

NOTE

This is a preliminary narrative and should not be regarded as authoritative. It has not been checked for accuracy in all aspects, and its interpretations are not necessarily those of the Historical Section as a whole.

Ce texte est préliminaire et n'a aucun caractère officiel. On n'a pas vérifié son exactitude et les interprétations qu'il contient ne sont pas nécessairement celles du Service historique.

Directorate of History  
National Defence Headquarters  
Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0K2

July 1986

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: DHD 3-3  
by DD for DHist NDHQ  
Date: 27 mar 85SECRET

REPORT NO. 126  
HISTORICAL OFFICER  
CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

Canadian Operations in Sicily, July - August 1943

Part I: The Preliminaries of Operation "HUSKY"  
(The Assault on Sicily)



<u>CONTENTS</u>	<u>Page</u>
General Introduction (paras 1-23)	1
(a) Background of the Sicilian Operations (Paras 6-14)	2
(b) Beginnings of Canadian Participation in Operation "HUSKY" (Paras 15-23)	4
Planning Prior to the Canadian Participation (Paras 24-51)	7
Canadian Planning and Training (Paras 51-163)	16
(a) Preliminary Conferences and Discussions (Paras 51-65)	16
(b) The 1st Canadian Infantry Division Takes Over (Paras 66-76)	24
(c) The CAIRO Visit: The Death of Major-General Salmon and Appointment of Major-General Simonds (Paras 77-96)	28
(d) "A & Q" Aspects of the Planning (Paras 97-135)	36
(e) Training in Scotland (Paras 136-160)	46
(f) Security (Paras 161-163)	52
The Plan (Paras 164-247)	
(a) Intelligence: Topographical Description of Sicily (Paras 164-173)	52
(b) Intelligence: Enemy Dispositions and Defences (Paras 174-193)	54
(c) The General Plan (Paras 194-213)	59
(d) 1st Canadian Division Operation Order No. 1 and Complementary Orders (Paras 214-235)	65
(e) Directive to Canadian Commanders (Paras 236-247)	70
The Convoy Programme (Paras 248-257)	73
Embarkation, Exercise "STYMIE" and the Voyage to Sicily (Paras 258-276)	76

APPENDICES

Appendix "A": Map of the Invasion of Sicily by 15 Army Group	
Appendix "B": Map of the Assault on BARK WEST BEACH by 1 Cdn Inf Div	
Appendix "C": Map of Defences on BARK WEST BEACH	
Appendix "D": Administrative Appreciation for Operation "HUSKY", 24 Feb 43	
Appendix "E": List of Canadian Staff Officers engaged in planning for Operation "HUSKY"	
Appendix "F": Organization of 15 Army Group, 11 Jul 43	
Appendix "G": 1 Canadian Division Operation Order No. 1, 7 Jun 43	
Appendix "H": Strength State of all Canadian Units in Operation "HUSKY"	
Appendix "I": Messages from G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div to Comd 1 Cdn Inf Bde, 3 and 7 Jul 43	

16 NOV 1944

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: DHD 3-3

by 28 for DHist NDHQ

Date: 27 Mar 85

SECRET

REPORT NO. 126

HISTORICAL OFFICER

CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

16 NOV 1944

CANADIAN OPERATIONS IN SICILY, JULY - AUGUST 1943

Part I: The Preliminaries of Operation "Husky"  
(The Assault on Sicily)

1. This report is the first part of an historical record of the part played by Canadian Military Forces in the conquest of the Island of Sicily during the Summer of 1943.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

2. The operations in Sicily were the largest in which Canadian forces had up to that time participated during this war. The Canadian force involved included an infantry division (1 Cdn Inf Div), an army tank brigade (1 Cdn Army Tk Bde, now 1 Cdn Armd Bde), and considerable numbers of ancillary troops. The force engaged was thus considerably larger than that employed in the raid on DIEPPE (19 Aug 42), which was the only previous operation of the Canadian Army Overseas entailing large-scale contact with the enemy (see Reports Nos. 100, 101, 108, 109 and 116). Moreover, the DIEPPE raid, while involving large forces and resulting in very heavy casualties, was a one-day operation; whereas the assault on Sicily on 10 Jul 43 was the beginning of a protracted campaign, which entered a new phase with the landing on the mainland of Italy on 3 Sep 43 and is still in progress.

3. The Sicilian operations have a further special interest from the Canadian point of view in that the decision to participate in them resulted in the movement of large Canadian forces to a new theatre of war, the Mediterranean. Until the summer of 1943, the only Canadian Army personnel serving there (apart from a few observers) had been the Tunnellers employed at GIBRALTAR from 1940 through 1942 (see Reports Nos. 80 and 105) and the few hundred officers and N.C.Os. attached to the First British Army during the campaign in TUNISIA (see Report No. 95). The great mass of the Canadian Army Overseas had been concentrated from the beginning in Great Britain, and it had seemed probable that its field of operation would ultimately be North-West Europe. The Sicilian enterprise, however, opened up new prospects; and the Mediterranean has become a major theatre of Canadian operations, in which at the time of writing a Canadian force of a Corps of two Divisions, complete with ancillary troops and the necessary base establishments, is still in action. As a result of these developments and the more recent invasion of North-West Europe the operations of the Canadian Army Overseas are now divided between two European theatres - the Central Mediterranean, where the fight has been long and bitter, and the Low Countries, which have now become a focal point of the Allied attack in the West.

4. The Sicilian operations and the Italian ones which followed, are obviously a matter of major concern for the Canadian Official Historian, and they will accordingly be dealt with at length. The general principles will be the same as those followed in preparing the record of the DIEPPE operation (Report No. 100, paras 4-6). An attempt will be made to present a general outline of the whole campaign, which was a very large operation, involving many British and United States Divisions, in addition to the relatively small Canadian component; but in the nature of things the Canadian operations alone will be dealt with in detail. As in the case of DIEPPE, the aim will be to place before the Official Historian everything he is likely to need in compiling an adequate account of those operations, and a special attempt will be made to quote liberally from the most important written sources.

5. In preparing this record, the Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., has had a special advantage in the assistance of an officer who was present in the theatre of war throughout the operations and also participated in the work of planning. Major A.T. Sesia, formerly G.S.O. 3 (Ops), 1 Cdn Div, was appointed Historical Officer, 1 Cdn Div, during the planning stage. He proceeded with the Division to Sicily and remained with it until 2 Nov 43, at which time it was already north of CAMPOBASSO on the mainland of Italy. Major Sesia busied himself with collecting pertinent documents and interviewing officers who could throw light on important phases of the operations. As a result of his activity, a very large collection of documentary evidence relating to the operations in Sicily and Italy is now available at C.M.H.Q. Further information has been supplied by M.O. 1 (Records), War Office, who have given the narrator access to their files. Major Sesia himself returned to the United Kingdom to participate in the preparation of the narrative which follows, and the early part of the Report is mainly his work. Unfortunately, he returned to the field (as O.C. 2 Cdn Fd Hist Sec), before he could complete it. This has been done by Captain J.B. Conacher.

(a) Background of the Sicilian Operations

6. It is desirable to outline very briefly the general war situation as it existed previous to the assault on Sicily, in order that that operation may be seen in proper perspective and in relation to the course of the war at large. The paragraphs that follow should be read in conjunction with paras 7-16 of Report No. 100, which provided a similar background commentary for the DIEPPE operation the year before.

7. In Report No. 100 note was taken of the new aspect which the war assumed with the Anglo-American landings in French North Africa on 8 Nov 42. These landings, following close upon the victory of the British Eighth Army at EL ALAMEIN which drove the Germans out of Egypt, were the beginning of a difficult, but completely victorious campaign, which ended only with the total expulsion of the Axis Forces from Africa. The First British Army, in co-operation with strong American forces and French elements, advanced eastwards from its points of landing and fought a difficult winter campaign in Tunisia, which had been occupied by the Germans immediately after the Allied landings. The Eighth Army in the meantime had made a great march westward from Egypt driving Field-Marshal Rommel's forces before it; and early in April the Eighth Army joined hands with 2 U.S. Corps which had advanced from the west with the First Army (C.M.H.Q. File 4/Gen Apprec/3, "General Note April 1943"). By the end of April 1943,

the Axis forces in North Africa were confined to a "box" comprehending a radius of roughly 40 miles from TUNIS. During the first half of May, this last enemy refuge was stormed and North Africa was cleared. The capture of TUNIS and BIZERTA was effected on 7 May and the victorious end of the campaign was formally announced to the British House of Commons by Mr. Attlee on 13 May (The Times, 14 May 43). The enemy succeeded in evacuating only 638 men mostly by air; 248,000 prisoners were captured after 5 May including 15 German and seven Italian Generals, in addition to 43,000 prisoners in the earlier phases of the Tunisian campaign. 50,000 of the enemy were killed in the battle of Tunisia which therefore cost him 340,000 men. (The Army at War: Tunisia, prepared for the War Office by the Ministry of Information, 1944.)

8. The North African enterprise had been decided on during the Summer of 1942, and orders had been issued "at the end of July" (Report No. 100, para 15). Long before the fall of TUNIS, the leaders of the United Nations were planning the next stage of the Mediterranean operations. Indeed as far back as 21 Oct 42, before the invasion of North Africa had started, General Eisenhower at a Chiefs of Staff meeting in LONDON discussed the matter of exploiting a successful campaign there by assaults on Sicily and Sardinia. The British Prime Minister brought the matter up again at a meeting on 15 Nov 42, questioning which assault would be the more valuable. On political grounds he favoured Sicily. On 27 Nov the Joint Planning Staff was instructed to make an outline plan for the assault on Sicily to be known as Operation "HUSKY". The invasion of Sardinia (Operation "BRIMSTONE") was still under consideration for the end of March 1943. (Sicilian Campaign - Planning and Operations, 2 Oct 42 - 17 Aug 43. Report by M.O. 1 (Records) based on: C.O.S. (42) 155th Mtg (O) 21 Oct 42, 182nd Mtg 15 Nov 42, 190th Mtg 27 Nov 42.)

9. The Joint Planning Staff produced a Report dated 10 Jan 43 which included an "appreciation and outline plan", details of which are given below (paras 26-30). It is observed that with respect to the question of the date for the probable assault the Report stated, "we do not consider it possible to assess the date on which the assault can take place, but we cannot provide all the trained British forces before the end of July". (Canadian Planning Staff File 1001, now in the custody of Historical Section, C.M.H.Q.)

10. A Combined Chiefs of Staff paper (CCS 161/1) dated 21 Jan 43 (copy on Canadian Planning Staff file 1001) goes into further detail and suggests that in the circumstances then foreseen the target date for the assault should be fixed at 30 Aug 43. There is no reference in this paper to the possible use of Canadian troops, although the employment of at least one British Division from the United Kingdom was regarded as inevitable.

11. On 14 Jan 43, at a time when British and American forces were still fighting the battle with the Germans in Tunisia (1) and the Eighth Army was still more than 100 miles East of TRIPOLI, the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain met in conference near CASABLANCA in French Morocco. They were accompanied by the two countries' Chiefs of Staff, and many other senior officers were present for at least part of the conferences; among these were General Dwight D. Eisenhower, C.-in-C., Allied Forces in North Africa, and General Sir Harold Alexander, his Deputy, who was directly in charge of the military operations (The Times, 27 Jan 43).

---

(1) Due to weather conditions and stiff German resistance there was practically no progress on this front until April (Tunisia, op. cit.).

12. In ten days' conferences at CASABLANCA the plans for the next phase of the war were laid. Mr. Churchill has since described how the decisions were taken. In a speech in the British House of Commons on 21 Sep 43; he recalled that the essential decision for the invasion of French North Africa was taken during his conferences with President Roosevelt in WASHINGTON in June, 1942, and proceeded:

When I next met the President in January, 1943, and the combined Anglo-American staffs went into their protracted conference at CASABLANCA, the whole scene of the war was already transformed. No decision had hitherto been taken by us to go beyond North Africa, but now the advance of the Desert Army, which already stood before the gates of TRIPOLI, brought another quarter of a million men into play and enabled us to carry out the policy which I mentioned in my broadcast in November last, of using North Africa not as a seat but as a springboard. We resolved, therefore, to complete the conquest of Tunisia and meanwhile to make all preparations for invading Sicily.

(The Times, 22 Sep 43).

13. It is thus clear that the Sicilian operations, in which the Canadian Army was to play a not undistinguished part, were decided upon in January, 1943. The decision to include a Canadian component in the assaulting force was, however, not made until April, at which time 1 Cdn Div replaced 3 (British) Div in the proposed Order of Battle.

14. In the present Report no attempt will be made to deal with the considerations which have dictated the recent employment of the Canadian Army Overseas and in particular the decision to deploy first a small and subsequently a larger Canadian force in the Mediterranean area. It is hoped that this special and important subject can be dealt with separately at a later time.

(b) Beginnings of Canadian Participation in Operation "HUSKY"

15. At 2005 hrs on 23 Apr 43 Lt.-Gen. McNaughton, G.O.C.-in-C., First Cdn Army, despatched to the Chief of the General Staff in OTTAWA telegram GS 906 warning that his next succeeding telegram would require consideration at the highest level since it concerned the despatch of a Canadian division, a tank brigade and certain ancillary troops to the Middle East for employment in a landing operation.

16. At 2100 hrs on the same day the G.O.C.-in-C. despatched the following further telegram (GS 907) to the C.G.S.:

MOST SECRET

FOR STUART FROM MCNAUGHTON

PARA I - FURTHER TO MY WARNING TELEGRAM GS 906 THIS FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A LETTER FROM C.I.G.S. HANDED TO ME THIS AFTERNOON AFTER DISCUSSION WITH HIM AT WAR OFFICE. QUOTE THE WAR CABINET HAVE DECIDED TO UNDERTAKE CERTAIN OPERATIONS BASED ON TUNISIA. NEW PARA. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS INSTRUCTED ME TO ENQUIRE WHETHER YOU WILL AGREE TO CANADIAN FORCES PARTICIPATING, TO THE EXTENT OF ONE CANADIAN INFANTRY DIVISION AND ONE TANK BRIGADE

TOGETHER WITH THE NECESSARY ANCILLARY UNITS. NEW  
PARA. AS SOON AS YOU HAVE OBTAINED AGREEMENT OF  
THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THIS  
FORCE WILL YOU PLEASE LET ME KNOW. FULL DETAILS OF  
THE REQUIREMENT CAN THEN BE WORKED OUT IN CONSULTATION  
BETWEEN YOUR HEADQUARTERS AND THE WAR OFFICE. NEW  
PARA. I MUST MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE ARRANGEMENT FOR  
COMMAND AND CONTROL OF CANADIAN TROOPS PARTICIPATING  
IN THESE OPERATIONS WILL BE THE SAME AS THOSE FOR THE  
BRITISH FORMATIONS WHICH THEY ARE REPLACING. SIGNED  
A.F. BROOKE. UNQUOTE.

PARA II - I INFORMED C.I.G.S. THAT I WOULD (a)  
TRANSMIT THIS INVITATION TO YOU (b) DETAIL 1 CDN  
INF DIV, 1 CDN ARMY TK BDE AND CERTAIN ANCILLARY TPS  
PROVISIONALLY (c) AUTHORIZE STAFF DISCUSSIONS OF DE-  
TAILED PLANS TO COMMENCE (d) EXAMINE GENERAL PLANS  
AND ADVISE YOU THEREON AT EARLIEST.

PARA III - I HAVE OUTLINE PLAN APPROVED BY C OF  
S COMMITTEE AND MODIFICATIONS BY GEN EISENHOWER. THESE  
I HAVE GONE OVER BRIEFLY WITH DIRECTOR OF PLANS WAR  
OFFICE. I CANNOT YET EXPRESS DEFINITE OPINION EXCEPT  
TO SAY THAT ON EVIDENCE SUBMITTED PROJECT SEEMS TO  
REPRESENT A PRACTICABLE OPERATION OF WAR. I WILL ADVISE  
YOU ON THIS POINT AFTER FURTHER STUDY.

PARA IV - OPERATION CONSISTS OF TWO PARTS (a)  
THE FIRST UNDER ALEXANDERS DIRECTION AND MONTGOMERYS  
COMMAND INVOLVES A TOTAL FORCE SEVERAL TIMES GREATER  
THAN CANADIAN CONTINGENT INDICATED PARA II ABOVE.  
(b) THE SECOND SOME DAYS LATER DIRECTED ON OTHER LAND-  
INGS IS WHOLLY COMPRISED OF AMERICAN TPS UNDER AMERICAN  
COMMAND.

PARA V - REQUEST YOUR INSTRUCTIONS REPLY I AM  
TO MAKE TO BROOKE AND PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS LAST  
PARA OF HIS LETTER. THESE SHOULD REACH ME FOR DE-  
LIVERY NOT LATER THAN TOMORROW SATURDAY AFTERNOON.

17. At 1100 hrs (OTTAWA time) on the following day (24 Apr)  
the C.G.S. (Lt.-Gen. K. Stuart) despatched to General McNaughton  
the following reply (C.G.S. 314):

MOST SECRET

FOR MCNAUGHTON FROM STUART

PARTICIPATION IN PROPOSED OPERATION IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH BROOKES LETTER APPROVED SUBJECT OF COURSE TO CON-  
SIDERATION OF YOUR FURTHER ADVICE AS CONTEMPLATED YOUR  
PARA TWO

18. At 0030 hrs on 25 Apr, General McNaughton replied  
(telegram GS 914) that he expected to see General Brooke on  
Monday (26 Apr), "by which time latest developments in plans  
should be available for my study". In the meantime, he stated, he  
was "proceeding with organization of force and special training".  
At 1930 hrs on the same day, General McNaughton despatched a  
further telegram (GS 915) as follows:

TO STUART FROM MCNAUGHTON

REFERENCE YOUR CGS 314 DATED 24 APRIL 1943

PARA I. I HAVE NOW HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE  
THE GENERAL PLANS OF THE OPERATION IN QUESTION AND TO  
DISCUSS WITH SENIOR STAFF INCLUDING VICE C.I.G.S. AND  
D.M.O. AT THE WAR OFFICE.

PARA II. I HAVE SATISFIED MYSELF THAT THESE PLANS REPRESENT A PRACTICAL OPERATION OF WAR.

PARA III. FURTHER COMMANDER 1 CANADIAN DIVISION HAS STUDIED DETAILED PLANS OF HIS PARTICULAR PART OF THE OPERATION AND WHILE THEY ARE NATURALLY SUBJECT TO FURTHER DEVELOPMENT HE HAS INFORMED ME THAT HE IS SATISFIED WITH THE ROLE TO BE ASSIGNED.

PARA IV. I THEREFORE RECOMMEND YOUR APPROVAL OF CANADIAN PARTICIPATION INDICATED IN MY GS 907 DATED 23 APRIL 1943.

PARA V. REQUEST REPLY EARLIEST.

19. On 27 Apr, the following reply was received from OTTAWA (Telegram CGS 335):

MOST SECRET

FOR MCNAUGHTON FROM STUART

CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN PROPOSED OPERATION AS INDICATED YOUR GS 907 AND AS RECOMMENDED YOUR GS 915 IS APPROVED.

PARA II. YOU DO NOT SPECIFICALLY STATE YOUR AGREEMENT WITH DIVISIONAL COMMANDER BUT WE ASSUME THAT YOU AGREE WITH HIS VIEWS.

PARA III. TO MAKE PARTICIPATION EFFECTIVE, ORDER IN COUNCIL AUTHORIZING THE DETAILING OF THE FORCE IN WHOLE AND IN PART QUOTE IN COMBINATION UNQUOTE UNDER THE VISITING FORCES ACT TOGETHER WITH APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTIONS IN THAT CONNECTION WILL FOLLOW PROMPTLY.

PARA IV. PARTICIPATION IS OF COURSE SUBJECT TO RETENTION BY THE CANADIAN COMMANDER OF INHERENT RIGHT OF REFERENCE TO HIS GOVERNMENT.

PARA V. WILL APPRECIATE INFORMATION FROM TIME TO TIME SO CAN KEEP MINISTER AND WAR COMMITTEE AS FULLY ADVISED AS POSSIBLE RE DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS AND OTHER MATTERS RELATING TO EXPEDITION.

20. On 28 Apr, General McNaughton despatched in reply a telegram (GS 941) running in part as follows:

MOST SECRET

FOR STUART FROM MCNAUGHTON

PARA I. YOUR CGS 335 DATED 27 APR RECEIVED.

PARA II. I WILL NOW REPEAT NOW FORMALLY COMMUNICATE YOUR PARA I TO C.I.G.S., AND IN THIS INCORPORATE SUBSTANCE YOUR PARA IV.

PARA III. REFERENCE YOUR PARA II RECOMMENDATION GIVEN IN PARA IV MY GS 915 IS BASED ON ALL THE PRECEDING PARTS THEREOF. IN THE VERY SHORT TIME AVAILABLE I UNDERTOOK AN ANALYSIS OF THE GENERAL PLANS AND GAVE TO MAJ GEN SALMON AND STAFF OFFICERS THE TASK OF STUDYING IN DETAIL THE PARTICULAR ROLE INDICATED FOR 1 CDN DIV. AFTER DISCUSSION WITH HIM

I ENDORSED HIS VIEWS.

PARA IV. SITUATION NOW IS THAT CABLE FROM CAIRO RECEIVED TODAY INDICATES SOME CONSIDERABLE CHANGE PROBABLE IN PLAN AS AFFECTING 1 CDN DIV. WE HAVE NO REASON TO VIEW THIS CHANGE OR OTHERS WHICH MAY BE MADE BY THOSE ON THE SPOT WITH ANXIETY AND IN THESE MATTERS MUST REST ON THE JUDGMENT OF THE RESPONSIBLE SENIOR COMMANDERS SUBJECT TO THE SAFEGUARD GIVEN YOUR PARA IV.

PARA V. SALMON AND A GROUP OF HIS STAFF OFFICERS LEAVE BY AIR TONIGHT FOR CONSULTATIONS IN CAIRO AND RETURN TO U.K. I AM SENDING BRIGADIER BEAMENT AND LT COL TOW BY AIR TOMORROW TO CONCERT ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH GENERAL ALEXANDER. BRIG BEAMENT WILL RETURN AND TOW REMAIN AS A POINT OF CONTACT.

PARA VI. 1 CDN DIV AND 1 CDN ARMY TANK BDE NOW MOVING TO TRAINING AREAS IN SCOTLAND.....

21. The C.I.G.S. was officially informed of these decisions in three letters from General McNaughton dated 25 and 26 Apr and 3 May. (See paras 59, 60 and 63 below.)

22. The documents referred to in the foregoing paragraphs will be found in C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1 and First Cdn Army file P.A. 1-14-1, at present in the custody of Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q.

23. Such were the circumstances under which Canadian formations were committed to the invasion of Sicily. It is now necessary to re-trace our steps in order to study the military planning of the operation from its inception. This report is divided into five further sections covering the 3rd (British) Infantry Division's planning, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division's planning and training, the plan finally produced, the convoy programme and the voyage to Sicily. Subsequent reports will deal with the Division's part in the actual campaign. It is intended to prepare a separate report on the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade's part in Operation "HUSKY".

#### PLANNING PRIOR TO THE CANADIAN PARTICIPATION

24. Before describing in detail the Canadian share of the assault on Sicily, it is essential to examine the General Plan as originally conceived by the Joint Planning Staff and to trace its development to the point at which Lt.-Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton was invited to participate. The vicissitudes of the 3rd (British) Division's planning must be known to appreciate the circumstances under which the Canadian planning staffs took over.

25. On 10 Jan 43, the Joint Planning Staff issued a Report (para 10, above) which contained an appreciation and the Outline Plan for an operation to eject the Axis forces from Sicily and to occupy the island, but warned that

Before the operation can take place at all the enemy air forces must be reduced to an extent that will ensure our air supremacy. A measure of ascendancy over Axis submarines in the Mediterranean must also have been gained.

(C.P.S. File 1001, War Cabinet Paper, J.P. (43) 7 (Final) 10 Jan 43 "Operation "HUSKY", Report by the Joint Planning Staff".)

This Report considered that the projected operation - to which was given the code name "HUSKY" - was far beyond British resources and that it was essential to depend upon at least fifty per cent American participation. No date for the assault was given, but it was not considered possible to provide trained British forces before the end of July, 1943. It is interesting to note the following comment:

We are doubtful of the chances of success against a garrison which includes German formations.

(ibid.)

Lack of information about the beaches (particularly below water) seriously handicapped the Planning Staff since air photographs and reconnaissance reports of the beaches were not available at the time. Without these it was not possible to commence detailed planning. The Joint Planning Staff were of the opinion that planning would be extremely complicated, as it would be necessary to draw the forces to be employed from opposite ends of the Mediterranean as well as from outside. (ibid.)

26. This original plan to invade Sicily was based on the assumption that the Allies were firmly established in the whole of French and Italian North Africa, but that Sardinia and Pantelleria remained in Axis hands. Strategic surprise, furthermore, was considered impossible since the Axis could not fail to appreciate the threat to Sicily or Sardinia, as large-scale preparations would inevitably have to be made at Malta and in North Africa. Tactical surprise could, on the other hand, be achieved in some measure by feints, but, no matter what precautions the Allies took in this regard, the garrison of Sicily was likely to be in a high degree of readiness. There was an anti-ship and an anti-aircraft warning system in the island, and it would have been unsafe to assume that there were beaches which were unwatched. (ibid.)

27. Considerations of weather, terrain, coast defences, beaches and maintenance of the assaulting forces, led to the conclusion that landings could be made in the Western and North-Western areas (PALERMO) and in the South-Eastern area (CATANIA). It was considered that with a view to such simultaneous landings at both ends of the island, prior naval and air action would be necessary to drive and keep the Italian Battle Fleet up the Adriatic. It was thought that by employing a capital ship covering-force in the waters off South-East Sicily, and by disposing light forces to the North-West, protection against enemy surface forces could be given to landings at both points. Failing this, and since the British Naval Forces which were likely to be available for the operation would be insufficient to provide more than one heavy covering force, it would be necessary to call on the Americans to provide a second covering-force. (ibid.)

28. The possible courses were:

- (a) to capture the PALERMO area;
- (b) to capture the CATANIA area;
- (c) to capture both.

The last-mentioned course was selected and for planning purposes it was assumed that forces would be provided as follows:

- (a) SCIACCA-MARINELLA and PALERMO areas -  
United States.
- (b) South-Eastern and CATANIA areas -  
British.

(ibid.)

29. The Outline Plan provided in the Report of 10 Jan 43 was divided into the following phases:

PREPARATORY MEASURES

- PHASE I - The Assaults
- PHASE II - Exploitation and capture of PALERMO and CATANIA
- PHASE III - Reduction of the island.

(ibid.)

30. The preparatory measures would consist of a series of naval and air actions directed against the enemy air forces, the Italian Fleet and enemy submarines. Heavy air raids on Italy, and action aimed at effecting the maximum reduction in Axis air strength generally (particularly in fighters) would be carried out from the United Kingdom. In the Mediterranean, day and night bombing, fighter sweeps, escort raids and low-flying attacks would be carried out with the object of interrupting Axis reinforcements to Sicily and furthering the attainment of air superiority by destroying Axis fighters. Finally, on the two nights prior to D Day a heavy and concentrated attack would be carried out on the MESSINA area. (ibid.) The main features of the Plan were:

(a) British Assaults.

- (1) Four separate landings in the AVOLA, PACHINO, POZZALLO and GELA areas on the south-east corner of the island by three divisions and an infantry brigade group plus commando, parachute and armoured units on D Day to secure the airfields in that area and the ports of SIRACUSA and AUGUSTA. These airfields were required to enable the assault on CATANIA to be protected.
- (11) On CATANIA by one division on D plus 3 to secure the port and airfields, with parachute troops in the GERBINI area.

(b) American Assaults.

- (1) On the south-west shore in the SCIACCA area by one division on D Day to secure the airfields in that area. These airfields were required to cover the assaults on PALERMO.
- (11) On the PALERMO area by two division and other troops on D plus 2 to capture the port of PALERMO and adjacent ports and airfields. Escort carrier to provide additional support for the assaults.

(c) Follow-up.

- (1) One British division to be landed through CATANIA and one American division through PALERMO.

(ibid.)

31. The complicated problem of providing army forces for the British share of the assaults was discussed in a further report by the British Joint Planning Staff prepared for the Combined Chiefs of Staff at CASABLANCA (See para 11 above). British troops were available in the Mediterranean and in Persia and Iraq but mounting them into an assaulting force was another matter. Shipping and stores had to be provided and the troops had to undergo special combined operations training. (C.P.S. File 1001, Report by British Joint Planning Staff, 21 Jan 43.)

32. Among the British troops available for the assault were the 5th and 56th Divisions in Persia and Iraq and the 78th and New Zealand Divisions in Tunisia. The limitation of port facilities in the Middle East made it impossible to mount all of the divisions there. To transfer one or more of these divisions to Tunisia

and Algeria for special training and subsequent mounting was regarded as inadvisable, for it would seriously curtail American preparations for mounting their share of the operation, and thereby result in the postponement for at least one month of the date of the assault. It was decided that the provision of one division mounted in the United Kingdom was the solution, even though this would occasion special difficulties of planning, command and control. (ibid.)

33. The question then arose how to bring this division from the United Kingdom to Sicily. Two alternative routes were available; one by way of the Cape of Good Hope to Egypt, the other through the Strait of Gibraltar and Sicilian Narrows. The first course, while less hazardous, entailed much loss of time. It was estimated that it would take at least six weeks to move a large body of troops from the United Kingdom to Egypt; accordingly, it was decided to risk the more dangerous waters of the Sicilian Narrows. (ibid.)

34. The Report (para 31 above) recommended that the British share of the assault should take the following form:

Three Divisions (initial assault) from the Middle East,

One Division (D plus 3 assault) from the United Kingdom,

One Division (Follow-Up) from Tripolitania.

(ibid.)

35. The recommendations in these reports were considered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at CASABLANCA, and Operation "HUSKY", the assault on Sicily, was decided upon in preference to Operation "BRIMSTONE", the assault on Sardinia. (Planning for the latter was finally suspended in February.) These decisions were approved by the President and the Prime Minister who, however, urged that, if at all possible, the operation be carried out in the June moon period. A directive was issued to General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Allied Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean area, entrusting him with the task of preparing for and carrying out the operation. Under him and exercising their command jointly there were to be three commanders: General Sir Harold R.L.G. Alexander, K.C.B., C.S.I., D.S.O., M.C., the Deputy Allied Commander in Chief; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, Bt., G.C.B., D.S.O., the Naval Commander in Chief in the Mediterranean; and Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Tedder, K.C.B., the Air Officer Commanding in Chief in the Mediterranean. In February Lt.-Gen. Sir B.L. Montgomery, K.C.B., D.S.O., and Lt.-Gen. G.S. Patton were named as Commanders of the British and American components in the invasion force, respectively. (M.O. 1 Report op. cit., based on C.C.S. 66th Mtg 22 Jan 43 and 69th Mtg 23 Jan 43; C.C.S. 170/2 and 171/2/D of 23 Jan 43; C.O.S. (43) 18th Mtg (O) 12 Feb 43.)

36. The Joint Planning Staff Report (referred to in para 31) mentioned the 1st and 4th (British) Divisions as "possibilities" for the assault division from the United Kingdom, but shortly afterwards both of these divisions were despatched to take part in the Tunisian campaign (C.M.H.Q. File 4/Gen Apprec/3, War Office "General Note March 1943"). A.F.H.Q. (Allied Force Headquarters in North Africa) therefore requested the War Office to select and train some other division (C.P.S. File 1001, Tel 1602, A.F.H.Q. to W.O. 18 Feb 43). The 3rd (British) Division (Major-General W.H.C. Ramsden, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., M.C.) was finally chosen.

37. There is no document available at C.M.H.Q. to indicate the date of the actual selection of 3 Div, but an Administrative Appreciation of Operation "HUSKY" issued by G.S. (Plans) War Office, 24 Feb 43, mentions this Division as the one to be mounted from the United Kingdom to carry out the CATANIA assault (C.P.S. File 1001, Administrative Appreciation for Operation "HUSKY", 24 Feb 43).

38. This Appreciation, dated 24 Feb 43, includes an outline plan for the operation very similar to the one described above (paras 28 and 29), which will be found in part in Appendix "D". D-day was now set for 22 Jun (2) while the Divisions to be provided by the Eastern Task Force and their destinations were named as follows:

AVOLA - PACHINO - POZZALLO assaults - 5 and 56  
Divs from the Middle East,

GELA assault - 1 Div from North Africa,

CATANIA assault - 3 Div and one infantry brigade  
group from the United Kingdom,

Follow-up D plus 28 - one infantry division from  
the Middle East.

The Planning Headquarters for A.F.H.Q. (Force 141) were to be at ALGIERS, those for the Western Task Force (Force 343) at ORAN and for the Eastern Task Force (Force 545) at CAIRO. (ibid.; M.O. 1 Report referring to C.O.S. 23rd Mtg, 18 Feb 43.)

39. Apparently no advice had yet been sent to A.F.H.Q. to the effect that the 3rd Division had been selected to replace the 4th Division for the D plus 3 (CATANIA) assault for on 5 Mar 43 the following telegram was despatched to the War Office:

Request nomination division for D plus 3 assault  
and name commander may be notified.

