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REPORT OF
HIS HONOUR JUDGE J.C.A. CAMERON
RE
JAPANESE INQUIRY AT VANCOUVER, B.C.
1942

TORONTO,

December 19, 1942.

The Honourable Louis S. St. Laurent, P.C., K.C., M.P.,
Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada,
O t t a w a.

Sir,

I have the honour to present you with my report as Commissioner, appointed under Part one of the Inquiries Act, to inquire into and report upon the charges, allegations, etc., contained in articles in the Vancouver News Herald, of Vancouver, under the heading "Nippon Black Dragon operates within B.C." etc.

By Commission, dated October 24, 1942, I was appointed a Commissioner -

"to inquire into and report upon the charges, allegations, statements and questions contained in articles on page one of the Vancouver News Herald, of Vancouver, B.C., dated the 26th of September, 1942, under the heading: "Nippon Black Dragon Operates within B.C.", and on page four under the heading "Black Dragon in B.C.", and in the issue of the same paper dated 9th October, 1942, on page one under the heading: "Reporters find Japs are loath to go to 'Morii Camp.'"

A copy of a minute of a meeting of the Committee of the Privy Council, approved by His Excellency the Governor General, dated October 24th, 1942, is, in part, as follows:

"That the newspaper "Vancouver News Herald" in its issues of the 26th September, 1942, and 9th October, 1942, published articles referring to a 'Japanese Fascist-like gang' as being directly

affiliated with the 'Black Dragon Society of Japan' and to Etsuji Morii as being connected therewith;

"That the said articles contained charges, allegations and statements and asked questions which cast reflections on the British Columbia Security Commission, the administration of the Defence of Canada Regulations, as well as upon the said Morii and others; and

"That in the opinion of the Minister of Justice it is expedient, in the public interest, that a full, complete and impartial inquiry be made into the matters referred to in these articles."

The inquiry was opened in Vancouver, B.C. on October 30th, 1942, and was concluded on November 21st, 1942.

PARTIES REPRESENTED

The News Herald was represented by Senator J.W. do B. Farris, K.C., and C.L. McAlpine, K.C.; the British Columbia Security Commission and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police by C.H. Locko, K.C.; and A. Bull, K.C. appeared on behalf of Etsuji Morii while he was giving evidence.

Present at the hearing throughout, but not represented by counsel, were several members of the "Consultative Council for Co-operation in War Time Problems of Canadian Citizenship."

At the opening of the inquiry, I requested that all persons having any knowledge of the matters in question should come forward and present their evidence. The inquiry was public throughout.

At the opening of the inquiry Senator Farris, for the News Herald, stated his position, a part of which is

as follows:

"Definitely there is not charged against either of these bodies (the British Columbia Security Commission and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police) any allegation of bad faith, of conscious neglect of duty, of dishonesty or of collusion, or any action on their part collectively or individually which would reflect on the character or personal integrity, good intentions, honesty or loyalty of any member of the Commission and the Police. The only charge that I can read or wish to read into the allegations contained in this paper, so far as either individuals or collectively members of this Commission or the Police, is a criticism of policy in regard to one Moril..... In fact, I would be glad to say that as far as the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are concerned and the members of the Commission, the Chairman and other members I know personally, I would add my word that there could not be the least suggestion of any improper conduct on their part other than a criticism of policy.....In making these comments I intend no reflection on the loyalty or good faith of any member of the Police or the Department of Justice, or the Commission. It is a criticism of policies and methods, and is, in my judgment, necessary to be made to explain the difficulties with which we are now confronted because of that situation.....As far as Moril is concerned, there is no hesitation to emphasize any charges that have been made against him. It is believed that he is a disloyal character, that he is dishonest, that he is vicious and is a dangerous character and would take advantage of any position of trust in which he was placed....."

PART I

#1. NATURE OF INQUIRY

In essence, the charges and questions in the News Herald were three-fold:

(1.) That Etsuji Morii, a Japanese naturalized in Canada in 1921, was a gambler, racketeer, used gangster methods to enforce his will on the Japanese community, protected Japanese illegally in Canada, was feared by other Japanese, and that the facts were known, or, by reasonable investigation, could have been known to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and that his services should not have been used in any capacity by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the British Columbia Security Commission, and that his contacts and influence with these organizations were used to levy tribute on other Japanese;

(2) That Morii was an officer of Sokokukai, a Japanese organization said to be directly affiliated with the Black Dragon Society of Japan, that he was disloyal to Canada and should have been interned;

(3) That the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the British Columbia Security Commission, with knowledge of his alleged bad reputation, were "complacent"; that by reason of his previous services to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the said Morii had "sold" himself to that organization to such an extent that its officials believed in him implicitly and did not thoroughly investigate reports as to his bad character.

#2 WITNESSES

In all forty-five witnesses were heard and of this number eighteen were Japanese brought in from the self-supporting schemes and camps set up by the British Columbia

Security Commission. Much of the evidence of these Japanese had to be interpreted. In addition, there was heard the evidence of all three members of the British Columbia Security Commission, representatives of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police stationed at Vancouver, the Editor and two reporters of the News Herald, two members of the Consultative Council, and three Japanese members of the Liaison Committee, as well as others.

#3. NATURE OF THE EVIDENCE

Realizing that at least some of the statements in the News Herald were based on the briefs of the Consultative Council and of the Japanese born in Canada, and on reports rather than direct evidence, I found it necessary to admit a considerable amount of hearsay evidence in order, if possible, to ascertain the identity of those who originally made the statements and who could then be called to give direct evidence in proof thereof.

As will be pointed out in later paragraphs of the report, it was found that many of the charges were based on rumour and on unsubstantiated statements. In several instances witnesses stated that they got their information from Japanese whom they could not identify; from others who had refused to identify themselves through an alleged "fear"; or from persons who had been told by others and who had refused to give evidence by affidavit or otherwise when requested. In addition, many of the reports, when traced to the source, were found to be without foundation and false.

As an instance of the latter type, reference is made to a letter from Mr. Phillipot, the Editor of the News Herald to his Counsel, dated November 3rd, 1942, intimating that he had been told by three Japanese of four other

Japanese who had information which incriminated Morii -- that one of these gave money to Morii for protection; two others gave \$3,000.00 to Morii to enable them to stay in Vancouver; and that the fourth was a key witness and could give evidence as to Morii's activities. All these witnesses were brought to Vancouver and gave their evidence, and each denied the statements attributed to him, in toto, and that any money had been paid directly or indirectly to Morii for protection, deferment or otherwise.

The first of these witnesses, Raikawa, admitted paying \$1,500.00 to a fund being raised by the Japanese to help their destitute compatriots - but not to Morii.

Some of the other witnesses got their information through Mr. Rev. Mr. Norman, of the Consultative Council, and he in turn admitted that he secured his information chiefly from the Nisei group - but could get no direct proof of any sort except in regard to two issues of the magazine "Sekoku" - hereinafter referred to in more detail.

#4. THE SPARLING AND HULL COMMITTEES

In view of the fact that Morii came in contact with the British Columbia Security Commission through Mr. Mead, it is necessary to state briefly the latter's experience with the Japanese problems in British Columbia. He had at one time been stationed on the west coast, and at that time instigated an extensive inquiry into the illegal entry of Japanese into Canada, and thereby acquired a knowledge of the situation among the Japanese. After the outbreak of the war with Germany, a certain agitation developed in British Columbia against the Japanese, and Mr. Mead was instructed to go to British Columbia and make an investigation of the problem. As a result, the Sparling Committee was appointed to investigate and bring in a report.

on the Oriental situation in British Columbia, and Mr. Head was a member of that Committee which subsequently made its report. This Sparling-Keenleyside report was dated December, 1940, entitled "Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee on Orientals in British Columbia."

Following this report, it was decided to conduct a voluntary registration of all Japanese in Canada. This was carried out by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, without public expense, under Order-in-Council 117, and with the co-operation of the Japanese themselves. In this registration Mr. Head had a leading part and approximately 24,000 Japanese were registered, and the matter completed before Pearl Harbor.

As a result of the report of the Sparling Committee, there was set up a standing committee to advise the Government on Oriental problems in British Columbia, headed by Mayor Hume of New Westminster, and Mr. Head was appointed a member of this committee. This committee will hereinafter be referred to as the Hume Committee.

#5. FIRST EVACUATION OF MALE JAPANESE

Following the declaration of war against Japan, and on the advice of the Hume Committee, it was decided to evacuate all male Japanese of military age (between 18 and 45) from the protected area, and this was being carried out under direction of the Hume Committee by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Certain trouble developed in placing these Japanese in other provinces, and Mr. Head went to Vancouver and impressed on the leading Japanese the necessity of obeying the order. The evacuation then continued, but shortly thereafter, on February 26th, 1942, a general order

(Exhibit 8) was issued by the Minister of Justice directing the removal of all people of the Japanese race from the protected area, forthwith. This area is shown in Exhibit 20. To carry out this work, the British Columbia Security Commission was set up on March 4th, 1942.

While the details of the activities of the previous committees may seem irrelevant to this inquiry, yet, in my mind, they are very important because of the activities of Mr. Mead in all matters leading up to the establishment of the British Columbia Security Commission; and inasmuch as it was through his knowledge of the influence of Morii among the Japanese and his proven willingness to cooperate with these committees, that Mr. Mead again sought his cooperation in the very important task, now committed to the British Columbia Security Commission - that of removing some 24,000 Japanese forthwith from the coastal areas and placing them in the interior of British Columbia and in other parts of Canada.

#6. ESTABLISHMENT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
SECURITY COMMISSION

By P.C. #1665, dated March 4th, 1942, there was established the British Columbia Security Commission, By P.C. #1666 the personnel thereof was appointed, and there was also set up, by said P.C. #1666, an Advisory Committee composed of twenty representative citizens of the Province of British Columbia.

#7. PERSONNEL OF THE BRITISH COLUMBIA
SECURITY COMMISSION

At the outset, it may be pertinent to identify the personnel of the British Columbia Security Commission, which was set up for the purpose of evacuating all persons of Japanese racial origin from the coastal areas of British Columbia.

The Chairman is Major Austin Taylor, of Vancouver, a man held in high regard throughout Canada, not only because of his prominence in the commercial life in the country, but because of his contribution to public affairs. He is President of Braconne Lines, Limited, a Director of the Bank of Canada, and Vice-President of the War Time Merchant Shipping Limited, and his services on the British Columbia Security Commission are given without any remuneration.

Mr. John Shirras is the Assistant Commissioner of the British Columbia Police, with which organization he has been connected for sixteen years.

Mr. Frederick John Mead is an Assistant Commissioner and Director of Criminal Investigation in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and a former member of the Sparling and Hume Committees dealing with certain Japanese problems.

The personnel of the Commission has remained the same throughout.

PART II

8. THE LIAISON COMMITTEE

As soon as the British Columbia Security Commission was appointed, Mr. Mead recommended to the Commission that an effort should be made to secure the co-operation of the Japanese in the evacuation, so that it should run smoothly. It was desired to treat them humanely and avoid unnecessary hardships in carrying out the Government orders. This suggestion was agreed to and Mr. Mead called in Mori and Nishiguchi, two Japanese from whom he had previously received a good deal of assistance, and after explaining the matter to them, they, upon his request, agreed to form a representative committee of Japanese to co-operate in the evacuation scheme of the British Columbia Security Commission. They were asked to return in forty-eight hours and submit the names of the proposed Japanese Committee to the British Columbia Security Commission.

The two men named went to the building formerly occupied by the Nippon Club, where they found a considerable number of Japanese interested in the evacuation. With these men they discussed the formation of a Liaison Committee of Japanese. There were chosen Etsuji Morii, Mishiguchi (born in Japan but naturalized in Canada), Michio, a National; and the name of Dr. Ishawara, a dentist resident in Vancouver and former President of the Japanese Canadian Citizen's League, was suggested to represent the Nisei. These four met the Commission on March 7th, and were told the duties the Commission had to carry out, and that the co-operation of the Japanese would be desirable. They were told that the Government orders must be carried out; that the Liaison Committee should thrash out its own problems and appear before the Commission with one opinion so that there would be no argument or waste of time. Dr. Ishawara stated that he doubted that he could satisfactorily represent the group of Nisei and did not commit himself as to being a member of this Committee, and also raised certain controversial points. They were told that if their group was a representative committee it would be satisfactory, but if not, to go back to their people, form a representative committee, and return on March 9th. Further efforts were made by these men to secure a wider membership for the committee but they were unsuccessful, and on March 9th Mishiguchi, Etsuji Morii and Michio returned to the British Columbia Security Commission, but Dr. Ishawara, although notified, did not attend. The Chairman of the Commission then gave to each of the three a letter, marked as Exhibit 21, which is as follows:

"BRITISH COLUMBIA SECURITY COMMISSION

1130 Marine Building
Vancouver, B.C.

March 9th, 1942.

"COMMITTEE REPRESENTING JAPANESE POPULATION

"MEMBERS OF COMMITTEE:

ETSUJI MORII

ARTHUR NISHICOUCHI

IPPYO NICHIO

"The above-named appeared before the B.C. Security Commission on this date representing themselves as
"a Committee acting on behalf of the whole of the
"Japanese population in this Province.

"The B.C. Security Commission recognizes this
"Committee for the purpose of discussing problems
"or complaints in connection with the evacuation of
"the Japanese population from the restricted areas
"of British Columbia.

(Sgd) AUSTIN G. TAYLOR

CHAIRMAN

B. C. SECURITY COMMISSION."

It is to be noted particularly that these three men (hereinafter referred to as the Liaison Committee) were not appointed at any time to any position under the British Columbia Security Commission or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, but, as the above letter states, were merely recognized by the Commission for the purpose of discussing problems or complaints in connection with the evacuation. Other than as mentioned in the letter, they had no status of any sort and received no remuneration. All three men served voluntarily, and at considerable financial loss, each paying his own expenses in connection with the matter.

While on this inquiry I am not concerned in any way with the general policy of the British Columbia Security Commission, I should state that, in my opinion, the setting up of such a Liaison Committee composed of Japanese was entirely proper and logical. The task of moving and relocating 24,000 Japanese was a very large one, and the order directed their removal forthwith. Many problems affecting individual Japanese were bound to arise and it is obvious that without the co-operation of influential Japanese, such a task could not have been carried out as efficiently and expeditiously as was the case. It was natural that such a Committee, speaking the Japanese language and composed of men of influence in the Japanese community, who had many contacts with Japanese throughout the Province, and two of whom had previously co-operated with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, should be accepted to pass on information from the British Columbia Security Commission to the Japanese, and in turn convey to the Commission any special individual problems arising among the Japanese due to the evacuation.

