their deployment capacity, and their ability to stand alone and to get that work done.

From the Afghan security force perspective, the larger picture was not just prosecuting a counterinsurgency. That was effectively a means to an end to create space on the ground for local level Afghan governance that was a reasonable and safe alternative to the Taliban. That is what the hard fighting was about. It was not just chasing down and killing Taliban. As I came to understand it tactically and operationally, my part was to get those Afghan police functioning well so that they could equip themselves appropriately in the Hold phase once we had done the Shape and Clear phases. It was elusive and I did not see the success, although I saw the beginnings of success, in finding, empowering and facilitating local Afghan governance to effectively be the logical alternative to what was otherwise a dismal future. When I say elusive, this would be an observation, not criticism. I do not believe, whether it was Canada or the U.S. that preceded and followed us, that we have had the success that we might have had because the civilian assets of that mission could not properly exploit the opportunities on the ground. The security environment was not sufficiently permissive.

The only thing I needed to learn to be a full participant in the comprehensive approach was how to write myself into the script. I needed to know how to navigate in that working environment. As much as we might have described ourselves as partners or Team Canada, the truth of the matter is that in the case of the Canadian police contingent, we were not integral, we were a dependent and only had the potential to be integral to the success

of the mission. Once I cracked the code, the rest of it became relatively straightforward.

### **Getting Written into the Script**

So how do you get written into the script? That was just me banging on the door of General John Vance, Commander of Task Force Kandahar. In the very early days, I was back and forth between Kabul and Kandahar until I could sort out how we were going to do this. I recall saying to him that here is what I know is going on, and the following range of things are delivering no derivative benefit to Canada, nor to Kandahar, and certainly not to the ANP. So I said I would not countenance any more of that, and I did not want any more Canadian police teaching Afghan guys how to dismount a truck with a rubber gun. This was behind the wire stuff. I said we needed to lean forward, we needed to be out and about doing the same thing that soldiers do in terms of their commitment to raising the capacity in ANSF. I do not want to over-complicate things. The Canadian civilian police needed to get written into the script of what effectively was a much more robust operational and tactical thrust of operations, with an appropriate focus on outcomes.

It is a lot easier to have a discussion with the General if you happen to be an assistant commissioner. It would be a lot less easy to have that conversation if you were an inspector and were physically distant. That is what I inherited, the young Canadian police officers that were just doing God's work at the PRT, and one lone guy at Task Force Kandahar Headquarters who was kind of like the police liaison guy, if the General happened to have a question. That was nice, but it was pretty benign. It was pretty clear to me that the idea was to try to better lead a concerted effort of police capacity building, get the best you could out of a small number of Canadian police officers. How best to do that? Well, if the operating environment by and large is predominantly green and the lexicon refers to commander's intent and battlespace owner, how complicated can that be? I had Canadian colleagues in the police world in Ottawa who could not spell ROE (Rules of Engagement). They had the audacity to try to deploy my guys in there without rules of engagement. There was no collective wisdom or understanding in Ottawa, notwithstanding we had been in that theatre of operation for over two years, albeit in very small numbers. So they sent me there it was to move faster, harder, smarter.

We were civilian police in a demonstrably paramilitary role. We were out and about outside the wire. Later on we were imbedded with Afghan security

forces. Our other civilian counterparts either never had the numbers or the luxury of time and space created for them to connect with local governors. The people entrusted with doing the bidding of the provincial governor's office were those elders who effectively had stewardship of running of the City of Kandahar. I cannot imagine that we could have done a much better job. On a scale of 1 to 10, our comprehensive approach was a good solid 8.5. I think we gave what we could. The working environment was sufficiently unyielding, that it was just not within the realm of possible to work better with the local governors.

### **The Representative of Canada in Kandahar**

There was a bit of an experiment at the time of creating a civilian counterpoint to the Canadian task force commander. I am referring to the civilian lead who was the Representative of Canada in Kandahar, the RoCK. The General effectively cast a bit of a longer shadow than the RoCK, but the message was very clear. The message was that shoulder to shoulder, together, both civilian and military assets on the ground, would exploit the opportunities to restore stability to Kandahar and good governance to the benefit of the people in the future. I thought that was bold. It was not just a gesture. You could see that there was a healthy tension and it was not all sweetness and light. There were philosophical debates and differences, and sometimes it was personality that just got in the way. But I do think, from what I saw over the course of one year with more than one actor playing those roles on both the civilian side and the military side, that there was the best intent and best effort to make it work.

### **Influences on Canada's Comprehensive Approach**

There was, as there always is, in these very complex theatres of operation, influence that is brought, legitimately or otherwise, against the indigenous host government to change or to go faster. It was not just NATO on the ground. There were donor countries and governments with their own agendas. And there was a lot of confusion with respect to how to get the best advice possible to the Minister of the Interior in terms of the future of the ANP. There was a governance mechanism that was created in the early years. They were called the IPCB, International Police Coordination Board. That board was like a board of directors, and the members of the board were ambassadors of countries who had skin in the game (i.e., ambassadors that represented countries that were paying or bleeding). The idea was to make sure those ambassadors came to that board table with sufficient knowledge and

information to provide cogent advice and direction to the Afghan government Minister of the Interior to improve the capacity and deployment capacity of its police. Our comprehensive approach was sufficiently robust to anticipate the requirement of an executive police council to effectively brief and prepare the Canadian ambassador to carry on a dialogue with the Minister of the Interior of Afghanistan, and in many cases to prevail in terms of argument, debate and discussion about the ANP.

Our comprehensive approach was no match for the major muscle movements that our American colleagues caused to occur. Our American colleagues could bring tremendous assets to bear in terms of people, ordinance and certainly money to be ever so persuasive. The best that we could do was to be to be the good Canadians that we are, understated but wise in our observations. The quiet Canadian voice of reason was to not build too much infrastructure in Kabul. They could not support it in terms of organizational structure and the mapping of job descriptions and the things that would be normative in a North American context, but not relevant or necessary in the Afghan context. So it was point, counterpoint. We embraced the idea of providing capacity within the Minister of the Interior to help his office think, reason and decide, and to build just enough capacity to be able to drive out some of the national training and some of the capacity building initiatives that needed to be done, but no more than necessary. Our American colleagues were predisposed towards building, with the hope that the rest of it would come in the fullness of time. Our answer was that it would actually collapse under its own weight because the Afghans have no capacities to support it.

### **Working with the 92<sup>nd</sup> Military Police Battalion**

The three-star General at RC(S), moved the bigger assets in favour of whatever the operational priorities were. The Canadian Battalion worked in the City of Kandahar and the populated approaches to the City of Kandahar, and in outlying areas in Panjwayi. It was understood that there needed to be more capacity, during the summer of 2009 through to 2010, to effectively get a grip on that city and get the Afghan military and police behaving well, doing their respective roles well within counterinsurgency operations, and being properly supported. From the policing perspective it was acknowledged that they were a benign presence. You could exhort them to do all manner of things, but in the absence of being with them, they would not act. I was nowhere in the chain of command, nor even the decision-making loop that posited or promoted the necessity of that company level strength in the form of the

company within the 92<sup>nd</sup> Military Police (MP) Battalion that came to Kandahar, but it was a wise decision. Their Colonel reported directly to the Commander of Task Force Kandahar. I did not report to General Vance; if there was any reporting relationship at all, it was to the RoCK because we were considered part of that small constellation of civilian assets.

While I was nowhere in that chain of command in the sense of executing commander's intent, I took the advantage of knowing that the 92<sup>nd</sup> was coming, getting with the commanding officer as soon as they arrived to tell them what I thought we were up against. They were mobile and came with fairly large numbers. They had somewhere in the range of 100 to 125 personnel. We had 50, and of the 50, we had probably in the range of 35 were in Kandahar. I could continue to ride with the Canadian force protection, or I could marry up with them for a Canadian-U.S. police presence. It was a change paradigm, effectively. I proposed or advocated that particular police to police paradigm. We did not need to have a formal meeting; we had a conversation behind a LAV (light armoured vehicle). He said that it made sense to him. We had an agreement in principle through a conversation behind a LAV in a gravel parking lot.

