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CANADIAN OPERATIONS IN ITALY  
SEPTEMBER - DECEMBER 1943: PRELIMINARY REPORT

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Canadian Operations in Italy.

September - December 1943: Preliminary Report.

1. The following is a very brief outline of the operations of the Canadian component of the Eighth Army during the campaign in Italy from the time of the landings on the mainland on 3 Sep 43 up to, and including, the capture of ORTONA (28 Dec 43).
2. This purely preliminary narrative does not profess to be more than a summary of the events with which it deals. The object has been, however, to depict the Canadian contribution in relation to the Allied effort as a whole. In this connection the Canadian achievement was not inconsiderable. Commencing with a successful assault across the Straits of Messina, followed by rapid exploitation, the Canadians played a very useful part in the northward advance that not only helped to relieve the immediate German pressure against the Allied landing at SALERNO but also, by the end of 1943, had resulted in the effective occupation of nearly half the Italian mainland. Perhaps equally important, from a purely Canadian point of view, was the additional battle experience obtained, initially in the advance from POTENZA to the CAMPOBASSO area, and later, in greater measure, during the severe fighting that characterized the MORO River and ORTONA battles.
3. The principal sources used have been the relevant operation orders and intelligence reports, Major-General Vokes' accounts of the MORO River and ORTONA battles, and various accounts given by participants to Historical Officers in the field, together with the latter's own memoranda. All of these sources are to be found in the files of the Historical Section, C.M.H.Q. Brigadier M.H.S. Penhale, who commanded the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade throughout these operations until 15 Oct 43, has read the report in draft, and the substance of his comments has been incorporated. Full utilization of War Diaries must await the preparation of a more complete and much longer narrative.

#### GENERAL BACKGROUND OF THE OPERATIONS

4. The conquest of Sicily had paved the way for the Allied assault on the "toe" of Italy. With the occupation of MESSINA, on the night 16/17 Aug 43, a satisfactory base had been established on the Island for future operations against the Italian mainland, (see Report No. 103). The fact that, during August, negotiations were proceeding for the surrender of Italy did not affect the plans that were made for the assault, as German resistance was certain (C.M.H.Q. File 4/Gen Apprec/3: General Note on Operations, issued by War Office, September, 1943). Accordingly the Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, decided to use 15 Army Group, under General Sir Harold Alexander, in a two-way at-



tack on the Italian mainland.

5. An initial landing on the "toe", by the Eighth Army, was to be followed by a more ambitious and amphibious operation, to be executed by the American Fifth Army consisting of 6 U.S. Corps and 10 British Corps in the Gulf of Salerno. The immediate objective of the latter operation was the capture of NAPLES; but, if German opposition was not too strong, there was the glittering prospect of driving north to ROME and simultaneously cutting off the enemy formations committed to the defence of southern Italy. (Report of Gen. Alexander's press conference of 23 Oct 43: The Times, 25 Oct 43.) As later experience revealed, the German Command was in a position to reinforce its troops in the SALERNO area rather more quickly than had been anticipated; but, regardless of this development, it was evident from the start that the success of the Allied venture depended in no small degree upon the speed with which the landing in CALABRIA was exploited. The Eighth Army, under General (later Field Marshal) Sir Bernard Montgomery, was selected for the attack on the "toe", and, within this battle-hardened formation, 13 British Corps had under its command 1 Cdn Inf Div and 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde as well as 5 Div, 231 Bde and two Commandos.

6. The operation that was planned to secure the Messina Straits, preparatory to an advance east and north, along the Calabrian coast, was known by the code name "BAYTOWN", and, as part of this operation, 13 Corps was required to establish a bridgehead on the mainland. In the first of three phases, 1 Cdn Div, under the command of Major-General G.G. Simonds, was to make a shore to shore assault on the right flank, on a one-brigade front, in the vicinity of REGGIO. Thereafter, this division would secure REGGIO, its airfield and the high ground to the east, and, in the final phase, would assemble the divisional reserve for the concerted drive to the east and north (Hist Sec File "BAYTOWN"/1 Cdn Inf Div/C/I: "BAYTOWN", 1 Cdn Div Operation Order No. 1).

7. 14 Cdn Army Tk Regt of 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde was placed under command 1 Cdn Div for the assault while 11 Cdn Army Tk Regt was allotted to 5 Div which was to land on the left flank of 1 Cdn Div and in the vicinity of GALLICO. The whole operation was to be supported by the artillery of 30 Corps and that portion of 13 Corps artillery not required for the assault together with batteries of long range American guns all sited on the Sicilian side of the straits. In addition, the whole weight of the tactical air force was to be concentrated on the immediate hinterland of the REGGIO - SAN GIOVANNI coastal area and the Royal Navy were to assist the land based artillery by providing Bombardment Squadrons, which in the case of the one supporting 1 Cdn Div consisted of one monitor, one cruiser, and five destroyers. Intelligence Reports indicated that, except for "isolated detachments", the Germans were not expected on the beaches, and Italian coastal defences were not considered formidable (Hist Sec File "BAYTOWN"/1 Cdn Inf Div/L/E: 1 Cdn Div Int Summary, 31 Aug and Addenda to same 1 Sep). "The sapper plan for the assault was very similar to that of the original landing in SICILY with one or two minor changes, chiefly in timings, the result of lessons learned" (Hist Sec File: Italy/1 Cdn Inf Div/RC/C/F: History of the Italian Campaign, 4 Fd Coy, R.C.E.).

#### THE LANDING ON THE MAINLAND AND THE DRIVE TO THE NORTH

8. At 0430 hrs, 3 Sep 43, being about one hour before first light (Hist Sec File "BAYTOWN"/RN/C/I: Operation "BAYTOWN",



Naval Outline Plan, 25 Aug 43), the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier M.H.S. Penhale, successfully carried out the first phase of the divisional attack by landing on, and occupying, FOX Beach, immediately north of REGGIO on the Calabrian coast. The brigade had embarked from the beaches in the MILI MARINA area, on the Sicilian coast, south of MESSINA. As had been anticipated, only slight resistance was encountered; opposition offered to the landings was described as "negligible". (Hist Sec File Italy 1943/15 Army Gp/C/H. 15 Army Group linrep, (liaison report) 4 Sep 43; Allied Force Headquarters linrep, 7 Sep 43; Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/1 Cdn Inf Div/L/D: Account of the landing given by Capt. V.C.J. Thrupp, 8 Oct 43.)

