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## Evaluation of Recruiting and Basic Military Training

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## Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADM(HR-Mil)	Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources – Military)
ADM(PA)	Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs)
AMOR	Annual Military Occupation Review
BMOQ	Basic Military Officer Qualification
BMQ	Basic Military Qualification
CDA	Canadian Defence Academy
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff
CEOTP	Continuing Education Officer Training Plan
CF	Canadian Forces
CFAEP	Canadian Forces Aboriginal Entry Program
CFAT	Canadian Forces Aptitude Test
CFDS	<i>Canada First</i> Defence Strategy
CFLRS	Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School
CFNRCC	Canadian Forces National Recruiting Contact Centre
CFRC	Canadian Forces Recruiting Centre
CFRG	Canadian Forces Recruiting Group
CFRIMS	Canadian Forces Recruiting Information Management System
CFTDC	Canadian Forces Training Development Centre
CHRC	Canadian Human Rights Commission
CMP	Chief of Military Personnel
CO	Commanding Officer
CRS	Chief Review Services
DAOD	Defence Administrative Orders and Directive
DGMPRA	Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis
DHRD	Director Human Rights and Diversity
DM	Deputy Minister
DMA	Director Marketing and Advertising
DND	Department of National Defence
DPGR	Director Personnel Generation Requirements
EC	Environmental Command
EE	Employment Equity
FY	Fiscal Year



HRMIS	Human Resources Management Information System
HRSDC	Human Resources and Skills Development Canada
IT	Information Technology
KM	Knowledge Management
LMA	Labour Market Availability
MF	Military Factor
MILPERS	Military Personnel
MPMCT	Military Personnel Management Capability Transformation
NDA	<i>National Defence Act</i>
OPI	Office of Primary Interest
PAA	Program Alignment Architecture
POR	Public Opinion Research
PRes	Primary Reserve
PWGSC	Public Works and Government Services Canada
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Reg F	Regular Force
Res F	Reserve Force
RMC	Royal Military College
RPM	Recruiting Process Manual
RPP	Report on Plans and Priorities
SIP	Strategic Intake Plan
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
WFA	Workforce Analysis
WPC	Warrior Preparation Company

## Results in Brief

Chief Review Services (CRS) conducted an evaluation of the Canadian Forces (CF) Regular Force (Reg F) recruiting and basic military training programs of the Department of National Defence (DND). The evaluation was carried out between July 2010 and April 2012, and it examined the relevance and performance of the programs with respect to their expected outcomes and capabilities, as well as that of the associated support activities.

The report was prepared as per the Departmental Five-Year Plan to comply with the Treasury Board Policy on Evaluation and the requirements of the Management Accountability Framework. The principal stakeholders for this evaluation are the Deputy Minister (DM); the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS); and the Chief of Military Personnel (CMP), who manages recruiting and basic military training for the Reg F. Other principal stakeholders include the Environmental Commanders<sup>1</sup> and the Assistant Deputy Minister (Public Affairs) (ADM(PA)).

In fiscal year (FY) 2011/12 the expenditures of the Reg F recruiting program component allotted in the Program Alignment Architecture (PAA) were \$62,650,000 and those under the basic military training component were \$312,208,000.<sup>2</sup> In total, the value of recruiting and basic military training is \$374.9 million, or approximately 1.8 percent of the DND budget.

### Background

Within DND, the recruiting and basic military training programs include the sub-sub activities found in Sections 1.2.1.1 and 1.2.2.1 of the PAA. These activities support the operational capability of the CF by attracting and enrolling sufficient applicants to meet CF personnel requirements. This includes ensuring that they are prepared morally, mentally and physically for the profession of arms and trained with the skills, knowledge and attitudes necessary to undertake their occupational training. Over the past five years, over 29,000 Reg F personnel entered the CF through the recruiting and basic military training programs. A further 22,000 Reserve personnel were also processed during the same period through the recruiting component of this program.

<sup>1</sup> The Environmental Commanders include the Commanders of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army, and the Royal Canadian Air Force.

<sup>2</sup> The PAA includes the first year of salary for recruits. The actual training phase is approximately 13 weeks.

### Overall Assessment

The evaluation found that the recruiting and basic military training programs are needed, align with federal and departmental policies and priorities, and are the responsibility of the federal government and DND.

Although the recruiting and basic military training programs are effective and efficient in the delivery of the desired outcomes, opportunities for improvement exist in the following areas:

- selecting and training recruiting staff;
- developing plans to offset cutbacks and closures; and
- aligning diversity goals with their achievability.

Collectively, these programs support the objective of providing the people necessary to enable DND to provide combat-effective, multi-purpose forces ready to protect Canada and Canadians at home and abroad. Personnel are a key pillar of the *Canada First* Defence Strategy (CFDS) and as such allow the CF to meet its designated missions. The outputs and outcomes of the programs with respect to the overall objectives of the CF are depicted in the recruiting and basic military training logic model ([Annex B](#)).

## Delivery Approach

The CF accomplishes its recruiting and basic military training activities in four phases – requirements determination, attraction, and selection/processing, following which successful applicants proceed for basic military training.

## Methodology

The evaluation used multiple lines of evidence to ensure the reliability of reported results and utilised both qualitative and quantitative methods, including:

- document reviews including the *National Defence Act* (NDA), DND Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP), CF Recruiting Strategic Level Guidance on Winning the War for Talent 2007, Office of the Auditor General May 2006 Report, and numerous other DND and Canadian Forces Recruiting Group (CFRG) reports on recruiting and basic military training;
- key informant (stakeholders, subject matter experts) interviews regarding the effectiveness of recruiting and basic military training and issue identification;
- a case study of one enrolment program – the Continuing Education Officer Training Plan (CEOTP) to assess specific issues identified by program stakeholders;
- surveys of activity stakeholders (recruiters, participants, and key staff) to assess both efficiency and effectiveness;
- an administrative and financial data review, including trend analysis; and
- benchmark comparisons to other nations (Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US)) to assess efficiencies and alternate approaches.

## Key Findings/Observations and Recommendations

### Overall Findings – Relevance

Over the past five years the CF has grown from approximately 64,000 Reg F military personnel to over 68,000. As per the CFDS, there is an ongoing need to maintain the CF at these levels, and offset an annual level of attrition of approximately 6 percent. Therefore, the need for this program is demonstrated by the ongoing demand to replace approximately 4,000 military personnel each year to maintain current levels.

As no other organization would recruit for the Canadian military, and since it is not possible to obtain suitably trained soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen from the Canadian education system, or the private sector, the activities under the recruiting and basic military training programs are an appropriate role for DND to undertake. In fact, there is a legislative responsibility to do so. Under the NDA (1985) it is the responsibility of the DND to provide a military force for the government of Canada.

Recent government commitments towards maintaining the military personnel levels of the CF at 68,000 also highlight that these programs are and will be an ongoing priority for DND.

### Overall Findings – Performance (Effectiveness)

The evaluation found that overall, the recruiting and basic military training programs are effective in the delivery of the desired outcomes. However, there are opportunities for improvement.

To evaluate the effectiveness of the programs, a review of each component activity was conducted and assessed against meeting objectives and desired outcomes. It was found that the programs are successful in attracting sufficient numbers and quality of people to meet the vast majority of recruiting targets and basic military training requirements. Furthermore the programs have demonstrated innovation in their move towards the use of online tools, and in the provision of approaches to drive up diversity, such as the Bold Eagle initiative for Aboriginals. The programs also are seeking to improve the training success rate by establishing physical training initiatives (such as Warrior Preparation Company (WPC)) in advance of traditional basic military training.

There are opportunities for improvement in the distribution and maintenance of relevant policies and guidelines, as well as in the selection and training of recruiting staff. Furthermore, the existing data management systems are not conducive to providing sufficient information for comprehensive statistical analysis, which limits the ability of the program to manage its operation at the strategic level. Other issues noted include the recent closure of numerous CFRG detachments without any apparent compensatory approaches, which will result in reduced access or modified levels of service in the affected regions. Lastly, the feasibility of the current employment equity (EE) goals need to be reviewed.

### Recommendations

1. As the CF has reached its expansion goals, update, or replace the 2007 Canadian Forces Recruiting Strategic Level Guidance on Winning the War for Talent and other relevant recruitment and basic military training policies and guidelines to provide a greater emphasis on recruiting quality candidates versus expansion targets.

**OPI:** CMP

2. Streamline recruiting guidelines and policies and establish a Central Repository System to store all relevant recruiting policies, and guidelines.

**OPI:** CMP



3. Implement changes to ensure that all new recruiters receive training at the commencement of their duties, and that the training also incorporates improvements in interpersonal skills such as interview techniques, communications, marketing and career counselling. A 2011 study completed by the Director General Military Personnel Research and Analysis<sup>3</sup> (DGMPRA) should be considered in developing options for change.

**OPI: CMP**

4. Review, update, and assess compliance with policies on the selection of staff for posting to recruiting positions.

**OPI: CMP**

5. Establish centralized and formal processes and tools to retrieve, track, and utilize the necessary data to improve strategic decision making regarding resource allocation and recruiting approaches.

**OPI: CMP**

6. Work with Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) to address timing issues and means to establish procurement instruments for marketing campaigns that can put contracts in place during the start of the calendar year.

**OPI: CMP**

7. Develop and implement plans for alternate approaches for maintaining national access to recruiting services for all Canadians and for supporting Reserve processing following personnel reductions in CFRG and CFRG/detachment closures.

**OPI: CMP**

8. Assess the realistic ability of the CF to achieve its EE goals and if necessary consider improving or adding more EE special programs towards reaching them.

**OPI: CMP**

9. In lieu of targets based upon overall long-term objectives with no concrete end date, establish annual goals to be met in each EE category based upon realistic measures of attrition and recruiting capacity.

**OPI: CMP**

### **Overall Findings – Performance (Efficiency and Economy)**

While overall, the programs demonstrate reasonable efficiency and economy, there are opportunities to become more efficient.

Trend analysis of overall program expenditures and staff numbers demonstrates that despite transitioning from a growth mode to one of sustainment, the cost per recruit still compares favourably with other recruiting programs from benchmark nations, including those that use the private sector for recruiting.

<sup>3</sup> Job Analysis: Canadian Forces Recruiter Position: Selection and Training Recommendations, December 2011, DGMPRA.

One area of opportunity lies in improving performance measurement. Due to data limitations, the recruiting program has not established formal efficiency measures and as such it is difficult to determine if the most efficient allocation of resources is being utilized. For example, the lack of data makes it uncertain if recent reductions in the number of recruiting centers are cost-effective solutions. While they have reduced costs, there may be negative outcomes in the areas of program reach and level of service provided to Reserve Force (Res F) processing, and EE recruiting programs. Further, additional resources were not provided to CFRG to offset the loss of presence of these centers, such as investing in improved e-recruiting tools.

The main inefficiency, however, exists in various components of personnel requirements planning and management, primarily with the inability to synchronize all of the sequential recruiting and training elements. This lack of coordination between recruiting, basic military training, and occupational training has resulted in personnel waiting for extended periods of time for their next level of training, resulting in serious losses in efficiency as trained personnel essentially are not utilized for months on end.

### **Recommendations**

10. Conduct a more detailed business case review of the current resource allocation for recruiting while maintaining current standards and national access. To enable this there is a need to improve the data management system (as per Recommendation 5).

**OPI:** CMP

11. Develop a refined methodology to determine an accurate cost per recruit and cost per applicant. Conduct a trend analysis over the coming years starting with FY 2011/12 to monitor the costs on an ongoing basis.

**OPI:** CMP

12. Develop options to ensure Basic Military Qualification (BMQ) graduation numbers are in alignment as much as possible with the demand and availability of occupation training. This includes expanding CFRG's just-in-time training initiative. Coordinate this analysis with Recommendation 5.

**OPI:** CMP

13. Study alternative approaches to recruiting over time to determine if there are any cost-effective opportunities or lessons to be learned.

**OPI:** CMP

### **Performance – Continuing Education Officer Training Plan**

The evaluation found that CEOTP, although a relevant entry program, has been poorly managed throughout its existence. A new policy document for the program is felt by stakeholders to address its known deficiencies.

**Recommendation**

14. Review Defence Administration Order and Directive (DAOD) 5002 – 6 for compliance within three years.

**OPI:** CDA

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**Note:** Please refer to [Annex A](#)—Management Action Plan for the management response to the CRS recommendations.

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## 1.0 Introduction

This report presents the results of the evaluation of the CF Reg F recruiting and basic military training programs. The evaluation was undertaken by CRS between July 2010 and April 2012 on behalf of the CDS and the DM. The evaluation will be used to inform future senior management decisions related to the recruiting and basic military training programs. While the DM and CDS and the Environmental Commanders are the primary “clients” for this program, the key program delivery partner is CMP.

### 1.1 Profile of Recruiting and Basic Military Training

The purpose of recruiting and basic military training is to support the operational capability of the CF by attracting and enrolling sufficient applicants to meet CF personnel requirements. This includes ensuring that they are prepared morally, mentally and physically for the profession of arms and trained with the needed skills, knowledge and attitudes to undertake their occupational training. The programs have existed from the onset of the establishment of the CF, and address the needs of the CF for both officers and enlisted personnel for all three environments (Royal Canadian Navy, Royal Canadian Air Force, Canadian Army) plus Military Personnel Command in over 100 different occupations.

#### 1.1.1 Background

During the past five years (FYs 2007/08 to 2011/12) the CF has grown from 64,397 to approximately 68,000 personnel. The recruiting and basic military training programs have been responsible for meeting these growth demands, as well as the ongoing maintenance of these levels. In fact over the past five years over 29,000 Reg F personnel have entered the CF. A further 22,000 Reserve personnel were also processed during the same period through the Reserve recruiting component of this program.

#### 1.1.2 Objectives of the Programs

The specific activities, outputs and outcomes of the recruiting and basic military training programs are illustrated in the program logic model, as shown in [Annex B](#).

The CF recruiting and basic military training programs aim to achieve the following immediate, intermediate and long term outcomes:

- Immediate Outcomes
  - A well-managed and modern recruiting system is in place
  - Sufficient number of suitable applicants has been attracted for each occupation
  - Sufficient number of applicants is processed and the right person is recruited into the right occupation at the right time
  - Sufficient recruits are prepared for the profession of arms and trained with the needed skills, knowledge and attitudes to undertake occupation training

- Intermediate Outcome
  - CF has qualified and sufficient numbers of personnel ready at the right standard to commence occupational training
  - CF reflects Canadian society
- Ultimate Outcomes
  - Force generators have sufficient personnel to accomplish assigned tasks
  - CF is seen as an employer of choice
  - Canadians recognize the value of the CF
  - CF has a culture of retention

### 1.1.3 Benefit to Canadians

Canadians benefit in several ways from the recruiting and basic military training programs:

- high-quality candidates are selected for the CF;
- Canada has a strong Armed Forces to meet defence commitments;
- safety and security at home and abroad; and
- employment and training opportunities.

### 1.1.4 Delivery Approach

The CF accomplishes its recruiting activities in three phases – requirements determination, attraction, and processing and selection, following which successful applicants proceed to basic military training.

