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R E P O R T NO. 109
HISTORICAL OFFICER
CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

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Date: NOV 21 1986

Operation "JUBILEE" : The Raid on Dieppe,
19 Aug 42

Part III : Some Special Aspects.

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17 Dec 43

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Operation "JUBILEE" : The Raid on DIEPPE, 19 Aug 42.
Part III : Some Special Aspects.

1. Earlier reports have dealt with the preliminaries of the DIEPPE operation of 19 Aug 42, and with the execution of the operation. The present report deals with certain additional aspects of the operation.

THE PLAN AND ITS RESULTS

2. It is of special interest to observe the comments of senior officers on the manner in which the plan for the operation served its purpose, and on the various weaknesses which appeared in practice. In this connection attention is directed to the section of the Combined Report (C.B.04244) dealing with Lessons Learnt (paras. 324-375). These lessons are presented in summarized form in paras.324-42, and those of them which bear most closely on the experience of the Canadian troops at DIEPPE may be quoted here:

324. The need for overwhelming fire support, including close support during the initial stages of the attack.

325. The necessity for the formation of permanent naval assault forces with a coherence comparable to that of any other first line fighting formations.....

328. The necessity for flexibility in the military plan and its execution.

To achieve this, the assault must be on the widest possible front limited only by the possibilities of control and the amount of naval and air support available.

329. The allocation to the assault of the minimum force required for success and the retention of the maximum force as a reserve to exploit success where it is achieved.....

333. The necessity for fire support in any operation where it has not been possible to rely on the element of surprise. This fire support must be provided by heavy and medium Naval bombardment, by air action, by special vessels or craft working close inshore, and by using the fire power of the assaulting troops while still sea-borne.....

335. Tanks should not be landed until the anti-tank defences have been destroyed or cleared.....

336. Great and continuous attention must be paid to security problems.....Only important extracts from Operation Orders should be taken ashore. These should be kept in manuscript form and have their official headings removed.

337. Briefing of the troops should take place as late as possible.....

338. Unless means for the provision of overwhelming close support are available, assaults should be planned to develop round the flanks of a strongly defended locality rather than frontally against it.

339. A far higher standard of aircraft recognition is essential both in the Royal Navy and the Army.....

341. The importance and necessity of using smoke cannot be over-emphasized and larger quantities of smoke must be carried in any operation of the size of the assault on Dieppe.

342. Some form of light or self-propelled artillery must be provided once an assault has got across the landing place and is making progress inland.

3. These extracts may be said to provide an official commentary on the operation; and they summarize the operational experience obtained from it, the gaining of which was one of its main objects.

4. Some of the special comments of Canadian officers should be noted. General Roberts, in his report on the operation sent to G.O.C. 1 Cdn Corps on 27 Aug 42 (file S-3-5/Ops from H.Q. First Cdn Army, at present in the custody of Historical Section, C.M.H.Q.; printed in C.B.04244, pp. 142-3) writes in part as follows:

10. Recommendations

(i) Tks

The employment of tks in a raid of short duration is not recommended and it is considered that a bridgehead must be est prior to the disembarkation of tks.

(ii) Landing Craft

All landing craft should have heavier armament, which should be shielded and so positioned that it can support the assaulting tps.

(iii) Support Landing Craft

Some form of heavily armoured and heavily armed support craft is necessary...

(v) Bomber Support

The effect on the population of coastal towns of heavy bombing as a preliminary to a landing must be accepted.

When a suitable measure of air superiority is attained, Bomber Comd should be prepared to employ accurate and heavy day bombing on targets such as towns, and heavily defended beaches.

This appears to be the only way of obtaining the equivalent of heavy arty concentrations in land operations.....

(viii) Flexibility

It is considered that in all operations of this nature the initial assault should be made by light forces to feel out the soft spots, with strong and flexible reserves quickly available.

5. On 28 Aug 42 General Crerar wrote to General Roberts acknowledging this report, and making some observations concerning sub-para.(viii), above. He wrote in part as follows:

.....I am not convinced that the tactics you here indicate are suitable for "all operations of this nature". There are practical limitations, in the way of technical interservice difficulties which are bound to impose a certain degree of rigidity in the plan of Combined Operations. It must also be accepted that if our intelligence concerning the enemy is complete, we shall be able to frame an effective plan in advance of the operation. This situation is unlikely but not impossible.

(Copy on file 8-3-5/Ops, from H.Q. First Cdn Army).

6. In connection with this discussion on the question of planning for the use of reserves, the Official Historian may perhaps take note of the fact that it is impossible to use large reserves to real advantage unless the commander is armed with full and accurate information concerning the course of operations as they develop. Examination of the sections of Reports Nos. 101 and 108 dealing with communications and information in the various sectors at DIEPPE may suggest that such information was frequently not available to the commander in this operation.

7. After the operation, General Roberts prepared a very detailed set of answers to a lengthy questionnaire drawn up at Combined Operations Headquarters. A copy of this document is on file Ops-3-3-1-2 Div from H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, now at Overseas Records Office, ACTON. Some of General Roberts' observations in this report should be noted here.

8. Among the points made was (para.5) the fact that the weight of shell used in the preliminary naval bombardment "was hardly heavy enough for such strongly built posns". In answer to a question concerning the value of the support of the actual assault by cannon fighters, General Roberts (para.7) observed that it appeared that in this case this support "was not of sufficiently long duration" to meet the purposes of the attack. He added:

It is questionable whether Cannon fire in itself is adequate for an operation of this nature against fixed defs such as pillboxes, houses, etc. It is considered that Cannon fire against open defs would be of great value and in case of fixed defs the effect would be increased greatly when used in conjunction with dive bombing.

9. In answer to a question as to whether "we were wrong in not arranging for a heavy air raid before the assault took place", General Roberts wrote (para.8) as follows:

This question has been discussed at length. The advantages of accurate bombing are obvious. The reasons against were:

- (i) effect on the French population.
- (ii) could only be done in the hours of darkness and would therefore be most inaccurate.
- (iii) This (ii) would only alarm the defs and probably would do more harm than good.
- (iv) inaccurate bombing might block the streets and thus bar the way for our tks.
- (v) fires would also be started which would bar both tks and inf.

10. In answer to the question whether the frontal attack was justified "in view of the fact that we were not taking any steps to pulverise the defences that would oppose such an attack", General Roberts replied (para.6):

Very questionable if a frontal attack is justified. Defences were stronger than anticipated and failure at blue beach altered the whole situation.

The questionnaire also inquired whether it should be accepted as a principle that when conditions permitted, "the attack should be planned to develop round the flanks of the strongly defended locality rather than frontally against it"; and went on to ask whether it was also true that frontal assaults should not be excluded "if adequate and dominating close support can be given"; and whether feint frontal assaults, possibly with the object of fixing the enemy's defence and perhaps his reserves, should not be excluded. General Roberts assented to all three propositions (para.9).

11. In answer to the question, "When planning an operation should it be accepted as a principle that the minimum number of troops is allotted to the assault in order to keep the maximum number available for exploiting success?", General Roberts again assented (para.11); while to the further question whether inter-communication and boat control difficulties could be sufficiently mastered "to make a very flexible plan of this nature a practical proposition", he replied that this should be possible with training, but was a matter for the Navy to decide.

12. In reply to a query apparently originating with an American officer, whether plans were sufficiently flexible to permit the Force Commander to exploit "soft spots", General Roberts replied (para.26), "Plans were not flexible. All but one bn were up to in the initial assault". To a further question from the same source, "Is a forced landing practicable on defended beaches without the advantage of surprise or great superiority in fire support?", General Roberts replied (para.27), "No, must have surprise or great superiority of fire, preferably surprise with fire sp available if required".

