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Situation of the Canadian Military Forces Overseas, Autumn, 1943: I.

Position and Roles of Canadian Forces in the United Kingdom.

1. This Report briefly summarizes the present distribution of Canadian Military Forces in the United Kingdom, and traces their roles as these have developed since the presentation of Report No. 72 (dated 3 Jun 42). It also provides a very condensed survey of the employment of the Canadian Army Overseas generally during the period under review.

CHANGES IN THE GENERAL ASPECT OF THE WAR

2. Since the writing of Report No. 72, momentous changes have taken place in the general aspect of the War. The initiative has passed from the enemy to the United Nations, and whereas in the spring of 1942 the posture of our affairs was still mainly defensive, the problems of defensive strategy have since become the preoccupation of the enemy. In June 1942 the forces of Field-Marshal Rommel had overrun TOBRUK and driven the British Eighth Army far back into EGYPT; while in the CAUCASUS the Germans seemed about to break through to the CASPIAN and the oil fields of BAKU and beyond.

3. Since that time the situation on both fronts has been reversed. The assurances given by Marshal Stalin of the relief of STALINGRAD were fulfilled and have been followed in the summer of 1943 by the advance of the Russian Armies in an offensive sustained over a front of 1,000 miles, and penetrating in some places over 500 miles in depth. The opposing forces now stand on the general line of the DNIEPER, and it is not clear that the momentum of the Russian advance is yet spent. The newspapers of 8 Oct 43 reported a general resumption of the offensive by the Russians all along the front.

4. The tide of German military power has similarly receded in the Mediterranean area. In the autumn of 1942, the British counter-attack launched at EL ALAMEIN on 23 Oct thrust Rommel back; and this, combined with the Anglo-American occupation of French North Africa beginning on 8 Nov, induced the long German retreat which ended in May 1943, after a final battle in Tunisia, with the annihilation of Axis power in Africa. This decisive transformation of the African theatre from a desperately fought battle-ground into an ample and secure base for operations against the continent of Europe, produced the decisions taken in conferences at CASABLANCA and WASHINGTON to carry the war across the Mediterranean with the object of forcing the surrender of Italy before the end of the

year. (The course of the war during the period under review may be traced, for 1942, in the third volume of the war speeches of the Rt. Hon. Winston S. Churchill, C.H., M.P., The End of the Beginning (London, Toronto, Melbourne and Sydney, 1943) and in the subsequent speeches made during 1943, the text of which is available in The Times (LONDON), 12 Feb, 20 May, 9 Jun, 1 Jul, 1 Sep and 22 Sep).

5. These considerable shifts in the fortunes of the United Nations in the West have had their effect upon the position and prospects of the Canadian forces in England. The defensive role embodied in the Plans to Defeat Invasion, drawn up by 1 Cdn Corps with a view to the defence of Sussex (see Report No. 72) has been modified; a shift of emphasis has taken place in conception, training and employment. The Canadians have come increasingly to focus their attention upon their part in the invasion of the Continent. Already in 1942 Canadian troops had begun to assay the difficult tasks that lay ahead. The first raiding expedition in which Canadians actually crossed the Channel, Operation "ABERCROMBIE" of 22 Apr 42, was merely a slight and disappointing prelude to the larger events which were to follow. (See Reports Nos. 81 and 86). The first main clash with the enemy came with Operation "JUBILEE", the raid at DIEPPE of 19 Aug 42, which is the subject of Reports Nos. 83, 89, 90, 98, 100 and 101.

6. By the autumn of 1942 the danger of the invasion of Britain appeared to have sensibly diminished, and although the responsibility for maintaining an up-to-date Plan to Defeat Invasion still remained, the immediate operational role of formations of 1 Cdn Corps had come to be limited to measures against raids. A more positive role in a new theatre was forecast when, in April 1943, arrangements were made for 1 Cdn Div and 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde to undergo a course of Advanced Combined Training in Scotland, their anti-raid responsibilities in Sussex being taken over by 3 Cdn Div. This move was the beginning of a journey that was to take 1 Cdn Div and 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde into the Central Mediterranean theatre, when, as formations of the Eighth Army, they made entry into Sicily in the invasion which began on 10 Jul 43 (Operation "HUSKY", on which report will be made in due course), and has since been carried over into the mainland of Italy (Operation "BAYTOWN", beginning 3 Sep 43, on which subsequent report will be made). The Italian operations are still in progress as this report is written. In Sicily Canadian formations, engaged in protracted large-scale operations against the enemy for the first time in this war, although the war had been in progress for nearly four years when the invasion of Sicily began. By far the greater part of the Canadian field army, including 2 and 3 Inf Divs, 4 and 5 Armd Divs, and 2 Armd Bde, still remains in England and has not yet seen action.

