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Directorate of History
National Defence Headquarters
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K1A 0K2

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CANCELLED

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HISTORICAL SECTION
CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

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22 MAR 1946

Operation "JUBILEE": The Raid on Dieppe, 19 Aug 42.
New Light on Early Planning

1. This Report may be considered an addendum to No. 100, which dealt in detail with the preliminaries of the Dieppe operation. It presents the results of additional investigation lately carried out with the kind assistance and co-operation of Combined Operations Headquarters.
2. The account of the early planning of Operation "RUTTER" contained in Report No. 100 derived almost exclusively from the Combined Report on the raid issued by Combined Operations Headquarters (C.B. 04244). Until 30 Apr 42 Canadians had no part in the planning and no documents relating to planning during that period are in Canadian hands. Examination of the so-called "War Diary" of Combined Operations Headquarters (which actually consists of a series of bound volumes of records arranged by individual operations) has now enabled the present writer to make some further comments on the earliest phase of planning.
3. Attached as Appendix "A" are copies of certain particularly relevant documents, including what is evidently the earliest written paper concerning Operation "RUTTER" - the record of a planning meeting on 14 Apr 42. Attention should also be directed to the "Appreciation from Point of View of the Raid Planning Staff (Military)" of which a copy is also appended in Appendix "A". While in the C.O.H.Q. records this document is not itself dated, it is clearly very early, and a reference in C.O.H.Q. Records, Vol 21, page 1, indicates that its date was actually 17 Apr 42.
4. Careful comparison of the narrative in C.B. 04244 with these documents suggests that the compiler of the narrative (Mr. Hilary St. George Saunders) leaned very heavily, in his account of planning, on the "Notes on Principal Changes in the Military Plan", dated 14 Sep 42, of which a copy is also included in Appendix "A". This document, written after the actual operation, appears in particular to be the source of his information about the reasons for the adoption of the plan for a frontal assault. Comparison of this document (see especially para 2) with C.B. 04244, para 15, indicates that the latter gives perhaps a somewhat more assured interpretation on this point than the written records warrant; and it is important to note

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that while (evidently on the basis of this memorandum of 14 Sep 42) the C.B. gives an account of a discussion at the formal meeting on 25 Apr 42 on the pros and cons of a frontal assault, the actual minutes of this meeting (copy also included in Appendix "A") contain no reference to this subject. (It must be assumed that this meeting of 25 Apr is the one referred to in the "Notes on Principal Changes", although it gives the date as 24 Apr; there is no other record of a meeting on this latter date.)

5. On this very important matter of the reasons for the adoption of the frontal assault plan (on which there is actually no strictly contemporary written evidence in the documents seen and attached hereto), an important additional point is contributed in the verbal evidence of Brigadier A.H. Head, a memorandum of which is attached as Appendix "B". It will be noted that Brigadier Head states that the frontal assault was closely related to what was considered in 1942 the pressing necessity for the acquisition of an undamaged major port at the very outset of any invasion operation. It was this necessity, according to Brigadier Head, that led the planners to adopt the scheme of frontal attack. It was feared that an attempt to take a port by landing on its flanks might result in delays and probable demolition of the harbour facilities before they fell into our hands; whereas if a frontal attack into the heart of the port could be demonstrated to be practicable this problem would be satisfactorily solved.

6. Although C.B. 04244 states (para 12) that General Montgomery "attended the principal meetings of the planners" from a very early date, no reference to his actual attendance at a meeting has been found earlier than 5 Jun (see minutes of meeting, Appendix "A"). He presided over this meeting on 5 Jun, which eliminated the air bombardment from the plan. He attended two meetings on 15 Jun. He was clearly not at the meeting on 25 Apr (minutes, Appendix "A").

THE REVIVAL OF THE OPERATION AFTER 7 JUL 42

7. Reference to Report No. 100 (paras 97-112) will indicate that Operation "RUTTER" was cancelled on 7 Jul 42 with every appearance of finality, but was revived as Operation "JUBILEE" about a week later. Report No. 100 could offer no very definite explanation for this revival, and at this moment no actual written evidence has yet been seen. It should be noted that while the C.O.H.Q. planning records for "RUTTER" are systematically arranged and fairly extensive, the "JUBILEE" volumes are less systematic and contain almost nothing on planning; and nothing at all has been found on this particular point. The verbal evidence of Brigadier Head (Appendix "B") however,

seems to go far to explain the revival. It will be noted that Brigadier Head considers that the Dieppe raid was an important element in the Combined Operations Headquarters programme generally; that its cancellation had been a great disappointment to the C.O.H.Q. planners; and that when Captain Hughes-Hallett suggested a means of reviving it without concentrating the force or re-briefing before embarkation C.O.H.Q. was highly pleased.

