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R E P O R T NO. 164

HISTORICAL SECTION

CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

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NOV 26 1986

The Problem of Selection and Reallocation of
Personnel in the Canadian Army Overseas
1939-1946

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The Problem of Selection and
Reallocation of Personnel in the
Canadian Army Overseas, 1939-1946.

1. This Report is an attempt to deal with certain aspects of the problem of making the best utilization of the manpower available to the Canadian Army Overseas. It does not pretend, however, to be a complete story of either the Personnel Selection or Medical aspects of the problem. Such an account cannot be complete, since the work of selection and allocation carried on in Canada, at the time when recruits were enlisted or engaging in basic training, covered a wider field than that carried on overseas. The principal sources of material have been Canadian Military Headquarters' files and certain war diaries and files in the possession of O.I.C. War Diaries, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q.

DISREGARD OF SELECTION PROCEDURE AT OUTSET

2. Following time-honoured practice, volunteers who had come forward for the Canadian Active Service Force had been enlisted into the unit of their choice, which usually had been the local N.P.A.M. unit which their friends were also joining. As a consequence, men enlisted, for example, into a local field battery when their general level of intelligence might not warrant their being able to absorb the necessary training. Others, who held trades' qualifications or possessed a mechanical aptitude, had joined the infantry, whereas their civilian training would have better fitted them for service with a Signals unit or Ordnance workshop. Moreover, provided a man was able to meet the existing medical and dental standards, he was enlisted with little respect to his mentality, which, in a considerable number of cases, was later shown to be too low for satisfactory service in any arm. There were also a number of cases of men having been commissioned whose standard of intelligence and/or education was such they they were completely unsuitable for service in their particular arm of the service. In the early days of the War such a condition also existed as regards a considerable number of artillery officers, and steps were taken in the winter of 1941 to re-assess the capabilities of such officers. (First Cdn Army file PA 6-8: Page to C.M.H.Q., 5 Jun 41, and Preliminary Narrative, History of the Canadian Military Forces Overseas, Chapter VIII, para 36). Gradually such unsuitable officers and men had been weeded out of field units and returned to the Holding Units for disposal. The result was, however, that a considerable amount of time and money had been wasted in an attempt to train these men. There also arose cases of commanding officers vehemently holding on to men who, although satisfactory, could be employed to better advantage elsewhere.

3. By the spring of 1941, the shortage of skilled tradesmen in proportion to the expanding needs of a mechanized army and the competition exerted by the Navy and Air Force to get recruits made it evident, however, that something more positive would have to be done so that the best possible use might be made of available military personnel. It seemed logical that all recruits entering the army should be directed into the channel best suited to their capabilities at the outset rather than having to be transferred later, after much time and money had been spent on training.

EARLY ATTEMPTS AT PERSONNEL SELECTION

4. In the period immediately preceding the outbreak of war in 1939 some thought had been given to the question of what would be the effect of the impact of modern war on the mental processes of the average Canadian donning a uniform. Prior to the outbreak of war, Lt-Col J.A. Linton of the D.G.M.S. staff at N.D.H.Q. headed a committee which intimated in its report that one "logical solution in the first place was in the education of medical officers. (First Cdn Army file PA 6-8: Linton to D.M.S., C.M.H.Q., 23 Jun 41). Then, in October, 1939, the President of the National Research Council (General McNaughton) arranged that a standing joint committee, taken in part from the staff of the D.G.M.S. and in part from the Canadian Psychological Association, should explore, with each of the three services, the possibilities of devising a system of intelligence tests to uncover otherwise latent abilities in recruits. (Ibid: Personnel Selection in the Canadian Army, June 30, 1941, Part B). Such action was taken, on a demonstration basis for the Army and Navy, and on a research basis for the R.C.A.F. Test materials were prepared and in March, 1940, demonstration testing of 700 troops was held in four Military Districts, and on a further 500 naval ratings and officer candidates. Independent statements from officers commanding the units concerned unanimously favoured the use of such tests, and the Joint Committee thereupon recommended, through the D.G.M.S., that a Directorate be established to handle such testing. Unfortunately, in June, 1940, the death of the Minister of National Defence, Hon. Norman Rogers, and the critical turn taken by the war, delayed matters at N.D.H.Q. and the Joint Committee ceased to function.

5. In August, 1940, Hon. J.L. Ralston, the new Minister of National Defence, reopened the matter through the Director of Organization, and suggested to the Canadian Psychological Association that a voluntary scheme be introduced, with the co-operation of N.D.H.Q. This was agreed to and a panel of civilian psychologists was formed for each military district. On 18 Jan 41 an order was issued to District Officers Commanding, covering the procedure to be followed. On this basis, during March 1941, personnel of the Canadian Armoured Corps and certain other units were tested and the results analysed. (Ibid).

6. Then, on 4 Apr 41, the acting President of the National Research Council gave a grant of \$2,000.00 to the Canadian Psychological Association to further its studies on intelligence and aptitude measurement in the Canadian Forces and to facilitate a canvass of similar procedures in the United Kingdom and United States. The Association's president, Professor E.A. Bott, Professor of Psychology at the University of Toronto, spent May and June overseas, while the Secretary of the Association went to Washington to consult with the Adjutant-General's Branch of the War Department. With him, Professor Bott brought some sample copies of the Revised Examination "M" Test which had

4 Group test which can be administered to 50 or more men at a time. It is composed of eight short sub-tests, all different, and each purporting to measure a somewhat different aspect of an individual's ability. Sub-tests 1, 2 and 3 are non-language picture tests containing no reading material, and can be understood by illiterates. Sub-tests 4 and 5 are designed to measure a man's knowledge of tools and simple mechanical processes that reflect mechanical aptitudes, since men who have an aptitude of this kind are usually also interested in and experienced in some mechanical matters. Tests 6, 7 and 8 measure an individual's ability in arithmetic, word vocabulary and relationship respectively - a considerable degree of literacy is required to do this well. (C.M.H.Q. file 6/Select Br/1/6: Ferguson to AG.2., C.M.H.Q., 18 Mar 43)

been compiled by the Canadian Psychological Association, based on the results obtained from the sample tests given in Canada during March, 1940.

7. In the United Kingdom study had been proceeding along similar lines. Since 1938 a Flying Personnel Research Committee, headed by Sir Edward Mellanby (President, Medical Research Council), had been investigating conditions in the R.A.F. Early in May, 1941, the War Office received a report from the Advisory Committee on Mental Testing which it had set up; the new Adjutant-General, Sir Ronald Adam, began to implement its recommendations with the establishment of a Selection of Personnel Directorate to conduct a compulsory programme of intelligence testing throughout the British Army. (Ibid: Personnel Selection in the Canadian Army, June 30, 1941, Part A). This Directorate was headed by a Regular Army Officer of wide experience, assisted by an expert with scientific experience in personnel work. A parallel development had been undertaken independently by the Admiralty as a result of the high wastage caused by inadequate initial selection. During March-May, 1941, a Committee surveyed the existing situation and practice in the Royal Navy, and recommended the recruitment of five experienced industrial psychologists and additions to recruiting staffs so that unsuitable personnel might be rejected at the outset.

8. Although still nominally at peace, the United States Army, which was being raised to a strength of over 1,500,000 men by the "Selective Training and Service Act" of 1940, was determined to make the best possible use of its draftees. Thus a vocational psychologist had been added to the Adjutant-General's Branch as Director of Personnel Research to supervise the task of giving intelligence and aptitude tests to all men inducted into the army.

9. The German Army had also called psychology to its aid and by early 1941 was reported to be using upwards of 200 trained men in the work of personnel selection.

THE BOTT REPORT

10. While in the United Kingdom, Professor Bott had ample opportunity to study the work being done within the three British Services and to discuss with Generals McNaughton and Montague what should be attempted in the case of men already serving overseas with the Canadian Army. On 29 May General McNaughton authorized him to visit various units and discuss personnel problems with a number of senior officers. During the following week Professor Bott took up the problem with Brigadier Page and the Group Commanders of Canadian Base Units, where most of the problem cases in the Canadian Corps had by then found their way. He also visited No.1 (O.C.T.U.) Wing, C.T.S., No.1 Canadian Neurological Hospital, No.15 Canadian General Hospital, No. 1 Canadian Base Depot, Canadian Detention Barracks and the Overseas Records Office, C.M.H.Q.; later he attended a meeting of representative medical officers from hospitals and field units. Between 30 May and 15 Jun he was also able to give sample "M" Tests to 50 O.C.T.U. cadets, 16 candidates for commissions in the R.C.E., 24 men at the Canadian Detention Barracks and 77 category men (including mental defectives and psychoneurotics) at the Canadian Base Depot. The majority of the officers consulted subsequently put their opinions and suggestions on paper for Professor Bott. These were attached as appendices to the report which he submitted to General McNaughton on 30 Jun.

11. In this Report Professor Bott summarized his findings under two headings: present problems in selection overseas, and steps which might be taken in Canada to contribute to their solution. (42/Bott/1: Personnel Selection in the Canadian Army, 30 Jun 41). The Overseas officers consulted had all agreed that, in the manning of technical branches, quality of manpower was more important than quantity and that more scientific methods were needed to allocate the available material so as to minimize wastage.

12. Selection overseas was then proceeding along two lines which, although seemingly diametrically opposite, were fully consistent. One programme was designed to eliminate unsuitable soldiers from field units and concentrate them in holding units for subsequent removal to an embarkation base depot, detention barracks, a civilian prison or a mental hospital. This admittedly promoted wastage. The other programme, dealing with serviceable troops, had as its object the better selection of officers, accurate trade testing of men to fit them in where their capabilities could be best utilized and the salvaging of as many as possible of the disciplinary or behaviour cases of misfit. Both programmes emphasized strongly the need for careful selection, which, if not done before, must be done overseas. Canada was the obvious place to handle selection problems; since, in addition to the saving effected in shipping space, there would be less wasted training and a higher standard of morale and efficiency would be maintained.