7. In May 1943 the Area of 1 Cdn Corps was reorganized as Sussex District and taken over by British troops in order to free the Corps from all static responsibilities and to allow it to concentrate on training for offensive operations. The commitment of an infantry division and a tank brigade in Italy, and the increased emphasis among the main body of Canadian troops still remaining in Britain, on training for the attack, reflect the general trend of the war during the period covered by this Report.

THE CHANGING ROLE OF 1ST CANADIAN CORPS

8. The foregoing outline as it relates to 1 Cdn Corps may be developed in more detail. During the fortnight (6 Jun - 21 Jun 42) following the restoration of the Corps front on completion of Exercise "TIGER" (see Report No. 73), 1 Cdn Corps units devoted themselves primarily to training the Home Guard units in their respective areas (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, Appx 8, CANMILITRY to DEFENSOR, 6 Jun 42), a function which they appear to have fulfilled with considerable success (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, letter from C.O. Sub-Area to B.G.S., 18 Jun 42). The good relations existing between the Canadians and the Sussex Home Guard are reflected in the fact that the latter subscribed nearly £700 as a fund for presentation to 1 Cdn Corps. This fund was devoted by the Corps to providing a trophy and annual prizes to be awarded to the most efficient unit or sub-unit of the Sussex Home Guard (Canada's Weekly, 1 Oct 43).

9. During the month of June, Rommel's victories in North Africa served to emphasize the necessity for the fullest development of "the requirements for successful offensive action", and in a memorandum referring to "the very serious reverses which our armies have suffered in Libya", the Corps Commander, Lt.-Gen. Crerar, stressed the importance of efficiency in the offensive:

The aim of every Commander, in organizing and disposing his forces for the approach march to the contact battle, must be to ensure that he strikes the enemy with superior force and in a surprising manner, on a front which is suitable to the development of an attack. To secure that aim, forethought, careful, quick planning and speedy execution are essential.

The proper technique in developing offensive action once contact has been gained has been convincingly demonstrated by our enemies.

(W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps,
Appx 51, Corps Commander's
Memorandum GOC 4-0, 30 Jun 42)

10. During the summer of 1942 and the winter of 1942-43 training was organized to prepare 1 Cdn Corps "for future landings and early offensive operations on the Continent" (Ibid., Appx 25, Training Instruction No. 13, 18 Jul 42), a role to which it was to become, apparently, increasingly dedicated as time went on and for which the raid on DIEPPE afforded significant, if costly, experience to Canadian formations. Thus, in the August training period, for example, Divisional and Army Tk Bde Commanders were to set and conduct tactical exercises without troops and signal exercises on a Brigade Group level, designed to afford Brigade and Regimental Commanders and Staffs "the greatest value in preparation for future landings and early offensive operations on the

Continent". Such H.Q. exercises were to include:

- (a) A Bde Group as an initial landing force, with the task of establishing a bridgehead.
- (b) A Bde Group passing through a bridgehead, already established, and carrying out a subsequent advance with the capture of a definitive objective.

(Ibid.).

11. Though the general situation of the war had altered the priority of tasks set for the military forces in Britain, the dangers of invasion were not wholly discounted. The policy covering the disposition of Home Forces during the winter was built upon the principle that "although the chances of an invasion of this country being attempted in 1943 are remote, the possibility will always remain that the Germans might make the attempt as a desperate measure to offset failures elsewhere." (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, Appx 23: Policy for Home Forces, Winter 1942-43, 19 Dec 42). Thereafter no further anti-invasion exercises were to be carried out except for the Home Guard. Under these conditions the priority of tasks assigned to 1 Cdn Corps was thus set forth:

- (a) Defence of important objectives against raids.
- (b) Training of 1 Cdn Corps for offensive operations overseas.
- (c) Training of Home Guard.
- (d) Anti-sabotage protection of vulnerable points.
- (e) Assistance to the civil authorities in event of heavy air attack.

Such was the insistence upon the importance of the offensive, that the possibility of raiding on the part of the enemy had itself come to be looked upon as affording opportunity for putting offensive training into practice.

Hostile raids, if they occur, will afford an opportunity for practical application of the offensive tactics in which 1 Cdn Corps are being trained.

(Ibid.).