9. The 1st, followed by the 2nd, Canadian Infantry Brigades, under Brigadier H.D. Graham, and Brigadier C. Vokes, respectively, crossed the Straits in succeeding waves and all immediate objectives, including REGGIO, were speedily attained. So successful was the landing that REGGIO airfield and GALLINA village, both of which originally had been planned as objectives of 1 Cdn Inf Bde, were actually occupied by 3 Cdn Inf Bde. Preparations were at once made to penetrate into the mainland of Italy on a north-easterly axis from REGGIO through LE GAMBARIE towards DELIANUOVA.

10. There being little opposition, apart from heavy demolitions, the initial landing was quickly exploited and the Canadians pushed inland, capturing DELIANUOVA, nearly 20 miles in a direct line from REGGIO, on 6 Sep 43. In the words of one commanding officer: "Everywhere we went we found the enemy had left just about the day before" (Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/2 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D: Account by Lt.-Col. C.B. Ware, O.C., P.P.C.L.I., 21 Nov 43). Two days later they had taken POLISTENA, further to the north, as well as LOCRI, on the eastern edge of the Italian "instep". The route lay over rugged country, the weather was cold and rainy, and the inhabitants of the Calabrian hills were not altogether friendly (Thrupp, op. cit.).

11. Meanwhile, at 1730 hrs, 8 Sep 43, General Eisenhower announced the Italian capitulation; and at 0410, 9 Sep, in the face of very strong opposition, the Fifth Army made its landing south of SALERNO. 1 Cdn Div had reached BADOLATO by this date and from this time onwards, during the critical stage of the SALERNO operation when the divisions of the Fifth Army were fighting desperately to maintain their bridgehead (9-16 Sep 43), it was imperative that the northern advance should be maintained with all possible speed in order to assist them.

12. The division received orders to establish itself in the area of TAVERNA - CATANZARO, further north along the eastern coastal road, for the purpose of reorganizing and closing up, and in order to permit extensive reconnaissance with the object of locating German troops and the extent of their demolitions (Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/1 Cdn Inf Div/GOC: B.G.S. 13 Corps to 1 Cdn Div and 5 Div, 9 Sep 43).

13. A pause may be made here to consider the successful conclusion of the opening stages of operations on the Italian mainland in so far as Canadian troops were concerned. It was a period characterized by a carefully planned, and comparatively unopposed, landing on the "toe", followed by a rapid thrust into the interior, with the enemy obviously avoiding any serious commitments. Italian resistance, even prior to the armistice, had been only nominal. The German withdrawal could be mainly attributed to the fact that, originally, they were reported to have



had only two divisions (the 26th Panzer and 29th Panzer Grenadier Divisions) in the Calabrian area, and following the SALERNO landing, they were justifiably apprehensive of attacks launched on their flanks, and in their rear, along the extended coastline (Linreps, 81, 82).

14. The administrative arrangements that were required to facilitate the Canadian advance were a notable feature of the operation. Troop-carrying, over these great distances, with very little transport available, presented a most difficult problem. Lines of communication became greatly extended and it was only by the exercise of great skill and ingenuity that the necessary supplies were brought up and essential troop movements completed. Three Landing Craft Infantry (Large) were used to move 3 Cdn Inf Bde from LOCRI to CATANZARO and these craft were of much assistance further north along the coast (Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/1 Cdn Inf Div/O/D: Account by Lt.-Col. W.P. Gilbride, A.A. & Q.M.G., 1st Canadian Division, 9 Oct 43).

15. The rapid northern advance continued without active opposition. By 16 Sep 43 1 Cdn Inf Div had made contact with 5 Div as far north as CASTROVILLARI, and on 19 Sep three days later, the Corps Commander, Lt.-Gen. M.C. Dempsey, issued instructions to Maj.-Gen. Simonds for the latter to reconnoitre an area east to ALTAMURA, north to MELFI, and west towards AULETTA (Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/1 Cdn Inf Div/GOC). In a little more than a fortnight, the Italian "foot" had been quickly and neatly amputated.

16. As a further expedient to relieve the German pressure at SALERNO, a composite force known as "BOFORCE" was organized at VILLAPIANA on 17 Sep 43. The West Nova Scotia Regiment, a battery of field artillery, a squadron of tanks and other elements were placed under the command of Lt.-Col. M.P. Bogert, O.C. West N.S.R., and he was given the task of making a swift drive towards POTENZA with the object of seizing this important communications centre. Although constituted as a separate force, "BOFORCE" was, in effect, the advance guard of 3 Cdn Inf Bde and was closely followed by the remainder of that formation. Consequently, POTENZA actually fell on 19 Sep 43 as the result of an attack made by the brigade as a whole. West N.S.R. attacked frontally, with the R. 22e R. carrying out a right flanking movement designed to secure the hills beyond the town. (Brigadier M.H.S. Penhale's comments, C.M.H.Q., August 1944; Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/3 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D: Account by Lt.-Col. G.F.C. Pangman, 5 Feb 44.) Lt.-Gen. Dempsey congratulated the Canadians upon the speedy capture of their objective. This success was a contributing factor to the satisfactory conclusion of the battle at the SALERNO bridgehead.

17. Patrol activity was continuous on the Canadian front; demolitions and slight skirmishes with German rearguard units presented the chief problems. (A typical example of this patrol activity is contained in Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/4 Cdn Recce Regt/C/D: Report by 4 Cdn Recce Regt (4 P.L.D.C.) of action at NIGLIONICO, 19 Sep 43.) By 1400 hrs, 22 Sep, 3 Cdn Inf Bde had occupied the high ground to the north-east of POTENZA, and 2 Cdn Inf Bde had established itself north-west of the town. 1 Cdn Inf Bde remained at SCANZANO in a position to protect the right flank of the division (Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/1 Cdn Inf Div/GOC: Notes of G.O.C's. "O" Group, 1400 hrs, 22 Sep 43).



18. At this point in the campaign there was a pause for regrouping and the shifting of the "tail" of 13 Corps to allow for administrative services to function through the newly acquired port of TARANTO. Plans were made for an attack north-westwards along the Adriatic coast in conjunction with an advance deep into the heart of the Southern Apennines. For this purpose 13 Corps assumed command of 78 Div and 4 Arm'd Bde which were previously concentrated in the BARI - TARANTO area under the command of 5 Corps. The capture of FOGGIA and its important group of airfields was achieved with little opposition by advanced elements of 4 Arm'd Bde on 27 Sep. (War Diary Main H.Q. Eighth Army G.S. Branch, September 1943.)