In addition to amphibious training for Two Brigade  
Group assault, selected division should receive  
mountain warfare training before leaving U.K.....

(C.P.S. File 2000 Tel 4476, A.F.H.Q.  
to W.O., 5 Mar 43.)

In reply the War Office despatched the following telegram on the same day:

ONE

For your information General Ramsden Commander  
3 Division (composition two infantry one tank  
brigades plus extra infantry brigade to be nomin-  
ated) visited War Office and seen HUSKY plan and  
now in touch with Norfolk House. Commander 4  
Division requested hand all HUSKY documents to  
Ramsden. Now assuming any further instructions  
will be issued by you or Norfolk House.

TWO

Ramsden would be glad to know whether you con-  
template sending Army member your planning staff  
London shortly. Also requests despatch to London  
R.A.F. member immediately if possible or to arrive  
30 March at latest.....

(2) Mr. Churchill, supported by the Chiefs of Staff, continued to press for the early date, despite misgivings in North Africa. The Chiefs of Staff were even willing to have the preliminary assaults all British if necessary. (M.O. 1 Report.)

FOUR

He proposes visit you when plan ready. Can you give date.

(ibid.; Tel 58051, War Office to FREEDOM (A.F.H.Q.) Algiers, 5 Mar 43.)

It would appear from the two telegrams quoted above that little, if any, detailed planning was accomplished from 18 Feb 43 until 5 Mar 43. There is no doubt that the actual execution of the proposed operation hinged upon the outcome of the North African campaign. Furthermore, the second telegram indicated that no actual take-over by the 3rd Division from the 4th Division had yet taken place.

40. Although detailed planning could not commence because of the lack of a firm plan, it was considered advisable that immediate steps be taken to embark the 3rd Division on a programme of intensive training in Scotland. The Division was stationed in Kent, but by 22 Mar 43 it was ready to proceed to Scotland for combined operations and mountain warfare training. (ibid., General Ramsden to General Montgomery, 16 Mar 43.)

41. Reference to mountain warfare is found in two letters, one referred to the preceding paragraph, and the other from the War Office to Lt.-Col. G.G.H. Wilson, G.S.O. 1, 3rd Division. In the former General Ramsden said:

I am also asked to be ready for mountain warfare. If anything more than the rudiments required, I must have more time and must be provided with equipment, i.e., pack saddles, loading ropes, etc.

(ibid.)

The War Office letter dwelt at some length on the advisability of training with pack animals:

I know that General Ramsden is of opinion that you cannot do much about training for mountains in the time available but, of course, anything which you can do in this line will be of very great value to you later on. The divisions in North Africa have found the need and have been using local animal pack transport for some time. They must have felt the lack of prior acquaintance very considerably because we have had another cable stressing the need for you to get any experience possible.

Consequently I am writing this to ask if it would be of any value to you to have some pack animals at your disposal when you are in Scotland. I don't suggest that you should attempt training on the scale that has been carried out by 52 Div, but you will have intervals in your combined training when it might be possible for a battalion to practise loading on to animals and so on. I am sure that even the merest prior experience will be of use later.

We have four Indian Mule Coys going spare at present and you could have any or all of them. I haven't checked that it will be possible to accommodate them in your area but I will take this up immediately if you would like them. I don't anticipate insuperable difficulties because they ought to be able to go under canvas if necessary.

Please let me know if you would like any. If so we can send you a fair amount of information on Pack Tpt and I am sure that 52 Div would be able to help with practical experience.

(ibid., Letter War Office (S.D.5) to Lt.-Col. Wilson, 14 Mar 43.)

The above letter is important for although it was later decided not to employ pack animals (C.P.S. File 2150, Tel 62815, War Office to A.F.H.Q., 21 Mar 43), some of the successes achieved in Sicily would not have been possible but for the use of pack animals which were requisitioned from the civilian population.

42. In order to obtain clarification of many obscure points which arose because of lack of firmness in the plan, General Ramsden arranged to visit the Planning Staff in the Middle East (C.P.S. File 2000, Tel 60440, War Office to Force 141, 13 Mar 43). This telegram was followed by a personal letter to General Montgomery dated 16 Mar 43 (already referred to in para 40 above), in which he says in part:

.....I feel it very necessary for Rear Admiral Mack and I (sic) to visit you or your staff very soon, to get the low down. From many visits to the War Office I am sure there will be no final say until either I come out or you send a plenipotentiary home with enough staff on which to plan and get the Armada into shape.....

It is apparent that General Ramsden left for CAIRO by air on 27 Mar 43 (ibid., Letter Gen. Ramsden to Lt.-Col. Wilson, 26 Mar 43), but no documents are available to indicate the result of this visit.

43. On 20 Mar General Montgomery decided that his forces were not strong enough to carry out the allotted task. Therefore a new plan was evolved in which the American Force undertook to furnish a division for the GELA (DIME) landing. The British 5 and 56 Divs were now to land across the AVOLA (ACID) beaches and a division, from North Africa, at POZZALLO. An infantry brigade group from the Middle East was to land in the PACHINO (BARK) area and 3 Div was still to make the D plus 3 assault South of CATANIA. The American attack on SCIACCA on the South-Western coast was cancelled and as a result no fixed date was set for the American assaults West of PALERMO. This plan was again amended on 11 Apr when a fourth British division, 51 (H) Div from North Africa, was introduced to carry out the GELA assault, thus releasing the American division for the SCIACCA assault as originally planned. The New Zealand Division was named to carry out the "CENT" assault now apparently moved West from the POZZALLO to the SCOGLITTI area. The D plus 3 assault on CATANIA was now cancelled and on the AVOLA sector, 3 Div substituted for 56 Div, which had been suddenly called into the Tunisian battle. 50 Div was to be held in immediate reserve in MALTA and a tank brigade from 3 Div in a North African port. Three British parachute brigades and two American parachute regiments were now to support the attacks. Additional shipping for an extra British division was provided for from British and American reserves at the expense of assault training and cross-channel operations "on a decision to give absolute priority to "HUSKY" (M.O.1 Report, op. cit., referring to NAF 185 23 Mar 43; C.P.S. File 2000, Tel 3211, NAF 207, ALGIERS to War Office, 11 Apr 43, Tel 3319, 11 Apr 43, A.F.H.Q. to War Office, Tel 3580, 12 Apr 43, Force 141 to War Office).

44. The plan was still not firm, however, and on 14 Apr General Ramsden cabled General Dempsey asking him to forward "a new directive" forthwith. He pointed out that 3 Div planning was to start on 17 Apr and that loading tables had to reach the War Office by 8 May, as vehicles were being shipped on 28 May (C.P.S. File 2000, Tel, War Office to Force 545, 14 Apr 43).

45. On 16 Apr, Force 545 (the Eastern Task Force Planning Headquarters) despatched a telegram to the War Office stating that the final plan had not yet been decided upon, but giving an outline of what the role of 3 Div would be. The force was divided into two parts, Force A and Force B, the latter to be held in army reserve in a North African port. The Division's new role differed radically from its previous ones in that the assault was to take place on D Day (instead of D plus 3) and it was now to assault in the SCOGLITTI area (on the southern coast of Sicily) instead of SIRACUSA-AUGUSTA on the East coast. This change in plan provided the final basis on which planning was to commence, though at the time that the telegram was received there was still doubt as to the 3rd Division's actual role as indicated by the word "anticipated". ("HUSKY" Plan 17 Apr 43 containing "extracts from Most Secret Cipher telegram received from Force 545....ref GP (1) 36177 dated 16 Apr".)

46. An approximate Order of Battle of Force A was outlined as follows:

Force A.

Three Inf Bde Gps	
Two Beach Gps	
One Tk bn	
One SP Fd Regt	
One med Regt	
Two Commandos	
One Sqn Scorpions	
One Sec Smoke Operating Coy	
One CCS Incl FTU	
FW Cage	
One HAA Regt	} For QUEEN BEE (COMISO) and PARK HEAD (BISCARI) Airfds.
One LAA Regt	
One AA Ops Room	
One Bomb Disposal Sec	
One CRE Works Sec	
One DCRE Works Sec	
One Artisan Works Coy	
One ME Sec	
One P & L Coy	
One Gen Tpt Pl RASC	

The Order of Battle for Force B had not yet been received, but it was known that it would consist of 33 Tank Bde less one battalion and units required for the port of CATANIA and the group of airfields in the area of this city. (ibid.)

47. While no official Plan had yet been received regarding 3rd Division's role, Branches and Services of the Division were instructed to commence their preliminary considerations of the Plan on the assumption that:

- (i) 3 Div will carry out CENT assault.
- (ii) 3 Div will only be responsible for the organization and preparation of Force A.
- (iii) Organization and preparation of Force B will be carried out by another HQ either in UK or elsewhere. (ibid.)

48. Time was the greatest determining factor throughout this period, since D Day was now tentatively set for 8 and then 10 Jul (C.F.S. File 1018, Memorandum by Executive Planning Section, War Cabinet, 21 and 22 Apr 43). One senses an undertone of uneasiness in some of the documents on hand, in which it is inferred that unless those responsible for the planning at A.F.H.Q. produced a firm plan the operation would have to be postponed. Such was the tone of a letter by General Ramsden addressed to the

Director of Plans, the Admiralty, and to the Under Secretary of State, the War Office, (D.M.O.):

1. Planning for Op HUSKY is held up for lack of directif. Unless received immediately, the operation must be postponed. Following paras review the matter in detail.....

4....In view of Force 545 Cipher GP (1) 36177 dated 16 Apr this information must include the split between ships to be allotted to Forces A and B.

5. Unless, therefore, the information requested above is made available to us immediately we cannot complete our planning and preparation in time for an assault on 8 Jul.

6. We request therefore that this should be brought to the notice of C.G.S. for onward transmission to Forces 545 and 141.

(C.P.S. File 2000, General Ramsden to Admiralty and War Office, 20 Apr 43.)

49. On 18 Apr 43 a Planning Memorandum was issued by "G" Branch, 3rd Division. This Memorandum was based on the Outline Plan to determine how much planning could be done without further official instructions. This document pointed out that whereas Force A would be under the command of 3 Div and 30 Corps, since it would carry out the CENT assault, Force B would be entirely outside the direction of the 3rd Division as its role would be that of Army reserve during the early stages of the assault. Therefore, the 3rd Division should not be responsible for the preparation of both Force A and Force B inasmuch as the latter would be "entirely outside the direction of 3rd Division", because of the role this Force would have to carry out (if held in reserve in a North African port) and consequently the day of its employment would differ from that of Force A. The following deduction was accordingly made:

.....it is apparent that the Planning of this Force must be considered quite separately from that of Force A and that this Planning cannot be done by 3rd Division but must be done by the Comd with direct access to Force 545 and the War Office.

(ibid., Memorandum of Planning on "HUSKY", 18 Apr 43.)

The War Office held to the same view and on 22 Apr 43 sent the following telegram to A.F.H.Q.:

FIRST.

It appears you contemplate making Comd 3 Div responsible for Force B mounted from this country. In view of fact Force B is in force reserve and may not even operate in same Corps Area as 3 Div it appears this should not be responsibility of Comd 3 Div.

SECOND.

Force B should be loaded under War Office arrangements. Suggest you send staff officer fully conversant with plans to advise as to priorities. Comd 3 Div would then be concerned solely with forces allotted to him for completion his role....

(ibid., Tel 72894 (S.D.5) W.O. to A.F.H.Q., 22 Apr 43.)

50. The change in the 3rd Division's role referred to in para 43 above, resulted in placing this Division in 30 Corps instead of 13 Corps. Despite the lack of objectives, which had not yet been given by Force 545 (apart, of course, from COMISO Airfield), the Division on 20 Apr 43 was urged to continue planning, and this was to be "directed towards getting two assault Bde Gps ashore as quickly as possible" (*ibid.*, Tel G.P. (1) 37664, 20 Apr 43).

51. On 22 Apr 43 a telegram from "FORTUNE" (code name for A.F.H.Q. Planning Staff) to C.-in-C. Middle East (for Force 545) and repeated to the War Office and A.F.H.Q., ALGIERS, confirmed that the plan envisaged the employment of 3rd Division to attack CENT Beach at SCOGLITTI with COMISO Airfield as its initial objective, and that the assault on SIRACUSA-AUGUSTA originally entrusted to 3rd Division was to be carried out by a Division from the Middle East (*ibid.*, Tel (copy) 6008 FORTUNE ALGIERS to C.-in-C. Middle East, 22 Apr 43).

#### CANADIAN PLANNING AND TRAINING

##### (a) Preliminary Conferences and Discussions

52. Thus matters stood when the decision was taken to substitute the 1st Canadian Division for the 3rd (British) Division. While at Norfolk House on the afternoon of 23 Apr General McNaughton received a telephone request to visit General Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, at his earliest convenience. General McNaughton immediately proceeded to the War Office for the meeting with General Brooke referred to above (para 16). During the conversation, General Brooke "invited General McNaughton to agree to the participation of one Canadian infantry division and one Canadian tank brigade and certain ancillary units in a proposed operation based on TUNISIA against ...". Immediately following this meeting, General McNaughton held further conversations with Generals Weeks, Galloway, and Kennedy and Brigadier Porter, during which he was "put in the picture" by these officers. On returning to C.M.H.Q., General McNaughton prepared and despatched the cable to the C.G.S. quoted in para 16 above. (File P.A. 1-14-1, Memoranda of Discussions at the War Office 23 Apr 43, General McNaughton - General Brooke; General McNaughton - General Weeks (D.C.I.G.S.) - General Galloway (D.S.D.); General McNaughton - General Kennedy (D.M.O. (O)); General McNaughton - Brigadier Porter (Director of Plans); dated 28 Apr, 27 Apr, 27 Apr, 26 Apr 43, respectively.)

53. At 0900 hours the following morning a meeting was held at H.Q. First Cdn Army at which the following officers were present:

Lt.-Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton, G.O.C.-in-C. First Cdn Army,  
Maj.-Gen. H.L.N. Salmon, G.O.C. 1 Cdn Div,  
Brigadier (later Maj.-Gen.) C. Foulkes, B.G.S. First Cdn Army,  
Lt.-Col. (later Brigadier) W.P. Gilbride, A.Q.M.G. First Cdn Army,  
Lt.-Col. (later Colonel) G.P. Henderson, G.S.O. 1 (Int) First Cdn Army,  
Lt.-Col. (later Colonel) G.E. Beament, G.S.O. 1 (Ops) First Cdn Army,  
Lt.-Col. (later Brigadier) G. Kitching, G.S.O. 1 (Ops) 1 Cdn Div,  
Lt.-Col. C. Finlay, A.A. & Q.M.G. Canadian Planning Staff.

In opening the meeting, General McNaughton stressed "the need for good security by all concerned with regard to the information which he was about to announce." He then told the officers present that he had received a request from the C.I.G.S. for the participation of Canadian formations in an operation against Sicily "under the command of Eighth Army (Gen. Montgomery) and under the direction of Eighteenth Army Group (Gen. Sir Harold Alexander).....the Cdn formations would be part of a British U.S. force several times

larger than the Cdn forces concerned." The G.O.C.-in-C. then went on to say that he had requested Government approval for his proposal to nominate 1 Cdn Div (Maj.-Gen. H.L.N. Salmon, M.C.) and 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde (Brigadier R.A. Wyman) (3) and certain other ancillary units for this task, and that he had moreover authorized arrangements to be proceeded with on a provisional basis pending receipt of full information from the Canadian Government which was expected during the day. (File P.A. 1-14-1, Minutes of a Meeting held at H.Q. First Cdn Army, 24 Apr 43, dated 26 Apr 43.)

54. Brigadier Foulkes and Lt.-Cols. Henderson and Beament then explained to the meeting the scope of the operation, the broad aspects of Sicilian topography, defences, etc., and the outline plan. General McNaughton "pointed out that the plan which had been given is that which had been approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee and subsequently modified by General Eisenhower." Further modifications were expected to reach the War Office from Allied Force Headquarters, North Africa, by special courier during the day and little time remained for the completion of arrangements; the Canadian Force Commander would accordingly have to proceed without delay to organize and train his force and complete the detailed plans. General McNaughton said that it would be necessary for General Salmon and one or two of his staff officers to proceed by air to North Africa for discussions in the very near future. He also placed the Canadian Planning Staff at the disposal of General Salmon for whatever assistance he might require and stated that every use should be made of the contacts which this Staff already had with the War Office and Combined Operations Headquarters. (*ibid.*)

55. A subsequent meeting at the War Office, at 1030 hours on that same morning, was attended by General McNaughton, General Salmon, Brigadier Foulkes, and other Canadian and British staff officers. The purpose of this meeting was to bring together, for the convenience of General McNaughton and General Salmon, representatives of the War Office Directorates who could render assistance in the preparation of the Canadian forces in Operation "HUSKY". The representative of each Directorate then outlined the function of his Department as it applied to "HUSKY" and indicated to what extent and in what manner the necessary information, directives, etc., would be made available to the Canadians. Great stress was laid on security in regard to impending operations and a statement on security by Prime Minister Churchill was read to the assembled group of officers. In reply to a question by General McNaughton, Brigadier Porter (Director of Plans, War Office), who conducted the meeting, stated that 1 Cdn Div would have under its command one tank regiment and that the remainder of 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde would be in Army Reserve at the disposal of the Task Force Commander (G.O.C.-in-C., Eighth Army). The organization of the Combined Force was noted as under:

- 
- (3) The reason these formations were nominated by General McNaughton was explained as follows: ".....as 1 Cdn Div had completed basic combined ops training, he would detail this division....for this operation. In addition, he stated that he would detail 1 Cdn Army Tank Bde,....which was at a very high state of training and which had experience in the Dieppe operation." (File P.A. 1-14-1, Memo of a Discussion General McNaughton - General Brooke, dated 28 Apr 43.)

A.F.H.Q.  
(Eisenhower)  
|  
18 Army Group  
(Alexander)  
Force 141  
|

Eastern Task Force  
(Force 545)  
(Montgomery)

Western Task Force  
(Force 343)  
(U.S. Army)

The Canadian force would be part of the Eastern Task Force under General Montgomery, but it was not known at the time under which Corps it would be placed. (*ibid.*, Memorandum, dated 26 Apr, of Meeting held in Room 220, War Office, 24 Apr 43.)

56. Later the same morning, General McNaughton attended still another meeting at the War Office at which were present Major-Generals Galloway (Chairman), Salmon, Ramsden and other high-ranking Canadian and British officers. Because of their far-reaching importance to the participation of Canadian forces in the Mediterranean theatre, the minutes of this meeting are quoted in full:

1. General

DSD opened the meeting by stating that 1 Cdn Div has been selected to replace 3 Div in its operational role; this was at present subject to the approval of the Cdn Govt. The object of the meeting was to decide the action necessary to implement this decision.

2. The following points were agreed:-

- (a) There would be no restriction other than security on the contacts between HQ 1 Cdn Div and HQ 3 Div. GHQ, Home Forces were being asked that HQ 1 Corps should be available to assist 1 Cdn Div in trg.
- (b) The Orders of Battle of Force A and Force B would be examined by the Cdn HQ concerned and they would notify DSD when they would be prepared to discuss the replacement of British non-div units by Cdn units. 3 and 4 Beach Groups would in any case accompany 1 Cdn Div.
- (c) 1 Cdn Div planning staff would move to Norfolk House forthwith.
- (d) 1 Cdn Div would submit to DQMG (AE) by 29 Apr 43 their requirements for landing reserves.
- (e) The Tk Bde accompanying 1 Cdn Div would be re-equipped with Shermans; if necessary these tks would be drawn from those issued to 33 Tk Bde. This matter would be referred for action to D R A C.
- (f) The question of the standardisation of equipment and vehicles so as to fit in with what had been arranged for 3 Div was agreed in principle; this matter would be investigated by 1 Cdn Div and DQMG (AE).

- (g) Comd 1 Cdn Div would consider the question of re-equipping his A Tk Regt on a 6-pdr basis and also whether the Inf Bns would retain their 2-pdrs or change to a 6-pdr basis.
- (h) Comd 1 Cdn Div would be concerned only with the planning and organization of Force A. HQ 1 Cdn Army would deal with Force B.
- (i) 1 Cdn Bde with ancillary tps would move on or after 27 Apr 43 to Inveraray for training, 1-7 May. Rep 1 Cdn Div agreed to submit composition of this Bde Gp to D D Mov, the War Office, by the evening 24 Apr. 9 Inf Bde, at present training at Inveraray, would return to its billets in Dumfriesshire approx 28 Apr 43.
- (j) The move of the second Bde Gp, for training 10-16 May, would be arranged by the War Office on receipt from 1 Cdn Div of their accommodation requirements in Scotland.
- (k) The accommodation of 1 Cdn Div in Scotland would be arranged by the War Office.

(C.P.S. File 1003, Minutes of Meeting held in Room 220, The War Office, dated 24 Apr 43.)

57. Other matters discussed the same morning are referred to in a further memorandum written by Lt.-Col. (later Maj.-Gen.) Spry, P.A. to General McNaughton. The following paragraphs are extracted from this memorandum:

10. General Murison said that stores reserves were being held for the force as follows:-

30 days landing reserve  
30 days reinsurance

He pointed out that it would take four weeks to load and pack stores and vehicles, and that loading tables, etc., were required by his Directorate by 29 Apr 43.

11. Brig. Horn, representing QMG (Room 116, QMG House), said that the Cdn force would be maintained in the first phase from the U.K. and subsequently from the Middle East. After a discussion, and having regard to the spare parts situation, it was agreed that 1 Cdn Army Tank Bde would re-arm with Sherman tanks (Chrysler Engines) which are now held by 33 Tank Bde in Scotland. It was subsequently arranged that 1 Cdn Army Tank Bde would return their Ram II tanks to C.B.O.D. on their departure for the Combined Training Area, Scotland, and that Sherman tanks would be issued by the War Office in the training area. General McNaughton agreed that as a general principle the Cdn force would adopt British stores and equipment wherever possible in order to simplify the task of provision and maintenance.

12. General Salmon was instructed by General McNaughton to make recommendations in regard to the arming of A Tk Pls of inf bns and the provision of 6 pr or 17 pr A Tk guns for the fourth bty in the div A Tk Regt. It was noted that supplies of 2 pr amn would be available from the Middle East if required.

(File P.A. 1-14-1, Memorandum of Conference held in Room 220, War Office, 24 Apr 43, dated 26 Apr.)

58. On the same day the War Office issued a memorandum signed by Brigadier V. Blomfield, D.D.S.D., which outlined the War Office policy to be adhered to during the takeover by 1 Cdn Div from 3 Div. The memorandum follows:

1. A decision has been taken that a Canadian Division shall take over the operational role at present allotted to 3 Division. This is at present subject to confirmation by the Canadian Government but, in order that no time may be lost, it is intended to proceed on the assumption that that confirmation will be received.
2. The extent to which the non-divisional troops, which have been allotted to 3 Division, will be replaced by Canadian units has not yet been decided but it is anticipated that the majority will still have to be found from British resources. Pending further instructions, therefore, all units nominated and prepared will be presumed to be required.
3. The time available for planning and preparation is short and it is therefore essential that Canadian Headquarters and the Divisional Commander selected should be given every assistance.
4. Instructions are being issued by the War Office to Commander 3 Division to establish direct contact with 1 Canadian Div and to place at the disposal of the Canadian Commander full details of the progress in planning and preparation that has so far been made. Arrangements will also be made for the attachment to the Canadian force of such Staff Officers as may be considered necessary.
5. It is requested that you will issue instructions to Headquarters, 1 Corps (British) that they will, as a matter of first priority, afford every assistance in planning and training to the Canadian Division in the same way as they have up till now, to 3 Division.
6. Changes in the training programme and their effect on the training and accommodation of 3 Division and other troops will be communicated as early as possible. It will probably be necessary to call a meeting very early to decide these questions. It is hoped it may be found possible for 3 Division to remain in Scotland.

(C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1, Memorandum dated 24 Apr 43)

59. On the following day, 25 Apr, General McNaughton again visited the War Office for further discussions. In conversations with Lt.-Gen. Nye, V.C.I.G.S., and Maj.-Gen. Kennedy, D.M.O. & P., he stressed his responsibilities to the Canadian Government in connection with his recommendation as to the soundness and practicability of the plans of the proposed operation, and said that he was ready to examine these plans in greater detail. General Nye appreciated his position but urged that all possible speed was necessary. General Kennedy, and later Brigadier Kirkman, D.D.M.I. (G 2 Plans), then gave General McNaughton much more detailed information than he had previously received. The latter then proceeded to Norfolk House for a final conference, recorded as follows in a memorandum prepared by Brigadier Foulkes, B.G.S., First Canadian Army:

Gen McNaughton discussed the general plan for the proposed operation with General Salmon, G.O.C., 1 Cdn Div and Gen Ramsden, G.O.C., 3 Div (British). Gen Salmon stated that he was quite satisfied that the role contemplated was a suitable task for the forces allotted and from his preliminary studies he felt that the operation had a reasonable chance of success. He was not in disagreement with any phase of the general plans but of course there was much detail yet to be obtained and much more intelligence was required, including more extensive air photographs. Gen Ramsden shared the same views.

### Conclusion

As a result of the discussions and study of the plan at the War Office and the opinion expressed by Gen Salmon concurred in by Gen Ramsden, Gen. McNaughton decided that the operation envisaged was a practical operation of war and was now prepared to recommend to the Canadian Government that final approval of Canadian participation should be given. As a result of this decision G.S. 915 was despatched at 1930 hours, 25 April.

(File P.A. 1-14-1, Memorandum dated 29 Apr of Discussions held at the War Office and Norfolk House 25 Apr 43.)

G.S. 915 is quoted in para 18 above.

60. During the discussions with General Nye, the question of placing Canadian forces under General Alexander instead of General Eisenhower was brought up. General McNaughton showed General Nye a copy of a letter he had just addressed to the C.I.G.S. and pointed out that "under the only existing machinery, 'Visiting Forces Act', it was not legally possible to place any Canadian troops under an allied commander. The legal status of Canadian troops under an American commander was discussed including court-martial warrants, etc., and General Nye suggested that he thought all British troops in the Middle East were handled by the British authorities for discipline". (ibid.) The contents of this letter warrant its quotation in full:

With reference to your Most Secret letter to me dated 23 April 1943 in which you invited the participation of one Canadian Infantry Division and one Tank Brigade together with the necessary ancillary units in the projected operation we had discussed previously and to my reply dated 24 April 1943.

I have now been authorized by my Government to undertake the operation in question and for this purpose I propose to place the 1st Cdn Division, the 1st Cdn Army Tank Bde and certain Canadian ancillary units which can be substituted with advantage under the command of General Alexander who will be authorized to group them in British formations under his command as he may consider appropriate.

My authority to take this action is subject to the usual limitations of my powers, namely, that I shall examine the general plans and recommend their acceptance to my Government.

In this connection, I understand that a communication is now expected from Allied Forces Headquarters, North Africa, which will propose certain changes in the draft plans of which I have already been informed at the War Office. I will

be happy to examine the plans with these changes at the earliest moment convenient to yourself and to take the requested action thereafter.

Meanwhile, as I understand the changes to be made are probably minor, and as it is a matter of extreme urgency to proceed with the organization and training of the force, I have authorized the re-organization of Cdn units where necessary and their move to Scotland for training to be undertaken forthwith.

(ibid., General McNaughton to General Brooke, 25 Apr 43.)

61. A second letter written the following day expressed General McNaughton's satisfaction at the manner in which he had now been enabled to discharge his special constitutional responsibility on behalf of Canada:

Further to my letter to you of 25 April 1943, a copy of which I discussed in some detail with Lt.-Gen. Nye, V.C.I.G.S., yesterday afternoon at the War Office.

Subsequent to this discussion I had a talk with Major-General Kennedy, D.M.O., and to members of his staff in the course of which I was given very satisfactory information covering the broader aspects of the operation we have under consideration.

Later I met Major-General Ramsden, G.O.C., 3 Div (British) and Major-General Salmon, G.O.C. 1 Cdn Div, at Norfolk House where I went into the plans for the particular part of the operation now assigned to 3 Div (British) which it is contemplated should be taken over by 1 Cdn Div.

While naturally the details of these plans are subject to further development in the light of the additional local intelligence required, I have ascertained that Major-General Salmon is satisfied with the role which he would be required to undertake.

On the basis of these inquiries, I cabled my Government last night recommending that their approval to our participation be given and requesting a reply at the earliest.

I will advise you further so soon as this reply is received.

(ibid., General McNaughton - General Brooke, 26 Apr 43.)

62. On 27 Apr the matter again arose during a discussion between Lt.-Gen. Ismay, C.O.S. to the British Prime Minister, and General McNaughton at the War Cabinet Offices. "Among other matters", wrote General McNaughton in a memorandum of the discussion, "I mentioned that the Cdn commanders would be placed under cmd General Alexander, the reason being that the only legal formula we had was the Visiting Forces Act which did not give authority to place Canadian troops under other than a British cmd. General Ismay suggested that someone should tell General Eisenhower of this situation in advance . . . and I agreed that I would either do this myself or arrange for General Brooke to do so". (ibid., Memorandum (29 Apr 43) of a Discussion between Lt.-Gen. McNaughton and Lt.-Gen Ismay on 27 Apr 43.)

63. That afternoon General McNaughton held a conference at C.M.H.Q. with General Montague, Brigadiers Beament, Rodger, and Foulkes and Lt.-Col. Spry. Among other matters discussed, according to Lt.-Col. Spry's memorandum of the meeting, "it was agreed that General McNaughton would cable General Eisenhower explaining the need for placing Cdn troops 'in combination' with British troops as at present there was no legal machinery for placing Cdn troops under command of other than British commanders". (ibid., Memorandum, dated 6 May 43, of a conference held at C.M.H.Q. 1545 hours, 27 Apr 43). The final settlement of these matters is recorded in a third letter from General McNaughton to General Brooke dated 3 May quoted in part below:

On 28 April 1943, I received a cablegram advising that I might expect an Order in Council authorizing the detailing of the forces in whole or in part 'in combination' under the Visiting Forces Act, together with appropriate instructions which would include the retention by the Cdn Commander of his right of reference to the Cdn Government.

On 1 May 1943, I received by cable the text of the Order in Council above referred to, namely PC. 3464 dated 29 April 1943.

This Order in Council deals with 'the serving together'; the placing in and withdrawal from 'in combination'; 'attachment'; and 'command' of the combined forces. It provides for our relations with the Naval, Military and Air Force of any part of the British Commonwealth and unlike the previous Orders in Council which it replaces, it is not restricted geographically to Europe nor to the Military and Air Forces of the United Kingdom or of Australia and New Zealand.

. . . . . I am also instructed that 'Canadian participation is subject to the retention by the Senior Cdn Combatant Officer of the force concerned of the right to refer to the Cdn Government, through' me, 'in respect of any matter in which such forces are, or are likely to be, involved or committed'. I am informed that later instructions will issue in respect to awards for gallantry, etc.

I have carefully studied these instructions, and in the result I am satisfied that a thoroughly practicable and satisfactory system for the command and administration of our forces can be set up. . . . .

(ibid., General McNaughton to General Brooke, 3 May 1943.)

64. On 28 Apr General McNaughton received from General Brooke a note of a more personal nature:

My dear Andy:

I have received from General Montgomery the following message which he has asked me to pass to you:-

"Am delighted Canadian Division will come under me for Husky."

Yours ever,

(Signed) A.F. BROOKE

(ibid., 28 Apr 43.)

In reply General McNaughton sent the following to General Brooke:

My dear Alan:

Thank you for your note of 28 April 1943 giving Monty's cable.

I will be very much obliged if your staff would send the following reply for me:

"For Montgomery from McNaughton.

Many thanks for your cable received through Brooke. Canada is sending 1 Cdn Div and 1 Cdn Army Tank Bde and certain ancillary units to 18 Army Group under Allied Force HQ., North Africa. We have every confidence in these formations and in their commanders and feel sure they will give a good account of themselves in operation HUSKY.

Kindest personal regards and sincerest congratulations on the magnificent successes achieved by Eighth Army under your command."

Very sincerely yours,

(Signed) A.G.L. McNaughton

(ibid., 29 Apr 43.)

65. An outline has been given above of the important conferences and discussions immediately arising out of the decision to include a Canadian force in Operation "HUSKY". To avoid repetition, much of the significant information disclosed at these conferences has been omitted here but will be included in a general survey of the plans, to be presented in a later section of this Report. The story now becomes that of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division. (Very detailed Memoranda on all these meetings will be found in file P.A. 1-14-1.)

**(b) The 1st Canadian Infantry Division Takes Over**

66. No time was lost in informing the senior Canadian formations in the United Kingdom that a movement of major importance was taking place within the Canadian Army whereby 1 Cdn Inf Div and 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde were to move from South Eastern Command to Scottish Command for advanced combined training, in accordance with a schedule laid down by the War Office. A letter by Brigadier Foulkes addressed to the Commander, 1 Cdn Corps (Lt.-Gen. H.D.G. Crerar, C.B., D.S.O.), and repeated to 2 Cdn Corps, C.M.H.Q., South Eastern Command, and the War Office was sent on 24 Apr 43 outlining the training policy to be followed by the two Canadian formations. The letter ends, "arrangements for training 2 and 3 Cdn Divs are also part of the security cover plan", for the movement of a major Canadian formation within the United Kingdom could not be accomplished without some comment, and it was important from the beginning to attempt to create the impression that 1 Cdn Div was merely carrying out an advanced stage of the combined operations training it had already commenced some months before (see Report No. 93).

