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REPORT NO. 108

HISTORICAL SECTION

CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

26 Nov 49

Operation "JUBILEE": The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42

PART II: The Execution of the Operation.

Section 2: The Attack on the Main Beaches

AMENDMENT NO. 1

1. This amendment incorporates certain information which has come to light since this Report was originally drafted in 1943.

ACTION OF TANKS ASHORE

2. With reference to paras 75-140 of this Report, there has been considerable further discussion and investigation since it was written.

3. Lt-Col R.R. Labatt, who commanded the R.H.L.I. in the operation, twice visited Ottawa in 1945, after his repatriation to Canada following the end of hostilities, and commented upon this and other Reports. Lt-Col Labatt asserted strongly that only three tanks reached the Dieppe Esplanade at any time during the operation ("I had the whole esplanade under observation and saw only a total of 3 Tanks there") ("Comments by Lt.-Col. Labatt and Major Lazier", 26 Nov 45; original on H.Q. 1451-603/R5, copy on C.M.H.Q. file 24/Dieppe/1).

4. As a result of Lt-Col Labatt's assertions, letters were written to former officers of 14 Cdn Army Tk Regt who were in action at Dieppe. As a result, statements were obtained from Capt (Lt in 1942) Edwin Bennett and Lt A.L. Breithaupt; these are on file (H.Q. 1451-202/14, copies on C.M.H.Q. file 24/Dieppe/1) and support the evidence of Major C.E. Page summarized in this Report. Lt Breithaupt wrote (10 Dec 45), "As far as I can recollect, 13 or 15 tanks crossed the sea wall and reached the Esplanade... Most of these tanks with the exception of the few that were knocked out on the Esplanade, one of which was mine, "Betty", did return to the beach on the order of withdrawal..." Mr. Breithaupt lists a number of tanks known to have crossed the wall, and sums up, "This accounts for ten tanks known to have been on the Esplanade and there were several others." Mr. Breithaupt refers independently to an incident at Oflag VII B mentioned by Major Page: "Major Page had a meeting for all tank officers at which he took down information regarding each individual troop".

5. Capt Bennett, writing on 3 Dec 45, describes in detail the operations of his own troop of tanks, which landed from L.C.T. 7 in the second flight. This troop evidently landed on White Beach, and after moving some distance to the left and finding that the sea-wall was impassable because of the ditch in front of it, turned about and travelled the length of the beach to the vicinity of the Casino, where Capt Bennett's own tank, evidently followed by the other two of his troop, crossed the wall. Many details are given. Capt Bennett writes, "I do know that our Troop 10, "B" Squadron was the first over the wall by the Casino".

6. Capt Bennett's evidence appears to establish definitely the number of tanks which crossed the wall. As noted in para 124 of this Report, Major Page, as a result of the conference at Oflag VII B mentioned above, was able to list 13 tanks which certainly crossed the wall. He believed that two others, "Beefy" and "Bloody", also crossed, but he was not certain of this point. Capt Bennett's evidence establishes that they did cross, for they were in his troop. He states that these two tanks returned from the Esplanade to the beach; his own had been damaged and was left on the upper level. Capt Bennett writes, "In Germany I was in a different camp than the other officers from my regiment". This presumably accounts for Major Page's uncertainty concerning these two tanks. It would appear that we can now say definitely that 15 tanks crossed the sea-wall.

7. The evidence on this point is clearly overwhelming. Lt-Col Labatt undoubtedly believes that only three tanks did reach the Esplanade, but the best evidence on the action of the tanks is that of the men who manned them.

PENETRATION INTO DIEPPE FROM RED AND WHITE BEACHES

8. More evidence is now available than formerly concerning the various small parties which entered Dieppe on foot during the operation.

9. With reference to paras 52-3, it appears that we must now conclude that the penetration by Lt L.C. Bell's party did not take place. Lt-Col Labatt (who must be assumed to be a good witness on matters connected with his own unit) wrote in connection with these paragraphs, "There is no evidence to support this. It is thought that Lt L.C. Bell was killed before reaching the town proper. He was not seen by anyone who would have known him either in the Casino or in the town." (Comment by Lt-Col Labatt, as above, para 3.)

10. With reference to paras 164-5, it is now clear also that the reported penetration into the town of a party of Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal under Capt G. Vandelaer did not take place. When questioned on this

subject, Capt Vandelaac testified that not only did he not get into the town himself, but he believed that no other member of his company did so, and indeed that no one at all got into Dieppe except Lt Scott of the Essex Scottish (Memorandum of interview with Major G. Vandelaac by Capt J.H.J. Gauthier, 8 Nov 46). This however does not necessarily invalidate the story told by Sgt Dubuc (paras 161-3), for the latter returned to England, whereas Capt Vandelaac became a prisoner and probably would not have known about Dubuc's party. The position with respect to Sgt Dubuc would seem to remain as stated in para 163: it seems likely that he got into the town, although his story in its details may contain some element of embroidery. It may be noted that Lt-Col Labatt considered his story "absolutely preposterous from beginning to end", but this officer could scarcely have any knowledge of the matter.

11. The penetration by C.S.M. Stapleton's party of the Essex Scottish (paras 65-7) is of course well authenticated. It was also reported that another party of the Essex Scottish, led by "Lt Bill Scott" got into the town (letter by Lt J.E.R. Wood, R.C.E., 18 Dec 45, C.M.H.Q. file 24/Dieppe/1; see also memorandum of evidence of Major Vandelaac, above, para 10). This matter was investigated, and a letter from Lt Scott himself seems to leave no doubt that he never got beyond the Esplanade; he describes how he and three men, late in the morning, crawled ("as much for safety, as anything I guess") along a shallow trench which "brought us out at the first street on the town side of the esplanade [presumably the Boulevard de Verdun] where we were a short time later captured" (letter to Lt-Col Jasperson, original on H.Q. 1451-603/E2).

MESSAGES SENT BY BRIGADIER SOUTHAM

12. A memorandum by Major G.M. Rolfe, D.S.O., R.C. Sigs, the senior Signals officer who landed, describes the nature of the communications made use of by Brig Southam. Brig Southam passed his messages to Force Headquarters through a No. 19 wireless set in Major Rolfe's scout car "Hunter". Major Rolfe states that he saw Brig Southam on the beach "about 0630 hrs" and that Brig Southam "spent the remainder of the operation in the vicinity of my scout car". This car was "slightly to the west of the tobacco factory". (Memorandum, 11 Feb 46, H.Q. 1451-202/14.)

13. With reference to para 261, Major Rolfe writes:

Brig. Southam spoke only twice on the air in person during the operation. These two transmissions covering a contact with Green beach shortly after landing and the message detailed at 1243 hrs giving sitrep on White and Red beaches and commending Lt. Millar. All other transmissions and reports were given by me using code name "Bill".

I take no responsibility for the transmissions at 1307 hrs because we had no hope of evacuation.

HONOURS AND AWARDS

14. One additional major award has been made since this Report was written. H/Capt J.W. Foote, who is referred to in para 187, was awarded the Victoria Cross after the end of hostilities (CARO No. 6410, dated 28 Feb 46).

15. It should also be noted, with reference to paras 65-7, that C.S.M. Stapleton was awarded the D.C.M. after his repatriation (CARO No. 6377, dated 11 Feb 46).

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REPORT NO. 108

HISTORICAL OFFICER

CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

Operation "JUBILEE" : The Raid on Dieppe,
19 Aug 42

Part II : The Execution of the Operation.
Section 2 : The Attack on the Main Beaches.

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REPORT NO. 108

HISTORICAL OFFICER

CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

17 Dec 43

Operation "JUBILEE" : The Raid on DIEPPE, 19 Aug 42.

Part II : The Execution of the Operation.

Section 2 : The Attack on the Main Beaches.

1. Earlier Reports (Nos. 100 and 101) have dealt with the preliminaries of the DIEPPE operation of 19 Aug 42, and with events in the flank sectors. The present Report deals with the main attack, delivered on the beaches fronting DIEPPE itself. Some general aspects of the operation, including the return to England and the handling of casualties there, are also treated.

THE PLAN AND THE FIRST ASSAULT

(a) The Plan of Assault.

2. The general nature of the plan for the attack on the beaches immediately fronting DIEPPE has already been explained. It will now be outlined in somewhat greater detail.

3. The arrangements for air and naval support are described above (Report No. 101, para. 7). Under cover of these arrangements, the Essex Scottish were to land on RED BEACH, and the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry on WHITE BEACH, at 0520 hrs, the first flight of tanks landing simultaneously with the assaulting infantry.

4. The general instructions for the landings on WHITE and RED Beaches (Detailed Military Plan, Appx "D") began with the injunction, "It is vital to the success of the operation as a whole that WHITE and RED beaches be in our hands with the minimum delay". It was provided that the infantry of the first flight landing on these beaches would establish a bridgehead by immediate assault. Infantry, R.C.A.S.C., R.C.O.C. and Provost would provide off-loading parties for the R.C.E. assault detachments; the latter would clear the necessary beach roadways and remove obstacles to enable the tanks to enter the town. The tanks, the order stated, would support the assault, and were to proceed to their objectives whether the beaches were cleared or not. Major Sucharov, commanding Beach Assault Engineers, tells the writer, however, that verbal arrangements were subsequently made between himself and Lt.-Col. Andrews by which the tanks were to assist in clearing beach pillboxes if necessary.

5. The Essex Scottish were commanded by Lt.-Col. F.K. Jaspersen and were designated by the code name "FRED". As provided in the Detailed Military Plan, the role of this unit was to be as follows. One company was to cross the bridges north or south of the BASSIN DU CANADA, capture three Light A.A. guns at 237688 (on the LE POLLET cliffs) and consolidate the east bank of the harbour. Another company was to seize the German armed trawlers lying at the quayside at 233687, in co-operation with tanks and a detachment of the Royal Marine "A" Commando which was to land from H.M.S. "Locust" and a flotilla of Fighting French chasseurs. Subsequently this company would assist in consolidating the east bank of the harbour.

6. A third company was to move southward on the west side of the harbour basins, capturing three Light A.A. guns at 239671, a battery position at 235670 and a Light A.A. gun position at 235661. Subsequently it would make contact with the R.H.L.I., secure the perimeter of the position as far as the bridge at 240673, and select and mark an emergency landing ground for the Air Force in the area of the RACECOURSE. The remainder of the unit would clear the east side of the harbour and the town of NEUVILLE, and would subsequently contact the Royal Regiment of Canada and consolidate to hold the east side of the harbour. The portions of the unit east of the harbour would then provide local protection for the force employed against the trawlers, for the R.C.E. demolition party working on the cranes, and the artillery detachments in the area of the four-gun battery at 238688.

7. The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry was commanded by Lt.-Col. R.R. Labatt and known by the code name "BOB". This unit was to act as follows (Detailed Military Plan, Appx "D").

8. One company, moving west along the cliff-top from the Casino, was to capture two Light A.A. guns near the edge of the cliff at 212683 and make contact with the South Saskatchewan Regiment from POURVILLE. One troop of tanks was to co-operate. Subsequently this company would assist in the capture of the position at LES 4 VENTS.

9. Another company, operating southward, was to capture the important battery position at 220665 and the three Light A.A. guns at 219668 nearby. Subsequently this company also would operate against LES 4 VENTS. A third company was to operate southwards along the RUE GAMBETTA and capture a machine-gun post at 225673. It would advance to control the RUE GAMBETTA as far as the southern edge of the town, and would establish contact with the Essex Scottish at the road junction at 236664. The remainder of the unit would be in reserve. In the later stages the R.H.L.I., acting in accordance with developments, would secure the perimeter around DIEPPE from the buildings at 215671 to the road junction just mentioned, where it would make contact with the Essex Scottish.

10. The 14th Canadian Army Tank Battalion (The Calgary Regiment), commanded by Lt.-Col. J.G. Andrews, and designated by the code name "JOHNNY", was to land in successive flights. This, as already noted, was the only unit to issue written orders. These orders (see unit War Diary, August, 1942) were dated 7 Aug. 42 and were to the following effect. Flight 1, consisting of nine tanks (H.Q. "C" Sqn, 8 Tp "B" Sqn, and 15 Tp "C" Sqn), was to land at 0520 hrs simultaneously with the infantry. No. 8 Troop would land on WHITE BEACH, from which it was to push on to assist the R.H.L.I. in dealing with the two Light A.A. guns at 212683. The other six tanks would land on RED BEACH. They would assist the Essex Scottish in subduing the armed trawlers at the quayside and would then cross to the east bank of the harbour to support the Essex. They would subsequently move inland to the high ground at 265663, carrying with them, if conditions permitted, up to two platoons of the Essex for local protection. From this high ground they would dominate the east side of the harbour and the village of ARQUES.

11. At 0535 hrs Flight 1A, nine more tanks (H.Q. "B" Sqn, and 6 and 9 Tps "B" Sqn), were to land on WHITE BEACH. One of the troops was to deal with the four-gun battery at 220665 and with

the LES 4 VENTS position, both in co-operation with the R.H.L.I.; while the squadron headquarters and the remaining troop, likewise in co-operation with the R.H.L.I., would deal with the machine-gun post at 225673.

12. The tank battalion headquarters less one tank was to land on WHITE BEACH with Flight 2 at 0605 hrs, rendezvous with H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde at the CHURCH OF ST. REMY (225685), and co-ordinate the subsequent operations of the battalion, controlling its action in support of the Camerons attacking the aerodrome. A Command Post with three scout cars was to land simultaneously with Battalion Headquarters, report to H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde and remain with it until all tanks had been re-embarked. The balance of Flight 2, all landing at 0605 hrs, would consist of 7 and 10 Tps "B" Sqn, and 15 Tp "C" Sqn.

13. The remainder of the tank battalion was to land in Flights 3 and 4 and assist in exploitation in accordance with developments. The last tank landing provided in the Detailed Military Plan was set for 0705 hrs, when "up to 16" tanks ("A" Sqn less Sqn H.Q., which was to land 20 minutes earlier) would land as a mobile reserve and would "probably exploit to ARQUES".

14. The two infantry brigade headquarters were to go ashore at 0605 hrs. H.Q. 4 Cdn Inf Bde was to land on RED BEACH and set up at the CHURCH OF ST. JACQUES (229685) at the east end of the town. H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde, landing on WHITE BEACH, was to set up at the CHURCH OF ST. REMY, not far from the Casino, as already noted. The Signal Stations and Beach Signal Stations for these two brigades were to land with their respective headquarters. The Beach Signal Station of 4 Cdn Inf Bde was to open immediate communication to WHITE Beach and BLUE Beach; that of 6 Cdn Inf Bde was similarly to open communication with GREEN Beach and RED Beach.

15. The provision for the action of Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, employed as Floating Reserve, was as follows. This unit, less two platoons which were to land from L.C.Ts., was to be three miles offshore at 0605 hrs, and to be available for landing by about 0650 hrs. On arrival at the anchorage off DIEPPE, the Officer Commanding was to report on board H.M.S. "Calpe" to receive his orders. If the operation proceeded according to plan, his task, as already observed, was to provide a rear-guard on the western side of the harbour to cover re-embarkation.

(b) The Assault on RED and WHITE Beaches.

16. The vessels carrying the assaulting force for the main beaches reached the positions for lowering landing craft on time and without contact with the enemy. The landing craft were duly lowered and formed up without mishap. The flotillas from "Glengyle", "Prince Leopold" and "Prince Charles" approached the shore with those from "Glengyle" on the right. The passage towards the shore was uneventful.

17. The destroyers behind the landing craft began the covering bombardment provided in Operation Orders on schedule. It appears however that H.M.S. "Locust" did not take part in this preliminary bombardment, as she had been unable to keep up with Group 4 during the passage (Report from "Locust", Appx 20 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander). Accordingly

the bombardment was carried out by the guns of four destroyers: "Garth", which opened fire at 0512 hrs and shifted her target to the eastern side of the harbour at 0519 hrs; "Eleasdale", which fired on the Casino and buildings adjoining from 0513 to 0520 hrs; "Berkeley", which fired on houses at the back of RED Beach beginning about 0510 hrs; and "Albrighton", which opened fire about 0513 hrs and shifted her fire when the "cease fire" Verey light signal was sent up by the landing craft (Reports of destroyer commanders, Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander).

18. The Air Force also played its part in this phase exactly as scheduled. The smokescreen over the east headland was duly laid. The Air Force Commander states (C.B.04244, para. 984), "This was most effective, lasting from 0510 to 0600 hours". The attack by cannon fighters was also put in on schedule and was (according to the same source) "successful in centralising (? neutralizing) enemy fire along the front from 0515 to 0525".

19. Army witnesses in the first flight of landing craft provide evidence of the punctuality of the naval and air attacks. For example, B.36973, C.S.M. Stewart, J., of "B" Coy, R.H.L.I., an excellent witness, writes, "The Navy landed us dry at approx. 0520 hrs, after we had witnessed the arrival of the Air Force who machinegunned the coast before we went in". A soldier of the Essex Scottish (A.21634, Pte. Carley, S.) gives a somewhat similar account:

We moved in until we were a half a mile from the shore directly in front of the town. We stopped as the R.A.F. was just starting to bomb the town. We waited in our A.L.C. till 14 minutes past five as that was when the R.A.F. stopped bombing. Then we moved into the beach.

The evidence of B.37070, Pte. West, H., H.Q. Coy, R.H.L.I., may also be quoted: "We stood by for about 20 mins or half an hour while the navy and airforce went to work with guns. We then started in and made a very good landing as far the Navy was concerned."

20. The touchdown on WHITE Beach is thus described (Appx 5 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander) by Lt.-Cdr. C.W. McMullen, R.N., whose duty it was to navigate the landing parties for RED and WHITE Beaches in to shore and to lead and support the WHITE Beach landing:

The flotillas started deploying and the smoke laying Aircraft started dropping their smoke bombs on the East Cliff. The bombardment, bombing and cannoning of the beaches commenced, excellently timed, and although fire appeared to be coming at us from every direction (including astern) the boats touched down on the beach at 0523. Two of the White Beach boats were heavily damaged during the approach but all White Beach boats disembarked their troops. Red Beach boats appeared to do likewise.

I fired three red vereys lights as arranged when the leading boat was about 200 yards from the shore; the bombardment, however, had stopped some little time before this.....

The smoke mortar was used throughout and smoke bombs were lobbed on to the shore across the whole front of the flotilla in the last few hundred yards before reaching the beach.

21. The flotilla officer of H.M.S. "Glengyle", carrying the R.H.L.I., reports (Appx 3F to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander) that his flotilla beached at 0522 hrs, with the centre boat "200 yards to the East of Casino as arranged", two boats "becoming casualties". He adds: "Aircraft cannon support was excellent, but the bombing did not appear to have had much effect." This officer, like some other witnesses, had apparently assumed that a heavy bombing attack on DIEPPE had been intended.

22. The flotilla officer of H.M.S. "Prince Charles" describes (Appx 3G to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander) the touchdown of his flotilla, carrying part of the Essex Scottish:

The run into the beach was good and our fighter aircraft came into attack when the craft were about 300 yards offshore. The touch-down was made at 0520 and the dis-embarkation of the soldiers from the boats was facilitated by the steepness of the beach.

23. The report of the Commanding Officer of H.M.S. "Prince Leopold" (Appx 2E to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander) describes the approach of this vessel's flotilla, carrying another portion of the Essex Scottish:

As soon as the land could be distinguished it was found that the Flotilla was to the westward and the Flotilla Officer altered course so as to beach in the correct spot. This made rather a big space between H.M.S. "Prince Leopold's" and H.M.S. "Prince Charles" Flotillas at the "touch down" which was made a few minutes after schedule.

24. It will be noted from this evidence that the touchdown of the assault landing craft on RED and WHITE beaches was late, but only a little late, the latest actual time given above being 0523 hrs. The evidence of some of the Army witnesses quoted above (para. 19) indicates that these men believed that the flotillas halted until the Air Force attack had concluded. There is no evidence for this in the Naval reports, and the evidence of Capt. (now Lt.-Col) D.F. MacRae (S.D. & G. Highrs), an excellent witness, is that the fighters were still attacking when he landed with the Essex. If the times given in the Naval reports and the report of the Air Force Commander are accurate, this must have been the case. The "Detailed Chronological Air Narrative" (Appx B to Annex 7, C.B.04244) states that five Close Support Fighter Squadrons attacked RED and WHITE Beaches from 0515 to 0525 hrs. The Air Force Commander in his Covering Letter points out that the fact that the infantry were a few minutes late prevented their taking full advantage of this attack.

(c) The Touchdown of the First Flight of Tanks.

25. Although the infantry landing craft arrived very close to time, the first flight of tank landing craft were decidedly late, and this certainly exercised a distinctly adverse influence upon

the course of the operation. The report of the senior officer of the tank landing craft of the first flights ("A" L.C.T.: Appx 9 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander), after describing the difficulties encountered in obtaining prompt and accurate fixes from the craft responsible for navigation, states that the beach was identified shortly after 0502 hrs, and that at 0515 hrs the craft were still two miles from shore. It proceeds:

6. The craft gradually opened out into line abreast, and the 1st Flight was led in through the smoke at 0530.

This would presumably indicate that the first nine tanks touched down somewhere about 0535 hrs, i.e. about 15 minutes late. The naval evidence seems conclusive on this point, although Major B. Sucharov reports that his L.C.T. (No. 2), which he believes was the first to touch down, made its landing at 0525 hrs.

26. Parties of both the R.H.L.I. and the Essex Scottish were carried in L.C.Ts. This accounts for some men of these units reporting that they saw no supporting air attack at the time of the assault. For instance, A.21509, Pte. Maier, J., Essex Scot., who was with part of "B" Coy on L.C.T.4 (in Flight 1A), reports that he saw no British aircraft attacking the town. Certain similar reports in letters from prisoners of war are presumably to be explained in the same manner.

27. The result of the tanks' late arrival was to leave an important gap in time between the cessation of the naval bombardment and the cannon fighter attack and the time when the 6-pdr guns of the tanks could come into action against the enemy defences. The comment of Brigadier Mann on this point may be quoted:

The two battalions landed on time but the LCTs were between ten and 15 minutes late owing to their having been given a wrong fix for their position some distance from the Beach. This of course meant that the immediate fire support of their six pounders and besa's was not available when it was most desirable that it should be.

(Lecture Notes: The Combined Services Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42.)

28. The portion of the report of the Naval Force Commander dealing with the touchdown on RED and WHITE Beaches (C.B.04244, Paras. 924-5) should be quoted:

.....The main landings on "Red" and "White" Beaches took place punctually and according to plan, with the exception that the leading wave of three L.C.T. approached from too far to the Westward and were about 10 to 15 minutes late in touching down.

The air support, and the smoke-making aircraft on the East cliff, were accurately synchronised, and the destroyers' fire, both on the houses along the front while the boats were going in, and subsequently on the East and West cliffs, appeared to be as effective as could be expected.

(d) The Enemy Reaction to the Assault.

29. It is obvious that no surprise could be expected on RED and WHITE Beaches. Apart from any influence exerted by the unfortunate encounter of Group 5 with enemy vessels, the attack on GREEN Beach half an hour before the assault on the town itself, and the attack on BLUE Beach somewhat later, followed by the preparatory naval and air bombardment, were certain to have roused the defenders. Success on the main beaches therefore depended upon exact synchronization of support with the landing and upon the power of the attack - naval, air and military - being sufficient to overwhelm the garrison of the beach defences and the positions overlooking the beaches.

30. It is now obvious that in fact the brief bombardment with 4-inch naval guns and by cannon fighters was not sufficient to subdue the power of the defence to the extent necessary to permit the assaulting infantry to penetrate into the town. Against concrete defences these expedients had little permanent effect, though doubtless they greatly reduced enemy action while they lasted. Lt.-Col. D.F. MacRae testifies to the extremely formidable character of the fighter attack. In spite of this, it is clear that considerable fire was directed at the landing craft carrying the infantry as they approached the beach, and from the moment of touchdown the fire became increasingly hot.