13. The Canadian Army Overseas was already trying to deal with selection problems along the following lines. From February, 1940, to 10 Mar, 1941, a total of 2,135 all ranks had been medically boarded as category E for return to Canada: of these, 453, or 21 per cent, were classified as mental cases, chiefly suffering from "anxiety neuroses", chronic alcoholism or mental deficiency. A weekly out-patient clinic had been established at No. 1 Canadian Neurological Hospital to handle mental or behaviour cases referred there by the Holding Units. It appeared that in only 20 per cent of the cases was the trouble organic in basis, and follow-up study on 63 psychoneurotic patients who had been back with their units for periods up to three months indicated that "salvage" was possible in upwards of half the cases. Medical officers with special training were being selected and stationed at certain Base Units to handle such cases as they cropped up. A Committee on Functional Nervous Diseases had been set up to study mental diseases in the Canadian Army Overseas and liaison had been established with the R.A.M.C. officers engaged in the same sort of work under the direction of the Consultant in Psychological Medicine at the War Office.

14. At the other end of the scale, an Officers' Selection Board consisting of five members had been first organized in December, 1940, to ensure that the selection of C.O.A.U. cadets was standardized; this board, however, considered only general suitability and not allocation (see Report No. 156). The procedure for trade testing other ranks included a review of a soldier's occupational history as well as a test of his present trade skill, but no attempt was made to measure general intelligence (capacity to learn) or aptitude for particular specialties. A constructive policy had been adopted towards behaviour cases at the Canadian Detention Barracks, Witley, and out of 200 cases discharged up to the end of May, 1941, there had been only two repeaters.

15. On 3 Jul Professor Bott outlined his findings during the course of a conference at C.M.H.Q., attended by Generals McNaughton and Montague, Brigadiers Murchie, Phelan and Luton. It was agreed that immediate steps should be taken to draw up proposals

for the organization of a personnel selection branch, outlining its aims, objects and scope; the matter could then be referred to Ottawa. Personnel selection in the initial stages would have to be centred at the base units; it could then progress to field units in the cases of men who were found to be square pegs in round holes. It was further agreed that "selection should, in the first instance, be made when personnel are recruited, then previous to embarkation, at Holding Units, and, if necessary, in the field, so that selection would constantly be applied in various stages. (42/Bott/1, Memo by Major Dunn, 10 Jul 41).

FORMATION OF A PERSONNEL SELECTION SECTION

16. Following further discussions, on 22 Jul Generals McNaughton and Montague informed Ottawa of their desire to set up a Personnel Selection Section at C.M.H.Q. (6/Select Br/1: rel A 1376, Cannilitary to Defensor, 22 Jul 41). Such a Section would work in close liaison with similar sections at the Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry. Captains C.A.F. Clark and I.J. Stone were attached from infantry holding units to work with Major M.S. Dunn (A.G.2) at C.M.H.Q. on the primary organization work for such a section. A study was made of the personnel selection methods being employed in the British Services and United States Army and a suggested establishment and programme drawn up. In their trial selection work with tradesmen they were assisted by two medical officers: in this connection it was hoped "from a medical point of view to prevent neurosis, which often occurs in personnel who are employed on work for which they are not fitted." (Ibid: Luton to D.G.M.S., 24 Jul 41).

17. On 25 Jul a reply was received from Ottawa to the telegram dispatched by Generals McNaughton and Montague. A Personnel Selection Section had not yet been set up at N.D.H.Q. but the "intelligence test revised examination 'M' was being employed on a voluntary basis under the direction of the A.G. Branch (Ibid: tel 1407, Defensor to Cannilitary, 25 Jul 41). This test had been administered to about 9,000 all ranks and the results indicated good discriminative value of test for different ranks and for successful army tradesmen in mechanical trades." The scheme had been approved by the Minister of National Defence on a voluntary basis but had not yet been utilized as a selective instrument for soldiers at the time of enlistment. Mr. Ralston had further approved of the adoption of the U.S. Army Mechanical Aptitude Test, which was to be administered by the Directorate of Military Training for trades training. The Canadian Psychological Association felt, however, that a proper organization, including a full-time qualified staff, should be set up. Such a Directorate should be under the Adjutant-General's Branch so as to facilitate the allocation or transfer of men. The Director should be an officer of recognized military standing and, if possible, he should have had experience in industrial or clinical personnel work; a physician trained in psychological medicine would be preferable. (First Cdn Army file PA 6-8: Personnel Selection in the Canadian Army, Jun 30, 1941, Part B)

18. A report on the progress made overseas in studying personnel selection procedure and problems was taken back to Canada at the end of July by Brigadier Stuart. On 6 Aug, Brigadier A.E. Nash (D.A.G., N.D.H.Q.) sent a personal telegram to Maj-Gen. E.W. Browne, the Adjutant-General, who had arrived in the United Kingdom to consult with General McNaughton and C.M.H.Q. on general matters of policy, to the effect that a C.G.S. meeting was considering the establishment at N.D.H.Q. of a Personnel Selection Section to:

... classify after enlistment all recruits and personnel including officers in all formations and to embrace intelligence tests questionnaires and aptitude tests generally following War Office organization... Stuart and I have discussed matter with Minister who agrees in principle and hopes you will concur as he considers that in interests of service proposals should be implemented without delay.

(Ibid: Tel AG 1506, Defensor to Canmilitary, for Browne from Nash, 6 Aug 41)

In view of the amount of work involved it was considered in Ottawa that a separate directorate should be set up under Colonel G.B. Chisholm, M.C. A medical psychiatrist in civil life, Colonel Chisholm had served as an N.A.P.M. Brigade Commander, and during the early months of the war had commanded the northern area of M.D.No.2 (North Bay, Ontario) before being posted to N.D.H.Q. as a G.S.C.I. (Trg). A civilian advisory Committee was being organized and co-operation was assured by the National Research Council and the Canadian Psychological Association.

19. General Browne immediately dispatched a telegram containing his concurrence and advising that he had had a short discussion with General Sir Ronald Adam at the War Office, and had also discussed the matter with General Montague. He was going to examine the question more fully with General Montague and with General McNaughton before returning to Canada. Upon his return, General Browne took with him samples of a proposed form for "Soldier's Qualification Card and Questionnaire" which had been drawn up by Captains C.A.F. Clark and I.J. Stone after their study of British and American methods. (Ibid: Tel A 1818, Canmilitary to Defensor, 1 Oct 41, and Memorandum on Personnel Selection Branch, C.A.C. - Organization of, by Clark, Stone and Dunn, 15 Aug 41)

20. A N.D.H.Q. telegram of 20 Sep advised that a Directorate of Personnel Section was being organized in Ottawa, and that selection procedure would be undertaken, in the beginning only at District Depots, Basic and Officers' Training Centres. (42/Bott/1: Tel AG 1907, Defensor to Canmilitary, 20 Sep 41). Colonel G.B. Chisholm was appointed Director. Already some of the designated personnel for this directorate were obtaining military qualifications at the O.T.C., Brockville, and additional men, selected from among those professionally qualified, would be treated in the same way. In addition to the staff of army examiners in the Directorate, a psychiatrist was attached from the R.C.A.M.C. to serve in an advisory capacity. As more Assistant Army Examiners were qualified, the process of selection would be extended to include the formations and units serving in Canada. Selection procedures were to include the use of a general classification test (Revised Examination "M") in both English and French, non-language tests adopted from the United States Army, and certain mechanical aptitude tests. These tests were to be given to groups of up to 50 men, following which individual personal interviews would be undertaken by an Assistant Army Examiner. A record card had been developed and would accompany the soldier's documents for the information of future commanding officers. In addition, a punched card would be kept at N.D.H.Q. for all men of the following classifications:

- (a) Potential Officers;
- (b) Men of high intelligence;
- (c) Men selected for Trades Training;

- (d) Men showing neurotic reactions in the classification test and on personal interview, for many of whom psychiatric consultation will have been arranged;
- (e) Men whose low level of intelligence will not permit their being given complete training to overseas standards...

(6/Select Br/1: Memo by Colonel Chisholm on Directorate of Personnel Selection, u.d.)

21. The duties of Assistant Army Examiners, under the direction of the Army Examiners, were laid down as advising Commandants and commanding officers as to the suitable training and employment for each officer and man coming into the Canadian Army. Generally speaking, sergeant examiners were to be selected from men with army experience who were too old or of too low a category for overseas service.

PROGRESS OVERSEAS DURING 1942

22. The task of organizing Personnel Selection work overseas continued under the direction of Captains Clark and Stone during the early autumn of 1941. Using the M test, five other ranks were selected from 55 candidates for temporary employment in the giving of the test to C.C.T.U. candidates. (Ibid: Report of Personnel Selection Work Overseas, 20 Sep 41). When queried for more details as to whether the British or American systems of selection should be employed, a Defensor telegram of 3 Oct suggested that the "whole procedure be kept on clinical basis with psychological testing, interviewing and suggestions concerning allocation carried out under direct supervision of adequately trained personnel. (Ibid: Tel AG 33, Defensor to Canmilitary, 3 Oct 41). Upon the arrival of Major J.W. Howard from N.D.H.Q. to take charge of Personnel Selection work overseas, it was proposed to endeavour to collect as much data as possible about all ranks overseas below the rank of captain. Both interviews and the completion of an "M" Test would be required to supply this information. (Ibid: Howard to D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., 8 Nov 41)

23. In order to complete this extensive programme by the end of March, 1942, it was thought necessary to obtain between 75 and 100 testing teams, each comprising an officer and two or three N.C.Os. On 11 Nov 41 Brigadier Beament (D.A.G., C.M.H.Q.) therefore requested Canadian Base Units to furnish the necessary personnel. (Ibid: Beament to H.Q., C.B.U., 11 Nov 41). On 1 Dec a first group of potential selection officers reported to No.1 Canadian Transit Depot for a week's instruction by Major Howard in personnel selection work. A week later these officers began selection work at the various Holding Units, and on the following Monday a further group of officers commenced a training course at No.1 Canadian Transit Depot. Another week's course started on 5 Jan 42. A total of 75 officers from within Canadian Base Units were trained during this period, and after working in groups of three for one to two weeks they were dispersed as teams of one officer and two other ranks.

