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Canadian Military Journal welcomes the submission of manuscripts on topics of broad significance to the defence community in Canada, including, but not limited to, security and defence policy, strategic issues, doctrine, operations, force structures, the application of technology, equipment procurement, military history, leadership, training and military ethics. Forward-looking pieces which present original concepts or ideas, new approaches to old problems and fresh interpretation are especially welcome.

Authors are asked to note the following general guidelines:

- Manuscripts may be submitted in either official language.
- As a general rule, manuscripts of major articles should be between 3500 to 6000 words in length, including endnotes. However, shorter pieces are also welcomed, especially views and opinions that engage in the debate of relevant issues, as are letters to the editor.
- Manuscripts must be submitted in electronic format, on disc or by e-mail, in MS Word or WordPerfect. E-mail address: cmj.rmc@forces.gc.ca. The preferred program is MS Word.
- Manuscripts should be accompanied by appropriate graphs, charts, photographs, maps or other illustrations which illuminate the context of the article. All images sent electronically, including photos, charts, figures, and graphs, should be no smaller than 5”x7” and saved at 300 dpi as a JPEG or TIF file in Photoshop or other well-known formats. Expressed another way, an individual image of 1MB will usually suffice for publication purposes. If in doubt about image suitability, contact either the Editor or the Publication Manager for guidance. Illustrations from a Powerpoint program cannot be used because the resolution is too low (72 dpi).
- Manuscripts should conform to standard academic style, using Oxford English or Petit Robert spelling, with endnotes rather than footnotes.
- Acronyms and military abbreviations should be used sparingly, but, if unavoidable, they may be used in the body of the text provided that the term is written out in full the first time it is used, followed by the abbreviated form in brackets. On the other hand, military jargon and slang terms should, as a rule, be avoided.
- All submissions must be accompanied by a brief (one paragraph) biographical sketch of the author which includes current appointment, telephone number, e-mail address and mailing address.

All manuscripts normally will be reviewed anonymously by at least two external readers from the Editorial Board, who will make recommendations to the Editor as to suitability for publication. Manuscripts will be judged on the originality and quality of the argument or discussion, the relevance and timeliness of the topic, and on quality of the writing style.

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Vol. 16, No. 3, Summer 2016

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Caribou Memorial at Newfoundland Memorial Park on the Somme commemorating Newfoundland's losses from the battles of the First World War, particularly those at Beaumont Hamel, 1 July 1916.
Credit: Image ID D3OBRC © Ian Nellist/Alamy Stock Photo

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Canadian Military Journal/Revue militaire canadienne is the official professional journal of the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence. It is published quarterly under authority of the Minister of National Defence. Opinions expressed or implied in this publication are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of National Defence, the Canadian Armed Forces, Canadian Military Journal, or any agency of the Government of Canada. Crown copyright is retained. Articles may be reproduced with permission of the Editor, on condition that appropriate credit is given to Canadian Military Journal. Each issue of the Journal is published simultaneously in print and electronic versions; it is available on the Internet at www.Canada.ca/canadian-military-journal.

ISSN 1492-465X
Welcome to yet another summer edition of the Canadian Military Journal. The majestic caribou stag statue that graces our cover was deliberately chosen to honour the gallant yet futile sacrifices of the men of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment at Beaumont Hamel in France, one hundred years ago this summer. It was at Beaumont Hamel, on 1 July 1916, during the opening day of the Somme Offensive, that the regiment fought its first battle in France, and it would be its costliest of the entire war.

At the dawn of 1916, the two great opposing armies remained deadlocked on the Western Front in a line of trenches that stretched nearly 1000 kilometres from the Swiss frontier through France and out to the Belgian coast. In numerous attempts to break the stalemate, both sides “…adhered to outdated army traditions and relied on massive, head-on infantry assaults. As attack after attack failed, the toll in human lives grew rapidly… The Allied plan for 1916 was to launch simultaneous offensives on the Western, Eastern, and Italian Fronts. In the West, the region of the Somme was chosen for a joint French and British assault about mid-year.” However, the Allied plan was upset in February when the Germans seized the initiative and launched a bloody and extended assault against the French at Verdun. “During this holocaust of fighting, the French sent frantic appeals to Sir Douglas Haig, the new British commander, to hasten the Somme offensive and take the pressure off Verdun. With French forces being so thoroughly decimated at Verdun, the British now had to assume full responsibility [for the summer offensive.]” The massive build-up for the campaign was planned well in advance, and by the end of June, all was ready. However, the German army had been long forewarned of the attack, and they were firmly entrenched along an extensive ridge of chalk hills that were very heavily fortified.
“On 1 July, in broad daylight, one hundred thousand men, the Newfoundlanders among them, climbed out of their trenches and advanced shoulder to shoulder in line, one behind the other, across the crater-torn waste of No Man’s Land. Weighed down by 30 kilograms of equipment each, they advanced slowly towards the waiting German guns.” Starting from the British support trench known as St. John’s Road, the Newfoundlanders had to traverse some 230 metres of fire-swept terrain before they even reached their own front lines. When they finally emerged at the edge of No Man’s Land, they looked down an incline to see, for the first time, the German wire more than 500 metres away. “It was a wonder that any man could remain unhit more than a minute in the inferno of fire that swept across the exposed slopes. Nevertheless, holding as best they could the parade-ground formations then prescribed for assaulting infantry by the General Staff, the thinning ranks pushed steadily forward. Half-way down the slope, an isolated tree marked an area where the enemy’s shrapnel was particularly deadly. Called “The Danger Tree,” its twisted skeleton has been preserved and still stands at the spot where many a gallant Newfoundlander fell on that tragic July day.”

The attack by the brave Newfoundlanders was over in less than thirty minutes. Afterwards, the British Divisional Commander wrote of the Newfoundland Regiment’s effort: “It was a magnificent display of trained and disciplined valour, and its assault failed of success because dead men can advance no further.”

Before the day was done, British army casualties at the Somme would total 57,470, of which 19,240 were fatalities. “No unit suffered heavier losses than the Newfoundland Regiment, which had gone into action 801 strong. When the roll call of the unwounded was taken next day, only 68 answered their names. The final figures that revealed the virtual annihilation of the Battalion gave a grim account of 233 killed or died of wounds, 386 wounded, and 91 missing. Every officer who went forward in the Newfoundland attack was either killed or wounded.”

“In the Beaumont Hamel Memorial Park, which was officially opened by Earl Haig on 7 June 1925, the monument of the great bronze caribou, emblem of the Regiment, stands on the highest point overlooking the site of St. John’s Road and the slopes beyond. At the base of the statue three tablets of bronze carry the names of 814 members of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment, the Newfoundland Royal Naval Reserve, and the Mercantile Marine – those who gave their lives in the First World War and have no known grave… In the park, two small cemeteries, Hawthorne Ridge No. 2 and Y Ravine, contain the graves of many who fell on that fateful day.”

A portion of the trench that was part of the 1916 battlefield at Beaumont Hamel.
EDITOR’S CORNER

With respect to our current issue, General Jonathan Vance, our Chief of the Defence Staff, ‘takes the point’ with a status report for Operation HONOUR, the over-arching effort he launched last August within which the Canadian Armed Forces was tasked to address harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour within its ranks. While General Vance concedes that significant progress has been made, there is still much work to be done. In his own words: ‘The change that is upon us of creating a culture ensuring a respectful, dignified professional environment for every member of the Canadian Armed Forces is both necessary and unavoidable. It is what is owed to those who risk all to defend their nation and its values. And it is pivotal to our continued success as a world-class fighting force. As with all our operations, Operation HONOUR will succeed.’

Next, Major-General Éric Tremblay, Commander of Military Personnel Generation and the Canadian Defence Academy, and Dr. Howard Coombs of the Royal Military College of Canada, opine that “…the time is at hand to create Reserve Forces with the capacity and capability to assist in meeting the ongoing challenges posed to Canada by complex domestic and international security settings.” They are followed by Dr. Kunal Mukherjee of the University of Lancaster in Great Britain, who examines contemporary China, and uses “…the ‘New War’ theory to understand conflicts in different parts of contemporary China, and to see to what extent this ‘New War’ theory fits in with the Chinese context, and helps us to understand those conflicts.” In so doing, Mukherjee introduces new case studies, those of Xinjiang and Tibet.

Two very different major articles related to military history and the lessons they provide round out this section of the issue. With respect to the lessons that history furnishes, and under the broader banner of the philosophy of global security, Dr. Marc Anderson examines the American philosopher Josiah Royce’s concept of international war insurance as he proposed it on the eve of the First World War. Anderson then re-examines Royce’s concept from two related vantage points… “First, by comparing it to the core assumptions behind the endeavours actually adopted, namely, the League of Nations and the United Nations, two prominent models of the way some larger scale attempts at collectives of defence have played out historically. Secondly… it will be reassessed in light of those attempts, from the perspective of the practical metaphysics of the form of insurance in relation to consistent community creation.”

We then offer two very different opinion pieces for consideration. In the first, Dr. Stephen Hare, Manager of Development and Support at the Defence Ethics Programme, furthers the dialogue with respect to the role for Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) chaplains and Defence ethics. Hare concludes: “The fundamental contrast between the approach of moral philosophy and that of theology… concerns the method of seeking the possible answers. Whether it is faith or reasoning which is the sine qua non of any ethical knowledge… The obstacles to making headway for an ethics program might well lead the organization to ask how these two functions, sharing the goal of helping members face the difficult challenges of their chosen profession of arms, can support each other better than they have up to now.” Then, Chief Warrant Officer Necole Belanger, currently the CWO for the Strategic Response Team on Sexual Misconduct, submits that the CAF “…has not adapted its senior NCM training, education, and more specifically, employment experience, to meet the present need of NCM leaders who require the abilities and commitment to contribute to CAF strategy (i.e., leading the institution). More precisely, the over-reliance upon our traditional model of training only serves to develop outstanding CPO1/CWO tacticians, who operate in silos of excellence at the tactical level.”

Next, our own Martin Shadwick explores the present government’s pledge to recommit to supporting international peace operations with the United Nations, making our specialized national capabilities available on a case-by-case basis. Finally, we close with a number of book reviews, including two different perspectives on the same book, which was penned by a distinguished Canadian historian.

Until the next time.

David L. Bashow Editor-in-Chief Canadian Military Journal

NOTE

1. Quoted passages are drawn from the souvenir booklet produced for the Newfoundland Beaumont Hamel Memorial by the Department of Public Affairs, Veterans Affairs Canada (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1983.)
The Chief of the Defence Staff, General Jonathan Vance, Addresses Sexual Misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces

“Remember upon the conduct of each depends the fate of all.”
- Alexander the Great

General Jonathan Vance, CMM, MSC, CD, was commissioned upon graduation from Royal Roads Military College in 1986. He later served as Deputy Commander of the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples and Commander of the Canadian Task Force in Kandahar, Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010. He then went on to be Commander of the Canadian Joint Operations Command in September 2014, and on 17 July 2015, he was appointed Chief of the Defence Staff.

Introduction

Canada’s rich military heritage is one of the nation’s most cherished achievements. Forged on the heights of Vimy Ridge, the murky waters of the North Atlantic and in the violent skies over England and occupied Europe, and more recently in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, our military legacy was shaped by unsurpassed courage, breath-taking audacity and an undeniable fighting spirit. From Mafeking to Medak and Kapyong to Kandahar, Canada’s warriors have consistently proven their mettle amongst the world’s best.

Yet ours is not merely a legacy of boldness and bravery. One of the hallmarks of Canadian military achievement has been our unwavering humanity regardless of how harrowing the environment. Indeed, the feats of Canadian sailors, soldiers and airmen and airwomen over the decades have almost always been characterized as much by compassion for those afflicted by conflict as by other attributes of our warrior acumen.

Canada’s fortunate and much-envied geography has dictated that most of our war-fighting, past and present, has occurred not at home protecting Canadian territory, but on foreign soil in support of allies and in defence of the national values we hold sacred: freedom, respect, dignity, fairness and opportunity. They are ideals over which Canadians have fought and died at home and especially abroad.

Embodying these values has always been central to the fabric of the Canadian military. This is why the revelations suggested in spring of 2014 and confirmed a year later that the Canadian Armed Forces continues to struggle with a problem it believed it had addressed many years ago is so devastating. That some CAF members have chosen, however consciously, to shun core values the CAF exists to defend is disturbing and merits immediate, decisive attention. However, as a professional soldier, to realize...
that this problem has manifested itself in situations where some serving members have preyed upon fellow brothers and sisters in arms is completely indefensible and utterly shameful.

Important as it is for the CAF to consistently uphold the national values it exists to defend, this is not the only reason why the institution must address the pressing problem of harmful and inappropriate behaviour. Fundamentally, every man and woman who willingly serves their country despite the many dangers and sacrifices of military service deserves a professional environment in which they are treated with respect and dignity. Yes, the nation regularly sends them into harm’s way, with the inherent dangers of injury, illness or even death. This is central to the function that we fill and the risks we take. However, it is unfathomable that serving members are psychologically or physically disrespected, threatened or victimized from within the organization they so proudly serve. As part of a leading national institution, Canadian Armed Forces members merit better.

Equally fundamental, any attitudes or behaviours adversely impacting the camaraderie, cohesion and confidence of serving members – the principles at the heart of a professional fighting force – will corrode the CAF’s operational effectiveness over time. If the implicit and unflinching mutual trust and confidence in one another regardless of gender or background is diminished in any way, we are less likely to step up with the same assurance, determination and effectiveness in the next firefight. There is no greater menace to the integrity and effectiveness of a force of last resort than the erosion of trust amongst serving members standing shoulder to shoulder.

When I became the Chief of the Defence Staff last July, I outlined that the CAF’s problem of harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour would be one of my top priorities because of its impact upon the continued success of our proud institution. I remain as convinced now as I was then that we must address this problem decisively and permanently.

I am regularly reminded by Canadians of all walks, including serving and former CAF members, that misguided attitudes and behaviours towards sexual behaviour have become a societal scourge affecting military and non-military organizations across the country and around the planet. Of course, they are not wrong. In recent years, the problem has become more pronounced, and countless organizations find themselves facing challenges very similar to ours.

My response to this is always twofold. First, the fact that the CAF is not alone in facing this situation does not make it any less serious to those in uniform afflicted or affected by it. And secondly, the problem’s eventual consequences on the CAF are much more profound than on almost any other organization. For most, it may translate into tarnished reputation, reduced market share or diminished bottom lines. For a professional fighting force, the impact of weakened trust and cohesion is often loss of life as well as decreased reliability on operations. Regardless of what is happening around us, we have a serious problem that we must fix now.

“There is no greater menace to the integrity and effectiveness of a force of last resort than the erosion of trust amongst serving members standing shoulder to shoulder.”
How did the CAF get here?

It is difficult to know exactly how or when the problem of harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour in the CAF came about. As with most complex issues, a combination of factors has resulted in the present situation. The institution relied on partial metrics that appeared to indicate that the situation was improving over time and was no longer a major problem. These included unit climate surveys and statistical data on female member attrition rates. In the wake of Madame Deschamps’ report, we’ve realized that some of this analysis was insufficient. Stated simply, we were not fully aware of the situation and its impacts.

Additionally, the institution and its leadership became somewhat tone-deaf around sexual misconduct, interpreting the environment through a prism that did not consistently reflect the realities on the ground. In my view, this was neither intentional nor manipulative, however its effects were no less harmful to the organization generally, and affected members specifically.

Finally, nothing happens in a vacuum. The twenty year period from the early-1990s to the early 2010s, dominated by protracted commitments in the Balkans and Afghanistan, was one of the most operationally intensive in modern Canadian military history. It catalyzed profound shifts in how we think, organize and operate that are still being untangled and codified. The first priority was operational, as it must be during such spikes. Amidst the pervasive change, some non-operational imperatives did not receive the level of attention they otherwise would or should have.

What is obvious, and what matters most, is that the issue of harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour within the Canadian Armed Forces has dogged the institution for much too long and must be solved rapidly, decisively and permanently—a commitment against which the CAF will rightfully be judged moving forward. We will not fix this by orders or decrees, and positive, sustainable change will not be imposed unilaterally from the top-down. The shifts in behaviours and attitudes required of the CAF must come from all of its members across the organization. The well-worn phrase that ‘we are all in this together’ could not be more accurate.

This is not to suggest for a moment that all or most of the members of the Canadian Armed Forces are guilty of thinking or behaving inappropriately. This is simply not the case. There is little doubt that the perpetrators of uniform-on-uniform sexual harassment and sexual violence are a small minority. However, the environment within which such acts are occurring is one shaped by each and every CAF member. Madame Deschamps spoke of the prevalence of a ‘sexualized culture’ within the grassroots of our institution. Regardless of the label put on it, the reality is that this environment must change. Achieving this will be an all-hands effort.

If our recent history tells us anything, it is that previous initiatives implemented to solve the problem were not effective, or effective enough. Past emphasis tended to focus on short-term behavioural change rather than alterations in longer-range attitudes essential for sustained culture change. Once attention on the problem decreased or shifted elsewhere, previous behaviours and attitudes generally returned.
In tandem with this punctual perspective was the absence of systemic measurement of the specific outcomes and overall change intended. Training and education programming on harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour was developed and delivered. The expectation was that it would yield the necessary results. Unfortunately, the outcomes it actually generated were not systematically measured, precluding the opportunity to confirm within the institution that the intended behavioural and attitudinal change was in fact occurring, or apply necessary adjustments to bring this about.

Finally, the CAF’s approach to addressing harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour has traditionally been framed as an organizational or corporate priority. For most organizations, this is imminently sensible. However, for a professional military force, with its unrelenting focus on operations, this approach has proven largely ineffective. In the eyes of many in uniform if not most, it relegated the endeavor to secondary importance. The direct relationship between solving this problem, upholding the warrior ethos, and sustaining CAF operational excellence was not made strongly enough. Instead, members were left to connect these dots and come to their own conclusions as to the significance of eliminating this scourge from the professional landscape.

These are shortcomings we cannot repeat if we are to finally break the cycle and inculcate the long lasting behavioural and attitudinal change needed.

**Operation HONOUR**

I launched Operation HONOUR last August as the over-arching effort within which the Canadian Armed Forces would address harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour within its ranks. I adopted this approach for one simple reason – the CAF does not fail on operations. We demonstrated this in Croatia, Bosnia, Afghanistan and a myriad of other daunting theatres throughout our modern history, just as we are proving it in Iraq and elsewhere today.

A major component of Operation HONOUR’s remit is implementing the ten recommendations of the spring 2015 Deschamps Report. While these constitute the brunt of the effort, the operation is not limited to the recommendations and will cover additional ground.

The kick-start of Operation HONOUR was an unequivocal reaffirmation of the institution’s expectations regarding the behaviours and attitudes of all CAF members toward harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour. I communicated this in the clearest of terms to my senior commanders shortly after becoming the CDS, and they rapidly did likewise with their subordinate commanders. The result was that all CAF members, including those deployed in overseas operations, were reminded of what is expected of them both behaviourally and attitudinally, regardless of situation or context.

The responsibilities and accountabilities of Canadian Armed Forces’ leaders at all levels were specifically underscored because only sound, fully engaged leadership will solve the problem this time. As such, commanders throughout the organization were reminded of the vigilance required to identify incidents of harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour, and the diligence needed to respond decisively to victims, perpetrators and enablers. The requirement for vigilance and diligence was also repeated and reinforced further to all CAF members, including those who may have been less mindful of organizational expectations vis-à-vis sexual harassment and sexual assault before Operation HONOUR.

Central to this message is the imperative that we must consistently provide compassionate care to victims and protect them from contributing circumstances and environments following acts of inappropriate behaviour or the commission of crimes. Not only must complaints be handled quickly, compassionately and decisively, our people need to perceive this to be the case. Moreover, there must be confidence that the mechanisms in place consistently deliver justice and protection throughout the reporting, investigation, and adjudication processes.

One of Operation HONOUR’s defining features is its focus on victims – the start point for the CAF’s response to harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour. I have made it clear to CAF leadership that providing more responsive and effective support to victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault is the first priority, consistent with our absolute responsibility to care for our people. This message has been emphasized throughout the CAF chain of...
command, directing leaders to be more attuned and responsive to the needs of victims. Moreover, I’ve ordered the commanders and custodians of existing mechanisms designed to support victims to review their practices and methodologies in the aim of improving the range, quality, accessibility and transparency of the services on offer. Victims must come first!

As importantly, I directed the establishment of the first-ever dedicated independent support centre for CAF members that have been adversely affected by sexual harassment and sexual assault; the Sexual Misconduct Response Centre (SMRC). The creation of the SMRC aligns with a central recommendation of the Deschamps Report. One of its key tenets is that it is positioned outside of the military chain of command, providing victims with a unique option compared to those already in place. For example, the SMRC allows CAF members to reach out for information or support without automatically triggering formal reporting, and the subsequent investigative and judicial processes that follow. This practice was identified by Madame Deschamps, and reinforced by former and serving members, as a significant impediment to CAF members in coming forward and asking for information or support.

At present, the SMRC provides CAF members with basic support services – an offset required to stand up the centre in record time. It’s mandate and range of services will expand considerably as the SMRC matures, eventually delivering more comprehensive support offerings as well as influencing core elements of the CAF effort to prevent harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour, including policy and training development.

Another new structure dedicated solely to the CAF’s response is the CAF Strategic Response Team on Sexual Misconduct (CSRT-SM). Established concurrent with the final development of the Deschamps Report, it is dual mandated to (1) coordinate all components of the Canadian Armed Forces’ response to the problem and (2) develop and execute pan-CAF solution elements such as policy and training modernization, and institution-wide performance measurement. As with the SMRC, such an entity dedicated exclusively to the problem of harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour has never existed within the Canadian military until now. While its function is not nearly as visible as that of the SMRC, it plays a pivotal role.

Woven into multiple aspects of Operation HONOUR is the integration of external expertise and experience in modernizing related policies and training, and advising the bodies and leaders involved in the endeavour. Previous CAF efforts to address this problem were decidedly insular in nature. As functions of both the longevity of the CAF’s challenge and its evolving nature as a societal issue, it was recognized that an exclusively made-in-CAF solution would not provide the sustained positive change sought. For this reason, the institution has reached out to researchers, academics, care practitioners and respected observers to understand and integrate their perspectives into various aspects of the CAF response.

One of the most important elements of the Canadian Armed Forces response to harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour and Operation HONOUR is the onus on performance measurement. As stated earlier, a key shortcoming of previous attempts to address the problem was a lack of regular, structured assessment of
Organizational culture change depends not only on the change implemented, but on the response of the concerned stakeholders (internal and external) to this change. They must first become aware of it, then understand it, eventually believe in it, and ultimately become part of it in order for large-scale change to take root and succeed. Such buy-in on a matter already generating high levels of skepticism requires tangible proof that positive change is happening and will continue. Hence, the ‘demonstrability’ of the effects of Operation HONOUR in solving the CAF’s problem of harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour is essential to inculcating and sustaining this change.

For this reason, the current CAF response integrates systemic performance and outcome evaluation measures throughout the various Operation HONOUR components. A centerpiece of institutional measurement is a CAF-wide survey specifically measuring member attitudes and behaviours on this issue. Conducted by Statistics Canada at the request of the CAF due to the former’s world-class track record in executing public environment research within large organizations, along with its ability to ensure complete confidentiality to respondents, the survey will have engaged Regular and Reserve Force members in April and May. It is the first ever institution-wide survey dedicated strictly to harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour. It will be repeated at regular intervals, providing the CAF with a better understanding of the progress achieved in reshaping organizational culture.

Buttressing the Statistics Canada project will be a range of quantitative and qualitative outcome measurement initiatives administered at lower levels of the institution and tied to specific elements of Operation HONOUR. These will contribute to a much fuller understanding of operational progress as it evolves.