8. At the same time, it is expedient to remember the general strategic situation in July 1942. The Western Allies were under very heavy pressure to give effective aid to Russia, whose armies were suffering serious defeats. There was, indeed, a danger of Russia being driven out of the war. Great Britain and the United States had considered mounting Operation "SLEDGEHAMMER", a "diversionary assault on the French coast", "if such a desperate measure became necessary to lend a hand toward saving the situation on the Soviet front"; but the decision arrived at during conferences in London which seem to have begun immediately after the decision to revive the Dieppe raid was taken was that "SLEDGEHAMMER" could not in fact be mounted in 1942, largely on account of "poverty of equipment, especially in landing craft" (General Marshall's Report: The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific, pages 8 - 9). It is probable that at a time when vigorous offensive action was being demanded both by the Russians and by the peoples of the Allied nations, Operation "JUBILEE" appeared to those in London responsible for the higher direction of the war as a sort of small-scale substitute for "SLEDGEHAMMER". In the absence of access to papers on the Cabinet level, this matter must, however, remain largely conjectural.

9. It is hoped to uncover further evidence, in due course, on the various points mentioned above which still remain somewhat obscure.

C.S.
(C.P. Stacey) Colonel,
Director Historical Section.

COPY

CANCELLED

Combined Operations Headquarters,
1a Richmond Terrace,
Whitehall. S.W.1.

18th April 1942

MINUTES OF MEETING HELD AT COMBINED OPERATIONS
HEADQUARTERS AT 1100 HOURS 14.4.42. TO DISCUSS
OPERATION "RUTTER"

Present:-

Major General J.C. Haydon	C.O.H.Q.
Commodore Ellis	C.O.H.Q.
Brigadier G.E. Wildman-Lushington	C.O.H.Q.
Brigadier C.V. McNabb	G.H.Q. H.F.
Captain J. Hughes-Hallett	C.O.H.Q.
Group-Captain Willetts	C.O.H.Q.
Commander M. Hodges	C.O.H.Q.
Captain T.M. Gray, R.M.	Plan/Sec

1. N.A. gave a brief outline of the plan for the operation.
2. It was agreed that the project was attractive and was worthwhile.
3. A.A. questioned the advisability of using a battalion of parachute troops. After some discussion it was agreed that the landing of parachute troops in small groups for the purpose of cutting communications should be considered.
4. It was agreed to remit the further examination of the project to the Advisers (Major Fanshawe to represent Home Forces) to:-
 - (a) Define the object of the raid.
 - (b) State approximately the forces required.
 - (c) Explain the way in which the forces would be employed.
 - (d) Enumerate the limiting factors.

It was agreed that, although the Advisers and Planners would have to go into considerable detail to test the practicability of the plan, the outline plan for submission to higher authority for approval should not be more than a broad outline.

OPERATION "REFUGER"

Conclusions of meeting held at C.O.H.Q. on Tuesday, 21st April.

Present:

Major-General J.G. Haydon, D.S.O., C.B.
 Captain J. Hughes-Hallett, R.N.
 Group Captain A.H. Willett, R.A.F.
 Commander D.B. Luce, D.S.O., R.N.
 Wing Commander Homer.
 Lieut. Commander Moorhouse, R.N.R.
 Major R. Farnham (Home Forces).
 Major W.H. Scrime, R.A.

The meeting considered that the outline plans suggested to G.O.C. Airborne Division and D.C.G.S. Home Forces by V.C.G.O. on Monday, 20th April, have to be modified in view of certain naval considerations.

The situation now is that it will be impossible to arrange for the first flights to land $\frac{1}{2}$ hour after nautical twilight, accompanied by some Churchill tanks for the following reasons:

- (a) If tanks accompanied first flight, tactical surprise will be lost because the Forces may be seen heading for their objective 2 hours before dusk.
- (b) There is considerable risk involved in landing T.I.C.s etc. in dark. Some of the T.I.C.s would foul the grounds on the beach, resulting in stranding and consequent confusion.

2. Having considered these objections the meeting agreed on the following suggested modifications to the plan for the direct assault on the port.

- (a) $\frac{1}{2}$ hr. after nautical twilight (Zero):

'D.B. & F.' battalions land at beaches 5 and 5
 Parachute battalion is dropped in vicinity of D'ARGUES
 Glider Company lands inland of beach No.1.
 Groups of paratroopers are dropped to deal with mobile
 batteries and any additional targets outside the port.
 Simultaneous air bombardment against town and sea front.

- (b) The main landing of one squadron of tanks and two battalions on the sea front should take place $\frac{1}{2}$ hr. later (Z + 45)
- (c) The bulk of the tank force should land between Z + 130 and Z + 180.
- (d) Engineers and miscellaneous troops required for demolitions on the approaches to the town and in the town would accompany the forces mentioned in (b) and (c) above.
- (e) No tank squadron will now land at Beach No.5 which seems to be more difficult than was supposed at first.

3. The question of fighter cover and support during the day was discussed at some length. It was agreed that 3 Battalion would require fighter support during its advance on the aerodrome and that fighter cover generally would take the form of a moderate degree of cover throughout the hours of daylight with maximum intensity at certain hours, when the danger to the naval force and small craft was greatest. These periods seem to be Z + 130 and Z + 240 and from the time loading commences until dusk.