24. As well as carrying on testing and interviewing at the several reinforcement units, 18 teams commenced sifting the 5th Canadian (Armoured) Division. Once teams became experienced it was found that each could test and interview about 20 soldiers in a day. The Revised Examination "M" was the principal test used, with the same standard of grading as in Canada. The "A"

Test of mental alertness was also used for O.C.T.U. candidates. For some low scoring ("M" Test) literate personnel, the United States classification R-I test was also used and in a few special cases the British Stanford-Binet (1936) test was employed. (6/Select Br/1/2: Senior Officer to Secretary, D.N.D., 12 Mar 42). A qualification card had been prepared to record all pertinent information; in an effort to discover any behaviour of an unstable and erratic sort, it included questions concerning more personal aspects of a man's life. The important items on this card were to be reduced to a code and placed on Hollerith punched cards; the use of the Hollerith system would reduce hand sorting to a minimum during the search for individuals possessing certain required qualifications. (6/Select Br/1: Memo by Senior Officer, 11 Jan 42). Up to 11 Jan 42 some 2,500 Soldier's Qualification Cards had been received and sorted by hand with a view to discovering potential tradesmen and completely trained tradesmen who were not employed as such. The Qualification Card in use overseas differed somewhat from that adopted in Canada and it was considered that reinforcements should fill out the overseas card for ease in subsequent administration (see para 73)

25. Towards the end of January, 1942, following the completion of the testing and interviewing of personnel presently in the Reinforcement Units, interviewing teams were sent on to the units in the C.C.M.A. area, and then the 1st Canadian A.A. Brigade. On 5 Feb teams were sent to Scotland to examine the personnel of the Canadian Forestry Corps. (Ibid: Beament to H.Q. C.F.C., 2 Feb 42). On 19 Feb, 12 teams reported to units of the 3rd Canadian Division. By the middle of March 85 such teams were still working, chiefly with field units, but progress had not been quite so rapid as had been hoped. At this time testing and interviewing within the 5th Canadian Armoured Division was nearing completion: about one third of the 3rd Canadian Division was done, but interviewing was only just getting under way in the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions. (Ibid: Wedd to D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., 13 Mar 42). Due to the improved weather conditions and the increased training programme, testing and interviewing within field units slowed down materially.

26. The Canadian Army Overseas was also able to obtain for a short period the services of Dr. W.E. Blatz for the purpose of lecturing to officers on factors affecting the maintenance and improvement of morale. Dr. Blatz, also a member of the staff of the Department of Psychology at the University of Toronto, was spending some time in England at the request of the Ministry of Health to investigate and deal with certain psychological problems which had arisen among evacuated children. He was prevailed upon to deliver a number of lectures to the officers of both Canadian Corps and Canadian Base Units during January-February 1942. While the task of the Personnel Selection Officers* was to uncover misfits, Dr. Blatz's lectures were designed to give the average junior officer an understanding of how to deal with the normal problems confronting his men, even when they were considered as normal soldiers. (Ibid: Wedd to H.Q. C.R.U., 23 Jan 42, and Leach to Senior Officer, 2 Feb 42). Subsequently (1 May 42), the substance of Dr. Blatz's lectures was issued by C.M.H.Q. as a pamphlet on Morale, with a foreword by General Montague.

* Commonly referred to as S.P.Os; similar in qualification to the officers who were known in Canada as Army Examiners and Assistant Army Examiners.

27. By 19 May the process of selection had progressed sufficiently for instructions to be issued that subaltern officers and all other ranks of convoy N.A.8 were to be tested and interviewed by personnel selection teams immediately on their arrival at reinforcement units. No individual on this draft was to be posted away from a reinforcement unit until this had been done. (6/Select Br/1/4: Teletype AT 863, C.M.H.Q. to C.R.U., 19 May 42). Provision had been made by now for the compulsory transfer of tradesmen or potential tradesmen to the arm of the service for which they were needed (Preliminary Narrative, History of the Canadian Military Forces Overseas, Chapter XI, para 115), and it became the task of the Personnel Selection Section to gather relevant information and decide as to whether such forced transfers were necessary. (6/Select Br/1/4: Senior Officer to Under-Secretary of State for War (M.T.5) 13 May 42)

28. Mistakes were made on occasion, however, and both regimental officers and medical officers were inclined to disagree as to the reallocation of certain low-grade men. One unit commanding officer had urged that "men from the 'fringes of civilization' with little schooling and not much prospect of being N.C.Os. are, nevertheless, desirable soldiers because of their rugged characters and expertness in such subjects as fieldcraft." (Ibid: Clark to AG.4., C.M.H.Q., 15 May 42). Therefore, S.P.Os. were instructed to maintain an even closer liaison with regimental and medical officers. As a complementary measure, on 19 Jun 42, Lt-Col. R.M. Crowe, G.S.O.1. at Headquarters C.R.U., issued a circular letter to reinforcement units stressing the importance of maintaining liaison between the Chief Instructor and the S.P.O. at reinforcement units. The S.P.O. was able to supply information concerning the mental level, training, experience and suggested employment of individuals; while the Chief Instructor was directed to record his opinion of each man on the qualification card and review all the entries since:

The information obtainable from these cards has been extremely helpful in many cases in choosing personnel for courses, special training or special employment. By use of the cards, it is believed that much time will be saved hereafter by being able to select men for employment and courses without parading them.

(6/Select Br/1/5: Circular by Lt.-Col. Crowe on Personnel Selection - Liaison with Chief Instructors, 19 Jun 42).

29. During June, 1942, Brigadier Chisholm, now a D.A.G. at N.D.H.Q., was on visit to the United Kingdom. At this time he stated that reallocation should take place immediately after testing and interview; other factors entered into the matter so largely that a subsequent reallocation based on an original interview was unlikely to be satisfactory. (6/Select Br/1/6: Memo by Col. Brown, 18 Jun 42). The follow-up interest in Canada was being confined entirely to sub-normal and abnormal men. Brigadier Chisholm also expressed doubt in the value of the Hollerith cards in the matter of selection (see para 24), except in respect to supplying factual information. (Ibid)

30. By late summer the majority of the troops of First Canadian Army had been interviewed and tested by personnel selection teams. In the case of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division which had just arrived in the United Kingdom, a number of men had been tested in Canada; in order to complete records for all personnel, and to answer certain questions not asked in Canada, authority was given, however, on 29 Oct for 15 teams of

officers and other ranks to carry out the necessary work under the direction of the divisional personnel selection officer. (6/Select Br/1/7: Circular letter by Lt.-Col. Hjalmarson on Completion of Examination by Personnel Selection Staff, 29 Oct 42)

31. In the case of enlistments in the United Kingdom of men of Canadian origin, it was the practice to give such men the Revised Examination "M" and a personal interview, upon which decision rested whether or not they should proceed for medical examination and acceptance into the Canadian Army. (Ibid: Clark to Personnel Selection Officers, 27 Nov 42))

INTRODUCTION OF PULHEMS GRADING

32. The existing standards for medical categorization had been based primarily upon the requirements of a foot soldier, with emphasis on the ability to march, and the special senses were grouped together in a manner which did not allow of finer differentiations of degree of disability or defective function. What was required instead was some system of classification whereby allowance would be made for minor variations from normal and the recruit guided into some useful employment in a mechanized army. (Although flat feet would debar a man from service with an infantry unit there was no reason why he might not be employed to advantage driving a vehicle or serving as a skilled tradesman.) Therefore, during the late spring of 1943, a categorization known as PULHEMS Grading was introduced in Canada by the R.C.A.M.C. in order to provide "a detailed description of each soldier, by function, with a view to his use to the fullest extent of (but not beyond) his abilities by the Canadian Army (C.A.R.O. No. 3666, 29 Sep 43). The principles and meaning of PULHEMS gradings were:

- P - Physique
- U - Upper limbs
- L - Locomotion
- H - Hearing
- E - Eyesight
- M - Mental ability
- S - Stability

The grade for each function, ranging from "1" to "5", was recommended by the appropriate member of the medical board; a "5" in any function was total incapacity for service but men could be acceptable for combatant or L. of C. duties if they had as low as "2" (and later "3") in one or more of certain of the functions. (Ibid)

33. During the course of his visit to the United Kingdom in April, 1943, Brigadier G.B. Chisholm (later D.G.M.S. at N.D.H.Q.) discussed the introduction of PULHEMS grading in the Canadian Army Overseas. On 13 Apr he suggested to General McNaughton that in connection with such a step the work of psychiatrists, psychologists and medical officers should be brought into closer liaison. In Canada the personnel selection staffs came under the D.G.M.S., although not a part of the R.C.A.M.C. (see para 66). Such an organization would not be possible overseas, due to the administrative tie-up with "A" Branch, but General McNaughton gave his full support to the introduction of PULHEMS grading. With the introduction of this method of medical grading, it would be the task of S.P.Os. to determine where men with lower than a continuous "1" profile would fit in. (52/Conference/2: Memo of Conference held at H.Q. First Canadian Army, at 1630 hrs, 13 Apr 43, to discuss the proposed new system of physical grading, 17 Apr 43).

34. On 20 Apr, Brigadier Chisholm attended a further conference at C.M.H.Q., to which representatives of all arms of the service had been invited, in order to decide what PULHEMS grading would be the minimum for each trade and type of employment with the field force. (52/Conference/3: Minutes of a conference held at C.M.H.Q., 1000 hrs, 20 Apr 43, on Functional Medical Grading, 21 Apr 43). Brigadier Beament, D.A.G., pointed out that although a commanding officer would want every man in his unit to be completely fit in every way, such would be impossible due to the manpower shortage:

We are so short of manpower that we have to employ every man - what we are striving for is not perfection which is not obtainable, but a profile which will allow us to employ as many men as possible.

(Ibid)

35. It had been originally hoped that all men in First Canadian Army could be reboarded under the PULHEMS system, at the rate of 10 per cent per month, but the dispatch of the 1st Canadian Corps to the Mediterranean and the participation in "pre-invasion" exercises by other formations of First Canadian Army made this impossible. The new method of medical classification was accepted overseas, however, and, with effect 1 Dec 43, all new medical boards were carried out using the PULHEMS system of gradings.