31. Lt.-Col. MacRae's account of the enemy reaction as the Essex Scottish moved in is as follows:

As we continued to move in, visibility grew better and we came under fire of the shore weapons about five o'clock. The intensity of the fire increased and shells and long range mortar bombs were bursting in the sea among the advancing craft. Some of the craft were hit and sunk but the majority of them were able to carry on. There was no hesitation, flotillas retained their formation, and despite the heavy fire, the assault wave of craft touched down on the beach at 0505 (? 0525) hrs. (1)

The evidence of Pte. Carley of the Essex, who has already been quoted, is that, "About 200 yds away from the beach a terrific amount of machine gun fire and artillery fire was being sent at us".

32. There is somewhat similar evidence from the R.H.L.I. front, although there are indications that here there was rather less fire before touchdown. For example, B.37838, Pte. Kelf, L.J., of H.Q. Coy (Sig), writes, "Just before landing we came under fire. This was the result of us opening fire over the side of the ALC with our Brens". Another soldier, B.37509, Pte. Drury, V.C., of H.Q. Coy writes:

As we neared the beach shells were falling close around us; we learned later that much of this was heavy mortar. Then we ran into MG fire. As we reached the beach and the door opened we could see the Casino and right in front was a MG post firing on us.

(1) This extract is from the account written by Lt.-Col. MacRae for the Essex file of personal stories. He subsequently contributed a longer account to the Essex War Diary.

33. Two other soldiers of the R.H.L.I. write in terms which suggest that the enemy's fire was not intense at the moment of landing. B.37924, Pte. Johnson, C., of H.Q. Coy, writes, "There seemed to be no direct fire on our particular beach at the time of landing, but as we blew a hole in the wire we were fired on by numerous weapons including mortar". B.36589, Pte. Telfer, J., of "C" Coy, writes, "The enemy seemed to hold its fire until we were half-way across the beach and then opened up and we were caught between crossfire".

34. These last references very probably reflect the temporary deterrent effect of the attack by the cannon fighters.

THE SUBSEQUENT FORTUNES OF THE INFANTRY.

(a) WHITE BEACH : The R.H.L.I.

35. If the fire encountered by the R.H.L.I. at the moment of landing was not intense, it became so almost immediately. The following is the description written by B.36546, Sgt. Volterman, F.B. (R.A.P. Sergeant, R.H.L.I.):

Once landed, the fire became more intensified, including that from well placed mortars. The source of enemy fire, although not visible, was definitely coming from the Casino, the Casino and points on the West cliff.

36. The narrative of the battalion's operations written by Captain (now Major) W.D. Whitaker (War Diary, R.H.L.I., August, 1942, Appx 21) describes the situation as follows:

On landing we were met by heavy enemy fire of all types from the Casino, the buildings and positions along the esplanade and from the headlands on both flanks. The entire battalion was pinned down by the weight of this fire. "D" Coy, on the West of the Casino was almost wiped out. In front of us lay three rows of wire, a six-foot wall and 150 yards across the esplanade, Dieppe itself. Many of the Officers and men were killed or wounded in an attempt to cross the beach and scale the wall.....

37. The most prominent feature on WHITE Beach was the large and lofty Casino. This building held a considerable number of the enemy, including snipers in the tower and on the roof. At least one large gun, probably of about 4-inch calibre, was mounted in the building (in a new emplacement at the north-west corner); and there were various strong points outside the building, including in particular a heavy pillbox in front of the building near the north-east corner. L/Sgt. (now Sgt.) G.A. Hickson, R.C.E., states that this pillbox mounted a gun comparable in size to our own Bofors 40-mm. and was manned by five men; other witnesses

credit it with a larger garrison. While the Casino and its subordinate defences made serious difficulties for the R.H.L.I. in the early stages of the attack, they nevertheless provided a certain amount of cover from the fire of other positions, and the Casino when itself cleared provided the means of crossing the Esplanade area under cover and thus facilitated the entry of some small parties into the town.

38. The wire obstacles on the beach were breached at various points by the explosion of Bangalore torpedoes, and this made it possible for parties of the infantry to enter the Casino. The pillbox in front of the Casino was knocked out, Major Whitaker and other witnesses say by B.36962, Pte. Greaves, T.E., who exploded a Bangalore torpedo in one of the loopholes. This soldier is still listed as "missing" (14 Oct 43). Subsequently the Casino was entered after wire on a "sun porch" on the front of the building had been cut. A number of men of the R.H.L.I. entered in this manner, followed by Sgt. Hickson and the surviving members of the R.C.E. demolition party which he had been instructed to lead to the Post Office, where they were to destroy the Telephone Exchange. Before entering the Casino, Sgt. Hickson attempted to move the gun from the pillbox, but finding it immovable he destroyed it.

39. The infantry, assisted by the sappers, who were well equipped with demolition charges, now began to clear the Casino. It was a very large building, and its interior was a maze of rooms and passages of various sizes. Clearing it of enemy snipers was in consequence a long and complicated operation. Major Whitaker states, "Nearly an hour was needed before all the enemy were either killed or taken prisoner".

40. Sgt. Hickson employed a number of charges of plastic high explosive to blow down walls inside the building and destroy snipers, who were numerous. After dealing with a number of these, Sgt. Hickson and the men with him proceeded to assail the gun emplacement in the north-west corner already referred to. This was of two storeys, the gun (which was firing upon our ships offshore) being in the upper one. Entrance from the Casino was by a steel door which was locked. Sgt. Hickson blew this door down with a charge which also killed or stunned the men of the gun-crew. Hickson then entered the emplacement and exploded a one-pound charge on the breach of the gun, in which there was a shell. This presumably destroyed the gun.

41. In the process of clearing the Casino, a considerable number of prisoners were taken. Sgt. Hickson states that the final total was 23; Major Whitaker states that in the end there were "approximately thirty" in the building.

42. At 0712 hrs intelligence reached H.M.S. "Calpe" that the Casino had been "taken" ("Calpe" Intelligence Log, War Diary, "G", H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, August 1942. Appx 51). This may indicate the time at which the process of clearing the building was completed.

43. While the Casino was being cleared, the men of the R.H.L.I. who had remained on the beach were being subjected to very heavy fire from the inaccessible positions occupied by the enemy. Major Whitaker writes:

Between 0700 hrs. and 1100 hrs. the beach was continually plastered by enemy mortar and shell fire. A great many of our casualties were caused by this fire, as most of our troops had to seek what cover

they could find on the beach, as they were unable to advance over the wall, owing to the fact that the enemy had them enfiladed from the headlands.

One N.C.O. (B.36723, Sgt. Douglas, J., of H.Q. Coy) describes his own experience thus:

I landed with "A" Coy and made a dash from the boats to about half-way up the beach. Lieut Baisley from then on took us forward over the wall. At this point Lieut Baisley was killed. Nobody else tried to go over the wall after that. We did not know exactly where the fire was coming from. The places we fired at were the windows of the tower in the Casino where we could see tracers originating; both rifles and Bren fired into the windows and no more fire was seen from there. We remained on the beach, being pinned down by fire from the high ground to the West of the Casino.

While some men lay along the sea-wall west of the Casino, or on the beach nearby, other sheltered under the wall immediately in front of the Casino. One of these was B.36977, Cpl. Wray, J.A., of H.Q. Coy, who writes, "We stayed there all the time, being pinned down by cross-fire from the hill on the West and the Casino towers".

44. The records of the R.H.L.I. contain few references to Lt.-Col. Labatt, and although there are some indications that the commanding officer was able to exercise some direction over the unit by his 18 set (B.37259, Pte. Prince, H., "C" Coy, states that Major Pirie was able to communicate with him in this manner) it appears that such control was limited. The evidence of B.36765, C.S.M. Dean, W., H.Q. Coy, makes it clear that Lt.-Col. Labatt with his battalion headquarters group was on the beach some distance east of the Casino, and that from here the C.O. was exercising what command was possible. B.36883, Sgt. Goodman, F.V., H.Q. Coy, tells how after firing across the sea-wall with a Bren gun he was directed by Lt.-Col. Labatt "to organize men in this vicinity to direct their fire towards the high ground to the West".

(b) Penetration into DIEPPE from WHITE BEACH.

45. As already noted, the Casino when occupied constituted what was in fact a covered avenue between the beach and the BOULEVARD DE VERDUN skirting the front of the town. Thanks largely to this fact, at least two parties of the R.H.L.I. and one party commanded by a sapper sergeant were able to penetrate into the town and remain there for some time. Other portions of the R.H.L.I. took up positions in slit trenches or small buildings on the south side of the Casino and carried on sniping against the German positions in the buildings fronting the esplanade and in and around the Castle.

46. It would appear that the first party to enter the town was a group of about 14 men commanded by Capt. A.C. Hill, second in command of "B" Coy. The evidence of B.36973, C.S.M. Stewart, J., who was a member of the party, is that Capt. Hill led it from the beach into and through the Casino (which our troops at this time had entered but not yet cleared) at about 0600 hrs. Capt. Hill, obviously a most bold and aggressive leader, was determined to push on into the town, and under his direction C.S.M. Stewart

covered the main body of the party with Bren gun fire while they ran across the open from the south side of the Casino to the buildings on the front of the town.

47. Attempting to enter the town by the RUE DE SYGOGNE, the party found the road block here impassable, as it was covered with heavy wire which they had no means of cutting. They succeeded, however, in breaking into a building on the east side of the street and by this means entered a cinema theatre which is evidently the "Theatre" appearing on the 1:5000 map of the town.

48. Passing through the theatre, the party advanced into the town. C.S.M. Stewart's recollection of their route is that they followed the RUE COURONNE and the RUE SAINT REMY to the RUE DE SYGOGNE, where an enemy patrol was engaged. The party turned back along the RUE SAINT REMY and down the RUE DES BAINS, as far as the RUE DE LA BARRE. Here again there was contact with enemy soldiers, and the Canadian party retired into the square surrounding the CHURCH OF ST. REMY and from this square made their way by the short unnamed cross-street opposite the centre of the church into the RUE DE LA BARRE. Here C.S.M. Stewart fired with the party's one Bren gun on a group of enemy soldiers in the street outside what appeared to be a headquarters near the PLACE DU PUIITS SALE and inflicted casualties. Here also a signaller (L/Cpl. Harris) was killed by a sniper. His 18 set had not worked all morning, and the party accordingly had had no communication with battalion headquarters.

49. As heavy enemy opposition was now being encountered, Capt. Hill's party retired into the square surrounding the church and returned, probably by the RUE SAINT REMY, the RUE DE SYGOGNE and the RUE DU PORT D'OUEST, to the cinema theatre. En route they saw what appeared to be an enemy anti-tank gun in position near the intersection of the RUE DE SYGOGNE with the RUE CLAUDE GROULARD, and engaged the enemy troops about this gun.

50. C.S.M. Stewart believes that the party had been in the town for about one and a half hours, and returned to the theatre about 0730 or 0800 hrs. They remained in the theatre thereafter for about two hours more, and were joined by Major H.F. Lazier, several other ranks of the R.H.L.I., and some sappers (probably members of L/Cpl Sinasac's party, referred to below, para.130). About 1000 hrs enemy infantry were observed converging on the theatre from more than one direction, and while C.S.M. Stewart and B.37098, Pte. Liss, A., engaged the enemy, the main body of the party made their way out of the theatre by the PORTE DU PORT D'OUEST and after being joined by Stewart and Liss rushed back across the open to the Casino, only one man being hit during the crossing.

51. The War Diary of 7 Cdn Fd Coy states, presumably on the evidence of Sgt. Hickson, that Lt.-Col. Labatt and a party were seen entering the town, and Sgt. Hickson told the writer that he saw Lt.-Col. Labatt returning from the town. The evidence of members of the R.H.L.I., however, and particularly that of C.S.M. Stewart and C.S.M. Dean, seems to make it quite clear that the Commanding Officer was never in the town; and it must have been Capt. Hill's party which Sgt. Hickson saw returning.

52. Major Whitaker states that another party of the R.H.L.I., commanded by Lieut. L.C. Bell, also succeeded in making its way from the Casino across the esplanade and into the town. Major Whitaker's narrative continues:

On reaching the Church of St. Remy, Lieut. L.C. Bell was forced to withdraw, as the greater part of his force had been either killed or wounded.

Major Whitaker places the withdrawal of this party at 0900 hrs.

53. Sgt. Hickson states that while in the Casino he met an officer who told him that he had been as far as the Church of St. Remy and had "found nobody there". Sgt. Hickson believed that this was one of the two subalterns of the R.H.L.I. named Counsell; but it seems likely that it was in fact Lieut. Bell. Lieut. Bell is listed as killed.

54. Sgt. Hickson himself states that he took a party of about 18 men into the town somewhat later, leading them along the south-east wing of the Casino and across the BOULEVARD DE VERDUN. That they crossed the open boulevard in safety was probably due to the cover provided by a tank which had stopped near the south-east corner of the Casino and engaged enemy machine-guns in and around the Castle, silencing much of the enemy fire at this point. This may have been the tank "Bert" which appears in German photographs in this vicinity.

55. Sgt. Hickson's party penetrated through the buildings facing the beach and reached the intersection of the RUE DE LA MARTINIERE with the RUE DE L'HOTEL DE VILLE and the RUE DE LA HALLE AU BLE a short distance north of the Church of St. Remy. Here there was much activity by enemy snipers. Civilians, or, at least, persons in civilian clothes, were moving freely about the streets. Sgt. Hickson's party came to the conclusion that these people were engaged in giving away the positions of individual Canadian soldiers to the snipers; they therefore cleared the streets with Bren gun fire.

56. One sniper firing from an upper window was killed with an anti-tank rifle, and one house was cleared and the party of German infantry holding it destroyed after hand-to-hand fighting. As ammunition was exhausted and no support was in evidence, Sgt. Hickson then withdrew his party to the Casino. While on the way back they heard the destroyers' hooters sounding the warning signal for withdrawal.

57. The action of Capt. Hill's party is attested by the written evidence of a considerable number of members of it in the file of personal stories written by members of the R.H.L.I., and appended to the unit War Diary for August 1942. For the action of Lieut. Bell's party the only authority found is Major Whitaker's narrative, which however is presumably based on reliable evidence. The account of the work of Sgt. Hickson's party is based entirely upon this W.C.O.'s own evidence; he did not know the names of any of the men with him. The writer considers him however to be a thoroughly reliable witness. The evidence of B.25252, Spr. Price, W., of 2 Cdn Fd Coy, should be considered in this connection. He writes in part:

With Hickson until after Casino cleared.

Sgt. Hickson went toward town. Told me to sit quiet.....

.....Waited for Sgt. Hickson who came about noon.....

Sgt. Hickson received the D.C.M. It is of interest that he was later attached to a unit of the First (British) Army in North Africa, and won the M.M. for services there (Overseas R.O. 3618, 12 Jul 43).

(c) RED BEACH: The Essex Scottish.

58. On RED BEACH there was no such feature as the Casino, which broke up the terrain and facilitated the infiltration into the town of the parties whose operations have just been described. The beach on which the Essex Scottish landed was completely open and was commanded by the east headland (in which the Germans had weapons sited in caves well illustrated in air photographs reproduced in C.B. 04244) at a range of only some 400 yards. It was also overlooked by the lofty buildings along the BOULEVARD DE VERDUN and by pillboxes on the Esplanade wall: while snipers in the upper parts of the Casino were able to harass the Essex on the beach with fire at longer ranges.

59. The landing of the battalion has already been described. Fire directed against the unit was undoubtedly considerable as the landing craft moved in, although the smoke laid from the air must have interfered with that of the guns on the east headland; and as in the case of WHITE BEACH it evidently grew hotter following the landing.

60. Lt-Col. D.F. MacRae, the only officer with the unit who landed and subsequently returned to England, has written a detailed narrative of the operation (War Diary, Essex Scot., August 1942, Appx VI). He states that there were two wire obstacles on the beach in front of the sea-wall, which was itself lined with heavy wire.

61. The troops, Lt-Col. MacRae states, rushed out of the landing craft in perfect order as they touched down; the wire-crossing parties immediately went to work and the first obstacle was crossed. "So far as I know only one man was lost in this crossing" (Lt-Col. MacRae's narrative). The small losses at this stage were probably due to the fact that the cannon fighters were at this moment still "delivering a very heavy and audacious attack".

62. Heavier casualties were sustained in breaching and crossing the second belt of wire. The enemy was doubtless returning to his positions after the cessation of the fighter attack, and both mortar fire and shell fire began to come down in addition to that of automatic weapons. Lt-Col. MacRae writes, "There was at this time a great deal of light M.G. fire on the wire obstacles which caused several casualties amongst the troops while crossing said wire". Lt-Col. MacRae's opinion is that by 0545 hrs, "somewhere between 30 and 40% of the Essex Scottish personnel were either killed or wounded".

63. The survivors of the assaulting troops had now reached the sea-wall forming the north edge of the Esplanade, and attempts were made to organize attacks across it with a view to penetrating into the buildings on the BOULEVARD DE VERDUN. These attacks were unsuccessful, and resulted in further heavy casualties. Lt-Col. MacRae's account of the efforts of the battalion to come to grips with the enemy at this point should be quoted at length:

The 3-inch mortars were set up but almost instantly were destroyed by bomb or

shell fire. Smoke cover was put over by the 2-inch mortars and the crossing of the sea wall was attempted. This crossing was met with intensive gun and mortar fire as well as L.M.G. fire and almost all of the assaulting troops were killed or badly wounded. The Companies were reformed and despite the loss of some officers started a second assault under cover of smoke. By this time some of the 2-inch mortars had been destroyed by enemy fire and the second attack suffered similar fate to the first. By this time the wireless sets were largely destroyed; there being only the 18 set in "C" Company still functioning. The enemy continued to shell the beach with heavy mortar fire and M.G. fire on the flanks causing many casualties. A third attempt on a reduced scale was made to cross the wall and was met by a hail of fire causing most of the personnel to become casualties.

64. The evidence of Pte. Maier is that he saw no attempt to organize an attack across the sea-wall; but this soldier was carried on an L.C.T. of Flight 1A and therefore landed very late and did not witness the attacks made by the battalion before its strength was materially reduced by casualties. The fact that the tanks of Flight 1 were ten or fifteen minutes late in landing has been noted (above, para. 25). Had they been present (as had been intended) at the time of these attacks, the results of the latter might have been more fortunate. A.21355, Pte. Fleming, J.T., also reports that he saw no organized attack; but this soldier himself crossed the wall and reached the buildings a few minutes after the landing.

65. At this time about 12 men succeeded in crossing the Esplanade and penetrating the enemy positions. This is the only party of the Essex known to have made such a penetration. The senior member of the party was A.21463, A/C.S.M. Stapleton, C. Its action is described as follows by Lt.-Col. Jasperson in a letter dated 23 Aug 42 and written to Lt.-Col. Jasperson's banker in LONDON from a prisoner-of-war camp in France (copy on C.M.H.Q. file 10/JASPERSON P.K./1):

CSM Stapleton.....did a remarkable job of getting forward in to buildings with about 12 men and accounted for a considerable number of enemy in transport and also enemy snipers.

66. The work of the Stapleton party is referred to in an untimed message from the Essex to the R.H.L.I. recorded by a listening set on H.M.S. "Calpe":

12 of our men in the buildings. Have not heard from them for some time.

The approximate time at which this message was sent is probably indicated in an entry in the Intelligence Log of "Ferne" at 0610 hrs: "Essex Scot across the beaches & in houses". This

indicates that the information of this small penetration was greatly exaggerated in transit, and this probably had an important influence on a later stage of the operation (see below).

67. For more than a year after the action, Lt.-Col. Jasperson's letter and the message above quoted were the only sources of information available concerning this particular incident. In October, 1943, however, a member of the party, Pte. Fleming, referred to above, returned to the United Kingdom as one of the first group of prisoners of war to be repatriated from Germany. He described how, only five minutes or so after the landing, a group of about nine men, including himself and A.21520, Cpl. Grondin, C.H., crossed the wall and rushed forward. Seven men (he thinks) fell during the crossing of the Promenade, but the Corporal and himself reached and entered the houses fronting the BOULEVARD DE VERDUN. In these houses they met several other men, including C.S.M. Stapleton. The party killed a number of enemy snipers in the buildings and subsequently found their way out at the back and advanced down a street, which Pte. Fleming thinks was probably the RUE THEOPHILE GELEE, towards "C" Coy's first objective - the houses on the QUAI DU HABLE overlooking the harbour and the enemy trawlers (see para.5, above). En route they engaged and killed more snipers. The objective was reached, but at this point Pte. Fleming was wounded and C.S.M. Stapleton ordered him back to the beach; accordingly, he cannot describe the further fortunes of the party. Major C.E. Page of 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn states, however, that while in Oflag VII B he heard the story of a party which destroyed a lorry-load of arriving German troops somewhere in the vicinity described; and there seems little doubt that this is the incident in which C.S.M. Stapleton "accounted for a considerable number of enemy in transport" as described by Lt.-Col. Jasperson.

68. Lt.-Col. MacRae explains that following the three attempts at assault which have been described the Essex Scottish were no longer able to attempt to carry the fight to the enemy, owing to the heavy casualties which they had suffered. He writes:

10. The Essex Scottish were unable to continue organized fighting as by about 0630 hrs they had suffered at least 75% casualties, a large number of the officers being killed or very severely wounded. Offensive action however was continued from behind the sea wall by firing at slits in pillboxes, windows and anywhere the enemy showed themselves..... Offensive efforts by the remnants of the Essex Scottish were continued for some hours by getting ammunition from the casualties until finally about 1030 hrs there was practically no ammunition left. Ammunition was taken from the wrecked tanks and used as far as it would go....

69. Lt.-Col. MacRae states that some No. 68 grenades were fired into the Tobacco Factory from EY rifles. It was at this time that the factory "caught fire and was rapidly completely ablaze", though Lt.-Col. MacRae is not entirely certain that the fire was caused by these grenades.

70. Pte. Maier has described the situation at this time as it existed in the sector where he found himself, a short distance west of the Tobacco Factory. At this point there was a depression in the beach forming a sort of trench along the front of the sea-wall, which at this point accordingly rose probably nearly six feet above the shingle (cf. the evidence of Major Page, para. 98, below). The men in Pte. Maier's vicinity took shelter in this trench, and as it appeared that any further attempt to organize an attack across the sea-wall would have been suicidal, all that could be done was to organize the line of the wall as a sort of fire-trench. The men took turns in keeping watch across the wall, each doing a five-minute tour. Pte. Maier himself fired with a Bren gun at a sniper on the roof of one of the buildings facing the beach, and on several occasions he used his own weapon, an anti-tank rifle, against snipers in the tower of the Casino. These, he states, he silenced. He also silenced with the anti-tank rifle a machine-gun which began firing from the Casino tower at about 0800 hrs. He received the D.C.M.

71. Throughout this period there was continuous mortar fire, and casualties continued to mount. Lt.-Col. MacRae described the mortar fire in these terms:

Judging from the blast I would say these were 4-inch mortars and while their blast effect was considerable they buried sufficiently before exploding that their danger area was not very great. A number of minor casualties and bruises were caused by flying shingle thrown up by these bombs.

72. There are on file a considerable number of personal stories by other ranks of the Essex Scottish, all of which afford general corroboration of the facts as given above. All of them dwell upon the continuous mortar fire. One such narrative, that of A.21624, Cpl. Donaldson, J., may be briefly quoted:

Mr. Hueston had pushed forward with some of 12 Platoon, so I crawled, ran and squirmed over our platoon area on the beach and managed to find some men. I now had Ptes. Percy, Tousignant, Crockett and Martin. That was all I could see that were unhurt, so we started in the direction of the sea wall in front of the Tobacco Plant. We all made it to the sea wall safely and found the remainder of the company. Capt. Wilson was in charge now and tried his damndest to find a possible way to cross the street into town. They threw so much H.E. and kept such a hail of machine-gun bullets that it was impossible to get going. We returned fire from the wall as best we could. Saw Pte. Maier get five direct hits on a machine-gun post on our right flank with his A/Tk rifle. He was wounded about an hour later. Capt. Wilson

got word through from some higher authority to stay at the wall and not try to get into town. So we fought there for hours.

