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The Participation of First Cdn Army
in Strategical Planning in 1942.

1. The present report describes Canadian participation in the high level strategical planning which was carried out in the United Kingdom during 1942 for certain Allied projected operations in Europe and the North Atlantic. The report covers the planning of three specific projects - Operations "JUPITER", "ROUND-UP" and "TONIC". The international implications involved in these projects were such that the majority of the material regarding two of the operations has not at the present time (December 1946) been downgraded in security from the TOP SECRET level.

"JUPITER REVIEW"

2. On 9 Jul 42 General McNaughton was summoned to a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (attended by Brooke, Portal and Pound) and informed that he had been invited by direction of the British Prime Minister and War Cabinet to review the possibilities of a Combined Operations project in northern Norway which was aimed primarily to protect the convoy routes to Russia. This projected operation had been previously studied and rejected by the Committee "as being impracticable at the present time" (General McNaughton's Personal Diary, 9 Jul 42). Mr. Churchill had refused to accept the Committee's rejection and had requested that the subject be reviewed by a new and unprejudiced mind. On the suggestion of the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Attlee, General McNaughton had been proposed as the "outsider" best fitted to carry out this investigation.

3. While dubious about the need for reviewing this operation, called "JUPITER", the Chiefs of Staff of all three services offered the fullest co-operation, and expressed a willingness to make available any staff officer that General McNaughton wished. "It was clearly evident that no bitterness whatever existed in the minds of the Chiefs of Staff on account of an outsider being called into consultation on this subject" (Ibid). In order to avoid any chance of prejudice, it was agreed that General McNaughton should not read previous criticisms of the project.

4. Already plans for a large-scale invasion of Europe were brewing, and it was understood that such plans called for participation by the Canadian Army. Everything depended upon building up sufficient reserves of men and equipment to ensure success, for failure might mean defeat. Under the circumstances, it was understood from the beginning that General McNaughton would not be prepared to commit Canadian troops in what was comparatively a "sideshow" unless good military reasons justified it, and only then, with the full concurrence of the Canadian Government (First Cdn Army file: PA 1-7-1: GS 2386, Canmilitary to Defensor, McNaughton to Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence and C.G.S. only, 9 Jul 42).

5. In a Most Secret cable General McNaughton informed his Government that the special task

... will not repeat not involve me handing over Comd First Cdn Army even temporarily but for the next few weeks I will have to leave much of detail to others. Fortunately First Cdn Army Staff is now fairly well advanced in organization and competent to carry on with collection all Cdn Units under Command in accordance with very satisfactory arrangements made yesterday by Paget which it is hoped to complete early in August.

(Ibid)

Meanwhile, chiefly as a result of shortage of staff officers, organization of 2 Canadian Corps had been deferred until 1 Aug 42, "when a start will be made looking to completion by end September" (Ibid). In view of this postponement the task of setting up a special staff was rendered somewhat simpler, and General McNaughton proposed to take Brigadier Simonds from 1 Canadian Corps as his B.G.S., to be assisted by Majors Spry, Page and Rowley, who had hitherto been employed at G.H.Q. Home Forces (General McNaughton's Personal Diary 13 Jul 42).

6. The specific object of Operation "JUPITER" was to seize enemy aerodromes in northern Norway from which Allied convoys to north Russia were being attacked. It involved the conquest and retention of such parts of northern Norway as were suitable for aerodromes (First Cdn Army file PA 1-7-1: Operation "JUPITER", War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee, War Office Fortress August 4, 1942; Printed for the War Cabinet, August 1942). In undertaking to examine the problem General McNaughton and his staff made no attempt to consider it against the background of other possible Allied military commitments.

... The problem of the capture and denial to the enemy of certain areas in North Norway has been studied solely on its own merits to deduce what are considered to be the minimum forces required under existing conditions and an operational and maintenance plan for their employment.

The assumption has been made that the Russian Armies are continuing effectively to resist the main German Armies on the eastern front at the time the operation is launched. Little justification could be found for Operation "Jupiter" as a gesture of rescue to Russian Armies which were already disintegrated. As consultation with the General Russian Staff has not been permitted, what is considered to be the minimum essential Russian co-operation has been assumed.

(First Cdn Army file PA 1-7-1: Operation "JUPITER", War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, op.cit., Annex 1).

In this connection Mr. Churchill forwarded a personal memorandum of his views on Operation "JUPITER" to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. With reference to General McNaughton's task, he remarked, "The Planners should set themselves to making a positive plan and overcoming the many difficulties, and not concern themselves with judging whether the Operation is desirable or not, which must be decided by higher authority." (First Cdn Army file PA 1-7-1: Memorandum for Chiefs of Staff Committee, initialled W.S.C., 13 Jun 42.)

7. On 12 Jul 42 in the course of a conversation with Mr. Churchill at Chequers, General McNaughton referred to "JUPITER REVIEW" as follows:

I said that I welcomed the present task which he had asked me to undertake but that I could not entirely give up my attention from the Canadian Army. As regards the duration of this task I said I could not give a definite opinion at present. It would certainly take two weeks and perhaps four weeks depending upon the availability of the information required. He said that I had a free hand to choose the staff required and he offered to help if any difficulties arose. I answered that so far we had met with every assistance and that I did not think that any insurmountable difficulties would arise.

The Prime Minister emphasized that the present task is a study without commitment to employ Canadian Troops, but he remarked that our people naturally knew about cold climates.

(General McNaughton's Personal Diary 15 Jul 42; Memorandum of Lieut.-General McNaughton's Visit with the Prime Minister on 12 Jul 42.)

8. General McNaughton's review of Operation "JUPITER" was issued by the War Office on 4 Aug 42. On balance it was considered that "there is little chance of strategical surprise or tactical surprise in respect of the objectives..." (First Cdn Army file PA 1-7-1: Operation "JUPITER" War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee; printed for the War Cabinet August 1942). Any reasonable prospect of success in the face of air opposition would depend on a combination of weather conditions making flying impracticable, and yet suitable for the lowering and beaching of assault craft. Based on meteorological averages, the chances of such a combination in December, when daylight hours were shortest, were about 6-1 against.

Russian co-operation in the form of an offensive on the Litsa front is essential. Once Russian troops have been committed to this attack, failure on our part to go through with the assault landings might have dire political consequences. Therefore, the final decision to proceed with the Combined Operations must be made when the Russian offensive opens, some ten days in advance of the arrival of assaulting forces off the beaches. It is beyond the powers of meteorologists to give any forecast over such a period and the final plunge must be taken on an incalculable chance that the weather may be favourable.