This Liaison Committee functioned from the building formerly occupied by the Nippon Club, which, as a club, had been closed on December 7th. It may be pointed out here that the Nippon Club was a Social Club which had been established some seven years previously, the members of which were prominent and well-to-do Japanese, including the Japanese Consular authorities. There is no evidence whatever that it was other than a social club or that any of its activities were in any way subversive. From the time of its organization, the members had elected ten directors, and these in turn chose Etsuji Morii as the manager in each year.

#9. PERSONNEL OF THE LIAISON COMMITTEE

- (1) Etsuji Morii. This man was born in Japan 54 years

ago; came to Canada in 1906, and was naturalized here in 1914. He has not returned to Japan since first coming to Canada. He was in business until about ten years ago, but latterly has derived his main income from his interest in B.C. Japanese Club Limited - an organization commonly called "The Showa Club," and which will be more particularly referred to later. Since the formation of the Nippon Club he has been its manager. He is of the Buddhist faith.

(2) Arthur Nishiguchi, Until December 7th, 1941, this man was a merchant in New Westminster. He came to Canada when twelve years of age and carried on a business with his father and two brothers, all of whom are in Canada. He was naturalized in 1918 and served in the Canadian Army in the last war, but not overseas. At the request of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police he appeared before the Sparling Committee and his advice was asked in connection with the voluntary registration which followed. Subsequently he was chosen by the Japanese as a member of the sub-committee which worked in co-operation with the Hume Committee and had a part in its activities and assisted this Committee in connection with the evacuation of Japanese males, of military age, as well as the registration of Japanese. He also assisted in the Victory Loan drives among the Japanese, and personally bought \$9,000.00 worth of bonds.

(3) Ippo Nichio. This man was born in Japan. He came to Canada twenty seven years ago and is not naturalized. His business was that of importer of silk, called the Domestic Silk Company Limited. He is married and has four sons, and at the time of the evacuation, two of his children were attending the University of British Columbia and two were in High School. His father and mother are dead. He has two brothers in Japan. Since coming to

Canada he has returned to Japan on five or six occasions. He says that about 1926 he tried to secure naturalization but found on attending at the Naturalization Department of the Canadian Japanese Association that he could not be naturalized. He also appeared before the Sparling Committee and gave his assistance. He assisted in the voluntary registration of Japanese carried out in 1941, and was one of the group of Japanese who appointed the sub-committee of five to work under the Kunc Committee.

#10. THE FORMATION OF THE COMMITTEE OF
TWENTY-FIVE.

On March 15th a representative meeting of one hundred to one hundred and fifty Japanese was convened by the Canadian Japanese Association, apparently for the purpose of considering co-operation with the British Columbia Security Commission. This organization had been in existence for many years and was the largest single Japanese association in Canada. Morii was present, but was not the Chairman. This meeting appointed a nominating committee of seven, which in turn nominated a committee of twenty-five Japanese (which included the three members of the Liaison Committee). Ten Nisei were included in this Committee of Twenty-five, the others being Japanese Nationals or those who had been naturalized in Canada. It may be pointed out here that, according to the evidence of Assistant Commissioner Wood, Japanese in Canada may be divided into three groups, as follows: 25% Nisei, born in Canada of Japanese parents; 27% naturalized in Canada; and 48% Japanese Nationals.

Morii was asked to be Chairman of this Committee of Twenty-five. There is some uncertainty as to what actually occurred at the meeting. Mr. Nishiguchi says

he was told immediately after that the meeting recognized the Liaison Committee of three and that twenty-two others were named to act with them. In any event, there seems no question that the meeting was called by the Canadian Japanese Association, that the three members of the Liaison Committee were included in the composition of that Committee of Twenty-five, and that Morii was asked to be Chairman of that Committee. This would seem to indicate confidence in Morii, and in his ability to handle the matter, although one witness suggested he was chosen as Chairman because of his previous experience with the Police and not because he was trusted.

The witness Yasuura, called by Mr. Farris, stated that at this meeting those present appointed Morii, Nishiguchi and Nishio as a Liaison Committee, with power to appoint sub-committees to carry out the work.

Morii stated at that meeting that he felt the work was too big and asked time to consider. Later in the week a committee met him and said they had been unable to get together and presented him with a piece of blank white paper and stated: "Will you take full responsibility and act according to what you deem necessary" - and he interpreted their statement and the piece of paper as indicating that he was to have 'carte blanche' to form his own committee.

#11. FORMATION OF WAR TIME SECURITY COMMISSION

Morii was of the opinion that because of the magnitude of the task and the fact that the Japanese were spread throughout many communities in the coastal area, that a larger committee should be appointed to assist the Liaison Committee, and that he should not be limited to

dealing with twenty-five only. Having been given 'carte blanche', he convened a meeting of twenty-five Japanese (whom Nishiguchi described as representative of naturalized Japanese, Nationals and Nisei in the district), and this group chose from one hundred and twenty-five to one hundred and fifty Japanese throughout the province as a working committee, selecting the names of prominent Japanese throughout British Columbia, and basing its selection on a list of names supplied by Mr. Kunio Shimizu, of those Japanese who had assisted the sub-committee of Japanese (headed by Morii) which had worked on the voluntary registration of Japanese under the Hume Committee. This group was called The Wartime Security Commission.

Exhibit 22 is a list of the places from which members of this working committee were chosen and the number of representatives from each locality.

#12. CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH WARTIME SECURITY COMMISSION

Among the charges in connection with this group (called the Wartime Security Commission) which never met, but was used as an aid to the Liaison Committee, were:

(1) That nearly half of those chosen were Japanese Nationals. This is denied by Morii, and there is no contrary evidence. In any event, had such been the case, it would not appear to have been a serious matter, inasmuch as 48% of the Japanese in Canada are Nationals;

(2) That Morii appointed his subordinates and favourites, among them Jiu-Jitsuists, to the Committee, but Morii's evidence, and that of Nishiguchi, show that such was not the case, and there is no evidence whatever to the contrary;

(3) That some persons were appointed to the Committee by making contributions to a fund created by Morii, a portion of which only was used to assist in the evacuation of needy families; No evidence was offered to support this contention; Morii denies it, and the fact that the choice was made from a list supplied by Shimizu would indicate that this charge was also unfounded;

(4) That the members of the Committee were assured they would be the last Japanese to leave the protected area. The only evidence on this point is that of Morii himself, who stated that it was untrue, and "what we said was that the members of the Wartime Security Commission have responsibility to move out to the last man people from the protected areas." There was some uncertainty as to the interpretation of this statement from Japanese into English, and two other interpreters agreed that he said: "It was their responsibility to remain until the last people had been moved out." On the question being again put to Morii, he said that what he had stated was: "That the members of the Wartime Security Commission had a responsibility to see to it that every Japanese from the protected area has to be moved out, right to the last they have that responsibility." In this connection, it is significant to observe that while the evacuation was not completed until November, 1942, all three members of the Liaison Committee were themselves evacuated to a self-supporting scheme on May 28th, 1942. Morii denied that he had anything whatever to do with deferment of evacuation, and it is clear from the evidence of the officials of the British Columbia Security Commission that neither the Liaison Committee nor any of its members had anything to do with the details of the evacuation, and that these

officials themselves determined the persons to be evacuated, the time of the evacuation, and the places to which they would be evacuated.

Until the formation of this Wartime Security Commission there appears to have been no complaint at all - except some trifling ones as to the short amount of notice given to male Japanese who had been moved out before March 4th, 1942. Until this time no one made any complaint to the British Columbia Security Commission or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police as to the supposedly bad character of Morii, or his unsuitability to represent the Japanese.

#13. THE CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL FOR CO-OPERATION IN WARTIME PROBLEMS OF CANADIAN CITIZENS, (THE CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL).

Here I might mention the activities of a group called "The Consultative Council for Co-operation in War-time Problems of Canadian Citizenship", hereinafter referred to as "the Consultative Council." It was composed of a group of white people in Vancouver interested in Japanese problems - Ministers and returned missionaries from Japan, a school teacher, a member of the Legislative Assembly for British Columbia, business men, and others who thought they could be of assistance in the evacuation if they formed themselves into a group and "stood by." Rev. Mr. Norman pointed out the objects of this Committee as follows:

"It was primarily a group of Occidentals who had friends in the Japanese community, and we felt that the treatment of the Japanese, and all members of the Japanese race, exhibited a certain amount of race prejudice. We felt the Germans - members of the community of German extraction and Italian extraction - were not being treated as harshly, and we recognized the inevitability of the evacuation, and we felt it was perfectly necessary, but we

felt this, that while it seemed to be a matter that concerned the Japanese, nevertheless it was something that concerned all Canadian citizens; that is, it was a matter of personal liberties. That is according to Canadian law, children of Japanese parents are Canadian citizens, and yet the treatment of them was purely racial. It did not matter where they were born, it was just simply a matter of fact they were of Japanese race, and it was our purpose to stand by, and also, I might say quite clearly, our express wish to assist the Security Commission in whatever way we could because we had this special knowledge of the Japanese....."

Two members of the Consultative Council appeared before me at the inquiry and gave evidence - Rev. Mr. Norman, a returned Missionary, now resident in Vancouver, and Dr. Black, a retired school principal. It seems clear that most of their contacts were with the Nisei, but at times also with the Naturalized Canadian Japanese Association.

Apparently the Consultative Council was formed at the end of March, their first work having been performed on the night of March 27th, when Norman and Black went to the building of the Continental Daily News, where eighty-seven Nisei had gathered in protest after refusing to report for transfer to Schreiber, Ontario. These gentlemen quite properly urged compliance with the Government order and received a promise that such orders would be carried out, but later these Nisei declined to carry out the order. It may be observed here that according to Mr. Norman, the only complaint of these men was that while they were willing to co-operate with the Government, they wished to protest in order to keep the families together and would strike. Mr. Norman said that was their chief grievance, and no mention was made of any complaints then as to Morii. These

gentlemen quite properly reported the whereabouts of these eighty-seven Nisei to the authorities.

Assistant Commissioner Mead stated also that when he attended at Hastings Park, where large numbers of Nisei were gathered after they had refused to obey the orders of the British Columbia Security Commission, he discussed the matter with them, and that no complaint whatever was received at that time as to Morii or his activities, or character - the sole complaints being that of opposition to evacuation and to the breaking-up of families.

It is clear that the Consultative Council, while actuated, so far as the evidence discloses, by the best of motives, accomplished practically nothing in the way of aiding the evacuation. This was admitted by Mr. Norman. At the same time, I am convinced that the members of this Council were of the opinion that the Government was wrong in treating Canadian-born Japanese in a way different to that accorded to Canadian-born children of German and Italian parents, and that their belief in the honesty and the loyalty of the Nisei led them to accept reports of the Nisei as to the influence of Morii with the British Columbia Security Commission and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and as to Morii's bad character without testing their accuracy. Mr. Norman stated that in his contact with the naturalized Japanese and the Japanese Canadian Citizens' League, he saw no first hand evidence of a fear that Morii was said to have inspired; that, in fact, these organizations were fighting Morii, which would seem to indicate that they were not afraid of him. Mr. Norman, however, believed that this

fear existed, although he had no proof of it. About June 1st, 1942, the brief of the Consultative Council (Exhibit 10) was sent to the Prime Minister, to the Leader of the Opposition, and the Minister of Justice. Mr. Norman had a large part in the preparation of this document, the contents of which were based in part on the unsigned Japanese brief (Exhibit 17) which had never been presented to the authorities, although Mr. Norman believed that such had been the case.

Mr. Norman first heard complaints about Morii from Iwasaki (the former editor of the Japanese Daily News, which ceased publication on December 7th, 1941) about the end of March.

In his evidence, Mr. Norman said that he knew of four Japanese groups: the Morii group, Naturalized Japanese Committee, the Japanese Canadian Citizens' League, and the Nisei Mass Evacuation Group, and stated that all except the Nisei Mass Evacuation group were working for the evacuation.

Until the end of March, 1942, Mr. Norman had never heard of Morii in any way. The complaints he heard in April and May were against the Liaison Committee (not Morii alone), but there were specific complaints about the character of Morii. It is significant that the complaints were against the whole Committee, and it must have been because of their work with the British Columbia Security Commission.

Throughout the whole inquiry no one attempted to attack the character of Nishiguchi, or Nichio, both of whom had been highly regarded in the Japanese community, but there is evidence also that all three members of the Liaison Committee, as a result of their work with the British

Columbia Security Commission, were the object of a campaign of vilification which broke out about this time. Their families were boycotted, and in some cases their associates were assaulted. It is manifest, therefore, that the attacks were on this Lidson Committee as a whole, and that objection was taken to their work and co-operation with the authorities. The attacks on Morii's character were merely an incident in the affair, and made possible because of his conviction of manslaughter, and his association with a gambling club, which had been matters of public knowledge for years.

Mr. Norman demanded proof of the statements made to him as to Morii's bad character, but in every case was told that the persons alluded to could give no evidence. This should have put him on his guard and suggested to him the desirability of establishing the statements as facts rather than rumors, before acting on them. It is clear also that Mr. Norman's interest in the matter was not entirely confined to rumors he had heard regarding Morii. He was told that five years before Morii had opposed a Committee going to Ottawa to request the vote for the Japanese. Mr. Norman said he would have approved of the vote for the Japanese had he been here. He also assumed that Morii was responsible for the early evacuation of Rev. Mr. Shimizu, a Japanese Christian Minister. It is clear from the evidence of Sergeant Barnes, of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, that Morii had nothing to do with it, that Sergeant Barnes had ordered it for what he thought was good cause in order to facilitate the general evacuation.

~~Certain definite evidence as to Morii's activity~~
did come to light as a result of Mr. Norman's demand for

more proof. In the month of April he was given Exhibit 6 - "Sokoku", a Japanese Magazine published in Japan by the Sokokukai (Fatherland) Society, by one Kita. This was the issue of September 6th, 1929. Early in May he was shown Exhibit 9, an issue of the same magazine for December, 1939. These magazines are referred to hereinafter under the headings "Sokokukai" and "The Black Dragon Society."

#14. THE JAPANESE BRIEF

The articles in the News Herald refer to the Japanese brief (Exhibit 17) as having been supplied to the authorities, and many of the statements in the newspaper articles are based on this Japanese brief. This brief, so-called, which is undated and apparently was never signed by anyone, was shown at the inquiry never to have been sent to either the British Columbia Security Commission or the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and neither organization had any knowledge of its existence until a copy was produced at the inquiry. Mr. Norman frankly admitted that he was wrong in his belief that such a document had been submitted to the authorities. It is clear, therefore, that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the British Columbia Security Commission cannot be

charged with any negligence or inaction in regard thereto, except as to statements which came to their attention from other sources. It is clear also that had the brief been signed by responsible Canadian-born Japanese, as alleged, and given to the authorities, it would have been the duty of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to immediately and thoroughly investigate the charges, by contacting the Japanese who signed it and ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the statements. No such opportunity was afforded them.