- Requirements determination: to determine the needs of the CF, a Strategic Intake Plan (SIP) is prepared annually which determines how many enrollees are required, from which entry plan, and into which occupation.
- Attraction: various approaches are used to attract applicants to the CF, including national marketing and advertising campaigns, online sites (*www.forces.ca*), and direct recruiting through attendance at job fairs, high schools and universities.
- Processing and selection: the process can take one of two forms. In some circumstances it is a “first past the post” system whereby applicants are selected for enrolment in the order that they successfully meet all the entrance requirements. Alternatively, satisfactory applicants are pooled and then selected in competition with others.
- Basic military training: following enrolment, recruits normally proceed to Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School (CFLRS) at Canadian Forces Base St. Jean, Quebec, to begin their initial training through either the BMQ training or the Basic Military Officer Qualification (BMOQ) training.

### 1.1.5 Program Resources

The recruiting and basic military training programs include the sub-sub activities found in Sections 1.2.1.1 and 1.2.2.1 of the PAA. In FY 2011/12 the expenditures of the Reg F recruiting program component allotted in the PAA were approximately \$62,650,000 and those under the basic military training component approximately \$312,208,000.

## 2.0 Methodology

### 2.1 Evaluation Objective and Scope

The evaluation followed the scope and methodology set out in an evaluation work plan developed during the planning phase completed prior to the commencement of the evaluation. The evaluation work plan was designed to align with the Treasury Board Policy on Evaluation (April 2009). The following sections outline the evaluation aim scope, issues and questions, data collection methods, and limitations for the evaluation.

The objective and scope of the evaluation are as follows:

- to assess the relevance and performance of CF recruiting and basic military training programs for the period from FYs 2007/08 to 2011/12;
- to assess and analyze one specific entry program—the CEOTP; and
- to examine the current status of “red/distressed” occupations.

This evaluation focused primarily on the relevance and performance of the CF Reg F recruiting program and the Reg F basic military training program. It did not assess the following:

- Res F SIP, attraction, recruiting, and initial training and outcomes except for CFRG’s capability to process Res F applications; nor
- the accuracy or rationale of the individual occupations’ Reg F SIP.

### 2.2 Evaluation Issues and Questions

The evaluation of Recruiting and Basic Military Training examined issues related to relevance and performance (see [Annex C](#) for the complete evaluation matrix, which also includes specific indicators and methodologies for each evaluation question).

#### Relevance

##### Evaluation Questions

- **Continued Need.** Is there a continued need for the CF to attract, recruit, and train new members for its occupations?
- **Alignment with Government Priorities.** Are the objectives of CF recruiting and basic military training, linked with federal government priorities and DND/CF strategic outcomes?
- **Alignment with Federal Roles and Responsibilities.** Does the DND/CF role in CF Reg F recruiting and basic military training align with federal roles and responsibilities?

**Performance (Effectiveness) – Immediate****Evaluation Questions**

- Is there a well-managed and modern recruiting system in place?
- Have sufficient numbers of suitable applicants been attracted for each occupation?
- Have sufficient numbers of applicants been processed and has the right person been recruited into the right occupation at the right time?
- Have sufficient recruits been prepared to undertake occupational training?

**Performance (Effectiveness) – Intermediate****Evaluation Questions**

- Does the CF have qualified and sufficient numbers of personnel ready at the right standard to commence the occupational training phase?
- Does the CF reflect Canadian Society?

**Performance (Efficiency and Economy)****Evaluation Questions**

- Are the most appropriate and efficient means being used for CF Reg F recruiting and basic military training activities including training synchronization?
- Are there alternatives for delivering these services?

**Other Issues****Evaluation Question**

- Is CEOTP a relevant, effective and efficient officer entry plan?

**2.3 Data Collection Methods**

A key intent of this evaluation was to assess relevance and performance. Mixed methods design, encompassing qualitative and quantitative methods, were used to address certain complexities and risks within the programs as well as to enhance the reliability and validity of the information and data collected.

A logic model built by the evaluation team was considered by the evaluation Advisory Group (a group of key stakeholders formed to provide advice, primarily for the evaluation plan/strategy and findings/recommendations), and program stakeholders assisted the evaluation team to determine the programs' outcomes (immediate, medium and long term).

An Evaluation Matrix/Framework ([Annex C](#)) was developed to describe the methodologies adopted for each evaluation question as well as the data sources used. The Evaluation Framework also ensured that all evaluation information needs regarding relevance and performance were addressed. Fieldwork for this report was conducted from June 2010 to December 2011.

The evaluation involved the following lines of evidence:

- literature scan and program document review;
- key informant interviews;
- administrative and financial data review including trend analysis;
- questionnaires;
- case studies (which included document/administrative data reviews, questionnaires and interviews);
- external expert opinion; and
- benchmarking.

### 2.3.1 Document Review

Preliminary documents reviewed included background documentation, as well as materials related to departmental priorities such as the CFDS, Defence Priorities FY 2011/12, the Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP), CF Recruiting Strategic Level Guidance on Winning the War for Talent, CMP Functional Guidance documents, CDS documents such as the Military Personnel Management Doctrine, previous reviews such as the 2006 Office of the Auditor General Report and background information on CFLRS. In addition, Canadian federal policy documents and priority identification instruments (e.g., Budget Speeches, Canada’s International Policy Statement,) were reviewed. All relevant documents were further organized according to evaluation questions and indicators in the Evaluation Framework/Matrix ([Annex C](#)).

### 2.3.2 Key Informant Interviews

Interviews (n=45) were held with key senior stakeholders from CMP, CFRG, the Canadian Defence Academy (CDA), CFLRS, ADM(PA) and senior staff from the Army, Navy and Air Force, other occupation authorities and advisors, and an outside comparable agency, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). These provided context to the document review and data analysis as well as qualitative input on the evaluation questions.

All interviewees received an interview guide in advance. Interviews were mostly conducted in person. Follow-up to some of the interviews was conducted by e-mail and telephone. A template organized according to evaluation questions and indicators was used to summarize the interview data, which was then coded and analyzed.

The evaluation used the following qualifiers in the findings to give the reader a sense of the “weight” of the interview respondents:

- “some or a few” refers to fewer than five respondents;
- “many” refers to less than half of the respondent group, but more than “some”;
- “most” refers to the majority of respondents; and
- the “vast majority” of respondents refer to more than 80 percent of the respondent group.





### 2.3.3 Administrative and Financial Data Review

Program performance data was reviewed to determine to what degree the program was achieving its intended outcomes. Administrative data for the five-year period (FYs 2006/07 to 2011/12) covered by this evaluation that was reviewed included requirements reports, recruiting activity reports (monthly/quarterly), statistical reports such as success and attrition rate at CFLRS and expenditures and budget related reports and/or analysis of these reports. Moreover, reports such as Annual Military Occupation Reviews (AMOR) were reviewed to provide links between the SIP and the requirements of the users. The administrative data review also introduced various issues which were further pursued in interviews and questionnaires.

Data analysis of the actual program utilization and expenditures in comparison to the attributed funds in PAA sub-sub activity 1.2.1.1 and PAA sub-sub activity 1.2.2.1 also supported findings. This information was derived from multiple sources in DND's financial reporting data base: Defence Resource Management Information System.

### 2.3.4 Questionnaires

Three online questionnaires were conducted from April 2011 to May 2011. The questionnaire populations were the Commanding Officers (COs) of the Occupation Schools; current officers enrolled in the CEOTP; and recruiters who work in Canadian Forces Recruiting Centers (CFRC) across Canada. In each case, the whole population was surveyed.

In the case of the COs of Occupation Schools, the population was relatively small (n=16); therefore, sampling was not necessary. The questionnaire focused on the achievement of extant basic military training standards by students arriving at the occupational training schools as well as the suitability of those standards for occupational training requirements.

The aim of the second questionnaire was to contact all officers enrolled in the CEOTP to assist in determining whether the CEOTP was still a relevant enrolment plan, had been implemented as planned, and had reached its intended outcomes. The questionnaire link was sent to all records of names recorded in the CEOTP commissioning plan (441 names). The response rate was 41 percent.

The aim of the third questionnaire was to determine whether or not recruiting processes and procedures were clearly defined and well understood by the CF recruiting staff. Assuming all the positions were filled, the total number of recruiters recruiting for the Reg F is estimated around 198 (88 Reg F, 110 Res F) working across Canada. The questionnaire link was sent to all recruiting centers by CFRG headquarters inviting recruiters to participate. The response rate for this questionnaire was 67 percent.

All three online questionnaires comprised a blend of questions that required open-ended responses or opinions conveyed through a seven-point scale anchored at the end-points with the terms “strongly agree” (7) and “strongly disagree” (1), and a “not applicable” point outside the scale. Respondents were asked to respond to their level of agreement with questionnaire statements and to provide qualitative statements.

### **2.3.5 Advisory Group**

An advisory group of key stakeholders was formed to provide their views on policy, analytical, and operational issues related to recruiting and basic military training.

### **2.3.6 Observation**

The evaluation team attended two AMOR meetings in order to gain an understanding of the AMOR process, and to provide focus on key questions of the evaluation.

### **2.3.7 Benchmarking**

A search for “best practices” in the US, the UK and Australia was conducted to establish a comparative analysis. The results provided a basis for comparison between similar organizations. This information was derived from various sources including the web sites of defence departments of the above mentioned countries, previously completed studies, newspaper articles and interviews with contacts attained through Canadian Defence Attachés stationed in these countries.

RCMP staff members were also consulted on several evaluation issues to establish a comparative analysis.

## **2.4 Limitations**

The following are limitations of this evaluation:

- Financial data is not maintained separately for recruiting work related to the Reg F and the Res F.
- A lack of available data on costs and outcomes associated with similar or comparable programs limited the detailed analysis of cost effectiveness.
- The registered response rate to online questionnaire was low due mainly to technical issues (broken links). Moreover, out of office replies were high—particularly with the CEOTP surveys—due to CF deployment in Afghanistan and elsewhere around the world. The response rate to the questionnaire to the occupation schools was particularly low, both due to technical and out of office reasons. For this reason, the evaluation team undertook a different methodology and interviewed the occupation authorities for the three Environmental Commands (ECs) and the support occupations.
- The records of CEOTP officers were not reliable.

## 3.0 Evaluation Findings

### 3.1 Relevance

The following section examines the extent to which the CF Reg F recruiting and basic military training programs address a demonstrable need, are appropriate to the federal government role, and are aligned with DND/CF priorities.

#### 3.1.1 Continued Need for the CF Recruiting and Basic Military Training Programs

**Finding 1.** To sustain the Canadian Forces, there is an ongoing need for a reliable, effective, and efficient, recruitment system.

As shown in Table 1, over the past five years the CF has grown from approximately 64,000 Reg F military personnel to over 68,000. This growth was met by the activities of the recruiting and basic military training programs. As per the document review,<sup>4</sup> there is an ongoing need to maintain the CF at these levels, and offset an annual level of attrition of approximately 6 percent.

FY	Total Strength (1 April)	Intake Target	Forecast Attrition	FY Attrition Rate	Strength (31 March)	Force Expansion Target
2007/08	63,716	6,717	6,088	9.1%	64,397	68,000
2008/09	64,397	7,701	6,217	9.1%	65,890	68,000
2009/10	65,890	7,522	5,293	7.6%	68,124	68,000
2010/11	68,124	4,806	4,691	6.7%	68,250	68,000
2011/12	68,250	4,044	4,407	6.3%	67,887	68,000
2012/13	67,887	4,400	4,319	6.2%	67,968	68,000
2013/14	67,968	4,170	4,152	6.0%	67,986	68,000
2014/15	67,986	4,275	4,019	5.9%	68,242	68,000

**Table 1. CF Recruiting Requirements.** The recruiting and basic military training programs fulfill their mandate in recruiting and training sufficient numbers of candidates to meet a force expansion target of 68,000.

Source: Data compiled from CMP/CFRG

<sup>4</sup> DAOD 5002-0, Military Personnel Requirements and Production, CMP; Military Personnel Management Functional Planning Guidance FY 2011/12, CMP; The Fight of Today, Military Personnel Planning and Management Document, CMP, 2009.

### 3.1.2 Alignment with Government Priorities

**Finding 2.** The objectives of the recruitment and basic military training programs align with federal and departmental policies and priorities.

The evaluation found that the CF Reg F recruiting and basic military training programs align with two of the Government of Canada Priorities<sup>5</sup>: 1) a safe and secure world through international cooperation, and 2) a safe and secure Canada.

DND/CF contributes directly to these objectives by providing combat ready military forces that can be tailored to meet both domestic and foreign expectations. By responding to annual personnel requirements, the recruiting and basic military training programs directly contribute to this outcome.

It is clear from DND documentation that recruiting and basic military training are priorities for the Department. The RPPs for DND for the five years (FYs 2006/07 to 2010/11) place specific emphasis on recruiting. These reports consistently include the priority of “Strengthening the Defence Team: recruit, develop and sustain under-strength military and civilian occupations”. In addition, this program is a current activity under Section 1.2 of the PAA for the Department.

The CF Reg F recruiting and basic military training programs are aligned with Part V of the CFDS – Rebuilding the CF/Investing in People. By ensuring sufficient numbers of suitable applicants are attracted, enrolled and trained to support occupational and operational requirements as defined in the SIP, the programs contribute directly to the personnel pillar of the CFDS – rebuilding the CF personnel.

### 3.1.3 Alignment with Federal Roles and Responsibilities

**Finding 3.** Based upon program information gathered during the evaluation plan and the conduct of the evaluation, it was concluded that there is alignment between the recruiting and basic military programs and departmental and federal roles and responsibilities.

A literature review was conducted to assess whether the recruiting and basic military training programs aligned with Government of Canada and DND roles and responsibilities. The assessment for this issue was based on the following performance indicators:

- linkages to federal roles and responsibilities; and
- linkages to DND/CF roles and responsibilities.

<sup>5</sup> NDA, R.S., chapter N 4, section 1, Department of Justice.

Federal responsibility for these programs is linked through the NDA,<sup>6</sup> which outlines the responsibility of the Government of Canada and DND to provide armed forces for Her Majesty, raised by Canada and consist of one Service called the Canadian Armed Forces (i.e., the CF). The NDA<sup>7</sup> establishes the Reg F consisting of officers and non-commissioned members who are enrolled for continuing, full-time military service.

To deliver this outcome, it is necessary to maintain a standing force of some 68,000 Reg F military personnel, trained in more than one hundred occupations and specialties. It is important to emphasize that the CF, unlike most other organizations, must recruit and develop its staff bottom up, before they are employable. Neither the Canadian education system, nor the private sector, produces soldiers, sailors, airmen and airwomen that can readily be employed in the CF. Accordingly, to obtain qualified personnel, it is the role and responsibility of the CF to operate and maintain a recruiting and training system.

### 3.2 Performance (Effectiveness)

The following section provides the findings with respect to how effectively the CF recruiting and basic military training programs have achieved their intended results over the course of the evaluation period.

The immediate, intermediate and long-term outcomes for the evaluation of recruiting and basic military training are displayed on the logic model at [Annex B](#). For this evaluation, only immediate and intermediate outcomes were assessed as the long-term outcomes are heavily influenced by numerous activities and factors external to this evaluation—far more so in fact than by the earlier outcomes of the program. Causal linkages between the recruiting and initial training program and its long-term - outcomes, while they exist, cannot be definitively established.

