

NOTE

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Ottawa, Canada
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M E M O R A N D U M

10 Apr 46.

On instructions from the Chief of Staff, the paper prepared by Lt.-Gen. G.G. Simonds to which reference is made in paras 4 and 5 of Report No. 150, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., and appended thereto as Appendix "C", was extracted and destroyed on 9 Apr 46.


(M.H.S. Penhale) Brigadier,
Deputy Chief of the General Staff,
CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS.

WEH/MJT

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CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

Appendix "B".

FEB 12 1946

The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada
in Operation "SPRING", 25 Jul 44.

General C.G. Simonds, formerly C.D.C. 2 Cdn Corps.

1. In the course of Operation "SPRING", an attack delivered south of Caen by 2 Cdn Corps on 25 Jul 44 (see Report No. 131, paras 112 - 119), the four rifle companies of The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada were virtually destroyed. The Minister of National Defence having undertaken to make a public statement on this operation, Historical Section C.M.H.Q. was recently instructed to prepare such a statement. The statement as drafted and submitted to the Department of National Defence is attached to the present Report as Appendix "A".

2. This account is the result of most intensive research. It may almost be doubted whether any single battalion operation has ever been more thoroughly investigated than this one. In addition to careful examination of all documents (including reports of investigations undertaken at the time of the operation or shortly afterwards) a great number of survivors have been interrogated, both in the United Kingdom and in Canada. Memoranda of these interviews, embracing personnel of 6 Cdn Armd Regt and 5 Cdn Fd Regt as well as of R.H.C., will be found on C.M.H.Q. file 24/AEF/1/6.

3. Full references to the sources of information on which the draft statement prepared for the Minister is based are attached to the present Report as Appendix "B".

4. The draft statement was read by Lieut.-General G.G. Simonds, formerly G.O.C. 2 Cdn Corps. While suggesting no amendments to the statement for publication General Simonds thought it desirable to put on record for historical purposes certain additional points concerning this operation. He accordingly prepared a paper, dated 31 Jan 46, of which a copy has also been forwarded to the Department of National Defence. This paper suggests that there were somewhat serious failures in minor tactics by the units concerned in Operation "SPRING" (all of which had had very little experience of active operations).

5. As General Simonds' paper is clearly an important contribution to the history of this operation, a copy of it is appended as Appendix "C" of the present Report.

C.P.S.

(C.P. Stacey) Colonel
Director Historical Section

APPENDIX "A"THE BLACK WATCH (ROYAL HIGHLAND REGIMENT)
OF CANADA IN OPERATION "SPRING", 25 JULY
1944.

The Minister of National Defence today issued the following statement:

I have been asked by friends of the regiment to make a statement concerning the attack by the 1st Battalion of The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada south of Caen on 25 July 1944 in which the four rifle companies of this battalion were almost totally destroyed.

All possible facts concerning this operation have been collected, and many officers and other ranks who survived it have been interviewed or have written descriptions of their experiences. The account which follows is a compilation based upon the information thus collected as well as upon examination of all relevant official reports and other documents.

It will be recalled that in the latter part of July 1944 the situation in the Normandy bridgehead was as follows. On the right flank the First United States Army had captured Cherbourg and cleared the entire Cotentin peninsula, and, fighting its way southwards, had by 18 July captured St. Lô. On the eastern flank, the Second British Army had had very hard fighting in the Caen area, which the enemy recognized as the vital pivot of his position and defended with proportionate determination. Canadian formations were engaged here under the operational command of the Second Army. The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division (commanded by Major-General R.F.L. Keller)

had taken part in the assault on D Day and had been fighting ever since; the 2nd Canadian Corps (commanded by Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds) took over a section of the front (including the Caen sector) on 11 July, and at the same time the first elements of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division (commanded by Major-General C. Foulkes) which had lately arrived from England, entered the line. Headquarters First Canadian Army took over the extreme left sector of the Allied front on 23 July, but the Caen area and the Canadian formations there did not come under its command until 30 July.

Caen itself was taken on 9 July. On 18 July the Second Army, including the 2nd Canadian Corps, broke out from the city and the adjacent area in a powerful attack directed eastward and southward across the River Orne. This attack made considerable progress and materially enlarged the bridgehead; but our tanks and infantry were finally checked by the enemy's gunscreen on the plain east of Caen and on the rising ground to the south, where the Canadian troops' positions were temporarily stabilized about four miles below Caen.