#15. COMPLAINTS OF THE NISEI

It was about the time of the setting-up of the Wartime Security Commission, or shortly thereafter, that friction began to develop among the Japanese themselves. The Nisei, all Canadian-born Japanese, took a somewhat natural objection to being classed with the Issei (Japanese born in Japan), and to being ordered to evacuate the coastal area. They felt, as Canadians, they had the same right as other Canadian citizens - that their loyalty to Canada should be assumed and that they should not be evacuated. Another objection was that if they had to be evacuated, it should be in family groups and not as individuals. The policy of the Commission as regards the latter objection, has subsequently changed, and where possible the Japanese were moved in family groups. Their first complaint - that of entire opposition to the evacuation of Nisei - reached the point where masses of them refused to obey the order of the British Columbia Security Commission, and as a result several hundreds were detained by the Commission and later interned by the Minister of Justice.

It is significant also that on March 25th, 1942,

the British Columbia Security Commission issued a notice to all males of Japanese racial origin in the Vancouver and surrounding district, 18 years of age and over, and not in possession of a permit, requiring them to report at the Royal Canadian Mounted Police barracks, as follows:

Japanese Nationals - March 27th;

Naturalized Canadians - March 30th;

Canadian-born Japanese - March 31st.

This notice is Exhibit 23. This was the first step in the evacuation by the British Columbia Security Commission, and clearly indicated that, under the then existing policy, there would be a break-up of Japanese families. Strenuous opposition to the plan on the part of the Nisei developed, and rumours began to spread as to the character of Morii and his unsuitability to head the Liaison Committee. It became immediately apparent that it suited the purpose of the Nisei (in order to assist their campaign of opposition to the evacuation) to place the blame on the Liaison Committee, and particularly on Morii, for failure to secure exemption for them from the evacuation order, and for failure to secure evacuation in family groups. Statements were made that he had been charged with murder, was a gambler, operated a gambling house, was a strong Japanese Nationalist, head of the Sokokukai, and had a great influence with the British Columbia Security Commission, and that the Japanese were afraid of him.

Sergeant Barnes, of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, testified that various letters vilifying Morii were traced and found not to have been sent by the persons whose names were attached. These rumors also stated that Morii levied tribute on the Japanese, stating that he could secure deferment of evacuation for those who contributed.

No such attack had been made on his character before this time, - about the end of March or the beginning of April, 1942, although he had been a well-known figure in the Japanese community for years.

#16. PREPARATION AND PUBLICATION
OF ARTICLES BY NEWS HERALD.

This Japanese brief came to the attention of Ward, a report of the News Herald, and, as a result, in the News Herald of September 26, 1942, (Exhibit 1) there appeared the headline:

"NIPPON BLACK DRAGON OPERATES WITHIN B.C."

Reference to a later part of this report, under the heading "The Black Dragon Society" will indicate that this charge is quite unfounded. All the Japanese witnesses who were interrogated on this point denied the existence of the Black Dragon Society in British Columbia or in Canada, and said that they had never heard that it existed here until they saw the News Herald of September 26th. The reporter Ward stated that his statements as to the activities of the Black Dragon were "implicit" in the translations of the Sokoku magazines (Exhibits 6 and 9) which he received from Mr. Norman. Ward also was given copies of Exhibits 10 and 17 (the briefs of the Consultative Council and the Japanese brief) by Mr. Norman, and from these, and an article he read in a newspaper as to the connection between the Sokokukai and the Black Dragon, he felt the headlines were warranted. He relied on the members of the Consultative Council, and believed that as they had prepared a brief, Exhibit 10, (he says that they also had given information which resulted in the preparation of Exhibit 17 - the Japanese brief) that the statements in the brief must be true; and that prior to the publication of the article on September 26th, he

discussed it with Mrs. Jamieson, M.L.A., a member of the Consultative Council, who told him the information was substantially correct. It is apparent that his confidence in the Consultative Council was quite unwarranted, that their information was entirely hearsay (except in regard to the two magazines, Exhibits 6 and 9), and that Ward was so impressed by the caliber of the members of the Consultative Council that he accepted as facts what were, in reality, merely rumors. He states that the article was published: "on the faith and confidence we had in the type of men represented in the Consultative Council."

The editorial of the News Herald of September 26th (Exhibit 2) was prepared by the Editor, Mr. Philpott. The news item, Exhibit 1, was prepared under his supervision by his reporters Ward and Thornton, and with his knowledge and approval. While he was absent from the city of Vancouver, when the news item appeared on October 6th (Exhibit 3) he said it was prepared by the same reporters, and assumes full responsibility for it.

Mr. Philpott was made Editor on May 1st, 1942, and previously was a columnist. This fact is mentioned because the policy of the paper seemed to have been changed. In an editorial of January 12th, 1942 (Exhibit 7), the public are urged to support the work of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in connection with the evacuation being carried out at that time, under the Hume Committee.

The Editor stated that he continued the investigation for a period of some two months prior to September 26th, 1942, and that he had secured his evidence from:

(1) A secret service agent, who was doing work for a short time in Vancouver. Sergeant Barnes, of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police at Vancouver, gave evidence that he knew this man, a totally inexperienced investigator, as had been pointed out by his superior when he asked Sergeant Barnes to assist him in his work. Sergeant Barnes stated that this man's work was entirely unsatisfactory, and that he so reported. The extent of his inexperience and unsuitability for his work may be gathered from the fact that while a secret service agent in the employ of a certain governmental authority (not Canadian) he discussed these confidential matters of public security with newspaper reporters;

(2) From Rev. Mr. Norman, and the Consultative Council;

(3) From his reporters, Ward and Thornton, in whom he had complete confidence, as shown by his statement: "if our reporter says it, that is true."

Mr. Philpott admitted that he had no personal knowledge of the allegations contained in Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, (the News Herald articles) and it is quite clear from the evidence of Ward and Thornton that their information was hearsay. Ward is mainly responsible for Exhibits 1 and 3, - Thornton "merely looking over Ward's shoulder." Ward secured his information from Mr. Norman, and the Consultative Council brief (Exhibit 10) and the Japanese brief (Exhibit 17). Certain Japanese also spoke to him, but he remembers no names, and their information was entirely hearsay. He also had interviews with one Dinsmore, who gave evidence at the inquiry. Dinsmore's statements were also based

entirely on hearsay, and in regard to one item he said he warned Ward that it was a rumor only. Dinsmore could not remember the names of his informants in regard to the statement that Morii's return had been asked by the Japanese Government. He denies having told Ward that Morii had bragged about this, or that he told Ward that six members of the Sokokukai were to be returned to Japan, although Ward says Dinsmore gave him this information.

It is to be noted that Dinsmore had been in touch with Mr. Norman before contacting Ward, and that he did not go to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police with his information as to Morii's Fifth Column activities, as Norman told him that it had already been taken up with the police, without results.

This witness, Dinsmore, made a very unfavourable impression at the inquiry. His wife is an Eurasian, her father being a Japanese, and Dinsmore, desiring to secure a permit for her to remain in the district, had approached a member of the British Columbia Legislature, in regard to securing a permit. He stated that he had no particular reason for going to the "News Herald" with this information, but later on examination by Counsel, admitted that he had previously given the same information to the "Vancouver Sun," which paper would have nothing to do with it. It is obvious that he had some personal interest in the matter, as otherwise he should have taken whatever information he had to the authorities, particularly in regard to what he thought might be a Fifth Column activity.

#17. NATURALIZED CANADIAN JAPANESE ASSOCIATION

This organization was formed sometime after

March 1st, 1942, and came into existence because of the evacuation of the Japanese. As the name suggests, it was composed of Japanese who had been naturalized in Canada.

Most of the evidence regarding this Association was given by S. Yasuura. His evidence establishes that he first heard complaints about Morii and the Liaison Committee at the time the male Japanese were being separated from their families during the evacuation.

As a result of the activities of this Association, a meeting was called in the offices of Mr. D. Murphy, Barrister, of Vancouver, consisting of representatives of thirty nine Japanese associations in British Columbia. Exhibit 12 is a copy of a letter sent by Messrs. Murphy and Murphy to the Minister of Justice and the British Columbia Security Commission, dated March 30th, which indicated the expressed desire of this meeting to cooperate in the evacuation, and which contained suggestions as to the manner in which it should be carried out. Attached thereto are the minutes of the meeting of March 29th. Paragraph 2 is a resolution that the meeting:

"declares that the present head of the Japanese Liaison Committee, Etsuji Morii, does not represent the Japanese community of British Columbia....."

This is the only reference to Morii in either Mr. Murphy's letter or the minutes of the meeting. In addition, there is attached thereto a suggested plan of evacuation.

It is quite clear from the evidence of Mr. Austin Taylor, Chairman of the British Columbia Security Commission, that this plan was rejected as being totally

impractical.

It is to be noted also that while this meeting of March 29th was said to be representative of thirty-nine Japanese Associations, and the representatives were officials of these organizations, that the resolutions themselves had never been submitted, so far as is known, to the various organizations for approval, nor is there any evidence that these representatives had power on behalf of their respective associations to pass any such resolutions. It can be considered therefore only as the expressed desire of those present as individuals.

It is to be noted also that, in paragraph two of the resolutions, no complaint whatever is made as to the character of Morii.

After the plan was rejected by the British Columbia Security Commission, Mr. Yasuura again appeared before the Chairman of the British Columbia Security Commission, and after advising Mr. Taylor that the Naturalized Canadian Japanese Association did not want Mr. Morii as the controlling power of the evacuation still to be carried out, Mr. Taylor gave him a letter, which is attached to Exhibit 13, and dated April 6th, 1942, as follows:

"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to advise that the management of interior towns, where this Commission intends to evacuate children and women and aged dependents to, will be under the supervision of a competent representative of this Commission, who will work

with a small committee of the local inhabitants and a small committee of Japanese resident in the respective towns."

Exhibit 13 is a later submission by this Association with a new plan, and contains a complaint regarding Morii's character, bad record and principles.

This witness, Yasuura, heard rumors as to Morii's acceptance of money, and upon endeavouring to get the evidence failed to do so, and, as he says:

"I could not get to first base. People came around with all sort of tales, but they could not produce the evidence."

When asked as to the complaints about male Japanese being separated from their families, he was questioned:

Question - "Was that the principal cause of the disturbance or objection?"

Answer - "Well, I kind of think so personally."

There was also a meeting of this association on April 7th, when about five to six hundred persons were present, and to which meeting was reported the plans of the British Columbia Security Commission, as ascertained by the Committee on April 6th from the Chairman.

#18. THE CANADIAN JAPANESE ASSOCIATION

This is probably the oldest Japanese Association in British Columbia, and is also the largest, having at times a membership in excess of four thousand.

Conflicting statements were given by various witnesses as to the activities of this Association in connection with the evacuation, after the British

Columbia Security Commission was set up.

Mr. Kinoshita stated that an executive meeting was held on February 23th (after the general order of February 26th was issued) and it was decided to call a meeting of all Japanese groups to appoint a committee regarding the evacuation, and this executive meeting agreed to discuss the matter with Morii. Some of the executive waited on Mr. Morii at the Nippon Club, on February 28th, and the latter agreed that such a plan was necessary. Kinoshita says that a representative group of about eighty met on March 1st, and appointed a nominating committee of seven, who in turn were to nominate a larger committee of twenty-five. There is some uncertainty as to the date of this second meeting, Kinoshita stating that it was on March 8th. On the other hand, Nishiguchi, Morii and Yasuura are of the opinion it was held on Sunday, March 15th, at the Nippon Club. There is no evidence to indicate that anyone at this meeting took objection to the selection of Morii as Chairman. The proceedings at the meeting have already been referred to under the heading "The Formation of the Committee of Twenty-Five."

There is some evidence that Morii declined to co-operate with the Committee of Twenty-five, and a suggestion that he would not attend their meetings. But it is clear also that he never consented to act as Chairman of this Committee limited to twenty-five, but asked time for consideration, and decided, after receiving the "white sheet" to form a larger and more representative Committee.

Morii was a member of several of the Committees of the Canadian Japanese Association - the Condition of the Times Committee, and the Committee having charge of the Benevolent Fund.

PART III

#19. COMPLAINTS AGAINST MORII.

Many of the rumors circulating about Morii were to the effect that the Japanese were in fear of him because of his alleged terroristic methods, and his connection with the Jiu-Jitsu Club in Vancouver, also because of a certain charge of murder. In 1921 he was charged with murder and acquitted, but found guilty of manslaughter, and as apparently the Trial Judge felt that he had been acting in self-defence, he was allowed to go on suspended sentence. This fact was known to the police, and doubtless to the entire Japanese community. Some years ago another murder was committed in Vancouver; Morii was detained for a few days by the police, and following an investigation it was found that he had nothing to do with the murder, and was released, and the man who had informed on him was deported. So far as is known, he was never charged with any criminal offence, except that of murder in 1921.

There existed in Vancouver a Jiu-Jitsu Club, of which Morii was a member, and in which he apparently played a prominent part. No evidence was introduced to indicate that this club was other than one where the art of Jiu-Jitsu was taught and practised, and there was material evidence to indicate that in a great many schools in Japan this instruction is used to build up physique and morale.

Evidence also was given that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police knew of Morii's connection with this

Club, and thought so highly of the training given, that its recruits were sent to that school for a course in Jiu-Jitsu, on instructions of the Commissioner, General McBrien. There is no evidence whatever that that Club had at any time been used for terroristic purposes.

In 1940, one Shogi (a Japanese who had served in the Canadian army in the last war) was assaulted at the Nippon Club by Morii. His evidence was that the assault was not provoked by him in any way and that he knew of no reason for the assault, but it is important to note that Shogi laid no charges. He gave as his reason that he was afraid of the Morii gang, and therefore let the matter drop. Morii's explanation is that Shogi had divulged certain confidential information given before the Sparling Commission (in the activity of which Morii had co-operated) and that when Shogi refused to discontinue doing so, he, Morii, lost his temper and struck him. Some weeks later when Morii and a friend were in a restaurant in Vancouver, Shogi was also present, and shortly after Shogi left he was attacked by Morii's companion. Morii said he had nothing to do with the attack and he knew nothing of it until it was over, and there is no evidence to the contrary. Months later, Shogi, in spite of these two matters just mentioned, shook hands with Morii and agreed to forget what had previously happened.

