

September 30, 1994

An Essay Commissioned by the
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples,
Ottawa, Canada

THEM ESKIMO MOB:

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF NUNAVUT

Revised 2nd. edition

BY PETER JULL

*And, as imagination bodes forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.*
(MIDSUMMER NIGHT'S DREAM - V, i, 14-17)

During the writing of this essay I visited Alice Springs in the central red deserts of Australia. Aboriginal people there were meeting to discuss the possibility of self-government, and how to achieve it. The Canadian Inuit leader, Rosemarie Kuptana, had mentioned me to the local people as a possible resource person during a holiday visit she had made to the area not long before. Some of them had also read a booklet I had written on Nunavut for outback Australian readers. So, the Aborigines present were all, in one way or other, aware of Nunavut. During the discussions one enthusiastic promoter of self-government present shouted to one of the more timid souls, "Come on, sis! Them Eskimo mob have done it!"

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Them Eskimo Mob:
International Implications of Nunavut
C Revised 2nd Edition C
BY PETER JULL

Despite some controversy and much misinformation between indigenous groups in Canada on the subject of Nunavut, it is a model which has tremendous inspirational power abroad.

The reasons for that are primarily that a country dominated by European settlers is handing back control of a huge territory full of natural resources to a very small number of indigenous people living there. Many of the details of the Nunavut claims settlement and territorial government now being implemented provide further interest abroad, notably:

- the re-empowerment of a hunter-gatherer and community service economy without a strong economic base aside from government transfer payments;
- Inuit co-management with the national government of resources, development, and environment through unique statutory bodies for the entire Nunavut area on-shore and off-shore (i.e., not just for those lands selected for full Inuit ownership);
- the transformation and domestication of one of the most sparsely inhabited and harshest environments on earth C a vast snowy blank to most people C into a modern settled organised place with the usual apparatus, large and small, of contemporary life;
- the primacy of traditional renewable resource values and environmental protection in a region hitherto widely imagined as having value only as a reservoir of industrial resources;
- Inuit rights and roles in coastal and marine areas;
- an indigenous people who seem to have concentrated on cooperation, generosity, and goodwill in their political public relations instead of angry grievances; and
- a non-European people with non-Indo-European language being formally recognised as a major political constituent of one of the world's G-7 nation-states.

Nunavut, and the various other indigenous ethno-regions now growing from the grass roots, are important to Canadians because they prove that

- our constitutional traditions and society are healthy even now, capable of new growth and renewal;
- we are not all nasty backbiting racists, incapable of embracing other traditions whether Inuit or Québécois, Dene or Acadian;
- we can find social/political consensus while solving the great problems of the

emerging new world, i.e., environmental management, resource rights, cross-cultural relations, and a pragmatic mix of state and private initiative; and

- we are world-class in terms of ideas and social policy for export, nowhere more evident than in the Inuit developments at home and in Circumpolar relations, if we would only have the courage to take a little pride in our achievements.

That is the big picture, but an accurate one. More specifically, Nunavut is the foremost symbol of a great change taking place across Canada. While Canadians and their governments at home have been generally slow to realise its importance, and its wider implications, interested persons and groups in countries overseas have not. Nunavut has three principal implications in international context:

- it communicates a new political order, a new Canada which embraces indigenous peoples and their homelands as well as a society of European peoples who have provided the majority of settlers in recent centuries, implicitly calling on the rest of the world to adopt similar policies towards indigenous peoples;
- it embodies a new sort of dispersed and environmentally sensitive national development in countries which had previously accepted a concentrated, urban-centred, industrial model of identity in which hinterlands were seen largely as industrial resources or picturesque holdovers of a European farming/fishing past; and
- it is one of a new category of cultures and societies emerging as political realities which will soon make up the greater part of Canada's territory and which has counterparts in many other countries (e.g., the circumpolar countries and Australia) in each of which non-European culture and values merge with international technology and perspectives to create a distinct new regional society.

These three facts have been almost totally ignored by governments, authors, researchers, and the world community who have generally seen only the specifics of individual cases. Yet they may be the most significant new facts of life in modern Canada!

It is desirable that the Nunavut message be more widely communicated abroad. A program of speakers, both indigenous leaders and expert staff/advisers, should be available for that purpose, equipped with video or written information. This could be a pilot project for a more general Indigenous Canadian Nation-Builders Program to take those creating and re-creating a new Canada C and new indigenous Canada in the process C to other lands where their inspiration and information are urgently needed. Such places might immediately include Australia, Alaska, and Scandinavia, with advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs on prospects and sensitivities for visits to Latin America and Africa.

An indigenous marine international network is urgently needed, and given the leadership of Inuit on this matter to date, and appointment of Mary Simon as Circumpolar Ambassador for Canada, timing and personnel are perfect for such an initiative.

Specific questions of a *de facto* or future international nature may be raised by Quebec secession from Canada.

1. Could Nunavut with its much greater population, 3-4 times that of Nunavik (the Inuit North of Quebec), be a provider of Inuit services to Quebec Inuit?

2. Could Nunavut federate with Nunavik and Inuit North Labrador for some or all public services, even if Nunavik remained part of a sovereign independent Quebec? An interesting proposal for such a Sami federation among the Scandinavian countries has been elaborated by the late A. Grahl-Madsen (1986; 1988).
3. Could a Greater Nunavut, a concept sometimes aired by Inuit leaders in both Nunavut and Nunavik, be created as a new territory or province out of North Labrador, Nunavik, and Nunavut in a post-Quebec crisis Canadian constitution?

If Quebec leaves the Canadian federation, or is persuaded to stay, that will not occur without major constitutional bargaining on a new division of powers (and boundaries?) among all regions of Canada. At that moment all possibilities which may have seemed unthinkable in the past become thinkable. The shocking neglect of North Labrador by federal and provincial governments to date is the most damning disproof of Canadian indigenous rectitude and invites radical solutions, in any case.

In any case, the Quebec Inuit determination to remain part of Canada and the equally determined view in the current Quebec government that Nunavik will go, will require inspired handling. In 1751 the Crowns of Denmark-Norway and Sweden ended a war with a boundary commission in Sami territory which based new national boundaries on indigenous use and occupancy, on indigenous customs and preferences, and on mutual non-belligerence and on exempting the indigenous people from any military service which might pit them against each other. A very civilised solution, surely, and one which *in its spirit* if not its details recommends itself to Canadians today.

Whereas indigenous leaders in some other parts of the world seem to wait for official non-indigenous bodies to bestow political and constitutional change on them., e.g., in Scandinavia, the Inuit of Nunavut had to create everything themselves. They had no agreed territorial boundaries. They had no political or legal bodies. They had no recent social links among scattered regions. They had no power or funds. They had to create everything themselves from nothing. They had only their ethno-national identity and their determination to succeed. They have succeeded. *That* is the real international implication of Nunavut.

The best thing Canada can do to realise or fulfil the international implications of Nunavut is to make sure that in terms of funding and political priority, Nunavut is given the earliest and best chance to succeed!

PREFACE to 2nd Edition

This is the second edition of a paper written in early 1993. When I wrote *Them Eskimo Mob* I had three things very much in mind.

1. There was a need for Inuit, other Canadian indigenous peoples, and their friends, as well as such other sympathetic readers as might be found in the public service and wider community, to have some feel for the real world of indigenous internationalism.
2. The exciting possibilities of Nunavut were often seen more clearly outside Canada than at home where its true value was sometimes lost in factional bickering within the indigenous movement.
3. Indigenous international work such as information-sharing and the practice of comparative studies could be both cheap and effective when well targeted, bringing important benefits to Canada's indigenous peoples and to indigenous peoples in need abroad, but this fact was not widely appreciated in Canada.

I therefore wrote something which might be readable and would convey some vivid impressions. An existential account was the most honest way to deal with the subject. Given the often misleading and bloodless accounts of indigenous internationalism otherwise available, I thought such a view long overdue. Both before and since I wrote that 1st draft I have been writing for Canadian and international audiences on Inuit political experience in Canada and can only sum up by saying that such experience is always received with great interest, and even enthusiasm.

Also, I have been fortunate to acquire some special recollections in the service of Inuit and have always felt an obligation to record these in some form for future Inuit use. The fact that Inuit organisations have been so casual about what little material is committed to paper, sometimes discarding whole cabinets full of files, will be a problem in future for those trying to recapture these most dynamic years in the realisation of Inuit political identity. At the time I wrote this there was, for instance, no available account of the crucial 1973 Arctic Peoples Conference in Copenhagen, although now that has been remedied with the appearance in 1993 of Inge Kleivan's account in a 1992 issue of *Études Inuit Studies* from Laval (Kleivan 1992).

It was not my intention here to write a typical academic journal piece. I wished to reach a wider and more general audience, for one thing. For many years I have written for indigenous peoples, for the publics they must inform to win their political battles, and for those who make policies with or without them. They are my intended audience here, as usual.

I should add that although I would like to propose policies and structures for Nunavut internationally, that is a matter for the Nunavut leaders and I would not do so without their direction or invitation.

PETER JULL, *Brisbane, January 1995.*

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Part I
Communicating Nunavut

We had to be united; we had to have the support of our people. Our struggle was long and difficult but it was worth it because it was the right thing to do.

JOHN AMAGOALIK, NUNAVUT LEADER SPEAKING TO ABORIGINES AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDERS IN DARWIN, AUSTRALIA, OCTOBER 1, 1992

NUNAVUT C THE THEME

The appeal of Nunavut is very simple. Seen by both other Canadians and those abroad it is this: a handful of Inuit whose full contact with modern industrial society is scarcely a generation old have organised some of the most forbidding and remote lands on earth into a cohesive new social and political entity, kept their ancient cultural values and social ideals which have now gained the respect of the wider world, and placed a new name on the map.

We must keep in mind that the question of Nunavut and its appeal or impact elsewhere is essentially about the views of outsiders. In other words, our *facts* here are actually impressions which may be more or less inaccurate but which are no less powerful for all that. Those outsiders will bring their own experiences and outlooks to the question. Aborigines in the central deserts of Australia may know nothing about seals or caribou C as I once found when struggling to make myself understood while lecturing on Nunavut under a tree in a dust-dry riverbed at +43EC in the Pitjantjatjara lands C but they certainly appreciate the importance of the political precedent and chuckle knowingly at the frustrations they have shared with Inuit in relation to the white man's local government schemes. Europeans may think that the idea of people forming a government in a huge land of snow and ice with a mere c. 20,000 people is comical. Torres Strait Islanders living on small rocky outcrops and coral cays may appreciate the new Nunavut marine management provisions while thinking it wrong to have less than 100% ownership of the Arctic islands.

The close-up view of Nunavut is sufficiently remarkable that reality and imaginings are not always greatly different. After all, the scattered Inuit people of a region of Arctic tundra, coasts and islands making up one fifth of the total area of Canada have used all possible political means for 20 years to secure a "land" claims settlement which includes marine areas and to create a new government for their territory, "our land" C *nunavut* in the Inuit language. This has been the Inuit reply to the post-war takeover of their communities and way of life by intrusive government run by outsiders and to industry and governments treating their lands and seas as industrial resources with scant regard for eco-systems vital for Inuit food and livelihoods. Furthermore, by securing their traditions on a grand scale through the putting of Nunavut on the map, they are also

paradoxically adopting in full the broader opportunities, political culture, and society of Canada through a federal constitutional system.

It may therefore be a sort of commentary on Canadians as a people that we have spent so much time complaining about what Nunavut is *not*, and does not do, and making unfavourable but meaningless comparisons between a vast sparsely populated Inuit territory and the socio-legal needs of Indian reserves.

NUNAVUT C THEME AND VARIATIONS

There are really four stories of Nunavut. The first and truest story is that of the Inuit themselves, together with their staff and advisers, their sympathisers and friends across Canada, and the many officials in federal and Northwest Territories (NWT) governments who have contributed over many years to bring the Nunavut project to fulfillment. This is a story of ideals and setbacks, discouragement and delay, hope and hard work, of sometimes cruel pressures C on individuals, their families and even their lives C and of happy times and sudden breakthroughs. It will be told by different people in different ways, and will become part of the folklore and official history of this newest addition to the Canadian federation.

The second story is that of Rumour, or Fame, that monstrous character described by Virgil in *The Aeneid*, which swiftly spread news of Nunavut, not always accurately, giving it the shape and aspect of a listener's predisposition or need. For instance, although Inuit leaders agreed in a meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau in June 1982 that Nunavut, being a bilateral federal-Inuit matter, need not be placed on the agenda of the first indigenous-government First Ministers Conference to take place the following spring, nevertheless the governmental delegations themselves, by their persistent questions and interest outside the conference, brought it up. Prime Minister Trudeau himself soon mentioned it in the FMCs, and Inuit leaders inevitably did, too. The Chairman of the Nunavut Constitutional Forum, who was also the NWT cabinet minister responsible for aboriginal rights and constitutional development, prepared an information paper for the FMCs as a report to help them appreciate the issue (Patterson 1984). The Alberta provincial government circulated a detailed briefing paper, having recruited one of the Nunavut team to prepare it (Jull 1984). Meanwhile, Nunavut was causing much wider ripples. Public inquiry panels, university departments, leading indigenous¹ institutions, world newsletters, and news media in other countries and on other continents were calling for information on Nunavut, and especially for speakers and articles. Overseas, students, experts, and cabinet ministers began to travel to Canada to learn more. On a far continent like Australia the story could appear suddenly and become a significant inspiration to indigenous people who sometimes found it hard to maintain hope against an entrenched hostile public opinion. And yet there were moments, e.g., in the dark days of mid-1985, when the international image of Nunavut had a dynamic life of its own while the real Nunavut at home seemed lost or defeated.