General Montgomery, who at this period was commanding, under the supreme direction of General Eisenhower, all Allied ground forces in the theatre, had followed throughout the campaign the principle of exerting every possible ounce of pressure on the British front with a view to facilitating the progress of the Americans on the western sector. In a directive to his British and American Army Commanders dated 30 June 1944 he wrote: "My broad policy, once we

had secured a firm lodgment area, has always been to draw the main enemy forces in to the battle on our eastern flank, and to fight them there, so that our affairs on the western flank could proceed the easier." The same directive explained his basic strategic conception - a break-through by the American forces in the west, which would then execute an encircling movement threatening the rear of the powerful German formations battling against the Anglo-Canadian forces on the eastern flank. His plan as outlined was "to hold the maximum number of enemy divisions on our eastern flank between Caen and Villers Bocage, and to swing the western or right flank of the Army Group southwards and eastwards in a wide sweep so as to threaten the line of withdrawal of such enemy divisions to the south of Paris." After 18 July the situation was favourable for the delivery of this decisive stroke, and on 21 July General Montgomery issued orders for the First United States Army to deliver its attack, which he subsequently termed "the main blow of the whole Allied plan", in the direction of Avranches. The task of the Second British Army as defined in the same order was to operate intensively with a view to inducing the enemy to build up his main strength east of the Orne "so that our affairs on the western flank can proceed with greater speed".²

This was the background of Operation "Spring", which the 2nd Canadian Corps was to launch on the morning of 25 July, simultaneous with the great American attack on the St. Lô sector. The Canadian operation was certain to be difficult and costly, for

it entailed attacking the commanding positions on the hills south of Caen, where the enemy had deployed large numbers of 88-millimetre and other guns, had converted every village into a strongpoint, and had concentrated great forces of the best troops in his army. Although his latest dispositions were not fully known to us previous to the operation, he had in fact hastily moved two armoured divisions and elements of a third across the Orne from his central sector as a result of the British attack on 18 July; and there were now no less than five German armoured divisions (the 1st, 9th and 12th S.S. Panzer Divisions, and the 2nd and 21st Panzer Divisions), in addition to part of the 10th S.S. Panzer Division and infantry formations, on the front east of the river. ③

④ The 2nd Canadian Corps plan for Operation "Spring" comprehended an attack along the axis of the main road leading to Falaise, with the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division advancing east of the road and the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division west of it. The 7th British Armoured Division and the Guards Armoured Division were under command and in the event of the infantry attack going well were to exploit southwards to seize high ground some miles beyond the German positions.

The terrain on the 2nd Division front was particularly difficult. The enemy was strongly posted on a kidney-shaped ridge lying just west of the Falaise road. The approaches to this ridge lay across open fields affording no cover. To the west of the ridge, on the edge of the Orne valley, the enemy held

a group of villages, St. Martin-de-Fontenay and St. André-sur-Orne (these two constituting one built-up area), May-sur-Orne, and Fontenay-le-Marmion. The defensive strength of the area was increased by the presence of iron mines and quarries, and it was found after the operation that a mine-shaft in a group of buildings called usually "the Factory" directly south of St. André-sur-Orne was connected with extensive underground workings. These and other tunnels, including one connecting Rocquancourt and May-sur-Orne, afforded the enemy the means of moving troops under cover from one section of his front to another, and of reoccupying positions after they had been cleared by our forces. ⁽⁵⁾ He had the further advantage of holding positions on high ground west of the Orne, sufficiently far north that their fire could take our troops attacking the villages on the east bank not merely in enfilade but in reverse.

The 2nd Canadian Infantry Division attacked with the 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade (commanded by Brigadier W.J. McGill) on the right and the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade (commanded by Lt.-Col. J.E. Ganong) on the left. The latter brigade had the task of capturing the villages of Verrières and Rocquancourt; the 5th Brigade was to capture May-sur-Orne and Fontenay-le-Marmion after The Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada (of the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier H.A. Young) had cleared St. André and St. Martin. The units of the 5th Brigade, while very well trained, had had only a week's experience of active operations.

The 5th Brigade attack was planned to take place in two phases. ⁶ After the Cameron Highlanders had cleared the "start line" running through St. André, Phase I would be carried out by The Calgary Highlanders, who were to attack at 3:30 a.m., with the assistance of "artificial moonlight" provided by searchlights, and capture May-sur-Orne. In Phase II, after the right flank had thus been secured, The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada would deliver a daylight attack with tank support and capture Fontenay-le-Marmion. This attack was timed to begin at 5:30 a.m.