36. On 28 Oct 43 General Letson (Adjutant-General) told an A Branch conference at C.M.H.Q. that Canadian manpower was not unlimited and that industry and agriculture, as well as the three services, were increasing their demands upon it. He stressed the desirability of fitting all men overseas into jobs, for "if a man is not suitable here to do a useful job, it is likely he will have to be discharged on return to Canada." (52/Conference/2: Minutes of 16th AG Branch Conference held 1430 hrs, 28 Oct 43). With 100,000 men sent overseas in the past 12 months the question presented itself as to whether it would be possible to get from Canada a better replacement than the man who was being sent back from England. Five reclassification boards had been set up in Canada to assess the value of every army officer, and those who could not be fitted into the H.W.E. or put into the reinforcement stream were being retired.

37. Subsequently, plans were made to reboard and re-classify 10,000 men in the reinforcement and static units under the command of C.M.H.Q. and have all "fit men" earmarked as reinforcements prior to 31 Mar 44. During the first four months these boards were in session, 4483 men were examined; 2421 were returned to Canada; 843 returned to static units and 1219 posted to field or L. of C. units. By the end of March 8017 men had been examined and the medical boards were disbanded; the remaining work was carried on by No.1 Canadian Reallocation Centre (see paras 56-61)

38. On 27 Apr 44 Brigadier J.A. de Lalanne, on visit from N.D.H.Q. where he was D.A.G.(A), again stressed the manpower shortage during the course of an "A" Branch conference at C.M.H.Q. and pointed to the difficulty of finding recruits who could meet the medical standards. Only about 55 per cent of the 6000 monthly intake of recruits in Canada had a PULHEMS profile 1111111, and he believed that there were only about 50,000 men in Canada suitable as reinforcements for overseas. Finding tradesmen was becoming even more difficult; therefore, skilled men should not be posted back to Canada merely because they were over age or of low category. (Ibid: Minutes of 26th AG Branch Conference held 1430 hrs, 27 Apr 44). Discussions on the question of standards of selection continued into May, and during June-July the Committee on Standards of Selection at

C.M.H.Q. worked out acceptable PULHEMS profiles for all jobs and trades. (Physical Standards and Instructions for the Medical Examination of Serving Soldiers of the Canadian Army Overseas, Pubs 55 (Revised 8 Sep 44)). It had already proved evident, from statistics produced by the British and American Armies, that a considerable proportion of neuro-psychiatric battle casualties would have to be accepted. (52/Conference/3: Minutes of Conference on Standards of Selection, held at C.M.H.Q., 1000 hrs, 6 May 44). Due to the scarcity of manpower, however, it was agreed by Generals Montague, Chisholm and Brigadier Luton (D.M.S., C.M.H.Q.) that such personnel should be graded "S.2" and placed in special employment companies to work in the L. of C. and rear areas of the operational theatres. (see para 44)

ESTABLISHMENT OF GENERAL PIONEER COMPANIES

39. Another task which devolved on the Personnel Selection staff was the selection of men for General Pioneer Companies* and the eventual disposal of many of them after their services were no longer required in the United Kingdom. Towards the end of March, 1942, No. 1 Canadian General Pioneer Company had been created from approximately 100 illiterates and men with a low mental standard who were unable to absorb the training necessary to produce efficient fighting soldiers. (6/Pnr Corps/1: Memo on Activities - 1 Cdn Gen Pioneer Coy, u.d.; see also 6/Gen Pnr Coys/1: Hamilton to S.D.& T, C.M.H.Q. 16 Nov 43). The project proved so successful that a second company was authorized on 2 Jun 42; subsequently approval was obtained from N.D.H.Q. (Ibid: Montague to G.C.C.-in-C., First Cdn Army, 28 Oct 42)

40. By autumn the personnel of No. 1 Canadian General Pioneer Company numbered 320 all ranks; composed of 52 per cent English, 40 per cent French and eight per cent European extraction. It was estimated by the unit's medical officer that 97.5 per cent of the men were single, 65 per cent of them were under 30 years of age and 91 per cent were "A" category. (Ibid: Memo Activities - 1 Cdn Gen Pioneer Coy, u.d.) Psychiatric and psychological classification had indicated that 78 per cent of the men were mental defectives without psychosis, 12 per cent possessed border-line intelligence, while the remaining ten per cent possessed average intelligence and were mostly N.C.Os. Certain of the men had been mal-adjusted in their former units and were happy in their new surroundings, while a number who had been diagnosed as "anxiety state" and neurasthenia appeared to be making satisfactory progress. "As a result of the outdoor life, the time taken for administration, some psychotherapy and a large dose of occupational therapy (manual labour)", it was considered that the individual was "definitely earning a day's pay." (Ibid). Many of the men with entries in their crime sheets became stable individuals after joining the companies. Officers and N.C.Os. contributed a large part of the success of the experiment by their patient but firm instruction and administration. From being "kicked around" by their previous units, these men found someone who was interested in their welfare. The duties assigned these men included the construction of gun pits, the sand-bagging of

* Not to be confused with the Pioneer Corps in British Army where men were classified as combatant troops. The title, Canadian General Pioneer Companies was adopted as being less objectionable to the soldiers involved than that of General Labour Companies.

buildings, landscaping, loading and unloading supplies, road-building and excavation, salvage, fatigues and maintenance. (Ibid)
Morale was good, for the men became adjusted to their new environment very quickly:

... when they find that at last they are in competition with their equals and the work allotted to them is not beyond their ability ... Recently a job of unloading 16 cars of coal, for which three days were allowed, was completed in one day. A man considers he is being severely disciplined when returned from a work party by the officer or N.C.O. in charge. Much of this spirit is due to the understanding on the part of the present administrative officers, of the men to be handled.

(Ibid)

41. On 5 Nov 42 the formation of three further companies was authorized by General McNaughton. General Montague followed this move on 25 Nov with the suggestion that a Pioneer Corps should be formed to include the estimated 5,000 illiterates who were serving in the Canadian Army Overseas. Since the Canadian Army would require the services of 3000-4000 pioneers, such a step seemed desirable. (Ibid: Postock to Senior Officer, 22 Oct 42 and Montague to G.O.C.-in-C. First Cdn Army, 25 Nov 42). It was the opinion of the Army Commander, however, that these men possessed too low a mental capacity for inclusion in a Pioneer Corps, which, if eventually formed, should be reserved for a higher standard of labour. (Ibid: Turner to Senior Officer, 2 Dec 42). General McNaughton stated his belief that these companies should continue to be known as General Pioneer Companies and that the personnel should be treated as belonging to a General List.

42. On 27 Apr 43 authority was issued to establish an increment to Headquarters, C.R.U., of a Lieutenant-Colonel (Labour Commandant), an adjutant and three other ranks, to administer the five existing general pioneer companies. (Ibid: C.M.H.Q. Administrative Order No. 61, 27 Apr 43). By the beginning of that month, enough further personnel had been screened by medical officers and S.P.Os. to provide five additional companies. The only limiting factor was the provision of suitable officers and N.C.Os. Action was taken to authorize five further companies, with effect from 30 Apr; they could then be formed when required. (Ibid: Morrison to S.D., C.M.H.Q., 8 Apr 43, and C.M.H.Q. Admn Order No. 69, 10 May 43). No. 6 Canadian General Pioneer Coy, of 12 sections, was mobilized at once, but no action was ever taken to form the remainder.

43. The proposed composition of the Canadian Army Overseas, revised to 1 Oct 43, provided for only two general pioneer companies of 10 sections each. (Ibid: Rodger to D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., 26 Oct 43). Changeover proved slow, however, and tasks were found to keep the existing six companies busy until the late spring of 1944. The Labour Commandant's staff and two companies were disbanded by 31 May but a further company, employed at a R.A.O.C. Depot at Bicester, Oxon, remained until 15 Sep 44. The remaining three companies, after reorganization, were retained to carry on work in the United Kingdom under the direction of D.Q.M.G., C.M.H.Q.

44. Late in the spring of 1944 authority was obtained to form nine Special Employment Companies; personnel were to be taken from men, largely returned from operational areas, who had a low "S" rating, as opposed to the personnel of general pioneer companies who normally were those with a low "M"

rating. (see para 38). Three such companies, under a group headquarters, replaced the Canadian General Pioneer Company, C.M.F. serving with 1st Canadian Corps in Italy. Three Special Employment Companies were organized in the United Kingdom to work with the remaining three General Pioneer Companies, and all six were grouped under a Headquarters, No. 1 Canadian Special Employment Group (Ibid: MacQueen to D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., 25 Aug 44). These companies were employed permanently on casual labour jobs with the Artizan Works Companies, No. 1 C.C.C.D.^x and other static units. The remaining three Special Employment Companies authorized served with Canadian troops within 21 Army Group. By August, 1944, there were, in all, some 122 officers and 5041 other ranks, drawn from all arms of the service, performing such work. Furthermore, eight special employment companies of similar type personnel were employed in Canada. (Ibid). In December a fourth Canadian Special Employment Company and a Group Headquarters were formed to serve within 21 Army Group.

45. Since Pioneer and Special Employment Companies were employed on similar work, the question of forming a Pioneer Corps to absorb all such personnel was again revived during the summer of 1944. (Ibid: MacQueen to D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., 25 Aug 44, and Roberts to C.M.H.Q., 30 Jul 44). No action was taken at this time. The problem of C.A.C., R.C.A. and C.I.C. other ranks with a permanent "3" or other grading too low for operational service being retained on paper as reinforcements at C.B.R.Gs.^ø resulted, however, in a request by General Burns, G.C. i/c Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech, 21 Army Group, that these men be absorbed into a Canadian Pioneer Corps. (Ibid: Burns to C.M.H.Q., 20 Mar 45 and Burns to Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q., 20 Mar 45). Due to the expected early termination of the war it was considered at C.M.H.Q., however, that the matter should not be taken up with Ottawa.