The operation is an extremely hazardous one. With good fortune quick and decisive successes might be gained - on the contrary, the result might be a military disaster of the first magnitude. In view of the size of the forces involved it is considered that the risks would only be acceptable if politically the results to be achieved were judged to be of the highest importance.

(Ibid)

9. For the Chiefs of Staffs there was considerable relief as well as satisfaction when General McNaughton's recommendations were made known. The "unusual constitutional arrangement" under which General McNaughton had been invited to review Operation "JUPITER" had been the British Prime Minister's responsibility. Mr. Churchill, despite the opposition of his Military Adviser, held strong views on the opportunities presented by "JUPITER", and it was probably with some trepidation that General McNaughton accepted an invitation to meet the Prime Minister at Chequers on 19 Sep 42 "presumably to discuss this matter on which his views are known to differ acutely from those of C. of S. Committee and myself" (First Cdn Army file PA 1-7-1: Tel GS 3271, McNaughton to Stuart, 18 Sep 42; see also *ibid*: Memorandum of 16 Sep 42). He carried with him, however, the whole-hearted support of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, whose secretary, Brigadier L.C. Hollis, had written on 11 Sep 42 that the Chiefs of Staff Committee: "have examined your appreciation on Operation 'Jupiter'." They "entirely endorse your conclusions. They expressed the opinion that this was one of the clearest and most ably worked out appreciations which they had ever had before them" (Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee to General McNaughton, Offices of the War Cabinet, 11 Sep 42).

10. But the British Prime Minister would not yet admit defeat. It was obvious that his mind was still set on an invasion of northern Scandinavia. As he watched the British convoys to Russia cut to pieces by German submarines and German aircraft based on Norway, the political as well as the military importance of getting supplies through to Russia assumed almost dominating proportions. There could be no more useful business, he told General McNaughton, than to make arms and to give them to Russia. If Russia were to cease fighting, Germany would have perhaps one hundred Divisions now on the Eastern Front available for attacks through the Caucasus, through Turkey, Spain, Morocco and West Africa, or even for an attack on England. (General McNaughton's Personal Diary, 22 Sep 42). In his Diary of 22 Sep 42 General McNaughton has recorded his feeling that the Prime Minister "was seeking to persuade - perhaps flatter - me into a course of action re "Jupiter" on which he had set his heart, knowing full well that as originally conceived it did not command the minds of his Chiefs of Staff" (*ibid*). Mr. Churchill's new plan involved a mission to Moscow headed by General McNaughton, and the British Prime Minister was prepared to ask the Prime Minister of Canada for his consent.

11. On 20 Sep 42 General McNaughton cabled as follows to the Chief of the General Staff in Ottawa:

II Prime Minister spoke of possible Russian co-operation on a large scale ... and of other factors which in his view emphasised importance early development of plans. He suggested to me that I undertake mission to Moscow later this week to concert these plans mentioning that if I went I would have access to Stalin personally. (Query.) He showed me his own memorandum on my

/paper

paper which called in question my conclusions on a number of points particularly Par IX on page three of printed paper. As regards this operation I said that naturally this conclusion might alter with changing tactical methods and equipment but I had not the data on the Malta convoy and the recent North Russia convoy both of which had taken place since my paper was written. He said then that I seemed to credit the German land and air forces with undue powers of movement and concentration and ability to operate larger forces over existing routes than would in fact be possible.

III. In reply I told him of the great care which had been taken in working out these conclusions which were based on the best technical information and advice obtainable ... As regards his invitation to me to go to Russia, I made no direct reply but said that as far as I was personally concerned I was anxious to do everything in my power which would help with the war and that under instructions of the Government of Canada I was naturally at disposal for any task ... He [Mr. Churchill] went on to say that my going would not involve a commitment to use Canadian troops, but he intimated this was desired. I again reminded the Prime Minister that I could do nothing useful unless I found myself in complete agreement with the views of the C. of S. Committee who are his constitutional advisers in the matter ... Further from a long discussion with Brooke C.I.G.S. on Thursday 17 Sep I know that he has not changed his view as to impracticability of operation under conditions predicated in my paper nor did he give me any indication that he thought Russians would participate on a large scale. I remind you Brooke was in Moscow with the Prime Minister and would presumably know of any specific offers made.

IV. There the matter rests for the moment and I do not intend to take any action myself pending further developments.

V. I must however point out that if on your instructions I go to Moscow and concert a plan then you may take it that pressure to use Canadian troops will be inevitable.

VI. For particular campaign in question this will involve a very comprehensive reorganization and re-equipment of our three Canadian infantry divisions at least and will alter the whole basis of our Army programme and training which up to the present has been focussed on a fundamentally different type of operation in western Europe. I doubt whether this could in fact be done effectively in the time likely to be available.

(First Cdn Army file PA 1-7-1;
GS 3284, Canmilitary to Defensor,
McNaughton to Stuart, 20 Sep 42.)

12. The proposed mission to Moscow was discussed at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee at Chequers, attended by Mr. Churchill, on the morning of 21 Sep 42. The Chiefs of Staff were anxious to persuade the Prime Minister to delay further action on "JUPITER" until it could be considered with other projects in a "Joint Appreciation" then in course of preparation. Nevertheless, on Mr. Churchill's insistence Operation "JUPITER" was discussed not on its own merits (which were still regarded unfavourably by the Chiefs of Staff) but in the political light of the general European scene. It was revealed that no further convoys could be run to Russia for the next three months, and that no definite undertaking could be given to open a "second front". With the Russians fighting for their lives it was considered, in the words of General McNaughton's Personal Diary, "that the least that could be done would be thoroughly to examine the possibility of Operation "JUPITER", so that should conditions develop making it both desirable and practical, everything would be ready to put it into effect. Anything less than this would seem inexcusable should Russia be defeated and put out of the war." (General McNaughton's Personal Diary, Appx I, 23 Sep 42, re meeting in the office of the V.C.I.G.S., 21 Sep 42).

