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Evaluation of CF/DND Participation in the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

3D	Diplomacy, Development and Defence	CORDS	Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program
ABCA	American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies' Standardization Program	Coy	Company
ADM(Pol)	Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy)	CRS	Chief Review Services
ANDS	Afghanistan National Development Strategy	CSC	Correctional Services Canada
AO	Area of Operation	CSS	Combat Service Support
ASIC/FST	All-Source Intelligence Centre/Field Support Team	DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
ATA	Afghan Transitional Authority	DfID	UK Department for International Development
CA	Comprehensive Approach	DGFDA	Director General Force Development Analysis
CDA	Canadian Defence Academy	DGP	Director General Plans
CDS	Chief of the Defence Staff	DIME	Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economics
CEFCOM	Canadian Expeditionary Force Command	DND	Department of National Defence
CENTCOM	US Central Command	DoD	US Department of Defense
CF	Canadian Forces	DoS	US Department of State
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency	DOS SJS	Director of Staff, Strategic Joint Staff
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency	DTELLD	Director Training, Exercises, Lessons Learned and Doctrine
CFC-A	Coalition Forces Command – Afghanistan	Elm	Element
CFD	Chief Force Development	EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
CFEC	Canadian Forces Experimentation Centre	EPRT	Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation	EW	Electronic Warfare
CJTF	Combined Joint Operations Task Force	FCO	UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office
CLS	Chief of the Land Staff	FM	Field Manual
CMP	Chief Military Personnel	GAO	US Government Accountability Office
CMTC	Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre	GPSF	Global Peace and Security Fund
CO	Commanding Officer	HUMINT	Human Intelligence
Comd	Commander	IED	Improvised Explosive Device
		IGO	Inter-governmental organization
		IO	Information Operations



IOs	International Organizations	OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force	OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
JALLC	Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre	OGD	Other government departments
JFCB	Joint Force Command Brunssum	OHDACA	Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid Fund
JIMP	Joint, Interagency, Multinational and Public	OOTW	Operations other than war
JRT	Joint Regional Team	OPI	Office of primary interest
JTF	Joint Task Force	OPLAN	Operations Plan
JTF-A	Joint Task Force Afghanistan	PCO	Privy Council Office
KAF	Kandahar Airfield	PCRU	UK Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit
KPRT	Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team	PMESII	Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information Systems
LAV	Light Armoured Vehicle	POLAD	Political Advisor
LFDTS	Land Force Doctrine and Training System	PI	Platoon
LO	Liaison Officer	PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
MIDLIFE	Military, Information, Diplomacy, Law Enforcement, Intelligence, Finance, Economics	PSTC	Peace Support Training Centre
MNE	Multinational Experiment	PsyOps	Psychological Operations
MoD	UK and German Ministry of Defence	PTL	Patrol
MoEC	German Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development	QCAR	Quarterly Campaign Assessment Report
MoFA	German Ministry of Foreign Affairs	QRF	Quick Reaction Force
MoI	German Ministry of the Interior	RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
MND	Minister of National Defence	Roto	Rotation
MP	Military Police	RTF	Reconstruction Task Force
MT	Motor Transport	RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation	S&R	Stabilization and Reconstruction
NCCIS	National Command, Control and Information System	S/CRS	United States State Department Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
NGO	Non-governmental organization	SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
NZ	New Zealand	SSR	Security Sector Reform
		START	Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force
		TACP	Tactical Air Control Party
		TCCS	Tactical Command and Control System



TMST	Theatre Mission Specific Training
TO&E	Table of Organization and Equipment
TOR	Terms of Reference
UK	United Kingdom
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USN	United States Navy
VCDS	Vice Chief of the Defence Staff



RESULTS IN BRIEF

An evaluation was conducted of the Canadian Forces (CF) and Department of National Defence (DND) participation in the Canadian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan.

The factors influencing this selection included the importance of the Kandahar PRT (KPRT) mission to national strategy, including “3D” (Diplomacy, Development, Defence), the Government of Canada’s policy framework relating to the “Responsibility to Protect,” the CF/DND Strategy Map, and lead nation vice niche contributor. It also considered the impact of new non-kinetic,¹ national 3D capability being created without previous CF experience or supporting doctrine, requiring evolving tactics and training.

Overall Assessment

DND/CF participation in the KPRT is providing an effective mechanism to assist in the execution of the three pillars of the Government of Canada’s strategic objectives for Afghanistan. DND/CF members and their federal government colleagues are addressing most of the challenges inherent in this new whole-of-government effort. This way of doing business has the potential to be adapted for future missions involving fragile states of national interest to Canada.

This evaluation noted a significant gradual improvement in the functioning of the KPRT over time, particularly at the tactical and operational levels in interagency cooperation and the Canadian Expeditionary Force Command’s (CEFCOM) contribution to mission success. The report’s main findings and recommendations are as follows:

Main Findings

- There was an initial lack of coherent vision of what the KPRT was meant to accomplish, and how objectives would be attained. Complicating this lack of a coherent vision was the fact that within the CF, the KPRT was never universally viewed as a key counterinsurgency tool, and it does not have a basis in CF doctrine. The KPRT was initially shaped to a large extent by the vision, objectives and concept of operations of successive Commanding Officers (CO) and supplemented by the Government of Canada Campaign Plan, the Joint Task Force Afghanistan (JTF-A) Base plan, and other strategic and operational-level directives.
- Training for this mission has evolved and more effectively meets the need; however, getting the whole-of-government team together for pre-deployment training remains an ongoing challenge.
- There is a lack of CF counterinsurgency doctrine, a situation that contributes to the lack of clarity as to where the KPRT fits into the counterinsurgency and information operation (IO) campaigns. This has also been noted by the other government department (OGD) participants, who seek guidance on what their role is to be in a counterinsurgency campaign.

¹ Kinetic operations feature the traditional use of military force to attack and destroy an enemy. Non-kinetic operations involve non-combat military activity. While kinetic operations may either impress or remove the enemy’s will to fight, non-kinetic operations are usually the ones that “win the hearts and minds” of the people.



- The role of the KPRT in support of the IO campaign was initially neither fully understood nor exploited. As a result, the mutual passage of information between the KPRT and other formations/units was sub-optimal. Also, the KPRT lacks the analytical support to collate, publish and act upon IO products. Further, operations are kinetically led so KPRT IO is at times reactionary to the security pillar of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). Despite improvements, the KPRT still lacks the necessary resources to effectively support the IO campaign.
- Early selection of proven, post-command officers to lead the military portion of the KPRT has become a successful process. The one-year cycle of rotating key leadership personnel has yet to be proven as the best option.
- Despite significant initial challenges, over time the KPRT developed as an effective team that performs successfully at the tactical level. Challenges exist at higher levels within Canada, where interdepartmental committees and working groups have been created to facilitate policy integration and the resolution of emerging issues.
- There is good visibility of KPRT activities and progress in Kandahar in achieving desired effects as laid out in the ANDS. However, the complexity of the situation in Kandahar is such that the extent to which the PRT itself can claim credit for progress is still difficult to measure.
- There is currently no CF/DND office of primary interest (OPI) assigned to coordinate the translation of broad grand-strategic² objectives into definable interagency tasks and performance metrics as they relate to international operations, and to track and report progress toward their achievement.
- There is no designated CF/DND OPI to coordinate military-strategic and operational-level interagency concepts, doctrine, performance measurement and lessons learned.
- Criteria and protocols respecting command and control relationships for deployed interagency units have not been fully developed at all levels. As a result, effectiveness in the achievement of unit objectives is vulnerable to the influence of organizational and individual biases and personalities of the participants.
- Integrated interagency planning is critical to ensure coherence, proactive coordination across government, and the achievement of integrated effects in post-conflict and humanitarian assistance, as well as to identify developing crises requiring remediation.
- Better preparation is required for CF members to interact closely with staff from OGDs and agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGO) and other civilian organizations. This requires new skill sets and consideration of selection criteria for key interagency positions. CF officer professional development and pre-deployment training for all deploying personnel have been adjusted to a certain extent to meet the need, but a more thorough, holistic review and update are required.

² Grand strategy deals with the full range of issues associated with the maintenance of political independence and territorial integrity and the pursuit of wider national interests. It is about the co-ordinated use of the three principal instruments of national power: economic, diplomatic and military. It is as much concerned with the avoidance of war as with its conduct. UK Joint Warfare Publication 0-01 – British Defence Doctrine, October 2001.



Recommendations

- Develop appropriate CF concepts and doctrine for counterinsurgency operations, to include a whole-of-government approach to PRT operations within a broader Comprehensive Approach (CA) framework.
- Integrate the KPRT (and other interagency deployed units) into CF IO campaign planning at the operational and tactical levels, and raise awareness of this role in force generation and force employment activities, including pre-deployment training.
- Review the selection, training and employment of CF civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and psychological operations (PsyOps) operators, and make adjustments as required to ensure an adequate pool of appropriately trained and available personnel.
- Develop and monitor metrics that measure the effects of reconstruction and development efforts in Kandahar province with emphasis on KPRT activities, recognizing the difficulties inherent in separating the KPRT contribution from that of other development agencies.
- Designate a strategic-level OPI to coordinate CF/DND involvement in future interagency operations, to include analysis of available military options to support the achievement of grand-strategic objectives.
- Designate a CF/DND OPI to coordinate interagency concepts, doctrine, performance measurement and lessons learned above the tactical level.
- Assist in the development, at the interdepartmental level, of criteria and protocols for assigning integrated leadership responsibility within deployed interagency units.
- Review and increase appropriately the current level of CF/DND participation in interagency planning. In so doing, consider the range of available planning options, to include establishing a standing whole-of-government planning unit, through to increasing resources assigned directly to the planning function within the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START).
- Improve the ability of CF personnel of all three Environments to operate effectively in an interagency, multinational environment, to include the development of appropriate skills sets and increasing employment and training opportunities that foster interagency interaction.

Note: For a more detailed list of CRS recommendations and management response please refer to [Annex A](#)—Management Action Plan.



INTRODUCTION

The CF mission statement for operations in Afghanistan directs that “*The CF will conduct operations in Afghanistan in order to support the Government of Afghanistan’s effort to create a secure, democratic and self-sustaining nation state.*”³

Background

In accordance with the Chief Review Services 2006/07 Work Plan, an evaluation was conducted of the CF/DND participation in the Canadian-led PRT in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. The factors influencing this selection of this project included:

- The importance of the KPRT mission to national strategy, including “3D”, the Government of Canada’s policy framework relating to the “Responsibility to Protect,”⁴ and the CF/DND Strategy Map;
- A new non-kinetic, national 3D capability being created without previous CF experience or supporting doctrine, requiring evolving tactics and training;
- Complexity in interagency interaction with OGDs and agencies, relationship with other CF units/allies/Afghan officials/NGOs, and new skill sets required; and
- Risk of mission failure or loss of life due to KPRT composition issues, including selection of personnel or skill sets (including those for key leadership positions), inadequate resources, training, project management, and loss of public support/confidence.

Objective

The objective of this evaluation was to examine the CF/DND areas of responsibility in the execution of the PRT program in Kandahar. The following issues were considered:

- Is the CF/DND force construct deployed to the KPRT adequately designed, staffed, trained, equipped and sustained to conduct effective PRT operations?
- Are the roles of, and interrelationships between, the CF/DND/OGDs and agencies/international organizations (IGOs)/NGOs/host nation clear and well understood by all parties?
- Is this construct effective and focused on an overall common aim?
- Are the command and control arrangements effective for this mission?
- Is there effective situational awareness maintained both in theatre and at higher levels of command for this mission?
- Is the PRT construct a viable whole-of-government option for consideration elsewhere in the future?

³ CF Campaign Plan – Afghanistan, 5 May 2006.

⁴ Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, December 2001. A core principle of this Government of Canada-led international initiative is: “*Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.*” <http://www.idrc.ca/openbooks/960-7/>.



Scope

This evaluation focused mainly on CF/DND aspects of the KPRT. It also took into account lines of communication and reporting relationships that reflect the current direction provided to the CF/DND on the integrated, whole-of-government approach to the conduct of operations.