Ultimately, I will not decide whether Operation HONOUR has succeeded, nor will my senior commanders. Rather, members throughout the organization will make this determination. They will judge whether their environments are less permissive to inappropriate behaviour than they were, and whether attitudes and behaviours are really changing or have changed. CAF members at the organization’s grassroots will be the final arbiters of the effort’s success, which is why the organization must systematically tap into them to assess the effects of Operation HONOUR-triggered change as it unfolds.
Finally, my approach to the CAF response to harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour through Operation HONOUR has been highly visible. I have done so deliberately to provide added impetus to the gravity of the situation and its potential impact on the CAF’s continued operational excellence. I mapped out my posture at my change of command ceremony – my initial statement as the Chief of the Defence Staff. Moreover, I directed that the launch of Operation HONOUR be as visible as possible to demonstrate the CAF’s intent to both internal and external stakeholders. The principle of transparency was firmly embedded in the Operation HONOUR operation order, making clear the importance of sustained visibility on the endeavor. Lastly, I committed to delivering regular progress reports at six-month intervals. The first of these was released to CAF members and external stakeholders, including interested media, on February 1st of this year. The report’s narrative was open and forthright, pointing out both initial progress and areas requiring greater attention.

We live and work in a turbulent and unpredictable time, and the Canadian Armed Forces is constantly shifting focus to meet new threats and emerging imperatives. This is inherent in the profession of arms. However, this reality cannot allow us to lessen our attention to issues that fundamentally affect what the organization is and why it matters. If this has caused us to lack perseverance, endurance or follow-through with past efforts to solve this problem, the highly visible posture adopted this time out will ensure that our feet are held to the fire until we have proven that we’ve achieved the sustained culture change to which we aspire.

Progress to Date

Culture change is a long-term endeavor – it is one of the most difficult leadership challenges an organization can undertake, especially one as steeped in tradition as the Canadian Armed Forces. It takes time to generate and inculcate; there are neither magic bullets nor quick fixes.

Given the profile of Operation HONOUR, I am frequently asked how much progress we have achieved to date and whether the organization will now succeed when it has failed in the past. My response is that we are off to a solid start – though it is still just a start. Last spring and summer, there was inordinate skepticism directed at both our desire to solve our problem of harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour, as well our capacity to do so. While much of the skepticism remains, and will until we have unequivocally proven that we have implemented sustained positive change, the mood is shifting. CAF members, including those at junior levels, are telling me that awareness has increased appreciably. There seems to be a growing belief that this time will be different. I am also already detecting behavioural changes amongst our members, and being advised of similar observations by the chain of command. This is in stark contrast to the prevailing sentiment six-plus months ago.

There are also early signs that leadership is increasingly vigilant on the issue and more diligent in responding decisively to occurrences of it.

There are also early signs that leadership is increasingly vigilant on the issue and more diligent in responding decisively to occurrences of it. Individuals have been called to account and action has been taken by the chain of command that has resulted
in some losing their command positions. We have recently put in place stronger methodology to identify and track trends in terms of the chain of command’s response to harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour, and will very soon possess a more thorough depiction of results than we ever have.

While all this is highly encouraging, I am anxious for more concrete results, as are our stakeholders. The data from the Statistics Canada survey will provide us with a stronger understanding of where we are at, and where we are headed. So, too, will supporting performance measurement applied throughout the institution.

Operation HONOUR has prompted considerable activity, which is equally positive. The policy modernization underscored in the Deschamps Report is advanced, and a comprehensive draft specific to the realities of the CAF environment will be ready for approval in the summer. It will include updated terminology and key definitions, as called for by Madame Deschamps.

A comprehensive audit of Canadian Armed Forces training and education content was recently completed, and the modernization of all related curriculum is underway. This will result in a number of training modules and tools currently in development, intended for use as of this summer. The objective is to deliver to all CAF members more modern, pertinent and resonant training on harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour across the continuum of their careers. The progress achieved on both the policy and training/education fronts have been strongly influenced by our evolving partnerships and consultations with external subject matter experts.

It is fair to question whether this progress is occurring fast enough, and whether it will eventually trigger the culture change intended. The tasks, timelines and objectives outlined in Operation HONOUR will help us gauge this and adjust accordingly, but ultimately it is the response of our members that will continue to indicate the breadth of success as the endeavor progresses.

Having stated all this, there is still considerable work to be done – much more than has been achieved to date. There are still incidents of sexual misconduct occurring, and it is very likely that there are still victims who have not come forward because they do not have complete trust in the complaint mechanisms, the military police structure, the military judicial system, the chain of command, or a combination thereof. This remains unacceptable.

There has been some criticism of the target I established for Operation HONOUR – that of eliminating harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour. There are concerns that it is unrealistic, however I cannot and will not accept a different target. The Canadian Armed Forces of tomorrow and beyond must nurture its members and secure their wellbeing. It must be an employer of choice despite the reality of sending people in harm’s way. And it must be respected not only for what it accomplishes but for what it is and represents. This can only be sustained if we set the highest aspirations for the institution and its integrity, and assiduously work towards attaining them. Ensuring a professional environment of dignity and respect is a cornerstone of such an institution.
The Role of Bystanders

Edmund Burke famously said; “The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing.” The Canadian Armed Forces will not accept the indifference or willful blindness of any of its members on this issue. Bystanders are an integral enabler of an environment where there is sexual harassment and assault, however unintentional their role might be. Accordingly, they must be central to shifting behaviours and attitudes in creating an environment that is no longer permissive. Of course, it takes courage to stand up to one’s friends and colleagues if they are behaving inappropriately, especially when that behaviour may seem inconsequential or inoffensive. However, for members of the Canadian Armed Forces, standing up to any form of harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour is absolutely essential, both on moral grounds as well as in terms of building and maintaining the trust and cohesion amongst one another and towards leaders that underpins a professional military force. That means intervening when one hears an inappropriate joke or misguided comment, or calling someone out for a misplaced gesture or touch. The sins of omission can be as damaging as the sins of commission, if not more so.

Every CAF member is responsible for the culture and reputation of our institution and the environment it sets out for its people. Those who hear, witness or otherwise become aware of situations of degradation or exploitation of any sort must show the moral courage to take a stand against it. Not doing so diminishes the CAF’s capability and dishonours the institution’s noble history and traditions. Indifferent behaviour by anyone in uniform cannot and will not persist.

Conclusion

In the words of the immortal Winston Churchill; “To improve is to change; to be perfect is to change often.” The change that is upon us of creating a culture ensuring a respectful, dignified professional environment for every member of the Canadian Armed Forces is both necessary and unavoidable. It is what is owed to those who risk all to defend their nation and its values. And it is pivotal to our continued success as a world-class fighting force. As with all our operations, Operation HONOUR will succeed.
Introduction

At the end of the 1990s, in the wake of the Cold War, it was apparent to the Canadian defence community that the global security environment had undergone significant change. Over and above this recognition, there were a number of unfortunate events involving the Canadian Forces (CF) in Somalia, Rwanda, and the former Yugoslavia. In response to all this, the Canadian government undertook a directed review of the nation’s military. Consequently, the final years of that decade produced significant military introspection and change. One of the issues examined during this scrutiny of the CF was the role and organization of the Reserves. At the time, the Reserves were shaped by the defence exigencies of the Cold War, as well as the funding available during those years. Arguably, the latest examination of the Reserves started in the 1990s and has been ongoing since then. It has ebbed and flowed, shaped by the escalating threats posed by the first two decades of the 21st Century. This is a time when military capabilities and forces must be balanced in order to counter a broad range of threats and requirements, from conventional to asymmetric warfare, in addition to non-combat operations such as humanitarian relief and the gamut of peace and stability missions. It is evident with growing challenges at home and abroad that the Regular component of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) may be pressed to meet all defence-related requirements of this evolving security environment. With the recent articulation of an upcoming defence review to be completed by the end of 2016, the time is at hand to create Reserve Forces with the capacity and capability to assist in meeting the ongoing challenges posed to Canada by complex domestic and international security settings.

Canadian Armed Forces Reserves – *Quo Vadis?*

by Éric Tremblay and Howard Coombs

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A Reservist from the North Nova Scotia Highlanders provides cover for troops while they secure a building during the final assault scenario as part of Exercise *Southbound Trooper XIII*, Fort Pickett, Virginia, 22 February 2013.
Canada’s Use of Military Power and the Defence Mandate

The war in Afghanistan was different from previous conflicts in one very significant fashion – national implementation of an integrated governmental approach to military operations. This type of civil-military integration for operations had not occurred at the highest levels of government since the Second World War. This “whole of government” (WoG) approach defined Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan, particularly between 2006 and 2011 in the southern province of Kandahar, and will continue to structure our engagement in conflict and other crises for the foreseeable future. This Canadian Way of War should be taken into consideration, along with the demands of the contemporary security environment, when examining possible options for the recently mandated defence review, which was introduced by the Governor General of Canada, His Excellency the Right Honourable David Johnston, on 4 December 2015: “To keep Canadians safe and be ready to respond when needed, the government will launch an open and transparent process to review existing defence capabilities, and will invest in building a leaner, more agile, better-equipped military.”

It is apparent from public statements, such as the Speech from the Throne, that the Federal Government intends to ensure that the ongoing defence review creates capacities capable of reacting quickly and comprehensively to many contingencies. This not only includes all aspects of national security, but also applies to assisting others in need. As part of this evolution, Canada will (1) maintain and reinforce alliances, especially with the United States, (2) focus developmental assistance to aid struggling members of the global community, and (3) aid efforts to establish international peace through the UN and supporting worldwide efforts to battle terrorism. All this will be attained through an integrated WoG governmental approach.

“So What?”

The CAF needs to have the ability to project sustainable and integrated tactical forces that are imbued with all types of enablers to deal with the threat environment. These forces are joint, capable of working within coalition or alliance operations in domestic and international environments, and encompass sea, land, air and space. They must also be integrated with partners, such as Global Affairs Canada. Such forces must exist, or at least must be able to be created quickly to deal with the demands of the 21st Century.
There will be a need for precise and key skills that will enable these unified organizations and national security. These skills are cultural and linguistic expertise, intelligence, influence activities (IA), including psychological and information operations, along with civil-military cooperation. They also include focused military capabilities such as special operations, nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) elements, and those of a more general nature, such as diplomacy and development. Also, abilities in the realm of cyberspace and space need to be expanded. Finally, an awareness of, and the ability to quickly and proficiently acquire, field and use developing and developed technology will be critical in protecting Canada and its population, along with its interests at home and abroad. Throughout all this, producing, obtaining and retaining people with special qualifications will underpin success. The Reserves, with a culture of service before self, offer an opportunity for Canadians who might not otherwise have that opportunity to provide their skills to national defence.

Canada’s Armed Forces Reserves

Today’s security environment poses challenges to all involved in the security and protection of Canada and her people. The “Departmental Performance Report for 2014-2015” views the Reserves as integral to the capacity of both the CAF and the overall Defence Team. The Reserves are currently funded for 27,000 citizen sailors, soldiers and air personnel, who are trained to a similar level, depending upon the service, as their Regular counterparts, but will require broadening and refreshing of collective and individual skills prior to full-time military employment. Regrettably, with constraints upon funding, training time available to Reservists, particularly at the entry level, and, again dependent upon the service, the ongoing restructuring of training in an attempt to address the latter two issues, that gap is widening. One could opine that these issues may in part be due to the lack of a strategic employment concept for the Reserve Forces.

There are a number of components to Canada’s Reserves. Firstly, the Primary Reserve consists of Navy, Army, Air Force, and Health Services, together with Legal and Special Operations that are each responsible to a service command. They can conduct or augment various operations with varying degrees of notice, field and use developing and developed technology will be critical in protecting Canada and its population, along with its interests at home and abroad. Throughout all this, producing, obtaining and retaining people with special qualifications will underpin success. The Reserves, with a culture of service before self, offer an opportunity for Canadians who might not otherwise have that opportunity to provide their skills to national defence.

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While all elements of the Primary Reserve provide qualified individual augmentation to the Regular Force, the three largest
Primary Reserve elements - Navy, Army and Air Reserves – have other roles. The Naval Reserve is integrated into its parent service for generation of forces and has a defined role in the context of the “One Navy” concept. It was originally assigned responsibility to crew the twelve Maritime Coastal Defence Vessels (MCDV), minor war vessels that were to be used primarily for coastal surveillance and patrol. The MCDVs are divided between both coasts. However, for the MCDVs, this role has evolved into a “blended crewing” concept, of Regular and Reserves. Their role has now expanded to include international and domestic operations. Moreover, reservists are tasked to frigates for deployments, and they have extended roles for enhanced naval boarding, as well as support to deployed maritime assets. These integrated Regular-Reserve teams deliver an enhanced capability and help enable RCN global engagement.

Similarly, the Army Reserve is integrated into the structure of the Canadian Army. Army Reservists are distributed across Canada in a variety of unit types, comprising 123 individual units in 117 communities, and divided into 10 Canadian Brigade Groups (CBG), the latter serving to generate forces when needed. The Army Reserve provides a capability for Territorial Battalion Groups (TBG) and Arctic Response Company Groups (ARCG) that, with some notice, can be produced for a variety of domestic operations. Also, the Army Reserve has provided up to 20 percent of recent augmentation for international deployments. The Army also assigns the Influence Activities (IA) role to the Army Reserve.
The Air Reserve is an integrated or “Total Force” organization that is fully amalgamated into the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF). Air Reservists are almost all former Regulars who have been trained in the Regular Force and have completed component transfers to the Air Reserve. There are no specific Reserve career paths or Reserve training in the RCAF. These Air Reservists are then integrated into RCAF units or “Air Reserve” squadrons with operational tasks. There are three flying squadrons which are predominantly composed of Reservists - two being aviation (rotary wing) squadrons, and one air (fixed wing) squadron. There are also four Air Reserve Airfield Engineering Flights that are the primary source of personnel for the construction of deployed RCAF facilities and airfields.

In addition to these three components of the CAF Reserves, the Canadian Forces Health Services Reserve provides field ambulance units and personnel to 1 Canadian Field Hospital Detachment Ottawa. This allows for support to domestic and international deployments through the production of trained medical personnel, as well as supporting Health Services initiatives and affiliated CBGs. Lastly, the Special Operations and Legal Reserves augment those capabilities on a full- or part-time basis.

Nevertheless, in spite of the efforts being made to strengthen the CAF Reserves, there has been a consistent downward trend in the numbers of personnel in the Reserves, with releases and transfers to the Regular Force exceeding the numbers being enrolled as Reservists. In November 2015, between the three Primary CAF Reserve elements, there were 19,369 members actively training, down from an average of 26,142 in 2011–2012. The overall number of active Reservists continues to lessen, with recruiting and retention not matching attrition and component transfers. On top of this, there is no strategic or centralized concept for employment, leaving the use of Reserve capability to the respective services. This creates a service-driven use of Reserve capacity that may or may not be aligned with strategic needs. Furthermore, there is little-to-no capacity to produce organizations that can react to contingencies, except on an ad hoc basis. For the most part, Reserve units, unlike Regular units, do not have unit level operational tasks and are not resourced to be employed in the same fashion. The supporting processes that would enable a viable Reserve, from recruiting to personnel management, are experiencing challenges or do not exist in a unified and centralized fashion. Within the current framework, each service is experiencing its own capability shortfalls. Formerly crewed by the Naval Reserve, the MCDVs are now, through necessity, no longer solely a Reserve task, with the greatest challenge to crewing MCDVs being the production of seagoing skills at higher rank levels. The training time exceeds the capacity of a part-time Reservist to achieve qualifications, and employment patterns limit short-term availability for employment. This issue is applicable to all Reserve elements of the Primary Reserve. The Army Reserve currently provides individual augmentation to the Army, although there are some ongoing efforts to increase that level of augmentation and adopt a philosophy of integration vice
augmentation. Plus, the Army Reserve has the ability to form ad hoc units for limited domestic employment. The Air Reserve is a Reserve in name only, with most members employed on a full time basis augmenting the RCAF. Overall there are deficiencies in readiness, training, infrastructure and equipment that can only be addressed through a reconceptualization of the CAF Reserves.

Past Restructuring and the Reserves

Restructuring is an emotive topic in the Canadian Reserve community. This is largely due to the re-organizations that took place after the Second World War. There were three key factors that contributed to a diminution of Reserve structures and capabilities during that time frame. First, the demands of the Cold War necessitated “forces in being” that could be deployed quickly. It was observed that Reserve Forces had lower training standards resulting from less time to acquire skills. They were not always equipped in an analogous fashion to the full time military, and would require time to mobilize, equip, train, and deploy. As a result, the value of their contribution, with the exception of providing a decentralized military presence among Canadians, was believed questionable. Second, the reductions mandated at various points after the Second World War forced defence planners to make hard choices with regard to reducing capabilities in order to realize savings. Lastly, due to a constantly changing strategic security environment, there was a consistent lack of coherent and enduring defence strategy linked to national goals and aspirations. The combination of all these factors made the Reserves an opportune target for reductions and amalgamations. These cuts, on top of the strong ties between the Militia and Reserve Units that were affected and their communities, created negative reactions - and emotions ran high. By the end of the Cold War, this trend had created what could be charitably labelled an “acrimonious” relationship between Canadian Regulars and Reservists. However, the conclusion of the Cold War prompted a national re-examination of Reserve roles and structures. The reports, policies and instructions, including recent CAF transformation initiatives that have transpired since then have created a combination of Regular and Reserve Forces within the framework of Total Force. Alignment of many administrative and financial systems, as well as common core training standards, has commenced, although much yet needs to be done in aligning personnel management within the CAF Reserve and with the Regular Force. The large Reserve contribution to international deployments to the Balkans and Afghanistan, as well as sudden domestic operations, such as ice storms, floods, firefighting and other crises, have demonstrated the capacity of the Reserve Forces.

Starting in the late-1980s, the gradual disintegration and eventual implosion of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact prompted national re-examination of Reserve roles and structures. The 1987 White Paper “Challenge and Commitments” was to produce revitalization of the CF, and, as part of that initiative, the Reserve Force. Naval Reserve involvement with the MCDV, although it has changed over time, dates from this period. At the same time, the Air Reserve was urged to play a greater role within what was, at that time, Air Command. However, it was the part-time soldiers of what was then known as the Militia who experienced the great-
est change. In a move that reflected that of many North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, Canada moved to a “Total Force” model for the Land Forces. This meant that Regulars and Reservists would serve in the same units, and that the Land Forces were restructured into four Land Force Areas: Western, Central, Quebec and Atlantic. The breakup of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the continual need for deployments to that region, under UN and later NATO command, resulted in thousands of Militia soldiers deploying with their Regular counterparts, and the implementation of Total Force. This had a corollary impact of forcing a re-evaluation of Militia training to increase standards. Attempts were made to ensure like equipment, as issued to the Regular Force, was also issued to the Militia to allow more efficacious support to deployments.

The 1994 White Paper was written in the wake of the Cold War, and was shaped, in part, by a desire to reap the “peace dividend” produced by the cessation of superpower tensions. Reductions to the Reserves were announced and a “Special Commission to Examine the Restructuring of the Reserves” was formed to look at the Primary and Supplementary Reserves. The foundation for the reorganization of the Army Reserve Districts, or regional headquarters, to CBGs was laid during this time. A four-stage tiered mobilization model was laid out, which commenced at initial force generation for smaller emergencies, then force enhancement by allocation of extra resources, then force expansion to much larger commitments requiring significant effort, and lastly, to national mobilization. This structure has been largely superseded by the need for high readiness forces to meet current national security needs.

There were a number of reviews throughout this period, from that of the Office of the Auditor General (OAG) in 1992, to the “Special Commission on the Restructuring of the Reserves” in 1995. The focus of the recommendations of this commission was the part-time soldiers of the Land Force Militia, as other Reserve elements were seen to have few challenges. There was subsequent appraisal of all this, particularly the last report, by the Special Commission of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs (SCONDVA). SCONDVA affirmed the concept of Total Force and recommended clear definition of the role the Reserves would have within defence activities, mobilization, and a need to increase the efficiency of the Reserves with the implicit intent of “doing more with less.” At the same time, the requirement for the Supplementary Reserve and the Canadian Rangers was continued. However, most importantly, there was a call for review of the Militia in the context of Total Force. The other Reserve elements were seen to be well on their way to meeting the demands of the 1994 White Paper.

Public reaction to certain events during some CF missions in the early 1990s prompted the creation of the “Monitoring Committee on Change in the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces” in 1997. From that initiative, the report, “In Service of the Nation: Canada’s Citizen Soldiers for the 21st Century,” was released in 2000. This document became known as the “Fraser Report” after its chair, the Honourable John A. Fraser. The report noted a number of continuing challenges with the Reserves and provided recommendations, which became the starting point for Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR), a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) directed project, under Lieutenant-General Mike Jeffery, who later became Commander of the Land Force. The observations of the Fraser Report had been given further impetus by the release of the Department of National Defence “Shaping the Future of Canadian Defence: A Strategy for 2020,” (or “Strategy 2020”), that called for modernization of the Reserves. In general, the Fraser Report noted issues with low training standards, burdensome administration, problems with recruiting processes, the lack of integration of the Reserves with the mobilization process, the need for a review of terms of service to bring in skilled applicants from the civilian economy who could fill specialized roles (such as psychological operations or civil-military affairs), the need for reliable funding that is protected, and a requirement for an increase to the strength of the Reserves. In addition to the Fraser Report and LFRR, there were a number of other Defence programs started at that time designed to grow the Reserves and provide better administrative structures to support them. Of note was the “International Policy Statement” (IPS) released in 2005, which took into account the ongoing CF transformation initiative of then-CDS, General Rick Hillier, and reinforced the necessity to increase the size of the Reserves. The IPS created the need for a mix of civilian and military specialist skills in the Reserves to react to domestic emergencies and to augment Regular Force units that had these abilities, such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear response, information operations and civil-military response capabilities. Furthermore, the requirement to augment the Canadian Rangers for security and sovereignty in the Arctic was again emphasized. Disappointingly, these goals were never fully realized.

The “CDS Planning Guidance – Future of CF Reserves” promulgated in 2007 continued the trend towards creating “relevant and responsive” Reserve Forces. Simultaneously, Canadian participation in the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan was making great demands on the CF. This in turn prompted a need for high quality Reserves that could contribute to this ongoing international operation, support domestic operations, connect Canada’s military to civilian communities, and assist in the maintenance of sovereignty, especially in the North. Reviews from this time re-confirmed the requirement for a common recruiting system and similar training standards, and called for a review of human resource and pay systems, as well as terms of service, to align them between the Regular and Reserve Forces. This would assist with the timely activation of Reservists to fulfill operational requirements. Throughout, there was a conscious movement to closer integrate civilian, Reserve and Regular members of the Defence Team and other security agencies. Hillier notes in his memoir, A Soldier First: Bullets, Bureaucrats and the Politics of War, that the outcome of this period was a defence policy statement – the “Canada First Defence Strategy” - that provided the overarching WoG strategy for the use of Canada’s military.
Following on from this was the “Report on Transformation,” or “Leslie Report,” named after its chair, Lieutenant-General Andrew Leslie, released in 2011. The Leslie Report called for a repatriation of full-time Reserve positions from headquarters and other locations to the part-time units and formations of the Reserve Forces to increase field force responsiveness. At about the same time, the Vice Chief of Defence Staff’s (VCDS) “Primary Reserve Employment Capability Study (PRECS) Report” of 2011 provided baseline figures for the Reserve Forces in the context of the ongoing transformation and other review efforts. The review included numbers for full- and part-time Reservists. PRECS also identified the need for Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAODs) pertaining to the Reserves, a requirement for a strategic concept for the Reserve Forces, and need to ensure correct and guaranteed funding levels. Since then, a host of high-level directives from both the CDS and VCDS have provided direction for implementation of initiatives focused upon creating a capable and quick-to-respond part-time Reserve that can support domestic and international operations. However,
one can argue that the changes detailed in these orders are not revolutionary, but evolutionary, building upon reports and reviews that have been put forward over the last two decades.

