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## REPORT NO. 101

## HISTORICAL OFFICER

## CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

Operation "JUBILEE" : The Raid on Dieppe,  
19 Aug 42.

Part II : The Execution of the Operation.  
Section 1 : General Outline and Flank Attacks.

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## R E P O R T NO. 101

## HISTORICAL OFFICER

CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS **D E C L A S S I F I E D**

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The Operation at DIEPPE, 19 Aug 42.

Part II : The Execution of the Operation.Section I : General Outline and Flank Attacks.

1. An earlier Report (No. 100) has dealt with the preliminaries of the DIEPPE operation of 19 Aug 42. The present Report consists of a brief general outline of the operation itself, followed by a more detailed account of events in the four flank sectors (BERNEVAL; VARENGEVILLE; PUIITS; POURVILLE).

## THE PLAN OF THE OPERATION

2. In the previous Report the course of planning for the operation has been described, and the successive changes in the plan noted. It is convenient at this point to outline the plan under which the attack was actually delivered on the morning of 19 Aug 42. The very compendious military orders for the operation will be found in the "Detailed Military Plan", attached to War Diary, "G", H.Q. 2 Cdn Div for August, 1942, and published, less certain Appendices, as an Appendix to the Combined Report (C.B. 04244). No written Brigade or Unit orders were issued, except by 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn.

3. The general scheme of the raid, as already described at some length, comprehended attacks on the two flanking coast defence batteries near BERNEVAL and VARENGEVILLE by British troops of the Special Service Brigade (Nos. 3 and 4 Commandos, respectively). These batteries, if not silenced, would seriously endanger our ships and craft lying off DIEPPE. Simultaneously, attacks were to be delivered by Canadian troops on the two flank beaches closer to the town. The Royal Regiment of Canada was to land at PUIITS and seize the headland immediately east of DIEPPE. The South Saskatchewan Regiment was to land at POURVILLE and establish a bridgehead, through which the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada, landing half an hour later on the same beach, would advance and attack the aerodrome of DIEPPE-ST.AUBIN and, if time permitted, the Divisional Headquarters believed to be located at ARQUES-LA-BATAILLE.

4. All four of these flank attacks were timed for 0450 hrs, British Summer Time. (On the relation of this time to light conditions, see C.B. 04244, para. 40. Minutes of Force Commanders' meeting, 16 Jul 42, (War Diary, "G", H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, August, 1942, Appx. 53) are confused, referring to 0450 hrs as fifteen minutes after, and 0520 hrs as one hour after, the beginning of nautical twilight. Brigadier Mann confirms that 0520 hrs was calculated as half an hour after the beginning of nautical twilight, this being the earliest time at which the R.A.F. could see for low-level attacks.) The success of these flank landings would depend very largely upon the achievement of surprise, and upon the landing craft touching down while it was still sufficiently dark to make it difficult

for enemy gunners who might be on the alert to see their targets. No arrangements, therefore, were made for naval fire support on these beaches in the first phase.

5. Half an hour after the delivery of the flank attacks, i.e. at 0520 hrs, a frontal attack was to be delivered upon the beach in front of the town of DIEPPE itself by two battalions of 4 Cdn Inf Bde. The Essex Scottish would attack the eastern half (designated RED BEACH), and the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry the western half (designated WHITE BEACH). Simultaneously with the landing of these units, the first wave of tanks of 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn (three troops) was to land, followed by further waves.

6. The progress of these tanks was to be assisted by a Beach Assault party of Royal Canadian Engineers, the functions of which were to aid the tanks in crossing the beach and the Esplanade wall, to detect and clear minefields, and to destroy with explosives the heavy road-blocks closing the heads of the streets facing the beach. The tanks were to cross the Esplanade wall, where it was low, with the assistance of tracks of chestnut paling, and where it was high by means of timber crib ramps built by the Engineers. Further details will be found below.

7. The assault on the main beaches was to be supported by an attack upon the beach defences and subsequently upon the front row of buildings by fighter aircraft armed with cannon. This attack would begin about 0515 hrs, shift to the buildings as the troops touched down, and continue until 0525 hrs. At 0515 also two gun-positions south of DIEPPE would be attacked by Hurricane bombers and day bombers. (Combined Plan, "JUBILEE", para. 25 and Appendix "E", p. 1.) In addition four destroyers and "Locust" were to bombard the front of the town for about ten minutes, from the time when landing craft were one mile from the beach until they touched down; this bombardment would then shift to the east and west headlands and continue for fifteen minutes more (Naval Operation Orders, "JUBILEE": Orders for Naval Supporting Fire). Aircraft were to lay smoke over the eastern headland at 0510 hrs to blind the gunners there. Smoke would be laid by the Navy to cover the landing craft approaching the various beaches only if heavy enemy fire was encountered. (Combined Plan, "JUBILEE", Appx "E", p. 1; Naval Operation Orders, Instructions for Smoke. )

8. The tanks landed on the main beaches were to press on and assist in clearing German gun positions south of the town and in capturing the entrenched position west of LES QUATRE VENTS FARM. The tanks were also to assist the Camerons in capturing the aerodrome and the Divisional Headquarters.

9. The R.H.L.I. were to co-operate with the S.Sask.R. in clearing up the situation in the area of LES QUATRE VENTS FARM and to the south-west of DIEPPE generally. The Essex

Scottish were to seize the harbour area, including the east side of the harbour; take possession of the armed trawlers in the harbour, with the assistance of tanks and a detachment of the Royal Marine "A" Commando to be landed by H.M.S. "Locust" and Fighting French Chasseurs; and clear and secure the area to the south-east of DIEPPE, including NEUVILLE, and link up with the R.Regt.C.

10. The result of these operations, it was hoped, would be the establishment of a perimeter covering the whole town of DIEPPE, outside of which the Camerons and the tanks would operate against their special objectives. Covered by this perimeter, the demolition parties of the Royal Canadian Engineers would carry out their tasks. The engineer demolition plan was very comprehensive and very detailed. Details may be found in "2 Cdn Div R.C.E. Demolition Instructions", dated 15 Jun 42 (War Diary, "G", H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, August 1942, Appx. 59). The general plan, including some aspects (presumably late additions to the plan) not included in these Instructions, is summarized in Brigadier Mann's lecture notes as follows:

....It is doubtful if any programme for the destruction of objectives of a similar nature has ever been so completely and scientifically prepared. Personnel had been sent on special courses to study the destruction of particular objectives, the stores had been especially prepared, and the parties rehearsed in their duties.

These tasks included the destruction of dock facilities, bridges, railway installations, a tunnel and numerous other targets. The plan also included a well arranged train wreck, which was a saboteur's dream. A number of cars were to be derailed well inside the tunnel, and then a train with a good load of explosives was to be sent in with open throttle. Col. Labatt wasted no time in changing his plans when he discovered that his intended HQ was sited immediately on top of the tunnel!

There was one other task which unfortunately we were unable to accomplish. We had obtained positive information as to the exact location of 2,300 naval torpedoes with War Heads of one ton of explosives each. The engineers, with great delight had arranged for a simultaneous detonation of this treasure. The idea was to fire a parting salute by a time fuze, when the expedition was well on its way back towards England, and finally, it had been part of the combined plan for a cutting out force of the RN, assisted as required by the RCE, to remove some 40 German invasion barges which the Royal Navy desired to borrow.

(Lecture Notes: The Combined Services  
Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42, p. 4.)

11. As none of this most carefully prepared programme of demolitions in the town itself was actually carried out, it seems unnecessary to rehearse it in greater detail. It may be pointed out, however, that the railway tunnel referred to is south-west of DIEPPE and immediately east of APPEVILLE. Its destruction would have interrupted railway communication with both LE HAVRE and ROUEN for a very considerable time. The demolitions proposed in the harbour area, including the destruction of the bridges and the large number of cranes there, would similarly have rendered the harbour largely useless for a long period.

12. Very detailed plans had been made for the withdrawal at the close of the operation. In this phase use was to be made of the one battalion of infantry (Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal) which had been provided as a floating reserve. This unit was to provide the rear guard covering the re-embarkation, on the west side of the harbour, and would share with the Essex Scottish, who had the same duty on the east side, the distinction of being the last unit to re-embark. The perimeter was to be narrowed in successive phases, and all troops were to be withdrawn by way of DIEPPE itself, where the deep harbour would facilitate re-embarkation. (On the withdrawal, see Detailed Military Plan, Appx "F".)

#### THE PASSAGE OF THE CHANNEL

13. The naval arrangements for the passage of the Channel are described in detail in C.B. 04244, which provides diagrams. As noted above, the total number of ships and craft involved, excluding minesweepers, was 252; and to move this great number of vessels across the Channel without detection by the enemy, without mishap, and on a timetable, was a most difficult and complicated task. It was carried out with almost complete success.

14. The task was complicated by the existence of an enemy minefield through which it was necessary to sweep passages. Two such passages were swept on the night of 18/19 Aug by the 9th and 13th Minesweeping Flotillas. These passages were in positions previously carefully laid down, and when swept were marked by dimly lighted "dan" buoys.

15. The force sailed in thirteen Groups, of which the first four comprised the infantry landing ships and their escort of small armed vessels. Groups 5, 6 and 7 consisted of the personnel landing craft and their escort, and Groups 8 to 12 of the tank landing craft and their escort. Group 13 comprised the seven Fighting French Chasseurs and H.M.S. "Alresford".

16. In H.M. destroyer "Calpe" were the Military and Naval Force Commanders, accompanied by Air Commodore Cole, the representative of the Air Force Commander. Air-Vice-Marshal Leigh-Mallory himself remained at H.Q. 11 Fighter Group, at UXBRIDGE, which was considered the best point for controlling the action of his squadrons. "Calpe" led four other destroyers and the infantry landing ships through the Western passage in the minefield.

17. In H.M. destroyer "Ferne" was a duplicate headquarters which could function in command of the operation in the event of the destruction of "Calpe". The senior military officer in "Ferne" was Brigadier Mann. The Detailed Military Plan provided that he should assume command in the event of General Roberts becoming incapacitated; while in the event of Brigadier Mann's becoming a casualty the command would pass to Brigadier Southam, commanding 6 Cdn Inf Bde, and from him, in case of necessity, to Brigadier Lett, commanding 4 Cdn Inf Bde, and then to Lt.-Col. G.P. Henderson.

18. "Ferne" led the L.C.Ps. and L.C.Ts. through the Eastern channel in the minefield.

19. The minefield was passed in safety, although not in quite the manner laid down; for the infantry landing ship "Queen Emma" lost touch with the destroyers whom she was supposed to follow and passed through the Eastern instead

of the western channel, "with Groups 1, 2 and 3 in company"; and H.M.S. "Locust" failed to find either of the channels and (aided possibly by her shallow draught) passed through the minefield itself in safety.

20. Having passed the minefield the force fell into formation with Groups 1, 2, 3 and 5 in front, followed by Group 4 and then Group 8. Next came Groups 6, 7 and 9, followed in turn by Groups 10 and 11. Groups 13 and 12, in that order, brought up the rear. The starboard or western flank was covered by the destroyers "Garth", "Berkeley", "Albrighton" and "Bleasdale", and the port or eastern flank by the destroyers "Slazak" (Polish) and "Brocklesby" (C.B. 04244, Diagram VI, opposite p.10).

21. The weather was fine and clear, and the sea absolutely calm (Statement of Lieut. F. Royal).

22. Two unfortunate minor accidents marred the passage and caused a considerable number of casualties. At about 1710 hrs, before the Force sailed, an accident took place on board H.M.S. "Duke of Wellington", when a grenade exploded among men of the Black Watch of Canada. This explosion occasioned nineteen casualties, one fatal (War Diary, R.H.C., August, 1942: Appx 10). A precisely similar incident took place among the men of the South Saskatchewan Regiment on board H.M.S. "Invicta" about 2330 hours. This explosion caused seventeen casualties among "C" Company (War Diary, S.Sask.R., 18 Aug 42). Pte. Haggard of this unit attributed the explosion to carelessness while cleaning grenades.

23. The "small Naval demonstration" off BOULOGNE provided in the plan (Report No.100, para. 44) was duly made by three motor gunboats between 0330 and 0450 hrs, but seems to have been ineffective. Depth charges and smoke floats were dropped, but "No enemy ships were sighted and there were no searchlights or other activities observed on shore" (C.B.04244, note to para. 28).

#### ENCOUNTER WITH ENEMY VESSELS.

24. At 0347 hrs, almost exactly one hour before Zero, a most unfortunate encounter took place with enemy vessels at a point about seven miles from the coast of France. Group 5 of the British force, consisting of 23 personnel landing craft escorted by S.G.B.5, M.L.346 and L.C.F.(L) 1, and carrying No.3 Commando, destined for YELLOW I and YELLOW II beaches, encountered a group of "at least five enemy craft" (Report of Commander D.B. Wyburd, commanding Group 5, Appx 7 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander). This group has been described as a tanker escorted by a number of armed coastal craft; but the tanker is not mentioned in the reports either of Commander Wyburd or the Naval Force Commander, although Commander Wyburd speaks of "a small German tanker of some 200 tons" which subsequently (at 0535 hrs) was encountered by M.L. 346 and fired on, with the result that her crew abandoned her and she drifted ashore. These enemy vessels ought perhaps to have been intercepted by "Slazak" and "Brocklesby", which as above explained were covering the port flank of the flotillas; these destroyers however were not in close company with Group 5; and indeed they took no part in the action which followed. The Commanding Officer of "Slazak", who was senior, believed, it appears, that the fire came from the shore, and this belief resulted in Group 5 being deprived of the protection which it should have received from the destroyers. This officer's report (Appx 28 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander) notes under 0350 hrs merely "Saw tracer and starshell fired in shore". The Naval Force Commander expresses the opinion that this officer was guilty of "an error of judgment", and

observes that in such operations in future it would be better to ensure that British officers are in command of all detached units (C.B. 04244, para. 917).

25. A violent engagement took place between S.G.B.5, supported shortly by L.C.F.(L) 1, and the German vessels. In this fighting, S.G.B.5 was badly damaged and the group of landing craft completely scattered. The result was to destroy any possibility of No. 3 Commando delivering its attack on the battery at BERNEVAL, known by the special code name "GONBBELS", with anything like complete success.

26. This encounter accordingly had a bad effect upon the fortunes of the operation generally. Nevertheless, there is no evidence that this engagement seven miles offshore gave definite warning to the enemy of the approach of the raiding force; that is to say, no evidence has been found that any actual message was passed announcing the presence of landing craft. However, the possibility must presumably be reckoned with that this noisy engagement, in which moreover a great deal of tracer ammunition was fired, may have increased the alertness of the German posts along the coast, particularly on the eastern sector of the area to be raided.

27. It may be noted that during the encounter with the convoy a Canadian naval officer, Sub.-Lt. C.D. Wallace, R.C.N.V.R., Boat Officer for the Flotilla Officer of the 1st L.C.P.(L) flotilla, in L.C.P.(L) 42, was killed.

#### GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE OPERATION

28. As the operation which now began was a very complicated one and divided into a number of separate incidents taking place at different points, it can be dealt with only by considering each area separately. It seems desirable, however, to begin with a very brief outline of the general course of the operation, in order that each part of the larger story may be comprehensible to the reader.

29. The two eastern flank attacks, at BERNEVAL and PUIITS, were almost total failures. At BERNEVAL a very small party of No. 3 Commando succeeded in getting ashore on YELLOW I BEACH and interfered with the fire of the German coastal battery for some time by sniping. It was unable to capture the battery, but its action was extremely useful. Other parties of this unit landed on YELLOW II BEACH but no one belonging to them returned. At PUIITS, the Royal Regiment of Canada, landed late and in daylight, was cut to pieces on the beach and was unable to clear the headland east of DIEPPE as provided in its orders.

30. The western flank attacks, at VARENCEVILLE and POURVILLE, were much more successful. No. 4 Commando completely destroyed the coastal battery at VARENCEVILLE and the German garrison there. The South Saskatchewan Regiment landed successfully at POURVILLE, but did not succeed in developing its bridgehead as had been hoped, particularly on the east side. The Cameron Highlanders of Canada also landed with slight loss, and the main body of the unit penetrated inland for about two miles, but being unsupported by the tanks landed at DIEPPE did not succeed in reaching the aerodrome or the Divisional Headquarters which were its objectives. The two Canadian units were withdrawn from the same beach on which they had landed, losing heavily in the process.

31. On the main beaches in front of DIEPPE success was small. The failure to clear the headlands on either side resulted in these beaches being exposed to very heavy enfilade fire. The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry and the Essex Scottish were in consequence largely pinned down on the beach, and had very heavy losses. Small parties of these units fought their way into the town, but the enemy defensive system as a whole was not broken. These statements apply equally to Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal (the floating reserve) which was subsequently landed.

32. Of the tanks which were landed only a very few (possibly one troop) actually penetrated into DIEPPE. Several got on to the Esplanade and did useful work there; but fire was so hot that the Engineers were unable to breach the road-blocks across the heads of the streets, and this prevented most of them from getting further. A considerable number of tanks were stopped on the beach before reaching the Esplanade wall.

33. In consequence of this situation, it was impossible to carry out the demolition tasks proposed; and withdrawal was ordered for 1100 hrs. It was carried out under very heavy fire, and the result was that many men could not be evacuated from the beaches. Shortly after 1300 hrs most of the men remaining on the main beaches surrendered. Somewhat less than half of the whole Canadian force embarked returned to England.

34. The events in the various areas will now be described separately in greater detail.

THE FLANK ATTACKS: THE FORTUNES OF THE COMMANDOS.  
I: NO. 3 COMMANDO.

35. No. 3 Commando, commanded by Lt.-Col. J.F. Durnford-Slater, had been destined, as already explained, for the attack on the German coast defence battery known to exist at 310719 at the north end of the village of BERNEVAL-LE-GRAND. The Commando was to land in two sections on the beaches known as YELLOW I and YELLOW II, the former at the village of PT. BERNEVAL, east of the battery, and the latter north-east of BELLEVILLE-SUR-MER and west of the battery. Both of these beaches were narrow, but this was especially true of YELLOW II where the width was only 100 yards, and the access inland was by a narrow gully, scarcely more than a chimney.

36. As already noted, the encounter with the enemy convoy made the full execution of the task of No. 3 Commando impossible. Of the 23 L.C.P.(L)s of Group 5, four had failed to reach the scene of the naval encounter because of engine trouble; four others were damaged during the action but succeeded in returning; five attached themselves to S.G.B.5, and three to L.C.F.(L)1, after the action; while seven landed their troops. Only four of these seven returned. (Report of Commander Wyburd.)

37. The Naval Operation Orders for the operation provided that the Senior Officer of Group 5 would break wireless silence and report, "if by delays or casualties it is the opinion of the senior military officer that the success of the landing at YELLOW beach is seriously jeopardised" (Naval Operation Order No. 1, para. 32 (c)). Commander Wyburd was however unable to comply with this instruction owing to the destruction of the wireless installations on S.G.B.5, and on other craft which Commander Wyburd encountered. The Force Commanders in "Calpe", in consequence, received no report of the misfortune until 0610 hrs, at which time the "Calpe" Intelligence Log records, "Gp 5 dispersed by enemy", and no full report upon

the encounter until "about 0630" hrs, when Commander Wyburd and Lt.-Col. Durnford-Slater reached the headquarters ship in an L.C.P.(L) (Report of Commander Wyburd).

38. Certain of the landing craft of Group 5, however, had pushed on on their own responsibility and made a gallant attempt to complete their tasks. Five of these landing craft, and subsequently a sixth, reached YELLOW I BEACH and landed their troops under covering fire from M.L.346, the five craft touching down at 0510 hrs, twenty minutes late. Heavy opposition was encountered immediately after landing, and it appears that none of the troops landed here succeeded in reaching the battery which was their objective, and as none of the men of No. 3 Commando landed on this beach returned to England little can be said of the events here. When an attempt was made to withdraw troops from YELLOW I BEACH at 0700 hrs, the Naval Beachmaster and the Beach Signal party were taken off under heavy fire but no soldiers were seen. (C.B. 04244, paras. 75-82.) It is apparent that the troops landed at this point were held up and ultimately overwhelmed.