The third story was probably inevitable, but it has surprised and angered the people of Nunavut. This is the dog-in-the-manger version by which some outsiders, including some other indigenous peoples, some officials, and various perpetual malcontents, have tried to deride or trivialise Nunavut (see also the section below, "Negative Echoes"). Some of these are people who can never accept *any* indigenous proposal, either because it

¹ C The word "indigenous" is used throughout because it is the preferred international usage today and because in Australia it is preferred to the term "aboriginal" which is inevitably limited in people's minds to the Australian Aborigines.

lacks some details which the perfect Heaven should have, in their view, or because they do not really have confidence in indigenous people running anything. The Greenland Inuit premier warned us about these negative currents through an interview with this author in 1981, and talked of how his country had burst through such a period before the home rule referendum and had won the enthusiasm of doubters in the first 18 months of self-government (Motzfeldt, personal communication). The reality of which he spoke was a blow when it came to Nunavut, all the same. Happier were the bonuses of outside support as when Georges Erasmus and other Dene leaders in 1982 supported the vote for Nunavut in an NWT referendum, a show of solidarity for which Nunavut leader John Amagoalik strongly praised and thanked the Dene in his victory remarks that April night in Iqaluit and in his press statement the next day. Hostile witnesses are also found abroad. In Australia, where Nunavut became a sign of hope after news reports in late 1991, it could also appear as a great and threatening wrecker of nations (see below). This third story of Nunavut rarely appears in any coherent form, and is more like the broken babble of Arctic radio communications in bad weather.

The fourth story, and the least known, is found in the details, the policy changes, and small political shifts negotiated or otherwise accommodated through many years of intense work. This story, contained in documents like the Nunavut claims agreement, can be extremely important as precedent for others abroad. This author was in trouble with offices of Prime Minister and Premiers around Australia at the time of first writing because Canada Post, unlike Rumour, travels slowly, *mirabile dictu*, and a shipment of copies of the Nunavut agreement sent many months earlier had never arrived. In the emergence of indigenous self-government, land rights, and constitutional recognition around the world, it is noteworthy that the same arguments and fears are expressed over and over again by those who oppose the indigenous political renaissance. Detailed information on how problems were solved in Canada, how concerns were addressed, can be very helpful in quieting such opposition and obfuscation. It is typical of such resistance or of the temperament which gives rise to it that it is both literal-minded and convinced of its own uniqueness. Gentle evidence that such quibbles are, in fact, simply the same old tune, and that they, the quibblers themselves, are the last to know, helps make curmudgeons crumble.

THE NUNAVUT APPEAL

The greatest power of the Nunavut example lies in its generality rather than its detail. What has inspired or intrigued people abroad is the same as that which has appealed to those within Canada. In discussing this subject here it is taken for granted that persons viewing Nunavut are members of the general public rather than the citizens of Nunavut itself or those who have developed it from concept to reality. A quite different range of issues interests insiders, of course, though ones no more or less real than those seen by outsiders.

It is worth identifying the major perceptions which make up the fascination of Nunavut. They are:

- C a modern industrial state turning over a large part of its territory to a small and scattered hunter-gatherer population;
- C the transformation and domestication of one of the most sparsely inhabited and harshest environments on earth C a vast snowy blank to most people C into a modern settled organised place with the usual apparatus, large and small, of contemporary life;

- C an indigenous people who, despite lack of high educational attainment or developed industry base, are taking on the complex tasks of modern government;
- C the primacy of traditional renewable resource values and environmental protection in a region hitherto widely imagined as having value only as a reservoir of industrial resources;
- C an indigenous people who seem to have concentrated on cooperation, generosity, and goodwill in their political public relations instead of angry grievances; and
- C a non-European people with non-Indo-European language being formally recognised as a major political constituent of one of the world's G-7 nation-states.

For the informed few there may be other significant elements, but these main features are at the root of interest, both positive and negative, in the Nunavut story overseas. The Inuit, with their universally known symbols of the dome-shaped snow-house, the piled-rock *inuikshuk* with arms outspread like an Arctic scare-crow, and faces circled by the fur-trimmed parka hood, are one of the most-recognised (if least-known) people on earth. This is undoubtedly a background factor for the interest in Nunavut, too.

These perceptions require no discussion here. Furthermore, the Inuit have sometimes, tongue-in-cheek, allowed themselves to be presented by playful use of the *clichés* and misunderstandings of outsiders' perceptions, something which amuses them more than it arouses irritation about *political correctness*. The lack of knowledge on the part of outsiders has been, after all, one of their greatest defences, enabling them to survive the impact of the White Man², as has been their language, unknown to all but a handful of non-Inuit. In the public relations accompanying Inuit political work in recent decades, political work of which the ultimate goal of Nunavut has always been an integral part, Inuit have rarely felt themselves to be on the defensive, a luxury afforded them by their isolated location relative to white settlement. In the one-third of Canada which they inhabit they are the majority of the population in every community except the border towns of Goose Bay-Happy Valley, Labrador, and Inuvik, NWT. This may account for their relatively confident and good-natured presentation of themselves to others, but it has been a significant political asset, whatever its cause.

Nonetheless, Nunavut developed as a clear concept in the early 1970s, although the causes and motivation were older (Merritt *et al*, 1989). It developed when the North still seemed remote, exotic, alien, anomalous C a backwater of an affluent Canada. It developed with very little regard to the international world, although information about the Alaska claims settlement stirred people, and the American civil rights movement and British de-colonisation were important news items for those with access to mainstream news media. In federal and NWT government memos of the 1960s it was axiomatic that the major problems of the North and its people C and this to an extreme degree in the Nunavut area C were *physical* remoteness and *socio-cultural* remoteness from Southern Canada and the developed world.

² C The White Man is used as a figurative term for an historical social reality as experienced by indigenous peoples. Anyone who doubts its meaning need only ask at the nearest reserve or northern village. It is not used here as an old-fashioned term for "the Caucasian race" or "Canadians", but for the European settlement of North America in its historical aspect *vis-à-vis* indigenous peoples.

In the shortening, darkening days four weeks before Christmas, 1973, in the Northern city of Copenhagen, the international indigenous peoples movement was born. The birthplace was no litter of scorn but the imposing Christiansborg Palace, ringed by its ancient moats in the old city, a centre of power through centuries of medieval development and now the home of the *Folketing*, the people's assembly, or people's parliament, of Denmark. Outside, the nearby streets held some of the finest shops in Europe, overflowing with exquisite gifts. Street vendors by the walls of old churches were selling straw goats from the heathen past when Christmas was a time of animal and human sacrifices. Several *clochards* in full Christmas flush tried to win back shoppers' coins from a recent influx of American youth who had taken to playing pop music on the street, the old-timers now spiritedly playing old Danish tunes on mouth organs, something the young Californians could not match, of course. One of these street people C vast, ferocious, redbearded, and solitary C suddenly launched himself at a crowd drawn by a chattering salesman demonstrating some new kitchen gadget from a podium, bellowing him down and flailing a crutch at the crowd who were now fleeing in all directions with the salesman like the money-changers in the temple before Christ's fury. (Other days this personage was crutchless and calm, an apparent favourite of young office girls who would stand a few moments speaking up to his great height respectfully as he leaned against a wall here or there along the streets of the old inner city.) The slow-moving river of mink coats, mingled with students in Palestinian scarves and world-wide political badges, resumed as before, all equal in their bright faces and good cheer in the cold air along the network of "walking streets". Directly past the royal stables and across the little Marble Bridge from Christiansborg lay the old Museum, one of the oldest in the Western world, where any visitor would be struck by the extensive exhibits of the material culture of circumpolar peoples from all around the Northern world C Greenland, Canada, Alaska, and the Eurasian land mass C and been struck, too, by the tremendous similarities and shared elements (such as the typical shaman's drum) of those cultures.

Inside Christiansborg the Danish professionals were still trying to digest recent events. The Arab-Israeli war had erupted in October, with Denmark especially singled out for punishment by oil embargo after the Prime Minister had expressed one small nation's sympathy for the plight of another surrounded by enemies. These oil shocks would soon, as we now know, re-write contemporary economic history and socio-politics. Furthermore, there was the electoral revolt which had just seen a gleeful Danish buffoon sweep up nearly a third of the national vote in a mass protest against heavy taxation. Was this the end of the welfare state? Of the caring society? Of the world as we knew it? What was the future of the country and the comfortable old culture which Christiansborg had so long symbolised?

In another one of the vast pale chambers of the building some Inuit activists from Greenland, with the help of the International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs (or IWGIA, a pronounceable acronym in Dano-Norwegian) C a documentation and support group of Northern European social scientists based in Copenhagen C had brought together leaders of Yukon and Northwest Territories Inuit, Dene, Métis, and Inuvialuit, and Sami (the Lapps), as the Arctic Peoples Conference (now well reported in Kleivan 1992). Modern Denmark has always been good to fugitives and the oppressed, but the disproportion of the threatened herders and hunters of the Arctic rim occupying a largely empty palace in troubled times must seem ironic. Their purpose was to mull over and share experience, and to look ahead. The leaders of the several peoples seated around a circle made a discovery which would transform them from isolated minorities at the ends of the earth: they were not alone, after all! Bitter personal experience of being punished at school for speaking their own language, of arrogant white administrators in their villages, of the breezy dismissal of heartfelt recommendations by visiting official bodies, and of a lyrical love of land, seas and seasons C a love apparently unknown to the governments and engineers now busy preparing to pump out oil and gas, to lay airstrips, to frighten the caribou (reindeer) C united them all. The mutual astonishment and excitement as these people discovered each other was moving for a Canadian observer who, living in Copenhagen at the time, had chanced upon the meeting. Moving, too, to see familiar faces from the North and hear English spoken for the first time in many months.

The individuals present at this meeting did not simply leave matters hanging in the air. They went on to talk to their friends back home and generate enthusiasm in the growing aboriginal rights circles. In the mid-1970s it was plainly recognised, albeit largely forgotten today, that this Copenhagen meeting led in no small part to creation of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples under Canadian First Nations sponsorship in 1975, and to the Inuit Circumpolar Conference in 1977. Sadly, the goodwill, personal friendships, and easy working relations among leaders of the several indigenous peoples of the Canadian North have not always been so evident since that 1973 meeting (although protection of the Northern environment and traditional economy have brought some cooperation in recent times, e.g. Jull 1991b). But such meetings and their follow-up ended the isolation of peoples far from the centres of power and at the mercy of powerful governments.

NEGATIVE ECHOES

Some of the negative reaction towards Nunavut from those who should most welcome it is that is, other indigenous groups has undoubtedly caused confusion. The story is not an easy one to tell. Although Inuit leaders of Nunavut have supported the right of all other indigenous people to seek their own political settlements with the White Man, some groups have attacked the terms of Nunavut for having exchanged land title over large areas for specific legally enforced benefits in perpetuity, and having accepted title of only *some* lands in exchange for management and planning rights in perpetuity through statutory bodies for *all* lands. Through years of negotiation the Inuit concluded that this was not only a very good package, but the best they would be able to obtain. Perhaps more importantly, Inuit became tired of delay, deciding that they needed as much control of their future as possible right *now* through the claims settlement and Nunavut government and that this was better than sitting on their hands while others developed the North around them, making irrevocable decisions which would all but pre-empt their future choices. These decisions have annoyed some other groups, or at least have provided them with a platform to demand more.

Some of the critics are not unjustly accused by Inuit of sheer envy. Besides, it is always a very difficult judgment to make as to the balance between the ideal and the possible in political negotiations, and probably impossible for anyone not dealing directly with the actual circumstances. The view of Quebec Inuit who settled their claims in 1975 was always clear, for instance, and its correctness has been demonstrated by their experience: it was better to take what they could and continue the fight for their future with some financial and other resources in hand than to hold back and carp powerlessly at white decision-makers designing the future without them.

In Australia, where land claims settlements mean a (sometimes large) patch of barren earth *and nothing else*, it has sometimes been easy to paint the Nunavut land quantum as trifling. At least one Canadian university professor has told Australian Aboriginal groups in this author's hearing that they are far more fortunate than their Canadian counterparts is that is, according to a simplistic land freehold ratio. The more difficult story of the Nunavut statutory bodies established to manage resource use, development, and planning has often been lost. This author has appeared in print in the major Australian newspapers, as well as on television and radio, trying to set the record straight.

At least all the publicity, regardless of its fine detail, has prompted indigenous groups and others serious about such issues in Australia to seek documentary detail and closer acquaintance with the Inuit and other Canadians directly involved with Nunavut.