67. The arrival of the Divisional Staff Officers in LONDON to attend the first conference did not pass unnoticed; the large number

of 1 Cdn Div staff cars bearing the red patch parked in the vicinity of C.M.H.Q., Cockspur Street, on Easter Sunday, made it obvious to such officers as entered the building at the time that there was "something in the wind" as far as 1 Cdn Div was concerned (Evidence of Hist Offr, C.M.H.Q.).

68. The actual handover of 3 (Brit) Div's role in Operation "HUSKY" to 1 Cdn Div was in the nature of an Operation in itself, known by the code name "SWIFT". The handover was to be completed by 25 Apr 43 at Norfolk House. Each 3 Div Branch handed over to its Canadian counterpart on a Branch-to-Branch basis. The procedure adopted was as follows: each 3 Div file was handed over individually to the Canadian opposite number by a British officer, and the contents of each file explained. In addition to the files, certain memoranda, instructions, etc., were studied by the opposite numbers together so that there would be no doubt or misunderstanding of the contents by the receiving party. (C.P.S. file 100, Minutes of A/Q Conference, 25 Apr 43.) The following were the heads of branches and services, 1 Cdn Div, with their British counterparts:

<u>CANADIAN</u>		<u>BRITISH</u>
Lt.-Col. G. Kitching	G.S.O. 1	Lt.-Col. G.G.H. Wilson
Lt.-Col. W.P. Gilbride	A.A. & Q.M.G.	Lt.-Col. E.J. Montgomery
Brigadier A. Bruce Matthews	C.R.A	Brigadier G.G. Mears
Col. C.H. Playfair	A.D.M.S.	Col. R.D. Cameron
Lt.-Col. D.G.J. Farquharson	A.D.O.S.	Lt.-Col. Worsdell
Lt.-Col. J.K. Bradford	C.R.E.M.E.	Lt.-Col. J.E. Land
Lt.-Col. H.L. Pease	C.R.A.S.C.	Lt.-Col. A.K. Yapp
Lt.-Col. J.H. Eaman	O.C. Div Sigs	Lt.-Col. Mountford
Lt.-Col. G. Walsh	C.R.E.	Lt.-Col. K.W. Urquhart

69. On 27 Apr 43, General McNaughton issued a Directive addressed to the G.O.C., 1 Cdn Div, and to the commander, 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde, outlining the policy that was to be followed by both these formations for the impending Operation. This ran as follows:

OPERATIONAL ROLE 1 CDN DIV AND 1 CDN ARMY TANK BDE

1. Subject to the approval of the Canadian Government, arrangements are being made for 1 Cdn Div, 1 Cdn Army Tank Bde, and certain ancillary troops to participate in the operation under British command. It is now considered essential to clarify the necessary adjustments to the normal system of command and administration resulting from this decision.

HEADQUARTERS 1 CDN DIV AND 1 CDN ARMY TANK BDE

2. Headquarters 1 Cdn Div and 1 Cdn Army Tank Bde now planning in London will come under command C.M.H.Q., forthwith for all purposes except:-

(a) War Office - for training, operations, intelligence, security.

(b) First Cdn Army - for completion G.1098. All questions of policy will be referred to C.M.H.Q., for consideration and to advise the Senior Combatant Officer, Canadian Army Overseas.

1 CDN DIV LESS H.Q.  
1 CDN ARMY TANK BDE LESS H.Q.

3. 1 Cdn Div and 1 Cdn Army Tank Bde less their respective H.Qs., will remain under comd 1 Cdn Corps while in Sussex. These will be administered by the Special Increments to be established under GSD.602. In order not to interfere or disturb the planning of the operation now in progress in London, 1 Cdn Corps will issue any orders and instructions to 1 Cdn Div and to 1 Cdn Army Tank Bde through the Special Increments concerned. As and when units or sub-units of 1 Cdn Div and 1 Cdn Army Tank Bde move out of the Sussex area, they come under comd C.M.H.Q., for all purposes, except as detailed in para 2 above.

#### MOVES TO TRAINING AREAS

4. Moves to training areas will be arranged direct between War Office, H.Q., 1 Cdn Div and H.Q., 1 Cdn Army Tank Bde and the Increment Establishments. Increment Establishments will keep 1 Cdn Corps informed.

#### TEMPORARY COMMANDER

5. In order that all questions of policy regarding equipment, special establishments, order of battle, etc., may be given proper consideration, Comd 1 Cdn Div and Comd 1 Cdn Army Tank Bde will appoint an Acting Comd to act for them on any occasions when they may be absent from their Headquarters.

#### COMMAND AND RESPONSIBILITY OUTSIDE U.K.

This matter will be subject to a special direction to be issued later.

(C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1, General McNaughton to G.O.C., 1 Cdn Div and Comd 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde, dated 27 Apr 43.)

70. It has been seen above that 3 Div experienced considerable difficulty in planning for an Operation whose final and firm Outline Plan was slow in reaching the United Kingdom. When the Canadians took over, a good deal of the preliminary spade work had been done over fairly rocky ground. The War Office and the officers of 3 Div were able to hand over to 1 Cdn Div a smoothly functioning planning organization, which did not suffer from interruption during the takeover. At this date it was not anticipated that there would be any major alterations either in the General Plan or in the planning in spite of this substitution of Divisions (C.P.S. Telegrams File, Tel OP (1)S.D/40135, Force 545 to War Office, 25 Apr 43).

71. In addition to the British officers who stayed on to assist 1 Cdn Div and 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde in the planning, certain specially trained officers of the Canadian Planning Staff were attached to Divisional Headquarters, and these officers were largely instrumental in implementing the decisions reached at the daily "G", "A & Q" and Inter-Services conferences. A list of the officers at H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, H.Q. 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde, Canadian Planning Staff and increments will be found in Appendix "E" (File P.A. 1-14-1, undated list of above mentioned officers, filed 28 May 43).

72. No attempt will be made here to explain in detail the mechanism of planning procedure. Insofar as this narrative is concerned, it is sufficient to give a brief outline of the manner in which this procedure was carried out with respect to Operation "HUSKY": three conferences were held each morning at consecutive hours under the auspices of the General Staff Branch, the "A & Q" Branch and of the three Services (Naval, Army and Air) combined, better known as the Inter-Services. All of these conferences were attended by representatives of the different Branches and Services, and of the Royal Navy, Royal Air Force and the War Office. Thus, agenda arising out of these conferences could always be dealt with by the Branch or Service concerned through its representative, and by this system complete co-ordination and co-operation in such a complex organization was ensured. The Executive Planning Section of the War Cabinet Joint Planning Staff also met regularly at Norfolk House to consider matters concerning the operation. (The minutes of all these conferences are to be found in the following files at present in the custody of Historical Section, C.M.H.Q.: C.P.S. 100, 1210, 1010, 1018, and 2002.)

73. The problems and difficulties in mounting a Force that was to be sea-borne to its point of contact with the enemy were most complicated, and considerable care had to be exercised by the Planning Staff to ensure that not a single item, however small, was forgotten. Operation orders, both General Staff and Administrative, had to be prepared without omitting the most minute detail. Intelligence reports from the Middle East were received from day to day, which, in many cases, necessitated important changes in the final draft of the Operation Order.

74. It will be remembered that the Assault Force proceeding from the United Kingdom was divided into Force "A" and Force "B", later re-designated Force "X" and Force "Y" (see para 45). It was subsequently decided to plan for Force "B" independently of Force "A", and for this reason its development and planning was carried out quite apart from the latter and, because of the lack of accommodation at Norfolk House, this was done at Devonshire House, also in LONDON.

75. Once it became known to the Middle East that 1 Cdn Inf Div was selected to replace 3 Div, Force 545 despatched a telegram to the War Office to the following effect: "Require Commander, G1 and A/Q one Canadian Div in CAIRO forthwith. Please arrange earliest priority air passages." Two additional telegrams requested that the C.R.A., one brigade commander, two battalion commanders, the C.R.E., and the O.C. Div Sigs be also included in the party. (C.P.S. File 1020, Tel GP (1) 4007, C.-in-C. M.E. to W.O., 25 Apr 43; C.I.S. Telegrams File Vol 1, Tel GP (1) 40327, Force 545 to W.O., 26 Apr 43; Tel GP 1, 40798, 27 Apr 43, Force 545 to W.O.)

76. The composition of this party led Major-General Salmon to believe that the assault would be on a one-brigade front and that a change in plan was indicated. He sent a telegram to Maj.-Gen. F.W. de Guingand, D.S.O., Force 545, asking for confirmation of this:

.....as I must make outline plan before leaving in order that staff may continue detailed planning. Myself and party as requested by you anticipate leaving Thursday subject to availability aircraft.

(C.P.S. Telegram File Tel 74016 G.S. (P) War Office to Force 545, dated 26 Apr 43.)

Maj.-Gen. de Guingand sent the following reply:

.....Some modification in your role may result from Conference being held Algiers morning 28 April. Until then all I can give you is that division may be required either to follow-up through the successful landings on one Brigade Front or to assault on one Brigade Front. Former is most likely. Will signal you immediately decision reached.

(ibid., Tel GP (1) 40805, Force 545 to W.O., dated 27 Apr 43.)

(c) The CAIRO Visit: The Death of Major-General Salmon and Appointment of Major-General Simonds

77. No information was received from the Middle East on the results of the conference referred to in the telegram above, but Maj.-Gen. Salmon on 29 Apr nonetheless continued with his original intention to proceed to CAIRO by air. Air passage was arranged through the Air Ministry and two aircraft were made available for the journey. A last-minute change was made when the two battalion commanders (who had not yet been specifically named) were replaced by the D.A.G., C.M.H.Q. (Brigadier A.W. Beament) and the A.Q.M.G., 2 Cdn Corps (Lt.-Col. D.K. Tow) (C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1, Memorandum by Brigadier Beament, dated 28 Apr 43). It was further instructed that Lt.-Col. (now Brigadier) Tow would remain in the Middle East until further orders. It had been originally planned to send Maj.-Gen. Salmon and his Staff Officers by air on the night of 28 Apr 43 and Brigadier Beament and Lt.-Col. Tow were to proceed on the following day in another aircraft.

78. The first party consisted of -

Maj.-Gen. H.L.N. Salmon, M.C. (G.O.C. 1 Cdn Div)  
Rear Admiral P.J. Mack, D.S.O., R.N. (Naval Force Commander)  
Capt. Sir T.L. Beevor, R.N.  
Lt.-Col. G.G.H. Wilson, (G.S.O. 1, 3 (Br) Div)  
Lt.-Col. C.J. Finlay, (A.A. & Q.M.G., 1 Cdn Div)  
(lately appointed)

(C.P.S. File 2000, Instruction signed by Lt.-Col. Kitching re Air Trip - First Party, 28 Apr 43.)

They took off in a Hudson twin-engined aircraft at about 0900 hours on 29 Apr 43. Near BARNSTAPLE, Devonshire, the aircraft crashed and burned. Gen. Salmon and all the other occupants were killed. Departure of the second aircraft was postponed. (C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1, Notes by Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., 29 Apr 43.)

79. Maj.-Gen. Montague telephoned the news of the accident over the scrambler telephone to Lt.-Col. D.C. Spry, P.A. to General McNaughton, who was at his elbow during the conversation. The following extract is from General Montague's notes:

.....The G.O.C.-in-C. then gave me the following instructions:

- (a) Walsh to be dropped from the second plane. Kitching, G.S.O. 1 1 Cdn Div, to go in his place and Kitching and Vokes were to start the conversations in Africa.

(b) Simonds is to take command of 1 Cdn Div.

(c) I am to ask War Office for a plane tomorrow.

Penhale instructed as above and phoned instructions to Kitching over scrambler.....

(ibid.)

80. "Simonds", mentioned above, was of course Maj.-Gen. (later Lt.-Gen.) G.G. Simonds, C.B.E., then newly appointed G.O.C. 2 Cdn Div, and previously B.G.S. 1 Cdn Corps. During the final weeks prior to his appointment to command 2 Cdn Div, General Simonds (then a Brigadier) visited the Eighth Army which was engaged in battle with Rommel's Africa Corps in North Africa. During his stay in North Africa, General Simonds, after an interview with General Montgomery, proceeded to 10 Corps where he was attached. He studied the organization of Main Eighth Army Headquarters during the planning stage for the attack by 30 Corps to break through the WADI AKARIT position while 10 Corps was to pass through the gap and exploit in the open country to the north. Throughout the remainder of the operations up to the fall of SUSA, he accompanied the Corps Commander with his Recce Group. Late in April he returned to England to take over 2 Cdn Inf Div. This experience in North Africa was to prove of immeasurable value to General Simonds for, by virtue of his appointment as G.O.C. 1 Cdn Div, he was later to direct a division in battle under General Montgomery. (References to General Simonds' visit to North Africa will be found in Report No. 95, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q.)

81. At 1430 hours on the afternoon of 29 Apr 43, General McNaughton advised General Simonds at H.Q., First Cdn Army, that "he was to command 1 Cdn Div vice Major-General Salmon..... and that he was to put himself in the picture in regard to the forthcoming operation as quickly as possible" (File P.A. 1-14-1, Memorandum of Conversations, dated 1 May 43).

82. Shortly afterwards Major A.F.B. Knight (D.A.Q.M.G., Canadian Planning Staff, attached to H.Q., 1 Cdn Div), advised Maj.-Gen. Montague that the occupants of the crashed aircraft were as originally detailed and that the C.R.A., 1 Cdn Div, Brigadier Bruce Matthews, was not aboard as at first believed (C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1, Notes by Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., 29 Apr 43).

83. The substitution of Lt.-Col. Kitching for Lt.-Col. Walsh on the aircraft leaving that afternoon was then arranged and a request was made for an additional aircraft to be ready for the following day (30 Apr 43) (3) for General Simonds and the officers who were selected to form his party. A ruling from higher authority had to be obtained because of the shortage of aircraft and that afternoon the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff himself visited the Vice Chief of Air Staff to make the request. (ibid.)

(3) It will be noted that a discrepancy exists with respect to the date on which General Simonds was to leave for CAIRO between this document and the one referred to in para 95. No doubt General Simonds delayed his departure by one day in order to acquaint himself thoroughly with the general picture before leaving.

84. Meanwhile, General McNaughton instructed that in the first aircraft there would be Brigadiers Beament and Vokes and Lt.-Cols. Kitching and Tow, in addition to the Naval personnel whom the War Office would name as having been appointed to replace Rear Admiral Mack and Capt Beevor. He further instructed that Lt.-Col. Gilbride would become A.A. & Q.M.G., 1 Cdn Div, but would continue with the planning in LONDON. General Simonds, Brigadier Matthews, Lt.-Col. Walsh, Lt.-Col. Eaman and Major Knight were to proceed on the following day in the second aircraft. (ibid.)

85. Meanwhile, there arose the question of whether or not security would be compromised should General Salmon's death be made public. It was of the utmost importance that none of the Canadian troops stationed in the United Kingdom should have any inkling of the crashed aircraft's destination. Except for one or two suspected cases, there was no breach of security, and the incident of General Salmon's unfortunate and untimely death soon ceased to be the subject of discussion and speculation (ibid.; Hist Sec File "HUSKY", 1 Cdn Fd Security Sec C/F War Diary).

86. However, a more serious aspect of this matter, from the point of view of security, was the manner in which General Salmon's death was to be announced to Canada. Quite obviously, since any large-scale movement of Canadian troops in the United Kingdom would indicate that something more than mere routine training was afoot and there were at that time no Canadian forces operating overseas from the United Kingdom, it was very undesirable to call public attention to the 1st Canadian Division. Too much publicity attached to General Salmon's death, therefore, was to be avoided. In fact, at the War Office the Inter-Services Security Board (I.S.S.B.) were against any advice of the accident being forwarded to Canada. General Montague was of the opposite opinion, however, and felt strongly that Canada would have to be advised. (C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1, Notes...29 Apr 43.)

87. The C.I.G.S., General Brooke, was informed of the accident late that afternoon, and he almost immediately communicated with General McNaughton by telephone, expressing the wish that any information of the accident going to Canada should be suppressed. It was only after some discussion that he agreed that Canada should be advised. Accordingly, the Army Commander instructed General Montague

.....to advise Stuart by open cable that "Salmon and Finlay were killed in flying accident over southwest England this morning" and that I am to have D.D.P.R. advise the British press.

(ibid.)

88. At 1955 hours that evening, General McNaughton (4) confirmed General Montague's telegram to General Stuart with the following:

(4) Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal telephoned General McNaughton and expressed his deepest sympathy for the loss of Major-General H.L.N. Salmon and Lt.-Col. C.F.J. Finlay and stated that he regretted "that the R.A.F. should have been the cause of the loss of these two outstanding officers." (File P.A. 1-14-1, Memorandum dated 30 Apr 43.)

**MOST SECRET. FOR STUART FROM MCNAUGHTON.**

**PARA. I.** YOU WILL HAVE HAD MONTAGUE'S CABLE REPORTING LOSS MAJOR-GENERAL H.L.N. SALMON AND LT. COL. C.F.J. FINLAY IN AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT OVER SOUTH WEST ENGLAND. I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR CONVEYING MY DEEPEST SYMPATHY TO THE BEREAVED FAMILIES AND AN EXPRESSION OF THE VERY GREAT LOSS WHICH THE CDN ARMY HAS ALSO SUSTAINED IN THE DEATH OF THESE OUTSTANDING OFFICERS.

**PARA. II.** NO REPEAT NO REFERENCE SHOULD BE MADE TO THE FACT THAT THESE OFFICERS WERE ON THEIR WAY TO CONFERENCE IN CAIRO CONCERNING PROSPECTIVE OPERATION 1 CDN DIV.

**PARA. III.** MAJOR-GENERAL G.G. SIMONDS HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED TO COMMAND 1 CDN DIV AND HE WILL LEAVE BY AIR FOR CAIRO TOMORROW. LT. COL. W.P. GILBRIDE HAS REPLACED LT. COL. FINLAY AS AA&QMG 1 CDN DIV.

**PARA. IV.** ADVANCE GROUP COMPRISING BRIG. A.W. BEAMENT, D.A.G., CMHQ., LT. COL. TOW, AQMG 2 CDN CORPS BRIG. C. VOKES, COMD 2 CDN INF BDE AND LT. COL. G. KITCHING, GSO I, 1 CDN DIV LEFT BY AIR THIS AFTERNOON.....

**PARA. VI.** ARRANGEMENTS FOR EQUIPMENT AND SPECIAL TRAINING PROCEEDING SATISFACTORILY.

(C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1, Tel GS 954,  
29 Apr 43.)

89. Maj.-Gen. Simonds arrived at Norfolk House late that afternoon. After familiarizing himself with the Outline Plan and the progress so far made under General Salmon's direction, he sent the following telegram to Force 545:

**BIGOT HUSKY**

Personal for General De Guingand from Commander 1 Canadian Div.

Reference your GP (1) 40805 of 27 Apr. In absence information as to decisions reached at conference ALGIERS 28 April am continuing to plan on assaulting at CENT on two brigade front. Request confirmation of role prior to my departure 1 May.

(C.P.S. File Telegrams Vol 1, Tel GS (P)  
74969, 29 Apr 43.)

A reply to the above was received on 30 Apr 43:

From Force 545 for Comd. One Canadian Div. From General De Guingand. Your 74969 G.S. (P) conference still sitting Algiers to decide final plan. You should definitely prepare to assault on two Bde. front. Possibly on Beaches 57 or 58.

(C.P.S. File Telegrams, Tel GP 10/42111,  
C.-in-C. M.E. to W.O., 30 Apr 43.)

The indefinite nature of this telegram hindered planning for the next two or three days since it was now projected to assault on a beach some 50 miles to the south-east of the original target, in addition to which the assault was to take place on a two-brigade front. This would mean, of course, a complete revision of that part of the planning which was concerned with the beaches themselves and the hinterland in the area. This affected the preparation of intelligence summaries, maps and beach diagrams, enemy coastal defences, etc., not to mention beach landings parties and the Naval participation in the assault.

90. Actually General Montgomery had developed still another plan differing from the previous one. As a result of the difficulties he experienced in driving the Axis troops from mountainous positions in Tunisia he had come to the conclusion that a greater concentration of effort was essential and insisted on having his corps and divisions within supporting distance of each other (M.O. 1 Report, op. cit.). On 25 Apr he held a conference at CAIRO where he elaborated this idea. The following graphic account of this conference has been given from memory by Comdr K.S. MacLachlan, R.C.N.V.R., who attended the conference:

I was present at the Conference held at G.H.Q., CAIRO on Easter Sunday, 25 Apr 43, at which words spoken by General Montgomery started the ball rolling for the final momentous changes in the Plan for Operation "HUSKY".

When General Montgomery, with pointer in hand, took the floor, he had before him a 12' by 12' plastic profile of Sicily. He commenced by outlining briefly the original plan for Operation "HUSKY" in which it was proposed to attack all around Sicily including the important harbour city of PALERMO. He concluded his remarks saying, "We won't do it this way. We'll deliver the attack on the southeastern part of the island and fight the battle on the CATANIA Plain. This is the 8th Army way of fighting and it will either be done that way, or they will get somebody else to do it".

I can well remember the bombshell effect with which these words fell upon the assembled group of very high-ranking Naval, Army and Air Force officers. Certainly no one but Montgomery could have said them and have gotten away with it. General Montgomery had come to the Conference accompanied by Admiral Ramsay (Naval Commander, Eastern Task Force) and, I suspect, they must have reached an agreement on Montgomery's new Plan, for he made no comment on the proposed change after General Montgomery's declaration. As far as I can remember the following were the principal officers present.

Royal Navy: Rear-Admiral R.R. McGrigor  
Rear-Admiral T. Troubridge

Army: Lt.-General Sir Oliver Leese, G.O.C., 30 Corps,  
Lt.-General M.C. Dempsey, G.O.C., 13 Corps,  
Major-General Berney-Ficklin, G.O.C., 5 Div, and  
Major-General Kirkman, G.O.C., 50 Div.

Off-hand I cannot say who were the Senior R.A.F. representatives. In addition to these officers there were also

present the planning operations staff of the three Services.

(Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/B/F, Account given to Major Sesia by Commander K.S. MacLachlan, R.C.N.V.R., Personal Staff Officer to Rear Admiral T. Troubridge, Commander Force "G".)

91. These proposals were not accepted at first by Admiral Cunningham or Air Chief Marshal Tedder who insisted on the capture of the GELA airfields. Finally however General Montgomery's plan was accepted and the British task force was concentrated, assaulting the southeastern corner of the island. The western assault was given up and the American task force switched to attack the GELA area. This plan, which was finally approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 12 May, will be dealt with in more detail below. (M.O. 1 Report, op. cit.)

92. At 0800 hours, 30 Apr 43, General Simonds breakfasted with General McNaughton and discussed many matters with him. General Simonds said that he would fly to CAIRO on the following morning, 1 May, and included with his party was Rear-Admiral Sir Philip L. Vian, K.B.E., D.S.O., R.N., who had been appointed by the Admiralty as Naval Force Commander in succession to Admiral Mack. Speaking of the Plan, General Simonds stated that he had gone over all the papers and that he was satisfied with the general arrangements and plans for the operation. He said that he was not disturbed by the possible minor alterations in the Plan which might involve a change from a two to a one-brigade assault. He said that since arrangements had been made for the training of two assault brigades, a possible reduction to one brigade would present no trouble. (File P.A. 1-14-1, Memorandum of Conversation General McNaughton - Major-General Simonds, 30 Apr 43.)

93. The conversation also touched upon initial administrative matters. A most important point was dealt with by General McNaughton when he spoke of the relations between General Simonds, General McNaughton and the Canadian Government, and advised General Simonds that he had the "right of reference" to the Canadian Government, but that this should be exercised in extreme cases only. (ibid.)

94. The first aircraft left HENDON airfield at 0915 hours, 30 Apr 43. The party consisted of Brigadiers Vokes and Beament, and Lt.-Cols. Tow, Kitching and Eaman. Gibraltar was reached at approximately 1645 hours and on the following afternoon at 1745 hours (London time) the aircraft touched down at HELIOPOLIS airfield (on the outskirts of CAIRO). That evening they met Brigadier G. Walsh, B.G.S. 30 Corps, Brigadier P. Sewell, D.A. & Q.M.G. 30 Corps, and Colonel Stewart, C.S.C. 30 Corps. Here the party split up and Brigadier Beament and Lt.-Col. Tow concerned themselves with purely "A" & "Q" matters, while Brigadier Vokes and Lt.-Cols. Kitching and Eaman commenced conversations with the Operations Branch pending General Simonds' arrival. It must be remembered that Eighth Army was still operationally engaged in Tunisia at that time and is not to be confused with Force 545. This Force was actually the Planning Staff for Eighth Army and consisted of some of the staff and Services Officers from Army, plus officers especially detailed to assist in the planning (see para 38 above). On 10 May it was redesignated "12th Army" (Hist Sec File "HUSKY" 1 Cdn Inf Div/B/F, Diary

29 Apr - 4 May; C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1, Tel 132 141/F61 G (P) from FORTUNE, 10 May 43.) The situation was described by Brigadier Beament in his Report on the trip which is quoted in part below:

While I was in the country (Egypt), the 8th Army and the 18th Army Gp were still fighting the battle, but a Planning Staff for the 8th Army (Force 545) had been created in Cairo and a Planning Staff for the 18th Army Gp (Force 141) had been created at Bouzareah outside Algiers. HQ 13 and 30 Corps had been withdrawn to Cairo for planning purposes. The Planning Staffs, Force 141 and 545, were purely planning organizations and where executive decisions required, it was necessary to obtain the concurrence of GHQ ME or AFHQ as appropriate.

It will therefore be seen that it was necessary for me at one time or another to deal with seven different HQS, namely - GHQ ME, Force 545, 30 Corps, 8th Army, 18th Army Group, AFHQ, Force 141. The problem was further complicated by the great distances involved, the fact that some of these HQS had only been recently created and that some of them were still engaged in battle, the division of their functions and responsibilities were not in all cases perfectly clear and that there were in certain cases rather definite clashes in personality.

(File P.A. 1-14-1 Report on Trip to the Middle East and North Africa, 29 Apr 43 to 14 May 43 by Brigadier Beament, 21 May 43.)

95. The second plane carrying the new G.O.C. left on the following day. At a later date General Simonds gave the following account of the trip:

We took off from Hendon Airfield at approximately 0945 hrs, 1 May 43. The party consisted of Rear-Admiral Vian, Lt.-Col. Walsh, Lt.-Comdr. Rivers-Smith, Major Knight and myself. After an almost overnight halt at Fort Reith, Cornwall, we arrived at Gibraltar at about 0900 hrs, 2 May.

When I had left London I knew that a change in the Plan had been contemplated but had no idea of the Plan as it stood. At Gibraltar I met General Brown-Ing who said that the change of Plan was still to the fore but that it was still not firm.

We left Gibraltar at about 0900 hrs and landed at Maison Blanche Airfield, near Algiers, at approximately 1330 hrs where we were advised that further progress eastward had to be delayed owing to sandstorms. I took advantage of this delay to visit 15 Army Group H.Q. where I was given a new Plan but was told that it was still not the final Plan.

We took off from Maison Blanche at about 0500 hrs, 4 May, and reached Cairo at about 1700 hrs. At 0630 hrs the following morning (5 May) I went to Force 545 H.Q. where I met Brigadier Walsh, B.G.S. 30 Corps and he gave me the outline of the new and firm Plan. Following my talk with Brigadier Walsh I studied all

the latest Intelligence summaries and what information was available on the new beaches we were now to assault. I then went to the Model Room and decided how I wanted to carry out my share of the task allotted to 30 Corps.

After I had decided on a Plan, I met Admiral Vian who told me that he did not like the beaches, and considered them unsuitable for assault craft; but we decided and agreed that in spite of the difficulties the assault was feasible, and we could carry it out.

At 1200 hrs I met Lieut.-General Sir Oliver Leese, G.O.C. 30 Corps, by appointment. He confirmed the tasks of the Division and I told him my Plan in outline, with which he agreed. I pointed out to him that the enemy coastal defences on the right and left flanks of our sector required special attention and he agreed that 51st (Highland) Division would clear the defences on the right flank, and concurred on the inter-divisional boundary. He agreed also to leave the Royal Marine Commandos with me (it had been decided to use them elsewhere) to pinch out the defences on the left flank.

I pointed out to General Leese that time was short as far as we were concerned, and that I had to get back to England within two weeks at the outside. I told him I had to put forward a firm plan, and leave Cairo with the clear understanding that whatever Plan I took back with me could not change as the loading of the ships was soon about to start and this could not be delayed.

In the afternoon I made a further study of the map and model, and put the Plan down on paper and cabled it home that night. The plan was cabled to England within 24 hours of my arrival in Cairo and was never changed since.

Most of the remainder of my time in Cairo was taken up with three matters which I had to settle before I left:

- (1) Bidding on the shipping. I tried to get two small infantry assault ships so that the Commandos could be carried and landed one hour before our assault, but in this I was unsuccessful.
- (2) Inter-Divisional boundary with 51st (Highland) Division. I had a number of meetings with the G.O.C. 51st (Highland) Division, Major-General ~~Wembley~~, and his G.S.O. I, Lt.-Col. Urquhart, to make certain that we were properly tied in on the right flank as regards junction points.
- (3) The landing and subsequent advance of 231 Inf Brigade Group. I had to ensure that this brigade's advance inland would tie in with 1 Cdn Inf Bde's subsequent tasks after Pachino Airfield had been captured.

*Wembley*

*Admt No. 1  
11 May 45  
JEL*

I also had conferences with both the C.C.R.A. and C.C.R.E., 30 Corps, and with the Intelligence Branch dealing with

the latter in particular as regards photographs, and stressing the need for detailed information regarding the beaches. I asked for a submarine reconnaissance of these beaches and arranged that we should send one of our photo I.O.s to Malta before we sailed from the United Kingdom. He would remain in Malta to rejoin our convoy on D-2 with all the latest information and photographs. I also arranged for them to send to me in England one of their own photo I.O.s to arrive a week before we sailed, and he was to be fully briefed with the latest information up to that time. I arranged that 51st (Highland) Division would send an L.O. to me who would arrive one week before we sailed, and fully briefed on their operation.

I left Cairo with my party at 1105 hrs, Sunday, 9 May 43. Admiral Vian and his staff officer did not return with us. We stopped at Castel Benito, Gibraltar, and finally landed at Lyneham Airfield after our navigator had almost lost me somewhere over Eire. From here we proceeded to London by train arriving at 1500 hrs, 11 May.

(Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/1 Cdn Inf Div/G.O.C.,  
Memorandum of conversation between General  
Simonds and Major Sesia at H.Q. 2 Cdn Corps,  
12 Mar 44.)

96. Reference to the excursion over Eire is amplified in some notes of Major Knight's regarding the trip. Under the heading 11 May he writes:

A near catastrophe. If it had not been for the excellent map reading of Maj.-Gen. Simonds, we would have landed in Ireland and been interned. Fortunately, the poor navigation was noticed and it was pointed out to the navigator that we were over Ireland and NOT England, with the result that the course was changed. We landed at an airfield near SWINDON, and travelled the balance of the journey by rail (where navigating is not necessary, and we were sure of arriving at our destination)....

(Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/1 Cdn Inf Div/K/F,  
Major A.F. Knight, "Notes for D.A. Q.M.G.  
War Diary".)

(d) "A & Q" Aspects of the Planning

97. With General Simonds' return, planning increased at an intense pace. Little time could be lost as deadlines for final loading and shipping dates were approaching. The operational plan will be presented in detail below. At this point it would be well to consider certain "A" and "Q" aspects of the detailed planning for the employment of a Canadian force in a climate very different from that to which they had been accustomed during three years of training in England. Lt.-Col. Gilbride, A.A. & Q.M.G., 1 Cdn Inf Div, discussed many of the administrative problems in the planning of "HUSKY" at a later date. His account is in part as follows:

The planning for operation HUSKY involved a great number of detailed calculations and many problems which had never risen before presented themselves, such as waterproofing of Sherman tks and the type of equipment Cdn Army personnel should bring with them into battle, when fighting with British firms. The spare parts situation in the Middle East and the sources of maintenance had to be considered plus the

type of veh for beach landing, for example, 4 x 4 vehs to cross sandbars, cutting out water trailers and using water trucks instead. We had to make certain that nothing was forgotten since there would be no shipping from the United Kingdom for this operation until 42 days after the landing.....

The Maintenance Project covered practically all details, from which we knew the contents of every lorry, and the drivers themselves knew what was in their lorries, where they were to go on landing and once they arrived there, what to do.....

When the waterproofing of vehs was completed vehs and stores were called to the ports of embarkation and this proceeded smoothly. We were able, in addition, to work in quite a number of spare vehs, but although we were assured that the majority of our 3-tonners were satisfactory and that the heights of the cabs were correct, we found that we had to cut down loads and heights on a lot of the vehs at the last minute. The stowing of the vehs was carried out efficiently and without hindrance.

We also had to make detailed arrangements in moving important stores to vehs such as amn, supplies and water. We had to make sure that the right stores and man were placed on the right veh to balance out the proper sub convoy.