39. On YELLOW II BEACH one landing craft, L.C.P.(L) 15, succeeded in landing its troops, five minutes before zero. The Boat Officer of this craft was Lieut. H.T. Buckee, R.N.V.R. The passengers were three officers and 17 other ranks of No. 3 Commando, the senior military officer being Major Peter Young. Sub-Lt. D.J. Lewis, R.C.N.V.R., was on this craft as Beachmaster, but was not permitted to land. Mr. Lewis, in an account written at Canadian Military Headquarters on 24 Aug 42, describes how Major Young and Lieut. Buckee conferred together, after the encounter with the convoy, and decided, in spite of this misfortune, to persevere and do their utmost to carry out their tasks. Accordingly, L.C.P.(L) 15 went in to YELLOW II BEACH, and the party of 3 Commando landed without opposition, and were seen to vanish "up the gulch".

40. This party acted with the greatest courage and initiative, and while an actual attack on the enemy battery was wholly out of the question, all of the three sections into which the Commando party was divided after landing got within about 200 yards of it and sniped it for about an hour and a half. The German gunners, in addition to replying with rifle fire, traversed one of the battery's heavy guns round and attempted to use it against the snipers. During the time that the Commando party was in action, the fire of the battery against our shipping was certainly ineffective, and it is doubtful, indeed, whether it ever became effective. Brigadier Mann comments, "As far as I know, no effective fire from the battery at BERNEVAL developed - due to the action of 3 Cdo....Their work was very good and probably vital".

41. Major Young's party subsequently withdrew to YELLOW II BEACH. Here Lieut. Buckee with L.C.P.(L) 15 duly met them, and the whole party was safely re-embarked by 0810 hrs. L.C.P.(L) 15 then returned to England.

42. The bold action and extraordinary good fortune of this single craft and the Commando troops who were its passengers is a very bright spot in the general gloom of events on the eastern flank beaches. That 20 soldiers should land completely unsupported, should succeed in interfering effectively with the action of an enemy battery, and should subsequently be withdrawn without loss by the same craft which put them ashore, constitutes a truly remarkable episode. Major Young and Lieut. Buckee both received the D.S.O.

43. The above account of the action of No. 3 Commando is based upon that in C.B. 04244, supplemented by the reports of the various Naval commanders (especially that of Commander Wyburd) and the personal narrative of Sub-Lt. D.J. Lewis. It should be noted that Commander Wyburd states that neither Lt.-Col. Durnford-Slater nor himself had any knowledge of any landing being made on the YELLOW Beaches until their return to NEWHAVEN.

THE FLANK ATTACKS: THE FORTUNES OF THE COMMANDOS.

II: NO. 4 COMMANDO.

44. On the extreme right or western flank of the operation, No. 4 Commando, commanded by Lt.-Col. Lord Lovat, M.C., who had distinguished himself in earlier raids and had been associated with Canadian troops in Operation "ABERCROMBIE" (see Report No. 81), was completely successful in its attack upon the German battery near VARENGEVILLE. The good luck of this Commando, which was the only military unit engaged in the operation to capture all its objectives, was in curious contrast with the ill luck encountered by No. 3 Commando on the opposite flank.

45. The objective of No. 4 Commando was a battery of six 15-cm. coast defence guns, situated at 152673, south-west of the village of VARENGEVILLE-SUR-MER. This battery was known to the attackers by the special code name "HRS". No. 4 Commando was to land on two beaches designated ORANGE I and ORANGE II. The former was a very narrow beach at VASTERIVAL; the latter was the eastern section of the much longer beach near QUIBERVILLE, which the planners had considered as a possibility for the landing of tanks.

46. Lord Lovat's force was composed of 252 all ranks, including a small party of United States Rangers (the unit's Operation Order refers to "7 attached allied personnel"). It was transported in "Prince Albert" and put ashore in L.C.As. Although some craft presumed to be enemy were seen while the latter were on their way to shore, they were successfully avoided. The troops touched down almost exactly at zero, those on ORANGE I being approximately three minutes late.

47. The plan was for one party, "Group 1", composed of 88 all ranks and commanded by Major D. Mills-Roberts, to land at ORANGE I and engage the battery from the north with a 3-inch mortar, while the main body, "Group 2", 164 all ranks, under Lord Lovat, landed at ORANGE II, made a detour and attacked the battery from the rear.

48. Major Mills-Roberts' party used two Bangalore torpedoes to clear wire obstructing the cleft leading to the top of the cliff, but the noise of these was at least partially drowned by that made by fighter aircraft then engaged in attacking the battery. The mortar section reached the cliff top successfully, and the party advanced close to the battery. Small-arms fire was opened, and a 2-inch mortar also opened fire. This mortar hit with its third shot the charges stacked beside the German guns ready for use. These blew up at 0607 hrs, and the battery never fired again. The 3-inch mortar subsequently came into action and the battery site was kept under heavy small-arms fire.

49. Lord Lovat's party landed on ORANGE II, and although the landing was opposed and there was some loss from mortar fire, the attacking force got across the beach wire and

penetrated inland along the bank of the River SAANE. After going about 1600 yards, they turned left to the wood of BLANCMENIL LE BAS. They then organized for the attack, and one troop, while moving to its concentration area on the edge of the wood, destroyed a party of about 35 German soldiers preparing for a counter-attack on Major Mills-Roberts' party.

50. At 0620 hrs, precisely on schedule, cannon fighters delivered a low-level attack on the battery. "This was only partly successful as the squadron came in mixed up with Focke-Wulfs" (Notes from Theatres of War, No. 11, p.15). Lord Lovat's force then attacked with the bayonet, crossing 250 yards of open ground swept by machine-gun fire. In a short time all the enemy positions were cleared, and the whole garrison of the battery were killed with the exception of four men who were taken prisoners. Captain P.A. Porteous particularly distinguished himself during this attack. In spite of having been three times wounded, he took command of "F" Troop, which had lost both its officers, and led it in the assault. He was subsequently awarded the Victoria Cross.

51. Resistance having been liquidated, the six guns of the battery were blown up, five of them at 0650 hrs and the sixth a little later. An enemy patrol coming from the direction of STE. MARGUERITE, west of the battery, was ambushed and shot up by part of "A" Troop, which had landed with Group 2 and moved by the shortest route to a position between STE. MARGUERITE and the battery with precisely this function in view.

52. Before the force withdrew, the bodies of the men who had fallen were collected on the battery site, and the Union Jack was run up above them. The men of No. 4 Commando then withdrew to ORANGE I BEACH under desultory sniping fire. Re-embarkation began at 0730 hrs, and although German artillery was firing, the shells burst some 500 yards to the westward, causing no casualties.

53. Lord Lovat was now able to report his success to the headquarters ship and to the C.C.O. The report to the latter ran as follows:

0850 hrs Every one of gun crews finished with bayonet. OK by you

(In file Ops 3-3-1-2 Div, vol. II,  
from H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, now in Records  
Office, ACTON.)

The Commando wounded were transferred to H.M.S. "Ferne" about 0900 hrs, and the detachment of No. 4 Commando then returned to England in its L.C.As.

54. In this very brilliant affair, a model of bold action and successful synchronization, No. 4 Commando lost two officers and ten other ranks killed, three officers and 17 other ranks wounded, nine other ranks wounded and missing, and four other ranks missing. As a result of the action of No. 4 Commando, heavy casualties and material losses were inflicted on the enemy. A most formidable German battery was completely destroyed and the safety of our ships lying off DIEPPE during the remainder of the operation was thereby very materially enhanced.

55. The very brief account given above of the operations of No. 4 Commando is based on C.B. 04244, supplemented by the unit's Operation Order ("G" War Diary, H.Q. 2 Cdn Div,

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August 1942, Appx. 58). Several details are drawn from Notes from Theatres of War, No. 11: Destruction of a German Battery by No. 4 Commando during the Dieppe Raid (War Office, February, 1943). Statistics derive from this account, which is later and therefore probably more accurate than C.B. 04244.

56. The accounts of the action of Nos. 3 and 4 Commandos have been checked against the reports submitted by these units, copies of which were received by the writer after the above account had been drafted. These reports include individual statements by Lt.-Col. Lord Lovat, Major Mills Roberts, Lt.-Col. Durnford Slater and Major Young.

#### THE CANADIAN FLANK ATTACKS. I: BLUE BEACH. THE ROYAL REGIMENT OF CANADA.

57. As already explained above, the task of the Royal Regiment of Canada, commanded by Lt.-Col. D.E. Catto, was to land on BLUE BEACH and clear the commanding headland immediately east of DIEPPE. The unit, designated for this operation by the code name "DOUG", was to land at Zero (0450 hrs) on a beach only 200 yards long and flanked on either side by lofty cliffs. In the gully beyond the beach lay the village of PUTS.

#### (a) The Role of the Royal Regiment

58. The Detailed Military Plan provided (Appendix "D") for one company of the regiment to deal with light anti-aircraft guns which might exist at 258697, on the eastern side of the gully, and subsequently, if necessary, with barracks believed to exist at LES GLYCINES Holiday Camp. One platoon of this company would then clear machine-gun posts in the area 268704. Another company would deal with a heavy anti-aircraft battery at 245693 (actually, 243694), near the edge of the cliff west of PUTS, and with light anti-aircraft guns in the same general region. It would mop up German marines in the coast-guard houses on the cliff west of PUTS and would subsequently establish contact with the Essex Scottish, who were to cross the harbour from the west. The main body of the battalion (which, assuming that Appx "D" of the Detailed Military Plan treats the attached company of the Black Watch as an additional company of the Royals, would amount to Battalion Headquarters and three companies) was to attack a 4-gun battery at 258686 (an entrenched position south of the village of PUTS), and would also deal with light anti-aircraft guns and machine-guns forming part of the same defensive system. Subsequently the Royal Regiment was if possible to seize the Gasworks at 243675, and protect the R.C.E. demolition party charged with destroying them. Thereafter the battalion would go into brigade reserve.

59. The Royal Regiment took with it a detachment of 3 L.A.A. Regt, R.C.A., and one of 4 Fd Regt, R.C.A. The Detailed Military Plan provided that the A.A. detachment should assist in capturing the enemy A.A. guns on the east headland, and if these were captured intact should proceed to

use them against enemy ground and air targets. The detachment had the special mission of bringing back parts of two new enemy A.A. guns, in the sights of which the British authorities had a particular interest (War Diary, 3 Cdn L.A.A. Regt, August, 1942, Appx 6). The detachment of Field Artillery would assist in the capture of the 4-gun battery at 258688, and in the event of its being captured intact would use the guns against another enemy battery at 249645, to the southward of DIEPPE, and against targets of opportunity. The Royals were also accompanied by "C" Coy of the Black Watch of Canada (less Coy H.Q.), working under the command of Capt. R.C. Hicks of the Royals. The role of this force is not particularized in the Detailed Military Plan, but the War Diary of R.Regnt.C., 19 Aug 42, states that "it was to land a little to the east of PUIITS beach, and perform a left flank protecting role". It may possibly have been the company destined for the LES GLYCINES area, but this is not clear. The Black Watch detachment, the two artillery detachments, and the R.Regnt.C. personnel with them, were known collectively as "Edward Force" (information from Capt. G.A. Browne, and of War Diary, R.Regnt.C., 19 and 23 Jun 42).

60. As already explained, the main body of R.Regnt.C. was carried in "Queen Emma" and "Princess Astrid", both sailing from PORTSMOUTH. The two artillery detachments were also in "Queen Emma", but the Black Watch company was carried in "Duke of Wellington", sailing from SOUTHAMPTON. This company appears in the tables of allotment of personnel, equipment and stores (Detailed Military Plan, Appendix "C") simply as a detachment of the Royals.

61. In the event, the Royal Regiment and attached troops were quite unable to carry out the tasks assigned to them; the regiment was shot to pieces on the beach, and no elements of any strength managed to penetrate beyond it.

62. This great misfortune, which adversely affected the whole subsequent course of the operation, was evidently largely due to the fact that the Royals were late in touching down. The reason for this appears to be, not action taken to avoid the naval engagement in which Group 5 became involved, but slowness in forming up the flotillas after they left the landing ships. The delay is thus described in the report of the Flotilla Officer of "Princess Astrid" (Appendix 3 B to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander) :

The boats were lowered promptly and smoothly and according to plan. There was, however, some delay in them forming up owing to an unknown M.G.B., almost certainly No. 315, taking station ahead of them in almost the position which our leading M.G.B. 316 had arranged to take. As a result the Flotilla formed up astern of her and it was a little while before they realised that they were in fact astern of the wrong M.G.B. and took station behind their leader M.G.B. 316.

The Flotilla Officer of "Queen Emma" states in his report (Appendix 3 A to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander) that although craft were lowered at 0300 hrs, the combined flotilla did not move off until 0325 (Lt.-Cdr. Goulding gives this time as 0321). The Flotilla Officer adds that this made it necessary to proceed at a greater

speed than had been intended, and in consequence the two mechanized landing craft (L.C.M.) which formed part of "Queen Emma's" flotilla, and were carrying 100 men each, could not keep up with the remainder. Ultimately, according to this officer, these two L.C.Ms., with four L.C.As. which had been astern of them, landed as a second wave.

63. Capt. (now Major) J.C.H. Anderson, who was in one of these L.C.Ms., from the port side of "Queen Emma", gives the following account of this craft's experience :

Difficulty in forming up never fully overcome, and as the flotilla moved off in line astern, our LCM gradually lost contact until at shortly after 0400 hours we were entirely alone.

A short time after this the LCM developed engine trouble and stopped. As the engine room hatch is in the floor of the craft, it necessitated moving men, 3" mortars and their dollies to allow the stoker to enter the engine room. Within a few minutes the craft again proceeded toward the shore. At the first sight of land it was at once apparent that we were heading directly into the harbour mouth, for a church spire appeared on high ground which could be none other than the east headland. Turning left we proceeded close in shore to the beach at PUITS. From the time that contact with the flotilla was lost until after touchdown, no other craft was sighted to my knowledge. Intense fire was not brought down on us until the landing ramp was dropped. I estimate touchdown at 0530 hours.

(Comments on draft of this Report, 29 May 43.) (1)

(b) The Assault on BLUE BEACH

64. According to the R.Regt.C. War Diary (19 Aug 42), "The general plan was that the Battalion would land in two waves, the first wave consisting of "A" and "B" Companies and Bn. H.Q. Group". The report of "Queen Emma's" Flotilla Officer (just quoted), however, seems to suggest that the second wave consisted simply of the group of craft (two L.C.Ms. and four L.C.As.) which lagged behind the main flotilla during the passage to shore. "Queen Emma" had five L.C.As. in all. "C" and "D" Companies evidently travelled in "Queen Emma"; and the fact that Lt.-Col. Catto was Army Officer in charge on board her (Appendix "C" to Detailed Military Plan) suggests that the War Diary's account is in error. (This War Diary entry appears to derive from a Memorandum by Major P.E.R. Wright of statements made by men in hospital after the raid, which is attached to the Diary as an Appendix.) The evidence of Capt. G.A. Browne after his return to England is that in the "YUKON" exercises Bn H.Q. landed with the second wave, but that on the day of the operation the intention was for all four companies and Bn H.Q. to land together, with "Edward Force" as a second wave.

65. The most definite and reliable evidence as to the unit plan of assault is that of Major J.C.H. Anderson, who writes as follows :

(1) This is not the only recorded case of a craft intended for BLUE BEACH touching down quite independently: see para.88, below. The landing arrangements for this beach went badly awry.

The Bn was to land in three waves, 1st wave to consist of A, B, & C Coys, C Coy right, A Coy centre and B Coy left. BnHQ Advance Group under the Bn 21/c Major G.P. Scholfield, was with this wave, as also were the AMLO's party and the BM's party, and were to land between C & A Coys. Second wave to consist of D Coy and BnHQ under command of Lieut-Colonel D.E. Catto, and were to land ten minutes after the first wave. A third wave composed of 'Edward' Force, to supply reserve Bren teams and left flank protection after the original assault, were to land ten minutes after the second wave.

(Comments on draft of this Report, 29 May 43.)

66. The Naval Operation Orders note (Appx "C") with respect to BLUE BEACH that "the most conspicuous object in this locality is the mile-wide gap in the cliffs at DIEPPE". The Senior Officer, BLUE BEACH Landings (Lt.-Cdr. H.W. Goulding, D.S.O., R.N.R.), acted upon this fact, and accordingly "steered for centre of RED and WHITE Beaches as intended until I could recognise the town" (Report of Lt.-Cdr. Goulding, Appx 6 to Enclosure No.13, Report of Naval Force Commander). Red and green lights were visible on the DIEPPE piers. When two miles from the town, Lt.-Cdr. Goulding "led the flotilla towards the beach steering a course to pass 7 cables from East Pier". While passing, the craft were challenged from this pier by flash lamp, but there was no fire.

67. Evidence differs somewhat as to the exact hour at which the first wave touched down. The report of the Flotilla Officer of "Princess Astrid", probably the best single piece of evidence, states that touchdown was at 0507 hrs. This would make the time 17 minutes late. On the other hand, a report received from Capt. G.A. Browne, R.C.A., Forward Observation Officer attached to R.Regt.C., states :

ROYALS touched down at 0535 hours, as I remember my first message to HMS GARTH, "DOUG TOUCHED DOWN 0535."

Capt. Browne certainly believed that "we were 45 minutes late in touching down". It appears, however, that he was with the second wave, for the F.O.O. party travelled in "Queen Emma" (Detailed Military Plan, Appx "C"), and Capt. Browne states that he can speak at first hand only of "C" and "D" Companies. The time given by Capt. Browne is evidently that of the landing of the second wave, and he had not realized that there was a long interval between the two waves. After his return to England he accepted this interpretation; remarking however that at the time he sent his message he had no idea that his party was not among the first to touch down.

68. The unit War Diary states that the first wave touched down at "about 0530 hours". This may possibly be based on the estimate of one man in hospital, who placed the touchdown at "nearly 0530 hrs" (Major Wright's Memorandum). The estimates of other ranks, a number of which are on file, vary very widely.

69. The naval statement of the time, then, is probably accurate; but whatever the exact time, the unit was certainly placed upon the beach so late as to make its task far more difficult than it would have been at 0450 hrs. Whereas surprise and a degree of darkness were clearly essential if the troops were to land successfully and cross the sea-wall and the heavy wire obstacles which obstructed the narrow beach at PUIITS, the landing craft in fact approached the shore in what was to all intents and purposes daylight (B-66984, Cpl. Ellis, L.G., "A" Coy, states that objects could be clearly distinguished while the craft were still half a mile from the beach) and were under observation and under fire before they landed.

70. The Flotilla Officer of "Princess Astrid" writes, "When about 100 yards from the beach fire was opened from the shore with very small automatic weapons firing 6 mm. calibre armour piercing bullets." He adds that Major Scholfield of R.Regt.C. was slightly wounded before landing, as was also a naval officer. There may have been other casualties.

71. All accounts agree that as the first wave touched down and the L.C.As. dropped their ramps machine-gun fire from the enemy defences was greatly intensified and heavy casualties were suffered immediately. The Flotilla Officer of "Princess Astrid" writes, "In several cases officers and men were wounded or killed on the ramp as they made to leave the boats."

72. As already noted, at the head of the beach at PUIITS was a sea-wall stated by the War Diary of R.Regt.C. to be "about twelve feet high" (Cpl. Ellis estimated the height as "perhaps 8 to 11 feet"). This was covered with heavy wire, and on the landward side was a deep and very thick obstacle of tangled wire (see statement of Cpl. Ellis). There were pillboxes on this wall, but the one on the section near the west end in front of which "A" Coy landed was found by Cpl. Ellis to be unoccupied. The evidence of this N.C.O., the only man of the unit who crossed the sea-wall and subsequently returned to England, strongly indicates that the enemy was not in strength on the western side of the gully, for he found several minor prepared positions here empty. He believed, however, that at least one house on the western side overlooking the beach was held by the enemy, and Capt. Browne states that one house here was cleared by Lt.-Col. Catto's party. The main strength of the enemy defence appears to have been concentrated on the eastern side of the gully, and centred particularly upon a loftily-situated fortified house which appears on the 1:12,500 Intelligence map at 253697, and is clearly visible in air photographs ("G" War Diary, H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, August 1942, Appx 59) and in pre-war photographs reproduced in C.B. 04244. This house must have been full of automatic weapons, and other houses may have been similarly equipped. B-68191, Pte. Creer, J.E., of "A" Coy, writes, "There was a big house just back from the wall, and there seemed to be a machine gun firing from every window." B-67330, Pte. (now C.S.M.) Murphy, J., who was in one of the L.C.Ms. that beached with the second wave, writes as follows :

I first fired into the house on the right when  
Cpl. Ruggles "B" Coy shouted to look at the house on

the left. I saw fire from this one and fired into each of the windows of the first floor. I think each floor had six windows. By the time I would get to the sixth window the first one would open up again.