19. The area of concentration of 1 Cdn Div was at CANOSA. 2 and 3 Cdn Inf Bdes moved there from the POTENZA - MELFI area and were joined by 1 Cdn Inf Bde moving northward from SCANZANO on 30 Sep. While 78 Div was to make a swift thrust towards TERMOLI, overland and by sea, 1 Cdn Div were ordered to advance to CAMPOBASSO along the main road from LUCERA to ISERNIA. On 1 Oct the divisional advance guard moved through FOGGIA and LUCERA and "bumped" the enemy at MOTTA DI MONTECORVINO where the foothills of the Apennines rise steeply from the FOGGIA plain. At the same time 2 Cdn Inf Bde had been entrusted with the task of providing left flank protection for the division and concentrated near TROIA for an attack north-westwards along the axis FOIANO - DECORATTO - VINCHIATURO. (Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/1 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D and Italy: 1943/2 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D.)

20. While the enemy continued to withdraw, and avoided any serious engagement in this sector, it became increasingly apparent that resistance would stiffen when the central, mountainous country in the vicinity of CAMPOBASSO was reached. Over this difficult terrain, with extensive demolitions hampering mechanical transport, German forces could be expected to offer much greater opposition than hitherto had been encountered. In the words of a participant: "From MOTTA right up to CAMPOBASSO we had fighting similar to that of Sicily. We continued to find ground a more obstinate enemy than the Germans" (Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/1 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D: Account of Lt.-Col. I.S. Johnston, O.C., 48 Highrs, 22 Oct 43).

21. On 13 Oct 43, Allied Force Headquarters announced that Canadian casualties in the period from 3 Sep 43, that is, from the beginning of the Italian campaign, to 6 Oct 43, were: 51 killed, 157 wounded and 2 missing. (Hist Sec File: Italy 1943/A.F.H.Q./C/H, 13 Oct 43. Equivalent figures for British units in the Eighth Army were: 253 killed, 1014 wounded and 535 missing.) These figures reflected the desultory nature of the fighting during the first month of operations in Italy.

22. After a sharp engagement with the battle group HEILMANN of the German 1 Para Div at MOTTA, 1 Cdn Inf Bde pushed forward capturing SAN MARCO, VOLTURARA, and CELENZA while 4 Cdn Recce Regt cleared COLLETORTO on the right flank. By 6 Oct the brigade had reached the bridge carrying the main road over the FORTORE River which had been extensively demolished. At this point 3 Cdn Inf Bde passed through and delivered a full scale attack against the high ground dominating the crossing on the right bank of the river. The impetus of this attack which was supported by the whole of the divisional artillery was sufficient to take the village of GAMBATESA and the brigade pushed forward westwards along the main road as far as GILDONE. Meanwhile 2 Cdn Inf Bde crossing over the bare and rugged hills that form the height of land between the FORTORE and CALONE river valleys pressed the enemy back from FOIANO



through DECORATTO, CASTELPAGANO and CERCEMAGGIORE, keeping contact at the same time with the main body of 1 Cdn Div on its right and with the most northerly patrols of Fifth Army on its left. (Hist Sec File 1943/1 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D, Account by Major G.E.B. Renison, 21 Oct 43; Hist Sec File Italy, 1943/2 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D, Account by Brigadier B.M. Hoffmeister, 16 Nov 43; Hist Sec File Italy, 1943/3 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D, Account by Captain R.D. Prince, 9 Dec 43.)

#### THE FIGHTING IN THE CAMPOBASSO AREA

23. Progress was slow in the face of continued opposition, and there was much fighting in the CAMPOBASSO area. The difficulties of transport in this region have been noted by a brigade commander:

The rate of advance was limited by the nature of the country and the use of mines and demolitions by the enemy. Transport could move only on the winding roads and so the depth of our advance was restricted to the speed and distance at which inf could move across country over the hills on either side of the axis of advance. Until the mines were lifted and the demolitions were repaired, guns and transport could not be moved, and while inf could be supported up to the limit of the range of arty, it was frequently necessary to use pack mules as the only means of refilling units with ammunition and rations.

(Brigadier Penhale, op. cit.)

The weather was extremely bad with heavy rains.

24. During the advance on VINCHIATURO 2 Cdn Inf Bde experienced almost continuous enemy shell and mortar fire as it moved forward, and road conditions were such that mules provided the only means of getting wireless sets and supporting arms forward quickly enough to assist the infantry. Nevertheless, the field gunners provided good support and the work of the sappers was outstanding. (Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/2 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D: Account by Brigadier B.M. Hoffmeister, 16 Nov 43.) A series of leapfrogging actions, by which the enemy was forced to relinquish vital, high ground, culminated in the capture of CAMPOBASSO by 1 Cdn Inf Bde on 14 Oct 43. The brigade had relieved 3 Cdn Inf Bde at GILDONE, while simultaneously, 2 Cdn Inf Bde had captured VINCHIATURO, six miles south-west of CAMPOBASSO.

25. CAMPOBASSO was captured one day ahead of schedule. "The attack ... went in at first light and was absolutely bloodless, all artillery being used to advantage" (Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/1 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D: Account by Lt.-Col. D.C. Spry, O.C., R.C.R., 27 Nov 43), and there followed a week's interval in which consolidation and reorganization of the area was completed and a programme of very active patrolling was instituted. The enemy had withdrawn in a north-westerly direction, but as strong counter-attacks were expected extensive preparations for defence were necessary. Patrols reported that the Germans were still active in BUSSO, ORATINO and SAN STEFANO, within a five mile radius of CAMPOBASSO. There was much artillery activity on both sides, and it was stated that "...for the first time in ITALY we were heavily pounded by enemy artillery". (Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/1 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D: Account by Major G.E.B. Renison, B.M. 1 Cdn Inf Bde, 5 Jan 44.) Nevertheless, on the second day of occupation, a ceremonial guard was mounted in the town square.