These are the only instances of alleged terrorism on the part of Morii which were presented at the enquiry, and I reached the conclusion that while Morii was wrong in attacking Shogi under the circumstances,

it does not in my view indicate that Morii was "terroristic" in his methods.

Considerable evidence was also produced to indicate Morii's connection with a gambling organization - the Showa Club, in Vancouver. It was established that this was a club where, in addition to billiards and pool, a restaurant and shoe shine business were carried on, and card games were played by Japanese. Those participating in the game paid a certain charge according to the time taken. Morii had a controlling interest in the establishment, but operated it through a manager, and received approximately \$200.00 per month, the proceeds of the operations of the whole club.

Sufficient evidence was not produced to establish the fact that it was a gambling organization, but in any event it was clear that a large part of Morii's income came from the operation of these card games.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police had known for many years that Morii had the reputation of operating a gambling house, but so far as is known, the police of the city of Vancouver, who would have charge of such matters, had laid no information.

#20. ALLEGATIONS AS TO THE OPERATION OF RACKETEERING BY MORII

In Exhibit 1, the issue of the News Herald of September 26th, there appear the following charges:

"Under the guise of raising relief funds, the gang (the Japanese Fascist-like gang) has extorted substantial sums of money from Japanese victims born in British Columbia....Morii was established as contact in the British Columbia Security Commission.

They further claim that Morii made a racket of the position.....They say he and his gang used the position of confidence under the Commission to levy tribute on all Japanese who for one reason or another wished to be evacuated later than others. Prices for this varied, they say, but were always what Morii considered the traffic would bear.....Some of these persons have gained their appointments, (i.e. to the Wartime Security Commission) by making substantial contributions to a fund created by Morii, a portion of which he stated was to assist in the evacuation expenses of needy families.....to date this relief has not been given out in any extent to justify this appeal.....In order to raise this fund he has appealed to and coerced the comparatively prosperous persons for financial contributions."

It is abundantly clear that in late March, or in April, 1942, there were rumors and reports that Morii was operating a racket in connection with a relief fund for the Japanese evacuees, and in connection with obtaining deferment of evacuation. It is significant to observe that these rumors also were spread at the time when there was a dissension among the Japanese groups as to who should represent them before the British Columbia Security Commission, and when there was violent opposition to the evacuation of the Canadian Japanese.

Immediately after December 7th, 1941, all Japanese fishing boats on the British Columbia coast were seized by the authorities, and as a result the owners and men employed were deprived of the means of

earning their living. It was apparent to the Japanese in the Vancouver district that something would have to be done to avoid distress among these men and their families. Contributions to a fund for that purpose were made to Mr. Nakayama, Treasurer of the Nippon Club (of which Club, Morii was Manager) by Japanese organizations and all-to-day Japanese individuals. Exhibit 18 is a statement of Receipts and Disbursements prepared by the Treasurer. It shows total donations of 4950.00, and Disbursements of 10,509.42, and that the deficiency of 5559.42 was made up by Morii. A substantial part of the expenses in December, 1941, were apparently for the benefit of the Nippon Club itself, but thereafter, in the main, the Disbursements were for the benefit of Japanese in distress due to the evacuation, maintenance for those passing through Vancouver, comforts and clothing for those being sent to outside places, food supplies and donations, to the poor, and transportation for fishermen returning to their homes after their boats were surrendered.

Two Japanese who contributed to this relief fund were called - Hoshino, a Drugist, and Maikawa, a Merchant. The former contributed \$300.00, and the latter \$1500.00, and apparently both contributions reached Nakayama, the Treasurer. Both said the contributions were for the Japanese relief, were voluntary, and were not for the purpose of securing deferment or preference in any way.

I have had considerable difficulty in arriving at a definite conclusion as to some aspects of this relief fund.

There are several matters which give rise to

suspicion. Hoshino did want deferment of evacuation, and due to his wife's condition, and because of his business, he was not evacuated until October 13th. He made his payment of \$300.00 in cash:

Kinoshita, Manager of the Japanese Department of a local bank, said that Hoshino told him he wanted the money for the purpose of securing deferment of evacuation. Hoshino denied the latter statement, and says he got his postponements in the ordinary way through the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (which is confirmed by the official Commission file), and Senator Farris, for the News Herald, stated, in this case: "nor is there any suggestion of the authorities being influenced by Morii."

Maikawa contributed \$1500.00, and Nakamyma says that because of the rumors circulating at the time about the Nippon Club, he did not put it in the general fund but kept it himself, and still has it in his possession. This amount was paid in cash also, to Kogetsu and not to Morii. Some time later Maikawa had a conversation with Morii as to getting permission for his brother-in-law to return from the Camp to Vancouver, as the latter's wife was expecting a baby, and Morii promised to try and assist him. Morii was at that time Chairman of the Liaison Committee, and Maikawa a member of the Wartime Security Commission - the working committee. He secured deferment from time to time until he went to a self-supporting scheme in the late summer. He did not see Morii at any time in connection with deferments, not pay him any money for that purpose. Apparently he secured these deferments in the ordinary and proper

way, and while there was some suggestion at the beginning of his evidence that he got the deferments through the Nippon Club, it became clear later that he secured them through the Liaison Committee, which had its headquarters at the building formerly occupied by the Nippon Club. This witness Maikawa was hesitating and uncertain in his answers, and, at times, confused.

There is also some suspicion in connection with the payment of the deficiency of \$5559.00 in this fund. Nakamyma says that as Treasurer he borrowed \$3000.00 from Mrs. Morii in December, 1941, and \$2250.00 from Morii in January, 1942. These amounts were paid in cash, and no receipts or notes given. Morii says that they were gifts to aid the relief fund, and that he never expected, and has not received, repayment; that he did not know of his wife's contribution until long after it was made, or how she secured the money.

While some of these matters give rise to conjecture and suspicion, yet I must be guided by the evidence itself. Nakamyma says positively that Morii had nothing to do with its collection, and there is no direct evidence to the contrary. Rather than making money out of this fund, Morii and his wife contributed over \$5,000.00. In addition, Morii says he made a good many small donations to individuals from time to time for relief purposes.

On the evidence, therefore, I must find that Morii did not use any of the monies administered by Nakamyma for his own purposes, and that these monies were not paid by the subscribers to secure deferment, or under any pressure. It is to be noted that several of the large subscriptions came from Japanese Associations, such as the Salt Herring Exporters, and a Fishermen's

Association.

Another collection was later made by the Wartime Security Commission. Exhibit 11 is a translation of a letter dated March 12, 1942, entitled:

"WARTIME SECURITY COMMISSION"

and the name of Etsuji Morii appeared immediately below. It is an appeal for funds to assist the destitute and needy Japanese. Morii's evidence is all that is available in this connection. It shows that the circular letter was sent out with his authority in order to raise more funds for relief purposes, as the work had greatly expanded due to the general order for evacuation of all the Japanese. On the second day after it went out he stopped further collections because he had heard of another scheme among the Japanese to collect \$60,000 for relief purposes, which he believed to be too large for their then needs; and as he heard that rumors were being spread that the Committee was trying to make money out of the fund. About \$4,100.00 was received from six or seven Japanese before this collection was stopped, the money going to Igushi, the Treasurer. Some of the money was still unexpended when Morii was evacuated.

There is no evidence that any of the money came into Morii's possession, or that any of it was paid for other than charitable purposes. The appeal by the circular letter would seem to indicate clearly that the collection was nothing more than would appear from the letter itself - a request to the better class Japanese to aid the less fortunate.

My conclusions, therefore, on this aspect of the case are that Morii did not operate a racket in connection with the appointing or securing men for the

Wartime Security Commission, or for deferment, or in connection with the relief funds. Sergeant Barnes says the relief collection among the Japanese was at the suggestion of the Hume Committee.

#21. "JAPANESE FASCIST-LIKE GANG
INTIMIDATES LAW ABIDING
CANADIAN-BORN JAPANESE."

The above is the opening sentence in Exhibit 1. Later there is a reference to a report that Morii and his gang used the position of confidence under the British Columbia Security Commission to levy tribute, and still later: "In twenty odd years of terrorization of the Japanese community in the Province, Morii has gathered plenty of information valuable to the enemy."

In the first place, it may be noted that the allegations are that the "intimidation" was against the Nisei. It was from this group that most of the opposition to Morii developed. No evidence whatever was produced to establish this part of the report. The only evidence as to intimidation or terrorization was regarding the attack on Shogi, who was born in Japan. That matter has been dealt with elsewhere.

Various witnesses said there were reports of "fear" of Morii; that he had the Jiu-Jitsuists at his back. His connection with that Club has been referred to previously. There is no evidence that he used it for the purpose of terrifying anyone, nor is there any proof that Morii had for twenty years terrorized the Japanese community, or that he had collected any information valuable to the enemy. His conviction of manslaughter was over twenty-one years ago, and was well-known. The only other incident which was referred to in the evidence was the assault

on Shogi in 1940, in connection with which Shogi laid no charges.

These latter statements in the News Herald are entirely unwarranted, and on the evidence, untrue. ~~They are not said to have been reports from the Japanese brief, and they are not contained therein.~~ The reference in that brief is as follows:

"He himself has committed one murder, and has been accused of another."

Both statements are false.

Then, at the end of this brief, under the heading "SUSPICION", appears this statement:

"We believe that we have reasonable grounds to look with suspicion on the activity of Morii and certain members of the Wartime Security Commission as a serious menace to the safety of the State."

The News Herald was scarcely warranted in making the unqualified statement as to the gathering of information useful to the enemy, even if it was based (and it is not so alleged) on the article in the Japanese brief.

#22. CHARGES RE T. ILYANA

In Exhibit 1 a charge is made that Ilyana was Morii's private secretary, and that he returned to Japan just before December 7th, 1941; that he was in the confidence of Morii and of the Black Dragon, and - "what Ilyana carried back to Japan with him is only conjectural unless Morii talks."

No evidence was submitted as to this man,

except by Morii, who said that Ilyana was not his private secretary, but that he wrote some letters for him, and that he had returned to Japan before Pearl Harbor, but "took nothing with him," and that he (Morii) had nothing to do with his return to Japan. He was an employee of the British Columbia Japanese Club, - the Showa Club.

There is no evidence before me to support these charges and insinuations regarding Ilyana and Morii. Ward got his information from Dinsmore, and it was entirely hearsay.

#23. CHARGES RE MORII BEING IN VANCOUVER ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1942.

In Exhibit 1 it is stated as a fact -

"Last week he was walking the streets of Vancouver - he may be here still."

This statement is quite untrue. All the evidence indicated that Morii left Vancouver on May 28th, 1942, to go to a self-supporting scheme at Minto, B.C., and did not return to Vancouver until the opening of the inquiry.

At the hearing Counsel for the News Herald admitted that this statement was an error.

#24. CHARGES RE MINTO CAMP

Exhibit 1 contains the following:

"When the heat became too fierce in Vancouver, he (Morii) and his friends were sent to Minto, in the Bridge River District; others went to Christian

Lake and Hope, which, until a short time ago, were practically one hundred per cent Morii settlements."

This is a statement by the paper, and one which casts a serious reflection on the operations of the British Columbia Security Commission, which alone was charged with the evacuation of Japanese after March 4th, 1942. The reasonable inferences from the statements are that the British Columbia Security Commission sent Morii and his friends to settlements as a result of the opposition to Morii's activities which developed among the Japanese; that the British Columbia Security Commission was influenced by such opposition; and also that "Morii Camps" were set up, or approved of, by the British Columbia Security Commission.

No effort was made to substantiate these statements in any way, and on the evidence of the officials of the British Columbia Security Commission that Morii never exerted any influence whatever in regard to the evacuation, that their own officials alone decided as to what Japanese would be moved, and the date and place of removal, I must find the statements totally unwarranted and untrue:

Minto, and several other places, were established by the Commission as self-supporting schemes, where Japanese possessed of sufficient assets to support themselves were permitted to reside out of the protected area.

#25. CHARGES THAT MORII WAS TO BE RETURNED TO JAPAN.

Exhibit 1 contains the following:

"Morii, say the Japanese, does not intend to stay in

Minto. He, and six others, all of the Sokokukai, are reported to have been demanded by the Japanese Government in the next exchange of Nationals.

This in spite of the fact that Morii was naturalized twenty-one years ago.

"This report has not been substantiated, but Japanese claim that Morii brings to them that it is so.....Why should he even be in a position to talk about repatriation to Japan....."

Ward, the reporter, says he got this information from Dinsmore, and from Shoyama, the Editor of the Vancouver Canadian (although Shoyama, by letter, denies this). Dinsmore said he told Ward there was a rumor that the Japanese Government had asked for the return of Morii and six of his henchmen, but warned him it was a rumor only. Dinsmore could not give the names of any of his informants.

On the evidence, I am satisfied that there was no truth in any of these statements. The Government authorities say that no request for the repatriation of Morii has been received, and Morii denies any knowledge of it whatever. It was idle gossip only, and when Dinsmore warned Ward that it was merely rumor, it should not have appeared even as an unsubstantiated report.

#26. TASHME CAMP

The article in Exhibit 3 - the News Herald of October 9th, 1942 - deals mainly with Tashme Camp, and the alleged reluctance of Japanese to go to that place, described as "Morii Camp." It is suggested that Morii proposed the name of the Camp. This is

untrue, and I find on the evidence of Mr. Mead, as well as of Morii himself, that the latter had nothing to do with the choice of name. It was made up by joining the first two letters of the names of the three

Commissioners of the British Columbia Security Commission.

There followed other statements, such as:

"The Nippon Club is enthusiastic about the predominance of Tashme in the list (i.e. of Camps)... that the Nisei mass evacuation group and the Japanese Canadian Citizens' League have almost all applied for other camps.....that Tashme is controlled by the Morii gang.....Whatever the truth or otherwise of this charge, the Japanese undoubtedly do not want to go to Tashme, and their bias against the camp is undoubtedly based on their fear of Morii. Morii, they say, has power to lay information against them and get their men interned when any of them object too strongly to Tashme."

Later there is a report of an interview by the reporters Ward and Thornton with several female Nisei, at the office of the Nisei Mass Evacuation Group, between September 26th and October 9th, at which these women stated that the opposition to Tashme was based on Morii's alleged control of that camp.

Morii was evacuated to Minto on May 28th, 1942.