REORGANIZATION OF 1ST CANADIAN CORPS SECTOR

12. Meanwhile, during the first week in August 1942, the sector held by 1 Cdn Corps was reorganized. Whereas there had formerly been two divisions forward and one in reserve, the sector was now divided into three Forward Areas and the North Sussex Sub-Area. 2 Cdn Div, being now returned from its

special training for Operation "RUTTER" (see Report No. 100, paras 103-4), took over the right front, transferring its H.Q. from COURTLANDS, SHARPETHORNE (816512) (C.M.H.Q. Location Statement No. 15, 9 Jun 42) to MUNTAM (562469) and with under command 11 Cdn Army Fd Regt; 3 Cdn Div moved into the centre with H.Q. at KNEPP CASTLE (593410), and 1 Cdn Div took over the left with Adv H.Q. at HEATHFIELD PARK (036397) and Rear H.Q. at NORTHDOWN HOUSE (029406), and with under command 8 Cdn Army Fd Regt (4/PROGRESS/11, G.S. 2843, CANMILITRY to DEFENSOR, 13 Aug 42; C.M.H.Q. Location Statement No. 17, 21 Aug 42). Right and Left Corps boundaries and North Sussex Sub-Area boundaries remained as they were, and there was no change of boundary between 1 and 3 Cdn Divs (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, Appx 20, 1 Cdn Corps O.O. No. 6, 17 Jul 42). The boundary between 2 and 3 Cdn Divs extended from the eastern edge of RUSTINGTON (Q 42) to WICK, thence by the line of the ARUN north to AMBERLEY and PULBOROUGH, thence by the Roman Road to BILLINGSHURST (all incl 2 Cdn Div), where it joined the southern boundary of the North Sussex Sub-Area. (Formations, sectors, boundaries and the general disposition of troops at STAND TO are shown on the map attached as Appx No. 3 of 1 Cdn Corps Operation Instruction No. 65, 1 Cdn Corps, Plans to Defeat Invasion (2nd Edition), W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, Appx 22, Nov 42).

13. Under this arrangement brigades were disposed as follows; In the Right Forward Area, 5 Cdn Inf Bde took up position in the TANGMERE Sector, and 4 Cdn Inf Bde in the LITTLEHAMPTON Sector, with 6 Cdn Inf Bde in reserve (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, Appx 22, O.O. No. 1, 25 Jul 42). In the Centre Forward Area 7 Cdn Inf Bde occupied the WORTHING Sector, and 8 Cdn Inf Bde took the SHOREHAM Sector, 9 Cdn Inf Bde going into reserve (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 3 Cdn Div, Appx 2, 3 Cdn Div O.O. No. 1, 3 Aug 42). In the Left Forward Area 3 Cdn Inf Bde was assigned to the NEWHAVEN Sector, and 2 Cdn Inf Bde to the PEVENSEY Sector, with 1 Cdn Inf Bde in reserve (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Div, Location Statement No. 20, 6 Aug 42). The reorganization of the Corps Area was completed by 8 Aug 42 (4/PROGRESS/11, G.S. 2843, CANMILITRY TO DEFENSOR, 13 Aug 42).

PLANS TO DEFEAT INVASION, 2ND EDITION

14. As a result of this re-alignment, and since the responsibility of 1 Cdn Corps for holding the Area against invasion still remained, a second edition of the Plans to Defeat Invasion was issued on 12 Nov 42 (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, Appx 16, Operation Instruction No. 65, 12 Nov 42). Importance was laid upon the necessity of maintaining the working effectiveness of the measures to meet invasion, in order that when the long occupation of Sussex by the Corps should come to an end the efficiency of these measures should remain unimpaired for the benefit of its successors (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, Appx 16, H.Q. letter from B.G.S., 14 Nov 42). The original plans have already been outlined in Report No. 72. The principles were unchanged. The objective in the defence of Sussex as defined by the Commander, South-Eastern Army, was to prevent the enemy from establishing a bridgehead through which his main attack could be supplied and reinforced; or if the enemy succeeded in establishing himself, to stop and break up his main thrusts to London and to counter-attack in order to recapture enemy bridgeheads. The Corps frontage was about 85 miles in length. Thus, to avoid the weakness inherent in thin

linear defence, it was considered essential to concentrate the field troops for the defence of certain vital areas, leaving less important places to be defended by such local forces as were available on the spot. In keeping with German strategy, the assumption was that in the event of invasion there would be a main landing in Sussex, forming one arm of a pincer movement, in conjunction with a landing in East Anglia, forming the other, the two directed west of, and enveloping, London as the principal objective. It was assumed also that a large-scale landing in Sussex might have the alternative objective of cutting off the troops in the Kent peninsula in combination with a landing in East Kent. As for the spirit in which the Plans were to be carried out, para 44 provides its own commentary:

THERE WILL BE NO WITHDRAWAL IN ANY CIRCUMSTANCES, and all ranks must be determined that every German who succeeds in setting foot in this country shall be killed.