Methodology

In order to assess the CF/DND capability required to meet federal government commitments for the KPRT, the following elements were considered:

- Review of available literature, internal documentation, applicable policies or agreements;
- Examination of the issues from the perspective of internal and external stakeholders; and
- Comparison of the CF/DND PRT processes with those of our major allies and alliance partners (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO); American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies' Standardization Program (ABCA)).

Evaluation Criteria

Performance measurement for the Canadian-led KPRT, in its whole-of-government sense, is intended to be undertaken using the goals and pillars outlined in the 2006 Afghanistan Compact,⁵ and the resultant execution of this Compact through the five-year program contained in the ANDS⁶ (see Figure 1). Both the Compact and the ANDS are also aligned with the UN-approved Millennium Development Goals⁷ – measurable goals for Afghanistan out to 2020.




Figure 1. Afghanistan National Development Strategy – Pillars and Themes.⁸

⁵ *The Afghanistan Compact*, an international agreement finalized at The London Conference on Afghanistan, 31 January – 1 February 2006

⁶ Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), <http://www.ands.gov.af/>.

⁷ UN Millennium Development Goals, <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>.

⁸ Afghanistan National Development Strategy – A Summary Report, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2006.

In that regard, measuring the effectiveness of the KPRT as a distinct whole-of-government entity against the ANDS and the Compact will be a complex undertaking. The determination of strategic outcomes or effects from what is, at present, a constantly evolving conceptual organization, will be challenging. Since this evaluation will not be a whole-of-government report, the evaluation team has concentrated on those criteria most affecting the CF/DND input to the KPRT: strategic, operational and tactical direction, organization and personnel employment, training, and sustainability.



EVOLUTION OF THE PRT CONCEPT

Historical Context

The use of a whole-of-government approach to integrated security, governance and reconstruction construct began in November 2001 in Afghanistan following the defeat of the Taliban and installation of an interim Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA). Unlike previous efforts to execute doctrinal United States (US) or NATO “stabilization and reconstruction” (S&R) efforts, such as had occurred in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990’s, the Afghanistan mission required a more comprehensive effort. The Afghanistan mission entailed the *de facto* rebuilding of a country and its institutions from the federal down through the local village levels, while simultaneously conducting an active counterinsurgency campaign.

Prior to the US/NATO involvement in Afghanistan, the UK had conducted a successful 15-year counterinsurgency campaign in Malaysia with an acknowledged whole-of-government context that contributed greatly to the success of that campaign. Forty years ago the US had also introduced an early form of a whole-of-government approach to the ongoing insurgency in Viet Nam. In 1967, much of the US Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) work was melded into the new military/Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program. The CORDS program was an attempt at the government's non-military efforts to “pacify” Viet Cong-controlled areas and return them to South Vietnamese government control.

CORDS brought into one program all of the diverse counterinsurgency programs run by the military, USAID and the CIA. Under CORDS, USAID personnel worked with American and South Vietnamese military and CIA personnel throughout the country, setting up programs designed to win Vietnamese villagers and farmers over to the South Vietnamese government's cause and to destroy support for the Viet Cong. In particular, CORDS helped the South Vietnamese develop and then support a national police force and local militias known as the Regional and Popular Forces. Included in CORDS was the controversial Phoenix program, which was designed to eliminate the rural Viet Cong infrastructure. That program ended in 1972.

From a historical perspective, the UK Malaysian experience, and other counterinsurgency operations over the last sixty years has shown that a successful counterinsurgency campaign usually lasts from 11 to 14 years.

In the Afghanistan situation, PRTs were initially introduced by the US to fill the gap between the end of the rapidly conducted major combat phase of operations in Afghanistan, which resulted in the eviction of the Taliban from power in late 2001, and the longer term “nation-building” reconstruction and rehabilitation phase. The latter phase is normally undertaken in the post-conflict period by the various civilian international organizations (IOs) such as the UN, and NGOs. This S&R gap, characterized by uncertainty, instability and lack of security, has remained in the South and East of Afghanistan to the present time.

Shortly after the occupation of Kabul in November 2001, the US Central Command (CENTCOM)-driven Coalition Joint Civil-Military Task Force began operating. This US task force, in support of the ATA, was assigned to be an information conduit to NGOs and to coordinate all civil affairs unit activities during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). Any



civil-military affairs activities would be funded through the joint US Department of Defense (DoD)/Department of State (DoS) Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDACA) fund.

At its earliest stages, the “comprehensive” S&R construct was called the Joint Regional Team (JRT) under the auspices of OEF. The original mission of the JRT was to coordinate reconstruction efforts, identify projects, conduct village assessments and coordinate everyone engaged in the reconstruction process.

JRTs evolved into PRTs in January 2003 after the Center for Humanitarian Cooperation organized a discussion with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and CENTCOM. The mission of PRTs was clarified as follows:

- a. to extend the influence of the ATA outside of Kabul,
- b. to expand the work of NGOs and international organizations outside of Kabul,
- c. to facilitate conditions for reconstruction so as to encourage movement of pledged funds, and
- d. to facilitate information sharing.⁹

The first PRTs were set up between December 2002 and February 2003 under the command of the Combined Joint Operations Task Force 180 (CJTF 180), at Gardez, Bamyan and Kunduz (see Figure 2). Some of the US PRTs were subsequently re-assigned to other lead nations – Bamyan (New Zealand-controlled) in March and an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) PRT Kunduz (German-led) in April 2003.



Figure 2. ISAF PRT Locations 2007.¹⁰

⁹ Conference minutes, “Civil Military Cooperation Conference.” U.S. Institute for Peace, Washington, District of Columbia, 16 January 2003.

¹⁰ ISAF Presentation, 7 February 2007.

Rationale for the Development of Provincial Reconstruction Teams

The unexpectedly rapid victory of the US-led coalition in Afghanistan in November 2001 forced a rapid re-assessment of post-conflict priorities. A longer campaign with higher casualties had initially been foreseen, with the need for S&R to be developed as the campaign unfolded. Quick victory and the establishment of a Transitional Authority in Kabul demanded a rollout firstly of humanitarian assistance, followed closely behind by S&R elements. Once a degree of stabilization of the security situation around Kabul had been reached in 2002, and Afghan federal elections called for 2003, it became necessary to push coalition S&R resources out to the provinces and districts to support these democratic elections.

At this point in time, the US was primarily conducting an active combat mission (OEF) in the hunt for Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, with few military resources dedicated to S&R. The security situation outside of Kabul was, in many cases, unstable, and NGOs attempting to work in these unstable areas had been attacked and their personnel kidnapped or murdered. As a result, virtually all of the NGOs suspended their activities in many of the Afghan provinces, which left a gap not only in fulfilling humanitarian needs, but also in reconstruction, development and areas needing significant and pressing rehabilitation such as infrastructure, agriculture and health support.

The newly created PRTs gradually assumed the S&R responsibilities throughout Afghanistan starting in early 2003. The earliest PRT partners were New Zealand (NZ), Germany and the United Kingdom (UK) who took responsibilities for PRTs in the North Central area of Afghanistan from the US where security conditions were relatively stable. Following a series of international conferences involving donor nations, the UN, and NATO, a decision was made to expand the mandate of the UN-approved, NATO-led coalition ISAF beyond the general Kabul area in four phases, effective 9 August 2003.

This expansion, meant to provide significant coalition S&R resources in the field prior to the Afghan national elections in September 2005, would also include the assumption of responsibilities for all of the PRTs throughout Afghanistan. The majority of the extant PRTs outside of the Kabul and Northern Afghanistan area at this point in time were US-led. On 27 January 2005, Terms of Reference were provided through Coalition Forces Command – Afghanistan (CFC-A) to all ISAF and OEF PRTs with the following mission:

“Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) will assist The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified area of operations (AO), and enable security sector reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts.”¹¹

¹¹ DCDS 3350-165/A29 (J3 Intl 2-4) OP ARCHER – PRT Table of Organization and Equipment, 2 June 2005.

The expansion took place in Stages (see Figure 3), with ISAF Stage 1 already having been completed in Kabul and the North of the country where ISAF assumed control of former CFC-A PRTs throughout 2004. ISAF Stage 2 expansion to the Western provinces was completed prior to the September 2005 elections. ISAF Stage 3 expansion to the Southern provinces, noted as a higher risk move,¹² commenced in late-summer 2005 and was completed by 31 July 2006.¹³ Final ISAF Stage 4 expansion to the Eastern provinces was completed by 5 October 2006,¹⁴ with the number of PRTs in Afghanistan increasing to 25.




Figure 3. NATO ISAF Staged Expansion.

Developing PRT Models – National Variations on a Theme

Following on from the initial US efforts to establish PRTs throughout Afghanistan, various coalition partners, upon assumption of control of a PRT, introduced a number of PRT models across the country. These models often reflected the various nations' differing views on how to deliver diplomacy, development and defence. One of the principal "drivers" of PRT design and implementation was the unique security requirements for each of the PRTs.

The US PRT Model

The initial US PRTs all had a similar structure, with up to 68 personnel. The largest PRT, in Gardez, had 60 military personnel in command, intelligence, tactical air control party (TACP), linguistic, patrol and security functions. Eight civilian slots were left open for Security Sector

¹² NATO ISAF PRT Analysis of Lessons Learned Interim Report, JALLC, 7 April 2005.

¹³ Congressional Research Service Report to Congress, Report RL30588, 14 February 2007.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Coordination, CIMIC, ATA representative, UNAMA, other US governmental agencies such as USAID and DoS, and NGOs. The two other PRTs were structured similarly. As the PRTs were not resourced separately in the initial OEF Stage 3 and 4 strategy, the military personnel had to be generated from CJTF 180 OEF missions. In order to avoid a serious downgrade of the war fighting capability, CJTF 180 deferred further build-up of PRTs unless additionally resourced. With some Romanian and Afghan liaison officers attached, the US PRT's received a basic multinational footprint. Despite its military layout, the focus of the US PRT's remains on nation-building functions and administrative support.¹⁵

Freedom of movement for US PRTs is regularly restricted to a 15-kilometer circle around the PRT locations and requires a 96-hour notice prior to authorization. Different from other PRTs, the US is not involved in patrolling or larger-scale reconnaissance activities.¹⁶




Figure 4. The US PRT Model.¹⁷

The UK/NZ PRT Model

The UK assumed control of a US PRT in 2003 in the north of Afghanistan at Mazar-e-Sharif under the OEF mandate. With a total of less than 100 personnel each and about six positions for reconstruction functions, the British and the New Zealand PRTs in Masar-e-Sharif and Bamyan were similar to the US model. The UK Commander had an attached Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Political Advisor (POLAD), a representative of the UK Department for International Development (DfID) and representatives of the US DoS, USAID and the ATA. Both nations used their security elements extensively for reconnaissance,

¹⁵ *Nation Building in Afghanistan*, Col Gerd Brandstetter, US War College Paper, 18 March 2005.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful But Not Sufficient*, PV Jakobsen, DIIS Report, June 2005.

patrolling and military observer missions, using “safe houses” to base sustaining patrols for up to three weeks. These human intelligence (HUMINT) type operations were paralleled by special reconnaissance tasks of their Special Forces. Integral force protection teams were able to simultaneously escort two different groups. Locally hired security personnel guarded the PRT locations. Integral Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs) were available to cope with emergency situations. Besides a relatively strong US presence in both PRTs, and additional troops stationed temporarily, the UK was additionally supported by a Danish infantry detachment.

The relatively benign security environment in the North and around Kabul enabled this particular construct. During ISAF Stage 3 expansion, in 2006 the UK handed over the Mazar-e-Sharif PRT to Sweden, and assumed control of another PRT in Lashkar Gah to the south, in Helmand province (see Figure 2). Attempts by the UK to replicate the Mazar-e-Sharif structure in Lashkar Gah met with mixed results due to the more volatile security situation in Helmand, and adjustments were required.




Figure 5. The 2003 UK PRT Model¹⁸

The German PRT Model

The PRT in Kunduz is organized as an inter-ministerial mission between the German Ministries of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), the Interior (MoI), Economic Cooperation and Development (MoEC) and Defence (MoD). Overall command of the PRT is executed by the representative of the MoFA. He reports directly to the MoFA in Germany, which coordinates at the ministerial level by means of a mirroring inter-ministerial Steering Group. The MoEC identifies, funds and conducts development and reconstruction projects in the region. Together with the MoI police officers reorganizing and training the police, the MoEC is the principal organization used for nation-building projects. The military component protects and enables the core PRT functions of

¹⁸ *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful But Not Sufficient*, PV Jakobsen, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) Report 2005:6, June 2005.

the civilian OGDs. The leader of the military portion of the German PRT is under operational control of Commander ISAF. For PRT-related issues he is subordinate to, and must coordinate with, the civilian MoFA representative. However, he automatically takes the lead in all aspects of security and military operations, including emergencies and evacuations.