### **The Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams**

There were small numbers of Canadian MPs. They had created entities known as POMLTs, Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams. The POMLTs were infantry led and MP supported. These were teams of young soldiers, typically led by a Canadian infantry captain, sometimes a major, a small group of 12 to 15 Canadian soldiers, and one or two MPs. It presupposed that the military police brought some level of knowledge, borne of experience, with respect to how to make the ANP behave better as police of local jurisdiction. That was faulty logic because, frankly, the MPs did not know that; the Canadian civilian police knew that. We sorted that one out in the field. The reason why it was an infantry commander and not a military police commander is because there were not enough MPs. This was just as well because if you found installations of deployed ANP, they oftentimes behaved and functioned very much in terms of any security force that had predominantly constabulary duties. They were very much like military in terms of ground owning and moving and securing ground as opposed to fighting for it.

We arranged the marrying of MPs and civilian police on these POMLTs. This arrangement worked reasonably well, but the real opportunity that we exploited did not come by virtue of the Canadians because there was not the strength in numbers. When the 92<sup>nd</sup> Battalion rolled in in company strength and deployed in teams of six or eight in light armoured vehicles, this became the new normal and an opportunity to be exploited. The American Colonel and I knew a couple of things about the efficacy of local police. One was that we had to get them out and moving for them to have any value at all. The predisposition of the police was to garrison behind walls and compounds and to have nominal mobility in terms of actually proactively influencing or shaping their environment. So we were up against a huge cultural predisposition not to move. But we knew that we had to physically get into the space of those police in their compounds, first by visiting and then by going and living with them. All of a sudden, we were there visiting. The next thing you know, we were there staying overnight. Next, we were helping with their defensive perimeters and some of the other things that you need to do because we were staying for days at a time. We were going on patrol; we were going on the move and all that good stuff.

## CONCLUSION

The NATO militaries have a common lexicon and a common wiring diagram, the staff system. I am very pleased to report that in Afghanistan, NATO countries effectively integrated in the field and spoke a common language in terms of delivering on commander's intent. As a Canadian, I was absolutely amazed to see how it worked and how well it worked. Not many Canadians appreciate fully the importance of our military being on an expeditionary footing. It sounds simple to say it, but there is a posture within the CAF that leans forward. This posture is to serve where called and to move promptly and with purpose wherever that happens to be. It is the only department of the Canadian government which is on an expeditionary footing. As laudable a job as we did in terms of living the comprehensive approach in Afghanistan, it should have revealed that to be completely successful, all of the departments need to be on an expeditionary footing.

The idea of Canada's whole-of-government approach as we enacted it in Afghanistan was to provide value at all levels: strategic, operational and tactical. I can tell you from the civilian policing perspective, I certainly exploited that opportunity. I knew going in where my lane was. I created the space operationally and tactically to make that contribution.

I can use our military history as an illustration. What caused Canada to succeed in Vimy? Certainly in part, it had to do with one General Arthur Currie and his propensity to prepare every soldier on the field to know their role. The rehearsal, the idea of providing maps and grid references and coordinates to young section non-commissioned officers so that every soldier who was going to go up that ridge knew what their part was going to be.

I am pretty proud of the fact that we effectively delivered that in Kandahar with the whole-of-government approach. Every man with a map. I had young constables from the Waterloo Regional Police and young kids who had never been anywhere, aside from their own patch, out working in downtown Kandahar. And they knew what they had to do to deliver on our strategic priority, which was ANSF police capacity building. They knew what their job was. So they got their alignment from the strategic level through me, operationally to Kandahar and tactically on the ground. That speaks well of our whole-of-government approach and the capacity to deliver on solutions at all levels: strategic, operational and tactical.



## CHAPTER 10

### THE INTEGRATED MISSION CONCEPT APPLIED TO MINUSTAH, HAITI

*Colonel Pierre Saint-Cyr  
Major Janie Desjardins*

#### INTRODUCTION

The Panel on United Nations Peace Operations of 2000 (better known as the Brahimi Report) stated that “force alone cannot create peace; it can only create the space in which peace may be built.”<sup>1</sup> It recognizes that to succeed, UN interventions need to go beyond the UN mission. To succeed, UN interventions need to include the other UN agency’s initiatives as the UN Country Team (UNCT) and the humanitarian intervention now called the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). It also recognizes the importance to have an exit strategy involving the Host Country Government to address the issues of conflict and instability and the requirement for the capacity building of the institutions of the affected country.

Recognizing the necessity to integrate the planning of all UN agencies and to bring together those who are addressing the root causes of instability and those who control the resources, the UN Secretary General, in 2006, endorsed a joint planning process called the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP). The main purpose of this planning process is to link all dimensions of a peace support operation (political, development, humanitarian, human rights, rule of law, social and security), under a strategy and design led by the SRSG. The aim is not to replace existing planning processes but to harmonize them and to sequence the activities of the different stakeholders in support to the Host Country and the UN mandate. The joint plan created by following the IMPP gives the UN agencies their strategic objectives, called the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF).

#### THE INTEGRATED STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR HAITI

The latest UN ISF for Haiti, dated November 2012, was signed by the Government of Haiti and the SRSG in Haiti. It clearly defines the joint strategy

adopted by the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and all UN agencies and groups supporting the national development of the country, the humanitarian efforts and the constant work needed to maintain stabilization. The ultimate aim is to progressively reinforce government institutions and civil society at all levels. The UN is not alone in this endeavour as this ISF is also considered by the core group of nations (Canada, United States, France, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru) to tailor their respective actions in Haiti.

The ISF is spread over four years. The ISF will be crucial in establishing a solid societal base for a prosperous future, not only economically, but also with the perpetuation of good governance. In four years, Haiti will have three elections: senate and municipal in 2013, legislative in 2014 and presidential in 2015. The conduct of these elections, in respecting democratic rules and without manipulations, could be a clear demonstration that Haiti has become a true democratic state with a normal electoral transfer of power. It will be also a test for the international community to see the outcome of their considerable investment aimed to institute and enhance principles of good governance in Haiti since 2004. Additionally, the ISF aims to gradually transfer all coordination and planning structures to the Haitians to be well prepared to respond to natural disasters. Even though the ISF is endorsed by various organizations, there is no mechanism to fully integrate the work of NGOs. Each organization works independently with some level of cooperation through the Deputy SRSG, the Humanitarian Coordinator and the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

To execute the ISF, MINUSTAH relies on all its components, particularly on the Military Component (MC) and Police Components (PC). However, MINUSTAH faces a challenge: Troop Contributing Nations fatigue. This has resulted in a “line in the sand” to possibly terminate its activities sometime in 2016. In anticipation of this eventuality, a Consolidation Plan has been produced indicating the steps to be taken by both the military and police components to progressively reduce their presence in all Haitian departments. These reductions will be done based on the *Police Nationale d’Haïti* (PNH) capabilities to reach a similar level of efficiency as presently demonstrated by both components. This is the theory, and a strong planning structure is required to produce an implementation plan.

Until very recently, MINUSTAH had no planning process to support the implementation of the ISF. Each Component defined its mission and planned

according to its understanding of MINUSTAH's mandate and interpretation of the ISF. One of the reasons for the absence of a planning process is due to the independence of each component's operations. The MC rapidly fulfilled its initial mission to stabilize the country and then played a role as it became an intervener in security operations. This allowed the PC to proceed with developing further PHN capabilities and becoming the first level of intervention with the PNH and second level with its Formed Police Units (FPU). Another reason for a lack of planning is the financial requirement, imposed by UN headquarters in New York, to reduce the number of soldiers and policeman instead of considering a capability based reduction. Both components cannot blindly reduce their forces without affecting PHN capacity building and security. Even the ISF does not mention the five Security Hubs concept which is a vital element of the MC Consolidation plan to ensure security and stability, key elements of the ISF.

Lack of integration is the MINUSTAH Achilles' heel. If this had been established at the beginning of the mission, mission success would have been achieved earlier. Today, with four years remaining in the mission, integration is now a necessity and a common strategy, in line with the needs of the ISF, is currently being developed. The upcoming election being the driving force, a new consolidation plan is currently in preparation. For the first time, a dedicated team of planners has been established within the PC and is joining its effort with the MC's U5 (Plans), leading to a common plan. This collaboration will definitively become a force multiplier essential to the implementation of the ISF.

The challenge of the ISF implementation goes beyond the integration of the UN agencies interventions and the coordination of the components of the UN mission. It also requires that the main fund providers, the troop contributing countries, and the core group of nations harmonize their interventions in Haiti at their national levels. Each nation intervening in Haiti must increase their interventions to restore security with programs to build the Haitian institutions, and with mechanisms of control to avoid the corruption that compromises the process. It is implied that a whole-of-government approach is necessary from each main player under the leadership of a National Plan.