15. By January 1943, it was considered that there would be indications at least two months before any large-scale assault upon the shores of Britain could be carried out. The principle was laid down that while measures against raids were to be kept in the highest state of efficiency, other measures and dispositions under the anti-invasion policy should be such that the Corps could be ready within two months. The plans and works prepared during the previous two and a half years were, as far as possible, to be prevented from falling into abeyance or disrepair. It was held to be virtually certain that in the event of invasion, more troops would be available in Sussex and fresh dispositions made. Hence it was no longer thought profitable for Divisions to attempt to keep their plans against invasion up-to-date so far as the dispositions of field force formations were concerned. The operational responsibilities of these formations were therefore limited to dealing with hostile raids (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, Appx 16, Letter on Anti-Invasion Policy, 10 Jan 43).

16. In the spring of 1943, stress was laid on the necessity of maintaining both anti-invasion and anti-raid plans to ensure the smooth and speedy hand-over to another command when the time came for the Corps to leave the Area. Hence, in the first two weeks of April, the Corps concentrated its efforts on re-conditioning the works and defences in the forward Brigade Areas, and the artillery positions covering these works at nodal points. The existing defence works were to be manned by the Home Guard (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, Appx 16, H.Q. letter 26 Mar 43).

REORGANIZATION OF SOUTH-EASTERN COMMAND

17. This vigorous spring-cleaning was preparatory to the entry of new tenants into the Corps Area. On 18 Apr 43, advance information was circulated regarding the reorganization of South-Eastern Command. This involved the formation of a Sussex District which was to take over the anti-raid responsibilities from 1 Cdn Corps on the following basis. A Lower Establishment Division was to be brought into Sussex for the purpose of taking over the anti-raid role in the coastal area. Sussex District would draw up an appropriate plan and be responsible for its implementation. Provision was made for the possible

employment of some Canadian units in reserve, but their commitments were to be so arranged that there would be a minimum of interference with the training of 1 Cdn Corps (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, Appx 9, H.Q. letter 18 Apr 43).

18. Further details were made available on 13 May 43. The objective in view was, first, to provide a permanent static chain of command in Sussex, and secondly to free 1 Cdn Corps from all static responsibilities, other than those of local defence, in order that it might concentrate on training for offensive operations. The reorganization of the Corps Area as Sussex District was to have effect from 15 May 43, the 55th Division to be accommodated in Sussex and to assume the anti-raid role in the coastal area. In the case of Canadian units located in that area, however, plans were to be co-ordinated between Division and District for them to take all possible offensive action for the defeat of raids (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, Appx 16, Reorganization of South-Eastern Command, 13 May 43). Full operational responsibility in Sussex was assumed by the Commander, Sussex District, with H.Q. at LINDFIELD (785449), as from midnight 2-3 Jun 43.

19. The temporary operational responsibilities of units of 1 Cdn Corps to be assumed until the completion of the Order of Battle of 55 Inf Div were as follows. 2 Cdn Inf Div was to provide one battalion to carry out a reserve battalion role for 199 Inf Bde in the West Sussex Sub-District. This assignment was to carry with it counter-attack responsibilities against the TANGMERE group of airfields. 3 Cdn Inf Div was to provide one battalion to carry out a similar role for 164 Inf Bde in the Central Sussex Sub-District. These two battalions were, however, to come under command of the two British brigades only in the event of an actual raid. Initially the Essex Scottish were chosen for the anti-raid role in the West Sussex Sub-District with location at HALNAKER Camp (3327), and the North Shore Regiment was allotted to the Central Sussex Sub-District with location in the area DITCHLING (762343) and HASSOCKS (740345). Except for these emergency precautions, the general policy for the training of 1 Cdn Corps remains unchanged and the Corps continues to prepare for offensive action. (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, Appx 1, 1 Cdn Corps O.O. No. 3, 2 Jun 43). The basic principle has been that:

The doctrine of assault on a heavily defended coast line is undergoing considerable evolution, with the new weapons and devices now available, and with the much greater resources in naval and air support which can be included in plans as compared with 1942.