NUNAVUT AND THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT

Nunavut has international importance for Canadian governments in a number of quite different ways. Most obviously it has added a significant element to Canadian credibility in the world of human rights, specifically indigenous rights. This added moral and political authority may be valuable to Canada in working bilaterally and multilaterally to tackle human rights needs abroad and to advise on democratic development, and even to participate in international efforts to establish new arrangements in parts of the world where the abuse of minorities has drawn international intervention. (When a rumour or leak got around during the Falklands war that Canada might be asked to provide an interim neutral local administration there, one Quebec Inuit leader offered only

half-jokingly to the Prime Minister to help, his region and regional organisation having the expertise of managing a similar cold and windswept territory.)

Canada has now taken a significant step, Nunavut, to establish itself as an authority on the graceful devolution of power to a minority culture and on pluralism in political practice. The corollary of this is that Canada has set itself a standard in accommodating indigenous autonomy and self-government at home, a standard against which future Canadian actions and policies will be judged overseas. During the era of pressure to negotiate black majority rule in Rhodesia, then soon to be Zimbabwe, a political aide to a minister in Ottawa muttered to this author in respect of Nunavut, which was then being publicly derided by a new Northern affairs minister, "Canada supports a policy in Southern Africa which it does not support in the Northwest Territories." A country as preachy as Canada must expect world scrutiny in return.

The most immediate implication is that Canada must see Nunavut not only as a concept but as a practical success. Government-indigenous relations in Canada are littered with grand rhetoric, hopes, and ideals which have ended in disappointment or failure. If Nunavut fails for lack of Canadian government and/or public commitment, it will send as strong a message abroad, and at home, as the preliminary hopefulness has done. It will undermine government credibility and the spirit of indigenous-government cooperation so hard won through years of frustration and dispute. It will call into doubt the legitimacy of governments and their policies in the eyes of indigenous peoples and others, and will invite the sort of confrontationalism which has been by and large avoided in the Canadian Arctic to date (Jull 1991a). Success requires that political will, adequate finances, training programs, and other preparations for successful Nunavut implementation be provided, and the timetable for implementation met. After all, much time has already passed, a full decade since the federal government gave the nod to the proposals contained in *Building Nunavut* (NCF 1983).

INDIGENOUS POLICY INTERNATIONALISATION

Indigenous rights are not a local matter in public policy-making. Even two and three centuries ago in Canada the European powers recognised the importance of indigenous relations which received attention first from the French and then the British Crown. However much indigenous people were prey to the local development interests of settlers in practice, the highest authorities of European government recognised that moral, political, legal, and policy imperatives of a higher order were in play. The information and communications networks of today's world, both within and between countries, and the proliferation of official and unofficial monitoring bodies, have at last provided the means to give effect to those imperatives. In Canada we are now used to seeing these developments as natural and logical, but experience elsewhere has not been so easy.

The evils of parochialism are demonstrated vividly by Canada's geo-political *alter ego*, Australia. There a similarly large expanse was also peopled by the British from the end of the 18th century. (French ships arrived at Sydney within days of the British "First Fleet" which began colonisation in January 1788, but the French moved on.) In Australia, too, unfamiliar or exotic natural environment and peoples were encountered by the Europeans. The country later emerged from its 19th century industrial development era as a modern federation boasting many social reforms which in some subject areas led the world. But even today it is unsure of being able to escape the logic which has seen genocide and paternalism continued to quite recent times, especially in Northern areas. On April 27, 1993 the representatives of outback peoples met with the Prime Minister and senior ministers in the Cabinet room C a meeting as important symbolically as substantively. The Australian Prime Minister had himself taken the indigenous affairs portfolio in his new government, assisted by two other highly experienced ministers. The April meeting was an attempt to lay the groundwork for a new relationship. The principal concern of indigenous leaders is that the federal government live up to the spirit of a 1967 constitutional referendum which massively supported federal paramountcy in a policy area previously assigned to the States. Those States and the state-like Northern Territory have, not surprisingly, given indigenous interests minimal weight. The record of a new "reformist" State Labor government cleaning up after decades of corruption and reactionary politics in Queensland has been particularly disappointing after great promises of change (Brennan 1992; Holden & Pearson 1993). Despite a determined internationalist push in Australia's foreign and trade relations policies, national attitudes and policies respecting indigenous people have until now lagged behind New Zealand, USA, and Canada, and behind Nordic countries like Denmark and Norway which, like Australia, have had strong labour traditions in modern government reform. In Australia, unlike Canada, the British Crown was unable to enforce a policy of respect for the indigenous nations in colonial times (Reynolds 1987) and was apparently unwilling to press the matter in the writing of the independence constitution. Repeated comments by Australian prime ministers have indicated that a major motive for recent federal attention to indigenous issues is the heat of overseas censure, the more important in that other party leaders at national or state level rarely make supportive comments. Australians today are finding a wealth of ideas and practical precedents in Nunavut and other Canadian experience, but they have not yet made much progress in overcoming entrenched social and political resistance to change at home. In 1986 the national Labor government had to abandon a nation-wide land rights policy in the face of its rejection by the Labor State government of Western Australia. In June 1993 the States are again confronting the Prime Minister, with the outcome utterly uncertain. By Australian standards, Canada has been lucky.

Much has happened in Australia since this was first written. The Prime Minister personally led negotiations through 1993 with Aboriginal leaders to achieve the Native Title Act, passed by Parliament just before Christmas after the longest parliamentary debate in Australian history. An excellent account of all this and surrounding issues is provided in a collection edited by Goot & Rowse (1994). Of more particular Nunavut interest has been the way that Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders have moved to the Canadian-style regional agreement approach to settling claims and self-government (see also footnote 5). While Inuit and other Canadians struggled long and hard to negotiate their regional agreements, fresh Australian indigenous groups have surveyed the Canadian experience of Nunavut and other Northern Canada agreements and are now devising their own agreements combining the best features of the Canadian cases. In short, *Mabo* and post-*Mabo* politics have brought Canadian and Australian indigenous experience and policy much closer together in the last 22 years. When John Amagoalik made his inspirational speech in Darwin in October 1992 to indigenous leaders, he could not have known how quickly Outback Australia would move forward and in the same direction as Nunavut. Yet nowhere could have seemed less promising for such innovations than the North, Centre, and West of Australia a few years ago.

Indeed, I am tempted to urge that Nunavut and the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, building on their cooperation with other regional claims groups across Canada in 1985 for the Coolican task force, should form a council of Canadian indigenous organisations representing areas subject to regional agreements and extend such a network to other "first world" countries, most notably Alaska, Russia, and Australia for a start.

Standards for national indigenous policy-making are set by many countries working individually or collectively. Some of their achievements become reflected in the mood, and rather less in the documents, of the United Nations; more of them are known to and circulated by indigenous peoples organisations and support groups, by academics, and by a minority of outward-looking public officials in the world's governments. Sometimes travelling journalists talk about progressive change among some "exotic" group overseas.

An unplanned expedient tried in one country may become a practical model or hopeful promise for governments or people far away. More often an activist or activist lobby uses someone else's experience to beat recalcitrant governments over the head. Whatever the actual dynamics, the result is the same: there is a growing global store of information about and precedents for indigenous peoples' relations with majority populations and with governments.

Of course, *many* areas of public policy are international today. This is true of all the world, not only of countries like Canada which are part of multi-national groupings sharing language or culture, or legal, economic, or political systems. We are used to the idea that "breakthroughs" in medicine, control of nuclear energy, astronomy, pest control, literature, film, pop music, even legal precedent (smokers' rights, right to die) come from abroad. However, on matters of human rights, including indigenous rights, we can become suddenly shy, coy, reluctant C nowhere more than in Australia, for instance (Jull 1992c). On such subjects we also hear raw voices not at all shy C countering ideals of just treatment with claims to understand "our natives" better than do "outsiders", "trouble-makers", "stirrers", white advisers, "dreamers", "poets", "international snoops", *et al.* Nowhere in the world have indigenous people more effectively employed the facts and forces of internationalism than in Canada, especially Northern Canada.

Dorothy Jones in her important book, *Code of Peace* (1991), describes the steady proliferation of international human rights agreements in this century. This is impressive and encouraging, despite the fact that the same century has seen wars of historic horror.

The present genocide in the former Yugoslavia will grow more horrible when more facts are available after the fighting, but almost certainly the international community's determination to limit or prevent such things happening again in future will also grow. Of course, the facile faith and even smugness of Europeans in recent times about the immunity of their continent to wars and mass human rights violation has been shown to be utterly hollow. At the same time, however, there have been steps forward. The gatherings of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) begun in the Helsinki process and now embracing all European countries, plus Canada and the USA, have adopted considerably more intrusive procedures for monitoring each other's treatment of minorities. Outside military protection for minorities from national governments in Iraq and Yugoslavia, and other novel forms of international intervention in Somalia and Cambodia, all show that internationalisation is growing despite practical problems in the face of determined local warriors. Some people view this as unconscionable, a new form of Western-inspired imperialism; many others see it as belated recognition that human rights are everybody's business.

For indigenous peoples in Canada the quiet end of this spectrum is probably the most useful C that is, the visiting of other peoples and homelands to exchange ideas about how to solve similar problems.

A fresh incident, typical of the problems which can arise, is instructive. In June 1993, Chief Ovide Mercredi of the Assembly of First Nations visited Australia as guest of the government to speak at the first Australian indigenous constitutional conference C an invitation-only event on June 4 & 5 for selected indigenous leaders and various academics and other "experts" including this author. His moving words and striking message proved an inspiration. However, television journalists later pressed him to talk about Nunavut, the only Canadian self-government model they knew, on ABC-TV's *Lateline*, a national evening show on the main political issue of the day. In the heat of the discussion his comments led many viewers to believe that Nunavut land rights were not protected and would be swept away if more non-Inuit moved into Nunavut. This, of course, is not the case. Inuit rights are protected in a federal claims settlement which is itself protected by the Canadian Constitution. Chief Mercredi's point that the "public government" aspects of Nunavut could be affected by future settlement was, on the other hand, correct, notwithstanding the fact that European and indigenous governments around the North Atlantic have all used their self-government powers to block immigration and to control settlement patterns in their homelands C e.g., Iceland, Shetland, the Faroes, and Norway, as well as Greenland (and the Maritime provinces of Canada in some cases!).

Then, in *The Australian* of June 11, the newspaper read all around Australia daily, a large photo of Chief Mercredi was accompanied by a story, "Advances deserve feather in our cap". The story was interesting for many reasons. It claimed that Australia is more advanced than Canada in land rights because a larger percentage of Australia is in indigenous hands. Nunavut was excluded from these figures, and perhaps other Northern areas, so the figures were wrong, in any case. The article then quoted Chief Mercredi on Nunavut: "The highly publicised Nunavut case, which created a new territory covering a fifth of Canada, did not provide native title, comprised barren tundra in the North and assisted only 17,500 Inuit, or Eskimos, he said."

Whatever Chief Mercredi really said cannot be known. The article's author was confused on so many points that we may be sure that the Chief was not exactly quoted, the more so as no quotation marks were used.

The "barren tundra" of Nunavut is home to Inuit, just as the huge lands of Central Australia and the Top End of the Northern Territory which give Australia its favourable indigenous land percentage are Aboriginal homelands seen as desert by the White Man. The only reason Inuit or First Nations in Canada, or Aborigines or Torres Strait Islanders in Australia, have land today is, in most cases, that the White Man thought it "desert" or "barren" or "waste".

Another contradiction in the story was that, on the one hand, it said Australia is ahead of Canada, but on the other it recommended the emerging British Columbia Treaty Commission as a model for Australia! Australia at the moment of the article was convulsed as governments fought over the best way to deal with the "native title" recognised by the High court in the *Mabo* case, so the question was a timely one.

This article in *The Australian* will prove confusing and destructive to indigenous people in Australia. Having heard of a practical model, Nunavut, they were now being told it was rubbish. More importantly, the governments and business people opposed to Aboriginal interests but who had come to accept that Nunavut makes precedents possible in Australia, could now discard that thought with undoubted relief. It was all just a mirage, after all, they could say.

Indigenous peoples and others in Australia and all around the world need to know that there are practical models accepted by governments and indigenous peoples elsewhere, and they need to know more about these so they can learn from them. They can work out the fine points and their preferences later on the basis of their local needs. If we take our disputes and quibbles overseas C take them to people who profoundly need hope and examples C we are doing the same thing as missionaries did all across Canada, using indigenous people to fight out ideological battles with each other, battles which have nothing to do with them! It is purely destructive and self-serving.

The way to serve as ambassadors for hope and indigenous progress abroad is to adopt a *both/and* approach rather than an *either/or* approach. That is, *both* Nunavut and Mohawk government, and many other models, are working for the people in various areas, meeting their needs and being improved or re-designed to fit local conditions. The conditions are so different in different places that some parts of one model and some parts of another may interest them. If the Eastern European revolutions of recent years have been about anything it has been that no régime and its defenders have a monopoly on truth and political

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADA'S ABORIGINAL PEOPLES

In 1983 at the Inuit Circumpolar Conference general assembly in Iqaluit, the Canadian Inuit leaders present had recently participated in the first of the series of four televised national constitutional conferences with heads of federal, provincial, and territorial governments. These had been won through a constitutional amendment negotiated in 1981. Mark R. Gordon of Kuujjuaq, Quebec, had played a principal role in making those early talks so promising, first by overcoming provincial jitters in late 1982 at a vast conference of officials in Ottawa in what must remain the most remarkable solo performance in Canadian constitutional history. As a result of that performance, he developed easy and cheerful relations with all delegations involved in the talks, a great asset for Inuit in future years.