The site for Tashme Camp was leased by the British Columbia Security Commission in July, 1942, and the evacuation thereto began in August. All the evidence of the authorities and Morii clearly shows that neither Morii nor any of his associates had anything

to do with the establishment or operation of Tashme Camp at any time, and there is no evidence to the contrary. The Camp is entirely under the control of the officials of the British Columbia Security Commission. It is equally clear that these officials arranged the evacuation details, and, in the course of their duties, they probably found it necessary to send certain Japanese to camps other than where the latter wished to go; as a result, no doubt, certain of these Japanese may have believed that Morii was responsible because of the false reports and rumors that had been circulated about his influence with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the British Columbia Security Commission.

Morii at no time had power to have objectors interned, as suggested.

These statements as to Morii's influence over Tashme Camp are entirely unfounded and false. They constitute a very definite attack on the officials of the British Columbia Security Commission by suggesting that they were influenced by Morii in this matter; and on the Royal Canadian Mounted Police by the inference that Morii could have objectors interned.

The facts in the case could have been ascertained by a call at the office of either organization at Vancouver, but Ward and Thornton did not take this simple precaution, and relied rather on statements of members of the Nisei Mass Evacuation Group, whose opposition to evacuation was well-known.

#27. JAPANESE FISHERMEN'S FUND

While not directly pertinent to the inquiry in that no reference is made to it in Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, I feel that I should mention certain evidence which was brought out at the hearing with regard to monies paid to Morii by certain fishermen and Fishermen's Associations in 1941.

A difficulty arose with regard to fishing licenses for about five hundred Japanese, who had been born in Japan of Japanese naturalized in Canada. It was decided in October, 1941, to apply to Ottawa for naturalization papers for these people, so that their status would be clarified, and then secure licenses. It was also decided to ask Morii's assistance, as it was felt he could help them by his co-operation, and through the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. It is clear that Morii was not at the meeting, and at no time requested any compensation, but the gathering of fishermen decided to ask each applicant to contribute fifty dollars "for the expense of covering all things, which he had handled for the fishermen." Most of the money was collected by the Secretary of the Fishermen's Association, who turned it over to Morii (about \$4,000.00 in all). Morii commenced making representations to the Government to secure the necessary naturalization papers, but after December 7th, 1941, nothing further could be done on account of the war with Japan.

The amount received by Morii seems large in relation to the services to be performed, and the necessary expenditures would be relatively small. Yet it is clear from all the evidence on this point that there was nothing in the nature of a racket. Morii had

nothing to do with the initiation of the matter, and requested no compensation, and the Association itself decided to raise the money from those concerned, collected it and turned the fund over to Morii. Three of those who had contributed applied to Morii for a return of their money after December 7th, 1941, and he returned it voluntarily.

This information was apparently not in the possession of the News Herald at the time it published the articles of September 26th and October 9th, and no reference is made to it therein.

#28. CHARGE THAT MORII SHIELDED ILLEGAL ENTRANTS INTO CANADA.

In the brief of the Consultative Council (Exhibit 10) there is this statement:

"We know of one Japanese who has admitted that he entered Canada illegally and has been shielded by Mr. Morii. The same source from which this information comes indicates that there are several scores of illegally entered Japanese in Rainbow Camp, Lucerne and Thunder River, who have been shielded by Mr. Morii."

There is no statement or comment in the News Herald as to this charge; and while it was not one of the matters I was directed to investigate, I feel I should comment on it, as considerable evidence was given concerning it at the hearing.

This man, M. Higo, entered Canada illegally

in 1926. At the time of the voluntary registration of the Japanese in 1941 (conducted by the Hume Committee) he appeared before Sergeant Barnes, of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and stated that he had entered Canada with his parents in 1910, when he was four years old. This was untrue, and apparently he told Barnes also that his father was dead. His father had come to Canada in 1906, but is now in Japan.

Higo says that prior to appearing before Sergeant Barnes he saw Morii (who was then Chairman of the Sub-committee assisting the Hume Committee), and told him of his position as follows:

"Since I have not got a passport, would you not do something so I can get a registration card - my father and my brother are in this country, having entered legally. My father is a fisherman here, and since I thought he had citizenship papers, therefore I want to see if I could not somehow or other receive a card."

He stated that Morii in reply said:

"You had better say you came in with your father about 1909 or 10."

After seeing Morii, he says he reported to Sergeant Barnes, and told him he had arrived in 1910. It is clear from Sergeant Barnes' records, taken at the time, that he was informed by Higo that the latter had entered Canada in 1910, and not in 1926.

Higo says he paid no money to Morii, that nothing more was said, and denied knowing any other Japanese in Canada illegally, or telling one Sato that

there were many others protected by Morii. Sato is the one referred to by the Consultative Council as the source of its information.

Morii states that he saw Higo about April, 1941, and was told that he came to Canada at three years of age and he had no papers; that he advised him to go to register, to tell the facts, and that the authorities would look up the records. He denies telling him to give any false information.

Even on Higo's own statement as to what he told Morii, there would seem nothing seriously wrong in Morii's advice, as stated by Higo himself. If the father had citizenship papers in Canada when his son was a minor, the latter might have been naturalized as well - through his father. As proof of the good faith of Morii, the evidence of Constable Davidson of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police shows that later when Higo's case was being investigated, Morii told him where Higo was located, and that when the latter came to Vancouver he, Morii, would advise the police.

Higo's statement was under investigation by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police after his registration in 1941. This registration was, of course, stopped when the war with Japan broke out on December 7th, 1941.

On the evidence I find that Morii did not tell Higo to give false statements to the authorities.

After the noon adjournment, following Higo's evidence, Morii stated under oath that at the noon hour Higo had told him that the evidence he had given in the morning was untrue.

#29. BRITISH COLUMBIA SECURITY
COMMISSION STAMP.

In the News Herald of October 9th there is this statement:

"The Nippon Club, controlled by Morii, and at present operated for him by two lieutenants, is one of the depots where Japanese apply for work orders of the British Columbia Security Commission preliminary to evacuation, and is the only one of several such depots permitted to use the seal with the words "B. C. Security Commission" across the face of it. Other Japanese bodies simply use their organizational seal."

On the same page is a photograph of part of a postcard, in Japanese, with the impression of a rubber stamp, which has, in the centre "B.C. SECURITY COMMISSION", followed by its address, and in the outer ring - "JAPANESE (an undecipherable word) COMMITTEE, VANCOUVER, B.C." Under the photograph appear the following words:

"It may need a reading glass to decipher it, but note the "B.C. SECURITY COMMISSION" across the centre of this Nippon Club stamp. The two vertical lines of Japanese characters which cross the stamp read - 'NIPPON CLUB, WARTIME LIAISON COMMITTEE.' This Committee was set up under the B.C. Security Commission by Etsuji Morii, who for years has been a chief agent of the Black Dragon Society in British Columbia."

Due to the fact that the photograph was of part of the card only, it was impossible to ascertain the meaning of the card itself. The only parts that could be translated were:

"Care of Nippon Club - Wartime Security Commission",

and

"This office will be closed down the 25th so everybody should be notified."

In English, at the top, are words that appear to be

"September 14th, 1942."

The reporter Thornton, in the course of his investigation, heard that the Nippon Club used the B. C. Security Commission seal. He was so informed by Ward, who in turn was told by Mr. D. Murphy, Barrister. Ward had also told Thornton that if a work sheet of a Japanese bore this special seal the holder would get preference in evacuation.

Ward therefore proceeded to the office of the Nisei Mass Evacuation Group to ascertain what type of seal they used. There he was informed that they had a postcard with the impression of the Nippon Club seal. He secured it and made the photograph above referred to. Subsequently, the above statement and photograph appeared in the News Herald.

These short form work sheets, of which Exhibit 31 is a sample, were issued by the British Columbia Security Commission to all Japanese Committees and individuals requiring them, and were for the purpose of collecting information relative to the

evacuation. The Nisei Mass Evacuation Group, the Japanese Citizen's Council and the Liaison Committee, and many others had these forms. There is no evidence whatever to bear out the suggestion in this article that this form of rubber stamp was ever used on any work sheet at any time; nor to support the idle rumor that Thornton heard that a Japanese who had work sheets with this stamp would secure preference in evacuation. The stamp he saw was on a postcard and not on a work sheet; the author of the postcard is unknown, and no one gave evidence as to how or when the stamp was affixed to the postcard, or how or when the date was marked on the card.

Morii said he had never known of the existence of this stamp; Major Taylor and Mr. Mead state it was never authorized by the B.C. Security Commission, and that when they heard of a stamp bearing the words "B.C. SECURITY COMMISSION" being used by the Liaison Committee early in the evacuation, they ordered that its use be stopped at once, and believed that this had been done.

Here, again, is an instance where a serious but totally unfounded reflection is cast on the British Columbia Security Commission by the suggestion that one special group of Japanese had secured unusual privileges from the Commission by the use of this stamp. The facts could very readily have been ascertained from any of the officials of the British Columbia Security Commission. Instead of supporting the work of the Commission in its difficult task, the article would lead the public to believe that its work

was being done in an unfair and improper manner, and would create uneasiness and suspicion among the Japanese themselves.

On the evidence, I find that this charge is utterly unfounded, and quite untrue.

#30. THE BOX OF CHOCOLATES.

This is another matter which was not referred to in the articles in the News Herald, but was brought out in the evidence, and to which I shall refer briefly.

Exhibit 15 is a letter from G. W. McPherson, Custodian of Enemy Property in British Columbia, to me, dated November 2nd, 1942. Attached thereto is a letter from him to Colonel Hill, O-C "A" Division, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Vancouver, dated May 2nd, 1942, outlining the story of "The Box of Chocolates."

Thornton (the reporter of the News Herald, and who had at one time been in the employ of the Japanese Consul's office at Vancouver) told McPherson about this matter in the first instance.

A Japanese, named Hosaki, and his wife, later came before McPherson, and Mrs. Hosaki gave her evidence through an interpreter, to the effect that her husband had been picked up by the Immigration Authorities for some unknown reason; that a friend - whose name she would not divulge - told her that Morii would assist her; that she purchased a box of chocolates from a store (she would not give the location of the store); that she put some money in the box (she

would not state the amount); and that she took the box, with the money, to Morii's home, where she delivered it, in his absence, to some other man - and subsequently her husband was released.

Investigation by McPherson showed that the Immigration Authorities had picked up Hosaki, as he had no papers and they believed he was an illegal entrant; but on finding the papers had been burned in a fire, he was released, being required to pay a bill of \$10.50 for maintenance in detention. It was shown to Mr. McPherson's satisfaction that Morii had nothing whatever to do with the man's release, the proceedings in the Immigration office having occurred without any interference by Morii in any way.

Mr. and Mrs. Hosaki were not brought before me, and the only evidence in the matter was obtained from Mr. McPherson, from Thornton and Morii. I have no reason to doubt Mr. McPherson's report in his letter as to what he was told by Mrs. Hosaki; but on the other hand there is no proof before me that this transaction ever took place. Morii denies that he ever received anything from these people, either chocolates or money, and that his recollection is that he contributed sufficient funds himself to pay Hosaki's board bill while in detention.

There are so many suspicious circumstances connected with Mrs. Hosaki's story that I have every reason to doubt the truth of it. She refused to tell the name of the friend who advised her, the name of the person who sold her the chocolates, and also gave her statement to Mr. McPherson under a pledge that by

would not divulge the information to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the British Columbia Security Commission until after she and her husband were evicted. If her story were true, there was no valid reason for withholding these details at the time, when her story could have been investigated. Her statement, of course, was not under-oath.

On the evidence, therefore, I must find that this story has no foundation in fact. I should point out also that on receipt of the letter from Mr. McPherson, Colonel Hill and Mr. Hood had the matter investigated by Sergeant Barnes. The latter had an interview with Mr. McPherson, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, as a result of the investigation, came to the conclusion that the report was unfounded.

#31. INTERVIEW OF MORII

In Exhibit 1 there is a statement:

"Morii is in no internment camp, as those Japanese who protested his actions are."

No effort was made at the hearing to prove this statement of the News Herald. It clearly means that those Japanese who are interned (or some of them at least) were detained because of their protests against Morii. Again, this is a very serious reflection on the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and is completely unwarranted by the facts. No one was interned because of protests against Morii, nor had

Morii anything to do with their internment. All the evidence establishes that they were interned because they refused to carry out the orders of the British Columbia Security Commission to submit themselves for evacuation.

Mr. Mead says that on one occasion he personally interviewed sixty of these Nisei as to their reasons for refusing to obey the orders, and no one had any complaint regarding the Liaison Committee or Morii. Their sole objection was that they wanted to leave in family groups or en masse. I gathered from the evidence that the ones who were interned were almost entirely of the Nisei group, although this matter was not gone into in great detail.

#31a. "DEFERMENTS OF
EVACUATION"

A determined attempt was made to show that Morii was responsible for securing deferments of evacuation for his friends and associates. His evidence, and that of the officials of the British Columbia Security Commission in charge of the evacuation, satisfied me beyond any doubt that these matters were settled entirely by the officials themselves, and that Morii had never attempted to interfere in any way, either to delay or expedite the evacuation of any of the Japanese.

PART IV

#32. SHOULD MORII BE INTERNED ?

In Exhibit 1, the News Herald asks this question:

"Why is Morii (who is implicated by his own articles in the Sokoku) not in an internment camp ?"

While I realize that the power to direct internment is vested in the Minister of Justice by virtue of the Defence of Canada Regulations, yet inasmuch as my Commission directed me to inquire into the "questions" as well as the statements and charges in the issues of the News Herald, I feel it my duty to deal with this question, as to why Morii is not interned, in a limited way. The inference in the question is definitely that Morii should have been interned.

Morii is not an enemy alien by virtue of his naturalization in Canada in 1914. The Minister of Justice if satisfied that with a view to preventing any particular person from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety, or the safety of the state, considers it is necessary to do so - "may make an order directing that he be detained in such place and under such conditions as the Minister of Justice may determine" - Section 21, Defence of Canada Regulations.

It may be assumed that while the Minister of Justice may exercise this power somewhat arbitrarily, it is normally exercised upon production of evidence which would lead to his being satisfied that the safety of the state required the internment of the individual.

I therefore take it for granted that while it is definitely not within the scope of my duties to advise the Minister of Justice that Morii should or should not

be interned, I should at least point out the evidence produced before me, both in his favour and that which is against him, and which might be of assistance in determining the question. My recent experience as Chairman of an Advisory Committee, appointed under Section 22 of the Defence of Canada Regulations, is of considerable assistance to me in stating these details.

