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Operation "TIMBERWOLF": The Movement of
1 Cdn Corps to the Mediterranean, 1943.

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10 Feb 47

Operation "TIMBERWOLF": The Movement of
1 Cdn Corps to the Mediterranean, 1943

1. A series of earlier reports^{*} have dealt with the movement of 1 Cdn Inf Div and 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde (hereinafter 1 Cdn Armd Bde) from the United Kingdom to the Mediterranean Theatre in the summer of 1943, and the subsequent operations of those formations in Sicily and Italy. Report No. 165 brought the account of these operations up to 4 Jan 44. The present report deals with the movement of additional Canadian Forces (H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, 1 Cdn Corps Tps and 5 Cdn Armd Div) to the Mediterranean in the autumn of 1943.
2. The policies dictating the employment of the Canadian Army generally and the momentous decision to divide the Canadian Army Overseas between two theatres of operations in particular, are not dealt with here. These matters will be treated subsequently and separately. The present report deals only with the results of that decision, the movement of formations, the problems arising from that movement and the means adopted for their solution.
3. The chief sources of information have been the Central Registry files of Canadian Military Headquarters and the photostats of the personal files of General A.G.L. McNaughton at Hist Sec, C.M.H.Q. War Diaries of the headquarters of formations concerned have provided additional data and this has been further supplemented from the personal diaries of senior officers and of the historical officers employed in the theatre.

THE PLANNING OF "TIMBERWOLF"

4. On 8 Oct 43 a selected group of senior officers met at C.M.H.Q. for what was described as a "movement conference". Present were the following:

Lt-Gen A.G.L. McNaughton, G.O.C.-in-C. First Cdn Army
 Maj-Gen P.J. Montague, Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q.
 Brigadier N.E. Rodger, B.G.S., C.M.H.Q.
 Brigadier A.W. Beament, D.A.G., C.M.H.Q.
 Brigadier J.A. MacQueen, D.Q.M.G., C.M.H.Q.
 Brigadier E.G. Weeks, A.D.A.G. (A), C.M.H.Q.
 Col D. Douglas, D."Q" S., C.M.H.Q.
 Lt-Col C.R. Archibald, G.S.O. I. (S.D.), C.M.H.Q.
 Major D.W. Cunnington, P.A. to G.O.C.-in-C.

General McNaughton announced that arrangements had been made for the Canadian Army to ship to the Mediterranean Theatre sufficient troops "to make up a balanced corps in the Middle East which should include 1 Cdn Inf Div, 5 Cdn Armd Div, 1 Cdn Armd Bde less motor battalion, and one A.G.R.A. consisting of one field and three medium regiments, hospitals to scale and rear echelon units as required." (First Cdn Army file P.A. 1-18-1: Conference of 8 Oct 43, Notes by Brig Rodger.)^{*} He stated that:

* Reports Nos. 126, 127, 132, 135, 136, 144, 158, 160, 161, 166, and 167.

The units and personnel proceeding at this time would take only personal equipment including 2-inch mortars. D.D.S.D. (British) will give C.M.H.Q. a detailed list of equipment to be taken. A.F.H.Q. is assuming responsibility in the equipping and maintaining of 1 Cdn Corps in the Middle East. C.M.H.Q. will be responsible for meeting A.F.H.Q. demands for items of continuing Canadian supply except vehicles which will be provided by the theatre.

(Ibid)^{*}

Heavy equipment and vehicles were to be taken over from the two British formations which were being returned to the United Kingdom to build up the force for Operation "OVERLORD", i.e. Headquarters and Corps Troops of 30 Corps, which had been disbanded in Sicily, and 7 (Brit) Armd Div, the famous "Desert Rats", who were still in operation in Italy.^{**}
(Ibid: Tel 78593, War Office to A.F.H.Q. Algiers, 13 Oct 43)

5. Further details released at this conference disclosed that the main group of Canadians would move in convoy KNF 25 or KNF 25A, which were scheduled to leave about 25 Oct. Space was reserved for approximately 25,000 Canadian all ranks, who were arranged in the following priority: H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps and Corps Troops, one 500-bed hospital, one 1,200-bed hospital, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 11 Cdn Inf Bde and advance parties for the units following on later flights. One month's reinforcements for the units embarking would be carried if possible, but not to the exclusion of the reinforcements already assigned to the convoy for 1 Cdn Inf Div and 1 Cdn Armd Bde, who were to proceed as planned. The destination of the forces was named as Sicily and the date of readiness was set at 20 Oct 43. The November and December convoys (KNF 26 and KNF 27) were to accommodate

* See also same file: Tel G.S. 2337, CANMILITRY to 15 Army Group for Tow Cdn, 23 Oct 43, "Para 2: General policy laid down and agreed with Troopers that no unit eqpt is to be shipped but is to be taken over in theatre."

** of C.M.H.Q. file 3/TIMBERWOLF/1: TEL OZ 3169, War Cabinet Offices to Britman Washington, repeated General Eisenhower, 13 Oct 43:

The above allocations (transfer of 50, 51 and 1 Airborne Divisions to the U.K. from the Mediterranean) has the disadvantage that it leaves us deficient of a battle experienced armoured division for OVERLORD. We have therefore examined the possibility of exchanging a British Armoured Division in the Mediterranean for a Canadian Armoured Division from the U.K. This would have the added advantage that we should meet the Canadian desire to form a Canadian Corps in the Mediterranean. We, therefore, intend to exchange the personnel of a Canadian and British Armoured Division and to despatch a Canadian Corps H.Q. to the Mediterranean.

10,000 and 4,000 respectively and any remaining troops would be despatched in January 1944.

6. The heads of services proceeded with such necessary arrangements as could be made with due regard to security, and further conferences were held with War Office officials to consider the many details attendant on such an extensive move. Next day, 9 Oct 43, General McNaughton and some of his senior officers attended a conference at the War Office, and the G.O.C.-in-C. handed over the list of units which it was proposed to send on the October convoy (First Cdn Army file P.A. 1-18-1: Minutes of the Conference, 9 Oct 43). Matters concerning equipment were discussed and it was agreed that the Canadians should accept British equipment and vehicles although General McNaughton made his point that 5 Cdn Armd Div should be provided with Sherman tanks fitted with 75-mm guns. Canadian vehicle maintenance was to be provided from British sources for the time being with the exception that 1 Cdn Inf Div should maintain its existing arrangements; but at the earliest possible time all Canadian units should be placed on the same footing. The vehicles and equipment currently held by Canadian units proceeding to the Mediterranean were to be handed over to those British units returning to take part in Operation "OVERLORD".

7. Although the hazards of Mediterranean convoy movement had been greatly reduced since the days of Operation "HUSKY" (See Historical Section Report No. 126, paras 161-163), there was still the submarine and the recently introduced aerial torpedo bomber to be avoided at all costs. Later events proved the wisdom of the extensive security instructions which accompanied all orders for Operation "TIMBERWOLF" - the name released at the above conference. The first security document, which was issued 11 Oct 43, gave the names of the only officers entitled to be informed and released instructions on the care of documents relative to the move. Special warnings were issued against the assumption that all War Office officials were fully in the picture, and Brigadier Rodger, B.G.S., C.M.H.Q. was made responsible for accepting and authorizing any additions to the charmed circle of the informed, a group who coupled that distinction with an equivalent shortage of sleep during the next few weeks. (C.M.H.Q. file 3/TIMBERWOLF/1: C.M.H.Q. Security Instructions of 11 Oct 43 signed by Brig Rodger) X

8. Meanwhile the "high level" decision was being made in Canada and on 12 Oct 43 the following telegram arrived at C.M.H.Q.:

This is to advise you that official proposal received today at highest level. War Committee has approved. Reply on highest level signifies concurrence being despatched tonight. Please proceed accordingly.

(C.M.H.Q. file 3/TIMBERWOLF/1:
Tel G.S. 1039, DEFENSOR to
CANMILITRY for McNaughton from
Stuart, 12 Oct 43)

* See also C.M.H.Q. file 3/TIMBERWOLF/1/2: Rodger to Montague, 6 Nov 43, which states in part:

in my opinion, which is substantiated by conversation at the War Office, all three branches of your staff at C.M.H.Q. have nothing to be ashamed of concerning our share in arranging the largest move of troops the War Office has experienced at such short notice.

General McNaughton replied:

Arrangements proceeding under code name "TIMBERWOLF". I consider we have just sufficient time to make date set for departure. Every possible step to expedite being taken.

(Ibid: Tel G.S. 2520, CANMILITRY to DEFENSOR for Stuart from McNaughton, 13 Oct 43)

Much of the paper work had already been done, for C.M.H.Q. Special Instruction No. 1, with details of the move and preliminary appendices which totalled 31 mimeographed pages was ready for issue under date 12 Oct 43. Warning orders were sent out on 13 Oct to all units on the first convoy, and units due to travel later were instructed to prepare advance parties to accompany the October group. No further leave was to be granted within units concerned and personnel on courses and still on strength were to be recalled before 16 Oct. (Ibid: Tel G.T. 2943, C.M.H.Q. to First Cdn Army, 13 Oct 43)

9. The fact that the troops proceeding to the Mediterranean were expected to come immediately under British command necessitated action by the legal branch of C.M.H.Q. Under the Visiting Forces Act it was necessary for a properly constituted military authority - in this case General McNaughton - to issue a directive placing the troops concerned "in combination" with the British units in the theatre so that the orders of the C.-in-C. might have legal authority over the Canadian troops. (See Historical Section Preliminary Narrative Chap 2, paras 41-66). Such a directive had been issued to General Simonds and Brigadier Wyman for the Sicilian operations and had been judged sufficient authority for further moves into Italy (C.M.H.Q. file 29/Visforces/5/5: War Office to 15 Army Group, 17 Aug 43).

10. As the campaign continued and no signs appeared of the Canadian forces being withdrawn, General Simonds asked General Montgomery for plans for the further operations of 1 Cdn Inf Div and Lt-Col D.K. Tow, the O.I.C. Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Echelon, sent a message to C.M.H.Q. asking if General Simonds and Brigadier Wyman were to be considered as "still operating within your directive and in conformity with employment approved by Canadian Government" (First Cdn Army file P.A. 1-18-1: Tel A.C.G. 18, 15 Army Group (from Tow) for General McNaughton and General Montague, 10 Oct 43) To this General McNaughton needed only to reply that General Crerar was on his way with a new directive which would supersede all those issued in the past - news of the "TIMBERWOLF" scheme was sufficient indication of the type of employment approved by the Canadian Government (Ibid: Tel G.S. 2545, to Tow for Simonds from McNaughton, 15 Oct 43. See also para 19).

11. The directive was sent through the War Office on 24 Oct 43 with a covering letter to G.O.C.-in-C. 15 Army Group in which General McNaughton explained that all the new troops would be under command as from the date of despatch from England, thus settling any possible dispute over the position of the troops in rear echelon and reinforce-

X This instruction is too large to include in a report of this nature and may be found in C.M.H.Q. file 3/TIMBERWOLF/1 together with amendments, and its successors concerning "TIMBERWOLF" 2 and 3, which were issued with only minor changes in detail for the November and December convoys.

ment groups. The problem of replacement of the force commander in the event of his becoming a casualty was settled by the device of a list of possible successors, approved by General Crerar, from which the C.-in-C. might make his choice until a force commander could be properly appointed and approved by the Department of National Defence. (C.M.H.Q. file 1/TIMBERWOLF/1: McNaughton to G.O.C.-in-C. 15 Army Group, 24 Oct 43)

12. General Alexander replied:

Dear McNaughton:

I received today the copies of your directive to Lt-Gen H.D.G. Crerar and will of course act in accordance with your wishes.

Lt-Gen Crerar visited me the other day and has seen Montgomery and 1 Canadian Division. We are doing all we can to facilitate the arrival and re-equipment of the new formations and units, though the provision of vehicles is a difficulty.

I am sure that soon the Canadian Corps will be adding to the successes gained by its predecessors.

(C.M.H.Q. file 1/A.A.I. Gen/1:
Letter 15 AG/C/226, Alexander
to McNaughton, 9 Nov 43)

13. To the Canadians still in England the chance to go to a theatre of active operations was a pleasant prospect after years of inactivity. To staff officers and commanders it was an opportunity to prove their ability under the actual arbitrament of war instead of the always unsatisfactory decisions of umpires. Even to the unfortunates immured in the reinforcement units, it was a helpful sign that their long incarceration might some day end, and to at least a few of them it promised a short holiday in the form of despatch as rear parties to settle final arrangements of unit equipment and accommodation. Since the bulk of the troops were going with only personal equipment, there were many items to be disposed of. There were undoubtedly some regrets when vehicles had to be surrendered, for Canadians always preferred their own types and the prospect of receiving worn British vehicles cannot have been pleasing. For the time being it was planned to consolidate all unit stores in unit lines until the first flight had departed and then to re-distribute them within First Cdn Army or return them to British ordnance depots for release to those British units returning from the Mediterranean area. A similar plan for vehicles allotted all non-operational types of transport to First Cdn Army and Canadian Reinforcement Units for training and demonstration purposes, while operational types were to be returned to Canadian Base Ordnance Depot at Bordon for distribution according to the needs of 21 Army Group. (First Cdn Army file P.A. 1-18-1: "TIMBERWOLF" arrangements, 102/X TIM/1, 19 Oct 43. See also First Cdn Army file P.A. 5-0-26: War Office Meeting of 13 Oct 43, Notes by Brig Rodger)

14. The transfer of these vehicles from Canadian units brought a War Office suggestion that the Canadian workshops might now accept an equivalent number of British vehicles for 4th Echelon repairs. (First Cdn Army file P.A. 1-18-1: "Q" (A.E.) 2C/245/5, A.Q.M.G. (A.E.) to S.O., 15 Oct 43)

15. After discussion of this proposition with General McNaughton, the Senior Officer replied to the War Office:

Our undertaking to send certain formations to the Mediterranean has not included any commitments as regards repair facilities or responsibilities for maintenance, units of Army L. of C. or G.H.Q., and it is considered essential that we should not become involved in the maintenance of particular British divisions. I agree that on occasion, such spare capacity as may exist from time to time in the Cdn base ordnance workshops should be made available to assist in the general problems of repair, so long as it does not involve an undertaking of maintenance for specific British divisions or restrict the allocation of R.C.O.C. personnel and will advise you if at a later date, capacity surplus to Cdn needs becomes available.

(First Cdn Army file P.A. 5-0-26:
50/EF Maint Eqpt/1, (D.Q.M.G.),
S.O. to D.Q.M.G. (A.E.) (War
Office), 4 Nov 43)

PREPARATIONS IN ITALY

16. News of the proposed transfer of troops was passed to A.F.H.Q. on 13 Oct. Stress was laid on the necessity for building up the Canadian force to the standard of a balanced corps and bringing it into action as soon as possible. A rough grouping of the troops by type was transmitted so that suitable landing places could be arranged to fit in with the rather complicated shipping plans which had not only to get the Canadians to the theatre but also to return to England the exchange units (see para 4). A.F.H.Q. replied accepting the reinforcements and provided the following destinations for the Canadian groups:

- | | |
|--|---------------------------------|
| (a) Corps and Army Troops | Sicily |
| (b) G.H.Q. and L. of C. Troops | North Africa |
| (c) Armoured Division (less
Armoured Bde) | Italy (probably
Taranto) |
| (d) Reinforcements | Philippeville
(North Africa) |

A later message changed the port of arrival for groups (b), (c) and (d) to Naples, a decision which led to much further correspondence (see paras 29-30). (First Cdn Army file P.A. 1-18-1:: Tels 78593, 78594, War Office to A.F.H.Q. Algiers, 13 Oct 43; Tel 7448, A.F.H.Q. to War Office and 15 Army Group, 14 Oct 43; C.M.H.Q. file 3/TIMBERWOLF/1: Tel 1015, A.F.H.Q. to War Office and 15 Army Group, 22 Oct 43)²

* C.M.H.Q. file 3/TIMBERWOLF/1/2: War Office to C.M.H.Q. S.D. & T., 4 Nov 43 states: "The choice of ports of disembarkation will be made by A.F.H.Q., and must depend chiefly on the port at which ships are required".

17. Problems of equipment and port facilities were more troublesome. The following message from General Eisenhower contains perhaps the best statement of A.F.H.Q.'s position:

The aspect which causes me most concern is the pressure I anticipate will be put upon me to get these troops into action at an early date. I cannot guarantee to do this because:

First, the equipment being released in Sicily by 30 Corps and 50 and 51 British Divisions is already heavily depleted and almost fully mortgaged as reserves for the British forces now engaged on the mainland who are already drawing upon this supply almost as fast as it can be moved up to them. We already import equipment as fast as port capacity will allow and this equipment is earmarked for formations already in the theatre. Even on the existing programme we have a back log which is likely to take many weeks to clear. The additional commitment for re-equipment of Canadians can not therefore be met by additional shipments which would remain in ports undischarged.

Second, a large proportion of the non-divisional troops will have to be disembarked in North Africa for administrative reasons, and will necessarily have to take a low priority in the long list of units to be transported overseas to Italy, since these priorities must be determined strictly on an operational basis. For example, we are now moving forward elements to complete units already in the field, service troops to operate the lengthy L. of C. and will shortly begin large-scale movement of the Strategic Air Force whose medium bombers are now operating at extreme range.

Third, the equipment of 7 Armd Div does not correspond with that of Canadian Armoured Divisions and a period of training will be essential to accustom the Canadians to these new types. This applies particularly to wireless equipment.

I have elaborated these points because I would like it made clear in advance that necessarily there will be a considerable delay in equipping the Canadians and bringing them into action.