## CANADA'S ROLE IN HAITI

The role of the Canadian government in Haiti is limited to four departments: DFAIT, CSC, DND, and the Solicitor General of Canada. The last three play

a direct role with MINUSTAH and are the sole Canadian troop contributor to this mission, performing duties to improve and maintain security and stability in Haiti. Five military officers and 80 police officers are presently deployed with MINUSTAH. Unfortunately, in February 2013, CSC withdrew its 10 officers. DFAIT, with its Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START), is the Government of Canada's centre of expertise for stabilization and reconstruction, contributing in building peace and security and coordinating whole-of-government policy and program engagements in Haiti. START complements Canada's engagement in Haiti by enhancing policing, improving conditions for prisoners, strengthening borders, increasing community security, and establishing front-line justice. Since 2006, START has committed more than \$80 million for stabilization projects in Haiti.

The Canadian government's efforts are also complemented by DND and Solicitor General personnel, who play a vital leadership role in the MINUSTAH. CAF senior officers are embedded in the MINUSTAH MC Headquarters. Among these officers, the influential position of COS is held by a CAF Colonel, which has a direct impact on the command and control of the MC. The same is seen with the PC where the Deputy Police Commissioner position is held by an RCMP Superintendent. These two key leadership positions contribute directly to ensuring that MINUSTAH's strategic objectives are achieved. It is through these two important positions that the integrated planning process between the MC and PC is being presently shaped. This demonstrates that above any national policy and their daily professional commitment, these two Canadians are discrete but essential enablers in supporting Canada's involvement in Haiti.

Even though the Canadians officers in the MC and PC are MINUSTAH officers, they are a definite force multiplier for START. These officers are not directly involved in the START projects, but nevertheless they indirectly assume a role when these projects require MINUSTAH support. On these occasions, the MC and PC will ensure a Canadian officer (military or police) is sent to show the Canadian flag. The support given by MINUSTAH to the *Garde Côtière de la PNH* is a prime example of cooperation by the Canadian officers of both components to START.

## CONCLUSION

Canada, being a Core Group member, is fully informed of the ISF aims and is able to tailor its comprehensive approach. Through various Canadian departments, it supports Haiti's political process, professionalizing the PNH, reforming Haiti's national security institutions and protecting civilians. For the time being, MINUSTAH is the main actor to ensure stability and security, which is essential for START to conduct its projects. Understanding that Canadian involvement in Haiti will not terminate in the next four years, it is in our interest to ensure that the ISF succeeds in 2016 and that the PNH will be able to assume the security of Haiti on its own.

## ENDNOTES

- 1 Retrieved on 2 August 2013 from <[http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/)>.



## CHAPTER 11

### **HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS: THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES DISASTER ASSISTANCE RESPONSE TEAM (DART) IN HAITI**

*Colonel Bruce Ewing*

#### **INTRODUCTION**

While all operations entail some aspect of the comprehensive approach, Humanitarian Assistance Operations, where the ability to cooperate has a direct effect upon the ability of the players to improve the situation for the suffering, are in a league of their own. What makes it especially difficult is the abundance of individuals and organizations with widely different skill sets, competencies and agendas rapidly thrust together into a chaotic environment. It can be even more difficult because this environment often lacks any overarching command and control. It is this type of environment, where the military is often in a supporting role, potentially shunned and/or feared by other stakeholders, which tests the ability of a leader to make a difference. The military is familiar with being in charge and having a command structure that is generally decisive and effective. During Humanitarian Assistance Operations, the military has to adapt and be much more flexible, tolerant and collaborative, especially during a catastrophic crisis where initial situational awareness could be almost non-existent. The earthquake in Haiti on 12 January 2010, in which almost a quarter of a million Haitians died and to which the Canadian government reacted with assistance in record time, was clearly one of these occasions.

#### **DEPLOYMENT OF THE DISASTER ASSISTANCE RESPONSE TEAM**

Although about 2000 CAF military personnel were eventually deployed to Haiti between mid-January and mid-March 2010, it was the Canadian Armed Forces Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART),<sup>1</sup> led by a core team from the Canadian Forces Joint Headquarters (CFJHQ), which first faced the complete lack of both command and control (C2) and situational awareness (SA) in Haiti. Luckily, their Humanitarian Assistance Operations-specific

training had somewhat, but not totally, prepared them for this situation. As Commanding Officer (CO) of the CFJHQ in Canada, my team and I, having specifically prepared for similar disasters, understood Humanitarian Assistance operations better than most other members of the CAF. For the Haiti mission, I was the military representative of the Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team (ISST)<sup>2</sup> for the government of Canada and simultaneously the leader of the CAF Reconnaissance (Recce) Team, which landed in Haiti within 24 hours of the earthquake. I was also the Task Force Commander until Brigadier-General Laroche, the overall commander of the Canadian military assistance force, arrived on the ground five days later, at which time I became the CO of the DART for the remainder of the operation. From start to finish, I experienced an extremely challenging Humanitarian Assistance Operation which provided many opportunities to work with people and organizations from numerous nations; some of these experiences were good and some not so good.

Although now disbanded and their tasks shifted to the 1<sup>st</sup> Canadian Division Headquarters, the CFJHQ was, for several years, the CAF's expeditionary HQ for Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO), Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Operations, and Theatre Activation (TA). The CFJHQ had the shortest notice to move (NTM) of any unit in the CAF, with its Recce team at 12 hours NTM and the rest of the unit between 24 and 48 hours NTM. It also was designed for rapid self-deployment, other than the requirement for aircraft and crew from the Air Force. The CFJHQ regularly trained with personnel from both DFAIT and CIDA with whom they might deploy or work with in theatre. This focus on training with personnel from other government departments was critical to the DART leadership and staff understanding of not only their own responsibilities in any Humanitarian Assistance Operation but, more importantly, the responsibilities of those other key government players. It also better prepared them to understand the chaotic situation which might be in effect on the ground given the myriad other actors who would be in theatre trying to conduct similar work as our military forces. At all times, our training focused on a whole-of-government and comprehensive approach. While maybe not critical, this focus was definitely important and very beneficial to be able to properly understand and operate in missions with such diverse players.

Portions of the CFJHQ had deployed on several Humanitarian Assistance Operations in the previous 15 years since the DART was established; however, none of these operations were put into effect as quickly as the deployment

to Haiti. The DART Recce team and the four members of the ISST (two members from DFAIT, one from CIDA, and me as the CAF representative) arrived in Haiti less than 24 hours after the earthquake. Previous deployments had taken from one to several weeks to deploy as the DART was designed to participate in the Relief Phase of an operation instead of the Rescue Phase. Generally, it took several days if not weeks for the government to determine what support Canada would provide. Normally by that time, the Humanitarian Assistance Operations were well underway and structured with some national or international C2 in place and good SA of the crisis on the ground. In the case of Haiti, the CAF deployment happened so fast that there was a definite lack of SA on the extent of the devastation and no understanding of the specific requirements since needs assessments had not been completed. In fact, the international organizations that would normally participate in these activities had not yet even deployed.

The CFJHQ Recce Team was advised of the earthquake 15 minutes after it happened and was given NTM about 90 minutes later at 1830 hrs on 12 January 2010. The team rolled out of its building in Kingston for the airhead at CFB Trenton at 0630 hrs the next morning. After having to wait for some additional medical personnel sent to assist and for the final preparations of the aircrew, the team departed Trenton for Haiti at about 1100 hrs and arrived at 1645 hrs that day, slightly less than 24 hours after the earthquake took place. Our team arrived so fast that the processes which our training had been predicated upon (e.g. a well-established national and/or international C2 organization with good SA) were non-existent. More telling about the chaotic and devastating situation on the ground was the fact that the CFJHQ, which was trained to perform the three separate NEO, HA and TA tasks in different operations, ended up performing all three tasks at the same time. This was something which was neither considered nor trained for but was able to be achieved by the CFJHQ staff primarily due to the previous training of the unit on each of these three responsibilities.