#### 3.2.1 Immediate Outcome 1: A Well-managed and Modern Recruiting System

The 2007 document Canadian Forces Recruiting Strategic Level Guidance on Winning the War for Talent<sup>8</sup> provides strategic input to guide the CF recruiting activities, and calls for a modern recruiting system. For the purpose of this evaluation, these were aligned with respective performance indicators:

- stakeholders understand, comply with, and feel policies and processes are effective;
- use of modern approaches;
- stakeholder assessment of quality of staff; and
- performance measurement systems are in place and incorporated in the decision-making system.

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<sup>6</sup> NDA, 1968, R.S. chapter N-4, section 1.

<sup>7</sup> NDA 15-1.

<sup>8</sup> Strategic Level Guidance on Winning the War for Talent. This document (2007) provides strategic-level guidance on recruiting, primarily focusing on recruiting— attract high quality people required to achieve the effect of transformed, expanded CF.

## Policy and Process

**Finding 4.** While a functional governance system for recruiting and basic military training exists, there are opportunities for improvement. Policies and guidelines need to be clarified, standardized, updated regularly and disseminated promptly across all CFRCs.

Key informant interviews with directors and senior staff from CMP, CFRG, and the ECs were conducted (n=9) to assess the effectiveness of this governance structure. While there was unanimous agreement among the stakeholders that there was clear and ample communication in both directions throughout the Chain of Command, the evaluation also found that there are concerns with the implementation of the governing policies. For example, although a record of decisions is published after each committee meeting, some informants commented that these did not easily translate into direction and policies.

While a vast majority of the recruiters (n=99/103) who responded to the CF recruiters' questionnaire found that the policies for the recruiting process yielded effective results, a significant number (n=38/103) felt that these processes were not easy to follow. More specifically, under the additional comments section of the survey, 27 respondents noted the following:

- selection policies were not easy to follow, were overly complex and continuously changing. A better dissemination system of new DAODs/policies is required (n=10);
- interpretations of policies and guidelines are inconsistent across CFRCs—no standardization (n=8); and
- sifting through information slows down the process. A central repository system should be in place to store all relevant policy information (n=9).

## Recommendations

1. As the CF has reached its expansion goals, update, or replace the 2007 Canadian Forces Recruiting Strategic Level Guidance on Winning the War for Talent and other relevant recruitment and basic military training policies and guidelines to provide a greater emphasis on recruiting quality candidates versus expansion targets.

**OPI:** CMP

2. Streamline recruiting guidelines and policies and establish a Central Repository System to store all relevant recruiting policies, and guidelines.

**OPI:** CMP

## Use of Modern Approaches

**Finding 5.** The program is utilizing modern approaches in the delivery of its activities, particularly through the increased use of online and web-based systems.

The consensus view among the stakeholders interviewed from the three ECs, CFRG and CMP (n=13) was that the CF recruiting attraction campaigns/activities have successfully contributed to significant numbers of applicants being attracted during the force expansion. Senior staff from CMP, CFRG and ADM(PA) pointed out that, although there was room for improvement, advancements on the *forces.ca* website and online recruiting have been noteworthy and are providing improved visibility for the CF. For example, data indicating the number of visits to the *forces.ca* website have demonstrated significant increases to the website over the last few years.

## Quality of Recruiting Personnel

**Finding 6.** A review of stakeholders and a survey of key informants found that overall the quality of staff, infrastructure, tools and technology is seen to be effective. There were no concerns expressed over the quality of recruiting centers. Some concerns were expressed over the quality of recruiters due to training and selection issues.

Recruiters require a wide range of knowledge and skills including those of marketing, an understanding of all entry plans and occupations, as well as strong interpersonal skills.

To meet this need new recruiters receive a two-week training course followed by a period of on-the-job training. Several initiatives have been under way to improve recruiter skills, such as updating and formalizing the recruiting series of courses to make them a qualification, updating and digitizing the Recruiters Handbook, improving performance measurement metrics and developing a recruiting doctrine (a draft is in circulation). In addition, a recruiter's screening protocol is being implemented so that only those clearly suitable and motivated to work in a recruiting environment are selected to do so.

Both recruiters themselves and relevant stakeholders were asked about the selection of recruiters and their preparation for employment. Comments received from stakeholder interviews were generally positive (77 percent interviewees). Indicative comments include the following:

- Most informants from CMP and CFRG felt that recruiter selection was less focussed on finding the best and aimed more towards finding someone who was available and willing. Recruiting is viewed as less than desirable employment in several occupations. Five recruiting COs have expressed disappointment to CFRG headquarters in the selection of their recruiting staff.
- Most recruiters and training providers interviewed commented that the two-week recruiter training provided only a basic knowledge and skills to perform their day-to-day duties.



- Most stakeholders interviewed opined that recruiter training was lacking in areas related to necessary interpersonal skills; recruiter training was widely felt to be more focussed on knowledge of the various occupations in the CF. The suggestion was made at the supervisory level that recruiting become a specific occupational specialty in order to provide increased quality and to develop longevity and continuity amongst recruiters.
- It was also noted by 13 respondents that there was a need for more bilingual recruiters serving in areas requiring bilingual services.

The Recruiter Questionnaire found that when training courses were provided, the majority (67 percent) felt they were relevant to their needs. However, 30 percent of respondents indicated that they did not receive training in a timely manner prior to commencing their employment. The questionnaire found, however, that this was offset by on-the-job training, and the vast majority (97 percent) were eventually satisfied with the overall level of training received.

### Recommendations

3. Implement changes to ensure that all new recruiters receive training at the commencement of their duties, and that the training also incorporates improvements in interpersonal skills such as interview techniques, communications, marketing and career counselling. A 2011 study completed by DGMPPRA<sup>9</sup> should be considered in developing options for change.

**OPI:** CMP

4. Review, update, and assess compliance with policies on the selection of staff for posting to recruiting positions.

**OPI:** CMP

### Performance Measurement

**Finding 7.** The recruiting and basic military training programs collect sufficient data to undertake useful performance measurement. However, retrieving these data for statistical analysis has been problematic due to inadequate data management systems. This is a significant concern since decisions regarding the program are not being made with the use of pertinent, supporting data. The Military Personnel Management Capability Transformation (MPMCT) project may be able to address this problem.

The document reviews and informants' comments (CMP, CFRG, and CDA (n=32) pointed out that performance measurement frameworks are in place to inform program outcomes. However, according to the program informants, technological weaknesses in data base systems i.e., the Canadian Forces Recruitment Information Management System (CFRIMS) and the Human Resources Management Information System (HRMIS) have been posing an ongoing day-to-day challenge in data collection. Further, the CFRIMS data base was not designed to support statistical analysis or capture of most data (or where it does capture data, it often does not allow for it to be exported or

<sup>9</sup> Job Analysis: Canadian Forces Recruiter Position: Selection and Training Recommendations, December 2011, DGMPPRA.



accessed via query or report). The current MPMCT project aims to establish a modern, flexible and integrated military personnel management capability including the upgrade and acquisition of modern, integrated information management/information technology enablers.

### Recommendation

5. Establish centralized and formal processes and tools to retrieve, track, and utilize the necessary data to improve strategic decision making regarding resource allocation and recruiting approaches.

**OPI:** CMP

### 3.2.2 Immediate Outcome 2: Sufficient Number of Suitable Applicants Have Applied for Each Occupation

The CF Strategic Level Guidance<sup>10</sup> document directed the CF to outperform competitors to attract talent by maintaining continuous contact with Canadians through competent, professional recruiting staff using the most relevant media options available. The same document also guided the CF to encourage dedicated individuals, who are mentally and physically fit, towards military service as a career of choice. Recently this has been an increasingly difficult challenge:

- according to the latest reports on Canadian demographics,<sup>11</sup> the traditional pool from which the recruits are drawn has been shrinking;
- factors such as increased levels of education, an aging workforce, a labour pool increasingly made up of immigrants, and the changing expectations regarding the nature of work among the 17- to 29-year-olds have also been contributing to challenges in recruiting<sup>12</sup>; and
- fitness levels of Canadian children and youth as well as those of adults have significantly been declining between 1981 and 2009.<sup>13</sup>

This outcome was evaluated using the following performance indicators:

- effectiveness of requirements planning;
- number of applicants attracted versus targets;
- degree of progress achieved in distressed occupations; and
- extent of effectiveness in marketing/advertisement activities.

<sup>10</sup> CF Recruiting, Strategic Level Guidance for Winning the War for Talent, 2007.

<sup>11</sup> Statistics Canada, <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/91-003-x/2007001/figures/4129873-eng.htm>, 5 December 2011.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Canadian Health Measures Survey, Statistics Canada <http://www.statcan.gc.ca/daily-quotidien/100113/dq100113a-eng.htm>, 5 December 2011.

## Requirements Determination

**Finding 8.** An effective requirement planning system is in place.

Interviews were conducted with the directors and directorate staff from stakeholders representing all environmental as well as CMP-managed occupations (n=9) and found that all were satisfied with the current planning process; they commented that it accurately reflected the requirements of their occupations and is used intelligently to plan a logical approach in restoring the well-being of distressed occupations. Further data analysis of the SIP Scorecard and the Statement of Production Requirement has demonstrated that the planning system is accurately reflecting the needs of the CF.

## Number of Applicants Attracted

**Finding 9.** A suitable numbers of applicants apply.

A data review was conducted to determine if appropriate numbers of applicants were being attracted. While data was not available regarding the total number of applicants processed, the targets for enrolments have largely been achieved each year (based upon the SIP target), indicating, by extension, that a suitable number of applicants must be applying each year. The results are shown in Table 2.

FY	SIP Target	Actual
2007/08	6,865	6,774
2008/09	7,995	7,334
2009/10	7,454	7,503
2010/11	4,750	4,743

**Table 2. SIP Targets.** This table depicts for FYs 2007/08 to FY 2010/11 how the CF has successfully achieved SIP targets. This is a total of all occupations and does not reflect variances with individual occupations.

Source: Data compiled from CMP/CFRG


## Degree of Progress Achieved in Distressed Occupations

**Finding 10.** Suitable progress has been made and continues to be made in attraction to distressed occupations.

Distressed occupations are those that traditionally are difficult to recruit to (see Figure 1). The reasons vary; most often, however, they reflect shortfalls in the labour market as a whole (such as those in technical trades), or due to economic considerations (i.e., medical trades have better private sector compensation). The directors and directorate staff from the three ECs were asked to outline the impact of distressed occupations on their operations.

- The Navy has suffered from numerous distressed occupations for several years. There was a chronic shortage of journeymen technicians which required personnel to move from ship to ship. Fleet maintenance was denuded of junior technicians affecting the level of maintenance. Recovery action is now under way but will take three to four years to make up.

- The Army and Air Force have had success in reaching its SIP requirements for all occupations and therefore are not overly concerned with distressed occupations.



**Figure 1. Reg F Intake by Distressed Occupations from FYs 2008/09 to 2011/12.** Each FY describes the number of distressed occupations for which CFRG has met 75 percent or more of the SIP as well as the number of distressed occupations for which CFRG met less than 75 percent of the SIP. The data is shown in Table 3.

Source: CMP

FY	Total Number of Distressed Occupations	Met 75 percent or more of Strategic Intake Plan	Met less than 75 percent of Strategic Intake Plan
2008/09	58	34	24
2009/10	55	46	9
2010/11	42	41	1
2011/12	22	19	3

**Table 3. Reg F Intake by Distressed Occupations from FYs 2008/09 to 2011/12.**

According to information obtained from the document and administrative data, general findings in the area of distressed occupations are as follows:

- The intake numbers are decreasing due to reduced attrition and demands for growth being curtailed as targets are met. Further, as other occupations are being filled more quickly, there is a greater opportunity to encourage applicants towards the distressed occupations.
- The number of projected distressed occupations was reduced from 42 in FYs 2010/11 to 22 in 2011/12.

## The Extent of Effectiveness in Marketing/Advertisement Activities

**Finding 11.** While the marketing campaign is largely successful, it could be more effective with a better alignment of recruiting attraction efforts, particularly the National Marketing Campaigns (ADM(PA)) responsibility) with the academic year of candidates.

Recruitment service quality check surveys conducted at CFRCs are performance measurement tools used to inform the effectiveness of advertisements. These surveys informed that the retention rates for advertisement lasted for several months and still prompted potential candidates to contact the CF. According to the Director Marketing and Advertising (DMA), the industry standard should be a recall rate 20 percent. Tables 4 and 5 indicate the CF campaign has greatly exceeded this target, averaging over 31 percent—an indication that the media campaign is effective.

Population	Unaided Recall in November 2006	Unaided Recall in March 2007	Unaided Recall in March 2008	Unaided Recall in March 2009	Unaided Recall in March 2010
18+	26%	31%	19%	40%	38%
18-24	31%	38%	26%	44%	50%

**Table 4. Media Campaign Recall Rates – Unaided Recall (Percentage).** Survey results to assess recruitment advertisement success.

Source: Data from ADM(PA)/DMA

Population	Action in November 2006	Action in March 2007	Action in March 2008	Action in March 2009	Action in March 2010
18+	0	2%	3%	6%	8%
18-24	0	5%	3%	15%	11%

**Table 5. Media Campaign Recall Rates – Action (Percentage).** Survey results to assess recruitment advertisement success.

Source: Data from ADM(PA)/DMA

Interviews with DMA informants indicated that increases in visits to *forces.ca* and the number of walk-ins, e-mails and telephone calls also correlated with attraction campaigns (TV, movie, newspaper ads). DMA also uses a variety of other performance measurement tools to evaluate the effectiveness of marketing activities:

- focus testing;
- SIP status (from CFRG);
- *forces.ca* metrics; and
- CFRG's Attractions Information Management System data (number of walk-ins, e-mails and telephone calls).

Most program informants who are connected with recruiting, including the three ECs, regarded current recruitment attraction activities as effective and contributing to reaching the recruitment targets. The only notable concern raised was that the Navy felt that some TV advertisements were not fully representative of their environment and did not contribute to getting the Navy message to the forefront.

Moreover, while a “marketing planning committee” has recently been formed with representatives from each EC, a plan has not yet materialized and consultations on advertisement issues have been limited. The Navy has provided additional reservist personnel to work in CFRCs, primarily to promote recruiting into the Navy occupations. CFRG informants indicated that over the past year significant success has been achieved in addressing shortages in distressed occupations in the Navy; however, it is difficult to measure how much of this success can be attributed to additional Naval personnel in CFRCs, National Marketing Campaigns targeting distressed occupations, or reductions in the SIP.

Program informants from ADM(PA), CMP, CFRG, CFRCs and the three ECs (n=14) also discussed that through its global virtual presence, the e-services provided by the Canadian Forces National Recruiting Contact Center (CFNRCC) have also contributed to successful attraction. It has consistently grown its total customer interactions since its establishment of e-applications, not only greatly improving response rates to applicant queries but also providing uniformity of information, and reducing local recruiting center workload.

One issue raised by some informants was the need for improved timing of recruiting attraction efforts, particularly the National Marketing Campaigns (ADM(PA) responsibility) with the requirements of the CF.

In addition, evidence drawn from the interviews and questionnaires underlined concerns about the timing of program activities, notably the need to align activity with the academic year, rather than the fiscal year. CFRG currently plans their attraction activities in conjunction with the commencement of the fiscal year, which means recruitment outreach activities (to high schools, universities) do not occur until almost the end of an academic year, which can be too late to compete for top prospects.