(First Cdn Army file P.A. 1-18-1:
Tel NAF 477, Algiers to Etoussa
signed Eisenhower, 19 Oct 43)

The War Office, however, took a somewhat brighter view of the situation, and General McNaughton was able to report that D.C.I.G.S. had assured him that "the situation is not as bad as anticipated" and that "necessary equipment will be

sent out from England." (Ibid: Tel G.S. 260, CANMILITRY to DEFENSOR, Stuart from McNaughton, 21 Oct 43)

18. When the "TIMBERWOLF" policy was decided upon, the Canadian troops in the Mediterranean were widely dispersed. 1 Cdn Inf Div and 1 Cdn Armd Bde were under command of Eighth Army and were about to move to the Adriatic Coast. Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech, under the direction of Lt-Col D.K. Tow, A.A. & Q.M.G., were with Headquarters 15 Army Group then moving from Sicily to Bari, and Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 2 Ech, with 1 Canadian Base Reinforcement Depot (1 C.B.R.D.) and the Canadian General Hospitals, was located near Philippeville in North Africa. The expansion of the Canadian force was bound to increase the detail of administration on a long term policy and particularly so for the ensuing weeks of arrival and re-equipment. These immediate and subsequent problems could be solved best by concentrating the Canadian services and maintaining them under a single command. Because of his experience in the Mediterranean theatre during the arrangements for Operation "HUSKY", Brigadier A.W. Beament, D.A.G. at C.M.H.Q. was chosen for the task. (See Report No. 126, paras 96-106, and W.D., Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech, May and June 1943). He was despatched with General Crerar's advance party, which arrived in North Africa 24 Oct (see para 31) in the interim, Colonel Tow was instructed to warn Maj-Gen G.G. Simonds, and Brigadier R.A. Tyman, Comd 1 Cdn Armd Bde, of the impending move and to make all preparations in his power. (First Cdn Army file P.A. 1-18-1: Tel G.S. 2535, CANMILITRY to 15 Army Group for Tow, 14 Oct 43 and Tel G.S. 2544, same to same, 15 Oct 43)

19. As noted above (in para 11), problems of policy and personnel had also been causing some concern to the senior Canadian officers in the field. On 14 Oct 43, General Simonds requested direction for the further operations of his force stating that General Montgomery, the Eighth Army Commander, had been unable to give him information. A telegram from the latter to General McNaughton of 16 Oct declared that he had "never heard of TIMBERWOLF". He recommended that Brigadier Vokes, Comd 2 Cdn Inf Bde, should be given command of 1 Cdn Inf Div and that General Simonds should command an armoured division - "He is a potential Corps Commander." (Ibid: Tel A.C.G. 21, to General McNaughton from General Simonds, 14 Oct 43; Tel C.S. 2177, C.-in-C. Middle East to War Office, McNaughton from Montgomery, 16 Oct 43). General McNaughton was now able to advise Colonel Tow that General Simonds would get his experience with armoured troops in command of 5 Cdn Armd Div when it arrived in the theatre, and he further forecast the advancement of Brigadier Vokes and Lt-Col B.M. Hoffmeister, O.C. Seaforth of C., to command 1 Cdn Inf Div and 2 Cdn Inf Bde respectively.* (C.M.H.Q. file 3/TIMBERWOLF/1/2: Tel G.S. 2552, CANMILITRY to 15 Army Group, for Tow from McNaughton, 16 Oct 43).

20. With the decision to increase the size of the Canadian forces in the Mediterranean and to continue their operations there, the problem of the situation and organization of Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech became vital. The chief command of the theatre lay in A.F.H.Q. with General Eisenhower at its head. This organization was then located in North Africa at Algiers. For operations in Italy, 15 Army Group under

* These officers had been actually commanding the formations named since 1 Oct. The "forecast" must have been one of confirmation.

General Alexander had for a short period its main headquarters near Bari on the Adriatic Coast. Colonel Tow, who was in charge of Cdn Sec 1 Ech, was somewhat of a "commuter" and had carried out his duties chiefly by air travel, being attached to Headquarters 15 Army Group and flying to Africa or Sicily when necessary (see para 18). As the advance up Italy continued, however, the problems presented by dispersal of personnel became more obvious and a new plan for the administration of the Allied forces in Italy was worked out. The administration section of Headquarters 15 Army Group was greatly reduced and the appointment of Major-General in charge of Administration was eliminated. "The administration services for the Army Group will be under Major-General Sir Brian Robertson who has organized what will in effect be an advanced A.F.H.Q. In name it will not be part of Headquarters, 15 Army Group." (C.M.H.Q. file 3/TIMBERWOLF/1: Tel A.G.A. 104, 15 Army Group to CANMILITRY, from Tow to McNaughton and Montague, 16 Oct 43)

21. This new group (Advanced Administrative Ech A.F.H.Q., later A.C.M.F. and finally A.A.I.) was to be located in Naples and was geographically north of main headquarters, 15 Army Group. Since Naples harbour was obviously designed to replace North African ports in the landing of supplies and reinforcements for the Italian theatre during the coming months adequate port facilities could not be found south of Leghorn - no better place could be chosen for the operations of Cdn Sec 1 Ech. The difficulties lay in the status of the headquarters and in liaison with the formations concerned. Colonel Tow recommended as follows:

I am definitely of the opinion terms reference Cdn Sec 1 Ech must still be to 15 Army Group though as a matter of mechanics section will probably be located with General Robertson.

(Ibid)

22. General Montague discussed the situation with Brigadier Beament before the latter left for the Mediterranean, and sent a memo to General McNaughton which read as follows:

I am of the opinion that it is fundamental (a) that this Ech, or at least a part of it contain an O.I.C., have the status of staff officers of a D.C.-in-C., and that the O.I.C. have direct access to the D.C.-in-C.

(b) that it would be in the highest degree improvident to split G.H.Q. 1 Ech into two echelons.

? X
It is therefore my view that ... Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech should remain accredited to 15 Army Group, though there seems to be no doubt that under the changed method of operating 15 Army Group the bulk at least of the section will normally work physically with General Robertson's headquarters.

(Ibid: S.O. to G.O.C.-in-C.,
First Cdn Army, 17 Oct 43)

23. This suggestion was passed to the War Office, who signalled A.F.H.Q. and 15 Army Group as follows:

1. Grateful your views concerning functions Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech after arrival 1 Cdn Corps ...

3. Our view arrangement would be for sec to be attached General Robertson with one or two senior officers attached at Corps H.Q. if thought necessary for liaison through 15 Army Group. Main responsibility for Cdn liaison to repose in 1 Cdn Corps H.Q.

4. Matter obviously one to be decided on the spot but knowledge of your views would enable us to advise Cdn authorities here.

(Ibid: Tel 861, War Office to A.F.H.Q., rptd 15 Army Group, 23 Oct 43)

This was not acceptable to Brigadier Beament who declared that:

the suggestion that Cdn liaison should centre on H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps was at the worst unworkable and at best would result in Corps looking over its shoulder. Further if part of Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech were at Corps the work of that Sec would be hampered. Everything indicates (a) necessity of the section remaining accredited to 15 Army Group (b) that section will normally work with General Robertson's headquarters, liaison visits being paid from there if necessary.

(Ibid: Tel 3847, A.F.H.Q. to CANMILITRY from Tow, 29 Oct 43)

24. The Canadian opinion was accepted by both A.F.H.Q. and 15 Army Group and it was explained to C.M.H.Q. by Brigadier Beament that the move to Naples did not in any way interfere with liaison with 15 Army Group. As long as that body remained at Bari there were direct lines and several daily planes and when it moved to Caserta in November 1943 it was less than an hour's jeep ride from Naples. No Canadian personnel were actually stationed with Headquarters 15 Army Group but particularly after the setting up of Canadian General Hospitals in Caserta there was no lack of officers in Naples prepared to make liaison runs, which for some time included an attendance at a daily conference. (C.M.H.Q. file 1/TIM Admin/1: Tel G.S. 2706, CANMILITRY to Adv Adm Ech A.F.H.Q., 1 Nov 43; Tel A.C.G. 27, FLAMBO to CANMILITRY, 4 Nov 43 and D.O. letter Beament to Montague, 4 Nov 43)

25. It may be noted at this point that no change in the functions of Cdn Sec 1 Ech was attempted. These were originally laid down during a conference at A.F.H.Q. in Cairo on 10 May 43, when Brigadier Beament obtained the following understanding:

The Cdn Staff elt will advise the principal British staff officers concerned in relation to difference between Cdn practice and British practice and will act as a liaison elt between the Cdn services authorities in the U.K. and

the British C.-in-C. Head of the Cdn Sec must, if necessary, have direct access to the C.-in-C. to represent the views of the Cdn authorities in the U.K. or the Cdn Service Comd in the field on matters of Cdn policy or interest. It was agreed that ... Colonel Tow ... should be accredited to force 141 at present and to General Alexander's HQ when it should be set up by whatever name it should be known. Since it was undesirable to have multiplicity of Cdn representation it was agreed that although Colonel Tow would normally work with force 141, he must have free and immediate access to all the HQs which may be concerned with Cdn business. It was also agreed that Colonel Tow would have the right to direct comm with the Cdn service authorities in the U.K.

(W.D., Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech,
June 1943: Appx 4)

26. C.M.H.Q. approved this agreement and conferred the following additional responsibility on Cdn Sec 1 Ech:

Within the limits laid down from time to time to take executive and administrative action regarding the control of personnel of the Canadian forces in the field, not being forces directly under the command of the Cdn force commander.

(Ibid: Appx 2, Montague to War Office, n.d.)

27. The War Office agreed to these functions and suggested that Cdn Sec 1 Ech should be located at A.F.H.Q., but the Canadian desire for some forward attachment was granted and no attempt to alter its status appears to have been made. (Ibid: Tel 92519, S.D. 5A TROOPERS to FREEDOM, 24 Jun 43 and Tel 4996, A.F.H.Q. to TROOPERS, 26 Jun 43)

28. Liaison with A.F.H.Q., which remained in Algiers, could not be solved in this simple fashion, and on his arrival in the Mediterranean theatre, General Crerar advised that a permanent detachment should remain in North Africa. He recommended Brigadier N.B. MacDonald, A.D.Q.M.G., C.M.H.Q., who became A.D.Q.M.G. (Liaison) for Cdn Sec 1 Ech. Brigadier MacDonald arrived on 5 Nov 43 and remained in Algiers until May 1944 with a small technical staff. (C.M.H.Q. file 3/TIMBERWOLF/1: Tel A.2078, A.F.H.Q. to War Office, C.M.H.Q., Crerar to McNaughton, 25 Oct 43; Tel A.3968, CANMILITRY to A.F.H.Q. (for Beament) and Tel 3379, A.F.H.Q. to CANMILITRY, Montague from Beament, both 28 Oct 43). This organization of Cdn Sec 1 Ech continued in Naples until June 1944 when the staff was moved to Rome with Headquarters A.A.I.

29. The next step in bringing the Canadian base units forward to the mainland was taken while the first convoy was still at sea. Officers from Cdn Sec 1 Ech made a reconnaissance of the Avellino area and pronounced the accommodation suitable. The ships of the first "TIMBERWOLF" convoy had various destinations as dictated by A.F.H.Q. policy, and four vessels were directed to land at Naples (see para 16). It so happened that these carried reinforcements for the first flight and for the formations already in Italy, and it was A.F.H.Q.'s intention that they would be trans-shipped to Philippeville

and later brought back to the mainland when needed by the field formations. Brigadier Beament therefore suggested that Canadian troops landing in Naples should remain in that area and that the rest of the Cdn Sec 2 Ech and C.B.R.D. units should be brought forward as soon as possible. Some objections were raised with regard to accommodation and shipping priority but the Canadians were willing to accept the minimum of buildings and offered to operate largely in tented accommodation until the buildings at Avellino could be sufficiently repaired for occupation. (C.M.H.Q. file 1/TIM Admin/1: D.O. letter Beament to Montague, 4 Nov 43 and enclosed therewith Beament to D.A.G., A.F.H.Q., 3 Nov 43)

30. The documents concerning the adoption of this policy are somewhat confused. Brigadier Beament in reporting to London explains the plan as outlined above and concludes with the following postscript. "I have heard that General Robertson now agrees with my views. Consequently our personnel will be trans-shipped to PHILIPPEVILLE from NAPLES [sic]". Since it was found necessary to send some 1600 of the Canadian personnel landing in Naples back to North Africa, the matter appears to have been settled by some sort of compromise. The main policy - that of moving the Canadian rear establishments forward - was firm, and Cdn Sec 2 Ech left Philippeville 4 Dec 43, opening in Avellino ten days later. 1 C.B.R.D. followed up on 27 Dec 43 and became part of 1 C.B.R.Gp which was set up in Avellino area when "TIMBERWOLF 1" arrived on 10 Nov 43. The "agreement" of General Robertson may have referred to the retention of the advance party of Cdn Sec 2 Ech and 1 C.B.R.Gp in Naples rather than their trans-shipment to North Africa. (C.M.H.Q. file 1/A.A.I. Gen/1: Tel A.C.Q. 1534, FLAMBO for CANDEX to CANMILITRY, 3 Dec 43, and Tel A.C.G. 1531, same to same, 20 Dec 43; see also w.D., Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech, 28 Oct 43)

31. Leaving the staff at C.M.H.Q. to complete the details of embarkation, Lt-Gen Crerar set out for the Mediterranean area with a selected group of his senior officers. The personnel of the party were arranged in two groups as follows:

The first party, leaving Paddington at 0905 hours, 20 Oct 43 -

Lt-Gen Crerar	Comd
Brig Lister	D.A. Q.M.G.
Brig Beament	O.I.C. Cdn Sec 1 Ech
Col Bennett	D.D.O.S.
Lt-Col Elwood	A.D.O.S.
Maj Blythe	D.A.D.O.S.
Lieut Hennel	A.D.C.

The second party, leaving at 0905 hours 21 Oct 43 -

Brig McCarter	B.G.S.
Col McQueen	D.D.S.T.
Lt-Col Cunningham	G.S.O. I (1 Cdn Corps)
Lt-Col Roaf	A.Q.M.G.
Maj Whelpton	D.A.Q.M.G.
Maj Baird	G2 (S.D.) G.H.Q. 1 Ech
Capt Carstairs	S.C. "Q".

(First Cdn Army file P.A. 1-18-1; ;
Army Commander's Memo of 20 Oct 43;
w.D., Lt-Gen Crerar, 20 Oct 43 ff)

Flying was delayed by bad weather until 24 Oct, when an early start was made and both parties reached Algiers in the early afternoon after a short halt at Gibraltar. On 25 Oct conferences were held at A.F.H.Q. to discuss the problem of re-equipping 1 Cdn Corps. (Only very brief notes exist concerning this conference which apparently brought disclosures somewhat embarrassing to all parties concerned). General Crerar records that:

It became immediately apparent that no practical basis for the re-equipment of Cdn Corps Tps; from [sic] some weapons and MT etc., of 30 Corps obtained. Demands of 15 Army Group had already resulted in the disappearance of a considerable portion of equipment which 30 Corps had taken to SICILY. Incidentally, many units of 30 Corps had landed on Assault or Light Scales and had never received their full G 1098 issues ... General Gale [Chief Administrative Officer A.F.H.Q.] was informed ... that the situation as found was not that which had been represented to H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps on our departure from ENGLAND and was most disappointing. General Gale indicated that War Office had been informed of the equipment situation by AFHQ although I gathered that this had been done only a few days before our arrival and after decision to despatch had been taken. General Gale went on to say that in light of the existing situation, the only solution he saw was to allot some 15 ships in the December maintenance convoy (which he thought he could spare) to transport Cdn equipment requirements.

(W.D., Lt-Gen Crerar, 25 Oct 43)

It was apparently in view of this complication of the equipment problem that General Crerar proposed Brigadier MacDonald to act as Canadian liaison officer at A.F.H.Q. (see para 28).^x

^x In referring to this and subsequent conferences, the A.Q.M.G. 1 Cdn Corps (Lt-Col - later Brigadier - W.G.H. Roaf) wrote on the attitude of A.F.H.Q. towards the arrival of 1 Cdn Corps and 5 Cdn Armd Div in the Central Mediterranean:

... The fact that they were actually coming, without other equipment than their personal kit and weapons, was accepted and the conference did outline the plan for re-mobilization of both formations. But it was early apparent that we would have to force the pace to obtain equipment and prepare both formations for operations as soon as possible. This impression was further strengthened by my personal conversation with certain staff officers at AFHQ ... Their reaction was one of surprise that we should be coming at all, and incredulity that we should be coming almost completely unequipped.

(Hist Sec file Italy: 1944/1 Cdn Corps/R/F, Docket 1: Letter Lt-Col Roaf to Historical Officer, 1 Cdn Corps, 2 Mar 44)

32. The conferences and later meetings of "Q" (A.E.) (Brit) and D.D.O.S. 1 Cdn Corps worked out lists of the equipment and vehicles needed by H.Q. and 1 Cdn Corps Troops and agreed on a rough figure of 3500 vehicles. The general decision was that:

(a) "B" vehicles (excl motorcycles) and certain items of equipment unavailable or in short supply in this theatre would come from U.K.

(b) "A" vehicles, guns, motorcycles and other G.1098 equipment will be supplied in this theatre.

(Ibid: and W.D., Cdn Sec G.H.Q. I Ech, 25 Oct 43)

Apparently it was decided to ignore the residue of vehicles relinquished by 30 Corps, for a War Office letter listing the vehicles to be sent specified them as follows:

3350 vehicles for Canadians will be provided, all on wheels.

Types included in total have been calculated on the following basis:-

(a) Unit vehicles for all units (less 5 Cdn Armd Div) given my 78594 of 13 Oct and 79197 of 15 Oct. (These messages refer to the complete Canadian force despatched and not only to the formations being sent out which had no counterpart units returning to the U.K.)

(b) Grand total 3350 made up by inclusion jeeps 200 and trucks 15 cwt. 220.

(C.M.H.Q. file 3/TIMBERWOLF/1/2:
Tel 84170, War Office to A.F.H.Q.,
30 Oct 43; First Cdn Army file
P.A. 1-18-1: Tels 78593 and
78594, War Office to A.F.H.Q.
ALGIERS, both of 13 Oct and
Tel 79197, same to same, 15 Oct 43)

33. The detail of the equipment needed was set out in a telegram of 2 Nov 43 in which A.F.H.Q. requested that the War Office:

Ship requirements of following categories of stores to complete A.F.G. 1098 scale for all units less 5 Cdn Armd Div ... priority of shipment as follows:

(a) Tools and machinery for R.C.A.S.C. and R.E.M.E. Workshops and L.A.Ds.

(b) Complete scale of spare parts and assemblies for Ordnance Field Parks, R.C.A.S.C. and R.E.M.E. Workshops and L.A.Ds. and units first aid M.T. outfits.

- (c) Fire control equipment.
- (d) Mine detectors.
- (e) All signal equipment excl of D class cable Special urgency for wireless sets Nos 19 and 33. Charging sets, telephones and switch-boards.
- (f) All controlled stores.
- (g) All medical and dental equipment required to complete the force.

A request that the equipment be packed in the vehicles assigned to the units concerned could not be complied with since the vehicles were being sent from ordnance depots and were not the vehicles turned in by the Canadian formations (C.M.H.Q. file 3/TIMBERWOLF/1/2: Tel 5274, A.F.H.Q. to War Office, 2 Nov 43; Tel 85818, War Office to A.F.H.Q., 4 Nov 43). Some of them in fact were British types and many efforts were made before it was possible to get the Canadian force back into Canadian-type vehicles (see para 63).^H

34. Leaving Brigadier Beament at Algiers to complete arrangements for equipment and to struggle with the problems of sorting out and re-routing the Canadian personnel arriving in the first flight (see paras 29-30), General Crerar proceeded to Sicily, where he inspected the accommodation at Taormina for Headquarters 1 Cdn Corps and that in surrounding areas for Corps Troops. On 29 Oct he went forward to Headquarters 15 Army Group, at Bari, spoke with Maj-Gen T.W. Richardson, C.G.S., and then proceeded to Campomarino (near Termoli) where he met General Montgomery and discussed plans for the future employment of 1 Cdn Corps. The meeting held great

* C.M.H.Q. file 3/TIMBERWOLF/1: Tel 80358, War Office to FREEDOM, ALGIERS of 19 Oct 43, stated that "Canadians have agreed to use British type "A" and "B" vehicles." But C.M.H.Q. file P.A. 1-18-1: Memo Cunningham (P.A. to G.O.C.) to Army Comd, 29 Oct 43, notes as follows:

"Para 2. War Office proposes C.M.H.Q. provide Canadian vehicles [for Cdn "Timberwolf" excl 5 Cdn Armd Div] on grounds that if complete vehicles are to be from UK, Cdn types would be more suitable for our units. Vehicles shipped to North Africa would be credited against our commitment to provide vehicles for returning British units and our net position would be unchanged."