"The house on the right," was probably the large light-coloured building which appears prominently in air photographs, standing perhaps 50 yards back from the sea-wall and parallel to it. This house, which may be the one referred to by Pte. Creer, presents to the beach three rows of about nine windows each. It may however have been less strongly held than the house on the left, which was well placed to enfilade the beach.

73. In addition to the machine-guns mounted in the houses and other positions, the enemy at this point was well supplied with mortars, with which he shortly opened heavy fire against the men on the beach. The Germans also had light artillery in support, quite apart from the heavier guns in the batteries not far away. Capt. Browne writes :

The DF fire of the German artillery (as I was later told by a German soldier, 75-mm Infantry guns) was apparently extremely well surveyed, for the shells burst precisely at the water-line at impeccably correct interval and timing. I saw two ALCs sunk by hits or splinters from this fire. From a Gunner's point of view, it was admirable shooting.

74. The German positions, apart from the houses, appear to have been extremely well concealed. Cpl. Ellis spent an hour or more on shore, and did not see a single German soldier, though he engaged an enemy machine-gun post adjacent to a pillbox position which itself did not appear to be in use. To quote Capt. Browne again :

The beach was ... plainly visible to the Germans, whose own fire positions were extraordinarily well-concealed from our view. The ROYALS were shot down in heaps on the beach without knowing where the fire was coming from.

75. These men of "A" and "B" Companies who had not been shot down at once had taken shelter against the face of the sea-wall. Here they were protected from the fire of the house, though not from mortar fire, but Cpl. Ellis states that the wall was enfiladed by a machine-gun on the high ground further east (possibly one of the posts shown on the Intelligence map at 255698) which caused further very heavy casualties among the men along the wall. (1)

76. Courageous efforts were made by officers and men of the first wave to cut or blow passages through the wire obstacles on the wall and reach the enemy positions. The evidence of men interviewed in hospital immediately after the operation is that several Bangalore torpedoes were fired on top of the wall. Cpl. Ellis assisted Capt. G.G. Sinclair, commanding "A" Coy, in laying and firing a Bangalore at a point where a recess at the west end of the wall, accommodating two flights of steps, gave some cover. Cpl. Ellis pushed through this gap and went up the hill to the right. What

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(1) The German newsreel film dealing with the operation includes "shots", probably taken immediately afterwards, which show dead men clustered thickly in front of this wall.

happened at this point thereafter is not known, but it is probable that Capt. Sinclair, who is now reported killed, fell while attempting to lead an attack through this passage. A letter from Lt.-Col. Catto, dated 30 Dec 42, says of him, "Gus I'm afraid caught it, too bad, he was trying to do a job in the non-existent wire...." (copy in Cdn Overseas Records Office). Cpl. Ellis subsequently met near the top of the hill a soldier (possibly Capt. Sinclair's batman) who had been with him at the time when the Bangalore was blown.

77. There are two versions of the action of Lieut. W. G. R. Wedd, who appears to have acted with distinguished gallantry. Men in hospital reported to Major Wright that after blowing a Bangalore on the wall (presumably near the east end) this officer led what remained of his platoon - about ten men - through the gap and was not again seen. A different story was told to Capt. Browne by surviving officers of the unit who had fallen into German hands:

....it may be permitted to mention the conduct of Lieut. Wedd of the R.Regt.C. Leaving the ALC at touchdown with his platoon, he reached the wall with little more than a section, and there found he was still being fired upon by one of the wall posts, a pillbox. There being apparently no other way of attacking the weapon, he left his corner of relative shelter and sprinted the short distance directly toward the pill-box with a M36 grenade. With complete disregard for his own safety, and displaying great skill, he flung the grenade through the fire slit of the pill-box, killing all its occupants and putting the gun out of action. His body, riddled with bullets, was later picked up in front of the pillbox. I could not myself witness this act from my position farther WEST on the beach, but it was verified later at VERNEUIL by Officers of the Battalion who had seen it and spoke of it.

(c) The Landing of the Second and Third Waves.

78. The second wave seems to have landed some twenty minutes later than the first, although as already noted (para.65,above) it appears that the interval intended was only ten minutes. The Flotilla Officer of "Queen Emma" reported,

The landing was not effected until 0525 owing to the fact that the craft had travelled a mile or so to the westwards of Dieppe and had to retrace their path.

"Princess Astrid's" Flotilla Officer states that the second wave was seen proceeding in towards the beach "at about 0530". Lt.-Cdr. Goulding's report states that the craft of the second wave were observed leaving the beach at 0528 hrs, and joined those of the first wave lying offshore at 0535 hrs. Capt. Browne, as already remarked, states that touchdown was at 0535 hrs.

79. During the approach of the second wave to the beach, two Support Landing Craft (L.C.S.25 and L.C.S.8) supported it with their light weapons, delivering "close and spirited fire in reply to the beach defences from almost point blank range" (Lt.-Cdr. Goulding's report). While the second wave was running in, moreover, British aircraft bombed the enemy positions on "the cliffs to the right of the beach" (Report of Flotilla Officer, "Queen Emma") and also laid smoke (Reports of Lt.-Cdr. Goulding and Flotilla Officer, "Princess Beatrix". Both state that this happened as the craft of the first wave were withdrawing, and mention that bombs appeared to fall on the beach. This was doubtless the smoke-laying attack which was planned to begin at 0510 hrs (Detailed Military Plan, Appx "D"); this affords additional evidence supporting the naval reports that the first wave touched down at 0507 hrs.) Capt. Browne notes that by the time of touchdown, "the smoke laid by the RAF had almost entirely disappeared, traces only remaining in the treetops above the beach".

80. Capt. Browne has described the bearing of the troops during the approach to the shore and the landing.

In spite of the steady approach to the beach under fire, the ROYALS in my ALC appeared cool and steady. It was their first experience under fire, and although I watched them closely, they gave no sign of alarm, although first light was broadening into dawn, and the interior of the ALC was illuminated by the many flares from the beach and the flash of the Bostons' bombs. The quiet steady voice of Capt. Thompson, seated just behind me, held the troops up to a confident and offensive spirit, although shells were whizzing over the craft and (they) could hear the steady whisper and crackle of S.A. fire over the top of the ALC. At the instant of touchdown, small arms fire was striking the ALC, and here there was a not unnatural split-second hesitation in the bow in leaping out onto the beach. But only a split-second. The troops got out onto the beach as fast as (in) any of the SIMMER exercises, and got across the beach to the wall and under the cliff.

81. As the landing craft of the second wave ran in, the men in them were able to see that the beach was (in the words of Mr. Ross Munro, the Canadian Press correspondent, who was in the same L.C.M. as Capt. J. C. H. Anderson, referred to above), "dotted with the fallen forms of men in battle-dress" (Glasgow Herald, 21 Aug 42). "C" and "D" Companies of the Royals were now landed "at the extreme right of the beach", "D" Coy, with which was the Commanding Officer's party, being "in a sort of re-entrant" on the western side of a spur of the cliff just beyond the west end of the sea-wall, and "C" Coy being on "D" Company's left and opposite the west end of the wall (Capt. Browne's report).

82. As the L.C.M. in which Mr. Munro was travelling touched down, it came under a murderous fire. "Vicious bursts of yellow tracers from German machine guns made a veritable curtain" about it, and bullets clanged against its armour (Glasgow Herald, 21 Aug 42). "As soon as the ramp at the bow of our boat fell fifteen Royals rushed the beach and sprinted up the slope, taking cover along the cliffside.

Machine-gun fire held back the rest...." (Mr. Munro's later story in Globe and Mail, Toronto, 22 Aug 42). There were many casualties in the L.C.M. The enemy fire was steadily returned from the boat by Capt. J.C.H. Anderson, B-67821, Cpl. Ruggles, F.H., Pte. Murphy, and others. Cpl. Ruggles worked his way towards the front of the craft, "over many wounded men", stopping several times to fire. When he reached the ramp he found that the craft was withdrawing from the shore, he believes on the orders of the Naval Beachmaster, who had been transported in this L.C.M. and had evidently found it impossible to get ashore. "As we were backing out I had one brief glimpse of men crouched against the cliff or wall and many others lying on the beach and some in the water." (Statement of Cpl. Ruggles.) Examination of the unit file of personal statements indicates that a very considerable proportion of the men of the Royals who returned from DIEPPE were passengers in this single L.C.M. Among them was Capt. Anderson, one of the two officers to return, who was wounded while firing at the enemy from the boat and collapsed across Mr. Munro's legs (Globe and Mail, 22 Aug 42).

83. A certain number of wounded men of the first wave were evacuated from the beach by the craft of the second (Major P.E.R. Wright's memorandum based on statements made by men in hospital). Pte. Creer states that as the men of the second wave were disembarking, "Some Officer shouted to us on the beach that it was hopeless. He said if you can get back in the boats do so."

84. What may be called the third wave of the assault on BLUE BEACH landed still later. It consisted of the Black Watch component of "Edward Force", under Captain Hicks, from "Duke of Wellington". Special interest attaches to this force, as "Duke of Wellington's" flotilla of landing craft was manned almost entirely by personnel of the Royal Canadian Naval Volunteer Reserve. The report of the Commanding Officer of "Duke of Wellington", prepared "in collaboration with the surviving Boat Officers", states that this flotilla consisted of six L.C.As. Of these, one left the ship empty as a result of the casualties suffered by the Black Watch in the grenade accident before leaving port (see above), and one, fitted with a mortar which had originally been intended for BLUE BEACH, was ordered instead at the last moment to land the mortar on RED BEACH, and did so.

85. It appears that it had been arranged that "Edward Force" would land when called in to the beach by the force already landed. No such signal was received, however. At 0525 hrs the flotilla was "abeam of Blue Beach and one mile from it"; and the decision to land the troops "was made jointly by the Flotilla Officer and Officer Commanding Troops" (Report of Lieut. J.E. Koyl, R.C.N.V.R., Senior Boat Officer, who took command of the Flotilla after the Flotilla Officer was wounded). Lieut. Koyl told the writer on 27 Nov 42 that, at the request of Captain Hicks, the Black Watch company was landed under the cliff to the west of the sea-wall. Here the main body of survivors of the waves landed earlier were gathered; they had set up Bren guns among the rocks and were firing at the house on the eastern cliff, which was still spouting fire.

Lieut. Koyl added, however, that Germans were visible on the west cliff also and were engaged by the naval craft with Lewis guns. The report of the Commanding Officer of "Duke of Wellington" says in part,

In the centre part of the Beach it was observed that about thirty of the Troops from the First Landing were apparently casualties. To the westward side of the Beach up against the base of the Cliffs, the main body of the First Landing of Troops were heavily engaged firing up to the Enemy on the Cliff-Top also against Enemy positions in houses halfway up the Cliffs to the East.

The Commanding Officer thus describes the landing of the third wave :

At 0545 our four Craft touched down at the Westward end of the Beach and close to the Main Body of Troops; all Troops borne were successfully landed.

86. These accounts are in general confirmed by that of Capt. Browne, who writes that "EDWARD force and the Prize Tp RCA" (i.e., the detachment of 4 Cdn Fd Regt) were landed "a hundred yards or more farther WEST down the beach" than "D" Coy and the C.O.'s party. (The "Prize Troop", designed to man captured enemy guns, was so called on the analogy of a naval "prize crew".)

87. The fate of the Black Watch company was a matter of painful concern and uncertainty to this unit; for of the men composing it the only ones to return to England were the casualties of the grenade accident, disembarked before the expedition sailed; two men who went ashore in charge of these casualties and were left behind; and one man (D-82705, Pte. O'Toole, A.) who landed on BLUE BEACH, wrenched his ankle in doing so, and was taken back into the landing craft from which he had just emerged (War Diary, R.H.C., 20 Aug 42; Pte. O'Toole's statement, Appx 12 to Diary for August, 1942). Various reports, including O'Toole's, state that the Black Watch landed with few casualties. Of their experiences after landing the only record so far seen is a letter from a prisoner-of-war camp in France, dated 24 Aug 42 and signed "Mark" (believed to be Lieut. M.G. Mather, R.H.C.). This letter (photostat at Records Office, ACTON) runs in part :

... I was right beside Jack Colson when he got his - a burst of machine gun (fire) right through the eyes and head....Except for poor Jack, the B.W. didn't lose a man!! - we had a few wounded. As you know by now, they were certainly waiting for us - and they really gave us the works...

The officer referred to as killed is Lieut. J.D. Colson, one of the three platoon commanders of "C" Coy, Lieut. Mather being another.

88. A reference in the War Diary of 3 Cdn L.A.A. Regt, August, 1942 (Appx 6) suggests that in addition to the three waves mentioned one L.C.A. carrying stores may have come in independently. Four men of this unit were in this craft, which "became mixed with the Essex Scottish" and approached RED

BEACH. When the mistake was realized the craft proceeded along the coast to PUTS. The situation found there is thus described:

Other boats of the R.R.C.'s could not be seen but they had evidently landed. Beach was strewn with bodies in and out of water and up to the wall. Men arriving at wall were trapped as beyond wall and also the beach side was swept by the M.G. and sniper fire. Those near the wall were being treated to grenades dropped from the cliff above or mortar fire.

One load of ammunition had been landed and some wounded men had been taken on board when the craft "suddenly ... pulled away from shore" with the four gunners in her.

89. The action of the Royal Regiment's 3-inch mortars is a disputed point, but it seems clear that at least one of them did fire a few bombs. Capt. Browne, it is true, reported (on the basis, he later told the writer, of what he heard from the R.Regt.C. mortar officer), "The Battalion's 3-in. mortars were never fired, and scarcely set up, two crews in quick succession being shot down at them, until I think, there were no more mortar personnel left". Statements of men who returned in the L.C.M. referred to above indicate that this craft carried two mortar detachments, but that one or both weapons were lost in deep water while an attempt was being made to land them under fire. Nevertheless, there is good evidence that a mortar was set up (though not by mortar personnel) some time after the second wave touched down, and that some bombs were fired. B-68232, Pte. Hamilton, M. ("C" Coy), states that after almost half an hour of machine-gun fire and sniping the Germans opened fire with 4-inch mortars, and adds:

It was then that Sgt. Peaks of B Coy went after the 3" mortars. The mortar section had been wiped out.

An SLC that was laying off shore had just laid a heavy smoke screen so Sgt. Peaks took advantage of it and got the mortar set up. I couldn't make out who helped him on account of the smoke but there were three others. They didn't get many more than three bombs away when Hienie found them with his machine-gun and they were cut to pieces.

90. Major Wright's rough notes of his interview with B-66783, Cpl. Jackson ("B" Coy), state that a 3-inch mortar was set up at the water's edge under severe fire after the second wave came in. It is stated to have fired fifteen bombs before enemy machine-guns "got the range" and killed the whole mortar crew. It is probable that this is the same incident as that mentioned by Pte. Hamilton. The N.C.O. referred to is presumably B-66541, Sgt. Peaks, E., who is now officially reported killed.

91. The Royal Regiment was supported from offshore by the destroyer "Garth". This vessel took part in the initial bombardment of the enemy positions overlooking the main beaches at DIEPPE from 0512 to 0519 hrs, subsequently

shifting her fire to the eastern side of the harbour and to targets at the head of the harbour, ceasing fire at about 0535 hrs. She then proceeded to engage enemy batteries on top of the east cliff, i.e. the cliff west of BLUE BEACH. At 0610 hrs she shifted her target to the rising ground above the east side of the harbour entrance at DIEPPE, and from 0615 hrs to approximately 0845 hrs batteries on the east cliff were engaged as opportunity permitted. The report of H.M.S. "Garth's" Commanding Officer (Appendix 23 to Enclosure No.13, Report of Naval Force Commander) gives the following account of his duel with the batteries on the headland west of PUTS and of the messages received from Capt. Browne on the beach:

I found throughout that their fire was extremely accurate and it was impossible to go in and carry out a steady bombardment.

It was a matter of going in through the smoke till close, squaring off and then retiring, then circling round and repeating the manoeuvre. On each occasion we were straddled and it seems extraordinary that more ships were not hit.

I was in touch with F.O.O.2 from 0541 to 0747, during which time he was held up at the foot of the cliff and most messages received concerned wounded and the fact that they were held up, which were passed to CALPE. He called for fire at a white house on the cliff top, which we answered, but I regret did not hit. He was not in a position to spot and all we could see were the shorts on the cliff face.....

92. This report indicates pretty clearly that Captain Browne's first message, reporting the touchdown at 0535 hrs, was received (at 0541 hrs). His recollections of one later message to "GARTH" accord with the account given by the destroyer's captain, for Capt. Browne states that at 0610 hrs he reported to H.M.S. Garth, "DOUG STILL ON BEACH CASUALTIES HVY MG MORTAR FIRE 0610".

93. In addition to "Garth", S.G.B.8 was off BLUE BEACH during the operation, but it does not appear that she was able to give effective support to the troops. Lt.-Cdr. Goulding's report states that "in conversation with" S.G.B.308 (evidently the same craft) he learned that a signal had been made to her from the beach asking for support "shortly after the Landing had been effected", but that S.G.B.308 had replied that she could not assist as she had to carry out "Task I". This task (detailed in Naval Operation Orders - J.N.O. 4, para. 6) was provision, in company with three other S.G.Bs., of "warning and cover against surface attack from the westward of DIEPPE." The report of S.G.B.8 herself (Appendix 18 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander) states that she led the landing craft at the rear of Group 3, which had become separated from M.G.B. 316, towards BLUE BEACH until she saw they were headed in the right direction, and that from 0505 hrs until 0540 hrs she remained off BLUE BEACH, about 1,000 yards offshore. The report adds :

Owing to the extremely confused situation on shore I was unable to give fire support without the risk of hitting our own troops. At 0540 I left the vicinity of Blue Beach to carry out TASK I, at that time being under fairly heavy fire from small calibre guns.

Subsequently (after 1055 hrs) S.G.B.S closed BLUE BEACH to 700 yards "and bombarded a field gun emplacement, R.D.F. aeriels and snipers on the cliffs, some hits being scored." This bombardment ended at 1210 hrs. It is probable that all the Canadian troops on this beach had been overwhelmed long before this time.

94. Not long after getting his message of 0610 hrs away, Capt. Browne himself left the beach and penetrated inland in company with Lt.-Col. Catto and a small party of officers and other men of the Royals and the R.C.A. This party appears to have been the only group of the slightest strength which got off the beach, and its experiences as described by Capt. Browne must accordingly be noted at some length.

95. The party got off the beach by cutting a path through the wire at the western end of the sea-wall. No Bangalore torpedoes were available here, as those allotted to "D" Coy had been lost overside from the L.C.A. which carried them, and "C" Coy's Bangalore men had been shot down as they landed. In these circumstances the only means of getting through the wire was the use of wire-cutters. "A path was finally cut by the Colonel, Sgt. Coles and two other ranks". Through this passage went a party consisting of, by Capt. Browne's account, six officers and 15 other ranks, consisting of Lt.-Col. Catto, Captain J.G. Housser, Lieut. Y.S. Ryerson and Lieut. T.L. Taylor, of the Royals, along with B-66765, L/Sgt. Coles, E.F., and eleven other men of this unit; and Capt. Browne himself with Lieut. J.D. McPetridge, R.C.A., and three of his men of 3 Cdn Lt A.A. Regt. Capt. Browne left his telegraphist, who was in the middle of a message, with his 66 set on the beach, telling him to follow later; but neither this signaller nor anyone else was able to follow Lt.-Col. Catto's party, apparently because machine-gun fire from a new position immediately came down on the gap in the wire. "The Colonel and his small party were now cut off from the remainder of C and D Coys on the beach. It was now nearly 0700 hrs British time." (Capt. Browne's report.)

