A conceptual model to understand interagency trust

And an application to Comprehensive Approach (CA) missions

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IMPORTANT INFORMATIVE STATEMENTS

Abstract

Building and maintaining trust has been termed a critical prerequisite for effectiveness within the Comprehensive Approach to Operations (CA). However, there is remarkably little additional discussion concerning trust in the CA context. As a result, there is little depth of understanding of what trust is, its foundational properties and exactly why and how it is important to collaboration in CA missions. On a more practical level, this means that there is virtually no guidance as to how interagency trust may be achieved or maintained within CA teams, and little attention paid to the factors that can enhance or undermine trust. This paper seeks to add substance to the discussion by applying the trust research literature to the challenges of CA missions. I also present a conceptual model of interagency trust to better illustrate key concepts and their interrelation.

Significance to defence and security

This research and the conceptual model presented are intended to make discussions of the importance and effects of interagency trust more tangible, accessible and practical for the military and civilian personnel who may be called upon to collaborate or interact in CA missions. Indeed, the conceptual model was developed as a vehicle through which the importance and benefits of trust can be incorporated into CA education and training programs. The conceptual model also makes predictions for research in this area, the results of which can provide evidence-based recommendations to inform the thinking of civilian and military leaders who formulate interagency concepts, strategy, policy, education and training to enhance Canadian operational effectiveness in complex missions.

Résumé

On considère que le fait de bâtir et de maintenir la confiance est une condition préalable à l'efficacité de l'approche exhaustive (AE) des opérations. Or, il y a manifestement peu à ajouter concernant la confiance dans le cadre de l' AE. Par conséquent, on comprend mal ce qu'est la confiance, quelles en sont les propriétés fondamentales, pourquoi exactement et en quoi elle est importante pour la collaboration aux missions de l' AE. Sur le plan pratique, cela signifie qu'il n'y a pour ainsi dire aucune directive sur la façon de créer ou de maintenir la confiance interinstitutionnelle au sein des équipes de l' AE, et l'on prête peu d'attention aux facteurs qui pourraient améliorer ou miner la confiance. Le présent rapport vise à étoffer la discussion en appliquant la documentation de recherche sur la confiance aux enjeux des missions de l' AE. Je présente en outre un modèle conceptuel de confiance interinstitutionnelle pour mieux illustrer les concepts clés et leur interrelation.

Importance pour la défense et la sécurité

La recherche et le modèle conceptuel présentés visent à rendre les discussions sur l'importance et les effets de la confiance interinstitutionnelle concrètes, accessibles et pratiques pour les militaires et les civils qui pourraient être appelés à collaborer ou interagir dans le cadre de missions de l' AE. De fait, le modèle conceptuel a été élaboré comme vecteur permettant d'intégrer l'importance et les avantages de la confiance aux programmes d'éducation et de formation de l' AE. Le modèle conceptuel permet aussi de faire des prévisions de recherches dans le domaine, prévisions dont les résultats peuvent amener des recommandations fondées sur des preuves afin d' alimenter la réflexion des chefs militaires et civils qui formulent les concepts, stratégies, politiques, programmes d'éducation et de formation interinstitutionnels visant à améliorer l'efficacité du Canada lors de missions complexes.

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1   Introduction

Addressing the multiple demands underlying international and domestic missions has increasingly required coordinated responses across a range of government departments and agencies. Variously termed Whole-of-Government (WoG), Interagency, Integrated or Comprehensive Approach (CA) to Operations, the approach has been adopted by a number of western countries as well as by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations (U.N.) (e.g., U.S. Department of Defense, 2010; U. N. Department of Peacekeeping, 2002; 2008; 2009; 2011; Simon & Duzenli, 2009; United Nations 2005; Ministry of Defence, 2006; Australian Government, 2010). Although referred to by different names, the essence of the approach remains the same, reflecting a philosophy that "seeks to incorporate all the elements of power and agencies, and harmonize them, their capabilities, and their activities, in order to work to address the elements and complexities present in an environment and reach enduring strategic and operational end states" (Canadian Forces Joint Publication 3.0 - Operations, 2010, p. 5-14).

The Canadian commitment to CA is reflected in several high-level governmental and Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) documents, for instance, the 2005 International Policy Statement, the Canada First Defence Strategy, the Northern Strategy, the Canadian Forces (CF) Integrated Training Plan 2012/2013, and Land Operations 2021 (Government of Canada, 2005; 2008, Chief of Defence Staff, 2012; see also Balasecvisius, 2010). CA has also been an explicit, foundational element of multiple Canadian international and domestic missions in the past decade, including OP ATHENA, OP ATTENTION (Afghanistan), OP HESTIA (Haiti), OP PODIUM (Vancouver 2010 Olympics) and OP CADENCE (G8/G20 Summits) (Brister, 2011; Buchan, 2011; Smith, McLellan, & Hobbs, 2013; Thatcher, 2005; 2011). Moreover, the ability to work effectively in a CA context is seen as an important enabler of future CAF operations, and a key means to ensure mission success in an increasingly complex mission environment (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008).

