NOTE

This is a preliminary narrative and should not be regarded as authoritative. It has not been checked for accuracy in all aspects, and its interpretations are not necessarily those of the Historical Section as a whole.

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Directorate of History
National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Canada
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July 1986

SECRET

REPORT NO. 159 OCT 5 1946

HISTORICAL SECTION

CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

Operation "JUBILEE": The Raid on Dieppe
19 Aug 42.
Additional Information on Planning

1. This Report presents certain further information relating to the Dieppe operation of 19 Aug 42, and particularly to the early planning of that operation. It should be read in conjunction with Report No. 153, dated 22 Mar 46.

2. This Report is based in the main upon information obtained from Capt. J. Hughes-Hallett, C.B., D.S.O., R.N., who in addition to serving at Dieppe as Naval Force Commander played a most significant and distinguished part in the general development of the Allied technique in combined operations during the recent war. Capt. Hughes-Hallett served successively as Naval Adviser Combined Operations at Combined Operations Headquarters, as Commander of Force "J" and as senior naval planner at COSSAC (Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Commander). He was perhaps more consistently concerned with the planning of the Dieppe operation than any other individual, and was in a particularly favourable position to know the facts.

3. Attached as Appendix "A" is a memorandum of general information received verbally from Capt. Hughes-Hallett in connection with the operation and allied subjects. Attached as Appendix "B" is an extract of the minutes of the first meeting of Force Commanders for Operation "JUBILEE", held on 21 Jul 42. This was copied by the present writer from a copy of the minutes in Capt. Hughes-Hallett's possession. It serves to supplement the planning documents attached to Report No. 153 or summarized in Report No. 100. It should be noted that the meeting of 21 Jul 42 was actually the second meeting of Force Commanders, an earlier one having taken place on 16 Jul (Report No. 100, paras 113 and 130-33). The earlier meeting, having taken place before the revived operation received the approval of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, was presumably considered informal.

NEW LIGHT ON PLANNING

4. The most important new information received from Capt. Hughes-Hallett relates to the conference on the operation held by the British Prime Minister after his return from his visit to the United States in June 1942. It is highly probable that no written information will ever be available concerning this conference, but Capt. Hughes-Hallett's evidence (Appx "A", paras 9-11) is that of a person who was present. His statement provides the background for the observation made by Mr. Churchill in Parliament on 8 Sep 42:

> I personally regarded the Dieppe assault, to which I gave my sanction, as an indispensable preliminary to full-scale operations.
>
> (The Times, 9 Sep 42)

Capt. Hughes-Hallett was impressed by the vigour with which General Sir Alan Brooke (C.I.G.S.) argued at this conference that the operation was quite essential if the ultimate invasion of France was to be seriously considered.

5. It should be noted that Capt. Hughes-Hallett's personal evidence supports that of Brigadier Head (Report No. 153, Appx "B") with reference to Capt. Hughes-Hallett's own part in the revival of the operation. Capt. Hughes-Hallett made the essential suggestion (the method by which the operation could be re-mounted without danger to security), although it appears from his evidence that the suggestion was verbal and not put on paper.

6. It is of interest too that the evidence of Capt. Hughes-Hallett is in complete agreement with that of General Crerar on the question of the chief responsibility for the original military planning. Capt. Hughes-Hallett states specifically that the frontal attack on Dieppe was included at the instance of General Montgomery, then G.O.C.-in-C. South Eastern Command. General Crerar touched on this matter in a personal letter (GOC-in-C 6-9-S) to the present writer, dated 11 Jun 44, in which he referred to his remarks made while briefing officers of Headquarters First Canadian Army on 7 Jun 44 (see Report No. 128, Appx "B"(ii)). General Crerar proceeded:-

> You will note in my remarks that I refer to the tactical conceptions held "in highest command and staff circles in this country" at that time. While I think it highly undesirable to be more specific these days, when history is written, it should, I believe, be made clear that the basic tactical planning for the DIEPPE operation was undertaken by Montgomery (Army), Mountbatten (Navy) and Leigh-Mallory (Air). Roberts, then commanding 2 Canadian Division, worked out the detail plans for the employment of his forces but the basic plan for the Army was that of Montgomery.
>
> You will remember that the original operation was planned for June, that weather prevented it being carried out and that before it had been revived and finally executed on 19 Aug, Montgomery was appointed to command of Eighth Army. Even though there was no change in the Montgomery plan of June and that of the operation actually carried out - so far as I can remember - (except the elimination of the Parachute troops), it would have been quite wrong to have brought his name into the controversy which then arose, and, I consider, it would still be quite wrong to do so.
>
> I am not sure whether this point was touched on in your memo on DIEPPE but, in any event, I pass the above on for your consideration.
>
> (Original letter in possession of Colonel C.P. Stacey)

7. Certain other points of interest will be found in Appendix "A". It should be noted in particular that an explanation is provided (para 18) for the interval of half an hour separating the flank attacks from the main frontal attack. The reasons were exclusively naval. It is of interest also to note the decided effects of the operation on subsequent German air activity over the Channel (para 21).

MISCELLANEOUS POINTS

8. The following points are extracted from various documents shown to the writer by Capt. Hughes-Hallett.

(a) The Lessons of Dieppe

9. Capt. Hughes-Hallett showed the writer a copy of the observations made by him at Lord Louis Mountbatten's request, on the C.O.H.Q. draft relating to "Lessons Learned at Dieppe". His memorandum, which is undated, contains the remark, "I am strongly opposed to the employment of cruisers in Channel operations. One must use Hunt Class destroyers or Capital Ships. Nothing in between is safe." The writer asked Capt. Hughes-Hallett to amplify this. He explained in reply that a cruiser offers nearly as large a target as a battleship but cannot produce anything like the same bombardment effect and is much more vulnerable. A battleship is not only heavily protected but can carry a very large number of anti-aircraft guns, which can be augmented by additional Oerlikons, etc., on special occasions.

10. In the same document Capt. Hughes-Hallett takes exception to the statement in the C.O.H.Q. draft that "The enemy were overpowered in the air and were unable at any time to develop serious attacks either against the troops on land or the ships and craft at sea". Capt. Hughes-Hallett writes, "For one period of the operation the air attacks were exceedingly serious and certainly far exceeded in intensity anything I saw in the Norwegian Campaign."

11. Capt. Hughes-Hallett also showed the writer an undated draft report to the C.C.O. by the Force Commanders on lessons learned at Dieppe. This brief and pithy report was never actually forwarded, although Capt. Hughes-Hallett has forgotten why. The points made are not very different from those in the officially circulated "Lessons", but the following note with respect to covering fire is of interest:

> It is our opinion that a Capital Ship could have operated off DIEPPE during the first hours of daylight without undue risk, and could probably have turned the tide of battle ashore in our favour.