13. The questionnaire deals also with a great number of more technical questions which need not be noted here.

THE QUESTION OF SECURITY

14. A matter of very special interest is that of the success of the security arrangements made previous to the operation. As has been pointed out in Part I, the operation was mounted in July and was abandoned after all personnel had been fully briefed in the plans. It was subsequently re-mounted in August. The possibility of the enemy knowing that we had proposed to operate against DIEPPE at an earlier time was thus not inconsiderable; although the final arrangements made (involving no preliminary concentration of the force) were certainly such as to make it difficult for him to obtain information of its revival.

15. After the operation, there was much talk of leakage, and undoubtedly the troops who took part in the operation,

and probably the men of the Canadian Army Overseas generally, were quite convinced that the enemy had known of our enterprise and had made special preparations to repel the attack.

16. A special report submitted by the Field Censors (Home) on Canadian mail examined during the period 22-28 Aug 42 contained the following comment by the censor:

Judging from a fairly good number of letters, it is quite evident that information concerning the raid had leaked out to the enemy prior to the raid, and most of the participants who returned refer to this fact. The enemy was apparently well aware of the intended raid and had made special arrangements accordingly and had brought reinforcements into the area specially to meet the raiders.

An Intelligence Report on the raid prepared by the General Staff at H.Q. First Cdn Army and dated 22 Sep 42 (copy on First Cdn Army file 56-1-1/Int, at present in the custody of Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q.) makes the following comment upon this passage:

The tps are evidently convinced of this fact and appear to have sold the censor on the idea that the enemy had been forewarned of the raid.

17. This Intelligence Report remarks, "There is no doubt that there was a certain amount of careless talk and consequent leakage of information due to indiscretions on the part of military personnel". Nevertheless, the report concludes, "It is practically certain, however, that no leakage of information reached the enemy". The following facts presented in support of this contention are quoted verbatim from the report:

(i) The captured Guard Report Book of 813 Army Coastal Bty at VARENGEVILLE proves that events were entirely normal on the night of 18/19 Aug 42 and that there was nothing to report up to 0345 hrs 19 Aug 42. The alarm was actually given at 0400 hrs, in all probability due to the unfortunate encounter of No 3 Commando with the enemy coastal patrol.

(ii) At 0130 hrs 19 Aug 42 personnel returning to the bty posn from patrol undressed and went to sleep despite the fact that they were in a period of alert during which they were supposed to sleep fully dressed.

(iii) At the CASINO the alarm was only given at

about 0500 hrs 19 Aug 42.

(iv) Enemy air reconnaissance on the evening 18 Aug 42 and the immediate preceding evenings was, if anything, less than normal.

(v) No reinforcements had been sent to DIEPPE. What did arrive just before the raid was a new draft for 302 Inf Div of the lowest possible category.

(vi) The fact that defence positions had recently been strengthened and increased was not confined to DIEPPE. Defence positions along the whole coast have been in process of reorganization since May.

18. One further significant piece of circumstantial evidence indicating that the enemy was not specifically prepared for an operation at this time and place is the fact adduced, as already noted, in the report of the Air Force Commander (Report No. 108, para. 194), that the German bomber effort did not get under way until five hours after the commencement of the operation. This would appear to be a most important point; for it is incredible that if the enemy had known of the intended attack he would not have had his bomber force in readiness to go into action against our ships at the very outset.

19. Although reports were current of statements by French civilians or German soldiers to the effect that the raid had been expected, investigation has not produced any actual concrete evidence that the enemy knew of our intention to operate against DIEPPE on 19 Aug. An example of these reports is the statement of Major C.E. Page (Report No. 107, Appx "B") that the Germans said that they had brought four machine-gun battalions into the town, and that they had been awaiting our attack for four days. Many similar reports are found in letters written by Canadian soldiers (see report on mail examined at LIVERPOOL in 2 Cdn Div file 2 DS(G)1-1-23-1). As already seen, such reports were not borne out by the interrogation of prisoners.

20. One somewhat amusing incident may be noted. At this period the British press was carrying a series of advertisements for a product called "Sylvan Flakes", the argument used being that these flakes were the best expedient for washing irreplaceable garments of distant origin. On 15 Aug 42, four days before the raid, the Daily Telegraph published one of these advertisements headed "Beach Coat from Dieppe". It was illustrated by a cut showing a lady wearing the garment named and pruning a tree. The matter was subsequently investigated, and one officer argued that the branches of the tree in the cut "fitted accurately on the 1:1,000,000 scale Dieppe map". A careful check by M.I. 5, War Office, however, left them "convinced that it is nothing more than a coincidence". (Documents on file 58-2-0/INT, from H.Q., First Cdn Army.) The "Sylvan Flakes" advertisements are still appearing, but with somewhat less specialized geographical references.

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21. A careful inquiry into the security aspects of the raid was made by Brigadier H.I. Allen, D.D.M.I.(S), at the request of the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee. His report was printed for the War Cabinet under date 5 Dec 42 (copies on file 58-2-0/INT, from H.Q., First Cdn Army). This report quotes the First Cdn Army Intelligence Report at length. On the question of whether or not the enemy was aware of our plans it does not express a direct opinion; but it quotes the Canadian conclusions (above, para. 17) and the very similar ones reached in a subsequent Security Report prepared by Combined Operations Headquarters, and shows no disposition to take issue with them.

22. The facts, then, would appear to be as follows. Our own propaganda and our own newspapers had encouraged the enemy to fear an attack upon his positions on the French coast, and he had been engaged in strengthening them, at DIEPPE and at many other points, for months past. Moreover, the enemy is as well aware as ourselves of those periods when moon and tide conditions are favourable to raiding operations; and such favourable conditions, existing at the time of the operation, resulted in the enemy being more than usually on the alert on the night 18/19 Aug. On this point a further passage from the Intelligence Report already cited may be quoted:

From prisoners' statements there appear to be three states of readiness on the French Coast:-

(i) Normal state of preparedness.

(ii) Highest state of readiness when all personnel sleep fully clothed at or near their posts.

(iii) Extreme state of readiness when all posts are fully manned and weapons loaded etc.

The highest state of readiness (ii above) is adopted during all periods when tidal and lunar conditions are particularly favourable for raids. Two such periods had been ordered since May:- the first from the end of Jun to 25 Jul; the second (which coincided with the raid) from 1 Aug to night 19/20 Aug.

23. The successful operation of the enemy's defensive arrangements at many points would appear to have been due, not to his having been warned, but to the general efficiency of those arrangements themselves. The enemy's scheme of defence was skilfully drawn and was well carried out.

ENEMY FORCES AND LOSSES

24. The information concerning enemy forces in the DIEPPE area given in the Detailed Military Plan for the operation under date 10 Aug 42 (Appx "A") runs in part as follows:

The DIEPPE area is held by the 110 Inf Div, a first line division originally recruited from the OLDENBURG district of GERMANY. It has recently seen service on the Russian front and has been sent to FRANCE to rest and refit, where it relieved the 302 Inf Div. Whilst the division may not be up to full strength, it has a good fighting record.

25. This part of the intelligence provided proved inaccurate. The Intelligence Report prepared at H.Q. First Cdn Army (22 Sep 42) comments as follows:

1. (a) The presence of 110 Div, which prior to the raid was reported to be holding the DIEPPE sector, was not confirmed; none of the PW captured had any knowledge that 110 Div had ever been present in this area. It may be assumed, therefore, that 302 Div had never withdrawn from the DIEPPE sector.

(b) Four of the PW captured were identified as belonging to 6 and 7 Coys of II Bn IR 571, forming part of 302 Div, a low category div with a lower scale of equipment than the normal inf div; the tpt being almost entirely horse-drawn.

26. The report notes that the order of battle of the three infantry regiments of 302 Div, from west to east, appeared to be as follows:

I.R.572 - area unknown.
I.R.571 - DIEPPE - POURVILLE area
I.R.570 - EU area.