During all the administrative planning we dealt with the War Office on any special equipments or changes of equipments, with CMHQ for any requests to depart from Canadian policy and on "A" matters and with 1 Cdn Army for completion of G1098 equipment. Our greatest difficulty was the fact that this Division was not completely mobilized when we commenced preparing for a combined operation. Had the Division been previously mobilized it would not have been as difficult a preparation as it turned out to be during the planning stage.....

(Hist Sec File Italy 1943/1 Cdn Inf Div/O/D,  
Account by Lt.-Col. W.P. Gilbride, A.A. & Q.M.G.,  
1 Cdn Div. Given 9 Oct 43 at Div H.Q. area near  
LUCERA, Italy.)

98. Many of the important decisions of the "A" and "Q" Planning resulted from the visit of Brigadier Beament and Lt.-Col. Tow to North Africa and the Middle East. They attended meetings at CAIRO and ALGIERS at which a wide range of "A" and "Q" matters were discussed. Decisions were made and brought back to the United Kingdom for final approval. (File P.A. 1-14-1, Record of "A" and "Q" Meeting G.H.Q., M.E.F. 4 May; Record of Meeting at A.F.H.Q., 10 May; Report of Trip to the Middle East and North Africa by Brigadier Beament 29 Apr to 14 May 43, dated 21 May 43.)

99. It was considered essential to have a Canadian "A" Staff element at General Alexander's Headquarters, although as far as possible, the Canadian forces were to work through the normal British Staff channels. The Canadian "A" system, however, differed in many respects from the British, and hence required separate treatment. As a result of Brigadier Beament's recommendation, and following approval of A.F.H.Q., a Canadian Section G.H.Q. 1st Echelon was authorized at General Alexander's Headquarters. As a basic principle, it was laid down that all matters

of administration were to be dealt with to the highest degree possible through normal Staff and Command channels. The chief functions of Cdn Sec G.H.Q., 1 Ech, under an A.A. & Q.M.G. (Lt.-Col. Tow) were (a) to provide a direct liaison on all except operational matters between the Canadian service authorities in the United Kingdom and the Commander-in-Chief, (b) to act as a channel of communication on administrative matters between the Canadian Force Commander in the field and the Canadian service authorities in the United Kingdom, or the Commander-in-Chief, as might be appropriate and (c) to provide a Canadian Staff Element at the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief to assist and advise the principal Staff Officers concerned in matters which were peculiarly Canadian. There were to be no Canadian representatives at intervening headquarters. (*ibid.*, Special Instructions to A.A. & Q.M.G., Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech, etc. 23 Jun 43.)

100. A separate Canadian section was also required at G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon. The officer in charge of this section was to be a representative at the Base of the Senior Officer of the Adjutant-General's Branch at Headquarters, 15th Army Group, in matters relating to the reinforcement of the Canadian force (*ibid.*). There were many knotty problems connected with the formation and location of this section which are gone into in great detail in Brigadier Beament's report.

101. To facilitate the work of these sections the Canadian authorities were anxious to set up a separate wireless link from North Africa to the United Kingdom and were prepared to authorize formation of a special signals section for the job. Force 141 and the War Office, however, were adverse to this proposal, arguing that the existing channels would be sufficient to handle the traffic. It was not until the following autumn, months after the campaign had begun, that the project was finally approved. (C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1/3, Tels X 495 Force 141 to W.O. 12 Jun and 96271 W.O. - FORTUNE 4 Jul 43; File P.A. 1-14-1, Brigadier Genet to General McNaughton 13 Aug and General Montague to Under-Secretary of State, 31 Aug 43.)

102. The provision of reinforcements for a Canadian Force proceeding to a new theatre of operations presented special problems, particularly since this force was to be engaged in an assault landing, and immediate casualties were to be expected. To mobilize Canadian reinforcements and set them up in depots close to the theatre of operations, without at the same time compromising security, presented an administrative problem of no small importance. It must be appreciated that at this particular time there were very few Canadian Army personnel in North Africa except for those known to be on attachment with the First Army. This was one of the major questions discussed in CAIRO during the conversations between Brigadier Beament, Lt.-Col. Tow and the senior staff officers of Force 545.

103. To conform with Middle-East establishments, the Canadian infantry battalions were mobilized to the former war establishment of four rifle companies rather than three, and reinforcements were calculated on this basis (File P.A. 1-14-1, Memorandum of Conference at C.M.H.Q. 27 Apr, dated 6 May 43). On 29 Apr 43, Brigadier Foulkes, B.G.S., First Cdn Army reported to General McNaughton that 1 Cdn Div was adopting the large infantry battalion War Establishment and that the battalions would be scaled down to assault strength by leaving out of battle selected personnel. General McNaughton remarked that this selection "should be watched closely to ensure that key personnel are available for reorganizing units after battle". (*ibid.*, Memorandum of Conversation held at H.Q. First Cdn Army, dated 29 Apr 43).

104. It was decided that reinforcements would be held "on the basis of two months at intense rates", 396 officers and 5732 other ranks. Included with these reinforcements were ".....3 officers suitable for employment as Grade II Staff Officers. Two of these for General Staff duties and one for Administrative duties....." Three additional officers were also included who were capable of holding third grade staff appointments. (File P.A. 1-14-1, Tel G.S. 1128, for Stuart from McNaughton, 17 May 43; Memorandum of Meeting held at H.Q. First Cdn Army 16 May, dated 20 May 43; C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/2, Tel 89853, W.O. to FORTUNE, 15 Jun 43.)

105. This reinforcement rate might seem somewhat high but there was a special reason. In a conversation with General Nye, General McNaughton explained that it was deliberate "in order that battle casualties may be returned to the United Kingdom to educate other Canadian troops in battle craft." General Nye said that he "considered this a very sound policy.....and was sure shipping would be available." In a communication to General Montague on the subject, General Simonds promised to co-operate, but added that he could not "accept in any sense the view that 1st Canadian Division is a 'battle school' through which the maximum number of untried reinforcements is to be passed." General Montague answered by reiterating General McNaughton's intentions but went on to say that the Divisional Commander's right to a proper proportion of recoverable casualties would be recognized. Lt.-Col. Tow, Officer in Charge, Cdn Sec G.H.Q., 1 Ech, would have full powers to take action regarding any personnel not under General Simonds' command. (C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1/2, Memorandum of Conversation, General McNaughton - General Nye, 12 Jun dated 14 Jun 43; General Simonds - General Montague, 4 Jun 43; General Montague - General Simonds, 16 Jun 43.)

106. A War Establishment was authorized for a Canadian Base Reinforcement Depot which was to consist of a Headquarters and four reinforcement battalions. Nos. 1 and 2 Battalions were to be infantry reinforcements, No. 3 other arms and No. 4 an advanced Base Reinforcement Depot with a proportion of reinforcements from all arms. (5) No. 4 Battalion consisting of 117 officers and 1338 other ranks was to be brought along on the D + 3 (follow-up) convoy. Both the War Office and A.F.H.Q. were initially opposed to this on the grounds that it would be impracticable to land them just behind the assault troops. To send them ahead, however, would compromise security, while to send them all to North Africa at the time of the landing might leave the Canadian force without reinforcements for a considerable time. It was argued that the Canadians should take additional fighting troops instead of reinforcements. These, however, would have required vehicles for which there was no shipping space, and it was not realized that these reinforcements represented bodies without vehicles and therefore could easily be taken. Generals Simonds and Montague pressed their case and won it. As it turned out, these reinforcements proved most useful on the beaches after the

- 
- (5) Inf (61-794); CAC (10-90); Recce (1-14); Arty (28-252); Eng (8-92); Sigs (3-37); RCASC (2-18); Meds (4-31); Ord (-5); Prov (-5). (C.M.H.Q. File 6/CBRD/1, 6/Cdn Admin/6, Authorized Holding and Suggested Organization 4 Bn, 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement Depot, 21 May 43.)

landing assault when every available man was required to assist in the unloading of munitions, rations and stores. Moreover, the Canadians found themselves in the position of having reinforcements available during the actual fighting. Had heavy casualties been sustained during the assault landings and these reinforcements not been available, it would have taken at least three weeks to replace the manpower wastage. These and other instances where changes in policy were recommended and in some cases grudgingly granted, later proved to have worked out entirely satisfactorily and were adopted by the Eighth Army as a whole for the subsequent landing in Italy. (Hist Sec File Italy 1943/1 Cdn Inf Div/O/D; Account by Lt.-Col. Gilbride, 9 Oct 43; C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1/2, Tels 84711, 86153 and 86843, W.O. to FORTUNE (A.F.H.Q.) dated 29 May, 3 Jun and 5 Jun; Tels AC3, AC5, AC6, 7769, 2281 and AC21, FORTUNE (A.F.H.Q.) to W.O. dated 29 May, 1 Jun, 2 Jun, 3 Jun, 18 Jun and 18 Jun 43.)

107. Since sufficient other rank reinforcements were not available from the reinforcement units in the United Kingdom, some were drawn from other Canadian field formations as listed below:

2 Cdn Div	322	3 Cdn Army Tk Bde	150
3 Cdn Div	379	1 Cdn Army Tps	35
4 Cdn (Armd) Div	276	1 Cdn Corps Tps	13
5 Cdn (Armd) Div	247	2 Cdn Corps Tps	24
		Lorne Scots Trg Bn	117

Requirements for officers were met solely by demands on reinforcement units (File P.A. 1-14-1, A.D.A.G. (A) to Senior Officer C.M.H.Q., 18 May 43).

108. For obvious security reasons, units concerned were not told the reason for this transfer and so they took the opportunity, in many cases, of unloading their worst soldiers and tradesmen who were out of practice in their trades. The Commanding Officer, Colonel Basher, reported considerable difficulties in the initial organization of 1 C.B.R.D. but by the time it was ready to sail the standard of discipline had improved. (C.M.H.Q. File 6/CBRD/1, Colonel Basher to D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., 25 Jun 43.)

109. Medical arrangements were another important phase of the "A" Planning. The original plans provided for the inclusion in Force "Y" of No. 5 Canadian General Hospital which was to remain packed on shipboard with a view to setting up in Sicily at the earliest possible date. Brigadier Beament, however, had not been satisfied that the medical provisions were on a sufficient scale, and suggested that additional Canadian medical units be despatched. It was planned to evacuate Canadian casualties westward from Sicily and TRIPOLI to SCUSSE and SFAX and it was therefore considered expedient to have a Canadian hospital in the latter vicinity. The British authorities welcomed this proposal. C.M.H.Q. therefore offered the War Office to provide the following additional medical units:-

One 1200 bed Hospital (15 Cdn Gen Hosp)  
 One Cdn Convalescent Depot (1 Cdn Conv Depot)  
 Two Cdn F.S.U.s. (Nos 1 and 2)  
 One Cdn F.T.U. (No 1)

The offer was accepted. (P.A. 1-14-1, Brigadier Beament's Report, 21 May and Memorandum re Meeting at H.Q. First Cdn Army, 16 May 43, dated 20 May 43.)

110. As a general policy it was laid down that until such time as a port was secured and a general hospital landed (probably not for several days) all casualties would be evacuated from the Island, except for trivial cases, and cases too severely injured to be moved. An estimate of casualties was made which happily

proved to be very much greater than was the case:

The estimated numbers requiring evacuation are:

D to D plus 6	3200
D plus 7 to D plus 14	1500
D plus 14 (and weekly thereafter)	875

These figures may be broken down as follows:

D	1000
D plus 1	600
D plus 2	500
D plus 3	400
D plus 4	300
D plus 5	200
D plus 6 to D plus 13	200 daily
D plus 14 onwards	125 daily

Of the above figures for casualties half will be sitting and half lying.

(Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/1 Cdn Inf Div/R/1,  
Operation "HUSKY" Maintenance Project of  
1 Cdn Div, 14 Jun 43, Sec 16.)

111. A suggestion that the Canadian hospital ship "Lady Nelson" be placed on the North-Africa - United Kingdom run was rejected (*ibid.*). Other small units authorized as a result of Brigadier Beament's recommendations included:

- 1 Canadian Dental Company
- A Canadian Graves Registration Unit
- 1 & 2 Canadian Line of Communications Provost Sections  
(to service Canadian Reinforcement Units)
- A detachment of First Canadian Army Base Post Office.

(*ibid.*, See also para 246 below.)

112. Several other detachments accompanying the Force may be noted here. Arrangements for news coverage must be made in planning for any campaign in modern warfare. This was the responsibility of No. 1 Canadian Public Relations Detachment under the command of Major C.W. Gilchrist. There were to be a conducting officer and two correspondents with each Canadian Force for the actual landing, followed by a reinforcement party of further correspondents conducted by another officer. The "assault" correspondents were to join their formation during the training in Scotland, wearing captains' "pips" instead of their press badges, for security reasons. (Hist Sec File: Sicily/1 Cdn PR Det/C/D, Account by Maj. C.W. Gilchrist, A.D.P.R. for Canadian forces in "HUSKY".) General McNaughton directed that, "They will be fully trusted, treated with complete frankness and given every proper facility for their work". On their attachment to 1 Cdn Inf Div the G.S.O. 1 issued a note to the effect:

The Div PRO will facilitate war correspondents in getting the news in the field and will arrange speedy transmission of their reports to the rear. When no correspondents are with the formation he will himself collect and transmit news reports to the rear.

(Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/1 Cdn Inf Div: PR  
Sec Directive signed by G.S.O. 1, 17 May 43.)

113. Film and photographic sections were also attached to the Divisional Headquarters (6), to obtain records of training and operations for publicity and military purposes (ibid., 24 May).

114. An innovation in the Canadian Army for this campaign was the special appointment of an Historical Recorder and a War Artist to accompany the Canadian Division. The duties of the historical Officer, Captain Sesia, previously a G.S.O. 3, 1 Cdn Inf Div, were to collect narratives of personnel participating in important phases of operations, to ensure the preservation of documents, etc., of historical value, and to keep a diary of his own observations. Lieutenant Ogilvie, a distinguished Canadian artist, with considerable military experience, was to make "the fullest possible pictorial record of the operations". (P.A. 1-14-1 General Montague to H.Q. 1 Cdn Div, 21 May 43; C.P.S File 2000/1, C.M.H.Q. to 1 Cdn Div, 11 May 43.)

115. Because of lack of shipping space it was necessary to shut out several units of the 1 Cdn Inf Div force from the assault and follow-up convoys, namely 3 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp, the balance of 1 Cdn Div R.A.S.C., consisting of H.Q. M.T. Coy, one Tpt Pl, 2 Comp Pl, one R.D.I. and one Wksp Pl, and 4 Cdn Recce Regt (less one sqn) with its L.A.D. (C.M.H.Q. File, Memorandum re Order of Battle, 16 May 43, Appendix "D"). Lt.-Col. Gilbride commented on this decision as follows:

....It was necessary to cut down on the number of administrative units that would be taken but arrangements had to be made to ensure that those brought would be sufficient to maintain the fighting units. One large RCASC unit was made up (composite coy) which had a large workshop and HQ plus five pls with sufficient RDI (relief driver increment) to allow for 24 hr driving and service station maintenance as vehs came in. A pl from this composite coy for instance, was used to carry defence stores and airfield construction stores rather than to draw vehs from the British General Transport Company and also a pl was used from the 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde RCASC to cater for 12 CTR which was under comd this Division.

We decided that it would be better to take almost two complete Bde Workshops rather than three very reduced ones so that we eliminated 3 Cdn Inf Bde Workshop and since there was room for only one workshop in 'Y' Force convoy it was further decided that it would be better to have a third line Inf Tps Wkshp which could work on Cdn vehs and could do second and third line repairs. There was included an adv wkshp det to work with 12 CTR. This proved to be most successful during the operation. Also included was a recovery tk wkshp which was used on beach recovery and it worked with the beach group. It was then felt that there would be need for some system of Ordnance supplies to follow Div but there was no space available for a large Div Sub Pk so we included a Div Sec of the Sub Pk especially scaled on the 'D' plus 3 convoy and had the Div Sub Pk pro-

---

(6) Film Sec: 1 Offr, 3 Sgt cameramen, 5 O.Rs.  
Photo Sec: 3 Offr Photographers, 4 O.Rs.

ceed with 'Y' Force. This also later proved to be essential because our landing reserves were taken over by Corps and subsequently by Army and we would not have had any spares at our disposal if we did not have the Div Sec.

(Gilbride Account, op. cit.)

116. With regard to the matter of Honours and Awards "it was agreed that in principle immediate awards which are within the delegative power of Combined Force Commander should be available to Canadians in the same manner and under the same circumstances as they are available to British Service troops" (P.A. 1-14-1, Memorandum of Meeting held at H.Q. First Cdn Army, 16 May 43, dated 18 May 43, see also Tel A1618 General McNaughton to General Stuart, 18 May 43).

117. Preparations on the "Q" side were just as complicated. No item of equipment, no matter how small, could be overlooked, since there would be no shipping from the United Kingdom for this operation until 42 days after the landing. A most important decision taken was that Canadian vehicles would be used entirely. Thompson sub-machine guns had to be taken because Sten guns were not used in the Middle East. Due to maintenance being provided from the Middle East all Signal Equipment of Canadian manufacture, especially the No 19 wireless set, had to be withdrawn and provision made for substitution of British equipment on British scales for corresponding units. A new weapon, the P.I.A.T. (Projector Infantry Anti-Tank), was also included. This weapon was still on the secret list at the time. 17-pounder guns were issued to the Anti-Tank Regiment while the infantry 2-pounders were replaced by 6-pounders. The Saskatoon Light Infantry, Support Battalion in the Division, also received new weapons, namely the 4.2" mortar and the Oerlikon. The new light-type respirator was also issued, as well as a new mark of anti-gas ointment. In addition to bringing special arms and equipment, it was also found necessary to change the organization of certain administrative units, at the same time ensuring that those brought would be sufficient to maintain the fighting units. (Gilbride Account, op. cit.; Hist Sec File 1 Cdn Inf Div R.C.O.C./B/F, Summary of Preparation, (A.D.O.S.), 28 May 43).

118. Since the earlier decision not to use mule transport (para 41) was revised again, an ex-cavalry officer and muleteers who had experience with mule transport were attached to the Division and over 100 sets of pack saddlery taken along. (C.P.S. File 2001, Minutes A & Q Conference, 28 Apr 43/"1 Canadian Division Force 'X' Maintenance Project", see para 125 below; Gilbride Account, op. cit.)

119. Nor was the comfort of the troops overlooked:

.....Also provided were comforts for troops such as E.F.I.(7) stores. These were provided for on a full scale for 30,000 tps for 30 days and among other things included beer and spirits. We were told that provision for this was unnecessarily taking valuable shipping space....We found that tonnage space was available for these stores and we brought them along....

(Gilbride Account.)

120. The special equipment referred to by Lt.-Col. Gilbride (para 97 above) was distributed sometimes on a lavish scale, e.g. 45,000 mosquito nets were provided. This equipment included khaki drill clothing for tropical wear; short puttees; special camouflage paint (to conform with Middle East requirements); rope soled shoes; tinted eye shields and glasses; sand channels and mats; inverkip sledges; wading stretchers for motorcycles; waterproof covers; air and ground recognition discs and strips in accordance with Middle East specification; pack saddlery, Yukon packs and Everest carriers (for mountain warfare); anti-malarial sets, bush nets, fly swatters and flit guns. (Summary of Preparation (A.D.O.S.) op. cit.) There were also, of course, all the various forms of motor transport used by a modern army.

121. The most important addition to the vehicles enumerated above was the D.U.K.W. The D.U.K.W. (or "Duck") is a normal 2½ ton 6-wheeled truck which has in fact a boat built around it. All six wheels are power driven. On entering the water the power is transferred to the propeller, the D.U.K.W. being steered by a normal steering wheel acting as the helm. Its seaworthiness is good and its performance through heavy surf remarkable. The maximum speed in water is better than six knots. If the propeller fails, the D.U.K.W. can be driven for two miles by the wheels. Its primary task was the transfer of stores from ship to shore. Because of its amphibious powers it was the only craft that had no fear of the sandbars which it was expected would be found off the beaches where the Canadian Division was to land. Indeed, in case of emergency as will be seen, it could even be used in place of L.C.A. to carry assault troops ashore. 350 of these American-made amphibians were allotted to the Eighth Army, and 100 were sent direct from the United States to the United Kingdom for the 1st Canadian Division. (C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1, "DUKWS" for 1 Cdn Inf Div, copy dated 15 May 43 of a document brought back from N.A. by Brigadier Beament.)

122. There was probably no other item of equipment for the Expedition that caused more anxiety than these 100 D.U.K.Ws. Until the last moment it was uncertain whether they would arrive in time to be loaded. The loading also presented considerable difficulty for it was essential if they were to fulfil their object, that these amphibians be loaded so that they might be launched at an early hour after arrival. It was planned to have 41 afloat by first light on D-day and a further 21 by the same night.

123. The training of special drivers was yet another problem since the D.U.K.Ws. were so late in arriving. It was arranged for one officer and two driver mechanics to fly from North Africa to the United Kingdom to train two amphibian platoons, R.A.S.C., at the Combined Training Centre near INVERARAY, Scotland. Only two D.U.K.Ws. were available until the first consignment arrived from the United States early in June. Orders were given for these to be rushed immediately to the C.T.C. so that all drivers might have practice driving them prior to loading. (Correspondence and memoranda on this subject are very numerous. The following files were drawn upon: C.P.S. File 1018 Tels 141F/104/G (P), 518 FORTUNE to W.O., 12 May, GP (1) SD/3038, Force 545 to W.O., 14 May, 80509, W.O. to A.F.H.Q., 17 May, 80826, W.O. to Force 545, 18 May, 86460, W.O. to 12th Army, 4 Jun 43; C.P.S. File 1018, War Cabinet Joint Planning Staff, Minutes of Meetings dated 18, 26, 31 May; C.P.S. File 2209/2 "Amphibious Vehicles"; C.P.S. Telegrams File, Tels 445 and W 417/711, A.F.H.Q. to W.O., 11 and 12 May 43.)

124. All the above and hundreds of other items too numerous to mention here made the Canadian Force a formidable one for, as

General Simonds was told at the War Office, this was "to be the best found Expedition which ever left the United Kingdom" (P.A. 1-14-1, Memorandum dated 14 May 43).

125. Many other "A" and "Q" decisions were embodied in "Operation 'HUSKY' Maintenance Project of 1 Canadian Division", dated 14 Jun 43, a very detailed and comprehensive document, the result of long weeks of intensive planning. (Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/1 Cdn Inf Div/R/1, Operation "HUSKY" Maintenance Project.)

126. Four major points affecting the administrative plan were stressed in the first section of the order:

- (a) Scarcity of water in the PACHINO PENINSULA and the uncertainty of finding water for replenishment necessitates an exceptionally large quantity of water being taken by the Assault and the Immediate Follow Up convoys. In addition special engineering facilities viz, well boring and distillation apparatus have been included in the stores taken by the Assault and Immediate Follow Up convoys.
- (b) There are no ports in the PACHINO PENINSULA, consequently provision must be maintained over the beaches for a considerable period in the preliminary stages of the campaign.
- (c) The hilly nature of the hinterland entails the possible use of maintaining warfare equipment at an early stage in the operation.
- (d) Malaria is very prevalent in SICILY and special precautions must be taken against this disease, which includes the landing of large quantities of anti-malaria equipment.

(ibid., Sec 1)

127. The administrative intention was expressed as follows:

To maintain Force "X" including Royal Navy and Royal Air Force components, over the beaches from D- to D plus 21, building up by D plus 14, a reserve of 10 days maintenance for the Force.

(ibid., Sec 2)

128. The Divisional Maintenance Area was to be organized and controlled by Headquarters, 103 Sub-Area (Beach) until Headquarters, 30 Corps, assumed responsibility. 3 and 4 Beach Groups under command of this Headquarters were actually to establish the Maintenance Areas and handle all stores for the Division. During the early stages 1st Canadian Division also had responsibility for certain Naval and Air Force stores (ibid., Secs 4, 5, 6 and 8).

129. Two Docks Operating Companies were included in Force "X" under command of the P.M.L.O., 1st Canadian Division, for unloading the Assault and Follow Up convoys (ibid., Sec 10).

130. Motor transport had to be kept to the minimum because of shortage of ship space, so the following scales were laid down:

- (a) First Line - Formations in the Assault Convoy will land with 'Assault Scale' of transport and will be brought up to 'Light Scale' on the D-plus 3 Convoy.
- (b) Second Line - Owing to the limited shipping space

a reduction in second line transport will be necessary...

(ibid., Sec 12)

131. The nature of the operation also involved the use of several different types of rations which were listed as follows:

Emergency (chocolate) Ration	- 1 per man
48-hour Mess Tin Ration	- 1 per man
Armoured Fighting Vehicle Packs	- 3 days reserve for Tank and Reconnaissance Regiments
COMPO Pack (14 men)	- For all troops and Prisoners of War until D plus 24.
Tommy Cookers (1 per Mess Tin Ration)	- 1 per man
Self-Heating Soup	- 1 tin per man (assault troops only)

Bread will NOT be available.....

One emergency ration, one 48-hour mess tin ration and one Tommy cooker were to be issued to each man after embarkation. (ibid., Sec 15.)

132. Due to the shortage of water referred to above its issue was restricted to a maximum of one gallon per man per day for all purposes. It was stressed that all units must capture and control with the least possible delay all available sources of water within their respective areas, but local supplies were to be regarded as dangerous until tested by medical personnel. During the voyage all troops were to be issued with sterilization tablets and carefully instructed in their use. (ibid., Sec 15 A.)

133. A section on Civil Affairs provided that a military government for the administration of the civilian inhabitants in the territory would be established immediately after occupation. Civil Affairs Officers were to be attached to the Divisional Headquarters to look after "the early resumption in the territory of law and order and the normal life of the civilian population", but as long as active operations continued they were not to concern themselves with communications, transport, or public utilities. (ibid., Sec 27.)

134. Other sections detailed instructions for provost corps, engineer services, postal services, ammunition, fuel and supplies, ordnance, and R.E.M.E. stores, labor, salvage, chaplains and burials, graves registration, intercommunication, documentation, handling of Prisoners of War and special methods for de-waterproofing of vehicles.

135. Early in June as the planning was being completed Brigadier Sewell, D.A. & Q.M.G., of 30 Corps arrived from North Africa to go over all the administrative aspects of the operation with the Canadian "A & Q" Staff. He also visited the Division during its final training in Scotland. (C.P.S. File 1034, Notes on Visit of Brigadier Sewell, 6 Jun 43.)

#### (e) Training in Scotland

136. While the Headquarters staffs were busily proceeding with planning in LONDON, the troops were just as busily engaged in special training in Scotland. The three brigade groups of 1 Cdn Inf Div had recently undergone basic combined operations training at the Combined Operations Training Centre, at INVERARAY, Scotland, (8)

---

(8) Divisional Staff Officers had attended a Combined Operations Planning Course at LARGS at the beginning of the year.

but this alone was not considered sufficient to fit them for an operational role (Hist Sec Report No. 93). The little time available for advanced combined operations training had made it necessary to send the Canadians into training areas in Scotland immediately after they took over from 3 (Br) Div.

137. Although 1 Cdn Div, like the other overseas Canadian Divisions, was made up in its rank and file of people from the breadth and length of Canada, there is no doubt that the influence of Canada's three Permanent Force infantry regiments and Permanent Force supporting arms gave it characteristics peculiar to itself. This was the Division which came overseas in 1939 under General McNaughton, which found itself almost embroiled in the British European defeat in 1940, which stood on guard in Britain thereafter, which sent a small force to SPITSBERGEN in 1941, and which smarted under the decision to give 2 Cdn Div the role of participating in the DIEPPE operation in August 1942. There is no doubt that 1 Cdn Div considered itself the logical choice for the next major operation in which the Canadian Army should become engaged.

138. During the preceding six weeks the 1st Division had engaged in a series of exercises - "MAPLE III", "PRESENT", "PAST", "WELSH" - which were carried out on a major scale. It was a remarkable coincidence that in one of these exercises the south coast of Sussex was made to represent the south coast of Sicily on which the Canadian Army, together with American forces, were said to have established bridgeheads. The final exercise lasted eight days involving the longest moves by convoy in the Division's history up to that time, which stood the Division in good stead when it found itself operating under similar circumstances in actual battle. In addition to this training the Division continued to maintain its anti-invasion role in East Sussex. (Evidence of Hist Offr 1 Cdn Inf Div.)

139. In order that undue attention would not be directed towards 1 Cdn Inf Div and 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde after these formations had proceeded to Scotland for advanced training, the B.G.S. First Cdn Army issued a Directive stating that arrangements had been made for advanced combined training for 1 Cdn Div and 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde under Scottish Command, and that the units of both these formations would move in accordance with a schedule issued by the War Office. The Directive concluded by saying that arrangements for training 2 and 3 Cdn Inf Divs would be issued at a later date. (C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1, Letter B.G.S. First Cdn Army to Comd 1 Cdn Corps, 24 Apr 43.)

140. On 25 Apr 43 a Training Directive was issued by the War Office which outlined a programme to be followed by 1 Cdn Div and 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde with a view to undertaking "(a) an opposed landing, (b) subsequent land operations including mountainous country." The training programme consisted of advanced assault training for the Infantry Brigade Groups at C.T.C. INVERARAY and refresher basic training for Divisional and Army troops at C.T.C. TOWARD. It was directed that 1 and 2 Cdn Inf Bdes would be trained as assault Bdes and 3 Cdn Inf Bde as a follow-up Bde. 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde was to take over the Sherman tanks from 33 (British) Army Tk Bde and commence training on these. In addition to the above, certain British units including 142 (S.P.) Regt, R.A. (self-propelled Arty), 70 Med Regt, R.A., and 75 and 104 L.A.A. Regts, R.A., which formed part of the assaulting forces, were to train with Divisional Troops. Nos. 3 and 4 Beach Groups (specially-trained troops for maintaining the beaches once the bridgehead is secured) had also commenced training under previous arrangements and were to continue under these arrangements. It was directed that all this

training was to be carried out with the assistance of 1st (British) Corps who were supervising that of 3rd (British) Division. (C.P.S. File 2152, Directives for Training 1 Cdn Div and Attached Troops, 25 Apr and 1 May 43 and 1 Cdn Div Training Programme at C.T.C.S., 26 Apr 43, both signed by Director of Military Training, W.O.)

141. It was General Simonds' express desire that as much mountain training as possible be included, if time permitted, for the whole Division and for 3 Cdn Inf Bde in particular. It was originally intended that 3 Cdn Inf Bde would proceed to Wales for mountain training but this was later changed and the Brigade took this training at CRIEFF, Scotland, instead. (*ibid.*)

142. The training period as laid down for each Brigade Group at INVERARAY was as follows:

1 Cdn Inf Bde	30 Apr - 8 May 43
2 Cdn Inf Bde	9 May - 17 May 43
3 Cdn Inf Bde	19 May - 26 May 43

In addition, 3 Cdn Inf Bde would take mountain warfare training in the CRIEFF area under the direction of a training team supplied by the Commandant, Mountain and Snow Warfare School, GLENFESHIE, Scotland. This training was to be undertaken prior to proceeding to INVERARAY for the period stated above. It was further directed that 33 (British) Army Tk Bde would give 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde all possible assistance in their training (*ibid.*).

143. Such was the programme, as outlined above, to be followed by the Canadian formations. On 29 Apr 43, the advance party of 1 Cdn Inf Bde arrived at INVERARAY and the main body arrived on the following day. From this date onwards, units in Sussex packed up and proceeded to Scotland by railway and road, leaving behind rear parties who cleaned up the evacuated areas, settled accounts, disposed of surplus kit and equipment. (Evidence of Hist Offr, 1 Cdn Inf Div.) Most of the troops were moved to their new locations by train but the Division's motor transport proceeded by convoys passing through the heart of LONDON enroute (W.D., P.P.C.L.I. 5-8 May 43).

144. The headquarters of formations of 1 Cdn Div in Scotland were located as follows:

H.Q. 1 Cdn Div and	
H.Q. R.C.A., 1 Cdn Div	TROON S.8153
H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Bde	KILMARNOCK S.9260
H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde	HAMILTON T.2177
H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Bde	GILMERTON O.3945

(C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1, Location Statement, 12 May 43).

145. In conjunction with the training of the Infantry Brigades, the supporting arms, and the various units of the Services (Medical, Army Service Corps, Ordnance, etc.), courses were also held for specialists such as driving, waterproofing, anti-tank gunnery, etc. Assault boat drill (getting in and out of mock-up L.C.A. with fighting equipment) was held under the supervision of Royal Navy instructors. Under this arrangement every possible effort was made to take advantage of the available time left for training. Waterproofing of vehicles had to be completed by 28 May when they would commence moving to the ports. All loading of stores and motor transport had to be completed in the Bristol Channel and Manchester area by 12 Jun, in the Mersey by 13 Jun and in the Clyde area by 14 Jun. It was thus obvious that little time could be wasted during the training period allotted to both Canadian formations. (See C.P.S. "Training" File, 2150 and 2152; note Programme of Events, 16 May 43.)

146. The week's training that each Brigade completed at INVERARAY included hardening training, hill climbing, practice with scrambling nets, assault landings, fast marches, and sniper training. Several exercises, involving unloading from large ships into L.C.A. by night and landing on beaches, were the high features of the intense programme. (W.Ds., P.P.C.L.I., R.C.R., R. 22e R., for May 43.)