73. Pte. Carley, already quoted more than once, describes his recollection of an incident on the beach "around 10 o'clock" when someone who had been wounded made some suggestion of surrender to Lieut. J.A. Prince:

But Mr. Prince said no as he was not the Colonel of the regiment and he was not surrendering for nobody. Mr. Prince was very calm and helped a lot, talking to the boys. Mr. Prince gave us the order to throw smoke between 1100 and 1130 hrs to the beach. That was the last time that I saw him.

74. The testimony of Lt.-Col. Jasperson to the behaviour of his battalion should be quoted. It is found in the letter of 23 Aug 42 already referred to (para. 65):

Mortar and shell splinters were whistling all around me, some as close as 8 feet but none got me. The most I suffered was periodic showers of stone etc on my tin hat and body which did me no harm. The experience was quite harrowing and how I was missed God only knows. The scene of it all will be imprinted on my mind forever. There are many things I would like to say but obviously can't. But I do want it known that the personal acts of bravery in this show are beyond words. I saw no one jittery and all fought splendidly in the best tradition. And that goes for all ranks.... Major Willis was undoubtedly outstanding. Badly wounded in chest, arms and head he carried on directing his company when it seemed humanly impossible to do so; and I am sure when he received his last wound it was due to his effort in trying to draw a man back to safety. Lt Green with a foot shot off had it bound up and continued to hobble on leading his platoon when a second bomb finished him.....Personal bravery was so outstanding by all that it is most difficult to distinguish between cases.

The officers referred to are Major J.A. Willis and Lieut. A.D. Green.

THE ATTACK ON THE MAIN BEACHES
THE TANKS AND THE ENGINEERS

(a) The First Flight of Tanks.

75. As already described, it had been intended that the first flight of tanks should land simultaneously with the infantry. The nine tanks constituting Flight 1 were carried on L.C.Ts. 1 (No.145), 2 (No.127), and 3 (No.159). These were to be reinforced subsequently by nine more tanks constituting Flight 1A, and carried in L.C.Ts. 4 (No.126), 5 (No.121), and 6 (No.163). Major A. Glenn, commanding "C" Squadron, was to land with Flight 1, from L.C.T. 1, and Major C.E. Page, commanding "B" Squadron, was to land with Flight 1A from L.C.T. 4.

76. Flight 2 was to consist of 12 tanks landed from L.C.Ts. 7 (No.124), 8 (No.125), 9 (No.166), and 10 (No.165). L.C.T. 8 carried the tank battalion headquarters, although Lt.-Col. Andrews was to remain on M.L. 343 until it was time to land.

77. The above details derive from the loading tables in the Detailed Military Plan (Appendix "C").

78. The Combined Plan (Appx "E"), the Naval Operation Orders (Appx "B"), and 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn Operation Instruction No.1 (War Diary, 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn, August 1942) leave no doubt that the nine tanks of Flight 1 were to land at 0520 hrs, nine more (Flight 1A, the immediate reinforcement) at 0535 hrs, and Flight 2 at 0605 hrs.

79. The Engineer parties whose task it was to assist the tanks to get forward were distributed between the various tank landing craft. A considerable proportion of the Engineer detachments intended for demolition work in the town were also carried on tank landing craft. The largest single group was 65 R.C.E. personnel in L.C.T. 9. Major B. Sucharov, R.C.E., commanding Beach Assault Engineers, was in L.C.T. 2.

80. The touchdown of Flight 1, as already noted (above, paras. 25 ff.) was made about a quarter of an hour late, probably with unfortunate results for the general fortunes of the operation on the main beaches. Flight 1A were sighted and led in "shortly afterwards" (Report of "A" L.C.T., Appx 9 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander; this report uses the phrase "the 2nd Flight of Group 8"). Flight 2 appears to have touched down at 0605 hrs as scheduled (Report of Lt.-Col. R.D. King on events in L.C.T. 8).

81. Orders had been issued that the three Churchill tanks on each landing craft would go off first, taking the chance of beach mines (which in fact appear not to have been present), in order to engage the enemy pillboxes. The fighting infantry and beach signal parties, and subsequently the sappers and the infantry working parties would follow.

82. As recently as 14 Aug 42, Major Sucharov had successfully demonstrated, in experiments on the sea-wall at SHOREHAM, the utility of a track-laying device which he had developed to enable the leading tanks to lay tracks of chestnut paling which it was considered would enable them to mount the esplanade wall at the points near the east and west ends where the shingle was almost level with the top of the wall. In the central section, where the wall was higher, it was proposed to build timber crib ramps, which had also been successfully experimented with during training; but on the day of the raid fire was so hot that this could not be done. No plans had been made for attempting to breach this wall with explosives. Before the assault five tanks of Flights 1 and 1A, the leading tanks on five of the six craft, had been fitted with the track-laying device. (The foregoing account derives from Major Sucharov's report of 2 Sep 42 (C.M.H.Q. file 55/OPS/41). Additional details were obtained in conversation with him on 22 Jul 43. See also Report of the Training carried out by the Engineer Group from 2 Cdn Div during the Exercise "RUTTER" and "JUBILEE" (To C.E., 1 Cdn Corps, from C.R.E., 2 Cdn Div, 20 Oct 42). Experiments had shown that tanks could climb walls up to 28 inches in height if chespaling was laid on the shingle in front to give them traction.) It may be remarked here that Major Page's testimony is to the effect that the track-laying device (necessarily very hastily constructed) was fragile and easily damaged; the one on his own tank was damaged beyond use on the transporter, before embarkation.

83. The fortunes of the successive waves of tanks will now be described in detail.

84. Of the three craft of Flight 1, two were lost, L.C.T. 2 being the only survivor. It is evident, however, that all the nine tanks of Flight 1 were successfully landed with the exception of one which was "drowned".

85. With respect to L.C.T. 2, which landed near the mole at the east end of the beach, ample information is available. Major Sucharov believes that this was the first craft to land. He states that it made a perfect touchdown, and that the enemy positions opened fire upon it as soon as the craft touched the beach. All three tanks were successfully landed, though only after considerable delay resulting from the motors not having been warmed up. Each tank in succession stalled on the ramp as it left the craft, and fifteen minutes elapsed before all three were clear. The track-laying device evidently served its purpose well in this case, for Major Sucharov reports that the first tank off L.C.T. 2 was seen to proceed up the beach to the esplanade wall, lay its tracks, climb the wall, jettison the apparatus and move west. The other two tanks followed in its tracks and likewise crossed the wall successfully.

86. The landing of the tanks from L.C.T. 2 is described in some detail by personnel of the mortar detachment of the Black Watch which was carried on this craft. One of these statements, that of D.81178, Sgt. Marsh, J.W., runs as follows:

I had a clear view of the tanks as they left the craft. The first tank was hit three or four times but kept going. It

went through the wire, but much to my surprise the wire seemed to spring into place again after the weight of the tank had passed over it. After receiving a couple of shots from the French tank which was standing close to the mole alongside of which we landed, our tank opened fire and must have scored a direct hit as the French tank seemed to explode into the air. While this was going on our second tank CHEETA was on the way out and headed for an enemy pillbox slightly to our left. The Jerries immediately ran from the pillbox and were promptly mowed down by our two Vickers guns which were being coolly handled by Tor. Scottish. Our third tank CAVELL which was towing the scout car HECTOR seemed to get stuck half on the beach and half on the ramp. Our Captain reversed and so pulled the ramp from under the tank but at the same moment a shell burst on the ramp and broke both winch cables. The tank now released rapidly pulled the scout car through the wire and also tore through the wall. The last I saw of the scout car it was tearing like hell up Foch Boulevard.

87. The French tank referred to appears clearly in air photographs (C.B. 04244, opposite p. 22). It had apparently been surrounded by concrete and was being employed as a pillbox.

88. Although more than one man of the Black Watch mentions a tank called "Cavell", evidence from 14 Cdn Army Tk Regt is that this tank was not present, and that the three tanks landed from L.C.T. 2 were "Cougar", "Cat", and "Cheeta", constituting No. 13 Troop of "C" Sqn, and commanded by Lieut. T.E. Cornett.

89. The R.C.E. personnel on board L.C.T. 2 did not succeed in landing. Major Sucharov decided that as the tanks had successfully crossed the esplanade wall and his further tasks lay further to the right, he would ask the captain of the craft to land the engineer personnel further to the west. Before this request could be passed the chains holding the ramp were hit and severed, and, the craft having drifted back a few yards, the ramp door dropped underneath it. The Captain now stated that the craft could not put in again. In consequence neither the sappers nor the mortar detachment on this craft were landed. (Report of Major Sucharov, 2 Sep 42).

90. The experience of L.C.T. 2 has been described at some length, partly because it appears to have been the first craft to touch down and partly because there is ample information concerning it. It serves, moreover, to exemplify the conditions which all the L.C.Ts. faced as they went in to the beach.

91. L.C.T. 1, carrying Major Glenn and "C" Sqn H.Q., also landed its three tanks. A.20271, L/Cpl. Donnelly, J.J.C., of 11 Fd Coy, R.C.E., who was on this craft, describes what took place. He writes, "On landing and before unloading tanks we

received several direct hits from artillery guns one of which disabled one pom pom gun". L/Cpl. Donnelly testifies that all the tanks, and the "armoured car" (i.e., scout car) which the craft carried were landed in approximately three minutes. He adds that No. 1 tank had the track-laying device, but it was not used.

92. L.C.T. 1 was, it would seem, badly damaged while on the beach, and though she succeeded in withdrawing from it she evidently sank shortly afterwards. First reports suggested that the tanks landed by this craft were stopped immediately after landing. L/Cpl. Donnelly wrote:

When ordered to abandon ship #1 T.L.C. which I was on was burning sinking and on fire also the three tanks and one armoured car were also out of action and approximately fifteen feet away from where they left the ship.

The evidence of Major Page given after his repatriation from Germany in October, 1943, presents a different picture.

One tank, "Company", he states, crossed the wall successfully; a second, "Calgary", made "a couple of trips up and down the beach"; while Major Glenn's tank "Chief" moved to a position on the beach near the Casino from which Major Glenn subsequently exercised command over the portions of the unit ashore. Examination of German newsreel films indicates that L.C.T. 1 sank just offshore near the mole. The number of the partially submerged craft is visible. It would appear that C.B. 04244 (chart opposite p. 24) is in error in identifying this craft as L.C.T. 7 (cf. para. 101, below.)

93. In the case of L.C.T. 3, evidence is comparatively slight. No reports by Engineer personnel carried on this craft have been seen. The War Diary of 14 Cdn Army Tk Regt (19 Aug 42) states that Captain B.G. Purdy's tank ("Bull") of No. 8 Troop of "B" Sqn, which was specially equipped with flame-throwers, "for some unknown reason" went off the craft "in very deep water" and was abandoned. Captain Purdy himself is missing. The only written reports by personnel carried on L.C.T. 3 are those of four men of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal. One of these men, D.61282, Pte. Bonneau, D., writes, "Un dive Bomber a tue pres de la moitie des Boys sur notre T.L.C.". He states that the party to which he belonged advanced 15 or 20 yards on the beach, and took cover "derriere des tanks detruits". D.61828, Pte. Labrecque, F., states that 25 men, including Lieut. Tetreault, were wounded on the L.C.T. He writes further "En débarquant, un tank est descendu dans l'eau et tandis que les autres descendaient les canons tiraient dessus". D.62415, Pte. Dorais, S., writes, "Les tanks sortirent", and adds that a mortar bomb killed and wounded many men in the L.C.T.; this perhaps is a more probable explanation of the casualties than the story of the dive bomber.

94. It seems apparent from this evidence that two of the three tanks on L.C.T. 3 were successfully landed.

95. L.C.T. 3 never came off the beach. German photographs show it aground near the east end of WHITE BEACH, some distance east of the Casino (C.B. 04244, Chart opposite p. 24; confirmed by examination of German newsreel).

96. Flight 1A must now be dealt with. As already noted, the three craft comprising this flight landed somewhat later than Flight 1; and as in the case of the earlier flight, two of the three were lost.

97. L.C.T. 4, carrying Major Page and "B" Sqn H.Q., touched down opposite the Tobacco Factory and landed its three tanks and one scout car, as described by A.21509, Pte. Maier, J., Essex Scot., who was on this craft, and R.C.E. personnel. A.19152, Spr. Vantassel, F.E., 7 Fd Coy, testifies that the first tank took "about three minutes to clear after ramp fell", and that the other tanks followed at intervals of about one minute. B.25268, Spr. Bryson, W., 2 Fd Coy, states that the L.C.T. was on fire before touching the beach, having come under heavy shellfire "starting just before touchdown". He also testifies that all three tanks landed, and states that the first tank reached the "breakwater" (presumably the Esplanade wall) and then had a track blown off. Spr. Vantassel says that this tank had "tracks blown off after going about 100 yds", and states further that the second tank suffered a direct hit on its turret a few yards from the craft.

98. Details of the experience of these tanks are now available from Major Page himself. His own tank "Burns" was first off. It advanced across the beach, but Major Page found progress obstructed by a ditch along the front of the wall. He believes that this was certainly intended as a tank obstacle and states that the mechanical digger used for excavating it was still on the beach. (It may be noted that Lieut. D.R.V. Flory, R.N.V.R., who landed men of the Essex Scottish, reported that the troops at the assault "took cover in a hole in the stones which looked as if it had been made by a grab and a crane which were near at hand": Appx 2.E to Enclosure No.13, Report of Naval Force Commander.) "Burns" turned to the right to avoid this ditch and shortly afterwards was struck by an enemy projectile which broke a track and also short-circuited all electrical circuits, depriving Major Page of communication with the other tanks of his squadron. He accordingly ordered his crew to evacuate, and they entered the ditch and lined the wall with their automatic weapons. Subsequently, Major Page (the senior tank officer ashore) having "gone off the air", Major Glenn was instructed to take command of the tanks on shore and did so.

99. The two following tanks, "Backer" and "Bolster", were both similarly stopped by hits on tracks soon after landing. The former's turret traverse was also damaged so that the gun could fire in one direction only; but the latter's guns were in action all morning. None of the tanks from L.C.T. 4 succeeded in crossing the wall.

100. L.C.T. 4 evidently sank after withdrawing from the beach. Spr. Vantassel comments: "Petrol on fire on top of water in T.L.C. did not reach our stores before we abandoned ship". The Senior Officer, L.C.Ts., RED and WHITE Beaches, states that he met L.C.T. 126 (L.C.T. 4) "sinking by the stern with engine room and mess decks flooded and the quarterdeck awash". He ordered L.C.P.(L)s alongside to transfer seriously wounded men (Report of "A" L.C.T., Appx 9 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander).

101. L.C.T. 5 apparently never came off the beach, and German photographs taken after the operation show it directly in front of the Casino (C.B. 04244, Chart opposite p. 24). The craft carried No. 9 Troop, "B" Sqn. The only evidence found with respect to this craft (luckily, good evidence) is that of M.17348, Tpr. Volk, G., who appears to be the only member of a tank crew who fought on shore and returned to England after the operation (memo by Lt.-Col. J. Begg in file Ops 3-3-1-2 Div, from H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, now at Overseas Records Office). Tpr. Volk states that the tanks landed dry, but the L.C.T. caught fire on the beach. Volk was hull-gunner in the third tank on L.C.T. 5. He states that the first tank to land was equipped with the track-laying device, and with its aid negotiated the loose shingle of the beach without difficulty. Lieut. M.J.A. Lambert in the second tank followed in the path of the first to make use of the chespalings, "but threw a track before he was clear". In order to clear Lieut. Lambert's tank, Volk's had to turn down the beach, and after moving a short distance it became "bellied" in the shingle. "Movement finally was restricted to a few feet." The tank had stopped immediately in front of the Casino, facing north.

102. Tpr. Volk described how a sniper on the roof of the Casino, in position "behind a turret wall", continued firing until early in the afternoon when the flash of his rifle was finally picked up on the tank's telescope sight, and one round from the tank's 6-pounder demolished the wall and ended the sniping. Volk himself left the tank to try to unhitch a scout car which had remained attached to it and to see if he could clear the shingle. It was evidently while thus engaged that he was wounded, and to this doubtless is due the fact that he was evacuated as a casualty instead of being captured with the majority of the tank crews.

103. It was perhaps this tank which C.S.M. Stewart of the R.H.L.I. saw on the beach in front of the Casino, firing west at targets on or about the RUE ALEXANDRE DUMAS. C.S.M. Stewart considered that the work of this tank contributed materially to the safe withdrawal of many of the infantry. This Warrant Officer is one of many infantrymen who pay warm tribute to the work of the tank gunners in engaging the enemy positions and keeping down their fire. Major Page suggests that this fire may well have prevented the enemy from rushing the beach and capturing many more of our men than he ultimately did.

104. L.C.T. 6, carrying No. 6 Troop, "B" Sqn, likewise landed all three of its tanks. This craft survived the

operation. The report of its Commanding Officer is available (Appx 13 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander). He states that the craft's first three attempts to land were frustrated by direct hits, one in the engine-room which caused fumes which overcame the helmsman, and two others on the wheelhouse itself. Finally the craft approached the beach at a different angle, under cover of L.C.T. 1 which was "about 60 yards off the beach, sinking". The report continues:

.....We beached the first tank, which went off, was mined about ten yards from the door, the second went a little farther, when it was dropped by gunfire, the third carried straight on.

This is one of very few reports of beach mines. The weight of evidence is strongly on the side of no mines having been present, and this particular report is known to be inaccurate, as Major Page testifies that all three of the tanks from L.C.T. 6 certainly crossed the wall successfully.

105. The Commanding Officer of L.C.T. 6 states that all the infantry on this craft "except thirty" were landed, and that after waiting fifteen minutes for the remainder to go ashore he came off the beach. He attempted to tow L.C.T. 1 off, and got a rope aboard her, but this was shot away and he was obliged to leave her.

106. B.25353, Spr. Sweet, G.F., 2 Pd Coy states that L.T.G. 6 touched down "about 5.55". He says that the first tank got off promptly and lost its right "tread" about 40 feet up the beach. The second tank followed and Spr. Sweet writes, "at end of ramp, treads seem to be shot off". The L.C.T. backed out "about 40 ft." to clear the ramp for the third tank, came in again, and the third tank landed, and was last seen by Spr. Sweet firing in the direction of a "large building". In the light of Major Page's categorical evidence concerning the activities of all three tanks on the Promenade (see below, para. 127) these statements indicate merely the danger of attempting to judge the progress of the tanks ashore on the basis of the reports of observers in the L.C.Ts.

(b) The Second Flight of Tanks.

107. The tanks of Flight 2, carried as already described in four L.C.Ts., were due to land at 0605 hrs. The craft of this wave, running in to make their landing at or about the time specified, encountered very heavy fire. As already noted, the tank battalion headquarters was in L.C.T. 8. When this craft touched down, its leading tank, commanded by the Adjutant, Captain A.G. Stanton, "got off at once but bogged down in the loose shale of the beach and blocked the remaining tanks from getting off". (2) Lt.-Col. Andrews is believed to have gone ashore for a short time and then returned to his own tank on the L.C.T. This craft then withdrew from the shore with the two remaining tanks still on board. The craft lay offshore for some time, but on a report being received that most of the tanks which had been landed were held up on the beach by the Esplanade wall, it was decided that an effort should be made to breach this with explosives carried on L.C.T. 8 for other

tasks. The craft accordingly beached for a second time. (Report of Lt.-Col. R.D. King, 21 Aug 42.) Messages sent to "Calpe" notifying Force H.Q. of this proposed action indicate that the time was shortly after 0800 hrs. On approaching the shore, this time without smoke cover, the craft was again very heavily shelled, and the cables holding the ramp were severed so that it fell and the craft touched down in possibly eight feet of water. Lt.-Col. Andrews, perhaps believing that a normal touchdown had been made, drove off into the water in his tank "Regiment". The tank was entirely submerged except for the turret. Lt.-Col. Andrews came out of the turret, and the crew also left the tank. Lt.-Col. King's report states that the C.O. was seen to make his way to a small craft (an M.L. or L.C.P.) which however "was almost immediately struck and set afire"; Lt.-Col. Andrews was not seen afterwards. A somewhat different account is given by K.53670, Cpl. Carnie, T.L., who was in the C.O.'s tank and was one of the men repatriated from Germany in October 1943. He states that the entire crew got out of the tank safely, and that he saw Lt.-Col. Andrews, waist-deep in water, approaching the shore. A sergeant from the same tank told him that subsequently he saw Lt.-Col. Andrews' body washing about in the shallows at the edge of the beach. The C.O. had apparently been hit, and may have fallen before he reached land. He is now officially presumed dead.

108. The third tank remained on board L.C.T. 8. This craft suffered very heavy damage and was for some time out of control offshore, as "all the navigating officers had been either killed or wounded" (Report of Lt.-Col. King). Brigadier Lett, commanding 4 Cdn Inf Bde, who was in this craft, was severely wounded; Lt.-Col. G.H. McTavish, R.C.E., was killed on the bridge, Lt.-Col. Parks-Smith, R.M., was mortally wounded, and there were many other casualties. Thanks to the exertions of the craft's one surviving officer, Sub-Lt. A.L. Whitehead, R.N.V.R., assisted by Major M.E.P. Garneau, R.22e R., and Sgt. T.J. Badlan, Royal Marines, the engines were got working and the craft was brought off the beach. (See Report by Major Garneau, undated, but with covering letter 29 Aug 42; and reports of senior surviving officer, L.C.T. 8; Sgt. Badlan; and Commanding Officer H.M.S. "Alresford"; Report of Naval Force Commander, Appendices 11, 12 and 13 to Enclosure No. 13.)

109. The Senior Officer, Chasseurs, describes how he saw L.C.T. 8 "lying off WHITE BEACH, having a Battle with the shore batteries all on her own". He adds:

I saw her get hit again and again, but each time she succeeded in altering course to bring one of her 2-pdr. guns to bear on the offending shore battery. It was a magnificent sight.

(Report of Naval Force Commander, Appx 19 to Enclosure No. 13.)

110. Much information is also available concerning the experience of L.C.T. 10, which carried part of H.Q. 4 Cdn Inf Bde, including the Brigade Major, Major (now Lt.-Col.) D.G. Cunningham. This craft touched down at 0610 hrs (Report of Lieut. D.F. Gooderham, War Diary, H.Q. 4 Cdn Inf Bde, August 1942, Appx 21). All three tanks and a scout car were successfully landed, though not without some delay. Several witnesses speak of the gallant action of an officer of the tank battalion who landed from this craft. The evidence of G.16564, Cpl. Gorman, T.B., R.C. Sigs, may be quoted:-

Our tanks started off and as I was at the front of the boat I had a very good view of it. The first tank was badly hit shortly after it got on the beach. The second and third tank were right behind it. The second tank was also hit and it seemed to me completely turned around. I did not see anyone emerge from it. I then saw the Major who went off in charge of the first tank emerge from it. He seemed to be badly wounded in the head and made his way to the second tank which he entered. He then swung the turret around and opened up on the batteries that were shelling us. In the meantime the third tank had become jammed in the water-tight doors and seemed to be in great difficulties. It finally got away and in the process of doing so took our watertight doors along with it. The last I saw of it was it disappearing up the beach.

A somewhat similar account of the same incident is given by D.24017, Sgt. Hart, D.L., R.C.Sigs, in a report dated 27 Aug 42 and addressed to Lieut. McCoy, Intelligence Officer, 4 Cdn Inf Bde.