Mark Gordon and Mary Simon, who had worked long together in both Quebec and wider Inuit politics, had their hands full in Iqaluit in 1983. There had been so many misfortunes and misunderstandings in the lead-up to this assembly that there were some strong tensions among delegates and their background teams. For one thing, financing was a long-running problem and Canadian Inuit were faced with possible cancellation of the conference until the week before it began. The Alaskan and Greenlandic delegations, already gathering for the charter trip across the Arctic, were not amused. Fortunately, Prime Minister Trudeau took an interest, over-rode various departmental shibboleths, and made an extra amount of some \$300,000 available to make the event possible. Mark and Mary had to play the role they had played so well three years earlier at the initially tense Nuuk ICC assembly C being the Canadian Inuit diplomats and fixers among diverse and sometimes feuding delegates. After all, the biggest issues of the Inuit world were up for discussion and people held strong views. It was widely agreed among delegates, then as at other ICC gatherings, that they were the two logical Canadian ICC presidents of the future. Despite all the work and behind-the-scenes strife in Iqaluit, Mark Gordon kept an eye on the bigger picture, as well. In one assembly resolution calling for "ICC Support of the Canadian Inuit Efforts in Constitutional Work", Resolution 83-05, one of the *Whereas* clauses read, at Mark's instruction,

Whereas, this work is accomplishing significant advances in human rights and constitutional development and is therefore relevant to the peoples of many countries,

and ended,

Be it further resolved that the Inuit Circumpolar Conference disseminate information about this work in order to assist peoples undertaking similar efforts elsewhere in the world.

"This work" always meant especially *self-government* and *aboriginal rights* to Mark and to all the Inuit leaders of the time, of course. The same men and women who discussed the national constitution were also working to strengthen self-government in Quebec, the Northwest Territories and, as soon as possible, in Labrador. They were involved with land and sea rights, with environmental problems, and resource development impacts in their home regions. Their view was "entire and whole and perfect", as the British Imperial hymn puts it, not compartmentalised into the specialties by which modern governments have lost some of the vital connections among things. Or, as Inuit leader Eric Tagoona said at the time to a questioner at a public hearing, "What are aboriginal

rights? That's Nunavut!"

Under the direction of Mark Gordon and Rhoda Innuksuk, the Canadian office of ICC concerned itself with obtaining useful circumpolar material for Inuit. For example, ICC Canada translated much of a pioneering study on indigenous coastal and marine concerns produced by the predominantly coastal Sami organisation, SLF (Samenes Landsforbund), and distributed copies to Inuit and other indigenous organisations, to government departments, and others. They obtained federal government assistance in translating the summary of Norway's Sami Culture Committee report on language and education rights, and had this distributed. They sought translation and publication of various other reports and books from Nordic Europe (especially Greenland, Denmark, and Norway). All of this material was directly useful to the various Inuit organisations negotiating land claims, negotiating self-government, working on current political issues, etc. The Nunavut self-government and claims teams were major consumers of this documentation, but Canadian governments also showed great interest and found some benefit.

The sort of vision Mark Gordon had for ICC and Inuit in the world has been given special meaning since the 1983 assembly in Iqaluit, and since his untimely death, by his friends and associates such as Mary Simon and Rosemarie Kuptana. Another, John Amagoalik, has taken the Nunavut message overseas, directly, to great acclaim. At the end of September 1992 he stood before several hundred outback Aborigines, Torres Strait Islanders, and representatives of Australia's national, state and territory governments under an iron roof and open walls in oppressive tropical heat in Darwin, Australia, to deliver what was generally regarded as the key speech of Australia's major Columbus-year conference, *Surviving Columbus* (Amagoalik 1994). During Amagoalik's conference visit an Australia television network showed an extended feature on Nunavut, nationally in prime time, featuring Nunavut claims leader Paul Quassa and his family in Iqaluit. This short documentary had tremendous impact in Australia in raising interest in Nunavut.

When the Northern Territory government hosted many invited guests from around Australia and from overseas at its own constitutional conference a few days after *Surviving Columbus* and in Darwin, also, this time it was held in the ritziest air-conditioned local hotel (Gray *et al.* 1994). The genie of aboriginal rights and self-government was out of the bottle, however. Speaker after speaker ad-libbed support on the theme, to the chagrin of NT ministers who apparently had hoped for a quiet photo opportunity for their own position. That position is one of continued exclusion of aboriginal people from a role or rights other than those of dutiful citizens of the White Man's territory and White Man's structures, rather like the NWT position before the 1979 election there, or Yukon position before the 1985 election. When one session was devoted wholly to indigenous issues, as planned, the NT ministers lacked even the courtesy to stay at the conference. For that session the conference paper on Nunavut by this author went missing, but he had thoughtfully brought along extra copies for those present (Jull 1994a).

More incredible has been the status of Nunavut as something *risqué*, or dangerous. The former Chief Justice of Australia published a piece denouncing it, making clear in the process that he did not have even the most basic information on the subject. On July 27, 1992 the Office of the Chief Minister ("premier" or "Government Leader") of the Northern Territory took the trouble to issue a rambling fretful statement on the subject, launching out at "apparent support for a separate Aboriginal State in the Territory", and, quoting Chief Minister Perron as saying that the two Aboriginal MLAs should assert themselves as the "true representatives" of Aboriginal people against the land claims organisations seen to be pushing for Aboriginal self-government (Perron 1992). The Northern Land Council and Central Land Council are federal statutory bodies with

leaders selected according to Aboriginal tradition, and much of the Media Release complains about continued federal power and presence in the NT. The Chief Minister also complains about the Aboriginal "push for direct federal funding" to their communities, i.e., funding not controlled by him and his cabinet.

The importance here is not that Nunavut is causing anxiety abroad. That, after all, is a comment on the reactionary innocence of outback Australia, not of the radical nature of Nunavut. The important thing is that in a situation where indigenous people are subject to reactionary attitudes and where ideas for change have been few, a practical proposal like Nunavut has stirred up constitutional debate and given people a practical model to discuss. Nunavut has helped to break a long-standing impasse in Northern Territory politics. Those who exercise the White Man's hegemony have been put on the defensive, and as the Chief Minister's astonishing press statement shows, as do his statements and those of his ministers at the October constitutional conference, they have no positive arguments to put forward. Their sole defence is the sanctity of the existing system, i.e., the White Man's continued control. For that reason, in a booklet prepared by this author for NT audiences, four pages were devoted to the arguments of the 1980 Unity Committee Report of the Northwest Territories Legislative Assembly refuting similar arguments then prevalent among the NWT's White community (MacQuarrie *et al.* 1980; Jull 1992b). Such points included most notably the *ad hoc* and provisional nature of territory boundaries and existing political systems, the lack of support for those within the indigenous community, and the importance of the consent of the governed in the success of any constitutional system.

That booklet was written in order to meet a growing demand for information about Nunavut then being heard around Australia by word of mouth, half-heard items on radio, and occasional confused press items. It was a 40-page booklet published by the Australian National University, the national research centre and policy think-tank of Australia, an institution having no equivalent in Canada. The booklet took care to provide a list of useful back-up reference publications and documents, and to see that these were available in the convenient research library which ANU maintains in Darwin. A simple, clear map was included in the publication, and the text was written with the problems and pressing concerns of Australian Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders in mind. This publication had a different emphasis than one the author would write for Canadians, for instance, or than one written for Norwegians. That is important. To give an example: the debates prior to creation of the Sami Parliament in Norway spent much of their heat and fury on the issue of whether its members should be directly elected or indirectly elected. As that question would not arise in Canada, nor have any application there, this author has never given it more than a fleeting mention in the monographs and articles he has written on Sami politics and policy in Norway (Jull 1994b). Cross-cultural communication is important, and problem-ridden. The habitual Norwegian word *miljø*, i.e., milieu, means precisely what Canadians mean by "the environment" in its contemporary sense C not the vague general *milieu* we know in English, a word borrowed from French as is the Norwegian word. A Norwegian *kommune* isn't where one will find either hairy young persons taking off their clothes or comrades in Mao suits from chin to toe, but a municipal government or township. However, visiting Norwegians will invariably use *milieu* and *commune* in English, leaving the unprepared hearer confused. An equivalent problem for Canadians in Europe discussing political issues is the lack of understanding there of federal systems of government; hence, the notion that Ottawa may be inhibited in legislating as it likes in respect of indigenous and environmental issues in Southern Canada is unknown.³

³ In Australia the highest court has supported Canberra's use of the External Affairs Power to knock states into line with federal policy on environmental and indigenous issues. I.e., Canberra has been judged to have over-ride powers to implement the letter

However, one does not always need hard work to create documentation. Canadian government press releases tell their own story, being a story so remarkable to hearers in, say, Australia, that they are passed around in awe. For instance, the Prime Minister's words in Iqaluit in May 1993 on formally signing the Nunavut claims settlement carry a punch abroad:

In the course of this transition [to establishment of the Nunavut government], we will redraft the map of Canada & indeed of North America. But our collective achievement is far more than a simple exercise in cartography. It is, at its core, an act of nation-building. Step by step, agreement by agreement, we are advancing toward a set of common goals: strengthening the economic, social and political foundations of the North, and enriching an ancient and cherished culture & the Inuit culture. We are forging a new partnership & a real partnership & not only between the Government of Canada and the future government of Nunavut, but between Aboriginal and Non-Aboriginal Canadians. From the new climate of confidence that this settlement will engender in the North, all Canadians will benefit. ... As the dreams of your ancestors become reality, the future of this country is strengthened. (Mulroney 1993)

After all, the words of official bodies count for much more than those of lobbyists and other enthusiasts.

The point of this discussion has been to show that Canada's indigenous peoples do have a message to spread in the world. However, it takes thought, preparation, and practice to do it effectively.

and even the spirit of international agreements, something vigorously resented and opposed by the states.

In February 1985 the federal Northern affairs minister had announced a target date for creation of the Nunavut government. He had also clearly stated the federal insistence on constitutional accommodations in the NWT for Dene, Inuvialuit, and Métis. Then all hell broke loose as MLAs, who had apparently under-estimated the momentum and determination of the Nunavut and Western Constitutional Forums, sought to recapture the Northern constitutional process and re-write its terms. These manoeuvres had many dimensions, but were about local ambitions and imagined business benefits as much as about larger social and political factors (Jull 1985). At any rate, they succeeded in sinking Nunavut.

Arriving in Tromsø in that spring of 1985 my plane bounced around between surrounding mountains, often blanked out in sudden snow showers. An English voice on the radio from the cockpit could have been 40 years earlier when the RAF Lancasters of the Dambusters came in on a similar flight path to sink the *Tirpitz*, one of the most significant achievements of the Northern war. The steel submarine nets used by the Germans to guard that ship still rusted on the beach nearby. My father had been killed in RAF Lancasters over Denmark, and his first cousin was dying now from various ill effects of his service in Arctic convoys in these waters. Before long I would see many more of the sites of World War II, with many more grisly associations (such as Tromsø locals re-enacting Gestapo atrocities around the city as street theatre on V-E Day), but for now I was mindful of the controversy raging in Norway. A journalist had opened up some of the less heroic, less triumphalist memories of Northern peoples who had been occupied by the Germans, and then had the whole North of their country burned, not a cow or shed spared, when a Russian advance ended the Nazi Occupation. The heroic recollections of some Norwegians were evoking more sneers than joy, locally. People had suffered much. When my friend, Terje, showed me the vast model Lancaster he was building in his house high on a hillside above the fjord anchorage where the *Tirpitz* was sunk, he commented that other kids must have been impressed by my father's RAF service. No, I replied, actually I had a bad time at school as the only child there without a father. Defeat in victory. The war, and the near demise of Nunavut after the apparent triumphs of February 1985 left me thoroughly depressed.

The snow in Tromsø was heaped 20 feet deep, but the early spring sun was now wheeling around the sky so that even though it still dipped below the horizon briefly at midnight, it was full daylight for 24 hours. I was given a room with light curtains in a building at the highest point of Tromsø Island. Sleep was fitful in the bright light. My window faced the local landmark mountain. The previous year on another visit I had come to think of it in many different ways through the paintings and other graphics of Hans Ragnar Mathisen, an outstanding Sami artist. That year I had bought from him the last proofs of his print, "Nunavut", a starry night seen in polar flight across the Inuit homeland, one of which the Inuit leaders then presented to Prime Minister Trudeau as a gift on his leaving office. Now I was all alone with the mountain, awake at all hours watching it change its aspects, its shadows, its colour (now gold, now rose) through each of the 24 hours. The ten weeks which followed made me understand why the Norse sagas always referred to this as a beautifully deceptive land full of spells, sorcery, danger, and mystery.