147. Apart from the week at the C.T.C., each battalion carried on a full syllabus of training and participated in several brigade schemes. The daily routine included P.F., bayonet practice, cross-country runs and unarmed combat. There were also frequent night patrols, special instruction for officers in the use of the number 18 wireless set and practice in the use of the compass at night. Special instruction was given in beach exit drill, the breaching of gaps in mine fields with emphasis on the Bangalore Torpedo, the use of mine detecting apparatus, the P.I.A.T. (considered a "No. 1 novelty"), in mountain warfare training and in drill for the new light type of respirator. (*ibid.*)

148. On 15 May 43 through a Directive on Operational Training General Simonds informed all his Commanders and Commanding Officers that 1 Cdn Div would go into action and that the blow against the enemy would be in Europe, opening with an assault landing. General Simonds stressed the need for taking advantage of every possible facility available to complete the battle training of the Division. He then outlined important points based upon lessons learned from the recent fighting in the Middle East which he had witnessed but a few months previously. (C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1, G.O.C. to all Comds and C.O.'s 1 Cdn Div, dated 15 May 43.)

149. The intensive training culminated in two major exercises, the second of which was to be a rehearsal of the actual assault. The first of these, known by the code name "WETSHOD", took place on 22 May. The Divisional "G" Staff left their Planning Conferences in LONDON to participate in this scheme. The object was -

- (a) To exercise the personnel and a limited number of vehs of 1 and 2 Cdn Inf Bde Gps and att tps in an opposed ldg and occupation of a covering posn.
- (b) To test Naval and Army sign comms especially during the early stages of a combined ldg.

(C.P.S. File 2151, 1 Corps Exercise "WETSHOD" Instr. No. 1, 8 May 43; W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, 21 May 43.)

150. The Brigade Groups embarked at GOUROCK and INVERARAY respectively in the same ships that they were to use on the operation itself. During the exercise landings took place north and south of TROON on the Ayresshire coast. 1 Cdn Inf Bde Gp landed on Beach TARE, approximately opposite MONCTON just south of TROON and 2 Cdn Inf Bde Gp landed on Beach UNCLE opposite GAILLES just north of TROON. (C.P.S. File 2151, 1 Corps Exercise "WETSHOD", Special Idea - Canadian.)

151. The G.O.C.-in-C., First Cdn Army, witnessed the landing of 2 Cdn Inf Bde Gp. He was accompanied by the G.O.C. 1 Cdn Corps (Lt.-Gen. Crerar), the G.S.O. 1, 1 Cdn Corps (Lt.-Col. Cunningham), and Brigadier Gibson, D.C.G.S. at N.D.H.Q. Notes

made by General McNaughton on the landing pointed out several weaknesses, chief among them being the lack of control by the beach organization. He also pointed out that there was a lack of adequate smoke, that the verrey lights were too low and that a high percentage of the mortar flares were duds. (File P.A. 1-14-1, Memorandum dated 26 May 43.)

152. On 26 May 43, Maj.-Gen. Drew, General Officer Commanding the Combined Training Centre, sent his comments on Exercise "WETSHOD" to Maj.-Gen. Simonds, outlining the weaknesses and shortcomings that he and his staff noted throughout the exercise. His main criticisms concerned

1. The passage of information.
2. Control by junior commanders.
3. Lack of cohesion and co-ordination in attacks.
4. Failure to establish Lt A.A. defences.
5. Week reception organization on the beaches.
6. The ineffectiveness of the Beach Group.

(C.P.S. File 2151, Director's Comments, 26 May 43.)

General Simonds replied thanking him warmly and saying that frank criticisms were just what he wanted. (See also Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/M "WETSHOD", containing Operation Orders, etc.)

153. After the exercise was completed, the Divisional "G" Staff returned to LONDON and resumed their planning. On 24 May all Unit Commanders likewise gathered in LONDON and were "put in the picture" at a briefing conference held by the G.O.C. (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, 23-29 May 43.)

154. General Montgomery visited England in the latter part of May, fresh from his victories in North Africa. On 19 May he had a conversation with General McNaughton concerning the Canadians' part in the coming operation. On the 27th he addressed a meeting of senior officers from the three services participating in "HUSKY". According to General McNaughton, "He made a very fine impression, and earned the confidence of all present in his plans which are a marked improvement over those put before me in preliminary studies." The substance of the address will be included in the subsection on the General Plan, paras 194-213 below (P.A. 1-14-1, Memorandum of Conversation, Generals McNaughton - Montgomery, 19 May dated 28 May 43; Cable, General McNaughton to General Stuart, 28 May 43). Planning was finally completed by the 31st of May and General Simonds and most of his staff returned to Scotland. (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div 31 May 43.)

155. Many of the planning personnel proceeded on a welcome five days leave. It may be noted that it was the G.O.C.'s wish that all ranks in the Division should have at least five days privilege leave. A directive to this effect had been in operation since 14 May, but leave was not granted while troops were at the C.T.C. or on the major exercises. (*ibid.*, 31 May; C.P.S. File 100, Minutes of A/Q Conference, 14 May 43.)

156. On the 3rd and 4th of June two divisional headquarters exercises called "CAMPFIRE" were held to practise the setting up of rear and forward divisional headquarters. On the 8th, 9th and 10th June, divisional signals exercises known as "ROCKET 1" and "ROCKET 2" were held at Dundonald Camp, GAILLES. These exercises comprised "an assault landing signal practice for all formations and attached troops in the Division". General McNaughton attended and later discussed the exercises with senior officers. (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div and Bde W.Ds. for June 43; See also Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/M "ROCKET" containing Exercise Instructions, Signal Instructions and diagrams and a lengthy telephone log.)

157. The previous week General Simonds had completed a thorough inspection of the whole Division, during which he outlined his general policy to all officers in each brigade group and referred to the possibility of real action follow-up in the "ROCKET" exercises. (W.Ds., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, P.P.C.L.I., R.C.R., R. 22e R., 1-7 Jun 43.)

158. The remaining days in Scotland saw the completion of waterproofing of all vehicles, a very important task for a force engaged in combined operations. From 1 Jun transport was being despatched to the various ports of embarkation. On 13, 14 and 15 Jun the various units and headquarters closed down their camps on Scottish soil and entrained for GOUROCK where they embarked on the ships that were eventually to carry them to the theatre of operations. (W.Ds., G.S., H.Q., 1 Cdn Inf Div, 1, 2, 3 Cdn Inf Bdes, R.C.R., P.P.C.L.I., R. 22e R., June 1943.)

159. The final briefing conference for all unit and formation commanders was held in LONDON on 15 Jun (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div 15 Jun 43).

160. On 10 Jun, General McNaughton sent the following cable to General Stuart in OTTAWA concerning his impressions of the Canadian forces' training and preparations in Scotland:

- Para I I have just returned from a visit to formations and representative units and apart from a few minor difficulties in course of adjustment everything is proceeding satisfactorily and to schedule.
- Para II Demonstration of Middle East technique in tank and infantry cooperation proved useful and immediately afterwards I held a conference our Corps, Divisional and Army Tank Bde Comds at which we were able to reach conclusion for uniform methods in Cdn Army. Copies will be sent you later.
- Para III Very much impressed with possibilities DUKW of which 100 have been made available. This provision has materially relieved our anxieties over being held up on sand bars with deep water inshore. It will substantially increase rate of build up in early stages assault landing.
- Para IV I witnessed Signal exercise covering assault phases which included participation all arms and services. Good progress in technique drill and execution evident.
- Para V Health, physical condition and morale of all ranks is excellent.
- Para VI Commanders down to Lt-Cols Comd now informed and all I talked to have high confidence.
- Para VII Waterproofing now practically complete and loading vehicles and stores proceeding.

(C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1/2, Tel G.S. 1356, 10 Jun 43, General McNaughton to General Stuart.)

(f) Security

161. In all the preparations for "HUSKY" and in the final embarking of the troops security precautions were an especial consideration. The fact that the United Kingdom component of the invasion was Canadian, made security measures more difficult since it was generally known that there were no Canadian formations in Africa or any other theatre of war. The divisional Field Security Officer took special precautions during the planning stages but felt that too many people were brought into "the know" in the early stages. There were some breaches of security during the training and planning period but the secret of the expedition's destination was well kept. When the troops finally embarked in the middle of June they still had no inkling where they were going or whether indeed this was the real thing or still another scheme. Speculation of course was rife. (Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/1 Cdn Inf Div/1 Cdn F.S. Sec/C/F, War Diary and other documents on the same file; "Summer Cruise 1943", account by Capt. D.H. Cunningham, in Hist Sec Files.)

162. Special orders were issued prior to embarkation to the effect that formation and unit signs, patches, designations or flashes denoting the country of origin of the troops were to be removed. However, once on board ship the troops were allowed to sew their patches back on again. (C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1/2, Agenda for meeting 28 May, Appendix "A"; W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, May 43, Appendix 90; C.P.S. Telegrams File, Tel SD/105 2812, FORTUNE to W.O., 20 May 43 and other telegrams; W.D., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Bde, 30 Jun 43.)

163. As a further security precaution at the time of embarkation it was arranged to continue wireless traffic on the divisional wireless links in Scotland in order to hide the movement from the enemy (Hist Sec File "HUSKY", 1 Cdn Fd Security Sec/C/F, Points discussed.....at I.S.S.B. 861st Meeting, 15 May 43.)

THE PLAN

(a) Intelligence: Topographical Description of Sicily

164. Enough has been said about the planning for Operation "HUSKY" to indicate what thorough and detailed work was accomplished. There is a tremendous amount of material available on all levels and concerning all aspects of the operational planning - only a summary can be included here. (Detailed information regarding the intelligence planning by 1 Cdn Inf Div for Operation "HUSKY" will be found in Hist Sec file Italy: 1943/1 Cdn Inf Div/L/D, Accounts by Capt. G.M.C. Sprung, Int Offr, 1 Cdn Inf Div and Capt. W. Hall, attached from Eight Army to H.Q. 1 Cdn Div as Air Photographic Interpreter.)

the I.S.I.S. (Inter Service Information Series) Report on Sicily which was published in a number of volumes. The great detail which this Report went into is well illustrated by a Supplement to the volume, "Resources", which in 41 closely printed pages lists 2,717 springs to be found in the Island along with information regarding their exact location, their yield per second and their utilization! (Hist Sec File "HUSKY" L/F, Part V (D) INLAND TOWNS, Part VI, COAST DEFENCES, (A) South Eastern Sicily, and a Supplement to Part II (RESOURCES), all dated May 1943. These are the only volumes in the Historical Section's files.)

166. The "1 Canadian Division Intelligence Summary" for the operation was probably based, to a large extent, on this Report. Everything that might affect the course of the campaign was taken

*Adm  
No. 1  
11 May 45  
JRD*

into consideration, - the historical, political, geographical and economic background of the Island and the purely military aspects of its defences.

167. The Historical Summary concludes with the following observations:

From the foregoing it will have been seen that the population of Sicily as a whole, as opposed to certain interests, has not been prosperous under Italian rule. After a period of neglect by Italy, the Fascist regime endeavoured to ameliorate the lot of the people and were apparently succeeding to some extent (although promises and expectations exceeded actual accomplishments), but the foreign policy of Mussolini has largely undone the work of years. It seems clear that there is opposition to the regime and to Germany and that there is a separatist movement favourable to this country; of the strength of this movement it is, of course, difficult to judge, but there would appear to be little doubt that conditions are such as to promise good results from its encouragement at the appropriate moment.

(Hist Sec File "HUSKY", 1/Cdn Inf Div/L/  
F, 1 Canadian Division Intelligence Summary.)

168. The succeeding section gives a detailed account of the government and administration of the Island, for as the Canadians were to discover, an invading army faces considerable local administrative problems in occupying enemy territory, and some knowledge of the previous system of administration is most necessary (*ibid.*).

169. The population, according to 1936 statistics, numbered 3,929,444. It was irregularly distributed, mostly in towns, because of the fear of malaria in country districts. The characteristics of the population and the probable attitude are noted as follows:

Sicilians have been described as temperamental and hot headed, but lacking single-heartedness and constancy for a cause. The large mass of the population is politically apathetic partly owing to poverty. Life is harsh; the great majority of the population is engaged in agriculture, and except in a few favoured spots, their life is a constant struggle for existence. Big estates, absentee landlords, malaria and the great shortage of water in a country where there is no rain from May to October have kept the standard of living very low. The standard of education and literacy is also very low, some 40 per cent of the population being unable to read or write. The younger age groups are of course more literate than the elder.

The Sicilian peasant commonly lives in a small town perched on a hill and often approached by a track so steep and rough that even the Sicilian carts cannot mount it. This isolation has helped the survival of many old customs and habits of thought.... At the outset of invasion it is possible that national pride stimulated by Fascist propaganda, may induce the civil population

to lend active assistance, at least in the early stages, to the defending forces. In these circumstances, they might even help the Germans, though this is most unlikely. It is, however, very questionable whether the efforts of the widely discredited Fascist propaganda machine will rally the Sicilians in the final emergency. On the contrary, it is more likely that the civil population will take no active part in military operations, but, as at Tripoli, will greet the invading forces with sullen indifference, whether they are British, Canadian or American.

(ibid.)

170. With respect to the topography of the Island, a general description reads in part as follows:

Almost the whole island is occupied by mountains and hills, which fall either directly to the sea or to restricted coastal plains or terraces. Apart from these coastal plains, the only area of low ground is that south of Mt ETNA where the lower courses of the R SIMETO, R DITTAINO and R CORNALUNGA form the flat CATANIA PLAIN liable to extensive flooding. AdmT No 1 11 May 45 01.22

.....In the East the valleys of the CATANIA PLAIN penetrate inland to the EREI Mts (the DITTAINO valley leads to the principal gap at ENNA). These hills are not an important barrier between East and West. In Central and Southern SICILY the bare treeless ridges and rolling hills composed in large part clays and soft rocks form difficult country; slopes are unstable and landslides probable.

(ibid.)

171. The climate is described as being hot and dry during the summer, "with conditions very constant, the temperature mounting by day and falling by night with monotonous regularity". Prevailing winds over the neighbouring seas are Northwesterly but on the coasts they are variable. Visibility is generally good during the day. Swell, as opposed to sea caused by the prevailing wind, is almost non-existent on the South coast. Airfield surfaces, visibility and cloud are, on the whole, favourable to aviation. (ibid.)

172. Detailed information is also supplied regarding communications on the Island. Three classes of roads are noted. "On nearly all routes there is a succession of ups and downs, and curves, owing to the mountainous nature of the Island." Gradients and curves on the State roads are well engineered, but many of the Provincial and Communal roads, on which the Canadian Division was destined to rely, follow a narrow and tortuous course. (ibid.)

173. A standard gauge railway runs through most of the coastal area while a network of secondary lines, many of narrow gauge, serves the interior (ibid.).

(b) Intelligence: Enemy Dispositions and Defences

174. The Intelligence Summary listed fifteen airfields in operation in Sicily, nine of which had been newly constructed during 1942. (See accompanying map of the Invasion of Sicily.) The German Air Force was thought to have a total of 452 aircraft and 24,000 personnel (including Flak (A.A.) personnel) on the Island while the Italians were estimated as having 285 to 290 aircraft and 10,000 personnel. Flying personnel were only from six

to seven percent of the total. (ibid.)

175. A later report indicated that all the bombers had been moved to the mainland leaving a total of only 500 planes on the Island, 200 being German (C.P.S. File 2500/3, 30 Corps, Planning Int Sum 3, 17 Jun 43).

176. The wider aspects of the air situation were gone into by General McNaughton in his preliminary conversations with General Kennedy and Brigadier Kirkwood at the War Office. The former said "that there was information to show that the Germans were short of petrol and that the main factor to be considered in deciding the relative strengths of air forces was the capacity of the available air fields. In his opinion, this limitation gave the Allies a decided advantage and the capture of the air fields in the eastern sector of (Sicily) (9) on 'D 1' day would greatly aggravate this serious limitation. Further certain preparatory measures were to be taken, such as large scale raids on airfields and ports in Italy to force the enemy fighters up, inflict heavy casualties and wide spread damage to the existing airfields". Information from the Air Ministry indicated "that the German Air Force was now estimated at 4,000 first line aircraft and the Allied Air Forces available for the proposed campaign were equal to the estimate of the total German Air Forces. It was confirmed that the Axis could not operate more than 1,700 aircraft from available fields within range". (File P.A. 1-14-1; Memorandum (29 Apr 43) of Discussions held at the W.O. on 25 Apr 43.)

177. The military force defending the island was considerably increased during the last two months preceding the invasion. At the meeting with General Kennedy referred to above, General McNaughton had been informed that there was an Italian field force of 78,000 (including three divisions), plus 75,000 Coast Defence Troops and about 5,000 Germans as staffs and guards on airfields or awaiting transport to Tunisia. Probable enemy reinforcements up to "D" Day were "estimated as additional two Italian divisions and one additional German division, if it could be evacuated from Tunisia." It was assumed that in view of British sea supremacy, the only reinforcement channels open to the enemy would be across the Straits of Messina or by air. The maximum build-up by these means was estimated at one and a half divisions per week and this was not taking into consideration the possible interference on enemy railway communications and ferry service of contemplated heavy allied air attack. (ibid.)

178. The Divisional Intelligence Summary contained information up to 12 Jun concerning the enemy order of battle. It was mainly derived from a single source, which was considered reliable, but confirmation was lacking. It estimated that Italian troops on the Island, forming the Sixth Army Command, numbered some 229,000. It was thought that there were two Army Corps, XII and XVI, containing a total of four field and five coastal divisions. The XVIth Corps in the Eastern part of the Island was thought to control 4 LIVORNO Division, 54 NAPOLI Division, 206 and 213 Coastal Divisions. (1 Cdn Div Int Sum, op. cit.)

179. Later information indicated that 54 NAPOLI Division had moved into the CASSIBILE-MELLILE area, to the west of SYRACUSE, while 4 LIVORNO Division had moved into the CALTAGIRONE area, north east of GELA (C.P.S. File 2500/3, 30 Corps Int Sum 3, 17 Jun 43; See accompanying map, Appendix "A".)

---

(9) The name is omitted in the original memorandum.

180. A last-minute note on the German order of battle in Sicily estimated a total of 20,000 German troops, including three Panzer Grenadier Regiments. It added the following information:

A most secret report dated 13 Jun 43 indicates that the Germans intend to transfer the Hermann Goering Division to SICILY. It is estimated that the strength of the elements of the division already in the Island is about 2,400. On the mainland it is believed that there are a further 11,000 men with about 50 field and medium guns, 100 A.A. and A Tk guns, 120 tanks and some 2,000 MT. Losses in Tunisia are estimated to have been 13,000 and it is unlikely that any of these units apart from some Flak, have yet been reformed. The Div should be concentrated in SICILY by 23 Jun 43.

(Hist Sec File "HUSKY" 1 Cdn Inf Div/L/F  
Last Minute Note on German Order of  
Battle.)

181. It was later disclosed that 15 Pz Div was also located on the Island (see accompanying map showing enemy dispositions).

182. It was expected that the Italian Coastal Divisions, using medium and coast defence artillery and specially prepared machine gun posts, would take the initial shock until the Field Divisions, concentrated in the interior, counter-attacked. None of the four Italian Field Divisions, however, had any battle experience. (1 Cdn Div Int Summary.) It may be noted here that after the landings were effected, it was found that practically all of the enemy dispositions were exactly as indicated in the Intelligence Reports (Evidence of 1 Cdn Inf Div Historical Officer).

183. The sector of the Sicilian coastline assigned to the 1st Canadian Division was the sandy beach COSTA DELL' AMBRA, known as Beach No. 57 or BARK WEST, which extended along the southwestern side of the PACHINO Peninsula, beginning at a point about two miles from the southern-most tip of the Island. For purpose of reference this beach was divided into two sectors, ROGER and SUGAR, each of which were further subdivided into RED, AMBER and GREEN sections. (See Appendix "B", a map illustrating the attack on "D" day.) The total length of the beach was 8,300 yards, the width 86 to 145 feet and the gradient 1/88 to 1/70. There were four M.T. exits, with two others probable. (1 Cdn Div Int Summary.)

184. Behind the beach was a steep limestone ridge approximately 10 to 15 feet high which merged into dunes. Backing this coastal strip, there were a series of salt "lakes" or "marshes" (indicated on the accompanying map) which were expected to present M.T. obstacles, although it was not certain what the state of these "lakes" would be in the summer time. Further inland as well as between these "marsh" areas were gently upward-sloping vineyards, terraced with stone walls. At intervals there were citrus orchards with trees fairly closely planted and areas of grazing land. A number of sharply cut stream beds, roughly aligned in a North to South direction, were expected to present obstacles to M.T. movement. (ibid.)

185. Three miles to the north-east of BARK WEST BEACH was the town of PACHINO with a population of some 22,000. A provincial road, macadamized but untarred, ran from PACHINO north-west to ISPICA (SPACCAFORNO) a nearby town of approximately 13,000 inhabitants. There was also a network of communal roads throughout the area but they were of low quality, probably surfaced with macadam but not tarred. (ibid.)

186. Extending a mile west of PACHINO and south of the ISPICA road was the PACHINO Airfield, the only landing ground in the peninsula. It consisted of two roughly rectangular strips forming a "T", the one 1,200 yards and the other 700 yards long. The normal capacity was 30 fighters with an emergency capacity of from 60 to 80. It was thought that there were eight L.A.A. positions around the landing ground, with a total of 22 guns which, it was assumed, could be sited for ground defence as well. The estimated strength, including A.A. and signals personnel, was 500 Italians, but it was probable that a proportion of machine gun companies, under command of the Coastal Division, were employed in the defence of the landing ground. (ibid.)

187. The topographical feature, which was later to cause the greatest concern, consisted of false beaches or sandbars which lay under water some distance off the shore. The water was thought to be possibly as deep as five feet inside one of these bars. This information regarding Beach 57 worried the planners, for it was obvious that if landing craft were going to ground on the sandbars then it was essential that the water inside the bars be not too deep for wading or driving motor vehicles. ("HUSKY" 1 Cdn Inf Div/1/F, 1 Cdn Div (Planning) Int Sum 16, 19 May 43.) The following is quoted from the Minutes of one of the Daily Inter-Service Meetings:

Para 4:

S.O.I. then gave the latest intelligence available with regard to this beach and stated that if these reports were to be relied upon it would appear that personnel only could be landed, and that the casualties would in his opinion be very high.

(C.P.S. File 1010, Minutes of Daily Inter-Service Meeting, 12 May 43.)

188. Intelligence based on air photography concerning the local defences in this area indicated the presence of about 15 pillboxes and 20 machine gun positions as well as several other "defended positions" and a certain amount of wire along the beaches. There were also other pillboxes, wiring and trenches further inland, especially in the vicinity of PACHINO Landing-Ground. There was a coast defence battery at MAUCINI, about 1½ miles inland and some 100 feet above sea level. It consisted of four medium guns with an all-round field of fire. They were sited in an orchard on low-lying ground near a farm house and surrounded by wire. Another coast defence battery, less dangerous to Beach 57, was located at 981882 in the adjoining British Division's sector. A third battery of field guns, covering the approach to PACHINO Airfield but in range of Beach 57, was reported at 964926, just north of the town. (See map Appendix "C".) (1 Cdn Div Int Sum, op. cit. and Naval Collation Maps, 11 and 12 attached; I.S.I.S. Report on Sicily Part VI, COAST DEFENCES, op. cit.)

189. It was not anticipated that the destination of the invading forces could be kept secret later than "D - 1" day. Therefore to summarize, this is what the Canadians considered they might expect in the way of opposition to their landing:

- (a) Air and submarine attacks on their convoys as they neared their destination, limited by the superior strength of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force; (10)
- (b) Artillery fire from eight to twelve guns as the landing craft approached the beaches plus machine gun fire as they came closer inshore;
- (c) Then sandbars to prevent craft from reaching shore and perhaps under-water mines;
- (d) On reaching the beaches there would be wire entanglements and perhaps mines and booby traps to clear while under fire from enemy M.G. posts and pillboxes.

190. Heavy casualties were to be expected if the enemy put everything into their defence. The critical point was whether the coastal defence troops would be ready and what heart they would have in fighting. In a letter to General Simonds, General Leese made the following comments on Italian fighting qualities:

The beach defence will probably be held by Italians. I expect that the immediate reserves will also be Italians. I have only once known the Italians carry out a really active counter-attack. If we can bring sufficient small arms to bear on them they usually check some distance away on their counter-attacks. As long as we have sufficient A/Tk weapons ashore to deal with any tanks that they may hold in local reserve I do not think we shall expect much difficulty from the Italian counter-attacks. On the other hand the Italian, during the Tunisia fighting, was very stubborn in defence, in fact, during the last few months the Italian has nearly always fought well in the defence until we have closed with him. Once we have closed with him he gives up. The great point about the Italian is that he does not hang on and fight, once the leading troops have by-passed him, as is the custom with the Germans, - a custom that makes the German such a difficult customer to mop-up.

The counter-attack which I think may give us the most trouble is the one which may be carried out by a German battle group assisted by tanks. I think a few hours may elapse before this can come in as it will be difficult for them to estimate exactly where the landing has taken place in view of the fact that the assault has taken place so late in the night....

(Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/1 Cdn Inf Div:  
G.O.C/E, General Leese to General  
Simonds, 10 Jun 43.)

191. Italian troops defending their homeland might be expected to put up stiffer resistance than they had in other theatres of war. At any rate, planning had to take the worst

- 
- (10) However, it is to be noted that the Naval Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Forces, Admiral Cunningham, was none too optimistic about the success of the operation. Indeed, when the new plan was first suggested, he visualized disaster and would not agree to it. It was not until 14 May that he finally concurred in what he called "having the Henley Regatta in the Sicilian Straits". (Memorandum of Conversation, General Simonds - Major Sesia, op. cit.)

possible contingencies into account. Indeed, the Minutes of one of the Inter-Service Meetings (see para 72 above) contain the following gloomy paragraph:

Para 4

G.1 stated with regard to casualties, that it had been laid down that providing there was one Battalion or more of the Brigade left when the beaches were reached they would assault as planned. If a whole Brigade were destroyed, the action of the Brigade which had been lost would be carried out by the Reserve Brigade assaulting, with the Commandos on their left flank.

(C.P.S. File 1010, Daily Inter-Service Meeting 27 May 43.)

192. Regarding enemy air activity, the Air Commander in the Mediterranean issued a warning a few days prior to the invasion that all troops must be prepared the first day or two to accept cheerfully enemy air action against ships and troops on the beaches (Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/C/E, Naval Message re Army Commanders' Conference, 7 Jul 43). A.A. defences were initially to be used to protect the beaches and not troops inland.

193. The Naval appreciation of the enemy Naval and Air Forces was expressed in the following paragraphs taken from Force V Naval Operation Order No. 1:

ENEMY FORCES. NAVAL

The enemy's Fleet is of considerable strength. It has, however, been largely inactive in the past, has had little success, and has incurred heavy losses. Morale is considered to be low, and tactical ability poor. It must, however, be recognized that if it is ever going to fight, it must fight now in defence of its own country from invasion, and that it is strategically well placed to do so.

AIR FORCE

The enemy Air Forces, though of considerable strength are greatly inferior to our own. Their capacity for harm should be considerably limited by the offensive action of our bombers, and by the defensive action of our supporting fighters. Nevertheless, a considerable scale of bomber and torpedo aircraft attack must be anticipated particularly at dusk, dawn and by night.

(Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/RN/C/I: File No. 3, Force V Naval Operation Order No. 1, Pl.)

(c) The General Plan

194. As previously indicated, the original object of Operation "HUSKY" was simply "to seize and hold Sicily". However, as planning proceeded a larger objective was developed, namely to knock Italy out of the war as quickly as possible. This slightly altered the role of the invading Forces, as General

Leese explained in the letter to General Simonds quoted above:

.....The object now is to dominate the Messina Straits as soon as possible and to get a footing in the South of the mainland of Italy. 10 Corps HQ, under Brian Horrocks, has therefore been brought in to plan for the passage across the Straits of Messina and the subsequent operations to form a bridgehead on the mainland.

(Letter General Leese to General Simonds,  
10 Jun 43.)

195. As we have seen, the Combined Force for this operation, known as Force 141, the Army component being 15 Army Group, was composed of an Eastern Task Force known as Force 545 with the Eighth Army, the military component, and a Western Task Force known as Force 343 with the American military force later to become the Seventh (U.S.) Army the military component. The organization was a complex one owing to the fact that the Eighth Army and the 18th Army Group were still fighting in North Africa during much of the planning period; hence the number of confusing code names given to the various headquarters. The Order of Battle of the 15th Army Group at the opening of the Sicilian campaign will be found in Appendix "F" (11). (See paras 35, 54 and 93 above.)

196. The American Force, under General G. Patton, consisted of 2nd Corps (1st and 45th Infantry Divisions), 3rd Infantry Division, 2nd Armoured Division, 82nd Airborne Division, and in reserve, 9th Division (Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/C/1, 141 Force Operation Instruction No. 2, 21 May 43). Their task was to make three simultaneous pre-dawn assaults on the GELA sector of the southern coast of Sicily between CAPO SCARAMIA and LICATA, capture the Port of LICATA and the airfields of PONTE OLIVO, BISCARI and COMISO, and eventually gain touch with Eighth Army at RAGUSA (*ibid.*, Twelfth Army Operation Order; Force V Naval Operation Order No. 1, *op. cit.*).

197. The newly reorganized Eighth Army (until "D" day known by the code name "Twelfth Army") was divided for the assault phase of the operation into two corps, 13 Corps and 30 Corps. The Army Reserve consisted of the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade (less one regiment) from the United Kingdom, two field regiments in TRIPOLI, and 10 Corps consisting of the 78th Infantry Division, the 1st Armoured Division, the 7th Armoured Division, the 4th Indian Motorized Division, the 2nd New Zealand Infantry Division and the 6th Armoured Division. Of the latter only 78 Div actually participated in the Sicilian campaign. (Twelfth Army Operation Order, *op. cit.*: File P.A. 1-14-1, Memorandum (1 Jun) of Lecture outlining Operation "HUSKY" by General Montgomery, 27 May.)

198. Force 545 was to make five simultaneous pre-dawn assaults on the south eastern corner of the Island, with the object of capturing SYRACUSE and PACHINO Airfield and of establishing a firm bridgehead on the line SYRACUSE - PALAZZOLO - RAGUSA, from which an advance could be made to capture AUGUSTA, CATANIA and the GERBINI group of airfields. 13 Corps, consisting of the 5th Infantry Division, the 50th (Northumbrian) Infantry

---

(11) The Army Group invading Sicily became known as 15th Army Group on "D" day.

Division, the 1st Airborne Division and other troops was under command of Lt.-Gen. M.C. (now Sir Miles) Dempsey who, in 1941, had been Brigadier, General Staff at Canadian Corps Headquarters. 5 Div and 50 Div were to land in the vicinity of AVOLA on the beaches referred to as ACID NORTH and ACID SOUTH respectively, while part of 1 Airborne Div was to land west of SYRACUSE and a Commando detachment just to the south of that port. 30 Corps, consisting of the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, the 51st (Highland) Division, the 231st Infantry Brigade and other troops was under command of Lt.-Gen. Sir Oliver Leese, Bt., who had commanded it during the battle of EL ALAMEIN and the pursuit into Tunisia. 51 (H) Div was commanded by Maj.-Gen. Wimberley and 231 Bde by Brigadier Smith. The latter was to assault through two beaches north and south of MARZAMEMI (0094) numbered 51 and 52 respectively, and known by the code name BARK EAST. Their immediate task was to secure a bridgehead some three miles wide inland to the road running north from PACHINO. 51 (H) Div was to assault on the beaches between AQUA PALOMBA (0189) and PUNTA DELLE FORMICHE (9485) known as BARK SOUTH. Their main task was to capture Beach 56 in the Bay RADA DI PORTOPALLO and PACHINO town. 1 Cdn Inf Div and attached troops were to capture the BARK WEST sector west of PUNTA DELLE FORMICHE as indicated below. (Force V Naval Operation Order No. 1, op. cit.; Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/1 Cdn Inf Div/C/I, 1 Cdn Inf Div Operation Order No. 1, 7 Jun 43; Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/C/I, Force 545 Military Operation Instruction No. 1.)

199. Following the change in the final objective of the operations, the plan after landing was somewhat altered as explained by General Leese in the letter referred to above:

The Allied Plan after landing, therefore, is for the Americans to form a firm base on the West covering the aerodromes, and for 13 Corps to drive on relentlessly in order to seize SYRACUSE, AUGUSTA and CATANIA with the least possible delay. From these bases the Eighth Army will strike with its right in order to secure crossings over the Straits. The general conception is thus to hold on the left and strike on the right. By this means we should cut off and isolate the enemy still holding out around PALERMO and in the West of the Island.

The role of 30 Corps is primarily to assist 13 Corps. This may necessitate holding, with you on our left, while we concentrate every effort on our right in order to take over the high ground above AVOLA from 13 Corps, thus releasing troops to assist in their further offensive actions to seize the ports. From this high ground we shall operate towards PALAZZOLO, and in due course take over SYRACUSE from 13 Corps. If the enemy resistance is strong, it may be necessary to concentrate the whole efforts of the Corps on the right, and so for the first few days it may be necessary to restrict your movements towards RAGUSA to patrol activities. Continue planning for offensive action against RAGUSA, but be ready to check and hold along the ROSOLINI - SPACCAFORNO road if we find that the enemy resistance is too strong to enable us to advance simultaneously on both flanks of the Corps. The Army Commander is explaining this plan to the Americans so that they will not be disappointed if we cannot join up with them at once in the RAGUSA area.....