It notes that statements of prisoners indicate that 302 Div was under command of LXXXI Corps, forming part of 15 Army. LXXXI Corps was commanded; it is believed, by General Kuntze, and the report comments, "It is of interest to note that the GOC LXXXI Corps belongs to the Armd Corps, and this may account for the strong A Tk def and also high state of trg of tps in A Tk def measures, which undoubtedly existed in the DIEPPE sector".

27. The sections of this Intelligence Report on the general condition of the German units should be quoted in full:

2 TRAINING

It is evident from PWs statements and entries in diaries that a large proportion of the strength

of the inf units was made up of recruits, some of whom had only 4 weeks training before joining their unit in the fd. A further proof of this low standard of training is evident from the entry in a diary, which discloses that a "recruit offr" had been appointed to take charge of the training of recruits. A part of the daily programme was devoted to such elementary lessons as "Recognition of Badges of Rank."

3. MORALE

The majority of inf PWs were of Polish birth, and born in the territory which for the time being has been incorporated into the Greater Reich. In one inf sec Poles made up almost 50% of the strength, but the average distribution was two Poles to eight Germans. These Poles were mostly of poor physique, some of whom before the outbreak of this war had been rejected for service in the Polish Army.

4. STRENGTH

Inf units were well up to strength, in the case of one pl even over est.

28. The sections of the Intelligence Report dealing with Enemy Defences and Weapons should also be quoted in part:

The area of DIEPPE was held by IR 571, with two bns fwd and one in res, to a depth of about 7 miles. In general, the defences were sited in an anti-raid role as opposed to an anti-invasion role, and the greater part of the fire power was concentrated to cover the available landing beaches.

The II Bn, holding the town itself, west of the river, occupied a posn of about 1500 yds deep, and the landward defences were sited to deal only with an attack from the rear by para-tps or land forces.

Details of located enemy weapons on the main beaches are shown in sketch att as Appx A, and it will be noted how completely the beach is covered by enfilade fire from the West headland. Details of defences sited in the East headland are not available, but the enemy was able to cover not only the sea approaches to the harbour and the main beaches, but also the greater part of the main beach in enfilade.

.....Prisoners of War seemed to think that the defences on the front were mainly intended as a decoy to draw the fire of the landing parties while the main defence was to

come from the cross-fire from the headlands.

It is of particular interest that in both East and West headlands some weapons were sited in artificial caves. On the east headland it is reported that some of these weapons came out to fire and were then pulled back into the caves. Fire from positions such as these is extremely difficult to locate, and it must be realized that their existence could not have been established prior to the operation by air photographs. (1)

.....Mortars were extensively used on all the beaches and in the village of POURVILLE. Their fire was extremely accurate and well co-ordinated with the MG fire plan, covering areas that were defiladed from MG and SA fire. The rapidity and accuracy with which new targets were engaged indicate that mortar fire was controlled from OPs.

.....Weapons covering the main beaches included a very high proportion of A Tk guns.

The report notes that prisoners estimate that on the front of approximately 800 yards held by No. 2 Platoon of No. 7 Company, I.R.571 on WHITE BEACH, there were at least four 3.7-cm (1.45-inch) A.Tk guns and one 4.7-cm (1.85-inch) A.Tk gun.

29. In the matter of reserves, the report notes that No. 5 Company of I.R.571 appears to have been in immediate local reserve, in huts at the junction of the main roads DIEPPE - NOUEN and DIEPPE - LE HAVRE (i.e., at 223674). This company, while not identified, was probably engaged in the later stages. "III Bn was held in regimental reserve at AMBRUMESNIL" (1661, south-west of OFFRANVILLE).

30. With respect to the employment of reserves, the Intelligence Report notes, "Tac R reports up to the time of withdrawal did not disclose any abnormal rd movement to indicate the bringing up of tactical reserves". It should perhaps be noted here, however, that one Tac R sortie at a late hour (1132 hrs) reported "Three and possibly five light tanks seen at W.2055" (some eight miles south of DIEPPE) (report of O.G. 35 Wing, R.A.F., 21 Aug 42; file Ops 3-3-1-2 Div, from H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps). It may also be noted that there are indications (Report No. 101, paras. 200, 201, 217, 218) of some local movement of German reserves into the BAS DE HAUTOT and POURVILLE areas, where they came into contact with the Camerons and the South Saskatchewan Regiment respectively. It is quite possible that these troops were portions of the reserve battalion believed to be stationed at AMBRUMESNIL.

- (1) These caves were in fact probably not artificial, and their existence was well known before the war: see Report No. 100, para. 20.

31. It is a rather striking fact that so determined and effective a defence was offered by a comparatively small force of low-category German troops. The Intelligence Report concludes that WHITE and RED Beaches were held by No. 7 Coy of I.R.571, with a company front of approximately 1750 yards. This front was attacked by two and ultimately three Canadian battalions which made little progress and suffered extremely heavy casualties. (2)

32. The explanation is to be sought in the completeness and strength of the German defences, in the care with which the troops had evidently been exercised in their defensive role, and above all, perhaps, in the fact that the real defences centred on the two commanding headlands, on which the assaulting forces never obtained any kind of foothold, and on which many heavy enemy weapons were mounted. The map of the "Defences of Dieppe West" based upon the statements of prisoners and attached to the Intelligence Report as Appx "A" shows the area immediately around the Castle, south-west of the Casino, as mounting two 7.5-cm. infantry guns, four heavy machine-guns and two heavy (8-cm.) mortars. No information from prisoners concerning the defences on the east headland is available; but intelligence collected before the operation indicates the presence of a considerable number of pieces of artillery there.

33. To estimate the enemy's losses is a very difficult and indeed impossible task. General Roberts, in his answers to the questionnaire already referred to, which requested an estimate of casualties inflicted on the enemy, wrote (para. 19(e)):

This is a most difficult question to answer. The 6 Cdn Inf Bde, gathering information on a Pl basis, estimate at least 500 to 600 casualties to the enemy on their front. There is a feeling that the number is considerably larger but there is no evidence to base any figure beyond that stated.

34. The Combined Report (C.B.04244) makes no detailed attempt at estimating enemy losses, but is content to say "His total losses in killed, wounded, and missing were perhaps 500" (para.319). In view of the fact that the enemy admitted suffering 591 casualties (below, para. 36) this seems rather too modest. The evidence of repatriated Canadian prisoners is that the hospitals in the area were full of German wounded after the operation. A German at VERNEUIL told Major Page that the enemy suffered 1,000 casualties; this may well be close to the truth.

- (2) General Grerar comments on this passage as follows: "Even low category troops, provided they are thoroughly drilled in a tactical routine, will continue to carry out such routine with remarkable persistence. The reason for this is, of course, that the troops are not required to think but simply to do what they have been drilled to do. It is when low category troops are presented with a military problem requiring thought and initiative that their lack of quality is revealed."

A report by (British) Prisoner of War Interrogation Section, 27 Aug 42 (copy in H.Q. First Cdn Army file 8-5-1/Ops, vol.2) suggests that the stubborn resistance might be accounted for by the reported presence of No.3 Versuchskompanie, evidently an experimental unit, which apparently manned the anti-tank defences on RED and WHITE Beaches.

35. Very few prisoners were brought back to England, the totals being Navy, 25 ratings; Army, 8 other ranks; Air Force, one officer and 3 other ranks; total, 37. The eight Army prisoners included four gunners from the battery at VARENGEVILLE, one infantryman from POURVILLE and three from the Casino (C.B.04244, para. 319). The number of prisoners captured during the operation was of course much greater (see, e.g., Report No. 101, para. 146 and Report No. 108, para. 40), but it was impossible to evacuate most of them.

36. The Germans' statement of their own losses should be noted. The German High Command Official Communiqué included the following passage:

Contrary to all allegations of the enemy propaganda, the German losses are as follows:

The Army - 115 dead, 187 wounded, 14 missing.

The Navy - 78 dead and missing, 135 wounded.