Further, there is difficulty in delivering the marketing campaign early in the year, according to the DMA, due to the approval process which includes seeking approvals from external agencies (e.g., PWGSC). DMA also annually reports to Parliament on their activities via PWGSC’s Annual Report on Government of Canada Advertising Activities.

### **Recommendation**

6. Work with PWGSC to address timing issues and means to establish procurement instruments for marketing campaigns that can put contracts in place during the start of the calendar year.

**OPI:** CMP

### 3.2.3 Immediate Outcome 3: Sufficient Number of Applicants is Processed and the Right Person is Recruited into the Right Occupation at the Right Time

This outcome is evaluated using the following performance indicators:

- evidence of clearly defined recruiting selection criteria;
- evidence that CF recruits the right person (quality recruits); and
- evidence that the processing time is responsive to needs of both the CF and the applicants.

#### Selection Criteria

**Finding 12.** Selection measures, polices, and procedures sometimes must choose between effectiveness and efficiency. CFRG has protocols in place to choose appropriately depending on context and conditions at the time.

**Finding 13.** Selection measures, polices and procedures are effective and adapt as required.

There was general satisfaction by the staff of the three ECs that selection standards for occupations were appropriate. There is a process in place to review selection standards and request modifications, as well as an organization dedicated to conducting the proper research.

Interviews with directors and directorate staff from CMP, CFRG, and the three ECs and the document review all indicated that the recruiting selection standards are dynamic and respond well to changing circumstances. They are systemically reviewed and updated. For example, a new DAOD<sup>14</sup> on CF personnel selection was recently approved and promulgated.

CFRG uses two selection approaches—a first-past-the-post system whereby applicants are selected as soon as they satisfy the necessary criteria and a top-down system whereby satisfactory applicants are merit-listed, pooled, and selected periodically in a competitive process. In times of growth and/or high SIP, the first-past-the-post system is favoured; top-down selection is increasingly used as the requirement drops for selected occupations and entry plans. Key informants from CMP (n=2) and CFRG (n=2) as well as senior staff officers from CFRG (n=2) confirmed that first-past-the-post is the more efficient approach as it offers savings in time and resources. It limits the number of applicants required to meet the SIP. Top down selection is more effective as higher quality candidates are selected over lower quality (although they all still meet the minimum acceptable criteria). Top down selection also has one efficiency aspect as it permits a better timing of intake with subsequent training. The informants confirmed that in principal they favoured the top down approach although sometimes in periods of large intakes, this approach might not be possible.

CFRG has introduced a new strategy of apportioning the SIP to the CFRCs quarterly vice annual allotment. This will space out application opportunities throughout the year. This also allows for smoother in-year adjustment of the SIP as required.

<sup>14</sup> DAOD 5002-5, Canadian Forces Personnel Selection, June 2011.

As part of the selection process there is a requirement to complete an aptitude test. The CF Aptitude Test (CFAT) is designed to be administered in English or French. However, some Allophones<sup>15</sup> had been experiencing difficulty scoring satisfactory marks. It was also noted that some of the Allophones attending basic military training have experienced training difficulties due to their insufficient language proficiency. This problem, although not epidemic, is reportedly more prevalent during subsequent occupational training where increased language skills are required. First language proficiency is not identified as a condition for enrolment into the CF. However, according to the Recruiter's Handbook,<sup>16</sup> an applicant who passes the CFAT, but shows an inability to work in either of the two official languages during the selection interview, will be considered temporarily ineligible. The applicant will be advised to improve his/her language skills and try for re-evaluation after a minimum three-month waiting period. Similarly, an applicant who does not pass the CFAT and whose language skills are inadequate will also be considered temporarily ineligible for a minimum period of three months.

The strongest opinions on selection policies and standards centered on the use of fitness standards as a selection protocol for the CF. In the past it has been the responsibility of the CFRCs to conduct these tests. At present this is now conducted at the start of the training phase. There has been an ongoing debate about whether or not to return responsibility for initial fitness testing back to the CFRCs.

A decision in August 2011<sup>17</sup> reinforced the ruling that physical fitness testing not be reintroduced at CFRCs. A new initiative is also in progress to develop new fitness standards for the CF. Accordingly, the policy will need to be reviewed in light of the new standards.

By way of comparison, the RCMP does have a fitness selection protocol consisting of an enrolment benchmark which measures performance on bona fide occupational requirements, which is valid for six months. The same standards apply both to men and women.

### Quality of Recruits

**Finding 14.** While fitness and educational levels of recruits in the last five years have been slightly lower than in the past, the quality of recruits is sufficient to meet needs.

A study was conducted by the DGMPPRA<sup>18</sup> on the quality of recruits in the CF. Results showed a small decline over the years in the indicators used to measure quality (CFAT and military potential scores, highest level of education, fitness level, and personality profiles).

<sup>15</sup> This method was predominantly adopted during the CF expansion to accelerate the selection process. Candidates are screened according to their suitability for CF service and meeting minimum standards specified for each occupation.

<sup>16</sup> Recruiter Handbook, 4.1.1.4 Evaluation of Language Skills and Ability to Follow Instructions.

<sup>17</sup> Warrior Preparation Course and Validity of Threshold fitness Testing, CMP, 16 August 2011.

<sup>18</sup> DGMPPRA, Trends in Canadian Forces Recruit Quality, November 2010.





Most informants (CMP, CFRG, CDA, CFLRS (n=22)) consulted were also requested to comment on the quality of recruits. Following are informants' comments in relation to rationale associated with the slightly lower quality of recruits:

- The demographics that are targeted by the CF are also targeted by other organizations; raising the quality line further would disadvantage the distressed occupations.
- The state of the economy is another factor that dictates the quality of recruits—seemingly, quality of recruits improves during a slow economy.
- The quality of recruits has also varied due to varying standards across CFRCs.
- The average age of recruits has climbed to 27 years old. This has resulted in a fundamentally different type of recruit—one who is more experienced, less receptive to authoritarian direction, and arrives with more external personal responsibilities (money, family, etc.).

Generational differences was another observation that was mentioned during consultations—compared to previous generations, recruits of today are described as harder to motivate. This observation prompted CFLRS to change their instructional approach to provide greater emphasis on coaching and mentoring as opposed to traditional pass/fail assessments.

Further, a recent study conducted by DGMPPRA<sup>19</sup> recommended that the CF should establish quality standards<sup>20</sup> which would allow the comparison of the percentage of recruits who meet or exceed the minimum standards to those who meet or exceed quality standards. According to this study, similar to the US military, the CF could then report whether its quality and quantity goals were met for each FY, thus rendering the tracking of changes in recruit quality easier.

Most informants also added that, despite these issues, the system has successfully been able to cope with differences observed with this slightly less fit and educated generation of recruits.

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<sup>19</sup> Ibid.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. The study underlines that measuring recruit quality and setting up standards would require a definition of recruit quality and specific benchmarks to assess recruiting success in terms of quality. For example, the US Department of Defense defines high quality recruits as individuals having a high school diploma and scoring in the top 50 percent on the Armed Forces Qualification Test, a measure of cognitive ability. Currently, the US military meets its recruit quality benchmarks when at least 90 percent of new recruits have a high school diploma and at least 60 percent score above average on the Armed Forces Qualification Test.



## Evidence that the Selection Process and Processing of Applications are Responsive to Needs

**Finding 15.** Although improvements in processing candidates has been evident in improved processing flow and reduced processing time, improving lines of communication as well as improving recruiter selection and training would further strengthen the process.

**Finding 16.** CFRG detachment consolidations and/or closures may lead to unintended negative outcomes in the areas of program reach and level of service provided to the Reserves. Alternative means of processing applicants from remote locations need to be further developed.

**Applicant Processing Time.** The 2006 follow-on review by the Auditor General<sup>21</sup> examined the progress made in recruitment and retention based on the findings of their 2002 review. According to the review, some applicants were withdrawing from the application process due to excessive processing delays. According to the FY 2008/09 RPP, the CDS directed that 70 percent of applicants be enrolled within 30 days.<sup>22</sup> To date, however, only 3 percent of applicants are processed meeting this target. According to the CFRG staff, there are difficulties in achieving this benchmark as much of the expended time is out of the control of CFRCs—for instance the time spent on security screening. According to administrative data review of processing time, actual processing time varies from two months to a year.

**Program Reach.** Following a peak in 2008 of 800 full-time equivalents and 39 recruiting detachments, CFRG has been reduced to 570 full-time equivalents, 25 recruiting detachments and two recruiting offices. According to interviews with senior staff officers from CFRG (n=3) and documents reviewed, the detachment closures and full-time equivalent cuts will have a significant effect on Reserve processing. CFRG may be unable to support Reserve processing in the affected areas and the remaining detachments may be unable to absorb the additional workload. CFRG is working with the Res F generators to develop coordinated solutions.

Furthermore, there will likely be an adverse impact on EE recruiting, particularly for Aboriginals, since the majority of the centers closed serviced outlying regions where these candidates reside. Although leveraging e-recruiting and e-applications could be an option, according to a number of stakeholders, there are technical limitations with the current e-recruiting system. Further, many aboriginal recruits rely upon face-to-face interaction with an actual recruiter.

### Recommendation

7. Develop and implement plans for alternate approaches for maintaining national access to recruiting services for all Canadians and for supporting Reserve processing following personnel reductions in CFRG and CFRG/detachment closures.

**OPI:** CMP

<sup>21</sup> 2006 May Status Report of the Auditor General of Canada—Military Recruiting and Retention.

<sup>22</sup> DND Plans and Priorities, 2008.

### 3.2.4 Immediate Outcome 4: Recruits are Prepared for the Profession of Arms and Trained with the Needed Skills, Knowledge and Attitudes to Undertake Occupation Training

**Finding 17.** Sufficient recruits have been trained at the required level. Basic military training standards reflect that recruits are prepared for the profession of arms with needed skills, knowledge and attitudes to undertake occupational training.

This outcome was evaluated using the following performance indicators:

- evidence that CFLRS Course Training Standards reflect that recruits are prepared for the profession of arms with needed skills, knowledge and attitudes to undertake occupational training; and
- success rates of the training program.

#### Appropriateness of Training

The three ECs as end users, and other program stakeholders (n=9), were asked to comment on whether basic military training has been responsive to their needs. It was reported that the basic military training has been relevant and that its standard was adequate and appropriate for follow-on occupation training. Although the Navy informants indicated that some aspects, such as the end of training field exercise, was Army-centric, they also commented that the standard attained could be applied to a naval environment. According to the program managers, a Navy-specific training package could either be conducted in naval units or as an environmental package to be developed and added as part of the current course. This would be difficult to achieve, however, as most courses are not specific to a single environment. Informants indicated that there were periodic reviews of the course standard and curriculum at which the Navy was always represented and where this particular issue should be discussed and resolved.

Information received from the questionnaires (4/9) sent to Commandants of the CF Occupation Schools, and interviews with CDA and the ECs pointed out the following:

- There are no concerns related to the course content and standards of basic military training.
- Although CDA does utilize formal review mechanisms such as course validation to gather information on the effectiveness of basic military training, there was not any indication of a systemic feedback mechanism in place between the occupation schools and CFLRS. However, key CFLRS personnel have begun making visits to the ECs.
- In the absence of basic military training, primary occupational training's effectiveness would be undermined since candidates who had no previous exposure to military ethos would struggle to be functional in military life and fundamental/generic military skills would be absent.
- Occupational training, combined with basic military training was not viewed as a preferred approach by the ECs.



## Success Rates

Throughout basic military training, instructors assess progress. If students fail, a progress review board is convened. According to the CFLRS informants, the basic military training success rate varies upon the entry plan. Success with the instructors is measured by the school's standards staff, personal observations and candidates' performance.

Most stakeholders consulted, representing CMP, CFRG, and the three ECs, expressed their content with CFLRS's current success rate and attributed it to its initiatives to overcome an earlier soaring attrition rate. These were put in place in 2009 following direction to come up with strategies to improve course success. Subsequent to the recommendations from the CMP retention team, CFLRS introduced 12 new initiatives in order to better motivate and challenge the new generation of candidates—who were generally described as being tech savvy, but not in good physical shape. One example of these initiatives is the WPC. Under this program, physically unfit recruits are sent for physical remedial training prior to basic military training. Most stakeholders agreed that by better motivating the new recruits as well as lowering the injury rate at CFLRS, the remedial physical training initiative, combined with other initiatives, contributed to lowering the attrition rates and successfully improved the training effectiveness at CFLRS.

The evaluation benchmarking study informed that the WPC initiative has been unique to Canada although it is being looked on with interest by other similar organizations.

An analysis of data has shown that the success rate of the training program has been sufficient to meet throughput requirements. Attrition (particularly among women candidates) has significantly dropped over the past five years, while the standards have been maintained. As a result the program is meeting targets with fewer candidates.

Table 6 compares the production output at CFLRS to actual intake.

FY	Number of candidates to be trained	Number of candidates completed basic training	Percentage (Attrition)
2007/08	4,639	3,506	24.4%
2008/09	5,852	4,397	24.8%
2009/10	5,848	4,375	25.1%
2010/11	3,432	2,953	13.6%
2011/12	2,870	2,481	13.5%
2012/13	3,660	3,172	13.3%

**Table 6. Basic Military Training Attrition Data by Fiscal Year.** Data by fiscal year shows improvement in attrition rate. Note that for each fiscal year period, the rationale for the delta is attrition (voluntary release, failure, illness, etc.).

Source: CFLRS Administrative Data

### 3.2.5 Intermediate Outcome 1: The CF Reflects Canadian Society

Immediate outcome 4 has demonstrated that sufficient numbers of candidates are graduating from basic military training. To determine if this is leading towards a CF that is more reflective of Canadian society, the evaluation conducted a data analysis of progress towards CF EE goals.

**Finding 18.** Progress towards meeting diversity goals has improved, particularly with respect to the Aboriginal category. However, the CF continues to face challenges in meeting its overall objectives for diversity.

**Finding 19.** Other comparable countries are observing similar representation problems, particularly recruiting women in their Armed Forces.

The CF EE Plan is the strategic document that provides long-term EE representation goals and includes a series of 33 initiatives to help progress towards achieving these goals. The document was last updated in 2010 following a new workforce analysis and included an increase in the long-term goal for women from 19.5 percent to 25.1 percent.

Tables 7a to 7d summarize CF long-term representation goals, CF enrolment by year, and overall CF representation from 2008 to 2011.