(Letter General Leese to General Simonds, op. cit.)

200. The British Line of Communication was to run back to the Middle East from an advanced base in TRIPOLI, while the American L. of C. was to run westwards to French North Africa and thence to the United States (File P.A. 1-14-1, General Montgomery's Lecture, 27 May).

201. These military operations were, of course, initially dependent on Naval and Air action. Some account is therefore necessary of the Naval and Air part of the General Plan.

202. The Naval plan was framed with the following intentions:

- (a) To avoid concentration of ships in the central Mediterranean for as long as possible in continuation of the Deception Plan.
- (b) During the Approach phase to conform the movements of all convoys to those normal for through Mediterranean convoys until D-1.
- (c) To provide strong A.A. escort for convoys around Cape Bon, which passage will be in daylight under fighter cover.
- (d) To concentrate the Battleship covering forces in the IONIAN SEA by D-1 to protect the assault convoys.

The movements of the Battle fleet on D-1 will be directed to threatening the West coast of Greece.

- (e) To provide strong escort and support for the Eastern Task Force assaults.
- (f) To cover the Northern and Western flanks of D Day assaults with surface forces by night.
- (g) To ensure the adequate escort for follow-up and return convoys.
- (h) To continue to support and maintain the Eighth Army to the full extent of their requirements.

(Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/C/I, Appendix "I" to Force 545 Military Operation Instruction No. 1)

Every effort was to be made to harry the Italian fleet in harbour and if possible to drive it up the ADRIATIC (Force V Naval Operation Order No. 1, op. cit.)

203. The Naval forces to carry out this plan were under the supreme command of Admiral Cunningham. They were divided into the same two main Task Forces as the Army, plus a Naval Covering Force called Force "H". The latter, consisting of four battleships, four cruisers, two aircraft carriers and some eighteen destroyers, was the force to be concentrated in the IONIAN SEA by D-1. An additional force of two battleships, two cruisers and six destroyers based on ALGIERS was to cover the convoys along the North African coast and to be a relief or reinforcement to Force "H". There was also a light covering force of cruisers and destroyers known as Force "Q", to be detached in the afternoon of D-1 to cover the northern flank of the eastern assaults. (Operation "HUSKY", Outline Naval Plan, 16 May 43; at present this document is not in the Historical Section's files but was seen at C.O.H.Q.)

204. The Eastern Task Force under the command of Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay, K.C.B., M.V.O., was divided into three main components: Force "A" under command of Rear Admiral T. Troubridge, D.S.O., carrying 13 Corps and sailing from the Middle East; Force "B" under Rear Admiral R.R. McGrigor, carrying 30 Corps less 1 Cdn Inf Div, sailing from the Middle East and from Tunisia; and Force "V" under command of Rear Admiral Sir Philip Vian, K.B.E., D.S.O., carrying 1 Cdn Inf Div and ~~1 Cdn Army Bde~~ (12). There was also a Naval Support Group known as Force "K", consisting of four cruisers and six destroyers based on MALTA to assist in the escorting of the south eastern assaults to their beaches and to provide gun support to the landings on ACID and BARK. Further gun support was to be provided by two monitors, five gunboats, nine landing craft gun (large), (L.C.G., L), six landing craft tank (rocket), (L.C.T., R) and eight landing craft flak (L.C.F.). Each Task Force also had four submarines at its disposal. (ibid.)

205. It may be noted that in all some 2,600 assault craft, transports and naval vessels were used (C.M.H.Q. File 4/Gen Apprec/3, W.O. "General Note" for July 1943). Exclusive of warships and smaller assault craft, there were over 750 transports of various kinds in all the different convoys setting out for Sicily. The components of the Eastern Task Force from the Middle East had some 300 transports, ~~while Force "V" had between 80 and 84~~. Each convoy had in addition its own escort of destroyers, corvettes and frigates, etc., over and above the Naval forces already referred to. (ibid.; Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/C/I, 141 Force Operation Instruction No. 2, 21 May 43.)

205A. Ports of embarkation for the Eastern Task Force were as follows:

1 Cdn Inf Div:	Clydeside
51 (H) Inf Div:	Malta, SOUSSE and SFAX
231 Inf Bde:)	
5 Inf Div: )	ALEXANDRIA and Port SAID
50 Inf Div: )	
1 Airborne Div	KAIROUAN
Ports for the Western Task Force were:	
45 (U.S.) Inf Div:	ORAN
1 (U.S.) Inf Div:	ALGIERS
3 (U.S.) Inf Div: )	
2 (U.S.) Armd Div )	TUNIS and BIZERTA
82 (U.S.) Airborne Div:	KAIROUAN

(This information has been obtained from Hist Sec files "HUSKY"/C/H and /C/I, and checked at the offices of Historical Section, War Cabinet Secretariat.)

(12) Four Canadian landing craft flotillas were included in the force carrying 51 (H) Div. Commander MacLachlan, R.C.N.V.R., personal staff officer to Rear Admiral Troubridge, later declared that had he known in time he certainly would have taken steps to ensure that the Canadian flotillas worked with the Canadian troops.

	<u>No. of Squadrons</u>		
	<u>British</u>	<u>American</u>	<u>Total Aircraft</u>
S.E. (Single engined fighter) Fighters (Offensive)	28 $\frac{1}{2}$	18	908
S.E. Fighters (Defensive) x	21	9	561
T.E.F. (Twin-engined fighter) Day (Offensive)	-	9	225
T.E.F. Day (Defensive)	4	-	64
T.E.F. Night (Offensive)	1	-	16
T.E.F. Night (Defensive)	7	-	112
Bombers - Light	7	12	304
Bombers - Medium (Day)	-	28	448
Bombers - Medium (Night)	9	-	180
Bombers - Heavy (Day)	-	36	432
Bombers - Heavy (Night)	2	-	32
Coastal xx	20 $\frac{1}{2}$	-	360
Army Co-op	4 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	110
Transport Aircraft	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	30	506
P.R.U./P.S.U.	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	2	70
Gliders	-	500	-
	113 $\frac{1}{2}$	146(excl gliders)	4328

NOTE: The term 'defensive' is applied to those squadrons whose primary function is shipping protection and defence of vulnerable areas.

x Excludes 1 Free French Squadron - 38 aircraft total.

xx Excludes 2 F.A.A. Squadrons - 24 aircraft total.

(ibid., Revision of Outline Air Plan dated 4 Jun 43.)

210. 23 of the Fighter Squadrons were originally to be based on MALTA, but three Wings (15 $\frac{1}{2}$  squadrons) were to begin moving into Sicily about D + 2, accompanied by one Flight from a Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron. After the capture of Pantellaria (13) a Fighter Wing of Kittyhawks was to assist MALTA in the protection of convoys on D-1, and move into Sicily about D + 8. (Outline Air Plan, op. cit.)

(13) Operation "CORKSCREW", the reduction of Pantellaria, was decided upon by General Eisenhower on 11 May and executed on 11 Jun. It was preceded by six days intense air bombardment and one day's naval bombardment. The assault was carried out by 1 (Brit) Div from SOUSSE and the garrison surrendered immediately. (M.O. 1 Report, op. cit.)

211. During the opening phases of "HUSKY" a large standing patrol of fighters based on Malta was to be maintained over the assault beaches for the first vital few hours. Light Bombers were to "operate in the western theatre and Medium Bombers in the eastern theatre to pre-arranged programme of attacks on enemy airfields and other selected objectives designed to neutralize the enemy air effort to such an extent as to minimize attacks on assault beaches and on shipping anchored off them and restrict the movement of reinforcements." Only in exceptional circumstances was close support bombing to be available to the Army. By the time the Air Force moved into Sicily the commitment for the protection of beaches was made.

It may be noted that three R.C.A.F. Wellington Squadrons operated in Sicily. *Adm. 11 May 5 S.E.D.*

In conjunction with the combined Naval, Air and Military plans, there was also a "Cover Plan" providing "a false date for D day and false destinations for the Assault Forces". Its objects were (1) to retard enemy reinforcement of Sicily, (2) to lower enemy vigilance there, (3) to reduce attacks on "HUSKY" shipping and (4) to keep the Italian fleet to the east of the Straits of MESSINA. The "Cover Dates and Destinations" were as follows:

Crete	24 Jul 44
Peloponnese	26 Jul 44
Corsica and Sardinia	31 Jul 44

(Twelfth Army Operation Order No. 1, op. cit.)

213. The actual date selected for the assault, referred to in planning as D-day, was 10 Jul 43 while H-hour, the time at which the first flight of landing craft in the main assault would touch the beach, was 0245 hours. This information was signalled to all ships in the operation only on 4 Jul. (14) (Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/C/E, C.-in-C. Med. to all Ships and Authorities, Operation "HUSKY", 4 Jul 43.)

(d) 1st Canadian Division Operation Order No. 1 and Complementary Orders

214. The foregoing outline of the General Plan forms the necessary background for the detailed Plan of 1 Cdn Inf Div. The Plan which General Simonds sent back from CAIRO (para 95 above) was, except for a few minor adjustments, the Plan that was ultimately embodied in the Division's Operation Order for "HUSKY" (Conversation between General Simonds and Major Sesia, op. cit.). The text will be found in Appendix "D". In conjunction with this Order, however, it is necessary to examine the very detailed Orders of the Naval Commander, the Senior Naval Officers (Landing) on ROGER and SUGAR beaches

---

(14) General Eisenhower had selected this date as far back as 20 Mar and reaffirmed it on 12 Apr (M.O. 1 Report, op. cit.).

and the Principal Military Landing Officer. (15) (Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/RN/C/I, Operation "HUSKY" Force V Naval Operation and Communication Orders, 30 May 1943, and "S.N.O.L. (R) Operation Order", 29 May 1943; C.P.S. File 109 P.M.L.O. Operational Instructions No. 1, 14 Jun 43.)

215. Force "K", comprising four cruisers and six destroyers, was to rendezvous with the assault convoys at 1200 hours on D-1 day and give them cover from thence onwards. At approximately 1800 hours seven L.C.I. (L) (Landing Craft Infantry, Large) and four M.Ls. (Motor Launches) for beach finding were to join the force from Malta. Before dark the whole convoy was to form into two columns and proceed to the release position for the assault which was seven miles off-shore. The left hand column, led by the Headquarters ship H.M.S. "Hilary" and carrying 2 and 3 Cdn Inf Bdes, was to approach SUGAR sector while the right hand column, headed by H.M. monitor "Roberts", was to approach ROGER sector. These ships were to reach the release position at H-130 minutes, i.e. 0035 hours, where they were to be joined by L.C.T., mine sweepers and ancillary craft for close support. The slow assault convoy was to arrive at the release position at H + 2½ hours accompanied by four fleet mine sweepers. (Force V Naval Operation Orders Nos. 1 and 3.)

216. On anchoring in the Release Position, landing craft were to be ready for lowering fully loaded. 22 L.C.A. (Landing Craft Assault) led by M.L. No. 1 and supported by one L.C.G. (L) and one L.C.F. were to proceed ashore carrying Nos. 40 and 41 R.M. Commandos, as soon as possible after arrival. They were to be landed by 0235 hours. 1 Cdn Inf Bde was to be landed in two flights on ROGER sector. Four assault companies in 16 L.C.A. led by M.L. No. 4 and supported by a destroyer, one L.C.G. (L) and three L.C.S. (M) (Landing Craft Support, Medium) were to be landed at H-hour, while the remaining companies and battalion headquarters in 21 L.C.A. and two L.C.M. (Landing Craft Mechanized) led by M.L. No. 5 were to follow twenty minutes behind the first flight and beach as required by the Senior Military Officer. (S.N.O.L. (R) Operation Order; see accompanying map of the assault.)

217. 2 Cdn Inf Bde was to be landed in a similar manner on SUGAR sector. (*ibid.*)

218. The supporting fire for the assault was to be provided by the monitor "Roberts", the A.A. cruiser "Delhi" and three destroyers under the control of Admiral Vian in "Hilary". In addition, supporting fire from two cruisers and three destroyers of Force "K" was to be expected on targets common to the three assaults, i.e., BARK SOUTH, WEST and EAST. Close support fire for the assault flights was to be provided by L.C.G., L.C.F. and L.C.S. (Force V Naval Operation Order Nos 1 and 6.) As we have seen, if complete surprise were maintained up to H-hour, no covering bombardment was to precede the assault. If such were not the case, however, the supporting warships were to bombard until H-15 minutes. If formations and units of 1 Cdn Inf Div had not silenced all coast defence batteries within the divisional sector by first light, the warships were to

---

(15) The "Force V Naval Operation and Communication Orders" issued on 10 Jun 43 over the signature of Rear Admiral Vian are sixteen in number and form a very detailed and comprehensive document running into several hundred pages with numerous charts and diagrams. The "S.N.O.L. (R) Operation Order", issued on 30 May over the signature of Capt Grey, R.N. is equally detailed, running into some 80 pages including 15 pages of excellent diagrams. Presumably there was a similar Order by his opposite number on SUGAR Beach but there is no copy in the Historical Section's files.

resume their bombardment and neutralize any active enemy batteries while engaging the landing forces. (1 Cdn Div Operation Order No. 1, op. cit.)

219. In a conversation with General McNaughton, General Simonds explained how closely the Navy and Army had to co-operate in this important matter. It was therefore arranged that an Army F.O.C. would accompany every Navy F.O.C. He said that the guns of destroyers and cruisers would fire on active hostile batteries engaging ships approaching the beaches, and that the two 15-inch guns of "Roberts" would engage the defences in the PACHINO area well clear of our troops and also the coast defence batteries and enemy reserves on the roads. The cruisers were to take on hostile batteries further inland. The L.C.G. carrying two 4.7-inch guns each were to deal with beach defence lights and gun flashes until landing craft were beached. They were then to draw off to the flanks and deal with enemy machine guns and mortars. The L.C.S. were for smoke if needed, and for shooting up beach lights. Fire was to be opened 100 yards off shore if surprise was not attained. The Divisional Commander paid special tribute to Admiral Vian for accepting "grave risks" in order to anchor his supporting ships close inshore to give more accurate fire. (P.A. 1-14-1 Memorandum (J. Jun) of Conversation General McNaughton - General Simonds, 30 May 43.)

220. Hedgerows, a special rocket weapon for beach assault, were to be fired when 100 yards from the beach if the enemy defences were in action, while the first flight of L.C.A. were to fire flying cordtex from the same distance whether defences were in action or not. The hedgerows were for clearing passages 100 yards by 25 feet through beach minofields while the cordtex was for detonating underwater mines. It was in 120 foot strips wound around conical drums mounted on the bows of the L.C.A. and fired by a 2-lb Scheumely pistol. Natural underwater obstructions were to be dealt with by L.C.P. equipped with explosives for that purpose. (S.N.O.L. (R) Operation Order, para 64 and Force V Naval Operation Order No. 5.)

221. The remaining serials (brigade and divisional reserves) were to be landed according to a schedule in L.C.T., L.C.M. and L.C.I. As a general principle, D.U.K.Ws. were to be used in the initial stage for the unloading of stores and not of personnel, and L.C.M. for discharging motor transport. The control of unloading was to be "the responsibility of the P.M.L.O. and R.N." working in conjunction with the S.N.Os.L and P.B.Ms. (Principal Beach Masters) (C.P.S. File 109, P.M.L.O. Operational Instructions No. 1, 14 Jun 43; W.D. 3 Cdn Inf Bde, June 43, Appendix re "Assault" by S.N.O.T.).

222. The intention of the Divisional Commander, as stated in his Operation Order, was:

- (a) to capture BARK WEST sector (Beach 57);
- (b) to protect the left flank of 30 Corps;
- (c) to capture PACHINO Airfield and develop it for operational use;
- (d) to prepare to advance to the line of the road ROSOLINI, 8502, - POZZALLO, 7592, in conformity with 51 (H) Div.

(1 Cdn Inf Div Operation Order No. 1, op. cit.; the text of this order will be found in Appendix "G".)

223. This operation was to be carried out in three phases. Phase I was to consist of the capture of BARK WEST sector, the destruction of coast defence artillery and beach defences, the clearing of the high ground immediately overlooking the beaches and the capture of PACHINO Airfield. During Phase II the divisional reserve were to be landed, certain features three to four miles inland were to be captured, and the division reorganized preparatory to a further advance. In the third phase the division was to advance in conformity with 51 (H) Div to the general line ROSOLINI - ISPICA - POZZALLO. (ibid.)

224. As we have seen, the assault on the beaches was to be made on a two-brigade front, supported on the left by a simultaneous assault by the Special Service Brigade.

225. The 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade Group, which was to land on ROGER sector east of GROTTICELLE at H-hour, had under command:

- 2 Canadian Field Regiment
- 142 Field Regiment (Self-Propelled) (less one battery and one troop)
- 51 Canadian Anti-Tank Battery
- 5 Canadian Light Anti-Aircraft Battery
- 1 Canadian Field Company
- Detachment 1 Canadian Division Signals
- 4 Canadian Field Ambulance
- Section 1 Canadian Division Provost Company

They were to:

- (a) destroy the enemy coast defence battery reported near MAUCINI,
- (b) capture PACHINO Airfield and the high ground to the west,
- (c) establish contact with 51 (H) Div during this advance, and
- (d) send patrols forward as soon as possible to contact 231 Bde to the north of PACHINO.

(ibid.)

226. The 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade Group which was to land on the beach known as SUGAR sector, west of GROTTICELLE, had under command:

- 3 Canadian Field Regiment
- Battery and Troop 142 Field Regiment (Self-Propelled)
- 90 Canadian Anti-Tank Battery
- 54 Canadian Light Anti-Aircraft Battery
- 3 Canadian Field Company
- 5 Canadian Field Ambulance

They were to:

- (a) advance west to destroy enemy beach defences, meet the S.S. Bde and give it what assistance it needed,
- (b) take up positions north of PANTANO LONGARINI and patrol to the northwest.

(ibid.)

227. The Special Service Brigade was also to land at H-hour between PUNTA CASTELLAZZO, square 8889, and PUNTA CIRIGA, square 8688, and:

- (a) destroy enemy coast defence batteries and their defence in that area,
- (b) capture the beach to the north of PUNTA CASTELLAZZO and
- (c) reorganize on the high ground to the northwest.

(ibid.)

(For Divisional and Brigade boundaries, divisions of the beaches and lines of advance, see the accompanying map of the landing.)

228. During the second phase the divisional reserve was to land in the following priority: the 12th Canadian Tank Regiment, the 1st Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment (less three batteries) and the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade Group with under command:

57 Anti-Tank Battery  
2 Canadian Light Anti-Aircraft Battery  
9 Canadian Field Ambulance  
One section of 1 Cdn Div Provost Company

This divisional reserve was to be prepared to land through whichever beach appeared to be most suitable. 3 Cdn Inf Bde was to advance inland to the vicinity of BURGIO. Then either 1 or 3 Cdn Inf Bdes, as ordered, was to continue to advance to the northwest, while 2 Cdn Inf Bde was to capture the high ground to the west of their previous positions. The S.S. Bde was to conform to the movements of 2 Cdn Inf Bde and cover the left flank of the division by occupying the ground to the south of the 2nd Brigade area, and patrolling to the sea at FOCE CHIANETTE. (ibid.) By the end of this phase 1 Cdn Inf Div was to have established a bridgehead approximately eight miles wide and four miles deep.

229. The Self-propelled and other Regiments of artillery were to be under command of the assaulting brigades as allotted and were to be deployed as close as practical to the inter-brigade boundary in order to facilitate their re-grouping under the Divisional Commander Royal Artillery (ibid.). The chief tasks of the Divisional Engineers were in order of priority:

- (a) clearance of lanes through minefields,
- (b) communications,
- (c) water supply,
- (d) possible 'de-lousing' of PACHINO Airfield, and
- (e) provision of defence stores and division dumps.

The Beach Engineers (R.E.) were responsible for clearing obstacles and mines on and off the beaches, improving exits, laying beach roadways, etc. (ibid.)

230. No. 3 Beach Group was to land with 1 Cdn Inf Bde Gp, develop the beach maintenance area and service the assault elements of both 1 and 2 Cdn Inf Bde Gps. No. 4 Beach Group was to be prepared to extend the beach maintenance area as ordered. The Special Airfield Construction Group was to restore PACHINO Airfield as quickly as possible. (ibid.)

231. The Operation Orders of 1, 2 and 3 Cdn Inf Bdes, the S.S. Bde, 1 Cdn Inf Div Arty, Engineers, Signals, Army Service Corps, R.E.M.E. and H.Q. 103 Sub-area Beach, are to be found in C.P.S. Files 103/"HUSKY"/1-9.

232. After embarkation the G.O.C. 1 Cdn Div issued a second order outlining his plan for securing the Corps' first and second objectives after the capture of the bridgehead, but since its contents are concerned entirely with a later more problematical stage of the operations, it is not necessary to refer to it further until the actual account of the campaign in a later report (Hist Sec File "HUSKY" 1 Cdn Inf Div/C/B, "Outline Plan for Securing Corps First and Second Objectives after Capture of the Beach-head", 5 Jul 43).

233. The 30 Corps Operation Order stressed the great importance of capturing, clearing and repairing the PACHINO landing ground, and if at all possible, of having it ready for the R.A.F. by the evening of D-day. Should 51 (H) Div or 231 Inf Bde achieve success in this area before the Canadian Division, then they were to capture, and start clearing and repairing the field. The Corps Order also provided that if Beach 57 proved unsatisfactory for development, 1 Cdn Div was to use the western end of Beach 56. (Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/C/I, 30 Corps Operation Order No. 5, 29 May 43.)

234. Provision was made for wireless communication with 45 (U.S.) Div operating on the left of 1 Cdn Div while an exchange of liaison officers was arranged with 51 (H) Div on the right (C.P.S. Telegrams File, Tel 128/G Ops, FORTUNE to W.O., Tel 9459, 10 Jun and P 203, 19 Jun 43, A.F.H.Q. to W.O.).

235. In the conversation between Generals McNaughton and Simonds referred to above, the operation's chances of success were estimated as follows:

It was agreed that casualties might possibly be higher in 1 Cdn Div than would be the case in a more battle experienced formation, even so General Simonds said that in view of the great superiority of force, the sound plans and the careful preparations he had not the slightest doubt of the successful outcome of the operation. General Simonds stated that recent intelligence reports indicated that the opposition which the expedition might expect to encounter would consist of some four Italian Divs with possibly an additional German div in reserve. None of the four Italian Divs had previously battle experience. He said the beaches allocated to 1 Cdn Div were difficult but on the other hand they were lightly defended. He thought the rate of build up as planned would be sufficient.

(File P.A. 1-14.1 Memorandum of Conversation, Generals McNaughton and Simonds, 30 May dated 1 Jun 43.)

(e) Directive to Canadian Commanders

236. On 19 Jun, a few days prior to the departure of the Canadian force from England, General McNaughton, as Senior Combatant Officer, Canadian Army Overseas, issued a Directive to the

G.O.C. 1 Cdn Div and the Commander of 1 Cdn Army Tank Bde. Appended to this Directive was Order of Detail No. 7. In pursuance of powers conferred by P.C. 3464, 29 Apr 43, this Order provided that the following formations and units "do act in combination with all the Naval, Military and Air Forces of the several parts of the British Commonwealth and serving in or based upon or operating from the Continent of Africa or embarked in the United Kingdom for the purpose of any such service....."

- 1 Canadian Infantry Division
- 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade
- 1 Canadian Tank Delivery Squadron
- Detachment 1 Canadian Tunnelling Company
- 5 Canadian General Hospital
- 15 Canadian General Hospital
- 1 Canadian Field Surgical Unit
- 2 Canadian Field Surgical Unit
- 1 Canadian Field Transfusion Unit
- 1 Canadian Convalescent Depot
- 1 Canadian Dental Company
- 1 Canadian Divisional Sub Park
- 1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade Sub Park
- 1 Canadian Infantry Troops Workshop
- 1 Canadian Tank Troops Workshop
- 1 Canadian Heavy Recovery Section
- 1 Canadian Lines of Communication Provost Section
- 2 Canadian Lines of Communication Provost Section
- 3 Canadian Provost Section
- 1 Canadian Field Cash Office
- Canadian Section GHQ 1 Echelon (Type A)
- Canadian Section GHQ 2 Echelon (Type B)
- 1 Canadian Graves Registration Unit
- 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement Depot-H.Q. and four reinforcement battalions
- Detachment First Canadian Army Base Post Office
- 1 Canadian Public Relations Detachment "

(P.A. 1-14-1-8, Directive of the Senior Combatant Officer of the Canadian Military Forces serving in the United Kingdom or the Continent of Europe, dated 19 Jun 43).

237. This Order was to take effect on the embarkation of the formations and units in question in the United Kingdom for despatch to the Mediterranean Theatre, from which date they were to come under command of the G.O.C.-in-C. 15 Army Group. General Simonds and Brigadier Wyman were to continue to enjoy the right of reference to the Government of Canada in respect to any matter in which the forces under their command were likely to be involved or committed or in any question of their administration which might require correction. Such reference was to be made through General McNaughton, and only when the remedial or other action deemed necessary had been represented to the Officer Commanding the Combined Forces without his having taken appropriate action. Appended to the Directive were warrants authorizing the two officers addressed to convene General Courts Martial for the trial of any officer or soldier in the military forces of Canada under their command. Warrants in like terms were issued to the G.O.C.-in-C. 15 Army Group, the G.O.C. Eighth Army and the Officer Commanding First Canadian Base Reinforcement Depot. Instructions regarding a number of matters of administration were contained in an appendix to the Directive. (*ibid.*)

238. General Montgomery had told General McNaughton prior to the issue of this Directive that he proposed to deal with only one Senior Canadian officer on purely domestic Canadian matters and that he considered it appropriate that Maj.-Gen. Simonds

should be this officer. He said that General Simonds would in this way be in a position to use his special authority to communicate directly with General McNaughton if the situation so demanded. General McNaughton said that he had no objection to this proposal providing it did not result in over-burdening General Simonds with responsibilities for Canadian units which might not be under his immediate command. (P.A. 1-14-1, Memorandum of Conversation between General McNaughton and General Montgomery, 31 May 43, dated 1 Jun 43.) The Directive itself gave the Commander of the Army Tank Brigade exactly the same powers as the G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div but it provided that the G.O.C.-in-C. 15 Army Group or the commander of a formation subordinate to him might place 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde in whole or in part under command of 1 Cdn Inf Div.

239. It will be remembered that the formations and units listed above were divided into two distinct forces designated as Force "A" and Force "B", code names later changed to Force "X" and Force "Y" (C.P.S. Telegrams file, Tel GPIG/47154, Force 545 to W.O., 9 May 43). Each of these Forces also contained a certain number of British units not included in the list of units and formations quoted above. A complete Order of Battle of Force "X" and Force "Y" with amendments is to be found in C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1/2 in the form of a War Office Memorandum dated 16 May 43. (This memorandum is also in C.P.S. File 2201 which also contains a complete list of Commanders and Staffs of 1 Cdn Inf Div and of non-divisional troops of 'Force X'.)

Canadian Ordnance and Medical units and a Canadian Field Cash Office were all in Force X. A Special Service Brigade, 142 Fd Regt (S.P.), 1 H.A.A. Regt, 31 L.A.A. Regt, 75 L.A.A. Regt, 15 Airfd Constr Gp, No. 3 and 4 Beach Groups and numerous other smaller British units were also included in this force. (1 Cdn Inf Div Operation Order, op. cit., Appendix "N".)

241. 12 Cdn Tks had been withdrawn from the Army Tank Brigade in accordance with General Montgomery's plan to have a tank battalion or an armoured regiment land with each division in the early stages. However, he had explained "that he proposed to group his armour as soon as possible and use it under the Corps and not in penny packets". (P.A. 1-14-1, Memorandum (1 Jun) of Lecture Outlining Operation "HUSKY" by General Montgomery, 27 May 43.)

242. The Special Service Brigade under the command of a distinguished British Officer, Brigadier R.E. Laycock, D.S.O. (subsequently Chief of Combined Operations) consisted of 40 and 41 Royal Marine Commandos. They had trained with the Canadian Division in Scotland but were under command for the initial assault only. The G.O.C. had endeavoured to obtain special L.S.I.(S) (Landing Ships Infantry, Small) to bring the Commandos from the United Kingdom to the beaches, but without success. Indeed at one stage in the planning, instructions were sent for the Commandos to proceed to North Africa ahead of the Force. Eventually, however, it was arranged for them to sail, 40 Commando with 1 Cdn Inf Bde, 41 Commando with 2 Cdn Inf Bde. (C.P.S. Telegrams File, Telegrams 8, 10, 14, 16, 18 May; W.D. 3 Cdn Inf Bde, May 43.)

243. The 142nd Field Regiment (Self Propelled) and the 70th Medium Regiment, R.A., were allotted to 1 Cdn Inf Div as extra artillery (Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/C/1, 30 Corps Operation Order No. 5, 29 May 43, para 9). 142 Fd Regt was included among the divisional troops and operated with the Division during most of the campaign. One battery of 70 Med Regt landed with the Division

while the remainder arrived in the D + 3 Convoy. The remaining units were all Army troops and were only with 1 Cdn Inf Div for the voyage from the United Kingdom and the subsequent landing. The primary task of all A.A. units was to be the defence of Ports and Airfields (Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/C/1, "Twelfth Army Operation Order No. 1", para 24.) In the first few days the beach groups worked very closely with the Division but before long they took the role of L. of C. troops (W.D. 103 Sub Area (Beach) July 1943).

244. Force "Y", which was to land on D + 3, was divided into five groups. Group 1 consisted of 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde (less 12 Cdn Tks) and the necessary signals, army service corps, ordnance, provost and medical units to make the Brigade self-sufficient, as well as the remainder of 70 Med Regt. Groups 2, 3 and 4 consisted of British artillery, engineer and other units while Group 5 contained 5 Cdn Gen Hosp. (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, May 1943, Appendix 71; Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/C/N, Order of Battle Force "B", 9 May 43; see para 250 below.)

245. The second line transport of Force "X" and certain units (16) not required for the initial assault were to sail in a follow-up convoy (known as HERRICK II) accompanying Force "Y" (C.P.S. File 108 Movement Instruction WS 31A and WS 31B, Appendices "A" and "B", 23 May 43).

246. Included in the Order of Detail list of units quoted above were the additional units authorized late in May as a result of Brigadier Beament's recommendations (see paras 109 and 110 above). Most of these were to travel direct to North Africa in two ships accompanying Force "X" or Force "Y" under the code name "OFFSIDE". (C.M.H.Q. File 3/SICILY/1/2 Memorandum of Meeting 28 May, dated 31 May 43, Tel 84711 W.O. to FORTUNE, 29 May 43; W.O. to C.M.H.Q. 18 May 43; C.M.H.Q. Instruction to Units "OFFSIDE", 11 Jun 43.)

247. The total strength of all Canadian units and formations, including reinforcements and miscellaneous units going to North Africa, embarked in the assault and immediate follow-up convoys of Forces "X" and "Y" was 1,851 officers and 24,835 other ranks, making a grand total of 26,686 all ranks (C.M.H.Q., A.G. (Stat) File Sicily Force, 10 Jul 43). Detailed statistics will be found in Appendix "H".

#### THE CONVOY PROGRAMME

248. So far, we have only discussed the Military plans for the campaign, both administrative and operational, and the Naval and Air Force plans insofar as they affected the Military plan. Some mention has been made of the various convoys participating in the invasion but it remains to be described how these convoys were formed in the United Kingdom. The business was primarily a Naval responsibility, and a governing factor was the number of ships available. Some units or sub-units had to be

(16)

1 Cdn Fd Regt, one squadron of 1 Cdn Recce Regt, one battery of 2 Cdn L.A.A. Regt, 1 Cdn Div Comp Coy RCASC, 4, 5 and 9 Cdn Fd Amb, 1 and 2 Cdn F.D.S., 2 Cdn Fd Hyg Sec, 1 and 2 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp, 2 and 3 Cdn Inf Bde Support Groups, Postal and Provost Detachments.

4

eliminated from the original Order of Battle for this reason (see para 114 above). Given the ships and the sailing dates, there still remained the very complex task of compiling loading tables and allocating personnel and vehicles to ships. Here the Army and Navy obviously had to work very closely together. The Army knew what personnel and equipment were required, the Navy where they could be stowed. As far as possible, units were kept together on the same ships but this could not be done with their motor transport so that most units had some personnel scattered on various M.T. ships on which their M.T. was loaded.