REALLOCATION OF PERSONNEL 1943-4

46. By the beginning of March, 1943, the Canadian Army Planning Committee was hard at work trying to adjust manpower requirements of the Canadian Army Overseas so that the total would fall within the recently created "manpower ceiling" of 232,000 all ranks. At the same time it became increasingly apparent that the existing manpower in the Canadian Army Overseas was not being used to the best advantage, despite the efforts of personnel selection officers to pull the more obvious square pegs out of round holes. The most flagrant cases of misfits had been, or were being, looked after, but there remained the question of dealing with officers and men who, although they were efficiently filling vacancies in units, might be employed otherwise in a manner more advantageous to the army as a whole. In a large number of cases, men had been with a unit since its inception and were loath to leave their friends. The question was first broached by Lt.-Col.M.S. Dunn, A.A.G.(S.P.) at 2nd Echelon on 2 Mar, in a letter to the D.A.G., C.M.H.Q. After giving some thought to the subject Brigadier Beament addressed a lengthy memorandum to the Senior Officer on 12 Mar, stating the problem in some detail.

^x No. 1 Canadian Central Ordnance Depot.

^ø Canadian Base Reinforcement Groups.

47. After a great deal of careful research, the British Army had worked out a job analysis for all units, so that if a unit was found to have a higher proportion of "high grade personnel than was required to make it efficient, then the surplus was transferred to a unit which was short. (C.M.H.Q. file 1/Pers Adjust/1: Beament to Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., 12 Mar 43). These standards could not be applied to the Canadian Army Overseas without considerable modification, since, judged by these British standards, Canadian units had both a greater proportion of high calibre and a greater proportion of low calibre personnel than could be permitted. There was an overall deficiency, in tradesmen and military specialists, however, and certain units would have to relinquish their surplus of such personnel.

48. A recent survey within the Canadian Army Overseas had disclosed that, out of the 165,720 other ranks considered, almost 35,000 were over 35 years of age or with a category lower than "A". Thus there were a large number of men serving in field units who would not be able to stand the rigors of operational service. The Canadian Army Overseas - limited to 232,000 all ranks, was heavily biased in favour of fighting formations, and included a higher percentage of fighting troops than a normal national army. Thus there were fewer places in which to put over-age, low category or illiterate personnel than in, say, the British Army. The only solution envisaged by Brigadier Beament was compulsory posting and compulsory transfer under the following headings:

- (a) The withdrawal from units of surplus tradesmen and military specialists in cases where overall shortages exist in such trades and specialities.
- (b) The withdrawal of a proportion of personnel of superior intelligence from those units which have marked excesses of personnel of this calibre, and the withdrawal from units of personnel whose civilian background fits them for trades or specialities in which they are not at present employed, and the training of such personnel in the trades and specialities for which their natural ability or civilian background fits them.

(1/Pers Adjust/1: Beament to Senior Officer, 12 Mar 43).

49. At this time, the Personnel Selection Section, C.M.H.Q. had recommended the transfer of over 1300 other ranks to the General Pioneer Companies, and 1130 had been actually transferred. A search of the Canadian Forestry Corps had revealed 383 young "A" category men, of whom 187 had already been transferred to combatant arms of the service. Out of a list of 457 unsuitable personnel submitted by the 5th Canadian Armoured Division, 431 were recommended either for transfer to other corps or for a change of employment in their existing units. (Ibid: Appx D, Some examples of reallocation made on recommendation of Personnel Selection Section, 11 Mar 43). Search was also made directly for tradesmen. Up to 1 Feb 43 recommendations on 763 men had been passed along for transfer to the R.C.O.C., and in the next six weeks a further 315 potential tradesmen were located. An additional 481 other ranks were recommended for transfer to the R.C.E. and R.C. Sigs for trades training. (Ibid)

50. On 27 Mar General Montague forwarded Brigadier Beament's memorandum to the Army Commander, with the recommendation that "compulsory posting and transfer be forthwith adopted by

you." (Ibid: Montague to G.O.C.-in-C. First Cdn Army, 27 Mar 43). General McNaughton agreed to this suggestion and on 6 Apr issued a directive to the effect that such compulsory transfers and posting were to be carried out through 2nd Echelon and/or Records, C.M.H.Q., as the case might be, both of which were empowered to deal directly with units. (Ibid: McNaughton to Senior Officer, u.d.). The directive stressed the "immediate necessity for adopting a policy designed to effect the employment of every individual in that capacity for which he is best suited by reason of his physical and mental capacity, his training and his natural aptitude." Continuing, General McNaughton wrote:

I fully appreciate that this policy will to a degree cut across the lines of individual preference and will affect to some extent the control that an Officer Administering or an Officer Commanding has over personnel of his Corps or Unit. It is inevitable that it will result in the removal from units of men whose loss will be felt. Notwithstanding these disadvantages, however, I am convinced that this action is necessary for the well-being of the Army as a whole, and I therefore expect all Commanders loyally to accept my decision and to do all things in their power to facilitate this necessary adjustment.

(Ibid: McNaughton to Commanders of all formations and units of the Canadian Army Overseas, 6 Apr 43)

51. In order to implement this policy and to set up the necessary machinery so that 2nd Echelon and Records could put transfers through, a meeting was held at C.M.H.Q. on 7 Apr. In addition to Brigadiers Rodger and Beament and other representatives of C.M.H.Q. and C.R.U., Brigadier G.B. Chisholm, D.G.M.S., and Colonel W. Line, Director of Personnel Selection (both from N.D.E.Q.) were present. As noted elsewhere, the target date for completion of First Canadian Army had been set back to October 1943 and major deficiencies still existed in C.A.C., R.C.A. and Infantry. The vast majority of those selected for transfer would only be potentially suitable for their new arm of the service - after they were retrained. It was considered that the R.C.A.S.C. should be the first corps dealt with, in view of its greater surplus of personnel to requirements. Less dislocation would be caused if the vetting of personnel were carried out within the reinforcement units, instead of at the field units.

52. As a first step towards the adjustment of the number of tradesmen and specialists in field units it was considered that 2nd Echelon should cross-post within corps. The problem of over-age and category personnel would have to wait until there was more information on the policy to be adopted as regards "functional categorization" (see paras 32-35). The Canadian Forestry Corps was to be asked to furnish 150 men per month for C.A.C., R.C.A. or infantry. It was further suggested that a number of liaison officers be appointed between 2nd Echelon and the field units to cope with any objections which might be raised by commanding officers. (Ibid: Minutes of a conference held at C.M.H.Q. at 1430 hrs, 7 Apr 43, on Utilization of Manpower - Cdn Army Overseas, 11 Apr 43).

53. Effective 22 Apr 43, an increment of 14 D.A.A.Gs. was added to 2nd Echelon to cope with the problem of re-sorting personnel within the Canadian Army Overseas. These officers

were to act as staff officers at 2nd Echelon and make frequent liaison visits to units of their own arm of the service to correlate the re-sorting process being carried on by Personnel Selection and records officers. (Ibid: Moran to OIC 2 Ech, 10 Jun 43). They were also empowered to visit reinforcement units and other Part II Order units for the purpose of determining the numbers of young category "A" soldiers who could be employed more usefully in fighting units. (Ibid: Moran to OIC Records, 6 Jun 43)

54. Surveys were carried out during the summer months in the four divisions remaining in the United Kingdom and in the several units belonging to corps and army troops. In the case of artillery field regiments it was found that generally speaking there was a surplus of driver mechanics and that the greatest deficiency was in surveyors and regimental signallers. (Ibid: Kenyon to OIC Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 2nd Ech, 29 Jul 43). A minor complaint from R.C.F. officers was that some S.P.Os. were continuing to recommend the transfer of men for training in trades which were already over-crowded, e.g. miners. (Ibid: Middlemass to OIC Cdn Section G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon, 31 Jul 43). The project seems to have been well on the way to completion by the end of September. Shortly after that the balance of the 1st Canadian Corps moved out to Italy and the units of First Canadian Army intensified their preparations for the forthcoming invasion of North-West Europe.

55. During 1944 another task falling to medical officers and S.F.Os. was the interviewing and grading of reinforcements, with a view to their transfer to the infantry as general duty personnel. As early as March 1944, N.D.H.Q. was requested to despatch only general duty infantry reinforcements from Canada. (44/Remuster/1: Bostock to M.G.A., C.M.H.Q., 28 Mar 44). The chief source of surplus reinforcement personnel overseas was A.A. and field artillery, R.C.E., R.C.O.C., and C.A.C. Authority was given, therefore, by the D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., on 28 Mar to effect the transfer to infantry of 500 general duty reinforcements from Nos. 1 and 2 C.A.R.Us., 1 C.E.R.U., and 3 C.A.C.R.U. (Ibid: Booth to H.Q. C.R.U., 28 Mar 44). In August action was taken to despatch all surplus reinforcement holdings of R.C.A. and R.C.A.S.C. other ranks, under 40 years of age and with a FULHEMS rating of at least 1111221, to the 13th Training Brigade for retraining as infantry. (Ibid: M.G.A., C.M.H.Q., to Comd, C.R.U., 5 Aug 44). On 23 Sep steps were taken to compulsorily transfer to infantry all tradesmen not in receipt of trades pay, and on 13 Oct the remustering of surplus tradesmen in receipt of trades pay began. These continued to draw trades pay for a six-month period following their remustering. (Ibid: D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., to H.Q. C.R.U., 23 Sep 44 and D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., to OIC Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech A.A.I., 13 Oct 44)

56. On 4 Sep some 106 surplus reinforcement officers from the C.A.C., R.C.A., R.C.E., and R.C.A.S.C., reported to No. 3 Wing, C.T.S. for a conversion course after making a voluntary transfer to infantry. On 20 Oct authority was given to commence compulsory remustering of surplus artillery and armoured corps officers, and the policy was later enlarged to include surplus reinforcement officers from other corps. (44/Remuster/2: Tel GS 627, Defensor to Canmilitary, Montague from Stuart, 20 Oct 44 et seq)

NO. 1 CANADIAN REALLOCATION CENTRE

57. With the arrival of the reinforcements expected from Canada in August and September 1943, it was expected that the strength of the Canadian Army Overseas would exceed the imposed manpower ceiling of 233,200 all ranks. The proposed dispatch

of a further 5000 reinforcements per month, in the absence of offsetting battle casualties, would increase still more the excess strength. It was therefore considered necessary, in August 1943, to return to Canada the considerable number of personnel who, due to age, medical category or low mental capacity, were unable to assimilate the training necessary to enable them to serve efficiently in field units. (6/Realloc Cent/1: Montague to GOC-in-C, First Cdn Army (PA), 23 Aug 43). Personnel returned to Canada would either be employed there on the home war establishment or returned to industry or agriculture, in order to permit the release of equivalent numbers of fit men from the Army in Canada, or from civilian employment, to form reinforcements for the Canadian Army Overseas. (Ibid: Memo on Conference - Disposal of Personnel of Can Army Overseas, 1 Cdn Reallocation Centre, 9 Aug 43)