13. Following this meeting a draft telegram to Stalin was circulated to members of the Committee. In essence this draft telegram proposed that Staff discussion should take place and plans for Operation "JUPITER" be drawn up and subsequently referred to the Governments of Russia, the United Kingdom and Canada:

... that no committment (sic) to carrying out the operation be involved unless and until these governments approved plans. That meanwhile preparatory work in detailed planning provision of equipment and training proceed as this would be useful in any event for other purposes.

(First Cdn Army file PA 1-7-1:
Tel GS 3297, Camilitary to Defensor,
McNaughton to Stuart, 21 Sep 42).

14. On 22 Sep 42 Mr. Churchill cabled Mr. Mackenzie King as follows:

We wish to send McNaughton to Moscow to discuss with Stalin and his experts the possibilities of the Operation "Jupiter", for the examination of which you kindly placed him at our disposal in July. There will be no question of any Canadian commitment. I shall be greatly obliged if you will authorize me to propose his name to Stalin.

(First Cdn Army file PA 1-7-1:
Tel 2108, Prime Minister to Prime
Minister, 22 Sep 42; also ibid.
Tel GS 3305, McNaughton to Stuart,
22 Sep 42).

15. General McNaughton asked the Chief of the General Staff for an affirmative reply to Mr. Churchill's personal request but he added:

May I observe that despite the fact that no commitment (sic) is specified in Mr. Churchill's cable and should a practical plan evolve from conversation in Moscow which is later approved by Governments of Russia U.K. and Canada then we are certain to be asked to participate. Adequate training is of the utmost importance and I therefore propose to arrange this before leaving.

(First Cdn Army file PA 1-7-1:
Tel GS 3305, Cannilitary to
Defensor, McNaughton to Stuart,
22 Sep 42).

16. On 24 Sep 42 Mr. King cabled as follows to the British Prime Minister:

My colleagues in the War Committee and I have given the most careful consideration today to your Most Secret message conveyed in Malcolm Macdonald's letter to me of September 22. The Minister of National Defence had already been advised fully by General McNaughton whose views in regard to the proposed operation and whose recommendation of an affirmative reply to your request were before the War Committee. Before I received your personal message we had communicated with General McNaughton pointing out that it was felt very strongly that his participation in such a mission would probably be taken to imply commitment in advance on Canada's part to an operation the feasibility of which was in view of his own conclusions open to the gravest doubts and that notwithstanding any reservations which might be made it might be taken as indicating our readiness to undertake such a commitment regardless of military considerations. It was pointed out to General McNaughton that it was felt that it would be much more natural and appropriate that such a mission should be headed by United Kingdom officer. This would follow naturally upon visits to Moscow by yourself and United Kingdom officers and would be so viewed in the United States as well as in Britain and Canada. I think that you would also wish to know of the following additional relevant considerations which we feel to be of importance. It would be extremely difficult if not impossible to keep the mission secret. General McNaughton's leadership of such a mission would we believe give rise at once to speculation of his being selected as Commander in Chief of a United Nations force for the opening of a second front. Concerning this as you are aware there has already been much public discussion particularly in the United States and this we fear might prejudice McNaughton in his relations with the Chiefs of Staff in Britain and the United States and also subject him to embarrassing comment in the press and elsewhere. General McNaughton's heading of the mission would at once suggest an operation in conjunction with Russia was contemplated and that the Canadian Army would participate. It seems to us that Jupiter would be an obvious conclusion for the enemy to reach. General McNaughton would consider and properly so that his paramount responsibility as Commander of the Canadian Army would be to tender

to the Canadian Government such advice as he might feel bound to give as to the military feasibility of the expedition. With this responsibility it might be embarrassing to you and to us as well as to him if he were at the same time to represent the United Kingdom Government or Chiefs of Staffs in discussions looking to the adoption after possible modification of a project on which he had already expressed a considered and adverse opinion. This embarrassment might be increased by the fact that the discussions on which conclusions formed would be affected by political as well as military considerations. McNaughton has mentioned that any plans drafted would be referred for consideration to the quote three Governments concerned unquote viz the United Kingdom the USSR and Canada. In our view the operation envisaged is of a scale and significance which bring it within the realm of major strategy decisions in respect of which should be shared by the United States. You are aware of the extent to which U S and Canadian Forces are cooperating on this continent as well as in Europe. Were the President not to be advised and his approval obtained in advance of the proposed mission its personnel and its object he almost certainly would feel that he should have been given an opportunity to express his views. In all the circumstances we are of the opinion that it would be unwise to have General McNaughton singled out for the purpose suggested. Our misgivings would not be as strong if McNaughton were to be a member though not the head of a combined mission upon which the United Kingdom and the United States were represented. I need not assure you that the views expressed above should not be construed as in any way modifying our fixed policy that Canadian Forces are to be available to be used wherever they can best serve the common cause. The Minister of National Defence and the Chief of our General Staff will be in Britain at the beginning of next week and will be able to give you our considered views in more detail.

(Ibid, contained in GS 2300
Defensor to Camilitary, Stuart
to McNaughton, 24 Sep 42).

17. In the meantime the whole situation had altered for General McNaughton as a consequence of a Staff Study (J.P.(42) 840, dated 23 Sep 42) giving particulars of British forces which might be available under Operation "JUPITER". (See Cdn Army file PA 1-7-1: McNaughton to Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 24 Sep 42). Since General McNaughton's "Jupiter Review" had been based on the assumption that a fixed number of British troops as well as large Russian forces could be counted upon, the reduction of forces suggested in this study seemed to undermine the original basis of his appeal to the Canadian Government for permission to go to Moscow. Under these circumstances he felt compelled to cable Ottawa, in part as follows:

III. The Paper J P (42) 840 was then given close study from which it emerged that in place of having British forces of five divisions etc. contemplated in my Appreciation Jupiter Review plus large additional Russian forces as a basis for new plans. The most that could be made available on the British side was a corps of two divs. Further the date was so late in the year as to make tactical surprise

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unobtainable. This profoundly altered the basis on which I had been proceeding and on which I had tendered my advice to you to give an affirmative answer to Mr. Churchill's cable to Mr. King. Accordingly I wrote to Secretary C of S committee as follows quote further to my letter to you of last night in which I acknowledged receipt of certain papers which were to be considered by the Chiefs of Staff Committee at 1115 a.m. today. As regards the last para of my letter, I have not yet received authority from my Government to undertake the contemplated mission to Moscow and in consequence, you will agree, it is not possible for me to meet the Chiefs of Staff Committee. However, I do not think that this is material, for the information given in Paper JP (42) 840 dated 23 Sep 1942 shows conclusively that no basis exists for a modification of "Plan Jupiter Review", which under existing circumstances would bring our participation into the realm of a practical operation of war. In consequence, there is no background for realistic military discussions with the Russian General Staff. I must point out that my agreement to advise my government to make my services available for the mission was based on the hypothesis that at least the full resources specified in "Jupiter Review" would be available from the United Kingdom, and that in addition very large Russian forces could be counted upon. This not being the case, I would have to communicate the facts to my government and take further instructions before I could proceed unquote. This letter was delivered by hand this morning before the meeting.