A script note on the above memorandum over the initials of General McNaughton reads, "Accept arrangement indicated in para 2." The request from the War Office and a reply based on General McNaughton's note are both missing from the above file but there is sufficient evidence that the policy was carried out.

Colonel Bennett, D.D.O.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps states that "these Cdn vehs were very rapidly shipped from England." (Hist Sec file Italy: 1944/Cdn Corps/R/F, Docket I, "The Re-equipping of 1 Cdn Corps and 5 Cdn Armd Div in the Central Mediterranean Theatre, Oct 43 - Feb 44")

significance. On 28 Oct General Montgomery had written to General Alexander as follows:

U640 personal for General Alexander from General Montgomery: "Please send Commander Canadian Corps to see me at Tac Army at CAMPOMARINO on 30 Oct, or whenever he arrives. When I have explained matters I will send him on to 1 Cdn Div. Important point to make quite clear to him is that I cannot accept a Cdn Corps H.Q. in my Army at present and that the Corps H.Q. and Corps Troops must assemble in North Africa or Sicily and wait there until shipping and maintenance situation allow of their being brought over. 5 Cdn Armd Div can release 7 Armd Div in due course, but will be quite unable to operate as a div for some months."

(Hist Sec file Italy: 1943/Eighth Army/C/F, W.D., G.S. Branch, Main H.Q. Eighth Army, October 1943, Appx "Z")

In General Crerar's diary only the following note appears:

Montgomery has forecast a regrouping of his forces early in the new year which will probably require the addition of another Corps Headquarters with suitable formations under command. 1 Cdn Corps would prospectively fit into this picture. General Montgomery very complimentary concerning accomplishments of 1 Cdn Inf Div.

(W.D., Lt-Gen Crerar, 28-29 Oct 43)

35. After talks with General Simonds and Brigadier Vokes at Campobasso, General Crerar returned to Headquarters 15 Army Group and had a short conference with General Alexander, during which the C.-in-C.

indicated his intention of moving 1 Cdn Corps and also 10 Corps to Eighth Army area within next few weeks. He described his difficulties owing to reduction in Mediterranean theatre of landing craft and landing ships. Showed himself in complete sympathy with desire of Canadian Government to bring all Cdn forces in this area under command H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps at earliest possible date.

(Ibid, 1 Nov 43)

General Crerar then returned to Sicily and continued preparations for the arrival of the first flight.

THE ARRIVAL IN ITALY

36. While preparations were being carried out in the Mediterranean for the reception of the Canadians the details of departure were being efficiently organized in England. There were the usual last minute changes in personnel, worries about equipment and baggage parties and the ever present problem of security, but these difficulties were mastered and

from the 23rd to the 26th Canadian forces converged on the ports of embarkation and boarded the waiting ships. Nearly all unit diaries speak with deep feeling of the excellent quality of the food which was provided on shipboard - chicken, eggs and white bread were particularly appreciated after years on British wartime rations. The prospect of seasickness could easily be forgotten in the immediate pleasures of repletion, the joys of relaxing on deck and the always inspiring sight of a convoy assembling. On 28 Oct the convoy had formed up and the voyage proper commenced. (W.D., G.S. Branch, H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps; A. & Q. Branch, H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps; G.S. Branch H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div; H.Q. 11 Cdn Inf Bde; H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Bde; and Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 2 Ech (C.M.F.), October 1943)

37. Rough weather was encountered during the first few days on the North Atlantic and the usual discomforts of convoy life were experienced to a greater or less degree depending on the efficiency of the ships' staffs.[#] On all ships the usual emergency drills were carried out and training schedules were prepared with the chief emphasis being placed on P.T. and lectures which sought to prepare all ranks for the new conditions of life which they were to meet in the new theatre. Because of the restricted area for training of a more vigorous nature health talks and classes in Italian were in high priority. As the convoy progressed further south, the weather greatly improved and all enjoyed the opportunity for sun-bathing and the relaxation of restrictions concerning clothing.^{##} (Ibid, para 12)

38. Even before the convoy passed through the Straits of Gibraltar on 4 Nov there were submarine alerts, but no effective enemy action took place until 1830 hours on 6 Nov 43, when a group of enemy torpedo bombers estimated to be twelve in number attacked the convoy off the North African coast. Although the convoy's gunners sent up effective fire and claimed three enemy planes down, the torpedo bombers got a direct hit on S.S. "Santa Elena", which carried among other units, Nursing Sisters of 14 Canadian General Hospital and elements of Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 2 Ech. Reports on other vessels damaged ranged from one to four in the war diaries consulted, but the final score appears to be the "Santa Elena" hit and abandoned, the S.S. "Marnik van St. Aldegonde" damaged, subsequently sunk, with no Canadian personnel aboard, and U.S. Destroyer "Beatty" sunk. (C.M.H.Q. file, 18/AAI/1/2: Tel 8755, A.F.H.Q. to CANMILITRY, 8 Nov 43). The

Comments on such administrative matters appear as appendices to the War Diaries of units and formations concerned. The most critical are those concerning the arrangements on U.S.A.T. "Edmund B. Alexander". (W.D., G.S. Branch, H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, November 1943: Appx 2)

Even when the men were allowed to appear in shirt sleeves they were displeased because this entailed stripping of web to provide belts (braces were taboo). The normal struggle between the letter of the law and the comfort of the troops was in full swing. All units mentioned the first use of mepacrine as an anti-malarial protection and no reports of unpleasant reaction appear.

"Santa Elena" was abandoned within two hours and most of the Canadian personnel were picked up by U.S.S. "Monterey", which stood by for survivors until shortly after midnight, when a submarine alarm sent it off to Philippeville. The remainder of the Canadians were rescued by destroyers which circled the ship and at one time attempted to run alongside it - only to be prevented by the high-running seas. Discipline among the troops aboard the "Santa Elena" was reported to be excellent and officers checked the ship before leaving; but the ship's crew seems to have played only a minor part in the operation, even requiring assistance from the Nursing Sisters in rowing the lifeboats. The male personnel made the transfer by life rafts and were fortunate in having relatively warm water for their impromptu naval operation. (W.Ds. as in para 36, November 1943)##

* Canadian personnel on S.S. "Santa Elena" were as follows:

	Officers	ORs
2 Echelon	5	63
8 Dental Coy	24	80
Educ Serv 2 C.B.R.D.	1	15
5 Rft Bn (less 5 Coy)	70	903
H.Q. Group C.B.R.D.	6	36
H.Q. 1 L. of C. Provost	1	6
1 Group Postal Unit	2	36
3 L. of C. Section	-	16
Cdn 1 Echelon	12	30
3 F.S.U.	2	9
4 F.S.U.	2	9
1 Bacteriological Laboratory	1	5
1 Hygiene Laboratory	1	5
1 Adv Depot Medical Stores	1	10
1 Dental Stores	1	5
14 Field Security Section	1	14
14 General Hospital (incl 101 Nursing Sisters)	144	245
2 Graves Registration Unit	3	9
6 Rft Bn	56	-
	333	1496

(W.D., Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 2 Ech (N.A.), November 1943)

** The diary of "A" party of Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 2 Ech (C.M.F.) contains the following relevant and interesting details:

Life boats containing the Nursing Sisters were lowered into the water and rowed away. From the stern were heard several orders and counter-manding orders regarding the lowering of life rafts into the water ... some time later it was realized by those near the bow of the vessel that personnel in the stern had almost all left although no order to abandon ship was heard in the bow. The last officers, including Captain Davy and Lieutenants Crossland and McInnes after ascertaining that there were no other ranks on board, went down the scramble nets into the sea and swam to the nearest raft.

(W.D., "A" Party Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 2 Ech (C.M.F.), 6 Nov 43)

39. The U.S.S. "Monterey" remained in Philippeville during 7 Nov and some survivors were landed, but the majority remained on board and left next day for Naples. During the late afternoon of the 7th they witnessed the end of the "Santa Elena", which had been reoccupied by a skeleton crew and was being towed into Philippeville harbour.

By 1745 hours she had reached a position between the "Monterey" and the shore and approximately one mile from land. When the tug stopped and she lost momentum she was seen to begin to settle by the stern. Gradually the stern sank till the ship was in an upright position with only the bow out of the water. Then she heeled over on the port side and disappeared from view.

(W.D., "A" Party, Cdn Sec G.H.Q.
2 Ech (C.M.F.), 7 Nov 43)^{**}

40. The Canadian administration was now faced with the replacement of the stores carried by the "Santa Elena" and the personal equipment of all Canadians on board. This problem was complicated by the lack of detailed information about the contents of the ship and the uncertainty of the extent of availability of local supplies. Lists of units and equipment were sent by air from the United Kingdom and satisfactory arrangements were made for the replacement of stores. (C.M.H.Q. file 3/TIMBERWOLF/1/2: Tel Cdn O2E/2021 to CANMILITRY from MacDonald, 8 Nov 43, and Tel 9359, A.F.H.Q. to CANMILITRY, 11 Nov 43; C.M.H.Q. file 1/TIM Admin/1: Tel Q.M.G. 3423 CANMILITRY to FREEDOM for CANDEX, 9 Nov 43, and Q.M.G. 3435 same to same, 13 Nov 43) Personal equipment and clothing for officers and nursing sisters presented a somewhat more difficult problem. A.T.S. clothing for the latter was sent from C.M.H.Q.^{**} and British officers' shops were able to meet most of the requirements of the former. One important change resulted from this incident - a modification of Article 778, F.R. & I. (O) which made it possible for officers in the field to obtain compensation for loss of personal equipment due to enemy action without first producing evidence that replacement had been required. (W.D., Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech, 24 Nov 43)

41. The units of the first flight completed their disembarkation without further unfortunate incidents and the chief formations were located as follows:

* Another account states that the tow rope parted and that the heavy seas smashed one of the few surviving bulkheads. The weather was so bad that only a few small boats were able to make shore and the larger vessels were forced to stay away from the docks. (W.D., Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 2 Ech (N.A.) November 1943)

** Arrangements were made to have 94 nursing sisters' uniforms made up in Naples by Italian tailors "subject to the supply of material, thread and buttons in the U.K." Examination of the War Diary of 14 Cdn Gen Hosp for January and February 1944 produces no further evidence that this expedient was adopted. (W.D., Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech, January 1944)

H.Q. and 1 Cdn Corps Troops	Taormina, Messina and surrounding area (in Sicily)
H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div) H.Q. 11 Cdn Inf Bde)	Afragola, near Naples
Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech	Naples
Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 2 Ech (C.M.F.)	Avellino
1 C.B.R.Gp	Avellino

In addition, a number of small units, medical groups and reinforcements were landed in Africa and were not able to come forward for some time. The stories of disembarkation presented in war diaries indicated that preliminary arrangements had been adequate and that accommodation was satisfactory if not luxurious. Headquarters 1 Cdn Corps in the Hotel San Domenico at Taormina had very pleasant quarters with a magnificent view which in times of peace had attracted international tourists. After a very few days of disorganization and relaxation while baggage and equipment were being brought forward, the units settled down to routine administration and to such limited training as was possible with only personal equipment and a bare minimum of transport obtained from British Ordnance Depots.

VISIT OF THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE, 22 NOV - 5 DEC 43

42. No sooner had the units of "TIMBERWOLF-1" arrived and settled in their new areas than the Canadian troops in the Mediterranean were visited (between 22 Nov and 5 Dec 43) by the Honourable J.L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence. While this visit was apparently a routine inspection of the newcomers and a morale-builder for the men who had already spent six months as Canada's only combatant force, it was also an occasion for conference at a high level on matters of policy affecting 1 Cdn Corps and First Cdn Army. (W.D., Lt-Gen Crerar; 22-30 Nov 43). Arriving at Bari on 22 Nov the Minister went first to Vasto where he met General Montgomery and discussed the policy of employing the Canadian troops in Italy. He then visited 1 Cdn Armd Bde, addressing the men of 11 and 12 Cdn Armd Regts and proceeded on the afternoon of 23 Nov to Campobasso where H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div was set up. After inspecting the other ranks' rest centre, the "Beaver Club", Col Ralston had dinner with General Vokes. Next day, in spite of heavy rain he made the rounds of the battalions of 1 and 2 Cdn Inf Bdes and the regiments of 1 Cdn Inf Div Artillery less 1 Cdn Fd Regt, R.C.H.A., who were as usual in support of 3 Cdn Inf Bde. On the 25th he inspected the R.C.A.S.C., R.C.O.C. and Medical Units with 1 Cdn Inf Div and had tea with the representatives of the Canadian press, concluding the day at a complimentary banquet tendered by the Italian Provincial Governor. (Ibid; War Diaries of formations concerned)

43. 3 Cdn Inf Bde were next on the Minister's list, and since they were in the line on the Upper Sangro, he met the officers at brigade headquarters on 26 Nov and visited the headquarters of West N.S.R., from whose O.P. he observed the front and the operations then in progress. He also saw some of the batteries of 1 Cdn Fd Regt R.C.A. The following day he returned to Main Headquarters, Eighth Army

and thence to Headquarters 15 Army Group where he had a talk with General Alexander who was ill with jaundice. About this time the Minister started to suffer from an infected tooth for which he received treatment at 5 Cdn Gen Hosp. Until 30 Nov he remained near Corps Headquarters in Sicily and spent his time on official correspondence and in conferences with Generals Stuart and Crerar. On the last day of the month he addressed the troops at Taormina and next morning he set out by plane for Naples where he met General Simonds in the middle of plans for the move of his headquarters to Altamura. Troops of 11 Cdn Inf Bde were inspected on the 1st and of 5 Cdn Armd Bde on 2 Dec. Having seen most of the Canadian field formations in Italy the Minister flew back to Catania in Sicily on 3 Dec, addressed the troops at Acireale, Ionia and Messina, and after spending the night at Taormina was taken to see the battle ground in the area Agira - Leonforte where 2 Cdn Inf Bde had experienced heavy fighting. The visits ended with an inspection of the Canadian Military Cemetery at Agira and on 5 Dec the official party left for the United Kingdom by plane. (W.D., Lt-Gen Crerar, 26 Nov - 5 Dec 43)

THE EQUIPPING OF 5 CDN ARMD DIV

44. The decision to re-equip 5 Cdn Armd Div from 7 (Brit) Armd Div was taken at a high level (see para 4) but there were many problems which arose in carrying out the programme on the ground. The first concerned the question of establishments. There were official differences between the scales and types of equipment as laid down for Canadian armoured divisions and British armoured divisions in the Middle East (see para 17). A further difficulty arose from the fact that the British formation, which had been fighting for many months, had made substitutions and improvements in their establishment to such an extent that the Canadians trying to make an accounting reported that "the 'Desert Rats' have a W.E. of their own. It appears during the last two years of fighting that they have been so successful that they have been in a position to demand exactly what they want in both personnel and vehicles and considerable difficulty is being experienced in the take over". (W.D., H.Q. 11 Cdn Inf Bde, 12 Nov 43). This possible excess of vehicles was of course hardly a problem and might have been turned to the Canadians' advantage. One formation notes that although the Canadians were to get equipment on the Canadian W.E., the arrangement was to be "subject to unofficial variation". (W.D., A. & Q. Branch, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 11 Nov 43). The actual procedure was "to have a barracks hand-over, with everything surplus to be turned in to ordnance and for everything deficient ... [to] put in demands to the Italian Ordnance Depots." (Bennett, op cit)

45. A third problem was one of Canadian origin, and was explained by General Simonds:

Matthews (my A.A. & Q.M.G.) tells me that the establishments sent by Corps to S.D. 15 Army Group are not the latest for the Cdn Armd Div - that additions have been authorized that are not shown. This is particularly important in the case of signals - our establishment as at present

shown does not provide sufficient personnel to man the required sets. My O.C. Sigs and A.Q. inform me that the necessary changes and additions had been authorized before they left England. The process has become one of more or less direct barter with 7 (Brit) Armd Div. I am taking their equipment and making adjustments as nearly as possible to our scales. I will then sort out the whole business in the training area.

(Hist Sec file Italy: 1943/
1 Cdn Corps: GOC/E: MS
Letter Simonds to Crerar,
15 Nov 43)

46. At first the transfer of equipment was carried out directly between the units concerned on a basis similar to a barracks hand-over, company to company (Bennett, op cit). H.Q. 11 Cdn Inf Bde took over during 13 - 14 Nov from H.Q. 131 Inf Bde, and H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Bde collected from 22 Armd Bde on 17 - 18 Nov. Ancillary and supporting units received their transport during the latter part of November, and the remainder of the equipment, which 7 Armd Div retained until they left Italy, was collected and distributed by special details despatched from H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div. As far as the War Diaries state, this arrangement applied to "B" class vehicles and carriers only. Tanks were supplied by H.Q. 15 Army Group under a different plan. (See para 6; W.Ds. H.Q. 11 Cdn Inf Bde, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Bde, November 1943). Even this equipment was not all to be retained long for on 26 Nov 5 Cdn Armd Bde were warned that "approximately 65% of the vehicles taken over from 22 Armd Bde will be turned in for use by other troops in Ops", and the next day the same formation reported that "some of the 3-ton trucks which are to be given up to 10 Corps were drawn from us today. The rest will go tomorrow". (W.D., H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Bde, 26 - 27 Nov 43)

47. The complaints against the vehicles taken over from 7 Armd Div fell into two categories:

- (a) type - there were too many 4 x 2 vehicles - i.e., they were not 4-wheel drive;
- (b) condition - they were considered not battle worthy.

(Hist Sec file Italy: 1944/
1 Cdn Corps/R/F, Memo of
Interview with Brigadier N.B.
MacDonald, C.B.E., at Algiers,
April 1944)

The condition of the vehicles left much to be desired. The Ir R.C. diary for 17 Nov 43 declares that "none of them are new and some of them have seen long service in the African campaign". An R.C.O.C. officer states that: "We found that daily maintenance and first line repairs had been largely neglected and that much second line repair work was outstanding." (Hist Sec file, Italy 1943/11 Cdn Inf Bde/R/F: The Re-equipping of the 11th Cdn Inf Bde, 10 Nov 43 - 13 Jan 44, A Report to the Hist Offr 1 Cdn Corps by Capt Murray D. Stewart, R.C.O.C. 73 L.A.D.). At H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Bde criticism was equally outspoken. The advance party reported on 29 Nov that, "work is progressing on trying to effect running repairs on vehicles taken from 22 Armd Bde", and the main group who arrived 1 Dec 43 were emphatic that "they are in very poor condition". As the elements of

5 Cdn Armd Div moved overland to Altamura their War Diaries reported frequent delays, more due to vehicle breakdowns than to the nature of Italian highways.