111. The loading table for L.C.T. 10 in the Detailed Military Plan (Appx "C") indicates that the Army Officer in charge on this craft was Lieut. A.B. Patterson, 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn (commanding No. 15 Troop, "C" Sqn), and information received from the unit is to the same effect. This would suggest that Lieut. Patterson was the officer whose gallantry so impressed witnesses on L.C.T. 10. This, however, is not a certain fact, in the absence of evidence from tank personnel. Evidence in letters from prisoners of war indicates that Lieut. Patterson was not wounded. Lieut. Patterson himself, in a letter to a brother officer dated 24 Aug 42 (copy in Overseas Records Office) wrote in part, describing officer casualties in his unit:

I am safe and sound and not wounded.....The following officers are here not wounded. Page, Glenn, Stanton, Rolfe, Eldred, Valentine, Douglas, Cornett, Patterson, Dunlap, Wallace, Drysdale,

Breithaupt, Lambert. Turney is slightly wounded in the stomach & is in hospital but will be O.K. I believe. Bennett was badly burned on face & neck but should be O.K. after a siege in hospital. I am afraid Andrews and Purdy are gone.....

112. The only officer of the unit who appears to have had injuries of the type described as suffered by the officer from L.C.T. 10 was Lieut. Edwin Bennett, who, it will be noted, is described by Lieut. Patterson as having been injured in the face. Letters from Lieut. Bennett himself (copies in Overseas Records Office) indicate that he was so wounded before landing. One of his letters, dated 15 Oct 42, should be quoted:

Our tank landing craft.....was hit twice coming in to shore, and I got the blast of the second explosion. I was badly burned but fortunately very little shrapnel hit me, in fact hardly any. My luck was with me, I guess, because the boat was able to land us on the beach; the shell had struck well above the water level. My crews were alright because they were in the tanks when hit but I had been up on the front of the boat and was just returning to climb in the turret.....My burns were the least of my troubles when we landed. They seemed to have everything but the brass band out to greet us. We did quite well, however, my own troop as well as any - just after my own tank was finally knocked out of action (around noon) my eyes closed up on me - but the left eye is now normal again and the burns now healed without a scar.

113. The detailed Military Plan (Appx "C") shows Lieut. Bennett (commanding No. 10 Troop, "B" Sqn), as Army Officer in charge on L.C.T. 7, and information from 14 Cdn Army Tk Regt coincides with this; moreover the information is confirmed by A.19109, Sgt. Lill, G.R., 7 Cdn Pd Coy, who was on this craft, and mentions Lieut. Bennett as being "badly hit" when the L.C.T. was struck by a shell before landing. The incident of the officer who supposedly changed tanks, then, remains obscure. Major Page was questioned concerning it. He had large opportunities for discussing the operation with officers of the unit in Oflag VII B, and in his opinion this incident never took place. He knows of no officer having changed tanks.

114. The experience of L.C.T. 7 has already been described in the words of Lieut. Bennett. The evidence of several R.C.E. personnel, as well as of Lieut. Bennett himself, is that when the L.C.T. was hit before landing a small fire was started on the centre tank. Lieut. Bennett, in a letter dated 7 Sep 42, wrote, "We put out a little fire on the back of the tank and then about two minutes later landed on the beach" (copy in Overseas Records Office). It is quite clear that all three

tanks landed from this craft. Their fortunes after landing are not quite so clear. One man, A.19294, Spr. Smith, J., 7 Cdn Fd Coy, writes of the third tank, "Believe it reached esplanade", but can say nothing of the others. This. Sgt. Lill's evidence suggests that the tanks got off, stopped and opened fire. The clearest and most complete statement is that of A.19315, Cpl. Holland, J.J., 7 Cdn Fd Coy, who states that the touchdown was "around 5.56 A.M." and gives the following account of the progress of the tanks:

2. Tank 1. No.1 moved off T.L.C. and stopped after moving about 30' off ramp. It was being hit with machine gun & artillery fire.

Tank 2. No.2 had caught on fire on board ship before beaching the blaze had subsided but it was still smoking when it beached.

Tank 3. No.3 was hit by fire on rear sprocket just as it got off the ramp & its guns were returning fire at gun in front of casino.

115. Lieut. Bennett's own tank (as mentioned by him in his letter dated 7 Sep 42) was named "BELLICOSE". Photographs from German sources show this tank on the beach close to an L.C.T. (Voelkischer Beobachter, 22 Aug 42; War Diary, 14 Cdn Army Tk Regt, August 1942, Appx 4). Major Page is sure that this tank crossed the wall, and thinks, but is not certain, that Lieut. Bennett's other two tanks also did so. The phrasing of Lieut. Bennett's own account (para. 112, above) suggests that this was probably the case.

116. It should be noted that Brigadier Southam, commanding 6 Cdn Inf Bde, was in L.C.T. 7 and succeeded in landing from it with part of his headquarters and some R.C.E. personnel under Lieut. W.A. Millar. As the beach was being swept by very heavy fire, however, the remainder of the military force on this craft was unable to land before it was withdrawn from the beach. Subsequently, about 1030 hrs, the troops on L.C.T. 7 were transferred to L.C.T. 10 "as LCT 7 was going in to the beach to get as many troops off as possible" (War Diary, H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde, 19 Aug 42). The report of "A" L.C.T. (Appx 9 to Enclosure No.13, Report of Naval Force Commander) states that during the withdrawal L.C.T. 7 was seen about half a mile off the beach, was ordered to withdraw to one mile, but "continued to close" and was seen apparently "hit aft, and on fire". This craft was presumably sunk offshore; as already noted, German newsreel films indicate that C.B. 04244 is in error in stating that it is one of the craft on the beach.

117. L.C.T. 9, carrying No. 7 Troop, "B" Sqn, also touched down under very heavy fire, and succeeded in landing all of its three tanks. B.25412, Spr. Pennels, S., 2 Cdn Fd Coy, who was in this craft, remarks that the R.C.E. party commanded by Lieut. E.R. Shackleton "showed terrific courage, by landing in the face of very heavy M.G. and shell fire". He testifies

that the three tanks landed rapidly, but can throw no light on their subsequent fortunes. B.29352, Spr. Gagne, A.A., 2 Cdn Fd Coy, states that the first two tanks were caught in what he calls a tank trap "with Brick wall about 20 ft long"; this may very well refer to a gully in front of the Esplanade wall. Spr. Gagne states that the third tank "turned left" and missed the trap, but can throw no light on its subsequent progress.

118. Of the four L.C.Ts. of Flight 2, three survived. It will be noted that none of the craft were lost at the time of landing, L.C.T. 7 being lost subsequently during the withdrawal.

(e) Action of the Tanks Ashore.

119. Analysis of the accounts given above of the fortunes of the ten L.C.Ts. that touched down makes it apparent that 29 tanks left the landing craft in this operation, only one of the 30 tanks comprising Flights 1, 1A and 2 (the third tank on L.C.T. 8) being brought back to England. Two tanks were "drowned" (those of Lt.-Col. Andrews and Capt. Purdy); accordingly, 27 may be assumed to have actually got ashore. The War Diary of 14 Cdn Army Tk Regt states, "Total vehicles lost are 28 tanks and 7 Scout Cars"; but a list of 29 tanks and commanders which went off craft is appended. The German High Command communique states that 28 tanks were landed; it seems possible that Captain Purdy's tank (above, para. 93) went down into such deep water that the Germans were not aware of its presence.

120. The passages already quoted from the evidence of eye-witnesses indicate the nature of the subsequent fortunes of the tanks which were successfully landed. It is clear that a considerable proportion of the tanks were stopped on the beach only a short distance from the points where they left the landing craft, either as the result of damage inflicted by enemy gunfire or because the shingle of the beach made further progress impossible. The Esplanade wall in the end sections (where, as already observed, it rose only a short distance above the shingle) was not a serious obstacle. It is now known that about half the tanks surmounted it successfully, some of them at least with the aid of chespalings. Of those remaining on the beach some were stopped before they reached the wall. In the central section where the wall was higher, the timber crib ramps proposed in the plan could not be built, and Major Sucharov (memorandum, 30 Jul 43, in C.M.H.Q. file 55/7116/1) suggests that some tanks "were ultimately knocked out after milling back and forth in front of the high wall in search of an exit". Air photographs taken on 21 Aug 42 (example in file 8-3-5/OPS, from H.Q. First Cdn Army), certainly show some tank-tracks running laterally along the beach in the central sector.

121. So few personnel of the tank battalion who were landed returned to England that evidence concerning this phase of the action is necessarily incomplete. The War Diary

of 14 Cdn Army Tk Regt (19 Aug 42) states, "Only two members of the total tank crews on shore managed to get away and the remainder were either killed or taken prisoner". On visiting the unit on 18 Sep 42, the writer was given the impression that the only actual survivor of the tank-crews who fought on shore was M.17348, Tpr. Volk, G.; and "A Brief History of 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade", compiled at H.Q. 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde and dated 29 Jun 43 (C.M.H.Q. file 24/FORMATIONS/1) states, "....only one other rank Tpr Volkes (sic) and none of the tanks were evacuated". The evidence of Tpr. Volk, who returned wounded, was taken down by the unit's Commanding Officer, Lt.-Col. J. Begg, D.S.O., in BRANSHOTT Hospital on 18 Oct 42, and is summarized at length above (paras. 101-2). Subsequently, knowledge of the tank aspect of the operation was greatly increased by the return of Major Page with the first group of prisoners of war repatriated from Germany (October, 1943).

122. The action of Tpr. Volk's tank ("Buttercup") in continuing to fire on enemy positions after it had been immobilized was characteristic; there is much evidence for the manner in which tanks stopped on the beach continued to fire. Pte. Maier of the Essex Scottish, whose statement has frequently been quoted, states that all three of the tanks landed from L.C.T. 4 were stopped on the beach. These tanks continued firing steadily throughout the action, in spite of hits by heavy shells, which by Pte. Maier's account sometimes left them "rocking". Such hits sometimes caused a tank to cease fire temporarily, but firing subsequently began again. Tanks on the Essex front were still firing as the infantry withdrew after the order for re-embarkation; A.22551, Pte. Mizon, J.H. writes, "I noticed that the tanks were still firing as I crawled behind one before hitting the water".

123. For a long period after the operation the number of tanks which crossed the wall, and the subsequent progress made by them, were little better than matters for speculation. Air photographs taken within two days of the operation showed three tanks on the Esplanade and 21 on the beach, with possibly one more in the water (C.B. 04244, chart opposite p.24). If 29 left the landing craft and one went down into deep water, three or perhaps four remained unaccounted for in these photographs. The large group of tanks on the beach, and the apparent implication that all these were stopped immediately after landing, were made the most of in enemy propaganda photographs. We now know that many of these tanks in fact crossed the wall and only later returned to the beach.

124. On the basis of his own observations and his conversations with other officers at Oflag VII B, Major Page is certain that the following thirteen tanks crossed the wall:

"Bob"	"Bellicose"
"Bert"	"Cougar"
"Bill"	"Cat"
"Betty"	"Cheetah"
"Blondie"	"Caustic"
"Brenda"	"Company"
"Bluebell"	

In addition, he believes, but is not certain, that "Beefy" and "Bloody" also crossed.

125. Most of these tanks (presumably, all those not disabled on the Esplanade) subsequently returned to the beach; Major Page believes that the majority had come back by about 0900 hrs. Air photographs show only three tanks on the Esplanade on 21 Aug. The reasons for the return were the fact that the unbreached road-blocks across the heads of the streets prevented the tanks from penetrating into the town, and the possibility of obtaining on the beach some cover from German fire and using their own guns thence to better advantage. This further explains the presence of a large group of tanks on the beach immediately north-east of the Casino; evidently the building gave them some protection from the German guns in or on the western headland.

126. Evidence from the infantry units throws light on the activities of the tanks on the Esplanade. Pte. Maier describes how, while he and other men of the Essex Scottish sheltered below the Esplanade wall, four tanks were "patrolling" up and down the BOULEVARD MARÉCHAL FOCH immediately above, and firing on the enemy positions. Similarly, there is evidence from the R.H.L.I. of valuable work done by tanks in the Casino sector. We have, in particular, the evidence of Major Whitaker, who in his account written for his unit's collection of personal stories describes how when a party of the unit were in a position immediately south of the Casino, "three tanks appeared and were cruising up and down the esplanade". He writes:

Although we were unable to communicate with them Pte. Graham directed their fire by directing Bren gun fire at the walls around enemy positions. When the tanks saw where his rounds were going they took over and knocked them out.

In the further narrative which he contributed to the R.H.L.I. War Diary, Major Whitaker refers to four tanks as being active in the Casino area. He writes as follows:

About this time (0900 hrs) three of the four tanks were able to make their way up on to the esplanade. Here they did great work cruising back and forth and knocking out many enemy positions in the frontal buildings and the castle on our right flank. The remaining tank had bogged down on the shale, but continued to fire on the right headland throughout the entire operation.

127. To Sgt. Hickson has described how one tank stopped, apparently immobilized, near the south-east corner of the Casino. From here it engaged enemy machine-guns in and around the Castle and silenced a number of them. To the presence of this tank Sgt. Hickson ascribes the safe passage of his own party (above, para. 54) across the Esplanade into the town. This tank was very probably "Bert", which appears in published German photographs

and German newsreels as stopped at this point. "Bert", commanded by M.27246, S.S.M. Menzies, G., belonged to No.6 Troop, "B" Sqn (para. 104, above), which was commanded by Lieut. J.H. Dunlap. Major Page states that when "Bert" was disabled Lieut. Dunlap brought his other two tanks alongside, evacuated the crew successfully (three men in one tank, two in the other), and then returned to the beach with his two sound tanks.

128. The tanks which succeeded in crossing the wall, it has been observed, were then faced with other obstacles: the heavy road-blocks across the heads of the streets running into the BOULEVARD DE VERDUN. None of these was removed.

129. As already noted, the destruction of these road-blocks with explosives was one of the functions of the Beach Assault Engineers. This work on WHITE BEACH was assigned to Lieut. W.A. Ewener, 7 Pd Coy, R.C.E. This officer and his party were carried in H.M.S. "Glengyle" and landed in front of the Casino from an L.C.M. When the Casino was entered by our troops Lieut. Ewener and the men with him made for it with a view to passing through it and reaching the road-blocks. At this time Mr. Ewener was wounded in the stomach, and although he contrived to carry a charge into the Casino he was too weak to go further.

130. A.20191, L/Cpl. Sinasac, M.D., 11 Pd Coy, R.C.E., now took charge, and with the survivors of the party attempted to carry out the allotted task. His objective was the road-block across the head of the RUE DE SYGONNE, leading into the main roads to the south. With two men named Kerr and McCaslin he reached the same theatre near the PORTE DU PORT D'OUEST which had been entered by Capt. Hill's party (above, paras. 47 ff.). McCaslin was slightly wounded. Sinasac returned to the Casino for more explosives, some charges having been dropped when men were hit. He was joined by A.35020, Spr. Laur, L.W., of H.Q., R.C.E., 2 Cdn Div. On the return trip to the theatre Kerr was wounded. It had been impossible to find all the charges that were required, but Sinasac's party now made for the road-block with those available. Heavy machine-gun fire came down, and Sinasac was wounded and Kerr wounded a second time. Spr. Laur states that the few charges available were placed on the block and blown, but he adds that "as the wall was fairly large" he does not believe that they can have done much damage. He had no opportunity of examining the block afterwards.

131. Spr. Laur speaks highly of the courage and determination of L/Cpl. Sinasac, and this M.C.O. was subsequently awarded the D.C.E. Spr. Laur himself received a mention in despatches. The above summary is based mainly on the account given by Sinasac, supplemented by that of Laur. Both are included in the file of Engineer personal stories collected by Major Sucharov after the operation. The incident is also dealt with in the War Diary of 7 Pd Coy, R.C.E.

132. So far as is known, no other road-block was reached by the demolition parties, and in consequence the blocks prevented most, if not all, of the tanks which had reached the Esplanade from penetrating into DIEPPE. It has been reported that certain tanks did get into the town. Sgt. Hickson states that while his party was operating near the Church of St. Remy, he saw three tanks moving west on the RUE DE LA BARRE. He is quite certain that these tanks had not entered the town at the Casino end. Major Sucharov was told that Lieut. A.B. Patterson of No. 15 Troop was heard to say by radio telephone that he was going through a house, and subsequently that he had passed through it successfully. The writer has seen no documents supporting this story. Capt. G.A. Browne, R.C.A., who was captured during the operation but subsequently returned to England, states that a "rumour" circulating amongst the prisoners after the action was that some tanks had to into the PARC JEHAN ANGO (formerly the BASSIN BERIGNY) and were there stopped by anti-tank guns. Unfortunately, Capt. Browne had little contact with the captured tank officers previous to his own escape.

133. Major Page is of the opinion that no tanks penetrated into the town. He never heard this suggested in his conversations with officers of his unit in Oflag VII B (and it may be noted that Lieut. Patterson's name is included in a list of Canadian officers confined there which Major Page furnished). In the light of this evidence, the story must be considered improbable. It should be added that examination of a large number of letters written by prisoners of war has elicited no reference to tanks entering the town.

134. On the other hand, it should be recorded that Cpl. Carnie (para. 107, above), while unable to offer firsthand evidence, stated that he had heard stories of tanks getting into DIEPPE; and the reports referred to in para. 132 must be taken into account. The question also arises: what became of the three or four tanks unaccounted for on the beach or Esplanade in the aerial photographs (para. 123, above)? Either these tanks got into the town, or the Germans had removed them before the reconnaissance photographs were taken on 21 Aug.

135. With respect to Sgt. Hickson's evidence, it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that the vehicles seen by this W.C.O. were German. The presence of enemy tanks in DIEPPE has not been authenticated; but we know from the evidence of Lieut. T.D. Archibald, R.C.A. (as reported by Capt. G.A. Browne) that the Germans had armoured cars in the area, and at a distance and under the conditions of action these might possibly have been mistaken for tanks.

136. Of the Engineer demolition parties, as distinct from the Beach Assault Engineers, none was able to carry out its task, for the simple reason that we never got control of the town. A considerable proportion of the men of these parties did not get ashore; among those that did, casualties were heavy. The men who landed worked with other troops at whatever task presented itself; the brilliant performance

of Sgt. Hickson's party (whose original objective was the Telephone Exchange) has been described above (paras. 38 ff., 54 ff.).

137. A list of the 29 tanks of 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn which left the landing craft (including names of commanders and crews) will be found appended to the War Diary of this unit for August, 1942.

138. The only authentic wireless log for the unit during this operation (a very fragmentary one) will also be found on the War Diary. In "War" (Army Bureau of Current Affairs), No. 27 (19 Sep 42), what purported to be "the actual R.T. wireless conversations" was published under the title "The Tanks at Dieppe". This material was collected by an officer of A.B.C.A. who visited the unit shortly after the action and probably includes some authentic scraps of remembered conversations; but H.Q. 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde has assured the writer that the only actual log in existence is the one referred to above. It is probable that the "War" publication contains an admixture of imagination.

139. Although the return of Major Page to the United Kingdom (October, 1943) has added materially to our knowledge of the work of the tanks at DIEPPE, some points relating to this aspect of the operation still remain obscure. These can only be elucidated by officers and men of 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn still in captivity in Germany.

140. Major Page pays a glowing tribute to the performance of the Churchill tank at DIEPPE. Every officer and man of his unit, he reports, was "absolutely sold on" this tank. Although many Churchills were stopped by broken tracks, no other type of tank would, he considers, have done better in this respect in the circumstances. Despite the storm of fire directed at them, no tank was pierced; and in consequence none caught fire, and not a single man was wounded inside a tank. (For casualty figures, see below, para. 236).

THE LANDING OF THE FLOATING RESERVE. LES FUSILIERS MONT-ROYAL AND THE ROYAL MARINES

(a) The Decision to Land the Floating Reserve.

141. About 0630 hrs the Military Force Commander decided to commit his Floating Reserve on the main beaches in front of DIEPPE. It will be recalled that this reserve consisted of one infantry battalion, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, commanded by Lt.-Col. D. Menard, and known for this operation by the code-name "JOE".

142. General Roberts in his report (printed as Annex 6 to C.B. 04244) describes the decision to land this reserve in the following terms:

About one hour after touch down, information received indicated that "Red" Beach was sufficiently cleared to permit the landing of the floating reserve. The Fusiliers Mont-Royal, under command of Lt.-Col. D. Menard, therefore were ordered to land and, moving to the West, establish themselves on "White" Beach and on the edge of the town of DIEPPE.

143. It is important to establish the nature of the information which led General Roberts to believe that RED BEACH was sufficiently cleared to make the landing of the Fus.M.R. desirable. It is probably safe to assume that the report which, as mentioned above (para. 66), was entered in the Intelligence Log of "Pernie" at 0610 hrs, to the effect that the Essex Scottish were "across the beaches" and into the houses, exercised an important influence on his decision. That this report was highly inaccurate, probably deriving, as noted, from a message concerning the action of C.S.M. Stapleton's little party of a dozen men, is one of the mischances of the operation.

144. It will be recalled that about the same time General Roberts, having been informed (likewise inaccurately) that the Royal Regiment of Canada had not got ashore on BLUE BEACH, had ordered them to land on RED BEACH. About 0630 hrs, therefore, he was taking very strong measures to reinforce this beach, where he believed the Essex Scottish to be making progress. The Military Force Commander's action is thus explained by C.B. 04244:

At that time his main pre-occupation was to secure the East headland ("Bismarck") at all costs and it seemed to him that more Infantry were necessary to achieve this purpose with the help of the tanks he now knew had got ashore.

145. At 0630 hrs, accordingly, the entry was made in the "Calpe" Intelligence Log, "Fus.M.R. going ashore Red beach".

(b) The Landing of the Fusiliers.

146. As already explained, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal had crossed the Channel in L.C.P.(L)s, which were now lying in the boat pool awaiting orders. Lt.-Col. Menard had gone aboard "Calpe" at 0610 hrs and had received his instructions. These instructions were now passed to the L.C.P.(L)s by loud hailer, to the following effect. Whereas in the event of everything going according to plan the

Fus.M.R. had been instructed to concentrate, after landing, in the PARC JEHAN ANGO, preparatory to establishing an inner perimeter and covering the withdrawal of the main force, the orders now issued, according to Lieut. (now Capt.) A.A. Masson, who was on L.C.P.(L) 24, made the region of the Tobacco Factory the unit's first objective. At this time the Tobacco Factory itself was already burning fiercely.

147. Capt. Masson states that the boats, which naval evidence indicates were 26 in number, approached the beach in single line. He believes, but is not entirely certain, that the order of sub-units from right to left (i.e., from west to east) was "D" Coy; "A" Coy; "C" Coy; H.Q. Group; and "B" Coy.

148. The officer commanding the L.C.P. Group was Lt.-Cdr. J.H. Dathan, R.N., who was in M.L. 214. Lt.-Cdr. Dathan's report (Appx 17 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander) describes the landing as follows:

The beach was obscured by smoke, and heavy fire from cliffs to the west was experienced during the run in. Immediately the Officer Commanding F.M.R. had shoved off, M.L. 214 went ahead at full speed towards the cliffs so as to clear the front and make further smoke to cover the boats. All boats (26) beached at about 0700, and with the exception of a few wounded soldiers, all soldiers landed at full speed. When the boats came out of the smoke, the beach was sighted at varying distances between 50 and 200 yards. Very heavy firing was opened on all boats from buildings in front of the beach, machine guns which appeared to be on the boulevard, and from the top of the west cliff further heavy machine gun fire, mortar fire and grenades. The boats were spread out over the entire range of Red and White Beaches, and with the exception of three boats who landed their soldiers with very few casualties, all the remainder reported that very heavy casualties were experienced immediately the soldiers landed. Of the 26 boats which beached, 24 withdrew. One was destroyed by fire as it withdrew. It is not known what happened to the other two.