26. During the "rest" period, from 15 Oct to 22 Oct 43, the defensive perimeter surrounding CAMPOBASSO was gradually expanded and, in spite of determined resistance by numerically inferior German troops, the latter were ejected from BUSSO, ORATINO and SAN STEFANO by 1 Cdn Inf Bde. By the end of the month the latter formation had established a bridgehead over the BIFERNO River after hard fighting for the villages of CASTROPIGNANO, TORELLA and MOLISE. In a similar operation further upstream 2 Cdn Inf Bde had secured the head-waters of the river after a bitter engagement at COLLE D'ANCHISE. (Renison, op. cit.; Spry, op. cit.; and Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/1 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D: Account by Major W.K. Stockloser, 2 i/c Hast & P.E.R., 5 Nov 43.) The way was opened for an operation against ISERNIA by 5 Div by way of the main road from VINCHIATURO, in which the Carlt & York R. assisted by driving the enemy from the precipitous slopes of the MATESE Mountains as far west as BOIANO.

27. During the last week of October 1943, the Hon. J.L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence, and Lt.-Gen. H.D.G. Crerar, G.O.C. 1st Canadian Corps, visited the Canadian sector of the Italian front. At this time 1 and 2 Cdn Inf Bdes were holding the miserable villages of their bridgehead across the BIFERNO under very trying weather conditions. Intensive patrolling activity, artillery duels, and the familiar problem of demolitions, were the primary features of the general situation.

28. The remainder of 1 Cdn Div was grouped in the CAMPOBASSO area enjoying a period of rest during which considerable attention was devoted to refitting, maintenance and training. The approach of winter necessitated special preparations in the way of clothing and equipment. The town was specially developed as a rest centre for the troops and a Forward Maintenance Centre for 13 Corps. Cinemas operated daily for their benefit, the former Fascist Youth Centre became the "Beaver Club", complete with Canadian newspapers, and in general, every effort was made to extend recreational facilities (Gilbride, op. cit.)

29. On 1 Nov 43, Major-General Simonds relinquished command of the 1st Canadian Division in order to take up his new appointment as G.O.C. the 5th Canadian Armoured Division. The latter formation was in the process of being moved from the United Kingdom to Italy where, together with 1 Cdn Div it was to form 1st Canadian Corps. H.Q. 1st Canadian Corps and Corps Troops disembarked at AUGUSTA, Sicily, on 7 Nov 43, and the H.Q. party of 5 Cdn Armd Div disembarked at NAPLES on the following day. (For the remainder of the period covered by this preliminary report, H.Q. 1st Canadian Corps was not engaged and the role of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division was not operational. The special problems, arising out of the re-equipment of this Division in Italy, cannot be discussed in detail in the present report.) The new G.O.C. 1 Cdn Div was Major-General C. Vokes, who had previously commanded 2 Cdn Inf Bde.

30. It is necessary here to survey briefly the fortunes of 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde who were shortly to be more closely associated with the rest of the Canadian force. The halt of Eighth Army's rapid advance through southern Italy which occurred in the last week of September found headquarters of the brigade together with 12 Cdn Army Tk Regt newly landed at TARANTO and assembled within a few miles of that port. 14 Cdn Army Tk Regt remained with 1 Cdn Div in the POTENZA area and 11 Cdn Army Tk Regt was still under command 5 (Brit) Div in the neighbourhood of SCALEA on the west coast. During the advance to CAMPOBASSO and the upper BIFERNO, 1 Cdn Div had been supported by 14 Cdn Army Tk Regt. In the closing stages of this operation 11 Cdn Army Tk Regt supported 2 Cdn Inf Bde in the fighting at COLLE D'ANCHISE and SPINETE and one squadron assisted the Carlt & York R. in the



advance to BOIANO. 12 Cdn Army Tk Regt did not long remain with the brigade and at the beginning of October was detailed to assist 78 Div in the amphibious assault on TERMOLI. The regiment moved overland from FOGGIA through SAN SEVERO and on 5 Oct was able to intervene in the battle for TERMOLI at a critical moment. For a variety of reasons, including the existence of a false beach which prevented the approach to shore of some of the L.C.Ts. of 4 Armd Bde, the seaborne operation on 4 Oct was behind schedule. On 5 Oct a dangerous counter-attack by 16 Pz Div threatened the infantry in the bridgehead with disaster. "B" and "C" squadrons of the regiment were placed under command 36 and 38 Inf Bdes respectively and on 6 Oct were able to stem the tide. In the meantime, "A" squadron had arrived in the battle area and exerted valuable pressure west of TERMOLI also in support of 38 (Irish) Inf Bde. This operation was distinguished by many gallant tank versus tank actions, dear to the hearts of tank men, and the regiment was heartily congratulated by General Dempsey, commanding 13 Corps and by the G.O.C. 78 Div. "B" Squadron particularly was addressed on parade by Brigadier Russell of the Irish Brigade in terms of warm praise. (War Diary H.Q. 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde, September 1943; W.D. 11 Cdn Army Tk Regt, October 1943; W.D. 12 Cdn Army Tk Regt, October 1943.)

31. During the latter part of October the whole of 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde again achieved a degree of concentration in the ISERNIA area where assistance was given to the advance of 5 Div. In the early part of November the brigade was transferred to the Adriatic coast where it came under command 5 Corps and prepared to take part in the operations of that formation during the winter. (Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/1 Cdn Armd Bde/C/F: Beyond the Sangro: an account of the operations of 1 Cdn Armd Bde, December 1943.) One regiment remained in the ISERNIA area in support of 5 Div. It may be noted here that the name of the brigade was changed in accordance with Canadian Army (Overseas) Routine Order No. 4108 of 18 Dec 43 and it was styled henceforth 1 Cdn Armd Bde, its regiments becoming "armoured regiments" in conformity with the rest of the units of the Canadian Armoured Corps.

32. The CAROVILLI operation was "an independent brigade operation well supported by artillery" which was carried out by 3 Cdn Inf Bde between 12 Nov and 22 Nov 43. (Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/3 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D: Account by Brigadier T.G. Gibson, 11 Dec 43.) Brigadier Gibson had taken over command of 3 Cdn Inf Bde from Brigadier Penhale on 15 Oct, the latter returning to the United Kingdom to take up the appointment of B.G.S., C.M.H.Q. The brigade covered approximately a divisional front and the intention was to create a diversion before the right wing of the Eighth Army (composed of 78 and 8 Ind Divs) launched its attack in the lower SANGRO area. A subsidiary purpose of this activity was to cover the very difficult work of the engineers, who were repairing a lateral road through AGNONE towards the eastern coast. The operation was completely successful and Brigadier Gibson was complimented by the Corps Commander (Lt.-Gen. M.C. Dempsey) to Brigadier T.G. Gibson, 22 Nov 43; quoted by Gibson, op. cit.). During the night of 27/28 Nov 43, General Montgomery struck a powerful blow at German opposition in the SANGRO bridgehead, and it was soon evident that the CAROVILLI diversion was but the prelude to much heavier fighting by 1 Cdn Div as a whole.