Air bombardment : offensive air action will continue from Z + 30 to Z + 35 at high and low level. The high altitude attack will be against the town generally. The low level attack will concentrate against the sea front and beach defences.

4. The withdrawal and re-embarkation would have to start with some of the tanks about 8 hours after zero. These would be followed by infantry. The maximum number of infantry would embark from the harbour itself rather than from the sea front.

MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD AT 1100 HOURS SATURDAY 25th APRIL
at C.O.H.Q. TO DISCUSS OPERATION "RUTTER".

Present:

Vice-Admiral The Lord Louis Mountbatten (in the Chair)	G.C.O.
Maj.Gen. J.C. Haydon	V.C.C.O.
Maj.Gen. P.S. Gregson Ellis	G.H.Q.
	Home Forces
Air Vice-Marshal Robb	D.C.C.O.
Commodore W.M. Ellis	A.C.C.O.
Brigadier Wildman-Lushington	R.M.A.C.O.
Captain J. Hughes Hallett, R.N.	N.A.C.O.
Group Captain A. Willetts	A.A.C.O.
Commander J.R. Luce	G.O.H.Q.
Lt. Col. A.G. Walch	Airborne Div.
Wing Commander J.W. Homer	Air 2.
Lt. Cdr. L.H. Moorhouse	I.P.(N)
Major W.H. Skrine	G.2.O.
Major W.G. Rees	Home Forces
Captain J.M. Gray, R.M.	Plan/Sec.

Captain Hughes Hallett explained the draft of the outline plan which, with minor amendments, was approved.

2. During the discussion of the Operation the following points were brought up and agreed :-

- (a) That the Force Commanders should on appointment be given a copy of para.9 of C.O.S.(42) 195 dated 30th March, 1942.
Note:- This should apply to all raids.
- (b) That, in this case, the "Supreme Commander" (vide C.O.S. paper referred to above) should be referred to as "The Naval Commander-in-Chief under whom the operation will be carried out".
- (c) That the system of command should be Joint Command.
- (d) That the covering letter for the Outline Plan should include a statement pointing out the value of this operation in order to gain experience for future large scale operations.
- (e) That the Outline Plan for submission to the Chiefs of Staff should be only in sufficient detail to enable them to give their approval.
- (f) That the Plan should include instructions for bringing back as many prisoners as possible.
- (g) That the practicability of denying the use of the aerodrome to the enemy, during the initial assault, by the use of smoke and H.E. bombs should be investigated.

/ (h) That ...

- (h) That the plan should cater for listing the military objectives for bombing in the town, to prevent indiscriminate bombing there must however, be a proviso to ensure that the bombing does take place even if visibility conditions do not allow accurate identification of targets.

Note:

In this connection Lt. Col. Moorhouse undertook to find out whether the civil population had been evacuated from the town.

- (i) That consideration should be given to means of disposing of any tanks that could not be re-embarked.
- (j) That V.C.C.O. and the D.C.G.S. should obtain the opinion of the G.O.C. Airborne Division on Tuesday, 28th April.

3. During the meeting, arising from points discussed, C.C.O. :-

- (a) Instructed V.C.C.O. to arrange a meeting of the Council and Advisorate at an early date to discuss a new system of Supreme Command for Combined Operations.
- (b) Instructed H.A. to draft a paper on the subject of giving formal notice that the coastal areas of occupied countries are liable to raids and that therefore the civil population should be evacuated.
- (c) Stated that the paper on "HAZING" to be submitted to the Chiefs of Staff should contain -
- (i) The implications of and reasons for remaining in occupation.
 - (ii) The implications of and reasons for an early withdrawal.
 - (iii) The implications of and reasons for a series of repetition raids.

(Signed)

J.M. GRAY.

Plan/Sec.

28.4.42.

Combined Operations Headquarters,
1A Richmond Terrace,
Whitehall. S.W.1.

5th June, 1942.

OPERATION "RUTTER"

MINUTES OF MEETING OF COUNCIL AND ADVISERS TO C.C.O.
AND COMBINED FORCE COMMANDERS WITH LIEUT-GENERAL
MONTGOMERY IN THE CHAIR.

Present:

Lt. General B.L. Montgomery, C.B., D.S.O. (In the chair)	G.O.C.-in-C. S.E. Command, and Staff Officer.
Maj-General J.C. Haydon, D.S.O., C.B.E.	Vice Chief of Combined Operations.
Rear-Admiral H.T. Baillie-Grohman, C.B., D.S.O., O.B.E.	Naval Force Commander and Staff.
Major General J.H. Roberts, M.C.	Military Force Commander and Staff.
Air Vice Marshal T.L. Leigh-Mallory, C.B., D.S.O.	Air Force Commander and Staff.
The Council and Advisers to C.C.O.	
The Conference Secretary.	