After one examines all this material, common themes emerge. First, there is a lack of strategic clarity regarding the employment of Reserve Forces. Second, there has been a perceived need for Reserve Forces that are distributed across the country to provide a link between those Reserve units and the regions where they are based. Third, there is an expectation that Reserve Forces will be able to react to contingencies, not always immediately, but within a short time – and more than in an individual augmentation fashion. This ability to provide an emergency collective response is in addition to giving ongoing operational support to the Regular Force. Fourth, there is an expectation that these forces be organized, trained and equipped individually and collectively, to operate in an efficient and capable fashion within an integrated governmental construct. Fifth, with enabling terms of service, specialized capabilities can reside in the Reserves. Finally, and importantly, a unifying and underlying theme throughout this period is that the CAF Reserves offer an opportunity to utilize the personal and professional skills that Canadians can and want to offer to national security.

Reserves for the 21st Century

The options for the Reserves laid out in this article are not revolutionary but evolutionary, and they are a necessity. They are more than “old wine in new bottles.” For the CAF to meet the exigencies and the expectations of Canadians and Government for national security, the way ahead must include viable organizations and roles for the Reserve to allow them to successfully and quickly integrate with the Regular Force for domestic and international operations. The successes of the recent past in these areas need to be solidified and further developed in a manner that assists in dealing with the current security environment. The Reserve also needs to be able to provide those capacities currently not imbedded within or residing in an effective manner in the Regular Force, and which are necessary for the successful prosecution of domestic and international operations. A successful reconceptualization of the Reserves will provide for the ways and means in which the Reserves can meet these requirements.
Threats are no longer thought of as being clearly delineated, reasonably predictable, and able to be dealt with by the appropriately mandated security or defence organizations. Instead, the current security environment demands integrated forces that can meet the requirements of the diffused and opaque dangers imbued within a continuum of hazards. This setting demands integrated groupings with a variety of specialized skills which can address public safety, national security, and international responsibilities. The Reserve Forces can be used to provide for and augment these capabilities. This idea of using the Reserves to provide such specialized skills has been brought forward before but has not been actualized. This also highlights the need to re-examine terms of service to provide for more fluid movement between the Regular and Reserve Forces, as well as to assure the availability of these Reserve skills when they are needed.

Individuals with the requisite and specialized skills, which cannot be feasibly created in the Regular Force, or can supplement limited Regular Force capability, can be enrolled in the Reserves. This can be done on a case-by-case basis using abbreviated military training to provide appropriate rank and sufficient military expertise to allow these individuals to contribute as part of the defence team in their area of expertise. One can argue that Reserve padres, medical and legal personnel fulfill these criteria. However, this could be expanded to include all manner of niche capabilities, such as military research, diplomatic initiatives, and development capacity. These specialists need to be held and managed outside the unit structure. On top of this, a “skills bank” or database of civilian skills should be established that would allow the CAF access to the currently unknown repository of non-military expertise available in the Reserve population and would help enable the WoG construct.

Also, Reserve Units could be designated or paired with Regular Force Units to specialize in the various enablers that are needed to provide depth and breadth to CAF response to preventing and dealing with security challenges. IA, cyber, space, special operations, unmanned aerial vehicle operation, to name a few of them, could be considered as roles of Reserve entities. Also, along with these specific needs one also needs to continue to address the requirements for conventional operations. The Air Reserve, in particular, should be re-examined to consider the formation of Air Reserve units that can lend themselves to tasks that can be conducted by an Air Reserve outside of current RCAF augmentation.

In order to do this, Reserve Units need to be examined to see how they can be structured to match the recruiting demographics of their host area in order to ensure that they are sustainable. That may mean lifting recruiting quotas for a number of years to determine what is feasible in a region. This will require another look at the rationale and processes of Reserve recruiting, which needs to surpass attrition and component transfers in order to enable the Reserves to increase.

Permanent groupings should be formed of consistently under-strength Reserve Units that can together form a single unit that can provide significant response capability. This would not involve closing or moving units, but simply admitting that a region can only produce a sub-unit or sub-sub-unit, not something larger. These smaller parts, in a fashion that maintains their rich histories, can be then combined to form a single unit under a commanding officer.

However, one could also ensure that senior Reserve positions are dedicated to those communities to maintain the historical continuity of senior CAF engagement within those areas. Building on this idea, experienced and capable senior Reservists who would currently be released due to a lack of Reserve positions at their rank level could be kept on strength in order to maintain the CAF connection to communities, as well as to establish and act as military liaison for public safety and security. This capability would need to be carefully managed to ensure that it does not become a sinecure.

The Reserve Units, particularly those of the Army Reserve, could be further grouped under Reserve formation headquarters, with all resourced sufficiently so that together they could be deployed for domestic operations in their geographic regions. It can be argued that the Army already provides this capability, however, that is not the case. CBGs are not equipped or resourced to provide a deployable formation headquarters, and TBGs are similarly poorly equipped. Also TBGs are raised and structured as needed from those personnel whom are available and wish to volunteer. The Primary Reserve needs to be organized and to have viable terms of service in order to respond to domestic needs within regional frameworks provided by their services. This requirement demands strategic vision and direction.

All this would allow for greater flexibility of employment for response for domestic or international purposes. As part of any Defence Team response to national security requirements the immediate provision of individuals or even groupings of Reservists would be facilitated by skills banks and unit specialization. The time that would normally be needed to prepare Reservists for employment would be counter-balanced by already-developed civilian skills or military expertise in necessary enablers. Within a short time, Reserve Units that had already organized, manned, and trained as units, and having trained collectively with their Regular Force counterparts, could generate larger groupings.

Despite this, the need for greater agility with regard to generating Reserve Forces remains in order to pre-empt asymmetric threats, rather than just react to them. This concept lends itself to a re-examination of ideas of Reserve utilization, and reaffirms the idea of much more fluid terms of service for both Regulars and Reservists to enrich both elements. Along with this, the Supplementary Reserve needs to be used to provide some of the experience needed to augment both the Primary Reserve and Regular Force. At this time, the Supplementary Reserve is sadly underutilized and processes do not exist to easily activate its members, or to recruit them into the Primary Reserve.

While extensive dialogue acknowledges that Reserve Forces need to be capable of providing augmentation to international operations and responding to domestic needs, that requirement should be clearly outlined by the CAF as part of a larger security strategy. These obligations need to be tangible, marked by identified outputs and supported by measurable training and employment benchmarks. The Naval Reserve has the MCDVs, while the Army Reserve requirement for TBGs and Arctic Response Company Groups, along with readiness and preparatory standards, should be
clearly defined. Furthermore, the Air Reserve should be re-examined to see if a linkage could be clearly established for the Air Reserve as an entity for tasks that may lend themselves to Air Reservists or formed Reserve Units beyond augmenting the RCAF on a day-to-day or periodic basis. Although the requirement to strengthen the Canadian Rangers through various programs has been consistently articulated, particularly over the last decade, that need demands clear definition and objects. The vision articulated by the CDS in his 2007 Planning Guidance for an integrated and effective Reserve Force has never been operationalized or resourced. Accordingly, in the absence of unified strategic direction, the services have provided Reserve employment concepts that have varied over time. This lack of consistency and centralization has created a situation in which it is difficult, if not impossible, to analyze and improve Reserve operations and to allocate resources accordingly.

All this will generate the structures necessary for the Reserve Forces. These organizations need not be uniform but can be, like the threat environment, asymmetric, and organized regionally to provide capability. They should be put together in a fashion that will allow them to take advantage of the recruiting demographics of the areas in which they are located in order to generate and sustain personnel levels. In addition, there will be individuals who are enrolled as specialists, in units and formation headquarters, all of whom will be capable of being integrated into domestic and international operations. These institutional transitions, in response to security exigencies, will be enabled by centralized and common Regular/Reserve management processes, including recruitment, education, training and terms of service, as well as protected funding.

Conclusion

Reservists’ contributions to operations and connections with the communities in which they serve are critical to Canada. The CAF must continue to recruit, develop, support and retain a ready, capable, motivated and relevant Primary Reserve force as both a strategic and operational resource for Canada and the CAF well into the future. The Primary Reserve will provide continued support to deployed operations and have demonstrated leadership and professionalism by making important contributions to CAF capability and response when called upon for operations and exercises at home and around the world.24


This aspirational statement clearly outlines the desired effects that need to be produced by the CAF to counter the asymmetric and conventional security threats posed by the 21st Century. These activities require teams of people that are familiar with each other and their capabilities, and they suggest the establishment of integrated professional development systems and the wider use of inter-department assignments to increase operating familiarity between the various agencies and others. Additionally, the Canadian Government needs to increase its pool of deployable capabilities on top of developing whole of government structures that contain a necessary cross-spectrum of skills and attributes.
which can be mobilized and dispatched quickly to deal with a spectrum of issues, domestically or internationally. The CAF Reserves can contribute significantly to this effort, providing part-time, skilled personnel with a culture of service before self.

The ideas highlighted in this article have been articulated in various forms and forums for several decades and have been implemented to various degrees. The underpinning tenet is to make optimal use of the skills Canadians can contribute through the Reserve Forces to assist with the creation of the integrated intra-government teams that can overcome all security challenges, from public safety, to the imperatives of conflict. This means continuing to improve administrative, financial, recruiting and other supporting processes; maintaining training standards that would provide for a level of interoperability between Regular and Reserve Forces; bringing civilian specialists into the Reserves under special arrangements; structuring existing units and formations, while preserving their lineage, into viable regional entities with domestic deployment capacity; establishing widespread community liaisons; imbuing specific enabling capabilities in Reserve units; making use of the latent capacity of the Supplementary Reserve; and assigning concrete and measurable goals and objectives for the Reserve Forces and Canadian Rangers within a strategic and centrally managed security concept. This strategic plan will provide direction on the organization and capabilities to be provided by the CAF Reserves, understanding that the generation of forces by Reserve Forces needs to be able to have immediate and long-term aspects. In the final analysis,

Simulated opposing forces attack a defensive position occupied by members of the Canadian Army Reserve, 4th Canadian Division, during Exercise Stalwart Guardian, 26 August 2015, at Petawawa, Ontario.
it is only in this fashion that one can create the Reserve Forces that Canada truly needs in the complicated and complex security environments posed by the 21st Century.

The authors would like to thank Major-General Paul Bury, OMM, CD, Chief of Reserves and Cadets, and two former Chiefs of Reserves and Cadets, Major-Generals (Retired) Herb Petras, CMM, CD, and Dennis Tabbernor, CMM, MSM, CD, as well as Commodore David Craig, CD, PhD, former Commander Naval Reserve, Colonel George Petrolekas, MSM, CD, Special Advisor Commander Canadian Army and Fellow, Canadian Global Affairs Institute, in addition to Colonel Robert Foster, MSM, CD, Director Army Reserve, and Major Mathias Joost, CD, Directorate of Heritage and History, for their review and suggestions with regards to this article. Also, they would like to express their gratitude to Christine Tabbernor and Lindsay Coombs for their editing of this material. Finally, we would like to express our appreciation to Véronique Storey for her invaluable research assistance.

NOTES

1. The designation “Canadian Forces” was changed to “Canadian Armed Forces (CAF)” in 2013.
4. At the time of writing the defence review had been confirmed and its projected completion will be end-2016. See Marie-Danielle Smith, “Defence minister: Military review to be completed by end of 2016: Harjit Sajjan says procurement is being looked at in ‘extreme detail’ as part of review process,” in Embassy News (13 January 2016); internet; available at http://www.embassynews.ca/ defence; accessed 18 January 2016, n.p.
9. This figure is to increase to 28,500 funded positions by 2019 – funded positions are deemed necessary to the operational capability of the CAF. The total number of Reserve positions in the CAF, including those that are unfunded, is 44,196.
10. Reserve funding, simplistically, for part-time Reserves, is based upon a number of paid days per year multiplied by funded positions. That Reserve pay is not protected in the same way as Regular Force pay, but is accessible to commanders for other requirements, as necessary. At this time, funding is not an issue as the numbers of reservists training are considerably less than the number of positions funded.
12. As of 30 November 2015, the numbers of Reservists paid that month were; Naval Reserve 2719; Army Reserve 14,795; and Air Reserve 1849. See the presentation Canada, Department of National Defence, Office of Reserves and Cadets, “CDS ID – Strengthening the Primary Reserve; AFC Update” (February 2016), Slide 12; and the figure for paid strength in 2011-2012, Slide 13.
14. The pre-unification names of the three services were restored in 2011.
15. Later renamed the Army Reserve.
16. The Land Force Areas were renamed as Divisions in 2013, but maintain a regional structure.
22. The most recent of these being Canada, Department of National Defence, “Chief of Defence Staff Guidance to the Canadian Armed Forces” (April 2015); and Canada, Department of National Defence, 1052-4-02 (C Res & Cds) CDS Initiating Directive Reserve Strategy 2015: Strengthening the Primary Reserve” (9 October 2015).
The post Cold War period has witnessed the rise of a new group of conflicts, which well known academics such as Mary Kaldor has called ‘New Wars’1 to differentiate the current group of conflicts from earlier wars that are in keeping with the classical definition of warfare. Kaldor’s thesis, although originally formulated in an East European context at an earlier period, has considerable explanatory power and it is without doubt that the theory still travels far and wide. Scholars have had a tendency to use the ‘New War’ argument within the context of Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. It is the aim of this article to go beyond these conventional case studies and use the ‘New War’ theory to understand conflicts in different parts of contemporary China, and to see to what extent this ‘New War’ theory fits in with the Chinese context and helps us to understand those conflicts. Thus, this article introduces a new set of case studies: Xinjiang and Tibet.

Conflicts that are classified as ‘new’ or ‘post-Cold War’ are not really ‘post-Cold War/post-1990s’ in the strict sense of the term, since there are always short term factors and long term factors that lead to the outbreak of a conflict, and some of the long term factors can actually be traced back to pre-Cold War, or even earlier times. Thus, the case studies chosen for this article are ‘new’ or ‘post Cold War’ conflicts in the sense that the levels of violence in some cases have escalated more than ever in the post-1990s phase, although the long term causes can be traced back to earlier times. In Tibet, for instance, we saw a huge uprising that took place in the year 2008. In relation to Xinjiang, Dr. Michael Clarke, a China expert and an Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the National Security College, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific, writes, ‘China became more concerned regarding the security of Xinjiang with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.’2 Furthermore, these conflicts have gone on to acquire the characteristic features of what Kaldor calls ‘New Wars’. This article is not so much interested in looking at the intricate details of the individual conflicts, but to what extent does the Kaldor thesis fit in within the Asian context. In this article, I have placed an emphasis on China’s contested borderland regions, Xinjiang and Tibet. Also, I have chosen China as my chief case study because it is one of the two new rising economic giants on
the Asiatic mainland, the other one being India. After the Asian Tiger economies reached near industrialised/miracle status, much attention has shifted to the mainland of Asia, with a special focus on China. In a world of increasing interconnectedness, developments in a rising Asia will invariably affect our lives in the west in one way or another. Thus, in an era of globalisation, the problems in Inner Asia or what may seem to be a remote part of Asia could have a profound impact upon our lives in the western world.

‘New Wars’ and Kaldor

Kaldor’s New War theory is most certainly a powerful argument, and it travels far and wide to explain most present day conflicts, including some of the conflicts in Inner Asia. The early chapters of the book, ‘Old and New Wars,’ look at some of the characteristic features of what Kaldor calls ‘New Wars.’ ‘New Wars,’ according to Kaldor, refer to those conflicts that started to take place in the 1990s and to a new form of political violence which must be distinguished from old wars. In these new wars, she argues, it has become difficult to differentiate between the ‘global’ and the ‘local,’ the ‘political’ and the ‘non-political,’ acts of aggression, or external attacks and acts of repression, or internal attacks. These wars need to be understood and analysed within the broader framework of globalisation. Kaldor argues, “New Wars are the wars of the era of globalisation.” We notice pronounced identity politics in these wars and the participation of the diaspora, or dispersed persons. The presence of the armed forces and paramilitary is also strong in these new wars. We see that these new group of wars are funded differently from the way older wars were funded. For example, the diaspora might provide these conflicts with the necessary funding. In earlier times, wars tended to be funded through state revenue. In these conflicts, we see the presence of both ‘global’ and ‘local’ actors. The ‘global’ refers to UN peacekeeping missions, humanitarian or liberal intervention, the presence of international NGOs, and the presence of the specialised agencies of the United Nations. The ‘local’ refers to indigenous actors, such as warlords, local political actors, Islamists, and so on. These are some of the characteristic features of what Kaldor calls ‘New Wars.’

Kaldor also talks about the sharp economic divide between ‘the global’ and ‘the local.’ These ‘New War’ conflict zones are also prone to human rights abuses. ‘New Wars involve a blurring of the distinctions between war, organised crime, and large scale violations of human rights. Although these wars are localised, they involve myriad transnational connections. New wars also arise in the context of the erosion of state autonomy, in other words, disintegration of the state. New wars occur in situations in which state revenues decline because of the decline of the economy and polity and also amidst criminality, corruption, and the inefficiency of failed or collapsed states.

Thus, in an era of globalization, the problems in Inner Asia or what may be seen to be a remote part of Asia could have a profound impact upon our lives in the western world.

Tian Chi (Heaven Lake), Xinjiang Province, China
Let us now see how this thesis fits in with the Chinese context. The ‘New War’ argument is a multi-faceted argument, and some of these facets fit in with the Chinese case.

**Chinese Xinjiang**

Geographically, Xinjiang is located in China’s extreme far North West. It is China’s largest province, and it has a massive border with the Islamic republics of Central Asia. “Currently, the region comprises 18 percent of modern China’s territory.” The ethnic composition of this province includes the predominantly Muslim Uyghur community, who claim to be a part of East Turkestan or Uyghuristan, and not a part of China. China’s atheistic character did not go down well with the Uyghur community of Xinjiang, who believed in and still feel very strongly about their Islamic identity. “Formal education in Xinjiang before the Qing re-conquest of the 1870s was generally Islamic.” Dr. Enze Han, another China expert and senior lecturer in Politics and International Studies at the University of London, writes, “The Uyghurs’ cultural grievances mainly result from two factors: The first is the Chinese government’s strict control of Islam in Xinjiang. The second factor is the chipping away of the education language from the school curriculum in Xinjiang.” For instance, originally, Uyghur pupils would start studying Mandarin Chinese from middle school, but in 1984, the language was pushed down to the third grade, and currently, they start studying it from the first grade. In addition to cultural grievances, Han also addresses the political and economic grievances. “One commonly cited factor to which Uyghur’s continual grievances is attributed is the repressive tactics employed by the Chinese state. Chinese state policies toward political dissent have always been harsh, particularly when ethnic separatism is involved. For example, at the end of April 1996, the Chinese government launched its first Strike Hard/Yanda campaign.”

From an economic standpoint, Xinjiang is estimated to contain 35.7 billion tons of oil and 22 trillion cubic metres of natural gas. China’s current strategy is to “…ship oil and natural gas from Xinjiang to its eastern provinces.” Xinjiang is rich in not just oil and gas, but also in cotton and other resources.

The Uyghurs have been quick to assert their differences from mainstream Han Chinese people, and this politics of difference has always unsettled officials in Beijing. “Rising Uyghur ethnic consciousness in the post-1978 era is believed to be related to the tension Uyghur-Han (Han being the dominant racial group in China) relations and conflicts in Xinjiang.” Dr. Nimrod Baranovitch of the Department of Asian Studies, University of Haifa, writes, “…a large body of literature makes clear that although the state plays a dominant role in the definition and representation of ethnic identities in China, ethnicity is a negotiated process and minorities are active agents in the negotiation of their ethnic identities.” The Chinese political establishment has tried to undermine the local identity of the Uyghur’s by trying to ‘Hanify’ Xinjiang by sending more and more racial Han Chinese people to the region and to take up jobs there. It was argued that ethnic
minorities would not be able to develop without the assistance of the so called advanced Han nationality. Thus, Han determinism replaced self-determinism. Although China argues that this Han migration is being done for purposes of economic development and to raise the material standards of the local Uyghur people, substantial evidence shows that the economic benefits are going to the Han Chinese and are being concentrated in their hands, rather than trickling down to the local Uyghur community. This has exacerbated the situation and made the Uyghur community more fierce in asserting their Islamic identity and distinctiveness. For instance, “…posters of Mahmud Qashqari and Yusup Hajib, two historical figures that the Uyghur consider their cultural heroes, have been widely distributed in Xinjiang, which in obvious contrast to the official Chinese versions that stress Xinjiang has been an inseparable part of China since antiquity, these posters link the Uyghur’s to a whole new world and to another history and civilisation.”

The Uyghur people, by and large, have been excluded from the decision making process with regard to development in Xinjiang, and yet they are expected to feel grateful to the Chinese for ‘developing’ their region. Well-known scholar and expert on China, Jackie Sheehan, argues that the colonial attitude towards the ethnic minorities of the peripheral borderland regions has galvanised the Uyghurs into action, asserting their distinct identity more than ever, thereby strengthening the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), and in the process, delegitimizing China’s claim over Xinjiang. The Chinese have always viewed cultural differences, especially religious differences, with considerable suspicion. It was feared that religious differences might undermine state values, state definitions of nationalism, and ‘patriotic’ ideology. Identity politics is, thus, very pronounced in the context of Xinjiang, which is also one of the aspects of the ‘New War’ thesis. “Asymmetric economic development and neglect of identity issues seem to be the bane of Xinjiang province in China.”

Kaldor’s theory discusses the strong presence of the paramilitary and armed forces in these conflicts. This aspect of the ‘New War’ theory fits in with the Xinjiang context in the sense that from time to time, the Chinese state has used the paramilitary and armed forces to crush the Uyghur uprisings. For instance, the people’s militia was deployed to arrest insurgents and other subversive elements who were threatening to undermine the Chinese state and national patriotic ideology. “East Turkestan has been under military control by Communist China since 1949.” The violent outbreaks in Xinjiang are sporadic. Thus, regional expert Dr. Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, writes, “A heavy police presence is a constant in Xinjiang.”

Another aspect of Kaldor’s thesis is that these ‘new’ conflicts need to be studied within the broader context of globalisation. Furthermore, boundaries between nation states are increasingly becoming blurred, and although conflicts in this day and age may seem to be localised, there may be strong transnational connections and a strong role played by external actors. Uyghur nationalism has been inspired by certain central Asians. The ETIM, in particular, is believed to have been inspired by the political Islam of the AF Pak region, and to some extent by Iran. Uyghur militants have been spotted in the AF-PAK region. In an era of globalisation,
activists and insurgents also make use of technology. "International campaigns for Uyghur rights and possible independence have become increasingly vocal and well organised, especially on the internet." Globalisation is affecting the development of Islam in China in a variety of ways. China is becoming part of the Islamic revival, which has become a global phenomenon over the last few decades. A certain kind of international Islam has become involved in strengthening Uyghur identity just as it has become enmeshed with ethno nationalist movements in various parts of the world. Dr. Stephen J. Blank, a Senior Fellow at the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College writes, “…this increasing violence clearly stems from the globalisation of violence, including terrorism that pervades much of the Muslim world, and from the general growth in Xinjiang’s global links of all kinds.” It could be argued that some of the aspects of the ‘New War’ thesis intertwine with other aspects of the thesis. For instance, in this case, globalisation, which Kaldor mentions, intertwines with identity and identity politics, which Kaldor also discusses. Technology has been crucial in spreading awareness of the problem in Xinjiang. As a result of this awareness, Muslims from other parts of the Islamic world who feel strongly about their Islamic sense of collective identity, will come and join their Muslim Uyghur brothers to fight against Chinese oppression, or what is perceived as Chinese oppression. Globalisation has also increased the inequality of the Uyghur community and has therefore led to much polarisation within the Chinese context. The Hans have benefitted from the process in comparison to the Uyghurs. Growing inter-connectedness often creates new animosities and conflicts, which can, in turn, fuel reactionary politics and deep seated xenophobia, which we see in the context of Xinjiang. The region is also rich in natural resources, which the Chinese mainland would like to exploit in its quest to become a global super power.