The Cameron Highlanders, whose strength was depleted as the result of previous fighting in the area, were at the commencement of this operation in St. André, in close touch with the enemy in St. Martin. They found it very hard to clear the start line, and although one message reporting it clear was received shortly before midnight ⁷ the unit thereafter continued to report heavy fighting. ⁸ The Calgary Highlanders attacked according to plan but had difficulty from the beginning with enemy machine-guns. It appears that enemy infiltration through the mine south of St. André in fact prevented the start line from ever being securely in our hands and contributed to producing disorganization and confusion throughout the operation. One company of the battalion was reported on its objective in May-sur-Orne at 5:50 a.m., ⁹ but this report may not have been entirely accurate. It seems clear, however, that elements of The Calgary Highlanders did fight their way into the northern outskirts of May-sur-Orne twice during the morning, but were both times pushed

out, retiring to the vicinity of St. Andre-sur-Orne. The battalion suffered heavy losses. Errors in map-reading and confusion in the darkness, as well as the presence of enemy troops behind our front, helped to prevent The Calgary Highlanders from fully reaching their objectives and making them good. Wireless communication was very bad throughout; the Commanding Officer was never able to get a clear picture of the positions of his companies and could exercise no effective control.⁽¹⁰⁾ The failure to clear May-sur-Orne and the continued presence of enemy elements in and about St. André-sur-Orne and St. Martin-de-Fontenay meant that the right flank of the subsequent Black Watch attack was badly exposed, while the left was similarly swept by fire from the ridge.

At 3:30 The Black Watch moved from the position which they had held east of St. André-sur-Orne to a forward assembly area in St. Martin-de-Fontenay.⁽¹¹⁾ It was found that this village was still held by the enemy in some strength, and it was necessary to clear it, although valuable time was lost in doing so in the darkness. In the process a considerable number of prisoners were taken and a number of Germans killed. The Commanding Officer of The Black Watch, Lt.-Col. S.S.T. Cantlie, was unfortunately mortally wounded by machine-gun fire while reconnoitring near the church in St. Martin. The senior company commander was wounded by the same burst. The command of the battalion devolved upon another company commander, Major F.P. Griffin, who appears to have taken over at some time between 5:00 and 5:30 a.m.⁽¹²⁾

It was now too late to carry out the attack according to the original time-table, which called

for artillery support at fixed times. It was necessary to make a new attack plan co-ordinated with the artillery and tanks, and as this would take further time Major Griffin moved the battalion into St. André-sur-Orne, probably with a view to better cover. This move was carried out rapidly and in excellent order.⁽¹³⁾ With a view to discovering the situation in May-sur-Orne, Major Griffin sent an officer's patrol to reconnoitre that village. This patrol entered the place and walked through the greater part of it, seeing only one German and drawing fire from one machine-gun. It now seems obvious, however, that May was actually strongly held and that the enemy, keeping his troops under excellent control, remained in concealment and allowed the patrol to return and report the village not occupied in strength. It had made no contact with The Calgary Highlanders in the May area.⁽¹⁴⁾

In the light of the general strategic situation which has been described, it was considered essential to push the attack; and Headquarters 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade sent orders to this effect to The Black Watch by wireless.⁽¹⁵⁾ Major Griffin held an "orders group" and issued instructions for the attack. He arranged for assistance from the artillery and from the squadron of tanks (provided by the 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment) detailed to support the battalion.⁽¹⁶⁾ He despatched his scout sergeant with half a dozen men to "take out" the single machine-gun reported in May-sur-Orne.⁽¹⁷⁾ The attack was now to be launched at 9:30 a.m. from a new start line immediately east of the factory. It is reported that the original

intention had been for the unit to advance straight south to May-sur-Orne (which it had been assumed The Calgary Highlanders would take) and there change direction to south-east to reach the objective at Fontenay-le-Marmion.⁽¹⁸⁾ The plan now adopted, however, was a direct advance from the factory across the intervening open fields and ridge towards Fontenay.