The move to ALTAMURA...was outstanding for the number of breakdowns which swamped the Ordnance Recovery services supplied by 73 L.A.D. (attached 11 Cdn Inf Bde) and the 11 Cdn Inf Bde Workshops. Of the magnitude of the recovery problem only this can be said: the 11 Cdn Inf Bde R.E.M.E. facilities worked for over three weeks to recover broken down vehicles to the ALTAMURA area.

(Ibid, and W.Ds. H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Bde and C.B. Highrs, November 1943)

48. In the middle of December 5 Cdn Armd Div had a full M.T. inspection based on A.F.G.857. The results of this showed that out of approximately 250 "B" class vehicles only eight per cent were considered to be Class 1. The remainder were rated as follows: Class 2, 10 per cent; Class 3, 35 per cent; Class 4, 25 per cent; Class 5 and 6, 2 per cent. A similar inspection of "A" vehicles showed a somewhat better picture, 87 per cent adjudged in Class 1 or 2 and 12 per cent in Class 3 and 4. Artillery was the subject of a similar check.

The Brigade (11 Cdn Inf Bde) E.M.E. carried out a quarterly inspection of all unit 6-pounders, and found that by any reasonable engineering standard over 60% of the brigade gun carriages were unserviceable. The pieces were in good shape, the Maximum Effective Full Charge for the worst worn gun being 300 out of a probable 450. The Brigade E.M.E. was of the opinion that this could have been considerably exceeded.

(Steward, op cit)

49. General Simonds took advantage of the visit of the Minister of National Defence to reveal the nature of the equipment received by 5 Cdn Armd Div.^v He records that

* Of the Minister's visit General Simonds reported to General Crerar:-

I took the opportunity of his visit to let him see some of the transport which we have taken over from 7 Armd Div. A number of the vehicles are "made up" from parts cannibalised from others. For instance, a Ford may have a Bedford engine in it and vice versa, and, apart altogether from the difficulty in making the stuff road-worthy in the first instance, the provision of spare parts would present a problem of the first magnitude. It is true that the 7 Armd Div landed at Salerno with this same transport but they have been told that providing their vehicles were good for 2000 miles they should not worry. Most of these same vehicles have now done well over 3000 miles since landing.

(Hist Sec file: Italy: 1943/
1 Cdn Corps: GOC/E: Letter
58-1/SD, Maj-Gen Simonds to
Lt-Gen Crerar, 4 Dec 43)

Colonel Ralston informed him that his division was to get some of the 3500 vehicles coming from the United Kingdom, but in a letter to Brigadier Beament he stated that he knew they were for Corps Troops and that he would have to rely on theatre resources to meet the shortages.* In this respect he was not optimistic:

It will be some time before we can carry out the necessary workshop tests, adjustments to establishments and check-up on what we have got. G.S.D. at 15 Army Group, with whom I have discussed this, recognizes that it is a most unsatisfactory situation, but holds that there is no solution in their power as the vehicles simply do not exist in the Mediterranean theatre.

If we are to get new or well-conditioned transport of the type with which Canadian formations have been equipped up to now, then only intervention on a high level will produce the desired result.**

(Hist Sec file: Italy 1943/
1 Cdn Corps: GOC/E: Letter
Simonds to Beament, 5 Dec 43)

To General Crerar he expressed much the same feeling:

I have been told verbally [he does not say by whom] that we should not worry about the condition of this equipment because we are going to be re-equipped with

* It had been accepted as a commitment of 15 Army Group to re-equip 5 Cdn Armd Div, and General Crerar refused to divert to the div any of the vehs and equipment arranged for 1 Cdn Corps Tps. The reason for this policy was that 15 Army Group had to live up to their commitment, in whole or in part. In spite of repeated pitiful appeals from 5 Cdn Armd Div for a share in the equipment arriving for 1 Cdn Corps Tps, this policy was adhered to, until Corps Tps were complete to W.E.

(Hist Sec file: Italy: 1944/
1 Cdn Corps/R/F: Letter Lt-
Col Roaf to Historical Officer,
1 Cdn Corps, 2 Mar 44)

** Later, when representations made by General Simonds to A.F.H.Q. through channels in the field had failed to bring replacement of the unsatisfactory equipment - A.F.H.Q. simply did not have the vehicles available - the Minister of National Defence requested and obtained intervention by the War Office. Its representations were referred to 15 Army Group, who now took the attitude that everything possible was being done. The policy originally agreed upon was reiterated; i.e., Canadian vehicles could not be provided in the Central Mediterranean Force. (Interview with Brigadier MacDonald, op cit)

new transport before operating but...I can not see on what realities (i.e., shipping, allocation of priorities) such promise is based and unless steps are taken about which I know nothing it is again nothing more than the expression of a pious hope.

(Ibid, Letter Simonds to Crerar, 4 Dec 43)

In a letter to Brigadier Beament Colonel Ralston dismisses the subject of equipment with a request that General Simonds prepare "rough figures of probable requirements not only of M.T. but of guns and other weapons as well to give something to work on as a rough approximation. I have pointed out that this was obviously needed just as promptly to avoid assumptions here [Algiers, where A.F.H.Q. was then situated] that the takeover has furnished what is wanted." (Ibid: Letter Ralston to Beament, 5 Dec 43)

50. General Crerar's reply to General Simonds did not hold out any hope of obtaining equipment from other than theatre sources. He had "laid on" that Brigadier MacDonald should regularly present an up-to-date report on the equipment situation to General Gale at A.F.H.Q.

Gale is fully aware of the political importance attached to the re-equipment of the Canadian formations which have recently arrived in the C.M.F. as well as knowing the military implications. He is also in a position to do what is required about the situation.

(Ibid: Letter Crerar to Simonds, 9 Dec 43)

Writing to Brigadier Beament two days later, the Corps Commander indicated that his policy was to leave the problem of 5 Cdn Armd Div's equipment in General Gale's hands until

...it is proved quite definitely that it is impossible for A.F.H.Q. to produce for Simonds the "A" and "B" vehicles, weapons, etc., which I was assured could be made available. There is danger in switching M.T. from Corps troops to 5 Cdn Armd Div because the result may well be that a reason can thus be found to delay the formation of 1 Cdn Corps owing to the non-equipment of one or more Corps troops units which Army or Army Group may then say are essential to the purpose. By the end of the month, or early January, this situation should be sufficiently clarified to decide on an alternative course of action, if required, but not before then.

(Ibid: Letter Crerar to Beament, 11 Dec 43)

The wisdom of General Crerar's decision is shown in the following letter from General Simonds of 28 Dec wherein he reports:

Eighth Army have 'turned on the heat' for us and controlled stores to complete our W.E. are flowing through fairly well. We have been given 97 new vehicles and this will at least result in the

proper conversion of the 'composite' vehicles we have and make most of the vehicles roadworthy. The very grave disadvantage of the 15-cwts 4x2 must be accepted, for there is nothing that can be done about it.

(Ibid: Letter Simonds to Crerar, 28 Dec 43)

51. The tanks for 5 Cdn Armd Div were to be Shermans as promised to General McNaughton (see para 6) but General Simonds was given a choice of taking over the Diesel-powered Shermans of 7 (Brit) Armd Div or waiting for Chryslers which had to be brought from North Africa. He chose the latter because "if we took the Diesels - they are no longer being made - replacements are not available and we would be very soon reduced to a mixture of the two types". (Hist Sec file: Italy 1943/1 Cdn Corps: GOC/E. Letter Simonds to Crerar, 15 Nov 43). He was promised delivery of the Shermans by the first week in December but was later informed that "only a very few tanks would be available until the end of December or January. This is very disappointing". (Ibid: Letter Simonds to Crerar, 25 Nov 43)*

52. While the plan was to deliver the tanks at the rate of 50 per week during December 1943, there was the almost inevitable delay. (W.D., A. & Q. Branch, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 3 Dec 43). The first 37 tanks were landed in Bari on 9 Dec but these had to be checked and overhauled by a British Tank Maintenance Group and the first delivery did not take place until 19 Dec when 3 Cdn Armd Recce Regt (G.G.H.G.) received two tanks. The Canadian reaction to the delay does not appear in any available document but the war diaries are full of references to conferences about equipment and General Crerar saw fit to write to Brigadier Beament at 1st Echelon stating that "equipment of 5 Cdn Armd Div should not result in confusing recommendations by several individuals going to A.F.H.Q., C.M.H.Q. and the War Office. This re-equipment issue is very big 'Canadian business'. Any recommendations to these higher headquarters must be co-ordinated by me and put forward over my signature or with my authority." (Hist Sec file: Italy 1943/1 Cdn Corps: GOC/E: Letter Crerar to Beament, 11 Dec 43. See also W.D. Lt-Gen Crerar, 11 Dec 43)**

* This is confirmed in an equipment memo presented by Brigadier Lister at H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps on 27 Nov 43, which states in part:

Mov (A.F.H.Q.) trying to provide shipping. Hope to have 230 tanks into BARI or BRANDISI [sic] by 31 Dec and balance forward in January. Hope to clear total requirements incl armd and [sic] O.P. by 31 Jan.

(W.D., A. & Q. Branch, H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, November 1943: Appx 45. The last line appears to be corrupt and probably should read "incl armd O.P.")

** An equipment memo, signed Roaf for MacDonald and dated 20 Dec 43, states that "the situation as regards M4A4 (Sherman Chryslers) is as follows:

Already shipped	135
Awaiting shipment	69
At vehicle park, North Africa	70
Shipped but not accounted for	3

W.D., A. & Q. Branch, H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, December 1943: Appx 38)

53. Long before the supply of tanks was complete, word was received that 11 Cdn Inf Bde were to form an infantry brigade group and go into the line. This emergency was met by transferring the best of the vehicles on hand to 11 Cdn Inf Bde and by a sudden increase in generosity by British Ordnance Depots in the matter of spare parts which had in the past been very difficult to obtain. For one L.A.D. this response was "prompt to the point of flooding... and it was not possible to sort, card and bin the stores that came before proceeding on 'Star'. [This] caused much irritation that could have been avoided by a similar release of parts over a longer period assuming of course that the stores were in the base depots". (Stewart, op cit). Other items being received from British formations were certainly not new. S.P. guns made available for 8 Cdn Fd Regt, R.C.A., are reported as "old guns discarded by 98 Fd Regt, R.A." (W.D., A. & Q. Branch, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 2 Jan 44 and G.S. Branch, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 2 and 6 Jan 44).^{*} By 7 Jan 45, however, the brigade group for Exercise "STAR" was practically complete when a request was made which further complicated the problem of equipment. (See para 94.)

54. 5 Cdn Armd Div were asked to supply an armoured regiment and a motor battalion for operational duties by 14 Jan. They replied that they had

...taken vehicles and equipment from all armoured brigade group to best scale and condition. By further denuding other units, one armoured regiment less Stuarts could be ready approximately 1 Feb. These dates subject to confirmation by O.C. your training as this forecast assumes present plans for supplying, moving and servicing tanks remain unchanged. Motor battalion completely deficient carriers all types and considerably deficient all other vehicles.

(W.D., A. & Q. Branch, H.Q.
5 Cdn Armd Div, January 1944:
Appx 4, Letter S.D.475, Main
Eighth Army to 5 Cdn Div,
6 Jan 44, and Letter Q.7, 5 Cdn
Armd Div to Main Eighth Army,
7 Jan 44)

In reply it was pointed out that except for trucks H.U.P. and carriers, "B" vehicles had been delivered in sufficient numbers to equip the division to "normal scales" and sufficient carriers and tanks were promised in time for a move on 14 Jan. This pre-supposed that 4 x 2 vehicles could be used - always a great point of discussion in the

* A check carried out by Major McCabe of Historical Section of the Offices of the Cabinet (British) at the narrator's request disclosed that 98 Fd Regt during this period was twice equipped with new S.P. guns, first with "Priests" about 4 Jan 44 and later in the month with a mixture of "Priests" and Shermans (the latter as armd O.P.). In view of the fact that W.D., A. & Q. Branch, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div for 19 Jan 44 carries an entry stating that a message had been received from Eighth Army releasing 24 "Priests" for 8 Fd Regt, R.C.A., it seems possible that the "old guns" mentioned above may have been finally retired from service. The diary of 8 Cdn Fd Regt makes neither reference to the exchange nor any criticism of the weapons received.

Italian Theatre where roads in the forward areas negotiable by two-wheel drive vehicles were few and far between. (Ibid: Letter S.D.4788, Main Eighth Army to 5 Cdn Armd Div, 8 Jan 44). Further vehicles were turned over to the Canadians by 4 (Brit) Armd Bde. "As usually these vehicles were in bad shape, some arriving on tow. The O.I.C. this column was frank to admit that units of Eighth Army had picked over the equipment before any of it was turned over to this formation." (W.D., G.S. Branch, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 9 Jan 44). The armoured regiments selected - 2 Cdn Armd Regt and Westmr R. (Mot) - were eventually supplied by cannibalizing the remaining units of the division, all Sherman tanks being transferred at once to 2 Cdn Armd Regt (Ld S.H.) so that the move could take place on 16 Jan 44. (W.D., A. & Q. Branch, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 10, 11 Jan 44)

55. To fill the gaps left by these emergency transfers, Lt-Col Matthews, A.A. & C.M.G. of 5 Cdn Armd Div, made a call on 15 Army Group for three-ton trucks which had been promised "over a month ago...After discussion with Brigadier Foster, B.G.S.(S.D.) and members of his staff and phone conversation with Eighth Army from there, release was granted for 70 three-ton 4 x 2s and 50 cased M.Cs. It was stressed by all at 15 Army Group that we were under command Eighth Army and that future applications in connection with releases of vehicles and equipment should be made through Eighth Army only". (W.D., A. & Q. Branch, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 11 Jan 44). On this understanding a statement of the division's equipment and vehicle situation was prepared and taken to G.(S.D.) Eighth Army, "who advised that further vehicles were in short supply and that no immediate releases could be expected". Two days later a personal conference between Lt-Col Matthews and Major Attenborough, G.S.O.2 (S.D.) Eighth Army, resulted in a promise that the latter would intercede with S.D. 15 Army Group and a subsequent report that "a substantial number of releases were forthcoming". (Ibid: 14, 16 Jan 44)

56. One attempt to develop a new organization in this theatre was brought forward during the period of re-equipment. Brigadier Ivor-Moore (Brigadier A.F.V. Eighth Army) and Maj-Gens Simonds and Burns (the latter arrived in Italy to take over the Armoured Division. See para 57), agreed that the replacement of two tank troops in each squadron by a troop of Daimler scout cars and an assault troop mounted in White scout cars, would provide a more useful unit than the existing organization of 3 Cdn Armd Recce Regt. Further details were worked out by Lt-Col Murphy, G.S.O. 1, 5 Cdn Armd Div, and Lt-Col Cumberland, then commanding this unit. Their suggested organization provided for "an additional wheeled recce element and an infantry element; the additional men required being drawn from 5 L.A.A. Regt, R.C.A.". This final proposal was submitted to Lt-Gen Creerar who eventually announced that "after a conversation with G.O.C.-in-C. Eighth Army it was decided that it was inadvisable to organize 3 Cdn Armd Recce Regt on a new and somewhat experimental basis at the present time and that the regiment should therefore draw the equipment according to the W.E. now in force, i.e., five troops each of two Sherman and two Stuart tanks per squadron". (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 22, 26, 30 Jan 44)

57. In view of the limited scope of this report the equipment situation of 5 Cdn Armd Div must be left at this point. The situation at the end of January was still far

from satisfactory. On 29 Jan Maj-Gen Burns, who had just taken over command of 5 Cdn Armd Div, met Brigadier Ivor-Moore, Brigadier A.F.V. Eighth Army:

Maj-Gen Burns stated that 1 Cdn Corps expected Eighth Army to complete the equipping of 5 Cdn Armd Div as originally planned. Brigadier Ivor-Moore proposed reducing the issue of Shermans to various units and H.Q.s. of 5 Cdn Armd Div in order to establish a reserve and to replace some tanks in 1 Cdn Armd Bde. The G.O.C. then stated that this was a matter for Eighth Army decision in view of operational requirements and that he wanted to be equipped to full establishment as soon as possible. He thought it inadvisable to eliminate H.Q. tanks in view of the possibility that at some future date the Div would be employed in the normal Armd Div role.

(W.D., G.S. Branch, H.Q.
5 Cdn Armd Div, 29 Jan 44)

It was not until March, largely through the efforts of R.C.O.C. mechanics in repairing the equipment taken over, that the supply of vehicles in 5 Cdn Armd Div reached the requirements. On 10 Mar 44, with a W.E. of 3023 vehicles (exclusive of motor cycles, jeeps and cars) the Division held 3123. With respect to 3-ton lorries, 4 x 4 G.S., 919 were held against a W.E. of 1021. (Interview with Brigadier MacDonald, op cit)

THE EQUIPPING OF 1 CDN CORPS TROOPS

58. As stated above (para 32) it was decided that 1 Cdn Corps Tps would be equipped with vehicles sent from England and with such other stores as were available in the theatre. (In the absence of any complete report on this subject, it has been necessary to piece out the story from various letters and telegrams and from the war diaries of formations concerned. Unfortunately, many of the latter are incomplete, since enemy action resulted in the loss of many original copies with unduplicated appendices and in some cases in the loss of all copies requiring reconstruction of the whole diary from memory. Correspondence with C.M.H.Q. provides the chief basis for policy but it is necessary and often very difficult to find out whether policy was followed when message files are missing from formation and unit diaries. Bennett, op cit, is the best available source of the Italian picture.)

59. The telegrams from London which announced the impending arrival of equipment for 1 Cdn Corps Troops stated that the ships carrying it would dock at Bari, Syracuse and Naples. This dispersal of ships was a problem which nearly always complicated the operations of Canadian base installations (see paras 29 - 30). Here the solution adopted was to set up a special ad hoc port organization at each port. These were under control D.D.O.S., 1 Cdn Corps, and consisted in each case of the following personnel:

- "(a) A H.Q. - C.O. to be nominated by D.D.O.S. 1 Cdn Corps.
- (b) Port Det R.C.O.C. to check veh stores ex ships.
- (c) Port Det R.E.M.E. - to handle non-runners.