Kaldor discusses how these conflicts happen in a situation of erosion of state authority. This applies to Xinjiang, since the ETIM is essentially a secessionist movement.

She is correct in suggesting that in these new conflicts, it has become increasingly hard to distinguish between the ‘external’ and the ‘internal.’ With regard to the Xinjiang conflict, this is very much the case. Although from the Uyghur standpoint, the Han Chinese presence in Xinjiang is viewed as external because the Uyghurs do not see themselves as a part of China, but rather, as a distinct nation in their own right. From an outsiders point of view, this distinction cannot always be made easily, since China sees Xinjiang as an ‘integral’ part of China, and has done everything it can to ‘sinify’ or ‘hanify’ the region, so that Xinjiang resembles China proper.

Kaldor is also correct in her point with respect to the participation of the diaspora in ‘new wars.’ With regard to Xinjiang, Beijing has blamed the Uyghur diaspora for stirring up violence within China, especially in Xinjiang. In this connection,
mention may be made of Rebiya Kadeer and her efforts to free Xinjiang. She is the leader of the Uyghur community and although based in the United States, she fiercely supports the movement for a free East Turkestan from exile.22

Xinjiang is also prone to human rights violations,23 which is also very much in keeping with the ‘New War’ thesis.

The Case of Tibet

The situation in Tibet is quite similar to the situation in Xinjiang. For starters, it is essentially a secessionist movement, and thus, happens in a context where China’s state authority being eroded. This is in keeping with the ‘New War’ thesis, since Kaldor mentions that ‘new wars’ end to take place in a context where state authority is increasingly being weakened.
Tibet, like Xinjiang, is also a deeply religious province. “Monastery education dominated before 1951, and still exerts a strong influence.”24 The only difference is that whilst Xinjiang is predominantly Muslim, Tibet is predominantly Buddhist. The complicated situation in Tibet has occurred partly because the pronounced cultural differences, especially religious differences, do not go down well with the Chinese state. This is because cultural values distinct from mainland China are seen to be eroding mainstream state values, nationalism, and patriotic fervour. Religious groups in China have been strongly associated with secret societies and have been known for their underground activities in trying to topple the Chinese government throughout Chinese history.25

The issue of Tibetan national identity involves the question, to what extent is Tibet or was Tibet a distinct nation? Tibetans have argued that they were always a distinct nation, but China, on the other hand, has denied this. China argues that Tibet is an integral part of China, and that China has exercised sovereign authority over Tibet for 700 years.26 The Nationalities Affairs Commission was meant to pursue a policy of unifying the region with mainstream China, or China proper. “The trajectory of Chinese nationality policies is reflected in discrimination against minorities, the weakening of minority autonomous institutions in the 1950’s, the attack on minority cultures and autonomy during the cultural revolution in the sixties, and finally, the modernisation agenda featuring the centralising and assimilating power of education and propaganda systems since the 1980s.”27 The Dalai Lama’s administration in Tibet had been abolished, and was replaced by the preparatory committee for the TAR [Tibetan Autonomous Region], as the official government of the region. After 1959, China launched a full campaign to integrate Tibet economically, politically, and militarily. The policy of Han migration also followed, which began to undermine local Tibetan Buddhist identity.28 Dr. Abanti Bhattacharya, an Associate Professor in the Department of East Asian Studies at the University of Delhi, writes, “The Chinese state, which calls for submerging all minority identities within the predominant Han identity in the larger cause of national cohesion and security, has effectively precluded the possibility of Tibetan assertions of identity and political autonomy.”29 “For China’s stability and prosperity, it is critical that all its nationalities identify with China.”30 A series of so-called patriotic campaigns were designed to encourage Tibetans, including the clergy, to support integration within China.31 Tibetans have feared in recent years that they will become a minority in their own land due to the Han migration and inter-racial marriages introduced and encouraged by the state. In other words, there is a strong fear among Tibetans have feared in recent years that they will become a minority in their own land due to the Han migration and inter-racial marriages introduced and encouraged by the state.”

Chinese army soldiers patrol the Barkhor Square in front of Jokhang Temple in central Lhasa, Tibet.
local Tibetans that they will lose their distinct cultural identity. Like Xinjiang, it is the Hans who control the Tibetan economy and Tibetan administration. Tibetans cannot compete with the Han, who tend to be more skilled professionally. Tibetans, such as the Uyghur community in Xinjiang, have been excluded from the decision making process as far as development in the region is concerned. Development means different things to different people, and what it means to Tibetans is not what it means to the Chinese state. Furthermore, the development is unbalanced across localities. Despite protests, the Han migration or Han flood has continued, and that has paved the way for a new and formidable pro-China constituency in the region that has increased China’s security in Tibet. Thus, at the heart of the problem is identity and identity politics, which is one of the aspects of Kaldor’s ‘New War’ thesis. Kendrick Kuo, a Ph D student in International Relations at George Washington University, writes, “...in public statements, China has grouped East Turkestan terrorists with Tibetan and Taiwanese independence advocates. Religious adherents are viewed monolithically so that when devotees use a religious group to push for political ends, all followers of that religion are treated as co-conspirators.”

In keeping with the Kaldor ‘New War’ thesis, we also see the participation of the diaspora who are actively trying to raise awareness of the Tibetan issue internationally. For instance, “The exiled Tibetans in India have led a vociferous campaign for a separation of Tibet from China and have been able to exploit China’s dependency on foreign powers to promote their interests. The US has been receptive to exiled Tibetan propaganda, which has also been mixed up with a highly-loaded human rights crusade against China.”

The region has also been subject to human rights abuses and police brutality. The strong presence of the armed forces and para-military in Tibet has paved the way for all sorts of human rights abuses and atrocities to occur. The PLA [People’s Liberation Army] took over Tibet in 1950. “Public Security departments have taken broad responsibility to enforce regulations controlling religious activities and have participated actively in suppression campaign.” Not only have many Tibetans lost their lives, but state policies have been introduced by which Tibetan language and resources are being systematically eroded. Thus, we see two features of the ‘New War’ thesis, that is, presence of the armed forces and the para-military, and human rights abuses. Sometimes, one aspect of the ‘New War’ thesis might intertwine with another aspect of the thesis. For instance in both cases, but more so with regard to Tibet, the heavy presence of the armed forces has paved the way for all manner of police brutality and human rights abuses to take place. Of course, there is an element of variation, and the thesis cannot be applied uniformly to both the case studies. The thesis seems to fit in better with the Xinjiang context than with Tibet. In other words, from the discussion above, we can find more of the features or aspects of the ‘New War’ thesis found in the context of Xinjiang than in Tibet.

As a solution to the above conflicts, one needs to look at both the short term factors as well as the long term factors that have caused the conflict. Measures to prevent conflict can be divided into two categories: light prevention and deep prevention. The practitioners of ‘light prevention’ do not necessarily concern themselves with the root causes of the conflict, but their aim is to “...prevent latent or threshold conflicts from becoming severe armed conflicts.” Examples would include diplomatic interventions and private mediation efforts. Deep prevention, in contrast aims to address the root causes of the conflict which may mean engaging with issues of development, democracy and community relations. Since the conflicts in this article have been going on for decades and are still occurring in one form or another, it is important to give serious attention to deep prevention. If we take the light prevention approach, the problem will continue to persist. Since economic, political and social realities have led to these conflicts, sound policies in these areas can also provide a solution. The situation in both the case studies is not broken beyond repair. Good governance, effective development, reducing arms, demilitarisation, increasing human rights, and reducing the economic gap which exists between the different ethnic groups of these two provinces is most certainly the way forward.
On 14 March 2015, protesters participated in a European rally in Paris marking a failed 1959 Tibet uprising against China, and claim for a free Tibet.

by Marc Anderson

Marc Anderson holds a Ph.D in philosophy from the University of Leuven in Belgium. His primary research interests include the creation of a system of pragmatic logic, and its application to issues of conflict, defence, and value creation.

Introduction

American philosopher Josiah Royce’s concept of international war insurance was offered on the eve of the Great War.

My intention here is to re-examine it from two related vantage points. First, by comparing it to the core assumptions behind the endeavours actually adopted, namely, the League of Nations and the United Nations (UN), two prominent models of the way some larger scale human attempts at collectives of defence have played out historically.

Secondly, Royce’s project will be reassessed in light of those attempts, from the perspective of the practical metaphysics of the form of insurance in relation to consistent community creation.

It will be argued that collective defence conceived as a guarantee of offensive action against an aggressor member of the collective both does and must fail. Further, that this failure is based upon the logical and metaphysical inconsistency of the set of assumptions behind collective defence, and that ostensibly participating members of such a collective whose overall
character – here exemplified by Canada under W.L. Mackenzie King’s leadership – manifests a more consistent set of accepted assumptions which will tend both to shy away from and defeat the security guarantee and hasten the collapse of the intended collective. Finally, it will be suggested that a consistent metaphysics, not of collective, but of communal defence, with potential contemporary application, is advanced in Royce’s war insurance proposal.

The Spirit of Royce’s Suggestions

War, Royce insisted, as the world descended into the hell of the First World War, could not be understood simply as ‘a mere relic of barbarism.’

The true ground of conflict was to be found rather in considering the nature of the relationship between a man and his neighbour. In such relationships, in the stance which each takes to the other, there is, at any given moment, an attitude of diversity or sameness. We can call these the hate and love for the neighbor respectively. I may hate my neighbor so that I do not want to do and will not do what he wants, or I may love my neighbor so that I will do what he wants, i.e. conform my actions to his.

This is to this point a dyadic relationship between two people or nations. When it arises and if nothing else intervenes, those people are left with only two options: be two which are alike to one another, or be two which are different to one another. Both constitute dead ends in Royce’s view.

When the unit is the nation, then, says Royce, the reason for war’s persistence is that nations have always historically tended to be related to one another as dyadic pairs.

The dyadic relationship is one in which the experience of one party easily tends to be either so separate from the other party’s experience as to be disregarded, or so similar that it overwrites it.

On the other hand, Royce contends that whenever we can go beyond the dyadic relationship of a pair of units and introduce an agent between the pair who will interpret between them, who will create and make conscious and carry out their unified will as members of a community, then we have a community of interpretation. Wherever we form such communities, we stabilize human society.

Insurance, through the insurance agent, works on this principle. But, as Royce stresses, the particular characteristic of an act of insuring is not creating social linkages – although it does – but that through the agent, it allows an individual to create linkages to other people or groups who will exist beyond, and perhaps well beyond, his present temporal self.

In this activity of the insuring agent: “…a man does not in general purchase an insurance policy merely for the transient creature of today called ‘himself.’ A man purchases insurance for his ‘beneficiary.’ His beneficiaries may include people or corporations of whose very existence he, the individual, is little aware. But his linkages with such beneficiaries may join him to the whole social order.”

We will see how far-reaching this aspect of insurance is with regard to the difficulties inherent in the usual assumptions regarding the promotion of peace.

Meanwhile, Royce offers a simple suggestion for addressing the problem of conflict between nations: “…apply to international relations, gradually and progressively, [the] principle of insurance…”

His recommendations toward setting up such an insurance community include: that it be administered by an appropriately large Board of Trustees comprised of experienced and upstanding financial experts; that it be located in a neutral country and invested globally; that it be open to all nations; and that the Board of Trustees whose only judicial role would be deciding who gains a payout if they have not fired the first shot in a war, would have a financial and fiduciary role.

The international insurance community would statistically investigate the causes of losses through conflict. It would tend to seek to reduce those losses by addressing their causes, and would be able to do so up to the initial limitations upon its functions laid out above. It would also tend to set out a new direction by example and guidance.
Now someone might ask: what in this insurance proposal would prevent a determined nation from waging war?

Royce responds as follows: if we succeed in drawing that nation state into the insurance community, then we will give it a new and interesting purpose which lessens its interest in war.

But we cannot prevent a determined aggressor from starting a war. In short, we cannot guarantee anything. And there are reasons for this which Royce’s project circumvents, even though the language of guarantee attained a prominence—in even as Royce was writing—which boded ill for an actual peace.

Lessons learned: from the League of Nations to the UN

The Great War began through a series of linkages which had brought society from a national scale to an international scale. By 1914, nations all across the globe had been linked through trade and colonialism.

Whereas society might earlier have been described—as Royce did—as a massive group of human individuals with all their various and conflicting actions, goals, and purposes, which would appear to stand dyadically against any human individual as a great power potentially ‘twistable,’ if one was clever, to one’s own ends, the notion of society now became applicable on a much larger scale.

The usual relationship between human individual and society came to manifest itself now on the much more complex level of individual nation state versus society of nation states.

And the dyadic relationships between individual and society, if they are metaphysically fundamental types of engagement of experience, would simply be transferred to that more complex level of experience.

But the proliferation of dyadic relationships meant that war would at some point be inevitable in the same way that a single human individual bereft of loyalty to community would, in Royce’s view, tend to clash with his/her society.

The decade before the Great War saw “crisis after crisis,” most notably in 1905, 1911, and again in 1913, any one of which might have started a conflict which was only narrowly and with increasing difficulty averted each time, despite the skill of seasoned diplomats. 7

The problem was that because the dyadic relationships were now proliferating on a level of complexity beyond that between human individual and local society, no attempts at mediation by a merely human individual would tend to be successful. It would take an individual of a much greater complexity to mediate, i.e., Royce’s international insurance community.

Inevitably, the conflict began and escalated through the domino effect of the dyadic relationships.

Jonathan Glover, one of the world’s leading ethical and moral philosophers, calls this ‘falling into the trap,’ attributing it partially to a nationalism compounded by social Darwinism, in which “…there was an idea of a ‘nation’ almost as a person…” 8

The nation state was growing toward selfhood, into a more complex variant of the human individual.

Yet, the relationships provoking the conflict operated in conjunction with a further relationship type, which, while not dyadic, is nonetheless also inconsistent.

Royce called it the war spirit. He defined it as a loyalty bringing together individuals to fight for their country’s cause, which binds together the purposes of the individual and his society into a community so as to bring them beyond the dyadic relationship. 9

This war spirit—I will also call it an effort toward localized community—acted over and above the domino effect of the chaos of dyadic relations and caused nation-states to ‘clump together,’ so as to form the equivalent of a ‘nation of nations’: the Great War’s Allied powers and—opposing—Central powers.

Now, Royce’s proposal was not offered in a vacuum. Professor and Oxford historian Peter J. Yearwood skillfully addresses the chaos of social motives which drove the League’s formation. One line of thought wanted eventual peace, but not too soon, before due punishment had been meted out. 10 Others wanted an international sanction and blessing of trade benefits which had arisen through the war, in favor of themselves; 11 some wanted to tempt America to imperialism; and some sincerely wanted peace.

What they got, in the end, was no more than could be expected, if the assumptions under which they were working were such as we have suggested above, namely: a new class of complex social unit—the nation state, interacting through a profusion of dyadic relationships, together giving rise to highly complex localized communities on the basis of the war spirit directed at a common enemy.

Given this, the resulting institution could not, as we will argue, be more than: 1) local in its interests and effectiveness; 2) liable to centre its efforts around various negative types of prohibiting action; and 3) dependent in its cohesion upon the directed use of force against an explicit enemy.

Motives, conditions, and assumptions thus began coalescing around the theme of the security guarantee, wherein the most prominent goal of a League of Nations was a pledge to act together by force of arms to defeat any nation attempting war. The ideal, then, was a peace by threat of force. The League’s history from inception to dissolution largely unfolded as the history of the waning of this ideal of guaranteed security.

On 10 January 1920, the League’s covenant came into effect. The first failure with regard to the main goal soon occurred.

“One line of thought wanted eventual peace, but not too soon, before due punishment had been meted out.”
In April 1920, full scale war broke out between Poland and Russia. The League’s council attempted to send an international force to the border between the disputants. The effort failed, and finally, nothing was done. This set the tone for future efforts.

Canadian engagement in the League exemplifies the ‘hot and cold’ attitude which increasingly prevailed, and it serves as a backdrop upon which to contrast the failures of the League’s core goal, as manifested in the 1920s and 1930s, with the implications of Royce’s suggestions.

Canada was a member throughout the League’s 27-year existence. For twenty of those years, its commitment was coloured by the leadership of Prime Minister Mackenzie King.

The longest serving Canadian prime minister, King was an intellectual and practical idealist. Attending Harvard between 1897 and 1900, he eventually gained a Ph.D, and met Royce, whom he found, “exceedingly entertaining . . .”

King’s outlook makes him ideal for exemplifying the contrast between the failures of the League’s security guarantee, and the implication of Royce’s suggestions. Namely, he was an interpreter, and as Dr. Adam Chapnick of the Department of Defence Studies, Canadian Forces College, says: “…when it came to peacemaking, William Lyon Mackenzie King was a natural.”

King’s peacemaking had a unique character. Not trusting to international structures, he consistently thought and acted on the scale on which the human individual was linked to the nation.

“To [King], problems were best solved by people, not structures, and conciliation was always the best of methods to employ in adjusting differences.” ... Maintaining domestic harmony concerned him far more than his country’s involvement abroad.”

King was a master at maintaining domestic harmony, but with regard to the international effort toward conflict prevention which the League sought, his performance was uninspired, even detrimental. King’s very character as a natural interpreter with regard to conflict precluded any real success in bringing Canada to actively support the core ideal of an international structure which guaranteed peace by force.

The League covenant’s centerpiece was its Article 10, which undertook to preserve its members against external aggression.
Between 1920 and 1923, the Canadian delegates attempted to weaken and even remove Article 10, arguing that imposing the same degree of liability upon all members was unfair, because the risks of invasion were far different for each. Canadian efforts did not change Article 10, but they sowed doubt around the security pledge’s efficacy.

Through the long decades of the 1920s and 1930s, King displayed an unwavering ambivalence toward Canadian military involvement in preventing conflict. His practical idealism lauded the League as an opportunity for international cooperation, but it never extended to supporting a collective of force for maintaining peace.

It could not. He was too busy holding Canada together at that scale at which he was a natural interpreter. Indeed, King went so far as instructing his delegates: “…to say nothing if possible, and very little if not. One Canadian diplomat, Hume Wrong, fantasized that the perfect Canadian representative would not really exist—business cards, an office, and luggage would suffice.”

After various minor defeats in implementing collective security, the League came to a crisis: the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in September 1931. The League ordered Japan to withdraw from Manchuria.

King, temporarily back in opposition, noted in his diary: “I doubt if the League can withstand [sic] the hand of Japan.” King was right. Within five months, the Japanese had gained control of Manchuria and set a course toward political isolation and withdrawal from the League.

Half a world away, China and Japan were disputing interests which had little to do with European powers, let alone Canada.

The Canadian League delegate, speaking ambiguously about the invasion’s justification, provoked a heated rejoinder back home at Toronto’s Empire Club, whose title: ‘Does Canada Take the League of Nations Seriously?’ pretty much summed up matters.

The answer was: yes, Canada did take the League seriously, but not as far as a military contribution to force a peace. That was simply not in the Canadian interest.

Again the League’s response to the conflict fizzled out.

The next major incident, the Abyssinian crisis, essentially broke the League’s back with regard to the dream of guaranteed collective security.
On 22 November 1934, a dispute arose between Abyssinian militia and Italian Somali soldiers, eventually resulting in the deaths of some 150 soldiers. Abyssinia sought League arbitration. The response was muted.

Mussolini began mobilizing on Abyssinia’s borders, the latter repeatedly petitioning the League for arbitration and neutral observers. Unbeknownst to the League however, the French had made a ‘backroom deal’ with the Italians. Mussolini was set on conquering Abyssinia.

Military intervention was out. Could less stringent prohibitive actions work?

By midsummer 1935, an arms embargo was declared upon both Abyssinia and Italy, despite this action clearly favoring Italy. By October, fighting erupted, bringing the Italians swift gains, while the League’s internal machinery slowly worked its way toward sanctions against Italy.

Back in Canada, the newly reinstated King government, walked softly and conveniently left ‘the big stick’ at home.

A young Canadian diplomat named Lester Pearson was in Geneva at the crucial moment when sanctions were considered. Initially, an embargo of products to Italy was envisioned, none of them key military resources. The Canadian delegate, Walter Riddell, fearing this action was insufficient, suggested adding steel, iron, and oil to the sanctions, to ‘put some teeth into them.’ This ‘Canadian proposal’ was soon unanimously accepted.

However, Riddell had badly misread his government’s intentions.

The reaction in Rome was immediate and violent: ‘Oil sanctions mean war.’ It was a reaction likely to impress Mr. King . . . a vigorous controversy ensued [among the Canadian public], the government became alarmed . . . and repudiated the initiative of its representative in Geneva for the extension of sanctions . . . [this] played an important part in destroying any remaining hope that strong sanctions, collectively and effectively applied, would force Italy to halt its military aggression against Ethiopia.

Riddell was sacked. Pearson, not keen, took his place, admitting later that: "...it soon became clear that all I had to do was be careful, and take no initiative, ‘to see no evil, hear no evil’ and above all, ‘speak no evil’... during that December week when I was in Geneva, the committee, in fact, never got to sanctions. They were too busy ... with dropping, rather than applying, sanctions."
Thus even weaker types of prohibitive action were shown to be subject to the vagaries of self-interest.

As the League swiftly dwindled into insignificance King waxed eloquent on his view of collective security:

_The Power of Non-Violence_ by Richard Gregg ... It bore out what I had been saying earlier that an institution formed for promoting peace makes a fundamental mistake when it relies on force & violence in the end for success — makes war a sanction for peace — it is a contradiction in terms. The present situation shows the folly of this — There are the two wings in conflict today:

(1) those who want no war in Europe & would sacrifice an institution [the League] which is fundamentally unsound in the particular mentioned [way] to preserve peace i.e., sacrifice the peace instrument which is proving to be a war instrument;

(2) those who would take chances on & go the length of war to save the peace instrument, which the war would destroy.21

War had been avoided temporarily, but war was on its way. Pretense at the League’s effectiveness now dropped, old-fashioned direct diplomacy became the order of the day, as Hitler’s Germany grew hourly more menacing.

But just as Italy had not really been an enemy, not yet, to those nations capable of enforcing Abyssinia’s security in 1935, Germany, in the closing years of the 1930s, was not really an enemy, not yet, until suddenly she was an enemy.

When, in September 1939, Britain declared war on Germany, when the only international community that King had known was threatened, then finally he accepted the use of force.

King could not support the League in a security pact. Yet if war arose, the ties of the community of shared history ensured that Canada would join the defence of the British Commonwealth community, but on the basis of that community of shared history, and thus, only as a national selfhood which had a clear purpose through having historically reconciled in that community the dangerous dyadic relationship with at least some of the global society of nations.

The League of Nations was now effectively dead in its primary capacity.
As the Second World War escalated, the factors which had precipitated the Great War again came into play: the mass of international dyadic relationships between nations and the appeal of the war spirit in the formation of localized communities of nations.

For both sides once again there was an enemy, and because there was an enemy, a localized community could coalesce around the defeat of that enemy. And so – ironically, if not for the deep metaphysical and logical considerations driving these tendencies – a united use of force which the world’s nations had never once been able to summon effectively for some twenty years, despite the stated aim of the League, was now quickly accomplished on a massive scale.