Immediately before the attack, the Brigade Commander, who had come forward, had a conference with Major Griffin in St. André.⁽¹⁹⁾ It had been arranged that the tanks would meet the battalion at the start line, but they were delayed a few minutes by the narrow sunken roads leading from their harbour in St. Martin. The battalion did not wait for them, and the first two troops of tanks reached the factory just after the companies moved across the start line.⁽²⁰⁾ Officers and men of The Black Watch state that the artillery support for which Major Griffin had asked did not materialize at the moment of the attack.⁽²¹⁾ In this they appear to be mistaken, as one of the artillery regiments in support (the 5th Canadian Field Regiment) reported to Brigade Headquarters at 9:15 on the fire tasks which it intended to fire in support of the attack at 9:30.⁽²²⁾ These tasks consisted of concentrations on probable enemy positions on the ridge east of May-sur-Orne. The Brigade Commander is certain that the fire plan was carried out as arranged, but believes that the battalion's advance was slowed by the enemy fire to the point where it was unable to take full advantage of our own bombardment. With this in view, additional artillery tasks felt to be safe (i.e., unlikely to hit our own troops) were ordered fired over and above

the original plan. These included the laying of smoke on the left flank. (23)

The Black Watch moved forward into the attack precisely at the time and in the manner planned. The four rifle companies advanced with "A" and "C" forward and "B" and "D" in rear. (24) The unit had already suffered a considerable number of casualties and it is reported that one company was now commanded by a sergeant. (25)

From the moment of crossing the start line the battalion was completely in the open and exposed to intense and accurate fire from the ridge, from May-sur-Orne, and from the enemy positions beyond the Orne. This fire included that of dug-in tanks, 88-millimetre guns, numerous mortars and rocket projectors, in addition to machine-guns and other small arms. (26) The enemy's strength in this area, hitherto in great part concealed, was now fully unmasked. (27) His weapons were skilfully sited and well dug in. (28) In the face of this extraordinarily destructive fire, which might well have daunted much more experienced troops, The Black Watch advanced with unwavering determination. As the companies moved across the fields the fire grew still more intense, and as they mounted the slope of the ridge immediately east of May-sur-Orne, beyond which lay Fontenay-le-Marmion, extremely heavy casualties were suffered. Surviving officers estimate that about 60 all ranks, led by Major Griffin, crossed the crest of the ridge towards the objective. (29)

The evidence of survivors indicates that on or just beyond the crest this remnant ran directly into

a strong and exceptionally well-camouflaged enemy position. Many men report heavy enemy tanks concealed in haystacks, and other weapons were similarly hidden. What remained of the battalion was now "pinned down" by intense close-range fire from these positions. Any further offensive action was impossible. Few men remained unwounded. Major Griffin, who led the unit throughout with a cool courage to which many soldiers pay tribute, was almost the only officer still on his feet when the crest was crossed; and as a result of the fierceness of the fire and the fact that virtually all the officers and N.C.Os. had fallen there seems to have been some dispersion at this stage. (30)

Although some men speak of enemy counter-attacks, most of the survivors agree that no large scale counter-attack was delivered. The enemy was content to wear the remains of the battalion down by fire, and subsequently to move in gradually and deliberately to clear the ridge and capture those men who were still alive. When it became clear that further advance was out of the question Major Griffin issued orders for withdrawal, every man to make his way back as best he could. Very few men, however, succeeded in disengaging. Major Griffin himself, after being once wounded, is reported to have been killed by a mine. When we later re-occupied the area his body was found lying among those of his men. The hour at which the last survivors were overwhelmed by the enemy cannot be settled with precision; estimates vary very widely, but it may have been about one p.m. (31) Officers who survived estimate that of a strength of perhaps three

hundred officers and men committed to this attack not more than fifteen succeeded in returning to our lines. ⁽³²⁾

From the moment when the attack went in there had been no communication with the battalion. The one wireless set known to have been with Major Griffin was in a jeep which was later found knocked out not far from the start line; ⁽³³⁾ and the intensity of the fire made contact by runner virtually impossible. Brigade Headquarters accordingly remained uncertain as to the unit's fate; artillery tasks, including the laying of smoke, were fired in the hope of assisting it to withdraw; ⁽³⁴⁾ and early in the evening Le Régiment de Maisonnouvo delivered a further attack against May-sur-Orne. This also failed, the battalion coming under heavy fire from machine-gunners in its rear who had doubtless infiltrated through the mine workings. ⁽³⁵⁾