This paragraph was evidently contributed by Capt. Hughes-Hallett himself, as the "Conclusions and Recommendations" included in the lengthy Report of the Naval Force Commander which he showed the writer (these recommendations are not included in the printed version of his Report) contained the same passage.

12. These "Conclusions and Recommendations" also included the following sentence:

> Although from a purely military point of view the results achieved were disappointing, and the heavy casualties sustained regrettable, it is considered that the operation was well worth while provided its lessons are carefully applied when the time comes to re-enter France on a large scale.

The same document remarks, "there is no doubt that tactical surprise was achieved.

(b) The Landing on Blue Beach

13. With respect to operations on Blue Beach (see Report No. 101, Capt. Hughes-Hallett informed the writer than an enquiry, of which no report was ever forwarded officially, was held concerning the landing there. The writer saw a copy of this report, which was signed by the Commanding Officer of H.M.S. "Queen Emma" and addressed to the Naval Force Commander, Operation "JUBILEE". It is dated 22 Aug 42. It contains the evidence of a number of officers commanding landing craft, and there are several references to troops hanging back and being reluctant to land. Several officers testify to this reluctance; on the other hand one said, "Boats were cleared immediately", and four other officers whose testimony was taken together were content to say that the troops' behaviour was "good". One is left with the impression that there were definite instances of reluctance to land, but that this attitude appeared only in certain craft and was assuredly very far from universal.

14. The report on this "Informal Enquiry" incidentally throws light upon the times and manner of landing on Blue Beach. A report by Lieut. E.C.W. Cook, R.N.V.R., of H.M.S. "Queen Emma", remarks that the second group of craft did not land on Blue Beach until 0525 hours. The report proceeds, "In actual fact this delay was not detrimential (sic) to the taking of the beach because the first flight landed sixteen minutes late at 0506".

(C.P. Stacey) Colonel,
Director Historical Section

Appendix "A"

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEWS WITH
CAPT.J. HUGHES-HALLETT, C.B.,D.S.O.,R.N.,
AT PORTSMOUTH, 29 AND 30 SEP 46

SUBJECT: The Operation at Dieppe, 19 Aug 42, and Related Matters.

1. I visited Capt. Hughes-Hallett, who is now Commanding Officer of H.M.S. "Vernon", on H.M.S. "Ramillies" in Portsmouth Harbour, arriving at sunset 29 Sep 46. I dined with Capt. Hughes-Hallett on the ship, and both before and after dinner he talked at length about the Dieppe operation. I slept on board, and had some further conversation with Capt. Hughes-Hallett after breakfast. He had given me a number of documents relating to the operation which I had not before seen. After making some notes on these documents, I went ashore about 0930 hours 30 Sep and had a further half-hour's conversation with Capt. Hughes-Hallett in his office. During this final interview he answered certain questions which had been raised in my mind by my perusal of his papers.

2. Previous to the Dieppe operation, Capt. Hughes-Hallett held the appointment of Naval Adviser Combined Operations at Combined Operations Headquarters. He explained that in the early spring of 1942, at a time when Lord Louis Mountbatten was called simply "Adviser on Combined Operations" and had not yet been appointed Chief of Combined Operations, the highest Service authorities in Britain were called upon to give an opinion as to whether an operation could be mounted against France at an early date in the event of this rather desperate action becoming necessary in order to keep Russia in the war. All the other authorities, including (if my recollection of Capt. Hughes-Hallett's statement is correct) the C.-in-C. Home Forces, reported that this simply could not be done; but Lord Louis Mountbatten and his staff reported that it was possible, in their estimation, to mount an operation against the Cherbourg Peninsula. Capt. Hughes-Hallett remarked that he believed that it was after this incident that Lord Louis was given the acting rank of Vice-Admiral and appointed Chief of Combined Operations; the Government, and particularly the Prime Minister, were, it appears, delighted to find one Service authority that was prepared to recommend action.

3. Capt. Hughes-Hallett mentioned that whereas the C.O.H.Q. planners believed Lower Normandy to be the only practicable area for the assault, other authorities (including G.H.Q. Home Forces) persisted in thinking in terms of an attack on the Pas-de-Calais. Operation "SLEDGEHAMMER" on this basis was finally declared impracticable, and planning then concentrated upon the problem of the full-scale invasion of the Continent. "Combined Commanders" were designated, General Paget representing the Army; and a plan was produced on the basis of attacks against half-a-dozen secondary ports covering a great part of the French coast. The conception was to undertake exploitation from those ports where good initial success was obtained. Dieppe was <u>not</u> one of the ports designated for use in this plan.

4. This project raised in an acute form the problem of attack on Continental ports and of the technique best fitted for this purpose. In these circumstances, the project for a raid on Dieppe assumed special importance from the experimental point of view, the more so as Dieppe had not been nominated as an invasion port.

5. The possibility of a raid on Dieppe had been in the minds of C.O.H.Q. planners for some time, simply on the basis of Dieppe being an accessible and obvious objective for a raid. (Capt. Hughes-Hallett mentioned in this connection that the raid on St. Nazaire had been recommended before the special objective against which it was finally directed - the great drydock - had been called to his attention.) The Dieppe project was now taken up seriously.

6. Capt. Hughes-Hallett said that the Combined Commanders' plan had contemplated attacking the ports from the flanks, by "pincer" movements. That Dieppe was not attacked in this manner was due to General Montgomery, then G.O.C.-in-C. South-Eastern Command. General Montgomery thought that the procedure of envelopment from the flanks was too slow; there were too many possibilities of the troops landed miles away on either side being held up before they could reach the town. General Montgomery inquired of C.O.H.Q. whether a raid of 48 hours' duration was acceptable; the answer being in the negative, he recommended a frontal attack rather than a plan based on envelopment.

7. During the early training for the Dieppe operation Capt. Hughes-Hallett was not present, as he had accompanied Lord Louis Mountbatten to the U.S.A. One of the objects of this visit was to advise the United States Military authorities that an invasion of the Continent in 1942 was not practicable, and to obtain their concurrence in that view. Capt. Hughes-Hallett mentioned that General Marshall had been very much wedded to the 1942 invasion plan, and agreed to its abandonment with great reluctance.

8. The first postponement of the raid was the result of Naval shortcomings appearing during Exercise "YUKON" (11 and 12 Jun 42), and the decision to postpone it was taken by Lord Louis Mountbatten, who had not witnessed it owing to his absence in the United States, on his return.

9. At this time Mr. Churchill himself visited the United States to discuss future Allied strategy. During his visit Tobruk fell (21 Jun 42). On his return from America Mr. Churchill called a private conference at No. 10 Downing Street to ask for opinions on the proposed operation against Dieppe. Capt. Hughes-Hallett attended this conference, but does not recall the precise date of it. The other persons present, in addition to the Prime Minister himself, were General Brooke (C.I.G.S.), Lord Louis Mountbatten, General Ismay and Brigadier Hollis (while, moreover, Mrs. Churchill hovered in the background arranging flowers). General Montgomery was not present.