2008 Reg F	Long-Term Representation Goal	Enrolled in Current Year	Overall CF Representation
Women	19.50%	15.85%	13.59%
Aboriginal	2.80%	2.77%	1.96%
Visible Minorities	9.10%	5.48%	2.83%

**Table 7a. 2008 Reg F.**  
Source: DHRD/CMP

2009 Reg F	Long-Term Representation Goal	Enrolled in Current Year	Overall CF Representation
Women	19.50%	14.45%	13.72%
Aboriginal	2.80%	2.51%	2.09%
Visible Minorities	9.10%	5.26%	3.26%

**Table 7b. 2009 Reg F.**  
Source: DHRD/CMP

2010 Reg F	Long-Term Representation Goal	Enrolled in Current Year	Overall CF Representation
Women	25.10%	13.51%	13.75%
Aboriginal	3.40%	2.52%	2.13%
Visible Minorities	11.80%	6.63%	3.65%

**Table 7c. 2010 Reg F.**  
Source: DHRD/CMP

2011 Reg F	Long-Term Representation Goal	Enrolled in Current Year	Overall CF Representation
Women	25.10%	12.67%	13.68%
Aboriginal	3.40%	3.28%	2.16%
Visible Minorities	11.80%	6.22%	3.86%

**Table 7d. 2011 Reg F.**

Source: DHRD/CMP

The CF has also promulgated a “Recruiting Directive 17/08” – Canadian Forces Aboriginal Programs Campaign. These Aboriginal recruiting and training programs such as the Bold Eagle and the new Aboriginal Leadership Opportunity Year at the Royal Military College (RMC), and holding the Aboriginal Forum, are all methods for connecting Aboriginal youth and communities with the military.

According to the interviews conducted, through targeted recruiting activities, CF EE representation has continued to improve and exceeded the requirements for Aboriginal representation goals in 2010 (Aboriginal programs such as Bold Eagle, Black Bear, Raven, Aboriginal Leadership Opportunity Year and the Pre-Recruit Training Course total 320 participants<sup>23</sup>). Representation from visible minorities has also improved in 2010. As for the representation of women, the informants commented that CF’s heavy engagement in operations might have caused more openings in occupations to which women are not normally particularly attracted. Some informants indicated that additional EE special programs would be required to reach the raised EE goals.

By way of contrast, interviews with the RCMP found that specific EE annual recruiting targets were set for women and that the RCMP has not only met current year targets, but exceeded the long-term targets as well.

The benchmarking study also examined the EE representation for women across similar countries i.e., Australia, the US, and the UK. Canadian representation of women in the Reg F is 13.68 percent, which exceeds the UK (9.1 percent), and is approximately the same as Australia (13 percent) and lower than the US (14.5 percent), although in these last two countries women are generally excluded from combat trades and Special Forces. These findings suggest other possible barriers for women that go beyond legal barriers: for example the requirement for mobility in the military profession or the fact that many occupations are non-traditional for women.

With respect to visible minorities, the US military<sup>24</sup> is the most diverse compared to Australia, the UK and Canada with over 17 percent in its officer corps. While demographic factors come into play which make comparisons difficult, it should be noted that in the US, those who have yet to achieve US citizenship are allowed to enrol as opposed to Canada and Australia where non-citizens are not allowed to serve. In the UK, despite the commonwealth policy, the ethnic diversity group remains underrepresented (5.5 percent). In Australia the representation is around 4.1 percent.

<sup>23</sup> CFRG Recruiting Operation Plan/Business Model 2011/12.

<sup>24</sup> Military Leadership Diversity Commission Report, March 2011.

**Recommendations**

8. Assess the realistic ability of the CF to achieve its EE goals and if necessary consider improving or adding more EE special programs towards reaching them.

**OPI:** CMP

9. In lieu of targets based upon overall long-term objectives with no concrete end date, establish annual goals to be met in each EE category based upon realistic measures of attrition, and recruiting capacity.

**OPI:** CMP

**3.3 Performance (Efficiency and Economy)**

The following section examines the extent to which the CF Reg F recruiting and basic military training programs use the most appropriate and efficient means for their activities.

Under the 2009 Evaluation Policy, efficiency is defined to be maximizing the outputs produced with a fixed level of inputs or minimizing the inputs used to produce a fixed level of outputs (paraphrase). Economy is defined as “minimizing the use of resources [...] to achieve expected outcomes.”<sup>25</sup> For the purposes of the Evaluation Policy, these elements of performance are demonstrated as follows:

- when outputs are produced at minimum cost (efficiency); and
- when outcomes are produced at minimum cost (economy/cost effectiveness).

**3.3.1 Resource Utilization in Relation to Outputs and Outcomes**

The following output and outcome criteria were used for the assessment of efficiency:

- efficiency of recruiting and basic military training approaches (planning and governance);
- efficiency in attracting and processing candidates;
- efficiency in costs per processed recruit;
- efficiency of basic military training; and
- efficiency of program coordination and synchronization.

<sup>25</sup> Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat. Policy on Evaluation, April 1, 2009. [www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=15024&section=text#cha4](http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng.aspx?id=15024&section=text#cha4).



## Efficiency of Recruiting and Basic Military Training Approaches (Planning and Governance)

**Finding 20.** A lack of readily available efficiency performance data prevents detailed analysis from being conducted in order to truly assess efficiency of the program structure. Accordingly, it is unclear if there are opportunities to drive efficiencies through rebalancing approaches.

Data available to the evaluation team provided information on CF recruiting and basic military training program allocations, the proportion spent on program activities, and views on alternative delivery mechanisms. However, there was no detailed explanation documented for fluctuations over time in the cost per participant and no detailed cost comparison to similar programs.


Financial data for regular recruiting are spread among several accounts. The vast majority of cost data is available but is not assessed as a whole for strategic decisions. Further, in many instances, recruiting activities are conducted within ECs but are not all attributed against recruiting.

The current recruiting approach was based upon the intention of providing direct services to all Canadians wherever they live in Canada. In 2012, there were two recruiting offices, nine recruiting centres and 25 detachments across Canada. Each centre is responsible for attracting and processing within its own geographical area. There are about 103 staff at CFRG headquarters and approximately 542 personnel in other areas, of which 170 are recruiters.

Program informants pointed out that recruitment is fundamentally a human enterprise. Despite the use of advertising and technological assistance, recruitment does not happen until a recruiter connects with Canadians on a personal level. That being said, how that “human contact” is made should be reviewed. Various means exist, whether they include online, telephone, in-person visits (such as on-campus recruiting), or through traditional recruiting centres. According to key informants from CFRG, one of the most effective means to establish trust and promote recruiting is to utilize Reservists from the local community.

Efforts have been made to align staff numbers with recruit intake. As shown in Figure 2, as the numbers of recruits needed have declined, so have the staff numbers at CFRG.





**Figure 2. CFRG’s Intake versus Strength.** This line graph depicts CFRG’s intake in comparison to its strength from FYs 2007/08 to 2012/13. The left axis represents the Intake and the right axis reads the CFRG strength. FY 2012/13 data are projections. The data is shown in Table 8.

Source: Data from CFRG

FY	Strength	PRes	Reg F	Total (Reg F and PRes)
2007/08	838	5,215	6,774	11,989
2008/09	782	4,672	7,334	12,006
2009/10	707	5,259	7,503	12,762
2010/11	670	4,331	4,743	9,074
2011/12	645	4,106	2,779	6,885
2012/13	645	4,689	4,398	9,087

**Table 8. CFRG’s Intake versus Strength.** This table summarizes the production output of CFRG against level of resources available to them through FYs 2007/08 to 2012/13. FY 2012/13 data are projections.

Analysis should be done to assess whether the proper mix of approaches and resources is being applied for current intake levels. While relevant data is captured by each type of activity, the CFRIMS data base was not designed to support statistical analysis or capture of most data (or where it does capture data, it often does not allow for it to be exported or accessed via query or report). In particular there is a need to determine if national access can be met by means other than the current reliance on the use of traditional recruiting centers. It should be determined if a greater emphasis could be placed upon other means such as online virtual recruiting centers or mobile recruiting offices to reduce overhead costs.

**Recommendation**

10. Conduct a more detailed business case review of the current resource allocation for recruiting while maintaining current standards and national access. To enable this there is a need to improve the data management system (as per Recommendation 5).

**OPI:** CMP



## Efficiency in Attracting and Processing Candidates

**Finding 21.** Technological initiatives such as e-recruiting have contributed to program efficiencies by shortening the response time and ensuring common standards for all applicants.

Most recruiters who responded to the questionnaire, as well as the informants consulted from CMP, CFRG, and CFRCs, viewed technology as an important tool in improving the efficiencies in the CF recruiting system. Further, they commented that for most young applicants, applying online is the preferred approach. In this regard, they recommended that CF should expand its visibility on other social network platforms, e.g., Facebook and Twitter. It was also noted that some CFRCs have been encouraging applicants to apply online rather than at the CFRC as it was viewed to be more efficient.

The stakeholders interviewed were optimistic that in addition to e-recruiting, other new technological initiatives will soon be contributing to efficiencies. For example, two of the selection tests—I-CFAT and the Personality Test—will soon be available via the internet from the Public Service Commission website. This will provide an automated initial screening and reduce the need to transport applicants to CFRCs as well as potentially saving staff time.

Most stakeholders from CFRG and CMP consulted were also in agreement that the centralization of e-recruiting through the CFNRCC in North Bay has increased efficiencies. Data analysis has shown that inbound traffic has been steadily increasing and is being handled quickly and accurately. Further, the amount of on-line and telephone traffic to CFRCs has been reduced, allowing them to focus on in-person contact and local attraction activities. Some informants believed that the CFNRCC might eventually replace the front desk at recruitment centers thereby reducing the workload of the CFRCs and allowing them more time for attraction and processing responsibilities.

## Efficiency in Cost per Recruit

**Finding 22.** As the CF transitioned from a period of growth to one of sustainment, the cost per recruit has significantly increased. However, based upon an external benchmark comparison, despite these recent increases, the costs per recruit for FY 2011/12 appear to be inline with similar military organizations, including those that outsource their program.

Table 9 depicts the average cost per recruit for five years from FYs 2009/10 to 2013/14<sup>26</sup>. It should be noted that FY 2011/12 was not utilized as a benchmark year since recruiting activities were greatly curtailed when the CF met its operational target of 68,000 midway through the year. FY 2012/13 and FY 2013/14 are included, even though they are based upon estimated values, as they represent the ongoing sustainment efforts required to maintain the CF at desired levels. Row H shows the average cost per recruit including the Res F processing for a cost per all candidate types processed.

<sup>26</sup> FY 2012/13 and FY 2013/14 are based upon budget projections.

Cost Element <sup>(1)</sup>	FY 2009/10	FY 2010/11	FY 2011/12	FY 2012/13 (estimate)	FY 2013/14 (estimate)
CFRG Total Expenses <sup>(2)</sup>	\$38,638,414	\$32,923,630	\$30,895,157	\$29,424,122	\$25,651,407
Reg F Salaries	\$28,749,095	\$30,120,471	\$30,050,618	\$30,050,618	\$28,098,176
Media Buy	\$12,504,287	\$12,235,259	\$ 5,153,024	\$ 5,135,024	\$ 5,135,024
<b>Total Cost Estimate</b>	\$79,891,796	\$75,279,360	\$66,098,799	\$64,609,764	\$58,884,607
Reg F Recruited	7,503	4,743	2,779	4,398	4,231
Reserve applications processed	5,259	4,331	4,106	4,689	4,689
Total candidates enrolled	12,762	9,074	6,885	9,087	8,920
Cost per candidate recruited (Regular and Reserve)	\$6,260	\$8,296	\$9,600	\$7,110	\$6,601

**Table 9. Cost per Recruit.** This table describes for five fiscal years, ranging from 2009/10 to 2013/14, the actual cost elements (CFRG total expenses, Reg F salaries calculated using the CFM, Media Buy and the total cost elements) as well as recruitment numbers (number of Reg F recruited, number of Reserve applications processed, total candidates enrolled and cost per candidate recruited (Reg F and Reserve)). It attributes cost per recruit based on expenses directly associated with CFRG activities and expenditures, excluding corporate overheads and EC contributions.

Source: Data from CFRG/ADM(PA)/Cost Factors Manual

**Notes:**

- (1) Financial data collected for this costing model are resources directly associated with CFRG activities and expenditures, excluding corporate overheads and EC contributions.
- (2) CFRG Total Expenses include operating expenditures, civilian salary wage envelope and allowances, Primary Reserve (Pres) pay, and infrastructure minor requirements.

The results show that as the total number of candidates enrolled was reduced each year as the demand declined, the average cost per enrolled candidate rose. Although it would be initially expected that the average cost would remain constant if resources were being used efficiently and reduced or increased as intake varied, in reality:

- efforts involved in activities such as attracting, screening and advertising do not change in direct proportion to the number of recruits selected;
- resources were not reduced as they were needed to ensure the growth of the Canadian Forces (64,000 to 68,000 personnel); and
- although the number of recruits selected has been reduced, the number of applicants received and screened/assessed has not been reduced as more emphasis is placed upon the quality of recruit through the use of pooling of potential candidates.

The projections for FY 2013/14 show that as the CF moves away from growth mode to one of sustainment, the cost per candidate enrolled will decline and in fact will approach cost levels of FY 2009/10, despite a 30 percent drop in expected enrolled candidate numbers. This drop is due to a reduction of approximately 26 percent in CFRG resources from FYs 2009/10 to 2013/14.

The projections for FY 2013/14 also show that CFRG's available resources will drop approximately 13 percent from the previous year, resulting in CFRG's closure of several of its recruiting detachments and restricting the level of service it is able to provide to the Reserves (see Recommendation 5 and the discussion on program reach in "Effectiveness").

In order to assess whether the sustainment cost of FY 2012/13 was realistic, external benchmarks were sought to compare the cost per recruit of the DND approach with that of other nations. Differences in intake, demographics, geography and policies towards accessibility made it difficult to find comparable organizations; however, one similar organization is the British Army. The UK is outsourcing its Army recruiting at a cost of \$22,086 per soldier recruited, based upon an intake of 7,500 recruits a year. By comparison, the CF cost at \$7,110, is much lower. Benchmarks with the US Air Force, Army and Navy also show that the CF cost is inline, as their cost per candidate ranges from \$7,900 to \$26,000.<sup>27</sup>

### Recommendation

11. Develop a refined methodology to determine an accurate cost per recruit and cost per applicant. Conduct a trend analysis over the coming years starting with FY 2011/12 to monitor the costs on an ongoing basis.

**OPI:** CMP

### Efficiency of Basic Military Training

**Finding 23.** As demand within the CF grew, the CFLRS doubled its production of graduates without significantly increasing overall program cost. As the CF has returned to a level of sustainment, the cost per graduate has returned to pre-2007 levels.

Table 10 summarizes CFLRS's allocated budget over six years versus number of candidates to be trained. For the FYs 2008/09 to 2012/13 period, total program expenditures decreased from \$70,648,208 to \$65,804,119 and the number of candidates decreased from 5,852 to 3,660. While total expenditures have decreased by only 7 percent, the total number of students has decreased by 37 percent. CFLRS officials underlined that the ratio of instructors to candidates were severely stretched during the period FYs 2007/08 to 2009/10. In fact, the ratio was reduced from one instructor per six candidates to one instructor per 15 candidates and that such levels were likely unsustainable over the long run due to stresses on the instructor staff and training facilities. Accordingly, while the cost per candidate or graduate in FY 2012/13 is 23 percent higher than that of FY 2008/09, the current cost figure is more reflective of a sustainable tempo.

<sup>27</sup> Source: <http://usmilitary.about.com/b/2008/07/07/interesting-recruiting-facts.htm>.