Yet reviews of CA missions in a variety of countries and theatres of operation have revealed the hard realities of its implementation (DeConing, 2008; Morcos, 2005; Olson & Gregorian, 2007; Patrick & Brown, 2007; Spence, 2002; Stephenson & Schnitzer, 2006; Winslow, 2002). Certainly considerable technical challenges to effective collaboration and coordination in CA exist, such as incompatible communication, knowledge management, and financial systems. However, purely organizational and social psychological issues have also proven to be at least equally significant barriers to CA effectiveness. These include conflicting political agendas, organizational structure disparities (hierarchical and centralized vs. flat and decentralized), rapid turnover and small pools of trained personnel, little or no corporate memory with few formal lessons learned mechanisms, differences in approaches to planning and disparate norms for interacting. Even "competition for resources and agency profile" (Olson & Gregorian, 2007, p. 13) has been noted as an impediment to effective coordination in CA.

CA missions are further complicated by the fact that many are mounted in response to a sudden requirement or a crisis. This means that the responding interagency teams often are often hastily formed, work under extreme time pressure and chaotic circumstances, have a limited timeframe of collaboration, and do not anticipate interacting together in the future. Even in longer term CA missions, such as Afghanistan, the start and end dates and the lengths of civil and military deployments were not synchronized. This means that in many cases personnel from the various organizations that contribute to these teams must hit the ground running.

Perhaps not surprisingly then, evaluations of past CA missions have concluded that effective CA has largely been ad hoc, accomplished by the lucky but almost always accidental meshing of personalities (Olson & Gregorian, 2007; Patrick & Brown, 2007; Rietjens, 2008). Indeed, a somewhat alarming 2012 analysis of US interagency efforts in Afghanistan offered that the use of "whole-of-government terminology nowadays mostly elicits exasperated sighs from governmental officials" … and that "[g]overnment agencies may well take the demise of large-scale operations as an excuse to retreat into their respective comfort zones" (Baumann, 2012, p. 33-34). Thus, unless lessons learned are mobilized into a concerted strategy and plan for the future, there is the real possibility that CA and its benefits may be abandoned due to frustration over the challenges of its implementation.

However, many of these same reviews have identified that the existence of trust between CA team members from different government agencies and departments is crucial to overcoming many of the barriers to collaboration in such missions. For instance, in their analyses of interviews of people from various international organizations who had participated in interagency humanitarian missions, Stephenson and Schnitzer (2006) determined that trust was integral to effective inter-organizational coordination. Canadians Gizewski and Rostek (2007) similarly noted that "building trust between different "cultures", be they within the CAF [Canadian Armed Forces], GoC [Government of Canada] departments, or NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations], is a critical prerequisite" for effective CA (p. 66). This thinking is further supported by a separate study in which interviews of senior Canadian military and civilian leaders also identified trust as instrumental in effective civil-military relations (Hill, 2007).

Although mentioned as critical, there is remarkably little additional discussion concerning trust in CA. Thus, there is little depth of understanding of what trust is, its foundational properties and exactly why and how it is important to collaboration in general and in CA missions specifically. Thus there is little understanding of its role in CA mission effectiveness. On a more practical level, this means that there is virtually no guidance as to how interagency trust may be achieved or maintained within CA teams, and little attention to the factors that can enhance or undermine trust. Hence while mentioned, statements regarding the importance of trust remain little more than platitudes and directed efforts to instantiate trust in such settings are often ignored, omitted, or at best, treated as an afterthought.

This paper addresses this issue, outlining what trust is and how it benefits collaboration, applying this literature to CA. Because of its complexity, I also present a conceptual model, adapted from the work of Robert, Dennis, and Hung (2009), to better illustrate key trust-relevant concepts and their interrelation. The objective of this paper and the conceptual framework is to begin to demystify trust in order to increase an understanding of the dynamics of trust in CA. The intent then is to inform discussions of trust, as well as to make discussions of trust more tangible and accessible for leaders who formulate interagency strategy, policy and training for the military and civilian personnel who may be called upon to collaborate or interact in future CA missions. However, the conceptual model provides additional benefits. For instance, it can also provide a vehicle through which the importance and benefits of trust can be illustrated in CA education and training. Finally, the model also provides a basis for predictions concerning trust, allowing for future empirical tests to provide evidence-based recommendations to enhance interagency strategy, policy, education and training, and in operations.

1.1 Trust: Definition, foundational properties and links to CA missions

Trust is the degree to which we are willing to rely on another (an individual, group or organization) to provide something important to us when we require it, even though we cannot compel them to do so. An amalgam of beliefs (i.e., certainty versus indecision) and emotions (i.e., feelings of security versus vulnerability), trust is our best estimate regarding the future behavior and motives of others. Accordingly, trust will become a greater concern as our level of interdependence with others grow and as the importance of and the risk, uncertainty and ambiguity of a situation increases (Holmes, 1991; Lewicki & Bunker, 1996; Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995).