The Luftwaffe including ground personnel, A.A. artillery and air signallers; 104 dead and missing, 58 wounded.

Altogether, therefore, the German losses amounted to 591 men..... (3)

(H.Q. First Cdn Army Intelligence Report, Appx "B")

37. These enemy statements obviously should not be taken too seriously. The report of No. 4 Commando was to the effect that the entire garrison of the battery at VARENGEVILLE was killed or captured, four men being brought back as prisoners. The strength of the battery manning this position, as given in a nominal roll dated 1 Jul 42, was 2 officers and 116 other ranks; another nominal roll, torn and undated, gives the strength as 145 all ranks (H.Q. First Cdn Army Intelligence Report, Appx "C"). As considerable numbers of Germans were certainly killed in the POURVILLE area (notably by "C" Coy of the S.Sask.R.) and a certain number in the Casino area, and there were certainly casualties in other sectors also, it seems clear that the German figures have been very materially reduced for publication. There can be no doubt, however, that the enemy's losses were much less than our own.

THE AIR ASPECT

38. It is not proposed to deal fully here with the air aspect of the operation, although its importance is obvious. Much has already been said of the work of the Air Forces: see especially Report No. 101, paras 7 and 80, and Report No. 108, paras. 18-24, 255-258. The

(3) There is a discrepancy here, which no source available at C.M.H.Q. can clarify: the figures as given add up to a total 691, not 591. It is possible that the figures of naval wounded should be 35, not 135.

operation would of course have been quite out of the question without the very powerful and effective air support which was made available. (This in turn would not have been possible had not DIEPPE been within the radius of action of single-seater fighters operating from English aerodromes.) The regularity with which the personal accounts written by Canadian soldiers after the operation pay tribute to the support received from the Air Force is rather remarkable, and is in contrast with some earlier operations of this war.

39. Of all the results of the DIEPPE operation, the one perhaps least open to any form of doubt is the clear-cut victory obtained by our Air Forces over DIEPPE, which resulted in the destruction of a large proportion of all the enemy's first-line aircraft in Western Europe. Mr. Churchill's comment in Parliament upon this aspect may be recalled:

This raid, apart from the information and reconnaissance value, brought about an extremely satisfactory air battle in the west, which the Fighter Command wished they could repeat every week.

40. The communique issued by Combined Operations Headquarters after the raid (The Times, LONDON, 21 Aug 42) gives the following account of the air operations:

Throughout the landing extensive air cover for both ships and landing forces was provided by aircraft from all Operational Commands of the Royal Air Force, from the United States Army Air Force, the Royal Canadian Air Force, the Royal New Zealand Air Force, the Polish, Czech, Norwegian, Belgian, and Fighting French squadrons.

While the principal objective of the air operations was to give support to the landing and cover to the forces during the land engagement, and to the naval craft, there, in fact, developed one of the greatest air battles of the war. Although this air battle had not been planned as one of the objectives of the operation, the Germans were forced to call up aircraft reinforcements from all parts of Occupied France, Holland and Belgium. Many of these enemy aircraft were engaged before they ever reached the area of the operations, large formations being broken up and dispersed particularly over the mouth of the Somme.

During the engagement 91 German aircraft are officially known to have been destroyed and about twice that number have probably been destroyed or damaged. In all these operations 98 of our aircraft were lost and the pilots of 30 of these are saved.

41. On 25 Feb 43 Air Marshal Sir T. Leigh-Mallory, who had been Air Force Commander at DIEPPE and had subsequently become A.O.C.-in-C. Fighter Command, made the statement that the Luftwaffe had actually lost 170 aircraft over DIEPPE (The Times, LONDON, 26 Feb 43). Earlier, in the covering letter to his Report on the operation, dated 5 Sep 42, he had written, "Reports since received indicate that the German Air Force on the Western Front lost between 150 and 200 aircraft."

42. The air aspect of the operation may be studied in detail in the Report of the Air Force Commander (Annex 7 to C.B.04244) and in the Detailed Chronological Air Narrative and other documents accompanying the Report as appendices. It should be noted that the Air Force Commander's covering letter, which is a valuable summary of the air aspect, is not published in C.B.04244. A copy is on file 2DS(G) 1-1-23-3, from H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, at present in the custody of Historical Section, C.M.H.Q.

43. The Order of Battle of the Royal Air Force for the operation (C.B.04244, para. 1005) indicates that a total of 67 squadrons was employed. These included 48 squadrons equipped with Spitfires of various types; 6 close support squadrons equipped with Hurricanes, and 2 Hurricane bomber squadrons; 2 bomber squadrons equipped with Bostons, and 3 smoke squadrons, of which two had Blenheims and one had Bostons; 4 squadrons equipped with Mustangs, and 2 with Typhoons. (4)

44. This Order of Battle does not include 24 American Fortress bombers which, with Spitfire escort, made "a most successful pre-arranged attack" upon the enemy fighter aerodrome at ABBEVILLE-DRUCAT at 1023 hrs (Report of the Air Force Commander, para.992, C.B.04244). This attack, it is explained, was timed "to coincide with the main withdrawal from the Beaches at which time considerable interference was anticipated from fighters operating from the ABBEVILLE area" (ibid., para.963).

45. A considerable number of squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force were engaged in this operation. As indicated in C.B.04244 (para.911), the list is as follows:

Fighter Squadrons, Nos. 401, 402,
403, 411, 412, 416.

Army Co-operation Squadrons, Nos. 400, 414.

46. It is of special interest that this was the first occasion on which the two Army Co-operation Squadrons, which up to this period had been assigned to duty with the Canadian Army Overseas, had an opportunity of practising in action their proper role of co-operation with troops. Although 400 Sqn (then designated 110 Sqn) arrived in the United Kingdom in February, 1940, it had, like the Army formations with which it was designed to work, a very long period of waiting before it went into action in its proper role.

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- (4) The two Typhoon squadrons are not included in the Order of Battle given in the copy of the report in 2 Cdn Div file 2DS(G) 1-1-23-3, but have been added in the version published in C.B. 04244.

47. The two R.C.A.F. Army Co-operation Squadrons, forming part of 35 Wing R.A.F., worked from GATWICK Aerodrome along with 26 Sqn and 329 Sqn, R.A.F. All four squadrons used Mustang aircraft. Of the work done by these four squadrons engaged in Tactical Reconnaissance, the Air Force Commander reported (C.B.04244, para.978):

Tactical Reconnaissance units suffered a higher casualty rate than any other type. This was due to the deep penetration required of them which necessitated their patrolling well beyond the Area of Fighter Cover. The coast roads leading to Dieppe were reconnoitred every half hour, and those from Amiens, Rouen, Yvetôt and Le Havre, places from which reinforcements might be expected, every hour.

Aircraft took off from Gatwick, flew to the Dieppe area via the Beachy Head route, made contact with the Command Ship, and then proceeded on their allotted tasks. On completion of each sortie Tactical Reconnaissance pilots flew sufficiently near to the ship to ensure satisfactory R/T transmission of any information they had. They then returned immediately to Gatwick and passed their information by telephone to the Air Force Commander.

The Air Force Commander mentions that "The only movement worthy of note" reported was that of the few light tanks referred to above (para. 30).

48. It has already been observed that Tac R failed to throw light on the uncertain situation at BLUE BEACH; and it is apparent also that the movement of German reserves in the area south-west of POURVILLE was not reported. The results obtained from the gallant and hazardous work of the Mustang pilots were thus scarcely proportioned to their losses, which were heavy. The statement of tasks, sorties and losses appended to the report of the Commanding Officer of 35 Wing (copy on file Ops 3-3-1-2 Div from H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, now at Overseas Records Office) is reproduced here:

Squadron No.	239	26	400	414	Total.
Tasks	8	9	12	9	38
Sorties	14	16	24	18	72
Pilots not returned.	3	5	1	1	10
Pilots returned by				1	1
20 Aug.					