The Naval, Military and Air plans were explained in turn by Lt-Col. C.O. Mann, G.S.O.1, 2nd Canadian Division, Lt. A.R.L. Butler, R.N., and Air Vice Marshal Leigh-Mallory. Modifications mentioned in the paragraphs that follow were noted by the meeting.

USE OF SMOKE

2. Naval and Military Force Commanders asked the Air Vice Marshal if smoke could be laid on beaches by aircraft to cover landing, or failing this, if there was any objection to the Navy laying smoke. Air Vice Marshal Leigh-Mallory pointed out that it was difficult for Aircraft to lay smoke accurately on a narrow beach and that in any case the use of smoke would interfere with attack by Cannon Hurricanes. After some discussion it was agreed not to use smoke by aircraft on beaches during the assault but to rely on the attack by four squadrons of Cannon Hurricanes to cover the landing. Some T.L.C. would be equipped with mortars and would be prepared to lay their own screens if the situation made this necessary.

/ NAVAL DEMONSTRATION

NAVAL DEMONSTRATION FOR BOULOGNE

5. It was agreed that a small Naval demonstration in the BOULOGNE area would be most valuable, as it might take the enemy's attention off the convoy. Rear Admiral Baillie-Golman agreed to take this matter up through C.C.O. The meeting also agreed that 0250 to 0350 on the day of the assault would be the best time for this diversion.

Air Vice Marshal Leigh-Mallory pointed out that during the "cover" period of about six hours, the vessels in the anchorage would be subject to attack by German fighter and fighter-bombers, as it might not be possible for him to reinforce the two fighter squadrons in the vicinity of Dieppe before the German attack had been launched. General Montgomery later stressed the importance of doing everything possible to increase the Anti-aircraft defence of ships and vessels to overcome these attacks during the period of occupation.

4. Captain Selby undertook to investigate,

- (a) the possibility of including additional ships, well armed with A.A. weapons, so as to provide adequate protection to the anchorage and harbour during the operation. General Montgomery stated that he could provide extra Bofors guns if C.O.H.Q. could get the ships in which to place them;
- (b) the provision of sufficient ammunition on all ships in view of the high expenditure rate which was to be anticipated.

AIR PLAN

5. Air Vice Marshal Leigh-Mallory proposed and the meeting agreed that air bombing of the port itself during the night of the assault would not be the most profitable way of using the bombers, as a raid which was not over-powering, might only result in putting everyone on the alert. As an alternative he proposed bombing BOULOGNE with 70 aircraft with a view to creating a diversion there, and he proposed also the bombing of CRECY and ARBEVILLE aerodromes between 0230 and 0400 hours. It was emphasised that the movement of our aircraft in the vicinity of ARBEVILLE and CRECY would tend to occupy the R.D.F. organisation at DIEPPE and might put out of action, at least for some hours, two aerodromes which the enemy would wish to use during the day of the operation.

6. It was agreed that cannon fighters should attack the beach defences and the highground on either side of DIEPPE, as the first flight of landing craft were coming in to land. It was also agreed that air action would be taken against German Headquarters in ARQUES at 0440.

CIVIL POPULATION

7. Brigadier Wildman-Lushington agreed to obtain from P.W.E. Executive the policy regarding bringing civilians back from raids, particular subject about which they should be interrogated and in general the control of the civil population during the operation. Force Commanders would be informed of the position as soon as the P.W.E. report had been received.

RUTTER

EQUIPMENT

8. Major General Haydon invited the Force Commanders to state their requirements for any special equipment which might be in short supply. Rear Admiral Baillie-Grohman asked for -

- (a) three shallow diving suits and experts to use them ;
- (b) six large wire cutters for removing wire or other obstacles from propellers.

No other requirements were stated.

9. Lt.-Col. Walsh, representing G.O.C. Airborne Division, joined the meeting and undertook that the Commander of the Airborne Troops taking part in the arrangement would be sent to meet the Military Commander at an early date, in order that the whole plan might be explained to him in full detail.

ENEMY INVASION CRAFT

10. Commander Ryder stated that sufficient fuel could not be carried to fill up the enemy invasion craft which it was hoped would be captured.

If these craft were found with empty tanks they would have to be towed back and special arrangements were being made to meet this contingency.

To: V.C.C.O.

OPERATION "RUTTER" AND "JUBILEE"
NOTES ON PRINCIPAL CHANGES IN THE MILITARY PLAN

GENERAL

1. Planning for "RUTTER" began about mid-April under the direction of Captain Hughes-Hallett. The first Outline Plan was submitted to the Council at a meeting on 24th April and approved with minor amendments.

A number of alterations were made in both the Outline Planning (at C.O.H.Q.) and during the detailed planning stage (partly at C.O.H.Q. and partly at I.O.W.) The principle points of interest appear to be :-

- (i) The decisions to adopt a frontal assault on Dieppe in preference to flank attacks.
- (ii) The decision to cancel air bombardment of the town and port.
- (iii) The landing of Tanks on the town beaches in preference to landings on the west.
- (iv) The use of Air borne Troops.
- (v) Alteration from a "Two Tide" to a "One Tide" operation.