10. During the discussion Mr. Churchill betrayed some anxiety about the Dieppe project. He asked Lord Louis Mountbatten if he could "guarantee success". Lord Louis naturally replied that he could not. Mr. Churchill then said something to the

effect that he was afraid of "another Tobruk". Lord Louis Mountbatten asked "You mean you're afraid that the troops will run away?". It was then mentioned that Capt. Hughes-Hallett had lately been training with the Cameron Highlanders of Canada in the guise of a private soldier (he had spent some days with the unit as a member of Capt. J. Runcie's company). Hughes-Hallett was asked his opinion of the troops, and assured the Prime Minister that, so far as the men he had been with were concerned, they would "fight like hell".

11. The C.I.C.S. now interposed and expressed in very decided terms the view that the Dieppe operation was quite indispensable to the Allied offensive programme. He told the Prime Minister that if it was ever intended to invade France it was absolutely essential to launch a preliminary operation on a divisional scale. This strong opinion from the highest military authority in the United Kingdom presumably carried the day, and it was doubtless of this conference that Mr. Churchill was thinking when on 8 Sep 42 he told the House of Commons, that he had himself sanctioned the Dieppe raid as being "an indispensable preliminary to full-scale operations".

12. With reference to the revival of the operation after its cancellation on 7 Jul 42, Capt. Hughes-Hallett contributed the following facts. Immediately after the cancellation, a "post-mortem" conference was held at C.O.H.Q. to discuss the experience gained during the training. After this conference the Force Commanders, General Haydon, Capt. Hughes-Hallett himself and perhaps one or two other officers remained behind for a further discussion. It was pointed out that in view of the views held on the Cabinet level, as just explained, the Government would probably expect a divisional operation to be mounted that summer; and there appeared to be no other possibility so good as the Dieppe operation, for which a ready-made plan existed and a force had already been trained. The great objection to reviving the project was <u>security</u>, all personnel having been fully briefed before its cancellation. Capt. Hughes-Hallett made the suggestion that the operation could be re-mounted without preliminary concentration, and therefore without danger of the Germans discovering what was afoot, provided General Roberts, the Military Force Commander, was prepared to undertake the operation without further combined training. A couple of days later General Roberts telephoned Capt. Hughes-Hallett and said that he was quite prepared to undertake the operation on this basis and in fact gave the impression of being anxious to do so.

13. A meeting of the Force Commanders took place on 16 Jul 42, at which various tactical points were discussed. (On this meeting see Report No. 100, paras 113 and 130-133).

14. On 20 Jul 42 the project was discussed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee. Capt. Hughes-Hallett showed me a copy of the minutes of the meeting, which approve the revival of the operation by inference and refer to Capt. Hughes-Hallett as the new Naval Force Commander. These minutes refer to the operation simply as the next large-scale raid and not by its objective or any code name. On 21 Jul, presumably as a result of the Chiefs of Staff approval, the first formal meeting of the Force Commanders for Operation "JUBILEE" was held. Capt. Hughes-Hallett showed me the minutes of this meeting and I made extracts of them.

15. I asked Capt. Hughes-Hallett whether the question of relieving pressure on Russia appeared to have been an important consideration in connection with the revival of the operation. He said that he did not believe that it had played more than a decidedly secondary role in the decisions.

16. I asked Capt. Hughes-Hallett whether the possibility of employing a capital ship in support of the raid had been discussed or recommended during the planning. He replied that this question had been raised at a very early time, but that the highest naval authorities were so hostile to the idea of employing a capital ship in the Channel that there was simply no use making any more formal recommendation; the Admiralty would not hear of it. Subsequently, after his appointment as Naval Force Commander, Capt. Hughes-Hallett recommended, as a sort of substitute element of heavy support with a view to the possible need of silencing troublesome batteries, having a force of 12 Stirlings in the air and on call (somewhere about Beachy Head). Bomber Command, however, did not agree, arguing that the Stirlings would inevitably be shot down.

17. Capt. Hughes-Hallett mentioned that Air-Marshal Leigh-Mallory was himself quite sure that adequate fighter protection could have been arranged for these Stirlings. He mentioned in passing that Leigh-Mallory at more than one meeting questioned the practicability of the military plan. At one point General Crerar (Capt. Hughes-Hallett thinks it was) inquired whether Leigh-Mallory was speaking as an airman; to which Leigh-Mallory replied that he was speaking as a last-war Western Front subaltern. It was his belief that the troops would be pinned down in the very beginning and would never get going again.

18. Capt. Hughes-Hallet explained, in answer to a question, that simultaneous attacks all along the front at Dieppe were impracticable for naval reasons. If the main attack had gone in simultaneously with the flank attacks there would not have been sufficient sea room for the ships and craft (as it was, the density of the infantry landed at Dieppe was much greater than in any other operation before or afterwards). Moreover, the differences between ships' speeds constituted a serious obstacle. In order to put in the main attack at the same time as the flank attacks it would have been necessary to sail the L.S.Is. from Southampton half an hour earlier than was actually done; and in that event they would inevitably have been spotted by the Germans' routine evening air reconnaissance as they left the harbour.

19. Capt. Hughes-Hallett mentioned that a complication arising at a late stage of planning for the revived operation was the fact that a few weeks before the raid the Germans laid a minefield down the middle of the Channel. This meant a material change in the naval plan, involving the sweeping of channels. It also involved taking the big L.S.Is. out of Southampton and rehearsing them in passing through a dummy minefield. This was difficult and complicated, as it involved getting the ships out of Southampton and getting them back again, both during the short hours of a single summer night. This was successfully done, but not without arguments with the Southampton port authorities, who had never heard of such goings-on.

20. Capt. Hughes-Hallett mentioned that during the operation on 19 Aug 42 he advised General Roberts to withdraw somewhat earlier than was actually done. The General, however, was loath to abandon hope and reconcile himself to the failure of the operation.

21. Capt. Hughes-Hallett mentioned one result of the Dieppe operation which he considered worthy of notice in history. The German Air Force in the Channel area never recovered from the blow it received on 19 Aug 42. This was evidenced in the cessation of attacks on the coastal convoy between Portsmouth and Newhaven. Before the raid, this convoy had been subjected to regular attacks; Capt. Hughes-Hallett thought that there had never been an occasion when it was not attacked. After Dieppe, on the other hand, it was never interfered with from the air. The alteration in the situation was very striking.

22. Capt. Hughes-Hallett said that the most important naval lesson of Dieppe - that of the need for permanent naval assault forces - had in fact been learned before the raid had actually been delivered, and he had made a recommendation to this effect on paper before the raid.