It will be noted that the two Canadian squadrons, while carrying out more sorties than the others, were fortunate in having considerably smaller losses.

49. 400 Sqn, R.C.A.P., was commanded by Wing Commander R.C.A. Waddell, and 414 Sqn by Wing Commander R.P. Begg.

50. Certain of the conclusions reached by the Air Force Commander after analysis of the results of the operation are of interest. In particular, he emphasizes the fact that smoke action was by far the most effective form of support afforded by the air forces to the troops. In his Covering Letter he writes, in part, as follows:

3. Our attacks from the sea were made under the supporting fire of destroyers only against strong and well organised shore defences. Every effort was made therefore to provide maximum air support and air cover during the initial assault.

4. This Air Support under Fighter Cover comprised airborne smoke and bombing attacks on enemy battery positions and the shooting up of the enemy's defences by cannon Hurricanes. Of these, smoke was by far the most effective. It was laid by Bostons and Blenheims dropping 100 lb. phosphorus smoke bombs from about 50 feet.....

6. Bombing attacks on battery positions were not as effective as smoke.....

8. It was intended to employ Bombers against any enemy reinforcements making for Dieppe but none were located. Insistent demands were made for continued attacks against enemy gun positions. Bombers proved to be quite ineffective for this task although in the circumstances it was the only use to which they could be put....

Air Marshall Leigh-Mallory remarks subsequently, "I could quite easily have done with treble the number of smoke aircraft."

51. On the ineffectiveness of bomber attacks on battery positions, the firsthand evidence of Capt. G.A. Browne (Report No. 101, para. 97) is in full accord with the conclusions reached by the Air Force Commander.

THE PUBLIC RELATIONS ASPECT

52. A minor aspect of the operation, but one not undeserving of notice, is that of Public Relations. From the Canadian point of view, the "publicity" following the operation appeared in some respects unfortunate and there was widespread comment among Canadian officers and soldiers upon the light in which the early reports represented the operation.

53. In these reports as presented in British newspapers, and probably in American and perhaps even Canadian newspapers as well, the part played both by the very small detachment of American troops present and the much larger but still secondary component provided by the Special Service Brigade was exaggerated at the expense of the part played by the Canadians. A particularly glaring example was the account presented in the English weekly "Picture Post" (5 Sep 42) under the highly inaccurate title "Dieppe : The Full Story". In 11 pages of text and photographs, devoted chiefly to R.A.F. and Commando aspects, the only mention of Canadian participation was in two obscure sentences on the tenth page. It is fair to say that the misunderstanding was cleared up only when Mr. Churchill, in his speech in the House of Commons on 8 Sep 42, went out of his way to correct the current misconceptions. In this speech he spoke of the operation as follows (The Times, LONDON, 9 Sep 42):

It is a mistake to speak or write of this as a Commando raid, although some Commando troops distinguished themselves remarkably in it. The military credit for this most gallant affair goes to the Canadian troops who formed five-sixths of the assaulting forces, and to the Royal Navy, which carried them all there and which carried most of them back.

54. Some part of the origin of the misconception may perhaps be found in one passage of a "Private and Confidential Memo to Editors" issued from the Ministry of Information by Francis Williams (Controller, Press and Censorship) at 1330 hrs on 19 Aug (C.B. 04244, Appx "B" to Annex 14):

For your own information, I may say that while Canadian troops comprise the main body of the landing force, they constitute approximately one-third of the total personnel of all Services participating in the raid.

In a subsequent memorandum, issued at 2110 hrs on 20 Aug. Mr. Williams attempted to undo the effect of his previous one. He now wrote:

It will be very much appreciated if in their stories of the Combined Operations raid on Dieppe, the newspapers will bear in mind that by far the biggest proportion of the troops engaged were Canadian forces.

To emphasise Commandos in headlines and stories would be to give an unfair perspective to the operations.

(C.B. 04244, para. 1263).

55. The effect of Mr. Williams' first memorandum, which may, doubtless without his intending any such thing, have been understood by some editors as an indication of an official desire that the part played by the Canadians should at least not be exaggerated, can be directly traced in newspaper reports. For example, the Daily Sketch of 20 Aug 42 contained the sentence, "The main body of the landing force was composed of Canadians, but they constituted only about a third of the personnel engaged".

56. The Canadian press party which was present during the operation was conducted by Major (now Lt.-Col.) C.S. Wallace, Public Relations Officer at H.Q. First Cdn Army. Three Canadian newspaper correspondents were present: Messrs. Fred Griffin, Ross Munro and Wallace Reyburn. Mr. Munro witnessed the landing of part of the second wave on BLUE BEACH and subsequently landed for a few moments on the main beaches. Mr. Reyburn landed with the South Saskatchewan Regiment and witnessed the events in POURVILLE; he was slightly wounded but succeeded in returning to England. One Canadian broadcaster (Mr. R. Bowman) was also present, and one Canadian photographic officer, Lieut. F. Royal of the Public Relations Section, C.M.H.Q. The latter was on L.C.T.11, which did not touch down; but he succeeded in obtaining a number of dramatic pictures. Only one official photographer landed, a British sergeant who did not return.

57. Three books have been written concerning the operation by newspapermen who were present. One of these, We Landed at Dawn, is by Mr. A.B. Austin, a British correspondent who was with the Royal Regiment of Canada during the training but with 4 Commando during the operation. Mr. Austin has since been killed in Italy. The second book, Rehearsal for Invasion, is by Mr. Reyburn, and is mainly a personal account of his experiences. The third, Dress Rehearsal, is by Mr. Quentin Reynolds, correspondent of the American magazine Collier's, who was present on board H.M.S. "Calpe" during the operation, not as a member of the press party but as an official "spectator" (Enclosure No. 1 to Naval Force Commander's Memo. NPJ 0021/92/3 of 8 Aug 43).

58. Another published account of the operation is contained in a British official pamphlet entitled Combined Operations 1940-1942. This is the work of Mr. H.A. St. George Saunders, Combined Operations Recorder, and is in the main a popular version of C.B.04244, the text of which was prepared by the same author. Historical Section, C.M.H.Q. had no opportunity of commenting on the text of Combined Operations 1940-1942 until it was in proof; but at that time the account of DIEPPE was hastily surveyed and a certain number of corrections suggested and made. This very interesting pamphlet has already had a large circulation.

ESCAPES OF PRISONERS OF WAR.

59. A certain number of the Canadian officers and other ranks who were captured at DIEPPE have succeeded in escaping and returning to the United Kingdom. These include one officer and four other ranks of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal, who being French-speaking, had better opportunities than others for escape while detained in France, whence the prisoners were soon moved to Germany. There have been no escapes from Germany. The full list of those who have made their way back to this country follows:

Capt. G.A. Browne, R.C.A.
Capt. John Runcie, Camerons of C.
Lieut. A.A. Masson, Fus.M.R.

D.61182 P.S.M. (W.O.III) Dumais, L.A., Fus.M.R.
D.61265 Pte. Joly, G., Fus.M.R.
D.62077 Pte. Lafleur, C., Fus.M.R.
D.61748 Pte. Vanier, R., Fus.M.R.