The military contingent has a strength of about 300 service personnel comprising a battalion level staff, including CIMIC, plus administration and contracting, a public affairs centre, a reconnaissance platoon, an infantry company including a tactical air control party, a helicopter detachment, platoon size detachments of military police (MP), IO, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), communications, a Headquarters Company plus a full-size medical rescue centre (RZ). The military component also integrates an Afghan army liaison officer and an ISAF liaison detachment, plus about 30 multinational personal from Belgium, Switzerland, Hungary and Romania. The PRT compound in the center of Kunduz is guarded by a hired platoon of Afghan soldiers. The German soldiers are rotated every four to six months.




Figure 6. The German PRT Model.¹⁹

¹⁹ *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful But Not Sufficient*, PV Jakobsen, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) Report 2005:6, June 2005.

KPRT—PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

Canadian-Led Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team—Organization

Canadian government involvement in PRTs began with a cross-departmental reconnaissance visit to Afghanistan in March 2003. This was followed by a series of staff visits to a number of PRT locations until March 2005, when a choice was made by the federal government to assume control of the US-run PRT in Kandahar. The choice of moving to Kandahar was based on an agreement between the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and DND, that Kandahar was where Canada could make a decisive impact on the expanding Afghanistan mission as the Stage 3 transition from the US-led OEF to NATO (ISAF) was taking place.

The initial rotation (Roto 0) of less than CF troops to assume control of the Kandahar PRT from the US took place in July and August 2005. Working under the US-led OEF (CF participation designated Op ARCHER), they were joined in September and October by representatives from DFAIT, CIDA and the RCMP.

The original Roto 0 CF contribution to the PRT included a military headquarters staff of 17, a composite force protection group of ... personnel formed as a non-doctrinal infantry company (minus), a field engineer section of ... personnel, a CIMIC and cell of ... personnel, between Kandahar Airfield (KAF) and the PRT, and an *ad hoc* combat service support (CSS) group split between Camp Nathan Smith (the KPRT base in downtown Kandahar) and out of KAF (see Figure 7 - approved Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E), dated June 2005).

Since August 2005, the KPRT TO&E has undergone a series of changes, evolving as the security situation changed in Southern Afghanistan. During Roto 1 (February-July 2006), the PRT command and control relationship with the newly arrived CF battle group was altered from a direct reporting relationship to the Canadian Commander Joint Task Force Afghanistan (Comd JTF-A), to under command of the CO of the battle group. While easing the Comd JTF-A's span of control, it ultimately proved to be a problematic move as the force protection company was taken away from the KPRT by the CO of the battle group to be used as a line infantry company during Op MEDUSA. This severely reduced the KPRT's freedom of movement and led to a curtailment of most KPRT activities external to Kandahar City for the duration of this Roto. During execution of Op MEDUSA, and concurrent with the arrival of Roto 2 (July/August 2006), this situation was remedied by having the KPRT again report directly to Comd JTF-A.

The military strength of the KPRT at the start of Roto 2 was again back to approximately personnel. After one year in theatre, and gaining experience of what was needed in the areas of security and development in Kandahar province, an enhanced contracting and project management cell were also added to the KPRT TO&E. In addition, a military police section was also made part of the KPRT to assist the RCMP in Afghan police capacity building. As a result of these additions, the Rotos 3 and 4 KPRT TO&E have remained at approximately(+) CF personnel.



It should be noted that the evolving reporting relationship described above was restricted to the military CO and personnel of the KPRT. Staff belonging to OGDs and agencies (DFAIT, CIDA, RCMP, USAID at the outset) were not bound by the CF or ISAF chains of command, and reported directly back to their parent organizations on issues beyond their authority to resolve. Selection of a military KPRT CO was made by mutual agreement based on the extant security situation, and in point of fact, the KPRT is a partnership of equals, with decisions being made collegially.




Figure 7. Roto 0 CF Kandahar PRT TO&E June 2005.

²⁰ DCDS 3350-165/A29 (J3 Intl 2-4) Op ARCHER – PRT TO&E, 2 June 2005.

The KPRT Role in the Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Campaign

Undue emphasis on military action clouds the key political realities, which can result in a military-dominated campaign plan that misses the real focus of an insurgency.

Gavin Bulloch, *Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency*, Parameters, Summer 1996

The PRT is a new and unique construct for both the CF/DND and other Canadian federal government departments and agencies. As part of the CF Campaign Plan for Afghanistan, the KPRT has been described to the evaluation team by several interviewees as the “centre of gravity” or the centrepiece of the “One Canada” approach of the overall Canadian effort.

The US/NATO development of the PRT concept has been noted above, but its context for Canadian personnel in the overall Afghanistan counterinsurgency campaign has not been elucidated with clarity or singularity of vision. The KPRT’s purpose and objectives have been described to the evaluation team in a number of slightly different ways by the participating federal government departments. This slight variance in “vision” by the various departments and agencies caused some early friction in command and control relationships and in what the military would call “tactics, techniques and procedures” between the departments. That the PRT has worked so successfully is principally due to the strong working relationships established by the KPRT participants who want to “get the job done.”

The strategic campaign plan should be directed in such a way as to sequence and coordinate the various agencies' individual lines of operation according to the overall strategic requirements at the time.

Gavin Bulloch, *Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency*, Parameters, Summer 1996

What was not articulated well by the Canadian participants at the strategic and grand-strategic levels at the beginning of Canadian operations in Kandahar was the importance of policy integration and coherence, and how the KPRT was to fit into the overall ISAF counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan.

Counterinsurgency requires the integration of all elements of national power – diplomacy, information operations, intelligence, financial and military – to achieve the predominantly political objectives of establishing a stable national government that can secure itself against internal and external threats.

John A. Nagl, *Learning To Eat Soup With A Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, University of Chicago Press, 2002

Leading subject matter experts such as Kitson, Trinquier, Falls, Mockaitis and Nagl (quoted above) have all pointed to a number of common elements or “principles” for the conduct of a successful counterinsurgency campaign. These include:



- The recognition that the insurgency is not primarily a military problem;
- The absolutely essential requirement for good local intelligence;
- The need for close cooperation between the civil-police team with the military in a supporting role; and
- The need for exercise of minimum force by all security forces.

The military plan should form one strand in a coordinated "attack" upon the overall aims of the insurgents. This should be established by a strategic estimate conducted by a government taking military and other advice. From this will flow further operational and tactical estimates and plans. While military forces may have a critical role to play at certain stages in the campaign, overall their contribution will be secondary and should be kept in perspective.

Gavin Bulloch, *Military Doctrine and Counterinsurgency*, Parameters, Summer 1996

There should be no hesitation in naming the overall Canadian military and civilian effort in Kandahar province as anything but participation in a counterinsurgency. Canada, in its support of the UN-approved, NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, has chosen sides in the ongoing conflict. The PRT in Kandahar is a central piece in the counterinsurgency effort in that province. However, the evaluation team has not found linkages to any existing NATO or ABCA counterinsurgency doctrine, or indeed to any emerging links to CF counterinsurgency thinking, in the background documents for the employment of CF personnel in Kandahar.

A variety of studies, papers and commentaries on PRTs and how they can fit into a counterinsurgency effort have been completed in the past several years. Again, common themes have emerged in virtually all of this body of work that reaffirm the basic principles of counterinsurgency noted above. All leading experts in the field have stressed the importance of not just the military, but also the need for the rest of the involved departments and agencies to become participants in the overall campaign planning process from the earliest stages. Lacking a proper aim and commonly understood strategic direction, all participants will fall back on what is most familiar and comfortable.

Finding: There are numerous organizational models of PRTs being used in Afghanistan. Canada has adapted their PRT to meet the security situation in Kandahar province.

Finding: There was an initial lack of coherent vision of what the KPRT was meant to accomplish, and how objectives would be attained. Complicating this lack of a coherent vision was the fact that within the CF, the KPRT was never universally viewed as a key counterinsurgency tool, and it doesn't appear in any CF doctrine related to counterinsurgency. Presently the Government of Canada Campaign Plan, the JTF-A Base plan, and other strategic and operational level directives supplement the CO KPRT's vision, objectives and concept of operations.

International Strategic Direction

Original international approval and direction for the Afghanistan mission came from two UN Security Council Resolutions. Following on from these resolutions, there has been a series of strategic directives and plans created to operationalize the UN/ISAF mission. There have also been several internal-to-Afghanistan plans and directives, including Afghanistan's Millennium Goals Country Report – Vision 2020²¹ published in 2005 wherein the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) outlined its overarching goals for the well being of its people.

There is the previously mentioned ANDS with its three principal pillars of governance, development and security. An updated agreement between the Afghan government and the international community is articulated in the Afghanistan Compact of 2006, which itself was a follow-on from the original Berlin Declaration of 1 April 2004. Within the military strategic and operational realms, direction for the execution of the Afghan mission has come from a number of coalition/ISAF plans, including (from higher to lower) NATO/SHAPE OPLAN 10302, JFCB OPLAN 30302 and the ISAF OPLAN 38302.

Canadian Government and Military Strategic Direction

The evaluation team has examined the initiating Memoranda to Cabinet that provided the rationale for the deployment of the KPRT. These documents give an outline of what could be termed “grand strategic” direction for the whole-of-government effort. Also examined were the unsigned PRT Framework Arrangement between DND, DFAIT and CIDA,²² and other supporting Memoranda of Understanding and Letters of Assist. To execute the CF portion of the mission, including the place of the KPRT in the mission, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) Directive – CF Operations in Afghanistan, and the CDS Campaign Plan of 5 May 2006 are the principal guiding documents at the military strategic level.

The Roto 0 KPRT CO received verbal direction from the CDS on his “Commander’s Intent” for the PRT, but never did receive formal orders for his mission. Using the draft Framework Agreement and the CDS verbal direction, the Roto 0 KPRT CO worked with the Comd JTF-A to craft the Task Force orders to allow the KPRT to function in what was very much a state of flux. There were challenges noted by a number of KPRT military members in translating what was a *de facto* “strategic vision” from the CDS into realistic tactical tasks. An early PRT focus was supporting the local elections being held throughout Afghanistan in 2005. Once the elections were completed successfully in November of that year, there was little coordinated direction provided to direct the PRT’s actions towards a commonly understood follow-on goal.

At the operational level, personnel interviewed, both in theatre and in Canada, were unanimous that the establishment of CEFCOM through CF Transformation was a success, and was responsive to KPRT needs.

Finding: Strategic direction to the KPRT Roto 0 was given verbally at a very high level, and required the KPRT leadership to define the unit’s role and to develop realistic tactical tasks. Given that the KPRT was a new mission for the CF/DND, as well as for OGDs and agencies, this proved an ongoing, evolutionary challenge with improvements being made on an ongoing basis.

²¹ Millennium Development Goals, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Country Report 2005 – Vision 2020.
http://www.ands.gov.af/src/src/MDGs_Reps/MDGR%202005.pdf

²² 3350-165/A37 (J3 Intl Plans 2) 16 November 2005.



PRT Training

From the commencement of the Kandahar mission, training for the CF members of the KPRT was, by necessity, *ad hoc*. The PRT was not, and is still not, a doctrinally recognized military construct, and drew on (for Roto 0 as an example) individuals from twelve different units across the CF. The original TO&E (Figure 7) created an organization which could offer a patrolling capability to provide security for either military-directed CIMIC activities, or support to the DFAIT, CIDA, RCMP and IGOs resident in the KPRT, including a USAID and a UK DfID representative. However, the Protection Company was an *ad hoc* organization based loosely on an infantry company (minus), less its normal integral combat support and combat service support organization.