## THE SITUATION IN HAITI

There were clearly many more challenges during this operation than any previous Humanitarian Assistance Operation for which DART had deployed. These were mainly due to the speed with which we deployed, the lack of SA upon arrival and for several days thereafter, the lack of any effective national C2, and the massive devastation of the city into which we deployed. The fact that Haiti was already the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere before

the earthquake did not help the situation. The earthquake had destroyed a substantial number of buildings in the capital, roads were blocked by either rubble or people living in the streets, and local transport and host nation support was almost non-existent. Our aircrew were not even aware of the state of the runway in Port-au-Prince until we arrived over the city, established communications with the tower, and did a visual check of the runway before attempting a landing. The airport building itself was damaged and we were not able to enter it. The Canadian embassy where we stayed was damaged, the main building was out of bounds and, due to a lack of space, we had to set up our Command Post and sleep on the tennis court. Limited transportation and the need to transport evacuees to the airport meant that our Recce team had to wait at the airport for almost seven hours before being picked up and the normal 10 to 15 minute trip took over an hour due to the roads being blocked by debris and people living on the streets. All this was totally different to previous missions on which the DART deployed, usually several days to weeks after the event, into an undisturbed city with appropriate infrastructure, some host nation support, and effective SA, before moving into an area to conduct their Humanitarian Assistance mission.

Additionally, the destruction in the city of Port-au-Prince meant that there was absolutely no free space anywhere in the city. Every park, sports field and many of the city's streets became places for people to set up shelters. Deploying forces and organizations had very limited locations to set up camp or stockpile aid or relief supplies. In fact, even the airport was jam-packed and the American military had taken control of the entire airport property as well as the airspace in order to ensure some control. On Day Two I actually requested that our own air bridge be temporarily slowed down due to a lack of space to put unloaded equipment and supplies and a lack of personnel and forklifts to unload the aircraft. While my higher headquarters was loath to follow my recommendation due to pressure to provide assistance as fast as possible, some of our aircraft ended up being delayed and or redirected elsewhere as the Americans would not allow them to land as scheduled due to this lack of capacity at the airport and within the city. Thus, my recommendation to delay additional aircraft temporarily, while not supported by my higher command, ended up happening anyway due to the situation on the ground.

The situation was such that on Day Three I requested that the Canadian Ambassador address the issue with the American Ambassador. The American Ambassador subsequently introduced me to the head of USAID, who was

controlling all American assistance. He subsequently gave directions that we were to be provided appropriate space by the American military controlling the airport to offload our equipment and stockpile our supplies until such time that we could find a location to deploy and clear the airhead. Without this high level engagement and direction, we would have continued to have issues with finding locations at the airport to stockpile our equipment and supplies. At the time, Port-au-Prince was the only airport in the country able to receive large aircraft and every bit of assistance from around the world was focused on arriving at that location.

The almost total lack of C2 and SA by the host nation and the fact that the UN and other organizations that would have initially established some sort of SA and a plan were not yet on the ground meant that it was difficult for us to formulate our own plan of action. The host nation C2 and SA was so bad that they were not even talking about damage in the vicinity of the epicentre during the first few days; I am not even sure if they were aware themselves where the epicentre had been. Thus, while international organizations were arriving to help, where that help should have deployed and what the exact requirements were was not clear for several days. That said, it appeared that most international aid was destined for the city of Port-au-Prince itself instead of elsewhere in the country. This gave Canada the ability to stand out from the crowd and deploy our resources outside the capital city.

## DEPLOYMENT TO JACMEL

The DART deployed by helicopter from Port-au-Prince to the city of Jacmel on the south coast of Haiti after receiving initial reports about the conditions there. This city of 40,000 people was reported as being 30 to 50 percent destroyed, completely cut-off from the outside due to the mountain road being blocked and/or cracked in numerous places, lacking fresh water, having their hospital destroyed, and receiving no assistance from anyone else. The Haitian President and Prime Minister both specifically noted their concerns for the people there based upon reports that they had received. As the resources of the DART appeared to match the needs of the city of Jacmel and we had some helicopters which could deploy my unit over the mountains to that city, the Head of Mission and I recommended that the DART deploy to Jacmel. This also got us outside of the extremely congested city of Port-au-Prince where it seemed that every other nation was trying to deploy and provide assistance. Once this was approved by the Government of Canada, deployment commenced.<sup>3</sup>

## Working with Local Organizations

In the city of Jacmel and the area, local politics with the mayor and local area leaders made assistance to the people in the city difficult. Clearly, there was some lack of trust and animosity between some of the local leaders, which often slowed down their official decision-making or skewed it one way or the other. Despite their rhetoric, it was obvious that the local leadership did not always have the best interests of the people in mind. As we were trying to support the desires of the local leadership and their civil protection agency, we had to work with them and try to influence them to do the right thing. Unfortunately, this took time and many people continued to receive less than the appropriate level of care, which they could have received had some of our recommendations been actioned immediately. We often had to do what we determined needed to be done without the involvement of the local leadership as their recommendations were often slow in coming, non-existent, or skewed toward supporting specific individuals. In the end, because they wanted our assistance and, as CO of the DART, I was the individual who made the final decision as to what we would do, we did have some influence over the local leadership. But things were not always that simple, especially after one local leader reminded me that he could easily assemble a crowd anywhere in the region, including outside our camp, which could quickly turn into a riot. The local leadership also had some strong links to some of the government's senior leadership, which was not always a positive thing as local direction and support was sometimes tied to political posturing at higher levels or by the national politician leadership. Thus, it was at times a very frustrating situation over which we had little control.

Another challenge dealing with the locals was security. In our deployment area the local police were basically non-existent and those who did exist were generally considered corrupt and not respected by the people. Luckily, they seldom left the local police station and, in fact, that was generally the only place where they could be found. There was also no Haitian military and the local UN Security Force responsible for security in that part of the country (from the UN mission that was already operating in Haiti) had too many restrictions on what it could do to be overly effective.<sup>4</sup> As such, as well as trying to bring aid to the people of the area, we ended up not only responsible for our own security, but had to take on some additional security responsibilities to assist other agencies, such as the World Food Program, to ensure proper control of the people during food distribution and feeding activities.

Our personnel retained their weapons during all of their Humanitarian Assistance duties, unlike previous DART deployments such as Pakistan in 2005, where the host nation provided security.

### **Working with International Organizations**

While most international agencies that responded to the earthquake in Haiti did good work, we did have some challenges working with some of them. Most organizations and agencies involved in Humanitarian Assistance Operations are there for the good of the people and do the best that they can in supporting the local people. This ranges from large UN organizations such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) to small "Mom and Pop" groups that just want to help out. There are always agencies or organizations that have their own agendas in such operations; as long as they are helping the people, this is not an issue because there is never enough support in such disastrous situations.

However, there were two groups in my area of operations in Haiti that made our work a bit more challenging than it needed to be. The first group was Doctors without Borders (*Médecins Sans Frontières*). Our medical personnel working outside the destroyed hospital in Jacmel ended up leaving the hospital and setting up our own clinic as several people working with the group at the same hospital made it known that they preferred that our military personnel not be there. Given that we had the ability to set up our own separate medical clinic, I had our personnel move elsewhere. That was an easy solution to the situation which also made our own security situation much easier.

The second group included some of the UN personnel who were already permanently based in the area before the earthquake. They had certain responsibilities for coordinating support to the local people but, unfortunately, some of them (in my opinion) lacked any initiative, coordination skills, or sense of urgency. The solution to getting them to be even semi-effective included initially encouraging them to make decisions during meetings for areas in which they were responsible. When that proved ineffective, I addressed my concerns directly to their UN leadership when they made a visit from Port-au-Prince to Jacmel, as their incompetence was clearly a hindrance to improving the situation on the ground for the local people.

## Working with Other Canadian Armed Forces Organizations

I was provided with support by the crew of HMCS *Halifax*, mainly through the provision of personnel for general duty tasks, and an Air Force unit which operated an airfield in my area of operations. It was especially gratifying to see how well the army, navy, and air force personnel all worked together as a team to help the Haitian people. It was clearly one team with one goal, help the Haitian people who needed our help, despite the fact that we were from three different services and had never worked with each other before. While we all did great work, it was obvious that the overwhelming desire to help in any way possible sometimes was in conflict with the requirement to “do no harm” and try to ensure an equal provision of support when feasible. As the DART and other organizations generally assist in Humanitarian Assistance Operations for the short term only, it is important to try to share limited resources as evenly as possible. Once basic needs are met, any assistance provided must be sustainable in the long term and not build up the expectations of the locals, especially when our own standards of living are higher than the normal standards of the people before the catastrophe. It is important to prevent aid recipients from becoming “targets” of others, especially criminals.