The report that the Fus. M.R. had landed was entered in the "Calpe" Intelligence Log at 0704 hrs.

149. It is obvious that the unarmoured L.C.P.(L)s were heavily fired upon as they approached the shore. Capt. Masson reports that he saw one craft hit and sunk, and many

others struck. His own boat was not hit, though there were many near misses.

150. Although General Roberts' intention had been that the unit should land on RED BEACH, in the event it was scattered along the whole extent of RED and WHITE Beaches, and a very considerable proportion of it was in fact landed west of WHITE BEACH on the narrow strip of shingle under the lofty cliffs. Capt. Masson believed that the reason for this was heavy fire from the east cliff experienced as the L.C.P. Group moved in; but a somewhat more probable explanation is that given in C.B. 04244 (para. 214), which attributes the landing of these elements so far west to "the strong Westerly set of the tide and the smokescreen which made visibility very poor".

151. Although a considerable part of the unit was certainly landed under the cliff, there is ample evidence from Fus.M.R. personnel to support Lt.-Cdr. Dathan's statement that the boats were spread out over the whole of RED and WHITE Beaches. The returning members of the unit were required to fill out a questionnaire specifying the craft on which they were carried and whether it had landed on the "right" or the "centre" of the beach. The file of these questionnaires contains evidence from 14 L.C.P. (L)s; and while it is not entirely satisfactory in many cases, the weight of it in ten of these instances appears to be to the effect that the craft landed in the centre or the right centre of the beach, i.e. to the east of the cliffs. It must be remembered, however, that boat casualties were probably heaviest on the extreme right, and the evidence for this sector is in all likelihood particularly incomplete. The men who can testify to events here are chiefly those who, as in the case of D.61301, Sgt. Barry, J., were wounded immediately after landing and pulled back into the boat which had landed them, or who were wounded before landing and never went ashore.

152. Some witnesses state that they went ashore in the left sector of the beach. A number mention contact with the Essex Scottish; and several speak of events in the vicinity of the Tobacco Factory.

153. Capt. (now Lt.-Col.) D.F. MacRae, whose evidence on the Essex Scottish sector has been quoted at length, has told the present writer of how the Fusiliers came ashore. The boats, he states, approached the beach at speed, and the troops poured out of them and charged up the beach with bayonets fixed, suffering very heavy casualties immediately.

154. Unfortunately, the records of the Fus.M.R. in this engagement are unsatisfactory. The unit's War Diary

makes no attempt whatever to provide a narrative of its action; the diarist contents himself with transcribing the brief and necessarily inaccurate teleprinter summary of the operation issued by H.Q. First Cdn Army the day following the operation. The answers to the questionnaire already referred to have only a limited value. The narrative which follows has been built up from them and from the further evidence of a number of individuals, including several members of the unit who were captured and subsequently succeeded in making their escape.

155. The portion of the unit landed under the cliffs west of the Casino was unable to accomplish anything. Capt. Masson, who was in this area, states that his men were bewildered by the turn events had taken. He saw nothing of his own company commander, Capt. R.J.H. Haineault (who had in fact been badly wounded and is a prisoner of war), and received no orders from him after landing. The evidence of Ptes. G. Joly, C. Lafleur, and R. Vanier, all of whom are returned prisoners of war (see below, paras. 156 and 158, and subsequent Report), is that Capt. S. Marchand, commanding "A" Coy, which had landed under the cliffs, was unable to make wireless contact with higher authority as his set had been damaged by water.

156. The three soldiers mentioned reported as follows on the fortunes of the men in this area:

As long as they remained close to the cliff face the men were comparatively safe, though the enemy dropped mortar bombs from the top which exploded without doing much damage. In this sheltered position, however, the men of the FUS.M.R. were unable to engage the enemy and they therefore made numerous attempts to work round to the flanks and also to silence enemy M.G. fire by setting up mortars on more exposed positions on the beach. None of these attempts were successful and merely resulted in further heavy casualties.

157. After a time, the enemy, discovering presumably that the portions of the Fus.M.R. thus pinned down on the narrow strip of beach under the cliff were unable to resume the offensive, became bolder and began to roll up the unit from the west. The evidence of Capt. Masson indicates that the enemy troops reached the beach by some track to the west of the point where the Fus.M.R. men had landed. At a time when Capt. Masson was attempting to organize an attack across the extreme western end of the sea-wall, between the Casino and the cliff, Capt. Marchand and a group of Fus.M.R. men appeared from the

west with their hands up, followed by a German officer and some German soldiers with a machine-gun. Capt. Marchand told Capt. Masson that further resistance was impossible, and he and the men with him then surrendered. Capt. Masson believes that the time was between 1030 and 1045 hrs. The prisoners were marched west on the beach and taken to the top of the cliff by a steep track, probably at the break in the cliffs at 215685.

158. Capt. Masson had considerable difficulty in estimating the total number of men of his unit captured under the cliff; his estimate, which had been as low as 100, finally rose to 200. C.B.04244, apparently on the strength of evidence from the three escaped prisoners already mentioned, states that 288 men surrendered here. This figure is not given in any of the written accounts of their interrogation which the present writer has seen (C.M.H.Q. file 4/POW/1). It seems somewhat high, in view of the evidence quoted above concerning the comparatively large proportion of the unit which landed east of the cliffs.

159. Some personnel of the Fus.M.R. were active in and around the Casino. One of these was D.61182, P.S.M. Dumais, L.A., who landed near the Casino. The L.C.P. (L) carrying his party, which consisted of men from the mortar platoon, pulled offshore prematurely when only six men had landed, carrying 14 other men and the mortars out to sea. P.S.M. Dumais entered the Casino and assisted in organizing the defence of it. About 1000 hrs he engaged snipers in the steeple of the Church of St. Remy with a Bren gun and silenced them. Attempts to organize attacks across the boulevard to the town were abandoned on account of lack of smoke bombs.

160. When our troops withdrew from the Casino, P.S.M. Dumais returned to the beach. He attempted to board an L.C.A., but was borne down by the weight of his equipment and nearly drowned. He got back to shore and joined a group of men sheltering behind one of the beached L.C.Ts. An attempt was made to organize defence here, but the rising tide made the position untenable and on the appearance of the enemy in strength the party surrendered. (Memoranda of P.S.M. Dumais' evidence are in C.M.H.Q. file 4/POW/1. This W.O. later escaped and was awarded the M.M. He was one of the Canadian personnel attached to the First Army in TUNISIA, and distinguished himself there; see C.M.H.Q. file 10/DUMAIS L.A./1.)

161. Some parties of the Fusiliers penetrated into the town, all apparently in the vicinity of the Casino. D.62050, Sgt. Dubuc, P., who had landed near the west end of the Casino, after spending a considerable time on the beach made his way east through the backyards of houses on the RUE ALEXANDRE DUMAS, followed by about 11 men of the Fus.M.R. This party got into the town through a gap in the road-block across the RUE DE SYGOGNE. They advanced down this street, destroyed a party of Germans

in a weapon-pit at the intersection of the RUE CLAUDE GROULARD, and then advanced east along the latter street and the QUAI BERIGNY to the BASSIN DUQUESNE and the BASSIN DU CANADA. After inflicting casualties on the guards on vessels in this Basin, Sgt. Dubuc's party, which was now largely out of ammunition, was encircled and captured.

162. The party were disarmed, forced to strip to their underwear, and left guarded by one German soldier. This man they overpowered, and the party then began to run. Sgt. Dubuc himself succeeded in finding his way back to the Promenade in front of the town, and reached the beach, where he found Lt.-Col. Menard lying wounded.

163. This story rests entirely upon the evidence of Sgt. Dubuc, who is unable to give the names of any other men of the party, and who has not seen any of them since the operation. The present writer, however, believes that Sgt. Dubuc's story can in general be accepted as accurate, although there may be doubt concerning some details.

164. It appears that Capt. G. Vandelac also took a party of the Fusiliers into the town. Sgt. Dubuc states that as his own party was approaching the road-block at the RUE DE SYGOGNE, they saw this officer with a group of about 20 men, apparently under excellent control, enter the buildings fronting on the BOULEVARD DE VERDUN near the PORTE DU PORT D'OUEST. What this party subsequently accomplished is not known, but Sgt. Dubuc later saw Capt. Vandelac on the beach and heard him give the order for re-embarkation. A number of men of the unit subsequently testified to the death of Capt. Vandelac, who was said to have been crushed between an L.C.A. and an L.C.T. to which men were being transferred. Nevertheless, he is now known to be a prisoner of war.

165. The evidence of D.62227, Cpl. Metcalfe, H., who was wounded soon after landing, is that Capt. Vandelac waited "till all had got ashore", and then "called his platoon commanders". Cpl. Metcalfe writes, "I saw them disappear over wall. Later during the day they came back same way". This may indicate that Capt. Vandelac led what men of his company he could collect over the sea-wall and into the town.

166. Of the men of the unit who landed on the beach east of the Casino many, as in the case of the other units concerned, were unable to advance more than a few yards from the point of landing. For example, D.62917, Pte. Ricard, C., who states that he landed to the left of the beach from L.C.P.(L) 10, testifies that it was not possible to advance more than 75 feet from the water's edge. Some men (for instance, D.61191, Pte. Malo, H.), state that they advanced as far as the barbed wire.

D.114955, Pte. Petrin, P., describes how he cut a path through the first wire under the direction of Capt. R. Gravel, who subsequently ordered his party to take shelter against the sea-wall. D.61322, Pte. Belair, L., reports that his party advanced as far as the barbed wire, but adds that, following a tank, they advanced "jusqu'a la premiere rue", where they fired on Germans in the second stories of the houses. An officer of another regiment, he states, then ordered them to retire. As this soldier refers to Capt. Vandelac, though not in connection with this incident, it is not impossible that this description refers to the work of Capt. Vandelac's party. Pte. Belair remarks that while the enemy were very skillfully disposed, nevertheless in the house windows they were easily picked off: "Nous les descendons facilement".

167. It is worth noting that two platoons of the Fusiliers had been detailed to land with Flight 1 of the L.C.Ts., to act as an off-loading party for engineer stores, assist in building beach roadways, and subsequently become an immediate reserve for the commander of 6 Cdn Inf Bde. These men were divided between L.C.Ts. 1, 2 and 3. No reports have been seen for the small party embarked on L.C.T. 1. Of the larger group on L.C.T. 2, none appear to have disembarked. Of the party on L.C.T. 3, at least four returned to report that they had landed after seeing the tanks go ashore. There were also half a dozen men of the Fusiliers on board L.C.T. 16, which never touched down.

168. Lt.-Col. Menard and his headquarters group landed on the beach east of the Casino and set up as well as they could under heavy fire. Lt.-Col. Menard himself was severely wounded in one arm, evidently shortly after landing; in conversation with Lt.-Col. Menard on 2 Oct 42 the writer was given to understand that he had received four bullets in the arm and had subsequently been struck on the head by a piece of "shrapnel". Sgt. Dubuc states that at the time of re-embarkation Lt.-Col. Menard refused to go aboard until all his men had been taken off. Sgt. Dubuc and another N.C.O. nevertheless carried the C.O. to an L.C.A. and embarked him safely. Of the seven major Canadian units participating in the DIEPPE operation, the Fusiliers alone brought their Commanding Officer back to England.

(c) The Landing of the Marines.

169. A considerable detachment of the Royal Marine "A" Commando, commanded by Lt.-Col. J.P.P. Phillipps and divided into two assault parties known by the code names "TIGER" and "ROBERT", had been incorporated in the force for the purpose of cutting out the enemy craft in DIEPPE harbour. After a time it became obvious that H.M.S. "Locust" and the Chasseurs could not enter the harbour with the Marines on board, and this detachment became available as an additional floating reserve.

170. General Roberts now decided to utilize this force also on the main beaches. Deceptively encouraging intelligence was still being received. Shortly after 0800 hrs, it was believed that the situation on WHITE BEACH was such that additional troops landed there might be able to penetrate through the town and clear the east headland by an attack from the south. At 0810 hrs it was thought that the tanks were getting forward effectively; an entry in the "Calpe" Intelligence Log at this time runs,

Elements of Johnny have made progress now in front of Tobacco factory.

At 0800 hrs, moreover, Brigadier Lett had reported to General Roberts from L.C.T. 8, "We are going in with Johnny to land on White Peter". At 0817 hrs the "Calpe" Intelligence Log contains the entry, "have control of White BEACH". At 0818 hrs the same log notes, "TIGER going in to WHITE PETER".

171. Capt. P.W.C. Hellings of "A" Coy, R.M. Commando "A", thus describes the plan which the Commando was to carry out:

After the floating reserve had been landed there was no news, until Commander Ryder returned from KELPIE (? "Calpe"), when he reported that RED and WHITE beaches were clear of opposition and the General wished the marines to go in and support the ESSEX SCOTTISH through WHITE beach. The Colonel gave his orders from LOCUST, the idea being to pass through the beach to the town and there reform and report to the Colonel of the ESSEX SCOTTISH, the object of the force being to pass around the WEST and SOUTH of the town, and attack the batteries on the EASTERN cliff from the SOUTH.

(Report of Capt. Hellings, included among copies of Commando reports on the operation received from H.Q. Special Service Bde.)

172. It was evidently at first intended that the Marines should be supported by the landing of some of the tanks which were still lying off DIEPPE in L.C.Ts., for at 0837 hrs a naval message from "Calpe" to "SNOW WHITE" ("Ferne") was sent, as follows:

Group ten L.T.Cs. are to land with marines on white beach supported by Locust.

(War Diary, "G" H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, August 1942, Appx 41)

Group 10 L.C.Ts. consisted of six craft. It is evident that the order for them to land their 18 tanks was subsequently cancelled. No reference either to the order or its cancellation appears in the Intelligence Logs of "Calpe" or "Ferne".

173. The Marine Commando, however, duly went in to land. The officers and men were transferred from "Locust" and the six Chasseurs into two L.C.Ms. and five L.C.As. This group of craft formed up off GREEN BEACH, and the run to WHITE BEACH meant steaming parallel to the shore for a considerable distance. The Chasseurs formed up on either flank of the landing craft in an attempt to screen them from the fire of the shore batteries.

174. The report of the Senior Officer, Chasseurs, (Lieut. M. Buist, R.N.) (Appx 19 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander) gives a graphic account of the landing of the Marines:

It was not long before I realised that this landing was to be a sea parallel of the Charge of the Light Brigade. There was a Barrage coming from the cliffs on the East side of the harbour and from the houses on the Promenade which showed only too well that White Beach was under a very heavy fire. Added to which there was a blazing L.C.T. high and dry on the Beach, and another abandoned alongside it. Shells started to burst all round the group of landing craft, which we endeavoured to screen by smoke; and I shouted to Colonel Phillips to ask what he thought about going on; but I doubt whether he heard me. Anyway he merely waved his arms and grinned to show that he meant to land at all costs.....

175. At this point Lieut. Buist's own craft (Chasseur 14) was struck, and pulled out of line to inspect the damage. The vessel was able to resume position within a few minutes, and Lieut. Buist's narrative continues:

By this time the landing was all over.
(1) Five of the seven landing craft had reached the Beach and had been shot to pieces. The remaining two had run in and had been ordered back by Colonel Phillips before they touched down. Both of the officers in them said that the Beach was a shambles with the bodies of the soldiers lying in arrowhead formation as they had advanced from the Landing Craft. Colonel Phillips was seen to fall a few seconds after turning them back. When last seen he was standing up in his L.C.M. the ramp of which had apparently jammed with the rest of the Company Headquarters Platoon, dead in the boat. Major Houghton with a few men from the Rear Headquarters Platoon had managed to get ashore and were seen sheltering under the lee of a burnt out tank.

176. It is stated in C.B. 04244 (para. 221) that when Lt.-Col. Phillips realized the fact that WHITE BEACH was being subjected to exceptionally heavy enemy fire, he put on a pair of white gloves so that his hands might be more easily seen, stood up on the forward deck of his own craft and signalled to the rest to put about into the shelter of the smoke-screen. "He had scarcely completed this signal when he fell, mortally wounded". His action undoubtedly saved many of his men from landing upon a beach where they could have accomplished nothing. The general report on this Commando's share in the action states that only two L.C.As. and one L.C.M. actually reached the shore, the remainder turning back. The reports from this unit confirm that Lt.-Col. Phillips signalled the rear craft to retire, but no document seen mentions the detail of the white gloves.

(1) Actually, apparently, three: see para. 176, below.

177. The Naval Force Commander in his report states that this landing took place at about 0840 hrs (C.B. 04244, para. 928).

178. The reports concerning the experience of L.C.T. 8 at the time of her second landing, and of the craft which landed the Marines a few minutes later, would indicate that at this period the fire being brought to bear upon the beaches was, perhaps, fiercer than at any previous time. A plausible inference from this might be that the enemy had succeeded in bringing additional artillery into action.

MISCELLANEOUS UNITS OFF THE MAIN BEACHES

179. Notice should be taken of certain detachments, most of which did not succeed in landing, which were employed on the craft off the main beaches.

180. Among the units thus employed, particular interest attaches to the machine gunners of the Toronto Scottish Regiment (M.G.), which provided for the operation a detachment of five officers and about 120 other ranks, with 48 Vickers guns with A.A. mountings. 28 of these guns were to remain on board L.C.Ts.; the remainder were to land to provide A.A. defence on the cliffs and beaches. The unit's Commanding Officer, Lt.-Col. (now Brigadier) G.S.N. Gostling, was himself in L.C.T. 16.

181. Although very few men of this unit landed, its personnel were hotly engaged. The Vickers guns mounted on the L.C.Ts. were frequently in action, both against enemy aircraft and against shore targets when the L.C.Ts. were on the beach. Personnel of other units on the L.C.Ts. report most favourably upon the behaviour of the Toronto Scottish gunners under fire, and on the manner in which they stood to their guns under extraordinarily difficult and dangerous conditions. For example, Capt. A.L. MacLaurin of the Black Watch, who was on L.C.T. 2 with a mortar detachment of his unit which did not land, writes, "The performance of the Tor. Scots. M.G. party was.....one of great courage, and all the gunners on duty were wounded". D.61637, Pte. St.-Onge, G., of the Fus.M.R., who was also on L.C.T. 2, describes how a Toronto Scottish soldier, although wounded in several places and with a foot half cut off, continued to fire on the enemy "avec un bel esprit de combat".

182. Casualties suffered by the Tor.Scot.R., as known at 1 Oct 45, were one man killed, four reported prisoners of war (these probably being men who went ashore with the Principal Military Landing Officer, Major B.S. McCool), and eight men returned wounded (C.M.H.Q. file 18/DIEPPE/2). (4)

183. Reference has already been made to the large detachment of 3 L.A.A.Regt, R.C.A. (nine officers and 236 other ranks, under Major C.R. Ostrander), which was also

(4) Of the four prisoners of war, three were wounded.

to be employed in an A.A. role on shore. The action of the small party of this unit which landed has been described above in the account of events on BLUE BEACH. Apparently the men of this unit who remained on the L.C.Ts. were not in action, and the unit suffered no casualties except those on BLUE BEACH (War Diary, 3 Cdn L.A.A. Regt, August 1942, Appx 6).

184. It may be noted here, however, that the portions of this unit left behind in England saw considerable action on the afternoon of the day of the raid. Bofors guns were deployed at BOGNOR REGIS as a special anti-raid precaution. "About 1600 hrs an engagement developed at SELSEY and BOGNOR resulting from enemy raids on landing points for parties from Dieppe raid. Several JU's 88 and Do's 217 were shot at - 214 rds. being expended and 19 hits being claimed. The destruction of three planes (Category 1), damage to two others is claimed.....A good deal of enthusiastic and useful shooting was produced from detachments consisting of drivers and cooks etc. in absence of gun crews on raid." Unfortunately, no official credit for the planes destroyed was obtained by the unit, as the claims were too tardily forwarded to A.A. Command.

185. The basic Medical unit in the force was the 11th Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C., commanded by Lt.-Col. G.L.M. Smith. This unit embarked for the operation nine officers and 116 other ranks. The great majority of these were carried in L.C.Ts. of the later flights which did not land. One section, however, went in to BLUE BEACH with the Royal Regiment of Canada. Of this section, commanded by Capt. C.T. Robertson, only six men returned to England. The account written by A.27001, Sgt. Baird, W.J., indicates that these men were carried in the L.C.M. in which Mr. Munro was a passenger (Report No. 101, para. 81).

186. It is convenient to make reference here to the work of the various Regimental Medical Officers. It is clear that these officers did very fine work, and casualties among them were heavy. Of the six R.M.Os. who went ashore, only two returned to England, and one of these, Capt. R. Brachman, of the Camerons, was badly wounded and was still in hospital at the end of 1942. Major Law spoke highly to the writer of this officer's work. He received a mention in despatches. The medical officer of the Fus.M.R., Capt. C.H. Alleyn, was apparently killed soon after landing. The medical officer of the R.Regt.C., Capt. R.R. Laird, was wounded and became a prisoner of war, but was repatriated to the United Kingdom in October 1943, having suffered amputation of a leg. There are many reports of fine work on the beach by Capt. D.W. Clare, medical officer of the R.H.L.I., who is also a prisoner of war, as is Capt. J.F.S. Walmsley, medical officer of the Essex Scottish. Personnel of the S.Sask.R. speak highly of the courageous and untiring efforts of their medical officer, Capt. F.W. Hayter, who had the good fortune to return to England unwounded. Capt. L.G. Alexander, medical officer of 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn, who did not land but was on L.C.T. 8, which was so heavily shelled, is also highly spoken of. Capt. Alexander and Hayter both subsequently received the Military Cross.

187. A word may also be said here of the work of Regimental Chaplains. Four of these officers were present during the operation. Of these, H/Capt. J.P. Browne, attached to the Camerons, distinguished himself by his work for the wounded, himself returned wounded and was awarded the Military Cross. The chaplain of the R.H.L.I., H/Capt. J.W. Foote, also was active in assisting the wounded on WHITE BEACH. In a letter dated 24 Aug 48 (photostat in Overseas Records Office, ACTON) this officer wrote,

I was able to do a good deal of bandaging - & giving morphine injections but the casualties were so numerous and some so terrible that we soon ran out of supplies. It was difficult to get any shelter for the wounded and many of them were killed after they had been bandaged..... I decided to stay behind and carry out my work among the men - I don't expect I could have got back very easily.....

Capt. Foote is a prisoner of war.

188. The chaplain of 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn, H/Capt. W.E.L. Smith, did not land. The chaplain of the Fus.M.R., H/Capt. J.A. Sabourin, the only Roman Catholic chaplain present during the operation, gave assistance to men who were wounded in L.C.P.(L) 14 at the time of the unit's landing, and subsequently on an L.C.T. Father Sabourin received a mention in despatches.

AIR ATTACKS ON NAVAL CRAFT OFF DIEPPE

189. An important aspect of the operation is the effort which the enemy directed against the assemblage of British naval craft which lay off the town of DIEPPE during its course. It is a rather remarkable fact that this very large group of craft was able to lie so close to the enemy's coast for a period of about nine hours without suffering heavy losses by enemy action.

190. It is of particular interest that no attempt was made by the enemy to employ either surface naval forces or submarines against the craft off DIEPPE. At about 0750 hrs a report of E-Boats approaching from BOULOGNE led the Naval Force Commander to detach three destroyers to deal with them; no attack developed however, and the Naval Force Commander observes, "It is remarkable that at no time during the entire operation was there any organized opposition from German naval forces" (C.B. 04244, para. 932).

191. It appears from the Naval Force Commander's report that very little actual damage was done to the ships lying offshore by the fire of German shore batteries, although the destroyers attempting to support the troops on shore "were forced constantly to shift their positions" to avoid being hit (C.B. 04244, para. 933).