249. In a report on this subject, the Historical Officer who accompanied 1 Cdn Inf Div, described the **situation as follows:**

The operational movement of Forces "X" and "Y" was one of great complexity. Ships had to be loaded and then formed into convoys. The loading was done tactically, i.e., ships were loaded so that vehicles and cargoes could be discharged under degrees of priority that were governed by the tactical Plan and by the facilities for discharge that would be available at the beachhead. Assaulting battalions had to be allotted to ships together with their full complement of beach party personnel (for organizing and maintaining traffic on beaches), and of engineer recce parties (to clear paths through minefields). It was, moreover, essential that vehicles, stores, supplies and ammunition necessary to maintain the assault would be landed as quickly as possible. M.T. ships and cargo vessels had to be so grouped that their arrival at the Release Position would immediately follow upon the landing of the assaulting waves. This grouping of vessels was accomplished by allotting them to convoys whose dates of departure, speed and dates of arrival at the destination were governed by the tactical nature of the personnel and cargoes which they carried.....In order to load the vessels with stores, supplies, ammunition and equipment, and subsequently have them available where they would be needed most, a system of convoys and sub-convoys was evolved. These convoys and sub-convoys were subsequently re-grouped into the various assaulting waves under Naval direction and sailed on various dates, each being allotted its course, speed and expected time of arrival at the Target.....

(Hist Sec File, 1 Cdn Inf Div "HUSKY" 1 Cdn Inf Div/Q/F Folio II)

250.

The Navy designated the forces sailing from the United Kingdom for Operation "HUSKY" somewhat differently from the Army. Thus the assault portion of the military "Force X", scheduled to land on D-day, was called Force "V" by the Navy and was commanded by Rear Admiral Vian (see para 204 above). Only that part of the military "Force X" sailing with the follow-up convoys was called Force "X" by the Navy. Military "Force Y" on the other hand, was also called Force "Y" by the Navy.\* The Navy further designated the separate convoys by letters "K.M.", followed by the letters "F" or "S", "fast" or "slow", plus a number. (17) for

Admt No 1  
11 May 46  
S.E.D.

(17)

\* It appears that the naval forces "X" and "Y" were in some respects subordinate to Force "V", but according to the Orders they were to be "sailed from United Kingdom by Admiralty" (see "Force V Naval Operation Order No.2", pages 13 and 15).

loading purposes, on the other hand, the planning staffs had developed a group of code names. Thus, in the first system of designation the convoys arriving on D-day were known as K.M.F. 18 and K.M.S. 18 (the latter being divided into A and B), and the convoys arriving on D + 3 as K.M.F. 19 and K.M.S. 19. Under the second system of designation the convoys carrying the assault portion of "Force X" (K.M.F. 18 and K.M.S. 18) were called "HERRICK I", and ships carrying the follow-up portion of "Force X" (part of K.M.F. 19 and K.M.S. 19) were known as "HERRICK II". The convoys carrying "Force Y" (the remainder of K.M.F. 19 and K.M.S. 19) were divided into five groups each with a separate code name: "LINNELL", carrying 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde Gp; "WILLOUGHBY", carrying R.A.F., R.N. and A.A. (R.A.) personnel; "FUSTIAN", carrying R.A.F. and beach sub-area personnel; "KENORA", carrying port group personnel and "NANTUCKET", carrying 5 Cdn Gen Hosp. (Operation "HUSKY", Force V Naval Operation Order No. 1; C.P.S. File 111, HERRICK I and HERRICK II Loading Tables; C.P.S. File 1018, War Cabinet Joint Planning Staff Minutes, 19 May 43; C.P.S. File 1020 Tel 83693, W.O. to Force 545, 26 May 43.)

251. "HERRICK I" was further sub-divided into "BESOM", carrying 1 Cdn Inf Bde Gp, 40 Commando and numerous miscellaneous units, "NIMROD", carrying 2 Cdn Inf Bde Gp, S.S. Bde H.Q., 41 Commando and other miscellaneous units and "SASH", carrying 3 Cdn Inf Bde Gp, Div H.Q., 12 Cdn Tks and other miscellaneous units. (C.P.S. File 111, HERRICK I and HERRICK II Loading Tables.)

252. The bulk of the troops sailed in the fast assault convoy, K.M.F. 18, on D - 12 (28 Jun). This convoy consisted of the Headquarters ship, H.M.S. "Hilary", six Landing Ships Infantry (Large) (L.S.I., L), two Landing Ships Personnel (L.S.P.), <sup>Adm. 11 May 43</sup> ~~two~~ <sup>three</sup> Landing Ships Tank (L.S.T.) and an Anti-Aircraft Ship. It may be noted that while the shipping was divided into "BESOM", "NIMROD" and "SASH" (for purposes of loading and allocation of personnel) the ships in each of these groups did not necessarily sail together. Indeed K.M.F. 18 and K.M.S. 18 were each made up of components from these three groups.

253. The actual ships in K.M.F. 18 were as follows:

Name of Sub-Convoy	Type of Ship	Name of Ship	No. of Ship
BESOM (1 Cdn Inf Bde Gp etc)	L.S.I. (L)	H.M.S. "Glengyle"	A.1
" "	" "	"Marnix van St. Aldegonde"	A.2
" "	" "	"Derbyshire"	A.3
" "	L.S.T.	H.M.S. "Boxer"	AA.8
" "	" "	H.M.S. "Bruiser"	AA.9
NIMROD (2 Cdn Inf Bde Gp etc)	L.S.I. (L)	"Circassia"	A.4
" "	" "	"Llangibby Castle"	A.5
" "	" "	"Durban Castle"	A.6
" "	L.S.T.	H.M.S. "Thruster"	BB.5
SASH (3 Cdn Inf Bde Gp etc)	L.S.H.	H.M.S. "Hilary"	A.7
" "	L.S.P.	"Batory"	A.8
" "	" "	"Ascania"	A.9

(Force V Naval Operation Order No. 1, op. cit. Appendix 7.)

254. The bulk of the M.T. and stores and some personnel, required for the assault, were embarked in the slower convoy, K.M.S. 18A and 18B. K.M.S. 18A consisting of eight L.S.T. sailed from the United Kingdom on D - 21 (19 Jun), while K.M.S. 18B consisting of seventeen M.T. ships, one Landing Ship Carrier (L.S.C.), one L.S.G. and one petrol carrier sailed on D-16 (24 Jun). These two convoys were to join forces on D-5 (5 Jul), when the composite convoy became known as K.M.S. 18. About 1200 hours on D-1 (9 Jul) seven ships from K.M.S. 18 were to join the fast assault convoy. The remainder of K.M.S. 18 were then known as the 'slow assault convoy'. (*ibid.*, paras 45, 46 and Appendix 7.)

255. K.M.F. 18 was to be escorted by five sloops and two frigates until D-3 and thenceforth by several special destroyer groups, while K.M.S. 18 had an escort of six corvettes, one sloop, one cutter and one frigate until D-5 after which special destroyer groups took over. Two Anti-Aircraft ships also accompanied K.M.F. 18 and K.M.S. 18 from the United Kingdom to the assault. (*ibid.*)

256. K.M.S. 19<sup>(42 ships)</sup> and K.M.F. 19<sup>(19 ships)</sup> carrying Military Force "Y" and the balance of Force "X" sailed from the United Kingdom on D-15 (25 Jun) and D-9 (1 Jul) respectively, the former escorted by one destroyer, one frigate, one cutter and six corvettes, the latter by three destroyers and three frigates. One L.S.F., two personnel ships and fourteen M.T. ships from these convoys, the ships belonging to Force "X" and known as HERRICK 11, were scheduled to arrive off the beaches at BARK WEST on D + 3. (*ibid.*)

257. The ships were loaded in different ports on the Bristol Channel, on the Mersey and on Clydeside, but all assembled in the latter area to form the various convoys. (Evidence of Lt.-Col. Pullen at that time a member of the Canadian Planning Staff). According to the lists in "Force V Naval Operation Order No. 1" the number of ships in these convoys leaving the United Kingdom totalled 92. This figure includes eight L.S.Ts., which this Naval Order includes in a supplementary list of naval ships, but excludes one A.A. ship which is listed under K.M.F. 18, and one Oiler which according to a pencilled amendment to the order was to join K.M.S. 18 on D-1 from an undisclosed port of departure. (The ships are listed again by convoys in "Force V Naval Operation Order No. 2" which lists the eight L.S.Ts. under K.M.S. 18A and excludes the A.A. ship and the Oiler. These lists, however, show only eight ships in K.M.F. 19.) exercise known as "STYMIE" was planned to be a dress rehearsal for the invasion of Sicily and a section of the Ayrshire coast in the vicinity of TROON was selected with local topography somewhat similar to that of the PACHINO Peninsula. Planning for the exercise was very detailed and the plan corresponded closely to the "HUSKY" one. For security reasons, however, the narrative of the plan represented the selected area of TROON as being a part of the coast of German occupied France. (Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/M, "STYMIE", Outline of Exercise "STYMIE". The file also contains numerous Operation Orders and Instructions, Loading Tables and an Intelligence Log for the exercise.)

259. The exercise was to take place in two parts, the first starting on the night 17/18 Jun with 1 and 2 Cdn Inf Bdes assaulting the TROON beaches on a two-brigade front, and 3 Cdn Inf Bde following through in reserve. The troops were to be re-embarked at 2000 hours 18 Jun. On 21 Jun the exercise was to be repeated with the reserve brigade landing on a different beach. (Outline of Exercise, *op. cit.*)

260. On 17 Jun a convoy of twelve ships left the Clyde to take part in this exercise which was to be one of the greatest full scale combined operations manoeuvres yet held in the British Isles. At 0130 hours, 18 Jun the assault commenced but at 1000 hours it was necessary to suspend operations because high winds were making the seas too dangerous for the landing craft. As a result the troopships returned to the Clyde. (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, 18 Jun.)

261. The unfavourable weather continued and on 20 Jun it was necessary to postpone "STYMIE II". During the interval the G.O.C. held a conference of unit and formation commanders and visited various ships at anchor. He found the M.T. ships very crowded but morale seemed to be good. The weather on the other hand, continued to be bad so that on 22 Jun it became necessary to cancel "STYMIE II" altogether but 3 Cdn Inf Bde which had been unable to take part in "STYMIE I" carried out a landing exercise in the Clyde. (*ibid.*, W.D. 3 Cdn Inf Bde, 22 Jun 43, and evidence of Captain D.H. Cunningham.)

262. Owing to these adverse weather conditions Exercise "STYMIE" was not as successful a rehearsal as had been hoped for. However, some lessons were learned and duly noted after the event. In a report on the exercise the Chief Umpire commented that the initial landings were quick and quiet with no lights visible. He said that control was good on ROGER beach but not so good on SUGAR. The attacks on the aerodrome and certain selected targets were "carefully thought out and well carried out". He was critical however, of the lack of lateral communication, of the failure of companies to pass information back to battalions and battalions back to brigades, and of the lack of patrolling. Control by junior leaders was also criticized and it was considered essential that more N.C.Os. and men understand the situation fully. (Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/M, "STYMIE" "Exercise "STYMIE" the Beaches", "Report on Exercise "STYMIE" by Chief Umpire", and "Notes on Exercise "STYMIE I".)

263. The days dragged on as the force waited longingly for the day of departure. Physical training, lectures, weapon cleaning, etc., helped to fill in the time and one or two much appreciated route marches ashore were arranged. Finally about 2100 hours on 28 Jun the fast assault convoy steamed out of GREENOCK Harbour. (W.Ds., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div and H.Qs., 2 and 3 Cdn Inf Bdes.)

264. Aboard each ship the men were briefed at a set date after sailing (e.g. 1 Jul for the fast assault convoy), and in line with General Montgomery's policy of keeping the troops informed at all times of what was going on they were put fully "in the picture" and told in detail what their operational roles were to be. (The Naval Commander had objected to this on the ground that should any of the vessels be torpedoed and some of these personnel taken aboard a U-boat as prisoners, the operation would be jeopardized.) An indication that the security measures taken had been successful was given when the announcement that the target was Sicily came as a complete surprise to most of the men. They cheered heartily when they were told that they were entering the Mediterranean theatre of operations and would become a part of General Montgomery's Eighth Army. (Hist Sec File "HUSKY" 1 Cdn Inf Div/Q/F, II Report of 1 Cdn Inf Div Hist Offr on the Voyage to Sicily.)

265. Special messages from Generals McNaughton, Montgomery and Crerar and from Admiral Vian telling the troops of their mission and wishing them the best of luck were read out to all ranks. On 1 Jul the senior officer on each of the troopships opened the ship's bags containing the instructions for all units on board. These contained bales of maps, air photos, operation orders, and intelligence pamphlets, while on each ship there were large scale models of the beaches and hinterland where the division was to assault. In the following days all ranks were briefed on these models with the result that none were too unfamiliar with PACHINO Peninsula when they finally landed. (Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/1 Cdn Inf Div/C/I, Messages from Generals Montgomery and McNaughton; Hist Sec File "HUSKY" 1 Cdn Inf Div, G.O.C./E, Letter of General Crerar, 16 Jun 43; W.D., R.C.R. 1 Jul 43.)

266. The Divisional Headquarters issued a special directive for training during the voyage which insisted on the "maintaining of regular hours for physical training, washing, eating, fatigues, games and lectures". Special stress in the lectures was given to the use of codex, the M.E. map reference code, signals procedure, first aid, sanitation and the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians. The men were warned that looters would be dealt with in the "severest manner". The directive insisted that the division was to "go ashore physically fit, with everyone knowing his job and what is required of him, and with a definite urge to kill". "It will be impressed on all ranks" it asserted "that good fighting must be associated with smartness of turn out and keenness in all those things which go to make a good soldier. This division must become known not only as a fighting division but as one possessing every good military quality". (Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/1 Cdn Inf Div/M/I, "1 Cdn Div Training Memorandum No. 1, 23 Jun 43".)

267. As part of the preparation a special handbook called "Soldier's Guide to Italy" was passed out to all the troops. This pamphlet contained a description of the geography, the history, the government, the church, the principal towns and industries of Italy and told the soldier what his assignment was in the country and what his relations were to be with civilians. It also gave him information regarding various Italian customs, currency, weights and measures and a list of useful Italian words and phrases. ("Soldier's Guide to Italy", a copy of which is in Hist Sec Files.)

268. During the voyage every effort was made to make all ranks malaria minded by special instruction and by the taking of mepacrine tablets. Indeed this matter was considered so important by General Montgomery that he had addressed a letter to all unit commanders regarding it. (Hist Sec File "HUSKY"/1 Cdn Inf Div/R.C.A.M.C./B/M.)

269. The fast assault convoy (K.M.F. 18) took a course north of Ireland and then due south but well to the west of the Bay of Biscay, then east towards GIBRALTAR, which was passed during the night of 4/5 Jul. Thence it headed eastwards through the Mediterranean along the North African coast, rounded Cape Bon and continued southeast towards TRIPOLI until about 0900 hours D-1 (9 Jul 43) whence it turned northwards passing MALTA about 1200 hours. Beyond a few alarms which sent all the ships weaving and caused considerable excitement, the voyage was accomplished without incident, a striking proof of Allied sea and air power. Perfect weather prevailed almost throughout, and as it became hotter, all ranks changed into tropical wear.

After months of hard training in the cold misty climate of Scotland the cloudless skies and blue seas through which they now passed were a most welcome change. (Report on the voyage by 1 Cdn Inf Div Hist Offr, op. cit.)

270. The slow assault convoy was, however, less fortunate. On the night 4/5 Jul, two of its ships, the "City of Venice" and the "St Essylt", were torpedoed in the Mediterranean between ORAN and ALGIERS, while on the following day the Commodore's ship, "Devil" was also sunk. These three ships between them carried some 470 Canadian troops, (18) of whom one officer and 54 other ranks were reported missing. 562 vehicles were lost including:

99	3-ton Trucks
102	15-cwt Trucks
52	5-cwt Willy's
52	Carriers
37	Heavy Utility Vehicles
4	Caravans
4	L.C.Vs.
68	Motor Cycles
14	25-pdr Guns
8	17-pdr Guns
10	6-pdr Guns
6	Bofors
31	Tractors
14	Trailers
1	Bulldozer
4	Transporting Sledges

(n) F.79 para 271. Add the following footnote to this paragraph:

英英

This officer was Major J.M. Robinson, Divisional Photo Interpreter, who had previously flown from England to Malta to obtain the latest information available. He had reconnoitred the Pachino beaches from a submarine and was then brought by destroyer to meet the convoy from the United Kingdom. He came aboard via the "bosun's chair".  
(Hist Sec File: Italy 1943/1 Cdn Inf Div/L/D, Account by Capt.G.M.Sprung.)

been made on the night 27/28 Jun which revealed that a firm sandbar some 20 yards wide and about 18 inches below water stretched from 935884 for 600 yards to the south and about 80 yards off ROGER beach. Inside this bar there was a steep drop shorewards to as deep as nine feet. Off SUGAR beach there was a similar bar but it was 2½ feet under water with only a five foot drop toward the beach. On 7 Jul a special Photo Intelligence Officer came aboard the "Hilary" from a destroyer with last minute intelligence and photographs confirming this information. (Hist Sec File "HUSKY" 1 Cdn Inf Div/C/E, Naval Message for General Simonds from 30 Corps, 29 Jun 43; Messages from G.O.C. to Comdr 1 Cdn Inf Bde, 3 and 7 Jul 43; C.P.S. File 2500/3, Cable 346219 Z29, 29 Jun 43, 30 Corps to W.O. (for 1 Cdn Div), W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, 7 Jul 43. In re-transmission the Naval message slightly changed the map reference.)

6501

In a ~~turn~~

In a report to H.Q., 1 Cdn Inf Div, Major D.S. Harkness, R.C.A., O.C. Troops on the "Devis" told the details regarding the sinking of this ship. The following is quoted from this report:

Admt.  
No 1  
11 May 45  
S.E.D.

At approx 1545 hrs, 5 July 43, the ship was struck by a torpedo just aft of amidships. The explosion was immediately beneath the OR's Mess Decks, and blew the body of one man up on the bridge, and two more on to the boat deck, as well as the rear end of a truck, etc. Fire broke out immediately, and within 3 - 4 minutes the fore part of the ship was cut off from the aft part. Explosions of ammunition were continuous.

The men, with two exceptions, behaved extremely well. They took their boat stations in an orderly manner, and did not throw over the rafts or jump overboard until the order to abandon ship was given. In the meantime, they collected wounded and burned men, and took them overboard with them when they went.

About a dozen men were trapped on the Mess Deck; several of these were able to get out themselves. I organized a gang, with ropes, who succeeded in pulling out the remainder. All these men were fairly severely burned, three of them very badly.

(C.M.H.Q. File 18/AAI/1, folio 278)

When all personnel aft were overboard Major Harkness himself left the ship and three minutes later at approximately 1605 hrs it went down. According to the report "Personnel were in the water for varying periods up to two hours, when all had been got on rafts or picked up by the rescue tug. About half an hour later a destroyer took on all survivors and ran us into BOUGIE, "TUNISIA". There the uninjured or slightly injured survivors were partially re-equipped and sent on to Sicily where they landed late on 13 Jul. The following day they joined their units. Of 12 Officers and 252 other ranks on board the "Devis" 51 other ranks were reported dead or missing. (ibid)

During the first nine days of July, in accordance with the preliminary bombing plan (para 211 above), the Allied Air Forces had carried out intensive attacks on the enemy's airfields in Sicily. During this period the North-West African Air Forces carried out 394 heavy, 1,225 medium and 377 light bomber effective sorties against Sicilian landing grounds while Cyrenaican - based Liberators of the Ninth U.S. Air Force flew 126 effective sorties against these objectives. On one day, 5 Jul, 50 out of 54 aircraft on the main GERBINI airfield were destroyed on the ground, and on the same day 35 out of a force of 100 German fighters were shot down while attacking a formation of 27 Fortresses. (R.A.F. Mediterranean Review No.4, H.Q. R.A.F. Middle East, July-September 1943: "The Conquest of Sicily"; a copy is in Hist Sec Files.) The R.A.F. Account referred to above sums up the results of the bombing programme as follows:

The Allied air forces' attacks on the Sicilian airfields during the first nine days of July rendered many of them unserviceable and about a half of the enemy's aircraft formerly based there were either forced to withdraw to South Italy or moved to newly constructed landing grounds. In particular, on the eve of the Allied landings the main GERBINI airfield, seven of its satellites, and COMISO airfield were rendered unserviceable; in the west, also, as the result of the heavy attacks in June BOCCA DI FALCO airfield appeared to be unserviceable and CASTELVETRANO was all but abandoned.

In addition to the great number of enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground in the course of the pre-invasion blitz on the Sicilian airfields, bombers operating under the control of the North-west African Air Forces claimed the destruction of 56 enemy fighters in combat for the loss of seven aircraft shot down by anti-aircraft fire and enemy air action and eight missing; escorting fighters accounted for another 45 enemy aircraft destroyed at the cost of seven shot down and five missing, and MALTA-based Spitfires acting as top cover to the N.A.A.F. bombers also accounted for an appreciable number of enemy fighters. U.S. Liberators of the Ninth U.S. Air Force encountered little enemy air opposition in the course of their attacks on GERBINI and COMISO airfields and destroyed only one enemy fighter in combat without loss.

272. As a result of this news, General Simonds ordered Brigadier Graham, commanding 1 Cdn Inf Bde to use three L.C.T. with D.U.K.Ws., instead of L.C.A. for one assault company of Hast & P.E.R. and the two assault companies of R.C.R. Thus, if the L.C.Ts. should go aground the D.U.K.Ws. would swim off them to the shore. (Messages, G.O.C. to Comd 1 Cdn Inf Bde, 3 and 7 Jul, op. cit.; see Appendix "I".)

273. Since it was obvious that the BARK WEST landing was going to be a difficult one, 30 Corps Headquarters made special arrangements to send 24 extra D.U.K.Ws. in three L.C.T. from Malta. (Hist Sec File "HUSKY" 1 Cdn Inf Div/C/E, Messages from 30 Corps to 1 Cdn Inf Div, 30 Jun and 7 Jul.)

274. As the force approached its destination various other convoys directed on the same target were passed and planes were seen flying overhead bound for Sicily which was now being continuously bombed in preparation. (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, 7-9 Jul 43.) But the Italian fleet and even the German Air Force still failed to come out and meet the approaching colossus. If the enemy were aware of what was impending they gave no sign of it. They knew that an attempt at invasion was likely, but they could not answer the questions where or when.

275. During 9 Jul all the various assault convoys of both the Eastern and Western Task Forces and their escorting warships were gradually concentrating according to schedule just to the south of Malta. Thence they sailed northwards, each convoy heading for its assigned beach. It was a hot cloudless day without the suggestion of a breeze until the early afternoon when a stiff gale suddenly blew up which churned the seas into angry masses of whitecaps. There was much concern lest the gale continue throughout the night and prevent the carrying out of the operation. However, about 1900 hours it began to abate and although there was still a considerable swell it was considered that landings would be possible. Tension increased as the zero hour approached and all ranks took what rest they could in preparation for the strenuous days ahead. Towards midnight they ate their last meal on board ship, their last regular meal for some time to come. In their packs they carried 48-hour emergency mess tin rations to tide them over the first few days. (Account by 1 Cdn Inf Div Hist Offr, op. cit.; W.D., H.Q., R.C.A.S.C., 1 Cdn Inf Div, 1-9 Jul 44.)


276. At about 2330 hours allied aircraft passed overhead to complete the softening-up process on the various points of the Island where the defences were most likely to interfere with the assault landings. Finally at 0048 hours, 10 Jul the Headquarters ship H.M.S. "Hilary" dropped anchor at the release position, quickly followed by the other vessels of the convoy. (Account, 1 Cdn Inf Div Hist Offr.) The months of planning and training were over, and now, after almost four years of waiting, the 1st Canadian Division was to engage in active operations - operations that would end only with the final collapse of the German Army in Europe.

*Para 276, add footnote - See Amend. No 1.*  
.....

277. This report was begun by Major A.T. Sesia and completed and revised by Captain J.B. Conacher.

*J.B. Conacher*  
for (C.P. Stacey) Colonel,  
Historical Officer,  
CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS.


# APPENDIX "A"



# LANDING OF 1 CDN INF DIV ON PACHINO PENINSULA

10 JUL 1943

## APPENDIX 'B'




# APPENDIX "C"

BRITISH - MOST SECRET  
AMERICAN - SECRET

## KEY.

- C.D. BATTERY
- A.A. "
- PILL BOX
- M.G. POST
- xxx WIRE



#### APPENDIX "D"

The following extract is taken from an "Administrative Appreciation for Operation HUSKY", dated 24 Feb 43 (C.P.S. File 1001)

#### OBJECT OF APPRECIATION

1. To act as a basis for S.D. and administrative planning.

#### OBJECT OF OPERATION

2. To capture and hold Sicily.

#### STRATEGICAL SETTING

3. The plan is based on the following assumptions:-
  - (a) The Allies are firmly established in the whole of French and Italian North Africa.
  - (b) Sardinia and Pantellaria remain in Axis hands.
  - (c) Spain has remained neutral and Spanish Morocco has not therefore been occupied and there are no signs of development of Spanish hostility nor further imminent German threat to Spain.

#### OUTLINE PLAN

4. (a) Preparatory Period. Naval and air action during the preparatory period will be directed towards the following objects.
  - (i) To reduce effectiveness of the enemy air forces, particularly fighters and day bombers.
  - (ii) To inflict the maximum damage on the Italian Fleet and drive it up the Adriatic.
  - (iii) To gain control over enemy submarines in the Mediterranean.
- (b) Heavy raids on Italy and action aimed at effecting the maximum reduction in Axis air strength generally (particular in fighters) to be carried out from the United Kingdom and North Africa.
- (c) In the Mediterranean, day and night bombing, fighter sweeps, escort raids and low flying attacks will be intensified from D minus 21 until D Day, with the object of -
  - (i) Interrupting Axis reinforcements to Sicily.
  - (ii) Furthering our attainment of air superiority by destroying Axis fighters.

Finally, on the two nights prior to D day, a heavy and concentrated bomber attack will be carried out in the Messina area.

#### Phase I - D Day assaults.

5. Assaults will be carried out in the following areas:

#### South-Eastern Area (British assaults)

##### A. Avola Area.

- (a) One commando to capture the coast defence guns at Cap Iuero di Perco.

## APPENDIX "D" (contd)

### Phase I - D Day assaults (5) contd.

- (b) One infantry division and one army tank battalion to land on a two brigade front to capture Siracusa and Augusta.

#### B. Pachino area.

One infantry brigade group to capture the airfield at Pachino.

#### C. Pozzallo area.

- (a) One parachute brigade (less one battalion) to be dropped to assist in the capture of the airfield at Comiso.

- (b) One infantry division (less one infantry brigade group) and one armoured regiment to land on a one brigade front to capture the airfield at Comiso and to advance to the high ground Palazzolo - Buccheri - Vizzini.

#### D. Gela Area.

- (a) One parachute brigade (less one battalion) to be dropped to assist in the capture of the airfield at Ponte Olivo.

- (b) One infantry division to land on a one brigade front to capture the airfield at Ponte Olivo and St. Michele, and to guard the flank of the subsequent advance on Catania.

### Western Area (American assaults)

#### E. Sciacca - Marinella Area.

One infantry division and an armoured regiment to land on a two brigade front to capture the landing ground at Sciacca and the airfield at Castelvetro.

### Phase II - Assaults.

#### 6. Palermo Area (American Assaults.)

On D plus 2 the following assaults will be made in the Palermo area.

#### F. Castellamare.

- (a) One Commando to capture the coastal batteries at Cap S. Vito.

- (b) One infantry division (less one infantry brigade group) and one armoured brigade group (less one armoured regiment) to land on a two brigade front on beach 32 with the object of severing road and rail communications between the west of the island and Palermo, and linking up with our forces at Castelvetro.

#### G. Trappeto

One infantry division (less one infantry brigade group) to land and to advance eastward against Palermo.

#### H. Carini Bay

- (a) One commando to capture the coast battery at Cape Gallo.

## APPENDIX "D" (contd)

### Phase II - Assaults. (contd).

#### H. Gerini Bay (contd).

- (b) One infantry brigade group to land on beach 35 to assist the Trappeto force in the capture of the Palermo area.

#### J. Cape Zaffarano area.

One infantry brigade group and one Commando to land south of Cape Zaffarano to prevent the arrival of reinforcements from the east and to assist in the capture of Palermo.

### 7. Catania Area (British Assault)

One D plus 3 the following assault will be made in the Catania area:-

- (a) Three parachute brigades to be landed in the Gerbini area to assist in the capture of airfields.
- (b) The batteries in Catania town to be neutralized by naval bombardment and two Commandos to be landed south of the town to deal with the remaining Catania batteries.
- (c) One division and one infantry brigade group to be landed on a two brigade front to capture Catania and the airfields.

### Phase III - Reduction of the Island.

8. To assist in this phase of the operation one infantry division will be landed in each of the eastern and western areas by D plus 28 if they are found to be necessary.

### TIMING OF OPERATION

9. The original assault date envisaged for the operation was 25th July 1943. The examination is at present taking place with a view to mounting the operation at a suitable moon period in June. Present planning deals entirely with the earlier date, i.e. 22nd June, and all efforts must be concentrated on launching the assault on this date unless or until it is found impracticable to do so.

### SYSTEM OF COMMAND

10.	Supreme Commander	-	General Eisenhower
	Deputy Commander	-	General Alexander
	Western Task Force Commander	-	General Patton
	Eastern Task Force Commander	-	General Montgomery

### CENTRES OF PLANNING

Allied Force Headquarters	-	Algiers
Western Task Force	-	Oran
Eastern Task Force	-	Cairo.

### MOUNTING OF OPERATION AND PROVISION OF FORCES.

12. As at present planned the British portion of the operation is to be mounted and forces found as follows:-

APPENDIX "D" (contd).

Phase III - Reduction of the Island (contd).

Mounting of Operation and Provision of Forces (12) contd.

Avola-Pachino-Pozzallo assaults - 5 and 56 Division, ex P.A.I.C.

Gela assault - 1st Division ex North Africa.

Catania assault - 5rd Division and one Inf Bde Gp ex United Kingdom.

Follow Up D plus 28 - One infantry division ex Middle East.

APPENDIX "E"SECRET

The following list of Canadian staff officers engaged in the planning for Operation "HUSKY" is a copy of an undated list in File P.A. 1-14-1

H.Q. 1 CDN DIV

G.O.C.	Maj.-Gen. G.C. Simonds, C.B.E.	29 Apr 43
A.D.C.	Lieut. K.L.W. Scott Edmn R	22 Mar 43

GENERAL STAFF BRANCH

G.S.O. 1	Lt.-Col G. Kitching, RCR Edmn R	14 Dec 42
G.S.O. 2(Ops)	Major E.D. Danby, Seaforth of C	26 Apr 43
G.S.O. 3(Ops)	Capt P.R. Bingham RCR	7 Dec 42
G.S.O. 3(Ops)	Lieut (A/Capt) A.T. Sosia / RMLI	31 Jan 43
G.S.O. 3(CW)	Capt H.E.C. Price, RCR	13 Nov 42
G.S.O. 3(Int)	Capt A. Chambers C.Int.C.	27 Apr 43

BRANCH OF THE A.G. & Q.M.G.

A.A. & Q.M.G.	Lt-Col W.P. Gilbride, RCASC	29 Apr 43
D.A.A.G.	Major F.E.D. Wallace, ED, Gen List (DCH Rif)	6 Aug 42
D.A.Q.M.G.	Major A.F.B. Knight, RCA	27 Apr 43

MEDICALS

A.D.M.S.	Lt-Col (A/Col) C.H. Playfair, RCAMC	29 Apr 43
D.A.D.M.S.	Major J.K. Boll, RCAMC	22 Jul 42

ORDNANCE

A.D.O.S.	Major (A/Lt-Col) (O.O.2 cl.) D.G.F.16 Feb 43 Farquharson, RCOC
----------	---

PROVOST

A.P.M.	Capt (A/Maj) N. Cooper, C.Pro.C.	16 Feb 43
--------	----------------------------------	-----------

LEGAL

A.D.J.A.	Capt G.M. Graham, Gen List	3 Feb 43
----------	----------------------------	----------

1 CDN DIV SPEC INCREMENT

G.S.O. 2	Capt (A/Maj) D.W. McAdam, West NSR	27 Apr 43
A.A. & Q.M.G.	Lt-Col W.J. Moogk, R.Wpg. Rif	27 Apr 43
D.A.Q.M.G.	Capt (A/Maj) C.S. Fraser, 1 C Scot R	27 Apr 43
S.C.	Maj J.A. Lefebvre, R 22e R.	3 May 43

CANADIAN PLANNING STAFF

A.A. & Q.M.G.	Maj (A/Lt-Col) C.H. Harding, RCA	3 May 43
G.S.O. 2 (Ops)	Maj B.G. Pullen, Lorne Scots	30 Jan 43
G.S.O. 2 (SD)	Maj P.E.R. Wright, R. Regt. C.	31 Jan 43
G.S.O. 3 (Ops)	Capt E.L. Fortune, West NSR	28 Jan 43
D.A.A.G.	Maj D.F. MacRae, MC., SD&G Highrs	28 Jan 43
D.A.Q.M.G. (Ops)	Maj G.H. Spencer, RCB	7 May 43
D.A.Q.M.G. (H)	Maj H.E. Hacking, RCASC	31 Jan 43
S.C. "Q"	Capt C.R. Payan, R de Mais.	3 May 43

CANADIAN PLANNING STAFF INCREMENT

S.C. "A"	Capt W.A. Wood, RMC	3 May 43
S.C. "Q"	Capt E.H. Counsell, RCA	3 May 43
S.C. (Arm)	Capt L. Sarantos, RCASC	3 May 43

APPENDIX "H" (contd).