Certainly, these features are entirely consistent with CA missions. For instance, the objectives associated with CA are often beyond the capabilities of a single organization. Thus by definition, interagency partners must be interdependent, relying on each other to provide resources important to them and to overall mission success. Moreover, importance, complexity and risk are the hallmarks of conditions that characterize the environments that require a CA response (Thompson & Gill, 2010). Third, the separate lines of reporting, authority, responsibility and command within the different contributing organizations often means that members have little control over, and cannot guarantee the behavior of, personnel from different agencies.

Our level of trust in others is informed by our perceptions of them on up to four dimensions: 1) another's technical skill or ability level, i.e., their *competence*; 2) their genuine and unselfish concern for others, i.e., *benevolence* 3) their adherence to valued common principles or ethics, i.e., *integrity* and 4) their behavioral consistency, i.e., *predictability*.[1] Understanding each of these dimensions can be important. For instance, where one skilled colleague may show genuine care for others (high competence and high benevolence), another colleague can be equally competent but also be quite selfish (high competence but low benevolence). These differences have important implications in terms of who we trust and in which situations we can trust them. Consistent with this premise, people who participated in CA missions have noted that their assessments of their interagency counterparts often centered on perceived competence level, but also at times on the perceived benevolence and integrity of the members of other agencies (or even of the agencies themselves) (e.g., see Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown, & Flear, 2011).

Trust is responsive and dynamic, developing and changing over time (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt & Camerer, 1998; Searle, Weibel, & Den Hartog, 2011). For instance, two types of trust are typically associated with early stages of a relationship, and are used in the absence of any personal knowledge of the other. *Calculus-based* trust has the most impersonal, external and straight exchange basis (i.e., 'what is in it for me', I trust if the rewards for me outweigh my costs). Similarly, in the absence of direct knowledge, humans also utilize categories as a way to start to make sense of a situation. Such *Category-based trust* is heavily influenced by the most available, salient categories that the unknown other appears to represent and by third party recommendations; these are used to *infer* the unknown individual's integrity, competence, benevolence and/or predictability. Of course, in the absence of deeper knowledge, the most immediately salient categories are also the most readily observable such as age, ethnicity and/or sex, which may not have any actual relevance to effectiveness. For instance, stereotypes of

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[1] Note that many theorists have dropped the predictability dimension.

military by civilians as 'authoritarian and arrogant' and of civilians by military personnel as 'flaky do gooders' have often been cited as an impediment to successful interagency collaboration (Winslow, 2002; see also Thomson et al., 2011).

Foundational models of trust development (Holmes, 1991; Kelley, 1979; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Rempel, Holmes & Zanna, 1985) specify that trust begins at a neutral or at best, at a slightly positive level, but requires several iterations of deepening risk taken and rewarded (e.g., Holmes, 1991) for trust to be established. This assumption is problematic for those interagency teams of strangers that are rapidly formed to deal with a crisis or in on-going teams where there is a high turnover of membership: there is simply no time for gradually increasing risk-taking and reward. However, other research has demonstrated that, under the right conditions, even initial trust levels in work settings can often be fairly positive. In these cases, trust seems to be assumed to be warranted, as long as there is no evidence to the contrary (McKnight, Cummings, & Chervany, 1998).

Not surprisingly, the presence of the right conditions is critical. Meyerson, Weick, & Kramer (1996) further investigated a specific type of category-based trust, coining the term 'swift trust' to describe teams in which members who had no prior personal knowledge of each other acted 'as if' high trust existed. More specifically, they argued that swift trust could occur in ad hoc teams when each member's role within the team is clear, understood and deemed important to task completion by each member of the team. Indeed, it is each member's very assignment to the team that is used as a proxy for evidence that they are qualified and motivated to make effective contributions to the team. (Meyerson et al., 1996; see also Thompson, under review, for an in-depth discussion of swift trust and its application to CA teams).

In other cases team membership continues over time, and the bases of trust can – although do not always – shift. In those cases where direct interaction provides more specific information about the individual, our trust in them can become *knowledge-based*, which allows us to start making more informed predictions about that individual's future behavior. Where such direct knowledge also leads to the development of an understanding and an appreciation of the other's underlying goals, attitudes, beliefs and values, a more intrinsic (i.e., satisfying in and of itself) interest in the well-being and concerns of the other can occur and is termed *relation-based trust* (e.g., when colleagues or acquaintances become friends). Finally, if commonly-held, important beliefs and values are revealed, team members can develop a shared group identity or collective mentality. This is *Identification-based trust*, in which people feel comfortable acting on each other's behalf, fully confident that each understands the other's needs and that each person's priorities and interests will be protected by the other (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996).

These differing bases of trust are of course quite pertinent to interagency teams. As noted earlier, in many cases interagency team members are strangers to one another, called together to work on a mission that is deemed to be extremely important or is a crisis, and have no expectation of interacting together again in the future. This means that there is simply no time for the cycle of gradually increasing risk-taking and reward that is a core assumption in foundational models of trust development (Holmes, 1991; Kelley, 1979; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Rempel, Holmes & Zanna, 1985). In such circumstances the dynamics of calculus and category based trust will predominate, and trust may well be focused more on self-interest and the tangible perceived benefits versus risks of trusting and/or on those salient categories that imply the trustworthiness of the other. Moreover, in those cases where members' roles within the team are understood and the contributions to the team outcome are appreciated, it is possible that swift trust can occur.