- (d) R.C.A.S.C. Drivers Dets - to clear vehs from quayside to veh parks.
- (e) Ord Dumps dets - to unload stores from vehs on way from quayside to veh parks. Subsequent sorting and issuing.
- (f) Ord Veh Pk Dets - to check and issue vehs to unit reps.
- (g) R.E.M.E. Veh Pk Dets - to service vehs in the veh pks.
- (h) Guards - for store dumps and veh pks."

(W.D., A. & Q. Branch, H.Q.
1 Cdn Corps, November 1943,
Appx 36, 1 Cdn Corps Adm Instr
No. 3, 23 Nov 43)

The officer commanding the port organization was authorized to hire civilian labour as he saw fit. The distribution to units was left to "Q" 1 Cdn Corps under a central control office established by D.D.O.S., 1 Cdn Corps. The directive ended with a warning that "the stores and vehicles referred to in this instruction are for units of 1 Cdn Corps Troops and they will NOT under any circumstances be issued to Canadian formations not yet under command this Corps without reference G. (S.D.) and Q. at this H.Q." The first vehicles were expected to arrive about 9 Dec 43. (Ibid)

60. Some confusion in W.Es. and in quantities of vehicles required seems to have reigned in the minds of military authorities both in Italy and the U.K., for there exists a long series of telegrams which make claims and counter-claims of error and miscalculation over this equipment. From Cdn Sec, G.H.Q. 1 Ech came two specific complaints: (a) That out-of-date W.Es. had been used in making up the list and "changes authorized by organizational tables apparently were not taken into consideration. This has resulted in deficiencies (which were listed and requested) ... and some small surpluses." It was quietly suggested that the latter be shipped and considered available as wastage. (C.M.H.Q. file 1/A.A.I. Gen/1: Tel A.C.G. 80 FLAMBO (from CANDEX) to CANMILITRY, 25 Nov 43). C.M.H.Q. replied:

Agree surpluses be retained and used as wastage. Deficiencies in accordance latest W.Es. being prepared for shipment earliest. Will notify convoy when arrangements with Troopers completed.

(C.M.H.Q. file 1/TIM Admin/1:
Tel G.S. 3011, CANMILITRY to
FLAMBO (for CANDEX), 30 Nov 43)

(b) That the vehicles and equipment for non-counterpart units (those for which no matching units were being sent from the Mediterranean to the U.K.) had been forgotten in calculating the totals to be sent. (C.M.H.Q. file 1/AAI Gen/1: Tel FLAMBO (from CANDEX) to CANMILITRY, 25 Nov 43. Manuscript note on this folio over signature General Montague informs B.G.S., C.M.H.Q., "I wish the facts and to cable Beament as helpfully as possible."). C.M.H.Q. replied that these units had been considered and that the only vehicles still to be sent were some ten items mostly connected with

meteorological sections which would follow at the earliest possible occasion. (C.M.H.Q. file 1/TIM Admin/1: Tel G.S. 3012, CANMILITRY to FLAMBO (for CANDEX), 30 Nov 43)

61. The detail of these vehicles and stores and the units concerned appear in C.M.H.Q. files. For the purpose of this report the following summary produced by A. & Q. Branch, H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps is considered an adequate picture:

<u>Convoy</u>	<u>Expected to Arrive</u>	<u>Vehicles Included</u>
K.M.S. 33	4 Dec 43	208 (60 vehicles for two vessels shut out of convoy and add to K.M.S. 34.)
K.M.S. 34	16 Dec 43	1569
K.M.S. 35	26 Dec 43	1573

"Estimating fifteen days to offload, register and distribute K.M.S. 35, it will be approximately mid-January before 1 Cdn Corps has all vehicles Ex U.K." (W.D., A. & Q. Branch, H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, November 1943, Appx 5, Memo by Brig Lister, 27 Nov 43)

62. This programme was followed with only minor exceptions. K.M.S. 33 was delayed and was not offloaded until 11 Dec and there were some adjustments which resulted in stores destined for K.M.S. 35 being held for K.M.S. 36, but on 17 Jan at a 1 Cdn Corps A. & Q. conference, it was reported that "K.M.S. 35 has arrived. It has been almost completely distributed." This good news was accompanied by a warning that "from now on only small shipments of vehicles will be arriving. Corps [sic] is about 75 per cent better equipped than Eighth Army. Eighth Army will not allow any replacement of vehicles until we get down to the standard of other formations. As we lose a vehicle it is gone and will not be replaced. Vehicles should be well looked after ... When K.M.S. 35 is completely unloaded all units should be well equipped". (W.D., A. & Q. Branch, H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, December 1943: Conference 10 Dec 43, Item 262, Conference 28 Dec 43, Item 351; and January 1944: Conference 17 Jan 44, Item 13.). Within a week D.D.O.S., 1 Cdn Corps, was able to report that "receipt of issue of vehicles shows that with the exception of a few technical vehicles Corps troops are almost complete". (W.D., A. & Q. Branch, H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, January 1944: Appx "B", 22 Jan 44)

63. At this stage it was possible to disband the special port organizations and leave the handling of all later small shipments in the hands of 3rd Canadian Mobile Laundry and Bath Unit in Naples. Many difficulties had to be overcome before this distribution could be completed. The following quotation explains some of the difficulties of one of the port organizations:

In Italy the vehs were all concentrated in the football grounds at BARI and from there advance parties of the units who were to draw them came in and picked them up against orders issued by the D.D.O.S. in Sicily. Unfortunately we had just got going when the BARI raid occurred. There was considerable confusion and we were ejected from our accommodation. However we

re-organized without undue difficulty. The important point was that all details were worked out very carefully in advance against possibilities of ships going to a different port or different convoy and we had to work out a flexible organization for this purpose. It is worth, at this point, emphasizing that the people we had to work with were less than 100 ranks, trained, plus Mobile Laundries who had never done anything like this before ... Unloading of ships was delayed due to unforeseen difficulties. For example, in some ships the vehs had seed potatoes packed around them. On some days a German recce plane would come over. The A.A. guns fired and the Italian labourers fled and did not re-appear that day.

(Bennett, op cit, pp 2 and 3)

An attempt to exchange vehicles of British manufacture for Canadian types is reported as receiving approval in theory from S.D. 15 Army Group but failing in practice because "Fords and Chevrolets were not available for trading". (Ibid: 6 and 18 Jan 44)

64. As mentioned above (paras 32 and 58) it was decided that certain items of equipment for 1 Cdn Corps Troops could be obtained in the theatre. This applied to guns and motorcycles, bulk and accommodation stores and controlled stores in general. Since the equipment cast off by 30 Corps was largely depleted, the re-equipping of 1 Cdn Corps Troops involved a search for resources throughout the Middle East Command. The memo by Brigadier Lister already quoted in para 61 outlines the procedure to be adopted.

The equipment required has been listed in bulk by items and sent with issue orders to the Ordnance Depot Sicily. Items and quantities they are able to supply will be deducted from the bulk list and the inability list will be circulated to depots in N.A. (chiefly BONE and ALGIERS). The same procedure (i.e. further inability from BONE and ALGIERS) will be repeated to depots in Middle East (CAIRO and ALEXANDRIA). Any further incapacities will be demanded from troopers (depots in U.K.).

The following target dates were set:

- (a) All incapacities in Mediterranean Theatre to be known 21 Dec 43.
- (b) All Mediterranean provisions to reach 1 Cdn Corps 21 Jan 44.
- (c) Complete provision date U.K. items 15 Feb 44.

(W.D., A. & Q. Branch, H.Q.
1 Cdn Corps, November 1943:
Appx 45, 27 Nov 43)

65. The stores available in Sicily were ready for issue on 10 Dec, but in the absence of documentary evidence to the contrary it may be assumed that the quantities were small. (Ibid). A. & Q. Diaries of the formations concerned do not indicate any great flood of distribution

and the units waiting in Sicily were loud in their complaints of the lack of even token equipment for training purposes. The gunners are perhaps most vocal in this respect - as one commanding officer declared, "the gunners are more affected than other units as they never feel equipped unless they have guns and no guns are available". (W.D., H.Q. R.C.A. 1 Cdn Corps, 29 Nov 43, Visit of Lt-Col Thorne of 1 Cdn L.A.A. Regt to H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps).^{*} Attempts were made to borrow equipment for training purposes from British units under command H.Q. 1 District, and some enemy equipment was distributed which could be used for modified gun drill, and which paved the way for possible future appropriations of "Tedeschi" weapons. (Ibid: 2, 9 and 14 Dec 43).^{**} The artillery commander mentioned above soon found means to vary training from the monotony of route marches, for during the inspection of his unit by the C.C.R.A. it is reported that his men were engaged in "training with Bangalore Torpedoes, snap-shooting with Italian rifles, target practice with Breda M.Gs. and an exercise consisting of a troop overcoming an enemy strongpoint during a dismounted approach march". (Ibid: 18 Dec 43)

66. A comprehensive report on the equipment situation appeared on 20 Dec 43 which confirmed that the supplies from Sicily had been distributed and that the North Africa availabilities had been drawn and were being moved direct to the "heel" of Italy (Taranto or Bari), where vehicles would be picked up by advance parties of drivers from the units then preparing to move forward from Sicily. Certain items had been in shorter supply than anticipated. This was particularly true of motorcycles, which had been largely turned in during the desert campaigns and were now being drawn by units in Italy where highways were at least passable to motorcycles. Medium artillery had already been provided for 1 Cdn Med Regt, R.C.A., but guns for the other medium regiment were being delayed while modifications were being carried out by British Ordnance. Signal equipment, as found in North Africa, had not been of very good quality and attempts were being made to have new sets sent out from C.M.H.Q. (W.D., A. & Q. Branch, H.A. 1 Cdn Corps, December 1943, Appx 38, Memo signed Roaf for MacDonald, 20 Dec 43). By this time the troops of 11 Cdn Inf Bde had gone into battle and preparations were being made to bring the rest of 1 Cdn Corps Troops forward. This made re-equipment more urgent than ever and General Crerar reports the transmission of a letter to General Alexander in which he discussed "the slow

^{*} The Colonel reported:
...that he was having difficulty in maintaining a high state of morale in his unit and that his men were becoming 'browned off' ... The men in the regiment arrived in Sicily in a very high state of morale. The lack of equipment even for training purposes and the necessity for route marches and other training of this type produce a serious problem in maintaining morale.

(W.D., H.Q. R.C.A. 1 Cdn Corps, 29 Nov 43)

^{**} Captured German S.Ps. were actually fired on a German position on Cotignola in the 1 Cdn Corps attacks of December 1944 and were on display at a captured weapon exhibition in Ravenna, January 1945.

rate of issue ... of equipment".* (W.D., Lt-Gen Crerar, 15 Jan 44). There seems little doubt that the equipment of our troops was brought at least up to local standards before the end of January** for although there continued to be complaints about equipment, these were common and well justified throughout all units in the Mediterranean theatre as the preparations for another "Second Front" received the highest priority on matters of equipment and personnel (see paras 74 and 85).

DEMANDS FOR INCREASED HOSPITAL FACILITIES

67. It will be recalled that General McNaughton had stated that the "TIMBERWOLF" move was destined to provide a Canadian Corps in the Mediterranean with "hospitals to scale and rear echelon units as required" (see para 4). In preceding paragraphs the equipment problems of the fighting troops have been recorded at some length. These troops, however, never formed more than two-thirds of the total Canadian force in Italy; the remainder had needs just as urgent, and perhaps more so, since fighting troops cannot operate without the services. As the front-line troops began to move into Italy more and more services became necessary, and the load on Canadian overall manpower became more apparent. We shall note later in this report how this

* The letter is stated as being despatched on 16 Jan 44 and appears to belong to file G.O.C. 5-0-1, letter not found. Replies, 29741 from FREEDOM and 58570 from TROOPERS are also among the missing. Bennett, op cit, page 4, gives the following dates for events in the equipment of 1 Cdn Corps Troops.

- 11 Jan 44 Col Bennett and Col Elwood (A.D.O.S., Cdn Sec 1 Ech) went to Cairo and presented bulk requirements in spare parts to A.D.O.S. Provision, (M.E. Command).
- 19 Jan 44 1000 tons spare parts shipped from Egypt.
- 29 Jan 44 Balance of 1 Cdn Corps deficiencies of ordnance equipment shipped from Middle East.
- 11 Feb 44 First of spare parts from M.E. unloaded at Bari.

Colonel Bennett further states:

I returned to Italy on 15 Jan and found that with the spares we had received from the U.K. from 500 A.O.D. [Brit] and D.D.O.S. Eighth Army, the Corps now has a fairly good interim supply of spare parts ... Major Smith, D.A.D.O.S., Corps Troops, set up his dump and distributed all stores which had been received from North Africa and from England which brought the units up to about 50 percent completion of equipment. The units were practically complete in transport.

(Bennett, op cit, p.4)

** Appendix "A" shows a set of equipment tables presented as of 10 Feb 44. These do not bear signature but carry the stamp of Lt-Gen Crerar and hand-written note "PA my file". These lists appear in Hist Sec file Italy: 1944/1 Cdn Corps/R/F.

situation finally led to protests from the highest quarters in London and to the serious dislocation of the planned economy for Canadian manpower which had been drawn up at N.D.H.Q. (see paras 80 - 86). The provision of the extra units and equipment made necessary by the bare existence of a Canadian force of 75,000 all ranks in Italy could in itself form the basis of a lengthy report. All that can be done here is to illustrate the general trend by citing one or two specific examples to give a brief summary of the whole situation by means of an appendix (see para 74 and Appx "B").

68. Among the units in "TIMBERWOLF 1" were 14 and 11 Canadian General Hospitals. When it became apparent that the Canadian units with the exception of 5 Cdn Armd Div would have to be supplied with vehicles from the United Kingdom, Cdn Sec 1 Ech raised the point of vehicles for hospitals, a query that automatically led to a request for an increase in W.E.s. to provide drivers. C.M.H.Q. stated that:

No provision [is] being made for general hospitals as you will appreciate that W.E. makes no allowance for vehicles or personnel to operate them. Normal solution this regard to obtain services L. of C. transport coy. As L. of C. Brit responsibility propose you apply for these services from Brit sources.

(C.M.H.Q. file 1/TIM Adm/1:
Tel G.S. 3011, CANMILITRY to
FLAMBO for CANDEX, 30 Nov 43)

69. Brigadier Beament replied in a long telegram, wherein he quoted previous discussions on the subject:

It was fully appreciated ... that hospitals draw transport services from L. of C. Gen Tpt Coys. As I explained, experience has shown that this theory did not work out in practice and therefore if hospitals were to have reasonable transport facilities they must be provided on a hospital establishment basis. In point of fact except for special moves or requirements of an unusual nature it has never repeat never been possible to obtain tpt for hosps L. of C. tpt coys. Hospitals have operated unsatisfactorily on captured or borrowed eqpt generally on a singularly low mechanical quality. At present I have obtained Staff Duties release for limited amount of transport for Nos. 1 [sic] and 14 Gen Hosps on assurance that this would be covered by W.E. as agreed. It is pointed out that it was found necessary to provide scales of transport for hospitals even in U.K. although it is true that these vehs and pers are carried on the strength of administrative tpt coy.. They are nevertheless definitely allocated to hospitals and do not operate on a tpt coy pool for normal purposes. If hosp W.E. is not to be amended to provide transport and unless prepared to accept that it will be impossible on most occasions to provide adequate transport for hospital adm purposes only alternative is to supply Cdn L. of C. Tpt Coy from which tpt can be drawn and this would be relatively uneconomical.

(C.M.H.Q. file 1/TIM Adm/1:
Tel A.C.G. 1512, FLAMBO from
CANDEX to CANMILITRY, 3 Dec 43)

70. Convinced either by the clarity of the appeal or by consciences guilty of omission, C.M.H.Q. replied that the request would be granted and the changes in W.E. were authorized and sent to the Mediterranean early in February (C.M.H.Q. file 1/TIM Adm/1: Tel G.S. 5108, CANMILITRY to FLAMBO for CANDEX, 11 Dec 43; Letter S.D. & T. to S.D. 2, 11 Dec 43; Tel G.S. 489, CANMILITRY to FLAMBO for CANDEX, 15 Feb 44).

71. As the Canadian troops settled into their training areas and the general locations of the Canadian base units began to take pattern against the accommodation situation the need for further medical services was pointed out to C.M.H.Q.:

AVELLINO area being developed as Cdn base area and will eventually probably hold up to 10,000 troops. Had hoped to find suitable location in area for 600-bed hospital but reconnaissance reveals this impossible. Nearest Cdn Hosp will therefore be CASERTA. Desirable there should be some closer hosp facility for less serious cases. Perfectly adequate facilities exist for 200-bed hosp. As an interim measure Corps Commander has agreed to this installation being operated by an F.D.S. and will prove satisfactory short term solution. F.D.S. however ultimately required in combat zone. As long term policy strongly recommend I be recognized to despatch one Cdn 200-bed general hosp. In formal discussion with D.D.M.S. FLAMBO indicates this addition to medical facilities area would be highly acceptable.

(First Cdn Army file P.A. 1-18-1, Tel A.C.A. 188, FLAMBO from CANDEX to CANMILITRY, Montague from Beament, 16 Nov 43)

Action to provide a 200-bed hospital was approved in London by both General Montague and General McNaughton and at A.F.H.Q. subject to the proviso that the hospital should not be despatched at such time as would exclude more important units from convoy space. The chosen hospital, 3 Cdn Gen Hosp, was despatched with equipment on the January convoy. It disembarked at Naples on 27 Jan and was set up in Avellino. (Ibid: Letter 1/TIM Adm/1 (A.D.A.G.(A)), 19 Nov 43, unnumbered cipher A.F.H.Q. to W.O. signed Eisenhower, 23 Nov 43; Tel G.S. 2970, CANMILITRY to FLAMBO for CANDEX, 28 Nov 43 and W.D., 3 Cdn Gen Hosp, January 1944)

72. Another 600-bed hospital was offered in December as available for service in the Mediterranean Theatre. (No copy of a request from 1 Echelon for this further unit has been located but it is stated to have been in response to a suggestion from the D.M.S., C.M.H.Q., and letters were located in which it was established that this one more 600-bed hospital would bring the proportion of beds to personnel in the Mediterranean area approximately to that arranged for 21 Army Group.) (C.M.H.Q. file 1/AAI Gen/1: Letter Montague to McNaughton, 6 Dec 43). It must have been a pleasant surprise for CANDEX to have an offer of personnel for which they had not already begged, and their reply lightly suggested that while the overall hospital situation in Italy might make it ...

advisable to send the hospital in the meantime the Canadian troops would be better served by setting up a 300-bed increment for each of 14 and 15 Gen Hosps as already established in Caserta where there were not proper buildings for another complete unit. D.D.N.S. FREEDOM was naturally not averse to obtaining another Canadian hospital in the theatre, and he approved the move. (First Cdn Army file P.A. 1-18-1: Tel G.S. 3060, CANMILITRY to FLAMBO for CANDEX, 6 Dec 43; Tel A.C.G. 1517, FLAMBO from CANDEX to CANMILITRY, 8 Dec 43; Tel A.C.G. 1525, FLAMBO from CANDEX to CANMILITRY, 16 Dec 43). C.M.H.Q. promised a 600-bed hospital for the February convoy and suggested that if the increments were needed they could be set upon a G.S.D. 602 basis* and be disbanded on the arrival of the 600-bed unit. (Ibid: Tel G.S. 3179, CANMILITRY to FLAMBO for CANDEX, 19 Dec 43). Now thoroughly interested in the idea, CANDEX spoke strongly in favour of the increments rather than the full hospital and pointed out the saving in manpower involved by the suggestion. C.M.H.Q. however, stood its ground and argued that the extra manpower would include the extra doctors necessary to keep up the desired standard of treatment. (Ibid: Tel A.C.A. 1629, FLAMBO from CANDEX to CANMILITRY, 22 Dec 43; Tel G.S. 3227, CANMILITRY to FLAMBO for CANDEX, 24 Dec 43. Latter telegram concludes, "this also accepted and decision final".)