IV. I now have your GS 2300 and I note that no affirmative reply has been given to Mr. Churchill's invitation. Ends.

(Ibid, GS 3325, McNaughton to Stuart, 24 Sep 42).

18. In an effort to avoid a breakdown the Chiefs of Staff made haste to point out that Paper No. J.P. (42) 840 was merely a Staff Study which had not at the time been considered by the Chiefs of Staff themselves, and that it now seemed possible "to resolve or mitigate some of the many difficulties and obstacles to the Operation which are set out in that paper." (First Cdn Army file PA 1-7-1: Brigadier L.C. Hollis, Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, to General McNaughton, 24 Sep 42). This message was immediately cabled to Ottawa, but in no way affected the issue in the minds of the Canadian Government. On 25 Sep 42, through the medium of the United Kingdom High Commissioner, Mr. King informed Mr. Churchill as follows:

Have considered with the greatest care your message received today through Malcolm MacDonald. General McNaughton has also informed us of his correspondence with the Chiefs of Staff. [I need scarcely say that we have had very much in mind the critical importance of every thing practicable being done to encourage and sustain Russia at this time and are most anxious to give every possible assistance towards that end. Aside altogether from any question of commitment on Canada's part it seems to us that to have McNaughton undertake a mission of the kind contemplated without a realistic plan in which he himself has confidence

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offering at least a reasonable prospect of success upon which military discussions could be based would be to risk results prejudicial to relations with the Soviet Union as well as to McNaughton's own future usefulness.] From what we have before us it would seem that plans so far considered do not provide such a background. We have endeavoured to give full weight to the important points you now mention. However everything considered we cannot but feel that the serious issues mentioned in my reply to your previous message would inevitably be raised by a visit to Moscow of the Commander of the Canadian Army as the head of such a mission. Knowing how great your anxieties are we all very much regret not being able to see eye to eye with you in this matter. I can assure you however that we have sought to view it sympathetically in all its bearings. Ends.

(Ibid; contained in Tel GOS 475
Defensor to Canmilitary, Stuart
to McNaughton, 26 Sep 42).

19. It was now clear that the "JUPITER" project was "dying" in the face of mounting opposition. The text of Mr. Churchill's second cable to the Canadian Government is not available. It is clear, however, that he regretted the Canadian Government's refusal to release General McNaughton for the Moscow Mission, but failing a reconsideration of this decision the British Prime Minister still hoped to send a Senior British Officer. In view, however, of the doubts expressed within the British War Cabinet, as well as within the Chiefs of Staff Committee, it was already assumed at Headquarters, First Canadian Army, that Operation "JUPITER" would soon enter the lumber room of lost causes. (Ibid; see Memorandum of Brigadier G.G. Simonds, 29 Sep 42).

"ROUND-UP"

20. Meanwhile various projects for the invasion of the Continent were under discussion (see General McNaughton's Personal Diary, Appx B, 3 Sep 42; Memorandum of 2 Sep 42). Chief interest centered on "ROUND-UP" which envisaged a full scale invasion of the Continent of Europe with a general frontage which included the Pas-de-Calais, Seine North, Seine South and Cherbourg. In the autumn of 1942 Canadian Military policy was directed towards preparing for Operation "ROUND-UP", on the assumption that a self-contained Canadian Army would participate. At a meeting held in General McNaughton's office on 3 Oct 42, attended by the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the General Staff, the G.O.C.-in-C. once again emphasized that he was against "any splitting up of the Cdn Army, just as the Commander of the Cdn Corps in the last war had been", and the meeting generally agreed. He also pointed out that "the Cdn Army could bring the greatest effect against the enemy by operating as a self-contained force serving under their own officers and as a truly Canadian organization". (General McNaughton's Personal Diary, 4 Oct 42; Memorandum of 3 Oct 42). Plans called for the use of British, American and Canadian forces, and in October 1942 the role specified for First Canadian Army was to "follow up" through the bridgehead gained by the Americans. (Ibid)

21. The target date for "ROUND-UP" had originally been 1 May 43, but owing to the slow movement of American formations and units overseas the date had to be postponed. None the less, the vastness of the "ROUND-UP" project involving as it did the intimate and detailed co-ordination of Allied plans weighed heavily on administrative planning staffs. For Canada the objective of a self-contained army meant a considerable stretching of manpower resources, and there were fears in some quarters that this might seriously encroach upon industrial production. By October the total Canadian Army Overseas would be about 167,000 all ranks. The total Canadian force required for "ROUND-UP" was 250,000. Apart from the need of another 85,000 men there were the onerous tasks of organizing new units and staffs particularly for L. of C. and Base. (General McNaughton's Personal Diary, Appx "I": Memorandum of 20 Sep 42).

22. Another difficulty was that of training. When Canadian participation in "ROUND-UP" had first been contemplated there were in the United Kingdom large numbers of American, British and Canadian troops. Consequently anti-raid and anti-invasion roles were a broadly shared responsibility; the 1st Canadian Corps could, under the circumstances, be easily withdrawn for organization and special training relative to its role in "ROUND-UP". By the autumn because of the exodus of British troops from the United Kingdom three Canadian brigade groups had to be left in Sussex for local defence until a complete British Lower Establishment Division became available. Indeed, although he disliked the idea, General McNaughton offered to leave Canadian Corps under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief, S.E.C.O. This proposal had been gratefully accepted. (Ibid)

23. The possibility of the German invasion in 1942 was never far from the thoughts of General McNaughton. At the time of Mr. Ralston's visit to Britain it seemed to him that the threat of invasion was not as unlikely as was generally supposed. According to the Minutes of a meeting held on 3 Oct 42, General McNaughton saw a danger in weakening at all severely the Home Defence forces.