Thus, the League’s failure facilitated the birth of the UN, a birth which unfolded in precisely the same way as the birth of the former.

The enemy, earlier a mere shadow, suddenly became explicit. The defeat of the explicit enemy presented a goal to accomplish, around which gathered the locally consistent community of the ‘nations united against the axis menace,’ or United Nations, as it soon became known.

As the war turned in favor of these ‘United Nations,’ tentative musings upon postwar cooperation began intensifying and coalescing, and once again, nations were driven toward a cooperative organization built around the mirage-like dream of collective security.

Eerily reminiscent problems arose almost immediately. The great powers envisioned themselves as forming an ‘exclusive gentlemen’s club.’ The question became: who else would be allowed to join that club, if only as subordinate members?

Before attending Dumbarton Oaks, King outlined his position:

If the new world system is conceived in terms of power alone . . . peace may be kept for a time, but not for long. If it is to last and broaden out from precedent to precedent it must embody a dynamic idea and ideal. The concentration on security, and on the need to marshal overwhelming force to meet threats to security, is not enough. Security from war is indeed essential, but real security requires international action and organization in many other fields . . .

Yet, collective security came to dominate the conference agenda.

A year later, at the 1945 San Francisco conference, the issues had grown both more pressing and more difficult. The postwar world was shaping itself around the localized interests of the conflict’s participants. With the common enemy nearing defeat, the goal of the war spirit community was fading fast.

Ultimately, the Canadian delegation’s greatest success, under King’s guidance, was convincing the great powers that the UN should have fully fledged economic and social functions.

But with regard to the forcing of peace, history was repeating itself.

The great powers would not budge on the veto principle. Their war spirit unity had begun dissolving into the localized dyadic interests which would ensure that they sought an unconditional veto of collective military action as a necessity for preserving those interests.
Thus, out of the ideal of the security guarantee came inevitably what we may call the guarantee to make war.

The UN’s architects had thus bequeathed to the future an institution fundamentally flawed in this respect and that future had already begun drifting toward the dyadic polarization of the great powers later manifested in the Cold War’s conflicts.

**Lessons Applied: Prospects of Great Community Building in the Contemporary World**

The problems in the League and UN ideal can be summarized as follows.

*First*, the structures envisioned were vulnerable to local interests and effectiveness.

*Second*, their efforts tend to be efforts of a prohibitive or negative type. Clearly, such efforts tend to falter. Prohibitive efforts tend to work against all interests local and otherwise, and some interpretive linkages somewhere – linkages between consistent communities, i.e., financial linkages – are broken. Moreover, prohibitive action engenders fear of prohibitive retaliation, or worse, aggressive retaliation, increasing the dyadic aspect.

*Third*, and most importantly, the structures depended upon a directed use of force against an explicit enemy. The paradox is: no nation state could be an enemy before it actually *was* an enemy. The League could not declare one of its members to be an enemy, for the very core of the adopted assumptions was that members intending war would be cowed into giving up their plans before becoming an enemy. But if so, the League was forever without a goal. Peace was to be the goal. Indeed, but peace from whom? This was doomed to be forever unanswered. The assertion the security guarantee’s architects wished to make, i.e., the assertion ‘no enemy shall attack one of us,’ was hopeless as a goal. Logically it was forever the attempt to prove a negative universal, which, as Royce insisted, was a futile task.

One cannot have a mere static peace guaranteed by force. Rather, there must be something to act upon, something to do together in community which is interesting enough to take us beyond the ‘having something to do together in false community’ of war, which is also very interesting in a self-interested local way.

The context which organizations such as the League and UN have to work with is the following. A new class of complex social unit, the nation-state, which has proliferated over the past few centuries. These social units interact with ‘the group of such units’ as of yet primarily by means of dyadic relationships, mirroring at a higher level of complexity the relation which often holds between the human individual and the human group as a mere society. This state of affairs tends to give way to highly complex localized communities formed on the basis of the war spirit directed at a common enemy.
Enter Royce.

Royce had discussed the nature of the war spirit as a basis of loyalty, as we noted. He held it at arm’s length however, insisting that there were far better types of loyalty. I have attempted to show why he did this.

The war spirit community is essentially a false community, which is to say that it is locally consistent in its goal, but self-destructively inconsistent as soon as one attempts to generalize the negative principle of its actions.

Much of cooperation of both World Wars was war spirit cooperation, with the goal of defeating an explicit enemy.

But when the goal was removed, i.e., as soon as the enemy on a national scale – for example, the Central Powers – was defeated, then the false community would begin collapsing, along with any League emboldening its formative assumptions. A less complex variant of this can be seen even in the effect upon otherwise strong, though localized, military communities – armies – in contemporary conflict, whenever and to the extent that ‘who or what the enemy is’ becomes increasingly vague. Communities cannot exist without a definite goal, and without a positive goal, they can only exist temporarily and in a relatively weak form.

Why hasn’t the UN collapsed yet? Because the dyadic polarization of the global society of nations has kept up a low-level war spirit community – i.e., the Cold War – and because other consistent communities within the United Nations effort – i.e., economic development – have upheld it. However, eventually it will collapse in its collective security aspect, just as the League did.
Now the solutions to our three difficulties fall into three categories: expansions of the sense of self–hood of each of the units in question (the nation-states), which broaden their interests and increase their effectiveness; the promotion of indefinite opportunities for positive expansive action, i.e., growth; the selection of one or more primary and secondary goals, all of which are expansive explicit goals, i.e., they cannot logically be completed as the negative singular goal of defeating an explicit enemy can be completed and yet they can be logically worked upon as positive particulars in a way that the negative universal of the security guarantee cannot be worked upon.

Royce’s variant of these solutions resides in the form of insurance itself applied at the nation-unit level.

The solution to the first difficulty was to be an expansion of selfhood of each unit, which broadens its interests and effectiveness.

As Royce puts it: ‘Everyone serves himself,’ that is, his own interests. The trick is going to be promoting action which serves those interests in a consistent way, i.e., in an expansive way.

Insurance is usually blandly defined as an effort to guard against unforeseen future experiences. But this is a negative and ‘muddle-headed’ definition. Positively defined it is the attempt to interpret one’s present experience to one’s future experience; that is, in ‘laying aside money for a rainy day,’ we are really caring for our future selves.

My self is the span of experience which I am able to hold together in an interpretation. Insurance expands that self by recognizing and interpreting my present to my future: I look forward from the present to a time when I will have an interest in and an effective opportunity to act with regard to future experience.

At a stroke then, I solve the first difficulty of localized interests and effectiveness, in this expansion of selfhood, interest, and effectiveness. And this solution allows the nation-state as the member unit to get an expanded sense of its selfhood, for a future in which it will have an interest in acting.

The solution to the second difficulty was the promotion of opportunities for positive and expansive action leading to growth.

The form of insurance, open to unlimited expansion, does this directly.

How many new members can the insurance community accept? It can accept as many as will join.

The insurance fund itself – the sign of the community’s value—becomes a centre for unlimited positive expansion which cycles between recruiting new members to grow the insurance fund, actively applying the fund to newer, larger projects of insurance, recruiting more members, and so on.

All this is the very opposite of the opportunity presented under the assumptions of the security guarantee, where every ‘success’ – and even every ‘non-success,’ such as the Japanese and Italian withdrawal – essentially excludes a member and shrinks the group and its interpretive linkages.

The solution to the third difficulty was the selection of various explicit primary and secondary goals.

Here, the insurance principle displays aspects which link up with its answers to the first two difficulties, and with other indirectly-related aspects.

First, the international insurance community has the positive and open-ended goal of the growth of the community.

Second, it has the goal of the longevity and continuity of members’ experience and of itself as a community, i.e., both are insuring their own lives, so to speak. In case conflict occurs, it always has the specific goal of rebuilding and supporting its members with regard to any damage suffered in the conflict.

Two further subordinate goals then arise: the statistical study of the causes of conflict, again an expansion of the selfhood of the members, but now with regard to past experiences, their histories; and the goal of discovering specific new creative ways of correcting the errors leading to conflict.

The logistical guidelines of Royce’s proposal then fall naturally into place as so many suggestions supporting insurance’s tendency of promoting national selfhood, positive growth, and diverse goals.

Thus, for example the board of trustees is to be ‘appropriately large,’ to be able to grow along with a community which is constantly growing. It is to undertake a positive and expansive action in making public all of its proceedings. It is to have an original agreement of purpose between its members which expands the insurance community’s selfhood with regard to its historic past. It is to invest its fund broadly within the financial community and seek advice from an international judicial community, thus promoting still larger communities.

War insurance in the Contemporary Context

I invoked Royce’s metaphysics in tracing the path of aggression leading to false communities of eliminative intent. From the simple dyadic relationships of individual to society, the increasing complexity of human affairs leads to more complex dyadic relationships of individual nation state versus a society of nation states. These relationships engender a cyclical action between accepting collectivity as sameness, and the rebellion of individuality as utter difference, leading to conflicts of nation state against ‘society of nation states,’ just as the human individual strives against society as a power.
The principle of community is often intuited as the solution. But it is wedded to further mistaken assumptions, manifesting themselves particularly in recent human history at an international level, as we offered with regard to the rise and fall of the League of Nations and its very similar offspring, the United Nations.

In these institutions, we see the assumption of the eliminative goal as a goad to communities of the war spirit. Eliminative goals are inconsistent with the structure of community and render war spirit communities inconsistent. Yet, eliminative assumptions are sometimes distrusted by nations – i.e., Canada – proceeding predominantly along other lines.

The solution then presents itself in Royce’s suggestions regarding the nature of insurance as a basic structure which grows community. Insurance allows for the expansion of the nation unit’s selfhood, indefinite opportunity for expansion, and explicit expansive goals. This suggests the value of creating an international insurance community to address conflict.

The most promising aspect of such a community is that it could be commenced on almost any scale, i.e., by a few members with voluntary interest in the project.

It might begin with low GDP countries and a small seed fund. A country such as Malawi for example, recently relatively stable, might well join an insurance community with, say, Paraguay, with which it has otherwise few interests.

One of the greatest difficulties might come from the worldwide arms industry.

But precisely because the international insurance community would in no way take steps to prohibit the manufacture of arms – as sometimes attempted – then the arms manufacturing interests, even if believing themselves threatened, would certainly not be worried initially. Positive growth once begun would begin addressing the arms problem indirectly.

The insurance premiums of members would also contribute to addressing this problem. However, not through penalties for belligerency.

Conclusions

I have attempted to show that the spirit of Royce’s approach is based upon the tendency toward expansion of interpretation, that is, positive action of growth, rather than varieties of constriction of interpretation found in prohibitive or eliminative action.

In that spirit, turning to positive forms of assessment with regard to the premium would be an obvious tack. An insurance premium represents a positive contribution to the community, a contribution of value which can heal the community’s later mistaken actions. Accordingly, basing our assessment of war insurance premiums upon the voluntary contributions by members to the growth of stabilizing interpretive linkages within the community would be wise.

I call fostering these interpretive linkages – the community’s value – interpretive defence. Differing from the usual meaning of defence, it neither involves nor invokes any offensive attack, nor any type of constriction, and can manifest at physical complexities, but also at higher complexities.

Assessing the defensive contribution which a community member has made would not be easy, but it would be far easier than the impossible task of trying to assess what a member nation might do with regard to starting wars. Contemporary voluntary telematic tracking rewarding good driving behavior parallels this, as does home insurance premium assessment, which historically, has rewarded interpretive defence with home security systems, fire hazard systems, and so on.

A final point, insurance companies have the advantage of something called the float, the fluctuating difference between the money theoretically paid out if all claims were called in and the money actually paid normally.

The ‘float’ for our international insurance community would – eventually – be enormous, a store of value available for use by the community of nations on the scale of international projects.

A final point, insurance companies have the advantage of something called the float, the fluctuating difference between the money theoretically paid out if all claims were called in and the money actually paid normally.

The ‘float’ for our international insurance community would – eventually – be enormous, a store of value available for use by the community of nations on the scale of international projects.

It would be perfectly placed to initiate and fund those further projects of community, such as insurance for global disease outbreak, to which Royce so presciently alludes.
NOTES

2. Ibid., p. 39.
3. Ibid., p. 52.
11. Ibid., p. 59.

14. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 100.
21. King diary, 20 December 1935. [Insertions mine]
22. Chapnick, 82. [Italics mine]
23. Ibid., 134.
Introduction

Black History Month has been celebrated in Canada since February 1996, providing further recognition of Canada’s cultural mosaic. It commemorates the contribution made by black Canadians in all aspects of Canadian society – culturally, politically, socially, militarily – dating back to before Confederation. In fact, people of African origin were present in Canada when it was known as New France, and they have been part of our cultural mosaic ever since.

In the military realm, one of the most cited contributions has been that of No. 2 Construction Battalion, a First World War labour unit that served in the United Kingdom and France, being authorized in part as a result of pressure from the black community in Canada to be allowed to participate in the First World War. The 100th anniversary of No. 2 Construction Battalion will be marked on 5 July 2016, and the unit is celebrated as Canada’s only black unit of the First World War. Since 1993, the town of Pictou, Nova Scotia, has celebrated annually the battalion and the town’s role in its formation and training. Market Wharf in Pictou was designated a National Historic Site in 1993 to commemorate its role as headquarters for the battalion.

One issue associated with commemorating No. 2 Construction Battalion is the fact that no operational history of the unit has been written. The resurgent recognition of the battalion started in 1986 when Calvin Ruck published his history on the formation of the unit. Other works followed soon thereafter in academic journals. Over the next 25 years, there would be generated both a Master’s Thesis and a Bachelor’s Thesis that examined aspects of the unit. The common thread throughout these modern works was that of the attempts by black Canadians to enlist. Some description was provided on the activities and working conditions of the battalion. However, the brevity of these works and the nature of the topic resulted in the omission of details about the unit’s work. For a unit as celebrated as this one, it would seem appropriate that the commemoration not only be about the formation of the unit, but also about its achievements.

This article will provide an overview of the operational history of No. 2 Construction Battalion. The aim is to provide a sense of the work done by the unit, and hopefully, inspire others to pursue further research on the operational aspects of the unit. Of necessity, this article can only be a synopsis as a more detailed history would consume many more pages.
Background

The starting point has to be battalion’s duties while still garrisoned in Nova Scotia, even before leaving for the United Kingdom (UK). As the men of No. 2 Construction Battalion were busy recruiting or training, the call was placed for them to remove railway tracks in western New Brunswick. Between January and early-March 1917, a company of 250 men removed railway rails from the Grand Trunk Railroad sidings at Edmundston, Napadogan (north of Fredericton), and Moncton, from whence it was shipped for use by the railway troops in France. By the time the company returned to Truro, the unit was preparing to deploy to the UK.

No. 2 Construction Battalion arrived in Liverpool on 7 April 1917, having been transported from Halifax on the S.S. Southland, a ship operating under the White Star-Dominion Line. Unit personnel made their way to Seaford, which was to be their home for the next five weeks. On arrival at Seaford, one of the first things to happen was that the unit was placed under quarantine for ten days. This was normal for all newly-arrived units and men to allow for the detection of any contagious diseases and to prevent their spread. Being quarantined did not mean being inactive. They were soon employed on work parties and were digging trenches for troops in training. They also built and maintained roads within the base. With Seaford being a major Canadian base and one that would soon expand, this work was necessary.

Around 1 May 1917, they also formed a permanent air picket in case of air raids. Britain had earlier been subject to Zeppelin attacks and, anticipating that a series of attacks could occur in the relatively near future, the chief constable for the area had begun appropriate preparations in March 1916. The possibility of being called to action so soon after arrival in England would likely have stirred the hearts of many members of the company, especially those who had been rejected for service in CEF infantry battalions, but now found themselves potentially on a front line. However, the zeppelins did not show up. And as did many other CEF units in England, they planted potatoes as a supplement to the regular food supplies. Thus, for the period in which No. 2 Construction Battalion served in the UK, their activities were not much different than what would be considered for other construction or labour units.

While all this was happening openly, behind the scenes, there was much activity that most soldiers did not see, particularly with respect to the employment and size of the unit.

The men of No. 2 Construction Company helped operate the mills of the other forestry companies at La Joux. Note the French lady in the centre of the photo. Local civilians would have been regular visitors to the camp. Note also the horses (far right), the primary source of transportation for the CFC in this area.
To the Continent

On 17 May, the newly renamed and redesignated No. 2 Construction Company left Folkestone for Boulogne, France. The company arrived at Jura at 1:00 AM on 20 May, having had one 'hearty' meal at Abbeville on the 18th and only one meal on the following day. Jura is a Department (district) in the foothills of the French Alps, west of Lac Leman, on which the Swiss city of Lausanne is located. For Canadian purposes, Jura was part of No. 5 District, Canadian Forestry Corps (CFC), a relatively new district for the CFC in France. The District itself had only begun to receive its first companies at La Joux, a small community in the Jura Department, a few weeks before the arrival of No. 2 Construction Company.

On arrival at La Joux, one of the first things to happen was for the company to be placed in quarantine for ten days due to a case of measles. This did not mean that the men of No. 2 Construction Company did not work – this they did. On the 22nd, 300 of them were working – felling trees, cutting logs, hauling them to the mill and then doing the millwork. To this was soon added preparing the finished wood products for shipment, and carrying out the shipping operations. These wood products included railway ties, and board and stakes for use in the trenches.

There was more to their work than just assisting in logging operations. An important requirement for any camp is water. No. 2 Construction Company was responsible for ensuring the camp, shared with the Forestry Companies, had an adequate water supply for cooking, drinking, and washing for over 1,300 men, and more importantly, for use in the mills. Getting the water to the camp meant supervising the water stations with their pumps and ensuring the lines were not damaged or leaking as the water was moved by a series of pumps up a rise of 1,500 feet. When a power plant was installed and began operations in January 1918 to provide electricity for the camp, it was the men of No. 2 Construction Company who operated and maintained it. The plant provided 125 volts/80 amps DC, and was fed by a small boiler in the washroom.

Transportation was one of the main roles for No. 2 Construction Company, transporting the logs from the forests, down the logging roads to the mills, and then bringing the finished products to the railroad junction. The area in which the men of No. 2 operated was not easy terrain for mechanized operations. Heavy rainfall in the summer washed away logging roads or left them rutted, while snow made the roads very slippery in the winter. Further, the narrowness and steepness of these logging roads were beyond the capabilities of the vehicles then in use. Horses were the answer, and they were used in large number in the La Joux area. Similarly, the roads to the railhead were also affected by the rain and snow. Therefore, continual road maintenance was necessary.

Most of the horses allocated to the CFC were either old or Category “B” animals. Already in poorer condition, these horses had suffered from work-related injuries, debility from overwork, and neglected grooming that facilitated the spread of the mange. By the end of the war, most of these animals were in such condition that they could not be resold as farm or transport animals, but were deemed fit only to be killed and used for human consumption.
No. 2 Construction Company likely possessed between 70 and 100 horses. They made the best of their poor steeds, keeping them well-shod and groomed. The horses were regularly inspected by veterinarians of the Canadian Army Veterinary Corps (CAVC), while a sergeant from the CAVC was attached to the unit to ensure daily inspections and first aid treatment of the animals. Of the nine forestry districts of the CFC in France, only No. 5 had a dipping tank into which horses could be soaked in a calcium sulphide solution to control the mange. Grooming after work was important for the health of the horses as they could have picked up ticks and other insects while in the forest. This would have been done by the horse-handlers at the end of the work day and was serious enough that if it was not done or done properly, a soldier could be charged for failing to groom properly, or with mistreating the animals. This was the case with at least two soldiers of No. 2 Construction Company.

Having moved the logs to the mills, it was now the company’s responsibility to move the finished products to the railhead. This they did by maintaining the roads and driving the trucks that carried the lumber. About 100 men were employed on roadwork, operating a rock-crusher, a steam drill, a steam roller, and trucks. As Lieutenant-Colonel Sutherland noted, “the roads were kept in a good state of repair where the heavy traffic demanded the best roads possible.”

The variety and diversity of the work accomplished can be seen in where the men of No. 2 Construction Company were employed in February 1918, when the unit strength was 257 men, two large contingents having been detached in November and December 1917. Thirty were employed as teamsters, 50 in the various mills, 50 in bush operations, 30 in shipping, 15 as cooks, 20 in other district employment and the rest in miscellaneous tasks.

The effort to produce more wood products was continual, and one to which the men of No. 2 Construction Company were co-opted. The small size of each forestry company meant that they could not operate their mills for more than one 12 hour shift. For most of the month of June 1917, No. 2 Construction Company provided a night crew of about 65 men to operate the local mill. In January 1918, a letter from No. 5 District CFC, which called for greater output, was read to the men. This meant that the unit and inexpensive, could not move the necessary number of logs, while the trucks could not manage the roads. Logging railways had operated in North America for over 50 years, and so the example existed for an alternate means of transport. The decision was made at higher levels that a rail line should be built that ran from the timber lots towards La Joux. A detachment from No. 22 Company and fifty men from No. 2 Construction Company built a two-mile long, 24 inch gauge railroad from Le Glacier, south-southeast of La Joux Station. The construction continued through September.

The railhead at nearby La Joux was the loading point for the wood products produced at the local CFC mills. While there are members of No. 2 Construction Company and of the Canadian Forestry Corps companies in this photo, it was the men of No. 2 who did most of the transportation of the finished products.
would be working nights and Sundays. The Sunday effort did give them some respite, as work did not commence until after the church service, instead of at the normal 7:00 AM. In these efforts, they assisted No. 21 Company, CFC in setting a record of over 95,000 Board Measures cut in 10 hours. The letter from CFC asking for greater output was obviously taken to heart, and the record production showed the level of co-operation between No. 2 Construction Company and the forestry companies they supported. The men of No. 2 had to ensure that there were ample logs ready to be cut and brought forward quickly.

Not all the effort and thought was put towards production. On 6 December 1917, the SS Mont Blanc collided with the SS Imo in Halifax Harbour. The resulting explosion leveled much of Halifax and Dartmouth. It did not take long before the word reached the men of 2 Construction Company, a large proportion of whom were from the Halifax area, or had family residing there. There was a great amount of anxiety on 8 December, but even more when the extent of the damage became known. Major Sutherland made immediate inquiries as to casualties among family members, while a relief fund started at No. 5 District for relatives of Halifax explosion. It must have seemed a miracle to the men of the company when, on Christmas Day, they received a message from Colonel H.F. MacLean that no such casualties had been reported.

The speed with which the news of the Halifax explosion reached the ears of the men of No. 2 Construction Company demonstrated that despite the distance, and what by modern standards were not very rapid communications, the men of the Company were not isolated. News, as they say, travels fast. The actions upon hearing the news of the explosion also demonstrated that events at home had an effect on the troops in France. Although both of the above conclusions seem intuitive, it is worth noting as the men at La Joux were in a remote region of France, and at the end of a long postal and communications chain.

Other members of the Company found means of amusing themselves, or at least, demonstrating a lack of or difficulty in adjusting to military discipline. Within a short time of arriving in La Joux, a number of the members had already made names for themselves by appearing in front of Major Sutherland. Some of these defaulters were put to work building a log cabin jail as a reminder of what would happen if they continued in their errant ways. However, the behaviour did not improve, and in September 1917, CFC Headquarters in France decided to send them closer to the front lines where their labour could be used, and hopefully, where greater discipline could be instilled.

On 12 November 1917, one officer and 54 other ranks from 2 Construction Company were attached to 37 Company, CFC, which was operating near Peronne in northeast France, arriving there on 14 November. Here, their work consisted of manual labour, such as cutting logs, moving them to the mills, and keeping the roads repaired, these activities thus being very similar to what they had been doing at La Joux.