In some other cases interagency teams may continue with the same membership over the course of years, a situation consistent with the time and circumstances conducive to knowledge-based trust, and possibly to relation- and identification-based trust in some cases. Stephenson and Schnitzer (2006) eloquently discuss the importance of both categories and of direct knowledge in the development of interagency trust, as well as how category and knowledge-based trust can facilitate each other in these settings.

> Organization reputation and perceived professional competence trump personal relationships in the absence of such knowledge, but personal knowledge, when it exists, may be critical to decisions to extend trust and therefore to cooperate across organization lines. … [W]orkers may be skeptical or even jaundiced about a specific organization, but if they believe their counterpart there is competent and trustworthy, they are likely to agree to coordinate anyway. These relationships are self-reinforcing; good reputations and experience in one theater make it more likely that harmonization of activities will occur in future scenarios, a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy (p. 219).

All things being equal, the relative importance of the bases of trust (e.g., external versus internal), the dimensions on which trust is based (i.e., competence, benevolence) and of the role of beliefs versus emotions in trust are dependent on the nature (e.g., professional vs. personal) or stage (early vs. established) of a relationship, and/or the nature of the specific situation encountered (e.g., the context requires technical skill vs. genuine care and concern).

Of course, decisions to trust can be revisited, should evidence seem to arise that calls our decision into question, in particular if we begin to question the motivations that underlie the behavior of others. Depending on how betrayals are resolved, trust can, in certain cases actually deepen, although feelings of distrust often lead to at least temporary increased suspicion and vigilance regarding the other (Lewicki, 2006; Lewicki & Weithoff, 2000; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). In fact, once broken, trust may be more difficult to re-establish and take different strategies to rebuild than occurred initially (e.g., Kim, Ferrin, Cooper, & Dirks, 2004).

1.2   How does trust enhance effective collaboration?

Fortunately there is a wealth of research from several different disciplines that has demonstrated that high trust is associated with increases in effective collaboration in a number of important ways for organizations, groups, and individuals (see Atwater, 1988; Axelrod, 1984; Bazerman, 1994; Caslen & Louden, 2011; Das & Teng, 1998; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Gambetta, 1998; Good, 1988; Friedlander, 1970; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998; Zand, 1972). Indeed, trust has been termed the "single most important element of a good working relationship" (Fisher & Brown, 1998, p.107). For instance, when trust exists between organizations, information flow between partners is enhanced (Zand, 1972); there is less emphasis on the formalization of organizational controls and protections and on the establishing and monitoring costly sanctioning mechanisms" (Tyler & Kramer, 1996, p. 4). Important to the collaboration philosophy that underpins CA, high trust between partner organizations keeps authority and decision making structures decentralized and these organizations are more likely to be comprised of self-managed teams (Cohen, Ledford & Spreitzer, 1996; Dunphy & Bryant, 1996).

At the group or team level, higher trust is related to increased efforts to reach out across organizational boundaries (Stephenson & Schnitzer, 2006) and to higher group cohesion (Dirks, 1999; Mach, Dolan, & Tzafrir, 2010; Zaccaro, Gualtieri & Minionis, 1995). Similarly, high trust is associated with increased concern about the welfare and outcomes of the overall group, and there is less likelihood of exploiting others vulnerabilities (Mayer, Davis & Schoorman, 1995; Brewer & Miller, 1996). Importantly, given the quickly evolving situations that often characterize an interagency mission, high trust is associated with information sharing (Zand, 1972), an acknowledged key to better team performance (Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009), with creative and productive problem solving, (Boss, 1978) and with developing mutually beneficial, integrative solutions (Walton & McKersie 1965).

High trust reduces the likelihood of conflict and helps to defuse its potential, because when trust exists, people are more likely to interpret each other's ambiguous actions in a constructive manner that supports the stability of the relationship (Uzzi, 1997; Zaheer et al., 1998). Similarly, should a problem occur, higher pre-existing levels of trust usually mean that the responses of the injured party tend to be less intense or more limited as they are associated with external rather than internal attributions, i.e., there must have been a good reason for the behavior; the actions were inadvertent, rather than deliberate and reflecting on the others poor character (Robinson 1996; Benton, Gelber, Kelley, & Liebling, 1969). Indeed, particularly valuable in a crisis or when unforeseen circumstances arise, high trust maintains honest and open communication, and leads to the sharing of scarce resources (Krishnan, Martin & Noorderhaven, 2006; Mishra, 1996). Also critical given the often discrepant organizational cultures and processes that occur in an interagency context, trust:

> … encourages partners to be aware of the processes and procedures that each partner follows (Gulati & Singh, 1998). Thus, trust encourages partners to remain flexible when managing their interface in the face of interdependence. … Under high interdependence, inter-organizational trust is therefore essential … as it facilitates mutual adjustment and allows the smoother synchronization of critical tasks. (Krishnan, Martin & Noorderhaven, 2006, p.896).