192. That heavier losses were not suffered from enemy artillery and air action was certainly due mainly to the use of smoke to conceal the ships. The need for smoke

was found to be much greater than had been anticipated. As a result of the failure of the landing forces to neutralize the batteries on the headlands, additional sorties by smoke-laying aircraft were repeatedly called for and the available R.A.F. resources in this field were seriously strained. In addition to the smoke laid from the air, the naval vessels themselves constantly made smoke. The report of the Naval Force Commander makes the point (C.B. 04244, para. 935) that the smoke made it difficult to see what was happening and to give support to the troops on shore, but that nevertheless it was the smoke alone which made it possible for the destroyers and landing craft to remain close inshore.

193. It was chiefly by air attack that the enemy harassed our craft off DIEPPE; and it is of special interest to note that it was only after 1000 hrs that really heavy action by him developed. A note on the air aspect of the operation is included in Part III, below; at this point, only the attacks on our naval craft will be dealt with.

194. The report of the Air Force Commander states that in the early part of the operation, enemy air effort "was confined entirely to fighters patrolling the area in small numbers", with occasional dive attacks on our ships. "It was not until about 1000 hours, some six hours after our assault, that our patrols encountered enemy bombers. It would seem, therefore, that these had not been at a high state of readiness." As time passed, the enemy brought up aircraft from Holland, and "Night bombers in increasing numbers were used until all his resources on the Western Front were in action". (C.B. 04244, paras. 995-7.)

195. The development of the enemy air attack as outlined by the Air Force Commander can be traced in the reports of individual naval vessels, which make it clear that from about 1000 hrs there was fairly constant attack, although it was constantly interfered with by the very effective fighter cover provided by our own air forces. The navigational Log of H.M.S. "Calpe" (Appx 21 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander) notes, "Bombing of vessels and craft by enemy aircraft started at 1015". The Polish destroyer "Slazak" reported (Appx 28 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander), "During the operation it is considered that the ship came under fire mostly inaccurate from the shore about ten times, and that fire was opened upon aircraft some thirty times."

196. Only one important naval vessel was lost by bombing. This was H.M. destroyer "Berkeley", whose Commanding Officer reports that she was struck at 1318 hrs, at which time the general withdrawal of craft was in progress. The ship's back was broken, and it was necessary for H.M.S. "Albrighton" to sink her by torpedo. The Air Force Commander states (C.B. 04244, para. 999) that "Berkeley" was sunk by "a bomber jettisoning its bombs". "Berkeley's" Commanding Officer in his report (Appx 25 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander) says that she was attacked by

three Dorniers, which were engaged by our own fighters, but one of the aircraft came on and dropped 4 bombs. Two of these struck the ship.

197. H.M.S. "Galpe", it should be noted, was attacked, shortly after "Berkeley" was hit, by a Messerschmitt which "opened fire on the bridge with cannons and machine-guns". Air Commodore Cole, the representative afloat of the Air Force Commander, was severely wounded, and there were other casualties. Subsequently two near misses caused further casualties and damage on the ship and one started "a short but very fierce fire" (Report from H.M.S. "Galpe", Appx 21 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander).

198. Although H.M.S. "Ferne" does not appear to have been damaged by enemy air action, she was struck by a shell from a shore battery which put her director temporarily out of action (Report from H.M.S. "Ferne", Appx 22 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander).

199. Numerous enemy aircraft were shot down by naval A.A. fire. C.B. 04244 (para. 314) lists a total of 24 aircraft which can be credited to individual vessels with some certainty. This probably does not represent the whole damage done to the German Air Force by naval fire.

200. It should be added that it was universally observed that aircraft recognition by our forces was inadequate, and on numerous occasions our A.A. fire was directed at our own aircraft. The reports of officers of 3 Cdn L.A.A. Regt are of special interest on this point. Capt. G.C. Wallach, who seems to have been on L.C.T. 16, as he mentions Lt.-Col. G.S.N. Gostling, writes as follows:

I was standing beneath the bridge when 2 Bostons escorted by Spitfires flew very low over us. The naval gunner on T.L.C. 15 (? 16) opened up, followed by several machine guns mounted on the deck, followed by fire from our Oerlikon guns. I dashed up to the bridge and asked the first officer why the goddam gunner was firing upon our aircraft. His answer was noncommittal so I then dashed over to the gunner and asked him what he was firing at and he replied "At a Focke Wulf Torpedo Bomber". The planes were now out of range and fire was stopped. We were recompensed for our mistake by having the escort of Spitfires spray us liberally with machine gun fire.

COMMAND, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS,
RED AND WHITE BEACHES

201. Some brief examination must be made of the working of the arrangements made for command and the passing of information in the main theatre of the operation.

202. In the light of the conditions which have been described, it is obvious that difficulties were to be expected. The units on shore, possessing only a foothold on the beaches and subjected to constant heavy fire, inevitably had their communication arrangements disrupted by the destruction of signal equipment and casualties to personnel. At the same time, as has been noted, the smoke which it was necessary to lay for the safety of the ships offshore made it difficult for the Force Commanders and other officers on these vessels to see and appreciate what was going on ashore.

(a) Force Headquarters.

203. As has already been made clear, the Military and Naval Force Commanders were in H.M.S. "Calpe", accompanied by Air Commodore Cole, the representative of the Air Force Commander, who himself remained at UXBRIDGE. A duplicate headquarters was maintained in H.M.S. "Ferne", to function in case of H.M.S. "Calpe" being destroyed or seriously damaged. Both these vessels were elaborately fitted as headquarters ships, with a great deal of additional wireless equipment installed. It is unnecessary to describe the technical arrangements, but attention is directed to Annex 10 of C.B. 04244, where the signal communications are described in full, and a diagram (opposite p. 174) of a "Hunt" class destroyer fitted as a headquarters ship with special wireless equipment installed is provided.

204. In general, it may be said that information received by the Force Commanders with respect to RED and WHITE Beaches was somewhat more adequate than that received with respect to the flank beaches. Nevertheless, the narrative above, and particularly those portions of it relating to the information which led General Roberts to land his reserves, is sufficient to indicate that the information received was decidedly unsatisfactory in many respects.

205. Examination of the Intelligence Logs of the headquarters ships indicates that information relating to the Essex Scottish was fragmentary and incomplete. That relating to the R.H.L.I. was similar.

206. With respect to Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, almost no information was received after their landing. At 0835 hrs, it is true, H.M.S. "Ferne" recorded a message from this unit on "B" Wave: "On White Beach constant fire from west & cannot move forward". Two pieces of information concerning this unit appear in the "Calpe" Intelligence Log in the vicinity of nine o'clock. At 0845 hrs occurs the entry, "Joe in severe difficulties, must be taken off or will be wiped out". At

0908 hrs comes the entry, "Joe is surrounded". The first of these entries is marked, "May be bogus", and the second, "Believed phoney". A considerable number of subsequent entries indicate that Force H.Q. was querying all the shore stations with which it was in touch for news of the Fus.M.R., and was receiving uniformly negative reports. The fact is that each group on the beach could report only upon events in its immediate vicinity, and could throw very little light on the situation at large.

207. In the final stages information was reaching the Force Commanders from two main sources on shore, by radio telephone in each case. One of these was that portion of H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde, including Brigadier Southam, which had got ashore. The other was Major B.S. McCool, the Principal Military Landing Officer, who seems to have been transmitting from an abandoned scout car of 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn. A letter from Major McCool, now a prisoner of war, to Major Peter Wright, dated 29 Dec 42, describes the conditions under which the P.M.L.O. was working:

We had most of our small party blown up within three minutes of landing and whenever we collected another half dozen the same thing happened. Finally we established contact from a derelict scout car but had to face fire to reach it. They drew claret out of me five times but nothing more than skin deep. Walt McGregor shared with me the trips out to the car after our last signal expert got shot. By the way I was very grateful to the Navy for a fast reply to one of my urgent appeals. I recognized Pat's voice. They undoubtedly saved our lives. A sniper had been picking us off each in turn. Dick Eldred of Calgary, also of my gang, is, beyond question, the bravest man I could imagine, let alone see in action.

The references are to Capt. W.L. McGregor of the Essex Scottish and Capt. C.R. Eldred of 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn. "Pat" is Lt.-Col. G.P. Henderson. It would seem that the scout car from which Major McCool worked was on RED BEACH, as he called attention to the necessity of bombarding the pill boxes at the end of the pier there, ("Blow hell out of pill boxes at end of pier east of red beach. They are causing trouble"; 0939 hrs.).

208. Something must be said of the conditions, so far as they are known, in which the units on the beach attempted to maintain communications with their Brigade Headquarters. With respect to the R.H.L.I., it appears that Lt.-Col. Labatt had a No. 18 wireless set working at his headquarters on the beach, as we know that he was able to issue orders over it, and to receive the message instructing him to take command of the Brigade (evidence of B.37259, Pte. Prince, H., and B.36765, C.S.M. Dean, W.). Major Whitaker states (War Diary, R.H.L.I., August 1942, Appx 19) that the order to evacuate "came through on the 'C' Coy 18 set, situated in the communication trench on the town side of the Casino".

209. For communications with the Essex Scottish, we have the evidence of "B" Group of H.Q. 4 Cdn Inf Bde (which was on L.C.T. 10):

Vanquish came through at 0940 hrs. At this point the only set we could contact the Bns through was the "C" Coy set of Essex Scot. This operator did a marvellous job every time he spoke you could hear mortar and MMG fire. Despite this he relayed messages for us and passed on information to us briefly and slowly. The Essex (? R.H.L.I.) were contacted at approx 1000 hrs. We only succeeded in raising them once. Vanquish.....was passed to them.....

(War Diary, H.Q. 4 Cdn Inf Bde, August 1942.)

210. The fragmentary records of the Fus.M.R. throw little light on the fate of this unit's H.Q. wireless sets, but the supposition would appear to be that they were put out of action soon after landing.

(b) Headquarters of Brigades.

211. Some attention must be paid to the fortunes of the headquarters of the two infantry brigades involved in the operation.

212. H.Q. 4 Cdn Inf Bde was divided between L.C.T. 8 and L.C.T. 10. On the former craft was "A" Group, under Brigadier Lett, on the latter "B" Group under the Brigade Major, Major (now Brigadier) D.G. Cunningham. Neither of these two Groups succeeded in landing.

213. The fortunes of L.C.T. 8 have already been described. It will be recalled that this craft touched down twice and was very heavily shelled. On the second occasion Brigadier Lett himself was wounded, and it was with difficulty that the craft was brought off the beach.

214. After being wounded, Brigadier Lett instructed Col. Labatt through Major Garneau to take over command of the Bde (Narrative of "A" Group by Major Garneau, War Diary, H.Q. 4 Cdn Inf Bde, August 1942, Appx 15a). Major Garneau observes that there was no acknowledgment of this message. It was received, however, as C.S.M. Dean of the R.H.L.I. writes, "The Brigadier was reported wounded and Col. Labatt took over". In spite of his wounds, Brigadier Lett was still able to give directions "from his stretcher" and continued to do so.

215. L.C.T. 10 also touched down and was considerably damaged. After landing its tanks, it pulled offshore, and when it touched down again the ramp was hanging perpendicularly and Major Cunningham's 19 set could not be landed (Narrative by Lieut. D.F. Goederham, Appx 21, War Diary, H.Q. 4 Cdn Inf Bde, August 1942). Although the personnel of "B" Group could not get ashore, they were able to maintain useful communications with the units there.

216. At 1125 hrs, L.C.T. 10 was taken in tow by a M.L. for the return to England. Major Cunningham protested very strongly, and "requested that the towing craft cut us adrift as we were the only means of communication between the bns and Force H.Q. Our wireless sets were still functioning. The B.M. contacted Force but was told that he could do no good and to remain in tow" ("B" Group Narrative by Lieut. T.R. McCoy, War Diary, H.Q. 4 Cdn Inf Bde, August 1942, Appx 15a). The Group's 18 set was soon out of range, but its 19 set was still able to hear Brigadier Southam on the beach, and recorded his final messages (see below).

217. H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde was divided between L.C.T. 7 (on which was "A" Group under Brigadier Southam) and L.C.T. 9 (on which was "B" Group under the Brigade Major, Major (now Lt.-Col.) A.H. Fraser). L.C.T. 7 touched down, at 0605 hrs, and was subjected to very heavy fire. The narrative in the Brigade War Diary (19 Aug 42) runs in part as follows:

The tobacco factory was dead ahead of us. The windows and doors were stuffed with MGs which hammered away when the ramp was lowered to let the tanks out. Heavy guns in the east cliff were pounding the L.C.T. the whole time. The tanks rolled out and swung to the right....

Brig Southam called to bring the wireless set and went ashore under cover of the last tank. He was not seen again by anyone who came back but got into a disabled tank for communications. He directed operations on the beach until the surrender at 1309 hrs.

Lt.-Col. D.F. MacRae suggests that the reference to the Tobacco Factory is mistaken, as this building was on fire at an earlier time.

218. Some further details are given in a narrative by Lieut. E.J. Norris, of the Brigade Defence Platoon (War Diary, H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde, August 1942, Appx A-1). He states that as the tanks were driven off shellfire seemed to concentrate on them temporarily, and at this point Brigadier Southam and some R.C.E. personnel got ashore. Artillery fire then concentrated again on the L.C.T., preventing any more from disembarking. One of those who got ashore was Lieut. W.A. Millar, R.C.E., who was with Brigadier Southam during the rest of the morning (see below). (A.19373, L/Cpl. Morrison, G.D., 7 Fd Coy, writes, "Lieut. Millar, Sgt. Murray and McMurry certainly deserve credit in getting off, in record time under almost impossible conditions".) Heavy casualties were sustained on the L.C.T., a Signals party which was attempting to wheel a 19 set off the craft suffering a number of them. The Brigade 46 set had already been put out of action. The L.C.T. then pulled back offshore.

219. At the time of withdrawal, military personnel on L.C.T. 7 were transferred to L.C.T. 10, as it was proposed that L.C.T. 7 should return to the beach to re-embark troops.

220. L.C.T. 9 also landed its tanks under heavy fire. The Brigade Major and his Signals party did not get ashore, but after the L.C.T. had pulled back they were able to maintain communication with the units ashore (evidence of B.31108, Sgmn. Rickard, D.R., "L" Sec, 2 Cdn Div Sigs). They had however, no set working to Force H.Q.

221. At about 0915 hrs, accordingly, Major Fraser contrived to transfer his party to L.C.T. 10, in order that he might be able to use the wireless facilities of H.Q. 4 Cdn Inf Bde. The episode is described as follows by Lieut. McCoy:

At approx 0915 hrs the LCT of "B" Gp. H.Q. 6 Bde. came along side, and all their personnel were transferred to our craft. The only wireless set that they had functioning was their #18 set. The B.M. of 6 Bde. used our #19 set for rear link.

Thanks to this arrangement, Major Fraser was in touch both with Force H.Q. and his Battalions at the time when the orders for withdrawal were issued, and this probably contributed materially to the successful evacuation of a considerable proportion of the S.Sask.R. and the Camerons from GREEN BEACH.

222. One special point of interest should be noted in connection with H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde. The Detailed Military Plan had authorized each Brigade H.Q. to take ashore "two complete copies" of the plan (para. 18(b)). This was done because, as already explained, both Brigade Commanders were in the line of succession to the command of the Force, and certain parts of the order (notably those covering the withdrawal) were too detailed to be carried in a man's mind. It appears that parts of one such copy taken ashore by H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde subsequently fell into enemy hands, as the enemy published considerable extracts from it. This was Copy No. 37. A report, dated 4 Sep 42, by Major Fraser (who had been promoted Lt.-Col. in the interim) states that Copy No. 37 had been stripped of unnecessary appendices before landing. The report continues:

The operation order and certain of the appendices i.e. code names, plan for withdrawal, etc. were placed in a special waterproof case carried by S/Sgt. Armitage, who landed on White Beach and is now missing.

It is not known what became of Armitage and/or the orders.....

(File 2 DS(G) 1-1-23 from
H.Q. 2 Cdn Div.)

H.19761, Sgt. Armitage, R.C., is now reported by Cdn Overseas Records Office as a prisoner of war.

223. It is of some interest to note that D.61763, Pte. Lebel, J.A., Lorne Scots (Defence Platoon, 6 Cdn Inf Bde), who landed from L.C.T. 9, states, "When we landed on the beach I saw the brigadier pick up some papers from some men who were lying on the beach".

224. Very little evidence is available concerning the locality where Brigadier Southam set up his rudimentary headquarters after landing. A second-hand report of the evidence of Capt. T. Hansen (?), who is stated to have been reserve F.O.O. with Brigadier Southam, indicates that the latter established his headquarters just behind the Casino, "in area 225686" (memorandum in handwriting of Lt.-Col. G.P. Henderson, included in file of R.H.L.I. personal stories of the operation, at present in custody of Historical Section, C.M.H.Q.). The writer has seen no other written evidence emanating from anyone who knew where Brigadier Southam was. Major C.E. Page states that Brigadier Southam was active on the beach in directing and encouraging the men, and set a very fine example. He was slightly wounded in the leg.

THE WITHDRAWAL FROM RED AND WHITE BEACHES

(a) The Orders for Withdrawal.

225. By 0900 hrs, the available infantry reserves having been landed without effect, and the enemy remaining in possession of the headlands and other positions covering the beaches, upon which he was still directing an extremely heavy fire, it was apparent to those on H.M.S. "Calpe" that it was out of the question to persist in the attempt to capture the town and that it was necessary to consider plans for withdrawing troops who had been landed.

226. In his report the Naval Force Commander writes as follows (C.B. 04244, para. 937):

By 0900 it had become clear to me that the troops ashore were in difficulties and were unlikely to gain possession of the East and West cliffs, which dominated the main beaches.... It was obvious therefore that the military situation was serious, and that it was becoming steadily more difficult for ships and craft to close the beaches. Accordingly, I advised the General that the withdrawal should take place with as little further delay as possible, and should be confined to personnel. I considered that 1030 would be the earliest practicable time, as it was necessary to warn the Air Officer Commanding 11 Group and to pass instructions to the landing craft. The General agreed, subject to confirmation nearer to time.

227. General Roberts in his own report observes (C.B. 04244, para. 952) that by 0930 hrs it was "clear that not only was the capture of the planned objectives now impossible, but also that it had become necessary to make immediate plans for withdrawal". Agreement between the Naval and Military Force Commanders having been reached, Capt. Hughes-Hallett gave his preliminary orders for effecting the withdrawal.

228. He states that a signal giving the time for the withdrawal as 1030 hrs was coded and prepared for despatch. Subsequently, however, General Roberts informed him that he

would "prefer to wait until 1100" (C.B. 04244, para 939) and the signal was despatched amended in this sense at 0950 hrs. The reasons for General Roberts' request have already been noticed (Report No. 101, para. 211).

229. As noted in connection with the withdrawal from GREEN BEACH, it is clear that in fact a military message was sent out giving the time of withdrawal as 1030 hrs, and that it was immediately corrected to 1100 hrs. This was at 0930 hrs, somewhat earlier than the naval signal (Brigadier Mann's message to UXBRIDGE, War Diary, "G", H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, August 1942, Appx 63). The "Calpe" Intelligence Log notes at 0935 hrs that the code word "Vanquish", indicating withdrawal, was passed to 4 Cdn Inf Bde, 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn and UXBRIDGE (ibid., Appx 51).

230. General Roberts points out that the decision to withdraw at 1100 hrs "necessitated abandoning any tanks that had been landed in order to re-embark personnel". The Detailed Military Plan (Appx H) notes that the withdrawal of tanks on 19 Aug could not begin before 1200 hrs, on account of the state of the tide. This was comparatively unimportant, as the Naval Force Commander was already convinced that in view of the volume of enemy fire it was "out of the question" to send tank landing craft inshore (C.B. 04244, para. 938). 1100 hrs, however, was the time originally scheduled for the commencement of re-embarkation in the Detailed Military Plan, which assumed that it would be completed by 1430 hrs. It is considered that troops must be re-embarked on a rising tide.

231. At the time when the initial decision to carry out withdrawal was taken, Commander H.V. McClintock, Boat Pool Officer, was on board "Calpe", and he left the ship about 0950 hrs, with instructions to initiate the withdrawal at about 1030 hrs, "using L.C.As. to ferry troops to such available L.C.Ts. as could be anchored off". He proceeded accordingly to round up the various groups of landing craft, instructing them to lie about one and a half to two miles off their respective beaches and be ready to go in when ordered. While thus engaged he was hailed by "Calpe" and told that the withdrawal would start at 1100 hrs, and that the landing craft were to go in at that time without further orders. Commander McClintock writes, "I asked Lieut. Commander Dathan, the Assistant Boat Pool Officer, to pass this on to the western half of the landing craft while I went to deal with the eastern half" (Report of Cdr. McClintock, Appx 16 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander).

232. The Air Force Commander had duly received, at "approx" 0930 hrs, advice of the decision to withdraw. Orders were then issued for an increase of the fighter cover over DIEPPE from three squadrons to six to aid the withdrawal. At 1004 hrs a request was received for a smokescreen on RED and WHITE Beaches from 1100 to 1130 hrs. The exact action taken is not fully clear, but three Blenheims laid a smokescreen over the DIEPPE area at 1110 hrs, as the result of orders issued at 1039 hrs, and three other smoke Blenheims were over DIEPPE at 1200 hrs. The foregoing details derive from the "Detailed Chronological Air Narrative" (C.B. 04244, Appx B to Annex 7), but this

evidently does not include full details of all the smoke-laying sorties actually made. Army witnesses refer to effective screening across the front of the town by aircraft at certain stages of the withdrawal.

233. The Naval Force Commander had meanwhile made arrangements for the destroyers to support and assist the landing craft as they went in to the beaches. He reports as follows:

At about 1022, the destroyers were ordered to form on a line to bear 070° to 250° and to follow the landing craft in. All vessels suitably placed were instructed to make smoke. The wind was on-shore and slightly from the West, and an effective screen of smoke prevented the landing craft from being fired upon until they were close inshore. Unfortunately, the smoke also hid the beaches from the destroyers and it was very difficult to see what was going on, or to offer effective support by gunfire. Nevertheless, without the smoke it is doubtful whether any withdrawal would have been possible.

(C.B. 04244, para. 939).

234. The reports from the destroyers indicate that the movement here described was carried out by "Slazak", "Brooklesby", "Berkeley", "Ferne", and "Calpe" herself. "Bleasdale" reports that she could not, in the first instance at least, find "Calpe" on account of smoke, and "Garth" does not refer to the matter. (Reports, Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander.) How effective this movement was is hard to estimate; it seems possible, at least, that it was carried out too early to have a great effect upon the actual approach of the landing craft, which do not appear to have touched down until about 1120 hrs.

(b) Re-embarkation of Units.

235. At this point it may be well to attempt a brief analysis of the somewhat fragmentary evidence which is available for the experience of the units ashore during the re-embarkation.

236. For Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal there is comparatively little evidence. The answers to the unit questionnaire referred to above are very brief on this point; they refer simply to the very heavy fire under which the re-embarkation was carried out, the fact that there were many wounded men in the craft, and that in general the morale of the troops remained high. The comments of Lieut. P. Loranger is, "Blesses bien nombreux sur bateau, courage general, bon moral de tous". Several men speak of being transferred from L.C.As. to L.C.Ts. D.61455, Pte. Provencal, G., states that he and his comrades re-embarked under an intense fire, he himself being wounded by a piece of "shrapnel" in doing so. He got aboard an L.C.A., which he left ten minutes later because it was sinking, and the men were bailing with their steel helmets. He reports three enemy air attacks on the boats. D.61690, Sgt. Gagne, W., reports having seen Lt.-Col. Menard struck in the head by a piece of "shrapnel" on board an L.C.T.

237. D.61288, Cpl. Laframboise, F., speaks of a long struggle to push an L.C.A. off the beach, mentions assisting a man of the Essex Scottish and a wounded soldier of the R.H.L.I. aboard, and remarks that there were many men drowned around the L.C.A.