During the German spring offensive that commenced on 21 March 1918, 37 Company was in the path of the German advance, and some shells fell in the area of the camp. On 23 March, they were forced to leave Forêt de Bias, and ordered to leave their lumber, machinery, and mill intact. All important parts for the machinery were buried, and 22 wagons were loaded with the most important stores. They marched out of camp at 5:00 PM with the Germans then only about 2,000 yards away.

On 25 March, they took over the mill at Wail and began operations the next day. By August 1918, there were only 37 of the original 54 personnel remaining from 2 Construction Company. Some had actually changed their recidivist ways, while others had not.

A second major detachment of company personnel was sent to serve in northern France at the end of 1917. They were sent there when the medical officer in Jura initiated a process, since he believed the men from the United States and the West Indies could not handle the winter in Jura, at the base of the Alps. He therefore suggested they be sent to warmer climes. As may be imagined, his beliefs were unfounded, the proof arising when the rain and damp weather of November 1917 gave way to the cold dry weather in December, and the ‘southern’ enlistees had no trouble adapting to the new temperatures. However, by this time, the decision had been made to transfer these soldiers, and CFC Headquarters in France would not request a reversal, since it would have made both themselves and the medical officer who initiated the transfer appear ridiculous.

On 30 December 1917, a detachment of 180 men led by two officers left La Joux for No. 1 District, CFC, with its headquarters at Alençon. They arrived there on 31 December near midnight. The men were then broken up, with one group joining No. 38 Company, CFC, at Andaine, with whom they remained for the rest of the war. Another group was attached to No. 54 Company, CFC, operating at Bois Pelay. They remained with No. 54 until 25 May 1918. When No. 54 Company moved to Forêt de Senonches, the detachment was also transferred, now becoming attached to No. 42 Company at L’Évêque. A further group of men served with No. 43 Company, CFC, at Les Sausseux, in all probability from mid-1918.

As with the detachment at 37 Company, these men performed manual labour, helping the forestry companies they supported produce and ship their timber products. When the decision was made to start demobilizing No. 2 Construction Company, these men, along with those from No. 37 Company, were recalled at the same time.

When No. 2 Construction Battalion left for France, it left behind 89 of its men in England where they would become part of the Nova Scotia Regiment. For most of these soldiers, they spent their time doing menial work in between periods of infantry training, being posted between No. 17 Reserve Battalion and No. 26 Reserve Battalion. In late March, a group of 50 was sent to join their parent unit in La Joux as reinforcements, arriving on 8 April. They were followed on 6 June with a further 17 members. These troops were sorely needed, as the number of men in the company at La Joux had been steadily declining, due to injury and illness. By February 1918, the complement at La Joux was just 257, which was not enough to provide all the manpower required to support four forestry companies.

Of those remaining at Seaforth, some joined CFC companies in England and France. Twelve were posted in October 1918 to No. 7 Company and to No. 8 Company CFC, six to each, where they participated in the construction of airfields for Lord Trenchard’s Independent Air Force. Only a few of No. 2 Construction Battalion’s 600+ men were to see combat.
One of these was Private R.G. Bonnette, who first served with the Canadian Veterinary Corps before being transferred to the 10th Battalion, where he was shot in the chest on 2 September 1918.46

It had been the desire of many black Canadians to fight against the Germans. This apparently remained a desire of many if not most of the members of No. 2 Construction Company while they were in France. However, as previously noted, only a few were able to do so, although the men attached to 37 Company came very close to combat. For the men at La Joux, the opportunity was more fleeting.

As mentioned earlier, on 21 March 1918, the Germans launched their massive Spring Offensive. With the approval of the Quartermaster General, the CFC in France prepared to form two 800-man battalions for a reserve unit, issuing orders for each district to begin squad and musketry drill for all ranks in their spare time.47 Both the offer and the preparations were a bit premature. The General Officer Commanding the Canadians in London did not approve the plan, while the Canadian Corps indicated they did not have the transport available for these men, but they could be used for digging trenches in rear areas. Further, both commands indicated that the men of the Forestry Corps could not be spared from their forestry duties.48

The hopes of 2 Construction Company were raised that they may become involved in the fighting as they followed the progress of the German advance with “intense interest.” Major Sutherland sent a telegram to the Director of Timber Operations, stating in part, “…will you please recommend my unit which is organized for construction work for transfer to the Western front.” It would be almost a month before a reply was received. It stated simply that it was “not expedient at present time” to detach the company away from their work.49 Despite this rejection and the often contradictory messages being sent down from headquarters, No. 2 Construction Company conducted military training during the week and on Sundays including rifle drill and training in nearby French trenches, all the while continuing their timber work.50 This continued into June by which time all threats from the German advance had passed, as did hopes of seeing combat.

One aspect of No. 2 Construction Company’s efforts that has gone unnoticed was their supervision of Russians who were attached to the Company as labourers. In April 1916, the first Russian brigade arrived in France, having left Moscow on 3 February. They went on to fight with the French Army. However, after news of the February 1917 Revolution, followed by a mutiny among a large number of the men that lasted from June to early September, they were deemed to be unsuitable for combat, and some were transferred to work with the CFC

The black soldiers of No. 2 Construction Company worked alongside their white compatriots at La Joux, as illustrated in this photo.
in France. This was thus to be a difficult task as the Russians No. 2 Construction Company had to supervise included mutineers who had railed against the established order.

The first Russians destined for service with No. 2 Construction Company arrived in January 1918. It soon became obvious that this was a very mixed group in terms of character, politics, and suitability for the work. In mid-March, 22 were sent to Reims considered as “unfit,” while a number of others were actually considered “useless.” Unfortunately, what “unfit” meant is not stated, whether it was a medical categorization, or related to other issues. The posting out of 22 soldiers may have reduced the number of problem children, but it did not eliminate the problem.

By April 1918, there were 100 Russians attached to No. 2 Construction Company, and some of these men were busy spreading “socialistic doctrine.” By 16 May, issues with the quality of their work and political agitation had reached the point where an armed guard from No. 2 Construction Company had to be placed over 56 “malcontents” in one hut. They were still under guard at the end of the month. Regrettably, there is not enough detail to state whether they refused to leave the hut, or if they had been confined there. By the time No 2 Construction Company left La Joux for the UK in December, there were 150 Russians attached to the unit, who were then taken on strength by No. 40 Company.

On 11 November 1918, the armistice came into effect. On 30 November, the CFC ordered that 1000 “low category men” and No. 2 Construction Company were to be returned to the UK for demobilization. Over the next months, the men of the Construction Battalion were shipped back to Canada, and over time, their legacy was forgotten. In November 1919, Lieutenant-Colonel Sutherland indicated that he was anxious to have the identity of No. 2 Construction Battalion preserved by making it an active militia unit organized from black Canadians. However, this was not to be, as units of the Canadian Forestry Corps and Canadian Railway Troops were not continued after the war, and hence, there was no unit to carry on their legacy.

Until Calvin Ruck brought the contribution of No. 2 Construction Battalion to the public’s attention in 1986, the only celebration of their wartime effort occurred in Toronto in 1926, when a plaque was unveiled at the Provincial Legislature. The event was inspired by the 76th annual general convention of the British Episcopal Church, which was held at that time, bringing in blacks from across Canada and the United States. Premier Howard Ferguson took time out from his duties to attend, and he advised the more than 200 black attendees that the members of the battalion had a right to be proud of the part they had played during the war.

La Joux had men of various nationalities working there. Here, Russian soldiers are mingling with the men of No. 2 Construction Company and other military services.
Conclusion

No. 2 Construction Battalion has been celebrated as Canada’s only all-black unit. This was to be the last major segregated unit in the Canadian military, since the militia in the inter-war period became integrated, and government policy prevented segregated units from being formed during the Second World War. Its men supported three major forestry operations in various skilled and unskilled capacities, demonstrating that they were ready to serve in whatever manner was required.

The men of the Battalion also put their skills to good use, operating boilers, pumps, rock crushers and other pieces of what was considered complicated equipment at the time. They maintained and operated vehicles and railway equipment, and they employed and cared for their horses. These may not seem like great skills in today’s world, but they were of considerable value at the turn of the last century. Their work was also of great value, providing railway ties to keep supplies moving to the front, as well as boards and stakes for use in the trenches. It was of enough value that the military commands did not want to disrupt the flow of these supplies, even when the need for combat manpower was great.

The men of No. 2 Construction Battalion should be celebrated, not just for a government decision that created their unit, but for their contribution to the war effort. While they may have wanted to make a more direct contribution, their efforts and those of all the men working behind the front lines, provided the support the men at the front needed to help defeat the Germans.

NOTES

1. A brief history had appeared in a 1920 compilation of Nova Scotia’s part in the First World War, but this was soon forgotten. M. Stuart Hunt, Nova Scotia’s Part in the Great War (Halifax, N.S.: The Nova Scotia Veteran Publishing Co. Ltd., 1920), p. 150. Hunt’s work provides a brief overview of the province’s units and their activities. The section on No. 2 Construction Battalion contains some details not mentioned in the unit’s war diary. These details should be considered as accurate as Hunt had access to many individuals who would have had first-hand knowledge of the war effort of Nova Scotia’s units. In fact, in the preface, Hunt thanks Lieutenant-Colonel D.H. Sutherland for having contributed to the book. Preface, x.


4. See, for instance Armstrong, Pitman, and Walker at previous references.

5. Hunt, p. 149. He indicates that this was the only volunteer unit to engage in any work prior to proceeding overseas.

6. The ship was launched in 1900 as the S.S. Vaderland, operating for the Red Star Line on the Antwerp-New York run. Converted into a troop ship at the start of the war, she was renamed Her Majesty’s Troopship (HMT) Southland in 1915 to avoid having a German-sounding name. Initially carrying CEF members to the UK under the operation of the White Star-Dominion Line, she saw service in the Aegean Sea (Gallipoli Campaign), where on 2 September 1915, she was torpedoed by UB-14. After being beached and then repaired, she returned to service in August 1916. On 4 June 1917 she was again torpedoed, this time by U-70, and sunk off the coast of Ireland with the loss of four lives.

8. Ibid.
10. Library and Archives Canada (LAC), War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, 17 May 1917. Routine Order issued by Headquarters and found in Canadian Routine Orders, Volume 1 have a number of entries that demonstrate the importance of gardens. For example, Routine Order 4250, 25 June 1918 allowed Officers Commanding to use the lettuce, radish, and spring onions grown in unit gardens to supplement the diet of the unit. Root vegetables that were to be stored could be saved in straw, for which indents could be made from their own stores office – Routine Order 2655, 13 October 1917. A warning was also issued about carefully peeling potatoes to avoid wasting too much of them – Routine Order 2561, 28 September 1917.
11. LAC, RG 9, III-A-1 Volume 8, File 10-9-40; Letter, Chief of the General Staff, OMFC to Col G.S. Harrington, D- OMFC 12 April 1919, and Letter, Lieutenant-Colonel D.H. Sutherland to Sir George Perley, 27 April 1917. One result of the establishment change was that Lieutenant-Colonel Sutherland had to accept a reduction in rank to major if he wished to remain with the unit.
12. LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, 17-20 May 1917.
13. LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, 21 and 23 May, 1917; and Hunt, p. 151.
15. LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, 8 January 1918.
16. LAC, War Diary, No. 5 District, 28 June 1917.
17. Cecil French, A History of the Canadian Army Veterinary Corps in the Great War, 1914-1919, C.A.V. Barker and Ian K. Barker (Eds.), (Guelph, ON: Crest Books, 1999), pp. 82-83. By the end of the war, cattle had been so reduced in number that horses were substituted as a form of meat intake for many French civilians. French, pp. 82, 83, and LAC, War Diary, No. 5 District. See, for example, entries for 16 June and 8 July 1918, where all horses in the La Joux area were inspected The dipping tank was built at the instigation of Capt W.F.R. Stubbs of the Canadian Veterinary Corps, and was likely assembled by 2 Construction Company, although this cannot be positively confirmed.
18. See personnel file of 931198 W. Allison, who was charged with failing to properly groom his horse, while 931609 W. Douglas, was charged with mis-treating the horses. The personnel files are available at the LAC, about half of which can be downloaded from the LAC website at http://www.bac-lac.gc.ca/eng/discover/military-heritage/first-world-war/first-world-war-1914-1918-cel/Pages/search.aspx
20. LAC, War Diary, Canadian Forestry Corps Headquarters, France, entry for 18 August 1918.
21. Hunt, p. 151; LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, June, July and September 1917; and LAC, War Diary, No. 5 District, 3 July 1917.
22. Sutherland’s comments are in Hunt, p. 151.
23. LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, 1 February 1918.
24. LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, 1 June 1917. The normal establishment of a Forestry Company was about 170 other ranks.
25. LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, 14 January 1918.
26. LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, 26 January 1918.
27. LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, 30 January 1918.
28. LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, 8 and 13 December 1917.
29. LAC, War Diary, No. 5 District, 20 December 1917; LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, 25 December 1917.
31. Ibid., p. 190.
32. LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, 12 November 1917; and Hunt, p. 151. Hunt provides the date of 9 October. However, this should be considered an error, as the war diary would provide the more exact date. The men were attached to No. 37 Company, but were not part of the unit. They still belonged to No. 2 Construction Company.
33. LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, 8 and 13 December 1917; and Hunt, p. 151. As with the men sent to support No. 37 Company, these 150 men were never part of any unit of No. 1 District, but were attached to these units. This was similar to the way that units of the Chinese Labour Corps were attached to the Forestry Corps.
34. LAC, War Diary, Canadian Forestry Corps Headquarters, France, 23 March 1918.
35. LAC, RG 9, III-C-8, Volume 4499, 37 Company folder, H.S. 7-D-37-1, Narrative of 21 to 23 March 1918.
37. Summarized in Armstrong, “The Unwelcome Sacrifice,” pp. 191-192. Greater detail of the process, which started in November 1917, can be found in LAC, RG 9, III-C-8, Volume 4516.
38. LAC, War Diary, No. 1 District Headquarters, Central Group, Canadian Forestry Corps, 31 December 1917 and 1 January 1918; LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, 28 and 30 December 1917; and Hunt, p. 151. As with the men sent to support No. 37 Company, these 150 men were never part of any unit of No. 1 District, but were attached to these units. This was similar to the way that units of the Chinese Labour Corps were attached to the Forestry Corps.
39. See personnel file of 931209 Julian Sullivan, who was struck off strength of No. 38 Company on 9 February 1918, at which time he proceeded to hospital. 931502 John Sullivan, was charged with being absent without leave on 22 February 1918. He served with No. 38 Company until at least September 1918 and he was admitted to hospital in the UK on 5 September while on leave.
40. LAC, War Diary, No. 1 District Headquarters, 25 May, 30 June 1918.
41. Personnel Files 931836 Harry Franklin Suttles and 931287 Frank Bennett.
42. LAC, RG 9, III-A-1, Volume 8, File 10-9-40, Letter Deputy Adjutant General to Minister, OMFC, 20 December 1917; and Routine Order 2055, 21 July 1917, Headquarters, Canadian Routine Orders, Volume 1
43. LAC, War Diary, Canadian Forestry Corps Headquarters, France, 3 April 1918 notes that 50 OR reinforcements for 2 Construction Company arrived from England. War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, 8 April and June 1918.
44. LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, 1 February 1918.
45. LAC, RG150, Volume 191, Folder No. 7 Company, CFC and Volume 192, Folder 8 Company, CFC. The daily orders for both units have a nominal roll as well as attachments and detachments. The soldiers from No. 2 Construction Battalion were identified by their service numbers, as well as being compared to the Battalion’s March 1917 sailing list.
46. Personnel file of 931404 R.G. Bonnette. He transferred to the 10th Battalion on 6 February 1918.
47. LAC, War Diary, Canadian Forestry Corps Headquarters, France, 10 and 11 April 1918. The two CFC battalions were to form a brigade with a Royal Engineer battalion and be placed under the command of Lord Lovat, who was the Director of Timber Operations in France.
48. LAC, War Diary, Canadian Forestry Corps Headquarters, France, 13 and 15 April 1918.
49. LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, 25 March, 3 and 29 April 1918.
50. LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, 5, 12 and 18 May, 1 June 1918.
52. LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, February, 22 March 1918.
53. LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, April 1918.
54. LAC, War Diary, No. 2 Construction Company, 2 April, 16, 31 May 1918.
55. LAC, War Diary, Canadian Forestry Corps Headquarters, France, 30 November and 2 December 1918.
56. Canadian Armed Forces, Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), 74/672, Box 19, Folder 12, Note - H.Q. 462-16-1, Volume 2, Folio 73. The meeting took place in Halifax on 21 November 1919. On returning to Canada, Lieutenant-Colonel Sutherland’s rank was restored.
57. “Negro Soldiers of Britain Praised,” in Border Cities Star, 18 September 1926.
58. 2 Construction Battalion was not the only all-black unit created in the First World War. The author has discovered at least one other unit composed of black soldiers and white officers that participated in the war in Europe. Further research is being conducted to gather the required information on the unit’s officers, men, and activities.
Humanism and the Military Conscience: A Reply to Pichette and Marshall

by Stephen Hare

Introduction

In their article entitled, “Is There a Role for Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Chaplains in Ethics?” Padres Yvon Pichette and Jon Derrick Marshall suggest the case for an expanded role of the Chaplaincy to “…model, teach and implement ethics at the tactical and operational level” in the CAF. Their rationale, at least in part, seems to be their belief that the current approach to a CAF ethics support function (as provided by the Defence Ethics Programme) is necessarily a dubious one to address ethics in its fullness: it is “a public ethics program” which is “necessarily reductionist” in that it cannot fully address “questions of spirituality, religion and the human person.”

This argument inevitably raises time-honoured questions about the nature of ethics and its relationship to religious faith. In this reply, I will briefly challenge what appears to be the authors’ belief that secular ethics in general is inadequate to human ethical needs. Equally important, however, I will suggest we can answer the question posed by the title of their article in the affirmative. Both the Programme and the Chaplaincy have the same aim in some sense (seeking to support the ethical well-being of individual CAF personnel, and thereby helping the organization as a whole to be ethically sound). In all likelihood, these different programmatic approaches bring to bear differing but complementary skills to the task. If both programs worked in a more complementary fashion, they could well be more effective in pursuit of the common goal, provided there is an adequate understanding of each by the other before premature decisions are made.

Discussion

The old philosophical argument against religious faith as the proper foundation of ethical belief goes something like this: faith is inherently not reducible to reasoned argument; since people demonstrably arrive at different faiths (and many profess no faith at all), it is a futile exercise trying to argue one faith over another by rational means. In one of the major institutions of a formally secular society like Canada,
this means that an institutional approach to ethics ultimately must be grounded in secular reasoning, not religious faith. There is certainly room for individuals to practice their faith within the CAF, and where faith influences one’s ethical beliefs, inter-faith chaplains are presumably well schooled in ways to be receptive and supportive of the reflective concerns of such individuals.

If secular ethics were by its very nature unable to address the most important ethical problems faced by the institution, whereas religion were able to do so, then we might have a compelling argument for focusing all programmatic ethics in the Chaplaincy. However, my reply argues that secular ethics has sufficient power to guide the professional identity, attitudes, and behaviours of CAF personnel as these relate to some profound ethical challenges confronted on duty.

Pichette and Marshall seem to want to use the existence of various private faiths that can flourish in a secular society as a basis for delineating what they call “public ethics” from “private” or “personal” ethics,” where the “deeper” sense of ethics resides in a private, spiritual realm, leaving “administrative” matters such as conflict of interest, in the public, secular realm. Ethics, however, has never worked like this. By its very nature, as a discipline, ethics has always sought to answer questions such as: How should human beings live well? What really matters in life? What is the ultimate foundation of right and wrong, good and bad? What are the foundations of any knowledge? Such questions themselves obviously touch upon both public and private life, and the way

Aristotle, by Raphael (1483-1520).
in which one answers the questions will have implications for both, although these implications may be very different between private and public life, and yet in accordance with a common framework. Generally speaking, theories of ethics assume an underlying universality of application. It is the differing nature of public and private realms which explain the differences in implications for each.

Conflict of interest is a useful example because it is at the intersection of private and public life. Ethics makes the assumption that personnel as human beings will continue to have private interests in their professional roles, and sometimes, due to the possible influence of those interests, their professional impartiality may be compromised, or at least it may appear so. Conflict of interest policy is a risk-management measure designed to reduce the likelihood of loss of professional impartiality. It is, in fact, a relatively recent concept, unlike ethics. In terms of its understanding of the content of ethics itself, conflict of interest policy only needs to assume that the ethical viewpoint and the self-interested one are often in tension with each other. Beyond impartiality and its appearance, the exact nature and foundations of ethics need not be elucidated for conflict of interest to be coherent as an idea and manageable as a risk. More fundamental ethical concerns in CAF cannot be handled in this way, because they will engage deeper passions, often ones that are justifiably pulling in conflicting directions.

One sometimes hears it said in everyday conversation that, now that religion has less and less influence over conduct in our society, we are losing our ethical compass. This contrasts curiously
with some recent writings of public intellectuals, who have argued that the influence of religion is at the least unnecessary, and in some views, even pernicious, to the ethical health of society. It is not necessary to assent to this view to observe that, for at least a few millennia since ethical speculations were first recorded in writing, those thinkers who prized reason as the foremost basis of knowledge were acutely conscious of the sometimes-major influence of religion in popular moral thinking. Many seminal moral philosophers have explicitly chosen to question and ultimately reject this influence, on the grounds such as those already described. These writers did not conclude their speculations empty-handed, but argued for and against a variety of ingenious theories to explain ethics and guide morality, even if none of those theories considered in isolation is entirely convincing.

The legacy of this historical dialogue is modern secular ethics. We can go back to one of the pre-Christian giants of ethics, Aristotle, to argue that there is an ancient tradition in moral philosophy of separation between human ethics and the transcendent realm. The dominant interpretation of Aristotle’s view of religion is that the first principle (the eternal “unmoved mover”) would have no interest whatsoever in the adventures and travails of people, in contrast to the anthropomorphic, pagan gods, as popularly celebrated in his cultural milieu. Aristotle developed a rich theory of human nature and needs that was elaborated into an argument, not only about what it means to be a good person in one’s private life, but what are better and worse political foundations for a good society. Aristotle is probably the most important source of modern thinking about personal character traits (or virtues), which continue to play a pivotal role in institutional discussions of excellence (reflected today, for example, in the popularity of aspirational codes of institutional values).

Nor is Aristotle an anomaly in the history of major contributors to modern thinking on ethics. Immanuel Kant is probably the most influential Western philosopher in shaping the secular approach to the idea of human dignity. Kant himself acknowledges that ethical knowledge accessible via reason alone as he sees it is fully congruent with the Ten Commandments. At the same time, he insists that any reasoned knowledge of things-in-themselves, beyond the realm of worldly experience, as mediated by our categories of mental judgment, is strictly impossible. He places the idea of a Supreme Being as an idea of reason that is beyond these categories, although generated from them in the manner of an artefact of the mind. Whatever truth this Supreme Being may or may not correspond with is an unknowable one. This does not lessen by one iota Kant’s passionate convictions about the rational foundation of human greatness and of the certitude of our strictly reasoned capacity to understand and distinguish right and wrong.

All credible contemporary secular attempts to further refine ethics agree in a few fundamental assumptions: that all human beings have equal inherent worth and equally sound claims to self-determination, as well as the capacities to fulfil that claim in the context of an ethically sound society. This goes hand-in-hand with the end of special claims to knowledge residing in, or rule by, some privileged class, be they hereditary kings, a priestly caste, or a master race. All of us are capable of reasoning, and reason is the most necessary basis of ethical insight.