Just as importantly, trust provides important cognitive and emotional benefits to each individual in the group. As noted earlier, high trust reduces uncertainty and doubt, thus reducing the perceived risk and increasing the perceived control in a situation. It is crucial in informing the predictions we make about others' behaviors and therefore what is likely to occur in the future. Trust also allows us to focus on the task at hand, rather than to use valuable cognitive and attentional resources to monitor the surrounding environment. In particular, individuals do not feel compelled to monitor and spend valuable time interpreting the behavior and motives of others to ensure that our own needs and priorities are being met (referred to as defensive monitoring, see Currall & Judge, 1995). Because high trust groups are more cohesive, it is also associated with less perceived stress at the individual level (Bowers, Weaver, & Morgan, 1996; Zaccaro, Gualtieri, & Minionis, 1995). Finally, research also shows that high trust is related to increased job empowerment, satisfaction, commitment and performance in workers (Cohen et al., 1996; Dunphy & Bryant, 1996; see also Dirks, 1999).

2 A conceptual model of interagency trust

Acknowledging the breath and complexity of the information presented thus far, I now detail a conceptual framework of trust development relevant to the interagency context to provide the reader a more tangible representation of key trust concepts and their interrelation. To do this, I build on a model of trust development in newly formed, computer-networked teams (Robert, Dennis, and Hung, 2009). Their model, presented in Figure 1, depicts trust, termed 'Trust Belief' as being influenced by a person's predisposition to trust (i.e., an individual difference based on their past trust-relevant experience[2]) and 'In-Group Bias', the degree of perceived similarity between oneself and the unknown other, a determination that is made based upon the salient categories that the other appears to represent. Also depicted as influencing Trust Belief, the authors specify that Knowledge-based trust will occur "once an individual has sufficient knowledge to develop perceptions of a team member's (a) ability, (b) integrity and (c) benevolence" (Robert et al, 2009, p. 248). Perceived risk, defined as the "likelihood of a significant disappointing outcome (Robert et al. p. 248), is also implicated in assessments of trust. Indeed, their model reflects the researchers specific research focus in that risk is depicted as being solely and directly affected by 'Communication Environment' (e.g., face-to-face vs. computer-based interactions). They argue that computer based teams can be at a disadvantage because they do not have access to as wide a range of social cues and mechanisms for social control and monitoring such as "direct supervision, … similar backgrounds, … [common] values and experiences" … and often lack shared norms "which can facilitate the exchanging of information without the need for explicit communication are often missing…" (p. 249). This lack of cues is hypothesized to directly increase a perceived risk of failure.

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[2] For instance, where a person's past trust in other people has typically been rewarded, the person will have a higher predisposition to trust others; where the person believes that others have usually let them down, there will be a lower predisposition to trust others.

Figure 1: A model of individual swift trust and knowledge-based trust (Robert, Denis and Hung, 2006)[3].

Interestingly, their model also specifies that it is the *difference* between perceived risk and trust belief that will predict actual trusting behaviors and/or intentions to trust in the future. That is, when the rewards and likelihood of success outweigh the costs and risks of failure, the person will be more likely to engage in trusting behaviors and the intention to trust others in the future. In other cases, however, the costs of failure specific to the situation can be so high that the risk can lead us not to engage in trusting behaviors – even if we feel the others are trustworthy individuals. Finally, the model acknowledges the potential for initial trust assessments to play some role in subsequent trust, reflecting instances in which people engage in selective perception, weighting new information that is consistent with their initial beliefs more heavily than new inconsistent information.

This model has much to offer with respect to developing an understanding of the mechanisms of trust in work relationships. Relatively straightforward, it is intended to address both initial and subsequent trust assessments. The model allows for trust levels to be low, neutral or high, specifies why you would expect this to be the case, and details how and why subsequent trust might remain the same, increase or decrease based on the specific evidence accrued and the perceived situational risks and the potential residual effects of initial trust assessments. On the other hand, as useful as their model is, it is very specific to their interests of describing the effects of communication environment (i.e., face to face versus computer-mediation) on assessments of trust. Moreover, although they tested their model as a two stage process of initial and later trust, their conceptual model does not reflect a two stage process. Thus, I believe that some modifications to their original model might better reflect important conceptual and sequential properties from the more general trust literature outlined earlier and be more applicable to the

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[3] Copyright 2006 From 'Individual swift trust and knowledge-based trust in face-to-face and virtual team members' by Robert, L. P., Denis, A. R. and Hung Y.T.C. Reproduced by permission of Taylor and Francis, LLC (http://tandfonline.com).

objectives of educating about trust and of informing CA policy, education, training and operations. However, the expanded model presented in Figure 2, clearly builds on the Robert et al. model.


Figure 2: A model of interagency trust in comprehensive approach missions.