If the Russian front could be stabilized it might be possible for the Germans to free some 60 - 70 divisions and make them available for operations in any theatre. All intelligence pointed to the fact that German preparations in the Low Countries and France had been carried out in great detail. He further stated that owing to the fact that the Germans could operate on interior lines and of the great flexibility with which they can move their air forces, the defence of the U.K. was still of prime importance if a "toe hold" on the Continent of Europe was to continue to be held by us.

(General McNaughton's Personal Diary, 4 Oct 42; Memorandum Minutes of a meeting held in General McNaughton's office, 3 Oct 42)

24. This opinion was shared by General Paget, C.-in-C. Home Forces, who expressed the view that "we were taking very serious risks as regards the defence of the United Kingdom... Whatever success might be achieved elsewhere, failure here would end the

war for us." (General McNaughton's Personal Diary 19 Oct 42; Memorandum of meeting at the War Office 17 Oct 42). According to General Paget, the Chiefs of Staff Committee placed a high value on the air forces to counter invasion (of which it was assumed a two months' period of warning might be expected); but the C.-in-C. Home Forces refused to share this optimism unless adequate ground forces were certainly available. (Ibid)

25. Nevertheless, projects for operations on the Continent of Europe continued to be studied, and General Sir Alan Brooke, the C.I.C.S., was anxious that the Canadian Army participate in at least one project. According to General Brooke, the Canadian Minister of National Defence "had expressed a wish for the more active employment of the Canadian Army." (Ibid). Two projects were opened for consideration by the Canadian Army. One involved the use of a "Northern Task Force" which would be used in alliance with Operation "TORCH" (invasion of North Africa) and which would involve the close association of British and American troops. General McNaughton was opposed to Canadian participation on the grounds that a self-contained Canadian organization would be difficult to maintain, and he was anxious "that any Canadian force employed might be so used that it could be returned to the Cdn Army at an early date as he attached great importance to keeping them as a well-planned, self-contained organization for Home Defence and eventual employment on the Continent." (Ibid) Under the circumstances General Paget agreed to furnish the elements for the "Northern Task Force" from the Home Forces.

Brooke

"TONIC"

26. With regard to the second project, the occupation of the Spanish Canary Islands (Operation "Tonic"), General McNaughton showed greater enthusiasm. "TONIC" was originally designed to facilitate the invasion of North Africa (Operation "Torch"), but it contemplated a separate and distinct operation in the event of a German invasion of Spain.

27. It was a recognized and traditional fact that Britain always required a fleet base in the eastern Atlantic. In the event of Gibraltar being occupied, the Canaries provided the only possible base in that area. Moreover, the position of the Canaries on the flank of the sea route to North Africa made it essential to deny their facilities to the enemy.

28. The specific object of Operation "TONIC" was the acquisition of La Luz as a fleet base and, incidentally, the harbour of Santa Cruz as well as the flying boat base at Grand Canary. On the assumption that Allied troops would not be "invited" to occupy the Canaries, Operation "TONIC" was planned as an armed invasion.

29. As early as March, 1941, plans had been initiated for the organization of a striking force which would be ready to land in the Canary Islands should Germany invade Spain and occupy Gibraltar. This force, with headquarters at Inveraray, was to include two Royal Marine Brigades, the Special Services Brigade as well as supporting tanks, artillery, engineers and services. The original operation was designated "Pilgrim", and General Alexander and Admiral Hamilton were selected as force commanders. In August a full-scale rehearsal was carried out at Scapa Flow, when L.S.T. were used for the first time. The subsequent report of the "Pilgrim" commanders on this exercise recommended complete freedom of action vis-à-vis the Director of Combined Operations.

This move for independence on the part of the force commanders led to disagreement between the Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Combined Operations, Admiral Sir Roger Keyes, which ultimately led to the resignation of the latter and the appointment on 4 Oct 41 of Lord Louis Mountbatten as "Adviser on Combined Operations."* (C.O.H.Q./C/F: The Evolution and Development of Combined Operations, Technique and Material, March 1946, pp.11-12.)

Real H.L.H.K.

30. In September, Admiral Hamilton and General Alexander completed a final draft of the invasion plans, which included a direct assault on La Luz. In Mar 42, however, the whole scheme was re-examined by Major-General E.C.A. Schreiber and the direct assault was omitted owing to lack of sufficient naval forces. (See First Cdn Army file 7-1-2(Ops): War Cabinet, Joint Planning Staff, Operation "Tonic", Report by the Joint Planning Staff, 24 Nov 42).

31. Meanwhile, by the summer of 1942, "TONIC" had succeeded "Pilgrim" as the projected operational safeguard. Obviously, there was no certainty that this operation would be undertaken. Indeed, by the late autumn of 1942, it seemed most improbable that Germany would enter Spain, especially in the event of Spanish resistance. None the less, any substantial Russian defeat could abruptly alter the whole situation, and throughout the year the need for Operation "TONIC" as a potential safeguard remained.

32. In the words of the report by the Joint Planning Staff (16 Dec 42):

If the Germans were in Spain, the amount of shipping which could be passed through the Straits of Gibraltar would be severely limited so that Casablanca would become the main port of transit for the whole of French North Africa. And in these circumstances, we cannot ignore the possibility, however remote it may be, that the Germans might base heavy ships at Lisbon or Corunna. Dakar is too far to the south for a fleet operating from there to give cover to our North African supply route. Therefore, the original object of the operation, viz. to acquire the use of La Luz as an alternative fleet base in the event of Gibraltar becoming unusable still holds good.

(First Cdn Army file PA 1-11-1:
War Cabinet, Joint Planning Staff,
Operation Tonic. Report by the
Joint Planning Staff, 16 Dec 42)

33. The possibilities of Canadian participation were explained by General McNaughton in a memorandum of 19 Oct 42. According to General McNaughton, the C.I.G.S., General Sir Alan Brooke, had stated:

* In March 1942 the Prime Minister directed that Lord Louis be called Chief of Combined Operations and be promoted Vice-Admiral with the honorary ranks of Lieutenant-General and Air Marshal. Furthermore, the C.C.O. should become a full member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee when matters concerning him were discussed.