Roto 0 training was foreshortened by the need to deploy quickly into theatre. As with most Roto 0s the CF have experienced in the last fifteen years, the principle of “best professional judgement” on what training would be required for the KPRT was exercised. This meant a prepared set of training activities featuring basic “scenario” training, including operational training in the new organizational configuration. For example, the infantry sections were based on the Gelandenwagen (G-Wagon) patrol vehicle seating capacity rather than a doctrinal light infantry or mechanized infantry section. Training never was undertaken with the entire KPRT establishment in place.

The Land Force Western Area-based personnel who provided the bulk of Roto 0 did have several weeks of Theatre Mission Specific Training (TMST) before departure. In addition there was training provided through a contract with the University of Calgary on Afghan languages, customs and culture. Cultural training was found to be of significant importance and has now been incorporated in all pre-deployment training.

Roto 1 had noticeably more focused training based on early lessons learned from Roto 0. This Roto was also the first where more of the KPRT CF “team” could be trained as a group. Their pre-deployment work-up period included more comprehensive soldier skills training, but still lacked any realistic collective training pertinent to the KPRT, unlike the training received by the Battle Group, where a series of exercises culminated in Exercise MAPLE GUARDIAN at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre (CMTC) at CFB Wainwright. Integrated Battle Group/KPRT training was not undertaken. It was also noted that the OGD representatives had not been able to undertake training with the KPRT “team.”

From Roto 2 onwards, there has been an increasingly coherent PRT training package, but which still lacks training scenarios reflective of “in theatre” reality. Emphasis during collective training has not been placed on the different aspects of the KPRT’s role in Afghanistan. Other than established Land Force Doctrine and Training System (LFDTs) soldier skills training standards, there are still no PRT Battle Task Standards available against which to assess overall readiness of the KPRT to deploy. This should not be surprising since the PRT “concept” and organization has no “owner” who would normally be assigned those responsibilities related to policies, doctrine and training standards.

Since the Canadian-led KPRT is land-centric both in focus and composition, the Comd LFDTs has, by default and on his own initiative, assumed a significant degree of control over the collective training aspects of the KPRT. Comd LFDTs has also directed the Peace Support



Training Centre (PSTC) to include PRT-related training in their various syllabi. The PSTC is currently the Centre of Excellence for CF CIMIC and PsyOps training, in addition to training OGD members. It should be noted that both the CIMIC and PsyOps specialists undertake their own individual and specialty training separate from the PRT functional training.

It is not evident to the evaluation team that a comprehensive training approach that can be linked to appropriate direction for the overall mission has been agreed to, and executed by, all the participants in the KPRT. Outside of the CF, each department or agency chooses to send, or not send, individuals to portions of the CF PRT training cycle. Lacking an interdepartmental concept, doctrinal framework or agreement for this activity, training for a “3D” PRT has changed with every CF Roto. All participants interviewed for this evaluation have agreed that this whole-of-government training is a necessity, and that integrated training would produce a more cohesive team; however, to date, the overall execution of 3D training has been uneven at best.

Finding: Training for this mission has evolved and more effectively meets the need; however, there are currently no collective Battle Task Standards for the KPRT. Collective training followed by the tactical reconnaissance permits the military side to view the complexities of the mission and to understand that the handover is a critical training period as well.

Finding: The whole-of-government team can never get together before the deployment of each Roto because of other department force generation cycles, the six month offset for civil-military leadership rotations and the general lack of a lead on guiding in Canada-whole-of-government training.

Finding: The lack of availability of OGD personnel for 3D training has been challenging in terms of building the PRT team. There is a need to identify KPRT staff from all departments and agencies sufficiently in advance to ensure their availability for critical training periods. Even if all personnel were to be made available, the ability to replicate their part in a realistic way is a challenge.

Counterinsurgency/PRT Doctrine

A 2007 CRS evaluation of the CF doctrine program²³ noted that the CF lacks doctrine for the PRT, and more significantly, for counterinsurgency operations. The lack of doctrine in both areas is viewed as an important deficiency, given that the KPRT is an integral component of the Information Operations campaign,²⁴ which is itself an integral part of the overall Afghanistan counterinsurgency campaign.²⁵ In the absence of doctrine, PRT training and operations since 2005 have been undertaken with a significant degree of what a number of interviewees for this evaluation have described as “best professional judgement” as to how to integrate the KPRT into the overall counterinsurgency/IO campaigns.

The initial inclination of all Canadian KPRT partners from the earliest expression of interest in PRTs by the Government of Canada in 2003 was to try and integrate as much of the previous Bosnia/Kosovo experience into their planning and conduct of operations. What became quickly

²³ 1258-123 (CRS), *Evaluation of the Maintenance and Currency of CF Doctrine*, March 2007

http://www.dnd.ca/crs/rpt/cfdoctrine_e.htm.

²⁴ CF Campaign Plan – Afghanistan, 5 May 2006.

²⁵ NATO/SHAPE OPLAN 10302.



apparent was that an integrated counterinsurgency/IO campaign in Kandahar province requires significantly different skill sets, unique personal attributes for deployed leaders at all levels, and non-standard training.

Given the lack of CF doctrine for counterinsurgency operations and not having a distinct PRT doctrine, differences in the approach to the counterinsurgency/IO campaign have been encountered within the various CF organizations participating in the campaign, and externally with the OGDs resident in the PRT. In addition, OGDs have expressed concern that there is little or no information provided to them which would better enable them to effectively participate in a counterinsurgency campaign.

Finding: There is a lack of CF counterinsurgency doctrine, a situation that contributes to the lack of clarity as to where the KPRT fits into the counterinsurgency and IO campaigns in Kandahar province. This has also been noted by the OGD participants who seek guidance on what their role is to be in a counterinsurgency campaign.

Recommendation: Develop appropriate CF concepts and doctrine for counterinsurgency operations, to include a whole-of-government approach to PRT operations within a broader CA framework.

PRT Integration into the Information Operations Campaign

Information Operations can be defined as: “Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems.”

US Joint Publication (JP) 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, 13 February 2006

US Joint Publication 3-13 (quoted above) provides clear guidance to US forces on IO. However, in the Canadian context, the evaluation team found differences in the level of understanding by participants of how the CF/DND IO Campaign in Kandahar province was intended to unfold. Despite a CF IO policy directive signed by the DM and CDS,²⁶ a Joint CF IO manual,²⁷ and a comprehensive Land Forces doctrine manual,²⁸ the CRS evaluation team has encountered a wide variety of interpretations of IO as it applies to not just the KPRT, but across the whole Afghanistan mission. There is considerable misunderstanding of Information Operations as a function and as a discipline.

The evaluation team has found no coherent overarching direction provided for the CF KPRT mission that explains to all parties, including OGD members, how this IO campaign is to be conducted. There is no evident direction on how functions central to IO such as Intelligence, CIMIC and PsyOps are to be integrated to help in achieving the campaign aims. Figure 8 shows the current US doctrine encompassing IO within a broader framework of operations.

²⁶ CF Information Operations Policy for International Operations, DM/CDS signed 8 December 2004.

²⁷ B-GG-005-004/AF-010, CF Information Operations, 15 April 1998.

²⁸ B-GL-300-005/FP-001, Land Force Information Operations, 18 January 1999.






Figure 8. Information Operations Integration in a Counterinsurgency.²⁹

From the commencement of the CF mission in Kandahar, there has been a less than ideal integration and use of Intelligence specialists into the IO campaign as it has been applied to the KPRT. The use and composition of the Intelligence cell within the KPRT has varied from Roto to Roto, with resultant uneven Intelligence input into KPRT operations. Intelligence input to the earlier Rotos was principally aimed at support to the combat operations, with less emphasis on the “non-kinetic” aspects, such as cultural intelligence. There was little positive communication between the earlier KPRT Rotos and higher-level Intelligence assets such as HUMINT teams. This resulted in the loss of a significant amount of potentially useful non-kinetic information that the KPRT members had gathered in their day-to-day operations, but for which no client for this information could be found.

This lack of understanding of what value could be extracted from ongoing KPRT operations, or what the KPRT requirements would be to support the IO effort is a reflection of the apparent lack of general understanding of what is necessary for an IO campaign as part of a larger counterinsurgency mission.

²⁹ FM 3-24/MWCP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, US Headquarters Department of the Army, December 2006.

The level and efficacy of situational awareness in theatre and at higher levels of command is much more dependent on analysis rather than the amount of information. The critical variable for situational awareness is not the amount of information, but what is done with it. Analysis is perceived as best undertaken by those most proximate to the situation in theatre, but for some OGDs, the exercise can be optimized by the transmittance of the original source reports to Canada for analysis. This would not be duplication of effort but provide an additional perspective for the CF and OGDs in theatre. Also important is that analysis provided from Canada be distributed back to the KPRT for its own situational awareness.

Finding: The role of the KPRT in support of the IO campaign was initially neither fully understood nor exploited. As a result, the mutual passage of information between the KPRT and other formations/units was sub-optimal. The problem now is one of personnel resources. KPRT lacks analytical support to collate, publish and act. Further, operations are kinetically led so KPRT IO is at times reactionary to the security pillar of the ANDS.

Recommendation: Integrate the KPRT (and other interagency deployed units in the future) into CF IO campaign planning at the operational and tactical levels, and raise awareness of this role in force generation and force employment activities, including pre-deployment training.

Personnel Selection and Sustainment

As the PRT is a non-doctrinal *ad hoc* construct, CF personnel selection for the organization has been based on providing the majority of the personnel from formed Army sub-units and attaching-in subject matter experts where deemed necessary.

The selection of the KPRT CO has generally been successful to date. The individuals have been hand-selected by senior CF officers who chose individuals who had previous unit command experience, and had strong personal qualities such as superior communication skills, a demonstrated ability in negotiation, an aptitude for bringing disparate groups together to focus on common objectives, and related abilities. The original six-month cycle for the CO and other key leadership positions was extended to one year to improve continuity.

Selection of the “main body” of the early KPRT Rotos was based on a sub-unit from the same Land Force Area that provided the Battle Group, and consisted of a Regular Force infantry Protection Company (minus), combat engineers, Military Police, Intelligence, combat support and combat service support individuals from across Canada, and Reserve Force CIMIC and PsyOps specialists. Later Rotos have seen the addition of CF contracting and project management specialists, added numbers of Military Police and Intelligence specialists, and an infantry company.

As noted earlier, the KPRT has been staffed by individuals from at least ten units or formations from across Canada. Throughout all the Rotos to date, this has exacerbated both the individual and collective training requirements for the KPRT as a number of these individuals have arrived at the KPRT mounting base with varying states of individual readiness. This problem is not unique to the KPRT but has been noted in past CRS evaluation reports as a recurring problem when mounting any CF overseas operation.



Unlike their Regular Force counterparts, who are usually selected up to 18 months in advance, and who then commence their pre-deployment training, most Reserve Force personnel employed in the KPRT are not available for a Class C contract of more than 12 months in duration, principally due to job security reasons. This therefore reduces their time available for KPRT individual and collective training. Again, this is not a KPRT-specific issue and, short of establishing a national job protection scheme, there is probably no adequate short-term solution to this ongoing problem.

Sustainment of Reserve Force specialists for the KPRT, particularly CIMIC operators who are all Reservists, could become problematic. The overall CF CIMIC establishment is based on a given number of positions, generally up to 65-75 personnel that can be force-generated by each Land Force Area. In terms of force employment, some trained CIMIC personnel are unavailable to deploy for various reasons, including an inability to take a leave of absence from their civilian jobs. If some form of the KPRT were to remain active post-February 2009, when Canada's principal combat troop commitment is currently scheduled to end, the requirement for CIMIC operators would continue. It is uncertain at this point in time whether enough deployable CIMIC personnel can continue to be force-generated under the current CIMIC organizational construct resident strictly in the Reserves.

Finding: Early selection of proven, post-command officers to lead the military portion of the KPRT has become a successful process. The one-year cycle of rotating key leadership personnel has yet to be proven as the best option.

Finding: Given that the CIMIC and PsyOps functions have been assigned to the Land Reserves, and that a number of factors conspire to limit the available pool of deployable CIMIC and PsyOps operators in each Land Force Area, sustainment of the required number of CIMIC and PsyOps detachments could pose a challenge if an extended PRT presence remains in Afghanistan post-February 2009. This could prove further challenging if a CIMIC or PsyOps requirement exists in support of two or more simultaneous missions in the future.