Accordingly, I rename the 'Trust Belief' variable 'Initial Trust' to better reflect its developmental position and to encompass the cognitive and emotional bases of trust, – after all, emotions also can significantly contribute to trust assessments and trust beliefs are as much a feature of subsequent trust assessments as they are initial ones. Also integrating the wider trust literature reviewed earlier, Initial Trust is assumed to be influenced by four main factors, two of which are drawn from Robert and colleagues: 'Predisposition to Trust' and 'In-Group Bias.' 'Predisposition to Trust' remains a feature of the expanded model; however, I rename the latter variable as 'Salient Categories,' to better reflect the fact that that the most immediately salient categories of an unknown other (e.g., age, sex, organizational affiliation) can as easily suggest negative stereotypes as positive ones and thus, in-group and/or out-group biases may ensue[4].

Also reflecting the wider trust literature I add two additional variables to initial trust. The first, 'Cost-Benefit Analysis', reflects the processes involved in calculus-based trust, that is, an initial assessment of the costs versus benefits of participating in the interagency team. The second variable, 'Team Roles' is added to reflect the principles underlying swift trust discussed earlier and speaks to issue of whether own role within the team and the roles of other interagency team members are clear and seen to be important to the completion of the task. Again to better reflect the developmental properties of trust formation, I also move the 'Predisposition to Trust' and the 'Salient Categories' variables, along with new variables 'Team Roles' 'Cost-Benefit Analyses' and 'Initial Trust' prior to the variables of 'Ability', 'Benevolence' and 'Integrity' and the

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[4] In their model Robert et al., also include control variables such as age and gender because these have been shown to affect trust levels. However, as age and gender are considered to be important initial categories in the interagency realm, I include them as part of the salient categories variable.

summary variable of 'Knowledge-based Trust'. This is to better reflect the fact that 'Salient Categories' and 'Team Roles' are used to infer an unknown other's ability, benevolence and integrity, they are proxies for initial trust and remain approximations of those dimensions.

Accordingly, as Figure 2 also indicates, I have added a separate Knowledge-Based Trust variable. This is to better reflect the impact of the interactions that provide an accumulation of direct evidence concerning the Ability, Integrity and Benevolence of the other. Again, these modifications are intended to better reflect the temporal and conceptual distinctions outlined in the wider trust literature. Situational risk and its definition remains a feature of the revised model. However, I also seek to better understand and quantify the risk variable in a CA context. Thus, I have also expanded the variable 'Communication Environment', renaming it 'Inter-organizational Factors.' Certainly computer mediated interaction is relevant to interagency teams that can be geographically dispersed both across an area of responsibility (AOR) and between the AOR and home organizations. Nonetheless, the sources of confusion concerning social rules, norms and rewards when various agencies and departments come together in a CA context often occur whether the team is distributed and communicates only via computer or whether they are co-located. Supporting this thinking, Dirks and Ferrin (2001) have described this as a continuum along which behaviors, rules, norms and cues are thought to vary[5], and detailed how trust works at different points along this continuum. Where appropriate behaviors, norms and rules are overt, clear, understood and shared, behaviors are largely proscribed and issues of trust are not as relevant. As norms, rules, roles etc., become less clear, trust shapes the explanations we ascribe another's somewhat ambiguous actions and intentions. Where another's behavior is unexpected and potentially negative, trust will affect the extent to which the other might be given the benefit of the doubt versus ascribing negative intent to their ambiguous actions. Finally where cues and norms are weakest, trust is assumed to have direct effects on the extent to which cooperation, information and resource sharing will occur (Dirks & Ferrin, 2001; see also Thompson & Gill, 2010). The CA literature supports the importance of such Inter-organizational factors as research has documented interagency team members' confusion and frustration over these very issues. Team members have also reported the impact on them of at ambiguous or conflicting lines of reporting and a lack of shared experiences, both perceived as undermining the efficacy and efficiency of interagency communications and coordination (Olson & Gregorian, Patrick & Brown, 2007; Thomson et al., 2011).

Moreover, as noted earlier, although similar to many organizational alliances in a variety of bureaucratic ways, the missions that CA/WoG teams undertake are often quite unique in terms of the mission-specific factors that exist. Examples of mission specific factors would include government priority and public awareness and pressure, time pressure, level of mission-related information available, and level of physical danger to interagency team members, etc. Thus, as indicated in the revised model, the weighting of inter-organizational and mission specific factors will affect perceptions of risk – where risk is higher, trust among interagency partners will be a more pressing concern.