33. The fierce fighting of October which had carried the Fifth Army from the VOLTURNO to the GARIGLIANO had subsided in November and all further progress was impeded by the flooded con-



dition of the latter river, especially in the area of MINTURNO. It was now the turn of the Eighth Army to make its contribution to the series of alternate blows which had dislodged the enemy from southern Italy. General Montgomery's Order of the Day heralding the great attack across the lower SANGRO River announced that the Eighth Army had as its task the driving of the enemy north of ROME. To do this at such a distance it was presumably considered necessary to seize the line of the PESCARA River and the main lateral road PESCARA-AVEZZANO-ROME before winter set in in the Central Apennines and made any turning movement from the north impossible. The assault across the valley of the SANGRO entailed considerable infiltration and bridging under cover of darkness. This began on 19 Nov and continued until the night 27/28 Nov when the main assault on the high ground overlooking the left bank of the river was delivered by 5 Corps with three divisions under command. 1 Cdn Div was assigned a role of exploitation on the coastal flank where it would relieve 78 Div as the course of operations permitted. (War Diary, Main H.Q. Eighth Army G.S. Branch, November 1943.)

34. On 27 Nov, orders were issued for a divisional move to the SANGRO bridgehead, where the Canadians were to relieve 78 Div coming under the command of 5 Corps. Commencing 28 Nov, the move was made from CAMPOBASSO, by way of TERNOLI and VASTO, on the eastern coast, to FOSSACESIA and S. VITO. Here 1 Cdn Div relieved 78 Div, brigade for brigade, as operations permitted. In view of the bitter fighting which followed, it is noteworthy that, simultaneously with this divisional shuffle, on the same front, the Germans relieved their badly mauled 65th Infantry Division with the 90th Panzer Grenadier Division. Captured orders indicated that the latter division had been ordered to establish and maintain a permanent line on the MORO River. (Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/1 Cdn Inf Div/C/D: Account by Capt. G.M.C. Sprung, G.S.O. 3, Int at 1 Cdn Div, 3 Jan 44.)

35. By the afternoon of 2 Dec, 1 Cdn Inf Bde was in the area of PETACCIATO, some miles behind the SANGRO River and 2 Cdn Inf Bde was south of FOSSACESIA. 3 Cdn Inf Bde had not yet commenced its move from the mountains north of CAMPOBASSO. The stage was set for a protracted period of the most severe fighting yet experienced by the Canadians in Italy. The line of advance, towards ORTONA, was crossed at intervals by deep transverse valleys and ravines running towards the sea. The winter rains had begun and movement of transport was difficult (Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/1 Cdn Inf Div/C/F: Crossing of the MORO and Capture of ORTONA, by Major-General C. Vokes, 14 Mar 44). As usual, systematic demolitions, by the Germans, hampered the progress of operations.

#### THE CROSSING OF THE MORO

36. On 4 Dec, 38 Inf Bde of 78 Div (now, along with 4 Armd Bde, under command 1 Cdn Div), reached the line of the MORO and reported the enemy in considerable strength on the far side. All attempts to cross failed (*ibid.*). Heavy rains caused considerable administrative anxiety by washing out the bridges across the SANGRO River in the rear. Moving forward to the MORO, in its turn, 2 Cdn Inf Bde occupied a position on the left of 38 Inf Bde in the vicinity of APOLLINARE, and 1 Cdn Inf Bde was brought up to nearby S. VITO.

37. After receiving reports of patrols and reconnaissance by the engineers, the G.O.C. 1 Cdn Div decided to force the main crossing of the MORO along the road from APOLLINARE to S. LEONARDO.



It was anticipated that ORTONA could then be menaced from TOLLO, about six miles south-west of the former place (*ibid.*). As a diversion, designed to distract the enemy's attention from the main axis of advance, small footholds were established and maintained in the face of determined counter-attacks, on the coast road near the mouth of the MORO by the Hast & P.E.R. and also near ROATTI by the P.P.C.L.I. "From the first, the Germans appreciated our main threat to be straight up the coast road to ORTONA. Consequently though our crossing was made opposite S. LEONARDO, the Germans threw their reserves against our positions astride the coast road" (Sprung, *op. cit.*).

38. In the ROATTI area, the P.P.C.L.I. made a very successful effort, on the night 5/6 Dec, resulting in the capture of the village. No less than five counter-attacks were beaten off thereafter, and the Germans were forced to withdraw, "leaving behind many dead, some prisoners and five knocked-out tanks" (Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/2 Cdn Inf Bde/C/F: Report, "Crossing of the MORO and Capture of V. ROATTI", P.P.C.L.I., 21 Apr 44). 38 Inf Bde required relief, having had severe fighting during the battle for the SANGRO bridgehead, and its place on the MORO was taken by 1 Cdn Inf Bde on 5 Dec 43. Similarly, 1 Cdn Armd Bde relieved 4 Armd Bde on 6-7 Dec. 3 Cdn Inf Bde was held in reserve near ROCCA SAN GIOVANNI.

39. At 1630 hrs 8 Dec, covered by heavy air and artillery support, 1 Cdn Inf Bde launched an attack across the MORO and units speedily captured the ground west of S. LEONARDO. (Vokes, *op. cit.*; a more detailed account of the attack is given by Renison, *op. cit.*) Unfortunately, due to heavy resistance from enemy tanks and infantry, they were unable to capture the village itself. During the night 8/9 Dec, 3 Fd Coy, R.C.E., succeeded in constructing a diversion around the blown bridge at the point of crossing, although at all times they were under heavy hostile fire. Their success was vital to the situation as a whole for, without the diversion, it would have been impossible to bring armoured units forward in support of the infantry. On the morning of 9 Dec, 2 Cdn Inf Bde crossed the MORO and, with the able assistance of tanks from 1 Cdn Armd Bde, the road to S. LEONARDO was finally blasted open, in spite of mud and mines, and the village was occupied. "The enemy, now identified as 90 P.G. Div, lost heavily in men and equipment. Our casualties were comparatively light" (Vokes, *op. cit.*; Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/1 Cdn Armd Bde/C/F: Brigadier R.A. Wyman's weekly report to Comd. 1 Cdn Corps, 20 Dec 43; Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/2 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D: Account by Capt. W.S. Dewar, I.O., 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 12 Jan 44). At this point, the bridgehead over the MORO was firmly established but German resistance had, if anything, increased.