96. Reaching the top of the hill above the west end of the sea-wall, the party cleared two large houses there, "resistance being met in the first only". Capt. Browne describes the situation now as follows:

Sounds of firing on the left flank had now died completely away. From the centre and the right flank we could hear intermittent bursts of German automatic fire and the steady detonations of their mortar bombs. From this we inferred that A and B Coys had been knocked out, and that the survivors of C and D Coys were still pinned down in the angle of the cliff,

being cut up by mortars. We discovered that we could not get back to the beach, nor could we get back to the cliff edge because of LMG fire from the left flank, up on the hill-side.

97. In these circumstances, and seeing a strong German patrol advancing from the direction of the fortified house, Lt.-Col. Catto's party moved westward along the cliff-top in the hope of making contact with the Essex Scottish. They struck west and south until they reached the main road running between PUIITS and NOTRE DAME DE BON SECOURS. Here they were just east of the six-gun 88-mm. battery at 243694 which had been one of the Royal Regiment's objectives. From the cover of woods in the vicinity of 250694, the little party watched this battery firing on British aircraft, and its performance commanded Capt. Browne's professional admiration:

The 88-mm. Battery of 6 guns on the cliff top between N.D. de BON SECOURS and PUIITS served its guns magnificently. It was low-level-bombed at least four times and machine gunned oftener by our fighters after 1000 hrs, that is, between 1000 hrs and 1600 hrs, with us as witnesses, and each time the guns were back in action within a matter of a few seconds, firing upon the departing aircraft. Once, after a low-level attack, only two guns were instantly back in action, the other times always at least four.

98. After reconnaissance which disclosed that the main beaches of DIEPPE were not visible from the cliff top nearby, that the roads in the area were commanded by enemy machine-guns, and that no ships were to be seen, the party decided to give themselves up. Capt. Browne writes:

The situation suggested that we were trapped. After long consideration the decision was taken to surrender. We surrendered at 1620 hrs.

99. Of events on the beach itself after Lt.-Col. Catto's party left it, not a great deal can be said. It is apparent that after suffering prolonged bombardment with mortar bombs, (stated by Capt. Browne to be 3-inch); shellfire from four 75-mm. infantry guns which the same invaluable witness saw in action, evidently in the general area 2569; hammering by stick grenades which he reports as having been "lobbed down from the cliff top above"; and machine-gun fire from the inaccessible German positions, the survivors of the companies on the beach surrendered. It is probable that over half of the men on the beach had by this time actually been killed, and of the remainder few can have been wholly unwounded. Capt. Browne writes, "Shortly after ten o'clock (or it may have been nearer eleven) while in the wood, we heard the survivors of the beach being marched past under guard."

100. K-25599, Gnr. Rowe, H.J., of 3 Cdn L.A.A. Regt, who was one of the men who clung for a long period to the bottom of a capsized L.C.A. a short distance from the beach, reported, "After the firing all died down the Germans came down with stretchers and started clearing the beaches."

101. Gnr. Rowe testified that attempts were made by the men on the beach to scale the cliffs :

He was with a corporal who organized a small party to attempt to get up the cliff. As soon as they came into the open three were killed and Gnr. Rowe was wounded....He saw a captain and a party try to scale the cliff. All of the party were knocked out and the captain alone got half way up the cliff and then his body came rolling down.

(d) Information and Communications, BLUE BEACH.

102. It is important to note that with respect to the misfortune on BLUE BEACH, as earlier with respect to the encounter with the enemy convoy at sea, information was extremely slow in reaching the Force Commanders, and when it did reach them it was not in the first place such as to enable them to appreciate the situation in the BLUE BEACH area with any accuracy.

103. The Flotilla Officer of "Princess Astrid" in his report attributes the poor communications with Blue Beach mainly to the fact "that only 2 ordinary signalmen were landed from the 10th Flotilla" and that the Beach Master and his party did not land. Capt. Browne throws further light on this matter. He states that the Battalion H.Q. No. 18 wireless set got wet during disembarkation, and was thus put out of action. The result was that the Battalion's only means of communication was Capt. Browne's own No. 66 set (a No.18 set modified for Naval use). This should have sufficed, as the set was in touch with "Garth" for more than two hours (see para.91, above); but for some reason it was long before any message thus passed was successfully relayed by "Garth" to "Calpe".

104. Examination of the Intelligence Log maintained on "Calpe" indicates how little information reached the Military Force Commander. At 0550 hrs (by which time all three waves had landed) the log notes "No word from Doug"; and the first definite statement concerning the Blue Beach situation (a very inaccurate one) is the entry for 0620 hrs, "R.REGT C. not landed", for which no source is given. Five minutes later the additional entry is made, "Impossible to land Blue Beach", and it is noted that this information was "passed to 4 Bde Sending him to Red Peter ", while simultaneously the Air Force was asked to bomb the "Rommel" battery inland from Blue Beach. This last request was cancelled later when it became known that the Royals were in fact ashore.

105. It is apparent that in the mistaken belief that the Royals had been repulsed and had not landed, General Roberts ordered this unit to reinforce RED BEACH, the Essex Scottish sector; and the log notes at 0640 hrs, "BLUE Beach proceeding to RED Beach".

106. The information received by "Calpe" at 0620 hrs, that the Royals had not landed, is entered in "Ferne's" Intelligence Log at 0625 in the form, "Impossible to land any troops on Blue Beach. From Navy." It is possible that

this represents a garbled version of an untimed naval message recorded as received by the Naval Force Commander from "BLUE PETER" (the BLUE BEACH Naval Beach Station): "Impossible to land anymore troops on Blue Beach". A further message, also untimed and with the same origin, ran:

Have only 20 personnel remaining can give no report. Have beach officer with us. Have about 10 soldiers plus beach party and beach master remaining.

(War Diary, "G", H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, August, 1942, Appx 51).

This clearly describes the situation in the L.C.M. in which the Beach Party had travelled (above, paras. 81-2, and cf. report of "Queen Emma's" Flotilla Officer). Until this time no messages from Captain Browne passed on by "Garth" had reached "Calpe", for at 0610 hrs the latter recorded an exchange of messages on "A" wave with H.Q. 4 Cdn Inf Bde:

Sherwood No word yet from Doug. Have you heard? Answer NO.

(War Diary "G", H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, August 1942, Appx 51).

107. Lt.-Cdr. Goulding's report indicates that he, lying off BLUE BEACH, had in fact no knowledge of what was happening on shore; for he states that when at about 0545 hrs an L.C.A. came alongside and gave him a message from "BLUE PETER" in these terms, "Please send L.C.A. in to evacuate him, he is standing against the wall", he interpreted this as indicating that the operation was proceeding according to plan and that the Beach Master wished to be transferred to another beach as arranged. He issued instructions accordingly, but cancelled them on seeing an L.C.A., probably that of Lieut. Ramsey (see below) moving in towards the beach. At this time Lt.-Cdr. Goulding was unaware that the Beach Master had not landed.

108. After trying in vain to get in touch with "Calpe" himself, Lt.-Cdr. Goulding sent a signal to M.G.B. 316 to pass to her, to the effect that the Royal Regiment "had been landed with few casualties". At 0715 hrs an M.L. ordered Lt.-Cdr. Goulding to report personally to "Calpe". This he did, he states, at about 0745 hrs, "and reported to the Force Commander that the Royal Regiment of Canada had been landed on BLUE Beach".

109. Lt.-Cdr. Goulding probably reached "Calpe" a few minutes earlier than the time he mentions, for though this ship's Intelligence Log makes no mention of the news received from him, it notes that at 0739 hrs the request for close support on "BISMARCK" (the headland east of DIEPPE) and "ROMMEL" was cancelled, and this was certainly the result of the information that the R.Regt.C. was ashore. The intelligence was evidently passed on to "Ferne" (although the actual message is not available, no outgoing messages from "Calpe" having, apparently, been preserved); and at 0740 hrs the "Ferne" log recorded, "R Regt landed Blue

Beach. Doug landed 3 coys practically intact." At 0745 hrs "Fernie" passed the news to UXBRIDGE in a message which, it would seem, turned the time of origin into the time of the event and placed upon the event an optimistic gloss which nevertheless is not at variance with the impression which Lt.-Cdr. Goulding, on his own showing, had at this time of the BLUE BEACH situation, and which quite probably derived from Lt.-Cdr. Goulding's own evidence:

Doug landed three coys intact Blue Peter 0740 going well.

C.B. 04244 (para. 218) suggests that this intelligence "may have been sent out by the enemy", but there seems no reason to doubt that its source was Lt.-Cdr. Goulding. At 0817 hrs the "Fernie" log records what was doubtless a more detailed version of his evidence :

Calpe reports Doug 3 coys OK. Hvy fire from fortified house. Took cover - no further news. No news of 4th Coy.

110. Lt.-Cdr. Goulding states that while he was on board "Calpe", "a signal was received from 'Garth' saying that BLUE Beach was asking for help and evacuation". This appeal had probably been sent to "Garth" over Captain Browne's 66 set after Captain Browne himself had left the beach. It may be the one message passed by "Garth" of which the text is preserved in the "G" War Diary of H.Q. 2 Cdn Div. It is untimed :

From Blue Beach is there any possible chance of getting us off.

(War Diary, "G", H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, August, 1942, Appx 51.)

It would appear that this or a similar message, received possibly two and three-quarter hours after the first touchdown on BLUE BEACH, was the first really reliable indication received by General Roberts of the situation there. As a result of it, Lt.-Cdr. Goulding states, he was instructed by the Naval Force Commander "to take an M.L. for close support and make an attempt to evacuate BLUE Beach".

111. At or about the same time the Force Commanders made strenuous efforts to obtain information concerning the true situation on BLUE BEACH from both Air and Naval sources. At 0755 and again at 0820 hrs Brigadier Mann sent messages to UXBRIDGE requesting "Tac R" on BLUE BEACH, the "White House", the "ROMMEL" battery, and "BISMARCK". The "Detailed Chronological Air Narrative" (C.B. 04244, Annex 7, Appx "B") notes that such a request was received at 0807 hrs and an order "passed to Gatwick". No reference to receipt of the second message is found, nor is there any record of a Tac R report having subsequently been received. The report of No. 35 Wing, R.A.F., operating from GATWICK, contains no clear reference to this task, but it is noted that Sorties Nos. 22 and 23, which would coincide with it in time, "force landed".

112. The Naval efforts were equally fruitless. M.S. "Locust" reports as follows :

At 0830 ship was ordered to reconnoitre Blue beach and report, but nothing was seen owing to dense smoke screen.

(e) Attempts at Withdrawal.

113. The story of the attempts to withdraw troops from BLUE BEACH is a difficult and complex one, and there is considerable conflict of evidence.

114. The story begins with the action of a single L.C.A. (apparently L.C.A. 209, a craft of "Queen Emma's" flotilla commanded, it appears, by Lieut. Ramsey) which made an independent attempt at evacuation, evidently arising out of the message which, as mentioned above, Lt.-Cdr. Goulding interpreted as a request for withdrawal of the beach party. Timing is doubtful, but it seems probable that this attempt was made in the vicinity of 0600 hrs. The episode is thus described by the Flotilla Officer of "Queen Emma" :

Shortly after 0700 a radio message was sent out from Blue Beach asking all L.C.As. to return to the beach to evacuate the beach party. L.C.S.8 which was still patrolling off the beach and L.C.A. 209 were the only craft to pick up this message and the L.C.A. went in under cover of the L.C.S. Upon reaching the beach the boat was swamped with soldiers and forced to retire. Very heavy fire was encountered and many of the soldiers were killed or wounded. Owing to the jam and excess of personnel in the boat it was impossible for the doors to be housed up, and a fair amount of water was shipped. When the craft was about fifty yards from the beach, she was hit with some heavy guns and capsized. The enemy still continued firing and as far as is known only two of the crew and one soldier were saved from the boat.

115. What appears to be the same incident is described by the Flotilla Officer of "Princess Astrid", who states that after the craft of the second wave had withdrawn from the beach and joined "Princess Astrid's" flotilla offshore, "Lieutenant Ramsey, R.N.V.R., who had been the last to disembark troops on Blue Beach returned to the beach" and was seen to touch down. His boat "broached to" and was subsequently pushed off from the shore, only to be overturned by "a burst of gunfire". "Men in the water were seen to be picked off by snipers." Further evidence is that of Lt.-Cdr. Goulding, who as already noted reports seeing an L.C.A. proceeding towards shore after he had received the request for evacuation at about 0545 hrs. He states that this craft was supported by L.C.S.8, and that he subsequently learned that as she pulled off she was "heavily shelled, cannon fired, swamped and overturned".

116. There is no lack of military evidence on this episode, as the R.Regt.C. file of personal stories contains six individual accounts by men who were in this craft, Major

Wright interviewed still another man in hospital, Gnr. Rowe provides another personal account, Cpl. Ellis though never in the craft witnessed the incident, and Capt. Browne refers to what appears to be the same episode, though in slightly different terms.

117. A particularly vivid description is that of B-67002, Pte. Simpson, E.J. (H.Q. Coy, R.Regt.C.) :

Later an A.L. craft landed on the beach and orders were given to board her. There was a terrible scramble and nearly everyone (still alive) made for the small ramp doors. The slaughter was awful. The boat had to be pushed off the beach. It was so full of holes it began to sink. At that time, I would venture to say, at least fifty men were aboard. Bullets were still pouring in and a bomb landed alongside. It turned over on its keel and stayed afloat. A few men swam away, while others and myself clung to the still floating craft. We were only about a hundred yards from the shore and were still being blasted by enemy fire. From what I saw, there was no life on the beach.

Not less striking is the evidence of Gnr. Rowe concerning the experience of the men clinging to the boat :

He reports that if anybody on shore or where he was 100 yards off shore moved the slightest bit, the move was rewarded with a sniper's bullet. The chap clinging next to him was hit three times immediately after moving from the pain of his wounds.

(War Diary, 3 Cdn L.A.A. Regt,  
August, 1942, Appx 6.)

118. Cpl. Ellis was at the top of the west cliff above the beach when he saw this L.C.A. on the shore. It was still there when he reached the beach, and he helped to push it off, but did not enter it. He saw the craft turn away from the shore, and when he looked at it again it had capsized. Cpl. Ellis then entered the water and began to swim. The fact that his watch stopped at 0630 hrs suggests that the time for this episode given by "Queen Emma's" Flotilla Officer (above) is about an hour too late. The evidence of Capt. Browne, who witnessed the incident before he left the beach some time previous to 0700 hrs, points to the same conclusion. This officer is alone in describing the L.C.A. as an ambulance craft, "bearing a large red 'A' on its standard", but for the rest his account is in general similar. He places the incident at "about six o'clock", and remarks that the rush to get aboard the L.C.A. was "the only instance suggestive of panic that I saw or heard of on BLUE beach".

119. Of the men who swam away from the capsized craft, some - among them B-66530, Sgt. Legate, J.E., R.Regt.C. - were subsequently picked up and brought back to England. Several of those who continued to cling to the boat were rescued, apparently nearly four hours later, under singularly dramatic circumstances.

120. The report of Commander D.B. Wyburd, R.N. Appendix 7 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander) states that "at about 0950" L.C.P. (L)s of Group 6 (which had previously put the Cameron Highlanders of Canada ashore at GREEN BEACH) were ordered from the boat pool "to endeavour to bring off troops from Yellow beaches". "At about 1005" they closed what they believed to be YELLOW I BEACH, but which proved in fact to be BLUE BEACH. Among the personnel of Group 6 were a considerable number of Canadian officers and ratings. On 24 Aug 42, Sub-Lieut. J.E. Boak, R.C.N.V.R., commanding L.C.P.(L) 19, gave the writer a full account of the incident, confirmed on the same day by Sub-Lieuts. J.E. O'Rourke and W.R. Sinclair, both R.C.N.V.R., who had also been present. They stated that as the unarmoured landing craft approached the shore they came under a perfect hurricane of fire from artillery, mortars and machine-guns. A group of soldiers were seen close inshore, clinging to what appeared to be a raft. Two boats, one of which was Mr. Boak's, closed the raft (which was in fact the capsized L.C.A. already referred to) to take off the men upon it. As L.C.P.(L) 19 passed close to the L.C.A., her crew shouted to the soldiers to jump, and four of them caught hold of ropes trailing from the boat. Three of these men were pulled into the L.C.P.(L); the fourth dropped off and was presumably drowned. The other boat, believed to have been L.C.P.(L) 80, commanded by Sub-Lieut. B. Franklin, R.N.V.R., picked up the rest of the men on the L.C.A., but this act of gallantry cost the lives of two of Mr. Franklin's crew (including a Canadian rating, A.B. J.A. McKenna, V-1540, who was killed while returning the fire from the shore) while Mr. Franklin himself was wounded.

121. Among the soldiers thus rescued by Mr. Boak was Pte. Simpson, whose account of the affair tallies in detail with Mr. Boak's. He states that the men saved with him were B-68183, Pte. Roberts, L.W. and B-67403, Pte. Wallace, J.N., both of R.Regt.C. The fourth man, who was not saved, was a Pte. Armstrong. Two men of this name and rank were reported missing from R.Regt.C. after the operation.

122. The attempt at evacuation ordered by the Naval Force Commander during Lt.-Cdr. Goulding's visit to "Calpe" produced no results, no craft reaching the shore. Accounts of this episode differ materially on important points.

123. Lt.-Cdr. Goulding's report states that on receiving his orders he communicated them to M.L. 291, and in company with this craft, an L.C.S. "whose turret was jammed", and several L.C.As., proceeded towards BLUE BEACH. At first there was some difficulty in finding it, but it was finally located: "The beach itself was not visible, but the silhouette of the valley above the fog was quite plain." There had already been some controversy with "the Commanding Officer of the M.L.", who had suggested that "the Landing Craft should proceed into the cliff and go along to the Beach by themselves". This however was not done, and when the flotilla came abreast of the beach Lt.-Cdr. Goulding "asked the Commanding Officer of the M.L. to bombard the White House with his 2-pdr., and he replied that he would give us what support he thought necessary." Lt.-Cdr. Goulding describes the sequel as follows:

15. With the exception of 2 L.C.As, I ordered Landing Craft to stay where they were, and led the two L.C.As in towards the beach. After proceeding about 100 yards, fire opened up from the shore on a very heavy scale of all types of weapons, and it was quite impossible to proceed further without some fire support. The M.L. did not exchange (return ?) the shots.

124. A different account of the episode is given by Lt.-Cdr. C.W. McMullen, R.N., who had earlier led in the landing craft going to WHITE BEACH and had supported the landing there. This officer was in M.L. 291. At a time which he cannot specify he was instructed by Captain J.D. Luce in "Calpe" to help Lt.-Cdr. Goulding with the BLUE BEACH withdrawal. He then proceeded towards BLUE BEACH, followed by four L.C.As. and an L.C.M., and by Lt.-Cdr. Goulding in an L.C.S. Lt.-Cdr. McMullen proceeds :

When in a position I reckoned to be east of Blue Beach I closed the land until I could just see the cliffs above me (at) about 500 yards distance. I recognised the Water Tower and shape of the cliff as being that of the East Cliff above Blue Beach and I then asked Lieut. Comdr. Goulding to come alongside in his L.C.S. suggesting that he went inshore with two boats well to the East and then work west towards Blue Beach to see if he could see anything.

He replied that he considered it hopeless to approach Blue Beach without the support of a bombarding destroyer.

This discussion was terminated by the smoke haze lifting from the cliffs and a heavy fire being opened on us from a variety of machine guns along the cliff tops.

The boats withdrew, under the cover of a smoke screen laid by M.L. 291 in the course of which her First Lieutenant was seriously wounded, and the attempt was abandoned.

Two immediate signals were soon afterwards received but as M.L. 291 had the incorrect syko cards I had to go alongside another ship to get the signals ordering evacuation.

125. The only other account of this episode found is that of the Flotilla Officer of "Queen Emma", who, after describing the receipt of the orders for evacuation at about 1000 hrs, writes :

Lt. Cdr. Goulding took charge of the craft off Blue Beach and tried to effect a landing. The enemy fire was far too strong for this to be attempted and the craft were forced to retire. An endeavour was made to obtain the help of some heavier support but eventually the landing craft were ordered to return to England.