I was expected to give a series of seminars on Nunavut. There was much enthusiasm and admiration in Northern Scandinavia among Sami for Nunavut. I had the use of an office on the modern new university campus, and had friends there from other years. Being the visiting English writer also meant much time spent discreetly editing the papers in stilted English which everyone seemed to have hidden in his or her bottom drawer. I learned about everything from local road repairs to international oil politics in this way. Long walks and lugging groceries up the hillsides and the spring air were also restorative. Terje's house had a million-dollar view of fjord, mountains, and through a gap on an island opposite, of the Ice Sea, or Arctic Ocean. We would sit on his open porch eating fresh shrimps and bread with beer in the spring sun, snowdrifts lying all around.

None of which solved the problem of my seminars. I had no more stomach for the sort of facile solidarity talk and easy encouragement typical of much inter-indigenous contact. Besides, wasn't it all a delusion or a lie? Better to tell it like it is. If indigenous people did not get something more than slogans and pat answers, how could they possibly succeed in the difficult struggles before them? How many conferences had we all attended where smiles and platitudes and self-deception and clenched fist salutes had substituted for real understanding or progress on the difficult issues? I decided to talk not only of the hopes and dreams of Nunavut, but of some of the hard lessons we were learning. It would be a closed group of university students and teachers, serious social scientists, and Sami activists. So I decided to tell the truth. The calculation paid off. For days afterwards, Sami individuals who had been present insisted on dinners, lunches, extended coffee sessions, and talking half the night, bringing along others who had not been present. They, too, wanted to talk about the real issues, not just the pretty window-dressing. Victory in defeat. Too many of us, in our desire to make self-government marketable, had painted pretty pictures without adequately preparing ourselves and others for the hard problems.

NUNAVUT ITSELF IN INTERNATIONAL WORK

The initiative of indigenous people in Canada has been critical to the initiation, development, and international impact of world indigenous rights bodies and events. The World Council of Indigenous Peoples, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the World Assembly of First Nations, and Indigenous Survival International are the most obvious examples. Canadian governments C sometimes including local as well as federal, provincial and territory governments C have provided support, expertise, even staff, and often funds, to help. There is a tradition of partnership here, and one which has become an ongoing relationship, e.g., in relation to annual United Nations human rights positions and conferences. Given that the accession to governmental status of indigenous peoples across Canada is the central theme and goal of indigenous politics today, it is logical that the whole question of the international personality of indigenous governments be examined. The First Nations of much of Canada will have their own views of such matters. Inuit, with the particular concerns they have (e.g., marine environment, a shared language), with the experience all Inuit regions have already acquired through the ICC, and with the creation of governments such as Nunavut and Kativik, have a particular set of requirements.

Inuit are an international people, and their full participation in the ICC is no more exceptional than Canadian membership of the British Commonwealth or the Francophonie. Furthermore, the creation of Nunavut as a full member of the Canadian federal system, i.e., as a province-like entity participating with Yukon and NWT in inter-governmental relations, means that its government will have a special role in representing Inuit and Arctic interests in international relations. Indeed, *Building Nunavut* (NCF 1983) included a separate item on this subject, not to challenge federal authority in international relations, but to highlight the importance to Inuit of cultural, economic, environmental, and other interests shared with fellow-Inuit in adjacent lands. Ten years later the flow of history has made internationalisation a much greater and more immediate issue. As the first and largest sovereign government in Inuit Canada, the Nunavut Territory might logically take on the primary role of sponsoring the Canadian ICC office and operations.

The four jurisdictional regions of Inuit Canada C Labrador, Quebec, Nunavut, and the Inuvialuit region of the Western NWT C are all experiencing the establishment of new claims and political structures. These structures will change their needs and increase their interest in international contacts, and will also increase their capacity to fund the Inuit Circumpolar Conference. It seems likely that a new relationship among Inuit governments and Inuit claims organisations in these four regions, and the ICC, will evolve. It is, of course, up to the ICC and the other Inuit entities concerned to define any new *modus vivendi*. However, the ICC has given Canada and all Canadians a unique window on the international Arctic and on neighbours like Greenland which were hitherto little known. It has proven a valuable entity, not only for Inuit or for the North. ICC has had to play many roles in the past, but when there are strong Inuit governments across the North C the major objective stated at the ICC's founding in 1977 C some sorting out of roles between them may take place. In any event, ICC will surely grow in importance as an international organisation representing a large and little known region of the world. Whether ICC finds its main future role as an information network, a cultural agency, an environmental advocate, a facilitator of exchange visits, a research institution, a broker of cooperative projects, etc., remains to be seen.

FRIENDS AND ALLIES

As has been shown earlier, the mere existence of information about indigenous achievements and the normal workings of news media, academic networks, etc., does not mean that information will reach, willy-nilly, the audiences abroad who would benefit. Further, the packaging and transmission of information for particular target audiences is a further hurdle. Australia is the country of the world most like Canada, and one linked by language, history, and a strong comparative political studies tradition *and* by an active, Canadian government-assisted organisation which actively promotes and holds conferences on Canadian studies. At the last such conference of ACSANZ (Association of Canadian Studies in Australia and New Zealand) in December 1992, there were numerous papers on Canadian indigenous issues. One paper, presented by this author, specifically dealt with Nunavut and a comparable Australian region, Torres Strait (Mulrennan and Jull 1992). Nevertheless, the continuing isolation of Australia's indigenous peoples and the difficulty they have in gaining access to information on Canadian indigenous experience *experience* which is strongly relevant to their current needs and which offers constructive models (and hope) for their advancement *indicates* that existing policies, programs, and facilities do not work. A more active out-reach program by Canadian indigenous people as visualised and urged by the late Mark Gordon is needed.

Such an out-reach program is not hard to devise. It probably cannot be run directly by governments, because many governments *not* all of them nasty military dictatorships, either! *would* view such activity as a breach of diplomatic practice. Besides, it needs the sensitivity and fellow-feeling (solidarity) which indigenous persons share with other indigenous persons. Typically the circumpolar peoples have found it easier to talk to each other about some subjects, despite language barriers, than they do with many of the national government officials charged with administering them. To their credit, Canadian and other circumpolar governments (e.g., Norway and Denmark) have come to accept that there is value in cooperating in the Arctic rather than in trying to hide embarrassing social policy and program failures as sometimes occurred in the past. This development is due almost entirely to the initial efforts of Greenland Inuit, Sami, and the Inuit of Alaska and Canada.

In difficult economic times it is unwise to recommend unnecessary spending or new programs. On the other hand, in Nunavut, and in recent Canadian developments in indigenous-government relations of which Nunavut is merely the most dramatic to date, Canada has two assets which must not be hidden under a bushel:

- a general example of racial and cultural accommodation which can give Canada well deserved credit in the international community, lending it additional moral authority across the range of international concerns; and
- practical experience in problem-solving amidst racial and cultural tensions, i.e., the principal international relations issue in the world today.

Canadians who have advocated closer Arctic cooperation between Canada and the Nordic countries have been attacked by one American scholar (who shall remain nameless). He has held that it was natural that Canadian Northern relations be primarily with the USA, and that encouragement of Canadian-Nordic relations was an attempt by Canadians to find someone whom they could dominate! Writing here for a Canadian audience it is not necessary to answer such an assertion: of our many national or collective faults, bullying of other countries has been absent. A Canadian might say that such a criticism was

"typically American", i.e., viewing the world solely in the perspective of relative raw power, coupled with the pathetic need of the bully to be loved, a common theme in domestic violence. At any rate, the real reason for recommending more contact with Northern Europe is that those countries share with Canada a belief in social and cultural community, active government, the welfare state, strong environmental concern, human rights activism, active Northern development policies, and contemporary currents of reform in respect of indigenous rights. In recent years Canada has worked creatively and positively both at government level and through indigenous contacts with the Nordic countries, notably in United Nations human rights work respecting indigenous peoples and in strengthening regional circumpolar identity and relations. The USA, on the other hand, has denigrated and undermined UN human rights work, specifically including work on indigenous peoples, and at the recent Euro-Arctic meeting in Kirkenes, Norway, the American ambassador to Norway denounced the involvement of indigenous people in international work in general. Alaska and Alaskans are suitable partners in international efforts, but it would be foolish for Canadians to be held hostage to the national pretensions of the USA or its government.

Part II

Meta-Communicating Nunavut

And I saw a new heaven and a new earth; for the first heaven and the first earth were passed away...

And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain: for the former things are passed away.

And he that sat upon the throne said, Behold, I make all things new. And he said unto me, Write: for these words are true and faithful.

REVELATION 21: 1, 4-5.

NUNAVUT - A NEW WORLD ORDER?

Nunavut is not some sort of freak or unique occurrence, unprecedented and unlikely to recur. On the contrary, it is one of a number of emerging new regional hinterland societies in the "first world". Others include Yukon; Northern areas of seven Canadian provinces from Labrador to British Columbia; Alaska; Greenland; the Faroe Islands; North Norway, and the adjacent regions of Northern Sweden and Finland; and the Northern Territory and regions of North Queensland and Western Australia in Australia. What is characteristic of these societies is that their settler culture, or the impulse of recent European dominance, has ended or retreated and has sometimes failed or stalled or proven inadequate to the challenges of the region. Instead of Europeans simply bulldozing or homogenising all in their path, as happened in many parts of the "old frontier" of settlement in Southern Canada, new possibilities have opened.

There is hope of change elsewhere, as well, not always on the remote frontier. For instance, the Algonkians of Ontario have opened up the Ottawa Valley through their land claim to a renewal of understanding of the region's history, historical social processes, successive economies and livelihoods and of the environment which has been traumatised and altered by, first, the forest industries which have hacked their way through the whole region, then the marginal farming, and finally the damming and regulating of the principal rivers. Yet even a fine new history of the region published as late as 1989 could dismiss the First Nations in one sentence, the opening sentence of the book: "Before 1800 the Ottawa Valley was essentially uninhabited except for a small Amerindian population" (Reid 1989). For the history of a resource frontier in one of the central areas of Canada and the earliest fur trade and exploration corridor from the Atlantic coast to the West and the total ignoring of the indigenous people, who certainly did not simply levitate into the realms of light on the coming of the White Man, is a considerable oversight. The Algonkians are doing all people from that region a great service, quite apart from their immediate need to obtain justice and a restoration of their economy and opportunities. They are making it possible to understand history wholly and truthfully.

Without that we have been living a sort of false existence in an alien land, a land we have denied from the outset, as in Reid's book. We are like the English settlers to Australia who tried to replace all the unique and striking flora and fauna of a far continent with the English country gardens of "Home". In Norway, the 1985 history of an Arctic fjord township, Kvænangen, created both controversy and interest and won the national book prize and by movingly revealing the real history of a socially and historically complex region which lay hidden (Björklund 1985). Local people said to the author, "You have

given us back our history." This was the more important because many good Norwegian homes had been, in fact, good Sami homes or good Finnish homes. They were hiding their history and culture, sometimes even from themselves, in an ultra-nationalist modern nation-state. They had denied their own heritage in the desire to be modern, equal, accepted, and not the "dirty Lapps" or "backward Finns" of redneck Norwegian prejudice.

Perhaps the most brilliant discussion of such cross-cultural complexities in the world to date is one specifically discussing these remote North Norwegian townships (Eidheim 1971). It is highly relevant to Canada.

With the demise of the post-war boom, and the recent loss of foolish national trust in easy riches or wonderful mega-projects in the North, public and official attitudes in capitals and board rooms are changing. With the shift in power in many parts of the country, especially the Northern territories and provincial Northlands, accompanying the rise in indigenous rights and self-government and in environmental awareness, the drift away from the old "liberal development model" may be accelerating. "The North" is no longer an industrial boomtown waiting to happen; it is the homeland of long resident peoples making creative use of all resources and ideas possible. The role of explicitly indigenous culture will increase even in White towns. In some areas the indigenous heritage of people C perhaps long hidden, or "under-communicated" as the anthropologists say C may be resumed and enhanced. We will see the indigenous North moving farther and farther South C that is, the re-indigenisation of the social culture of marginal regions of white settlement. The consolidation of indigenous culture through the nation-wide indigenous self-government movement will fill in the "empty" North across the provincial North.

The character of the new multi-ethnic territorial societies in "first world" countries is not pre-determined. It varies considerably with ethnic mix. Nunavut, with its overwhelmingly Inuit population, has and will have a different character from Greenland where 200 years of strong top-down Danish rule prevailed. They both differ from rural Alaska C or urban Alaska. What may be most interesting are those areas which, like Labrador and coastal Sami townships of North Norway, are now regaining traditional indigenous identity after experiencing long periods of social and cultural domination by outsiders. It would be interesting to know if it is possible, through research or comparative studies, to learn more about the processes of *de facto* social and cultural change which have often flown in the face of *de jure* policies. Canada should launch such studies of emerging new ethno-regional political and quasi-political entities, not least in order to gain some enlightenment about our own future.