23. The prototype naval assault force was Force "J", of which Capt. Hughes-Hallett was the first commander. Force "J" was simply the Dieppe force kept in existence and "J" stood for "JUBILEE". Other assault forces were later organized on the model of Force "J".

24. Capt. Hughes-Hallett fully agreed that Exercise "PIRATE" (October 1943), carried out by Force "J" with 3 Cdn Inf Div, was a most important landmark in the technique of combined operations. It was the prototype of the "OVERLORD" plan, not only with respect to the fire plan, but also with respect to the manner of marshalling the assault craft in successive waves. He remarked, incidentally, that experiments had been made with firing army field artillery while seaborne even before Dieppe. The gun used was an ordinary 25-pounder, not self-propelled.

25. Capt. Hughes-Hallett mentioned that during 1942 many large assault operations were proposed and some were actually mounted, although none except the Dieppe operation was actually put in. Among these operations were "BLAZING", an attack on Alderney; "CLAWHAMMER", a scheme for an attack on the Cherbourg Peninsula with Brigadier Laycock as Military Force Commander; and "IMPERATOR", a scheme for an armoured raid on Paris, involving the landing of tanks and armoured cars south of the Somme and a dash by the armoured car force to Paris, where they would shoot up the Hotel Crillon, rekindle the light on the unknown warrior's tomb and fall back to re-embark at Quiberville, where a subsidiary force of infantry would be landed at an appropriate time to cover their embarkation. Capt. Hughes-Hallett mentioned that General Paget, usually a very cautious officer, was surprisingly keen on "IMPERATOR".

26. Capt. Hughes-Hallett referred to the conference known as "RATTLE" (1943). He said that while this conference did not actually contribute much to the COSSAC plan for "OVERLORD" it did contribute to its acceptance. Capt. Hughes-Hallett said that during the conference it was suggested that the first wave of assault must be composed exclusively of infantry. A corps commander from Italy (Capt. Hughes-Hallett thinks, General Crocker) interposed and said that if this was done the infantry would be merely pinned down at once, as at Dieppe, Salerno, etc. He felt that the first wave of assault should consist of a limited infantry component with armour and engineer support. Capt. Hughes-Hallett immediately rose and said

that if this idea was adopted the assault would have to be done in daylight, owing to the complicated variety of craft involved.

27. Capt. Hughes-Hallett, although he was officially credited by Mr. Churchill with being the originator of the idea of the artificial port, said that he had no use for the "Mulberry" as actually constructed in Normandy. He felt that the concrete structures and the pierheads were quite unnecessary; his idea of the artificial port had been simply blockships to provide sheltered water.

28. Capt. Hughes-Hallett referred at some length to the famous alterations in the COSSAC plan originated by General Montgomery (and/or General Eisenhower). He said that these had been greatly exaggerated. It had always been intended to use five divisions in the earliest phase; the change consisted in shifting two of them from an immediate follow-up role to one of actual assault. On the matter of the extension of the front to include the base of the Cotentin Peninsula, Capt. Hughes-Hallett said that he had actually included this in an early draft of the COSSAC plan; but the Senior Military Planner at COSSAC (General West?) advised against it on the ground that it might militate against being able to ensure the capture of Caen on D Day. The early capture of Caen was considered of great importance by the Navy, quite apart from other considerations, as they wanted the canal system available as shelter for landing craft. In extending the front to include the base of the Cotentin, General Montgomery was merely returning to an earlier conception.

(C.P. Stacey) Colonel,
Director Historical Section.

1 Oct 46.

APPENDIX "B"

COPY

No. NF/J1

Combined Operations Headquarters,
1A Richmond Terrace,
Whitehall, S.W.1.

24th July, 1942.

OPERATION "JUBILEE".

MINUTES of 1st meeting of Combined Force Commanders at Combined Operations Headquarters on 21st July, 1942.

PRESENT:		Copy No.
Vice Admiral The Lord Louis Mountbatten (in the chair)	C.C.O.	1 - 3
Air Marshal T.L. Leigh-Mallory (Air Force Commander)	A.O.C. in C 11 Group	4
Major-General F.N. Roberts (Military Force Commander)	G.O.C.2 Cdn Div	5
Air Commodore Harcourt-Smith	11 Group	6
Captain Hughes-Hallett (Naval Force Commander)	N.A.C.O.	7
Lieut.Colonel P. Henderson	2 Cdn Div	8
Lieut.Colonel The Lord Lovat	Commando	9
Lieut.Colonel F.H. Durnford-Slater	Commando	10
Commander Luce	Naval Force Staff	11
Major Stockley, R.M.	" " "	12
Lieut.Commander Wedlake, R.N.V.R.	" " "	13
Lieut. Butler	" " "	14
Pay.Lieut. Spencer	Secretary	15-20

OPERATION ORDERS. Action.

C.C.O. opened the meeting and outlined the procedure to be adopted regarding the orders for Operation "JUBILEE". It was agreed that the Navy, Army and Air Force Commanders would prepare and sign a combined plan which C.C.O. would forward to the Chiefs of Staff Committee for approval. ....

2. The Military Force Commander stated that in this operation he would be acting under the direct orders of Lt.General H.G.D. Crerar, D.S.O. (1 Canadian Corps, Home Forces).

FORM OF ATTACK.

3. Alternative forms of the initial attack were then discussed and the following principal points were agreed:-

Action.

(i) A synchronised attack was not acceptable as the various speeds of ships would necessitate a daylight operation and it was essential that certain landings, particularly of the L.C.Ps. should be made in the dark.

(ii) If the initial attack were concentrated on the inner coastal batteries lying on the high ground east and west of JUBILEE, while the Commandos attacked the outer coastal batteries, the entire military plan of operation would have to be revised. A battalion would be required to effect this form of attack and the delay incurred by awaiting their success would prove a serious disadvantage to the main operation.

4. It was subsequently agreed to adhere to the original plan of attack and improve the steps taken to neutralise the fire of the inner coastal batteries. In this connection the Air Force Commander agreed to investigate the provision of the maximum number of bombers available for this task, and the Naval Force Commander agreed to prepare details for naval supporting fire. ....

5. C.C.O. suggested that Group Captain Willets and Lieut. Lord Antrim should consult the Air Force Commander regarding the use of smoke with special reference to this task and that smoke trials should be carried out as soon as possible. ....

6. It was considered preferable that JUBILEE town should be submitted to naval fire and not be bombed by the R.A.F. ....

AIR SUPPORT.

7. The Air Force Commander then added that air forces available would depend largely upon other requirements such as assisting the Commandos. Lieut. Colonel Lord Lovat (Commando - Orange Beach) considered that air support though not essential, would definitely be an advantage in the attack on his objective.

Action.

8. The Air Force Commander agreed to detail a Spitfire squadron to support the Commandos, and also provide bombers to bomb the outer coastal batteries which would be attacked by the Commandos, providing that the light made this a reasonable target. ....