In Haiti, personnel from the DART HQ initially spent time educating the higher Canadian HQ staff with respect to Humanitarian Assistance. The higher HQ was rapidly created from two other HQ in Canada, to provide C2 to the entire Canadian Contingent, with the DART being just one of several Canadian units in theatre. Unfortunately, there were still times when my higher HQ initially gave direction to do things which were inconsistent with how my team, as well as my DFAIT and CIDA advisors,<sup>5</sup> believed they should be conducted in a Humanitarian Assistance Operation. We had to spend time “discussing” the direction because it was not considered the appropriate way ahead. In one case I was directed to take the lead on an issue that the local leadership was not resolving in a timely manner. However, if we had done so, none of the various UN organizations would have supported us and it would have delayed the situation even more. In fact, the CAF would have been all on our own without appropriate support and without any way to sustain the activity upon our departure if we had completed the task as initially directed. So, even though we might have been the largest and best resourced organization in our area of operations, the CAF was not necessarily the experts nor understood all the intricacies of Humanitarian Assistance Operations. As such, it does not always make sense to try to do things alone

or to force through a plan that might be considered inappropriate by other organizations that have much more experience and responsibilities in Humanitarian Assistance Operations.

One of the most frustrating situations throughout the initial part of the operation actually involved dealing with my own higher HQs back in Canada. This experience highlights that it can be just as challenging working with other military people, who you would expect to think in a similar way, as it would be working with civilians, who the military might not understand. While the CAF had a very well established Contingency Plan for deploying the DART, the decision was made to amend it just as we were deploying. Just over a month before the earthquake the Chief of Defence Staff had been briefed on a new concept which allowed for a more flexible response to a Humanitarian Assistance Operation abroad to include moving faster with different resources to assist in the Rescue Phase (the first 72 hours) of any Humanitarian Assistance Operation. While it might have been a good concept, it had not yet been fleshed out with any clear tasks or direction to make it into a proper plan. That plan was going to be written during the subsequent two to three months and then the concept trialled with an actual deployment of part of the DART to another country in the spring of 2010. Unfortunately, the earthquake in Haiti happened before the contingency plan was rewritten.

The revised concept did allow some assets, such as additional medical personnel,<sup>6</sup> to be deployed with the initial Recce team, as well as for a helicopter to be deployed in one of the initial lifts. However, it actually delayed the overall deployment of the DART itself as much of the DART equipment ended up being bumped to other flights so that other resources could be deployed instead. In the end the DART never did receive most of its vehicles which caused us to have to rent barely serviceable civilian vehicles to transport our personnel and to conduct any minor construction tasks that we thought would prove helpful to the locals. This in itself was extremely challenging as it there was no organization in the area from which we could just call and rent, and it was difficult to locate many vehicles that had appropriate safety standards.

There was a great desire from higher HQs to report daily on how many civilians my medical team had treated and how much water I had produced so that the Canadian public could be kept informed of our good work. Unfortunately, the results were limited compared to what they could have been because my resources were not deployed into theatre as effectively had the

original plan been executed, and appropriate resources were not available in theatre due to the poverty of the country in which we operated. While hindsight is 20/20, I would suggest that the entire deployment would have been much smoother and more effective had the original contingency plan been executed and then subsequent resources for the build-up of forces to 2000 CF personnel deployed immediately thereafter instead of a hodgepodge of the two.<sup>7</sup> As the commander on the ground, not receiving my resources as planned and practised was extremely frustrating, but we did what we could with the resources as they showed up. I know everyone had the best intentions in mind as they tried to implement the new concept but when one has to move a lot of resources quickly and many people are involved in its delivery, a well established and practised plan is better than new bright ideas.

## CONCLUSION

In the end, the deployment of 2000 CAF personnel to help the people of Haiti was an outstanding public relations success story. As CO of the DART, my team and I had some outstanding opportunities to work with many people from different nations and try to resolve situations that initially appeared unsolvable due to the chaotic situation on the ground at that time with extremely limited resources, a non-existent C2 structure, and very limited SA. However, in the end, most people worked together in order to provide whatever assistance they could to the people of Haiti. While all the personnel might not have been trained in conducting Humanitarian Assistance Operations or known the ins and outs of such activities, the average CAF member's desire to help others in any way possible is well respected and gets them focused in the right direction. The most important point to learn however is that the military has to adapt and be much more flexible, tolerant, and collaborative during Humanitarian Assistance Operations than during the warfighting missions for which it normally trains. Despite our abilities to deploy quickly and with substantial assets, many civilian organizations are actually much better trained and organized to conduct such Humanitarian Assistance missions than the military. We need to continue to learn from them.

## ENDNOTES

1 The DART HQ was based in the CFJHQ but the majority of personnel (about 170 of the 205 member team) were individual augmentees, mostly from 2 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group in Petawawa, who provided medical, logistics, engineer, and defence and

security platoons so that the DART could provide a medical clinic, potable water and limited engineer support to a humanitarian operation.

2 Whenever there is HA requirement in an area of the world to which the Government of Canada is contemplating deploying resources, potentially including the DART, it can deploy an ISST to assist the Canadian Head of Mission (HOM) in that country to make a recommendation to DFAIT, which in turn is put to the Government of Canada for a decision. The ISST consists of four individuals: two from DFAIT (one of whom is the team leader), one from CIDA, and one from the CAF. The CAF member has traditionally been the CO of the CFJHQ, who would subsequently become the CO of the DART if the decision was made to deploy the DART. In order to speed up deployment if the decision was made to deploy the DART, the CFJHQ Recce Team could deploy at the same time as the ISST. This would also give the ISST more personnel on the ground to help gather facts about the situation and determine appropriate responses, thus helping the HOM make a recommendation.

3 It is interesting to note that after making the recommendation to deploy to Jacmel, I found out that the Governor General of Canada at that time, Michaëlle Jean, grew up there and every reporter that subsequently interviewed me asked if that was why we deployed there.

4 In one such case, the World Food Program was moving some supplies to an area down the southern coast which had not yet received anything and asked us for assistance with security. The local UN Force could not get authority to deploy there given it crossed some of the boundaries put on them through national caveats.

5 The CO of the DART had both a CIDA and DFAIT advisor throughout the mission. The CIDA advisor especially was extremely useful as he understood what long term projects Canada was already doing in the country, and what might not be appropriate should we do more than provide basic medical aid and potable water. Both organizations were extremely useful in consulting with other international organizations to coordinate what could be done, especially given that they both understood the mandates of many of these other organizations. As well, they were not military and thus appeared less threatening to some of these other organizations who might not be as receptive to working with the military.

6 The deployment of these personnel caused an additional two to three hour delay to our initial deployment, as they were not on any notice to move nor packed to deploy.

7 Unfortunately, even daily talks with the Commander of Canadian Expeditionary Force Command and his direction that the DART have priority on deployment was not sufficient to put the train back on the rails once the original plan had been revised.



## CHAPTER 12

### A MILITARY POLICE EXPERIENCE FROM OP PODIUM: PROVOST MARSHAL JOINT TASK FORCE GAMES

*Commander Lucie Tremblay*

In early 2006, upon my selection for the position of Naval Provost Marshal and Senior Military Police Advisor at CFB Esquimalt, the CDS was signing the Initiating Directive for the 2010 Vancouver Olympic and Paralympic Games which the CAF code named Op PODIUM. Op PODIUM was going to be a large scale domestic operation with the main CAF contribution being to the overall security of the Vancouver 2010 Winter Games in support of the RCMP. The CDS' intent for this operation was for security of the Vancouver Games to be the number one domestic priority for the CAF for the winter of 2009-2010.<sup>1</sup> The Joint Task Force Games (JTFG) was formed, in which I was appointed the Senior MP Advisor.

The relationship between JTFG, the Vancouver Organizing Committee and the RCMP intensified and a number of operational and logistical partnerships were formed. The CAF was tasked to provide security and ceremonial support to the RCMP as the security lead. The organization formerly known as Canada Command was the CAF Office of Primary Interest and the driver in the concept of operations for the employment of MP and technical support for this large scale event. I was initially integrated into this new team on a part-time basis, in addition to fulfilling my normal duties at the Base and as an Advisor to the Commander JTF Pacific. Gradually, as we approached the Vancouver Winter Olympic Games, this new responsibility shifted from a part-time to a full-time job, that would lead to major exercises, theatre activation and deployment. By September 2009, I was fully engaged with JTFG and working under command of the Commanding Officer of the JTF Support Element (JTFSE), where I would lead a team of thirty MP personnel to assist in a variety of operational support functions to activities that could not be delivered by local standing commands.<sup>2</sup> The 2010 Games were preceded by a number of activities led by JTFG for the department, including the participation in a government integrated exercise program. This meticulous preparation by all agencies from all levels of government

ensured that they worked together and were well prepared to respond to any potential emergency on land, sea or in the air.