DECISION TO ADOPT A FRONTAL ASSAULT ON DIEPPE IN PREFERENCE TO A FLANK ATTACK.

2. The military planning syndicate at C.O.H.Q. produced two outline plans for the assault (about 18.4.42.) In the first one the plan was generally similar to that adopted for "JUBILEE", with the exception that it involved the use of Airborne Troops, a heavy air bombardment of the town and an assault on the aerodrome by Infantry supported by Tanks. The alternative plan was to land two battalions in floating reserve. The sixth battalion (less dets.) was to be landed with a battalion of Army Tanks at QUIBERVILLE.

A verbal discussion (of which there is no written record) took place at C.O.H.Q. about the 18th April to decide which of the alternative plans should be adopted. V.C.C.O., D.C.C.S. Home Forces, R.G.S. (Plans) H.F., and G.O.C. Airborne Division were present. Although it was not possible to consider the plan in detail, all agreed that on balance there were advantages in taking the town by a frontal assault.

H.A. was not present at this meeting. His view was that a frontal assault would be unduly hazardous. The advantages and disadvantages of the two alternative Military Plans were put before the first formal meeting to consider the Outline Plan, at C.O.H.Q. on 24th April. Some reasons for their decision to adopt the frontal assault were :-

- (a) The loss of time which would be involved by flank landings as far west as QUIBERVILLE would make a surprise attack on the town more difficult to achieve.
- (b) Tanks landed at QUIBERVILLE would have to cross three rivers - all anti-tank obstacles.

/ (c)

- (c) Available intelligence was that Dieppe and its neighbourhood was defended by one low category battalion, with certain Coastal and A.A. Batteries. Dieppe was NOT thought to be a heavily defended objective.

A fundamental feature of this first outline plan was a heavy air bombardment of the town, timed so as to precede the arrival of the first flights of Infantry by as short a time as possible and to be of maximum intensity. It was agreed that surprise would be difficult to obtain and that reliance must be placed on the confusion resulting from the bombardment and subsequent low flying attacks.

THE DECISION TO CANCEL AIR BOMBARDMENT OF THE TOWN AND PORT.

3. The outline plan for operation "RUTTER" submitted to the Chiefs of Staff on the 9th May included a high level bombing attack to commence at a time most suitable to Bomber Command and to cease not later than one hour before the beginning of Nautical Twilight. The object of this was stated to be :-

- (a) Disorganisation of the defences.
- (b) Tiring of the Garrison.

The suggested scale of attack was to absorb a minimum of 150 sorties.

The decision to drop high level air bombardment was reached at a Council Meeting, attended by the Force Commanders, at C.O.H.Q. on the 5th June, 1942. The R.A.F. Force Commander proposed, and the Meeting agreed, that air bombing of the Port itself during the night of the assault would not be the most profitable way of using bombers and might only result in putting everyone on the alert. As an alternative he proposed certain diversionary bombing attacks on objectives to the East, such as BOULOGNE, ABBEVILLE, DRUCAT and CRECY.

WHETHER TANKS SHOULD BE LANDED ON TOWN BEACHES OR FLANK BEACHES.

4. Although the beach at QUIBENVILLE appeared to be a good Tank beach, it was too far from Dieppe and discarded for the reasons mentioned in paragraph 2 above. The only other possible places for landing Tanks were FUITS and POURVILLE and neither of these places appeared to be favourable.

During the preparation of the outline plan there was much discussion as to whether tanks should be landed with the leading flights or subsequently. It was decided to land some tanks with the leading flights in order to give close support to Infantry and Demolition parties moving across the open ground between the beach and the front of the town. This duty of the tanks was no less important when subsequent intelligence disclosed the presence of walls blocking the exits from the sea front into the town. Elaborate experiments were carried out to decide the best means of breaching these walls by prepared charges. Churchill tanks were also tried out on shingle slopes of various kinds to ensure that they would negotiate shingle banked against the sea wall at Dieppe.

The possibility that the enemy would hold up our leading flights by minefields was an additional argument in favour of close support by tanks to troops clearing the minefields.

"R U T T E R"THE USE OF AIRBORNE TROOPS.

5. The first outline plan (24th April) included the use of 1½ Parachute Battalions and up to 2 Glider Companies. These were to attack the Headquarters at ARQUES and isolated batteries East of DIERRE (BERNEVAL). Subsequently the available Airborne Force was reduced to 1 Battalion only owing to the shortage of aircraft and trained pilots, gliders, etc., for the Airborne Division. There was, however, a possibility that 2 Glider Companies might be available in time for the operation in June.

After the second postponement to "RUTTER" (early in July), it was decided not to use any Airborne troops. Subsequently the role of attacking the batteries in BERNEVAL and VAUSEVILLE was taken over by the 2 Commandos.