73. This seems to have been the last time that any contribution requested for the Italian theatre was decided upon without a more than careful eye being kept upon the manpower situation. When a request was made for a second convalescent depot, the reply was to authorize only a second division of the one already operating, and when CANDEX pointed out that with the fighting troops in the Adriatic and the remainder of the hospitals and base units around or moving to Avellino two separate establishments were absolutely necessary, no change was permitted. Instead CANDEX was advised to: "re-examine accommodation situation with a view to centralizing convalescent services in one place accordingly". (Ibid: Tel A.C.G. 1522, FLAMBO from CANDEX to CANMILITRY, 15 Dec 43; Tel G.S. 1380, CANMILITRY to FLAMBO for CANDEX, 19 Dec 43; Tel A.C.A. 1629, FLAMBO for CANDEX to CANMILITRY, 22 Dec 43; Tel G.S. 3227, CANMILITRY to FLAMBO for CANDEX, 24 Dec 43)

THE MANPOWER SITUATION

74. The foregoing examples of demands for increased Canadian medical services could be multiplied many times in other branches and services. At Appendix "B" will be found a list prepared for the M.G.A. at C.M.H.Q. showing the situation at 6 Feb 44 with regard to all new units and increments which had been requested and the action taken thereon. It will serve to demonstrate the "snowball" effect of increasing the Canadian force in Italy. Finally, after minor complaints had been voiced at each successive request, General Montague sent a full-length protest to General Crerar as follows:

* For a description of the formation of G.S.D. 602 units on a temporary basis see Report No. 168, The Organization of First Cdn Army.

PARA I Must draw your attention to continued requests for increases to establishments Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech and other base and L. of C. details now being received from Beament. Realize many of these of small dimension but accumulative effect now achieving serious proportions. For your information since base installations originally approved and set up in theatre total personnel involved in new demands amount to 228 officers and 1,342 other ranks of which more than 60 percent are apparently required for base and L. of C. details for which British are responsible.

PARA II You will agree approved policy and imposed manpower ceiling does not allow large buildup for base and L. of C. installations and that with small contingency reserve of manpower available we cannot approve additions without corresponding reductions elsewhere.

PARA III Situation extremely complicated by necessity of providing for two theatres. Needs of both must be carefully weighed in balance before granting approval even in principle to many recommendations received. While doubtless general requirements discussed with you feel I must request that you with Beament exercise careful scrutiny upon all new and unforeseen demands already made and which in future may be requested.

PARA IV Earnestly desire to provide you and your troops with best possible services but feel that you must appreciate no present prospect of obtaining authority to increase overall manpower ceiling. Can assure you every effort being made here to increase working margin and availability of personnel by reducing static establishments, review of attachments and cutting out non-essential units.

(Ibid: Tel G.S. 3163,
CANMILITRY to O2E [sic] for
CANDEX, for Crerar from
Montague, 18 Dec 43)

75. General Crerar obviously had no intention of accepting the blame for this situation and replied as follows:

Only requests for increase establishments Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech discussed by Beament with me and for which he sought and obtained my general approval are those mentioned his letter Cdn 56/5/1 ECH/1, 29 Nov 43, to you and total 27 all ranks. In consequence totals indicated third sentence your message not explainable by me. Consider it most important you make personal visit this theatre without delay apart from Cdn Sec [sic] matters as above other important questions require discussion me and representation Cdn Army Commander.

(Ibid: Tel O. 4, Comd
1 Cdn Corps to CANMILITRY,
Montague from Crerar, 22
Dec 43)

76. To Brigadier Beament he made the following comment:

You will have seen the S.O.'s letter to me re the manpower increases you apparently have been requesting and my reply. I consider that C.M.H.Q. must remain responsible for organization Cdn Sec 1 and 2 Ech's, and all that comes under you. I shall indicate the "service" I want, but I am not going to deal any more than I can help in the detailed ways and means this involves.

(Hist Sec file: Italy 1943/
1 Cdn Corps: GOC/E: Letter
Crerar to Beament, 25 Dec 43)

This letter sets out clearly the position of the Senior Combatant Officer in the Mediterranean theatre in relation to the Canadian Echelon units in C.M.F. While C.M.H.Q. might have preferred to have the Commander, 1 Cdn Corps, in the position of "Supreme Commander Canadian Troops Mediterranean Area" - which in theory he was - the exigencies of operations and the vast geographical separations coupled with bad transportation inevitably placed heavy responsibilities on the O.I.C. Cdn Sec 1 Ech.

THE PROVISION OF REINFORCEMENTS

77. When it was decided to move more Canadian troops to Italy the need for more Echelon units obviously included a larger staff to handle the reinforcements required. 1 C.B.R.D. had been performing this function for 1 Cdn Inf Div and 1 Cdn Armd Bde, but now it was decided to set up H.Q. 1 Cdn Base Rft Gp to command 1 and 2 C.B.R.D., with 14 Cdn F.S. Sec and H.Q. 1 L. of C. Provost Coy also under command. The staff of this new headquarters was made up partly from volunteers for the United Kingdom and, to some extent, from the excess personnel of 1 C.B.R.D., which had been granted certain increments to operate in a detached role in North Africa. Brigadier E.W. Haldenby was appointed to command the new headquarters. (First Cdn Army file: P.A. 1-18-1: Tel A. 3770, CANMILITRY to 15 Army Group for Tow, 17 Oct 43; and W.D., H.Q. 1 C.B.R.Gp, October 1943). The new formation, with the exception of 1 C.B.R.D. who were already set up near Philippeville, travelled to Italy on the ill-fated "Santa Elena" and suffered the usual losses of kit and equipment. They docked at Naples on 10 Nov 43 and after 12 days at Caserta moved to permanent quarters in Avellino, where they joined 1 C.B.R.D. (less 4 Battalion), at the beginning of 1944. (W.D., 1 C.B.R.Gp and 1 C.B.R.D., October to December 1943)

78. When the Canadian forces moved into Sicily, 4 Bn of 1 C.B.R.D. had been chosen as a forward detachment, and landed close behind the assaulting troops. Keeping in close touch, this battalion moved forward to Taranto and later to Termoli, whence forward companies were in turn detached to Corps F.M.As. and D.M.As. The procedure adopted is fully laid out in a D.O. letter from Brigadier Beament to General Montague, written after a visit of the former to H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div where the whole situation had been discussed with General Montgomery.

Para 12. The following detailed scheme for reinforcing 1 Cdn Inf Div has been put in motion:

- (a) 4 Bn is now established at LUCERA and will be moved later on to TERMOLI as accommodation and ry facilities permit.
- (b) At the present time there is a transit camp at railhead at TERMOLI and ry facilities exist between LUCERA and TERMOLI.
- (c) 4 Bn will provide a coy in the D.M.A. 1 Cdn Inf Div and coy in the F.M.C. 5 Corps. These coys will be respectively under the comds of the D.M.A. and F.M.C. for local adm but the control of pers flowing through them will be maintained by the O2E I.O. at 1 Div and O2E I.O. at 4 Bn respectively.
- (d) Each of the two forward coys will hold approx 300 rfts of which approx 75% will be infantry. The balance of 4 Bn will hold approx 600 rfts of which approx 2/3 will be infantry.
- (e) The D.M.A. and F.M.C. holdings will be comprised of non-tradesmen and non-specialists. Small numbers of the more common type of tradesmen and specialists, e.g. cooks, drivers I.C. will be held forward. A small pool of tradesmen will be held at 4 Bn but fundamentally, highly skilled pers will be obtained specially from the main base at AVELLINO. The previously existing practice of trying to keep a cross section at reinforcing echelons has resulted in skilled tradesmen being tied up for long periods without any opportunity of being refreshed in their trades.
- (g) The policy will be to keep forward echelons filled up in the same manner as is done in the case of ammunition. By adopting the system outlined above two advantages emerge:
 - (i) The forward reinforcing echelons are under a definite commander who is responsible for caring for them at all times and moving them when D.M.A. and/or F.M.C. moves.
 - (ii) Personnel to replenish fwd echelons can be forwarded on supply and ammunition lorries without difficulties.

(W.D., Cdn Sec 1 Ech,
December 1943: Appx 13,
Beament to Montague, Can 56/
1/OIC/1, 18 Dec 43)

A request for a special increment to a forward reinforcement battalion in such a role was one of the many increases asked for by Cdn Sec 1 Ech. (See Appendix "B"; C.M.H.Q. file 1/AAI Gen/1: Tel A.C.G. 1544, FLAMBO from CANDEX to CANMILITRY, 24 Dec 43). The increment was to consist of:

1 Major, 2 Lieuts for records and General
administration
1 Chaplain
1 Sgt clerk Gp B/C
2 Sanitary duty ptes
2 Batman drivers
2 Drivers I.C.
4 Motorcyclists
4 Motorcycles, solo
2 Cars 5 cwt
2 Lorries, 3-ton
1 Water trailer

(C.M.H.Q. file 1/AAI Gen/1:
Tel A.C.G. 1544, FLAMBO from
CANDEX to CANMILITRY, 24 Dec 43)

79. One interesting addition to 1 C.B.R.Gp was formed in January 1944, when Brigadiers Beament and Haldenby prepared an ad hoc W.E. for 1 Non-Effective Transit Wing to handle personnel returning to the United Kingdom or Canada - a task previously performed by 2 Battalion of 1 C.B.R.D.

Brigadier Haldenby stated that H.Q. and two coys of 8 Bn would be used to run the new N.E.T. Wing. One to hold category pers and one to hold duty pers. Lt.-Col. Lent would be in command because of his experience at N.E.T.D. in the U.K.

This unit was to include a standing medical board. It opened at Monteforte outside of Avellino (V.Ds., Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech, 2 and 3 Jan 44, 1 C.B.R.Gp, 5 Jan 44, and 1 C.B.R.D., 7 Dec 43).

80. The above paragraphs have dealt with the responsibility, within the Mediterranean theatre, of getting personnel to and from the forward units; the problem of getting them to the theatre is connected much more closely with the general manpower situation of the Canadian Army Overseas. In general, there existed a conflict between the demands of the Canadian military authorities in Italy, who wished to keep a large reserve of reinforcements both to meet casualties and to supply the need for specialists, and the problems of the administration in the United Kingdom, who had to face both the dwindling or restricted supply of men from Canada and the prospective calls of 21 Army Group when Operation "OVERLORD" should finally be launched.

81. When "TIMBERWOLF 1" was planned, one month's reinforcements for all the units taking part were included. When the second flight was being organized British authorities found space in the convoy for not only the units available from Canadian sources plus one month's reinforcements, but also for additional personnel. This extra space was offered to the Canadian authorities at C.M.H.Q. and it was decided to take advantage of the offer and include further reinforcements:

Difficulties may arise later regarding the availability of space in future convoys. Better to have the bodies out there than to delay despatch from here.

(C.M.H.Q. file 3/TIMBERWOLF 1/
1/2: Longhand note, Penhale
to S.O. on letter S.D. & T. to
S.O., 1 Nov 43)

A report by General Montague states that the numbers were obtained only with difficulty:

These demands were broken down to show details of requirements by arms and services and by tradesmen within arms and services. These were filled only by drawing on all available personnel from every source. For example by permanent C.R.U. establishments, G.S.D. 602 units, etc. In the case of some trades demands were not completely filled. The above drafts complete the quantity of Canadian reinforcements in the Mediterranean theatre with the exception of two [sic] months' reinforcements for second flight -- figures approximately equal to the detail in line five above [77 officers and 733 other ranks]. These will be despatched in the December convoy.

(C.M.H.Q. file 1/AAI Gen/1:
Letter S.O. to G.O.C. First
Cdn Army, 3 Nov 43)

The phrase "two months' reinforcements for second flight" appears to be in error and should read "second month's reinforcements for second flight".*

* The following figures show reinforcements despatched to the Mediterranean theatre with "TIMBER CLF" convoys K.M.F. 25A and K.M.F. 26.

First Flight

<u>Line No.</u>	<u>Draft</u>	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>	<u>Total</u>
1.	Oct demand for 1 Cdn Div and 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde	198	3401	3599
2.	Exchange personnel	217	203	420
3.	First month's rfts, First Flight, 5 & 6 Rft Bns	133	1713	1846
Totals -		548	5317	5865

Second Flight

<u>Line No.</u>	<u>Draft</u>	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>	<u>Total</u>
4.	Nov demand for 1 Cdn Div and 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde	50	640	690
5.	First month's rfts, Second Flight, 7 Rft Bn	77	733	810
6.	Second month's rfts, First Flight, 8 Rft Bn	131	1470	1601
Totals -		258	2843	3101

(C.M.H.Q. file 1/AAI Gen/1:
S.O. to G.O.C.-in-C., 3 Nov 43)

82. During November of 1943 there were suggestions that the two months' intensive holding should be reduced. Brigadier Weeks advanced a suggestion of six weeks' intense or one month's intense exclusive of X-Lists. Brigadier Zeigler added a second suggestion that since the chief deficiencies appeared to be among tradesmen, some sort of proportional scheme might be set up to balance the claims of the Mediterranean theatre and of 21 Army Group. These suggestions were overruled by the Senior Officer who stated, "My decision is that there should be no change in the holdings for the present. Review can be suggested if thought that further changes in the situation warrant this". (C.M.H.Q. file 1/AAI Gen/1: Letter A.D.A.G.(A) to B.G.S., C.M.H.Q., 24 Nov 43 and pencilled note thereon by Brigadier Zeigler; Letter B.G.S., C.M.H.Q. to S.O., 26 Nov 43, with pencilled note as above over Senior Officer's signature)

83. No change in the situation occurred during December, but early in January 1944 a proposal to amend the basis of calculating reinforcements in connection with X-Lists threatened to reduce the numbers sent to the Mediterranean, no matter how many months' wastage was permitted. The chief points in the new scheme appear in a letter from General Stuart to Brigadier Beament:

Para 3. A reconsideration of the basis of calculation of percentages of the component parts of X-List which should be charged against rfts, and the percentages which should be allowed as non-effectives, has resulted in the adoption of a new basis slightly in variance to that communicated to you in our A5041 dated 25 Dec 43. The following is the new basis which will be used as a future policy:

<u>X-List</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Percentage Chargeable Against Rfts</u>	<u>Percentage Allowable as Non-Effectives</u>
X-1	P.O.W.	0	100
X-2	Detention	100	0
X-3	Hospital	12	88
X-4	Unposted rfts	100	0
X-5	Courses in theatre	100	0
X-6	Missing	0	100
X-7	Seconded	0	100

Para 5. In view of the allowances from the X-List which you will be able to count as non-effectives there is no sound basis for an additional allowance of 3%. It is true that Canada allows Cdn Army Overseas to hold an additional 3%, of W.E. and rft strength to offset temporary loss of available manpower caused by non-effectives. However this 3% is dissipated by X-List allowances granted to the component parts of the Cdn Army Overseas in the manner detailed above.

(C.M.H.Q. file 1/wastage/2:
Stuart to Beament, 7 Jan 44)

Brigadier Beament's reply stressed some of the special problems which had arisen in the Mediterranean theatre and made a strong case for his own solution of these problems:

The method of calculating rft bids which you have now laid down has certain points which operate against the holdings in this theatre at any time equalling two months intense rates, and I therefore consider that certain modifications are necessary. It is essential that calculations include an estimated casualty figure for the period between the day on which my bid is made, and the day the convoy bringing reinforcements arrives. The fact that convoys arrive each month is offset by the inclusion of the rfts demanded on the previous bid. Furthermore I have just been notified that convoys are now spaced at 36 day intervals, and therefore casualties must be calculated for a longer period than two months; for example, my bid for K.M.F. 31 after concurrence by you must reach FREEDOM by 25 Feb 44 and therefore my calculations will be made on or about 23 Feb 44 to include the period ending 15 May 44. In other words, a period of 81 days for which casualties must be calculated. At the same time the number of rfts received from X-3 List will be at the rate of 12% per month for 81 days. I consider it wrong in principle to include 100% of X-2 List, as soldiers sentenced to detention are all serving sentences in excess of 90 days and cannot be made available readily ... there is no reason to believe that over a projected period for every soldier released there will not be another committed.

Under the present basis no allowance is made for any personnel graded by medical boards for duties only in L. of C. and G.H.C. units. As the numbers are substantial, this seriously affects the reinforcement picture and in order to deal with the problem I have created an X-9 List in this theatre, to which such personnel are posted together with individuals who are not available as rfts, such as personnel awaiting medical boards, those subject to confidential reports, O.C.T.U. candidates awaiting interview by O.C.T.U. Selection Board and exchange personnel awaiting posting to field units ... As proved necessary in the U.K. due allowance for non-effectives must be made and not more than 25% of the X-9 List should be included as available.

(C.M.H., file 1/AAI Gen/1/3:
Beament to M.G.A., 9 Feb 44)

84. The final decision was slightly more favourable to the Mediterranean theatre than was the original plan as appears in a letter despatched 17 Mar 44 as follows:

The question of the lapse of time between the day on which a C.M.F. bid is made and the day on which rfts arrive in the theatre was raised by you. It is agreed that the anticipated casualties between these dates should be taken into account; but it is considered that the interval in question should be based on available information as to dates of sailing and not on any fixed period of time.

Changes in percentages of X-Lists:

X-8	For return U.K.		
	Chargeable Against Rfts -		0
	Allowable as Non-Effective -		100

X-9 . Others Non-available
Chargeable Against Rfts - 50
Allowable as Non-Effective - 50

It is noted in yours of 9 Feb that you state that personnel graded by medical boards for duties in G.H.Q. and L. of C. units only have been included in X-9. It is considered that such personnel should not be included in X-9 as defined in R.O. 4308 of 23 Feb 44. Personnel who have been graded by medical boards for duties in G.H.Q. and L. of C. units only are definitely available as reinforcements for such units. If the number of such personnel is so great that it exceeds the number of reinforcements required for the units of this description, then application should be made for return to U.K. of the surplus.