126. Lt.-Cdr. Goulding reports that after failing to contact "Calpe" to obtain further instructions, he finally passed a signal to her via M.G.B. 316. He accurately reports

"the sense" of this message, the actual text of which, as recorded at H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, ran: "Could not see provision (? position) Blue Beach owing to fog and heavy fires from cliff and White House. Nobody evacuated." (1 Cdn Corps file Ops 3-3-1-2 Div, Vol. II) (now at ACTON). The time of origin is 1145 hrs.

127. The available evidence is so conflicting that it seems impossible to determine how far this attempt at withdrawal was pushed.

128. It is desirable to try to fix the time at which the attempt was made. "Queen Emma's" Flotilla Officer (para. 125, above) is not necessarily writing of events in strict chronological order. The approximate time is indicated by Lt.-Cdr. Goulding's visit to "Calpe", beginning about 0740 hrs, and by the fact stated by Lt.-Cdr. McMullen, that the orders for evacuation were received shortly after the attempt had been abandoned. These orders were issued about 0930 hrs. The time when the troops remaining alive on BLUE BEACH surrendered is not at present known; but Captain Browne's statement that they were marched away "shortly after ten o'clock (or it may have been nearer eleven)" suggests that at the time of this abortive attempt there were still men to be evacuated on BLUE BEACH.

129. Later in the morning another attempt was made, and this was persevered in to the extent of the loss of one landing craft. Lt.-Cdr. Goulding's report mentions this episode :

The other half of Group 3 Landing Craft, I subsequently learnt, under Lieutenant Hewitt, H.M.S. "PRINCESS ASTRID", made an attempt to evacuate BLUE Beach without success.

The report of Lieut. Hewitt, "Princess Astrid's" Flotilla Officer, gives a more complete account.

Three L.C.As. and one L.C.S. proceeded to Blue Beach by orders received from an M.L. to attempt an evacuation. When in close proximity to the beach one L.C.A. (Lieutenant Mace, R.N.V.R., 10th Flotilla) was sunk, probably by bombing, and the remaining craft made several attempts to approach the beach under heavy gunfire. One of the last attempts to reach Blue Beach was made shortly after 1100. Fire from the beach was still terrific and there was no sign of life on the beach.

It seems quite probable that at the time when these efforts were made the remnant of the Royals had already been overwhelmed.

130. It seems apparent from all the evidence that the only craft which actually touched down on BLUE BEACH for the purpose of re-embarking troops was Lieut. Ramsey's L.C.A.

Casualties, BLUE BEACH

131. The casualties suffered by the Royal Regiment of Canada in this engagement were extraordinarily heavy. The unit's embarkation strength was 26 officers and 528 other ranks, a total of 554 all ranks (Figures furnished by Cdn Section, G.H.Q., 2nd Echelon, and corrected by Overseas Records Office as at 31 Dec 42, C.M.H.Q. file 18/DIEPPE/1/2). Of these, only two officers and 54 other ranks returned to England after the operation; and of those returning, as reported by the unit, one officer and 29 other ranks were detained in hospital, and six other ranks died of wounds. Of those reported by the unit as "Returned safe" (one officer and 25 other ranks), some had certainly suffered minor wounds (Casualty Return, War Diary, R.Regt.C., August 1942, Appx 9). Lt.-Col. A.H. Fraser, who took command of the unit immediately after the operation, believes that the final totals of men returned are two officers and 57 other ranks; but Records Office figures (31 Dec 42) are two officers and 62 other ranks. Casualty Returns compiled by Canadian Overseas Records Office, as of 1 Mar 43, give the total casualties for this unit as 26 officers and 498 other ranks, suggesting that only 30 other ranks returned wholly unwounded (C.M.H.Q. file 18/DIEPPE/2). It is certain that no officer came back unwounded; Capt. Anderson suffered a head wound and Capt. Catto lost an eye and was otherwise wounded; no other officer returned.

132. As of 1 Mar 43, information reaching the Canadian Overseas Records Office was that 14 officers and 252 other ranks of the unit were known to be prisoners of war, in addition to two officers and eight other ranks known to have died of wounds after capture. How many of these were wounded is not known, but as already suggested the number must be very large. On the same date six officers and 135 other ranks were listed as killed, and two officers and 64 other ranks as missing; and in the circumstances it must be assumed that the great majority of the missing were either killed in action or drowned. There can be few if any cases in the history of the Canadian Army of units suffering a larger proportion of fatal casualties in half a day's fighting.

133. The only unit at DIEPPE suffering a larger number of casualties than the Royals was the Essex Scottish, whose total as of 1 Mar 43 was 532 all ranks, or eight more than that for R.Regt.C. The Essex, however, had a larger number of men taken prisoner, and their fatal casualties were considerably fewer (only four officers and 64 other ranks being listed as killed, and one officer and 35 other ranks as missing).

134. The embarkation strength returned for the Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada for this operation is four officers and 107 other ranks. This figure clearly includes not only the company engaged at BLUE BEACH but also four mortar detachments employed off RED BEACH; it must exclude the men wounded in the grenade accident and disembarked before sailing. The unit's casualties as of 1 Mar 43 were reported as a total of three officers and 71

other ranks. Of these, two officers and 64 other ranks were known to be prisoners of war, and one officer was missing. These casualties, including only six men wounded, obviously do not include those caused by the accident. (C.M.H.Q. file 18/DIEPPE/2.)

135. Embarkation strength for 4 Fd Regt, R.C.A., was three officers and 20 other ranks. None of this party returned. Two other ranks are listed as killed. Two officers and 17 other ranks are reported prisoners of war. The third officer (Capt. Browne) was reported at 1 Nov 42 as "illegally detained" in Unoccupied France, having escaped from the Germans; subsequently he fell again into Axis hands when the enemy marched into this region on 11 Nov 42; but he escaped from the Italians and has now returned to England. One other rank is missing. (C.M.H.Q. file 18/DIEPPE/2.)

136. 3 L.A.A. Regt, R.C.A., suffered losses of one officer and one other rank killed, one officer and nine other ranks prisoners of war, and seven other ranks missing. Although the unit's embarkation strength was nine officers and 236 other ranks, the great majority were intended for an A.A. role on the main beaches and never landed; and these casualties were all suffered by the small detachment (two officers and 24 other ranks) landed on BLUE BEACH. Of this, seven other ranks returned, of whom three were wounded (War Diary, 3 Cdn L.A.A. Regt, August, 1942, Appx 6).

THE CANADIAN FLANK ATTACKS. II : GREEN BEACH.  
THE SOUTH SASKATCHEWAN REGIMENT AND  
THE QUEEN'S OWN CAMERON HIGHLANDERS  
OF CANADA.

137. The Canadian landing on the right or western flank, at POURVILLE, was carried out by the South Saskatchewan Regiment (commanded by Lt.-Col. C.C.I. Merritt, and designated by the codename "CECIL") and the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada (commanded by Lt.-Col. A.C. Gostling and known by the codename "GOOSE"). As already briefly explained, the South Saskatchewan were to land at Zero (0450 hrs) and establish a bridgehead through which the Camerons, landing half an hour later, would advance to attack the aerodrome and, if time permitted, the Divisional Headquarters.

(a) Action of the South Saskatchewan Regiment

138. The Detailed Military Plan (Appendix "D") laid down the following general principles for the attack in this sector :

2. S Sask R MUST secure GREEN beach with the minimum delay to enable Camerons of C to pass through

without opposition. GREEN beach station will only close down when it is assured that WHITE and RED beaches are in our hands and therefore that a route for withdrawal is open to S Sask R and Camerons of C.

In greater detail, it was provided that one company of S. Sask.R. would immediately operate against the high ground to the east of POURVILLE, capturing two L.A.A. guns at 212683 (near ST.NICOLAS) as well as an R.D.F. station on the cliff at 208683, and other L.A.A. guns nearby. This company would subsequently consolidate, make contact with the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry advancing from DIEPPE itself, and assist in the capture of LES 4 VENTS Farm, on the high ground at 213675. A second company, also moving eastward, was to capture A.A. guns on this high ground at 211678 (referred to as light guns in the Detailed Military Plan, but shown as heavy on the Intelligence map), assist the R.H.L.I. (who would have one troop of tanks co-operating) in capturing LES 4 VENTS Farm. Subsequently this company would consolidate, and would select and mark an emergency landing ground for British aircraft in the 4 VENTS area.

139. Another company would operate west from POURVILLE, clearing a machine-gun post at 185678, on the cliff, and holding the locality until the Camerons had landed and the beach was clear of craft. The balance of the unit (i.e., Battalion H.Q. and one company) would occupy LA MAISON BLANCHE in POURVILLE, spoken of in the Plan as an Officers' Mess, consolidate to secure GREEN BEACH and make contact with the R.H.L.I. at LES 4 VENTS. Subsequently the unit as a whole would cover the west flank of the DIEPPE perimeter, its point of junction with the R.H.L.I. being buildings at 215671, south-east of LES 4 VENTS.

140. As already noted, the South Saskatchewan were carried across the Channel in the infantry landing ships "Princess Beatrix" (in which Lt.-Col. Merritt was Army Officer in charge) and "Invicta". These ships carried a total of 10 L.C.As. and two L.C.Ms. (Detailed Military Plan, Appx "C"). Trans-shipment and approach were carried out successfully, and the craft touched down on GREEN BEACH only a very few minutes late. The Flotilla Officers of the two L.S.Is. agree in fixing the time at 0452 hrs (Appendices 3 D and 3 E to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander). Information collected from various individuals, apparently by an officer of H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde, and appended to the unit War Diary (August, 1942) is to the effect that "All Coys landed approx the same time 0455 hours"; and L-13282, Pte. Haggard, W.A., states that after landing he heard someone on the beach say that the time was "five minutes to five".

141. The S.Sask.R. appear to have achieved a considerable measure of surprise. The information collected as above is to the effect that "very few casualties occurred on beach landings", and Major (now Lt.-Col.) J.E. McRae (second-in-command) writes, "Actually we were on the beach before fire was opened and we got over very quickly..." Pte. Haggard states that there was no enemy fire during the landing, but that some machine-gun fire was directed at the L.C.As. as they

retired from the shore. The evidence of "Invicta's" Stilla Officer is that the landing was "unopposed except that L.C.A.315 which touched down 2 minutes later on the extreme right flank was fired upon by a light machine-gun post. Military personnel in this craft suffered several casualties as they disembarked". (Appendix 3E to Enclosure No.13, Report of Naval Force Commander.) Many men of the unit, in their personal accounts written later, suggested that the enemy had purposely held his fire until after the landing.

142. Major McRae states that the whole unit landed as one wave. The order of companies from right to left (i.e., from west to east), as determined by their respective roles after landing, was "C" Coy, "B" Coy, Bn H.Q., "D" Coy, "A" Coy and the Special Platoon. The last-named sub-unit had the task of capturing the wired strong point under the east cliff which appears on the Intelligence map at 198680. "C" Coy was to be the company to deal with the area to the south and east of POURVILLE. "B" Coy was to clear POURVILLE itself and deal with a wired position at 198668, on the west bank of the SCIE some distance inland. "D" Coy was to capture the position at LES 4 VENTS. "A" Coy was to capture the R.D.F. Station, the searchlight position on the cliff edge to the west of it, the battery at 210678, and the Light A.A. guns at 212683.

143. Capt. H.B. Carswell (6 Fd Regt, R.C.A.), who landed with Bn H.Q., states that the "whole party" (meaning presumably the whole unit) appeared to have landed west of the River SCIE "instead of both sides" of it as had been intended. Examination of the personal narratives written by members of the Special Platoon seems to indicate that this was not the case with this force, for none of them mention crossing the bridge in the village (though a possible exception is an obscure reference in the report of L-12082, L/Sgt Kerr, R.K.); but L-12601, Pte. Wentzel, G.C., states that the platoon after landing "went along the wall to the left of where we landed for about 100 yds", and this might possibly have entailed crossing the river at its mouth, where it was very shallow. Major McRae's opinion is that the unit as a whole was landed considerably further to the right of the beach than had been intended, and that this slowed the initial progress of the left companies towards their objectives. Numerous personal stories leave no doubt whatever that "A" and "D" Coys were landed west of the SCIE and had to cross the river by the bridge in the village or by other means.

144. The village of POURVILLE, which lies on what is in effect a narrow dyke between the marshy flats of the SCIE and the Channel, was separated from the beach by a sea-wall some eight feet high, "heavily covered with wire" (Capt. Carswell). Passages were cut through the wire and the companies entered the town. Battalion H.Q. was established in a garage at 195679, about 100 yards from the beach (Major McRae).

145. One of the objectives of "C" Coy, as described by Major McRae, was the "probable M.T. shed" at 191673, on the high ground some 800 yards south-west of the village. It was also to deal with the machine-gun posts nearby, including

evidently the one on the cliff-edge at 185678. Among this Company's first tasks after landing was the clearing of a large white hotel overlooking the beach (presumably the very long white building which appears prominently just behind the sea-wall in air photographs). This building turned out to be the quarters of a group of foreigners, some of whom at least were Belgians, brought into the area for forced labour. Clearing them out took some time, and some casualties were inflicted on the German guards here. French people in the houses nearby told the troops that the German forces were in position on the hill behind the hotel.

146. No. 13 Platoon, commanded by L-12403, Sgt. Long, H.E., now advanced up the hill to make contact with the enemy. At the top of the first rise the platoon came under fire, Sgt. Long was wounded, there were other casualties, and for a moment the platoon's advance was suspended for want of leadership. The initiative was then taken by two private soldiers, L-13282, Pte. Haggard, W.A., and L-13504, Pte. Berthelot, G.B. These men proceeded to organize an attack on the German position, which consisted of slit trenches near the large house at 192678 (La Maison Blanche), and according to Pte. Haggard was held by about fifty Germans with four machine-guns. Two sections of the platoon being pinned down by fire in front of this position, Pte. Haggard took the third and placed it where it could take the position in the rear; and having instructed the other sections to attack when they heard fire from that direction, he led the third section against the German position. The Germans opened fire upon his party, and Pte. Berthelot was wounded while attacking across the open and firing his Bren gun from the hip. The enemy, however, gave in comparatively easily when they found themselves being subjected to an encircling attack. Pte. Haggard states that twelve enemy prisoners were taken here, all the rest of the German detachment being killed. He took the prisoners back and handed them over in POURVILLE, picking up five more on the way. (A considerable number of prisoners were taken in and around POURVILLE; the evidence of Lieut. Buchanan is that the S.Sask.R. had taken 50 to 60 by 0800 hrs.) Various soldiers, including L-12225, Pte. Clarke, E.A., and L-12549, L/Cpl. James, F.C., state that No. 13 Platoon subsequently moved to higher ground nearby, and that here there was some sniping.

147. No.14 Platoon had successfully occupied the M.T. shed at once, finding no enemy there (statement of L-13405, Cpl. Devine, H.W.). No.15 Platoon, after remaining in the main street of the village for about twenty minutes and "killing fifteen Huns", "took the first road on the right" and moved up to their objective, which was probably the machine-gun post on the cliff-edge. Lieut. L.R. McIlveen, commanding this platoon, states that the objective was found to be "in a disused condition". He subsequently withdrew his platoon to the Maison Blanche, where some enemy soldiers still in the vicinity were killed or captured.

148. In "C" Company's area all objectives had been captured, and the situation was now well in hand for the moment; but in sectors still more important to the success of the operation a smaller degree of success was achieved. As already noted, "A" and "D" Coys, whose objectives lay

on the high ground east of POURVILLE, had been landed west of the SCIE, and were thus obliged to cross the bridge across the river at 196679. This bridge was completely commanded by prepared German positions on the high ground to the east, and it is clear that the enemy (who, even if perhaps momentarily surprised, was clearly in a high state of general alertness) was in full readiness in these positions before the Companies were able to get across the bridge and make progress towards their objectives.

149. The first portion of the unit to come into action to the east of POURVILLE was probably the Special Platoon, commanded by Lieut. L.L. England, which as already noted landed on the extreme left of the battalion and probably did not have to cross the bridge. This force did not encounter heavy opposition immediately after landing, but on working to the left towards the strong point which was its objective it came under fire at a road block "about 100 yds from where we landed" (L-12979, Cpl. Conroy, H.A.), which Major McRae believes to have been near the curve in the road at 198680. Here Lieut. England was wounded, and there were other casualties. L-12349, Sgt. Neil, R.R., took command. Reconnaissance led to the conclusion that it was impossible to clear the strong point ahead without assistance, and Bn H.Q. was asked by wireless for mortar support, which however did not materialize (evidence of L-12499, Pte. Johnson, O.A.). The Special Platoon then moved to the right (i.e., inland), and threw in its lot with part of "A" Coy which now came up (evidence of L-12313, Sgt. Richardson, W.A., L-12082, L/Sgt Kerr, R.K., and L-12979, Cpl Conroy, H.A.).

150. "A" Coy, it will be recalled, was to capture the R.D.F. Station, and with this in view was landed on the left flank of the battalion. The company crossed the sea-wall west of the river, and the platoons made their way to the left along the main road through POURVILLE to the bridge. Many soldiers note that this road was heavily wired on both sides, evidently with a view to forcing an attacker to expose himself to the fire of the German automatic weapons firing on fixed lines from the high ground. The curve in the road already mentioned was to be the company rendezvous, but it lay beyond the bridge. L-12016, Sgt Smith, B.H., writes :

I went over the bridge followed by one section and came under very heavy LMG fire, the remainder of the Pl then crossed under the bridge.....

As we advanced from the bridge the fire was very heavy from two pill boxes situated one above the other, well up on the forward slope of the hill. There were snipers and riflemen from the slope of the hill and back along the road.

The MGs seemed to be firing on fixed arcs and were very accurate and all were mutual supporting, covering nearly all dead ground.

151. The enemy fire was returned, and the men with Sgt. Smith took cover in the vicinity of the road block and engaged the enemy in the pillboxes and individual snipers.

The pillbox at the bend of the road was cleared; this was probably the position dealt with by L-12179, Pte. Sawden, C.E., whose gallantry at this point is attested by many witnesses. L-12049, Pte. Wanner, P., for example, reports,

Past the road block, running along the base of a hill I saw Pte. Sawden, C., take out an MG post. Pte. Haselhan threw smoke and Pte. Sawden went forward under covering fire and threw grenades into the post.

Pte. Sawden is now reported killed in action.

152. At this point further portions of "A" Coy came up and Capt. T.M. Osten took command. The company, with the survivors of the Special Platoon, now attempted to force its way through to the R.D.F. Station. The route followed was evidently along the road running inland along the base of the hill, and then uphill at a point where the trees in the vicinity of 202678, and the little valley running in the direction of the R.D.F. Station, gave some hope of a covered approach. It was found, however, that every route was covered by enemy fire. Sgt. Smith's narrative, possibly the clearest account of this episode, continues:

As we came up behind a hedge row we were met with very heavy MG fire from two hills and were forced to ground. We tried to beat down his fire and advance but this was impossible. Four truck loads of reinforcements were seen coming up to these posns.

We then moved back about 50 yds and to the right, planning a right flanking movement. Here again we came under very heavy MG fire, the enemy guns always supporting one another. Here we were joined by more of our own men and some of the Camerons of Canada. Lieut. Dickin joined us at this point and displayed great heroism.

The Germans then brought mortar fire to bear on us, which was very accurate. We could do nothing here so tried a left flanking movement. Here we met the same results. We were in a small orchard with a few houses scattered around, some containing a few Germans, and a few in the trees. We cleared these, but came under heavy mortar fire, MG, and incendiary fire. This gun seemed to be the same size as a two pounder, could be fired as in AA or at troops at a very rapid rate.

Here a French family assisted us by dressing our wounded....

Both Lieut. L.L. Dickin and Lieut. G. Stiles speak, like Sgt. Smith, of two successive flank attacks which failed.

153. Elements of "A" Coy apparently got within a short distance of the R.D.F. Station, which was found to be very heavily wired and defended. One soldier's comment is, "When we reached the RDF station we found the enemy too strong for us with the weapons we had. Arty was badly needed". (L-13396, L/Cpl Bales, A.F.). Fire support was requested, but could not be brought to bear (see below).