In this connection, I do not feel that a conviction of manslaughter (in this case committed in self defence) and the operation of a gambling house - even if proven - should have any bearing on the question of internment. The only matters proven by evidence, and which would throw any light on the question as to whether he might act in a manner prejudicial to the safety of the state, are:

(1) His address before the Canadian Japanese Association in the fall of 1939, quoted in the Sokoku of December, 1939, a translation of which is attached to the brief of the Consultative Council, Exhibit 10.

(2) An address before a Fishermen's Association in 1939.

I shall deal first with Morii's alleged connection with the Sokokukai and the Black Dragon Society.

#33. THE SOKOKUKAI

In Exhibit 1 it is stated:

"They pointed out that until a few months before the date of the (Japanese) brief, March 1942.....he had been President of the Canadian Chapter of the Sokokukai, or Fatherland Society, which they allege is a sister organization of the Black Dragon Society,-

which is hated and feared throughout the East.....
Morii, they say, is an expert at Jiu-Jitsu, as
are his followers of the Sokokukai..... This organiza-
tion, say the Japanese, partakes of the general
characteristics of Fascism..... for many years he
has advocated Fascist and National principles,
both by speeches and by distribution of the magazine
Sokoku."

In Exhibit 3 (the article of October 9th)
it is stated that:

"Etsuji Morii, chief agent in British Columbia
of the Japanese Nationalist and Fascist magazine
Sokoku, and head of the Sokokukai Society, which
is a daughter organization of the Black Dragon....."

In Exhibit 6 there appears a picture of
Morii and one Kita, taken in Stanley Park, Vancouver, in
July, 1939, on the occasion of the latter's visit to
Vancouver en route to Europe. Kita was a member of
the Diet of Japan, and head of the Sokokukai, the
Fatherland Society of Japan. Under the picture it
stated that Morii was Branch President of the Sokokukai,
and Kita the Managing Director.

The only other suggestion as to there being
a branch of the Sokokukai in British Columbia is the
report in Exhibit 9 of Morii's speech in the fall of
1939, where it is stated that:

"Morii, as President of the Canadian Branch of
the Sokokukai, is active in expounding the policies
of the Fatherland" -

and an article in the Japanese paper of Vancouver
"Canadian Daily News" of July 12th, 1939, (at the time

of Kita's visit) reporting the latter's speech at a meeting presided over by Morii. This article states it was held "under the auspices of the Sokokukai." Kita was National Director. There is nothing in this article to suggest there was a local branch in British Columbia.

The main evidence at the hearing as to the existence of this organization in British Columbia is that of Morii, who says there was no such society here - that he was never a member of it at any time, and did not hear of it until Kita's arrival in July, 1939. It might be said that it would be to Morii's interest to deny the existence of the society, but I am fortified in my belief that he was telling the truth in this regard by the fact that none of the other Japanese witnesses, many of whom resided in the Vancouver area, suggested that there was any branch of the Sokokukai here. Several of them would certainly have known of it had it existed, and could have so testified. Several said they had never heard of it.

I have come to the decision that I am not entitled to conclude from an article published in Japan by Kita, (National Director of the Sokokukai) in his own paper, and which glorifies his own activities in that Society, that Morii was a Branch Director in Canada, or from the article in the "Canadian Daily News", that the Society existed here. The evidence before me is to the contrary.

* Further, there is no evidence that Morii ever distributed the Sokoku magazine. He says that copies came to the Nippon Club from Japan after Kita's visit (presumably sent by him), and Iwasaki, who produced copies to Norman, says he got them there, and not from Morii.

I find, therefore, that the charges as to Morii's connection with the Sokokukai, and the Sokoku magazine, are without foundation in fact. All the charges in this connection, and as to the Black Dragon, were based on the two copies of the magazine (Exhibit 6 and 9) produced by Iwasaki to Norman, who demanded some concrete proof of the rumors reported to him regarding Morii. These were seized on as complete substantiation of the rumors, and a vast superstructure raised on a tiny foundation of fact, resulted in the charges in the Consultative Council and Japanese briefs.

It is interesting to note paragraph four, on page four, of the Consultative brief:

"If the Sokoku of September, 1939, did not make it clear that Morii is the leader of the Japanese Fifth Column, the issue of December, 1939, leaves no room for doubt on the matter."

This is a quotation from Mr. Norman's letter to the Consultative Council, and the statement is made after reading Morii's speech made in the fall of 1939 (hereinafter referred to) before representatives of every Canadian Japanese Society.

#34. MORII'S ADDRESS IN 1939

Exhibit 9 contains a speech delivered by Morii under the auspices of the Canadian Japanese Association of Vancouver, in the fall of 1939, at a meeting of representatives from every Japanese society. It is headed: "The Fundamental Duties of the Subjects of the Empire", and it is added

"Mr. Morii, as President of the Canadian Branch of the Sokokukai, is active in expounding the policies of the Fatherland to the comrades resident in Canada. He is also head of the intelligence section of the Japanese Association, a member of the Condition of the Times Committee, and President of the Nippon Club."

A translation of the main parts of this speech is attached to the Consultative Council brief, Exhibit 10.

There is no doubt that Morii gave this speech, and in it he showed strong leanings towards the Japanese nation in its war with China. He is a Buddhist, convinced that the Emperor of Japan is of Divine origin; that the Sino-Japanese war is a Holy War, undertaken, as he says, to bring about peace. He was active in collecting comforts for the Japanese soldiers and their families. The speech, in my opinion, is strongly Nationalistic, and clearly proves that at that time his sympathies were entirely with Japan, notwithstanding the strong feeling in Canada in favour of the Chinese. His attitude then was possibly that of all Japanese, especially of the Nationals and those naturalized. But it must be borne in mind that it contains no suggestion of any feeling against Canada or Great Britain, and that it was not until two years later we were at war with Japan. In several places he refers to "our Nation - our Empire of Great Japan - our Imperial Japan - the National Policy of our Japan - the Fatherland - as Citizens of the Empire." These words are significant as indicating that while a naturalized citizen of Canada,

Moril had a great interest in Japan, which he consistently referred to as "our Empire."

#35. THE BLACK DRAGON SOCIETY

In the News Herald of September 26th, 1942, there appears the headline:

"NIPPON BLACK DRAGON OPERATES WITHIN BRITISH COLUMBIA"

and in the opening paragraph of the same issue it is stated that:

"according to responsible Canadians and respectable Canadian-born Japanese, a Fascist-like gang intimidates law abiding Canadian-born Japanese, and the gang is directly affiliated with the notorious Black Dragon Society of Japan."

Again, in the article of October 9th, 1942, the statement is made:

"the reporters did not have the answers, but they learned the Black Dragon is still powerful in British Columbia."

The 'responsible Canadians' referred to were the members of the Consultative Council. Reference to its brief (Exhibit 10) shows clearly that there is no charge in that brief that the Black Dragon operates in British Columbia. It merely states that one of the sponsors of the Sokoku magazine is Toyama, prominently associated with the Black Dragon Society - a similar organization.

The reference to the 'respectable Canadian-born Japanese' (Nisei) is to the Japanese brief (Exhibit 17), which, it will be recalled, was never in the

possession of the British Columbia Security Commission, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, or any person in authority, and so far as is known was never signed by anyone. Here it is stated:

"he, (Morii) was until a few months ago President of the Sokokukai (Fatherland Society) - a sister organization of the Japanese Black Dragon, which is similar to the German Bund."

(Anyone with any knowledge of the German Bund could scarcely make the statement that it was in any way similar to the Black Dragon Society).

There is no statement in this brief that the Black Dragon operated within British Columbia. It is apparent that the anonymous authors of this brief reached the conclusion that the Sokokukai was a sister organization of the Black Dragon Society for the same reason as Mr. Norman, of the Consultative Council.

In Exhibit 6 there is a list of sponsors of the Sokokukai, including the name of Mitsura Toyana. This man is reputedly the head of the notorious Black Dragon Society of Japan, a secret and terroristic organization, which, according to reports, had as one of its main objects the elimination by assassination of liberal minded politicians in Japan, and the acquisition of power by the militarists.

Mr. Norman came to the conclusion that as Toyana's name appeared as a sponsor of the Sokokukai (as well as the name of Matsuoka, a well known member of recent Japanese Cabinets and an ardent Nationalist), it was directly affiliated with the Black Dragon Society. This, in my opinion, was a totally unwarranted conclusion.

The evidence of Special Constable Upton, who lived for years in Japan, is that the list of sponsors of the magazine contained the names of many liberals of Japan. The Japanese brief (Exhibit 17) says in regard to Morii:

"He was until a few months ago President of the Canadian Branch of the Sokokukai, a sister organization of the Japanese Black Dragon, which is similar to the German Fund."

I have no reason to doubt that whoever prepared the Japanese brief containing this assertion, reached his conclusions as to the connection of the Black Dragon Society and the Sokokukai on the same basis as Mr. Norman, namely, the presence of Toyana's name in the list of sponsors.

The general tenor of the news item in the issue of October 9th, 1942 (Exhibit 3) has to do with Tashme Camp. In the opening paragraph, however, there is a reference to the Sokokukai as a daughter organization of the Japanese Black Dragon. (It is interesting to observe that Mr. Norman assumed that the organizations were similar, that the authors of the Japanese brief concluded they were sister organizations, and, as shown in Exhibit 3, Mr. Ward concluded that the relationship was even closer - that of parent and daughter.)

In the second paragraph of Exhibit 3 is a somewhat terrifying statement as to the activities of the Black Dragon Society in Japan, followed by:

"there is evidence to show that its activities are still rampant in this Province."

The concluding statement in the article is that the

reporters learned:

"the Black Dragon is still powerful in British Columbia."

These conclusions of the authors of the article (Exhibit 3), referring to the Black Dragon, were arrived at after a conversation with several female Nisei, and according to the article itself, and the evidence of the reporter Ward, the interview had to do with the supposed powerful influence of Horii and his alleged control over Tashme Camp; not a word was said by these women as to the Black Dragon, and the conclusions of the reporters in reference to its "continued existence" and that "its activities were still rampant" are based on nothing more than the imagination of the reporters.

All the evidence submitted before me is conclusive that the Black Dragon Society of Japan has not operated, and does not operate, in British Columbia. Every Japanese witness questioned on this matter stated that so far as he knew, it had never existed here, and that its presence in British Columbia was never heard of until the article in the News Herald of September 26th, 1942. Some of these Japanese witnesses had been in Canada for a great many years, and were people of wide contacts in the Japanese community, and would undoubtedly have heard of its organization and activities had it existed.

The officials of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police stated that this Society had no organization in Canada, and Special Constable Upton (who resided for many years in Japan, speaks Japanese fluently, and has been engaged on special work for the Royal Canadian

Mounted Police among the Japanese here) said that the nature of the Black Dragon Society indicated that it would have no reason for its existence outside of Japan, and that it would be completely illogical to suggest that such was the case.

In my view, there is a great difference between the two news articles in Exhibits 1 and 3, as to the existence of the Black Dragon Society in British Columbia.

The former article is based on charges said to have been made mainly in the Consultative Council brief and the Japanese brief (although in neither of these briefs is it alleged that the Black Dragon does exist in British Columbia). Some of the statements (Exhibit 1) were stated by the reporter Ward to be "implicit" in the language of the briefs.

But, on the other hand, the article of October 9th, 1942, is in quite a different category. It is based entirely on investigations carried out by Ward and Thornton - the News Herald reporters - and their own evidence clearly indicates that those investigations disclosed nothing as to the Black Dragon. They made the bold statements;

"there is evidence to show that its activities are still rampant"

and,

"we have learned the Black Dragon is still powerful in British Columbia."

Anyone reading this single article could quite properly assume as facts that the Black Dragon existed, and was rampant in British Columbia at that date - October 9th,

1942 - not merely that there were reports or charges that such was the case. These statements were on the evidence quite unwarranted; they did not follow from the interview of the reporters with the Nisei women, and were without foundation in fact.

While the Editor assumes full responsibility for the articles, it should be pointed out that Ward, who was the main author of both articles, was almost totally inexperienced in reporting, and that Thornton, while a man of only slightly more experience, had but a small part in their preparation, and, as he states - "merely looked over Ward's shoulder."

I therefore find on the evidence that the Black Dragon Society of Japan has not operated, and does not operate, in British Columbia.

Further, I may add, that Assistant Commissioner Mead stated that in the course of his duties he attended conferences with the heads of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the United States, both at Ottawa and Washington. Subversive movements and intelligence work are discussed at these meetings, and at no time was it suggested that either the Sokokukai or the Black Dragon Society existed in Canada, and no mention was ever made of these organizations.

#36. ADDRESS TO FISHERMEN'S ASSOCIATION

The evidence as to this subject is found in the statement of Yoshida, who says it was delivered at a meeting of about two hundred fishermen, at Port Essington, in May, 1939. In general it had to do with

the national policy of Japan, said to be of Divine origin. It had nothing to do with the Sino-Japanese war, and the witness said he did not know Morii's attitude towards Japan, which would seem to indicate that in any event the speech was not ultra Nationalistic. Yoshida stated:

"The people trusted Morii before the formation of the Security Commission; previously Morii had been talking about loyalty to Japan - he suddenly swung around and talked loyalty to Canada, and worked for the Canadian Government" -

and that therefore the Japanese did not like him; they felt he was a spy for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. This witness also resented the fact that Morii had previously assisted the police in reporting Japanese who had entered Canada illegally. He felt that anyone with knowledge of these things should not have reported them. Morii did not deny making this speech.

#37. MATTERS WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED FAVOURABLE TO MORII.

In this connection, there is a very long record of co-operation with authorities, and particularly with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Earlier in this report I indicated that Mr. Mead was responsible for contacting Morii when it was first considered desirable to have a Japanese liaison committee which would assist the British Columbia Security Commission, and that Mr. Mead chose him because of his knowledge of his usefulness, acquired from personal experience.

The evidence of Mr. Mead and other officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (quite apart from the statement of Morii and other Japanese) made it abundantly clear that Morii had been particularly useful to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in dealing with problems among the Japanese.

About 1932, when it was discovered that there were many Japanese illegally in Canada, Mr. Mead heard of Morii and requested his co-operation, pointing out that these illegal entrants into Canada reflected on the whole Japanese community. Morii was of great assistance; he went to the Skeena River district and collected illegal certificates, turning them over to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and in the result, and in part due to his assistance, the situation was cleared up, many Japanese returned to Japan, and others were prosecuted and deported. One of the Japanese prosecuted successfully at that time was active in opposition to Morii in the work of the Liaison Committee in 1942.

In February, 1941, a representative group of Japanese were asked to form a Committee to work with the Hume Committee, (previously referred to). The Japanese, who were representative of the Japanese community, themselves appointed a committee of five, and named Morii as Chairman. This sub-committee was of great assistance to the Hume Committee in voluntary registration of Japanese. All, including Morii, gave their services voluntarily.