To summarize, therefore, your reinforcement requirements, as from the end of March, will be based on one month's wastage at intense rates plus non-effectives, the total of which will be determined by allowable percentages against component parts of the X-List as shown above, plus estimated wastage between dates of submission of bid and estimated arrival, and less recoverable casualties in the same period.

(C.M.E.C. file 1/AAI Gen/1/3:
Stuart to Beament, 17 Mar 44)

85. Meanwhile another plan for the assignment of manpower in the Canadian Army had been worked out at C.M.E.C.

Para 2. Troopers have represented strongly that we must on no account prejudice composition of Cdn component of 21 Army Group ... Troopers meeting similar but more complex situation by imposition of manpower subceiling in respect of theatres within which comd concerned is given liberty of action to make use of personnel at his discretion. I suggest for your consideration we institute similar arrangement to govern Cdn allocations of personnel.

Para 3. Proposal is to establish for each theatre a sub-ceiling based on summation of W.Es. of authorized units plus approved rfts which for C.M.F. is placed currently at two months holdings. Within this limit comd will be given liberty to utilize personnel in accordance with his appreciation of operational factors availability and nature of service to be added.

Para 4. Above would be combined with power to force comd within this approved ceiling to form temporary units on existing Cdn or Brit W.Es. or on provisional organizational tables. Personnel required for such units would count as rfts unless later authorization granted for conversion to permanent basis. All ranks and trades groupings to be temporary and to be surrendered on termination or disbandment.

Para 5. To satisfy N.D.F.C. requirements and in order to secure organizational uniformity and control in respect of theatre priorities full details would be advised this H.C. and confirmation

granted under G.S.D. 602. It will be understood that should priorities change or resources increase units and additions established on a temporary basis could be reconstituted as permanent addition to theatre after full authorization by this H.Q. under C.G.S. 139 in which event appropriate transfer from contingency reserve to theatre sub-ceiling would be made.

Para 6. Please give the above early consideration and cable me your comments after discussion with Montague.

(C.M.H.Q. file 1/Cdn Army/1/4:
CANMILITRY to FLAMBO for
CANDEX, 4 Feb 44)

In general this plan was acceptable to the Canadian military authorities in Italy, who, however, desired to set up the ceiling at the highest possible level. Brigadier Beament therefore suggested that it should be calculated on the following basis:

- (b) For the purpose of calculating the ceiling the units presently authorized to form in the Med theatre should all be counted within the summation of W.Es. These include all units shown in G.S. (S.D. 1) tables 5 Feb 43 as approved or approved in principle with the exception of increment to forward base Rft Bn which will be accepted as G.S.D. 602 charge. [See Appx "B"]
- (c) In addition to units in (B) the following W.Es. should be included in summation. Increase to W.Es. of Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech, Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 2 Ech and non-effective transit wing.
- (d) If any further units within the composition of the Cdn Army are transferred to this theatre, W.E. should be included in summation and sub-ceiling increased accordingly.
- (e) Other units required and outlined to Montague will be accepted as G.S.D. 602 charge against rfts.

(Ibid: Tel A.C.G. 1689,
FLAMBO from CANDEX to
CANMILITRY, Stuart from
Beament, 23 Feb 44)

86. While these suggestions were being exchanged the problem of wastage was again raised by C.M.H.Q. The fixed rate of reinforcements from Canada and the probability of casualties from "OVERLORD" had created a situation in the reinforcement units which led to the following decision:

Para 2. In future we will review situation monthly on receipt forecast of your bid and will take into consideration your actual casualties and forecast of your activity and availability of reinforcements considering other theatre and other pertinent factors.

Para 3. For reasons stated above and in view of operational priority this theatre consider you must operate with one month's holdings at intense rate from end of March. This will enable you to reinforce efficiently until end April if intense period activity extended and will provide opportunity to review in March when bid for K.M.F.31 must be confirmed. You will bear in mind that rate of return of casualties will accelerate.

(C.M.H.Q. file 1/AAI Gen/1/2:
Tel G.S. 533, CANMILITRY to
FLAMBO for CANDEX, 19 Feb 44)

87. As might have been expected this suggestion was strongly opposed from the Mediterranean section, where both Brigadier Beament and General Crerar stressed the need of an adequate pool to meet the casualties expected from projected operations, pressing the point that the time lag inherent in the convoy system had been further increased by gradual lengthening of the interval between Mediterranean convoys, now 36 days. (C.M.H.Q. file 1/AAI Gen/1/3: Tel A.C.A.2048, FLAMBO from CANDEX to CANMILITRY, 25 Feb 44). These arguments were futile against the immediate necessities of the reinforcement situation in the U.K. and a definite decision was made on 13 Mar 44, when a ceiling of 61,483 all ranks - 56,308 on W.Es. and 5175 as one month's reinforcements - was granted to the Mediterranean theatre. Rules for the employment of reinforcements in ad hoc and special units were as follows:

Para 5. Further in order to enable the Comd of the force to meet temporary or emergency conditions he is permitted to authorize as temporary provision within the approved manpower sub-ceiling W.Es. and units required subject to the following conditions:

- (a) Such authorizations if of a permanent nature to be referred to C.M.H.Q. where if concurred in as such will be ruled as an authorized addition to the force and covered by appropriate transfer of manpower from the contingency reserve to the sub-ceiling for the force.
- (b) Such authorization if of a temporary nature only will be advised to C.M.H.Q. stating date of inception, purpose of formation, manpower involved, expected duration and subsequently the actual date of termination.
- (c) Personnel involved in such temporary authorizations are to be counted against rfts for the theatre until such time as authorized as a permanent provision within the force or termination of the temporary authorization.

(Ibid: Tel G.S. 778,
CANMILITRY to FLAMBO for
CANDEX, 13 Mar 44)

Replies from both General Burns (now commanding 1 Cdn Corps) and Brigadier Weeks protested the reduction to one month's wastage with the usual arguments, but the last word lay with C.M.H.Q., who produced the following ruling on 30 Mar:

Inform Comd 1 Cdn Corps we will endeavour at all times to ensure that your rft holdings do not fall below equivalent of one month at intense rates approx. This policy will take into account convoy turnaround, actual strengths and other relevant factors such as recoverable casualties and will result frequently in your total exceeding two months' requirements. Our assessment of your bids will be based upon projection of these considerations in the light of our monthly review. You will appreciate however that with operational priority now accorded European theatre and arrivals from Canada at fixed monthly rate this policy may require modification from time to time.

(C.M.H.Q. file 1/AAI Gen/1/3:
Tel G.S. 966, CANMILITRY to
FLMBO for CANDEX, 30 Mar 44)

88. There will be no further reference to reinforcements. In order to establish the policy on the sub-ceiling this section has gone somewhat beyond the time limit for the rest of the report. The complete problem of reinforcements will no doubt be treated on a broader scale in policy reports where the national problem may be reviewed. For the troops in Italy and for anyone who writes for or about them it is simply a matter of getting enough reinforcements, not only to meet the heavy casualties which were suffered, but also the problem of supplying the right men at the right time and place in a theatre where distances were great and transport problems almost unbelievably difficult.

TRAINING AND EARLY OPERATIONS

89. Since the "TIMBERWOLF 1" convoy landed on 10 Nov 43 and the Corps was not completely in action till the end of January 1944, some mention should be made of what the troops did in the interim. Actually there was not much time for training. Out of these 80 days must be taken the time for a unit to get itself settled in a new camp, in a new land, and to unpack and set up stores which had an unhappy way of getting misdirected or delayed in transit. With the exception of 5 Cdn Armd Div the troops were supplied with only skeleton transport for the first two months, and that of such quality as made it of limited value for even the essential matters of supply, let alone training needs (see para 65). Moreover there were at least two lengthy moves for most units. Corps Troops moved from Sicily and 5 Cdn Armd Div Troops from Afragola to the first Corps concentration at Altamura and all had lengthy moves forward to the Ortona area before they got into action. The visit of the Minister of National Defence (see paras 42 - 3), Christmas and New Year holidays, persistent illness and incapacitation due to local ailments - particularly enteritis and jaundice and unprecedented incidence of

V.D. - all made further inroads on training time.[★] Due to the delay in obtaining battle-worthy equipment, training itself was largely limited to the use of personal weapons and to hardening exercises - training which was undoubtedly needed but which held little interest for the troops who had spent a year or more in England doing exactly the same thing. With the exception of some experience gained in the use of enemy weapons as noted above (para 65) it is doubtful if the troops went into battle as fit as when they left the United Kingdom; certainly they were not so well equipped. But they brought with them a keen ambition to play a worthy part in the operations of Eighth Army and to maintain the reputation already set up by 1 Cdn Inf Div and 1 Cdn Armd Bde. (War diaries of all formations and units)

90. Although these Canadian forces as a whole were designed to spend some weeks in reserve, they were not all left in training areas. On 8 Nov instructions were issued by 15 Army Group that 1 Cdn Med Regt, R.C.A., was to be equipped without delay and sent to support 13 Corps. Since this was an order direct from British authority concerning a Canadian unit, General Crerar wrote immediately to General Alexander offering the use of any troops that might be needed but voicing his opinion that the selection of the Canadian units employed should be a matter for his own decision. This direct and early application of his powers under the Visiting Forces Act undoubtedly helped to make clear the true position of the Canadian forces in the Mediterranean. (Hist

★ A report in December 1943 on the alarming incidence of this disease stated that "the rate for V.D. among Cdns in Sicily is now 454 per thousand per year". (W.D., Cdn Sec 1 Ech, December 1943: Appx 24, Hunter to Beament, 22 Dec 43). Various attempts to meet this particular problem included abandoned plans for supervised brothels and a general educational policy with penalties for troops who could not prove that the elementary protection provided by V-packs and "blue light centres" had been adopted. Placing the large cities 'out of bounds' normally led to excesses in the villages or among rural communities where adequate prophylactic stations could not be properly established. (W.D., H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 11 Nov 43)

Sec file: Italy 1943/1 Cdn Corps: -GOC/E: Letter G.O.C./1-0, Crerar to Alexander, 10 Nov 43; W.D., Lt-Gen Crerar, 9 - 10 Nov 43; and W.D., A. & Q. Branch, H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, Conference of 15 Nov 43)★

91. Another call on Canadian manpower was made in mid-November when the local political situation in Sicily became so disturbed that it was considered necessary to set up a special force, consisting of what were called "double companies" from 1 Cdn Corps Troops, to provide aid to the civilian power in case of emergency. "Bad distribution of food by A.M.G.O.T., black market and racketeering plus agitation of Fascist elements" were given as potential causes of trouble. (W.D., Lt-Gen Crerar, 15 Nov 43). Six special groups each to consist of one major, three captains and four lieutenants, with 250 other ranks, were organized under command as follows:

★ General Crerar's reply contained the following paragraphs:

I am writing to you personally, rather than taking up the matter officially with your H.Q. concerning certain implications of 15 Army Gp Message S.D.1043 dated 8 Nov which deals with the early equipment and despatch to the mainland of 1 Cdn Med Regt of 1 C.A.G.R.A., which formation arrived in Sicily yesterday and is under my administrative command. This message was addressed for action to 1 District. It was merely repeated to me for information.

As you know no question arises as to the utilization of Cdn formations and ancillary units of the Central Mediterranean Force in whatever operational tasks you may decide and, where necessary, the consequential placing of such formations and units under other Cdn command. While the Cdn Govt desires that the several Cdn formations in this theatre should be grouped as soon as practicable and to the maximum extent in 1 Cdn Corps and under my comd, I am instructed that this desire is not to be interpreted as restricting your decisions concerning appropriate grouping of these Cdn formations etc, for such operational tasks as you may contemplate. Indeed I am delighted that at such an early future date at least one of the units which came out with me will be in action.

My protest deals only with the procedure adopted in the case of this message. I hold the definite view that the instructions from your H.Q. should have been addressed to my H.Q. as well as to H.Q. No. 1 Dist. I also consider that, as a matter of principle, I should have been given the opportunity of nominating the particular Cdn Med Regt for this operational responsibility. While, in fact, 1 Cdn Med Regt is a suitable selection, conditions unknown to your H.Q. might well have indicated otherwise.

(Hist Sec file: Italy 1943/
1 Cdn Corps: GOC/E: Letter
GOC/1-0, Crerar to Alexander,
10 Nov 43)

Messina area	Lt-Col Thorne	1 Cdn Lt A.A. Regt
Taormina area	Lt-Col Darwin	C.R.E. 1 Cdn Corps Troops
Riposto area	Lt-Col Liggatt	2 Cdn Med Regt, R.C.A.
Acireale area	Lt-Col Wright	11 Cdn Armd Fd Regt, R.C.A.
Catania area	Lt-Col Bulner	C.R.A.S.C. 1 Cdn Corps Tps coln
Syracuse area	Lt-Col Bingham	1 Cdn Armd C. Regt

These groups were, however, never called upon to act. (W.D., G.S. Branch, H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, November 1943, Appx 7)

92. The engineers of 5 Cdn Armd Div were called upon soon after their arrival. On 27 Nov, General Simonds was requested to make them available for operations with Eighth Army and agreed "so long as it was assault work and not building behind the lines". This assurance was received. (W.D., G.S. Branch, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 27 Nov 43). The sappers under Lt-Col J.D. Christian, C.R.E., 5 Cdn Armd Div, moved forward and operated under command Eighth Army but in support of and assisting the engineers of 2 N.Z. Div, who had been heavily engaged and had found it difficult to maintain the L. of C. The first job assigned to the Canadians was the improvement of a stretch of road from Casalanguida (H4283) to the Sangro. This task was given to 1 Fd Sqn. 10 Fd Sqn was put to work on a high level bridge over the R. Aventino at map reference H300901; this they completed by 10 Dec - an achievement which won them praise from General Freyberg. On 9 Nov, 1 Tp of 1 Sqn came under command of 1 Cdn Armd Bde and operated with 12 Cdn Armd Regt, clearing mines under shell fire. The whole group was recalled to the command of 5 Cdn Armd Div at the end of December, and although not all of their tasks had been of an "assault nature" they had operated under shell fire and mortar fire and during enemy air attacks, and had suffered several casualties, two of which were fatal. The value of the training received is noted by the C.R.E., 5 Cdn Armd Div:

...this period has been very valuable in that it has been semi-operational without the urgency that the coming re-attachment to the division will require.

(W.Ds., G.S. Branch, H.Q.
5 Cdn Armd Div, 12 Cdn Armd
Regt, 1 and 10 Fd Sqs, R.C.E.,
January 1944)

93. H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps received a somewhat unusual assignment during January. A transit camp was needed in the Salerno area for a large movement of personnel. 1 Cdn Corps was asked to provide 1600 men to run the camp and to do traffic control in the surrounding areas. In view of the impending operations for 5 Cdn Armd Div the men were provided by 1 Artillery Group, R.C.A., which detailed 11 Cdn Army Fd Regt and 2 Cdn Med Regt, while 1 Cdn Corps Arty sent 1 Cdn Lt A.A. Regt and 7 Cdn A.Tk Regt to make up the necessary detachments. The first two units mentioned set up and operated the camps, which

were situated between Naples and Salerno, and the latter two were chiefly occupied with traffic control. Camps were established to handle a move of 2000 but drafts of more than a thousand were an exception. It was possible to allow the Canadian personnel some time for recreation which included trips to Pompei and swimming on some of the finest beaches in the Mediterranean. The regiments returned to 1 Cdn Corps area at the end of January. (W.Ds., H.Q. 1 Cdn A.C.R.A., H.Q. R.C.A. 1 Cdn Corps, 11 Cdn Army Td Regt, 2 Cdn Med Regt, 1 Cdn Lt A.A. Regt, 7 Cdn A. Tk Regt, January 1944)

EARLY OPERATIONS OF 11 CDN INF BDE GP

94. The first formation of "TIMBER WOLF" actually to serve in the front line was 11 Cdn Inf Bde and 5 Cdn Armd Div. On 4 Jan 44 word was received at Brigade Headquarters that an infantry brigade group was to be formed to relieve 3 Cdn Inf Bde in the line north of Ortona (see Report No. 165, para 294). The move was given code-name "Exercise STAR" (W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 5 Jan 44). A month earlier the G.O.C. 5 Cdn Armd Div had written to General Crerar:

The infantry brigade is steaming ahead and by the end of this month I could form a brigade group which I would like to send forward to get its first experience of contact with the enemy.

(Hist Sec file Italy: 1943/
1 Cdn Corps: GOC/E: 58-1/
SD Simonds to Crerar, 4 Dec 43)

General Crerar replied:

I agree that it would be very helpful if you could arrange to get some operational experience for the 11 Cdn Inf Bde before the division, as a whole, is put together. I should imagine that Eighth Army would be only too glad to receive this fresh reinforcement and so relieve an inf bde which is in need of rest and refit.

(Ibid, GOC/1-3, Crerar to
Simonds, 9 Dec 43)*

On 2 Jan H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div received word that the Inf Bde Gp was required for active service at the earliest possible date (W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 2 Jan 44). Three days later, Brigadier Kitching, Comd 11 Cdn Inf Bde, returned from the front and held an "O" Group, in which he explained the plan for the forthcoming relief.

* No further material appears to be available to explain the decision to employ 11 Cdn Inf Bde Gp at this time. General Crerar's original War Diary and Appendices for December 1944 were lost by enemy action (C.M.H.Q. file 24/Diaries 21 A. Gp/1, Vol 2, Letter O i/c War Diaries to D. Hist, 10 Apr 45, and Vol 5, A.D.A.G.(A) letter, 2 Nov 45).

95. 11 Cdn Inf Bde Gp was composed as follows:

H.Q. 11 Cdn Inf Bde

11 Cdn Inf Bde Sp Gp

C.B. Highrs

Ir R.C.

Perth R.

17 Cdn Fd Regt R.C.A.

49 Bty 4 Cdn A.Tk Regt R.C.A.

47 Bty 5 Cdn Lt A.A. Regt R.C.A.

24 Fd Amb R.C.A.M.C.

10 Fd Sqn R.C.E.

11 Cdn Inf Bde Coy R.C.A.S.C.

11 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp R.C.O.C.