(W.D., G.S., 1 Cdn Corps, Appx 12, 3 Cdn Inf Div, Combined Operations Training, 8 Jul 43).

Accordingly H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps and 3 Cdn Inf Div have been concerned with a special assault programme which began in the second week of July and extended into September. These activities have been carried out in the light of experience gained in the actual field of combat.

MOVE OF 1ST CANADIAN DIVISION

20. Meanwhile in April 1943, the decision had been taken that a Canadian Division should take over the operational role in the Mediterranean area previously allotted to the 3rd (British) Division. Although the time available for planning and preparation was short, arrangements were made for 1 Cdn Div and 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde to proceed to Advanced Combined Training in the Scottish Command, while Div H.Q. took a "refresher course in Divisional Planning", to be held in LONDON, under arrangements by the Canadian Planning Staff (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, Appx 16, H.Q. letter 25 Apr 43). This "course" was, in fact, security cover; the Divisional Staff was actually engaged in planning for Operation "HUSKY". 3 Cdn Div took over the anti-raid responsibilities for the Centre and Left Forward Divisional Sectors from 1200 hrs on 28 Apr 43. In the first week in May 1 Cdn Div had begun its new Combined Operations Training in Scotland with Divisional H.Q. at TROON (78/837519). (4/PROGRESS/11, G.S. 1066, CANMILITRY TO DEFENSOR, 10 May 43; C.M.H.Q. Location Statement No. 22, 15 Jun 43). It will be recalled that formations of 1 Cdn Div had already carried out a programme of Combined Operations training in the previous winter (see Report No. 93).

21. Two months later, on 28 Jun 43, a convoy bearing H.Q. 1 Cdn Div steamed out of the Clyde for Operation "HUSKY", which was to be mounted against Sicily. (W.D., Draft, G.S., 1 Cdn Div, Entry for 28 Jun 43).

PRESENT LOCATIONS OF 1ST CANADIAN CORPS FORMATIONS

22. The present distribution of 1 Cdn Corps formations as notified in C.M.H.Q. Location Statement No. 24 (24 Sep 43) is as follows. Adv H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps remains at WAKEHURST PLACE, and Rear H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps at WORTH PRIORY. Adv H.Q. 2 Cdn Div remains at MUNTHAM (para 12 above). The Division's brigades are disposed with their H.Qs. as follows:

H.Q. 4 Cdn Inf Bde

HALNAKER HOUSE,
HALNAKER,
(344278)

H.Q. 5 Cdn Inf Bde

LAVINGTON HOUSE,
EAST LAVINGTON,
(385357)

H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde

HAWKHURST COURT,
NR. WISBOROUGH GREEN,
(463425)

23. By 17 Sep 43, 3 Cdn Div had moved out of Sussex into the Area BOURNEMOUTH, SOUTHAMPTON, PORTSMOUTH, where it assumed a limited operational role (4/PROGRESS/11, G.S. 2332, CANMILITRY to DEFENSOR, 21 Sep 43), having shifted its Adv H.Q. from KNEPP CASTLE to BALMER LAWN HOTEL, BROCKENHURST (739234) and Rear H.Q. remaining at WOODGATERS, WEST SUSSEX (591435). Of the Division's brigades, H.Q. 7 Cdn Inf Bde was at SOUTHCLIFFE HOTEL, BOURNEMOUTH, while 8 and 9 Cdn Inf Bdes were

doing Combined Operations Training at INVERARAY and CASTLE TOWARD (4/PROGRESS/11, G.S. 2413, CANMILITRY to DEFENSOR, 29 Sep 43).

24. 2 Cdn Armd Bde (formerly 3 Cdn Army Tk Bde) is under command 1 Cdn Corps, and has its headquarters at WORTHING, Sussex (C.M.H.Q. Location Statement No. 24).

25. It should be noted that during the summer of 1943 there were important troop movements arising out of Exercise "HARLEQUIN", an exercise designed to test arrangements for passing troops destined for overseas enterprises through concentration and assembly areas to embarkation points. 5 Cdn Armd Div came under command of 1 Cdn Corps for the purposes of this exercise, and moved into Hampshire as a result (see below, para, 26). Adv H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps moved temporarily to The Grange, near OLD ALRESFORD, Hants (995565), Rear H.Q. remaining at Worth Priory (C.M.H.Q. Location Statement No. 23, Amendments Nos. 1 (23 Aug 43) and 3 (26 Aug 43). 2 Cdn Div likewise moved temporarily, into the WINCHESTER area (*ibid.*, Amendment No. 4, dated 2 Sep 43). By 24 Sep 43 both Adv H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps and Adv H.Q. 2 Cdn Div were back in their normal locations in Sussex (C.M.H.Q. Location Statement No. 24). 3 Cdn Div did not participate in Exercise "HARLEQUIN", as it was engaged at the time in a programme of Combined Operations Training which took its brigades in succession to Scotland; but as soon as "HARLEQUIN" was over it moved into Hampshire for further training (para 23, above).