... that the chance to undertake this operation was offered to us in view of the representations made by Canadian Minister of Defence, but if we did not wish to do so, he would find someone else. I then again stated that what we desired, and I was sure this was the view of the Government and people of Canada also, was that Cdn Army should be so used as to make the maximum contribution of which it was capable; we would act in whole or part and would give most careful consideration to any project; we could not act without the approval of our Government except as regards Home Defence and raids on the Continent of Europe of limited duration. He might be sure that prompt consideration would be given and recommendations made in respect to "Tonic". We were not particularly concerned with fighting for its own sake or glamour, nor did I think that a prolonged wait for a proper opportunity to strike would have an adverse effect on morale. Our officers and men were far too sensible.

(General McNaughton's Personal Diary, Appx I, 17 Oct 42; Memorandum of meeting at War Office, attended by C.I.C.S., C.-in-C. Home Forces and General McNaughton, 17 Oct 42).

34. Operation "TONIC" involved the use of headquarters 1 Cdn Corps and 1 and 3 Canadian Divisions. 2 Canadian Division had not yet repaired the losses sustained in Dieppe, and it was planned to continue it for the time being in a Home Defence role. "Tonic" involved 6-8 weeks' preparation since an opposed landing might be expected. From the point of view of General McNaughton one great advantage lay in the fact that, following the operation, the Canadian force "would then become available to rejoin the Canadian Army in the U.K." (First Cdn Army file PA 1-11-1: Memorandum of meeting held in the Army Commander's office, 17 Oct 42). After studying an Appreciation drawn up by the British Joint Planning Staff, he cabled Ottawa requesting authority to undertake the operation.

I have satisfied myself that the required special training and the organization and equipment of the force can be effected in the time available and that the operation is one which would contribute substantially to the success of the Allied cause.

(General McNaughton's Personal Diary, Appx K, containing Tel GB 3577, Camilitary to Defensor, 18 Oct 42)

35. On 18 Oct 42 General McNaughton wrote to the C.I.C.S. as follows:

I have now had an opportunity to study and consider the outline plan prepared by your Joint Planning Staff ...

I have reached the conclusion that this represents a satisfactory basis from which to develop detailed plans for a practicable operation and I have therefore cabled my Government for authority to undertake this operation and to proceed with the necessary preparations forthwith.

(First Cdn Army file PA 1-11-1:
General McNaughton to General Sir
Alan Brooke, K.C.B., D.S.O., 18 Oct 42)

36. On 22 Oct the Chief of the General Staff replied as follows:

As requested you are authorized to undertake this operation and to advise the C.I.G.S. accordingly, subject always when the detailed plans are worked out to your being satisfied as to its military feasibility and value compared with risks involved and as to the adequacy of resources and of arrangements for transportation and support. On completion of detailed plans will you please report on these points for information of War Committee.

(First Cdn Army file PA 1-11-1:
Tel CGS 552, Stuart to McNaughton,
22 Oct 42)

The following day General McNaughton informed the C.I.G.S. that he had received his Government's authorization to proceed with detailed planning.

I name Lt.-Gen. H.D.G. Crerar, Comd 1 Cdn Corps, as the Commander of the Canadian land forces which will be composed of the required elements of H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, 1 Cdn Div, 3 Cdn Div and such other detachments of units and services as may be found to be necessary and available.

(General McNaughton's Personal
Diary, Appx M, McNaughton to
Brooke, 23 Oct 42).

37. "TONIC" was only "a possibility", but nevertheless offices were arranged for General Crerar and his planning staff at 123 Whitehall Court, and General McNaughton requested that enquiries be made with regard to various Combined Operations training facilities which might be available to the Canadian Army.

38. It was highly important that the utmost secrecy should be observed in preparations and in order to supply "cover" for General Crerar and his staff the official statement to the Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., merely announced that a Canadian Planning office was being opened at the War Office in order that certain selected First Canadian Army officers might obtain practice in planning possible operations and that a desirable liaison would be established with the appropriate branches of the War Office. (First Cdn Army file 6/7 Corps/1/2: McNaughton to Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., 19 Oct 42).

39. On 2 Nov 42 General Crerar expressed certain doubts to the Army Commander regarding the "Cover" supplied for the Canadian Planning Staff in London. He suggested that:

The cover reason for the Cdn. Plan. Staff should be the necessity of training selected members, H.Q. 1st Cdn Corps (incl it's G.O.C.) and of 1st Cdn Army in the technique of Combined Ops., and in conjunction with the reps of other Services. For cover purposes we could refer to the Cdn. Plan. Staff as "Cdn Combined Ops, Staff Course" London.

(First Cdn Army file PA 1-11-1:
Crerar to McNaughton, 2 Nov 42).

To this General McNaughton replied on the same day:

I have your Most Secret notes of 1 and 2 November 1942. I am averse to any over elaborate cover plan for it will invariably defeat its own purpose.

The small staff set up in London for the moment is known as "Cdn Planning Staff" and I see no purpose in changing it, at least, until as a result of the discussions which I expect you will shortly be authorized to undertake with the Naval and Air Force Commanders, we know what should be the set up of the Joint Planning Staff for the operation in question.

I am all for the Cdn Headquarters involved in the operation being the Headquarters of 1 Cdn Corps and when it is withdrawn from SECO for the purpose I will arrange for another Headquarters, possibly H.Q. 2 Cdn Corps, to take its place.

(Ibid: McNaughton to Crerar,
2 Nov 42)

40. The note of 1 Nov to which General McNaughton referred dealt with the question of "residual responsibilities" in Sussex, when the troops required for Operation "TONIC" left the area. The 2nd Canadian Division would remain, along with a considerable proportion of the 1st and 3rd Canadian Divisions, other than infantry units. It was clear too that the bulk of "bodies" forming Headquarters 1 Canadian Corps would also be left behind. It seemed to General Crerar that the simplest "hand over" of 1 Canadian Corps residual troops and S.E.C.O. responsibilities "would be to call the Headquarters left behind 'H.Q. Cdn Forces Sussex' or some such title... and then fill up the vacancy caused by the departure of those required for "TONIC" by the officers and sub-staff earmarked for equivalent duties H.Q. S.E.C.O. and 2 Cdn Corps".

I think it very desirable that it should be recognised that G.O.C. 1 Cdn Corps, and H.Q. Staff of that Corps are functioning as the military portion of the Operation. Otherwise, the Corps H.Q. will lose its association with such responsibilities - or rather, never establish it. The H.Q. and Command of an "ad hoc" type, with a special name, will disappear after "the ball is over."