Also following from the trust literature, I articulate trust-relevant outcomes at two levels: Team-based Outcomes and Member-level Outcomes. Based on the trust literature summarized earlier in the paper, team-level outcomes include level of information and resources sharing, level

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[5] Dirks and Ferrin (2001) refer to this construct as situational strength. I have renamed this as Inter-organizational factors to reduce confusion between the organizational elements and the mission-specific elements.

of overall communication and proactive communication (i.e., providing useful information before it is requested), level of awareness of partner process, procedures and constraints, conflict level, cohesion level, level of mutual adjustment, synchronization of critical tasks, ability to develop integrative, mutually beneficial solutions, flexibility to changing circumstances. Also following from the trust literature summarized earlier in this paper, member-level outcomes include level of uncertainty, doubt, level of defensive monitoring, perceived risk level, level of perceived control, and level of task focus and engagement. The higher the level of interagency trust, the higher the level of each of the team- and member-level outcomes are expected, save for conflict levels. In this case, lower levels of interpersonal conflict are anticipated to be associated with higher trust levels, although task-related differences of opinion may be independent of interagency trust levels. However, higher trust teams should be able to resolve such task-related differences with mutually beneficial and/or acceptable decisions. Also consistent with the larger trust literature, a mutually reinforcing feedback loop is depicted as existing between team- and member-level outcomes Reflecting the iterative nature of on-going trust, the model allows for an important feedback loop from outcomes back to perceptions of integrity, benevolence and competence, further influencing the degree of knowledge-based trust that exists, which will interact with degree of risk, and so on (see Mayer et al, 1995). Finally, I have also populated an annotated version of the expanded model, presented in Figure 3. This more fully articulated version of the interagency trust model is intended to provide a more tangible teaching and training aid concerning the importance of trust and how it operates in such contexts.

Figure 3: An annotated model of interagency trust in comprehensive approach missions.

In summary then, the intent of these modifications in the revised model is to better reflect the developmental nature of initial and subsequent trust specific to interagency contexts, the different factors that influence each, as well as a more definitive specification of the types of outcomes that should occur as a result. In doing do, the hope is that it retains all of the positive aspects of the original Robert et al. model, while being more useful to an interagency context. For instance, an initial application of the research summarized here is that it is important to have an understanding of the dynamics of calculus- and category-based trust in the initial stages of interagency missions and within ad hoc teams. This means that policy makers must come to terms with the fact that effective interagency collaboration and coordination does take additional time and energy, especially in the early stages. Accordingly, a better initial understanding of the nature of the

expertise and the resources each organization brings to the table and just as importantly their mandates and constraints needs to inform strategic, operational and tactical levels of planning and operational execution.

Of course, the current model represents only a starting point in many respects. The model is informed by traditional trust theory and research as well as the interagency literature, including interviews of Canadian civilian and military personnel who have participated at tactical, operational and strategic levels in CA missions in various theatres of operation. There is no doubt that the richness of this interview data is extremely valuable. Indeed, the strength of this approach is that it provides a deeper representation of people's experiences and perceptions. However it essentially remains people's personal theories of how they think that trust works in interagency settings, which may or may not be accurate. Ideally, empirical tests are required to validate, and where needed refine the model with respect to its specific applicability to the comprehensive approach context. For instance, while the revised model readily addresses calculus based, category-based and the knowledge bases of trust assessments, it does not reflect relation- or identification-based trust, which the literature generally describe as the highest, best and most resilient forms of trust. On the other hand, it remains an empirical question concerning the extent to which relation-based and identification-based trust play a necessary role in interagency settings. That is, they may be a 'nice to have'; the empirical question is the extent to which they provide significant benefits in increased operational efficiency and effectiveness above and beyond that provided by knowledge-based trust. Still, as risk increases in an interagency mission, or as these missions entail different types of risk (e.g., mission effectiveness vs. threat to life), relation- and identification- based trust may become more important.

Several other important questions need to be addressed in the future. For instance, although detailing many of the central processes associated with trust development, it does not take into account the role of boundary spanners, those individuals whose organizational role [e.g., liaison officers] and/or personal attributes (e.g., effective communicators) leads them to have contact with or to seek out their counterparts in another organization (Friedman & Podolny, 1992; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Thompson & Gill, 2010; Zaheer et al. 1998;).

Similarly, while the organizational trust literature suggests the primacy of competence in assessments of trust in work settings (e.g., Robert et al. 2009), it remains important however to apply this research to the interagency context and to different circumstances within the interagency context (e.g., standing committees versus ad hoc crisis response groups) to determine if this finding remains the same in these particularly dynamic and challenging contexts. Moreover, with respect to knowledge-based trust, several important questions remain: what specific knowledge of the other interagency team members and how much of that knowledge is necessary to promote optimal collaboration and coordination earlier in missions? Are there ways to achieve this prior to direct interaction? Does this make a difference overall to mission effectiveness? Does this knowledge make a difference in the face of apparent betrayals of trust?

Some preliminary experimental evidence begins to speak to this last issue. More specifically, my colleagues and I (see Gill, Thompson & Holton, 2014) have found that providing even a very limited knowledge of the organization that an interagency partner represents can increase initial trust assessments of military personnel, relative to no information being provided. On the other hand, it is also important to note that in this experiment, this limited knowledge did not appear to provide a buffer when an interagency partner failed to supply promised needed resources. We

also found that while trust did subsequently rebound after the trust violation, it did not recover to its initial levels. Again, while preliminary in nature, these findings suggest that the provision of knowledge about the organizations that the interagency partner represents provides at least initial benefits. It is of note as well that these effects were found by providing a minimum of organizational information, leaving the area ripe for further investigation as a way to improve interagency interactions.