LOCATIONS OF FORMATIONS OF 2ND CANADIAN CORPS

26. As mentioned below (para 32), 5 Cdn Armd Div came under command H.Q. First Cdn Army on 24 Jun 42. Early in August of the same year 5 Cdn Armd Div moved from ALDERSHOT to COURTLANDS, WEST HOATHLY, SUSSEX (819513) (Amendment No. 3, 6 Aug 42, to C.M.H.Q. Location Statement No. 16; 4/PROGRESS/11, G.S. 2916, CANMILITRY to DEFENSOR, 18 Aug 42), whence 2 Cdn Inf Div had moved to take up position in the reorganized Corps front at MUNTHAM (para 12 above). In the summer of 1943, 5 Cdn Armd Div moved into the new training area in NORFOLK, where the Division had established itself by 5 Jul 43 with H.Q. at COCKLEY CLEY, SWAFFHAM (257230) (4/PROGRESS/11, G.S. 1640, CANMILITRY to DEFENSOR, 13 Jul 43; Amendment No. 4, 12 Jul 43 to C.M.H.Q. Location Statement No. 22). In August the Division had left Norfolk for Hampshire, with H.Q. at DRAYTON FARM, BARTON STACEY (8762) (Amendment No. 1, 23 Aug 43, to C.M.H.Q. Location Statement No. 23), where preparations for Exercise "HARLEQUIN" (25 Aug - 15 Sep) were completed by 20 Aug 43 (4/PROGRESS/11, G.S. 2074, CANMILITRY to DEFENSOR, 25 Aug 43). The most recent C.M.H.Q. Location Statement (No. 24, 24 Sep 43) shows the Division still at CAMP "A", BARTON STACEY (867628) where it thus augments 3 Cdn Inf Div in that area (para 23 above).

27. On its arrival in the United Kingdom, H.Q. 4 Cdn Armd Div was set up at the ROYAL PAVILION, ALDERSHOT (289704) which 5 Cdn Armd Div had vacated on its move into Sussex (C.M.H.Q. Location Statement No. 17, para 12 above). When 1 Cdn Inf Div left HEATHFIELD PARK for Combined Operations Training in Scotland, 4 Cdn Div moved thither (C.M.H.Q. Location Statement No. 22, para 20 above). Following upon the withdrawal of

5 Cdn Armd Div from Norfolk, 4 Cdn Armd Div migrated there, its present H.Q. being at COCKLEY CLEY (C.M.H.Q. Location Statement No. 24, para 22 above).

28. As a result of the movements detailed above, large bodies of Canadian troops have been stationed for varying periods during 1943 in two regions - Hampshire and East Anglia which had formerly seen little of them.

29. The training programme of H.Q. 2 Cdn Corps included Exercise "LINK" (13 - 19 Sep 43), carried out in the THETFORD Area of Norfolk, in which this Corps H.Q. commanded 61 Inf Div and 1 Polish Armd Div in a full scale exercise against a controlled enemy, involving various phases of battle including the organization of support, with live firing by R.A. units (4/PROGRESS/11, G.S. 2332, CANMILITRY to DEFENSOR, 21 Sep 43).

30. The remaining locations of 2 Cdn Corps follow. Except for temporary moves, H.Q. 2 Cdn Corps has not changed its location since its organization:

H.Q. 2 Cdn Corps

PAINSHILL PARK,
COBHAM, SURREY
(538796)

H.Q. 4 Cdn Armd Bde

LYNDFORD HALL,
MUNDFORD, NORFOLK,
(G275126)

H.Q. 10 Cdn Inf Bde

DERSINGHAM HALL,
NORFOLK,
(G153492)

H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Bde

CAMP "D",
BARTON STACEY,
HANTS,
(U882623)

H.Q. 11 Cdn Inf Bde

CAMP "A",
BARTON STACEY,
HANTS,
(U867632)

The location of Corps troops and units of 2 Cdn Corps will be found in C.M.H.Q. Location Statement No. 24 (para 22 above).