58. In order to ensure that no individual should be returned home whose services could still be utilized to advantage, it was proposed at C.M.H.Q. to form a Reallocation Centre, comprising an administrative element and three examining boards with capacity to review the cases of 100 soldiers a day. On 23 Aug the Senior Officer therefore sought General McNaughton's approval for a temporary Canadian Reallocation Centre of 12 officers and 16 other ranks, to be attached to No. 6 C.I.R.U., and an increment of two officers and 20 other ranks for No. 1 N.E.T.D. to hold and administer personnel pending their dispatch forward as reinforcements or back to Canada. (Ibid: Montague to GOC-in-C, First Cdn Army (PA), 23 Aug 43). On the following day approval was obtained from General McNaughton, under the authority of defensor Telegram GSD 602.*

59. While steps were being taken to organize the Canadian Reallocation Centre on 13 Sep 43, instructions were issued to units of First Canadian Army to compile nominal rolls of personnel who did not conform to the existing standards of age and medical category for service in the field; those who were fit but whom the commanding officer considered unsuitable because of low mentality, illiteracy or a physical disability which had not lowered the medical category; and those who, while they did not conform to the set standards as regards age and category, were fit to be taken into battle. In the case of the last nominal roll, the following certificate was to be signed by the commanding officer:

Notwithstanding that the above personnel do NOT qualify under present age or medical standards, I consider them fit for active service and certify that I am prepared to take them into battle. (Ibid: Walford to GOC 1 and 2 Cdn Corps, 13 Sep 43)

Postings to the Reallocation Centre were to be made for personnel coming under the first two headings. There they would be interviewed and classified as: fit for employment in field units of their own arm; fit for employment in field units of another arm; fit for employment in a static unit; and for return to Canada. (Ibid)

60. On 3 Oct No. 1 Canadian Reallocation Centre began to function at Algonquin Camp, under command of Lt.-Col. R.H. Back, who had a staff of personnel selection and medical officers, including a psychiatrist. According to the directive given, personnel for return to Canada would be of category "C" or lower, over 45 years of age, or unsuitable because of low mentality or instability (or both) (Ibid: Weeks to OC, 1 Cdn Reallocation

* This telegram gave the Army Commander authority to set up provisional establishments to cover experimental and temporary organizations subject to certain conditions.

Centre, 10 Nov 43). The deciding factor was, however, not whether a man was performing his present duties acceptably but whether they could not be done as well or better by a man whose age and category would permit of utilization as a reinforcement when required. During October, some 1043 men were reallocated, of whom 355 were earmarked for return to Canada. (Ibid: Hessey-White to A.G.2, C.M.H.Q., 23 Nov 43). Due to the fact that the majority of those examined required medical boards, reallocation went slowly (50 a day), until authority was received on 30 Dec to carry out reallocation following merely an expression of opinion by a medical officer as to a man's probable PULHEMS grading. By 3 Jan 44 the daily output had gone up to 70 men and 300 were disposed of that week. (W.D., 1 Cdn Realloc Centre: 3 and 8 Jan 44). Some of the difficulties experienced can be gathered from the diarist's entry for 19 Jan 44:

All the personnel in training at 10 Training Coy^{*} reported to this unit, this date for disposal. These 81 soldiers, though young and healthy, were the most discouraging group, yet dealt with by this unit. A gang spirit pervaded the group. They were inhibited by no laws of social behaviour. In that most of these soldiers were psychiatric cases, arrangements were made for the Medical Officer of 10 Training Coy to visit this unit on 20 Jan 44 to assist the unit's Neuropsychiatrist in appraising the personnel.

(Ibid: 19 Jan 44)

61. At the beginning of 1944, it was estimated that in the static units and reinforcement units there were approximately 10,000 all ranks who were considered "unfit for the field." (6/1 Realloc Cent/1: Brown to ADAG(A), C.M.H.Q., 7 Jan 44). Since it would be impossible for all these men to pass through the Reallocation Centre, unit selection committees^ø were empowered to dispatch direct to No. 1 N.E.T.D., for return to Canada, all personnel whom they considered unsuitable for further

* In August 1942 a proposal was advanced at C.M.H.Q. to form a Special Assault Company to salvage the young potential habitual offenders "who, due to their excitable nature and, possibly lack of sympathy on the part of their superiors, have a record of continual minor and increasing offences, and who therefore are in danger of becoming permanently lost to the Army." (Ibid: Montague to GOC-in-C, First Cdn Army, 6 Feb 43). Habitual offenders in civil life were considered to be permanently lost to the Army, as regards performing useful service, and the only remedy to stop their continual rotation from field units to detention barracks or prison, then back to reinforcement units and field units, was return to Canada. Approval was given by the Army Commander on 19 Sep 42, but due to a number of delays caused by lack of accommodation, and suitable staff and suitable employment, No. 10 Training Company was not authorised until 30 Apr 43. Training got under way in June, but a large number of the potential trainees had proceeded to the Mediterranean with their units, while others were refused transfers by commanding officers. Thus only a relatively small number of men were reclaimed and it was not considered economical to maintain a staff of 60 all ranks to salvage a group of 50 men every three months. No. 10 Training Company was therefore disbanded, with effect from 31 Jan 44.

ø Composed of the administrative officer, records officer, personnel selection officer and medical officer of the unit.

employment in the Canadian Army Overseas and who had in addition a PULHEMS profile containing one or more "4's". (Ibid: Weeks to H.Q. C.R.U., 24 Jan 44). Thus, until 31 Mar when the policy was reviewed, only personnel for whom it was considered there might be further employment overseas would be dispatched to No. 1 Canadian Reallocation Centre. (Ibid: See also W.D., 1 Cdn Realloc Centre, 25 Jan 44). On 1 Feb all units within C.R.U. submitted three nominal rolls of their personnel: those fit for service as reinforcements in their own or another arm of the service, those unfit for field service but suitable for present employment, and those of no further use to the Canadian Army Overseas. Unit Selection Committees began reallocating their own personnel according to these three classifications and only referred the doubtful cases to No. 1 Canadian Reallocation Centre. By the end of March a total of 6827 men had passed through the Reallocation Centre since its inception: 4245 were returned to Canada, 1313 were posted to field units and 1000 to static units. (W.D., 1 Cdn Realloc Centre: March 1944, Appx 5, Report of Progress for month of March 1944)

62. By April 1944 the manpower situation had changed considerably. It now appeared that the supply of reinforcements from Canada was deteriorating in quality and that in many cases these might not be as good as the men being returned home through the Reallocation Centre. Since the establishment of this unit a firm policy had been laid down regarding the employment of S.F.Cs., namely, that they would be held in three pools - one for each theatre and one for C.R.U. - where all personnel proceeding to and from a theatre of operations would be assessed. Thus in fact, the individual reinforcement units had become reallocation centres. (6/1 Realloc Cent/1: Bostock to D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., 11 May 44). There were still about 7000 men in the static units who were fit for field service, the majority being retained there because of special qualifications. There were in the reinforcement units about 4000 personnel unfit for field service. The task of reallocating many of these latter to replace a proportion of the 7000 men in static units could really be done by unit selection staffs in reinforcement units. There seemed no longer any advantage, therefore, in maintaining a separate Reallocation Centre: for, when men were sent there, they felt that they were automatically en route for Canada (Ibid). After discussing the matter with the D.A.G. and Colonel Line, Director of Personnel Selection from N.D.H.Q., General Montague proposed the disbandment of No. 1 Canadian Reallocation Centre. (Ibid: Montague to D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., 12 May 44). The Army Commander gave his approval and disbandment took effect from 3 Jun. In order that low category personnel in reinforcement units might be used to replace specialist personnel in static units, the previous ban on training them as tradesmen was lifted on 22 May.

63. Experience had shown, however, that means should be provided within a theatre of operations for reallocating personnel in general, and, in particular, the re-examination of so-called neuro-psychiatric casualties. Therefore, to serve Canadian troops in the Mediterranean, authority was given on 13 May 44 to establish No. 2 Canadian Reallocation Centre (Type B) of three officers and 16 other ranks with effect from 25 Feb. (C.M.H.Q. Administrative Order No. 86, 16 May 44). Approval had already been given for the formation, with effect from 27 Apr, of a No. 3 Canadian Reallocation Centre - Type C - to serve Canadian troops in 21 Army Group. (C.M.H.Q. Administrative Order No. 74, 28 Apr 44). These units served until after the cessation of hostilities.

EXPANSION OF PERSONNEL SELECTION STAFF DURING 1943

64. In addition to the projects discussed above, by the late spring of 1943 the amount of work being undertaken by S.P.Os. at the several reinforcement units had reached the point where staffs were clearly inadequate. Officers in charge of training were coming to make more use of the information and recommendations provided by the reinforcement unit's S.P.O. regarding the placing of problem cases and the general allocation of men for duty. The existing war establishment for S.P.Os. consisted of 13 officers at C.M.H.Q. and 30 officers on the strength of C.R.U. As of 16 Mar 43 General McNaughton had given approval to the establishment of an increment at C.R.U. to carry the S.P.Os. required for work in the field formations of First Canadian Army. (9/CMHQ Pers Select/1: Senior Officer to G.C.C.-in-C. First Cdn Army, 20 Mar 43).

65. During the visit of Brigadier G.B. Chisholm and Colonel W. Line to the United Kingdom during the month of April, the question of exchanging S.P.Os. between Canada and overseas was discussed. (See paras 33 and 51). Brigadier Chisholm considered that very few officers in England were conversant with the process of recruitment, selection and training through which men passed in Canada, while officers there were just as ignorant of the conditions and requirements overseas. (9/Select Br/2: Chisholm to D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., 9 Apr 43). He expected that there would be a considerable reduction in medical boarding and selection in Canada by August, at which time it should be possible to make a number of well trained S.P.Os. available for work overseas. The first proposal did not meet with a favourable reception at C.M.H.Q., but it was decided to take advantage of the latter. Therefore, on 22 Jun a telegram was dispatched to Ottawa requesting that 40 selection teams (officer, sergeant assistant and clerk, private) be made available on loan for a period of approximately six months, since it was not desired to increase the establishment permanently to provide for them. Twenty teams would be required as soon as possible and the remainder a month later, in order to carry out the considerable readjustment of personnel necessary to place "available manpower in the particular trades and specialties" where they could best serve the Canadian Army. (Ibid: Tel A 2031, Canmilitary to Defensor, 22 Jun 43).