H.Q. 1 CDN ARMY TK BDE

Comd	Brig R.A. Wyman, ED.	2	Feb 42
B.H.	Maj E.F. Schmidlin, CAC	18	Jul 42
G.S.O. 3	Maj D.F. Cameron, CAC	27	Apr 43
D.A.A. & Q.M.G.	Capt H. Williamson, Gen List	27	Jul 42
S.G.	Capt H.T. Leggatt, CAC		

1 CDN ARMY TK BDE SPEC INCREMENT

G.S.O. 3	Maj R.R. Munro, CAC	3	May 43
----------	---------------------	---	--------

4 Later appointed 1 Cdn Inf Div Historical Officer.

APPENDIX "F"  
(Based on an Order of Battle, for 11 Jul 43, in C.M.H.Q. file 3/Sicily/1/3)

16 ARMY GROUP  
(Comd: Gen the Hon Sir H.R.L.G. Alexander)

SEVENTH (U.S.) ARMY  
(Comd: Lt.-Gen. G.S. Patton)

EIGHTH ARMY  
(Comd: Gen. Sir B.L. Montgomery)

SEVENTH (U.S.) ARMY

2 CORPS  
(Comd: Lt.-Gen. Omar Bradley)

RESERVE

2 ARMD DIV    1 INF DIV    3 INF DIV    45 INF DIV    82 AIRBORNE DIV    1, 3 & 4 Ranger Bns  
7- & 753 Indep Tk Bns    9 INF DIV

N.B. 2 Armd Div, 3 Inf Div and 82 Airborne Div were later withdrawn from 2 Corps. A "Provisional" Corps was then formed, later called 4 Corps.

EIGHTH ARMY

13 CORPS  
(Comd: Lt.-Gen M.C. Dempsey)

30 CORPS  
(Lt.-Gen. Sir G.W.H. Leese, Bt.)

4 ARMD BDE

23 ARMD BDE

1 AIRBORNE DIV

5 INF DIV    50 (N) INF DIV

51 (H) INF DIV    1 Cdn INF DIV    231 INF BDE    1 Cdn ARMY  
TK BDE

BEACH GROUPS	ARMY TROOPS
3, 4, 20 and 21 Beach Groups	5 & 6 A.G.R.A.
31, 32, 33 and 34 Bricks	S.S. Bde
	S.A.S. Regt
	1 Scorpion Regt
	M.N.B.D.O. II and other troops

N.B. An Eighth Army Outline Order of Battle, dated 8 Jul and effective on 'D' Day, shows 6 A.G.R.A., 4 Armd Bde, 1 Airborne Div, 32, 33 and 34 Bricks (Beach Groups) and 2 A.A. Bde under 13 Corps; and 5 A.G.R.A., 23 Armd Bde, 3, 4 and 20 Beach Groups, 31 Brick, 62 and 73 A.A. Bdes under 30 Corps. 10 Corps is shown as Eighth Army Reserve temporarily under Command C.M.H.Q. M.E.F. (W.D., Main Eighth Army, Appx 'L', Jul 43.)

The organization of both Armies was continually being changed as the campaign developed. For instance on 11 Jul the S.S. Bde was withdrawn from under command 1 Cdn Inf Div and placed under Army Command.

APPENDIX "G"

HOT SECRET  
OFFICERS ONLY

2200/G.268

7 Jun 43

COPY NO \_\_\_\_\_

1 CANADIAN DIVISION OPERATION ORDER NO 1

Reference Maps: GSGS 4072 - 1:500,000 SICILIA  
GSGS 4229 - 1:50,000 Sheets 276 - II  
277 - III  
GSGS 4228 - 1:25,000 Sheets 276 -II NE & SE  
277 -III NE & SW  
NE & SE

INTRODUCTION

1. (a) 1 Canadian Division is now a part of the Eight Army, which, together with a United States Army Corps, is to capture SICILY. This operation bears the code name HUSKY.
- (b) Eight Army, commanded by General Montgomery, has been divided for the assault phase of this operation into two Corps - 30 Corps and 13 Corps. 1 Canadian Division is with 30 Corps.
- (c) The commander of 30 Corps is Lieutenant General Sir Oliver Leese Bt, who commanded it during the battle of ALAMEIN and the pursuit into TUNISIA. The Corps now consists of 1 Canadian Division, 51 (Highland) Infantry Division and 231 Infantry Brigade. 51 (Highland) Division is commanded by Major General Wimberley and 231 Brigade is commanded by Brigadier Smith.
- (d) The commander of 13 Corps is Lieutenant General Dempsey who, in 1941, was Brigadier General Staff at Canadian Corps Headquarters. 13 Corps has under command 5 Division, 50 Division and 1 Airborne Division.

INFORMATION

2. Enemy

For enemy dispositions, description of beaches and terrain, and inhabitants, see Intelligence Summaries and defence overprints as issued.

3. Own Troops

- (a) 13 Corps are landing in the area AVOLA (J 0112), their main task being to seize SYRACUSE and AUGUSTA as soon as possible.
- (b) 30 Corps are assaulting the PACHINO Peninsula.
- (c) 2 United States Corps are landing in the area GELA with the task of securing the airfields at GELA, BISCARI and COMISO.

All the above assaults will be carried out simultaneously.

4. 30 Corps Plan

- (a) 231 Brigade is assaulting through two beaches which lie NORTH and SOUTH of MARZAMEMI 0 0094. These beaches are numbered 51 and 52 respectively and are known by code name BARK EAST. The immediate task of 231 Brigade is to secure a bridgehead from N 983965 - FATTA S. LORENZO N 9695 - road running SOUTH to excluding PACHINO town - thence road junction 983918 - inlet 001923.
- (b) 51 (Highland) Division is assaulting on beaches between ACQUA PALOMBA 0 0189 and PUNTA DELLE FORMICHE N 9485. These beaches are known as BARK SOUTH.
- The main tasks of 51 (Highland) Division are to capture 56 Beach (which lies in the bay at RADA DI PORTOPALO 0 0086), the high ground in area 0 0086 and PACHINO town.

INTENTION

5. 1 Canadian Division and attached troops (see Order of Battle Appendix 'N' ) will:
- (a) Capture BARK WEST sector (Beach 57).
- (b) Protect the left flank of 30 Corps.
- (c) Capture PACHINO airfield and develop it for operational use.
- (d) Prepare to advance to the line of road ROSOLINI 8502 - POZZALLO 7592 in conformity with 51 (Highland) Division.

METHOD

6. The operation will be divided into three phases.
- (a) PHASE I
- The capture of BARK WEST sector, the destruction of coast defence artillery and beach defenses, the clearing of high ground immediately overlooking the beaches and the capture of PACHINO airfield.
- (b) PHASE II
- The landing of the Divisional reserves, the capture of the two features at 8992 and 9195 and the re-organization of the Division preparatory to further advance.
- (c) PHASE III
- The advance by 1 Canadian Division in conformity with 51 (Highland) Division to general line ROSOLINI H 8502 - SPACCAFORNO (ISPACCA) N 8099 - POZZALLO N 7592.

PHASE I

7. Inter-divisional boundary including 1 Canadian Division - track 943871 - 958885 - cross roads 954893 - including 51 (Highland) Division PACHINO Town.
8. Assault on Beaches

The assault will be on two brigade front supported on the left by a simultaneous assault by the Special Service Brigade.

Right - 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group

with under command

2 Canadian Field Regiment  
142 Field Regiment (Self Propelled) (less  
one battery and one troop)  
51 Canadian Anti-tank Battery  
5 Canadian Light Anti-Aircraft Battery  
1 Canadian Field Company  
Detachment of 1 Canadian Division Signals  
4 Canadian Field Ambulance  
Section 1 Canadian Division Provost Company

Left - 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group

with under command

3 Canadian Field Regiment  
Battery and Troop 142 Field Regiment (Self  
Propelled)  
90 Canadian Anti-tank Battery  
54 Canadian Light Anti-Aircraft Battery  
3 Canadian Field Company  
5 Canadian Field Ambulance

(Troops under command 1 and 2 Canadian Infantry Brigades  
for landing only, are shown in Appendices "E" and "F")

9. Inter-Brigade Boundary - all inclusive 1 Canadian Infantry  
Brigade 926885 - point 14 925912 thence stream to 938938.

10. Task of 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group

1 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group will land on ROGER sector  
EAST of and inclusive 926885 at H hour and:

- (a) Destroy enemy coast defence battery reported at 956894
- (b) Capture all inclusive spur 950926 - 956900 - point  
14 925912 covering BARK WEST from NORTH-EAST and NORTH
- (c) Capture PACHINO airfield 9691, reorganize and be prepared  
to advance on axis PACHINO airfield - point 55 in road 917945 -  
- point 69 9095 - 917967 track junction 917947.
- (d) In order to establish contact with 51 (Highland) Division  
during this advance reconnaissance patrols will be sent to:  
  - (i) Point 21 9486
  - (ii) Ring contour 953877
  - (iii) Ring contour 967889

If 51 (Highland) Division are not in occupation of these  
points, the patrols will remain in observation.

- (e) Patrols will also be sent forward as soon as possible  
to contact 231 Brigade to the NORTH of PACHINO town.

11. Task of 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group

2 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group will land on SUGAR sector  
WEST of and exclusive 926885 and at H hr will:

- (a) Advance WEST to destroy enemy beach defences up to and  
exclusive compound at 889900 and, if required, co-operate  
with Special Service Brigade in destruction of enemy  
defences between inclusive point 886893 - 855890.

- (b) Position itself in area all inclusive bridge 89137 - bend in road 910935 - road and track junction 922915 - point 38 at 883920 and patrol to high ground in squares 8595, 8794 and 8594.
- (c) Prepare to advance and capture high ground all inclusive point 84 at 857956 - point 64 at 847945 - point 59 at 868944.
- (d) Allot at least one troop Anti-tank guns to the Special Service Brigade as soon as the latter have destroyed the enemy defences and re-organized as in paragraph 12 (d) below.

Engineer reconnaissance parties will reconnoitre the length of the LAVINARO BRUNO 8893 and the neck of land 894902, and report as to whether they are obstacles to wheels or tracks, prepare crossing places and report locations.

## 12. Task of Special Service Brigade

Special Service Brigade will land at H hour between PUNTA CASTELLAZZO square 8889 and PUNTA CIRIGA 8688 and will:

- (a) Destroy enemy coast defence batteries in the area 886893 and 855891.
- (b) Destroy enemy defences between these batteries in conjunction with 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade.
- (c) Capture beach area 888898 from landward side and inform Divisional Headquarters whether it is suitable for landing of personnel and vehicles and if seaward approaches are clear of obstacles.
- (d) Re-organize on high ground all inclusive road junction 878912 - point 26 878905 for protection left flank.

The Special Service Brigade will be responsible for the destruction of coast defences on their EASTERN flank as far as inclusive the compound at 889900.

## 13. Reporting of Initial Beachheads

- (a) 1 and 2 Canadian Infantry Brigades will report by using the code in (b) below as soon as local beachheads have been secured by leading assault companies. This information will only be passed when companies have crossed the beach, having passed through any beach obstacles, and are concentrated in the dunes beyond.
- (b) Code names are allotted as under:

### 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade

Right forward company right battalion  
Left forward company right battalion  
Right forward company left battalion  
Left forward company left battalion

HEATHER  
HOLLYHOCK  
HONEYSUCKLE  
HYACINTH

### 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade

Right forward company right battalion  
Left forward company right battalion  
Right forward company left battalion  
Left forward company left battalion

LAVENDER  
LILAC  
LILY  
LUPIN

- (c) 1 and 2 Canadian Infantry Brigades will also arrange that flares TR are lit in the beaches by forward companies as soon as each beach is gained.

- 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade to light red flares
- 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade to light green flares

(d) Special Service Brigade will report that they have made a successful landing by sending the code word ORCHID.

14. General Policy of Naval Support (for details see Appendix 'K')

- (a) If complete surprise is maintained up to H hour no covering bombardment will precede the assault.
- (b) If enemy coast defence artillery and defences open fire on our small craft or shipping before H hour H M ships will bombard until H minus 15 minutes and small support craft will support the assault with fire.
- (c) If formations and units of 1 Canadian Division have not silenced all coast defence batteries within the divisional sector by first light H M ships will again, without further warning, continue the bombardment and neutralizing of any active batteries engaging our ships, craft or the beaches.

Phase II

15. Divisional reserve will land on orders Divisional Headquarters in the following priority:

- (a) 12 Canadian Tank Regiment
- (b) 1 Canadian Anti Tank Regiment (less three batteries)
- (c) 3 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group with under command
  - 57 Anti Tank Battery
  - 2 Canadian Light Anti Aircraft Battery
  - 9 Canadian Field Ambulance
  - Section 1 Canadian Division Provost Company

16. Divisional Reserve will be prepared to land

- (a) through BARK WEST
- (b) through BARK SOUTH if BARK WEST is considered unsuitable
- (c) simultaneously on both BARK WEST and BARK SOUTH

17. Divisional Reserve Assembly Areas on landing

See trace 'T' attached.

If, through the condition of the beaches, 3 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group assemble in the MOOSE assembly area, they will move as soon as possible to the BEAVER assembly area.

18. Divisional Reserve Concentration Areas

See trace 'T' attached.

3 Canadian Infantry Brigade remain in the BEAVER assembly area until ordered forward by Divisional Headquarters (See paragraph 20 below).

19. Movement Divisional Headquarters and Divisional Reserve

The assembly deployment and moves of Divisional reserve and Divisional Headquarters will take priority over the development of the final maintenance plan.

20. Task of 3 Canadian Infantry Brigade

As soon as one battalion has assembled complete in the BEAVER assembly area it will capture and secure spur from BURGIO 927932 to Point 19 in 9192.

21. Task of 1 or 3 Canadian Infantry Brigades

1 or 3 Canadian Infantry Brigades as ordered will capture high ground all inclusive point 69 in 8995 - bridge 917967 - track junction 917947.

The bridge at 917967 will be held until handed over to 51 (Highland) Division in Phase III.

22. Task of 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade

On receipt of orders 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade will capture high ground all inclusive point 84 at 857956 - point 64 at 847945 - point 59 at 868944.

23. Task of Special Service Brigade

Special Service Brigade will conform to movements of 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade and cover the left flank of the Division by occupying inclusive ring contour 856930 to inclusive spur 8492 and patrolling from this point to the sea of FOCE CHIARETTE 833911.

24. Main Divisional Headquarters will move to vicinity 920922.  
Rear Divisional Headquarters will move to vicinity 925916.

Phase III

25. 1 Canadian Division will re-organize as below preparatory to advancing on a two Brigade front on AXIS PACHINO - ISPICCA 8099.

- (a) One Brigade in area all inclusive spur 950926 - 956900 - point 14 at 925912.
- (b) One Brigade in area all inclusive point 69 in 8995 - bridge 917967 - track junction 917947.
- (c) One Brigade in area all inclusive point 84 at 857956 - point 64 at 847945 - point 59 at 868944.
- (d) Special Service Brigade in area all inclusive ring contour 856930 - spur 8492.

26. Division Landing Table

- (a) BESOM - see Appendix "A"
- (b) NIMROD - see Appendix "B"
- (c) SASH - see Appendix "C"

(annexure 1 and 2 show tactical and administrative composition)

- (d) HERRICK II - see Appendix "D"

27. Allocation of Personnel and vehicles to convoy

- (a) BESOM see Appendix "E"
- (b) NIMROD see Appendix "F"
- (c) SASH see Appendix "G"
- (d) HERRICK II see Appendix "H"

28. Field Artillery

- (a) Self Propelled and Field Regiments will be under command assaulting brigades as allotted. They will be deployed by brigades as close as practical to the inter brigade boundary between 1 and 2 Canadian Infantry Brigades to facilitate re grouping under Commander Royal Artillery.
- (b) 1 Canadian Field Regiment on landing from HERRICK II will either be directed to an assembly area or placed under command 3 Canadian Infantry Brigade. The principle for re-grouping outlined in paragraph 28(a) above will be applicable.

29. Medium Artillery

93 Medium Battery on landing will proceed to an assembly area under command Commander Royal Artillery.

30. Anti-Tank

1 Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment (less three batteries) will be deployed under orders Commander Royal Artillery.

31. Anti-Aircraft (See Appendix L)

- (a) Anti-aircraft protection of 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade beach head will be the responsibility of the Brigade.
- (b) Anti-aircraft defence of 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade beach head area will be the responsibility of Commander 103 Sub Area.
- (c) Anti-aircraft defence of PACHINO airfield 9691 will be responsibility of Commander Royal Artillery.
- (d) On capture of airfield by 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade, the 5 Canadian Light Anti Aircraft battery will be responsible, as its primary and exclusive task, for the protection of the airfield.

32. Smoke

The use of smoke throughout the assault and subsequent exploitation will be subject to inter service consideration.

- (a) Approach to the beaches - a Naval responsibility. Smoke will be used as deemed necessary by Royal Navy for protection of craft.
- (b) The decision whether or not to use smoke for the Anti aircraft protection of the beaches will rest with the AADC who will consult the Officer Commanding Beach Group concerned.
- (c) Smoke used in conjunction with any observed fire plan after landing and involving resources of Royal Navy or Royal Air Force will be subject to smoke policy as issued by corps. It will be coordinated by the Commander Royal Artillery.
- (d) Brigades may use smoke within their own resources. Ship's Forward Observation Officers to be informed.

33. Bombardment Unit

Ship's Forward Observation Officer Parties will remain with 1 and 2 Canadian Infantry Brigades until ordered to return to Division Headquarters.

34. Ammunition Policy

- (a) All artillery units will land carrying full artillery and small arms ammunition, in assault scale operation.
- (b) Self Propelled, Field and Medium may expend up to 50% first line ammunition without referring to Commander Royal Artillery.
- (c) Division Light Anti Aircraft may expend ammunition as required.

35. Divisional Royal Engineers

Tasks and Priorities

- (a) Clearance of lanes through minefields
- (b) Communications
- (c) Water supply
- (d) Possible delousing of PACHINO airfield
- (e) Provision of defence stores and division dumps.

36. Beach Royal Engineers

Tasks and Priorities

- (a) Assist Royal Navy in dealing with underwater obstacles.
- (b) Clearing lanes in minefields for beach exits.
- (c) Improving exits and laying beach roadway.
- (d) Clearing mines from gun sites for Light Anti Aircraft and Heavy Anti Aircraft.
- (e) Clearing minefields for beach framework.
- (f) Water supply
- (g) Communications with beach maintenance area.
- (h) Royal Engineer Stores
- (j) Prisoner of War Cages.

37. Airfield Construction

(a) Tasks and Priorities

- (i) Restoration of main EAST WEST landing lane at PACHINO airfield.
- (ii) Restoration of NORTH SOUTH landing lane at PACHINO airfield.
- (iii) In the event of PACHINO airfield being very extensively damaged a new site will be located and developed to provide landing lane for 4 squadrons of Spitfires.
- (iv) Messages as to availability and completion of landing strips will be sent "emergency ops".
- (b) Reconnaissance and Advance Party 15 Airfield Construction Group will advance to PACHINO airfield under command 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade.

- (c) 15 Airfield Construction Group will advance to airfield under order 1 Canadian Division.
- (d) 233 Pioneer Company under command Transportation for construction vehicle landing ramp. On completion revert to Commander Royal Engineers 15 Airfield Construction Group.

38. Minefields

- (a) All minefields will be marked and dealt with in accordance with Allied Force Headquarters pamphlet "How to clear Mines and Booby Traps" March 1943.
- (b) The division of responsibility of Division Royal Engineers and Beach Royal Engineers with respect to mines on beaches and in beach maintenance area is:-
  - (i) Division Royal Engineers will provide lanes for passage of Mechanical Transport of assaulting troops through minefields on beaches on scale of one lane per assaulting battalion.
  - (ii) All other mine clearing on beaches and within beach maintenance area will be the responsibility of the Beach Royal Engineers.
  - (iii) Infantry Brigades will land one complete platoon Royal Engineers from Division Field Company with transport loaded and one set of lane marking stores, and keep intact as a reserve.

39. Beach Maintenance

- (a) Number 3 Beach Group will land with 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group and will develop beach maintenance area within 1 Canadian Infantry Brigade boundaries to service the assault elements of 1 and 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade Groups.
- (b) Detachment Number 4 Beach Group will land with 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group in sufficient strength to enable the vehicles of the Brigade Group to be passed through.
- (c) The remainder of Number 4 Beach Group will be in Divisional Reserve and will be prepared to land on BARK WEST or BARK SOUTH and extend beach maintenance area. It will be joined here by its detachment from 2 Canadian Infantry Brigade.

40. Water Supply - is of vital importance and the reporting of source of water will be the duty of all arms.

Division of responsibility:-

- |                               |                                      |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Reconnaissance and reporting: | - All arms - through normal channels |
|                               | CRE will maintain a Water map        |
| Development                   | - Royal Engineers                    |
| Allotment of Water            | - "Q"                                |

41. Codes

- (a) The new type Codex with 200 words will be used throughout 1 Canadian Division down to Infantry Battalion and Artillery Battery level.
- (b) The Middle East type of map reference code will be used by all ranks.

For further details and explanation see separate Signal Instruction and Orders.

42. Passwords

In order to establish a password common to the whole Army to cover the initial assault period the following password procedure will be adopted and made known to all ranks.

CHALLENGE - "DESERT RATS"

ANSWER - "KILL ITALIANS"

No other passwords will be used until further orders

43. Recognition Signals

Ground to Air recognition	}	- See Appendix "M"
Air to ground		
Ground to ground recognition		

ON LANDING AND UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS PENNANTS FLOWN BY AFV's AS OUTLINED IN APPENDIX "M" PARAGRAPH 3 (a) WILL BE POSITIONED AS FOLLOWS:

ONE at top of mast

One half way up mast

44. It is the responsibility of all comds to ensure that all ranks know the Army Commanders intention and plan before going into action.

45. Security

Complete copies of Operation Orders will NOT be taken ashore. Any relevant extracts required may be taken down in manuscript and in note form and will bear no official heading.

46. D Day and H hour

H hour is the time at which leading flights of assaulting infantry touch the shore.

D day is the day in which the assault commences.

D day and H hour have been communicated verbally to those concerned.

47. Code Names

- (a) At Appendix "J" attached is a list of code names for places, boundaries, assembly areas, etcetera which will be used in 1 Canadian Division. Formations and units will issue extracts of these as necessary.
- (b) No other code names within the divisional boundaries will be used except on application to Divisional Headquarters.
- (c) Any lists of code names taken ashore will not appear on the same piece of paper as place names to which they refer. It will be noted that Appendix 'J' is prepared for separating code names and place names by cutting.

INTERCOMMUNICATION - issued separately

ADMINISTRATION - issued separately

ACKNOWLEDGE

Method of Issue Hand and L.O.

Time of Signature 1600

(G Kitching) Lt Col  
GS 1 Cdn Div

DISTRIBUTION:

Copy No

1 Canadian Infantry Brigade	1	
2 Canadian Infantry Brigade	2	
3 Canadian Infantry Brigade	3	
1 Canadian Division Support Battalion	4	
Squadron 4 Canadian Reconnaissance Regiment	5	
Commander Royal Artillery	6	
Commander Royal Engineers	7	
Officer Commanding 1 Canadian Division Signals	8	
103 Sub-Area (Beach)	9	
Special Service Brigade	10	
12 Canadian Tank Regiment	11	
15 Airfield Construction Group	12	
30 Corps	13 - 15	
51 (Highland) Division	16	) through 30 Corps
231 Brigade	17	
1 Canadian Army Tank Brigade	18	
Rear Admiral (V)	19 - 30	
Royal Air Force	31 - 32	
Commander 1 Canadian Division	33	
GSO 1, 1 Canadian Division	34	
GSO 2, 1 Canadian Division	35	
Historical officer, 1 Canadian Division	36	
A/Q, 1 Canadian Division	37 - 38	
Principal Military Landing Officer	39	
Commander Royal Army Service Corps	40	
Assistant Director Medical Services	41	
Assistant Director Ordnance Services	42	
Commander Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers	43	
Deputy Assistant Provost Marshall	44	
Camp Commandant, 1 Canadian Division	45	
General Officer Commanding in Chief First Canadian Army	46	
General Staff (Plans), War Office	47 - 48	
Chief of Combined Operations	49	
File	50	
War Diary	51 - 53	
Spares	54 - 58	

# APPENDIX "H"

(Statistics supplied by A.G. (Stat), C.M.H.Q.)

## STRENGTH OF CANADIAN UNITS EMBARKED FOR OPERATION "HUSKY"

	1 CDN INF DIV UNIT	EMBARKED OFFICERS	ORs
<u>H.Q. UNITS</u>			
	H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div	60	194
	H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div Sp Bn	4	20
	1 Cdn F.S. Sec	1	14
	1 Cdn Inf Div Def & Emp Pl		48
<u>R.C.A.</u>			
	H.Q. R.C.A. 1 Cdn Inf Div	5	25
	1 Cdn Fd Regt	30	416
	2 Cdn Fd Regt	39	560
	3 Cdn Fd Regt	42	633
	H.Q. 1 Cdn A/Tk Regt (27, 51, 57, 90 Btys)	34	578
	H.Q. 2 Cdn Lt A.A. Regt (2, 5, 54 Btys)	44	755
<u>R.C.E.</u>			
	H.Q. R.C.E. 1 Cdn Inf Div	5	26
	2 Cdn Fd Pk Coy	6	141
	1 Cdn Fd Coy	6	234
	3 Cdn Fd Coy	6	183
	4 Cdn Fd Coy	8	233
<u>R.C.C.S.</u>			
	1 Cdn Inf Div Sigs	25	580
<u>C.A.C.</u>			
	4 Cdn Recce Regt (one squadron)	12	192
<u>R.C.A.S.C.</u>			
	H.Q. R.C.A.S.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div	5	24
	1 Cdn Inf Div Tps Coy	7	171
	1 Cdn Inf Bde Coy	18	486
	2 Cdn Inf Bde Coy	1	10
	3 Cdn Inf Bde Coy	4	242
<u>R.C.A.M.C.</u>			
	4 Cdn Fd Amb	13	202
	5 Cdn Fd Amb	15	196
	9 Cdn Fd Amb	13	203
	1 Cdn F.D.S.	7	89
	2 Cdn F.D.S.	7	90
	2 Cdn Fd Hyg Sec	1	25
		<u>419</u>	<u>6570</u>

APPENDIX "H" Cont'd

1 CDN INF DIV (Cont'd)

EMBARKED

UNITS	OFFICERS	ORs
TOTAL CARRIED OVER	419	6570
<u>R.C.O.C.</u>		
H.Q. R.E.M.E. 1 Cdn Inf Div	4	17
1 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp	5	178
2 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp	5	181
3 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp		
68 L.A.D. (A) (4 Recce Regt)		7
13 L.A.D. (A) (A/Tk Regt)	1	7
1 L.A.D. (A) (1 Cdn Inf Bde)	1	15
2 L.A.D. (A) (2 Cdn Inf Bde)	1	15
3 L.A.D. (A) (3 Cdn Inf Bde)	2	25
7 L.A.D. (B) (1 Cdn Fd Regt)	1	9
8 L.A.D. (B) (2 Cdn Fd Regt)		
9 L.A.D. (B) (3 Cdn Fd Regt)	1	6
14 L.A.D. (B) (Div Sigs)	1	15
15 L.A.D. (B) (Fd Pk Coy)		2
2 Cdn Lt A.A. Wksp (A)	1	21
<u>C. PRO C.</u>		
1 Cdn Pro Coy	2	78
<u>C.P.C.</u>		
1 Cdn Inf Div Post Unit	1	21
<u>INFANTRY</u>		
H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Bde	15	47
1 Cdn Inf Bde Sp Gp	14	192
R.C.R.	39	690
Hast & P.E.R.	42	701
48th Highrs	38	712
H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Bde	11	35
2 Cdn Inf Bde Sp Gp	14	198
P.P.C.L.I.	38	695
Seaforth's of C.	44	714
Edm Regt	38	699
H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Bde	13	44
3 Cdn Inf Bde Sp Gp	13	195
R. 22e R.	37	700
Carleton & York	37	695
West N.S.R.	37	714
(Inc. 1, 2 & 3 Inf Bde Sp Gp)		
<u>INCREMENT TO CORPS TPS FOR 1 CDN INF DIV</u>		
R.C.O.C. 1 Cdn Div Sub Pk	5	181
R.C.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Tps Wksp	5	168
R.C.A.P.C. 1 Cdn Fd Cash Office	2	4
TOTAL	887	14549

APPENDIX "H" Cont'd

1 CDN ARMY TK BDE GP		EMBARKED	
UNITS		OFFICERS	ORs
<u>C.A.C.</u>			
H.Q. 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde		26	155
11 Cdn Tks		39	608
12 Cdn Tks		43	638
14 Cdn Tks		38	614
<u>R.C.C.S.</u>			
1 Cdn Army Tk Bde Sigs		3	93
<u>R.C.A.S.C.</u>			
1 Cdn Army Tk Bde Coy (38 Coy)		15	528
<u>R.C.O.C.</u>			
1 Cdn Tk Bde Wksp		7	258
1 Cdn Army Tk Bde Sub Pk		3	76
1 Cdn Army Tk Tps Wksp		6	242
59 L.A.D. (C) (11 Cdn Tks)		1	23
60 L.A.D. (C) (12 Cdn Tks)		1	18
61 L.A.D. (C) (14 Cdn Tks)		1	24
<u>R.C.A.M.C.</u>			
2 Cdn Lt Fd Amb		10	176
TOTAL		193	3451

APPENDIX "H" Cont'd.

UNITS	MISCELLANEOUS UNITS	
	OFFICERS	ORs
<u>H.Q. UNITS</u>		
Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Echelon	3	3
Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 2 Echelon	13	153
1 Cdn Base Reinf Depot Reinforcements	468	5694
<u>C.A.C.</u>		
1 Cdn Tk Delivery Sqn	11	135
<u>R.C.E.</u>		
Det 1 Cdn Tun Coy	3	41
2 Det - 1 Cdn Tun Coy		
<u>R.C.A.M.C.</u>		
5 Cdn Gen Hosp (600 beds)	80	152
15 Cdn Gen Hosp (1200 Beds)	141	238
1 Convalescent Depot	13	95
1 Fd Surg Unit	2	8
2 Fd Surg Unit	2	8
1 Fd Transfusion Unit	1	2
<u>R.C.O.C.</u>		
1 Cdn Recovery Sec (Hy)	2	78
<u>C. PRO C.</u>		
1 L. of C. Provost Sec		16
2 L. of C. Provost Sec		16
3 Provost Sec		15
<u>C.D.C.</u>		
1 Cdn Dental Coy	13	73
<u>C.P.C.</u>		
Det First Cdn Army Base Post Office	1	17
<u>MISCELLANEOUS</u>		
Graves Registration Unit	2	6
1 Pub Relations Det	11	35
	771	6835
<u>SUMMARY</u>		
1 Cdn Div	887	14549
1 Cdn Army Tk Bde	193	3451
Miscellaneous Units	771	6835
	1851	24835

APPENDIX "I"

Message from G.O.C. 1 Cdn Inf Div to Comd 1 Cdn Inf Bde.  
(sent presumably at 1750 hours 3 Jul 43).

To: Brigadier - GLENGYLE

From: G.O.C. 1 Cdn Div

Report recce night 25 26 June indicates firm sandbar stretching from about 933883 some 600 yards southwards. Study of the latest vertical photos indicates this bar extends to about 939375. Bar is stated to be 1 ft 6 inches below water level 20 yards wide with steep drop to 9 feet depth on shoreward side. A later report states depth of water inside bar as two feet. Average distance of bar from main beach is 60 yards. If depth of water is nine feet I appreciate your main difficulty will be getting assault troops ashore. Defences are not strong and covering fire at your disposal should be able to neutralize those which open fire. Success in assault will depend upon the speed with which you can cross this bar and get troops on to the beach before enemy moves reserves to meet you for from their disposition it is apparent that the enemy are relying very largely on the physical difficulties as a defence in this sector. Because of impossibility of R.N. guaranteeing landing at specific points and extent of those obstacles it would be unsound to assault on basis of landing at particular beach sectors. In view of this you should prepare to alter your arrangements for landing as follows but no executive action will be taken until further orders from me. 3 LCTs each carrying 7 DUKWS will be at your disposal to replace LCSA carrying two coys RCR and right coy Hast and PER of your leading waves. LCTs will convey the DUKWS close to the sandbar. The DUKWS will then be driven over the ramp spread out and make straight for the beach. One LCT will report GLENGYLE and two to HARNIX on arrival at release position. I regret change at this stage and have asked for verification of report received. Your staff will work out your assault based on this instruction but I repeat no executive action will be taken to alter your plan until confirmation of depth of water beyond false beach has been obtained. In any event excepting the change in landing arrangements of the first wave of your first flight your assault will proceed in all other respects as you have planned.

(Second message sent 7 Jul 43).

To: Brigadier and SNOL(R) GLENGYLE

From: RA (V) AND GOC.

Water inshore from bar confirmed as depth nine repeat nine feet. You will therefore take executive action to land in DUKWS from LCT as outlined in my 031750. In event of failure of LCT to arrive release position your assault will be made in LCA directed against ROGER GREEN one and ROGER RED.

T00. 071723.