This same sub-committee again assisted the Hume Committee in the winter of 1942, when all male

Japanese, from eighteen to forty-five years of age, were ordered to be evacuated from the coastal area. It had other sub-committees scattered over the coast; and on Vancouver Island, and secured the co-operation of the Japanese Nationals to go to the work camps. This involved a great deal of work, and the evidence indicates that Morii took a leading part in all the efforts of this sub-committee.

In regard to the work of the Liaison Committee headed by Morii, Mr. Mead says that its work was of assistance to the British Columbia Security Commission in bringing the Japanese into Vancouver; that it had a great deal to do with organizing the local communities of Japanese so that they could be transported efficiently; and Mr. Mead added:

"We would never have got these people off the coast as smoothly as we did, and as quietly as we did, if it had not been for the work of the Liaison Committee."

There is no satisfactory evidence before me that this Liaison Committee was in any way responsible for the difficulties that arose in connection with the evacuation. Their work was considered very helpful by the British Columbia Security Commission, so much so that when the members of the Liaison Committee heard of the rumors against Morii and their own work, they offered to withdraw on several occasions, as they felt they might be an embarrassment to the British Columbia Security Commission. They were asked to continue because of their usefulness, and, as Mr. Mead says:

"They were realists and had a better appreciation

of the situation than the youngsters who were resisting the Commission."

The Chairman, Mr. Taylor, says the Liaison Committee was definitely of assistance in the evacuation.

Eventually, about May 7th, because of the annoyance caused by the rumors regarding the Liaison Committee and Morii, and the disputes that had arisen among the Japanese, the British Columbia Security Commission ceased to recognize any of the Japanese Associations. The Liaison Committee apparently continued to do what it could to help in the work among the Japanese (without formal recognition) until the members thereof were evacuated on May 28th.

It is to be noted also that at the time of the Second Victory Loan, Morii was chosen to be Chairman of the campaign, and his group secured subscriptions in excess of \$360,000.00. Morii himself contributed a substantial amount.

Two further points might be mentioned in Morii's favour. Sergeant Barnes stated that Morii told him that the Naturalized Japanese and Nisei wanted to show their loyalty to Canada by raising a Labor Battalion; and that Morii also secured eighteen hundred Japanese volunteers to go to the Road Camps set up by the Department of Labour before the general evacuation order came into effect.

The evidence of the officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police was that they did not consider that there was sufficient evidence to warrant a recommendation for internment, even with the knowledge of his speech of October, 1939, and of his alleged association with the Sokokukai (the Sokoku magazine was banned from Canada in 1940).

Having given the information which was placed before me at the inquiry and which might be useful in considering the advisability of Morii's internment, I feel that I should go no further in regard thereto, but leave the matter to those charged with the administration of the Defence of Canada Regulations.

Senator Farris said he did not consider Morii's speech subversive in itself, but he urged very strongly that I should make a recommendation that careful study should be given to this question, and that investigations be continued to determine whether Morii was guilty of any subversive activity.

In view of Morii's expressed devotion to Japan at the time of the Sino-Japanese war, and his frequent references to Japan as "Our Empire", I concur in that suggestion, and recommend that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police be instructed to pursue the investigation in whatever direction evidence may be obtained, if, in fact, such has not already been done.

PART V.

38. CHARGES OF COMPLACENCY
AGAINST THE AUTHORITIES

In Exhibit 1, the issue of the News Herald of September 26th, it is stated:

"Last Spring, Canadian-born and naturalized Japanese supplied to the Canadian Government, through the proper authorities, both directly and through a group of white citizens, a brief on Etsuji Morii, which to date has been completely ignored.....All the foregoing information was at the disposal of the authorities, drawn up by Japanese of Canadian birth or naturalization, and given to these various authorities by them, and by a white committee of highly responsible character, including ministers and teachers. Yet no action has been taken on Morii. No reply from Ottawa has been received by the white committee.....Why was the brief of these Canadian Japanese and the letters of the white committee pertinent thereto ignored by the officials at Ottawa? These are questions which the Canadian-born Japanese say should be answered"

In Exhibit 2 - the editorial in the News Herald of the same date, there appears the following:

"BLACK DRAGON IN B.C.

"Elsewhere in this paper the News Herald prints serious allegations of Fascist-like activities among some Japanese residents here. The accusations, which are made by highly responsible groups

of Canadian-born Japanese, and by 'white' groups with knowledge of the facts, would be serious enough on their own account.

"But even more serious is the accusation that those implicated in the activities of an off-shoot of the notorious Black Dragon Society, have been given special privileges and allowed freedom until the recent past.

"The facts speak for themselves. This paper believes that there should be a public enquiry, not only into the whole background of Black Dragon activities in B.C., but into the reason for official Canadian complacency towards it - especially when that complacency is not shared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the United States."

These statements and questions constitute very grave charges against those charged with the security of the State and the Commission appointed to deal with the evacuation of the Japanese - the British Columbia Security Commission. In his examination, the Editor of the News Herald, Mr. Philpott, made it clear that in his opinion Horii had influence and power with both the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the British Columbia Security Commission, and that he had a great deal to say as to who would be evacuated, at what time, and the point to which Japanese would be evacuated.

All the evidence before me indicates, as I have previously pointed out, that the British Columbia Security Commission, which alone had to do with the

matter of evacuation, was at no time influenced by Morii or any of his associates, and that the Commission's own officials made all the decisions in his regard. Further, there is no evidence that Morii or any of his associates endeavoured to influence the Commission in any way. The duties of the Liaison Committee were confined to assisting the Commission by co-operation among the Japanese.

As I have previously pointed out, the so-called Japanese brief was never submitted to anyone except the Consultative Council, and the authorities had no knowledge of it before this Inquiry.

The charges of complacency against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police must now be considered.

Counsel for the News Herald, in his argument, strongly urged his view that the evidence showed that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police had been complacent, in spite of the rumors that had been circulating about Morii; that their long experience with him had closed their eyes to anything that might seem to be against him; that while they knew of the reports being circulated about his bad character and that he was operating rackets in connection with the evacuation, they were so satisfied that they could not be true they were unwilling to make any proper investigation as to the truth or falsity of these rumors, and in fact did not do so. Further, it was argued that an investigation of the rumors and reports at that time might have secured concrete proof of the truth of the reports, whereas once the Japanese evacuation was complete, it was impossible to secure the evidence, and

it was not to be expected the Japanese now in evacuation centres would speak against their own countryman in war time.

I should at once point out that the charges of complacency against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are not of a general nature; that is, there is no complaint that they were in any way careless or negligent in connection with the general Japanese problem in British Columbia.

The evidence discloses that immediately after December 7th, certain Japanese suspected of being subversive were immediately interned, and other preventive measures at once undertaken.

No suggestion is made that the Force neglected to take any precautions necessary in the public interest, or to secure the safety of the state, except in regard to this one man - Etsuji Morii. It should be indicated also that the only interest the police had in the evacuation was to assist the British Columbia Security Commission by carrying out its instructions, chiefly when difficulty arose through disobedience to its orders.

Counsel for the News Herald, in his argument, did not urge very strongly that Morii had in fact influenced the course of the evacuation, but that his appointment as Chairman of the Liaison Committee gave him an opportunity to assert his influence and authority among his fellow-Japanese, leaving open the possibility of abuse; and that it created antagonism between the Japanese in the community and the Commission - and tended to interfere with the co-operation which was being

sought. The charges of the News Herald, however, are of a far more serious nature in that they charge the authorities with giving special privileges and extended freedom, with disregard for information received, and official complacency.

The Commanding Officer of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police at Vancouver is Colonel Hill, who has been in the Force since 1908; he took command at Vancouver in 1938, and has been in charge since then, except for the period November 1939 to April 1941, when he was serving overseas.

Detective-Sergeant Barnes, who has charge of the Intelligence Section for British Columbia, has been in the Force for twenty-three years, and has been stationed in British Columbia since 1936.

I have already referred to Assistant Commissioner Mead, under the heading "MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COLUMBIA SECURITY COMMISSION."

All these men have had lengthy experience in police matters, and Commissioner Mead particularly has a special knowledge of work among the Japanese, as indicated by his appointment to the Sparling and Hume Committees, and the British Columbia Security Commission. It may be assumed from their positions in the Force that they have the confidence of their superiors as competent officers, capable of carrying out their duties in an efficient manner, and quite in accord with the high standards of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

It must be kept in mind that Morii had nothing to do with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in

connection with evacuation. The letter of recognition to himself and the other two members of the Liaison Committee was from the British Columbia Security Commission. There is no evidence that he had any contacts with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police during the course of the evacuation by the British Columbia Security Commission, except possibly when he was interrogated as to the rumors circulated about him at that time. At the same time there is no question as to his recognition having been brought about by Mr. Head, who was not only an Assistant Commissioner in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, but also a Commissioner of the British Columbia Security Commission.

It seems very clear to me that no charge of complacency can be levelled against either the Royal Canadian Mounted Police or the British Columbia Security Commission for the recognition of Morii as a member of the Liaison Committee on March 9th, 1942. At that time Mr. Head had had ample proof of his trustworthiness and ability and willingness to co-operate, for the reasons which I have previously mentioned, and will not here repeat. All witnesses who gave evidence on this point agreed that he was among the most influential men in the Japanese community; he had never been paid for any of his services to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and was never actually in their employ. Up to March 4th, 1942, no complaints as to his bad character had been received by any of the officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. As far as they know, he was highly regarded among his compatriots.

It was not until after the general order for evacuation was issued, and it became apparent that Japanese

families would be broken up, that complaints were first heard. By this time the Liaison Committee was functioning - it had appointed the Wartime Security Commission, consisting of about one hundred and twenty-five to one hundred and fifty members throughout the Province, and the plans for carrying out the evacuation by the British Columbia Security Commission "forthwith" (in accordance with the orders) were under way. It was towards the end of March at the earliest when serious complaints were made. Efforts were made by the British Columbia Security Commission, as stated by Mr. Mead, to have the Nisei - who were the men most opposed to Morii - form their own committee to work with the British Columbia Security Commission, but there was no success with that committee, and in the result, after consideration, the Commission decided to abolish all Japanese committees in the early part of May, due to the friction that had arisen. Thereafter, the Liaison Committee was not officially recognized by the British Columbia Security Commission in any way.

Within about five weeks of the first complaints, therefore, the British Columbia Security Commission cancelled its recognition of the Liaison Committee. I think it cannot be suggested that the Commission could, or should, have acted at an earlier date without seriously disrupting the work of the evacuation.

Sergeant Barnes said that in his opinion had it not been for the assistance of Morii and his influence among the Japanese it might have been necessary to ask the military authorities to take a hand in the evacuation. It is to be remembered, also, that when the Commission did cancel the recognition of the Japanese committees, it was

not because the Liaison Committee had been proven a hindrance to the evacuation, but merely that all Japanese committees might be treated alike, and to remove any vestige of suspicion that had arisen because of the rumors circulating. That they wanted the assistance of the Liaison Committee is shown by the request that the latter continue its work when its members asked to be allowed to resign. As early as April 6th, Mr. Taylor had given the assurance to Yasuura (Exhibit 13), who had asked proof that Morii should not be the controlling power in the evacuation.

There is ample evidence, also, that the members of the Commission were ready at all times to consider any well founded complaints as to Morii (although, perhaps, not to those complaints based solely on rumors and suspicion) and devoted considerable time to such complaints. Some of these complaints were made through Mr. Grant McNeil, M.P.P., who was Honorary Secretary of the British Columbia Security Commission from its inception to May, 1942. I attach a great deal of importance to his evidence. Such complaints as came to his attention, and were of any importance, were passed on to the members of the Commission. He said that while there were complaints, the evidence was of a very flimsy nature; that they were all made by the Nisei, and that these complaints were made partially to advance their own interests, their grievances being that they thought they should not be evacuated, or that they should not be separated from their families. These statements by Mr. McNeil clearly indicate the source of the complaints, that they were made at the end of March or early in April, that they were made by the Nisei,

(some of whose members later caused the disturbance which subsequently led to their internment because of the opposition to the orders of the British Columbia Security Commission) and that the opposition to Morii was used as an aid to their objection to evacuation.

Next, I must consider the attitude of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in connection with the brief of the Consultative Council, and the rumors spread as to Morii's bad character and alleged connection with the Sokokukai and the Black Dragon. The police at all times had a knowledge of Morii's conviction on a charge of manslaughter, and that he was reputed to be interested in a gambling club, but they did not consider that these facts were of a nature which made it unwise for them to make use of his services in the way they were used. With that opinion I agree. In dealing with foreign groups, particularly in war time, it is necessary to use such material as is available, and has been proven to be effective.

It is important to observe also the nature of the duties which Morii carried out, after his recognition by the British Columbia Security Commission on March 9th, and which I have previously outlined. It was purely as an aid to the evacuation, and to facilitate its progress. He was doing no work for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, so far as has been shown. He was not a secret agent, or contact for the police; he was not required to spy on his compatriots, or asked to report on their loyalties, or, in fact, do anything where it was essential that his loyalty to Canada should be first established.

As Exhibit 21 shows, he was recognized as a member of the Liaison Committee to discuss problems or complaints arising in the evacuation, and nothing more. Had he been employed as a secret agent to operate among the Japanese, it would have been essential to have positive proof that he was completely loyal to Canada.

There is ample evidence to show that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police investigated the reports as to his operation of rackets among his fellow Japanese. For four years he had been appointed to the Committee of the Canadian Japanese Association, having to do with relief work. Nakamyma was the Treasurer of the relief fund being collected, and his statement was produced to the police by Morii, showing that instead of profiting by the fund, the latter had himself contributed substantial amounts. Had the police gone to the Treasurer, Mr. Nakamyma, they would undoubtedly have got the same statement as Morii produced, and as shown by Nakamyma's accounts. Constable Davidson, who heard of these complaints, endeavoured at the time to run down the rumors, but could get no evidence as to the identity of any persons who said they had paid money for any improper purpose. It was all hearsay. He told his informants that if they would produce the evidence he would have Morii arrested.