3   Conclusion

The concept of the Comprehensive Approach to Operations emerged rapidly in response to a new and challenging complexity in contemporary operational space. The focus of the discussion at its introduction was on its enormous benefits and it quickly became enthusiastically embraced. There was, however, remarkably little attention or effort devoted to the question of *how* CA would work or be put into effect. But the devil is in the details. Indeed, perhaps this combination of high expectations with less attention to details made it somewhat inevitable that some level of disillusionment and cynicism would result when the challenges associated with its implementation were revealed. Still, it is important not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Complex operations are expected to be the norm in the future security environment (Simms, 2011). Similarly, interagency missions remain a clearly articulated part of Canadian and international government policy.

CA is not a panacea. It will not guarantee success: there are often too many environmental factors that are out of the control of interagency teams in the complex and rapidly evolving missions in which CA is applied. Nonetheless, it currently remains the best hope to navigate the often byzantine demands of the future security environment.

In seeking to operationalize and institutionalize CA it is important to begin with a firm grasp of the underlying philosophy that is critical to its success. "It is not an approach that attempts to define the roles of the various actors, but rather to understand the actors and improve mechanisms for coherence (or as a minimum a de-confliction) of actions" (Simms, 2011, p. 76). … "Sometimes [CA players] will work with a multitude of actors, and at times simply need to understand the interactions and interests of all those in the arena" (Simms, 2011, p. 85). Simms makes two important points here. First, CA is based on understanding of others who may, or may not share all of your own goals and priorities. Second, CA must be approached as an inherently flexible construct in order to maximize its utility.

By definition, CA missions involve multiple, and often diverse agencies and organizations. By nature, CA missions involve at least moderate levels of risk, complexity and ambiguity. Where interdependence, complexity, ambiguity and risk are features of the operating environment, trust has a role to play. Indeed, the strategic and tactical importance of interagency missions coupled with the potential levels of danger and personal risk that contributors can be asked to assume make trust a particularly compelling concern. Inter-organizational factors that add to this complexity and ambiguity such as differences in mandates, priorities, organizational culture and even language and terminology are not merely sources of inconvenience and frustration but rather can contribute to increased complexity, ambiguity and doubt, and can be significant barriers to interagency trust and operational effectiveness. On the other hand, even in the face of such barriers, the existence of high trust will mean that members of different organizations are

motivated to work through this their differences, coming to a better mutual understanding of each other's perspectives, skills, requirements and constraints. Hence, the courses of action developed will be more integrative and important synergies and creative solutions will be more likely to emerge. Where there is the potential for conflict, its impact will be more limited and less likely to be carried into future interactions. Trust then is an integral human dimension enabler of interagency understanding and/or collaboration and, in turn, significantly enhancing CA operational effectiveness.

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List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms/initialisms

AOR	Area of Responsibility
CA	Comprehensive Approach to Operations
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CF	Canadian Forces
GoC	Government of Canada
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
U.N.	United Nations
U.S.	United States
WoG	Whole of Government

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Building and maintaining trust has been termed a critical prerequisite for effectiveness within the Comprehensive Approach to Operations (CA). However, there is remarkably little additional discussion concerning trust in the CA context. As a result, there is little depth of understanding of what trust is, its foundational properties and exactly why and how it is important to collaboration in CA missions. On a more practical level, this means that there is virtually no guidance as to how interagency trust may be achieved or maintained within CA teams, and little attention paid to the factors that can enhance or undermine trust. This paper seeks to add substance to the discussion by applying the trust research literature to the challenges of CA missions. I also present a conceptual model of interagency trust to better illustrate key concepts and their interrelation.

On considère que le fait de bâtir et de maintenir la confiance est une condition préalable à l'efficacité de l'approche exhaustive (AE) des opérations. Or, il y a manifestement peu à ajouter concernant la confiance dans le cadre de l' AE. Par conséquent, on comprend mal ce qu'est la confiance, quelles en sont les propriétés fondamentales, pourquoi exactement et en quoi elle est importante pour la collaboration aux missions de l' AE. Sur le plan pratique, cela signifie qu'il n'y a pour ainsi dire aucune directive sur la façon de créer ou de maintenir la confiance interinstitutionnelle au sein des équipes de l' AE, et l'on prête peu d'attention aux facteurs qui pourraient améliorer ou miner la confiance. Le présent rapport vise à étoffer la discussion en appliquant la documentation de recherche sur la confiance aux enjeux des missions de l' AE. Je présente en outre un modèle conceptuel de confiance interinstitutionnelle pour mieux illustrer les concepts clés et leur interrelation.

14. KEYWORDS, DESCRIPTORS or IDENTIFIERS (Technically meaningful terms or short phrases that characterize a document and could be helpful in cataloguing the document. They should be selected so that no security classification is required. Identifiers, such as equipment model designation, trade name, military project code name, geographic location may also be included. If possible keywords should be selected from a published thesaurus, e.g., Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms (TEST) and that thesaurus identified. If it is not possible to select indexing terms which are Unclassified, the classification of each should be indicated as with the title.)

Interagency Trust, Comprehensive Approach Missions, Conceptual Model