As part of the preparation for the 2010 Games, the CAF conducted several internal exercises to test communications, planning and interoperability with various law enforcement agencies. These exercises focused on the validation of operational readiness of the RCMP-led Integrated Security Unit (ISU).<sup>3</sup> Based on personal operational experience and expectations of working in a domestic and urban environment, there was no doubt in my mind that effective interaction between military and civilian police and other law enforcement at large would be key to the success of this operation. With emphasis being placed on testing the interaction between civilian police and higher level CAF interaction, MPs were not employed in a significant police role in the various exercises, except for limited integral support to the Land Component exercises held prior to the large domestic operation. The Army deployed with “formed units,” meaning that the units already existed and were used to working with each other.<sup>4</sup> As a result, Edmonton-based 1 MP Platoon had an advantage over other MP resources, in that they supported their component as a routine matter and while exercising for Op PODIUM, they established their police liaison network early.

Given the part-time nature of the MP role leading up to the Games, and inter-relationships focused on the work with key JTFG staff, there was only limited on-site exposure and interaction with civilian law enforcement on the mainland and a final confirmation exercise was vital. The series of government integrated exercises culminated with Exercise GOLD in November 2009, where coordinated incident responses by international, federal, provincial, regional, municipal and private industry partners were tested.<sup>5</sup> This was when MP personnel, equipment and a fleet of white MP police-marked vehicles first deployed and were introduced into the theatre of operation as part of the joint operations; the local community quickly noticed our presence. MP Officers wore the black operational patrol dress which made it harder for the public to distinguish military policemen and policewoman from a wide variety of police officers who had traveled to Vancouver to work in support of the RCMP. The MPs were stopped by the public many times on their patrols and asked questions as to why they were in the area. Sometimes members of the public would walk to access control points and question a security guard or other force protection personnel. As MP patrols grew in size and frequency, our MPs were often the first to respond to questions from curious local residents. This reaction upon initial deployment was to

be expected, even if we had established communications with local authorities sooner.

In response to various exercise scenarios and real life support to CAF personnel deployed, agreements were developed between the department and other governmental agencies for use of cells at local detention facilities. Such agreements were developed with both the Vancouver Police Department and local RCMP detachments, all having jurisdiction for their respective areas of the metropolitan city. Over the course of the deployed phase, very few incidents required the use of local police facilities and in cases where disciplinary measures were required, CAF members were dealt with by the chain of command and rapidly returned to their home units.

In the development of the concept of operation, it was agreed that MPs would remain under command of their respective environments. They would operate on various Op PODIUM sites from downtown Vancouver to Whistler, and in small supporting airport sites in between. 1 MP Platoon, as a formed entity, fell under command of the Land Component (LC) while the Air Component (AC) brought a mix of Regular and Reserve Force MP personnel as well as Wing Auxiliary Security Force members for airfield security and other air-specific needs. Throughout exercises and the operation, both LC and AC MP personnel provided close support to their respective commanders. The Maritime Component (MC) did not have assigned deployed MP assets, as it does not commonly operate in an environment with such close support. However, for this operation, the MC Commander received direct support from the JTFSE and consequently received support by MPs under my direct command. While I had oversight and technical authority over all MPs in theatre for the execution of policing functions, only JTFSE MP Platoon was under my command and control. When it came to policing in the theatre of operation, Special Constable Status was not sought after in the Province of British Columbia; therefore, our personnel were to focus their efforts on the military jurisdiction.

In early January 2010, after completing the final exercise in the Vancouver area one month prior, JTFSE MPs and equipment were deployed at the Jericho garrison camp. Composed mainly of Regular Force personnel and augmented by a few specially appointed Reserve Force MPs, the Platoon assumed its roles, working side-by-side with local police forces, patrolling the different sites where military personnel and assets were located and operating. The first week of activity in the designated area of operation saw its share of

challenges. Relevant relationships between MP leadership and Vancouver Police Sector Commanders had to be revisited and methods of communication had to be agreed upon. At the tactical level, aside from a few scenarios over the course of exercise GOLD, this was the first experience for both civilian and MP personnel working jointly in a real-life context. Working alongside local agencies augmented by hundreds of uniformed police officers from coast to coast, MPs were ready to police 4,500 Regular and Reserve Force soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen from across Canada deployed to British Columbia to help ensure a safe, enjoyable event.<sup>6</sup> MPs took part in several police convoys that required escorts for CAF assets and personnel. Those were managed by JTFSE and led by the RCMP under their jurisdiction. After the first week in theatre, routine settled in for JTFSE MPs as well as for all other MPs assigned to the Air and Land Force components. My senior staff and I were able to travel within the area of responsibility and visit CAF occupied camps, commissionaires employed in direct support to CAF, and local police representatives from Vancouver up to Whistler, British Columbia.

At that point in the 2010 Games, the MP transiting between the various areas of a crowded Vancouver city faced regular concerns. Despite the fact that the atmosphere around Olympic venues was joyful and uplifting, our personnel were often required to interact with local population for incidents unrelated to MP jurisdiction. Similarly, our jurisdiction on permanent and temporary defence establishments had to be reinforced with local authorities as there was no previous standing presence of Regular Force MPs supporting the CAF in Vancouver. Over the course of the 2010 Games, MPs also dealt with incidents involving CAF personnel that were not part of Op PODIUM but that happened to be, for a variety of reasons, inside the limits of the area of operation. In most instances, those were Regular Force CAF members on leave in the area visiting for the Olympic Games. Communications with other MP components and civilian police of jurisdiction greatly assisted in dealing with the wide variety of incidents. These examples further justified a solid relationship with local agencies.

The working relationship between the ISU and the MPs at JTFSE was identified as a key area needing our attention in the months leading to the Olympics. Upon deployment, trust-building was a concern and there was little time during this unique operation to establish trust on a professional police level. This was critical to effective operations and successful execution of the MP mandate. Every morning, along with other key support staff from JTFSE, I traveled to attend the JTFCG-led daily briefs at the Joint Operations Centre

located within the facilities of the RCMP Detachment in Richmond, British Columbia. My presence at those briefings facilitated the development and maturing of a network and greatly assisted in discussing operational issues of the day. On a tactical level, two members of the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service doubled as Criminal Intelligence Analysts for the Games, providing a valuable linkage between our MP resources and the ISU. Their independence from the chain of command as well as unique briefing protocols established with Task Force commanders and local police agencies were key in our ability to maintain effective operations.

In addition to relationship building with law enforcement partners, a large part of the JTFC Provost Marshal mandate was to coordinate security efforts with British Columbia Commissionaires. Through national contracting, commissionaires coordinated operations and brought in a large number of security guards from across Canada to partake in this unique Olympic experience. Given that Exercise GOLD was the official confirmation exercise, all DND-occupied sites were rendered fully operational between September and November 2009. Security was required for many temporary establishments, while augmentation was needed in other permanent defence establishments such as military armouries. This meant that all commissionaires had to be settled in for exercise GOLD, and employed, housed and fed throughout December, including the New Year holiday period, until military personnel would return to theatre in the first days of January 2010. This created several important interoperability challenges from a security and a resource management perspective. Communication protocols were developed to provide adequate support to all contracted security personnel. Under the LC leadership, local Reserve MP resources were critical in managing and supervising those deployed contractors over the holiday season.

Of all lessons learned by the MP during Op PODIUM, the command and control aspect was on the top of our list. The command structure prior to the recent reorganization of the MP occupation under the Canadian Forces MP Group did not allow for full independence of the policing role nor did it permit the same level of liaison. With the influx of CAF personnel to the greater Vancouver area in the year leading to the 2010 Olympic Games, taking part in recces, exercises and theatre activation, we had expected increased interaction between local police agencies and the Canadian military. With a command and control structure such as it is currently established, it is now easier to conduct liaison with agencies in anticipation of an increase in CAF population in any jurisdiction. With any large scale operation, it is important

to address real-life incident management and communications and police activity expected where large concentrations of military personnel and equipment congregate in an unfamiliar environment. Op PODIUM was a unique operation as the CAF was operating in direct support to the RCMP in their security mandate. Interaction with civilian police took place at various levels of leadership and the MP were only one of the players in the success of the 2010 Games.

Looking back at my role with Op PODIUM, I gained a lot of experience from being part of one of the largest domestic security operations in Canadian history. Its scope and scale highlighted many new challenges for modern military police operations. Many of those challenges and lessons learned derived from the 2010 Games have had a direct impact on the quality of future relationships with our security partners, not only in that province but also throughout Canada. The MP and supporting security personnel delivered an exceptional outcome of which they can be proud.