ALTERATION FROM "TWO TIDE" TO "ONE TIDE" OPERATION.

6. This alteration was made before the cancellation of "RUTTER". The changes in the Military Plan were as follows:-

- (1) The exploitation by an Infantry battalion to ARQUES would not be supported by Tanks unless ordered.
- (11) All Tanks would now re-embark at 1000 hours - All Infantry by 1100 hours.

This contraction in the time ashore gave less time to the enemy to develop a counter-attack and rendered interference by the Panzer Division at AMIENS much less probable.

14th September 1942.

G.2. P.1.

Alteration in plan made necessary through
postponement.

OUTLINE

1. The landing will take place as planned. Zero at 0415 hrs.
2. The military plan for the attack is changed only in that the exploitation to ARQUES will not be supported by Tks. unless ordered, in which case it will be A Sqn.
3. All tks. will now be re-embarked by 1000 hrs. All inf. by 1100 hrs.
4. This contraction in the space of time ashore has the effect of reducing the time available to the enemy to develop his counter stroke and the strength with which he can launch it.

DETAIL - ATTACK

5. TICS of 3 and 4 FLIGHTS will remain on the beach after landing their tks. First tks. to re-embark will enter these TICS by 0600 hrs.
6. C Sqn.

Tasks.....

"RUTTER."Tasks.

- (a) Sp. Essex Scot in establishing beach head as planned.
- (b) Attack TRAWLERS as planned.
- (c) Do not go to BUZZARD (MARTIN EGLISE) unless situation requires.
- (d) After (a) above sp. Essex Scot beach head - dominate approaches from East and South between Rivers ARQUES and L'HAULLES from NOT EAST OF GRID 26, with as few tps. as possible. Remainder to sqn. rally.
- (e) Prepare to aid paratps. if ordered.

7. B. Sqn.Tasks

- (a) Sp. HILL and/or S. Sask. R. in establishing beach head as planned.
- (b) 8 Tp. and 9 Tp. remain in domination after HAMBONE, YONKERS and YORKTOWN.
- (c) After (a) above is complete depending upon progress of Camerons of C., and if the time is NOT after 0700 hrs., sqn. may be ordered to sp. the attack to the aerodrome as planned, otherwise it will sp. HILL and S. Sask. R. in domination of their beach heads with as few tps. as possible - remainder to be in sqn. rally.
- (d) The attack on ARQUES will NOT now be supported by B. Sqn.

8. A. Sqn.Alternative Tasks

- (a) Move to bn. rally and then sp. Camerons of C. in attack on aerodrome, and possibly assist at ARQUES if the time factor is satisfactory; OR
- (b) If B. Sqn. has done aerodrome task, move to aerodrome and relieve B. Sqn. who will withdraw to beach.

Definite Tasks

- (c) After aerodrome captured, secure approaches from South and West until NOT AFTER 0845 hrs.
- (d) Cover withdrawal of B. Sqn. with as few tps. as possible, remainder to move to bn. rally to come under cmd. En.HQ.

9. En. HQ.

Move as planned.

10. Leading tks. must leave the beach as quickly as possible and will now disregard the possible though unlikely presence of mines on the promenade.

WITHDRAWAL

11. B. Sqn. unless given aerodrome task and as much of C Sqn. as possible will be re-embarked by 0800 hrs. (28 to 36 tks.).

12. A Sqn., En. HQ and any remainder C. Sqn. will be re-embarked by 1000 hrs. (22 to 30 tks.).

C. Sqn.

13. As many tps. as possible (up to 15 tks.) be on the beach by 0800 hrs.

14. Last tps. to be on beach by 0930 hrs. unless otherwise ordered.

B. Sqn.

15. Unless ordered to capture aerodrome move to bn. rally on "SCRAM" (about 0730 hrs.). Move to beach as ordered.

"RUTTER."

16. If aerodrome task is given to B. Sqn. withdraw to be on beach by 0830 hrs.

A. Sqn.

17. Withdraw as ordered.

Bn. Hq.

18. If moved forward to aerodrome will withdraw to Bn. rally at about same time as res. tps. of A. Sqn.

APPRECIATION FROM POINT OF VIEW OF THE RAID
PLANNING STAFF (MILITARY) ON THE PROPOSED OPERATION "RUTTER."

Note:- This appreciation has been made without any exact information regarding enemy infantry or strong points in the town and its neighbourhood, apart from certain locations of machine guns, coast defences, A.A. and field (?) artillery given in the Intelligence provided in File No. 521/15 Part II (Combined Operations Headquarters "RUTTER"). It is also made without the answers to question regarding the arrival of enemy reinforcements, possibilities of delaying their arrival, etc., enumerated in 4A of the file.

OBJECT.

1. To destroy certain military and civil installations in the area of the Port and to withdraw 15 hours later.

CONSIDERATIONS.

Enemy Dispositions in and near the Port.