Recommendation: Review selection, training and employment of CF CIMIC and PsyOps operators, and make adjustments as required to ensure an adequate pool of appropriately trained and available personnel.

Whole-of-Government Involvement in the Kandahar PRT

For the purposes of this evaluation, a “whole-of-government” approach is defined as *“one where a government actively uses formal and/or informal networks across the different agencies within that government to coordinate the design and implementation of the range of interventions that the government’s agencies will be making in order to increase the effectiveness of those interventions in achieving the desired objectives.”*³⁰

As noted earlier, there was strong interest by Canadian senior officials in having Canada lead a PRT as early as March 2003. This interest was shared equally amongst DFAIT, CIDA and DND. Various Government of Canada strategic position papers prepared in advance of Canadian acceptance of the Kandahar province PRT indicate a strong desire to use a whole-of-government approach based on the UK PRT model of Mazar-e-Sharif.

³⁰ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development report, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States*, page 15, 2006.



At the outset, the cross-departmental planning process for the PRT deployment was uneven at best. At the grand strategic level across the federal government in Canada, there is a recognized shortfall in long-term planning capabilities. Much of this shortfall can be attributed to individual departments having different resource allocation priorities. Very few departments and agencies outside of DND have adequate human resources to allocate to a strategic planning cell, or even to what the military would call “operational” level planning staffs. This contributed to differences of opinion among some staff members within the involved departments during the initial planning and execution phases of the KPRT, when the military planning staffs would create campaign plans without early consultation with the OGDs.

While the interest in the KPRT was shared across the Canadian government, there was an initial underestimation of the threat levels in Kandahar province. As a result, the original Ottawa “staff-driven” perceptions of how the KPRT could be organized, staffed and equipped (*à la* Mazar-e-Sharif) needed serious revisions once CF and OGD personnel arrived in Kandahar during the period July to December 2005. The UK model had been based on a relatively benign security environment in the North of the country, whereas Kandahar province still remained in a state of turmoil driven by insurgents, gangs and other non-state actors.

Roto 0 set the stage for the development of the whole-of-government concept. The CF members arrived earlier than had been anticipated (July 2005), with the OGDs each sending in one or two individuals as their representatives. The decision to centralize most KPRT assets in Camp Nathan Smith in Kandahar City was taken to demonstrate a separation of the “kinetic” part of the campaign from the “non-kinetic” part that is the principal mission of the KPRT. With this decision also came an attendant need for increased security of the KPRT base.

Planning issues aside, there were also pre-deployment discussions about the command and control arrangements for a whole-of-government PRT. The UK model has their Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) representative as the putative head of their PRT, with the military in a subordinate, supporting position. Although this was the initial construct desired by some of the OGDs, the security situation on the ground in Kandahar dictated that the military commander assume the lead in all security related issues. *De facto* command of the KPRT is a shared responsibility in theatre. All interviewees have stated that the senior KPRT leadership have a shared responsibility for consensus decision-making as it affects the mission. At the tactical level, this shared “command” system within the KPRT has functioned adequately to date.

Above the level of the KPRT, the whole-of-government effort has been seen by some of the participants as a mixed success. A draft Framework Agreement between the participating partners in the PRT was first created in 2005 that outlined the responsibilities of each of the departments. However, this document still remains in draft as of the writing of this report. The evaluation team has been told by several interviewees that the draft document was an adequate starting point for Roto 0, and has been superseded by events as required changes are made, both in theatre and in Ottawa.

While the CF can concentrate significant resources in order to support the mission in Afghanistan as its number one priority outside of the defence of Canada, the other KPRT participants have other competing priorities. There are significant cultural differences between the participating departments, which showed themselves early on in the deployment cycle. The CF, being mission command-oriented with a complete training infrastructure available to prepare



for the Afghanistan deployment, was often seen as very impatient and initially quite inflexible in their approach to the whole-of-government approach. Conversely, the CF often tended to view the other participants as too centrally driven and Ottawa-focused in their decision-making processes, resulting in perceived delays to getting on with the mission in Kandahar.

In this same vein, one of the most difficult pre-deployment issues for the OGDs was, and remains, the matter of theatre mission specific training. Outside of the CF, the participating departments have often had difficulties in identifying individuals for deployment to the Kandahar mission. Delays have often prevented these individuals from any significant participation in PRT pre-deployment training. The consequence, therefore, inevitably becomes a much more lengthy time to “team build,” often in theatre.

The whole-of-government construct for a deployed PRT was new for all concerned, and led to growing pains, especially given the differences in organizational culture and chains of command. There is a need to harness the strengths of the various departments prior to deployments such as Kandahar. There is a need for the CF to be willing to allow for some delay in the design of focusing directives such as the theatre campaign plan in order to get the “buy-in” of OGDs at the earliest stages of a potential mission.

Finding: Despite significant initial challenges, over time the KPRT developed as an effective team that performs successfully at the tactical level. Challenges exist at higher levels within Canada, where interdepartmental committees and working groups were created to facilitate policy integration and the resolution of emerging issues.

PRT Performance Measurement

We all need to agree on the same objectives and the same metrics for success. It seems like a no-brainer to everybody out there. But inside this town (Ottawa) and inside every capital city, it is a challenge.

David Mulroney, Associate Deputy Minister DFAIT, *Common Narrative: Canada's Integrated Approach to Afghanistan*, *Vanguard*, July/August 2007 <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/CommonNarrativeMulroney>

A number of interviewees for this evaluation indicated that providing suitable performance measurement mechanisms and performance targets for the KPRT has been a difficult task. As the PRT is a new construct for all parties concerned, there was no baseline data or performance measurement criteria available from the very start of the Kandahar mission.

There were early attempts in formulating quantitative measurement schemes that were thought to be of some use in performance measurement, such as numbers of wells dug, kilometres of road improved or medical outreach visits undertaken, etc. These numbers in and of themselves, while measuring activity levels, are not particularly useful in measuring performance, as they fail to capture the underlying outcomes or “effects” that these sorts of activities have had, measured against a desired target.

This problem was recognized early on in the mission, with subsequent revision of the overall performance measurement scheme. Currently, performance measurement for the KPRT is based principally on the CF Campaign Plan, which is an “effects-based” plan derived from the higher-



level ISAF Campaign Plan. Both of these Campaign Plans take their cues from the ANDS that sets what should be measurable performance goals out to 2010. All PRT participants throughout Afghanistan, regardless of national differences in organization, are charged by NATO with ensuring their coordinated efforts support the ANDS goals.

CEFCOM has taken the lead in attempting to provide a degree of outcomes or effects performance measurement suitable for the KPRT based on these Plans. This effort is coordinated through the operational level Interdepartmental PRT Working Group, which has members from the principal participating departments and is co-chaired by CEFCOM J5 and DFAIT staff. A product of these deliberations has been the creation of an “Effects Dashboard” mechanism that is useful to all the participating departments and agencies in being able to produce a valid tactical level outcomes document. One of the principal KPRT-related inputs into this process has been the KPRT CO’s political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information systems (PMESII) report, provided weekly to all participating government departments and agencies. The level of progress in achieving the desired effects is updated regularly, and trends are noted. The down-side of this process is that the large numbers of effects currently being measured are onerous for the staffs in theatre to collect, and are difficult to both collate and then aggregate into meaningful results.

Above the CEFCOM level, Comd CEFCOM regularly presents a shortened version of the operational level performance assessment to the CDS and DM to use at the strategic level both within the Department and in strategic level meetings with senior leaders from the OGDs.

The efforts at providing relevant performance measurement data at all levels has been a difficult task. However, the evaluation team notes that much positive work has been done in this area, and that performance measurement mechanisms and “effects” measurement are directly related to those goals outlined in the internationally approved ANDS.

Another aspect of KPRT performance measurement is that of cost-effectiveness. Equipping and maintaining a military unit of approximately 300 personnel, in a separate location from the main force, is estimated by CEFCOM to cost \$14.2M for FY 2007-2008.³¹ This includes direct CEFCOM incremental costs in Kandahar such as rations, infrastructure and communications, as well as supporting costs in Canada to support the KPRT, such as pre-deployment training, equipment and allowances. The full cost of the KPRT to the CF/DND is greater, and would also include associated personnel costs, Commander’s Contingency Fund (currently \$4.5M), etc.

It is too early to tell whether the KPRT is a cost-effective way of supporting the achievement of Canada’s national objectives in Afghanistan, and that determination is beyond the scope of this evaluation. However, as noted in a 2005 US study,³² *“PRTs by their nature should reduce costs because their primary responsibility is coordination and unity of effort. This should prevent duplicative development efforts – a cost savings. When PRTs are involved in the actual implementation of a project, they have a policy of hiring only local labor which is significantly cheaper than an NGO bringing in foreign personnel.”*

³¹ *PRT Costs and Estimates in Afghanistan*, dated 21 June 2007, provided to CRS by CEFCOM J8 (through Director Budget).

³² Andrea L. Hoshmand, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan*, University of Maryland, School of Public Policy, International Security and Economic Policy Project Course paper, 10 May 2005.



Finding: There is good visibility of KPRT activities and progress in Kandahar in achieving desired effects as laid out in the ANDS. However, the complexity of the situation in Kandahar is such that the extent to which the KPRT itself can claim credit for progress is still difficult to measure. The task of isolating KPRT effects achieved from those resulting from non-KPRT activities, such as CIDA or USAID projects that would have been initiated regardless of the existence of the KPRT remains a challenge.

Recommendation: Develop and monitor metrics that measure the effects of reconstruction and development efforts in Kandahar province with emphasis on KPRT activities, recognizing the difficulties inherent in separating the KPRT contribution from that of other development agencies.



THE “*COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH*”— INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Interagency Expeditionary Operations – Is the KPRT an Interagency “One-off” or a Prototype for the Future?

From a CF/DND perspective, it is important to ask at this juncture whether the PRT construct is a viable 3D option for consideration elsewhere in the future. If yes, then what will be required to develop and maintain a CF/DND “PRT” capability beyond Afghanistan?

Although measuring the full impact of the PRTs in Afghanistan remains a challenge, international consensus amongst key participants is that the PRTs have credibly performed their mission to help extend the authority of the national government to the provinces. They have facilitated development of a stable and secure environment, and, through military presence, enabled security sector reform and reconstruction efforts. A 2005 Danish study concluded that PRTs are an effective, flexible, low-cost instrument that can easily be adapted to other conflicts.³³

However, there is also general agreement that PRTs are not able to address the underlying causes of insecurity in Afghanistan. In essence, they do not win wars. Additionally, PRTs are seen to have other limitations:

- they are very tactical, and their strategic influence remains unclear;
- they are viewed as costly by non-defence partners who lack a surge capability for the required incremental funding and personnel to deploy;
- they must strike the appropriate balance between humanitarian, security, reconstruction and development;
- the relationships they develop with the local populace must be constantly re-ignited due to relatively short rotation cycles; and
- they lack the full support of NGOs, who feel that PRTs erode the humanitarian space and put aid workers at risk.

Based on the collective experience of those nations that have fielded PRTs throughout Afghanistan or have studied the development and utility of PRTs, there is consistent agreement that PRTs are most useful in a mid-secure environment where traditional NGOs do not have freedom of movement, but where the level of instability is not so acute that combat operations predominate.³⁴ In such an environment, a whole-of-government PRT with military protection elements is able to conduct stability and reconstruction activities that contribute to winning the goodwill of the local population. Conversely, in a secure, stable environment there would be no need for a PRT, since NGOs, diplomatic, development and other contributing organizations would have the freedom of movement to operate effectively.

³³ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS) report 2005:6, *PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful But Not Sufficient*, April 2005

http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2005/pvj_prts_afghanistan.pdf

³⁴ US Agency for International Development (USAID) Report PN-ADG-252, *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan - An Interagency Assessment*, page 20, June 2006 http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG252.pdf



There are considerable advantages to having a forward-deployable, civil-military unit that can provide its own defence, project a security presence, and promote political and economic development. However, the term “PRT” may not be relevant in the future, where locations may not have provinces or a style of government that lends itself to replicating the Afghanistan experience. There will also be those who believe that PRTs are *ad hoc* units and should be considered as such in terms of force generation and employment. Some of those interviewed during this evaluation have questioned the wisdom of institutionalizing a PRT capability when each case will be different - better to create a new “PRT” from first principles as the need arises. The evaluation team believes that such a “just in time” approach would be inappropriate and not be in keeping with that being taken by Canada’s major allies.