FY	Total Expenditures <sup>(1)</sup>	Number of Candidates to be Trained	Number of Candidates Completed Basic Military Training	Cost per Candidate	Cost per Graduate
2007/08	\$66,637,570	4,639	3,506	\$14,365	\$19,007
2008/09	\$70,648,208	5,852	4,397	\$ 12 072	\$16,067
2009/10	\$70,057,766	5,848	4,375	\$11,980	\$16,013
2010/11	\$69,048,335	3,432	2,953	\$20,119	\$23,382
2011/12	\$64,614,888	2,870	2,481	\$22,514	\$26,044
2012/13	\$65,804,119	3,660	3,172	\$17,979	\$20,745

**Table 10. CFLRS’s Allocated Budget.** Basic military training cost per candidate to be trained and per graduate.

Source: Data from CFLRS

**Note:**

- (1) Total expenditures include operating expenses, civilian salary wage envelope and allowances, PRes, and Reg F salaries as per the Cost Factors Manual. Recruits’ salary and corporate overhead are excluded.

Table 10 shows that during the period from FYs 2007/08 to 2012/13, the budget of CFLRS remained more or less constant although the number of candidates to be trained increased during the recruiting surge of the time and then fell back to historic levels. Although, the cost per graduate appears to have dropped during the surge years, in reality, this surge was unsustainable at these funding levels and now that the CF has stabilized, the costs are once again in line with pre-growth figures.

CFLRS has also made good use of technology to improve both training effectiveness and efficiency. For example, they have installed an electronic weapons simulator which greatly reduces time required on the firing range and ammunition usage. It is able to simulate environments not possible under traditional weapon training conditions. Due to its capabilities, this simulator has been recognized as highly efficient and cost-effective and now is being adopted by other organizations such as provincial police forces.

**Efficiency of Program Coordination and Synchronization**

**Finding 24.** The lack of synchronization between recruiting, basic military training, and occupational training has resulted in large inefficiencies—likely in the range of \$30 million per year.

Although data is not kept on the time graduates of basic military training wait for the next phase of their training, key stakeholder interviews have indicated that it can range from a few weeks to six months or more, depending on the particular occupation. It is likely that the average wait-time is three to four months, meaning that approximately \$11,000 of wages per recruit is lost as they await their next phase of training. This translates into an inefficiency of \$30 million in salary for FY 2011/12. Further, it has negative effects on the morale of recruits, at times leading to voluntary release.

There is an opportunity to significantly reduce these costs through the synchronization of enrolment with training. The CF should develop options to ensure BMQ graduation numbers are in alignment as much as possible with the demand and availability of occupation training by adjusting the intake of recruits into BMQ. Even if the numbers of personnel waiting or the wait times were reduced by half, savings in the realm of \$15 million annually could be achieved. By comparison this represents 33 percent of the cost of the military salaries of the basic training school, or more than 50 percent that of the recruiting centers.

Synchronization of enrolment with training start time is not a new concept and has been done to a limited degree in the past. In this regard, a management committee led by CDA was convened in 2007 to investigate the issue. Key comments raised were as follows:

- the force expansion, combined with a lack of surge training capacity is a major contributor to the lack of synchronization;
- improved visibility and accuracy into occupational training courses is required; and
- the management system for recruits as they progress through various stages of training is not a coherent, integrated system and is managed by different agencies at various points.

Informants were adamant that better personnel management tools are needed; current information systems are archaic and do not respond to certain program needs, i.e., aligning enrolment with training schedules.

Adding to the complexity of the synchronization of basic military training with occupational training are such things as environmental training for many occupations, split occupational training requirements, and security clearance requirements. Some occupational training courses start as often as weekly while others annually. A key CMP stakeholder explained that while there are theoretical inefficiencies in the wait time described above, there are also additional costs required to synchronize training such as additional instructors to run more course serials, for example.

In FY 2011/12, a new initiative, just-in-time training, was introduced for select occupations (five occupations in total) to improve the degree of synchronization of occupation training with initial training. The current trial is intended to explore the possibility of a limited use of the just-in-time model for select occupations during the temporary slowdown in recruiting and to identify the resources necessary to manage an expanded program in the absence of modernized personnel and training management information systems.

### **Recommendation**

12. Develop options to ensure BMQ graduation numbers are in alignment as much as possible with the demand and availability of occupation training. This includes expanding CFRG's just-in-time training initiative. Coordinate this analysis with Recommendation 5.  
**OPI:** CMP



### 3.3.2 Economic Alternatives for Delivering these Services

**Finding 25.** Alternative approaches to military recruiting, including outsourcing, have been trialed in similar countries, such as Australia and New Zealand. It is too early to reach a definite conclusion but they should be monitored.

Over the years, in order to improve efficiencies in certain areas, different approaches have been applied to the delivery of both the CF recruiting and basic military training programs. Two of the most significant initiatives were in the areas of e-recruiting and pre-enrolment fitness testing. These initiatives had positive results, particularly with respect to increasing success among designated EE groups. It is also noted that the delivery model of the CF Reg F recruiting program might further change once the e-recruiting component of the program is fully in effect and the downsizing of CFRG is complete. Similarly, the WPC component of the basic military training program has also been under discussion.<sup>28</sup> Further decision will follow the completion of a study that is preparing recommendations on new fitness testing methods and standards based on the CF's five common tasks.<sup>29</sup>

Other countries have also considered outsourcing recruiting.

For example, in 2011, the UK outsourced its army recruiting. The officials at the British Army's Land Command claim that the deal will save more than \$400 million over a decade, or 20 percent of the overall program cost by: closing 100 recruitment centers; utilizing technology to eliminate failing trainees earlier; removing well-paid senior non-commissioned officers and officers from backroom work; and eliminating expensive TV ads in favour of web-based advertising.

Similarly, in 2009, Australian Defence Force recruiting services was contracted out. However due to the risks associated with the contractor, the contract was later amended and taken over by another provider. The current model is based on collaboration between the Department of Defence and Manpower Services. The Australian Defence Force sets the targets, policy and standards. It also monitors contract performance and compliance. According to Australian Defence Force sources, after 18 months the results of this current model have shown a cost reduction of approximately 10 percent. Marketing costs were also reduced by 5 percent per year. The only activities that show no improvement are in the achievement of recruiting targets and in the reduction of candidate processing time.

New Zealand also utilizes external civilian agencies and specialists by outsourcing for marketing, call centre, medical and security check functions. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this approach provides a good mix of professional specialist skills and knowledge with the informed and credible approach of a uniformed recruiter.

Despite successes demonstrated by potential alternative recruiting approaches, based upon the cost per enrolled recruit, they do not appear to be more efficient than the Canadian model. For example, the UK cost per recruit is still more than three times that of Canada.

<sup>28</sup> Decision Brief on Fitness Testing on Enrolment, CMP, December 2011.

<sup>29</sup> Warrior Preparation Course and Validity of Threshold Fitness Testing, CMP, 16 August 2011.



**Recommendation**

13. Study alternative approaches to recruiting over time to determine if there are any cost-effective opportunities or lessons to be learned.

**OPI:** CMP

**3.4 Other Issues – CEOTP**

**Finding 26.** CEOTP is a relevant entry plan to the CF as it reaches additional potential applicants to those of other plans.

**Finding 27.** CEOTP as guided by Assistant Deputy Minister (Human Resources – Military) (ADM(HR-Mil)) 09/05, although an effective entry plan to meet short-term intake requirements, led to long-term problems of achievability and a potentially unnecessary loss of resources.

**Finding 28.** DAOD 5002-6 should effectively address the known problems of CEOTP.

**Background**

Prior to 1997, it was not a requirement to possess a university degree before being commissioned as an officer in the CF. Candidates who applied to become officers without wanting a degree could do so under the Officer Candidate Training Plan. However, on March 25, 1997, the Minister of National Defence at the time, in a report to the Prime Minister, established a departmental commitment to a university degreed officer corps. With very few exceptions such as commissioning from the ranks, a university degree was now required as a prerequisite to receiving an officer's commission. This put an end to the Officer Candidate Training Plan entry plan.

It was recognized, however, that at least for a few years, it would still be necessary to enrol and commission candidates who were lacking a degree. In 1998, as a temporary measure, the CEOTP was created as an officer production tool to address un-forecasted recruiting and attrition issues which negatively affected specific occupations. Candidates enrolled under this plan were required to obtain a degree during their initial terms of service or face release. It was to be used as a last priority in a list of various entry options. The interim CEOTP was to expire following a five-year transition period to the new degreed officer policy. CEOTP intake was allocated on a decreasing annual quota leading to a zero-loading restriction by FY 2002/03. Thereafter, the plan was to be zero-loaded from a planning perspective but was to be retained as a tool for exceptional unforeseen circumstances in specific targeted occupations.

In reality, by FY 2002/03, the CF was having difficulty finding sufficient qualified officer applicants from the remaining officer entry plans. Accordingly, ADM(HR-Mil) approved up to 70 CEOTP entries in seven occupations for FY 2002/03 and the CDS authorized an additional 60 the following year in two occupations and then did so again in FY 2004/05.

It had become clear that there was a need to make CEOTP a permanent entry plan. However, there were a number of problems with the interim instruction which created the





CEOTP that would need to be fixed before making it permanent. These included inter alia:

- no enforceable obligation to complete a degree;
- ambiguity in requirements;
- funding; and
- management of candidates.

Accordingly, in 2005, CEOTP was made a permanent entry plan primarily for the reasons of the force expansion of the time and continued personnel shortages in understrength occupations. The new CEOTP was formally established in ADM(HR-Mil) Instruction 09/05 with numerous features aimed at correcting the known problems of the temporary plan. The ministerial recommendation of 1997 was also amended to legitimize and facilitate CEOTP as a permanent entry plan.

After this revised CEOTP had been in place for approximately four years, it was realized that numerous problems continued to exist with CEOTP in terms of achievability, management and compliance. A CEOTP Working Group was formed to identify and study the problems and propose solutions. This resulted in an entirely new Defence Administrative Order and Directive—DAOD 5002-6, dated 9 November 2011. The fact that only a handful of CEOTP candidates have achieved degree status from the hundreds enrolled under CEOTP but approaching the end of their initial terms of service is strong evidence that the plan has not achieved its objective of commissioning officers without a degree but reaching degree status during their initial engagement.

## Discussion

CRS has reviewed documentation, interviewed numerous stakeholders, conducted a CEOTP participant's questionnaire, and conducted an analysis with the aims of understanding the CEOTP issues and assessing whether the new DAOD addresses the known problems of the plan. It is not the intent of this evaluation to identify all of the problems associated with CEOTP (this has been done and documented by the working group) but rather to present the significant issues from the perspectives of the major stakeholders and assess if/how they are being addressed.

## Relevance

As the CEOTP program is just one of the many entry plans into the CF, its overall relevance is included in the relevance section of this evaluation. The CEOTP was created in an environment whereby sufficient satisfactory candidates for some officer occupations could not be found within existing entry plans. There was a need to increase the number of available and interested candidates and still meet the requirements of a degreed officer corps. CEOTP was assessed as fulfilling both of these objectives and was approved. Years of experience with the program have demonstrated that the need for a larger selection pool continues on an intermittent basis for selected occupations. CEOTP has shown that it provides those additional qualified candidates if the requirement cannot be met from other entry plans first.



## Effectiveness and Efficiency

Because of the problems with the CEOTP program, it was completely overhauled during the course of this evaluation to address its known deficiencies. Therefore, rather than the original planned performance indicators, CEOTP will be reviewed for effectiveness and efficiency by discussing the following known major problems that were identified. This will be followed by an initial assessment of the revised CEOTP's ability to address these issues:

- insufficient time to pursue a degree;
- lack of compliance; and
- poor management.

**Insufficient Time to Pursue a Degree.** This has been the main point of criticism of the CEOTP. CEOTP candidates, in their questionnaire, expressed a strong indication that they did not have sufficient time to simultaneously pursue a degree, become occupationally qualified, satisfactorily participate in the demanding work schedule of a junior officer in a new job, pursue mandatory CF professional development, and have any kind of quality of life. Candidates felt strongly that they needed dedicated work time made available to pursue academic requirements. Other stakeholders expressed similar points of view on this issue as well. The chain of command feels that it is unrealistic for a junior officer to be expected to meet the rigors of occupational training followed by a first and second posting and still be expected to pursue academic pursuits. The Army clearly stated, for example, that it was the full-time job of a junior officer to take care of his/her soldiers, not a part-time one. Dedicated academic time should instead be made available between postings. The other ECs are in agreement. Academically focused informants indicated that the selection of a degree can greatly facilitate its successful pursuit and reduce the amount of time required. There are degrees available which provide significant credit for military training, experience and professional development. If CEOTP candidates are properly counselled and encouraged into these degree programs, many of the problems identified by the candidates could be reduced or mitigated.

## Compliance

- ADM(HR-Mil) 09/05 required the candidate to work with the CDA to develop an Individual Learning Plan to achieve a degree in the required time. There is evidence from the questionnaires that not all CEOTP candidates contacted CDA to complete an Individual Learning Plan. CDA's knowledge of who the CEOTP candidates are is limited to those who actually submitted a plan.
- ADM(HR-Mil) 09/05 required the candidate to complete a degree prior to the completion of their initial period of service or else face release except in exceptional circumstances. The reality of this consequence and its implications in terms of both occupational health and wasted expensive trained resources has only recently become evident as the early CEOTP candidates approach this career point. There is also evidence that many CEOTP candidates and other stakeholders either did not understand their obligations and consequences under the plan or chose to ignore them.



**Management.** There is consistent evidence from participants, administrators, and the ECs that the CEOTP program has been poorly managed since the release of ADM(HR-Mil) Instruction 09/05.

- There is a severe lack of data regarding actual enrolment numbers under CEOTP. This is the result of both a personnel data base that did not have CEOTP available as an entry option for some of the time as well as coding errors. Despite attempts to have this rectified on a file by file review basis, it was several years before any significant action was taken. The Air Force finally decided to take action on its own to clarify which of their personnel were CEOTP candidates. Various sources of CEOTP data still differ on how many CEOTP officers there are and how many have reached degree status.
- ADM(HR-Mil) 09/05 required several management actions to occur to achieve the CEOTP desired effects. Candidates were required to report their progress; COs were to report via the performance review processes; the chain of command was required to report unsatisfactory progress to an undesignated agency and CDA was required to provide academic counselling to CEOTP participants, amendments to the individual learning plans, and make recommendations for administrative action in the event of unsatisfactory progress. There is evidence from both candidates and stakeholders that monitoring and reporting was not being done anywhere except in isolated cases. Most candidates, when surveyed, stated that their chain of command took little notice of their CEOTP involvement. In some cases these management lapses were from ignorance of the requirement; in other cases they resulted from ignoring the requirement.

### **DAOD 5002 – 6: The Way Ahead**

DAOD 5002 – 6 was developed by CMP with the participation of all key stakeholders in order to address these and other problems with CEOTP that had developed following ADM(HR-Mil) 09/05. Numerous stakeholders who either employ CEOTP officers or else manage the CEOTP program were asked about their impressions of the DAOD. They are unanimously pleased with the product and feel that it addresses their particular concerns. There is a strong endorsement of the DAOD's provision of duty time for academic pursuits as well as more flexible options if candidates have not reached degree status at the end of their initial terms of service. There is also a strong endorsement of the DAOD's mandating one of RMC's continuing education degrees except in certain circumstances. This will maximize the academic potential of prior learning as well as that of military training and education and will therefore minimize the time required to complete a degree. DAOD 5002 – 6 is much more prescriptive on all of the management issues described above although there is some scepticism as to whether they will be enforced or not.