On April 15th, 1942, Mr. Mead directed Sergeant Barnes to investigate the rumors regarding Exhibit 6 - the Sokoku magazine of September, 1939, and Morii's connection with Kita. The latter investigated the circumstances under which the photograph of Morii and Kita

were taken. He had already known of some of the circumstances from Flight-Lieutenant Henry, a former officer of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police - who, while in the employ of the Immigration officials, was on the boat which brought Kita to Vancouver, when he had introduced Kita to Morii after the former expressed a desire to meet Morii. Sergeant Barnes made his report to Mr. Meai. Apparently he was satisfied from his investigation that there was no evidence of any connection between the Sökokuikai and the Black Dragon, or that either organization existed in British Columbia. He investigated Kita's visit through Morii and certain secret agents operating among the Japanese, and found that Kita had addressed a meeting held by the Canadian Japanese Association. Sergeant Barnes had already known of the strong Japanese nationalism expressed in the Sokoku magazine, and shortly after its publication recommended that it be banned in Canada, and this was done in 1940.

About May 2nd Sergeant Barnes received a translation of Morii's speech, as contained in Exhibit 9. This was a copy sent by Mr. Norman with the Consultative Council brief (Exhibit 10). He considered it carefully, and came to the conclusion that as it had been given in 1939, two years before we were at war with Japan, and as it contained nothing to do with British-Japanese relations, that he could not recommend Morii's internment on the basis of this article, and so reported.

The witness Sato also brought in a copy of Exhibit 9 to Special Constable Upton, in July 1942 (after Morii's evacuation). Constable Upton made a new translation of the speech for checking purposes. He

states that he also had previously made a thorough investigation of the article, but on this occasion he made the usual report to Ottawa and arranged an interview for Mr. Sato with Commanding Officer Colonel Hill. Constable Upton found no trace of the Black Dragon or the Sokokukai in Canada.

Colonel Hill also investigated Morii's speech, and came to the same conclusion as Sergeant Barnes. He said that his Department had been in touch with the Japanese situation for many years, and that he was satisfied that the Sokokukai did not exist in Canada, and therefore there was no necessity for recommending that it be banned.

Sergeant Barnes also discussed with Mr. McNeil the complaints the latter had heard regarding Morii.

The Consultative Council brief also referred to one man who had entered Canada illegally, and was said to have been aided by Morii. This refers to Higo, whose case has already been mentioned, and whose status was under investigation by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in April, 1941.

Considering all the evidence as to the investigation of any well founded complaints against Morii, I have come to the definite conclusion that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police were not guilty of any complacency in this regard. They had full knowledge of the various complaints, originating almost entirely from the Nisei (but in part from naturalized Japanese associated with them) and that they were linked up with the desires of the Nisei, who wished to avoid evacuation. They knew that many of the Nisei were of the opinion that Morii had not sufficiently stressed their views before

the Commission, and what they considered their rights as Canadian citizens, and that they thought he was too co-operative with the police. In spite of this knowledge, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police devoted a very considerable portion of their time in interviews and investigations, and found, as I have found on the evidence before me, that practically without exception the rumors and reports were totally unfounded.

I find also that their previous association with Moril did not in any sense blind them in their investigations, or create any improper or unwarranted prejudice in his favour. They acted throughout in the interests of the evacuation, and I believe co-operated to the full with the British Columbia Security Commission.

The articles in the News Herald also suggest that the authorities at Ottawa took no action in regard to the brief of the Consultative Council. With this suggestion I cannot agree. It is shown that their letter was acknowledged, and that subsequently the officials of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police at Vancouver made investigations, as I have previously pointed out, and that the members of the Consultative Council interviewed Mr. Mead, of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and Mr. Taylor, of the British Columbia Security Commission, in regard to the allegations in the brief.

PART VI - GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Heretofore in this report, and as directed by my Commission, I have endeavoured to deal with the allegations, statements, charges and questions referred to in the issues of the News Herald. I feel that I should also set forth briefly certain general conclusions which I have arrived at after considering the evidence as a whole.

#39. THE ORIGIN OF THE OPPOSITION TO THE COMMITTEE

It is quite clear that the Japanese born in Canada, and some of those who had been naturalized here, were shocked upon finding that they, as well as the Japanese Nationals, were to be evacuated from the coastal area, and that in the original plan many of the men would be separated from their families. They were doubtless aware that this placed them in a category different from the Canadian-born children of Germans and Italians. It is probable that a considerable number of the Nisei considered that their sole loyalty was to Canada, and that they should not be given the same treatment as the Japanese Nationals. It is highly probable also that they placed the blame for these actions on the one Japanese Committee that had been set up in connection with the evacuation - the Liaison Committee, assuming, quite incorrectly, that this body acted in an advisory capacity and made recommendations on policy to the British Columbia Security Commission; or that in any event, as representatives of the Japanese people, the Liaison Committee should have advised the British Columbia Security Commission to treat the Canadian Japanese in a

manner different from the Nationals. They knew that there were no representatives of the Nisei on the Committee, and probably concluded that their own special interests were not being looked after. (Dr. Ishawara, a Nisei, had apparently declined to act on the Liaison Committee, and although Nishiguchi endeavoured to secure another member of the Nisei in his place, he was unsuccessful.) The evidence shows that the Nisei naturalized Canadian Japanese Association and the Japanese Canadian Citizens League felt that the approach to the Japanese people by the British Columbia Security Commission should have been through their organizations rather than through the Liaison Committee. These groups, however, could not secure co-operation among themselves - as stated by Mr. Mead - and eventually the Nisei Mass Evacuation Group was formed by those who were determined to carry their objections to the point of resisting the evacuation.

In order, therefore, to accomplish their purposes and eliminate what they considered to be the great influence of the Liaison Committee, they commenced circulating rumors as to its activities. The attacks were against the work of the whole committee, but no personal charges were levelled against Nishiguchi and Nichio. (Both these men gave their evidence before me in a frank and straightforward manner, and I was satisfied throughout that they were telling the truth). But certain things were known about Morii which made it possible to attack him in a personal way, - his conviction of manslaughter and his connection with the Showa Club. Rumors of all sorts were spread as to his methods in forming the Liaison Committee and the Wartime Security Committee, and as to his character and behaviour, a summary

of which will be found in Exhibit 17, and practically none of which was established before me. They are, in the main, gross exaggerations, misrepresentations, or were completely false. It is not surprising, therefore, that as a result those who heard those rumors had a "fear" of Morii, based, not on anything they know he had done, but because of the rumors about him.

The evidence of Assistant Commissioner Shirras, of the British Columbia Police, indicates that the Japanese people are "susceptible to suspicion and subject to rumor," especially when worried; and that this is so is definitely established in this case. Mr. Shirras has visited practically all of the Japanese settlements since the evacuation, and knows of no case where there was any direct complaint made to him regarding Morii.

It is probably quite true, also, that the Nisei would have liked to terminate Morii's influence in the community. He was a Buddhist - many of them were Christians. He had no regular occupation, and was connected with an alleged gambling organization, and in the view of the Nisei these facts made him a "bad man."

#40. THE EFFORTS OF THE
CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL

The Nisei received a good deal of sympathy from the members of the Consultative Council, and this was quite natural and proper under the circumstances. I am satisfied that this group was not in sympathy with the general evacuation of all Japanese, and felt that the Nisei, with whom their main contacts had been, should have been given preferential treatment, and possibly exempted from the general order. But it is also clear to me that

(d) His willingness to accept "hearsay" as direct evidence, as shown at the hearing, when he expressed his opinion that hearsay evidence should not be rejected.

(e) His conclusion after reading Morii's speech of October, 1939, that he was the leader of the Japanese Fifth Column in Canada. This statement is made in Exhibit 10.

I am satisfied also that the charges in the News Herald were brought about in the main because of information supplied to it by the Consultative Council, or at any rate by some of its members. Ward secured the "briefs" through Mr. Norman, and was in contact with him, as was Dinsmore. The first article (Exhibit 1) was approved by one of the members of the Consultative Council as being "substantially correct."

I am unable to determine from the evidence the reason for the continued attack on Morii by the Consultative Council, after he had been evacuated for over four months, unless it was in expectation of scouring some benefit for the group in which they had a special interest - the Nisei. This is rather clearly indicated in the concluding sentence of Exhibit 1 - "These are the questions which the Canadian-born Japanese say should be answered."

#41. THE NEWS HERALD

It is undoubtedly the right of a newspaper to criticize the policies of governmental authorities, even in war time. But I do question the advisability of a newspaper making statements of a nature which would

undoubtedly tend to alarm the public during the war, and to discredit governmental bodies charged with the safety of the state, when such statements are without foundation, and the truth or falsity of which could be readily ascertained by competent reporters from those in possession of the facts. This is particularly the case where no public benefit could result from such publication, but rather the reverse. (It is to be recalled that Morii was evacuated to a self-supporting scheme on May 28th, 1942, and that the articles in the News Herald were in its issues of September 26th and October 9th, 1942, by which time the evacuation was nearing completion.)

Most of the charges in Exhibit I are based on the "briefs" and many are quotations therefrom, but this does not apply to a number of the charges in Exhibit 3, which are statements rather than reports. The existence of the Sokokukai in British Columbia and its connection with the Black Dragon Society, which were previously mentioned as reports, are here stated as facts. This article is not only an attack on Morii (which, while important from his point of view, would not be of very great general interest) but constitutes a very definite attack on the manner in which the British Columbia Security Commission was conducting the evacuation, and on the vigilance of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in protecting the public interest.

As I have previously indicated, these attacks are quite unwarranted. A brief interview with any of the Commissioners of the British Columbia Security Commission would have shown that Morii had had nothing to do with Tashme Camp, or its administration, at any time, and that Morii had not been in Vancouver since his

evacuation. The author of this article, however, preferred to secure his information from members of the Nisei Mass Evacuation Group, which so far as the evidence shows, was the one group that resisted the evacuation.

In general, the articles constituted a demand for Morii's internment. No one can question the right of a newspaper to make such a demand on proper and substantiated grounds. But here it is clear that the demand was based on the wishes of a particular group (the Nisei, which obviously had a special interest in attacking Morii) and those supporting them (the Consultative Council); and that some of the Nisei were those who caused the difficulties encountered in the evacuation. The attitude, therefore, of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in failing to intern Morii merely because of a demand from a very limited number of people, seems to me to be an indication that they had a proper regard for the rights of Canadian citizens, including those who had become citizens by reason of naturalization.

Mr. Philpott stated that after the publication of the first article he was not approached by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. I do not feel, however, that he should have any complaint to make in this regard. In his editorial of the same date he requested a public inquiry. In addition, it was undoubtedly clear to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police that his charges were based mainly on the Consultative Council brief and the complaints of the Nisei, which they had investigated some months before.

#42. S U M M A R Y

Summarizing in brief form the conclusions at which I have arrived, I beg to report as follows:

(1) The answers to the charges against Morii may be found in the various paragraphs of Part III, under the heading "Complaints against Morii." On the evidence, I have found them unfounded, except in regard to Morii's conviction on a charge of Manslaughter, his association with a reputed gambling club, and his assault on Shogi.

It will be noted that my conclusions throughout are stated to be "on the evidence." I should observe that I found it somewhat difficult to determine the actual character of Morii. His evidence was given through an interpreter, and for that reason I was somewhat handicapped in being unable to judge his reaction to questions submitted to him, or to form any satisfactory impression from his demeanour in the witness box. In addition, there may well be other individuals in the Japanese community who could throw more light on the charges against Morii. However, all witnesses were called who, in the opinion of either Counsel, were known to have any information which would be of assistance in the inquiry.

(2) In answer to the question - "Why is Morii not interned?" - I have submitted the material evidence in Part IV hereof. I have also concurred in the suggestion of Counsel for the News Herald in recommending that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police should be instructed to continue its investigations in whatever direction evidence may be obtained.

(3) I find that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have not been guilty of any complacency in regard to Etsuji Morii; and that Commissioner Mead was thoroughly justified in approving of his appointment as a member of

the Liaison Committee. I find also that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and its officers gave material assistance to the British Columbia Security Commission in carrying out the evacuation; and that, throughout, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in regard to this matter have been vigilant and efficient, and have lived up to the high standards which the Canadian public expects of that force.

(4) I find that the British Columbia Security Commission was not at any time influenced in the conduct of the evacuation by Moril or any of his associates, but that they received from him and from the other members of the Liaison Committee very valuable assistance in facilitating and expediting the evacuation.

I might add also that while the inquiry regarding the British Columbia Security Commission had to do only with its relations to Moril, that sufficient evidence was produced from many quarters to establish that through its Commissioners and Officers it had undertaken, and practically completed, a very difficult task in a most efficient and humane manner.

Before concluding my report, I desire to express my thanks to Counsel for their very great help in the preparation and presentation of the evidence, as well as to all others who assisted materially at the inquiry.

(sgd.) J. Chas. A. Cameron

COMMISSIONER

I N D E X

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1. News Herald, front page, September 26, 1942.
 2. News Herald, fourth page, September 26, 1942.
 3. News Herald, first page, October 9, 1942.
 4. Order in Council #1665, establishing British Columbia Security Commission, March 4, 1942.
 5. Order in Council #1666, appointing members of British Columbia Security Commission, March 4, 1942.
 6. Sokoku Magazine, September 1939.
 7. News Herald editorial on Royal Canadian Mounted Police, January 12, 1942.
 8. Notice by Minister of Justice re evacuation, February 26, 1942.
 9. Sokoku Magazine, December 1939.
 10. Brief of Consultative Council.
 11. Translation of Circular Letter of Wartime Security Commission, March 1942.
 12. Letter from Murphy and Murphy, dated March 30, 1942, with plan attached.
 13. Resolution and Mr. Taylor's letter of April 6, 1942.
 14. Minutes of meeting, April 7, 1942.
 15. Letter from Mr. McPherson to Commissioner, November 2, 1942.
 16. Letter from Canadian Junior College re Yamosoto, November 7, 1942.
 17. Japanese brief - undated.
 18. Nakamyma's statement of Receipts and Disbursements.
 19. Copy of receipt for rent to Tateishi.
 20. Map of Coastal area evacuated.
 21. Letter of Mr. Taylor, March 9, 1942, recognizing members of Liaison Committee.
 22. Typewritten copy of membership of Working Committee #145.
 23. Notice of B.C. Security Commission re Japanese males, March 25, 1942.

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24. Telegram from Ono, dated April 10, 1942.
 25. Smith's letter to B.C. Security Commission, dated April 17, 1942.
 26. Reply from B.C. Security Commission to Smith, April 23, 1942.
 27. Letter of Shoyama, November 12, 1942.
 28. Pamphlets distributed by Nisei Mass Evacuation Group.
 29. Translation of Canadian Daily News, July 12, 1942.
 30. Upton's comment on Patrons of Sokoku Magazine.
 31. B.C. Security Commission Work Sheet Form.
 32. Royal Canadian Mounted Police Notice,
 33. Large form of Work Sheet used by B.C. Security Commission.
 34. Translation of Articles in Exhibits 6.
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