DATE OF OPERATION.

9. C.C.O. stated that he was obtaining a meteoroligical (sic) report for the period chosen for the operation. It was agreed that the 18th, 19th and 20th August were the best days for a "two tide" operation. A "one tide" operation could be carried out on the 22nd and the 23rd of August, preferably the 23rd August. It was possible to carry out a "two tide" operation on the 21st August but this day was undesirable if enemy pressure was great.... ....

U.S. COMMANDOS.

17. C.C.O. stated that at least 50 U.S. Commandos should participate in operation "JUBILEE". Lieut. Colonel Durnford-Slater said he could very usefully employ about 20 of them. ....

SECURITY.

18. In discussing the question of security the Military Force Commander stressed the importance of the Tank Battalion being billeted at least ten days before embarkation at some location near the loading port to ensure adequate security. ....

19. U.S. officers acting as spectators were to assemble at Aldershot and join their respective ships at the last possible moment. Other spectators were to assemble at Bristol. C.C.O. agreed that Colonel Neville R.M. would inspect all spectators. ....

NEXT MEETING.

20. It was agreed that the 2nd meeting of Naval (sic) Force Commanders would be held at 1500 on Thursday 30th July at C.D.H.Q. (Montague House). ....

Dieppe file

CANCELLED

CONFIDENTIAL

24/DIEPPE/1/2

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: DHD 3-3
by _____ for DHist NDHQ
Date: SEP 18 1986

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH BRIGADIER A.E. HEAD, M.C., R.F., AT COMBINED OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS, 15 MAR 43.

Subject: The Origins and Consequences of the Dieppe Operation, 19 Aug 42.

I met Brigadier Head in the office of Brigadier Thomas, Chief of Staff, C.O.H.Q., who was present during our conversation. Major-General Laycock (C.C.O.) came in with Brigadier Head but left before the conversation about Dieppe began.

2. Brigadier Head was Military Adviser, Combined Operations, at the time of the Dieppe operation, and was for a long time a member of the Joint Planning Staff. He is thus in an excellent position to make an appreciation of the place of this operation in the development of the Allied technique of combined operations and in Allied strategy generally.

3. I asked Brigadier Head whether he could throw any light upon the question of why and how the Dieppe project was revived after being abandoned with such an appearance of finality on 7 Jul 42. Brigadier Head replied (pointing out that he was speaking purely from memory) that his recollection was that after the cancellation of Operation "RUTTER", at a time when everybody concerned was feeling greatly disappointed, Capt. Hughes-Hallett, who had been involved in the planning from the very beginning, made to the then Chief of Combined Operations proposals for re-mounting the operation on a different basis, which would overcome the security objections to its revival based upon the fact that all the personnel of the force had been fully briefed as to its objective before it was cancelled. The security question was the crux of the matter, and it was finally decided that Hughes-Hallett's proposals offered a satisfactory solution to this difficulty and that his scheme should be accepted.

4. At this time the feeling of the need for some offensive operation was very widespread, and the British Prime Minister, among others, had been greatly disappointed by the cancellation of the Dieppe project. Brigadier Head also mentioned the fact that the cancellation had been a very great disappointment to all the Canadians involved.

5. I then questioned Brigadier Head concerning the place of the Dieppe operation in the development of the C.O.H.Q. programme generally - i.e., in the growth of a Combined Operations technique looking towards the ultimate large-scale invasion of the Continent. Brigadier Head made it clear in reply that he considered the operation important in this respect, as providing a practical test of the many items of Combined Operations equipment which had been developed with a view to large-scale operations. Such a test had not been afforded by the smaller raids previously mounted under the direction of C.O.H.Q.; and Brigadier Head mentioned that there had in fact been no large-scale amphibious operations since Gallipoli. A

practical test of equipment and technique under battle conditions was considered essential.

6. I questioned Brigadier Head particularly on the relationship of the Dieppe operation to the question of the importance (as it was conceived at the time) of getting possession of a major port at the very outset of a large invasion operation. (He had mentioned this question in his lecture on "Amphibious Operations" at the Royal United Service Institution on 13 Mar 46.) Brigadier Head replied that there was a close connection between the Dieppe operation and this problem, and he emphasized that it was definitely with this problem in view that the frontal assault was included in the Dieppe plan; for it was feared that if reliance was placed upon flank attacks for the capture of a port, the capture might in fact be so long delayed that the harbour would be demolished and unusable by the time it fell into our hands. The Dieppe operation clearly showed, however, that frontal attack was not the answer to this problem.

7. I asked Brigadier Head whether the failure of the Dieppe operation led to the immediate adoption of the beach maintenance idea as an alternative to the capture of a major port. He said it did not. The immediate result was to lead planners to try to work out means other than frontal attack for the immediate capture of a port; they still remained "port-conscious". Only after the landing in Sicily, carried out (as a result of insistence by General Montgomery) over the beaches in south-eastern Sicily without the preliminary capture of a port, did the idea of mounting a major assault operation on a beach maintenance basis really catch hold. For it, Brigadier Head said, General Montgomery deserved full credit.

8. In the course of the discussion, Brigadier Head mentioned one point as very important. It was bad practice, he said, to put troops who, like the Canadians, had had no battle experience, straight into an operation like that at Dieppe. The Canadians had done extremely well in the very difficult circumstances, but this sort of thing should not be done if it could possibly be avoided.

9. Brigadier Head said that the man best fitted to give information about the Dieppe operation was Capt. J. Hughes-Hallett, R.N., now in the East Indies but expected to return to the United Kingdom in June 1946. Capt. Hughes-Hallett was concerned with the operation from the very earliest days of planning, and was Naval Force Commander in the operation itself. Failing Capt. Hughes-Hallett, Capt. Luce, his Chief of Staff, would be perhaps equally well-informed and possibly more impartial. Brigadier Thomas promised to advise me of Capt. Luce's present whereabouts.

(C.P. Stacey) Colonel
Director Historical Section

ACTION OF QUEEN'S OWN CAMERON HIGHLANDERS
OF CANADA (GREEN BEACH)

STATEMENT OF Company Sgt-Major G. GOUK, "B" Coy,
Camerons of C.

DIEPPE.

On the morning of 19 Aug 42 as we neared the coast of France we saw the finest fire works display, coloured lights, bursting shells, tracer bullets, well all it takes to make what we call a modern war.