ROLE OF H.Q. FIRST CDN ARMY AND LOCATION OF UNITS

31. Since its formation on 6 Apr 42, H.Q. First Cdn Army has continued to concentrate its attention on bringing the Canadian field army overseas to the highest peak of efficiency. The most recent developments in the science of war have been constantly scrutinized and the lessons of experience applied to all matters of policy relating to the employment of Canadian forces in an overseas theatre. Since the writing of Report No. 69 (May 42) in which the formation and purposes of H.Q. First Cdn Army are described, an extensive list of units has been accumulating under Army command. These appear in detail in Canadian Army Overseas Routine Order No. 3844, a special secret order.

32. H.Q. First Cdn Army remains at HEADLEY COURT, LEATHERHEAD, and the field army units directly under its command are situated, for the most part, near at hand in Surrey or Sussex. It may be noted here that on 16 Feb 43, 5 Cdn Armd Div, which had come under Army command on 24 Jun 42, passed to 2 Cdn Corps (W.D., G.S., First Cdn Army, Appx 1, G.S. 2361, CANMILITRY to DEFENSOR, 7 Jul 42; W.D., G.S., H.Q. First Cdn Army, Feb 43, Appx XIX; compare Report No. 72, para 28).

33. Note has already been made that certain responsibilities have been assumed in connection with the planning of raids (see Report No. 100, especially paras. 114 - 123 and 137). Thus, during the preliminaries that merged Operation "RUTTER" into Operation "JUBILEE", the role of the G.O.C.-in-C., First Cdn Army was clarified, when the C.-in-C., Home Forces, formally accepted the point that:

the G.O.C.-in-C., First Canadian Army (be) the military officer responsible for the conduct of raiding operations to be carried out by troops under his command.

34. In matters of policy, H.Q. First Cdn Army has surveyed a wide field of organizational and technical problems, ranging, for example, from those of chemical warfare (W.D., G.S., First Cdn Army, Appx 16, Aug 42), of reconnaissance, equipment, reinforcements and the like to such minor items as patches and unit titles (W.D., G.S., First Cdn Army, Appx 13, Oct 42).

35. A characteristic development was the institution in May 43 of a series of monthly G.S. conferences having as their object "to ensure that continuous progress be made towards the development of a common doctrine as appropriate in matters of (a) tactical employment, (b) battle technique, (c) training policy and methods." By this means it was sought to provide an appropriate method by which H.Q. First Cdn Army should better serve the purpose of a clearing house for the knowledge and experience accumulating among the formations and units under command. The policy of these meetings was thus set forth:

The development of a sound common doctrine ... depends upon the pooling and sifting of the wealth of experience now available throughout the formations and units of First Cdn Army. The function of this H.Q. in this regard is primarily one of providing facilities for co-ordination. It is hoped that matters for consideration at future meetings will be initiated in the main not by this H.Q. but by other formations represented.

The firm conclusions resulting from these conferences were to form the basis of recommendations to the G.O.C.-in-C. for adoption in First Cdn Army. The first of these meetings was to be held on 28 May 43 (W.D., G.S., First Cdn Army, Appx 18, G.S. Conferences, 1 May 43).

ROLE AND LOCATION OF CANADIAN PLANNING STAFF

36. An important corollary was the establishment of the nucleus, at Devonshire House, Mayfair Place, LONDON, W.1, of a Canadian Planning Staff, to operate under the direct control of G. Branch, H.Q. First Cdn Army. This staff took over from a larger one set up earlier for the examination of a special

project, and maintained for a time as an increment to H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps (Report No. 87, para 13 and Report No. 96, para 16). The primary function of C.P.S. was to build up and maintain an organization for collating and co-ordinating information on the planning and conduct of combined operations, the data to be available for the use of any staff that might be set up to plan a specific operation, and to serve as a guide for the policy to be adopted in training and equipping the Canadian forces (W.D., G.S., H.Q. First Cdn Army, Appx V, Canadian Planning Staff, 1 Feb 43). The Planning Staff played an important part in Canadian planning for Operation "HUSKY".

LOCATIONS OF UNITS UNDER CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

37. The present composition of Canadian Military Headquarters Units, which is to be found in Overseas R.O. 3844 (para 31 above), indicates an increase in the relative importance of the Medical and Reinforcement Units under command.