The action of the supporting tanks of the 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment should be noted. The plan for their employment in Major Griffin's attack was the same as the original one: this required them to enter May-sur-Orne and support The Black Watch from there by fire from the flank. The second-in-command of the squadron reached the "factory" immediately after the first two troops of tanks. One of the troop-leaders reports that these tanks were supporting The Black Watch from here by machine-gun fire on likely enemy positions, but that the effectiveness of this fire was limited by the excellence of the German camouflage. Finding that The Black Watch had already advanced, the second-in-command ordered these troops forward into May-sur-Orne (which he believed to be in our hands) and subsequently sent in a ~~third~~ troop to

support them. He believes that his tanks were in May-sur-Orne before The Black Watch reached the ridge. In the village they were at once heavily engaged by anti-tank guns and Panther tanks. One Panther was knocked out and another reported hit, but on our side all three troop-leaders' tanks, and possibly a fourth tank, were lost. Nothing could be seen of The Black Watch or any other Canadian troops, and after a time our surviving tanks withdrew to the factory area. During the day's operations every officer of the squadron but one became a casualty. (36)


The total casualties suffered by any unit in a single action are always difficult to determine with absolute precision, as individual reports are frequently received incorrectly dated. Careful analysis of the casualty records of The Black Watch indicates that the totals in this battle were as follows: killed in action, three officers and 105 other ranks; presumed killed in action, four other ranks; died of wounds, two officers and six other ranks; died of wounds while prisoner of war, three other ranks; wounded, 10 officers and 109 other ranks; prisoner of war, one officer and 81 other ranks (including 11 known to have been wounded) - an aggregate of 16 officers and 308 other ranks. It appears certain that some of those listed merely as "wounded" were also prisoners for a time, and that some listed merely as "prisoners" were also wounded. The figures given are based upon the reports received by the Records Office, Canadian Military Headquarters, London. (37)

When our troops re-occupied the ridge early in August, about 95 bodies of men of The Black Watch were found, scattered along the axis of advance in a manner that testified to the resolution with which the attack had been pressed. (38)

On other parts of the line the attack had gained a limited amount of ground. On the 3rd Canadian Division front The North Nova Scotia Highlanders had occupied part of the village of Tilly-la-Campagne, but were forced to withdraw from it after very violent fighting. On the front of the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade, The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry succeeded in capturing the village of Verrières, but The Royal Regiment of Canada, attempting to push on and take Rocquancourt, encountered extremely heavy opposition and was driven back. The infantry attack had failed to make sufficient progress to permit the use of tanks for exploitation; nevertheless, Verrières, lying at the north end of the ridge, was an important tactical acquisition, depriving the enemy of the highest point in his previous forward line, which had given him almost unlimited observation over the lower ground on which we had to prepare our attacks. The occupation of this area greatly reduced the enemy's observation and materially improved our own, and thus helped to prepare the way for the highly successful break-out attack delivered by the 2nd Canadian Corps on the night of 7-8 August. It should be added that an incidental but important result of the operation was the identification of the two new enemy armoured divisions on the Canadian front; the knowledge of their whereabouts was of great value to the Commander-in-Chief. (39) It is satisfactory to know

that the Germans had themselves suffered heavily; the 272nd Division, which provided the infantry element of the defence in the May-sur-Orne area, was so reduced that it had to be withdrawn to a quieter sector on 29 July. (40)

The real fruits of the gallant but ill-fated attack on 25 July 1944 must however be sought on the opposite flank of the Allied bridgehead. The sacrifices made that day, like those made by British and Canadian formations during the preceding weeks, had contributed in a most important degree, as the Army Group Commander had intended, to the progress made by the Americans on the right of the line. The attack of 25 July may be called the last phase of the great and costly holding attack which the Second British Army had been delivering for weeks past. On this same day, the First United States Army launched at St. Lô the offensive which produced a complete break-through and placed the American troops in Avranches by 30 July. This was the beginning of the decisive Allied victory in the Battle of Normandy. This victory was the product of the whole-hearted co-operation of good Allies. It could not have been won without the courage and skill of the American armies which first made the break-through and subsequently exploited it with such boundless dash and enterprise. Nor could it have been won without the desperate fighting on the eastern flank of the bridgehead in which, in accordance with the Allied master plan, British and Canadian troops, at very heavy cost to themselves, forced the enemy to maintain on their front the majority of his best and most formidable divisions.