154. With respect to the attempt of "D" Coy to cross to grips with the Four Winds Farm position, the evidence of Lieut. (now Capt.) J.S. Edmondson is that the company scaled the seawall and passed on to the main road, where it turned left to cross the bridge. Mr. Edmondson believes that the Company Commander, Major J.C. MacTavish, and two runners were the first to cross, and that portions of Nos. 16, 17 and 18 Platoons followed, the men either rushing across the bridge or swimming or rafting across the river. The bridge was still under heavy fire. Two soldiers' evidence may be quoted. L-13191, L/Cpl McKenzie, H., writes :

... We ... got over the wall and well into town before we were fired on, which was at the concrete bridge at the river. The bridge was covered with fire from the hill to the left and made it very hard for us to get across. Some of our boys got over the bridge some swam the river. I for one had a tough time swimming the river as my equipment dragged me down. As we crossed the river I heard mtr fire for the first time.

L-13416, Pte. Krohn, J., tells of casualties suffered in the attempt to rush the bridge :

The main street was easy to be seen, so we dashed for it and turned left to cross the bridge. L/Cpl Chilton, Evenden, Carswell, Pickford and myself were fired upon when we reached half way across, Chilton, Evenden and Pickford made a mad dash for the other side, Carswell was wounded together with two other boys beside me. It was too late for us to be able to make the dash. One more boy fell right beside me, so I flattened out, rolled myself over the side, into the Canal at the same time dragging one of the boys with me. The bridge was under heavy fire by this time. The rest of the company had to wade the Canal.

Pte. Krohn describes how a pillbox directly ahead, commanding the bridge, was silenced by "anti-tank fire" - i.e., with a Boys rifle. This may be the same position reported as cleared (probably a little earlier) by Pte. Sawden. It is quite likely that in the fighting immediately east of POURVILLE posts cleared of the enemy were subsequently reoccupied by him.

155. It was at this point, apparently, that the battalion's Commanding Officer intervened personally in the difficult situation to the east of the village. The evidence of Lieut. L.L. Dickin, who was acting as Intelligence Officer and was at Bn H.Q., is that when it became clear that "A" and "D" Coys were "having a stiff time", Lt.-Col. Merritt, who until then had evidently remained at his headquarters, went forward to see for himself. Lieut. J.R. Nesbitt, commanding No. 17 Platoon, has told how he and some of his men were held up at the bridge by a machine-gun firing on fixed lines, and how Lt.-Col. Merritt came up at this moment, "and decided we should dash over the bridge". Mr. Nesbitt writes, "He led the way and we crossed OK and I do not think we had any casualties".

156. This was not the only party which Lt.-Col. Merritt carried across this fire-swept passage by the force of his own example. Capt. Carswell writes :

Lt.-Col. Merritt led several parties across the bridge in POURVILLE which was swept by machine gun, mortar and fd gun fire continually. He was constantly exposing himself. On many occasions he crossed over the bridge, urging his men forward and calling, "See, there is no danger here". The men followed him splendidly but were shot down time after time.

Lieut. Edmondson tells of what he himself saw :

More than half of our Coy were across the bridge when I arrived. The Colonel, when he saw we were being held up, crossed the bridge several times urging the men forward, and the men followed. The dead were piled 2 deep for about 50 ft along the bridge.

At the time when the recommendation of Lt.-Col. Merritt for the Victoria Cross which he subsequently received was under consideration, Lt.-Col. (now Brigadier) M. Noel visited the S.Sask.R. to investigate this episode. The evidence which he collected, and which was summarized in the citation for the award, was to the effect that this gallant officer "personally led the survivors of at least four parties in turn across the bridge".

157. After thus contributing to getting "D" Coy over the bridge, Lt.-Col. Merritt organized further advance under fire. Capt. Carswell and Lieuts. Edmondson and Nesbitt all speak of the manner in which he carried the men forward, and Lieut. Edmondson writes, "He led an attack right up to a pill box and threw grenades inside". Further evidence of the inspiring example which he set at this point is that of L-12128, Sgt. McBride, B.P. :

The first time I met the Col. we were over the bridge. There was heavy fire coming down on the road as I joined a group of men who were held up. I heard the Col. speak and he said "We must get ahead lads, we need more men up front as quick as possible, who's coming with me". I replied, "We are all going with you". He said, "Good lads, let's go". We ran up the road with Col. Merritt leading, disregarding all danger, he led us straight up the road and after about 40 yards he stopped. Soon the Col. said, "Are you ready again?", we answered, "O.K. Sir", and away we went again right up to the road block. There we left Col. Merritt and went to rejoin "A" Coy.

158. In spite of the Commanding Officer's gallantry and the courage of his men, the lofty Four Winds position was not taken. "D" Coy pushed on towards it, and was joined by some officers and men of the Camerons who had now landed and come forward. Both Lieut. Edmondson and L-12526, L/Sgt

Coldwell, J.W., speak of an attempt by Major McTavish put in an attack on the "right flank" which was frustrated by the enemy's mortar and machine-gun fire. L/Sgt Coldwell writes,

At this point we captured two prisoners and also suffered a few casualties. At this point Pte Fenner was wounded very badly being shot in both legs while engaging the enemy in Bren Gun fire, which he was doing very effectively. We dragged him down the hill on his back where we dressed his wounds...

Another account by the same witness states that Pte. Fenner "crawled up on the hill and walked straight into enemy positions firing a bren gun from his hip and reached the top of hill killing a considerable amount of Germans". L-12515, Pte. Fenner, O.O., was subsequently awarded the Military Medal.

159. Major McRae states that one section, under L-22805, Sgt. Williams, K.A., did actually reach the edge of the Four Winds position, by an attack delivered straight up the hillside from the valley of the SCIE, a route which had been thought impracticable. The section was forced out by converging fire, some of it from enemy positions up the valley inland, but it withdrew in safety. Sgt. Williams' own written account is laconic in the extreme :

After we crossed the bridge we turned right followed road for 500 yds. Consolidated with some C. of C. and "A" Coy. Made our way over road, up hill and reached our objective. We killed several Germans and were later forced to withdraw and fought a rearguard action suffering light casualties. We withdrew to road and took up firing position...

160. When it became apparent that "D" Coy was unable to carry out its task at Four Winds Farm, it was ordered by Lt.-Col. Merritt "to swing left and assist A Coy on the R.D.F. station" (evidence of Major McRae). Lieut. Edmondson states that the order to help "A" Coy was received before the whole of "D" had had time to reach its rendezvous. The combined efforts of all the men available, however, were inadequate to the task in the face of the enemy's skilfully sited machine-guns and mortars. Supporting fire by artillery or 3-inch mortars was urgently required, and it could not be provided. Major McRae writes :

Requests by both A and D Coys for arty support were passed to the F.O.O. who immediately went forward. Fire brought down was not effective and was of no assistance in helping these coys forward, they called for mortar fire at this point and we were unable to give this as our detachments had been knocked out by this time. Small parties of these coys worked forward but aside from taking out some enemy posts were unable to assist their coys forward.

161. Capt. H.B. Carswell, the P.O.O. with the S.Sask.R., has described his efforts to bring the fire of H.M.S. "Albrighton", for which he was observing, on to the German

positions in this quarter. They were nullified by his inability to observe and lack of information concerning the exact positions of our own troops. The best observation point he was able to reach was "two houses just W. of cliffs". Most of the enemy's heavy fire seemed to him to come from the area 204678. Notes of Capt. Carswell's evidence, in the handwriting of Lt.-Col. G.P. Henderson, run in part as follows:

Enemy mortar fire very accurate and as he was DPd every time he opened up with his set he was constantly moving. But he did get in three shoots in area of les 4 Vents fe. Unable to observe effect of shooting.

Indicated targets to ALBRIGHTON in area of RDF sta which he believes were successfully engaged.

162. Reporting the information received from Capt. Carswell, the Commanding Officer of "Albrighton" writes (Appx 26 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander):

Three indirect shoots were started but he was unable to spot. He also indicated targets on the cliff between Dieppe and GREEN Beach for direct bombardment and I think ship silenced the fire of one light gun position. The ship could not remain stationary long as enemy gunners soon started getting close.

163. The only artillery available to support the troops ashore was that of the destroyers, and in these circumstances it could not be effective. It should be noted, however, that Lieut. Edmondson reports that L.M.G. fire was effectively used in support. In his comments on the draft of the present Report he writes:

The initial advance inland of 'A', 'D' and 'B' Coys was supported by L.M.G. fire onto the heights east of Pourville. In particular a German heavy Mortar was engaged by Pte Godfrey 'D' Coy. This Mortar was causing many casualties. Other entrenched Germans on the same height were also engaged. This fire fight continued until approx. 1000 hrs when the fire fight was continued by six men under Cpl. Jackson.

164. The one other expedient for giving support to the companies struggling to advance east of POURVILLE was fire by the S.Sask.R. 3-inch mortars, and this too proved a disappointment, as described by Major McRae (above). Capt. Carswell describes how he attempted to help the mortars, which were on the west side of the bridge, range on the area 204678; but "the target was out of range". The evidence of mortar personnel suggests that their weapons were soon silenced, not, as believed by Major McRae, by enemy action, but for lack of ammunition; L-12366, Cpl. McAlpine, J.B., describes the shoots which he undertook against the eastern hill until his bombs were exhausted. "All my detachment were disappointed because of our not having enough Mortar bombs."

165. When it became apparent that the capture of the objectives east of the village was impossible, the remains

of "A" and "D" Companies, along with the portions of sent to assist them (see below) and elements of the Camerons, took up defensive positions on the ground they had gained and held them until it was time for the withdrawal. Lieut. Dickin, who had gone forward from Bn H.Q. somewhat earlier, states that at about 0945 hrs orders were received to hold a perimeter until 1100 hrs. This, he says, was done by "using a small scattered force in front, heavy with brens, and the main body about 100 yds back ready to counter attack". At 1100 hrs the covering troops started back to the beaches "by fire and movement". (See also below, para. 221.) It would seem that the enemy had been content to limit himself to holding his positions; admirably disposed in posts chosen long before, and highly skilful in the fire-fight, he had no desire to initiate counter-attacks which would bring him to closer quarters with the men who had come from the sea.

166. "B" Coy was widely scattered in the course of this operation. C.S.M. Mathers, P., states that after landing No.10 Platoon was on the left, No.11 on the right and No.12 in the centre. No.10 Platoon went to the bridge, where it suffered a number of casualties, and part of this platoon under Major E.W. White appears to have crossed the bridge and advanced up the hill. Major McRae writes that after the village was cleared two platoons of "B" Coy "were taken to assist the left coys" but were able to accomplish little. These platoons were evidently Nos. 10 and 12, but it is probable that not the whole of either was with Major White east of the bridge. No.11 Platoon had gone forward to attack "a wired in position on right of river", evidently that at 198667, west of the river and roughly 1500 yards south of POURVILLE. This platoon, C.S.M. Mathers states, encountered difficulties and called for assistance at 0915 hrs. Mathers, who had taken command of the elements of the Company left in POURVILLE after Major White had gone forward and Captain Wilkinson had been wounded, sent word to No.12 Platoon to assist. He states that No.11 Platoon succeeded in taking the wired-in position. The evidence of men who seem to have been in this platoon (e.g., L-12685, L/Cpl Legroulx, E.J., and L-13010, Cpl. Madge, L.) speaks of silencing the fire of enemy posts with anti-tank rifles, but not of occupying them. At the time of the order to withdraw, No.11 was holding the position it had reached, and the bulk of Nos.10 and 12 was apparently in position on the high ground east of POURVILLE, with part of No.10 Platoon at the bridge.

167. Major McRae remained in POURVILLE in charge at Battalion Headquarters. He moved this Headquarters repeatedly, and it is recorded that he "seemed to be gifted with a sixth sense", in that mortar fire repeatedly came down on the spot from which he had just removed it. During the operation five different positions were occupied. At the second of these, an open space in the village at about 195678, a mortar bomb caused several casualties to Bn H.Q. personnel, one of the wounded being the R.S.M. (evidence of Major McRae). The headquarters was then moved to a position on the margin of the flooded land on the southern edge of the village.

168. After the early stages of the operation, Lt.-Col. Merritt spent little time at Bn H.Q., but was incessantly active in the forward areas, directing and encouraging the various parties of his unit, with which a considerable number of the Camerons were mingled. He had with him a signaller with an l8 set, but this man was frequently unable to keep up with him, with the consequence that the Commanding Officer was out of touch with his headquarters for long periods.

(b) Action of the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada.

169. The action of the Cameron Highlanders was laid down as follows in the Detailed Military Plan (Appx "D"). No detailed Company objectives were prescribed. It was merely stated that the Camerons would land on GREEN BEACH at Zero plus 30 (i.e., at 0520 hrs) and would,

Pass through Beach Head secured by S.Sask.R. and move to aerodrome with best possible speed, by-passing all enemy opposition where possible. Contact tanks vicinity NORTH edge of BOIS DES VERTUS 2265.

The unit's subsequent action would be to capture the aerodrome (2263) in co-operation with 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn and with the support of bombarding destroyers controlled by the F.O.O. with the battalion. Later still the Camerons, supported by tanks, would capture light A.A. guns located at 224639, 234640, and 233635. They would also deal "in accordance with developments" with the 4-gun battery at 249645, with the headquarters of the 110th German Infantry Division which was believed to be located in ARQUES or in the CHATEAU nearby, and with a heavy A.A. gun position at 239653. The unit would return to DIEPPE when withdrawal was ordered.

170. As already explained, the Camerons made the trip across the Channel in L.C.P.(L)s from NEWHAVEN. The evidence of Commander H.V. McClintock, officer in charge of Group 6, is that the passage to GREEN BEACH was uneventful and presented no navigational difficulties. It appears that Lt.-Col. Gostling had requested that the troops should be landed a little later than the time laid down in the operation order, presumably because he wished the S.Sask.R. to have plenty of time to open up the bridgehead. Commander McClintock writes:

.....Had we trusted to our dead reckoning and continued at a steady course and speed from our turn on to the last leg of the track laid down we would have made the correct beach about 10 minutes late, which was the time we were aiming for. Unfortunately when we sighted the coast we thought we seemed rather close and made a reduction in speed because the O/C Troops preferred to arrive late (rather) than early. Later when we could see a bit more we thought that we were rather too far to the eastward and made an unnecessary alteration of course which we later had

to correct. The Camerons of Canada were, however, eventually landed on the right beach about half an hour late (0550 instead of 0520). The L.C.Ps. were deployed about 2 miles from the beach and parted company with M.L.190 (Lieut. R.W. Ball, R.N.V.R.), as soon as the objective was quite clear.

171. Lt.-Col. Gostling had made the passage in M.L.190, which acted as guide, but on nearing GREEN BEACH he transferred to L.C.P.(L) 129, commanded by Sub.-Lt. J.E. O'Rourke, R.C.N.V.R. (A photograph of this craft, with Sub.-Lt. O'Rourke in charge, will be found in Canadian Geographical Journal, October, 1942, p.168.) The three flotillas comprising Group 6 deployed into two lines abreast about half a mile from the beach, and moved in in this formation (evidence of Sub.-Lt. J.E. Boak, R.C.N.V.R.). As the craft approached the shore it was plain that the S.Sask.R. had not been able to open up the bridgehead in the manner desired, for shells were seen to be bursting in the water just offshore (evidence of Capt. R.M. Campbell, Camerons of C.). In spite of this fire, all the boats landed, and there were almost no casualties on board, though Mr. O'Rourke states that one Sergeant of the Camerons was wounded on board his own craft.

172. Mr. O'Rourke relates that as his craft approached the beach Lt.-Col. Gostling was coolly calling out to his men explanations of the different types of fire which were coming down. Mr. O'Rourke remembers him saying, "Listen to that - that's mobile artillery!" The pipers of the Camerons were playing as the craft moved in. At the touchdown the troops landed in excellent order and very rapidly. Sub.-Lt. W.R. Sinclair, R.C.N.V.R., who was in L.C.P.(L) 127, told the writer on 24 Aug 42 that it was the best landing he had seen.

173. L.C.P.(L) 129, in Mr. O'Rourke's phrase, "hit the objective in a rather awkward position", at the east end of GREEN BEACH, east of the outlet of the River SCIE, and not far from a German pill-box which was still in action, the one beach position which the S.Sask.R. had not succeeded in clearing (evidence of Major McRae). Lt.-Col. Gostling went ashore and began to direct the battalion's advance through the wire obstacles. H-19927, Pte. McLaren, D.C., states that the C.O. was "directing wire cutting" when he was shot down and killed by fire from a pill-box. H-20067, Pte. Coll, W.J., who also landed from L.C.P.(L) 129, states, "Lt-Col A.C. Gostling was fatally wounded by the first burst from the M.G. in a pillbox built into the headland 100 yards on our left". Capt. John Runcie, who was very close to the C.O. at the time when he was struck, confirms that he was hit by fire from the left and killed instantly.

174. The battalion had landed on both sides of the River SCIE, and the separation thus brought about had considerable influence on subsequent events. It is clear from the evidence of Major A.T. Law (second-in-command) and of Capt. Runcie that the parts of the unit landed west of the river got across the sea-wall with little difficulty and few casualties; but those landed on the eastern section came under fire from the positions here which the S.Sask.R. had not been able to clear and were held up for a time in consequence.

175. On the basis of the evidence of Capts. Runcie (commanding "D" Coy) and Campbell (commanding "C" Coy), it appears that the troops landed east of the river comprised "D" Coy, part of "B" Coy, and two boatloads of "C" Coy. The passengers in these last included Capt. Campbell himself and the rest of "C" Coy Headquarters. The remainder of the battalion, comprising "A" Coy, two platoons (apparently) of "B" Coy, the majority of "C" Coy, and part of Battalion Headquarters, landed west of the SCIE.

176. As already noted, the troops landing east of the river were held up for a short time. Capt. Runcie made a reconnaissance towards the west end of the beach and discovered that it was possible to cross the river which at its outlet was "only a trickle", and that the western part of the beach was clear and quiet. As a result of this discovery, Capt. Runcie with about 15 men of his Company, and the parts of "C" Coy which had landed east of the river (including Capt. Campbell) climbed the wall to the west of the SCIE and entered POURVILLE by way of the west bank of the river. Capts. Runcie and Campbell thus entered the village with a party of about 30 men. The balance of Capt. Runcie's own Company, and "B" Coy (commanded by Capt. N.A.T. Young), had previously succeeded in crossing the sea-wall east of the river and had entered the town.

177. As a result of these events, the Camerons became divided into two main sections. The larger body, which had landed west of the river, was commanded by Major Law, on whom the command of the unit had devolved when the C.O. was killed. Major Law had at his disposal the whole of "A" Coy (commanded by Major N.H. Ross); Nos. 10 and 11 Platoons of "B", under the command of Capt. E.P. Thompson; and evidently the major part of all three platoons of "C", under the command of Lieut. F.R. Lane. Most of Battalion Headquarters likewise seems to have been with Major Law. (See individual company narratives appended to War Diary, Camerons of C., August, 1942.) This main body under Major Law subsequently moved inland and effected the deepest penetration made by any portion of the force engaged that day. The remainder of the battalion, itself considerably sub-divided, remained in the POURVILLE area and fought during the rest of the operation in parties of varying strength mingled with the men of the South Saskatchewan Regiment. The narrative of the Camerons' operations, therefore, falls naturally into two sections, and it is convenient to deal first with those parts of the unit which remained in and around POURVILLE.

### (c) The Camerons in POURVILLE.

178. Careful reading of the Cameron company narratives and of the statements of individuals, which are particularly numerous in this unit, indicates that the Camerons engaged in the fighting in and around POURVILLE comprised at least two main groups.

179. The first of these was the party which entered the town with Capts. Runcie and Campbell. On entering POURVILLE as already described these officers encountered

Lt.-Col. Merritt. Capt. Runcie enquired of Lt.-Col. Merritt whether he considered that he should cross the bridge and attempt to rejoin "D" Coy, which was believed to be pushing inland up the east bank of the SCIE. Lt.-Col. Merritt replied that he thought it better that Capts. Runcie and Campbell, and the men with them, should come under his own command and reinforce the S.Sask.R. This accordingly was done. Capt. Runcie got into touch with Major Law on his 18 set and obtained his concurrence. In consequence, Capts. Runcie and Campbell, and their party, operated under Lt.-Col. Merritt's command during the balance of the action, and from this time Capt. Runcie did not see the main body of his own Company.