“PRTs” as Complex Adaptive Systems

In the interests of distancing the CF/DND from adopting a reactive, *ad hoc* approach to 3D operations, it is suggested that the focus should be on considering the “PRT” concept in terms of *complex adaptive systems theory*,³⁵ in that such a unit represents a complex, non-kinetic “system” that must be inherently flexible, resilient, responsive and agile, and will take the form required by the existing situation. By way of example, initial US experiences with exporting the PRT concept from Afghanistan to Iraq were less successful than anticipated for a number of reasons.³⁶ As a result, ten new US PRTs being created in Iraq commencing in early 2007 have all been “Embedded PRTs” (EPRTs), set in their Brigade Combat Teams (rather than being autonomous), and have a renewed emphasis on shaping the political environment and reviving the local economy rather than on building infrastructure. Initial EPRT results appear promising,³⁷ although a July 2007 audit report by the US Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction highlighted continuing deficiencies, including the need for clearly defined objectives, performance measures and milestones.³⁸

It is thus proposed that a more generic interagency term than “PRT” be adopted, such as the conceptual *Comprehensive Approach* (a term adopted by the UK and described briefly below) or its actual application as, for example, an interagency *Reconstruction Task Force* (RTF). Regardless of the term ultimately adopted, each comprehensive, whole-of-government unit would be individually designed based on local circumstances in terms of mandate, composition, command and control relationships, resources, and the like.

With regard to the future relevance of the interagency unit construct, all indications are that for the foreseeable future, the CF will continue to engage in full spectrum operations. However, there is expected to be less emphasis on conventional warfare and more on operations other than war (OOTW), including counterinsurgency operations in fragile states, where the support of the

³⁵ Grisogono, AM, *The State Of The Art And The State Of The Practice: The Implications of Complex Adaptive Systems Theory for C2*, paper presented at the 2006 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (CCRTS), 6 May 2006 http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2006_CCRTS/html/papers/202.pdf.

³⁶ Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction audit report SIGIR-06-034, *Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq*, 29 October 2006 <http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/06-034.pdf>.

³⁷ Michael E O’Hanlon and Kenneth M Pollack, Brookings Institution, *A War We Might Just Win*, *The New York Times*, 30 July 2007.

³⁸ Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction audit report SIGIR-07-014, *Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Expansion in Iraq*, 25 July 2007 <http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/07-014.pdf>.



local population becomes the centre of gravity. History has shown that winning a counterinsurgency through kinetic means alone in a complex, multi-dimensional environment is not a viable course of action. The use of military and economic intervention must be balanced with cultural and ideological means to win the trust and confidence of local populations. Thus, building and maintaining a capacity to do so through *attraction* rather than *coercion*³⁹ in order to achieve objectives is a relevant strategy for the CF/DND for the foreseeable future.

The Future of Interagency Operations – The Allied View

The literature reviewed for this evaluation is replete with testimony to the effect that an interagency approach will increasingly be the norm in order to achieve national unity of effort and integrated effects. For example, in 2000, the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated in his Vision 2020 that: “...*this goal (achieving national objectives) will be achieved through full spectrum dominance – the ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations.*”⁴⁰

More recently, the US Army has highlighted the importance of interagency cooperation in the latest version of its counterinsurgency doctrine⁴¹, and has progressively introduced the acronyms DIME (diplomacy, military, information and economics), PMESII (political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and information systems – also used by the CF in assessing progress in Afghanistan) and MIDLIFE (military, information, diplomacy, law enforcement, intelligence, finance and economics) to reflect the range of complementary interagency functions.

As noted earlier, the UK refers to the *Comprehensive Approach*, described below by the UK’s Chief of the Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshall Sir Jock Stirrup in a 2007 edition of the RUSI Journal.⁴²

So the situation has arisen where the military alone cannot deliver that (strategic) success, but where equally it cannot be delivered without the military. Hence the need for what is called the ‘Comprehensive Approach’; that is, the coordinated and synergistic application of all lines of development: political, diplomatic, military, legal, economic, social, and so on.

Air Chief Marshall Sir Jock Stirrup, UK CDS, February 2007

A further example of the broad recognition by Canada’s allies of the importance of interagency operations is the view of the commander of the French Army’s doctrine centre, who noted in June 2007 that “*There are many lessons (from overseas deployments), but the first lesson learned is that military force alone is rarely able to fulfill the political objectives for the deployment. You have to combine civil and military actions.*”⁴³

³⁹ Joseph S. Nye Jr, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, June 2004, Harper Collins Canada.

⁴⁰ General Henry H Shelton, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Vision 2020*, June 2000
<http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jv2020b.pdf>

⁴¹ US Army/USMC FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency* field manual, December 2006
<http://usacac.army.mil/cac/repository/materials/coin-fm3-24.pdf>

⁴² Air Chief Marshall Jock Stirrup, UK Chief of the Defence Staff, *British Defence in a Changing World*, *RUSI Journal*, Vol 152, No 1, pp 20-25, February 2007.

⁴³ Brigadier General Vincent Desportes, Commander, French Army’s Center for Forces Employment Doctrine, as quoted in *Defense Week*, 18 June 2007.



The CF/DND Position on Interagency Operations

Given international acceptance of the importance of the interagency component in full spectrum operations, one might ask whether that acceptance is shared by the CF/DND. Indications are that the importance has been recognized, and it is now reflected to varying degrees at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. At the highest level within DND, the MND has linked success in military operations with the interagency (or whole-of-government) approach.⁴⁴

As part of a whole of government approach to defence and security, the Canadian Forces' first priority continues to be success in our operations at home and abroad.

This position has been reflected in the CDS's 2007 CF Collective Training Strategy,⁴⁵ which noted that an interagency approach to operations is required to ensure that all national "forces" are coordinated to produce integrated effects.

The ability to conduct joint operations and seamlessly operate with other government departments (OGD), also known as interagency operations, are the litmus tests of this (CF Collective Training) strategy.

At the Environmental level, the Army shares this recognition as it force-generates the Army of Tomorrow. As described in the Land Operations 2021 force employment concept, "*Given the security environment Canada increasingly confronts, these goals require forces that are combat-effective, but also highly mobile, adaptive, networked, sustainable and capable of operating in a joint, interagency, multinational and public (JIMP) context.*"⁴⁶

As for CF force employment, CEFCOM is also fully committed to interagency operations, as expressed in their mission statement: "*CEFCOM will conduct fully integrated global operations, across the spectrum from humanitarian assistance to combat, in concert with national and international partners to achieve timely and decisive effects in support of Canada's national interests.*"⁴⁷

Preparing CF/DND personnel for non-kinetic, interagency operations at the tactical level has now been incorporated, to a degree, into training at both the Peace Support Training Centre (PSTC) and the CMTC, and adjustments are continually made based on tactical lessons learned at the KPRT. Such training, as well as participation in relevant exercises, is available to CF/DND personnel and to those from other government departments and agencies involved in various aspects of interagency operations.

⁴⁴ Minister's Message, DND Report on Plans and Priorities 2007-2008, page ii

<http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/rpp/2007-2008/nd-dn/nd-dn-eng.pdf>

⁴⁵ 4500-1 (DTELLD), CF Collective Training and Exercise Guidance (CTEG) 2007, July 2007.

⁴⁶ B-GL-310-001/AG-001, *Land Operations 2021: The Force Employment Concept for Canada's Army of Tomorrow*, 2007.

⁴⁷ CEFCOM Mission Statement, 27 June 2007.



From the foregoing it is clear that interagency operations are expected to be among the most prominent CF/DND international missions for the foreseeable future. The CF's role from a national perspective in such cases will be primarily as an enabler, providing a secure environment for others (i.e., OGDs, NGOs, etc) to accomplish their mission, as well as assisting with humanitarian, reconstruction and governance efforts where required. From a military perspective, interagency units are also important contributors to intelligence gathering and the information operations campaign, communicating Canadian (or alliance/coalition) messages to the local population, while negating the influence of adversaries.

While the CF/DND has embraced most of the concepts of a whole-of-government approach in stabilization and reconstruction operations, acceptance must be followed by building CF/DND capacity and addressing gaps in a number of areas that are discussed hereunder. To the extent feasible, it should also be accompanied by reciprocal developments in the OGDs and agencies.

CF/DND Interagency Operations – Making Them Work

I think that our joint effort in Afghanistan is really about a new way of doing international work.

David Mulroney, Associate Deputy Minister DFAIT, *Common Narrative: Canada's Integrated Approach to Afghanistan*, *Vanguard*, July/August 2007 <http://www.vanguardcanada.com/CommonNarrativeMulroney>

As noted earlier, deployments of integrated units of military personnel and civilian government and/or non-governmental personnel differ markedly from military joint or combined operations. Differences in reporting relationships, decision-making mechanisms, organizational cultures, reporting timeframes, allocated resources, doctrine and levels of mutual understanding have the potential to complicate working relationships between the partners.

Significant differences of opinion have been expressed by OGDs to the evaluation team concerning the “depth” of resident capability required for PRT-like strategic and operational level planning. The reconciliation and management of expectations with respect to effects is an important part of interagency relationships between the DND/CF and OGDs. For future operations, holding to such differences of opinion could affect achievement of the desired integrated effects, or the timetable to do so.

The CF/DND can mitigate their risk in a number of ways. Gaps to be addressed, and proposed remedial action, are discussed below under the following headings:

- a. Interagency Strategy Development and Management;
- b. Strategic Interagency Concepts, Doctrine, Performance Measurement and Lessons Learned;
- c. Interagency Process Ownership at the Operational Level;
- d. Intelligence/Information Operations – The Interagency Role;
- e. Interagency Command and Control;
- f. Integrated Interagency Planning; and
- g. Preparing CF Personnel for Interagency Operations.



Interagency Strategy Development and Management

Unlike kinetic operations, where defeating the enemy is a clear, easily understood objective, those engaged in non-kinetic operations may not share a common understanding of the strategic objectives, or necessarily how to achieve them. It is therefore crucial in an interagency undertaking to translate broad strategic objectives into manageable tasks with measurable outcomes, and to communicate them clearly and de-conflict as required. Failure to do so can result in sub-optimal outcomes. In the case of the KPRT, strategic objectives were established when Canada became a signatory to the 2006 Afghanistan Compact. In so doing, Canada signalled support for the measurable security, governance and development goals and timelines (typically end-2010) established by the international community in support of the ANDS.

Notwithstanding the existence of the agreed strategic metrics (e.g., *“By end-2010...the Basic Package of Health Services will be extended to cover at least 90% of the population; maternal mortality will be reduced by 15%; and full immunization coverage for infants under-5 for vaccine-preventable diseases will be achieved and their mortality rates reduced by 20%.”*⁴⁸), the degree to which success can be attributed specifically to KPRT intervention remains unclear.

In the future, interagency excursions may not have the benefit of pre-established strategic metrics. If that is the case, they will have to be developed and direction provided to subordinate levels to reflect them in unit design and performance measurement. During the conduct of this evaluation the team encountered a diversity of opinion as to who would take the lead in that regard. In that strategy development involves coordination with OGDs and agencies, it should be expected that CF/DND OPI responsibility be assigned to a strategic organization rather than to an operational command.

In terms of how strategy development contributes to policy coherence, a 2006 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) study⁴⁹ listed the five major components of interagency operations as: analysis, policy, strategy, programming and monitoring. It noted that the strategy development process is key to linking these different components together by:

- encouraging consultation and shared analysis of political, security and development issues, as a basis for an agreed, coherent policy;
- linking departmental priorities in a nation to foreign policy objectives;
- providing a tool for managing interagency operations through the development of action plans with measurable outcomes;
- ensuring that departments speak with a common voice when dealing with host government authorities; and
- officially committing departments to work more closely together.

⁴⁸ *The Afghanistan Compact*, an international agreement finalized at The London Conference on Afghanistan, 31 January – 1 February 2006
http://www.ands.gov.af/admin/ands/ands_docs/upload/UploadFolder/The%20Afghanistan%20Compact%20-%20Final%20English.pdf

⁴⁹ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development report, *Whole of Government Approaches to Fragile States*, page 41, 2006 <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/15/24/37826256.pdf>



Finding: There is currently no CF/DND OPI assigned to coordinate the translation of broad grand-strategic objectives into definable interagency tasks and performance metrics as they relate to international operations, and to track and report progress toward their achievement.