## ENDNOTES

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## CHAPTER 13

### THE COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH AND TRAINING MISSIONS: SOME GUIDELINES FOR SUCCESS

*Lieutenant-Colonel Regan Legassie*

#### INTRODUCTION

In December of 2009, 160 members of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) boarded a plane bound for Sudan. These troops were the Advance Party (Recce Company) for the Main Contingent of RSLAF personnel who would depart Freetown's Lungi Airport about a month later to make up the Sierra Leone component of an all African Peacekeeping Force in Darfur.<sup>1</sup> Though a noteworthy fact on its own, the deployment of an all African raised and led Peacekeeping Force is only a sub-theme here. The main story is that only 10 years earlier, Sierra Leone itself had been the recipient of a similar intervention to quell a bloody civil war and prevent genocide from occurring in the capital of Freetown.

The tale of how a country like Sierra Leone can rally from a failing state on the verge of anarchy and transform itself into a nation capable of maintaining its own internal and external security and contribute to the development of peace and security across Africa through its participation in African Union (AU) missions (in addition to Darfur, the RSLAF is currently involved in the AU Mission in Somalia) is testament to the results that can be achieved through comprehensive operations. Currently, CAF is a major contributor to two other large scale types of comprehensive operations of this nature – one in the Middle East (Op PROTEUS) and, of course, one in Afghanistan (Op ATTENTION). Though they vary widely in scope and structure, they both have the same end state: create professional security forces that can assume responsibility to generate, train, employ and equip the personnel needed to maintain peace and security. Since there is little doubt that these type of missions are going to continue (if not increase) in the future,<sup>2</sup> it is important to distill the main lessons from these experiences to ensure future personnel who participate in these “training missions” are properly trained and equipped to achieve success.

## SCOPE AND STRUCTURE

In general, missions of this type involve at least five major participants – diplomats, military personnel, civilian police, contractors and, increasingly, NGOs.<sup>3</sup> Though all have a unique area of focus, (i.e. civilian police usually focus on internal security while the military focuses on external security and/or aid to the civil power), all these diverse entities must work together at all levels (strategic, operational and tactical) to achieve success. For example, in Sierra Leone, the efforts of the UK Forces and CAF to re-organize, train and equip the RSLAF were bolstered by the many other agencies, including: the UK Department for International Development (DFID), who ensured the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) was properly constituted and in line with the Rule of Law; the RCMP and UK Police, who trained and mentored the Sierra Leone Police (SLP); Contractors (Pacific Architects and Engineers; PAE) who built the barracks, camps and training centres; and the ICRC who delivered training on the Geneva Conventions and the Laws of Armed conflict to RSLAF Officers and NCOs. Without regular interaction, consultation and cooperation to ensure objectives and goals were properly aligned and sequenced, all these activities could have very easily worked at cross purposes.

To further illustrate this, the analysis that follows draws similar lessons from three recent training focused comprehensive operations the CAF has been involved in:

- a. Operation SCULPTURE. Operation Sculpture was the Canadian Contribution to the British-led International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) in Sierra Leone. Established in November 2000 in response to the Lomé Peace Accords which ended the civil war in the country, IMATT was charged with re-building, re-arming and re-training the RSLAF. Op SCULPTURE was closed out in February 2013.<sup>4</sup>
- b. Operation AUGURAL. In July 2005, on the request of the AU, the CAF “loaned” over 100 Armoured Vehicles (the CAF fleet of Grizzlies) to the Darfur International Task Force (DITF) to support an AU led peace-keeping mission in Darfur.<sup>5</sup> Canada also agreed to provide logistical support to get the vehicles into Sudan and deliver a Train the Trainer capability to personnel from the Troop Contributing Nations – Senegal, Rwanda and Nigeria – to ensure they were able to effectively to operate and maintain the fleet throughout the duration of the Mission. Truly comprehensive in nature, the Canadian team was divided between

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Headquarters of the DITF and the African Union), Khartoum, Sudan (AU Mission in Sudan Headquarters) and Dakar, Senegal (logistical head in Africa and location of training). They were aided by personnel from DFAIT to sort the diplomatic complexities of shipping armoured vehicles across Africa and were reliant upon contractors to move the equipment into Sudan and shuttle the trainees from their home nations to the training centre in Senegal and then onward into Darfur.

- c. Operation PROTEUS. Twenty Canadian Forces personnel comprised Canada's contribution to the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) for the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP).<sup>6</sup> Working with British and US Forces and with civilians, the main effort has been to enhance the ability of the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) to maintain peace and security over territory newly ceded from the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) in the West Bank under the terms of the Oslo Accords.<sup>7</sup> Canada's contribution to this mission focuses on equipping, training and mentoring the National Security Force (NSF).<sup>8</sup>

Common to all of these missions (and the current mission in Afghanistan) is the focus on providing a team of international mentors and advisors to assist the host country in developing (or re-developing) its ability to recruit, fund, train, and equip indigenous forces to carry out internal and external security. Given the broad scope this type of intervention dictates, there is little doubt that a multi-national comprehensive approach is the best mechanism to ensure success.

## ORIGINS OF TRAINING MISSIONS

CAF involvement in training missions is not a recent phenomenon. Its involvement – formally known as Foreign Military Assistance and Training (FMAT) Missions – dates back to the 1960s.<sup>9</sup> Specifically,

the intent of foreign military training is to raise the effectiveness and capacity of military forces so that the receiving nation may achieve internal security and stability, which in turn should contribute to regional stability... (and)...for many nations, the development of a professional military is a central pillar of nation building.<sup>10</sup>

Canada's involvement in training missions began with interventions in Ghana during the 1960s, matured through a subsequent foray into Tanzania in the early 1970s and was incorporated into CAF operations with the establishment of the Military Training Cooperation Programme (MTCP) in the late 1970s.<sup>11</sup> Until recently, most of these interventions consisted of a handful of officers and NCOs providing instruction, mentoring and oversight in selected locations around the world, or focused on providing opportunities on existing CAF courses for officers and NCOs from the countries we sought to influence. In all cases, the interventions, while well intentioned, were often sporadic, divorced from any significant overarching plan or strategy and often under-resourced. Today, the lessons of 9-11 and the impacts failing states can have on the developed world,<sup>12</sup> coupled with the emergence of the CAF Global Engagement Strategy (GES), mean "training missions" have become an important component of the comprehensive approach to operations.

## LESSONS LEARNED

Given the scope and potential these missions can offer to failed, failing and developing states, it is imperative to approach them with a clear understanding of what can be done, how long it takes, the sequence required, and the key players necessary for success. To that end, the following considerations are offered as guidance for future missions:<sup>13</sup>

### 1. Align Infrastructure Development with Capability Development

In 2009, one of the key problems facing the PASF in the West Bank was an inability to exercise proper Command and Control. Most of the Palestinian defence and security infrastructure present in the West Bank (including Yasser Arafat's Headquarters in Ramallah) was destroyed by the IDF during the Second Intifada.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, to achieve the goal of creating the ability for the PASF to maintain peace and security in the designated areas of the West-Bank, there had to be complementary efforts to build facilities, provide equipment and train personnel to use it effectively. Therefore, for much of 2010 and 2011, this was the focus of the Operation PROTEUS. Leveraging funding provided by the U.S. State Department and CIDA, and employing both local and international contractors, the Canadians oversaw the construction of several new Joint Operations Centres, designed and developed several courses on Operational Planning and Command and Control (at both the operational and tactical levels) and then delivered them to over 600

PASF personnel in the West Bank over the course of four months. By the end of the rotation, the team had spent over 600 hours on project management, another 1000 hours on course development and close to 1100 hours delivering training in the new facilities<sup>15</sup> – a task that could not have been completed without the involvement and assistance of contractors, the U.S. State Department, CIDA and members of the U.S. and UK militaries.

2. Use Professional Military Education (PME) to foster a sense of what it means to be a “professional force” and build a culture of professionalism and discipline.