180. The evidence of Capt. Runcie indicates that in the first place their party worked at the task of clearing the houses on the south side of the main street of POURVILLE immediately west of the bridge (i.e. at 196678). This was successfully accomplished. From this time the party worked in the vicinity of the bridge, on one side of it or the other, and always under accurate enemy mortar fire. Capt. Runcie states that previous to the withdrawal all enemy positions in the vicinity of the bridge had been completely cleared. It is obvious, however, that the area around the bridge continued to be swept by enemy fire. Capt. Campbell confirms that some of the commanding positions on the high ground overlooking the bridge were never cleared. His belief is that the pill-box appearing on the 1:12,500 Intelligence map at 200682 was never cleared; and while that at 196680 was cleared, it may later (as already suggested) have been re-occupied by the enemy. Capt. Campbell himself did not reach a point further east than the group of houses at 197680.

181. Some light is thrown on the situation in the bridge area in the later stages of the operation by the evidence of C.S.M. Mathers, S.Sask.R., who as already noted was at the bridge at this time. C.S.M. Mathers states that when the order for evacuation was received he sent two runners to No.12 Platoon with this information, but "Both became casualties crossing bridge". He then sent two other men who got through, although one was wounded.

182. A second party of the Camerons operated under the command of Capt. Young, who though commander of "B" Coy actually had with him only his Company Headquarters, No.12 Platoon and subsequently, at least, a part of "D" Coy. It appears that this party effected a considerable penetration. It is difficult to "pin-point" its operations with complete confidence, but accounts have been written by several other ranks who were members of it, including the Company Sergeant-Major of "B" Coy, H-19266, W.O.II G. Gouk. This indicates that after crossing the sea-wall the party advanced inland up the east bank of the SCIE, the general line which it had been intended the Camerons should follow in their advance towards the aerodrome. C.S.M. Gouk writes:

We worked our way under cover on the left of the river for about 500 yds. Then the Coy Comr thought it was about time we called a halt & got organized before going further, on checking up I found we had

only 12 Pl. with us & a Pl. of "D" Coy ("under Lieut McKellar & Lieut McManus" deleted in one copy of statement), it seems the Bn had got orders to proceed up the right bank of the river but somehow or other we never received it. The Coy Com. had no way of communicating with anyone so decided we would carry on & do as much damage as possible .....

183. It would appear that Capt. Young's party had advanced close to the east bank of the river and parallel to it, and it seems probable that C.S.M. Gouk's estimate of 500 yards for their penetration is a fairly accurate one, although H-20051, Pte. Davies, D.M., says, "Capt Young took us about a mile inland". C.S.M. Gouk states that after effecting this penetration the party proceeded to "swing left from the river towards a small village where we knew the enemy were, snipers & MG's seemed to be in every house". H-20240, Pte. Flemington, C.W., states that after an initial encounter with the enemy and suffering some casualties, "we advanced up the side of a steep hill & made our way to a house, which was almost half a mile from the shore, all the time taking cover from M.G. fire and some snipers". From these statements it would seem that Captain Young's party probably penetrated to the vicinity of the isolated building near the river at 201677, and then struck uphill towards the group of houses at 201679.

184. A comment of Pte. Flemington indicates the bold and cheerful manner in which Capt. Young was leading and encouraging his party:

I was kind of worried about all those bullets, but our company commander told us they weren't very good shots during the last war and that he didn't think they had had much practice since, so I took his word for it & keep going.

185. C.S.M. Gouk states that while the party were clearing the enemy from the houses mortar fire was suddenly opened. The Sergeant-Major writes:

Our casualties sure started mounting then, every corner you turned you seemed to run into mortar fire & they sure could place their shots. Well there was no stopping the boys then, they were seeing their pals for the first time being killed & wounded at their side & the only thought that seemed to be in everyone's mind was to have revenge.

Both Pte. Davies and Pte. Flemington mention that beyond the houses there was an enemy party disposed in slit trenches; and it is highly probable that the trenches referred to are those appearing on the 1:12,500 Intelligence map at 201680. It was apparently in leading an attack against this position that Capt. Young was killed. Pte. Davies writes:

We reformed & saw the enemy about 40 yds ahead. The 2" mortar fired 2 or 3 smoke bombs to cover our advance & Capt Young got up to advance & he was hit by M.G. fire & also by a Mortar shell.

186. This enemy position was evidently not taken, and the evidence of Pte. Davies is that at this time the party was reduced to 12 men, including both Camerons and S.Sask.R. It appears that Capt. Young's party had previously divided, for Pte. Flemington says, "By this time it was almost 10.30 hrs and we were wondering what to do next. We had lost our company commander, & our sjt major had left with some men to go to work on a few stray huns he had seen someplace".

187. Both Pte. Davies and Pte. Flemington state that at this point Lt.-Col. Merritt arrived and re-organized the party. Pte. Davies writes:

Then the Colonel of the S.S.R. came along & got more men which brought our total to about 25 men & wanted us to attack the strong point. We advanced & got under cover in a copse near the enemy under Maj. White (S.S.R.). The enemy was too strong so 7 of us were detailed under a L/Cpl. (S.S.R.) to hold our position until 1100 hrs.

Pte. Flemington states that under Lt.-Col. Merritt's direction the party succeeded in "wiping out" an enemy 4-inch mortar.

188. The "B" Coy narrative (which is not especially satisfactory with reference to this particular party) states that Capt. Young's party after his death joined a third party of Camerons commanded by Lieut. J.E.E. McManus and continued to fight until withdrawal. It appears, however, that this is not a wholly accurate account. The evidence of H-19715, Cpl. Brygider, A., of No.16 Platoon, an intelligent and courageous soldier who was subsequently awarded the D.C.M. for his services in organizing the evacuation of wounded under heavy fire, who wrote two detailed accounts of his experiences, indicates that a large group of "D" Coy, including Lieut. A.J. McKellar, crossed the sea-wall through a hole in the wire cut by Mr. McKellar, crossed the main road and subsequently "worked along" the "left" (obviously the east) bank of the river. Cpl. Brygider writes:

We found that the platoon had been split up and that there were many of the men of the other two platoons among us. We formed sections of all the men there and advanced farther up the bank. Here we met both the lieuts. McManus and part of "B" company. Here again we combined forces and advanced on some houses on the left of us. We went thru these houses but found that the firing came from some houses farther up the hill.

While orders were being issued for a left flanking attack on these houses, a mortar bomb inflicted casualties and Cpl. Brygider was directed to put the wounded men in a place of safety in rear. After carrying out this duty he returned to the party, which now advanced and "met up with Major MacTavish of the S.S.R.'s". Plans were made for an attack against the houses occupied by the enemy; again casualties were suffered; and at this time ("around 10 o'clock") Lieut. E. McManus ordered Cpl. Brygider to

take charge of the evacuation of casualties, including those earlier taken to the rear, to the beach. From this point Cpl. Brygider is unable to give further evidence of the experiences of the party.

189. This account indicates that the party with Lieut. McKellar worked forward independently and joined Capt. Young's party some distance inland, the two together subsequently making the uphill attack already described. Cpl. Brygider's account, however, suggests considerably less opposition in the houses than is reported by C.S.M. Gouk.

190. It is evident that the situation on the hillside east of POURVILLE, which was subjected to heavy enemy fire throughout the operation, was very confused. Mixed parties of the Camerons and the S.Sask.R., or both together, were operating here throughout the morning, coalescing or separating as circumstances dictated, and seeking routes of advance which would enable them to come to grips with a largely invisible enemy on the higher ground whose mortar and machine-gun fire was constantly inflicting casualties. The enemy suffered some loss here, and H.20731, Pte. Gobin, P.J., a Cameron who was fighting with a party of the S.Sask. R., mentions the capture of three prisoners.

191. Capt. Campbell when interviewed was of the opinion that only artillery fire could have cleared up the situation east of POURVILLE.

192. The evidence of all witnesses is that throughout the morning the village of POURVILLE and the surrounding area were under heavy and very accurate enemy mortar-fire. Enemy observation was extremely effective, and as troops moved the mortar-fire followed them. It was particularly remarked that wireless sets became a target as soon as they commenced to work, and sets had to be constantly moved in order to escape destruction.

(d) The Camerons' Advance Inland.

193. While the events above described were taking place in the POURVILLE area, the main body of the Camerons, the composition of which has been explained, had advanced inland under the command of Major Law. The original plan for the unit's operations had, as already mentioned, provided for an advance up the east bank of the SCIE and for effecting a rendezvous with the tanks at the BOIS DES VERTUS. Information obtained from Major Law, however, indicates that an alternative route had been provided for in case of need. This lay up the west bank of the river.

194. As soon as the Camerons had entered POURVILLE, the village came under very heavy mortar fire, and it was desirable to move the unit out of it as rapidly as possible, quite apart from the fact that its orders required this action. It was at once apparent that the S.Sask.R. had not succeeded in making sufficient progress to the eastward to enable the

Camerons to follow the route lying east of POURVILLE. The "A" Coy narrative states that after landing "The Coy immediately made for the assembly position on the East side of the river, some boat loads to the right and some to the left of the main road through POURVILLE which ran parallel to the shore. However before long it was obvious that the S.S.R.'s were unable to cross the bridge and that the town was becoming congested with troops. "A" Coy was then given permission to advance to the objective along the Western side of the river..."

195. The orders for the adoption of the alternative route were issued by Major Law over his 18 set, and the advance inland with the Camerons, less those portions of the unit already committed in support of the S.Sask.R. in POURVILLE, began immediately. Major Law was able to maintain effective communications with his companies by the No.18 wireless sets; but he had no communication with H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde, and the wireless set used by the F.O.O. with the Camerons had been knocked out very shortly after landing.

196. The battalion began to move inland along the main road south from POURVILLE in the direction of BAS DE HAUTOT, but almost immediately it came under machine-gun fire from the direction of LES 4 VENTS. Moreover, the observed fire of the enemy mortars had followed the battalion as it moved. Accordingly the battalion took the right fork at the road junction at 194676, at the south end of POURVILLE, and continued its southward movement under cover of the woods, moving up the "draw" in the direction of BERNOUVILLE. This route gave it cover from the fire of the enemy positions east of the river, but it was constantly harassed by German snipers who were extremely difficult to locate. "A" Coy was leading the advance, and "C" Coy provided the rear guard. Soon after entering the woods Nos.7 and 9 Platoons of "A" Coy "cleaned out" an enemy machine-gun post.

197. On reaching the trail-junction at 195665 (appearing at the O in BERNOUVILLE on the 1:50,000 map) the unit took the left-hand fork and, moving along the trail, passed the farm of BERNOUVILLE. Emerging from the woods, it moved towards the road and railway bridges across the SCIE at BAS DE HAUTOT. In the course of this movement, the "A" Coy narrative states, "in a wood around a farm, two Germans suddenly appeared but were promptly dealt with by Cpl Morden of the I.Sec and most of the boys of 8 Platoon. Practically every man could claim a hit".

198. The unit now deployed somewhat, "A" Coy taking post on the right to protect this flank from the high ground 206656, while "B" and part of "C" Companies moved down the trail in the draw at 203658, leading towards the hamlet and bridges of BAS DE HAUTOT. The H.Q. Group took up a position on the high ground 205660, from which it overlooked the bridges and approaches to BAS DE HAUTOT at comparatively short range. Considerable enemy activity was visible east of the river, what appeared to be a cyclist platoon being

noticed; and there was no sign of the Canadian tanks (all but a very few having, in fact, been held up on the beach or Esplanade at DIEPPE). As Major Law had no information beyond what could be seen from his position, and as time was now getting short, he decided to abandon the attempt against the original objectives, and, instead, to cross the SCIE, secure the high ground beyond, and push "A" and "B" Companies northwards to clear the area of LES 4 VENTS. Orders to this effect were issued at about 0900 hrs.

199. As "B" and "C" Companies began to move towards the bridge, enemy troops were seen advancing south on the road from POURVILLE, possibly from the group of buildings at 198672. This party was engaged "by Bn Hq. and support platoon" and suffered heavy casualties. Two snipers, H.19755, Pte. Huppe, A., and H.19769, Pte. Hebert, E., are stated by Major Law to have killed 15 of the enemy between them.

200. About the same time contact was made with enemy forces moving up from the south on the west bank of the SCIE. The leading section of "A" Coy, coming out on to the main road, "suddenly encountered a horse drawn mortar moving North", and destroyed this mortar detachment. This encounter is described by H.19922, Pte. Barnes, H.E., as follows:

We came onto two Germans at a crossroads with a horse drawn 4 in mortar. We shot the two Jerries and wrecked the mortar. About 100 yards from there we shot three Germans behind a fence.

H.19100, Pte. Pinder, W., gives a slightly different account, writing, "there were three Germans when we got there two were dead and we took one as a prisoner". The "A" Coy narrative confirms that a prisoner was taken. This prisoner made himself useful by carrying an anti-tank rifle during the subsequent withdrawal (evidence of Major Law and of H.20038, Pte. McCaw, G.A.).

201. Other enemy forces, however, were moving up. A detachment of horse-drawn close-support guns, apparently three in number, arrived from the south, succeeded in crossing the bridge (presumably the most northerly bridge) and on the east side took up a position covering the crossing. The Camerons' 3-inch mortars had been knocked out in POURVILLE, and they had no weapons capable of silencing these well-shielded guns. At the same time the Camerons were subjected to heavy machine-gun and sniper fire from the high ground above LE PLESSIS, square 2165.

202. Major Law now decided that it was not practicable for the unit to fight its way across the river. Accordingly, about 0930 hrs, he issued orders for withdrawal to the beach by the same route followed in the advance. Immediately afterwards he found that his 18 set had intercepted a message to the S.Sask.R. from H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde, the effect of which as understood by the operator was "Vanquish from

GREEN BEACH at 1000 hrs, get in touch with the Camerons". After sending a message to the S.Sask.R. advising of its action, the unit began its withdrawal.

203. This was carried out rapidly, though not without casualties. "C" Coy acted as rearguard; its casualties were "quite heavy", and the platoons became separated in the course of this rearguard action. The enemy also suffered casualties at this stage.

204. In the last phase of the withdrawal, on the road immediately south of POURVILLE, enemy machine-gun and mortar fire was again encountered. Throughout the advance and retirement the battalion was harassed by well-concealed enemy snipers. A platoon of the S.Sask.R. which had been sent out to contact the Camerons was met near the town, and the combined force re-entered POURVILLE at 0956 hrs. The Camerons at this time had still about 80 per cent of their strength intact.

205. It is interesting to note that H.19959, L/Sgt. Maxwell, W.C., of No.9 Platoon of the Camerons, states that in the latter part of the advance inland his Platoon "met with a part of a platoon of S.S.Rs. They had taken out a section of 3 snipers but were under machine-gun fire from a brick building in the valley just across the river". L/Sgt. Maxwell's Platoon fired at this building at a range of about 500 yards, but fire was ineffective. They then resumed their advance. This party of the S.Sask.R. may have been No.11 Platoon, whose attack on the wired position west of the river has been referred to above (para.166).

206. The above account of the advance inland is based on the battalion and company narratives appended to the unit's War Diary, supplemented by the statement of Major Law and by the written statements of individual officers and soldiers as quoted.

(e) Communications and Information, GREEN BEACH.

207. Information reaching the Force Commanders with respect to GREEN BEACH was more adequate than that with respect to either YELLOW or BLUE; nevertheless, it was still too slight to enable them to appreciate the situation effectively at many stages. Capt. Carswell states that he got a message off as soon as he landed with the S.Sask.R.; and the information given was duly entered in the Intelligence Log of "Calpe", as of 0450 hrs ("CECIL landed"). About an hour later, at 0556 hrs, the log notes the arrival of a false and misleading piece of information, the source of which is not clear: the code name "STUDY", indicating that the R.D.F. station had been captured. Major McRae states that this report was certainly not passed by H.Q., S.Sask.R. At 0600 hrs the log notes, "CAMERONS landed". At 0558 hrs Brigadier Mann in "Ferne" passed to UXBRIDGE the information of the capture of the R.D.F. station and the landing of the Camerons; and at 0635 hrs he stated that an attempt was being made to get the S.Sask.R. to close on

WHITE BEACH (to assist the R.H.L.I.). (War Diary, "G", H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, August 1942, Appx 63.) The obstacles in the way of such action have already been noted.

208. The "Calpe" log indicates that after this information was for some time comparatively fragmentary. At 0805 hrs it notes, "CAMERONS & S.SASK.R. cleared beach no further news". At 0830 hrs it records an intercept from S.Sask.R. to "ORANGE" (i.e., 4 Commando), "We are in serious difficulties on our left flank". The log notes that as a result of this Brigadier Mann requested tactical reconnaissance by aircraft, but no indication has been found that this produced useful results.

209. At 0846 hrs the log records that the S.Sask.R. had consolidated its first objectives, and adds that this unit "wants to adopt AJAX". It was further noted that there were heavy casualties at GREEN BEACH. "AJAX" was the code word provided in the Detailed Military Plan (Appx "F", p.16) by which units would report when they were in position for withdrawal to commence. The S.Sask.R. had not attained the position anticipated in the plan, but the code word was evidently understood as a request to initiate withdrawal. The log noted, "Permission granted". At this time the Force Commanders were already discussing arrangements for a general evacuation of the beaches. Major McRae states, however, that the unit at this time asked merely for the evacuation of casualties.

210. The original plan of withdrawal by way of DIEPPE was obviously impracticable, and it was therefore necessary to adopt the expedient, for which, as already noted (para.138 above), the Detailed Military Plan had made provision in case of need, of withdrawal from GREEN BEACH itself. While a decision on the time of the general withdrawal was still under consideration, a message was sent to the S.Sask.R. by H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde. This, as recorded in the "Calpe" file of "B" Wave messages, ran: "Goose is to come back GREEN PETER - relay by any means; will give time later". This message must have been sent about 0900 hrs, for at 0905 Brigadier Mann informed UXBRIDGE that Cecil and Goose had been "ordered off at Green". Apparently shortly afterwards, H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde sent a further message to the S.Sask.R.: "Vanquish 1100 - make every effort to advise Goose". This message is marked in the "B" Wave file "about 0940", but this note was evidently added subsequently. The time "1100" is overwritten, and was probably first written as "1030". This reflects the fact that the time first notified for withdrawal was 1030 hrs, changed immediately afterwards to 1100 hrs. (A similar change is apparent in Brigadier Mann's message to UXBRIDGE announcing the time, originated at 0930 hrs. This message at first gave the time as 1030 hrs, but a note by Brigadier Mann on the face of it indicates that it was "Changed OK" to 1100.)

211. General Roberts himself writes on the question of the change of time as follows (11 May 43) :

The original time set by me for withdrawal was 10.30. It could have been only a few minutes later that I changed it to 1100 hrs. My reasons were two-fold:

1) Fear that there might not be sufficient time to contact Camerons of C. who I knew had penetrated some distance inland and who were out of wireless touch and,

ii) On last minute advice from the Air Advisor, Air-Commodore Cole who told me that the extra half hour would ensure adequate air support for the withdrawal.

212. It seems likely that the second message from H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde to the S.Sask.R. was the one reported above (para.202) as intercepted by the Camerons; and it is possible that the confusion caused by the change in time resulted in its being understood by the Camerons as notifying an intention to evacuate at 1000 hrs.

213. General Roberts' note (above, para.211) indicates that he knew the Camerons had made a penetration, though he cannot have known of its extent. As already noted, the Camerons themselves were not in communication with their brigade headquarters, but Major Law had left with the S.Sask.R. information of his intention to advance inland.

214. At 1000 hrs Brigadier Mann passed to UXBRIDGE a situation report on GREEN BEACH. It ran in part:

Cecil 1 coy on West end of Green Peter rest near SAMBO or Green Peter sending patrol to contact Goose.....

"SAMBO" was the 4 VENTS area. The patrol sent to contact the Camerons was presumably the platoon of the S.Sask.R. which Major Law's force encountered in the course of its return to FOURVILLE.

215. From this time, information concerning GREEN BEACH was fairly full and accurate. At 1010 hrs (only about 10 minutes after the Camerons re-entered POURVILLE) Brigadier Mann informed UXBRIDGE, "Bill contacted Goose who now is with Cecil at GREEN PETER". At 1048 hrs the "Calpe" log noted, "Craft should go to east side GREEN BEACH".