60. Memoranda of interviews with several of these escaped prisoners will be found attached to Historical Officer's Reports Nos. 89 and 90. The experiences of Capt. Browne and Capt. Runcie were particularly remarkable, and probably merit the attention of the Official Historian. In the case of Capt. Browne, he escaped from the Germans, made his way into the section of France then unoccupied by the enemy and was interned by the French authorities there. He escaped from their custody but was recaptured; and following the occupation of the remainder of France by enemy forces on 11 Nov 42 he fell into the hands of the Italians. While being moved to GRIGNOLE by bus on 7 Dec 42, Capt. Browne succeeded in escaping yet once more. He made his way by TOULOUSE to the PYRENEES, and after a perilous experience on the snow-covered mountains in the depths of winter he got into the independent Republic of ANDORRA in company with two Spanish smugglers. Thence he was repatriated by way of GIBRALTAR, arriving in England on 26 Jan 43. In addition to effecting three escapes, it should be noted that while in custody in France Capt. Browne wrote and despatched to England through the agency of the United States Consul at LYON the remarkably detailed report of his experiences on BLUE BEACH at DIEPPE which is appended to Report No. 89 and upon which the narrative of events there included in Report No. 101 leaned so heavily. Capt. Browne was subsequently awarded the D.S.O., a decoration rarely given to officers below field rank. The award thus recognized an especially remarkable performance on the part of this officer (Canadian Army Overseas Routine Order 3225, 15 Mar 43).

61. The escape of Capt. Runcie also constitutes a remarkable episode. This officer, by feigning illness, succeeded in having himself transferred from a prisoner of war camp at VERNEUIL to a hospital in PARIS. Here he made his escape and was befriended by French people who lent him civilian clothes. About the middle of September he left PARIS for the south and made his way to the Spanish

frontier near ST. JEAN DE LUZ. This journey was made mainly on foot, and occupied more than nine weeks. Capt. Runcie represented himself as a Basque mechanic returning home. He got two lifts on German army lorries, the drivers of which accepted his story. In the case of French drivers he told his true identity, and although he came in contact in the course of the journey with many Frenchmen who knew he was a Canadian officer, he was never betrayed. At one point, between BORDEAUX and BAYONNE, Capt. Runcie had no water for two days. He crossed the Spanish frontier in safety on 22 Nov 42 and reported to the British Consul at SAN SEBASTIAN. After being taken to MADRID and making a report to the British Embassy there he was brought back to the United Kingdom by way of GIBRALTAR. He was subsequently awarded the M.C. (Overseas R.O. 3104, 8 Feb 43).

62. Lieut. Masson was also awarded the M.C. for his successful escape (Overseas R.O. 3225, 15 Mar 43). P.S.M. Dumais and Ptes. Joly, Lafleur and Vanier were all awarded the M.M. (Overseas R.O. 2960, 31 Dec 42).

63. In addition to the information relating to the escapes of the officers and other ranks mentioned above contained in Reports Nos. 89 and 90, many documents relating to the matter will be found on C.M.H.Q. file 4/P.O.W./1.

64. It is worth noting that there is evidence that in addition to the personnel just mentioned, certain individuals escaped temporarily from the Germans but were either recaptured by them or taken over by them from the French authorities at the time of the occupation of the previously unoccupied zone in France. This information derives from copies of letters from prisoners of war available at the Overseas Records Office. Two examples can be given, but a more complete examination of the very large mass of prisoners' letters at ACTON might yield additional instances. B.68274, Pte. Pelling, R.A., R.Regt.C., writes to his parents on 23 Sep 42. in part as follows:

I was taken prisoner on 19 Aug
and escaped the first night. I was loose
23 days and taken again on the 14 of Sept.
I lived on apples for the time I was loose.

A.21354, Pte. Tuer, R.J., Essex Scot., in a letter dated 14 Nov 42, describes how he escaped on the night 28/29 Aug 42 from a train taking prisoners towards Germany. He reached Unoccupied France, but was interned there, and his letter was written from a fort at NICE.

THE QUESTION OF THE SHACKLING OF PRISONERS OF WAR

65. A particularly unpleasant aftermath of the DIEPPE operation has been the fact that, chiefly presumably as the result of the capture by the Germans of part of a copy

of the Detailed Military Plan containing instructions for the tying of prisoners, British and Canadian prisoners taken at DIEPPE have been shackled by the Germans, and up to the time of writing (December 1943) measures taken for their relief have not been successful. It seems essential to summarize the main points of this unpleasant and painful controversy in the present report.

66. The "Intelligence Plan" for operation "JUBILEE" (Detailed Military Plan, Appx "L") contained the following passage (para. 4(b) (ii)):

Wherever possible, prisoners' hands will be tied to prevent destruction of their documents.

67. It is clear that this instruction was in accordance with the raiding technique developed by the Combined Operations Command. An earlier example is found in the Operation Order issued by Lord Lovat for Operation "ABERCROMBIE" (see Report No. 81). Para. 21 of this Order reads in part as follows:

There will be no P.O.W. cage, and prisoners' arms or wrists should be bound with a toggle rope before arrival at H.Q.

The separate Operation Order issued by 4 Commando for the DIEPPE operation (War Diary, "G", H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, Aug 42, Appx 58) includes the following passage (para. 35):

Prisoners will be securely tied by their thumbs with fish-line in the best Japanese tradition.....

It is interesting to speculate what use the Germans would have made of the text of this order, had they captured it as well as part of the Detailed Military Plan.

68. There is no doubt that a certain number of enemy prisoners were tied in the course of the DIEPPE operation. Sgt. Hickson told the writer that he saw some prisoners bound at the Casino, and although there are few references to this matter in the personal reports of individuals, one soldier of the R.H.L.I., B.36837, Pte. Johnston, J., speaking of the capture of thirteen prisoners in the Casino, writes, "Under Cpl Lisson's orders we tied their thumbs behind their backs and sent them back to the beach to help in carrying the wounded".

69. The course of the controversy with the German Government since DIEPPE must now be traced. The paragraphs that follow, except where otherwise stated, are based upon the documents on this subject in C.M.H.Q. file 45/TREATMENT/1.

70. On 2 Sep 42, as a result of the capture of portions of the Detailed Military Plan evidently including the Intelligence Plan, the German Government threatened to place in chains all prisoners taken at DIEPPE. The War Office announced in consequence that if an order for

tying the hands of prisoners was found to have been issued as stated, it would be cancelled. On 3 Sep 42, as a result, the Germans cancelled their proposed reprisals. (The Times, LONDON, 3 and 4 Sep 42.)

71. On 7 Oct 42 the German Government issued a further order for the shackling of prisoners taken at DIEPPE. This was stated to be the result of further investigation concerning DIEPPE, and of the SARK incident of 4 Oct 42, when German prisoners taken in a very minor raid were bound. British prisoners of war in Germany were accordingly shackled on 8 Oct 42. (Evening Standard, LONDON, 8 Oct 42).

72. On the same date the British War Cabinet decided to undertake reprisals against an equivalent number of enemy prisoners in our hands, and the Canadian Government was asked to agree and to co-operate. There had been no consultation with the Dominion Government in advance of the decision, and the Dominion Government, moreover, doubted the wisdom of the decision; it nevertheless acquiesced, from a desire to avoid public difference with the United Kingdom. On 10 Oct 42, accordingly, a number of German prisoners were shackled in the United Kingdom and in Canada. There was resistance to this measure in some Canadian camps.

73. On 23 Oct 42 the High Commissioner for Canada in LONDON suggested to the Dominion Government the possible desirability of moving the Government of the United Kingdom to make a statement on the situation in which the British and Canadian Governments should declare their intention of unshackling all German prisoners on a specified date, as evidence of their determination to uphold the Geneva Convention.

74. On 10 Dec 42, following the despatch by the Swiss Government of identical communications to the belligerents suggesting such action, the British and Canadian Governments announced that German prisoners in their hands would be unshackled on 12 Dec 42. This was duly done; but no reciprocal action by the Germans followed. The German Government, it appeared, was still demanding "effective guarantees" against the issuance of further orders for the tying of prisoners. (See The Times, LONDON, 4 Jan 43.)

75. On 17 Jan 43 the C.G.S., Canada, informed the G.O.C.-in-C. First Cdn Army by cable that, following an inquiry from the Dominion Government, the military members of Council had unanimously subscribed to the policy "that in future prisoners of war should not be shackled in the field". In reply to a request for his comments, the G.O.C.-in-C. concurred in this policy.