This core assumption is by no means the whole story, and it is not able to dispatch all our pressing worldly moral problems with tidy clarity. There are also valid objections with trying to derive too much from reason alone. A key objection to Kant is that he seems to ignore another necessary condition of ethical action, namely an affective (emotional, volitional) orientation towards acting in accordance with ethical beliefs. Human beings are shaped by drivers other than only the capacity for conscious reasoning, such as empathy as a biological and psychological phenomenon, and these drivers are also part of the essential picture in understanding ethical orientation. Affective and other dimensions of ethics are increasingly recognized by empirical science. Compassionate or altruistic impulses are phenomena that can be observed even in non-human species. This does not, however, compel us to assume such species are influenced by religious ideas.

These hasty sketches of the history of moral philosophy are meant to give some sense of the profundity of secular theories of ethics. Such theories help validate the strength and urgency of encountered ethical concerns, and to some extent, they can help precise one’s responses to them. There can be no more fundamental ethical concern for military personnel than the ethics of killing (and the choice of target under what circumstances). Although called upon to engage in lethal combat as part of a professional responsibility, military members can be affected in a private and personal way by such a “public” experience. This is where doctrines like Just War Theory, the Laws of Armed Conflict and their philosophical underpinnings are critical tools in helping shape perceptions about warfare, both before and after the actions in theatre occur. While they cannot make responsibility for casualties something morally easy or unambiguous, it is obvious that theoretical elements of military ethics are a vital part of military professional development, one that has no small impact on the choice of one’s actions in theatre, and one’s private perceptions of these actions. Military ethics (and ipso facto ethics in general) is a critical contributor to one’s personal, private experience of warfare, as well as one’s outward conduct in war.

As mentioned by Pichette and Marshall, the Three Principles of the Defence Ethics Program attempt to capture the ethical foundations of the defence institution in a liberal democracy. They adhere firmly to the core ethical insight of human dignity. Respect for human dignity comes first in the sense that the CAF exists to defend Canadian society and its more basic political values, as well as sometimes to exert an influence in areas of the world where political states of affairs are at odds with our own vision of a good society (typically a judgment shared by our international allies). However, reality is usually more complex and at least somewhat morally ambiguous. There is doubtless an element of expedient self-interest in some governmental decisions to enter operations in foreign lands, but the ethics that the CAF requires its members to practice are largely intended to align the espoused military objective – a furtherance of human dignity in geopolitics – with the patterns of military conduct that also support human dignity at the tactical level. Enlightenment ideals and corresponding standards of conduct are not “administrative” only. They are at the heart of what we believe about good and bad, right and wrong – and what humanity stands for.
A Way Forward: Joining Forces?

The potential for collaboration between the programs, notwithstanding all this, seems great. Chaplains have a unique position, both with their extensive informal knowledge of the climate and issues in the units they serve, and their unique relationship to the chain of command. By contrast, ethics representatives at the unit level under the Defence Ethics Programme report to their own unit superiors, and to no one else. The insight possessed by chaplains about the actual trends and perspectives among unit personnel, and their capacity to share this insight in suitably anonymized fashion to any level up the command structure needing to know, are both capacities from which the Ethics program could significantly benefit, if it could, to some extent, tap into them.

Moreover, the human skills that chaplains recognize as central to their professional success are of vital relevance to an ethics program, yet they have not been traditionally recognized within that program’s parameters as vital to it. Even if an ethics coordinator sees himself or herself as willing to hear confidential, serious, and delicate ethical concerns of a member (that is, they are about pressing problems that seriously harm morale and team health, rather than being only, say, an undeclared conflict of interest that does not yet do so), the member may not have confidence that the coordinator is the kind of person whom one can trust to receive one’s complaint well, and wisely offer advice or suggestions on how to best resolve it.

Much of the weakness in the Defence Ethics Programme’s attempts to promote everyday awareness and engagement about ethical matters among all personnel seems to tie to lack of minimum standards in how this program is communicated at the unit level. Unless it is by way of authentic, reprisal-free dialogue, a subject matter like ethics that is both full of “grey areas” and often contentious and sensitive in content is difficult to discuss constructively. One-way briefings that reiterate principles, values, and recourse mechanisms without actually tying them to real informal unit issues can be the unfortunate result, having little impact or perceived relevance, in that they skirt the toughest practical questions. Pity the unit ethics coordinator, who may aspire to facilitate a group conversation about ethical issues at a level of honesty that is difficult to attain at times, even in a private one-on-one meeting with a padre.

Conclusion

My very short and very selective excursion into the history of secular moral philosophy means to show that, like religion, ethics has always concerned itself with the deepest questions about life’s meaning and its implications for one’s own way of life. The fundamental contrast between the approach of moral philosophy and that of theology to the question concerns the method of seeking the possible answers: Whether it is faith or reasoning which is the sine qua non of any ethical knowledge. A secular institution ought to serve the needs of its diverse members by providing both an inter-faith
chaplaincy and deliberate practical efforts to help sustain a regular and authentic team conversation about the team’s own ethics needs and concerns. The obstacles to making headway for an ethics program might well lead the organization to ask how these two functions, sharing the goal of helping members face the difficult challenges of their chosen profession of arms, can support each other better than they have up to now.

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NOTES

1. I am grateful to Chief Warrant Officer Richard Nadeau, Major Sonia Rogers, and Ann Louise Gratton, all of the Defence Ethics Programme, for their comments on this manuscript.
3. Ibid, pp. 64-65.
The world is changing at an unprecedented rate, where conventional warfare as we have known it seems to be a thing of the past. More frequently, our military is faced with battling against non-state actors and our junior non-commissioned members (NCMs) are being tasked with increased responsibility across the gamut of military operations, in situations where their actions could have strategic and political consequences. As in the past, these sailors, soldiers, airmen and airwomen are being trained, led, and mentored by senior NCMs. Yet, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) has not adapted its senior NCM training, education, and more specifically, employment experience, to meet the present need of NCM leaders who require the abilities and commitment to contribute to CAF strategy (leading the Institution). More precisely, the over-reliance upon our traditional model of training only serves to develop outstanding CPO1/CWO tacticians, who operate in silos of excellence at the tactical level.

There is little doubt that strategic CPO1/CWOs exist within the CAF, but these extraordinary leaders come to be more by accident than by design. In order to operate in this uncertain and complex security environment, the CAF must create leaders in the officer and NCM corps who are capable of operating in a strategic setting. Yet, it has failed to consistently produce strategic NCMs who are capable of meeting our future security challenges. I will argue that the overarching need for developing NCMs capable of operating in the strategic arena appears to be a secondary consideration to developing outstanding CPO1/CWO tacticians, given that it is these very tacticians who are being succession managed into key positions and senior appointments (KP/SA). As I see it, there are two major causes to this problem: firstly; our current Canadian Armed Forces Professional Development System (CAFPDS) has not adequately prepared senior NCM leaders to fulfill these very demanding roles when called upon, and secondly; there is a pervasive culture of expectation, a belief that once appointed to a senior appointment (SA) position, the SA CPO1/CWO will continue to be pushed up through the senior appointment tiers or levels, due to the stigma attached when a member is not advanced or posted to a position that is not a senior appointment, and therefore seen as a “demotion.”

Under the current CAFPDS construct, as depicted in Figure 1, there is a heavy reliance placed upon education and training through developmental periods (DP) 1 through 4. The failure to recognize and place more emphasis at the senior NCM level on the experience and self-development pillars within the CAFPDS.
results in a CPO1/CWO who has often only been exposed to a single service and unilateral orientation, working predominately in their trade, until very senior in rank. As a result, the CPO1/CWO tactician has relatively limited and well-defined responsibilities, focusing primarily upon the present and near term. Typically, success is based on the capacity to apply and complete learned skills. And, routinely, problems are solved through the process of “educated guessing,” rather than using the prescribed decision making tools, which are not taught in depth until a member attends the Senior Leadership Programme (SLP). In order to truly develop NCMs who can operate in the strategic environment, consideration must be given to all pillars and the entire model, with opportunities for experience and self-development as an institutional leader being introduced much earlier.

Despite the CAFPDS building cumulative leadership training at the tactical, operational, and strategic level, the resistance to enhance NCM career opportunities at the institutional level does little to “develop employment/training opportunities which afford progressive and continuous exposure to the operational and strategic levels.” Furthermore, there exists a common attitude among senior NCMs that if the military does not supply the training, experience, and education then it must not be required. Naturally, this is a fallacy and another indication that the CAFPDS is failing to adequately emphasize the value of all four pillars. Self-development through lifelong learning will significantly contribute to the senior NCM increasing his/her readiness to undertake more demanding positions on the road to assuming greater responsibility.

Admittedly, not every NCM senior leader is destined to work at the strategic level. In fact, less than one-tenth of one percent of the CPO1/CWOs will ever progress to the very highest NCM levels of institutional leadership, but, “…anyone working directly for a strategic leader should be well-versed in strategic thinking concepts” so as to adequately support and advise their Commanders. In order to be a crucial asset, the senior leader should be able to affect the Commander’s decision making cycle immediately upon appointment, converting strategic decisions into operational and tactical excellence. For the most part, this is not the case today. Many CPO1/CWOs who are put into strategic leadership positions for the first time have not yet been exposed to DP 5 training and education, and it is not until this level that the senior CPO1/CWO is being educated and prepared to assume strategic leadership responsibilities in military or national security organizations.

It is suggested, that while this education is ‘top notch,’ embodied in such courses as the Senior Appointment course, the National Security programme, Canadian Security Studies programme and the Executive Leaders programme, they tend to be offered too late in the member’s career. CPO1/CWOs who are identified to attend such courses are already in positions where they are required to think and operate in this highly complex environment. For the most part, once in the position, they are learning how to operate at this level for the first time and have little experience to build upon. If more emphasis had been placed on experience and self-develop later in this member’s career, he/she would have stretched and broadened his/her capabilities beyond the tactical level. What is more, the CAF needs to do a better job at identifying senior NCM leaders who possess the potential to operate in the strategic environment and explore the possibilities of getting these individuals out of their occupational silos earlier in their career.
Currently, too many of our senior leaders cling to the tactical way of thinking, never truly grasping that they are sabotaging their own leadership by neglecting more strategic responsibilities. It is the entire NCM corps that suffers, because decisions taken at the strategic level almost always have a tactical and operational effect on sailors, soldiers, airmen, and airwomen.

Early exposure to the very complex world of institutional leadership, where challenges are often “ill-structured, messy, or wicked problems that do not have quick, easy solutions,” would increase the member’s professional body of knowledge, providing him/her with greater experience and ease while operating in the “grey zone.” Experience outside of one’s occupation and environment would go a long way to giving the senior leader a broader perspective on what it means to be a strategic leader vice a tactician. CPO1/CWOs provide an essential and unique capability to the commanders they serve and the subordinates they oversee. Thus, their professional development cannot be left to chance, as it is today.

Broadening capabilities beyond the tactical level requires senior NCMs to step outside their comfort zone, moving away from direct level leadership and towards indirect level leadership. Easing the transition from leading people to leading the institution means being proactive in providing opportunities to potential leaders earlier in their careers so that they are better prepared when thrust into an environment that is completely foreign to them. According to leadership development professionals Richard Hughes and Katherine Beatty, the challenges of making the transition to senior leadership typically fall into five broad categories:

1) Influencing others more effectively, particularly upwardly and outwardly;
2) Thinking strategically;
3) Achieving a better balance in handling short-term and long-term pressures;
4) Moving from a functional or departmental perspective to a broader organizational perspective; and
5) Actually creating or influencing organizational strategy.

As can be seen from the challenges outlined by Hughes and Beatty, transitioning to KP/SA positions is not conducive to the CAF’s succession planning process. Under the current system, individual files are submitted for consideration to the Personnel Appointment Board, and depending upon the KP/SA positions available in that given year, persons are then selected, based upon supply and demand and timing, which does not always equate to the right person, at the right time, for the right position, with the right qualification, and for the right reason, being selected for the job. If the best person for the job does not have all the ‘ticks in the box,’ or is out of synchronization in the posting cycle, then the position is filled by someone else. The CAF needs to move away from this type of antiquated thinking. Simply put, the right position should always be filled by the right person but we need to better prepare a wider range of potential candidates from which to choose.
Although the CAFPDS plays a key role in the development of institutional leaders, there are also specific leadership competencies and the leaders development framework that must be considered and applied to a greater extent across the NCM cadre. This would assist with the broader consideration of career development beyond technical skills associated with occupation to developing strategic and institutional leaders.

The Succession Planning and Management System is also an important tool that could be used to better effect in not only selecting personnel for appointments, experience, training, and education, but guiding development and enhancing potential, as well as addressing both individual and institutional expectations.

As stated at the beginning of this article, the manner in which the current succession planning process is set up has led to a pervasive culture of expectation. Only one percent of the entire NCM corps will ever make it to the rank of CPO1/CWO. Yet, by implementing special insignia and a separate pay scale for SA CPO1/CWOs, despite how well-intended it was, we have inadvertently created a ‘class system’ within this rank, which, in turn, puts undue pressure on people to only declare success once a SA position has been achieved. This culture is perpetuated by the limited SA positions; only 64 exist in the entire CPO1/CWO corps, which equates to one-tenth of one percent of the entire CPO1/CWO corps. Figure 2 depicts the special insignia currently worn by the 64 SA CPO1/CWOs in the CAF, along with the CPO1/CWO rank worn by the remainder of the CPO1/CWO corps, including those in KPs.

United States Army Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Connelly remarked that special insignia has led to an organizational culture, which he coined as the “Culture of the Wreath.” He goes on to further explain that there is an unwillingness to remove this special insignia denoting them as senior leaders. The same can be said for CAF’s SA CPO1/CWOs. The reluctance to not only remove the special insignia, but to additionally have their pay reduced after one year is a “cultural blinder” to the experienced leader who could otherwise accept broadening assignments and educational opportunities that would enhance his ability to perform successfully at the strategic level. To be frank, the current CAF succession planning process is viewed more as a ‘push up system’ rather than the ‘pull up system’ it was designed to be. Regardless of whether or not the individual demonstrates the expected strategic capacities required in an increasingly evolving security environment, often, he/she is pushed up to the next tier of leadership because to do otherwise would be viewed as career limiting or career stagnation. Intended or not, there is a stigma attached to CPO1/CWOs who are not selected for additional SA positions. The present ‘push up system’ will not ensure the right person, with the right qualification, is chosen for the right position.

One of the current Canadian Forces Chief Warrant Officer’s (CFCWO) priorities is to improve CAF processes concerning the manner in which we generate, develop, select and employ our senior NCMs. As a result, in July 2014, the Strategic Employment Model (SEM) project was created. The CFCWO tasked CWO Sherman Neil to manage this formal project, and Subject Matter Experts (SME) and representatives from all environments were selected, based upon recommendations by the CFCWO senior council, to assist CWO Neil in this endeavour.

SEM stood up in September 2014, and is anticipated to run no more than three years with all requirements being met by August 2017. Its aim is to implement an optimized and sustainable framework for the CPO1/CWO corps, formalizing how CPO1/CWOs are developed, managed, and employed to generate effective strategic leaders in order to meet the full spectrum of future CAF operational and institutional requirements. A successful end state to the project would see a re-designed strategic employment model where all KP/
SA CPO1/CWOs, “...have a complete and immediate grasp of their increased scope of leadership responsibilities, an understanding of the unique nature of these increased responsibilities, and the dedication of effort necessary to understand and influence the complex and dynamic environment in which these leadership responsibilities reside.” The current SEM is a logical step in the evolution of NCM succession planning, and it builds upon the foundation that was developed in the 2011 publication, Beyond Transformation, CPO1/CWO Strategic Employment Model.

Under the guidance of CWO Neil, the SEM team is redefining the role of the CPO1/CWO within the future strategic environment; investigating the gaps in CPO1/CWO capabilities and competencies; exploring the development of flexible employment streams and corresponding career paths and studying how to incorporate these competencies; cultivating the introduction of a categorization methodology within the model to assist in the management of the career paths; optimizing integration of succession planning/ career management/professional development education; exploring the requirements for developmental succession planning that recognizes that potential begins at the Warrant Officer (WO) rank level; conducting a holistic review of all supporting policies to succession planning; considering features and personnel management policy changes that assure greater career management and succession planning efficiencies and accountabilities; and, developing an institutional governance framework that includes and supports the environmental succession plans.

Throughout this article, it has been stated that the outcome of concentrating almost exclusively upon the education and training pillar within the CAFPDS, and not placing emphasis upon experience and self-development or the entire model, is that we develop CPO1/CWO tacticians operating in silos of excellence, who possess operational excellence, but only strategic mediocrity.

By operating under the assumption that competencies acquired within an occupation or environment are sufficient for other strategic functions and duties, the CAF is taking a monumental risk of them being unprepared when placed in a KP/SA position. Hoping they will rise to the challenge after six months to a year in the position is not an effective professional development strategy. Furthermore, by offering the top notch education that already exists for SA CPO1/CWOs earlier, before they actually assume a strategic level leadership position, will reduce the risk of them not being ready. Modifying the CAFPDS to ensure broader exposure across all pillars and the entire model that encompasses a professional body of knowledge, leadership, policy, and succession planning will allow the CAF to develop, manage, and generate a pool of future strategic leaders who are able to affect the commander’s decision-making cycle immediately upon appointment. It would certainly make it easier to ensure the right person, for the right position, at the right time was selected.

If senior NCMs understood earlier in their careers what it truly meant to be an institutional leader there might be less resistance to filling other institutional assignments beyond the 64 Senior Appointment positions. Additionally, if the special insignia for CPO1/CWOs was discontinued, except for the CFCWO and Command CPO1/CWO, the stigma associated with not attaining the next tier would be less visible and therefore less likely to be viewed as career limiting. Taking away any visible signs, like special insignia, that make some CPO1/CWOs different from their peers working at the institutional level, could eliminate the current “class system” that exists in today’s CPO1/CWO corps, and with that, the “culture of the wreath” should slowly disappear.

The SEM project will be the roadmap for CPO1/CWOs of the future, and it will ensure that these leaders are not only set up for success in positions for which they are best suited, but reach their full potential within the CAF. Gone will be the accidental strategic CPO1/CWO, replaced by CPO1/CWOs who have a complete and immediate grasp and understanding of their increased scope of leadership responsibilities, and the dedication of effort necessary to understand and influence the complex and dynamic environment in which these leadership responsibilities reside.

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Chief Warrant Officer Kevin West, Air Wing Chief, is on hand at Kandahar Airfield, 25 April 2011, for the departure of the last CC-130 Hercules (H-model) flight from Afghanistan.

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12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
The Renaissance of Peacekeeping and Peace Operations

by Martin Shadwick

In the Federal election campaign of 2015, the Liberal Party of Canada argued that Canada’s “influence and presence on the world stage” had “steadily diminished” during the almost decade-long tenure of Prime Minister Stephen Harper: “Instead of working with other countries constructively at the United Nations, the Harper Conservatives…turned their backs on the UN and other multilateral institutions, while also weakening Canada’s military, our diplomatic service, and our development programs.” Whether “confronting climate change, terrorism and radicalization, or international conflicts, the need for effective Canadian diplomacy has never been greater than it is today. Our plan will restore Canada as a leader in the world. Not only to provide greater security and economic growth for Canadians, but because Canada can make a real and valuable contribution to a more peaceful and prosperous world.”

In partial fulfillment of that pledge, the Liberal platform stated that, “…we will recommit to supporting international peace operations with the United Nations, and will make our specialized [emphasis added] capabilities—from mobile medical teams to engineering support to aircraft that can carry supplies and personnel—available on a case-by-case basis,” “…provide well-trained personnel that can be quickly deployed, including mission commanders, staff officers, and headquarters units,” and “lead an international effort to improve and expand the training of military and civilian personnel deployed on peace operations.”

Intriguingly, in his March 2015 ‘Open Letter on Foreign Policy to the 2015 Federal Election Winner,” Professor Roland Paris, now the Senior Advisor to the Prime Minister on Global Affairs and Defence, had offered a somewhat more expansive inventory of “specialized capabilities” by including “engineering companies, mobile medical facilities, in-theatre airlift”—thereby conjuring up images of UN-liveried Otters, Caribous, Twin Otters and Buffalo—and “surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities.”

The focus on providing specialized capabilities in support of UN peace operations also surfaced in Prime Minister Trudeau’s subsequent Mandate Letter to defence minister Harjit Sajjan. The Mandate Letter directed the minister to “…work with the Minister of Foreign Affairs to renew Canada’s commitment to United Nations peace operations.” This included: (a) “making...
Canada’s specialized capabilities—from mobile medical teams, to engineering support, to aircraft that can carry supplies and personnel—available on a case-by-case basis;” (b) “working with the Minister of Foreign Affairs to help the United Nations respond more quickly to emerging and escalating conflicts and providing well-trained personnel to international initiatives that can be quickly deployed, such as mission commanders, staff officers, and headquarters units;” and (c) “leading an international effort to improve and expand the training of military and civilian personnel deployed on peace operations, while insisting that any peacekeepers involved in misconduct be held accountable by their own country and the United Nations.” On the other hand, specific contributions to UN peace operations were not enumerated in the December 2015 Speech from the Throne—a relatively compact document that contented itself with a reaffirmation that the Trudeau government would “…renew Canada’s commitment to United Nations peacekeeping operations”—or in the April 2016 Public Consultation Document that formed part of Ottawa’s relatively fast-paced Defence Policy Review. The latter once again reaffirmed the government’s commitment to “renewing Canada’s contribution to peace operations”—and invited public input on how the Canadian Armed Forces should “…help increase Canada’s contribution to peace operations”—but studiously avoided any reference to specialized, or other, contributions.
The Trudeau government’s pledge to reinvigorate Canada’s extremely modest commitment to United Nations peace operations—the scaling back of which pre-dated the Harper government, but most certainly reached its nadir under the Conservatives—is unlikely to generate any substantial pushback. As David McDonough of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute noted in Embassy, “…by itself, it is hard to argue that renewing Canada’s role in UN peace operations is a bad thing.” Peacekeeping and peace operations remain deeply embedded in the Canadian national psyche and continue to enjoy extremely high levels of public support across virtually all regions, ages, and
ethno-cultural affiliations. Indeed, they have been mythologized and romanticized to such an extent that there is some risk of fuelling unrealistic expectations. Although the utility of United Nations (and other) peacekeeping and peace operations remains a matter for global debate, it is apparent that UN operations blessed with international political and diplomatic will, realistic mandates, and appropriate human and materiel resources—arguably an infrequent combination—can make demonstrably useful contributions to international peace and security.

It is nevertheless apparent that the Trudeau government’s palpable enthusiasm for a renewed Canadian commitment to peace operations will pose a number of challenges and dilemmas. Some relate to broader Canadian defence policy and to the relationship and balance between United Nations peace operations and other defence priorities and commitments. Others relate to Canada’s military capabilities, force structure and equipment holdings. Still others will focus on the amount and types of training required to operationalize an expanded Canadian peace operations role.

On the policy front, David McDonough urges caution as the Trudeau government moves forward with the renewal of Canada’s commitment to peace operations. His reservations “…do not mean that Canada should eschew UN peace missions. But the Canadian government needs to take into account competing priorities and the possible dangers that could arise from such missions. Above all, strategic-level thinking on the benefits, value, and possible costs and trade-offs of undertaking these missions need to be carefully and diligently assessed.” In other words, “…if Canada chooses to undertake a significant UN mission, it needs to first ensure that this does not come at the expense of its non-discretionary missions. Then it needs to assess its capacity to undertake such a mission in addition to its current operational tempo and, if that proves impossible, weigh the relative merits of a UN mission compared to other missions abroad, such as its role in NATO reassurance measures or as part of the Global Coalition to Counter ISIL.”