(First Cdn Army file PA 1-11-1:
Crerar to McNaughton, 1 Nov 42)

41. Such contemplated arrangements are presented as an example of the extent to which operational planning conflicted with basic Canadian Army training plans. Operation "TONIC" was not a certainty, but the 1st Canadian Corps would, of necessity, be

out in two once "TONIC" passed the preliminary planning stage. Such instability was inevitable; plans might even be changed daily or weekly to meet changing circumstances of war. Nevertheless, General McNaughton felt that under present arrangements he should be kept more fully informed of operational planning. As a consequence of the present situation he had found himself "unable adequately to advise the Minister of National Defence." (General McNaughton's Personal Diary, 4 Oct 42; Memorandum of minutes of meeting held in General McNaughton's office attended by Minister of National Defence, 3 Oct 42). On 26 Oct General McNaughton confessed that plans evolved and changed so rapidly that it was quite impossible to complete a systematic preparation required for any one of them or even to know for certain "what was on and what was off". He referred to "Round-Up" on which by agreement with C.I.G.S. and C.-in-C. Home Forces we had based the Cdn plans for development". Only incidentally had he learned of changes in plans for some time after they had been made.

We had the best will in the world to co-operate with the British authorities and had in fact met every request they had made, but this sort of thing made it very difficult for us to act sensibly in guiding our preparations which were now on a very large scale involving plans for a couple of hundred thousand troops or so, of which about 170,000 were now in the U.K. with supply lines and projects of all sorts stretching back across the Atlantic in time and space to Canada.

(General McNaughton's Personal Diary, 26 Oct 42; Memorandum of discussion with Sir Stafford Cripps, 23 Oct 42)

42. Meanwhile, in view of the preoccupation of Headquarters 1st Canadian Corps with Operation "TONIC" it seemed proper that another Canadian Corps Headquarters should take its place. Many Canadian unit and formation rear parties from the 1st and 3rd Canadian Divisions would be left in the Sussex area, and it was planned, moreover, to bring in a British infantry division from another command. Under the circumstances General McNaughton advised General Swayne, C.O.C.-in-C., S.E.C.C. that he would proceed immediately with the formation of Headquarters 2nd Canadian Corps. Such an organization would be at first on a "nucleus" basis, merely relieving such personnel of Headquarters 1st Canadian Corps whom General Crerar wished to have with him on his Planning Staff. (General McNaughton's Personal Diary, Appx G, 5 Nov 42; Memorandum of a conversation by General McNaughton with General Paget, C.-in-C. Home Forces, at G.H.Q. Home Forces, 4 Nov 42).

43. As soon as Headquarters 2nd Canadian Corps was prepared to take over, General McNaughton planned to withdraw Headquarters 1st Canadian Corps to Cobham, Surrey, where they could prepare for "TONIC" without distraction. On the return of the "TONIC" forces to S.E.C.C. General Swayne suggested, and General McNaughton agreed, that Canadian forces in Sussex should be so disposed that two infantry divisions would be forward under command Headquarters, 1 Canadian Corps, while 2 Canadian Corps consisting of one Canadian infantry division and 5 Canadian Armoured Division ("which would be better equipped very shortly") would be held in reserve. (First Cdn Army file PA 1-11-1: Headquarters First Cdn Army, 3 Nov 42; Memorandum of discussion between General McNaughton and General Swayne, 2 Nov 42).

44. By November plans for Operation "TONIC" had advanced to a point where directives to Force Commanders could be issued. On 4 Nov, General Crerar was informed as follows:-

In accordance with arrangements which I have made with the Chiefs of Staff Committee, you have been nominated as Military Commander for an operation against the Canary Islands should it be decided to undertake this operation. The object of the operation is to seize and hold the Islands of Grand Canary and Tenerife, with a view to securing for our own use the harbours at La Luz and Santa Cruz, and the flying boat bases in Grand Canary.

An estimate of the forces required for the operation is shown in the outline plan. You will examine this outline plan jointly with the Naval and Air Force Commanders who have been issued with similar directives. You should consult the Chief of Combined Operations and you should obtain any assistance you require from the Executive Planning Section of the Joint Planning Staff, through which your contacts with British Government Departments should be made. You will arrange any necessary alterations to the outline plan through the Executive Planning Section. You will in conjunction with the Naval and Air Force Commanders report to the Chiefs of Staff on completion of your examination.

45. Rear Admiral Hamilton was appointed Naval Commander; as yet no Air Force Commander had been nominated. Meanwhile, with the establishment of a small special staff in London adjacent to the War Office (see para 37), General Crerar began the task of detailed planning, a task that was rendered the more difficult by the absence of adequate air photographs.* He was given no executive functions; arrangements for training units of 1st and 3rd Canadian Divisions in Combined Operations were made by General McNaughton. (First Cdn Army file PA 1-11-1: McNaughton to Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., enclosing cable McNaughton to Stuart, 7 Nov 42). From the 3rd Canadian Division, the Highland Light Infantry of Canada, the Stormont Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders and the North Nova Scotia Highlanders were chosen as assault units. (Ibid: Memorandum to the B.G.S. 1 Cdn Corps from H.Q. First Cdn Army, 7 Dec 42)

46. Unfortunately, towards the end of December, landing craft training for Canadian troops had to be suspended. "The fact of the matter is", wrote Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten to General McNaughton, "that, largely due to the North African expedition, Combined Operations Command has got into very low water both as regards crews and craft." (Ibid: Mountbatten to McNaughton, 23 Dec 42). In order to meet future operational requirements the C.-in-C., Combined Operations, was forced to concentrate his energies on the repair and reconditioning of craft and the training of Naval crews.