40. The next objective was the important crossroads at the intersection of the ORTONA-ORSOGNA and S. VITO - MIGLIANICO routes known variously as the BERARDI or ORTONA cross-roads. This was approximately a mile and half beyond S. LEONARDO in the general direction of ORTONA. The strenuous fighting that this objective necessitated may be gauged from the fact that ten full days of persistent effort were required before the Germans were driven from the area. On 10 Dec, 2 Cdn Inf Bde and supporting tanks pressed on from S. LEONARDO, but were soon bogged down by hostile artillery and mortar fire as well as by the difficult nature of the country. The enemy was well dug in, on reverse slopes, which made our own artillery support comparatively ineffective. In an endeavour to break this deadlock, 2 Cdn Inf Bde was ordered to explore the enemy's strength to the north-east, that is, in the direction of ORTONA. Meanwhile, 1 Cdn Inf Bde maintained the bridgehead as a firm base, and 3 Cdn Inf Bde was moved forward to a position behind APOLLINARE.



41. Progress continued to be very slow in the face of determined opposition. Finally, 3 Cdn Inf Bde was moved to the vicinity of S. LEONARDO with the intention of trying a left flank attack, to the south-west of the cross-roads, on the night 11/12 Dec 43. The following morning revealed that the attack had not been successful, and there followed a 48-hour period in which the situation underwent little change. Numerous counter-attacks were beaten off and heavy casualties were suffered by both sides. In particular, the West N.S.R. and Carlt & York R., both of 3 Cdn Inf Bde, had heavy losses and in spite of great gallantry they were temporarily unfit for further offensive action (Vokes, op. cit.; Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/3 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D: Account by Brigadier T.G. Gibson, 27 Jan 44). Shell and mortar fire continually disrupted communications.

42. It was not until 14 Dec, when steady pressure exerted in the CASA BERARDI area resulted in important gains, that the situation could be said to have improved. On that day, infantry of 3 Cdn Inf Bde with tanks, and supported by a Corps artillery barrage, made a determined advance in a north-easterly direction towards the cross-roads. At the same time, 2 Cdn Inf Bde, which was in the general area south-east of the cross-roads, put in an attack with the object of cutting the main ORTONA - ORSOGNA lateral. 1 Cdn Inf Bde continued to press northward against the enemy on the coastal road (Vokes, op. cit.). While the attacks made in the other sectors did little more than hold the enemy, that of 3 Cdn Inf Bde resulted in the capture of high ground at CASA BERARDI. As this position dominated the German right flank, and the enemy core of resistance in the cross-roads area, the success of the infantry and armoured forces on this occasion must be accepted as decisive. It was here that the great gallantry of Captain (acting Major) Paul Triquet, of the R. 22e R., earned for him the Victoria Cross (Canadian Army Overseas Routine Order No. 4848, 8 Mar 44).

43. Although now placed in a tactically unsound position, the Germans showed no intention of relinquishing the struggle. On 15 Dec the enemy's 90 Pz Gr Div was relieved by 1 Para Div (Sprung, op. cit.). On the same day the enemy made a strong counter-attack, supported by tanks, in the CASA BERARDI area, but were beaten off with heavy loss (Vokes, op. cit.).

44. Preceded by a preparatory pause of 48 hours, the comp de grace in the battle of the MORO was administered by 1 Cdn Inf Bde on 18 Dec 43. The G.O.C., 1 Cdn Div planned this action in two phases: first, infantry of 1 Cdn Inf Bde were to make a strong thrust across the main ORTONA - ORSOGNA road and open the way for a movement enveloping the cross-roads from the south and west. Thereafter, in the second phase, the infantry would move forward and consolidate in the area of the cross-roads.

45. The attack began at 0800 hrs 18 Dec and was supported by "a barrage of unprecedented intensity", together with concentrations, which were fired by nine field and three medium regiments (Renison, op. cit.; Vokes, op. cit.). 12 Cdn Armd Regt of 1 Cdn Armd Bde was also in support. The opening phase was carried out according to plan, and by 1030 hrs, the first objective had been attained. A considerable number of the enemy were killed or taken prisoner (Vokes, op. cit.). The second phase was less successful, and, although a troop of tanks reported themselves at the cross-roads in the early afternoon the infantry were held up just short of the objective. However, during the night 18/19 Dec, the Germans with-



drew their shattered remnants from the cross-roads, and this severely contested area was finally occupied by the Canadians on the afternoon of 19 Dec. (1)

46. Thus ended the battle known loosely as "the crossing of the MORO" - a particularly difficult and protracted undertaking, during the course of which the Canadian troops fought their first major action of the Italian mainland campaign, suffered and inflicted heavy casualties, and exhibited great gallantry and powers of endurance. During the period 9-19 Dec 43, 1 Cdn Armd Bde claimed to have destroyed 22 Mk IV German tanks, four anti-tank guns and one self-propelled gun for a loss of 10 tanks. Battle casualties for the brigade, in the period 12-18 Dec, were: eight officers wounded; 10 other ranks killed, 35 wounded and four missing (Wyman, op. cit.). It is also stated that 400 prisoners of war were taken, and a total of 28 German tanks knocked out, by the Canadian force as a whole (Sprung, op. cit.). Canadian infantry casualties, which were heavy in some instances, are difficult to ascertain in detail for this period, and will be considered in connection with the battle for ORTONA. A strong line of natural defence, which, if the enemy had been given time, would have been converted into a second SANGRO, had been breached. Ahead lay ORTONA.