Parallel with these changes is the filling in of the map. That is, whereas most Canadians used to think of the North as a white blank with few place-names on the map, and all empty, waiting for the White Man to come along and write his will upon it, in the words of Lawrence of Arabia, and where officials sought only to pour in goods and services from the South (and the skilled personnel needed to explain them to "the natives"), the indigenous people have spoken out. They have not only reclaimed much of Canada for themselves, but they have reclaimed it for Canadian human understanding in general. They have shown that it *is* inhabited, it *can* and *does* nurture a rich and varied society, it *has* a history (with or without young men from the South coming along in their canoes one summer with cameras to bring it before the Canadian imagination), and its future is *not* going to be designed by planners in Ottawa or Edmonton but by many people living their daily lives. We may be especially grateful to those authors like Henriksen (1973) and Brody (1987) who have helped bridge the cross-cultural divide in Northern Canada for us.

It may be risky to over-extend the metaphor, but when a large emptiness or lost area of a personality is suddenly filled in, a being experiences a creativity and emotional fullness

previously lacking. The same may be true of Canada as a whole. Canadian history is being re-written, literally (e.g., Miller 1991), and our grand-children will grow up in a Canada whose image and self-image are very different from that we have known. For instance, in respect of Australia, Prime Minister Keating has stunned many White Australians with his blunt assessments of past injustices, and now this:

The culture of our indigenous people, Aboriginal Australians, is now substantially permeating the culture of Australia in its art, in its dance, in its music, and we are in a sense celebrating the renaissance of that culture. And I'm sure as time goes on it will start to play a much larger role in our general national culture as the Maori have played in New Zealand culture. [Keating 1993, 2])

It has also sometimes seemed that "the native movement" has done more to change Canada than to change "native" Canada, expanding notions of pluralism and socio-political flexibility in the former, while failing to greatly improve socio-economic conditions in many indigenous communities.

Environmental awakening, led by Inuit and other indigenous persons appearing before development inquiries and panels, and by Southern environmentalists, has also had great effect. From a blank white expanse of snow the North has been transformed in the Canadian mind through more information about environmental processes (Jull 1994c). Now it is widely understood to be complex, varied, and dynamic. With this growing complexity has come growing interest and pride among Canadians in general.

A generation ago, Northern Canada including Nunavut was a part of the White Man's post-war imagination. The "post-war" factor is probably a key: after 15 years of Depression and War the Canadian people needed hope, opportunity, and material expansion. The techniques of wartime propaganda were continued in the North in the sort of bombastic self-congratulatory "here we come and nothing will ever be the same again!" style which may have been useful to keep spirits up on the Normandy beaches but was misplaced in a peaceful land. In 1967, for instance, the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, proudly hosted the launch of a new film, *The North has Changed!* It began with a quiet scene of indigenous paddler in skin boat, and then the screen erupted in a loud explosion followed by pulsing music, with scenes of heavy equipment and the upheaval of construction sites. In retrospect it said everything about the Northern development mentality of the times, the mentality prevailing everywhere. The very next year, however, a campaigning new federal Prime Minister, Trudeau, visited the North and in a packed hall noticeably devoid of indigenous persons made clear that social policy issues, i.e., indigenous issues, were the federal priority in the North. The Minister stood rather awkwardly beside him; the North had indeed changed.

The needs and political motives of indigenous society today rightly centre on their own people. There are those among them who resent any suggestion that indigenous society and culture should take account of the White Man's Canada. However, nobody's politics occur in a vacuum. The Superpower constitutions are cases in point. The USA only united and only adopted the form of constitution it did in response to politico-military danger from Britain and, potentially, from other European powers. Russia today, fully armed with nuclear weapons, has been working its way through various phases of constitutional development designed in significant part to satisfy often small and difficult minority peoples and neighbours. The actual, rather than the intellectually ideal, context of political and constitutional development today is not only regional and national, but international as well. Perhaps it has always been a wider context than we have realised. Nunavut is significant not only for Northern Canada and Canada as a whole, but has proven an inspiration for other peoples and other continents. Indigenous people in

Canada affect and are affected by their neighbours, whether these are indigenous or non-indigenous.

A main dimension of Northern change exemplified by Nunavut is the ecologically sustainable development (ESD) ethic. This is built in through the many provisions of the Nunavut claims settlement relating to land, waters, seas, resources, planning, and development (TFN-DIAND 1992; Fenge 1992; Fenge 1994). By no means opposed to economic development, including sensible resource extraction projects, the people of Nunavut and all other Northern areas in Canada are successfully negotiating and implementing new arrangements for the planning and management of economic development. The principal shared features of these new approaches are sensitivity to the living environment; collective benefit to the local people in the area where development occurs; studies and research to learn as much as possible about natural eco-systems and socio-economic issues in the development area; the opportunity for full and open participation not only by experts but by the indigenous people of the region in evaluating and sharing knowledge on the project and impacts; and financial benefits to indigenous society through claims successor bodies and/or indigenous governments. This growing development ethic appears to be supported by all Canadians, judging by general opinion surveys revealing public attitudes on environment issues. This new "smart" and collectivist approach to resource management and economic development is a major innovation. The principal landmarks in terms of official documents to date are the Nunavut claims agreement (TFN-DIAND 1992) and the indigenous-government cooperation philosophy which permeates the Arctic Environmental Strategy (DIAND 1991). Already the latter document, coupled with the explicit advice of Nunavut claims principals and advisers, has been the shaping spirit behind the first serious Australian approach to indigenous marine issues, the Marine Strategy for Torres Strait (contained in a document by Mulrennan *et al.*, 1993).

In the hot South-East Trade Winds of mid-June 1993, an unprecedented gathering of federal and state (Queensland) officials, chairmen and one chairwoman of the Torres Strait Island councils, academic experts, environmental consultants, and local Islander and non-Islander fishermen took place on Thursday Island near the Equator in a new vocational college overlooking a passage among the Islands made famous by Cook on "discovery" work and Bligh rowing in an open boat to Timor in the 18th Century. Their improbable task was to discuss MaSTS, the Marine Strategy for Torres Strait, for which the Nunavut example of recent indigenous-government cooperation on marine policy and land claims agreement was the inspiration. Further, the wider Nunavut context of emerging self-government was also in the air C Nunavut having become the archetype of such in Australia C thanks to the Australian Prime Minister's reference to Canadian precedent in the first formal federal endorsement of "self-government" in a discussion paper which was the major subject of news and public debate for the weeks surrounding this Thursday Island meeting.

I was lounging uneasily at the back of the room, taking frequent coffee breaks from the meeting room (where the air-conditioning had failed) in the open air outside to discuss with equally heat-stressed Norwegian marine and indigenous self-government friends the prospects of Nunavut-Torres Strait-North Norway cooperation (which now seems likely to proceed, it may be added). I had to fend off inquiries from officials about the latest incorrect interpretation of Nunavut found in a recent issue of *The Australian*, providing them with copies of my corrective letter to the editor. My apparently dilatory manner did not entirely reassure my colleague, a fiery Irish scientist running a very tight ship at this "workshop" C really a conference C although my principal function was never needed, i.e., to help with an expected political explosion within the conference over Islander sea rights and demands for self-government. Unbeknownst to my scientist friend, I was pre-occupied with papers I was writing to deadline a few days later for a Canadian royal commission. But the scientist needed no help, in any case, although she did not recognise that until the gathering was ended.

In meetings of the advisory-cum-steering group in the evenings, and over dawn breakfasts, Nunavut was the unspoken model. Although Australian governments and departments within governments had been feuding for years over what could or should be done in the way of coastal zone management, nothing had actually happened until this Nunavut-inspired project was launched. The launching had been almost accidental. Writing out some "principles and objectives" in a frantic draft letter from the Islander leader to the Queensland premier who was ramming land rights legislation through his parliament in 1991 C writing guidelines for future Torres Strait development, in effect C this Irishwoman and I, a Canadian, had simply referred to a Torres Strait marine strategy, then capitalised the phrase in the final document, and then... it took on a life of its own. It has, since then, brought the warring official and non-official factions together, and it was proudly described by the most respected expert at the conference as the leading project in Australian marine innovation, now and in the likely future. Even more incredibly, government officials at the workshop were eager to provide further funding.

The conference was followed immediately by a visit to Thursday Island by a special federal commission to hear a report from the workshop. The scientist and I provided them with a recent paper we had co-authored on Torres Strait and Nunavut marine issues. The commissioners were fretting about the lack of information on the Canadian, especially Nunavut, case. However, they had already commissioned a report from me for submission by late July, delivering the Nunavut experience to them as they wrote their final report (Jull 1993b). That report may well provide a framework for Australia's coastal future. Unlike Canada with its long mastication of issues, such policy formulation processes in Australia often lead to decisive and early action.

The Thursday Island workshop has now been written up and published (Mulrennan & Hanssen 1994). It has generated much interest and my Irish colleague who produced it is now teaching in the universities of Montreal and working among indigenous peoples in Northern Quebec. The Nunavut experience, as well as my report on the Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy as it is being applied among the First Nations of British Columbia, is now widely available in Australia through my report (Jull 1993b). The Australian federal government report drew heavily on that material in a fine indigenous chapter (RAC 1993).

More unexpectedly, I found tremendous interest among Sami on the Arctic Coast in late 1993 when I innocently took along copies of my Nunavut-centred report, *A Sea Change* (Jull 1993b), to a conference I was attending there. There is obvious need for an indigenous marine network internationally, and Inuit or the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, having done so much work on the issue internationally already (especially with Greenland and Alaska), might be logical sponsors. In the wake of Rio's Earth Summit and growing

The new social, geo-political, and constitutional realities manifested in Nunavut need elaboration. Nunavut, like other Northern and sparsely settled regions in Canada where indigenous peoples live, is a new entity with a new identity. Canada will no longer have a simple European consensus in socio-politics and national culture & difficult as even that has been to realise in practice! & because a different sort of culture and people will be at the federation table. Of course, the variety of First Nations cultures sharing in constitutional work for some years past in Canada has brought this fact home to Canadian political *élites*, if not so thoroughly to the general public. Little has apparently been done to look at the larger implications, however. The problem forces us to reconsider the form and content of the nation-state. In Quebec where an ethno-nationalist movement has for many years sought with considerable success to redefine the political system around the identity and history of a single cultural community, i.e., the descendants of French settlers from the 17th and 18th centuries, some indigenous peoples such as Inuit and Crees have found it difficult to feel comfortable. That is, the ethno-nationalist nature of this emerging Quebec conflicts with the ethno-nationalism of indigenous peoples. Elsewhere in Canada the accommodation of indigenous peoples has not faced that ideological obstacle. It has become inevitable that Quebec will be judged harshly by critics for any failure in its actions towards indigenous peoples, just as it is inevitable that most Quebecois will resent any judgment by outsiders.

If we see in Canada today two uncertain forms of government arising from the ashes of British North America, they may be called *post-imperial* and *ethno-national*. By the use of "imperial" here, no hint is intended of the meaning suggested of an evil empire where the whim of a dictator is the dreaded law. Whether the Roman Empire was a multi-cultural world of opportunity, a nasty martial law dictatorship, an urbane refuge from former local tyrants or from neighbouring hordes no doubt varied across time and place and social class. We have become used to thinking of imperialism solely in images such as Nazi Germany or Stalin's USSR first crushing and then brutally occupying the territories of others, or in some of America's 20th century adventures in Latin America.

We might usefully look at mature empires in another way. Perhaps the archetypal modern empire is best expressed by Kafka in his story, "An Imperial Message", written in 1917 (Kafka 1988, 4-5). In the story the emperor himself, despite the best attempts of his officials, is unable to get his dying message through the milling millions to reach *you* & the story being addressed to "you, the humble subject." (Canada Post rather than the Kuwait war of 1990-91 may be typical of the new world order.) The mature empire, as distinct from the great power greedily acquiring territory, often appears in modern literature & e.g., Joyce's *Ulysses*, Musil's *Man Without Qualities*, Eliot's *Waste Land*, Pound's and Waley's translations from Chinese, Tynyanov's *Lieutenant Kijé*, the African and Caribbean worlds of the Naipauls, and Rushdie's India and Pakistan (i.e., the lost Empire-cum-Commonwealth). Joyce missed out on the republican violence of Ireland in his lifetime by living abroad, but his references to the Duke of Wellington and his "big white horse" in *Finnegans Wake* were no less subversive. Typically these mature empires harbour or actually spawn diversity and ingenuity, while their political apparatus is distant, largely ceremonial, incompetent, or even simply comical. It becomes *sinister* in those moments when foul purpose and efficiency combine, but these are few. Artists and writers may have seen a more everyday & even a truer & empire than those of us who properly detest figurative imperialism.