In both the West Bank and Sierra Leone, PME was used a tool to help professionalize the local forces. Unlike Western militaries, where the culture of merit-based promotion and professional development is fully integrated, these nascent forces often default to a promotion system based on progeny, monetary compensation or outright graft. Additionally, the deeply enshrined western military attribute of service before self is an anathema in these countries. Individuals in positions of power often use their authority for personal gain, usually at the expense of their subordinates.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, to change the culture and eradicate these conditions, PME was introduced into both the RSLAF and the PASF. In both cases, the initial focus was on the junior officers (2<sup>nd</sup> lieutenant to new majors), as this is the population from which the future leadership will be drawn. Building a sense of what it means to be “professional” early in a career and then reinforcing it with ongoing PME, mentoring, and opportunities to attend out of country courses and programs on leadership and staff development, affords the best chance of building and sustaining an attitude of professionalism and duty and eradicating the exiting ad hoc practices. While junior officers are usually the initial training audience, the effort must be expanded to include the junior NCO cadre to ensure the desired attributes are able to permeate throughout the organization and be reinforced by the emerging leadership; Over time, the doctrinal tenants and principles that form the basis of PME will lead to a new set of norms, thus enabling the development and sustainment of a “professional force”.

3. Design and Implement a Management Framework to Govern Recruiting and Training and Education.

A major contributor to lacklustre results in missions of this type is the belief that once the facilities have been built and the initial cadre training has been delivered, the task is complete. While it is true that these activities compose

the bulk of the effort, without an effective strategy to structure and coordinate regenerative training and manage the myriad of new qualifications and requirements, success can quickly turn to failure. For that reason, it is essential that all training missions include a complement of personnel who can design and implement a management model to govern the newly created Recruiting and Training systems.<sup>17</sup> In most modern militaries, some derivation of the Systems Approach to Training (SAT) provides this capability.<sup>18</sup> When properly implemented, a SAT process allows the adopting military to accurately define and predict existing and emerging requirements, quantify the costs and resources necessary to achieve them and then evaluate the results. Without such a mechanism in place, the host country will quickly find itself unable to maintain the advances gained during the comprehensive operation, thus diminishing the overall effectiveness of the mission.

4. Ensure all participants in the operation adjust their perceptions, mental models and expectations to meet the realities of the culture and situation.

One of the biggest problems in any comprehensive operation is coordinating the political and cultural perspectives of all the players, including those of the people you are assisting.<sup>19</sup> Described in social science research as ethnocentrism, this phenomena is a tendency to view events through the individuals own norms and customs.<sup>20</sup> Simply put, when we work with foreign militaries we are biased by our own perceptions of how long things should take, how they must be done, and finally, and perhaps most importantly, by what constitutes success. On comprehensive operations, this is compounded significantly by the numerous nationalities and perspectives of the other participants: other militaries, civilian police, NGOs, contractors. Regrettably, quite often the requirements of the host nation are overlooked or lost in the noise of these competing agendas.<sup>21</sup> Therefore, to be successful, personnel embarking on these types of missions must first be made aware of their own norms and expectations during pre-deployment training so that they can make a conscious effort to minimize the results through their lens and try to view progress through the eyes of the troops they are assisting.<sup>22</sup>

## TAKEAWAYS

A scan of any newspaper or newsmagazine today offers significant input for speculation on where the next training-focused comprehensive operation might occur. States such as Libya, Syria, Haiti and Mali are all in periods of

upheaval and transition that will no doubt result in a requirement to establish and stabilize the indigenous security forces. The deduction here is that large scale international missions to train and equip these fledgling forces are likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Given its long history in missions of this type, the CAF can position itself to be a major contributor to their success. Using the lessons above as guide, CAF personnel departing on these types of missions in the future can be well equipped to ensure success.

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7 Robert, M. Danin, *A Third Way to Palestine* (Foreign Affairs, January-February, 2011).

8 The PASF is a collection of several paramilitary organizations that were set up by Yasser Arafat. Though none can be considered an “army” since Palestine is not officially a state, they do perform certain army-like functions. The National Security Force (NSF) is akin to a rapid reaction force that is called out to quell protests and maintain order. The NSF work in aid of the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) who are not equipped for riot or crowd control and serve as a security presence in the assigned territories to prevent acts of terrorism or sabotage.

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# GLOSSARY

## OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

9/11	11 September 2001 World Trade Center Terrorist Attack
3D	Defence, diplomacy and development
10 <sup>th</sup> Mtn Div	10 <sup>th</sup> Mountain Division (Light Infantry)
AACC	All-Agency Coordination Centre
AC	Air Component
ANA	Afghanistan National Army
ANDS	Afghan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
ATA	Afghanistan Transitional Authority
AU	African Union
BG	Battlegroup
BSO	Battlespace Owner
BTK	Brigade Troop Kandahar
C2	Command and Control
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CCF	Commander's Contingency Fund
CCTM-A	Canadian Contribution to Training Mission – Afghanistan
CDC	Community Development Council

CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CEFCOM	Canadian Expeditionary Force Command
CF	Canadian Forces
CFJHQ	Canadian Forces Joint Headquarters
CFMLC	Canadian Forces Military Law Centre
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
Civ-Mil	Civilian-Military
CJIATF	Combined Joint Interagency Task Force
CJOC	Canadian Joint Operations Command
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CO	Commanding Officer
COE	Contemporary Operating Environment
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COS	Chief of Staff
CSC	Corrections Services Canada
DART	Disaster Assistance Response Team
DC	District Council
DDA	District Development Assembly
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DEVAD	Development Advisor
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DFID	Department for International Development
DG	Director General
DITF	Darfur International Task Force
DND	Department of National Defence
DSF	District Stabilization Framework
DST	District Support Team

ENGR	Engineer
EVE	Equal Value Exchange
FMAT	Foreign Military Assistance and Training
FPU	Formed Police Unit
G&D	Governance and Development
GES	Global Engagement Strategy
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GoSL	Government of Sierra Leone
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HQ	Headquarters
IA	International Agencies
IC	International Community
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDF	Israeli Defence Force
IJC	ISAF Joint Command
IMATT	International Military Advisory and Training Team
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
IO	International Organization
IPCB	International Police Coordination Board
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISF	Integrated Strategic Framework
ISST	Interdepartmental Strategic Support Team
ISU	Integrated Security Unit

JTF	Joint Task Force
JTFG	Joint Task Force Games
JTFSE	Joint Task Force Support Element
KAF	Kandahar Airfield
KDOM	Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Missions
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KPRT	Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
LAV	Light armoured vehicle
LC	Land Component
LOAC	Law of Armed Conflict
MC	Maritime Component
MC	Military Component
MDMP	Military Decision Making Process
MEPP	Middle East Peace Process
MINUSTAH	<i>Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti</i> (United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti)
MP	Military Police
MSF	<i>Médecins Sans Frontières</i> (Doctors without Borders)
MTCP	Military Training Cooperation Programme
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officers
NEO	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NSF	National Security Force

NTM	Notice to Move
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan
OGD	Other Government Departments
Op	Operation
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAE	Pacific Architects and Engineers
PASF	Palestinian Authority Security Forces
PC	Police Component
PCO	Privy Council Office
PDP	Provincial Development Plan
PER	Personnel Evaluation Report
PG	Provincial Governor
PME	Professional Military Education
PNH	<i>Police Nationale d'Haïti</i>
POMLT	Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team
PPCLI	Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSTC	Peace Support Training Centre
PSYOPS	Psychological Operations
RC	Regional Centre
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
RC(S)	Regional Command (South)
RoCK	Representative of Canada in Kandahar
ROE	Rules of Engagement
Roto	Rotation
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RP-S	Regional Platform-South

RSLAF	Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
RSSA	Region South Stabilization Approach
SA	Situational awareness
SAT	Systems Approach to Training
SLP	Sierra Leone Police
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SSI	Strategic Skills Initiative
STAB OC	Stabilization Officer Commanding
START	Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force
TA	Theatre Activation
TFK	Task Force Kandahar
TFK COMD	Commander of TFK
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFICYP	United Nations Force in Cyprus
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNREO	United Nations Rwanda Emergency Organization
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USSC	United States Security Coordinator
WoG	Whole-of-Government

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***The Comprehensive Approach: Perspectives from the Field*** is the sixth volume in the Canadian Forces Leadership Institute's "In Harm's Way" series. The series is intended to capture the leadership challenges and experiences faced by military and civilian leaders at all levels in the complex, challenging and ambiguous operations that have come to characterize the post-Cold War era. A complex environment is the hallmark of the comprehensive approach to operations. Operations in Afghanistan were Canada's most recent example of the comprehensive approach, and military and civilian experiences from these operations are well represented in this volume. Experiences from operations before Afghanistan are included to provide a historical perspective on how the comprehensive approach was applied, or, in the case of Rwanda, not applied. Experiences from Haiti, the Vancouver Olympics, and training missions in Africa and the Middle East provide a broad perspective of working in a comprehensive approach environment.