76. On 27 Jan 43, the Canadian authorities in the United Kingdom received the text of a proposed draft note to the German Government, and of a memorandum by the General Staff, War Office, upon which the note was based. This memorandum was founded on the view that urgent

operational necessity might sometimes dictate the tying of prisoners: the Geneva Convention, it was pointed out, prescribes "humane" treatment, and tying a prisoner is the more humane course where the alternative is killing him.

77. The C.G.S. (who had now arrived in the United Kingdom) and the G.O.C.-in-C., First Cdn Army accepted the War Office view, and this acceptance was notified to N.D.H.Q. On 28 Jan 43 the Minister of National Defence requested by cable a clarification of the situation, asking specifically whether the C.G.S. and G.O.C.-in-C. had changed their views on the question of shackling in the field. If they had changed their views, he asked to be informed what reservations they considered should be made in the interests of operational necessity. On 30 Jan 43 the C.G.S. informed the Minister in reply that it was now quite clear to him that the success of certain types of operation demanded that prisoners should be tied; and General McNaughton and himself considered that Canada should not agree to an undertaking not to shackle in the field. These views were based on the arguments in the War Office memorandum above referred to.

78. On 6 Feb 43 the High Commissioner despatched to Canada a draft Army Council Instruction relating to treatment of prisoners on capture. This A.C.I. prescribed treatment on humane principles as provided in the Geneva Convention and in P.S.R., 1930, Vol. I, Secs 126-7. While accepting the view that prisoners might be tied on the battlefield, it laid down the principle that such measures would be adopted only in case of operational necessity. It added "no order providing for the general tying of prisoners will be issued".

79. The draft A.C.I. was accompanied by a draft of a Secret letter to Army Commanders. This letter referred to two orders relating to the capture of prisoners which had been made the subject of complaint by the Germans. One of these was issued by 4 Armd Bde in the Middle East; the other was that issued by the Military Force Commander for the DIEPPE operation. Both these orders were stated to be "objectionable". It was stated that while local operational necessity might sometimes dictate the tying of prisoners, this should be limited to the duration of the period of necessity, and no order inconsistent with the proposed A.C.I. would be issued. The letter further provided that troops in contact with the enemy would not in future carry written orders dealing with the treatment of prisoners.

80. On 9 Feb 43 Canada House was informed that the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom had directed the issuance forthwith of the proposed A.C.I. and Secret letter to Army Commanders just described; and that he had approved the despatch of a note to Germany reporting the tenor of this action (including the reservation made in the interest of operational necessity), affirming

the determination of H.M. Governments to abide by the Geneva Convention, and stating that those Governments considered a combatant entitled to its protection from the moment of capture. This communication was to be made through the Swiss Government, and it was to be suggested that in communicating it to the Germans the Swiss should remark that it was assumed that in view of its text the German High Command would issue orders for the unshackling of British prisoners of war.

81. On 9 Feb 43 the V.C.G.S. and A.G. at N.D.H.Q. cabled to the C.G.S. some comments on details of the proposed A.C.I. and letter. The letter, it turned out, had already been despatched, but the wording of the A.C.I. was altered to meet one of the Canadian suggestions.

82. The proposed A.C.I. was duly issued as No. 266, dated 20 Feb 43. A Canadian Army Routine Order following the same lines but with different wording was prepared, and C.M.H.Q. was informed that until this was available, A.C.I. 266 should not be published as a Canadian Army Overseas Routine Order. As the result of an unfortunate slip at C.M.H.Q., the A.C.I., with only minor alterations to make it applicable to Canadian conditions, was in fact published as Overseas R.O. 3323 (10 Apr 43). Measures were subsequently taken to cancel this order and to publish the text of the order prepared in Canada as Overseas R.O. 3564 (19 Apr 43). As a result of representations from C.M.H.Q., para. 10 of this order ("The general binding of prisoners of war is strictly forbidden") was added to the Canadian draft, in order to maintain uniformity with the British orders.

83. The measures thus taken resulted, unfortunately, in no amelioration of the condition of Canadian and British prisoners of war in Germany. The German Government, when informed through Switzerland of the action proposed, objected strongly to the reservation made, and replied that it could only conclude that the British and Canadian Governments were "still adopting an attitude which is incompatible with terms of the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, and with the most elementary rule of humane and soldierly conduct of war" (Cipher telegram No. 1283 from BERNE to Foreign Office, 17 Mar 43). It was evident that the Germans were determined if possible to force the Allied Governments into an unconditional order against shackling. At the time of writing, the prisoners taken at DIEPPE are believed to be still shackled.

84. Some information on the actual manner in which the German orders were carried out may be gleaned from letters of prisoners of war available in the Overseas Records Office. Thus B.36650, Sgt. Harding, J.M., R.H.L.I., writes on 15 Oct 42, "We are being tied up every day since the 8th of October". Lieut. R.A.F. Currie, S.Sask.R., writes as follows on 11 Oct 42:

Have just arrived back in the
camp after having been in an old store

room of the local castle, with the Dieppe lads. We had our wrists bound with cords as a form of reprisal, having been accused of tying up our prisoners in the Dieppe raid. We arrived back here last night and found some lads segregated and hand-cuffed so we joined them.....

85. Capt. W.L. McGregor describes a somewhat later phase of the matter in a letter dated 9 Dec 42:

Finished our 2nd month in fetters yesterday, but resigned to having them on till the end of the war so anything short of that will come as a pleasant surprise. We wear them from 8 am to 9 pm only disadvantage being we're cut off from rest of camp - 300 of us.

86. Further details were given by the officers and men repatriated from Germany in October, 1943. Major C.E. Page (who on account of his poor health was never himself shackled) states that, as indicated above, for the first couple of days officer prisoners were tied with ropes. Thereafter for a time ordinary handcuffs were used; these were then replaced by chains with padlocks, and these in turn by handcuffs with chains perhaps 18 inches long. Although at the time when Major Page left Germany the prisoners were still officially shackled, the matter had become largely "a farce"; the handcuffs were distributed by the Germans and left for the prisoners themselves to put on; moreover, the locks were easily picked. The consequence was that the handcuffs were worn, in practice, only twice a day, on "check-parades"; and as long as the prisoners observed the convention at these times the Germans made no further difficulty in the matter. These were the conditions at Oflag VII B, at EICHSTATT, between MUNICH and NUREMBERG, where the great majority of Canadian officers captured at DIEPPE were confined.

87. The statements of repatriated other ranks indicate that whereas officers were tied with ropes for a few days only, in the case of other ranks this phase lasted several weeks; they speak of this as the worst period of their confinement. Apart from the shackling, their treatment at the hands of the Germans was not brutal.

HONOURS AND AWARDS

88. As a result of the DIEPPE operation, Canadian officers and soldiers received what, except for a very few isolated instances, were the first awards for gallantry won by the Canadian Army in the present war. The manner in which these awards were made created a constitutional precedent; for they were published in the London Gazette under the heading "Department of National Defence, Ottawa, 2nd October, 1942".

The list of awards was published in Overseas R.O. 2588 (2 Oct 42). It was headed by the award of the Victoria Cross to Lt.-Col. G.C.I. Merritt of the South Saskatchewan Regiment, the first award of this decoration to any Canadian in this war. Other awards listed in this order were as follows:

Distinguished Service Order	- 12
Military Cross	- 16
Distinguished Conduct Medal	- 12
Military Medal	- 45
Mention in Despatches	- 91

General Roberts received the D.S.O., as did Brigadiers Lett and Mann.

89. One additional D.C.M. was notified in Overseas R.O. 2959 (31 Dec 42), and one additional mention (for Capt. G.D. Skerrett, R.H.L.I. who was killed in action and was recommended by Lt.-Col. Labatt for the V.C.) in Overseas R.O. 4025 (17 Nov 43). The Fighting French authorities made 15 awards of the Croix de Guerre to Canadian Army personnel in connection with the operation (Overseas R.O. 3950, 27 Oct 43). Note should also be taken of the additional awards mentioned above in connection with successful escapes of prisoners of war.