Recommendation: Designate a strategic level OPI to coordinate CF/DND involvement in future interagency operations, to include analysis of available military options to support the achievement of grand-strategic objectives.

Strategic Interagency Concepts, Doctrine, Performance Measurement and Lessons Learned

One of the most pressing needs is for the creation of interagency doctrine for the prosecution of counterinsurgency and stability operations.

Lieutenant General (now General) David H. Petraeus, Comd-designate Multi-National Forces – Iraq, January 2007

In early 2007 US Army General David Petraeus noted to the Senate Armed Services Committee the vital need for interagency doctrine.⁵⁰ A similar need for CF interagency doctrine had been highlighted earlier, in 2003, by Col G Hug, SA DCDS, a situation that still persists in 2007. In Col Hug's words, *"There is no overarching interagency doctrine that delineates or dictates the relationship and procedures governing all agencies, departments and the military. Unity of effort can only be achieved through close, continuous coordination and cooperation to overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and personal limitations. Action will follow understanding."*⁵¹

Despite this deficiency, the initial design and continuing evolution and improvement of the KPRT over time was facilitated by tactical lessons learned, as well as the experience and insights of carefully selected key participants. Likewise, although performance measurement occurs at the tactical level and, to a certain extent at the operational level, as noted earlier, it is less evident how the KPRT contributes to the achievement of strategic objectives. This deficiency should be rectified for future interagency initiatives. Additionally, responsibility for developing and managing a strategic lessons-learned process for interagency operations remains unclear and requires clarification.

Failure to lay a solid foundation for the future, including formalizing agreements between parties, could lead to constantly re-learning the lessons of interagency operations. This was the case when the US migrated the PRT construct from Afghanistan to Iraq. In that regard, the US Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction noted in 2006 that: *"Complicating the US-led PRT program (in Iraq) are the lingering issues concerning the PRT mission and civilian-military integration, which, in part, have led to setbacks, operational delays, and resource shortfalls. We believe a critical first step to resolving these 'pain points' is for DoS (Department of State) and DoD (Department of Defense) to formalize an agreement reaffirming the PRT mission, defining*

⁵⁰ Gen David H. Petraeus, written response to an advance policy question posed by the US Senate Armed Services Committee, January 2007 <http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/January/Petraeus%2001-23-07.pdf>.

⁵¹ Col G. Hug, *Interoperability – The Challenge in 2010*, 30 September 2003 http://vcds.mil.ca/dgsp/pubs/rep-pub/analysis/challenge/intro_e.asp.



not only command authority and relationships, but also operational support, including defining objectives and performance measures.”⁵²

In addition to high-level strategy development and management, there is a need for the CF/DND to take a systematic approach to interagency operations, to include assigning CF/DND OPIs with responsibility for coordinating interagency mission objectives, concepts, doctrine, performance measurement and lessons learned at the strategic level.

At the operational level, there is also no designated process owner for interagency operations. While CEFCON is the primary CF force employer for deployed interagency operations, they are not responsible for force generation. With respect to the KPRT, since it has been primarily an Army operation, LFDTS provides KPRT pre-deployment training at both the CMTC and PSTC. Pre-deployment training increasingly incorporates interagency scenarios, and is continually updated as new tactical lessons are learned. It now also offers cultural awareness, introductory language lessons, and other lessons to help CF personnel prepare for peace support operations. Members of OGDs and agencies who will either deploy or manage some aspect of the operation are encouraged to attend, but, due to issues related to selection and availability, attendance to date has been uneven.

It should also be recognized that future interagency operations may lend themselves to greater participation by Navy or Air Force personnel in leadership or functional roles, as is the case with some US PRTs in Afghanistan (e.g., a USN Commander is CO of the Khost PRT). As well as capitalizing more fully on the CF’s human capital, it would also help reduce the Army’s personnel tempo pressures. The notion of training and employing Navy and Air Force personnel on future deployed interagency operations should be explored.

Finding: There is no designated CF/DND OPI to coordinate military-strategic and operational level interagency concepts, doctrine, performance measurement and lessons learned. Failure to address this situation will foster a sub-optimal, *ad hoc* approach to future interagency operations.

Recommendation: Designate a CF/DND OPI to coordinate military-strategic and operational level interagency concepts, doctrine, performance measurement and lessons learned.

Finding: Although interagency operations to date have been largely Army-oriented, that may not always be the case in the future. The opportunity exists to capitalize more fully on the complete range of CF/DND capacity by training and employing Navy and Air Force personnel in interagency roles.

⁵² Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction audit report SIGIR-06-034, *Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq*, 29 October 2006 <http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/06-034.pdf>.



Interagency Command and Control

The principal problem of interagency decision-making is lack of decisive authority; there is no one in charge. As long as personalities are involved who work well together and have leadership support, interagency efforts will prosper, but such congruence is not predictable.

Dr. Gabriel Marcella, US Army War College, June 2006

The degree of flexibility that is a hallmark of interagency operations can also be a weakness in that, as Dr. Marcella notes above, unity of command is lacking.⁵³ Partner departments and agencies enjoy equal status, although they may agree, at the tactical level, to have a titular head from one of the participating organizations. However, command and control above that level is complicated by the fact that all partners report to their own chains of command, a situation that could be problematic. For example, the military component of the KPRT reports to a military chain of command (CF and ISAF), but DFAIT, CIDA, the RCMP and CSC do not.

Despite the lack of unity of command at the operational and strategic levels, those associated with the KPRT in theatre and at higher levels have recognized the need to understand and collegially accommodate the other parties in the interests of achieving integrated effects. To promote coherence at the strategic level, in February 2007, Mr. David Mulroney was named Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, with particular responsibility for interdepartmental Afghanistan coordination.

In the future, the designated “leader” of a deployed interagency unit may be from another government department, a situation that would be even more complex if the unit’s senior CF authority also has a separate CF and/or coalition chain of command. Also, command and control relationships may change over the course of an extended commitment. For example, while the security situation at the outset may suggest a more prominent military leadership role, changing circumstances may suggest a need to re-assess command and control arrangements, and transfer leadership to a diplomatic or development representative. There is a need to develop, in advance, criteria and protocols for assigning leadership responsibility within the interagency unit, as well as when, and how, leadership would be transferred.

Finding: Criteria and protocols respecting command and control relationships for deployed interagency units have not been fully developed at all levels. As a result, effectiveness in the achievement of unit objectives is vulnerable to the influence of organizational and individual biases and personalities of the participants.

Recommendation: Assist in the development, at the interdepartmental level, of criteria and protocols for assigning integrated leadership responsibility within deployed interagency units.

⁵³ Gabriel Marcella, US Army War College, *Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, 2nd Edition, Chapter 20 – National Security and the Interagency Process, June 2006
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB708.pdf>



The Interagency Role in Intelligence/Information Operations

As noted previously, information operations are critical to a successful counterinsurgency. While the main focus of deployed interagency units may widely be seen as diplomacy and development, such units have an important function with respect to information operations and intelligence gathering. Within the KPRT, this role was initially neither fully understood nor exploited by the unit itself or by those assigned to intelligence positions within JTF-A. The importance of an effective, coordinated IO campaign and the need to incorporate the interagency unit therein must be reflected in force generation and force employment activities, including pre-deployment training.

Integrated Interagency Planning

The key to a reasoned response to an existing or emerging international situation is an ability to continuously monitor events in fragile states of national interest to Canada, assess their potential significance, consider operational options for intervention, and conduct preliminary contingency planning. In cases where a Canadian response might involve deployment of an interagency unit, it is of critical importance to conduct whole-of-government integrated planning. As an example of how other nations are recognizing the importance of effective interagency planning, a report issued by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) in May 2007⁵⁴ stated that DoD has not achieved consistent interagency participation in the military planning process. As to why this is the case, the report noted that limited guidance, information sharing and training hinder interagency participation in the development of military plans.

With respect to the KPRT, this integrated planning approach initially did not occur, and a Roto 0 campaign plan, military or otherwise, was not prepared. As events unfolded, a Roto 1 CF campaign plan was drafted in relative isolation using mainly military format and language, and only then shared with the other departments and agencies for comment. This initially reduced the level of reciprocal understanding and support by those outside DND, and required reconciling the differing viewpoints of the various parties to the satisfaction of all.

The military will, once given direction for a mission, seize the initiative in creating orders, structures, planning directives and mission guidance. That this occurs in a relatively short time frame is principally due to training and the fact that the CF has staffed their planning cells at the operational and tactical levels with significant resources compared to their counterparts in the OGDs and agencies.

The Canadian KPRT experience was mirrored in the US experience with PRTs in Afghanistan, wherein the absence of an integrated plan and concept of operations led to an inefficient reliance on improvisation.⁵⁵ In recognition of the need to take corrective action, both the UK and US have created national, strategic-level standing organizations to institutionalize civil-military coordination and provide pre-emptive planning capacity for stabilization scenarios.

⁵⁴ US GAO-07-549, *Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Stability Operations Approach and Enhance Interagency Planning*, May 2007 <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07549.pdf>.

⁵⁵ Robert M. Perito, US Institute for Peace, Special Report No. 152, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified*, October 2005 <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr152.pdf>.



Improvisation is not a concept of operations...Absent an established concept of operations and a clear set of guidelines for civil-military interaction, PRT commanders and civilians had to improvise. This was problematic because military officers and civilian agency personnel came from different 'corporate cultures' and had different, sometimes competing, mandates.

Robert M. Perito, US Institute of Peace, October 2005

UK – Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU): To ensure ongoing contact and integrated planning, in 2004 the UK formed the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU), a whole-of-government organization of about 30 staff that strengthens the UK's ability to promote a stable environment in countries emerging from conflict. The PCRU is jointly owned by DfID, FCO and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). Its aim⁵⁶ is to strengthen the UK's ability to help achieve a stable environment in countries emerging from conflict by:

- a. Facilitating cross-Government assessments of such countries to develop a common understanding of the issues;
- b. Facilitating integrated planning across Government that sets out a single UK aim and a strategic framework to inform the more detailed action plans of the military and individual Departments;
- c. Providing suitably experienced personnel able to work in these countries; and
- d. Identifying and sharing best practices, both in the UK and internationally, on how to deliver support for countries emerging from conflict.

In that regard, in October 2005 the PCRU deployed a team within the UK to work with other military, diplomatic and development staff to plan the UK's commitment to Afghanistan's Helmand province, including establishment of a PRT. The PCRU also provided staff to work in theatre during the stand-up of the PRT (essentially the "Roto 0"), as well as other staff to establish the UK's Strategic Delivery Unit in Kabul.

US – Office for the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stability (S/CRS): In July 2004 the US Congress authorized funding to establish the S/CRS within the DoS. Its mission, to "*lead, coordinate, and institutionalize US Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict...*" is broken down into five core functions: monitor and plan, mobilize and deploy, prepare skills and resources, learn from experience, and coordinate with international partners. As with the PCRU, it also has about 30 staff drawn from a number of US government departments and agencies, including the Army Corps of Engineers and Joint Forces Command. Although some analysts believe that the S/CRS has room to improve,⁵⁷ its creation is nonetheless considered indicative of a breakthrough mentality in the US military and executive branch, which values "peace-building" as a valid commitment of resources.

⁵⁶ UK Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) website <http://www.postconflict.gov.uk/>.

⁵⁷ Miriam Krieger, *Approaches to Post-Conflict Peace-building: The UK Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) and US Office for the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)*, King's College London, 1 September 2006, page 20.



Canada – Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START): Canada’s closest equivalent to the PCRU and S/CRS is the START, an organization that is integral to DFAIT, rather than being a stand-alone interagency unit. START was established in 2005 and consists of approximately 70 personnel, the majority from DFAIT. Its mandate is to ensure greater coherence, coordination and integrated planning across government in post-conflict and humanitarian assistance, as well as to identify developing crises requiring remediation. A senior-level, interdepartmental START Advisory Board provides strategic policy, priority setting and direction. The CF/DND member of the Board is the Director-General International Security Policy (DGIS Pol).