For our purposes here a POST-IMPERIAL political structure means no more than one which is loose enough to sustain a variety of regions and peoples, in which there is no rigorous enforcement of an official culture, and in which tolerance and accommodation rather than homogeneity and integration are pursued as political goals. Indeed, in his

celebrated recent analysis of the rise and fall of European empires and of America, Kennedy concludes that the attempt of some "oriental empires" to promote uniformity rather than diversity was one of the major reasons they failed to gain the power and prosperity of the Europeans (Kennedy, 1988, xvii). In our new model European empire, or world culture, where England's language is the most widely spoken even though England is insignificant in the political order, a world empire where many languages are spoken and published, each in its own confident nation or region, we use *empire* as a metaphor only: it is an empire without Ulster violence (one of the few uncomfortable holdovers from Britain's real empire!), but one where, as we see around us, values like human rights are globally shared and globally monitored, where nobody remembers who first implemented workman's compensation or child labour laws, where a socio-ethnic majority's national identity may be most strongly expressed in confidence that the trains will run on time and in minorities' confidence that the police are generally fair and honest, and where we can sigh that "none of us had much appreciation for the kind of courage it takes to get shot for the idea of a nation which is...a cultural association of psychopaths who...marched off with a volume of Goethe in their knapsacks, to skewer Frenchmen and Russians on their bayonets" (Huelsenbeck, quoted in Lewis 1988, 2).

We are now reliving through television the same kind of horrors in Europe which fired the post-war Canadian officials and idealists who designed Northern policy and who designed the first Nunavut (which was to be called Nunassiaq and had progressed as far as a coat of arms and a bill in Parliament). Too often, however, in our initial post-war enthusiasm for the elimination of racism and discrimination, we thought we could wish away culture and homogenise others in what was not really a world order at all but a distinctly Anglo-Celtic tradition. We were wrong. We have now learned what we should have known all along, living as we have been in a federal state with its embrace of regional culture and national opportunity: that respect for rights and culture, not their elimination, and self-government by territorially-based peoples, are the beginnings of cross-cultural accommodation in a workable political system. This applies to Nunavut no less than to Quebec, or to Nunavik within Quebec. Sometimes it seems as if the British Parliament of 1774 and the Scots, Irish and English political figures of Canada in 1867 better understood these complex realities of ethnic nations than we do today.

The Economist and other quaint organs of the old empire like to fault Canadians for lack of national theme, myth, or purpose, but two thousand years of internecine slaughter, being Europe's principal historical benefit from ethno-nationalism, may be something we are willing to forego. Canadians should feel less uncomfortable about their national political experience and celebrate it. They need not sink into despair and apathy because they are not a mean jingoistic people viciously pursuing some border conflict or recovering some ancient territory or long-forgotten right *vis-à-vis* their neighbours.

Australians now in the throes of republican fervour should also think carefully about these matters. The republicans to date have generally been open, tolerant spirits, but any upsurge in the desire to define Australianness in such an already xenophobic country must cause concern for Aborigines, Torres Strait Islanders, and other minorities. There are some persons in the Canberra parliament in all parties whose potential for misusing nationalist policies and laws makes one shudder. The Clerk of the Senate in Canberra has also sensed the latent paradoxes of a change in political system, arguing that the monarchic *form* in Australia better maintains the best republican values, while the new Australian "republicans" are promoting a power-centralising system which threatens to remove the various checks and balances essential to a true republic ("Senate clerk warns of republic power bid", *Australian Financial Review*, May 14, 1993). Within a week of that article appearing, the Australian Prime Minister launched an attack on New Zealanders in Australia as befitting disproportionately from Australian welfare programs, a favourite slur in Aussie pub lore, despite the large investments, employment

creation, and tax paid by New Zealanders and the undoubted brain drain from New Zealand into Australia. The New Zealand foreign minister remarked calmly that New Zealand sees "Australia as part of our Commonwealth relationship" whereas Australia sees NZ as just another foreign nation ("Kiwis still in there fighting to be friends", *The Australian*, May 20, 1993). In other words, the more generous ideals of empire may continue on one side of the Tasman Sea more than on the other.

Whether Canada can keep its post-imperial form from dissolving entirely, and whether that formlessness or flexibility can yet provide enough attraction to Quebec nationalists as an alternative to full sovereign independence, has important implications for Nunavut and all indigenous peoples no less than for other Canadians. Indigenous peoples must hope for greater accommodation. Nunavut could become an important symbol for Nunavik and other indigenous homelands in Quebec: a demonstration that an indigenous people secure in its territory and with powers of self-government promotes social and economic stability.

The fact remains that Canada is the only country in the world where the national majority has willingly set about re-negotiating the terms of nationhood with the earlier population of indigenous peoples.¹ Nunavut is the largest and most visible part of that process. It sets a standard which deserves wide publicity in the world. Through national and Northern accommodation of indigenous cultures, Canada has raised implicit questions about national constitutional structure and hinterland development elsewhere within its own borders and in the wider world. This sort of change may be the wave of the future in many countries.

PRACTICAL ACTIONS

Canadians have been depressed and discouraged about constitutional development in recent years, unaware that indigenous peoples such as the Inuit of Nunavut have helped the country to undergo a flowering of constitutional creativity and, quite possibly, the beginnings of a national transformation. It would be useful to provide a public forum for discussion of some of these changes, for instance by funding the Nunavut claims body, TFN, and the Inuit Circumpolar Conference to host an international public forum or conference on emerging trends in Northern government. It is remarkable that Canada has not hosted a major conference of international Northern peoples to discuss self-government experience and aspirations in a forum open to the news media and public, the more so as Canadians have rather more to discuss than the other circumpolar countries in which many such conferences have been held. A closed conference with little or no indigenous participation was held in Ottawa's Chateau Laurier hotel in summer 1984 in connection with a Royal Commission. That conference was useful, and an excellent short summary of it was published later (Whittington 1985). Despite the lack of such Canadian conferences, Northern Canada's indigenous leaders and their political/constitutional advisers have been in demand at Northern self-government conferences abroad. It seems strange that one should have been wined and dined in, for instance, Darwin, Australia; Wellington, New Zealand; Tromsø, Norway; Anchorage, Alaska; and Copenhagen many times, after giving talks on Nunavut and Northern Canadian indigenous political achievements, despite the lack of a Canadian forum. This very lack may be a major reason for one of the problems identified in this paper: that Canadians are unaware of the significant creative constitutional change in their own country brought about by indigenous peoples in the South (Cassidy & Bish 1989; Cassidy 1991) and in the North (Jull 1986; Jull 1992a; Jull 1994a). To many Canadians

¹ Australia could well be the second.

frightened by change, recession, uncertainty, massive job losses, and the scare tactics of the poorer sort of politician, indigenous political and constitutional development may seem to be an unwelcome raid on what is left of the national store because the positive nation-building aspects of indigenous self-government have rarely been communicated. In Northern Canada these have been most comprehensive, and herald a new sort of Canadian national identity.

Being a "good news story" in troubled times, the Nunavut innovations in cooperative indigenous-government environmental protection and resource management deserve to be more widely shared. They could provide answers to the sorts of conflict which predictably arise when a hydro project or new mine is rumoured. Nunavut-style sustainable development has tremendous application in its general principles anywhere in Canada, and its specific details may be useful to other indigenous peoples in negotiations.

It certainly has wide application abroad. Nunavut is arguably Canada's strongest action to date in giving effect to the global sustainable development ethic flowing from the Brundtland Report C and especially from that report's section dealing with indigenous peoples (Brundtland 1987, 114-116).

The preceding two paragraphs deal with a common problem: the need for strategic and overview approaches to Northern Canada. Often academic research militates against this, and we read a fine general-sounding title only to discover that we are reading about an isolated case. Such research must continue, but in the immortal words of a late Canadian, we must now put Humpty-Dumpty together again C and find out if he is a good egg! (Marshall McLuhan, of course.) Isolated communities of indigenous peoples need the sort of overviews, such as that of Cassidy and Bish (1989), which provide a large context, a sense of trends. Senator Charlie Watt, leader of Northern Quebec Inuit, said once of an NWT politician, "His trouble is that he is always thinking in black and white!" That is, not in technicolour. Not with sufficient imagination. We also need to step back and look at the whole picture, rather than pulverising our own little piece of it.

As a young Torres Strait Islander said recently at a major policy conference on Thursday Island, "Your sons and daughters shall prophesy, your old men shall dream dreams, your young men shall see visions!" (Joel 2:28) The use of such powerful images from the 1611 Bible did not seem out of place at the conference, although it caused some of the White workshop facilitators present, with their "vision"-seeking techniques of conference management, to retire humbly in silence. Such developments today C the creation or transformation of societies, whether in Northern Canada or Torres Strait C are profound and immense. They need to be treated in the large spirit befitting. It is worth noting that high on a neglected arch of the Peace Tower entrance to Ottawa's Parliament is the biblical comment, "Where there is no vision, the people perish."

On specific matters, there is a need for comparative regional studies between various indigenous homelands of Northern Canada C both the provincial and territorial North C and comparable regions abroad. The most pressing projects for work should be the regions of the circumpolar North C Alaska, Greenland, the Faroe Islands, Shetland, Sapmi (or Lapland, the North of Norway, Sweden, and Finland) and Russia. North Norway may be especially relevant today with its burgeoning sense of regionalism in the confines of a unitary state creating policy and political tensions. Northern regional policy remains a critical national issue ("Norway not hooked", *The Economist*, May 22, 1993). Work underway at the University of Tromsø on indigenous issues and regionalism (including socio-political myth-making), as well as resource management and development issues, are all of interest to Northern Canada. Tromsø scholars take a very strong interest in Canada, and make logical partners for research and exchange programs.

There must also be increased opportunity for indigenous persons in Nunavut and Canada

generally to make study visits to these other countries. Australia has a federal program for such indigenous study visits overseas. Travellers should also have some preparation in order to make the most of their opportunities. This author has written a small guide to assist Australians visiting Canada and other "first world" locations, for instance (Jull 1992d).

Australia must also be a partner for Canadian comparative research. Too little has been done. The most obvious needs here are for comparative studies between the Northern Territory, Yukon, and Northwest Territories (e.g., Loveday 1991; Jull 1994a), and between Queensland and Western Australia, as resource frontiers where attitudes towards indigenous peoples and land/sea rights have been aggressively negative, and British Columbia and Alberta. The fact that Queensland now has a reformist labour government like BC has not escaped the notice of some Australian politicians who have visited BC to find out what they can learn in relation to aboriginal development. Meanwhile, the first book of comparative Northern case studies in Australia, mainly dealing with Canada, but with Alaska and Norway also included, has surprised its authors by selling well both within Australia and through overseas orders (Jull and Roberts 1991).

Studies should focus most immediately on histories of social process and cross-cultural relations; legal and administrative history (including land rights); constitutional development; ethno-political organisation; indigenous aspects of environment and sustainable development; and resource management. These are urgent issues at the political level, although specific social issues like alcohol and domestic violence are no less important. Furthermore, an active program of *timely* translation of books and documents, especially from the Nordic countries, is needed. (Canada, for its part, could achieve much goodwill and provide much useful information by depositing good publications, including the better government reports, in Northern libraries abroad C in Nuuk, Torshavn, Tromsø, Alta, Kautokeino, Karasjok, etc., rather than national capitals.)

Studies must no longer be confined to traditional researchers and research bodies alone. There is a need to bring together indigenous organisations and communities; government officials; and research bodies (i.e., universities and independent bodies like the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee). Some helpful insights are contained in Dacks *et al.* (1990). Indigenous peoples should direct any research, wherever possible. Research results on social issues should be made publicly available, subject to ethical guidelines required to protect indigenous interests. The Quebec Inuit Makivik Corporation developed an excellent research department from the mid-1970s, whereby university researchers from many disciplines worked with local Inuit and were soon gaining major government research contracts (as well as carrying out projects necessitated by the 1975 land claims agreement). Knowledge and research are essential means by which indigenous people can redress the power and money imbalance between their Northern communities and big government and big industry outside. The development of Northern social research in the broadest sense, under indigenous control, is urgently required in Nunavut and the rest of the North. In the case of Nunavut, a research institute with community out-reach and comparative circumpolar functions is desirable. The Canadian Arctic Resources Committee has accumulated the sort of expertise which could be usefully employed in its creation, as have bodies like the Australian National University's North Australia Research Unit.

In June 1989 I returned to Canada to do some work for Inuit. Having recently been unnerved by a spell in a Sydney hospital's neurology ward, I was unusually grateful to be alive and to see Canada after years away. The death of Mark Gordon early in that April had been a deep shock and a deeper personal loss. I wanted to visit Canada to see his family and our mutual friends. Letters and contract work sent back and forth are no substitute. Some weeks in Montreal, Quebec City, and Ottawa were wonderful. But before returning to Australia I was asked to join the Inuit ICC team for the 3-yearly ICC assembly in Greenland. The first stop was Kuujuaq where on a sunny day I visited Mark's grave on a windswept hillside outside the town. Then on to Søndre Strømfjord and Sisimiut, a town all rock bluffs, steep lanes, and modern buildings. I was put up in an orphanage.

It was good to see old friends. There were the same people who had been at earlier ICC meetings. Furthermore, Sisimiut was the home of the Inuit organiser of that distant 1973 conference in Copenhagen. He hovered around the edges of this 1989 gathering as a revered elder statesman. For the first time there was a Soviet delegation at the ICC made up of Inuit and Chukchi and republic officials. A young Russian diplomat who looked and dressed like a fresh English boarding school leaver worked patiently with me trying to un-jam the photocopier in a hall. The Cold War was over in the Arctic. But the real eye-opener was the conference itself.