THE CANADIAN EFFECTS OF THE OPERATION

90. Since this was the first large-scale operation in which the Canadian Army Overseas met the enemy, it is worth while to make some attempt at analyzing the effects of it on Canadian opinion and morale, both in the Canadian Army Overseas and among the public in Canada.

91. The reports of the Field Censors (Home) on Canadian Army mail examined after the operation afford some basis for comment on the views of the Canadian troops. As has already been noted, these letters revealed a strong conviction that the enemy had known of the operation in advance; and there seems no doubt that security-mindedness among the troops increased as a result. In spite of this conviction, the operation, and the heavy losses which resulted from it, did not discourage the troops. The censors' comments run in part as follows (File 58-2-0/Int from H.Q. First Cdn Army):

3. GENERAL COMMENTS.

(a) Morale. - Majority of the letters, both from participants in the raid, and non-participants alike, are now more serious and thoughtful in tone than usual. However, there is a feeling of pride in being part of the Canadian Army, which they state has "at last had a chance to show how they can fight". Heavy casualties are freely admitted, and, as is natural, many writers are very anxious and depressed about the fate of many of their comrades

and friends, and their letters reveal their grief on this account, but in writing home they try to sound a cheerful note by writing home matters much more.

With very few exceptions, there is no great feeling apparent that the raid was not worth while, but there is evidence of a more realistic tone, which surmises much heavy fighting in the future, and the probable cost of this is faced soberly.

The morale of all appears very good. Regrets are not shown, but just enthusiasm, satisfaction and pride in achievement, and the Canadians' share in the raid.

Those who participated and returned do not complain of their wounds or make such of their suffering. The question the wounded ask is:- "How soon can I get out to join the unit again and have another go?"

There does not appear to be a hint of any desire to avoid further action. One says:-

(i) "I learned more at Dieppe than the Army could learn me in ten years."

Majority are now firmly convinced that the Canadians are superior fighters to the Germans, whom they consider are "yellow" when faced with the bayonet.

The non-participants generally wish they had been chosen, and hope to go next time.

Letters show a spirit of camaraderie and friendship. Those who fell are mourned sincerely and their bravery is honoured. Many writers state that they desire to follow in their steps and to exterminate the Jerries and avenge their pals.

Faith in their officers is freely expressed in many letters; such a phrase as the following being typical:-

(ii) "Our officers deserve great praise for their fine leadership and the courage they gave..."

There is a great uplift in morale and much confidence is expressed a typical example being:-

(iii) "You would be surprised the different feeling there is over here. Any day now we might expect some real action - well, Hitler, look out."

Generally the raid has had a stimulating effect on the Canadians, in spite of the losses.

(iv) "The spirit used to be pretty low, but now everyone is rarin' to go. At this rate the 2nd Front won't be long coming."

92. Subsequent censorship reports contain similar passages. That covering mail examined during the period 4-19 Sep 42 begins with the following general comment:

The general morale of the Canadian forces remains high and there continues to be evidence that the Dieppe raid has been a great incentive, and proved a stimulant and an encouragement to still greater efforts. Many writers who participated are anxious to avenge their comrades, and

to see further action. Very few indeed say they have no further desire to participate in such action. The great majority state that, although casualties were heavy, and the going pretty tough, they would willingly go over again tomorrow if they had to.

93. An interesting aftermath of the raid was the dropping by the enemy in the Canadian area in Sussex of many copies of a four-page leaflet made up of photographs taken at DIEPPE after the raid, showing the beaches strewn with corpses and abandoned tanks, and with numerous illustrations of Canadian soldiers as prisoners. The same censorship report quotes a letter on this subject:

The Germans dropped some leaflets to show what happened to our guys over there. I wonder if they think that we imagine we are on a picnic? We know what is to happen when there is a war on, and they will never scare us with pictures.

94. It is probably safe to say that the DIEPPE operation led the Canadian Army Overseas generally to take a more realistic and responsible view of the question of the "second front" in Europe, and to realize that the task ahead is one of the greatest difficulty and peril, and that operations designed to reconquer Western Europe from the Germans are not to be undertaken lightly or without very complete preparation.

95. To evaluate the effect of this first battle of the Canadian Army Overseas on Canadian opinion at home is much more difficult, particularly for a person writing in the United Kingdom. Only a few obvious generalizations can be set down here.

96. The operation continued to be a matter of the deepest interest to the people of Canada for many months. This interest began to wane only when the Canadian Army Overseas again became involved in large-scale operations - those in SICILY, commencing on 10 Jul 43. The public was avid in demanding all possible information about the operation, and while the statement issued by the Minister of National Defence in September (see Report No. 83) doubtless met part of the need, discussion and controversy continued and extended to Parliament, where certain members criticized the staff-work preceding the operation and its general conduct. These conditions were perhaps to be expected in view of the heavy losses sustained and the fact that the operation was both preceded and followed by a long period of inactivity for Canadian troops.

97. It is of some interest to attempt to assess the effect of the operation on recruiting in Canada. Full details are not available at C.M.H.Q.; but weekly totals of recruits obtained for the Active Army are found in the weekly summaries of activities cabled by the C.G.S. for the information of G.O.C.-in-C. First Cdn Army and S.O., C.M.H.Q. (C.M.H.Q. file 4/REPORTS/1/3). Examination of these

summaries indicates that just before the DIEPPE operation recruiting was yielding approximately 3,000 men a week. The immediate effect of the DIEPPE losses seems to have been to bring about a very slight immediate increase, but this was followed in succeeding weeks by a retrogression and during October the intake fell below 2,000 recruits in three separate weeks. In November there was an improvement, but the intake was still materially below what it had been in August. It would obviously be unwise to attempt to draw any important conclusions from these figures, and it may well be that the changes are due to some extent to seasonal conditions. It may be worth while, however, to tabulate here the figures of recruiting for the Active Army as notified to C.M.H.Q. during the period referred to:

RECRUITS ENLISTED FOR ACTIVE ARMY, 1942
(Weeks ending on dates given)

17 Jul	-	3,018	2 Oct	-	1,959
24 Jul	-	2,967	9 Oct	-	2,019
31 Jul	-	3,910	16 Oct	-	1,976
7 Aug	-	2,903	23 Oct	-	1,978
14 Aug	-	3,251	30 Oct	-	2,352
21 Aug	-	3,111	6 Nov	-	2,615
28 Aug	-	3,439	13 Nov	-	2,663
4 Sep	-	3,026	20 Nov	-	2,411
11 Sep	-	2,546	27 Nov	-	2,374
18 Sep	-	2,505			
25 Sep	-	2,225			

SOURCES OF INFORMATION

98. The series of reports dealing with the DIEPPE operation have been prepared from a wide variety of sources. The War Diaries of formations and units concerned have been very valuable, though their value has varied very considerably. The Diaries of certain units were almost useless, those of others made important contributions. In every case, however, it was necessary to resort to the personal evidence of individuals in order to build up an adequate picture of the operations of the unit.

99. The War Diary of the General Staff Branch of H.Q. 2 Cdn Div was invaluable, containing as it did a great variety of documents relating both to the preparations for the operation and its execution. Among these is a large collection of records of messages sent out by or received by the two headquarters ships during the operation.

100. The files relating to the operation kept at H.Q. First Cdn Army, H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps and H.Q. 2 Cdn Div have been placed at the writer's disposal and have likewise been invaluable. Of these files, some are already in the possession of the Overseas Records Office; others have been entrusted to the Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., and will ultimately be handed by him to the Records Office for custody. Under the terms of Overseas R.O. 3481, headquarters of divisions and higher formations are now permitted to deposit complete "dead" files of historical importance at the Records Office. The Officer i/c Records proposes to catalogue and preserve this material under the