A 2007 International Peace Academy assessment of the whole-of-government approaches to fragile states being pursued by seven nations (Canada, UK, US, Australia, France, Germany and Sweden) noted the relatively good working relationship between the START member departments, but also highlighted its challenges. One of the most significant challenges is considered to be the fact that each of the “3Ds” maintains an independent reporting chain to its home department, which tends to reinforce these narrow institutional mind-sets, rather than revealing the inherent interconnections between security, governance, and development.⁵⁸

Interagency Coordination and Planning: Is There a Preferred Model?

The International Peace Academy report noted above highlighted the need for a central, interagency coordination mechanism with firm directive authority. The report concluded that standing early warning and planning units (such as the PCRU) have certain advantages over other models in that they obviate the need to reinvent the wheel in each contingency, thereby increasing the prospect for rapid response and institutional learning. However, the report also observed that such units are vulnerable to debilitating weaknesses in that they lack the bureaucratic “heft” and political backing of full-fledged departments, and may have a tendency to “overreach” their authorities and resources.

While the START model is viewed by DFAIT staff as the preferred approach to interagency planning (rather than establishment of an independent standing unit), the minimal CF/DND representation (a single established Lieutenant-Colonel liaison officer position, vacant as of August 2007, and two Reserve Lieutenant-Colonel/Major project officer positions on 18-month contracts, both funded by DFAIT) in the 70-person organization does not provide the balance needed for responsive interagency coordination and integrated planning. The CF officers employed in START are fully tasked with a myriad of duties and have limited time available for the type and depth of operational contingency planning that the PCRU engages in.

Even when seconding staff to START, moreover, home departments have tended to regard the office more as a creature of DFAIT than a genuine interagency body. Furthermore, the co-location of officials from 3D departments presupposes that information will be shared on a regular basis and that analysis and planning will be done in an integrated fashion. This is not yet happening, unfortunately.

Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, International Peace Academy, 2007

⁵⁸ Stewart Patrick and Kaysie Brown, International Peace Academy, *Greater than the Sum of its Parts? Assessing ‘Whole of Government’ Approaches to Fragile States*, 2007 <http://www.ipacademy.org/asset/file/191/987-enbk.pdf>.



One of the challenges of interagency operations is the asymmetry of resources that can be applied to S&R operations, both in Canada and in theatre. Whereas the CF/DND possesses planning expertise and capacity, an expeditionary capability, and supporting resources in terms of personnel and discretionary funding that could be committed, until recently DFAIT and CIDA have had significantly fewer available personnel and short-term funding. DFAIT's START now has access to the \$100M Global Peace and Security Fund (GPSF) to facilitate a rapid response to crises. Also, as noted earlier with respect to the KPRT, additional DFAIT and CIDA staff were assigned over time, both in theatre and in Ottawa, and the typically long-term development approach followed by CIDA now accommodates shorter-term projects and a more agile approval process.

It is recognized that integrated interagency planning and the conduct of operations require closer ongoing contact with its primary partners to help overcome differences in planning culture, training and capacities, and that the establishment of a PCRU-type standing unit would be the preferred option. However, if that is not feasible because of management and resourcing implications, the CF/DND should review its commitment of resources to START, and consider assigning additional staff commensurate with the recognized growing importance of interagency operations.

Finding: Integrated interagency planning is critical to ensure coherence, proactive coordination across government, and the achievement of integrated effects in post-conflict and humanitarian assistance, as well as to identify developing crises requiring remediation.

Finding: The level of CF/DND resources currently allocated to collaborative interagency planning is extremely limited, and needs to be addressed to ensure timely, well-considered whole-of-government responses in support of Canada's national interests.

Recommendation: Review and increase appropriately the current level of CF/DND participation in interagency planning. In so doing, consider the range of available planning options, to include establishing a standing whole-of-government planning unit, through to increasing resources assigned directly to the planning function within START.

Preparing CF Personnel for Interagency Operations

Understanding each other's requirements and assets is also crucial. More importantly, through training with potential interagency partners, experienced liaisons must be developed to support long-term relationships, collaborative planning in advance of crises, and compatible processes and procedures. As with our multinational partners, interoperability in all areas of interaction is essential to effective interagency operations.

General Henry H Shelton, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Vision 2020*, June 2000, <http://www.dtic.mil/jointvision/jv2020b.pdf>

Other than policy officers and a few others who are seconded to other departments and agencies in staff or liaison positions, CF officers typically have very little exposure during their career to working closely on international operations with other government organizations and NGOs. If the CF/DND is to be prepared for a future of increased interagency collaboration, including



deployments, there is a need to develop systematically a CF/DND capacity in interagency policy coordination, integration and operations. As well as increasing opportunities for military officers to work with their civilian counterparts across a broad spectrum of activities,⁵⁹ a greater emphasis on exchange positions and attendance on each other's courses, where relevant, would improve mutual understanding and the overall effectiveness of deployed interagency units.

In addition to increasing opportunities for interagency interaction, suitability for CF interagency employment is also an important factor that reflects training, experience and personal traits (e.g., KPRT COs are carefully selected and approved by the senior leadership, and must have previous command experience). Military officers need effective problem solving, diplomatic and negotiating skills, an understanding of international affairs, heightened cultural awareness, capability in foreign languages, and exposure to economics. CF personnel working in an interagency environment should also be good communicators, and possess the ability to anticipate issues and effects from the strategic/national level down to the tactical level.

While the complexity of interagency operations has now been recognized, and the Canadian Defence Academy is increasingly providing training in subjects such as politics and international affairs,⁶⁰ a comprehensive review of the interagency component of officer professional development (e.g., Canadian Forces College courses) would identify curriculum enhancement opportunities, to include a sound theoretical foundation in national security decision-making, strategic planning and organizational behaviour.

With regards to employment of naval and air force personnel, while their personnel bring a host of occupational skillsets to the table which would be invaluable in a PRT context, what they lack is experience operating in the current environment in which they would be employed. To be effective, the PRT must also be environmentally prepared for all issues within the theatre of operations. In the case of operations in Afghanistan, the Navy and Air Force "hard sea/air occupations" would require training for field operations which in turn would require both formal training and some experiential learning to ensure they are capable of functioning (and surviving) across all aspects of the PRT operations. If the theatre of operations has removed any threat of hostilities, then this aspect of the PRT is less important and Navy and Air Force personnel could quite capably integrate into the PRT operation.

These environmentally specific skillsets are perishable skillsets. At present, the requirement to operate in these types of areas is assigned to the Army. If they are established and manned appropriately, there would be no need to engage Air Force or Navy personnel to augment these capabilities.

Finding: Better preparation is required for CF members to interact closely with staff from OGDs and agencies, NGOs and other civilian organizations. This requires new skill sets and consideration of selection criteria for key interagency positions. CF officer professional development and pre-deployment training for all deploying personnel have been adjusted to a certain extent to meet the need, but a more thorough, holistic review and update are required.

⁵⁹ Gabriel Marcella, US Army War College, *Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, Chapter 20 – National Security and the Interagency Process, page 280, June 2006

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/FILES/PUB708.pdf>

⁶⁰ MGen PR Hussey, on his retirement as outgoing Commander Canadian Defence Academy, as expressed to Ian Elliot of the *Kingston Whig-Standard*, and published 18 July 2007.



Recommendation: Improve the ability of CF personnel of all three environments to operate effectively in an interagency, multinational environment, to include the development of appropriate skills sets and increasing employment and training opportunities that foster interagency interaction.



ANNEX A—MANAGEMENT ACTION PLAN

Ser	CRS Recommendation	OPI	Management Action	Target Date
1.	Develop appropriate CF concepts and doctrine for counterinsurgency operations, to include a whole-of-government approach to PRT operations within a broader Comprehensive Approach (CA) framework.	VCDS	OPI Agreement. CFD will develop the CA concept (noting interdepartmental work with START and others), as well as CA doctrine, followed by PRT doctrine.	CA Concept Draft Paper due in February 2008.
2.	Integrate the KPRT (and other deployed interagency units) into CF information operations (IO) campaign planning at the operational and tactical levels, and raise awareness of this role in force generation and force employment activities, including pre-deployment training.	DOS SJS	OPI agreement. It is recognized that the PRT concept is a new and developing force multiplier that needs to be factored into future campaign planning. SJS DGP will include this in future planning directives.	All future initiating directives where PRT is to be employed as a capability.
3.	Review the selection, training and employment of CF CIMIC and PsyOps operators, and make adjustments as required to ensure an adequate pool of appropriately trained and available personnel.	CLS	OPI agreement. The Land staffs are actively engaged to resolve any issues with perceived CIMIC and PsyOps support to the mission in Afghanistan. The issues noted in the CRS report have been effectively mitigated through increased tour lengths, more robust training cycles, and greater forecasting / head-hunting of appropriate personnel against designated staff positions.	Ongoing.
4.	Develop and monitor metrics that measure the effects of reconstruction and development efforts in Kandahar province with emphasis on KPRT activities, recognizing the difficulties inherent in separating the KPRT contribution from that of other development agencies.	Comd CEFCOM	CEFCOM measures effects in Kandahar province through a number of sources such as weekly situation reports, survey results, open source reports and CIDA, DFAIT and DND project reports. These effects are presented in the “Effects Dashboard” that is updated quarterly. This quarterly update is presented to Commander CEFCOM in the form of the Quarterly Campaign Assessment Report (QCAR) and provides an evaluation of Campaign progress that is used to inform higher headquarters and Government. At the operational level, the effects measurement process is primarily concerned with the overall effect rather than which actor has created the effect, as most effects are a synergistic effort from a number of different actors. Where possible, the contribution of the KPRT will be documented. This process undergoes periodic review to ensure its validity.	Presently implemented.



ANNEX A

Ser	CRS Recommendation	OPI	Management Action	Target Date
5.	Designate a strategic level OPI to coordinate CF/DND involvement in future interagency operations, to include analysis of available military options to support the achievement of grand-strategic objectives.	DOS SJS	OPI agreement. SJS DGP will be the focal point for interagency discussions at the strategic level pertaining to military options, as part of the whole-of-government strategy. SJS will work in concert with ADM(Pol). This will include the CF's involvement in an interagency PRT.	As part of SJS role in liaising with OGDs.
6.	Designate a CF/DND OPI to coordinate interagency concepts, doctrine, performance measurement and lessons learned above the tactical level.	VCDS	OPI agreement. CFD/DGFDA becomes the CF Warfare Authority, following the development of a supporting governance framework.	Spring 2008.
7.	Assist in the development, at the interdepartmental level, of criteria and protocols for assigning integrated leadership responsibility within deployed interagency units.	ADM(Pol)	OPI agreement. The issue of leadership responsibilities, including criteria and protocols, will be dealt with in the PRT Working Group chaired by DFAIT. ADM(Pol) will work in concert with CEFCOM in developing the interdepartmental criteria and protocols.	Issue to be raised and work commenced by end FY 2007/08.
8.	Review and increase appropriately the current level of CF/DND participation in interagency planning. In so doing, consider the range of available planning options, to include establishing a standing whole-of-government planning unit, through to increasing resources assigned directly to the planning function within START.	ADM(Pol)	OPI agreement. This issue is best achieved through close interaction with PCO. In any type of interagency planning organization designed for a particular event, PCO will initially set the TOR and provide the mandate. ADM(Pol) will then be in a position to review and represent DND within that planning organization. In addition, ADM(Pol) needs to continue to review its annual contribution to START to ensure it is being adequately resourced and employed.	Ongoing. To be reviewed annually to determine level of interagency planning involvement.
9.	Improve the ability of CF personnel of all three environments to operate effectively in an interagency, multinational environment, to include the development of appropriate skill sets and increasing employment and training opportunities that foster interagency interaction.	CMP	OPI agreement. Comd CDA is conducting research that will answer: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. What relevant training and education now exists and can be leveraged both in the CF and in external agencies? b. What information does the CF need to glean from external agencies? c. What do the external agencies need to know about the CF? d. Who are the key players in the relevant OGDs with whom CDA will want to interact? e. What educational and training processes will be optimal for interaction between the CF and OGDs? 	Comd CDA will convene a senior stakeholders' workshop in early 2008 to present results of the baseline reconnaissance and preliminary consultation. Based on that knowledge a way ahead will be developed.