2. See Paras. 52 and 71, or 2A file, tracings etc., Only one battalion has been located, probably in the town with two companies at FOURVILLE and SAUGHAY, but no detailed information has been available since 1941. It is also stated that enemy A.A. dispositions have been moved and that it is possible that troops have moved also. A divisional and area headquarters are located in the area, but it is not clear where the remaining infantry in the division are stationed, or how long their mobile columns would take to arrive once tactical surprise has been lost.

From existing information it seems that the sea front between the Pier and the Casino (about 1700 yds). is covered by a number of emplaced machine guns, including two P.Bs. The entrance to the outer harbour is also covered by an enemy position just East of the channel mouth. There is a single belt of wire to seaward of the Promenade and some of the houses along the sea front are certain to be occupied by enemy infantry, probably equipped with anti-aircraft guns and flak. There are a number of rather narrow exits from the sea front. The sea wall seems from the photographs to be a fair tank obstacle, but breaches could be made by engineers landed with the 1st Flight.

CONCLUSIONS.

(1) The direct route into the town must be between the pier and

/the casino..

"RUTTER."

the casino. The houses and sea front will be held in some strength and must be dealt with by a heavy air bombardment immediately before the arrival of leading A.L.Cs.

(ii) The lack of detailed information of enemy infantry, billets and strong points, road blocks, etc., would complicate the plan of capturing the town by a frontal attack from the sea.

(iii) It will be impossible to avoid considerable casualties to the French population of the town in the event of the method of a landing covered by a heavy air bombardment being adopted.

ENEMY DISPOSITIONS ON NEARBY BEACHES.

3. (a) Beach No. 1 BENEVAL. 5 miles from the Port. This beach is covered by enemy A.A. and C.D. guns and has narrow exits, no doubt commanded by machine guns.
- (b) Beach No. 2 BELLEVILLE SUR MER. (3½ miles from the Port) A possible landing point for a small party as Beach No. 2 appears to be undefended, but the exit up the cliff-face by a footpath may not be easy, and both this beach and Beach No. 1 would be most difficult to locate in the dark.
- (c) Beach No. 3 FUIES. 1 mile from the Port. A possible landing for M.T. and perhaps a few light or cruiser tanks. The enemy are billeted in the vicinity and have a number of M.G. posts and one or two mobile batteries close by.
- (d) Beach No. 5 POURVILLE. 2½ miles from the Port. Near POURVILLE there is a break in the cliffs possible for active troops, Commando type - possibly rock climbers.
- (e) Beach No. 6 PETIT ALLY. 3½ miles from the Port.
- (f) Beach No. 7 VARENEVILLE. 4 miles from the Port.
- (g) Beach No. 8 VASERIVAL. 4½ miles from the Port.

Suitable for infantry only.

Exits from all beaches except No. 4 are narrow and twisting country lanes.

CONCLUSIONS.

(1) Parties landed at beaches as far away as BENEVAL and VASERIVAL would have some difficulty in reaching the outskirts of the town in time to influence the battle which would result from the frontal attack.

(ii) If infantry are landed at flanking beaches they might be best employed in pushing inland as far as main roads, e.g. Route Internationale, and blocking the approach of enemy mobile columns which are trying to reinforce the garrison.

"RUTTER."

(iii) Such infantry might also join up with troops in the open country along some of these main approaches and assist in demolitions which would impose delay.

4. ENEMY FORMATIONS WITHIN REACH OF THE FORT.

We must expect enemy mobile columns to arrive before long from outlying units of the division. These would probably include some light A.P.Vs. or armoured cars. If the force is to remain in occupation for 15 hours the arrival of enemy armoured troops is certain.

CONCLUSIONS.

(i) Some anti-tank guns should be included with the assault force if possible.

(ii) Although the use of tanks during the street fighting seems inadvisable the presence of some tanks to hold off enemy armoured troops later seems essential. These could be landed some time after the 1st Flight.

(iii) If tanks are considered essential to assist in mopping up the town, the danger to them would be decreased by the state of confusion existing after an air bombardment.

5. SURPRISE.

After Operation "BLAZING" we must expect all posts on the coast to be alert, particularly after dawn. Tactical surprise will be most difficult to achieve. The approach of aircraft may well be the signal for all beach defences to be warned.

There are one or two small inlets in the cliffs which appear to be undefended. All these would be difficult to locate, but, if found, a force of, say, a company, landed at each, might get ashore and inland without any opposition. This would be a chancy business, and some rock climbers must be included in any parties detailed for those beaches.

COPY

C.O.H.Q. Records Vol. 21 ("RUTTER" Vol I, A) p.16

1st June 1942

At the 166th meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee the following extract from a letter from the Permanent Under Secretary, The Foreign Office, was read: (for previous reference of para 23):

'B' Your minute of the 19th May to the Prime Minister urging on behalf of the Chiefs of Staff that the Cabinet ruling that targets in France may be Bombed 'when weather conditions are such that an accurate attack can be expected' might be relaxed so far as Combined Operations are concerned.