238. With respect to the R.H.L.I., we have descriptions of the manner in which, previous to the re-embarkation, the Casino was organized for all-round defence. C.S.M. Stewart describes how smoke was seen coming in, at a time when he himself had almost given up hope of withdrawal. He tells how Capt. A.C. Hill gave orders to carry the wounded from the Casino to the beach, and how under this officer's direction the troops in the Casino then withdrew by stages, the riflemen going first. C.S.M. Stewart stayed behind with the Bren gunners, who were still covering the withdrawal, and withdrew with them when ordered by Capt. Hill. C.S.M. Stewart saw the latter going towards the beach, but did not see him afterwards; he is now reported a prisoner of war.

239. C.S.M. Stewart remarks that there was no organized beach party at work, and men simply got aboard the boats which came in in any way they could. In these circumstances, some craft inevitably became overloaded. C.S.M. Stewart himself got aboard an L.C.A., which, however, immediately sank; and he believes that he swam for at least two and a half hours before he was picked up by another L.C.A. which was cruising to collect survivors.

240. The experience of Sgt. Hickson, who was in the same area, was not dissimilar. He got aboard an L.C.A. which was overloaded and in danger of sinking, and set the men to work bailing with their helmets. Subsequently he and some other men from this L.C.A. were transferred to an L.C.S., and assisted in transferring wounded from three L.C.As. to a destroyer, on which Sgt. Hickson himself returned to England. The L.C.S. went back shoreward, the officer in charge declining to take Sgt. Hickson with him. The destroyer on which Sgt. Hickson found himself was probably "Calpe", as he describes a fire on her stern caused by an enemy bomb.

241. Sgt. Hickson remarked that while on the beach he saw a great rush of infantrymen down from the centre of the beach towards the landing craft. He states that instead of scattering they seemed to concentrate on a few craft, and the crowd of men round these drew heavy fire.

242. The Commanding Officer of the R.H.L.I. did not succeed in getting away. A letter written by Lt.-Col. Labatt himself on 24 Aug 42 describes some part of his own experience:

I am a prisoner and for some fantastic reason unhurt.....I was in the water for a long time and when taken had on only shirt and under-pants:..... Many very brave things were done and I hope

that when we have sorted them out proper recognition will be taken.....

(Photostat, Overseas Records Office.)

243. Turning to the Essex Scottish sector, we find that here comparatively few men were evacuated; this unit brought back to England fewer men than any other major unit engaged. Lt.-Col. MacRae's narrative (War Diary, Essex Scot., August, 1942, Appx VI) describes the withdrawal as follows:

Somewhere about 1100 hrs aircraft laid smoke on the water front and A.L.Cs. came in to attempt to evacuate the troops. An effort was made to get those unhurt and the wounded who could be moved into the A.L.Cs. but enemy fire destroyed so many of the A.L.Cs. that very few of the troops got off. I got away myself with a small party of wounded in a small wooden row boat and we were eventually picked up by a smoke laying ship and later transferred to a beach protection ship where there was a surgeon.

The citation for Lt.-Col. MacRae's M.C. states that, although himself wounded, he "lifted the wounded into the boat, and himself swimming, pushed it two miles through the water, at which point he was rescued with his party".

244. There are a number of references to a large group of men which took temporary shelter behind an L.C.T. (probably L.C.T. 1) stranded on the beach. A.21137, Pte. Baker, R.A.M., writes, "I guess there were about four hundred men there", but this may well be an overestimate. A.21156, Pte. Cousineau, E.R., describes his own experience as follows:

When we withdrew we had to go back through a hole in the wire and then about 100 yds down the beach, all of which was under very heavy cross fire and with no protection till we reached a beached T.L.C. where with a large number of other soldiers we took cover until we were able to board an A.L.C. We had to leave this A.L.C. later as it was hit and transfer to a T.L.C. always under fire.

245. There are various references made to the use of smoke by the unit to cover its withdrawal. A.22551, Pte. Mizon, J.H., writes, "At 1100 hrs we were told to put a smokescreen out, so I managed to pick up two extra smoke canisters, and tossed them over the wall, and made for the beach....."

246. As in the case of the R.H.L.I., the Commanding Officer of the Essex did not return to England. Lt.-Col. Jasperson is a prisoner of war, and as above noted (paras.

65 and 74) useful information concerning his unit's action has been received from him.

247. It has already been remarked that practically none of the personnel of 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn who were landed succeeded in returning to England. The reason for this appears to be that these men, to whom as has been said above the infantry pay constant tribute, decided to remain in their tanks to the last moment and cover the withdrawal of the infantry by fire. There is ample evidence that the tanks' guns remained in action to the very end; see, for example, paras. 103 and 122, above. C.S.M. Stewart was convinced that the continued fire of the tank on the beach in front of the Casino contributed materially to the safe withdrawal of many of the infantry.

248. It has been pointed out above (para. 229) that the withdrawal order was passed to the tanks at 0935 hrs. No indication has been found that any special instructions were passed at this time to the tanks, and it was probably assumed that they would act on the general instructions. The tank-crews, however, under the orders of their officers ashore, chose to remain in their vehicles and in action. A very rudimentary wireless log of conversations heard, appended to War Diary, 14 Cdn Army Tk Regt, August 1942, noted that at 1205 hrs a message was heard, "Got to leave the tanks. Nothing else we can do". Shortly afterwards definite instructions were passed from Force H.Q. for the evacuation of tank personnel and the destruction of the tanks ("Calpe" Intelligence Log, 1218 hrs). At 1225 hrs Major A. Glenn, who had taken command of the tanks ashore, was heard to say "Unload crews from tanks". This was the last intelligible phrase picked up. It seems likely that by this time the evacuation was virtually at an end, and there were no craft on the beaches to bring off the tank-crews.

(c) Final Scenes on RED and WHITE Beaches.

249. The actual progress of the evacuation from RED and WHITE Beaches can be followed fairly closely in the record of messages received from stations on the beach, and particularly from Brigadier Southam's headquarters and from Major McCool, by listeners on "Calpe" and "Ferne", and certain other craft offshore. These messages afford a remarkable record of an heroic and tragic drama.

250. At 1044 hrs the section of H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde operating ashore informed Force H.Q. that there was opposition from both cliffs overlooking RED and WHITE Beaches, and added the gloomy observation, "Enemy along headlands waiting for Vanquish". ("B" Wave Summary, "Ferne" Messages, War Diary, "G", H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, August 1942, Appx 63. This summary appears to be an independent record, and not merely a version of "B" Wave messages otherwise recorded.)

251. At 1100 hrs the 6 Cdn Inf Bde shore station inquired what the situation was with respect to evacuation, and how many boats were coming. The answer, at 1102 hrs, was that

all available boats were coming and smoke was being laid ("B" Wave messages, "Ferne").

252. At 1115 hrs the 6 Cdn Inf Bde station reported that the beaches were now covered with smoke and inquired whether bomber support was being provided. The answer was that bomber support had been asked for. At about the same time the shore station was asked how many men had been evacuated so far. The reply was "None from Red or White". ("B" Wave messages, "Ferne".)

253. At 1120 hrs "BILL" (the 6 Cdn Inf Bde shore station) reported that craft were now coming in. It is evident that as the landing craft approached the shore they came under intense fire. At 1132 hrs "BILL" reported as follows:

Want lots of support. Enemy engaging craft, & (they) cannot get in. Much smoke & air support wanted.

Similar messages followed. At 1135 hrs "BILL" was heard to inquire, "Can we rush things? Things are getting heavy".

At 1140 hrs "BILL" reported:

Small boats have been hit & sinking. I do not (consider) it possible to evacuate unless you get everything available in here.

At 1154 hrs the shore station made another appeal:

Boats hit because no support. High ground to east & west of beaches must be bombed or shelled.

254. Probably at 1200 hrs, Force H.Q. informed "BILL", "Bombers are now over headlands. Close support coming". The reply was, "Support now arriving must be continuous or boats will not get away" ("Ferne" "B" Wave messages, and "B" Wave Summary).

255. Throughout this period, Force H.Q. was continually passing messages to UXBRIDGE in an effort to ensure that all possible air support was afforded the men on shore. The messages sent by Brigadier Mann to UXBRIDGE closely reflect the appeals received from Brigadier Southam. Thus at 1137 hrs he signalled:

Request lots support, enemy engaging craft need smoke and all support possible for LCAs. We are dropping a few Boche planes too. ("Ferne" messages)

At 1158 Brigadier Mann again signalled to UXBRIDGE:

Boats hit because no support. High ground to east & west of beaches must be bombed or shelled. Received from Bill 1154.

256. The "Detailed Chronological Air Narrative" (C.B. 04244, Appx B to Annex 7) enables us to check the results of these urgent appeals. Some examples can be given. At 1205 hrs UXBRIDGE received a request for smoke on the beaches and further support, which had originated at 1137 hrs. Owing to the unforeseen extent of the demands upon smoke-laying aircraft, none were available to meet this request; but arrangements had previously been made to have three smoke-laying Blenheims over DIEPPE at 1200 hrs (cf. above, para. 232). Brigadier Mann's message originating at 1158 hrs (above, para. 255) was received at 1217 hrs, and at 1243 hrs an order was issued for 175 Squadron (Hurricane bombers) with one close support squadron to attack the western headland, while one close support squadron attacked the eastern headland and one squadron acted as general cover. These attacks were actually delivered at 1330 hrs, after the troops ashore had surrendered.

257. It must be kept in mind that these attempts to answer urgent emergency calls were merely additional to a large programme of air support over the beaches during the withdrawal arranged by the Air Force Commander in advance, or in accordance with earlier requests. Six fighter cover squadrons were standing on patrol over DIEPPE between 1050 hrs and 1320 hrs. The western headland was attacked by escorted Hurricane bombers at 1020 hrs and 1045 hrs in accordance with orders issued at 0926 hrs and 0955 hrs respectively. At 1200 hrs three Hurricane squadrons with escort attacked the east and west headlands in accordance with orders issued at 1049 hrs. At 1205 hrs, two Boston squadrons with escort attacked the DIEPPE area in accordance with orders issued at 1113 hrs.

258. Examination of the Detailed Chronological Air Narrative emphasizes the fact that a considerable time-lag must be accepted as inevitable, in an operation of this sort, between the moment when special air support is requested and that when the aircraft are actually over the objective. In point of fact, in this instance, by the time the Air Force was able to come into action in response to the urgent appeals despatched by "Fergie" during the actual withdrawal, the drama on the beaches was over. The Air Force made every effort to assist the evacuation with the resources at its command. It must be noted here that in a great number of cases the reports of individual soldiers on their experiences pay tribute to the work of the R.A.F. and the general effectiveness of the air support provided during the operation.

259. Messages received from Major McCool provide further information concerning the circumstances of the withdrawal. One of these is thus recorded at 1150 hrs among the "Calpe" "A" Wave messages (War Diary "G", H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, August 1942, Appx 51):

P.M.L.O.'s reports Not good. Need
LCAs LCGs LCRs Lots of smoke & Leigh
 Mallory.

The request for "Lots of Leigh Mallory", signifying air support, had also been made previously, at 1104 hrs ("Fergie" messages, Listening Watch on "A" Wave).

260.) " At 1211 hrs the following information from Major McCool was recorded:

To Ham via Johnny Very few personnel have been evacuated. 1000 is maximum evacuated according to Brian.

("Ferne" messages, Listening Watch on "A" Wave.)

261. The messages received from the shore station of H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde constitute a dramatic record of the last moments of resistance on the beach. An entry in the "Ferne" summary of "B" Wave messages noted that one received at 1240 hrs was from "Bill in person", suggesting that at this moment Brigadier Southam took over the set himself. Lieut. McCoy, I.O. 4 Cdn Inf Bde, makes the following note on Appx 13 of War Diary, H.Q. 6 Cdn Inf Bde, August 1942, with reference to the group of messages received after this time: "All transmissions from 6 Bde were by Brig. Southam. I recognized his voice."

262. This final group of messages can be included here in full:

1243. "White Beach not good, Red Peter not so bad because of fewer people there. I recommend Lieut. Miller of 2 Cdn Fd Coy, RCE who has been doing a wonderful job here. That's one for the book." (5)

1301 "Bombard bldgs & Pill Boxes along promenade. Enemy closing in."

1305 "Give us quick support. Enemy closing in on beach. Hurry it up please."

1307 "We are evacuating."

1308 "There seems to be a mass surrender of our tps to the Germans on the Beach. Our people here have surrendered."

These messages were recorded by other listeners in very similar terms.

263. The reference to "fewer people" being on RED BEACH is in contradiction of the facts as now known. Far more men appear to have been left on RED BEACH than on WHITE BEACH, for as already noted nearly 400 officers and men of the Essex Scottish became prisoners of war. This unintentional misrepresentation doubtless arose from the fact that Brigadier Southam was himself on WHITE BEACH and could only dimly perceive the situation further east. This further illustrates

(5) Lieut. W.A. Miller's unit was actually 7 Fd Coy.

the fact already noted, that any individual or group could form an accurate impression of what was happening only in his or their own immediate vicinity.

(d) Naval Accounts of the Withdrawal

264. It is important to establish, if possible, the reason for the withdrawal being so much more successful on WHITE than on RED BEACH - that is, why the R.H.L.I. succeeded in withdrawing about four times as many men as the Essex Scottish. Analysis of the reports of naval officers may throw some light on this matter.

265. Commander H.V. McLintock, R.N., was Boat Pool Officer and therefore especially concerned in the naval arrangements for withdrawal. This officer in his own report (Appx 16 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander) states that he was on board "Calpe" at the time when the programme for withdrawal was being discussed, about 0930 hrs. Leaving the headquarters ship, under the impression that withdrawal was to be carried out at 1030 hrs as originally proposed, he "rounded up the various groups of landing craft and told them to lie about 1½ to 2 miles off their respective beaches and be ready to go in when ordered to about 1030". While thus engaged he heard from "Calpe" that the withdrawal would start at 1100 hrs, and that landing craft were to come in at that time without further orders. Commander McLintock's report continues:

I asked Lieut. Commander Dathan, the Assistant Boat Pool Officer, to pass this on to the western half of the landing craft while I went to deal with the eastern half. I had got about as far as abreast the end of Dieppe Breakwater when a bombing and cannon attack developed and I rather think that we were also under fire from the shore but am not sure. At any rate I retired very hurriedly to seaward followed by quite a few landing craft. The end of this attack found us rather disorganised as we had 3 or 4 rather serious casualties and I decided that I must dispose of them as soon as possible. This I eventually did to H.M.S. "ALRESPORD".

4. I was told by landing craft that had tried to approach Blue Beach that it was held by the enemy, and as I had come to the conclusion myself that it was not possible to evacuate from Blue, White or Red beaches, I told such landing craft as had followed me to form up on a course for home. I then went in search of H.M.S. "CALPE" to report what I knew to the Force Commander and to exchange information, but could not find her so made a signal in plain language to Captain Luce

by name. He replied saying "If no further evacuation possible, withdraw to 4 miles from shore". The signal was received by me as "No further evacuation possible, withdraw". Foolishly I made no reply to this signal so left the Force Commander in the dark as to what I was doing.....

5. While I was looking for H.M.S. "CALPE" I was joined by an L.C.T. who told me that White Beach was held by the enemy.

6. I must admit that I had some difficulty in making up my mind at this time as to the exact action to take. The difficulty was caused by the fact that I could see nothing to shoreward of me owing to the smoke and did not know really where all the landing craft were. I knew, or perhaps should say, was pretty sure that Lieut. Commander Dathan had a certain number with him, and I knew that a certain number had already started for home by my orders. There was also a Group consisting largely of L.C.Ps. which were in company with me. These I had difficulty in communicating with as my loud hailer was out of action, but no difficulty in keeping together because wherever I went they followed. After a certain amount of hesitation I decided the best thing to do was to withdraw with this Group, this I did at about 1230.

266. Lt.-Cdr Dathan's own report (Appx 17 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander) is comparatively brief on this subject:

At about 1000, orders were received from Commander McClintock to tell all L.C.As. and L.C.Ms. to go into the beaches on which they had landed troops and to be there at 1100 to bring off troops. Orders were passed to the western group of L.C.As. to this effect, and then to about 20 other L.C.As. lying in the Boat Pool. The last of these were led in by M.L. 214 towards the Red and White Beaches. At about 1145 when the last of these L.C.As. had gone in towards the Beach, M.L. 214 closed Calpe and asked if they had any special orders. No special orders were received, so M.L. 214 withdrew to about 3 miles off, and saw a convoy of R Boats, accompanied by an M.L. and some T.L.Cs. proceeding home. M.L. 214 then collected the other Landing Craft as they came off from the coast and eventually sailed in company with them and Calpe in the last group to leave.

267. The reports of the Flotilla Officers who actually carried out the withdrawal of troops from the beaches throw much light on the conditions encountered and on the reasons for the very limited degree of success achieved. The Flotilla Officer of H.M.S. "Princess Astrid", after describing his flotilla's attempts to evacuate BLUE BEACH (see Report No. 101, para. 129), proceeds:

At about 1100 some other boats which were left in the Boat Pool and which included 4 boats from H.M.S. "Princess Astrid's" 10th Flotilla carried out an evacuation on White Beach under heavy gun fire. The boats on touching down on this beach were literally swamped by sheer weight of numbers of troops trying to embark. Sub. Lieutenant Lonnson's boat was hit by heavy gun fire whilst on the beach and capsized. The remaining three boats of the 10th Flotilla succeeded in getting off with approximately 70 troops each on board and only by going full astern.

After leaving the beach, one of the L.C.As. referred to, which had been "badly holed on the beach" sank after the men on board had been transferred to other craft.

268. Another report on the WHITE BEACH evacuation comes from the Flotilla Officer of H.M.S. "Glengyle". This ship's craft had suffered heavily during the attempt to land the Marines (above), and only three boats of her flotilla remained in the pool at the time of evacuation. The Flotilla Officer writes:

1100 Ordered to evacuate White Beach - went in with BL 8, 4 and 11 and two or three of "Prince Charles" boats - this beach appeared to be in enemy hands with a small pocket of Canadians forming a strong point around a T.L.C. (stranded). Fire was very heavy and concentrated during this withdrawal. A number of tanks on the beach were apparently in enemy hands and firing at the craft. BL 4 was lost and at least two other boats but all troops were removed from the area although many were killed or drowned after they were embarked.

(Appx 3 F to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander).

269. The statement that tanks on the beach were apparently in enemy hands and firing at the landing craft is repeated in at least one other naval report (that of Lieut. O. MacKenzie Kerr, R.N.V.R., Appx 2E to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander) but in the absence of supporting evidence from those who were on shore it seems rather improbable.

270. One graphic report was made on the evacuation of RED BEACH. This is that of the Flotilla Officer of H.M.S. "Prince Charles" (Appx 36 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander), who, after describing how his flotilla was scattered at 1030 hrs by a heavy attack by fighter and bomber aircraft, describes his own experiences during the withdrawal as follows:

4. At 1040 I found I had only L.C.As 284 and 192 and went into RED beach with six other boats from different flotillas and started re-embarking troops. Of these 8 L.C.As. six were destroyed. My craft L.C.A. 284, came under heavy fire, received a direct hit on the hull and sunk. I advised my crew to swim away from the beach and four of us were picked up by an L.C.A. a mile and a half off the beach. I was subsequently transferred to M.L. 291 in which I returned to Newhaven. L.C.A. 192 got away with 80 men who were transferred to a Destroyer. L.C.A. 192 then had to be destroyed.

5. After 1030 there seems to have been several contradictory orders issued to L.C.As. Two of my Flotilla were ordered to close the beach and the other three were told it was hopeless and to return to England. In my opinion they should have approached to within 400 yards of the beach under cover of smoke and picked up the numerous survivors who were swimming away from the land.....

271. It will be recalled that the landing craft from H.M.S. "Prince Leopold", which were intended for the withdrawal from RED BEACH, on which they had originally landed their troops, actually went in by error to GREEN BEACH, where they did very useful work (see Report No. 101, paras. 228 ff.). Some of these later moved east to the main beaches, but were unable to accomplish much there. L.C.A. 186 picked up about 30 men from the water off RED BEACH. Her commander, Lieut. G. MacKenzie Kerr, R.N.V.R., describes his run eastward and what he saw on the main beaches in part as follows:

All this time, and during the run along the cliffs the craft was under heavy fire. I paused at WHITE Beach but there was no activity. At RED Beach there were two L.C.Ts. on fire and three L.C.As. out of action, beach was clear of smoke and enemy was shelling very accurately. Began to make smoke but exhausted my supply. I saw the beach strewn with corpses and it looked to me as if the Essex Scottish had never moved from where they got on first landing, but they were dead now. Two men waved from behind a tank, but the opposition was too strong to

approach without smoke cover. At this juncture, a near miss with a shell, nearly swamped the craft and turned me broadside on. I proceeded seawards to get more smoke.

272. The evidence of Lieut. Koyl, R.C.N.V.R., the Senior Boat Officer of H.M.S. "Duke of Wellington", who has already been quoted several times, runs in part as follows:

9. Whilst proceeding inshore to bring off troops, I was ordered by the Boat Pool Officer to follow him, we turned about and proceeded seaward at full speed under cover of Smoke Screen. We were led in the direction of the Main Convoy, waited in company with 4 L.C.As. from H.M.S. "PRINCESS ASTRID" until 1230 when we were ordered to sail for England.

273. These extracts, taken in conjunction with those given earlier in connection with BLUE and GREEN Beaches, reflect the courage and devotion of the naval officers and ratings who, under most perilous conditions, persisted in their tasks and succeeded in bringing off a considerable number of the troops whom they had landed.

274. The reasons for the limited success of the RED BEACH withdrawal can be clearly seen in these extracts. The chief of them may perhaps be summarized as follows:

- (a) The situation offshore was extremely confused, due in great part to the smokescreen, which however, as already remarked, was essential if any withdrawal whatever was to be effected. The smoke was probably responsible for the fact that the craft from "Prince Leopold" went to GREEN instead of RED Beach, and this in turn undoubtedly reduced materially the number of craft available to evacuate the Essex Scottish.
- (b) Heavy enemy air attacks at the time of evacuation contributed to scattering and disorganizing the craft which were available off the main beaches. One such attack, in combination possibly with fire from the shore, disorganized the group of craft under Commander McLintock's direct command, and evidently influenced his decision that evacuation from BLUE, WHITE or RED Beaches was impossible. As a result of this decision, it is clear, a considerable number of craft off the eastern section of the main beaches were ordered not to go in to the beach. The disorganization caused by air attack evidently resulted also in some of the craft from "Prince Charles" going in on WHITE instead of on RED Beach.

(c) In the absence of the degree of cover afforded on WHITE BEACH by the Casino, the fire maintained by the enemy on RED BEACH was extraordinarily heavy, and the majority of the craft which did touch down there were destroyed, six out of eight craft with the Flotilla Officer of "Prince Charles" being lost. It is highly probable that few other craft besides these touched down in the Essex Scottish sector.

275. To sum up: comparatively few craft were available on RED BEACH, due partly to accidents which sent craft intended for this area to other beaches, and partly to orders issued by senior naval officers who, on the basis of their observation of the situation, considered that attempts at evacuation here were hopeless. Of the craft which did touch down, very few succeeded in withdrawing with their troops.

276. While the landing craft were valiantly attempting to bring the soldiers off the beaches, the two Force Commanders on "Calpe" were to a great extent in the dark as to the progress of the evacuation. The Naval Force Commander reports as follows:

941. It soon became virtually impossible to know how the withdrawal was proceeding but, at about 1130, H.M.S. "Calpe" embarked two landing craft loads of troops, mostly wounded, from whom it was learned that there were still men waiting to come off at "Green" Beach. At about the same time the General asked for the ship to proceed to the main beaches and ascertain the position there. Accordingly M.L. 194 (Act. Lieut.-Commander W. Whitfield, R.N.R.) was hailed and instructed to round up the landing craft in the area and send them in again. At about the same time, a signal, originator unknown, was received to the effect that there were no more troops on "Green" Beach, and was immediately contradicted by my 1147. H.M.S. "Calpe" then proceeded off the main beaches and closed L.C.T. 9, to whom troops were then being transferred by landing craft. Some of these troops were embarked in H.M.S. "Calpe" in order to save time. Slightly later I closed A.L.C. 185 and 188, who had just come off from the main beach. Both gave it as their opinion that the conditions ashore precluded further evacuation.