## Conclusion

The occupation authorities all agree that while CEOTP is an effective short-term production mechanism for understrength and hard-to-recruit occupations, it comes with concomitant longer-term impacts. First and foremost are the conflicting realities on operational units of “getting the job done” but providing the necessary time to CEOTP candidates for their education requirements. This is compounded by the possibility of the release of the CEOTP member if he or she fails to achieve degree status in the prescribed timeframe. The ECs are more cognizant than previously of the operational “cost” of this entry plan and are much more cautious in using it.

## Recommendation

14. Review DAOD 5002 – 6 for compliance within three years.

**OPI:** CDA



## Annex A—Management Action Plan

### Performance (Effectiveness)

#### CRS Recommendation

1. As the CF has reached its expansion goals, update, or replace the 2007 Canadian Forces Recruiting Strategic Level Guidance on Winning the War for Talent and other relevant recruitment and basic military training policies and guidelines to provide a greater emphasis on recruiting quality candidates versus expansion targets.

#### Management Action

**Agreed.** Military Personnel (MILPERS) staff has confirmed that the 2007 Canadian Forces Recruiting Strategic Level Guidance on Winning the War for Talent and other relevant recruitment and basic military training policies require update. While CFRG remains committed to attracting and selecting quality candidates from among those who successfully complete the recruiting process, recent adjustments in the SIP combined with strong applicant interest affords CFRG the opportunity to provide greater emphasis on selecting quality candidates and implement business process renewal initiatives to improve efficiency. MILPERS staff will address this recommendation in the following manner:

- While recognizing that much of the 2007 Canadian Forces Strategic Level Guidance on Winning the War for Talent remains relevant, the strategic goal (i.e., expand the CF) and some of its guiding principles must be updated. On behalf of CMP, CFRG will undertake the following:
  - a thorough review of Winning the War for Talent to ensure the relevance of the strategic goal, its guiding principles and stated strategic objectives and release a revised Strategic Level Guidance on Recruiting.
  - a collection and review of existing CF recruiting doctrine and other recruiting publications as well as those used by other organizations to help shape future recruiting doctrine development; and
  - the publication of a CF Recruiting Doctrine Manual that will highlight the fundamental principles that will guide recruitment activities. This doctrine will align with the Military Personnel Management Doctrine Canadian Forces Joint Publication 1.0, and the revised Strategic Level Guidance on Recruiting.
- CFRG will implement a revised selection model, in particular the introduction of a personality measure and a person-job tool, to improve the success in predicting basic and occupational training performance and therefore further improve recruit quality.
- CDA will review basic military training policies as part of a broader ongoing review of the developmental period 1 for officers and non-commissioned members in the CF. This review is currently under way and the results will be used to develop a CF MILPERS Instruction for developmental periods 1 and 2.



**OPI: CMP****Target Dates:**

- Draft revised Strategic Level Guidance on Recruiting – March 2013
- Approved Strategic Level Guidance on Recruiting – March 2014
- Draft CF recruiting doctrine – March 2013
- Approved CF recruiting doctrine – March 2014
- Implementation of revised selection model – September 2013
- Review of basic military training policies – March 2013

**CRS Recommendation**

2. Streamline recruiting guidelines and policies and establish a Central Repository System to store all relevant recruiting policies, and guidelines.

**Management Action**

**Agreed.** This recommendation pertains to three principle areas: the dissemination of new DAODs and policy documents to CFRG (an issue which is compounded given the plethora of outdated Canadian Forces Administrative Orders, CF MILPERS Instructions, Compensation and Benefits Instructions and DAODs that influence recruitment), creation of a Central Repository of relevant policy, and inconsistent interpretations of existing policy. MILPERS staff will address this recommendation in the following manner:

- Director Personnel Generation Requirements (DPGR) will continue to:
  - maintain and amend as appropriate through the policy life cycle review process the DAODs pertaining to Military Personnel Requirements and Production, Enrolment, Canadian Forces Personnel Selection, Direct Entry Officer – Reg F, Continuing Education Officer Training Plan – Reg F, the related Personnel Psychology Directives, and CF Military Personnel Instructions pertaining to pre-enrolment physical fitness testing and drug use;
  - advance through the working group and the Director Strategic and Corporate Services' DAOD policy development process the seven remaining older, but still in force, personnel production plan policies that are promulgated as either a Canadian Forces Administrative Order or CF MILPERS Instruction (i.e., Regular Officer Training Plan; Reserve Entry Training Plan; Reserve Entry Scheme Officers; Medical Officer Training Plan/Dental Officer Training Plan; Military Legal, Pharmacy, and Chaplaincy Plans; Subsidized Education for Entry-level Masters, and Non-Commissioned Member Special Entry Plan) and convert these into five streamlined DAODs; and
  - liaise with CFRG and working group members on the status of policy development and continue to update and maintain the DPGR policy records found on the CMP Policy Tracker database.

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- CFRG will conduct an examination of current recruitment knowledge management (KM) processes including a review of existing recruiting documentation for currency and relevance then create a hierarchical architecture for managing KM that will be comprised of the following:
  - a recruiting doctrine manual;
  - Group Orders – designed to provide standing, standardized direction throughout CFRG. This effort will eliminate obsolete or invalid orders, reduce duplication, and eliminate conflicting CFRG direction;
  - Recruiting Directives – a complete review of all Recruiting Directives will be carried out to remove outdated and redundant material; and
  - Recruiting Process Manual (RPM) – The RPM will replace the current Recruiting Handbook and provide standardized processes for all recruitment activities related to attraction, processing, selection and enrolment functions. Work instructions provided in the RPM will provide recruiters with standardized steps to complement these recruitment functions. The RPM will enable the implementation of a process-based quality assurance system which will verify compliance with the RPM and provide a mechanism to validate and continuously improve processes.
  
- Implementation of group orders, recruiting directives, a recruiting process manual and an active process-based quality assurance system will establish a centralized repository of recruitment information for internal and external stakeholders, increase the accuracy, currency and relevance of KM information, provide standardized processes and policy interpretation for recruitment functions and establish an internal audit function to verify compliance and validate the performance of recruitment functions.

**OPI: CMP****Target Dates:**

- Policy life cycle review – ongoing
- Convert old policy documents to DAODs – 2016
- Publish CFRG Group Orders – December 2013
- Publish revised Recruiting Directives – December 2013
- Publish complete RPM – September 2013
- Implement a process-based quality assurance system – September 2013



**CRS Recommendation**

3. Implement changes to ensure that all new recruiters receive training at the commencement of their duties, and that the training also incorporates improvements in interpersonal skills such as interview techniques, communications, marketing and career counselling. A 2011 study completed by the DGMPRA<sup>30</sup> should be considered in developing options for change.

**Management Action**

**Agreed.** MILPERS staff and CFRG place considerable emphasis on training of personnel. Once selected for recruiting duties, personnel are required to complete a two-week course, specific to their particular function, followed by a six month on-the-job training package to solidify their skill sets. All new personnel must successfully complete this training and the requirement to continue their employment within CFRG. Training courses are conducted annually between September and November by Canadian Forces Training Development Center (CFTDC) to accommodate new arrivals and often repeated in April-May to train individuals selected for recruiting employment in the coming active posting season. Efforts to improve the quality of training provided include the following:

- an ongoing CFRG/CFTDC review of all recruiting courses (recruiter, recruiting clerk, military career counsellor, unit personnel selection officer, and commanding officers course). This review will look specifically at identifying course content that could be delivered via distance learning and will include the incorporation, where practical, of recommendations from the DGMPRA research report titled Realistic Job Preview: An Examination of the Canadian Forces Recruiting Process;
- the development of a new mechanism, jointly managed by CFRG KM personnel and the CFRG Recruit Personnel Selection Officer to coordinate required course modifications with CFTDC. This mechanism will capture CFRG Group Order, Recruiting Directive and RPM changes for incorporation into course materiel;
- the development of distance learning training packages by CFRG and CFTDC for the various recruiting courses to increase access to recruiter training materials. Implementation of distance learning will permit more time and emphasis to be placed on interpersonal skills, interview techniques, communications and marketing during the in-house portion of the training; and
- CDA has been conducting validations of the CFRG courses on a regular basis to ensure they meet the specified requirements. Table 11 identifies progress in this area. By the end of FY 2013/14, 100 percent of CFRG courses will have been validated.

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<sup>30</sup> Job Analysis: Canadian Forces Recruiter Position: Selection and Training Recommendations, December 2011, DGMPRA.

## Annex A

Course Title	Qualification	Last Validated	Scheduled Validation
Commanding Officer – Recruiting Organization	AEWU	Not yet validated	FY 2013/14
Military Career Counsellor	AHCK	FY 2010/11	No
Recruiter	AEWV	FY 2010/11	No
Recruiting Clerk	AJFY	FY 2010/11	No
Recruiting Test Administrator	AJOZ	Not yet validated	FY 2013/14

**Table 11. Validation of the CFRG Courses.** The table describes the course validation schedule for the five courses delivered by CFRG to the recruiting staff.

**OPI: CMP****Target Dates:**

- Review of all recruiting courses for applicability and validity – June 2013
- Implementation of improved recruiting course modification coordination – December 2012
- Distance Learning Training – September 2013
- Validation of all Recruiting Courses by CDA – April 2014

**CRS Recommendation**

4. Review, update, and assess compliance with policies on the selection of staff for posting to recruiting positions.

**Management Action**

**Agreed.** Director General Military Careers and CFRG staff remain vigilant and committed to the selection and quality of recruiting staff. This is accomplished initially through a screening process to ensure that those selected for recruiting duties not only possess the requisite skills and knowledge to fulfill their responsibilities but that they also have the desire and motivation to work within the recruiting environment and with the Canadian public. Although recruiting centre COs remain the final approval authority for recruiting staff selected for their units, these COs are sometimes provided a single nomination with the occasional comment from a career manager that this will be the only nomination (a “choose him/her or take a vacancy”). This lack of selection reduces the quality of recruiting personnel. Efforts to improve the quality and selection of recruiting personnel include the following:

- a review of the current CFRG recruiter selection/screening direction (i.e., CFRG Recruiting Directive 09/06 Selection of Recruiting Personnel);
- preparation and release of an updated CANFORGEN to replace CANFORGEN 185/05 (Recruiting Recruiters);
- a review of the language requirements for all Recruiter and Military Career Counsellor positions;
- a renewed effort by Director Military Careers to provide CFRG COs a wide selection of candidates for recruiting duties;



- distribution of a communiqué from Director Military Careers to all career managers of the importance of filling all recruiting positions with high quality/high potential candidates including providing alternate names, should nominated individuals fail screening for recruiting duties.

**OPI: CMP****Target Dates:**

- Review of Recruiting Directive 09/06 – December 2012
- Release of an updated CANFORGEN on recruiting – January 2013
- Review of language requirements – March 2013
- Provision of a wider selection of candidates for recruiting duties – Active Posting Season 2013
- Communiqué to career managers – January 2013

**CRS Recommendation**

5. Establish centralized and formal processes and tools to retrieve, track, and utilize the necessary data to improve strategic decision making regarding resource allocation and recruiting approaches.

**Management Action**

**Agreed.** MILPERS and CFRG staff have long recognized the requirement to improve information gathering in support of strategic decision making. As documented in this report and in Finding 7 in particular, “retrieving this data is problematic due to inadequate data management systems.” In addition to an obsolete CFRIMS, decision making is further hampered by an aging HRMIS, Director Human Resource Information Management Output Products, and Basic Training List Management System. Staff have pushed these systems beyond their planned capabilities with limited results. The only planned capability to address these shortfalls remains implementation of MPMCT which plans to transform DND/CF business that supports human resources and payroll services, implement Oracle PeopleSoft to replace legacy systems, modernize Information Technology (IT) infrastructure, migrate data for legacy applications, and develop and integrate interfaces with remaining IT systems. No further progress is possible without the delivery and implementation of this modernized, flexible human resources management system. Current efforts to address this shortfall include the following:

- participation by CFRG in the MPMCT Requirements Working Group;
- confirmation by the Project Management Office MPMCT that all recruiting requirements identified in the Requirements Working Group will be incorporated into the final system;
- delivery of MPMCT full operational capability; and
- implementation of centralized and formal processes and tools to retrieve, track, and utilize the necessary data to improve strategic recruiting decision making.

**OPI: CMP****Target Dates:**

- Participation in the MPMCT Requirements Working Group – ongoing
- Confirmation that recruiting requirements will be incorporated – January 2013
- Delivery of MPMCT full operational capability – 2016
- Implementation of centralized, formal processes and tools – 2017

**CRS Recommendation**

6. Work with PWGSC to address timing issues and means to establish procurement instruments for marketing campaigns that can put contracts in place during the start of the calendar year.

**Management Action**

**Agreed.** ADM(PA) is in constant liaison with PWGSC to find ways to improve timing issues for marketing and advertising campaigns. Contracts are in place for three years at a time before the start of fiscal years. As well, in daily operations, ADM(PA) provides PWGSC with a 'heads up' before finalizing media plans in order to ensure fast approval. This process has been implemented in the past year and successful results have already been observed.

**OPI: ADM(PA)****Target Dates:** April 2013**CRS Recommendation**

7. Develop and implement plans for alternate approaches for maintaining national access to recruiting services for all Canadians and for supporting Reserve processing following personnel reductions in CFRG and CFRG/detachment closures.

**Management Action**

**Agreed.** As documented in the report, between 2008 and 2012 CFRG strength will decrease by over 25 percent and the number of recruiting detachments will decrease by over 30 percent. Reductions imposed on MILPERS and CFRG staffs were designed to reduce departmental expenditures through a divestment of lower priority activities and a reduced level of recruiting services was an accepted outcome of these reductions.

In an attempt to mitigate the impact of these reductions and restore reduced national access to recruiting services and reduced support for processing Res F applicants, CFRG intends to implement business process renewal initiatives by moving to 100 percent online application for all Reg F, Res F and Component Transfer applicants and centralizing control initial applicant processing. This will include implementation of aggressive pre-processing file reduction techniques, remote completion of the CFAT, Trait Self Descriptive, reliability and background check as screening tools, implementation of a client relationship management system to improve and automate

many replies to applicants and active participation in social media. Progress will be highly dependent on personnel resources and IT support, both of which are undergoing significant reductions.

**OPI: CMP****Target Dates:**

- Implementation of 100 percent online application for Reg and Res F applicants – September 2013
- Implementation of centralized control of initial applicant processing – December 2013
- Limited participation in social media – September 2014
- Remote completion of CFAT, Trait Self Descriptive, reliability and background checks – August 2015
- Full participation in social media – September 2016

**CRS Recommendation**

8. Assess the realistic ability of the CF to achieve its EE goals; if deemed unachievable either revise the goals with an updated EE Plan or else consider improving or adding more EE special programs towards reaching them.