When formed in 1977 the ICC had brought people from remote areas together to try to get a better hearing from powerful national and international interests, such as the US government, Big Oil, etc. Now all that had changed. The same people were present, but were no longer young. Instead of idealistic resolutions they now had interests of their own, they knew the political sensitivities, and they were running significant organisations or territories with complex agendas. Political figures had come from the four nation-states C Denmark, Canada, USA, USSR C and sub-national units within these. These politicians did not make the familiar patronising speeches applauding Inuit initiative as in times past, but reported on behalf of governments on their record to date in implementing ICC resolutions. There were many pointed questions being asked of them in the corridors, although the public sessions were gracious. It was really an international accountability session with the governments of the USSR and USA, Alaska and Chukotka Autonomous Region, Denmark and Canada, Quebec and Greenland and the Northwest Territories, saying how well they were doing on improving environmental standards or schools, and how much better they expected to do by the time of the next assembly.

Part III

Conclusions and Recommendations

Unlike the 'long nineteenth century', which seemed, and actually was, a period of almost unbroken material, intellectual AND MORAL progress, that is to say of improvement in the conditions of civilized life, there has, since 1914, been a marked regression from the standards then regarded as normal in the developed countries and in the milieus of the middle classes and which were confidently believed to be spreading to the more backward regions and the less enlightened strata of the population.

(EMPHASIS IN ORIGINAL, P 13, *AGE OF EXTREMES: THE SHORT TWENTIETH CENTURY, 1914-1991*, MICHAEL JOSEPH, LONDON, 1994. BY ERIC HOBSBAWM

In this quotation Professor Hobsbawm is not suggesting that living conditions or the status of the working class, women, or minorities were better before 1914 than today. Rather, he is arguing as he has done before, e.g., in *The Age of Empire* (1987), that the ideals and values animating social and political élites, their imagined world or ideal world C the New Jerusalem for which they were aiming C were nobler or higher or morally superior to those held by the leadership of the Atlantic world today. For a generation brought up to regard Neville Chamberlain as the ultimate gutlessly immoral modern leader, as we are, the world leaders of the past several years have made Chamberlain look positively heroic as they babble about Yugoslavia and other horrors. Nor did Chamberlain have to face a Hitler doing his genocide on prime time television daily.

While Canada may plead innocence of such horrors, citing our famous (or infamous) niceness, various backlashes and mean streaks have become evident in recent years at home. That is why Nunavut, and the various other indigenous ethno-regions now growing from the grass roots up, with some support and input from the top, are so important. They prove to Canadians that

- our constitutional traditions and society are healthy even now, capable of new growth and renewal;
- we are not all nasty backbiting racists, incapable of embracing other traditions whether Inuit or Québécois, Dene or Acadian;
- we can find social/political consensus while solving the great problems of the emerging new world, i.e., environmental management, resource rights, cross-cultural relations, and a pragmatic mix of state and private initiative; and
- we are world-class in terms of ideas and social policy for export, nowhere more evident in the Inuit developments at home and in Circumpolar relations, if we would only have the courage to take a little pride in our achievements.

That is the big picture, but an accurate one. more specifically, Nunavut is the foremost symbol of a great change taking place across Canada. While Canadians and their governments at home have been generally slow to realise its importance, and its wider implications, interested persons and groups in countries overseas have not. Nunavut has three principal implications in international context:

- it communicates a new political order, a new Canada which embraces indigenous peoples and their homelands as well as a society of European peoples who have provided the majority of settlers in recent centuries, implicitly calling on the rest of the world to adopt similar policies towards indigenous peoples;
- it embodies a new sort of dispersed and environmentally sensitive national development in countries which had previously accepted a concentrated, urban-centred, industrial model of identity in which hinterlands were seen largely as industrial resources or picturesque holdovers of a European farming/fishing past; and
- it is one of a new category of cultures and societies emerging as political realities which will soon make up the greater part of Canada's territory and which has counterparts in many other countries (e.g., the circumpolar countries and Australia) in each of which non-European culture and values merge with international technology and perspectives to create a distinct new regional society.

These three facts have been almost totally ignored by governments, authors, researchers, and the world community who have generally seen only the specifics of individual cases.² Yet they may be the most significant new facts of life in modern Canada!

It is desirable that the Nunavut message be more widely communicated abroad. A program of speakers, both indigenous leaders and expert staff/advisers, should be available for that purpose, equipped with video and written information. This could be a pilot project for a more general Indigenous Canadian Nation-Builders Program to take those creating and re-creating a new indigenous Canada C and new Canada in the process C to other lands where their inspiration and information are urgently needed. Such places might immediately include Australia, Russia, Alaska, and Scandinavia, with advice from the Department of Foreign Affairs on prospects and sensitivities for visits to Latin America and Africa.

Quebec calls the Northland *Nouveau Québec*. This conveys much more than a mere regional sense. It is time for us to think about a new stage of national development centred on a huge region, a sort of *Nouveau Canada*, lying North of our major urban areas but with values and imperatives affecting all Canadians. Thanks to the international work of Inuit and other indigenous peoples, we need no longer know this zone as a poor or backward neighbour to our Southern cities, but as a region which is truly part of a new international community made up of similar new regional societies. This is very different from C and more promising than C the Mid-Canada Corridor concept of more than 20 years ago. For one thing, this new Canada is appearing already, led by the permanent residents of the area, unlike that earlier noble but doomed scheme of outside planners. Nor is this mere civil engineering, but a patchwork of cultural and social communities a-building from the ground up.

Until now Canadians and their governments have generally visualised the indigenous future in *either/or* terms of conventional province-like structures and small self-governing bands. Now Canadian governments, researchers, and information media must prepare the way of Nunavut and all the other Nunavuts C that is, indigenous-shaped or re-shaped hinterland societies C to emerge across the Canadian North, each with its own special character and needs. Nunavut and the other regional claims developments to date have been too much conducted in an air of weary concession by governments. It is time for a conceptual shift. Having had the courage and commitment to initiate this sort of regional socio-cultural and political accommodation in reality, indigenous and non-indigenous Canadians should now catch up with themselves through policies and research to consolidate the achievement at home and to share it with the world abroad. Most urgently this requires new study, thinking, and official understanding of cross-cultural relations, social change, ecologically sustainable development, remote area service delivery, customary law and local tradition in governance, locally and regionally manageable politico-administration and organisation, and political studies. It might logically begin in a Nunavut Institute of social studies founded to supply the first such

² A notable except has been Australia where Donna Criag of Macquarie University law school and her team have fed a whole new movement for *regional agreements* among Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders with their analyses of Nunavut and other Canadian comprehensive claims experience, e.g., Richardson BJ, Craig D, & Boer B, 1994: "Indigenous Peoples and Environmental Management: A Review of Canadian Regional Agreements and Their Potential Application to Australia C Part 1", *Environmental and Planning Law Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 4, August 1994, 320-343, and "Part 2", Vol. 11, No. 5, October 1994, 357-381.

new society with independent research and analysis.

There are those (both narrow nationalists in Francophone and Anglophone communities, and liberal assimilationists) who wish to stamp out such diversity. They hanker after homogeneous national society with atomised individuals, regardless of regional or cultural differences. The debate will not end soon, or perhaps, ever. The narrow uniformists will take heart from recession and global uncertainty to press for "streamlined" (i.e., monolithic) political structures. Something which picks up the more positive aspects of the late days of empire as they were lived within Europe C multi-cultural, tolerant, conducive to the sort of world culture and values which now typify life on earth (and which, paradoxically, are brought home by the common purpose and revulsion of all peoples from the Cliffs of Moher to the Urals in response to genocide in Bosnia) is more relevant. The uniformists will, however, argue against even completing the establishment of Nunavut. Nunavut's creation is in the vital interest of all Canadian indigenous peoples, and indigenous peoples around the world. It is also in the interests of all Canadians who favour an open, civilised society and who wish to avoid ethno-centric backlashes in any part of the country. It must succeed.

Specific questions of a *de facto* or future international nature may be raised by Quebec secession from Canada.

1. Could Nunavut with its much greater population, 3-4 times that of Nunavik (the Inuit North of Quebec), be a provider of Inuit services to Quebec Inuit?
2. Could Nunavut federate with Nunavik and Inuit North Labrador for some or all public services, even if Nunavik remained part of a sovereign independent Quebec? An interesting proposal for such a Sami federation among the Scandinavian countries has been elaborated by the late A. Grahl-Madsen (1986; 1988).
3. Could a Greater Nunavut, a concept sometimes aired by Inuit leaders in both Nunavut and Nunavik, be created as a new territory or province out of North Labrador, Nunavik, and Nunavut in a post-Quebec crisis Canadian constitution?

If Quebec leaves the Canadian federation, or is persuaded to stay, that will not occur without major constitutional bargaining on a new division of powers (and boundaries?) among all regions of Canada. At that moment all possibilities which may have seemed unthinkable in the past become thinkable. The shocking neglect of North Labrador by federal and provincial governments to date C the most damning disproof of Canadian indigenous rectitude C invites radical solutions, in any case.

In any case, the Quebec Inuit determination to remain part of Canada and the equally determined view in the current Quebec government that Nunavik will go, will require inspired handling. In 1751 the Crowns of Denmark-Norway and Sweden ended a war with a boundary commission in Sami territory which based new national boundaries on indigenous use and occupancy, on indigenous customs and preferences, and on mutual non-belligerence and on exempting the indigenous people from any military service which might pit them against each other. A very civilised solution, surely, and one which *in its spirit* if not its details recommends itself to Canadians today.

It would be more useful for Canadians to regard themselves as the first 21st century country than as a failure of 19th century nationalism. The embrace of cultural and racial pluralism, of a respect for environment, of significant decision-making power devolved to local people, of a rejection of the cultural dictatorship of capital cities and national *élites*

so typical of European civilisation, of charity and tolerance towards all, and of institutions and arrangements of collective enterprise and benefit to solve problems of under-development would be, indeed, a new world order. It is already the new Northern Canada order.

EPILOGUE

In the Dark Time (Mörketid) on the Sami Arctic coast at the end of 1993, an international conference was held in Tromsø by the Sami Centre at the University. Dr. Terry Fenge and I were there, both of us speaking in no small measure about Nunavut. I was very ill after a chill caught in Bangkok's super-cooled airport on my way to the conference, so that when Rigoberta Menchu was whisked out of an interview chair surrounded by TV crews, I was whisked into it so that a Sami doctor could go to work on me. Despite the fact that I was accompanying the Torres Strait Islander delegation from Queensland where we all live, I had to miss a good deal of what was going on, though exceptionally grateful when a friend brought me a fine pair of Sami mitts which had been presented to me *in absentia* at a banquet. Mitts are not generally found in Queensland shops.

Nonetheless, the currents at the conference, and afterward, would have been impossible to miss. Many Sami leaders, while acting the gracious hosts, were not at all *re-acting* to the fact that an expert commission which had been studying their rights to land and water for 13 years had just reported that *they had no rights!* In other words, while many Sami leaders believed themselves to be the most fortunate and advanced of the world's indigenous peoples C a familiar Scandinavian cultural attitude of superiority which they have adopted C there for all to see was their failure on even the most basic points of the world's indigenous agenda.

This experience has caused me much concern (see for instance Part V of another Royal Commission, *A Thousand Years*, 2nd ed, Jull 1994b). After all, it raises questions about indigenous internationalism in general. While a mature international system of indigenous rights and restored political peoplehood may indulge itself in ceremonial dinners and comfortable discussions... "we're fighting a war here, Sergeant!" as heroes used to say in the movies. There are more urgent priorities.

While it is fine for nation-state governments to buy indigenous leaders a few dinners or plane tickets abroad or a royal or republican or other medal at New Year's, such luxurious symbols do not mask the reality: indigenous peoples are dispossessed nations attempting to recover political and economic rights. In the absence of any satisfactory international or national systems of rights recognition, all such people owe each other and themselves a duty to share experience and expertise. There is not yet any study discipline of indigenous political science or indigenous public administration. Both are needed, preferably as a single or joint discipline. Until they are available, indigenous leaders must listen to each other across national boundaries, rather than to the Siren songs of national politicians who want to keep them from thinking too much about their rights. Indigenous leaders have overcome governments at home who told them they didn't need lawyers, but without those lawyers they could never have regained the recognition they have in Canada today. Now indigenous leaders and organisations must be no less hard-nosed about international ties.

Those ties should centre on vital interests of rights and politics, not on good dinners or sight-seeing. There is much to be learned and much to be shared. The main reason why indigenous peoples have gained as much as they have in recent decades is that the international rights standards have been pushed higher and have been shared; when an indigenous people ignores its own debt and potential contribution to those standards, it is undermining its own future political possibilities.

Whereas indigenous leaders in other parts of the world seem to wait for official non-indigenous bodies to bestow political and constitutional change on them., e.g., in Scandinavia, the Inuit of Nunavut had to create everything themselves. They had no agreed territorial boundaries. They had no political or legal bodies. They had no recent social links among scattered regions. They had no power or funds. They had to create everything themselves from nothing. They had only their ethno-national identity and their determination to succeed. They have succeeded. *That* is the real international implication of Nunavut.

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