(f) The Withdrawal from GREEN BEACH

216. As has already been noted, the S.Sask.R. had suggested as early as 0846 hrs that evacuation arrangements be begun, at least with respect to casualties. By this time, presumably, Lt.-Col. Merritt had become convinced that there

was no possibility of gaining control of his objectives on the high ground east of POURVILLE. A considerable interval followed, however, before evacuation could be undertaken; and during this time the enemy pushed forward and possessed himself of various positions from which he could harass the evacuation very effectively. When questioned by the writer Capt. Runcle, who as above noted was in POURVILLE, was of the opinion that the S.Sask.R., like Major Law's force, had misread the message announcing the time of evacuation and believed that it was to be at 1000 instead of 1100 hrs; and that this led to the premature evacuation of commanding ground which the enemy was able to occupy with disastrous results. There is, however, no other evidence for this, and Major McRae, the best possible witness on such a point, states that it was not the case.

217. The matter is perhaps most important in the southwestern sector, where it seems clear that "C" Coy of the S.Sask.R. had evacuated the high ground which it had occupied and was back in POURVILLE by 1000 hrs. Pte. Haggard saw "C" Coy withdrawing towards the beach long before the arrival of the L.C.As. Information from Lieut. (now Capt.) G.B. Buchanan, the Adjutant, is to the effect that "C" Coy "had withdrawn back at 1000 hours to Pourville in face of counter attack of 1 Bn of enemy". Lieut. McIlveen states that a request was received from Major Orme, commanding "C" Coy, for No.15 Platoon to reinforce No.14, "As a large enemy force were approaching down rd to MT sheds". When Mr. McIlveen reached No.14 Platoon they were retiring and Major Orme instructed him to give covering fire until certain that No.14 had reached the village. No.15 Platoon accordingly took up a position at the main crossroads, presumably at 193678, and states that the Camerons started coming through shortly afterwards. This indicates that "C" Coy had been driven off the high ground by 1000 hrs, which is confirmed by other evidence. "A" and "B" Companies of the Camerons took up covering positions, but these were in the vicinity of the crossroads, and the adjacent high ground was now in German hands. There is some evidence that before evacuation was complete the enemy had actually got into houses at the west end of GREEN BEACH (Capt. Carswell says "houses at edge of beach on W.flank"; and cf. evidence from "Albrighton", para. 235 below).

218. Major McRae, again the best possible witness, states that "C" Coy "was forced back by a Bn of Infantry coming in", and withdrew to a defensive position on the edge of the village, on orders sent by himself from Bn H.Q. He also arranged for a party of Camerons to support them. The enemy force evidently advanced from the direction of LE QUENOT. At 1000 hrs the "Calpe" Intelligence Log records the same GREEN BEACH situation report already noted (para.214) as sent at this time to UXBRIDGE, with the addition "1/2 bn enemy looming up to counter attack". The reference is presumably to the same enemy force just mentioned. The log notes that "Calpe" requested the map reference of the enemy force, but this was never received.

219. Lieut. McIlveen states that at 1100 hrs the enemy gained machine-gun posts "along the cliffs to our right". At 1115 hrs Lt.-Col. Merritt, still indefatigably active, came up and organized an attack which successfully wiped out these posts, and then returned to the beach.

220. With respect to the withdrawal of Canadian troops from the high ground east of POURVILLE, the evidence of Lieut. J. R. Nesbitt ("D" Coy, S.Sask.R.) is that his party held a position on the road by which they had advanced "until about 1100 hrs", and then withdrew to the beach. As already noted, there are numerous references to defensive positions being held until the order for withdrawal arrived; H.20051, Pte. Davies, D.M. ("B" Coy, Camerons), for example, writes, "At 1100 hrs we started retiring under cover of the L.M.G. back towards the beach".

221. In his comments on the draft of this Report, Capt. Edmondson explains that "at approx 1000 hrs" the message "Vanquish 1100 hrs" was received by the Camerons over an 18 set which was with Capt. Runcie's party in the public house "east of the bridge". Capt. Edmondson's account indicates that at this point it was agreed that he should organize cover for the troops withdrawing to the beach. He states that he divided the available men into two parties, "one under Cpl. Hart who took up a position near the bend in the road", and the other under Capt. Edmondson himself and Cpl. Jackson, which "stayed in the Pub", firing from the upper storey. Capt. Edmondson writes, "The bulk of the troops dropped over the cliff by 1100 hrs. Between 1100 hrs and 1125 we did not see anyone withdraw. We withdrew at 1125 hrs".

222. It is clear that, in spite of the efforts of such rearguards as that commanded by Capt. Edmondson, the enemy, throughout the operation, was in possession of positions from which he was able to bring effective fire to bear on the POURVILLE beach.

223. The story of the attempts to withdraw troops from GREEN BEACH (attempts which while costly were much more successful than those at BLUE BEACH) may be said to begin with the attempts of a couple of individual L.C.As. at a comparatively early time. The Flotilla Officer of "Invicta" reports on these episodes as follows:

4. At 0930 L.C.A. 521 went into GREEN BEACH but was unable to contact anybody and was forced to retire under heavy fire from machine-gun posts and the battery on the East cliff.

5. At 1000 L.C.A. 315 went into GREEN BEACH. The Beach Party could be seen taking cover under the wall, being held there by fire from light machine-gun posts on the West Cliff and by heavy calibre fire from the East Cliff which covered their line of retreat. One man was seen

to attempt to reach the boat but was instantly killed. The boat was then forced to retire.

"Princess Beatrix's" Flotilla Officer reports that after the initial landing L.C.A. 170 collected the Beach Party and attempted to land them, but was driven off by fire. The report received by the C.C.O. from Lt.-Cdr. R. Prior, R.N., who was on the beach, states that he had tried to pass a message requesting an L.C.A. to come in, to bring a signal party and evacuate casualties. He adds that at about 0900 hrs one L.C.A. approached, but while Lt.-Cdr. Prior was putting up a smoke screen to assist it it came under mortar fire and retired. This may have been L.C.A.170.

224. At 1040 hrs Brigadier Mann informed UXBRIDGE that L.C.As. were "going to GREEN PETER for Cecil and Goose". According to Major Law, the first wave of L.C.As. came in to the beach at 1104 hrs.

225. The evidence of every witness is that as soon as the troops began to cross the beach, which due to the state of the tide was now perhaps 200 yards wide, a very heavy cross-fire from weapons of many sorts came down upon it. It appears that this fire included that of mortars, machine-guns and small arms, and there is some evidence that there was shellfire also. Lt.-Cdr. Prior had made very efficient preparations for evacuation, having the barbed wire cleared away and the casualties placed under cover ready to be removed. Some of the enemy prisoners who were comparatively numerous in this area were used as stretcher-bearers and did good work as such. In spite of this Major Law believes that very few stretcher cases were safely evacuated; and during this final phase the Camerons suffered heavier casualties than in all the rest of the operation. Of the prisoners, only one from this area was brought back to England (Information, 2 Dec 42, from Capt. E. D. Magnus, who interrogated the prisoners).

226. The violence of the enemy fire, and the heavy casualties which it occasioned, cannot be better expressed than in the brief statement written by the Flotilla Officer of "Invicta":

6. At 1100 L.C.As.262,317,251 and 214 went into GREEN BEACH.

L.C.A.317 was badly hit and had to be abandoned on the beach.

L.C.A.251 was filled with more troops than she could carry. All efforts to clear some of the men away were impossible and she sank under fire about 200 yards from the beach.

L.C.A.262 managed to reach L.50(Destroyer) alongside which it had to be abandoned and sunk.

L.C.A.214 left the beach fully loaded and was taken in tow by a L.C.M. to a destroyer where she also had to be abandoned and sunk.

227. The same witness describes how L.C.As. 250 and 315 picked up survivors in the water off GREEN BEACH and subsequently twice returned to this beach, "to rescue survivors from sinking L.C.A's and from the beach".

228. The report of the Commanding Officer of "Prince Leopold" (Appx. 2E to Enclosure No.13, Report of Naval Force Commander), to which are appended the individual reports of the officers in charge of seven L.C.As. and an L.C.S.(M), indicates that this ship's flotilla, which had been intended for the evacuation of RED BEACH, actually ran in to GREEN BEACH. The evidence of these officers is similar to all other evidence for GREEN BEACH at this stage. The evidence of Lieut. D. R. V. Flory, R.N.V.R., in charge of L.C.A. 197, may be quoted:

17. At the order to re-embark troops I proceeded to the beach, which lay behind a thick smoke screen; an M.L. warned me of men in the water and coming through the smoke I found the men swimming out from the beaches to get away from the machine gunning at the flanks. There were some corpses in the water and those that were alive had little strength left. I picked about 20 men out of the water and proceeded towards the beach on the right flank of our flotilla. By this time, one engine was not working and the steering appeared defective. I stopped the boat before a group of men who had waded some 100 yards out, four were carrying a severely wounded man on a stretcher. We were now bow on to a machine gun position and it was impossible to manoeuvre the craft owing both to the mechanical defect and the weight of men clambering over the bow and stern: many were shot in the back as we pulled them over the bow. When every man in the vicinity was on board we had great difficulty in dragging the injured men from the lowered door. I gave orders to go astern on one engine which was a slow process, but by this time the steering had improved and we were able to put out to sea.

229. Lieut. O. Mackenzie Kerr, R.N.V.R., in charge of L.C.A.186, states that he saw a Chasseur beach on GREEN BEACH, "a very courageous and gallant act". Some of the L.C.As. of "Prince Leopold's" flotilla, after transferring their troops to larger vessels, proceeded towards DIEPPE and took part in the evacuation of the main beaches.

230. "Princess Beatrix's" Flotilla Officer does not particularize the beaches which his craft assisted in evacuating, but does mention that "L.C.A.215 is believed to have been bombed and sunk at about 1100 off Green Beach".

231. The evidence above quoted would indicate that at least 11 L.C.As. (and probably 12 or more), one L.C.S.(M), and one Chasseur, participated in the withdrawal of troops from GREEN BEACH, in addition to the craft giving support from offshore. At least four (probably five) L.C.As. were lost during this episode.

232. During the evacuation, a number of larger naval craft gave fire support from offshore. Among these was "Locust", which carried out bombardment from 1130 hrs to 1145 hrs, moving as far west as POINT D'AILLY close inshore, and subsequently fired smoke bombs on GREEN BEACH. At 1240 hrs "Locust" saw the beach "come under an enemy barrage", augmented by enemy bombers; and at 1248 hrs she bombarded the eastern cliff for five minutes, and received accurate return fire from guns of 4-inch calibre. "Locust" was also dive-bombed, and withdrew under cover of smoke. (Report from H.M.S. "Locust", Appx 20 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander.)

233. Support was also given by S.G.B.9, which, having intercepted a signal to "Locust" instructing her to give support at the "rising ground at end of Green Beach" asked and received the gunboat's permission to assist her. After making smoke until her smoke was expended, S.G.B.9 bombarded the rising ground at the end of the beach (which end is not specified), with 3-inch and pom-pom fire from a range of about 600 yards, beginning at 1234 hrs. Her fire was returned with Oerlikon guns and rifles, but ineffectively. She again bombarded the same area from 1255 to 1259 hrs.

234. Destroyers also supported the evacuation from offshore, in addition to embarking evacuated troops brought out to them by small craft. "Bleasdale" lay close to GREEN BEACH from 1105 hrs, "sometimes coming under unpleasantly accurate fire from shore batteries and machine-guns from the cliff". Her commander states that she was unable to give effective support as the position of our own troops was not known; but, he adds, "We did the best we could by firing smoke shell on the cliffs to the west". "Bleasdale's" F.O.O. was never in touch with her. (Appx 24 to Enclosure No.13, Report of Naval Force Commander.)

235. "Albrighton" was also giving assistance off GREEN BEACH, and her commander reports (Appx 26 to Enclosure No.13, Report of Naval Force Commander),

4. During the final withdrawal from GREEN Beach men were seen lying under the sea wall and dashing down under fire to the sea. Permission to bombard flanks was obtained from H.M.S. "CALPE" and position of some enemy forces in houses to right of beach established from solders brought off. Smoke shell was also fired on high ground to right of beach. After this ship picked up stragglers and survivors until retirement. During withdrawal communication was difficult due to great quantities of smoke. Coastal and landing craft were making for the nearest destroyer asking for the policy and instructions which were difficult to give.

"Albrighton" brought back 182 soldiers or men of landing craft crews, "as well as eight who died".

236. "Brocklesby" was also off GREEN BEACH, though evidently at an earlier time. She picked up men who were found swimming near a disabled L.C.A., and simultaneously bombarded the cliffs with her 4-inch guns, though "with a feeling of considerable ineffectiveness, since no point of aim was discernible". (Appx 27 to Enclosure No.13, Report of Naval Force Commander.)

237. "Brocklesby" reported the use by the Germans of a novel weapon. Her Commanding Officer states that at about 1150 hrs "An attack, by German flame throwing aircraft, was observed on the Western edge of GREEN Beach". This was delivered by three Junkers 88s which flew in low from the west, "at about half the height of the cliff immediately West of the Beach". The report is very categorical, but has not yet been confirmed from other sources.

(g) The Final Scenes on GREEN BEACH

238. In spite of the extremely difficult conditions, a very considerable number of men were successfully withdrawn from GREEN BEACH in the manner just described. Nevertheless, many others could not be evacuated and held a bridgehead on the beach until a comparatively late hour. For some time after the operation no details of this final stage were known in England; but we now have the testimony of two competent witnesses. One of these is Lt.-Cdr. Prior, who after being captured succeeded in making his escape from the Germans and entering the section of France then unoccupied by them. He was arrested and interned at LYON, as were a number of other officers, but succeeded in sending a detailed report (dated 3 Sep 42) to the C.C.O. through the agency of the American Consul. Later he himself returned to England. Capt. John Runcie, Camerons of C., who was also one of the party captured on the beach, has similarly succeeded in making his way back to England and has given important evidence.

239. Capt. Runcie states that the evacuation was covered by a perimeter established in POURVILLE by those troops who had operated in the area throughout the morning. Through this the main body of the Camerons, who had gone inland with Major Law, withdrew to the beach. As evacuation proceeded, the perimeter was progressively narrowed and in the last stage the party remaining withdrew to the beach itself and took cover behind the sea-wall. Scaffolding which had been erected for the purpose of repairing the wall gave the troops the means of firing over it at the enemy. The party on the beach was commanded by Lt.-Col. Merritt and was composed of men of both the S.Sask.R. and the Camerons, Capt. Runcie being the senior officer of the latter unit. The party held on under fire in the hope that boats might arrive to take them off, but this did not take place and Capt. Runcie is of the opinion that at this late stage it would have been suicidal for the craft to have attempted to return.

240. Lt.-Cdr. Prior reported in part:

A bombardment of the Hill to the East of Pourville would have enabled all men to be

embarked. The smoke screen put down by bombers to the West was a great help..... I requested the Army to fire all the houses on the fore shore to give us a smoke screen but the incendiary grenades were all defective.

241. During this time on the beach, Capt. Runcie witnessed one final act of gallantry on the part of Lt.-Col. Merritt, who crossed the wide beach under very heavy fire, picked up a wounded soldier who was lying at the water's edge and carried him to shelter under the wall. Lt.-Col. Merritt himself, in a letter dated 24 Aug 42 (copy at Overseas Records Office) pays tribute to the bravery of "Cpl Keyes" (presumably L.10206, A/Cpl Keys, H.L., now a prisoner), "who manned a Bren gun on the beach in a most exposed position under constant fire and remained there returning fire for some fifteen minutes, only stopping when wounded so badly as to be unable physically to continue". Of himself, Lt.-Col. Merritt says, "Actually I went everywhere during the battle but never got a scratch until in the last half hour when a sniper caught me..." This wound, he says, was slight.

242. Capt. Runcie states that after the final withdrawal of the boats, the beach was twice heavily machine-gunned by British Spitfire aircraft, who were presumably under the impression that it was now held by the enemy. These attacks caused some casualties.

243. When it was quite clear that there was no hope of a return of the boats, Lt.-Col. Merritt consulted Capt. Runcie, and all the officers present then discussed the situation. Ammunition, particularly for automatic weapons, was running short, and it was evident that there was now little chance of doing further damage to the enemy. The party therefore surrendered. Capt. Runcie places the time at 1500 hrs or a little later. In camp that night he found that the prisoners belonging to the Camerons numbered 120 other ranks. This affords some index of the strength of the party on the beach at the end, though it is possible of course that some of these men had been captured earlier. Capt. Runcie's impression was that the "rearguard" on the beach was composed about equally of Camerons and S.Sask.R.; but casualty reports prepared by Records Office, C.M.H.Q., as of 1 May 43, show only nine officers and 80 other ranks of the S.Sask.R. as prisoners, whereas the Camerons in the same category number nine officers and 161 other ranks. (Presumably badly wounded men would not be in the camp where Capt. Runcie counted the Cameron personnel on the evening of 19 Aug 42.)

244. It is of interest that there are naval reports of nobody being visible on the beach at the time when the last craft retired. For instance, "Invicta's" Flotilla Officer states that "By 1215 nobody could be seen on the beach", and L.C.As. 250 and 315, which had been engaged in picking up survivors as above described (para.227) then retired. The officer in charge of L.C.A.187 (Sub-Lt. K. Tew, R.N.V.R.), after carrying a load of 40 men from the beach and transferring them to a destroyer, approached the beach again. He writes:

..... Officer in destroyer told me it was impracticable to beach again and this tallied with my own theory but I took craft beyond smokescreen where I had a good view of the beach. There was no one there, except a few soldiers in the water who were swimming towards the other boats.

Similar evidence is given by Sub.-Lt. H. E. Sneed, R.N.V.R., commanding L.C.S.(M) 21. He describes how after transferring to a destroyer seven soldiers whom he had picked up, he "returned to the beach, but saw no live men, either in the water or on the beach". He passed this information on to Lieut. H. R. H. Williams, R.N.V.R., commanding L.C.A.176, who himself reports that on returning to the beach after taking off an initial load of 58 men, he "could see no troops".

245. In spite of these impressions in the minds of naval officers, the headquarters ships were soon aware that a considerable party had probably been left on GREEN BEACH. At 1235 hrs, Brigadier Mann sent a message to UXBRIDGE:

Green sitrep believe about 200 left  
ashore some may be off later.....

It did not, in the event, prove possible to bring off any of these men.

(h) Casualties on GREEN BEACH

246. Casualties suffered by the Canadian units engaged in the POURVILLE area were very heavy, but not quite so heavy as those suffered on BLUE BEACH or the main beaches.

247. The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada embarked for the operation a total of 32 officers and 471 other ranks, or 503 all ranks (Information from Overseas Records Office, 31 Dec 42 (C.M.H.Q. file 18/DIEPPE/1/2)). Of these, casualty reports available at C.M.H.Q. as of 1 Mar 43 indicate that 24 officers and 322 other ranks, or a total of 347 all ranks, became casualties. Of these, six officers and 41 other ranks were reported killed, and five other ranks died of wounds. Nine officers and 161 other ranks were known to be prisoners of war, and four other ranks had died of wounds while prisoners. Seventeen other ranks were reported missing. Of those who returned to England, nine officers and 94 other ranks were wounded. (C.M.H.Q. file 18/DIEPPE/2.)

248. The South Saskatchewan Regiment had a very similar total of casualties, but quite differently distributed. This unit brought a much larger proportion of its strength back to England. Its embarkation strength was 25 officers and 498 other ranks, or a total of 523 all ranks (Records, 31 Dec 42: C.M.H.Q. file 18/DIEPPE/1/2). Of these, casualties as known at 1 Mar 43 total 19 officers and 320 other ranks, or a total of 339 all ranks. Two officers and 58 other ranks were reported killed, and five other ranks died of wounds. Nine officers and 80 other ranks were prisoners of war, two other ranks had died of wounds while prisoners, and one

officer and 16 other ranks were listed as missing. Of those who returned to England, seven officers and 159 other ranks were wounded.

249. It will be noted from the above figures that a total of 265 all ranks of the Camerons (a little more than half the strength of the unit on embarkation) returned to England at the close of the operation. In the case of the S.Sask.R., a total of 355 all ranks succeeded in returning to England. Of these, however, nearly half were wounded.

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