66. In reply, N.D.H.Q. stated on 17 Jul that such a request could not be acceded to immediately, but that seven army examiners and 10 other ranks were being dispatched at once, together with Lt.-Col. N.W. Morton, who, "subject your concurrence" would take general charge of personnel selection activities overseas, with particular reference to clinical problems, thus freeing Lt.-Col. Howard to handle the records end of the work. (Ibid: Tel AG 4398, Defensor to Canmilitary, 17 Jul 43).

67. Ottawa also had queried C.M.H.Q. on a proposal arising out of the visit of Brigadier Chisholm and Colonel Line, that Personnel Selection officers should be transferred to the Non-Medical List R.C.A.M.C. Such a step had already been taken in Canada and the Directorate of Personnel Selection made responsible to the D.G.M.S. It would appear that part of the reason for this change lay in the fact that the new D.G.M.S., Brigadier Chisholm, was a psychiatrist and had developed personnel selection work in Canada from its inception. (First Cdn Army file PA 6-8: Beament to Senior Officer, 16 Jul 43). Brigadier Beament had opposed any similar change overseas when the matter had been raised by Brigadier Chisholm during the latter's visit. In a memorandum to the Senior Officer, dated 16 Jul, Brigadier Beament pointed out that there was a considerably different situation overseas. In Canada the

clinical aspect was uppermost, since emphasis had to be placed on directing the recruit into the proper channel at the start of his army career. Overseas, however, the problem was chiefly one of reallocation - an "A" problem, falling under the jurisdiction of the A.D.A.G.(A) at C.M.H.Q. Furthermore, at the War Office the Director of the Selection of Personnel was responsible to the Director of Organization and through him to D.A.G.(B).

68. On 22 Jul, therefore, the opinion of C.M.H.Q. on both matters was communicated to Ottawa in a personal telegram from General Montague to the Adjutant-General, General McNaughton had agreed with him that any such reorganization would be a retrogressive step. (Ibid: Tel A 2404, Canmilitary to Defensor, Letson from Montague, 22 Jul 43). General Montague was in agreement with the necessity for the closest liaison between medical services and personnel selection on the professional level but was not agreeable to having the responsibility of the latter divided between two officers, one of whom would be responsible for the clinical aspect and the other for organization. In his reply, General Letson expressed his disappointment at such a decision and pointed out that the adoption of PULHEMS grading made a close tie-up all the more necessary for both medical and personnel selection officers. (Ibid: Tel AG 4603, Defensor to Canmilitary, Montague from Letson, 31 Jul 43). He further pointed out that "we have pioneered in this field and that the close liaison now existing and which would be cemented by the step proposed has been commended by professional bodies in England, U.S. and Canada as a forward step." (Ibid). Lt.-Col. Morton had "had a wealth of experience in this field" and therefore was being sent over to take command of the readjustment programme.

69. A request from C.M.H.Q. on 15 Aug that the Overseas Qualification Card might be filled in for recruits before they left Canada, in order to relieve pressure of work on S.P.Os. at reinforcement units immediately upon arrival of a large draft met with an adverse reply. (9/Pers Select/2: Tel A 2767, Canmilitary to Defensor, 15 Aug 43). A Defensor telegram dated 24 Aug stated that such a course was not considered "feasible or desirable." (Ibid: Tel AG 4910, Defensor to Canmilitary, 24 Aug 43).

View here is that overseas qualification card when first adopted had some value in initial survey of Army overseas for purposes of assisting in urgent re-selection programme by machines. Its usefulness under normal conditions is of little value since it represents procedures incompatible with sound selection policy. (Ibid)

Willingness to co-operate was assured, however, and it was suggested that the Canadian information card (M.F.M. 196) which accompanied every soldier overseas should be considered to contain sufficient information.

70. Meanwhile, N.D.H.Q. was proceeding with plans to send further personnel selection teams overseas to aid in the completion of the Canadian Army programme. On 4 Oct, C.M.H.Q. was informed that 19 teams were being prepared for dispatch overseas and that a further 15 teams would be available early in November. These officers, eventually numbering 40, were attached to C.R.U. for duty, but efforts to have the Increment increased to absorb them were opposed by officers of "G" Branch, C.M.H.Q., who doubted the wisdom of "depleting the contingency reserve by the provision of Selection of Personnel officers and other ranks" within the manpower ceiling. (6/Select Br/1/10: Ziegler to B.G.S., C.M.H.Q., 24 Nov 43; Penhale to D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., 25 Nov 43;

Bostock to D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., 15 Apr 44; Strathy to D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., 20 Jun 44)

71. Neither General Letson nor the Minister of National Defence appeared entirely satisfied with the system and general direction of personnel selection overseas, for, on 19 Sep, the former had informed General Montague that he wished to take up the question personally during his forthcoming visit. (Ibid: Tel AG 5208, Canmilitary to Defensor, for Montague from Letson, 19 Sep 43). Meanwhile, he considered that the following principles should be borne in mind while utilizing the services of selection teams. Confusion and a lowering of morale would result if such teams were sent to comb out "long existing" units. Commanding officers would have long since come to conclusions as to the fitness of individual for jobs and "the man's experience and acquaintance with his task should more than compensate for any deficiency in his standards... To act on these standards and put in new men at this late date would seem unsound to say the least." (Ibid). Except in the cases of personnel considered unsatisfactory by the unit commanding officer, selection teams should confine their work to the reinforcement units; even here, the S.P.Os. should take care not to cover ground which already had been reviewed. As it was, the changing of establishments and the necessity of remustering certain men to new trades was causing sufficient disturbance and uncertainty in the minds of many.

72. As a result of the Adjutant-General's visit in October, Colonel Line arrived overseas in November, charged with making a report on the existing situation. Colonel Line still maintained that Personnel Selection overseas should come under the D.M.S., C.M.H.Q. and based his submission on the situation existing in Canada. Both Brigadiers Booth (D.A.G.) and Weeks (A.D.A.G.(A)) were of the same opinion that Brigadier Beament had expressed earlier in the year but were keen to see a compromise reached. As Brigadier Booth pointed out, however, in a memorandum to the Senior Officer, dated 24 Nov 43, regarding Colonel Line's attitude:

It is clear to me that notwithstanding his several visits to his country, he is still seriously lacking in appreciation of the problems of administering an army in the field.

(Ibid: Booth to Senior Officer,
24 Nov 43)

73. Reason prevailed, however, and at a conference on 2 Dec, attended by Brigadier Weeks, Colonel Line and Lt.-Col. Howard, a compromise solution was reached. Personnel Selection overseas was still to remain a distinctly "A" matter, but closer liaison was to be set up between Canada and the United Kingdom and there was to be a greater exchange of officers. (Ibid: Weeks to S.C. (through D.A.G.), 2 Dec 43). The personnel section record card (M.F.M.196) in use in Canada was to be revised by Lt.-Cols. Howard and Morton so as to meet overseas requirements and selection personnel were to work as far forward in the field as was practicable, i.e. at Base Reinforcement Groups. A new overseas routine order was to be published setting forth the relative responsibilities of commanding officers and S.P.Os. in matters of selection and reallocation of personnel. It was also recommended that an Overseas Standing Committee on Selection Standards be set up (see para 38) to work in close co-operation with the corresponding Committee which had been set up at N.D.H.Q. by C.A.R.O. (Can) 3497 of 1943.

74. The reluctance to include personnel selection teams within the "manpower ceiling" was finally overcome, and it was possible on 14 Apr 44 to inform Brigadier A.W. Beament, OIC Can Sec, GHQ 1 Ech, 21 Army Group, that an establishment of six officers and

18 other ranks had been provided to handle personnel selection work for the Canadian components of First Canadian Army. (6/Select Br/1/10: Bostock to OIC Cdn Sec, GHQ 1 Ech, 21 Army Group, 14 Apr 44 and Bostock to D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., 15 Apr 44). This section was to be included in the establishment of No. 3 Canadian Convalescent Depot. There already were three officers and nine other ranks serving in the Mediterranean Theatre, and it was now proposed to send a further S.P.O. to work within 1st Canadian Corps; these officers were employed at No. 1 Canadian Convalescent Depot and at Nos. 1 and 2 Canadian Base Reinforcement Groups. At the same time, 15 Apr, it was proposed to amend the Personnel Selection establishment within C.R.U.: a basic establishment of 33 officers and 87 other ranks was to be provided, with an increment of up to 15 officers and 54 other ranks to be added should an increase in the size of the several reinforcement units warrant it. (Ibid: Bostock to D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., 15 Apr 44).

75. As the campaign in North-West Europe got under way and the demand for reinforcements became urgent, the work of Personnel Selection increased. Most of the screening was carried out at the reinforcement units and within the 13th and 14th Training Brigades which arrived from Canada, with battalions to be broken up as reinforcements (see paras 55-56). Most of the work in the two operational theatres was in dealing with men who had found their way back to the Convalescent Depots, potentially for either reallocation or return to their original units. Insofar as possible, all reinforcements from Canada were interviewed on their arrival in the United Kingdom to review the potentiality of personnel in terms of current needs. Similarly, outgoing drafts were interviewed by S.P.Os. to ensure that personnel being dispatched to an active theatre would not prove unsuitable for that employment. (Ibid: Booth to H.Q. C.R.U., 4 Jul 44). Work was also carried out at No. 1 Canadian Selection and Appraisal Centre in the selection of reinforcement officers for 1 Canadian Parachute Battalion and in the appraisal of N.C.Os. (see Report No. 156). In the autumn, two Officers' Survey and Classification Boards were set up in connection with this centre to deal with officers, who, although unsuitable in their present employment, might be fitted into useful jobs in the Canadian Army Overseas. (See W.D., 1 Cdn O/S Offrs Survey and Classification Board, September 1944)

POST-WAR ACTIVITY

76. By the latter part of 1944, when post-war plans to repatriate and rehabilitate the Canadian Army Overseas were beginning to be studied, the emphasis on personnel selection work was already shifting to the repatriation of battle casualties and other low category personnel who were filling space in the infantry training regiments within C.R.U.^M During November, two S.P.Os. were attached to No. 1 N.E.T.D. to check the documents of category personnel being returned to Canada. A similar service was set up by three S.P.Os. for soldiers awaiting repatriation in the Canadian General Hospitals of the United Kingdom. (52/Liaison/1/2: Monthly Liaison Letter, November 1944). In December seven S.P.Os., headed by Lt.-Col. Wees, attended the first In-Service Counselling Course in Canada.