#### THE CAPTURE OF ORTONA

47. As a port on the Adriatic coast, and a communication centre, it was of considerable importance to the Germans, and the town was defended with perhaps even greater tenacity than had characterized the battle for the MORO. The enemy took full advantage of the stone and brick construction of the houses, and the narrow streets, for determined street fighting. The latter was something that the Canadian troops had not yet experienced on this scale, but during the eight days that were necessary to clear the town, infantry and tanks quickly learned to co-operate in mastering this type of warfare. Unfortunately (from the attackers' point of view), the town's port facilities were required undamaged and, therefore, ORTONA could not be bombed from the air prior to the attack. (Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/1 Cdn Inf Div/C/F: ORTONA, by Major-General C. Vokes, D.S.O., n.d. This account is primarily concerned with tactics, weapons and lessons learned, and is not a narrative. The chronological story of the battle is given in General Vokes' Crossing of the MORO and Capture of ORTONA, op. cit.) However, with respect to this aspect of the attack, it should be noted that later experience, at CASSINO in March 1944, suggested that massed aerial assaults were liable to have a boomerang effect in that serious obstacles were raised to the troops' progress. (War Office Weekly Intelligence Review, No. 32, 22 Mar 44; and Report on Air Operations in Support of 1 Cdn Corps, 11 May - 4 Jun 44, by G.S.O. 2 (Air), 1 Cdn Corps, 8 Jun 44.) As in the later stages of the MORO battle, German opposition came from well-equipped units of the fanatical 1 Para Div.

48. During 20 Dec, 2 Cdn Inf Bde, which was to play the leading part in the ensuing battle, forced the passage of the ORTONA - ORSOGNA lateral from the BERNARDI cross-roads to the outskirts of ORTONA itself. This steady advance was supported by tanks from 1 Cdn Armd Bde and by a very heavy artillery barrage, with smoke to cover the infantry's exposed left flank. Street fighting, which broke out immediately in the outskirts of the town, was curtailed by nightfall. Under cover of darkness, while large explosions denoting further German demolitions were heard in ORTONA, mortars and anti-tank guns were rushed forward to assist the in-

(1) The violence of the battle which had raged there so long is reflected in the pictorial record of this blasted area created during the weeks that followed by two Canadian War Artists, Major C.F. Comfort and Captain L.P. Harris.



fantry. (Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/2 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D: Account by Lt.-Col. J.C. Jefferson, O.C. L. Edmn R., 12 Jan 44; Vokes, Crossing of the MORO and Capture of ORTONA.) On 21 Dec, the L. Edmn R., with assistance from the Seaforth of C. which increased day by day thereafter, and supported by 12 Cdn Armd Regt and 90 A. Tk Bty, R.C.A., began the grim business of dislodging the enemy.

49. None of the side streets in ORTONA were wide enough to permit the passage of tanks, and the Germans had systematically organized their defence so that the line of least resistance led to a selected "killing ground" in the central town square and the main street (Vokes, ORTONA; and "Notes on the German Defence of ORTONA", W.O.W.I.R., No. 35, 13 Apr 44). Houses had been destroyed in such a manner as to create barriers, and mines and booby-traps were plentiful. All approaches to obstacles were covered by a pattern of mutually supporting machine gun and anti-tank fire. In many respects there was a close resemblance to the intricate labyrinth of street defences which characterized urban operations in the Russo-German conflict.

50. On the morning of 22 Dec, it was decided that ORTONA should be divided into sectors agreed upon by the tank and infantry commanders (Jefferson, op. cit.). The main street was used as an inter-battalion boundary, and each battalion had a front of not more than 250 yards. The tanks provided indispensable support in two ways: by spraying all likely enemy nests, as the infantry moved forward, and, thereafter, by engaging windows and doors with delayed action H.E. ("Beyond the Sangro: An Account of the Operations of 1 Cdn Armd Bde", loc. cit. See also account of typical action illustrating co-operation on 24 Dec, given in Appendix "A" to Maj.-Gen. Vokes' ORTONA). This close co-operation between tanks and infantry was an essential feature of the battle. By contrast, artillery assistance was of little value in ORTONA due to the close proximity of attacking and defending troops, and the ability of the Germans to infiltrate back into built-up areas after shelling had taken place.

51. Meanwhile 3 Cdn Inf Bde had been withdrawn to the S. LEONARDO area on 22 Dec to recuperate from heavy losses suffered in the MORO River battle. To assist 2 Cdn Inf Bde within ORTONA by loosening the enemy's grip on the town from outside, it was decided to move 1 Cdn Inf Bde to a position where it could menace the coastal road running north-west from ORTONA to PESCARA. As this road represented the enemy's only line of retreat from the town, it was anticipated that he would prove sensitive to pressure exerted in that direction. The attack was carefully planned, and included provision for a fleet of DUKWS at S. VITO to land rations, ammunition and petrol at a pre-arranged point on the coastal road north of ORTONA. (Renison, op. cit.)

52. In spite of spirited counter-attacks and rainy weather, which together with mines impeded the co-operation given by tanks, 1 Cdn Inf Bde's attack succeeded. By the night of 24 Dec, patrols had penetrated to S. NICCOLA and S. TOMMASO, west of ORTONA, and the 48 Highrs had reached a position east of these villages within 1,000 yards of the coastal road (ibid.). The German command was either very stubborn or very slow to appreciate the threat which this deep salient, driven into their right flank, constituted to the defence of ORTONA as a whole. Apparently underestimating the strength of the Canadian attack, the Germans "infiltrated boldly and were shot down with ease". (Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/1 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D: Account by Brigadier D.C. Spry, 4 Jan 44; Renison, op. cit.) With the improvement of weather conditions, a troop of tanks was able to reach the beleaguered 48 Highrs, and the



German flank was gradually driven back. This highly successful action, fought by 1 Cdn Inf Bde, contributed in no small measure to the ultimate withdrawal of the enemy from ORTONA on the night 27/28 Dec 43.

53. Meanwhile, a literally yard-by-yard advance was proceeding within the town. With the help of tanks and anti-tank guns, the L. Edmn R. and the Seaforth of C. fought a bitter house-to-house, and indeed a room-to-room, battle. Two days' fighting was required before the second main square, the PIAZZA MUNICIPALE, was reached. During the night 23/24 Dec the battalions were reinforced by substantial drafts and fierce fighting continued. (Hist Sec File Italy: 1943/2 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D: Account by Capt. W.S. Dewar, I.O., 2 Cdn Inf Bde, 12 Jan 44.) There was no pause in the struggle on Christmas Day - the fifth Christmas away from home for many of the Canadians - but, by the following day, 1 Cdn Div was able to report that two-thirds of ORTONA had been captured. As an indication of the activity of the infantry at this time it may be mentioned that, on one day, in one area of the fighting, a unit used 1100 3-inch mortar bombs. (Jefferson, op. cit.) The PIAT and the six pounder were also used extensively with good effect.