942. At about 1220, a signal was received from Commander McClintock indicating that no further evacuation was feasible. However, the Military Force Commander asked that a further effort should be made, and although I felt that this might well result in greater losses to troops already embarked, than in the embarkation of additional troops, I decided to give Commander

McClintock discretion whether to make a further effort. Accordingly, the following signal was made:-

"If no further evacuation possible withdraw."

Actually, the signal as reported to Commander McClintock omitted the word "if", and from that time onwards H.M.S. "Calpe" was unable to get into touch with him. I supposed at the time that his M.L. must have been sunk, but actually he was able to order the withdrawal of all landing craft to a pre-arranged position, 4 miles 330° from Dieppe. Consequently L.C.A. 185 and 188, with H.M.S. "Calpe", were soon the only craft left close in-shore, but owing to the low visibility I was not aware of this at the time.

277. The Force Commanders were determined not to leave the area while any hope remained of bringing off additional troops. In this resolution, H.M.S. "Calpe" approached very close to the beach at 1250 hrs. The Naval Force Commander's own account of this final attempt may be quoted:

944. At about 1250 I decided to close the beach again for a final personal view, and keeping A.L.C. 185 and 188 on either bow, H.M.S. "Calpe" steered for the eastern end of "Red" Beach, at the same time opening fire from the foremost guns at the breakwaters, on which machine-gun posts were reported to be preventing the troops on "Red" Beach from reaching the water. When about 9 cables from the beach, H.M.S. "Calpe" came under heavy fire, and no sign of troops or landing craft, other than derelicts, could be seen on the beach. Accordingly, H.M.S. "Calpe" manoeuvred to gain the cover of smoke, and I felt convinced that any further attempt to take off troops would be unlikely to succeed. Before finally giving up, however, I proceeded to seaward to close H.M.S. "Locust" and ascertain Commander Ryder's views, as it seemed possible that with H.M.S. "Locust's" shallow draught he might be more aware of the situation on the beaches. Whilst this interchange of signals was in progress, however, the General informed me that the larger body of the troops on the beach had surrendered.

278. The report of "Calpe's" own Commanding Officer (Appx 21 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander) and the Navigational Log appended to it note that the ship

closed RED BEACH at 1248 hrs, engaged the pillboxes on the breakwater with her forward 4-inch guns at 1253 hrs, and fired eleven salvos before retiring into the smoke about 1300 hrs. The reports from the officers in charge of L.C.As. 185 and 188 are available (Appx 2E to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander); both speak of the very heavy opposition encountered at the moment when they closed the beach in company with "Calpe"; and Lieut. K.D. Hall, R.N.V.R., in charge of L.C.A. 188, states that he saw two L.C.As. coming off the beach.

279. Capt. Hughes-Hallett in his report pays tribute to Commander McClintock and Lt.-Cdr. Dathan and McMullen. He writes:

The fact that over a thousand troops were evacuated, under conditions which can seldom have been equalled, must be attributed largely to the work of these officers.

(C.B. 04244, para. 943)

280. The remarks of General Roberts concerning the manner in which the Navy persisted in the attempts at withdrawal should be quoted (C.B. 04244, para. 952):

.....In spite of heavy casualties to both personnel and craft, the Navy went in again and again to every beach until it was heard that our men on "White" and "Red" Beaches were either killed or overwhelmed, when any further attempts would have been of no avail.

Every possible effort was made by the Navy to get the assault craft into the beaches, including the Force Commander's destroyer which closed the beach until it almost grounded, in an effort to support the withdrawal by fire and to pick up survivors.

281. It is of interest to note in this connection that one destroyer actually did ground while giving close support off WHITE BEACH during the withdrawal. The Commander of H.M.S. "Brooklesby" reported as follows (Appx 27 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander):

8. At about this time (1142) Boston aircraft laid a most effective smoke screen close to seaward of RED and WHITE Beach, and it was necessary for me to close the beach through this. I approached as close as I considered navigationally safe still in thick smoke and then turned parallel to the beach to wait for the smoke to

clear. When it did, I was within 500 yards of shore and came under 3", 2 pounder and small arms fire. The latter appeared to come from the larger buildings behind the beach, prominent among which was the Casino, into which a salvo of 4" was fired. A number of troops were on the beach and one man semaphored for boats to be sent in. Just to the left of the beach was a litter of Tanks, some overturned and others wrecked. As I could give no assistance commensurate with the risk to my ship in staying so close inshore, I altered to Port to open from the shore, but as the ship turned, her stern grounded. I continued to go ahead and she came off, but hits from 3" shell emptied the lubricating oil reserve tank and shot away the lubricating oil pipes to the gearing, putting both engines out of action. Several more hits were scored on the "BROCKLESBY", one starting a cordite fire at Y gun, but no serious damage was done. After about 3 minutes the starboard engine was in action and I proceeded clear.

CASUALTIES, RED AND WHITE BEACHES.

282. At this point the casualties suffered by the units engaged on RED and WHITE Beaches should be considered in detail.

283. As already explained, the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry succeeded in withdrawing considerably more men from the beach than was the case with the Essex Scottish. The R.H.L.I. embarked for the operation 31 officers and 551 other ranks. Their casualties as known at C.M.H.Q. on 1 Oct 43 were 7 officers and 120 other ranks killed, 5 other ranks presumed killed, one officer and 5 other ranks died of wounds, and one officer and 9 other ranks died of wounds while prisoners of war. 5 officers and 103 other ranks returned to England wounded. 8 officers and 90 other ranks are prisoners of war, and 7 officers and 69 other ranks are wounded and prisoners of war. One officer and 48 other ranks are missing. The regiment's total casualties were thus 30 officers and 449 other ranks; in other words, only one officer and 102 other ranks did not become casualties. The above figures indicate that a total of 7 officers and 210 other ranks, or considerably less than half the unit, returned to England after the operation. This unit, it will be noted, had a higher total of its personnel killed than any other except the Royal Regiment of Canada; and it had more officers killed than any other unit. (C.M.H.Q. file 18/DIEPPE/2).

284. The Essex Scottish had more casualties, as already remarked, than any other unit of the force. The regiment embarked 32 officers and 521 other ranks. Its casualties were 4 officers and 75 other ranks killed, 2 other ranks

died of wounds, and one officer and 7 other ranks died of wounds while prisoners of war. In addition, one officer and 27 other ranks returned wounded. 20 officers and 248 other ranks are prisoners of war, 3 officers and 115 other ranks are wounded and prisoners of war, and one officer and 16 other ranks are missing. The unit's total casualties are thus 30 officers and 501 other ranks. Two of the officers embarked remained on the landing ships (War Diary, Essex Scot., August 1942). No officer of this unit who landed, therefore, returned unwounded, and the only officer who landed to return to England at all was Capt. (now Lt.-Col.) D.P. MacRae, S.D. & G. Highrs, who was attached to the unit. Only 49 other ranks returned to England after the operation, and of these, as noted, 27 were wounded. (C.M.H.Q. file 18/DIEPPE/2).

285. Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal embarked 31 officers and 552 men. Their casualties as known on 1 Oct 43 were 6 officers and 83 other ranks killed, one officer and 4 other ranks presumed killed, 5 other ranks died of wounds, and one officer and 3 other ranks died of wounds while prisoners of war. (In addition, 2 other ranks have subsequently died while prisoners of war.) 2 officers and 51 other ranks returned wounded, 13 officers and 229 other ranks are prisoners of war, and 5 officers and 97 other ranks are wounded and prisoners of war. The unit's total casualties were thus 28 officers and 487 other ranks; and only 5 officers and 121 other ranks returned to England. (C.M.H.Q. file 18/DIEPPE/2.)

286. The casualties of 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn are of particular interest. Of the men of this unit who landed, as has already been explained, very few succeeded in returning to England. Nevertheless, there were likewise very few fatal casualties. The unit embarked 31 officers and 385 men. Figures available at C.M.H.Q. as of 1 Oct 43 show the following casualties: Killed, 8 other ranks; presumed killed, one officer; died of wounds while a prisoner of war, one other rank; wounded, 4 other ranks. 13 officers and 127 other ranks are prisoners of war, 2 officers and 16 other ranks are wounded and prisoners of war, and one officer and 2 other ranks are missing. The missing officer is Capt. Purdy, and the officer presumed dead, Lt.-Col. Andrews; both of these were last seen in the water.

287. In view of the evidence produced concerning the bold and determined manner in which this unit fought its tanks, a fact to which, as has been seen, many infantrymen bear witness, the astonishingly low figures of killed and wounded are a tribute to the staunchness of the Churchill tank. This is confirmed by the evidence of Major Page (above, para.).

288. This unit brought back to England 14 officers and 231 other ranks. The vast majority of these were never ashore. (C.M.H.Q. file 18/DIEPPE/2).

289. The personnel of the Royal Canadian Engineers, all of whom were employed on the main beaches, suffered heavily. The total of R.C.E. personnel embarked, as known to Over-

seas Records Office, was 11 officers and 308 other ranks. Casualties as known at 1 Oct 45 were as follows: killed, one officer and 17 other ranks; died of wounds, one other rank, plus one additional other rank who died of wounds as a prisoner of war; wounded, 4 officers and 33 other ranks; prisoners of war, 2 officers and 91 other ranks; wounded and prisoners of war, 2 officers and 36 other ranks; missing, 5 other ranks. The grand total of casualties for the R.C.E. was 9 officers and 184 other ranks. The report of Lt.-Col. L.F. Barnes on the Engineer aspect of the operation (5 Sep 42) calculates that of 95 all ranks of the Beach Assault parties, 71 landed and of these 62 were reported as killed or missing; and of 240 all ranks of the demolition parties, 93 landed and of these 90 were killed or missing (File 2DS(G) 1-1-23, from H.Q. 2 Cdn Div). Of the officers and other ranks of the Engineer Group who landed, 90% were reported killed or missing (the great majority, as already noted, now being known to be prisoners).

THE RETURN TO ENGLAND.

290. The return voyage can be briefly dealt with. At 1259 hrs H.M.S. "Ferne" was ordered "to concentrate small craft 4 miles S50° from Dieppe", and by 1320 hrs the "majority" of these craft were so concentrated. At 1345 hrs "Ferne" was ordered "to assume guide of fleet", and motor launches were ordered to keep the convoy closed up on her (Report from H.M.S. "Ferne", Appx 22 to Enclosure No. 13, Report of Naval Force Commander). Evidently the return voyage began at once. About 1410 hrs the last craft was reported three miles from the French coast (Report by Air Force Commander, C.B. 04244, para. 993). At 1436 hrs the Detailed Chronological Air Narrative (Appx B to Annex 7, C.B. 04244) notes, "Close Support Squadrons no longer required as force 12 miles off shore".

291. Fighter cover was maintained over the force throughout the homeward voyage, and was in general extremely effective. The strength of this cover was progressively reduced as the convoy approached England. At 1450 hrs it was reduced to five squadrons, and by 1656 hrs it was down to three squadrons (Detailed Chronological Air Narrative).

292. There were enemy air attacks upon the convoy, but they were not concentrated and not effective. The report of the Air Force Commander (C.B. 04244, para. 994) notes under 1545 hrs as follows:

There was considerable deterioration in the weather, and the enemy took advantage of the increasing cloud cover to send out single bombers to attack our ships as they neared the English Coast. One or two formations of F.W. 190s were also employed

for this purpose. In addition to standing cover over the returning convoy, 86 interception sorties were made.

293. As already noted, H.M.S. "Calpe" during this final phase suffered two bombing attacks, both of which secured near misses and caused damage and casualties. These attacks were the result of the ship's proceeding eastward independently to pick up a British pilot who was reported in the water (Report of Naval Force Commander, C.B. 04244, para. 945).

284. The final phase can best be described in the words of Capt. Hughes-Hallett's report, as printed in C.B. 04244:

946. Subsequently H.M.S. "Calpe" rejoined the convoy which proceeded without incident, other than some ineffectual air attacks through the Western swept channel, and to a position approximately 20 miles from Newhaven. At this point I was joined by Captain D. (16) with H.M.S. "Mackay" and H.M.S. "Blencathra", and I requested him to escort the small craft into Newhaven thus releasing H.M.S. "Calpe" and the other destroyers and H.M.S. "Locust" to proceed direct to Portsmouth with their wounded, who totalled over 500. The coastal craft and landing craft reached Newhaven without further incident, and the destroyers and H.M.S. "Locust" berthed alongside at Portsmouth shortly after midnight.

295. Shortly after the convoy left the French coast, both General Roberts and Brigadier Mann (in "Calpe" and "Fennie" respectively) availed themselves of the fact that carrier pigeons were available to send messages to H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps summing up their immediate impressions of the operation. General Roberts wrote, at 1340 hrs:

Very heavy casualties in men and ships. Did everything possible to get men off but in order to get any home had to come to sad decision to abandon remainder. This was joint decision by Force Commanders. Obviously operation completely lacked surprise.

(File Ops 3-3-1-2 Div, Vol. II,
from H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps)

Brigadier Mann wrote, at 1422 hrs:

Recording opinion now in case of trouble later. Surprise probably lost when naval encounter occurred in early AM - if LCAs spotted.

Strength of enemy. Seems to have been increased.

Basic view all army offrs in Fernie that Bomber Comd MUST provide really heavy support in future Combined Operations.

Troops seem to have behaved magnificently never a trace of panic in R/T. Failure to succeed in forcing Red & White due to very heavy fire on promenade. Gunfire also on beaches.

No news of Yellow or Blue parties since early AM. Comms worked well throughout. Are getting reports re casualties by lamp.

Sorry we failed to achieve our hopes. Navy did grand job. Regards Mann

We want to go again some time too!

(Ibid.)

TOTAL CASUALTIES OF CANADIAN MILITARY FORCE

296. The grand totals of Canadian military casualties in the DIEPPE operation, as known at Overseas Records Office on 1 Oct 43, were as follows:

	Officers	Other Ranks
Presumed Killed (Overseas R.O.3366)	4	22
Killed	38	599
Died of Wounds	1	30
Died of Wounds (P. of War)	5	36
Wounded	39	553
Prisoner of War	85	1253
Wounded and a Prisoner of War	33	515
Missing	7	147
Total casualties	212	3159

297. At this late date, it may probably be assumed that almost all of those shown as "missing" were in fact fatal casualties, doubtless chiefly drowned. If the missing be reckoned as fatal casualties, the total number of such casualties for the force, it will be observed, is 55 officers and 838 other ranks. The figures given indicate that a total of 172 officers and 2572 other ranks who embarked for the operation did not return to England. (These figures represent the total of Presumed Killed, Killed, Died of Wounds (P.of War), Prisoner of War, Wounded and a Prisoner of War, and Missing.) Comparison with the total embarkation strength (Report No. 100, Appx "A") indicates that 133 officers and 2086 other ranks of the Canadian force returned to England.

298. These figures derive from C.M.H.Q. file 18/DIEPPE/2.

299. The losses suffered by two brigades of the 2nd Canadian Division in this operation were so heavy as to reduce the division's battleworthiness very materially for a

considerable time. 4 Cdn Inf Bde in particular was almost destroyed, for the moment, as a fighting force: the total casualties of its three battalions amounted to 86 officers and 1449 other ranks. At 15 Sep 43, nearly a month after the operation, and after great efforts had been made to fill the gaps, R.Regt.C. was still deficient six officers and 218 other ranks, R.H.L.I. four officers and 193 other ranks, and Essex Scot. 12 officers and 212 other ranks (C.M.H.Q. to H.Q. First Cdn Army, 17 Sep 42, C.M.H.Q. file 6/DIEPPE/1). The DIEPPE battalions, filled with reinforcement officers and men many of whom were incompletely trained, were obliged to revert to a basis of elementary training; and when in the Spring of 1943 a scale of mobilization priority was established for First Cdn Army, 2 Cdn Inf Div was necessarily placed lower than the other infantry divisions (Telegram G.S. 787, CANMILITRY to DEFENSOR, 10 Apr 43: C.M.H.Q. file 4/PROGRESS/5).

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HANDLING OF CASUALTIES IN ENGLAND

300. At this point, after the actual operation had concluded, a heavy burden was suddenly thrown upon Canadian Military Headquarters and certain establishments under its control, notably the hospitals, the Records Office and the Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon. The task of caring for the returned wounded was a heavy one. Not less exacting were those of tabulating and notifying casualties and providing reinforcements for the units which had suffered heavily in the operation.

301. The performance of these tasks was rendered more difficult by the fact that C.M.H.Q. had no advance information whatever concerning the operation, and arrangements accordingly had to be improvised at very short notice. This information was withheld for security reasons, but its absence caused great difficulties after the operation and it was subsequently agreed, in discussions with H.Q. First Cdn Army, that a different arrangement would have to be made in future cases; see memoranda on this matter on C.M.H.Q. file 6/DIEPPE/1. The great amount of detailed work done at C.M.H.Q., at Records and at 2nd Echelon after the operation cannot be fully described here, but note should be taken of the burden which this operation threw upon these establishments at a few hours' notice. The work of Records and 2nd Echelon is summarized as follows in the fourth Liaison Letter from A.G.'s Branch, C.M.H.Q. to A.G., N.D.H.Q., 15 Sep 42 (C.M.H.Q. file 6/LIAISON LTR/2/2):

12.....(c) 2nd Echelon had considerable difficulty in collecting accurate returns of Casualties due to the fact that returning personnel were scattered over a large area, but by working long hours was able to despatch the necessary information to Records, although due to the numbers of names involved and the demand for speed a percentage of error had to be accepted.

(d) Records stood up well under a very heavy strain: certain weaknesses appeared which are now being rectified. The system of

handling large numbers of casualties has now been fully tested and when the present adjustments are completed should be very satisfactory.

302. Of the medical aspect some slightly more detailed mention should be made, although the story of this sphere belongs properly to the medical historian. The brief summary which follows is also extracted from the fourth Liaison Letter from A.G.'s Branch, C.M.H.Q. to A.G., N.D.H.Q.:

41. Dieppe casualties.

(a)Information of the raid was received by the D.M.S. at 0530 hours 19 Aug. Estimated casualties were 600. It was planned to use 1, 14 and 15 Cdn General Hospitals for reception of Dieppe casualties. In order to prepare hospitals in the vicinity for the reception of patients, sitting cases were cleared by special train from 1 and 14 Cdn General Hospitals to 7 Cdn General Hospital, some 330 in all. 15 Cdn General Hospital evacuated its available cases to 5 Cdn General Hospital.

(b) In the meantime efforts were made to prepare 7 and 8 Cdn General Hospitals and 1 Cdn Neurological Hospital for the possible reception of casualties. The estimation of casualties was exceedingly uncertain. Casualties began to filter through in the late afternoon of 19 Aug. At about 2000 hours on that date advice was received that casualties might reach 1500.

(c) Casualties were evacuated through two main ports to 1, 14 and 15 Cdn General Hospitals. Because of the large number of casualties expected, one ambulance train, carrying some 82 cases, was routed to 7 Cdn General Hospital. Due to the large number of surgical cases admitted to 15 Cdn General Hospital 50 cases were transferred to 8 Cdn General Hospital.

(d) All arrangements proceeded smoothly and by 0900 hours on 20 Aug, some 600 casualties had been admitted to the various Cdn General Hospitals. These were mostly Canadian but included other combined forces as well. Nominal rolls of all admissions were telephoned to Records by 1200 hours on 20 Aug and confirmed by special D.R. later that day.

(e) Full reports of this action are not yet available, but it was gratifying to know that the Medical service functioned smoothly and efficiently, and that at least 1400 beds were available for the reception of possible casualties. There

was no overcrowding, with the exception of 15 Cdn General Hospital, which was remedied by transfer of cases to 8 Cdn General Hospital. By the morning of 21 Aug, sufficient numbers of beds were distributed among the various Cdn General Hospitals to take care of the casual sick. Information was received rapidly and accurately at A.M.D.2 and was transmitted to Records and 2nd Echelon.

(f) Casualties arrived by convoy in the evening of 19 Aug and the early morning of 20 Aug. 14 Cdn General Hospital received about 100 casualties, 1 Cdn General Hospital, 120, 15 Cdn General Hospital, 230, and 7 Cdn General Hospital, 80. 50 cases were transferred from 15 Cdn General Hospital to 8 Cdn General Hospital. Meanwhile, 1 Cdn Neurological Hospital, Plastic Team at Basingstoke and 5 Cdn General Hospital were in readiness to take casualties if necessary. In all, approximately 600 casualties, mainly Canadians, were admitted to Cdn General Hospitals.

(g) Nominal rolls were phoned in by hospitals directly to the Officer i/c Records at about 1200 hours on 20 Aug. Nominal Rolls were forwarded from Cdn General Hospitals concerned to Officer i/c Records by special D.Rs, leaving the hospitals at 1800 hours on 20 Aug. Additional surgical teams were supplied to the Cdn General Hospitals from hospitals at the base as required.

(h) Liaison between A.M.D.2 and the ports was through D.A.D.M.S. 1 Cdn Corps. In spite of some difficulties in intercommunication the operation proceeded smoothly and with the exception of 15 Cdn General Hospital all General Hospitals were able to handle the cases forwarded to them. The transfer of cases from 15 to 8 Cdn General Hospital relieved the situation at the former hospital.

303. An article giving a detailed analysis of the casualties admitted to Canadian General Hospitals, and the results of treatment was contributed to The Lancet (17 Apr 43) by Colonel J.A. MacParlane, R.C.A.M.C., Consultant in Surgery, C.M.H.Q., under the title, "Dieppe in Retrospect". This sums up the general results as follows:

The total mortality for all the wounded which were admitted to hospitals was 2.5%. Seven cases were admitted in extremis and 8 died after operation; 16% of the cases were discharged during the first week and a further 14% at the end of the second week.

304. Some note should be taken of the services rendered by the Canadian Auxiliary Services to the troops returning from the raid. The following facts are extracted from "Report of Canadian Y.M.C.A. Services on the Return of Canadians from the Dieppe Action of August 19-20, 1942", of which a copy has been communicated to the writer.

305. In the case of the Y.M.C.A. alone, eight tea cars and eleven supervisors participated in the work of providing refreshment for the returning troops; and the other three "National Voluntary Organizations" (The Knights of Columbus, The Canadian Legion War Services and the Salvation Army) also took part. The four organizations were notified of the need for their services "about ten o'clock on the morning of the 19th August", and steps were immediately taken to stock mobile canteens with the stores required for the work, after which the cars proceeded to a rendezvous where they were notified of their intended locations. "In view of the fact that the men were returning to different ports, the tea cars were spread out over a wide area. Some of them were instructed to proceed to the docks and beaches, while others were directed to the Reception Camps, some seven miles inland, that had been erected for the purpose of receiving the returning men." Detailing the experiences of one canteen and one supervisor working at one of the ports, the Y.M.C.A. report states in part:

For the rest of the day and on through the night destroyers arrived with troops, and no effort was spared to cater for their every need, in fact it was felt by Mr. Kluckner and his staff that care was taken of everyone wishing to have a smoke, a cup of tea and something to eat. While first consideration was given to these troops, care was also taken of the reception personnel (Navy, Army and Air Force), who, otherwise would have been without food.... In all a total of 350 gallons of tea were dispensed from one tea car during that eventful night.

At one Reception Camp, "the tea car belonging to the Canadian Y.M.C.A. alone, served some 2,600 cups of tea".

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