38. Canadian Reinforcement Units.

Some changes have been made in the locations of the Headquarters of Groups, as set forth in Report No. 58, para 77, and Report No. 72, para 30, and an additional Group, "G", has been organized. These changes and the location of "G" Group are as follows:

H.Q. "B" Group

GUILLEMENT CAMP,
COVE,
HANTS.

H.Q. "D" Group

THE FIRS,
ALDERSHOT.

H.Q. "E" Group

WEST FRITH & ST. CROSS HOUSE,
DEEPCUT,
SURREY.

H.Q. "F" Group

ELDER SCHOOL,
OAKHANGER ROAD,
BORDON.

H.Q. "G" Group
(General & Infantry)

KNOLLYS ROAD,
ALDERSHOT.

39. Medical Units.

The recent enlargement of the number of Medical Units under command of C.M.H.Q. will be apparent from the following list of hospitals and their locations:

7 Cdn Gen Hospital

TAPLOW,
BUCKS.
(formerly at MARSTON GREEN)

8 Cdn Gen Hospital

ALDERSHOT,
HANTS.
(formerly at PINWOOD HOSPITAL,
CROWTHORNE)

10 Cdn Gen Hospital	KINGS LANGLEY, LEAVESDEN HOSPITAL, WATFORD, HERTS.
13 Cdn Gen Hospital	CUCKFIELD, SUSSEX.
14 Cdn Gen Hospital	HORLEY, SUSSEX.
16 Cdn Gen Hospital	MARSTON GREEN, BIRMINGHAM.
17 Cdn Gen Hospital	PINEWOOD HOSPITAL, CROWTHORNE, BERKS.
18 Cdn Gen Hospital	BRAMSHOTT, HANTS.
1 Cdn Special Hospital	BASINGSTOKE, HANTS.
Basingstoke Neurological & Plastic Surgery Hospital	HACKWOOD PARK, BASINGSTOKE, HANTS.
2 Cdn Conv Depot	HINDHEAD, SURREY.
Alton Conv Hospital	ALTON, HANTS.
Massey Foundation Conv Home (Officers)	GARNONS, HEREFORDSHIRE.

(C.M.H.Q. Location Statement No. 24, para 22 above)

Two General Hospitals long in England (Nos. 5 and 15), as well as 1 Cdn Conv Depot, are now in the Mediterranean area.

40. Canadian Forestry Corps.

The number of Companies of the C.F.C. as listed in Overseas R.O. 3844 (para 31 above) is now thirty. Their role is described in Report No. 97, which also provides a Location Statement. All are in Scotland.

41. Details of the locations of other units under Canadian Military Headquarters will be found in Location Statement No. 24 (para 22, above).

TARGET DATE FOR COMPLETION OF CANADIAN ARMY PROGRAMMES

42. In view of the altered aspect of the war since Report No. 72 was written, it may be noted in conclusion that rather less than a year ago, Lieut.-Gen. McNaughton, at a meeting held at H.Q. First Cdn Army, 22 Oct 42, to discuss certain matters affecting Canadian armoured formations, announced that owing to the changes in the strategic situation, he had agreed to set the

target date for the completion of Canadian Army programmes at 1 Oct 43 (W.D., G.S., First Cdn Army, Appx 13, para 77, Oct 42). That term has now been reached.

43. In the spring of 1943 a mobilization programme was adopted for the Canadian Army Overseas. Formations were placed in the following order of priority for mobilization (C.M.H.Q. file 1/MOB/1, note on C.M.H.Q. to H.Q. First Cdn Army, 2 Apr 43):

- 1 - 1 Cdn Inf Div
- 2 - 3 Cdn Inf Div
- 3 - 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde
- 4 - 5 Cdn Armd Div
- 5 - 1 Cdn Corps Tps
- 6 - 2 Cdn Inf Div
- 7 - 2 Cdn Corps Tps
- 8 - First Cdn Army Tps
- 9 - G.H.Q. Tps and L. of C. Units.

Of these formations, 1 Cdn Inf Div and 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde have already proceeded abroad and have been in action. It will be noted that 4 Cdn Armd Div was not included in the mobilization programme.

44. In his speech in Parliament on 21 Sep 43, Mr. Churchill committed himself to the statement that in due time the Allies would make "a direct attack across the Channel upon the Germans in France or the Low Countries":

At what we and our American allies judge to be the right time this front will be thrown open and the mass invasion of the Continent from the west, in combination with the invasion from the south, will begin.

(The Times, LONDON, 22 Sep 43).

This statement defines, perhaps, the ultimate role of the Canadian Army Overseas.

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