About 1000 yards from shore, the Coy Commander gave the order to prepare to land. We scrambled up on deck of the "R" boats after being cramped up in the bottom for over nine hours, gee but it sure felt good to think that we would be able to stretch our legs again on land. Everyone feeling in the best of spirits and to make us feel still better our Coy piper starts playing "The Hundred Pipers" - well we all knew that tune as it is "B" Coy's march past. The "R" boat grounds on a gravel beach with shells bursting pretty close, everyone jumps off at the bow, led by our Coy Commander, rush forward a matter of 50 yards to an eight foot wall. It sure was a disappointment on getting there to find the ugliest looking barbed wire stretching right from the top of the wall a distance of 12 feet, well the boys didn't hesitate long, as some of us kept firing at the German pill boxes, where snipers and M.G's. were busy. Those with wire cutters got working and within 10 minutes had two pathways cut through the wire. Now was our chance to get going. Over the wall we went and rushed across the main road and took cover on the river bank. Casualties were small, up to now a few of the men had slight wounds but that did not keep them back. We worked our way under cover for about 500 yards. Then the Coy Commander thought it was about time we called a halt and got organized before going further. On checking up I found we had only 12 platoon with us and a platoon of "D" Coy. It seems the Battalion had got orders to proceed up the right bank of the river, but somehow or other we never received it. The Coy Commander had no way of communicating with anyone, so decided we would carry on and do as much damage as possible, so we swung left from the river towards a small village where we knew the enemy were, snipers and M.G's. seemed to be in every house so we got busy on them and were doing a fairly good job cleaning them out with rifles and grenades when all of a sudden they opened up on us with their mortars, it sure was hell. Our casualties sure started mounting then, every corner you turned you seemed to run into mortar fire and they sure could place their shots. Well there was no stopping the boys then, they were seeing their pals for the first time being killed and wounded at their side and the only thought that seemed to be in everyone's mind was to have revenge. It sure was great to see the boys with blood all over their faces and running from wounds in their arms and legs not worrying about getting first aid but carrying on in a systematic manner, clearing out the "Nazis" from the houses just the same way as they learned to do on the Isle of Wight. We were getting on fine with the job when about 1130 hours a runner got through to us from somewhere and told us to fall back to the beach as the A.L.C. boats were on their way to pick us up. On arriving at the beach the boys who were able to walk helping those who were seriously wounded. We found to get to the A.L.C. we had to cross the open beach, a matter of 700 yards. I knew it was going to be hell getting to the boats as we could see the bullets knocking up the sand and shells bursting right along the beach.

(continued overleaf)

Well nothing for it but make the attempt and off we go, but the "Nazis" gunners sure took a heavy toll, it was pretty hard to see the boys being knocked out after all they had done. Those left crawled and dragged a pal along with him until they got near a boat, then others who had been fighting on the right side of the river helped to get them on the boats. Our troubles weren't nearly over yet, for the Germans kept sniping at men on deck of the boats and sure got their mark time and time again. At last we were picked up by a destroyer which cruised back and forth under a smoke screen until 1600 hours, then set sail for the mainland arriving there about midnight.

(Sgd.) G.Gouk, C.S.M. "B" Coy
Q.O.C.H. of C.
C.A.(O)

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW WITH
CAPTAIN R.M. CAMPBELL, CAMERONS OF C.,
AT CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS,
LONDON, 19 Dec 42

Subject: The Operation at DIEPPE, 19 Aug 42.

1. At the time of this interview, Captain Campbell was on the eve of returning to duty after recovering from wounds received at DIEPPE. During the DIEPPE operation he was in command of "C" Company, Camerons of C.

2. Captain Campbell read the memoranda prepared concerning interviews with Major Law and Captain Runcie, although he was not shown the latter's comments on his own gallant conduct. His impressions are not the same as those of Major Law and Captain Runcie on all points. He differs with Major Law on the meal provided for the troops at NEWHAVEN, which he thought not bad, and he also states that, with respect to Major Law's comment on the shingle on the beach at POURVILLE, this shingle was not very different from that encountered in the exercises preceding the operation. He also has a higher opinion of the anti-tank rifle than Major Law. Captain Campbell's impression of the details of events on the beach after disembarkation are not in accordance with Captain Runcie's at all points.

3. Captain Campbell mentioned the remarkable sight presented by the POURVILLE area as the Camerons approached the shore. Much to their surprise, shells were bursting in the water just offshore, and it was apparent that the S. Sask. R. had not succeeded in opening up their bridgehead in the manner expected.

4. Captain Campbell remarked that it appears that those parts of the unit which landed west of the River SCIE got across the sea-wall with comparatively little trouble. At the point where the wall crossed the river it formed a sharp angle (visible on the 1:12,500 map) which had the effect of shielding men west of the river from fire from the high ground east of POURVILLE. Captain Campbell's belief is that most of "C" Company and part of "B" Company - probably Captain Thompson and two platoons - landed west of the river. Two boatloads of "C" Company men landed east of the river. These carried Company Headquarters (including Captain Campbell himself), one section, and a few other personnel. This is the explanation of how Captain Campbell became separated from his Company.

5. The group of men who crossed the river from the east and went into POURVILLE up the west bank of the SCIE with Captains Campbell and Runcie amounted to about thirty all ranks.

6. Captain Campbell described the situation in the vicinity of the bridge in POURVILLE as it existed during the morning. He agrees with Captain Runcie's impression that it was before the arrival of the Camerons that Lt.-Col. Merritt led successive parties of his own unit across this bridge under fire. Captain Campbell states that some of the commanding positions to the eastward, overlooking the bridge, were never cleared. He believes that the pill-box shown on the 1:12,500 Intelligence map at 200682 was never cleared. The pill-box at 198680 was cleared, but may later have been re-occupied by the enemy. The furthest east that Captain Campbell himself

penetrated was the group of houses at 197680. Enemy mortars on the ridge to the eastward, in the area somewhere about 203680, were never silenced. Captain Campbell remarked that the situation around POURVILLE was really one which required artillery to clear it up.

7. Captain Campbell described conditions during the re-embarkation. He himself had been hit in the face soon after landing. When re-embarkation began he helped carry a stretcher case down the beach to an L.C.A. This L.C.A. stuck on the beach, owing to tide conditions not being right for re-embarkation, and Captain Campbell helped to push it off. While thus engaged he was again hit in both legs. He managed to get aboard the L.C.A., but after leaving the beach it sank, possibly because it had not been possible to get the ramp up. Another officer inflated Captain Campbell's life-belt for him, and another L.C.A. took off some of the casualties but could not find room for Captain Campbell. He swam back to the other craft, which was still floating, and with other men sat on it until it turned over; they then sat on the bottom of it until they were taken off by an L.C.A. of another wave which subsequently arrived.

(C.P. Stacey) Major,
Historical Officer,
Canadian Military Headquarters.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEW WITH
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AT CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS,
LONDON, 19 Dec 42

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(C.P. Stacey) Major,
Historical Officer,
Canadian Military Headquarters.

~~D R A F T~~

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SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF INTERVIEWS WITH MAJOR C.E. PAGE, C.A.C.,
AND OTHER PERSONNEL REPATRIATED FROM GERMANY,
AT TAPLOW HOSPITAL, BUCKS, 29 Oct 43.