What “needs to be avoided at all costs,” posits McDonough, “is a fixation on UN peace operations that overshadows and supplants other priorities. This could endanger the non-discretionary missions crucial for Canadian security and defence, as well as damage our relations with allies and long-standing alliances like NORAD and NATO.”

The pursuit of peace operations, he suggests, “could also have serious consequences to the future force structure of the Canadian Armed Forces. In light of budgetary shortfalls and recapitalization challenges, the government may be tempted to achieve cost savings by opting for an unbalanced force structure—one that is
lightly armed, constabulary focused, and specializing in peace operations rather than combat-capable, multi-purpose, and joint.” Such a force “would be ill-suited for the range of missions (from constabulary to combat, and including robust peace operations) facing today’s CAF.”

The Trudeau government’s declared interest in “specialized capabilities” is most intriguing on other fronts, in part because it harkens back to Canada’s default contributions to UN peacekeeping from the end of the 1940s to the end of the Cold War. With some exceptions—most notably the infantry battalions that served in Cyprus over multiple decades and the light armoured (later unarmoured) reconnaissance squadrons that served with UNEF I from 1957 to 1966—the peacekeeping legacy of which Canadians are so inordinately proud was originally forged not by frontline combat units but by commanders, staff officers, headquarters personnel, military observers, signallers, engineers, transport platoons, workshop units, logisticians, base units, medical personnel and in-theatre air transport units (which in some cases also performed surveillance tasks). Somewhat less clear is why the “specialized capabilities” model—which largely disappeared in the post-Cold War era, succeeded by infantry- and to a lesser extent armour-heavy contributions to such UN operations as UNPROFOR in the former-Yugoslavia—should draw the new government’s apparent favour. Since tradition alone seems a most unlikely explanation, some observers have pointed to the lower risks to life and limb associated with “specialized capabilities”—although in the modern era robust force protection is crucial even for “specialized” contributions—or to perceived political concerns over the increased financial costs associated, directly or indirectly, with infantry and armoured contributions to peace operations. The perceived preference for “specialized capabilities” may also reflect a straightforward conviction that Canada has real strengths in these areas, as underscored by the army’s ISR and other capabilities, the excellent overland ISR capabilities of the modernized Aurora, and the prowess of Canada’s expensively-acquired but extremely well-equipped CH-147F Chinooks. It is conceivable, as well, that Ottawa subscribes to the view—by no means uniquely Canadian—that in the future western countries will increasingly leave infantry-heavy contributions to the armies of such countries as India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

The apparent preference for the “specialized capabilities” model nevertheless poses a number of challenges. Some of the capabilities identified as “specialized,” such as in-theatre airlift, could prove to be at least partial ‘non-starters,’ given the UN’s increased use of private contractors. By the same token, Canada can utilize its utility tactical transport (i.e., the Griffon) and medium transport helicopters (i.e., the Chinook) and its CC-130J Hercules for in-theatre airlift, but the unmodernized Griffon suffers limitations in hot and high operating environments, and the Hercules fleet is not particularly large, given the prospect of a sustained UN commitment. Nor does Canada any longer possess the sort
A Canadian CC-177 Globemaster III strategic transport.

A CH-147F Chinook helicopter lands at Leismer Aerodrome in Conklin, Alberta, 6 May 2016, as part of CAF support to the Province of Alberta’s response to wildfires in Fort McMurray. This is the first time a CH-147F Chinook has been used in a domestic humanitarian operation.
of twin-engined fixed-wing transport aircraft that have so often proved useful for UN operations. In that regard, could a case be made for purchasing a few transport-configured aircraft over and above the requirements of fixed-wing search and rescue and/or for acquiring some new-production Twin Otters?

Much more fundamental is the degree to which a focus on “specialized capabilities” will be viewed as an adequate reaffirmation and renewal of Canada’s long-standing—but currently very modest—contribution to UN peace operations. As a number of respected commentators on Canada and peace operations have observed, a “specialized capabilities” niche may not suggest to the global community that Canada is adequately vested in the overall enhancement and revitalization of UN peace operations. Better, they suggest, would be a flexible approach that draws, as appropriate, upon Canada’s stock of “specialized capabilities,” other military capabilities (i.e., mechanized or light infantry), or some combination of the two.

This approach acknowledges that there are limitations to what Canada can provide, and takes note of the need to selectively modernize existing capabilities, and, where appropriate, to acquire new capabilities in support of peace operations. The navy’s ability to provide sealift and support to joint forces ashore, for example, is at a very low ebb with the disposal of both Protecteur and Preserver, the on-going conversion of a container ship into an interim Auxiliary Oiler Replenishment ship, and the even longer wait until the arrival of the new-build Queenston-class joint support ships. Even then, the RCN will still lack the roll-on/roll-off and other capabilities relevant to peace operations that would have been provided by the Joint Support Ship program as originally envisaged. The other services have their own limitations and deficiencies. That said, Canada’s post-Afghanistan military does possess a variety of capabilities and resources relevant to providing both “specialized” and other capabilities for UN peace operations. These include but are not confined to the army’s modernized LAV 6.0 light armoured vehicle and forthcoming Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle and Medium Support Vehicle, and the RCAF’s CC-177A Globemaster (long-opposed by some Liberals but an invaluable asset for all manner of peace operations), and the aforementioned CH-147F Chinook.
No less a concern is appropriate training for peace operations. In a February 2016 study published by the Rideau Institute and the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (Unprepared for Peace? The Decline of Canadian Peacekeeping Training (and What to Do About It)), Walter Dorn and Joshua Libben argue that the Canadian military “needs to increase the level of preparedness and training for peace operations if it is to be ready to serve in peace operations.” Their report therefore recommends “the reinstatement and updating of the many training programmes and exercises that have been cut [over the previous decade], as well as the introduction of new training activities to reflect the increasing complexity of modern peace operations. Only through such a significant increase in training can Canadian personnel be truly prepared for peace.” Although elements of the report have been criticized by such commentators as George Petrolekas on the grounds that, “Canada’s military has never been more ready to undertake peace-related operations,” both perspectives are in a sense accurate.

Although the Defence Policy Review’s Public Consultation Document did not, understandably, express a preference for particular types of contributions to peace operations, it is to be commended for striking a cautionary note about contemporary peacekeeping and peace operations: “UN peace operations have evolved in response to the changing nature of threats to international peace and security. Peace support missions are increasingly deployed to hostile environments where violence is systemic and there is a desperate need to end violations of human rights. Unlike ‘traditional’ peacekeeping missions of the past, most current missions operate where there is no clear peace accord to be monitored, the contested terrain is ever-changing, and the combatants rarely represent formal armies of recognized states. Contemporary mission mandates are heavily focused on protection of civilians, including support for the international agenda on women, peace, and security. They are complex and multidimensional in nature, and they are most often authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, thereby allowing use of force.” Canadians who mistakenly believe that today’s “peacekeeping” is virtually identical to that of Suez circa 1958 or to Cyprus circa 1988 would do well to heed such realities.

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Tarnished: Toxic Leadership in the U.S. Military
by George E. Reed
Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2015
216 pages, US$ 25.14
ISBN 978-1-61234-723-3 (Hardcover)
Reviewed by Allan English

Reed’s book is one of the latest in a long line of well-researched studies on the US Army’s leadership challenges published over the past four decades, another being “Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession,” written by researchers at the US Army War College.1

Currently dean of the School of Public Affairs at the University of Colorado following a 27 year career as an army officer, including six years as the director of command and leadership studies at the US Army War College, Reed brings a great amount of credibility to this topic.

He acknowledges that the majority of leaders in the US military are good leaders; however, toxic leaders have a disproportionately negative effect on their organizations. A few points he makes seem especially salient to me. The first is that the higher one ascends in the organizational hierarchy, the more favourable one’s interpretation of organizational effectiveness and health among different groups in an organization.

Second, in leadership situations, objective reality is less important than the perceptions of followers; therefore, it is not the intentions of leaders that matter most to followers but their perceptions of leaders’ intentions, as well as the outcome of the leaders’ actions, i.e., good intentions will not help leaders if their intentions are perceived negatively by their followers, or if their actions result in negative outcomes for their units, especially in the area of organizational health. Reed expands upon this point, and notes that if mission accomplishment is always put ahead of how missions are accomplished, militaries will often accept resource-mission mismatch situations, which can lead to cheating and a military culture of “busyness.” This view is echoed in the “Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession” report.

Third, wise leaders increase subordinates’ ability to tolerate uncertainty and avoid engendering a false sense of certainty in their units.

Fourth, typically, there is little policy change outside of periods of crisis response, and even then, reforms often target symptoms of problems, not their causes. Those who have studied the CAF’s various responses to sexual misconduct over the past three decades will recognize the validity of this observation in a Canadian context. And those dealing with these issues today will find Reed’s chapter on “Toxic Leadership and Sexual Misconduct” instructive.

An underlying theme in Reed’s work is the failure of US military personnel evaluation systems to weed out toxic leaders; in fact, they often facilitate toxic leaders’ rise in the hierarchy. This is largely due to the fact that these evaluation systems focus unduly upon short term mission accomplishment, the ‘what’ of mission execution, and give little weight to organizational health during a leader’s tenure, the ‘how’ of mission execution. This can result in toxic leaders rising in an organization while leaving in their wakes a series of demoralized units with unnecessarily high attrition rates. Reed shows that a “circle the wagons” approach can be used by those in power to defend the culture of the organization that has raised them to positions of influence, to cover for toxic leaders, and to curtail the career opportunities of their critics. Recent examples of lying and cover-ups of incidents of harassment, bullying, and sexual assault on sports teams, at universities, and at military academies in Canada and the US, show that this behaviour is not limited to the US Army.

I addressed some of these issues over ten years ago and summarized studies going back to the 1970s that highlighted a “serious gap between the espoused, traditional values and the actual values-in-use of the US armed services, particularly the Army.”2 For example, Reed notes that the US military still has an “up or out” career policy, despite, as noted over 30 years ago, its detrimental effects upon organizational health, and its tendency to perpetuate some of the most dysfunctional behaviours found in US military culture, i.e., micromanagement, a “zero defects” culture, an inability to manage risk wisely, and the widespread deception and dishonesty reported in the “Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession” study.

Notwithstanding the emphasis on mission command in CAF doctrine, its culture also supports and rewards micromanagement, as I pointed out in this journal.3 One reason is that, due to the tyranny of the posting cycle,” CAF leaders have a two-to-three year tenure in command positions where they are evaluated on what change they have initiated change in their units, but rarely are they held accountable for how those changes were executed, because they have moved on to other positions – often promoted for their initial “energy” in getting something started. This cycle encourages leaders to focus upon achieving set goals in a relatively short period of time, the ‘what’ of performance measurement, but there is little focus in the current CAF performance evaluation system on the ‘how,’ or the health of a unit, during the tenure of a given leader. Why is this type of behaviour so hard to eradicate?
One reason is that problems related to toxic leadership can be described as ‘wicked’ problems, because they have social and cultural components which must be addressed in a nonlinear fashion due to incomplete or contradictory knowledge, the number of people and opinions involved, and the interconnected nature of these problems with other problems. However, these leadership issues are often seen by militaries as ‘difficult’ problems that are linear in nature, and that can be addressed by a step-by-step solution process, such as variants of the Operational Planning Process (OPP). Until the true nature of these problems is recognized, they are unlikely to be solved.

In summary, while this book has some weaknesses, notably Reed’s choice of examples in some cases (they could be better given the extensive literature on this topic), it deserves a wide audience. It is easy to read and succinctly summarizes the extensive literature on this topic. I agree wholeheartedly with a colleague who said that “every senior CAF officer should read this book. And a good number of public service Executives working in DND!” I would extend that recommendation to every member of the CAF and DND who has an interest in improving leadership practices. Perhaps equally important is for scholars to give leadership in the CAF the same scrutiny as their American colleagues have given leadership in the US military.

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etc.
of Northern Ireland advocates not only restraint in the use of force, but also “perseverance.” In the next case study, that of Sierra Leone, Glenn illustrates how independent funding can prolong an insurgency that does not have public support. Following from that, the Solomon Islands provide an instance of the challenges posed to a successful counterinsurgency after military victory, when the indigenous national administration is not providing effective governance. Another perspective is given through examination of the exigencies of battle and criminal insurgency in Columbia that, at one point, controlled over 50 percent of the country. Lastly, the example of the Al Anbar “Awakening” in Iraq demonstrates what can take place when the population rises against groups that they formerly supported, and how these counterinsurgency effects can spread. Throughout this examination, it is clearly evident that in order to optimize the possibility of success, actions by the counterinsurgent, supporting agencies, and the supported government should be coordinated and inclusive.

From these studies, Glenn derives nine revised beliefs that assist greatly in framing an understanding of post-colonial counterinsurgency. These cover the utility of military force, whether gaining “hearts and minds” has primacy in counterinsurgency, the endurance of this form of conflict, support to the host nation government, the importance of patience, the role of democratic government, the relevancy of past practice, the dangers of militias, and a need to increase social resilience, vice physical infrastructure, as part of counterinsurgency. In combination with these beliefs, he also identifies a number of corollaries, observations, and thoughts that further enrich his research.

Additionally, this scrutiny enables Glenn to provide a refined definition of contemporary insurgency. He writes that insurrections can be understood as “an organized movement seeking to replace or undermine all or part of the sovereign authority exercised by one or more constituted governments through the protracted used of subversion and armed conflict.” (p. 8). This definition provides a reader with a nuanced delineation of counterinsurgency that takes into account the wide range of circumstances evidenced by the eight case studies presented in the book, and it is useful in creating understanding and communicating ideas pertaining to such current fighting.

Rethinking Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency is an innovative and meticulously researched look at the distinctions of modern counterinsurgency. Its contents prompt the reader to muse upon the nature of both insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. The case studies are authoritative, well written, and integrated with each other. Together with the methodology shown in these chapters, the themes that Glenn has brought out provide a basis by which one can scrutinize post-colonial counterinsurgency and develop a fulsome understanding. This book would be invaluable to any who have an interest in contemporary conflict studies and counterinsurgency. Thankfully the relatively affordable cost of the e-version allows those who would be interested in reading Rethinking Western Approaches to Counterinsurgency to purchase their own copy of what is sure to be a much sought after work.

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Stopping the Panzers: The Untold Story of D-Day

by Marc Milner

Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2014

 xvii-375 pages, US$ 34.95


Reviewed by John R. Grodzinski

Canadian historians and writers of history have, on many occasions, re-fought the battles that dominated the fields of Normandy during the summer of 1944. Assuredly, it seems to be a rite of passage for Canadian military historians, at some point, to venture outside their field of expertise and enlighten readers with their perspectives on the Normandy Campaign. Fortunately, the ground is fertile. Since 1991, when John A. English, presented in his The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command, an unfavourable assessment of the performance of First Canadian Army in Normandy, apologists, contrarians, nationalists, and revisionists have each responded in kind. Of those historians with a nationalist bend, none is perhaps better known than Terry Copp, the former head of the Laurier Centre for Military, Strategic and Disarmament Studies at Wilfrid Laurier University. For many years, in lectures, books, articles, and on battlefield tours, Professor Copp has sought to restore the reputation of the Canadian Army in Normandy. Now Marc Milner, a respected naval historian and Director of the Brigadier F. Gregg, V.C. Centre for the Study of War and Society at the University of New Brunswick, has entered the mêlée, and, as the jacket notes of his book state, presents “a paradigm shift in our understanding of the Normandy campaign.”

Throughout his 35 year career as a naval historian, Milner has always ‘had a foot’ in the Normandy Campaign. Whether in conversation with his father, who fought there, or in his interaction with colleagues, veterans, undergraduate and graduate students, or at military professional development sessions and in battlefield tours, Milner found the pull of Normandy irresistible. This book, the basis of which was first presented in an article published years ago in the Journal of Military History, is the culmination of research that began in the 1980s.

In March 1943, as Brigadier Freddie Morgan, the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (or COSSAC) and his planning staff (a supreme allied commander had yet to be appointed), began the initial estimates for what would become Operation Overlord, the Allied assault on Europe, the worst case scenario they envisioned had the Germans employ first class infantry divisions to defend the difficult bocage country west of Caen, while concentrating their panzer forces in the open countryside to the east of that city, an area ideal for mobile counterattacks,
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from whence the Germans could push the allies back to the sea. By the eve of the invasion in June 1944, allied intelligence confirmed what the planners feared most: 540 panzers were massing near Caen. This revelation came too late to change the plan, so as Milner notes, “there was nothing to be done except launch the assault and hope that it all worked out.” (p. 91).

The plan was beset with peril, and the 3rd Canadian Division was scheduled to advance inland from the beaches to where the risk from the panzers appeared to be greatest.

As Milner points out, whereas historians have focussed upon an anxious Allied Supreme Commander, General Dwight Eisenhower, who, in early-June 1944, wrestled with myriad factors, including poor weather and the potentially perilous airborne landings, that could rob the Allies of success, none “seems to have connected Eisenhower’s fears … to the 540 panzers … massing around Caen.” (p. 93). Fortunately for Eisenhower, his doubts regarding the amphibious and airborne landings did not translate into reality, as American, British, and Canadian troops secured a lodgement on the beaches that was slowly expanded during June.

Milner then turns his attention to the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and the attached 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade, both of which landed on 6 June 1944. Until II Canadian Corps became operational in July, they were the sole Canadian formations in Normandy. Milner challenges the “seriously flawed” (p. 300) understanding of the early stages of the advance inland established by Anglo-Canadian historians, by proposing that instead of the abortive attacks on le Mesnil-Patry on 11 June being stalled by “their own lack of initiative” or “tactical incompetence” (p. 300), Canadian troops, and in particular, the vanguard of the 9th Infantry Brigade, faced and defeated a powerful force, vastly superior in anti-tank guns and artillery. An earlier and even larger defensive battle waged at Putot, Bretteville and Norrey between 8 and 10 June, involving two Canadian brigades against the 26 Panzer Grenadier Regiment, elements of the Panzer Lehr Division, and the 12th SS Panzer Battalion, whose goal was to “destroy the Anglo-Canadian bridgehead,” was no chance encounter. This action was “fought in accordance with the Overlord plan,” and it stopped the “probable counter-attack on the whole Overlord Operation” (p. 301). Milner thus links Allied planning before the invasion with the course of events during the campaign, and attributes the iconic stand by the 3rd Canadian Division for saving the Allied invasion, making it “Canada’s greatest contribution to Allied victory in Normandy.” (p. 315).

This is a potent conclusion—perhaps explaining why an American and not a Canadian house published this book. Indeed, the jacket quotes come from American and not Canadian historians. Milner, however, chooses not absolve the Canadians of all criticism, by observing that the fresh Canadian divisions, and the corps and army headquarters that arrived afterwards, engaged in a “stuttering series of apparent missteps and missed opportunities,” that culminated in the “failure to close the Falaise Gap promptly.” But then again, as Milner notes, exoneration may prove possible, although it is “a subject best left to another time.” (p. 315). Perhaps a sequel to this study will address these topics. Until then, we are again left to dwell upon the course of events that culminated in a stunning Allied victory in Normandy during the summer of 1944.

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Stopping the Panzers:
The Untold Story of D-Day
by Marc Milner
Reviewed by Peter J. Williams

When confronted with a book’s title, which includes the words, “The Untold Story,” this reviewer, tends to be somewhat leery as to what lies between the covers. In this particular case, however, I was disabused of this by a number of things. First, the author: Professor Marc Milner is one of Canada’s most accomplished historians, being noted for his works on our naval history. With previous service in the Directorate of History and Heritage, he is currently serving as Director of the Milton F. Gregg, VC Centre for the Study of War and Society at the University of New Brunswick. Second, I was fortunate to attend the book’s launching at the Canadian War Museum, where the author gave a presentation on the work. This included (in his words), a resumé of what we think we “know” (this a very clever use of quotations marks by Marc) about Canada and D-Day. I, along with many in the audience, no doubt, found out that I didn’t know as much as I thought I did on the subject. Third, the book was from the University Press of Kansas, a leader in the military history field. Finally, and as I usually do before buying a book,
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I checked the extent of Notes and primary sources. There were, as my Australian colleagues would say, “No worries” on that account.

What the author seeks to do in this work, and which in this reviewer’s opinion he succeeds, is to lay to rest many of the so-called myths surrounding the performance of the 3rd Canadian Division, in particular, during the Normandy landings and immediately thereafter. Although it is well known (or should be) that the 3rd Division advanced farther than any other Allied formation on the 6th of June, conventional wisdom in the minds of some holds that in the days following, the Canadian advance was stalled, and that they had been bettered by the German opposition. Not so, claims Milner, who states that by D+4 (10 June), it was the troops of the 3rd Canadian Division, battered to be sure, who were the ones holding the high ground, having stopped the panzers (three divisions worth of them, and of whose leadership Milner is critical) which would otherwise have defeated the entire Allied invasion on the beaches.

The book starts by the background to the planning of the landings, in which the 3rd Canadian Division was effectively the Allied main effort formation, with the task to stop the German counter-attack on ground which both sides had identified as vital to accomplishing this task. The bulk of the book is taken up with describing the actions of the 7th and 9th Canadian Brigades, which led 3rd Division’s advance up to 10 June. Despite being perhaps more renowned for his narratives on naval warfare, Milner proves that he is equally comfortable, and indeed, is highly able in describing small combat actions at brigade level and below. In fact, Milner has walked the ground of the actions he describes in the book.

Being a Gunner, I so introduced myself to the author at the signing, saying that I hoped he gave much coverage to the actions of the Royal Canadian Artillery (RCA) in this book. He replied, saying that there was plenty of such coverage.

Indeed there was. But not totally of the type I had expected. Professor Milner goes into great pains to describe how well endowed the 3rd Canadian Division was with fire support, more so than any other Allied division which landed that day, as would befit its role, and we can take a certain degree of pride in this. However, one element of the “untold story” was that of 14th Field Regiment RCA, which, according to Milner, only began firing in support of 8th Brigade late on the afternoon of D-Day. Although this fire (in the author’s words), “…saved the North Novas from virtual annihilation…”, why the Regiment was not firing earlier puzzled me. So, I double checked the RCA official history and found that the entries for 14th Field were rather thin, making no real reference to its guns firing, but instead, describing problems the regiment encountered as a result of enemy fire and intervening crests between the guns and potential targets, which caused “serious problems.” This was a somewhat sobering revelation.

As to the scholarly aspects of the book, these are beyond reproach and are up to the standard one would come to expect from such an eminent author. The Notes run to some 24 pages, and the primary sources include material, not only from across Canada, but also the United States and the United Kingdom, including, interestingly, the archives of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). This is all supplemented with personal accounts of combatants and access to German sources, which give details of the extent of casualties they had inflicted upon them by the Canadians. Very good maps complement the narrative at appropriate points, and there were many somewhat rare photos, including those of key personalities within the 3rd Canadian Division and of both Canadian and German troops in action. One of these was of a Lieutenant James Doohan, an officer who came ashore on the 6th of June 1944 as a member of 13th Field Regiment RCA, (in which Milner’s own father served), and who subsequently became an actor, being better known to TV audiences as Star Trek’s “Scotty.”

Stopping the Panzers should be considered as a textbook for history courses at our Royal Military College and other Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) training units where the history of our fighting forces is taught. Certainly, every Canadian regiment (or “Regiment”) or Branch that went ashore on D-Day should have a copy in its unit library. Besides contributing to a better knowledge by future generations of our past, it will also teach them, should they have the “history bug,” that it is never too late to tell an “untold story.” Strongly recommended.

Colonel Williams has just retired from military service, but was most recently serving as Director Arms Control Verification on the Strategic Joint Staff. He is a regular contributor to the Canadian Military Journal.

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