* The remainder of this narrative is very largely based on "Notes for History of Personnel Selection Overseas (Counselling Phase)" by Major R.T. Payton, 1 Jan 46)

During the same month the field work on a rehabilitation survey of 7,762 all ranks in the United Kingdom, 50 per cent of whom had seen service in an active theatre, was completed; the findings were used as a basis on which to make post-war plans. (52/Liaison/1/2: Monthly Liaison Letter, December, 1944, S.P. Section, C.M.H.Q.). It was estimated by Lt.-Col. Wees that with a staff of 200 S.P.Os. it would be possible, within the first five months after the cessation of hostilities, to assist the majority of the troops in formulating their post-discharge intentions and in selecting educational courses likely to advance their plans. (6/Select Br/1/10: Wees to A.D.A.G.(A), C.M.H.Q., 9 Mar 45). Personnel Selection staffs could also select members for the C.A.P.F. and C.A.O.F. from among the volunteers overseas.

77. During January, 1945, authority was obtained in Ottawa, giving responsibility to the Director of Personnel Selection, working in close co-operation with the Army Adviser on Discharge Affairs, for directing In-Service Counselling. Such counselling was to begin as far forward in an operational theatre as possible and was to continue through the subsequent stages of repatriation until discharge. It was submitted by the A.A.G.(S.P.) at C.M.H.Q. that the period of return to civil life presented two main problems for the soldier: the maintenance of morale until repatriation and the preparation for actual return to civil life. (Ibid: Monthly Liaison Letter, January, 1945, S.P. Section, C.M.H.Q.). The need for rehabilitation training to provide for economic, social, family and personal adjustment was stressed. A C.M.H.Q. Planning Committee consisting of the Director of Education, A.A.G.(SP), the Officer Commanding No. 1 N.E.T.D. and the Rehabilitation Officer at No. 1 C.G.R.U. was formed to organize the policy which would be put into effect initially at No. 1 N.E.T.D.

78. On 15 Feb No. 1 N.E.T.D. became No. 1 Canadian Repatriation Depot, and repatriation training got under way on an experimental basis, with six S.P.Os. in attendance. Soldiers were interviewed as to their views on further military service and post-war discharge, their attitude towards returning to civilian life and their hopes of employment. (Ibid: Monthly Liaison Letter, February, 1945, S.P. Section, C.M.H.Q.). A series of courses was held at No. 1 C.G.R.U. to train S.P.Os. and their sub-staffs and unit educational officers in their new task; a number of Army examiners (S.P.Os.) arrived on exchange from Canada where rehabilitation was slightly more advanced. Four S.P.Os. continued to be employed with the rehabilitation training of men who were patients in Canadian general hospitals in the United Kingdom. During the same period practically all reinforcements from Canada were interviewed and their documents checked. (Ibid: Monthly Liaison Letter, March, 1945, S.P. Section, C.M.H.Q.)

79. During April the rehabilitation counselling programme at No. 1 Canadian Repatriation Depot continued to follow experimental lines. It was finally decided that the training would have to be divided between Personnel Section and Education officers. A further 50 officers were required to implement the proposed programme and selection was made from among unemployed regimental officers. A preliminary course of training was given to the P.E.* of all units under C.R.U.

80. With the end of the war in Europe Personnel Selection moved over on to the new basis. Personnel Selection Section "A" of 75 S.P.Os. and 197 O.Rs. was to function within C.R.U., with roughly 10 S.P.Os. at each repatriation depot, while Personnel Selection Section "B" of 125 S.P.Os. was to work within the

* Permanent Establishment.

framework of First Canadian Army. Personnel Selection work on the Continent, in charge of Lt.-Col. A.A. Day, was based on the brigade level, with S.P.Os. attached out to units as required. The 15 S.P.Os. already on the Continent were given a conversion course, 25 more who had finished the course in the United Kingdom were dispatched to join them and the further 90 were sent on as soon as they had been given adequate training on rehabilitation procedure in the United Kingdom.

81. Rehabilitation counselling overseas and the function of Personnel Selection Officers were formalized on 9 Jun 45 by the publication of Overseas R.O. 5876, which laid down that all other ranks would be interviewed prior to repatriation to Canada and be given advice as to the carrying out of post-war plans.

82. It was felt that soldiers should be interviewed at frequent intervals while still overseas, in order that the final counselling process in Canada might be as constructive as possible. Reports from the Repatriation Depots indicated that counselling interviews were proving more satisfactory with soldiers who had previously been interviewed on the Continent or elsewhere in the United Kingdom. By the end of June the number of counselling interviews had risen to 4500 a week in the United Kingdom and 4200 a week on the Continent. In addition, the services of two C.W.A.C. officers had been obtained to screen personnel of that corps.

83. A survey of 1000 M.Fs.M. 196, completed during June, revealed that approximately 85 per cent of other ranks planned to take up employment immediately upon discharge, although only 30 per cent had made definite employment arrangements. Of the remaining 15 per cent who desired full-time rehabilitation training, about one quarter wanted academic courses and the remainder vocational training. About six per cent of the over-all were interested in obtaining farms under the Veterans' Land Act and a further five per cent, who already had farms, were interested in improving their present holdings under the Act. To a very considerable extent the men were adopting a very realistic attitude about their return to civil life and were showing a preference for returning to the occupations engaged in before the war:

Major Occupational Groups	Desired Post-War Occupation	Pre-War Regular Occupation
Professional, Managerial	7 %	5 %
Clerical	9	8
Sales	4	5
Civic Employees	5	6
Rural	17	20
Skilled, semi-skilled	38	45
Unskilled, casual labour	9	9
Undecided, unemployed	11	2
	100	100

(52/Liaison/1/2: Training Liaison Letter, S.P. Section, June, 1945).

84. During July the training of S.P.Os. in various advanced phases of rehabilitation training was continued under the direction of officials from the Canadian Department of Labour and Veterans' Affairs. An S.P.O. was posted to the Selection

Board for Ithaki University. On 12 Aug 45 Lt.-Col. Wees^{*} returned to Canada for duty with the Department of Veterans' Affairs, and Lt.-Col. R.B. Haley assumed the appointment of A.A.G.(S.P.) at C.M.H.Q. and control of the programme. A third Personnel Selection Section ("C") of S.P.Os. was authorized to work within C.A.O.F. By early October there remained 94 S.P.Os. working in North West Europe and 118 in the United Kingdom. Due to the contraction of C.F.N. it was possible to post 21 S.P.Os. back to Canada during November, and Lt.-Col. A.A. Day, who had been the senior S.P.O. on the Continent, took over at C.M.H.Q. from Lt.-Col. Haley.

85. The rehabilitation programme was considered to have been a success as far as other ranks were concerned but the picture concerning officers was another matter. Rehabilitation lectures and counselling interviews had not been made compulsory for officers; thus the lack of knowledge of rehabilitation benefits and the uncertainty of a considerable number concerning their own future began to cause some concern at C.M.H.Q. Accordingly, on 24 Nov 46 a routine order (6292) was promulgated to draw the attention of all officers to the fact that rehabilitation counsel was available to them as well as the men.

86. About the middle of December it became apparent that the rehabilitation training programme overseas was just about at an end. Enough ships were available to get all but the C.A.O.F. home by the end of February, 1946, and it was therefore decided to cut Personnel Selection activities to an absolute minimum. C.F.N. was to close down in January so it was possible to withdraw its S.P.Os. before the end of the year. One S.P.O. was left with each wing of the several repatriation units within C.R.U. until they should close down; some 110 S.P.Os. overseas were released from duty by 1 Jan 46. After 2 Feb only a skeleton staff was left at C.R.U. and at C.M.H.Q. to wind up overseas activities and to administer the section which was remaining with C.A.O.F. In the months following VE Day over 250,000 men had been interviewed, 200,000 for rehabilitation and 50,000 for selective purposes.

CONCLUSION

87. Work during the first months of 1946 was confined largely to C.A.O.F. and the skeleton staff left within C.R.U. On 18 May 46, the former, No. 3 Canadian Selection of Personnel Section (C), was disbanded in the United Kingdom. During the 10 months of its existence approximately 80-85 per cent of the personnel of C.A.O.F. had been interviewed (12,168 all ranks). During the early stages of the occupation period, work had covered all phases of selection work, but during the last four months it was confined mainly to rehabilitation counselling. (52/Liaison/1/3: Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q. to

* Had succeeded Lt.-Col. J.W. Howard in June 1944. Lt.-Col. Howard was loaned to the War Office on 1 Jun 44 to help with the introduction of the PULHEMS System into the British Army. His original four months' attachment kept being extended until 15 Oct 45, when he was repatriated to Canada.

Secretary, D.N.D., 30 May 46). To complete the work of "run down" of Personnel Selection work overseas, No. 1 Canadian Selection of Personnel Section "A" (and Increment) was disbanded on 20 Jun 46; this unit as already noted had been working within C.R.U. In order to handle rehabilitation counselling for personnel still taking their discharge in the United Kingdom, arrangements were made, however, for three S.P.Os. to be continued on the strength of No. 1 Canadian Repatriation Depot. (Ibid: Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q., to Secretary, D.N.D., 28 Jun 46)

88. This report was prepared by Capt. J.M. Hitsman, General List. It was read in draft by Major O.J. Weiler, D.A.A.G.(S.P.), C.M.H.Q.

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