Subject:
The Operation at Dieppe, 19 Aug 42,
And Subsequent Treatment of Canadian Prisoners of War.

1. During the Dieppe operation, Major Page was in command of "B" Sqn, 14 Cdn Tk Bn. He was the senior officer of this unit to land in a tank, although it appears that the C.O., Lt.-Col. J.G. Andrews, may have reached the shore after his tank was "drowned".

2. Major Page's tank "Burns" landed from L.C.T. 4, he believes, "a few minutes late" but on the exact spot intended, directly in front of the Tobacco Factory, which was already ablaze at this time. His tank left the L.C.T. and moved across the beach, when Major Page found progress obstructed by a "tank trap" consisting of a trench dug along the front of the Esplanade Wall. Major Page states that there was no doubt that this was intended as a tank obstacle, and that the mechanical digger used for excavating it was still on the beach. The tank swung to the right to avoid the trench, and was almost immediately stopped by a shell hit ~~by a shell~~ which broke one track and destroyed all the tank's communications. As he had now no means of keeping in touch with the rest of his ~~Sqn~~ squadron, Major Page ordered his crew to evacuate the tank. They did so, and lined the Esplanade Wall with their automatic weapons.

3. At this time there were no ~~Infantry~~ infantrymen along the Esplanade Wall at the point where Major Page found himself and it was his impression that the main body of the Infantry had not yet landed. His party was subsequently joined by men of the Essex Scottish. Major Page's impression also was that his was the first tank to land; he looked up and down the beach through his periscopes after landing and saw no other tank.

4. The second tank on L.C.T.4 turned as it came off the craft, to avoid Major Page's tank, and got about ten yards past it, when it too was stopped by a hit on a track. The third

tank did not get as far as either of the other two before it was ~~also~~ stopped in the same manner.

5. ~~While~~ although Major Page confirms that some tanks were certainly knocked out on the central part of the beach, where the Esplanade Wall was high, while moving laterally and searching for a way across the Wall, he is quite certain that ~~about~~ from 12 to 15 tanks crossed the Wall in the end sectors where it was low. The majority of these tanks had returned to the beach by about 0900 hours. The reason for this return was the fact that the tanks could get some cover there from the guns sited in the East Cliff, while moreover they could get "better shooting from there". This ~~is the reason~~ accounts for the large concentration of tanks on the beach north-east of the Casino, an area which seemed especially favourable.

6. Major Page states that the tanks which crossed the Wall were from the troops commanded by Lieuts. Cornett, Patterson, Bennett, Breithaupt, and Dunlap, and Capt. Valentine.

7. Major Page does not know of any tanks having actually penetrated into the town, and does not believe that this took place.

8. With reference to the tank "Bert", which was stopped on the Esplanade, Major Page states that Lieut. Dunlap, to whose troop this tank belonged, brought his ~~other~~ remaining two tanks alongside it after it had been disabled, and successfully evacuated the crew, three men in one tank and two in the other.

9. Major Page states that 18 tanks had tracks broken by gun fire, and four had tracks broken by the shingle of the beach.

10. Not a single tank was pierced by enemy fire, and not a single man was wounded inside a tank. Lieut. Wallace's tank was struck on the turret by a shot which made the turret-wall bulge on the inside; it was believed that this might have been a shot from an 88-mm. gun. As a result of the performance of the Churchill tank at DIEPPE, Major Page states that every individual in the unit without exception was "absolutely sold on"

this tank. He particularly emphasized the fact that not a single tank was set on fire, and remarked that such information as ~~he~~ had reached ~~been able to gather~~ him about the Sherman suggested that that tank was not so satisfactory in this respect.

~~10.~~ 11. Major Page described how the withdrawal order "filtered through" among the men in the trench in front of the Esplanade Wall. He ordered the men with him to fall back, and was himself the last person to leave the trench. This was about 1200 hours. Near the water's edge he saw Lieut. Drysdale and his crew leaving their tank. Subsequently Lieut. Drysdale and his gunner re-entered the tank in order to silence a gun in a cave in the West Cliff which was proving troublesome. Several shots were put into the embrasure of this gun's position, and it was temporarily silenced. Subsequently it resumed firing and "plastered" Mr. Drysdale's tank heavily. Major Page, while not certain, thought that this gun might possibly have been of 75-mm. calibre.

~~11.~~ 12. Major Page's position on the beach at this time was somewhat to the east of L.C.T.3, which was aground. No boats came in to evacuate personnel from the ~~operation~~ portion of the beach where he found himself, though he saw four come in further to the west.

~~12.~~ 13. Major Page states that not all the tanks were destroyed by their crews, although some were certainly smashed up at the time of evacuation by the sticky bombs provided for the purpose. The destruction of tanks in some cases was hindered by the fact that large parties of Infantry were ~~sheltered~~ sheltering behind them.

~~13.~~ 14. After Major Page and the men with him had been captured, the R.A.F. laid "a lovely smoke screen" across the front of the town. This would have greatly facilitated evacuation had it been put down earlier.

~~14.~~ 15. Major Page says that the men of his unit actually "enjoyed" the operation, and were in good spirits after they were captured.

Their main complaint was that the circumstances of the operation had prevented ~~their~~ ~~photographs~~ ~~taking~~ free action by the tanks.

~~15.~~ 16 The Germans had many casualties at Dieppe. The hospitals in the area were full of German wounded. At Verneuil, one German said the total ~~was~~ casualties were about one thousand.

~~16.~~ 17. The prisoners were told by the Germans that they had "four battalions" of machine gunners in the town, and had been awaiting our attack for four days.

~~17.~~ 18. With reference to the treatment of prisoners in Germany, Major Page remarked that DIEPPE prisoners remaining there are still shackled, but the shackling is now largely "a farce", as the handcuffs are ordinarily worn only twice a day, on check parades. For a time in the beginning the prisoners were tied with ropes. Subsequently ordinary handcuffs were used, later still long chains with padlocks and finally handcuffs with long chains.

The prisoners pick the locks of these without difficulty.

~~18.~~ 19. Major Page was confined in Oflag VII B, at EICHSTATT, near MUNICH. There had been many escapes from this camp, but none of them had been permanently successful. The most notable case was the temporary escape of 67 officers (including about eight Canadians) through a tunnel on the King's Birthday this year.

Lt.-Col. C.C.I. Merritt, V.C., was one of this group. Major G. Rolfe, R.C.C.S., has made three escapes.

~~19.~~ 20 Although Major Page spoke of the DIEPPE prisoners being tied with ropes for a few days only, L.12192, Sgt. Jordan, D. H., S Sask R, whom I also interviewed, spoke of this phase as lasting several weeks, and remarked it was the worst period of their confinement. In general, he said, the treatment of prisoners was not brutal, and there was little if any "manhandling".