* In regard to the request of the Canadian Planning Staff for air photographs, the Chiefs of Staff, after consideration, came to the conclusion that "from the political point of view, air photographs should not be taken at present." (First Cdn Army file 7-1-2 Ops (Tonic): Page to Mann, 19 Nov 42)

47. To add to the difficulties of active planning, it was impossible to get the co-operation of the Naval Commander, Admiral Hamilton, owing to his enforced absence from London.* None the less, as General Crerar put it: "... the time at the disposal of the members of the Canadian Planning Staff is being put to very good advantage. All members who are not actually required to get on with preparatory work, are either "sitting in" with their War Office or Combined Operations opposite numbers, or attending, temporarily, Courses of Instruction, such as that now being given to Div Staffs at Largs. I am quite sure that the knowledge these officers are now obtaining will serve a most valuable future purpose, whatever happens to "TONIC". (First Cdn Army file 7-1-2(Ops): Crerar to McNaughton, 8 Dec 42)

48. Meanwhile, decisions taken by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 19 Dec indicated that "Tonic" was likely to be put on the shelf. Intelligence reports confirmed the prevailing view that it was "most improbable that Germany would attempt to move into Spain against Spanish resistance during the winter, even if she had the necessary forces, and that next spring she is unlikely to have the forces available unless unexpectedly Russia collapses". (Ibid: Report by Joint Planning Staff, Operation Tonic (circulated for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff) 16 Dec 42). The instructions issued by this Committee to complete the scheme on paper amounted to a direction, in the words of General Crerar, to "go in for a swim but not get wet". (Ibid: Crerar to McNaughton, 22 Oct 42). In the circumstances, General Crerar proposed to "round-off" the existing plan to the limited extent that the absence of the Naval Commander and the lack of beach photographs would permit. His suggested procedure was as follows:

3. (a) Complete the Intelligence Report on the Grand Canary now being compiled under my direction by the Canadian Planning Staff.
- (b) In the light of the considerable additional information which this Report will place at my disposal, and assuming that the Naval Force Commander will agree to whatever changes I may, in consequence, make to the composition and intended action of the Military Force, to re-draft the Army aspects of the existing joint outline plan.
- (c) Based on this re-draft, to draw up a directive covering the intended tactical employment of the Military Force, in pursuit of the objectives laid down, following its landing on the Grand Canary.

4. As regards the programme indicated in para 3 above, the majority of the officer personnel of the Canadian Planning Staff are presently gaining knowledge and experience in courses and exercises conducted by the Director of Combined Training. These attachments are scheduled to continue until approximately 15 Jan 1943. As urgency in the completion of such planning action as I can separately accomplish is not indicated, I do not propose to

/curtail

* In a memorandum based on a meeting of the Joint Planning Staff on 21 Dec, General Crerar wrote: "As indicated in the minutes of this meeting, the ability of the Force Commanders to carry out these instructions is negatived, in a practical sense, by the continued preoccupation of the Naval Force Commander on other duties." (Ibid: Memorandum of 22 Dec 42)

curtail these attachments. It follows that the work indicated in para. 3 will not be completed before about 1 Feb 1943.

(Ibid: Memorandum on Operation Tonic to Executive Planning Section, Joint Planning Staff, 22 Dec 42)

49. Unfortunately, it was not until 28 Dec 42 that General McNaughton learned officially of the Chiefs of Staff decision that Operation "TONIC" was no longer required and that the Canadian Planning Staff might now be disbanded. Although the blame for withholding this information could be laid at the doors of the Secretariat, there was, in the words of the Canadian Army Commander, "obviously something wrong with the machinery which failed to keep him fully informed with the progress of planning". (General McNaughton's Personal Diary, Appx "K": Memorandum of telephone conversation General McNaughton - General Kennedy, D.M.O., War Office, 28 Dec 42). As a result of this mishap the C.I.G.S. agreed to investigate the machinery for liaison with Canadian Army Headquarters, "during the planning stage of any operation in which it may be involved". General Sir Alan Brooke further agreed that the Senior Canadian Combatant Officer in the United Kingdom should be kept fully informed of the progress of such planning, and that copies of all papers issued to the Force Commander should be sent to him for his perusal (General McNaughton's Personal Diary, Appx "O", ~~28 Dec 42~~: Memorandum of conversation General McNaughton - General Brooke, C.I.G.S., War Office, 31 Dec 42).

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50. On 2 Jan 43 General McNaughton wrote to Brigadier L.C. Hollis, Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, as follows:-

I understand also that the situation now is that this operation has been postponed sine die and in consequence that there is no longer any need to keep troops detailed for it or to maintain the special planning staff which I had set up. I would be obliged if you would confirm this.

May I request that in reference to this project or any other projects which may be initiated involving Canadian troops or Officers of the Cdn Army as Force Commanders that copies of all relevant papers be made available to me direct at H.Q. First Cdn Army and as expeditiously as possible as otherwise I find myself at a grave disadvantage in planning for and arranging any action which may be consequential on conclusions reached by the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

(First Cdn Army file PA 1-11-1: McNaughton to Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 2 Jan 42)

51. By 6 Jan 43 it was agreed that any further study of Operation "TONIC" was purely academic, (Ibid: Memorandum of conversation between Generals McNaughton and Crerar on 5 Jan 43, 6 Jan 43), although the outline plan was to be kept available should circumstances eventually call for action. (First Cdn Army file 7-1-2 (Ops): Brig L.C. Hollis, Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee to General McNaughton, 7 Jan 43). Plans for operations in the Mediterranean were reaching final form. Allied successes in North Africa marked a major turn in the fortunes of war, and the

urgency that had been responsible for removing 1 Canadian Corps from their training grounds had passed. (General McNaughton's Personal Diary, Appx "O", 4 Jan 43: Memorandum of Conversation General McNaughton - General Brooke, C.I.G.S., War Office, held at the War Office, 31 Dec 42). A little later, suggested the C.I.G.S., General Brooke, Canadians [one infantry division] might participate in another operation in the same theatre further east.

52. As a consequence, beginning in January 1943 the work of reorganizing the Canadian Army Overseas was once again resumed and it was arranged that First Canadian Army should not be worried with manoeuvres preliminary to Exercise "Spartan" until approximately 1 Feb. (General McNaughton's Personal Diary, Appx "M", 2 Jan 43: Memorandum of conversation General McNaughton - General Paget, 31 Dec 42). Meanwhile, on 23 Jan 43, the Chiefs of Staff Committee instructed their secretary "to convey to the Canadian authorities their appreciation of the work which had been put in on the preparation of the plan." The same minutes recorded the Force Commanders' advice "that the existing plan for 'Tonic' had been 'rounded off' so far as was possible without the results of photographic reconnaissance. Only the last official formalities remained - to 'pigeon hole' the plan and disband the Planning Staff." (CPS/OPS/1-0/"T"/Vol 1: Extract of Minutes, 20th meeting Chiefs of Staff Committee, Offices of the War Cabinet, 23 Jan 43)

53. This report was prepared by Major G.S. Graham, Gen List.

G.P. Stacey
for (G.P. Stacey) Colonel
Director, Historical Section
Canadian Military Headquarters