54. The Germans offered stubborn resistance all the way, and used flame-throwers and infiltration tactics whenever possible. But the Edmontons and the Seaforths forced their way forward with great determination, and this steady pressure, together with the success of the 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade on his right flank, compelled the enemy to give ground. Control of the area in the vicinity of the castle was established, and finally, on 28 Dec, patrols reported that the Germans had evacuated the town. The end of the year found the Canadians pressing the enemy back to the high ground immediately east of the River ARIELLI.

#### CONCLUSION

55. At the beginning of 1944, 1 Cdn Div, together with 1 Cdn Armd Bde which was giving tank support along the whole front, faced a make-shift defence line held by the enemy with his left flank on the high ground in front of the mouth of the ARIELLI and his right flank on the snow-covered slopes of the MAIELLA massif at GUARDIA-GRELE. The much disputed ORTONA-ORSOGNA lateral road was only partially in the hands of 5 Corps where 1 Cdn Div and 8 Ind Div had pushed beyond it on the coastal flank. The ruins of ORSOGNA perched high on its formidable cliff still defied the New Zealanders. Although 1 Cdn Div had not succeeded in reaching its original objective, the seaside town of PESCARA, a heavy toll had been exacted from the obstinate enemy. The destruction of 90 Pz Gr Div was virtually complete and it retired for a long period of recuperation to the plains of Lombardy. 1 Para Div which had relieved it in the middle of the Canadian attack in mid-December and had endured the ferocity of the ORTONA fighting, dug itself in on the lower ARIELLI and remained inert until February of the following year when it was summoned to repeat its ORTONA tactics in the labyrinthine ruins of CASSINO. The tale of Canadian losses was a long one and during the period 4-29 Dec each battalion in the division suffered casualties of over half of its rifle companies' strength. (See Appendix "A" to this Report for infantry casualties during December 1943.) In a somewhat shorter period 8-25 Dec, 1 Cdn Armd Bde lost one officer killed, and 28 wounded; 27 other ranks killed, 81 wounded and one missing. (Vokes, The Crossing of the MORO and Capture of ORTONA; Beyond the Sangro; op. cit.)



56. From the beginning the task of reaching the PESCARA lateral road to ROME had been heavily complicated by the unexpectedly wet December weather which had temporarily destroyed the division's communications across the SANGRO River and had converted the numerous deep valleys of the Adriatic littoral into an unending series of tank traps and obstacles to that most vital of all the necessities of tactical logistics - the provision of supporting arms. Not since the grim struggle on the shell-swept beaches of DIEPPE had Canadian infantry and tanks been faced with such a storm of fire and such stubborn resistance. The enemy indeed had made good a winter line across the narrowest part of the Italian Peninsula and in the Adriatic sector at least he continued to stand on it until the summer of 1944 when the fall of ROME compelled a general withdrawal to the north. By this time 1 Cdn Div and 1 Cdn Armd Bde had themselves forsaken the narrow shelf along the Adriatic coast where they had spent the bitter winter months. But Canadian soldiers will long remember the hard fighting of those clamorous December days. In the words of Major-General Vokes (War Diary: Hist Offr 1 Cdn Corps, January 1944) "everything before ORTONA was a nursery tale".

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57. The sketch maps in Appendix "B" are intended only as a general guide to the operations described, and do not attempt to include all the place names mentioned. Pending the completion of a definitive narrative reference may be made to the following maps produced by the Geographical Section of the General Staff at the War Office.

G.S.G.S. 4230	Italy	1:250,000	Sheets 29, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 41, 42, 43, 47, 48, 52 & 53.
G.S.G.S. 4164	Italy	1:100,000	Sheets 162, 254
G.S.G.S. 4229	Italy	1:50,000	Sheets 141-II, 147-I

58. This report was drafted by Captain T.M. Hunter, R.C.A., and was completed and revised by Major S.H.S. Hughes, C. Int C., who was present in the theatre of war, as Hist Offr 1 Cdn Div, from October 1943 to the end of the period dealt with.

*S.H.S. Hughes*  
 for (C.P. Stacey) Colonel,  
 Historical Officer,  
CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS.



APPENDIX "A"

ANALYSIS OF BATTLE CASUALTIES OF INFANTRY UNITS IN 1st CANADIAN DIVISION  
DURING DECEMBER 1943.


	Killed		Died of Wounds		Died while POW		Wounded		Missing		Total Casualties	
	Offrs	O.Rs.	Offrs	O.Rs.	Offrs	O.Rs.	Offrs	O.Rs.	Offrs	O.Rs.	Offrs	O.Rs.
1st Canadian Support Battalion (Sask L.I. (M.G.) Bn)	2	10		6			3	65	1	2	5	83
<u>1st CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE</u>												
Royal Canadian Regiment	3	28	1	11			6	111		9	10	159
Hastings and Prince Edward Island Regi- ment	1	22	2	5		1	6	117	1	14	10	159
48th Highlanders of Canada		23		4			7	93		2	7	122
<u>2nd CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE</u>												
Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry	2	32		3			12	188	1	7	15	230
Seaforth Highlanders of Canada	3	53	1	4			13	127		8	17	192
Loyal Edmonton Regiment	3	36		5			6	122	1	16	10	179
<u>3rd CANADIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE</u>												
R. 22e R.	1	27	1	4			9	140	1	8	12	179
Carleton and York Regiment	5	29	1	8			2	106	2	34	10	177
West Nova Scotia Regiment	1	34		4			17	166	1	30	19	234
	20	294	6	54		1	81	1235	8	130	115	1714

Note:

(a) The above table was compiled from figures supplied by Casualties Section, Canadian Records, Acton, on 12 Jul 44.

(b) Such unit records as exist are not in complete agreement with the above. For example, it is stated that during December 1943 the Loyal Edmonton Regiment had 80 killed, 180 wounded, 20 missing and 98 normal evacuations (Jefferson, op. cit.)





PREPARED FOR THE HISTORICAL SECTION, GENERAL STAFF,  
CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, LONDON BY CPL. F. SHADLOCK, R.C.E.