**Management Action**

**Agreed.** The 2010 CF EE goal for Aboriginals is achievable. Although progress is being made with respect the revised CF EE goal for visible minorities (with enrolments exceeding current representation), progress still falls well short of the 11.8 percent goal. The revised CF EE goal for women is unattainable without the imposition of significant special measures. The Director Human Rights and Diversity's (DHRD) assessment is that the revised goal for Women of 25.1 percent is unrealistically high due to a flawed workforce analysis (WFA) methodology; this position is supported in large part by comparing the representation of women in CF with culturally similar militaries (i.e. the Technical Cooperation Programme nations) where none have yet achieved 20 percent. The WFA methodology developed several years ago by the ECs, Treasury Board Secretariat, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC) and the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) was used to calculate the CF labour market availability (LMA) and subsequently to establish CF EE goals. This compromise solution satisfied no one and was widely acknowledged by EE stakeholders as being inherently flawed. The CF was compelled to use the flawed 2004 WFA methodology to update the CF EE goals in 2010. HRSDC is unwilling to entertain changes to the WFA methodology until a valid military factor (MF) that captures the unique nature of military service in relation to the *Employment Equity Act* is produced. While CF EE goals are imposed on the CF by HRSDC and enforced by CHRC, several initiatives are under way to increase designated group representation with the CF and to develop more realistic EE goals for the CF. These activities include the following:

## Annex A

- **Implementation of an MF for calculation of CF EE goals.** The Interest and Propensity (I&P) survey is currently used as an indicator of the MF and is the key variable in determining the CF LMA. The Interest and Propensity survey overstates the propensity for women to consider a career in the CF and is acknowledged by CHRC and HRSDC to be an inadequate measure of availability. DHRD and DGMPPRA have been working to define an acceptable MF to capture the unique nature of military service in relation to the *Employment Equity Act* with the aim of determining a more realistic EE availability for the CF.
- **CF WFA methodology research.** Following development of an approved MF, DHRD and DGMPPRA will refine estimations of EE availability to provide an improved estimate of CF LMA. It is expected that this will lead to a reduced goal for women and, in tandem with ongoing Public Opinion Research (POR), may also lead to a reduced goal for visible minorities.
- **CF POR (visible minorities).** POR on CF recruiting of Visible Minorities is ongoing and will assist in validating EE goals. This study is being conducted in three phases with Phase I (Chinese-Canadians) complete and Phases 2 (Other Asian origins) and 3 (Black/Muslim origins) ongoing.
- **Special measures for women.** As CMP's training authority for Special Measures Programs, CDA has been working with DHRD and CFRG to create a special measure for women in the CF similar to the highly successful Canadian Forces Aboriginal Entry Program (CFAEP) for Aboriginals. MILPERS staff intends to explore the feasibility of establishing such a program.
- **Outreach to influencers.** CFRG has a successful model for outreach to Aboriginal influencers and is expanding this program to identify and include visible minority and women influencers.

**OPI: CMP****Target Dates:**

- Completion of MF research – March 2014
- Revised CF WFA methodology – March 2015
- POR Phase 2 (Other Asian origins) – March 2013
- POR Phase 3 (Black/Muslim origins) – March 2014
- Revised women and visible minority goals – March 2017
- Confirm feasibility of CFAEP-like special measure for women – March 2013
- Initial CFAEP-like special measure for women – March 2014
- Outreach to visible minority and women influencers – ongoing



**CRS Recommendation**

9. In lieu of targets based upon overall long-term objectives with no concrete end date, establish annual goals to be met in each EE category based upon realistic measures of attrition, and recruiting capacity.

**Management Action**

**Agreed.** DHRD, CFRG and DPGR will establish annual goals for each EE category to demonstrated progress towards CF EE objectives. These annual goals will be based upon realistic measures of attrition, workforce availability, recruiting capacity and special measures. DND is currently conducting research on gender representation in the Reg F that will enable this objective. Using a methodology developed for attrition forecasting, DRPG is developing attrition models for the male and female Reg F populations projected forward 5, 10 and 20 years. A scenario/sensitivity analysis will also be conducted to explore future female representation under various scenarios including a gradual or immediate increase in female recruits, improved female retention, increased/decreased SIP, and combinations of the above. This analysis would provide clearer estimates for the time required to achieve different female representation rates in the CF. In the interim, pending the results of these analyses, CFRG will set annual EE recruiting goals starting in FY 2013/14.

**OPI: CMP****Target Dates:**

- Implement interim annual EE goals – March 2013
- Completion of gender representation research – March 2014
- Implementation of annual EE goals – March 2015

**Performance (Efficiency and Economy)****CRS Recommendation**

10. Conduct a more detailed business case review of the current resource allocation for recruiting while maintaining current standards and national access. To enable this there is a need to improve the data management system (as per Recommendation 5).

**Management Action**

**Agreed.** MILPERS and CFRG staffs understand the requirement to conduct a detailed business case review of the current allocation of resources to Reg F recruiting; however, the lack of a modern data management system (detailed in the Management Action Plan to Recommendation 5) prevents this review until delivery of the full MPMCT capability. In addition, as detailed in the Management Action Plan to Recommendation 7, a reduced level of recruiting services including reduced national access was an accepted outcome of reductions imposed on MILPERS and CFRG organizations. As CFRG implements the business process renewal initiatives detailed in the Management Action Plan to



Recommendation 7, CFRG will ensure an appropriate (reduced) resource allocation for Reg F recruiting but a more detailed business case review will only be possible following MPMCT implementation.

**OPI:** CMP

**Target Dates:**

- Appropriate (reduced) resource allocation for Reg F recruiting – concurrent with implementation of the Management Action Plan for Recommendation 7
- Delivery of MPMCT full operational capability – 2016
- Completion of detailed business case review – 2017

### CRS Recommendation

11. Develop a refined methodology to determine an accurate cost per recruit and cost per applicant. Conduct a trend analysis over the coming years starting with FY 2011/12 to monitor the costs on an ongoing basis.

### Management Action

**Agreed.** MILPERS and CFRG staff agree with the requirement to determine an accurate cost per recruit and cost per applicant and to monitor these trends over time; however, the lack of a modernized data management system (detailed in the Management Action Plan to Recommendation 5) prevents a more detailed analysis than that performed in this report until delivery of the full MPMCT capability. In the absence of this capability, CFRG will continue to monitor costs on an ongoing basis in a manner similar to that used in this report. This approach is warranted given that the CF cost per recruit calculated in this report (as estimated for FY 2012/13) is the lowest of any of the comparable benchmarked nations. CDA will support and assist CFRG with this analysis as the results will be highly informative to the ongoing Individual Training and Education Modernization Initiative and will assist in the ongoing efforts to find efficiencies with both the CFLRS and the Occupational Training System. CFRG will conduct the following activities in support of this recommendation:

- annually monitor cost-per-recruit and conduct a trend analysis in a manner similar to that used in this report until delivery of the full MPMCT capability; and
- following full MPMCT implementation, develop a refined methodology to determine an accurate cost per recruit and cost per applicant, then conduct a trend analysis with these refined costs.

**OPI:** CMP

**Target Dates:**

- Monitor costs with the methodology used in the report – annually starting May 2013
- Delivery of MPMCT full operational capability – 2016
- Develop a refined cost methodology – 2017



**CRS Recommendation**

12. Develop options to ensure BMQ graduation numbers are in alignment as much as possible with the demand and availability of occupation training. This includes expanding CFRG's just-in-time training initiative. Coordinate this analysis with Recommendation 5.

**Management Action**

**Agreed.** Over the past year, CDA and CFRG have been working closely with the other Level Ones to reduce the wait time between BMQ/BMOQ and initial qualification training for a limited number of occupations. These trials have resulted in reduced wait times between completion of BMQ/BMOQ and Initial Qualification Training but relied on manpower-intensive coordination activities in several agencies. These trials reconfirmed CDA's 2007 observations that improved visibility and accuracy into occupational training courses is required and the management system for new enrollees is not a coherent, integrated system but remains managed by different agencies. Without a large influx of personnel to coordinate individual training schedules, no further progress can be made with the existing archaic CFRIMS, Human Resources Management System and the Basic Training List Management System. Integrating these disparate systems is the critical first step. Full implementation of MPMCT should bring a modernized HR management system which should enable full coordination of recruitment to the operationally functional point on an individual basis. The results of the recent trials are being used to develop a comprehensive strategy for aligning intake and recruit training with the capacity of occupation training following MPMCT implementation. The goal remains to decrease the number of personnel awaiting training and reduce the amount of time it requires to become occupation qualified in the Canadian Forces.

**OPI: CMP****Target Dates:**

- Delivery of MPMCT full operational capability – 2016
- Limited implementation of recruit to the operationally functional point – 2017
- Full implementation of recruit to the operationally functional point – 2019

**CRS Recommendation**

13. Study alternative approaches to recruiting over time to determine if there are any cost-effective opportunities or lessons to be learned.

**Management Action**

**Agreed.** MILPERS and CFRG staffs acknowledge the requirement to seek continuous improvement in all activities including the study of alternative approaches to recruiting. While noting that the CF cost per recruit calculated in this report (as estimated for FY 2012/13) is the lowest of any of the comparable benchmarked nations, CFRG continues to pursue significant business process renewal initiatives as detailed in the Management Action Plan to Recommendation 7 of this report. Following implementation of these process renewal initiatives and the development of a refined methodology to determine an accurate cost per recruit and cost per applicant (as detailed in Management Action Plan to Recommendation 11), MILPERS and CFRG staffs will determine if there are any further cost-effective alternate approaches to recruiting.

**OPI: CMP****Target Dates:**

- Delivery of MPMCT full operational capability – 2016
- Develop a refined cost methodology – 2017
- Complete business process renewal initiatives – August 2015
- Determine if there are additional alternate recruiting approaches – 2019

**Other Issue – CEOTP****CRS Recommendation**

14. Review DAOD 5002 – 6 for compliance within three years.


**Management Action**

**Agreed.** DAOD 5002-6 was issued on 9 November 2011 and, at the time of writing, will have been in force for one year. The CDA, as the organization responsible for managing the CEOTP, and DPGR, as the CEOTP policy holder, will collaborate to provide all stakeholders feedback and policy-related queries that will improve the management and delivery of this plan. As part of this process, CDA, with input from DPGR, will produce and forward to the Level Ones a Year 1 Evaluation Report that consolidates the lessons learned from the first year of implementation as well as an encapsulation of student progress and predicted completion times. This report is mandated in the DAOD and its release will coincide with the AMOR cycle. DPGR will convene a review of the DAOD in the fall of 2014 to coincide with the recommendation above.

**OPI: CDA**

**Target Date:** November 2014

### Annex B—Logic Model



**Figure 3. Recruiting and Basic Military Training Program Logic Model.** This logic model shows the specific activities, outputs and outcomes of the recruiting and basic military training programs.

## Annex C—Evaluation Matrix

### Relevance

**Question 1.1.** Is there a continued need for the CF to attract, recruit and train new members for its occupations?

#### Indicator

- Evidence that the recruiting and basic military training program continues to address a demonstrable need.

#### Data Sources/Methodology

- Document review
- Interviews
- Questionnaire

**TB Policy Issue Addressed – Issue #1.** Continued Need for the Program

**Question 1.2.** Are the objectives of CF recruiting and basic military training programs clearly linked with federal government policies and priorities and DND policies and priorities?

#### Indicator

- Linkages to federal government policies and priorities, and DND's policies, priorities and strategic outcomes

#### Data Sources/Methodology

- Document review
- Interviews
- Questionnaire

**TB Policy Issue Addressed – Issue #2.** Alignment with Federal Government Priorities

**Question 1.3.** Do the CF Reg F recruiting and basic military training programs align with federal roles and responsibilities?

#### Indicators

- Linkages to federal roles and responsibilities
- Linkages to DND/CF roles and responsibilities



**Data Sources/Methodology**

- Document review
- Interviews

**TB Policy Issue Addressed – Issue #3.** Alignment with Federal Roles and Responsibilities

**Performance (Effectiveness)**

**Question 2.1.** Is a well managed and modern recruitment system in place?

**Indicators**

- Stakeholders understand and comply with policies; stakeholders feel policies are effective
- Use of modern approaches (e.g., media effectiveness survey)
- Stakeholders' assessment of quality of staff, tools and technology.

**Data Sources/Methodology**

- Administrative data review
- Document review
- Interviews
- Benchmarking
- Questionnaire

**TB Policy Issue Addressed – Issue #4.** Achievement of Expected Outcomes (Effectiveness – Immediate Outcomes)

**Question 2.2.** Has a sufficient number of suitable applicants been attracted for each occupation?

**Indicators**

- Requirements planning is in place
- Number of applicants attracted
- Degree of progress achieved in distressed occupations
- The extent of effectiveness in marketing/advertisement activities

**Data Sources/Methodology**

- Administrative data review
- Document review
- Interviews

**TB Policy Issue Addressed – Issue #4.** Achievement of Expected Outcomes  
(Effectiveness)

**Question 2.3.** Has a sufficient number of applicants been processed and the right person recruited into the right occupation at the right time?

**Indicators**

- Evidence of clearly defined recruiting selection measures, policies and procedures
- Evidence that CF recruits the right person (quality of recruits)
- Evidence that the processing time is responsive to needs of both the CF and the applicant

**Data Sources/Methodology**

- Administrative and financial data review
- Document review
- Benchmarking
- Interviews

**TB Policy Issue Addressed – Issue #4.** Achievement of Expected Outcomes  
(Effectiveness – Immediate Outcomes)

**Question 2.4.** Are recruits prepared for the profession of arms and trained with needed skills, knowledge and attitudes to meet occupation training?

**Indicator**

- Evidence that CFLRS course Training Standards reflect that recruits are prepared for the profession of arms with needed skills, knowledge and attitudes to meet occupational training/success rates of the training program

**Data Sources/Methodology**

- Document review
- Interviews
- Benchmarking
- Questionnaire

**TB Policy Issue Addressed – Issue #4.** Achievement of Expected Outcomes  
(Effectiveness – Immediate Outcomes)

**Question 2.5.** Are sufficient numbers of personnel, reflecting Canadian society available for occupational training?

**Indicator**

- Degree of progress towards CF EE goals





**Data Sources/Methodology**

- Administrative data review
- Document review
- Interviews
- Benchmarking

**TB Policy Issue Addressed – Issue #4.** Achievement of Expected Outcomes (Effectiveness)

**Performance (Resource Utilization – Efficiency and Economy)**

**Question 3.1.** Have the most appropriate and efficient means been used for CF Reg F recruiting initiatives and activities?

**Indicators**

- The extent of efficiency of recruitment and training approaches (planning and governance)
- The extent of efficiency in planning and governance (modern program is established)
- Extent of efficiency in attracting and processing candidates
- Extent of efficiency in costs per processed recruit
- Extent of efficiency in basic military training

**Data Sources/Methodology**

- Administrative data review
- Document review
- Interviews
- Benchmarking

**TB Policy Issue Addressed – Issue #5.** Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy

**Question 3.2.** How could the recruiting and basic military training programs improve efficiencies in having the right people ready for occupational training?

**Indicators**

- Evidence/views of whether the training synchronization is well coordinated
- Evidence that economic alternatives have been trialed and/or sought for the delivery of these services

### Data Sources/Methodology

- Administrative data review
- Document review
- Interviews
- Benchmarking

**TB Policy Issue Addressed – Issue #5.** Demonstration of Efficiency and Economy

### Other Issues

**Question 4.1.** Has CEOTP been a relevant, effective and efficient officer entry plan?

### Indicator

- Evidence that CEOTP has been a relevant, effective and efficient officer entry plan

### Data Sources/Methodology

- Administrative data review
- Document review
- Interviews
- Questionnaire