~~20.~~ 21. I also interviewed K.53670, Cpl. Carnie, T. L., 14 Cdn Tk Regt, who was in Lt.-Col. Andrews' tank "Regiment" at DIEPPE. Cpl. Carnie confirms that when this tank was "drowned" the entire crew succeeded in getting out of it in safety. He saw Lt.-Col. Andrews reaching the shore, the C.O. being about waist-deep in the water when he last saw him. The ~~Sgt.~~ Sergeant from the same tank told Cpl. Carnie that he later saw Lt.-Col. Andrews' body washing back and forth in the waves at the edge of the beach; the C.O. had apparently been hit, and may have fallen before he reached the shore.

~~21.~~ 22. Cpl. Carnie states that it was common talk in the

camp after the operation that some tanks had got into the town of DIEPPE. One was reported to have "cleaned out a pill box". Cpl. Carnie had heard that three tanks in all got in, but he had been sceptical of this report. Cpl. Carnie himself was wounded in the eye shortly after landing and is unable to offer any first-hand evidence.

~~(C.P. Stacey) Lt.-Col.,~~
~~Historical Officer,~~
~~Canadian Military Headquarters.~~

~~22.~~ 23. Major Page feels that the presence of the tanks on the beach, and their continued fire, prevented the enemy from rushing the beach ~~with the result of~~ and perhaps capturing many more of our troops than was finally the case.

~~23.~~ 24. Major Page read this memorandum in draft on 1 Nov 43, and confirmed its accuracy.

(C.P. Stacey) Lt.-Col.,
Historical Officer,
Canadian Military Headquarters.

2 Nov 43.

7 copies

MEMORANDUM OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

PROVIDED BY MAJOR C.E. PAGE, C.A.C.,

AT CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS, 6 NOVEMBER 43.

Subject : The Operation at DIEPPE, 19 Aug 42.

1. With respect to tanks landed from L.C.T.1, Major Page states that "COMPANY" crossed the Esplanade wall; "CALGARY" made "a couple of trips up and down the beach"; while "CHIEF" moved to a position near the Casino, and Major Glenn took over command of the portion of the unit ashore (Major Page's tank having been put out of action) and operated from his position there.

2. Of the tanks landed from L.C.T.4, "BACKER" was hit and lost a track just on the edge of the anti-tank ditch in front of the wall, in line with the Tobacco Factory. This tank then received another hit on the turret ring which put the turret out of action to the extent that it could engage targets from one position only. "BOLSTER" lost a track after going about 50 yards, but its guns were in action all morning.

3. Of the tanks landed from L.C.T.6, ("BOB", "BERT" and "BILL") all three crossed the sea wall close to the Casino. "BERT" was put out of action on the Promenade, but Lieut. Dunlop took "BOB" and "BILL" alongside of "BERT" and evacuated the crew, after which Lieut. Dunlop took up a position on the beach near the Casino.

4. On the basis of information gathered from officers at Oflag VII B, Major Page is sure that the following tanks crossed the Esplanade wall:

"BOB"	"BLUEBELL"
"BERT"	"BELLICOSE"
"BILL"	"COUGAR"
"BETTY"	"CAT"
"BLONDIE"	"CHEETA"
"BRENDA"	"CAUSTIC"
	"COMPANY"

In addition to these, "BEEFY" and "BLOODY" probably crossed the wall.

5. Lieut. Bennett, who, in Major Page's view, himself did an excellent job during the operation, wished to mention the fine work of two of his crew, Tprs. Cornelssen and Anderson. Tpr. Cornelssen was killed after the crew had been evacuated from Lieut. Bennett's tank, while assisting wounded men in the water. Tpr. Anderson distinguished himself in the same work, but was not killed.

6. Major Page states that Brigadier Southam was very active on the beach, exposing himself constantly in directing and encouraging the men. He was slightly wounded in the leg.

7. Major Page read this memorandum in draft and confirmed its accuracy.

6 Nov 43.

(C.P. Stacey) Lt.-Col.
Historical Officer.

BEACH COLLECTING POST SECTION.

On board L C T No. 14.
Officers. Major R.H. Stevenson.
Captain W.A.N. Inglis.
19 Other Ranks.

ACCOUNT BY CAPTAIN W.A.N. INGLIS.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Personnel carried on L C T No. 14 were personnel which were intended to form the Beach Collecting Post, 6 O Rs aboard other L C Ts, were to join the main body after the landing had been affected to bring the total complement of men of this Section up to 25.

Personnel left Dale Park House, at 1600 hrs 18 Aug 42 by Troop Carrier, boarded L C T No. 14 at NEWHAVEN at 1930 hrs - at 2135 hrs moved out in convoy to DIEPPE - by 0500 hrs 19 Aug 42 the land sighted and heavy firing could be seen and heard along the french coast.

Numerous "Spitfires" were overhead, occasionally a "Dog Fight" took place as the odd German Fighter broke through the fighter screen.

L C T No. 14 moved within two miles of the beach, but was constantly on the move awaiting orders to land, between 0900 and 1000 hrs air attack was made by twin engine bombers of the ships in our vicinity, results were unsuccessful and these machines were shortly shot down.

Occasional salvo fired, apparently from large Coastal Defence Battery fell within the vicinity, but caused no damage - smoke covered the beaches from time to time, and with the numerous gun flashes the location of this battery could not be determined.

Other than the occasional air attack there is little to report.

It should be mentioned however, that A A Fire from the neighbouring ships as well as our own was often directed against our own planes, the recognition of "Friendly" or "Enemy" air craft was not good.

Sometime after 1200 hrs L C T No. 14 moved out in convoy with the other L C Ts of the third (wave) an "R" boat which had been damaged at 0700 hrs on "RED" beach was taken in tow as far as NEWHAVEN, an Officer i/c this craft stated that his craft had been damaged by severe M G Fire, coming from the Mole, on the extreme left flank of "RED" beach.

No air attacks were made on the return convoy - the personnel of this Section suffered no casualties.

EQUIPMENT CARRIED BY BEACH PARTY - MAIN BODY L C T.No. 14.

18 Stretchers - 3 blankets per stretcher - 6 Thomas Splints - 6 McCusker Cramer Wire Splints - 2 Mortar Bomb Boxes containing (Foot Pieces.
1. 580 Morphine syrettes - 2. 8 Lbs Sulphanilamide -3.20 ozs Idione.
4. 4 rolls adesive 5. 8 rolls elasastoplast 6.48 loz tubes triple dye
7. 12 5oz tubes triple dye.8. Surgical Scissors. 9.Haemostats.
10. Gause & Roller Bandages 11. 300 Field Medical Cards, with envelopes.

Personnel carried 10 shell dressings and 6 triangular bandages.

N C Os carried surgical haversacks plus the same compliment of shell dressings.