'A' The Secretary of State agrees with your proposals. At the same time he asks me to say that he is still against indiscriminate bombing at night except in connection with a coastal raid.

The Committee were informed that this letter had been submitted to the Prime Minister, and that he had minuted on it as follows:

General Ismay.

See that the above 'A' is observed except as provided at 'B'.

(Initialled) W.S.C.

30/v

24/DIEPPE/1/2

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH BRIGADIER A.H. HEAD
M.C., M.P., AT COMBINED OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS, 15 MAR 46.

Subject: The Origins and Consequences of the Dieppe
Operation, 19 Aug 42.

I met Brigadier Head in the office of Brigadier Thomas, Chief of Staff, C.O.H.Q., who was present during our conversation. Major-General Laycock (C.C.O.) came in with Brigadier Head but left before the conversation about Dieppe began.

2. Brigadier Head was Military Adviser, Combined Operations, at the time of the Dieppe operation, and was for a long time a member of the Joint Planning Staff. He is thus in an excellent position to make an appreciation of the place of this operation in the development of the Allied technique of combined operations and in Allied strategy generally.

3. I asked Brigadier Head whether he could throw any light upon the question of why and how the Dieppe project was revived after being abandoned with such an appearance of finality on 7 Jul 42. Brigadier Head replied (pointing out that he was speaking purely from memory) that his recollection was that after the cancellation of Operation "RUTTER", at a time when everybody concerned was feeling greatly disappointed, Capt. Hughes-Hallett, who had been involved in the planning from the very beginning, made to the then Chief of Combined Operations proposals for re-mounting the operation on a different basis, which would overcome the security objections to its revival based upon the fact that all the personnel of the force had been fully briefed as to its objective before it was cancelled. The security question was the crux of the matter, and it was finally decided that Hughes-Hallett's proposals offered a satisfactory solution to this difficulty and that his scheme should be accepted.

4. At this time the feeling of the need for some offensive operation was very widespread, and the British Prime Minister, among others, had been greatly disappointed by the cancellation of the Dieppe project. Brigadier Head also mentioned the fact that the cancellation had been a very great disappointment to all the Canadians involved.

5. I then questioned Brigadier Head concerning the place of the Dieppe operation in the development of the C.O.H.Q. programme generally - i.e., in the growth of a Combined Operations technique looking towards the ultimate large-scale invasion of the Continent. Brigadier Head made it clear in reply that he considered the operation important in this respect, as providing a practical test of the many items of Combined Operations equipment which had been developed with a view to large-scale operations. Such a test had not been afforded by the smaller raids previously mounted under the direction of C.O.H.Q.; and Brigadier Head mentioned that there had in fact been no large-scale amphibious operations since Gallipoli. A

practical test of equipment and technique under battle conditions was considered essential.

6. I questioned Brigadier Head particularly on the relationship of the Dieppe operation to the question of the importance (as it was conceived at the time) of getting possession of a major port at the very outset of a large invasion operation. (He had mentioned this question in his lecture on "Amphibious Operations" at the Royal United Service Institution on 13 Mar 46.) Brigadier Head replied that there was a close connection between the Dieppe operation and this problem, and he emphasized that it was definitely with this problem in view that the frontal assault was included in the Dieppe plan; for it was feared that if reliance was placed upon flank attacks for the capture of a port, the capture might in fact be so long delayed that the harbour would be demolished and unusable by the time it fell into our hands. The Dieppe operation clearly showed, however, that frontal attack was not the answer to this problem.

7. I asked Brigadier Head whether the failure of the Dieppe operation led to the immediate adoption of the beach maintenance idea as an alternative to the capture of a major port. He said it did not. The immediate result was to lead planners to try to work out means other than frontal attack for the immediate capture of a port; they still remained "port-conscious". Only after the landing in Sicily, carried out (as a result of insistence by General Montgomery) over the beaches in south-eastern Sicily without the preliminary capture of a port, did the idea of mounting a major assault operation on a beach maintenance basis really catch hold. For it, Brigadier Head said, General Montgomery deserved full credit.

8. In the course of the discussion, Brigadier Head mentioned one point as very important. It was bad practice, he said, to put troops who, like the Canadians, had had no battle experience, straight into an operation like that at Dieppe. The Canadians had done extremely well in the very difficult circumstances, but this sort of thing should not be done if it could possibly be avoided.

9. Brigadier Head said that the man best fitted to give information about the Dieppe operation was Capt. J. Hughes-Hallett, R.N., now in the East Indies but expected to return to the United Kingdom in June 1946. Capt. Hughes-Hallett was concerned with the operation from the very earliest days of planning, and was Naval Force Commander in the operation itself. Failing Capt. Hughes-Hallett, Capt. Luce, his Chief of Staff, would be perhaps equally well-informed and possibly more impartial. Brigadier Thomas promised to advise me of Capt. Luce's present whereabouts.

C.S.

(C.P. Stacey) Colonel
Director Historical Section