To CAEN

To PALAISE

TILLY-LA-CAMPAGNE

ROCQUANCOURT

VERRIERES

THE RIDGE

FONTENAY-LE-MARMION

ST ANDRÉ-SUR-ORNE

ST. MARTIN-DE-FONTENAY

Factory

BLACK WATCH
ATTACK
25 JULY 1944

MAY-SUR-ORNE

Orne River

Laize River

APPENDIX "B"

REFERENCES TO SOURCES OF INFORMATION TO ACCOMPANY
DRAFT STATEMENT PREPARED FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE (SEE APPENDIX "A").

1. General Crerar's file: G.O.C.-in-C./1-0.
2. Ibid.
3. Second Army Int Summaries, 23-27 Jul 44. 2 Pz Div, 9 S.S. Pz Div and elements of 10 S.S. Pz Div were the formations moving.
4. 2 Cdn Corps Op Instr No. 3 (24 Jul 44).
5. Intelligence Report on the Rocquancourt - St. Martin-de-Fentenay Iron Mines (W.D., Fus M.R., July 1944, Appx 18).
6. 5 Cdn Inf Bde Op Order No. 1 (24 Jul 44).
7. 5 Cdn Inf Bde Message Log, 242335.
8. Information from Brig. W.J. McGill (C.M.H.Q. file 24/AEF/1/6).
9. Ibid., 250550.
10. Report of Comd 5 Cdn Inf Bde, 28 Jul. Evidence of Lt.-Col. MacLaughlan, 28 Jul 44 (Hist Sec file AEF/5 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D).
11. Memorandum forwarded 12 Dec 45 by Lt.-Col E. Motzfeldt, incorporating his own evidence and that of Major J.P.G. Kemp, Major J.P.W. Taylor, Major E.S. Duffield and Capt. C. Stuart.
12. Ibid.; also evidence of Major E.R. Bennett (later killed in action), 1 Aug 44 (Hist Sec file AEF/5 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D and Major Duffield, 30 Oct 45).
13. Evidence of Major Bennett.
14. Motzfeldt memorandum. Evidence of Sgt. Benson, Scout Pl., R.H.C., 2 Aug 44 (Hist Sec file AEF/5 Cdn Inf Bde/C/D).
15. 5 Cdn Inf Bde message log, 250647 etc.
16. Motzfeldt memorandum.
17. Evidence of Sgt. Benson.
18. Evidence of Major Duffield, 30 Oct 45.
19. Motzfeldt memorandum. Separate evidence of Major Duffield, 30 Oct 45. Comment by Brig. McGill.

20. Evidence of Lt.-Col J.W. Powell, 9 Jan 46 (C.M.H.Q. file 24/AEF/1/6).
21. Motzfeldt memorandum.
22. 5 Cdn Inf Bde message log, 250915.
23. Comment by Brig. Megill.
24. Evidence of Major Duffield, 30 Oct 45. Evidence of Sgt. Benson. Motzfeldt memorandum.
25. Evidence of Major Duffield, 30 Oct 45.
26. Motzfeldt memorandum.
27. Evidence of Major Bennett.
28. War Diary, G.S., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Div, 25 Jul 44.
29. Motzfeldt memorandum.
30. Evidence of 31 individuals, chiefly private soldiers, forwarded with D.N.D. letter HQ 7-7-48 (DDHS) 11 Jan 46. See also Outline Report dictated by Comd 5 Cdn Inf Bde, 16 Aug 44 (Gen Crerar's file GOC-in-C 3-7-1).
31. Evidence of 31 individuals, as above. D.71428, Pte Norris, A.E.; D.72330, Pte Lipson, J.; and D.81596, Pte Deodati, J.C., all heard Major Griffin give the withdrawal order.
32. Motzfeldt memorandum, and explanatory letter from Lt.-Col. Motzfeldt, n.d.
33. Report to C. of S. First Cdn Army by Capt. F.S. Weatherston, 19 Aug 44 (Gen Crerar's file GOC-in-C 3-7-1).
34. 2 Cdn Inf Div message log, serial 2309, 251620.
35. War Diary, R. de Mais, 25 Jul 44.
36. Evidence of Lt.-Col. Powell and Lieut. W. Rawson.
37. See correspondence with O.I.C. Records, C.M.H.Q. file 24/AEF/1/6.
38. Report by Capt. Weatherston. Outline Report by Comd 5 Cdn Inf Bde.
39. Information from Lt.-Gen. Poulkes. F.M. Montgomery sent one of his staff to thank him for this information.
40. Interrogation of various German generals. Lt.-Gen. F.A. Schack, the Divisional Commander, stated that it was withdrawn "about" 27 Jul.