(W.D., H.Q. 11 Cdn Inf Bde,
January 1944: Appx 5, 11 Cdn
Inf Bde Movement Order No.1,
6 Jan 44)

96. The first section of the group started forward on 8 Jan and the move was complete five days later. The infantry battalions had by then already started the relief of 3 Cdn Inf Bde, C.B. Highrs taking over from West N.S.R. during the afternoon and evening of the 13th. All units of the brigade were inspected by Maj-Gen C. Vokes, who welcomed them to the new area and "told them what was expected of them". Ir R.C. took over from R. 22e R. the night of 13/14 Jan and Perth R. remained in reserve positions in square C3118. Patrolling activities were carried out from the day of arrival, the forward battalions sending representatives with the last patrols of the 3 Cdn Inf Bde units which were being relieved. The incoming troops experienced considerable mortaring and shell fire from the German positions, but casualties were very light and it appeared that the brigade war diarist had rightly interpreted the policy of the higher command when he wrote on 5 Jan, "The intention is to 'break us in easily'". (W.D., 11 Cdn Inf Bde, Perth R., C.B. Highrs, Ir R.C., January 1944)

97. The holding and patrolling role of 11 Cdn Inf Bde was abandoned for more vigorous operations in the middle of January, when it was decided to use the formation for a strong push up the Adriatic coast towards Francavilla. The operation which now ensued for the Brigade, 16 - 17 Jan, has commonly been referred to as the "Arielli Show". It involved an attempt to seize a series of strongpoints along and beyond the Tollo road (which ran from the mouth of the Riccio River inland to the town of Tollo), and from there to push forward into the Arielli Valley and establish firm positions there. (W.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div,

January 1944: Appx 52, Ops Log 15 Jan 44, Serial 1557). A detailed account of the attack, which did not succeed, will appear in a subsequent report^x (Canadian Operations in Italy, 5 Jan - 21 Apr 44). At the conclusion of the operation 11 Cdn Inf Bde was relieved by 2 Cdn Inf Bde (17 - 18 Jan 44), but did not long remain in reserve. On 20 Jan the Brigade came under command of 4 Ind Inf Div (of 13 Corps), to relieve 7 Ind Bde on the Orsogna front (W.D., H.Q. 11 Cdn Inf Bde, 20 Jan 44). Brigade Headquarters relieved H.Q. 7 Ind Bde at Spaccarelli (C2804), and C.B. Highrs relieved 1/2 Gurkhas. "B" and "D" Coys of Perth R. relieved the "Flank Force" of 7 Ind Bde on 21 Jan. (Ibid, 21 Jan 44). The remaining companies of the regiment were held in reserve, and on the 24th were moved into the area of the Ir R.C., who had taken over from the R. Sussex on the morning of 22 Jan. For the rest of the month activities of the Brigade were restricted to patrolling. Few casualties were suffered other than those from enemy mortaring and harassing shell fire. The problems of supply were met by the use of mule trains until fair weather at the close of the month improved road conditions and made vehicle transport possible. Throughout the period 11 Cdn Inf Bde remained under command 4 Ind Inf Div, and did not rejoin 1 Cdn Corps until 9 Feb (see para 103) (W.Ds., H.Q. 11 Cdn Inf Bde, Perth R. C.B. Highrs, Ir R.C., January 1944).

OPERATIONS OF OTHER UNITS OF 1 CDN CORPS, JANUARY 1944

98. As has been mentioned above (para 54), 2 Cdn Armd Regt (Ld S.H.) were called forward early in January to take part in active operations at a time when the equipment situation was still very unsatisfactory. On 9 Jan H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div received orders to send an armoured regiment and a motor battalion "north for operational duties 14 Jan 44" (W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 9 Jan 44). Training for 2 Cdn Armd Regt was speeded up and firing practice with the 75-mm was carried out on an improvised range on the Matera - Gravina road. This practice was never completed, for on 12 Jan word was received that tanks should be loaded forthwith on flat cars for an immediate move. The unit tank strength was brought up to 52 combat tanks by drawing 27 from 3 Cdn Armd Recce Regt, eight from H.Q. Sqn 5 Cdn Armd Div, three from Tank Servicing Unit at Bisceglie (P0996) and five from 200 T.D.R. in the same area. The troops moved forward on 16 Jan and during the 19th commenced reliefs of "A" and "B" Sqns 19 N.Z. Armd Regt, who had been in support of brigades of 4 Ind Inf Div in the Castel Frignano (H2999) area. "A" Sqn 2 Cdn Armd Regt took over support of 5 Ind Inf Bde and "B" Sqn that of 7 Ind Inf Bde. The only change in the situation took

^x On 26 Jan Maj-Gens Burns and Simonds visited H.Q. 11 Cdn Inf Bde. It was reported (apparently on the basis of their impressions) that

...it appeared that the Perth R. and C.B. Highrs, while not successful in taking and holding their objectives, had performed quite creditably in what was a difficult operation for their first try, fighting against hard opposition.

(W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q.
5 Cdn Armd Div, 26 Jan 44)

place on 21 Jan when 11 Cdn Inf Bde replaced 7 Ind Inf Bde and were supported by "B" Sqn for the remainder of the month. Weather was at first very bad and the ground conditions were such that several tanks of 19 N.Z. Armd Bde had been left behind. At the end of the month, however, weather improved and three of the N.Z. tanks were salvaged under cover of darkness by 5 Tp "B" Sqn. Operations consisted for the most part of range table shoots, but later as ground conditions improved it was possible to move forward and give direct fire on enemy positions. The month ended with weather conditions again deteriorating and the regiment ready to revert to under command of 5 Cdn Armd Div, who took over 4 Ind Inf Div's sector of the line at 1200 hours 1 Feb 44. (W.Ds., 2 Cdn Armd Regt, "G" Branch, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, January 1944)

99. The only other unit of 1 Cdn Corps which saw actual fighting before 1 Feb was the Westmr R. (Mot), who were sent forward at the same time as 2 Cdn Armd Regt. At the opening of 1944 the regiment was in a training area near Matera at P2033. They were in the process of slowly accumulating their equipment, when they were ordered, on 5 Jan, to pass most of it to the units making up "STAR" group (see para 94). The unit war diary notes that 87 vehicles were released, which left the unit "practically stripped of carriers and M.Cs." Basis and hardening training was continued until 9 Jan, when the word of a projected move forward was received. Immediately there were many things to be done, and done at short notice. Other 5 Cdn Armd Div units supplied equipment but all vehicles did not arrive until 15 Jan - the day on which the unit carriers were loaded on flat cars for the move. As the vehicles reached the regiment they had to be checked and in some cases re-fitted; the maximum of firing practice and administrative details had to be carried out, and the newly arrived dental officer (he reached the unit on 31 Dec 43) had to attempt the colossal task of at least checking the teeth of the complete personnel. Regimental officers of 8 Armd Fd Regt, R.C.A., gave valuable assistance in carrying out training shoots and allowing the infantry officers to practice directing fire on targets. (W.D., Westmr R. (Mot), January 1944)

100. The regiment moved forward on 18 Jan and next day reached a concentration area on the Sangro in the area H3192. From there they relieved the 1/4 Essex of 5 Ind Inf Bde under whose command the unit was placed on 19 Jan. Reliefs took place on 21 Jan and regimental headquarters was set up at Salarola (H229977). For the first days a detachment from the Essex remained with the Canadians to assist in patrols and to maintain deception.* The section was the scene of quite vigorous patrol activity by the Germans, which was interpreted by the I.O. of the Westmr R. (Mot) to indicate a possible withdrawal - recognized German tactics in the Mediterranean theatre. No actual attacks were put in by either side, but the regiment experienced a considerable amount of shelling and mortaring and carried out vigorous patrols, which failed, however, to produce the much desired "first" prisoner or dead German. The unit diarist speaks highly of the fighting qualities of the

* This was the period during which the Anzio bridgehead was established, and various operations were being planned at Army and Corps level to take advantage of the situation should the Germans withdraw or to provide such diversionary action as would help the troops in the bridgehead. (See also para 103)

Indian troops who occupied the flanking positions; "The men like them and they are good to work with in spite of some language difficulty." The expected German withdrawal did not take place and the regiment was relieved on 25 Jan by 1/9 Gurkhas and withdrew to reserve in its previous concentration area on the Sangro. There it came under command of 1 Cdn Armd Bde but still in the 4 Ind Inf Div group. The beginning of February found Westmr R. (Mot) again in the line in its old area, where it had relieved 1/9 Gurkhas on 31 Jan.

101. H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div did not take actual command of any fighting units during January 1944. The beginning of the year found Divisional Headquarters at Altamura chiefly concerned with equipment and training. The moves of "STAR" force, 2 Cdn Armd Regt and Westmr R. (Mot) fully occupied the attention of the staff for the first three weeks of January. On 19 - 21 Jan Headquarters moved forward to Gissi (H4680), whence the senior officers were able to pay visits to the headquarters of Eighth Army, 13 Corps, 1 Cdn Inf Div and 4 Ind Inf Div, and so keep in the picture concerning the operations of their troops detached for service with these formations. Canadian units left in the Altamura area when Divisional Headquarters moved north came under command 5 Cdn Armd Bde (W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div, 13 Jan 44). In the meantime, however, important changes in command in the Canadian Army Overseas were taking place (see para 19, and Hist Sec Report No. 118). General Simonds was slated to command 2 Cdn Corps, and although General Burns' visit to H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div was announced as a period of "attachment" the two generals acted together in conferences with the officers of senior formations.

102. Maj-Gen Burns officially assumed command of the Armoured Division from General Simonds on 23 Jan, and the latter left for the United Kingdom by air two days later. (W.D., Lt-Gen Crerar, 22 - 25 Jan 44). While the Canadian troops were eager to take a more active part in the operations of Eighth Army, it was also desirable that Canadian operations should be controlled by Canadian formations (see para 101). On 21 Jan Lt-Gen Dempsey, who was vacating the command of 13 Corps to take part in the planning of "OVERLORD" (and ultimately to command Second British Army), offered to suggest to his successor, Lt-Gen Kirkman, that

...after 11 Cdn Inf Bde and other 5 Cdn Armd Div tps now under 4 Ind Div had been in the line about 7 days, 5 Cdn Armd Div H.Q. might take over the sector for about another 7 days.

(W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q.
5 Cdn Armd Div, 21 Jan 44)

The proposal was immediately presented to Lt-Gen Sir Oliver Leese, who had succeeded General Montgomery as G.O.C.-in-C., Eighth Army, on 31 Dec 43. General Leese replied that

...it would depend on developments at the front, which he discussed briefly, and that he thought that the div should be concentrated for collective trg at an early date, in order that it could learn the methods appropriate to the probable further ops, as determined by Eighth Army experience.

(Ibid)

103. Some plans were made for the training concentration but as long as 11 Cdn Inf Bde, 2 Cdn Armd Regt and Westmr R. (Mot) were in the line such training operations could have comparatively little value. On taking over the divisional command General Burns visited Lt-Gen Kirkman and again broached the subject of having H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div take over the section of the front where its infantry were already in the line. He was told by the Corps Commander, however, that

...he thought it was not advisable during the next week or so, in view of the fact that the Germans might be forced to retire by the offensive on the WEST coast, in which case 8 Ind Inf Div would have to follow up and it would be awkward if an armoured division was holding the line. He thought that 11 Cdn Inf Bde and the other tps should remain in the line for about ten days in any case.

(Ibid, 24 Jan 44)

104. The situation in which 11 Cdn Inf Bde remained in the line under command 4 Ind Inf Div continued for another week, during which the G.O.C. 5 Cdn Armd Div explored the possibilities of his Headquarters assuming command of the Brigade, while at a higher level the Corps Commander pressed the Canadian viewpoint with G.O.C.-in-C., Eighth Army*. The Infantry Brigade was slated to "carry out a series of minor operations in conjunction with troops of 4 Ind Div in order to obtain a suitable jumping off area for the main attack on ORSOGNA. These attacks were contingent on the success of the first one which was to be carried out by 4/16 Punjabs, and which, it was hoped, would indicate that the enemy opposition was weakening". (Ibid, January 1944). From the War Diary it appears that General Burns held the opinion that 11 Cdn Inf Bde was not to be used for any further assault, although no confirmation of such an understanding has been found. He gave Brigadier Kitching instructions to take the necessary steps to prepare for the operations, but advised him not to commit his troops unless "the results of the Punjabs' attack indicated that the enemy were weakening". At Headquarters 4 Ind Inf Div the matter was discussed more fully, and Maj-Gen Toker agreed that the 11 Cdn Inf Bde attack should only be put in on the foregoing conditions. (Ibid)

105. On 30 Jan General Burns was warned by H.Q. 13 Corps that 5 Cdn Armd Div was to relieve 4 Ind Inf Div. Because of its single infantry brigade the Division was assigned a slightly shortened line, the Bianco feature C2196 on the left flank being taken over by 36 Bde of 78 Inf Div. (Ibid, 30 Jan 44). H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div took over command of the sector at 1200 hours 1 Feb with 1 Cdn Armd Bde less 12 and 14 Cdn Armd Regts under command and 11 (Brit) Inf Bde Gp as immediate reserve. (Ibid, 1 Feb 44).

1 CDN CORPS ASSUMES COMMAND

106. While these reliefs and minor operations were taking place Headquarters 1 Cdn Corps moved forward from Taormina to the mainland where they halted at 214607 on the Altamura - Torrito road. The main party arrived 11 Jan

* On 27 Jan General Crerar "had brief discussion with Army Commander, again emphasizing speedy amalgamation of Canadian Forces in CMF under my command." (W.D., Lt-Gen Crerar, 27 Jan 44)

and for the ensuing two weeks activities consisted mainly of supervision of such training as was possible among Corps Troops (who had also advanced to the mainland) and training schemes for the Headquarters personnel themselves. It was important that the latter should be ready to meet the discomforts and inconveniences of directing operations over a campaign when continued movement was necessary. A very complete drill was laid down and it functioned quite efficiently. Meanwhile General Crerar was in contact with the Army Commander and pressing for an active role for 1 Cdn Corps as a unified formation (see para 104). A number of staff officers were attached to British and Canadian units and formations on the front line. (V.Ds., Lt-Gen Crerar; "G" and A. & C. Branches, H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, January 1944)

107. Under command of General Leese in mid-January were 5 Corps on the Adriatic coast (comprising 1 Cdn Inf Div and 8 Ind Inf Div) and 13 Corps (with 4 Ind Inf Div and 78 Inf Div). As indicated above, 11 Cdn Inf Bde had operated under 5 Corps for the "ARIELLI Show" and had then returned to hold a portion of the 13 Corps line on the right while Westmr E. (Mot) was sent in between 4 Ind and 78 Inf Divs. On 13 Jan, H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps received warning to be ready to relieve 5 Corps about 1 Feb (V.D., G.S., H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, 13 Jan 44). During the last four days of January an increasing proportion of 1 Cdn Corps personnel moved into H.Q. 5 Corps at Rocca with their British opposite numbers, in order that the take-over might be as smooth as possible. Actual change of command took place at 0001 hours 1 Feb. Press representatives were granted an official interview and were allowed to inform the world that "a Canadian Corps was now in the line under command of the Eighth Army" (V.D., Lt-Gen Crerar, 2 Feb 44).

108. The long period of training was now drawing to a close and all ranks were increasingly eager to engage in the real operations for which they had rehearsed so long and travelled so far. General Crerar was speaking for, rather than to, his staff at Taormina when he concluded an address to all officers and senior N.C.Os. of H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps with the following words:

Through no shortcomings on our part, but due to the great issues and influences of a World War, we of the 1 Cdn Corps have been a very long time in getting to grips with the German enemy. No one can appreciate more sincerely than myself, the strain it has been on all ranks to maintain throughout these years of training and re-training in the United Kingdom, that keenness and good discipline and high morale which are essential to a first class soldiery. That strain has been successfully withstood. The fact that each one of us is a volunteer, undoubtedly has contributed to that result. In any event, the long period of anticipation and preparation is about over and the time of testing is at hand.

I have full confidence that 1 Cdn Corps will come through its tests in battle with great credit to itself and Canada. My job, and yours, is to see to it that as and when the formations of the corps are put into battle, they enter it with

every controllable circumstance in their favour and with every requisite of a sound plan completed in good time. There can be no higher responsibility. Let us see to it that it is fulfilled to the uttermost.

(Hist Sec file: Italy 1943/
1 Cdn Corps: GOC/E: Address
of Gen Crerar in Taormina,
11 Dec 43)

109. Although H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps now had two divisions (1 Cdn Inf Div and 8 Ind Inf Div) to command and could be considered as really being in action, the absence of the other Canadian troops in Italy from the Corps Order of Battle was unsatisfactory to General Crerar. With the utmost vigour the Corps Commander pressed for the return of these other formations to Canadian command. While successful in gaining the transfer of 5 Cdn Armd Div, in the case of 1 Cdn Armd Bde he was forced to accept a compromise solution which continued for practically the entire period of Canadian operations in Italy.

About 1800 hours [5 Feb] the Army Commander spoke to me on the secraphone, advising the withdrawal of a further formation from the Eighth Army front and intimating that 5 Cdn Armd Div would need to remain in the line, under command 13 Corps. I informed him that in spite of the administrative inconvenience that might be temporarily caused, there was no tactical reason that I could see, which should prevent the immediate grouping of both 1 Cdn Inf Div and 5 Cdn Armd Div under 1 Cdn Corps, transferring 8 Ind Inf Div to 13 Corps. While General Leese was definitely reluctant to make these changes, he did not entirely refuse, and suggested that I prepare my arguments on the case, for an Army Conference that he intended to hold next day. Later, about 1900 hours, Major-General Walsh, C. of S. Eighth Army telephoned me on the same subject. I repeated my former views and added that if they were not met I should have no alternative but to represent the continued undesirable situation of 1 Cdn Corps to the Canadian Government.

[6 Jan] As a result of representations made by me the previous evening, the C. of S. had worked out arrangements for interchange of command and reliefs which brought 5 Cdn Armd Div under command 1 Cdn Corps from 10 Feb 44, 1 Cdn Armd Bde being placed under command 13 Corps to give the latter requisite armour.

(W.D., Lt-Gen Crerar,
5, 6 Feb 44)

110. The reliefs for this new disposition took some days, but by 9 Feb H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div had moved to Frisa (C3106) and relieved 8 Ind Inf Div, coming under command 1 Cdn Corps at 1200 hours of that day. The war diary entry of 5 Cdn Armd Div provides a satisfactory tailpiece:

The Div was therefore brought together once more and ... 1 Cdn Corps was functioning as a complete Canadian Corps with both 1 Cdn Inf Div and 5 Cdn Armd Div in the line.

(W.D., HQ Branch, H.Q.
5 Cdn Armd Div, 9 Feb 44)

111. This report was prepared by Major L.A. Wrinch, General List, formerly Historical Officer 1 Cdn Inf Div and subsequently O.C. 1 Cdn Hd Hist Sec attached 1 Cdn Corps.

for *G. W. L. Hutchinson Major*
(C.P. Stacey) Colonel
Director Historical Section

Summary of Re-Equipment Programme
Percentage of W.E. held as of 10 Feb 44

H.Q. 1 CDN CORPS AND CORPS TPS

RM

Arm or Service, Formation or Unit	Tks	'B' Vehs	SIG Eqpt	Warlike Stores	G1098 Stores	Guns	Remarks
HQ 1 Cdn Corps		100%	75%	57%	60%		
Engrs		98%	40%	90%	85%		
Sigs		100%	75%	65%	45%		
S&T Supply Coys		100%	-	100%	100%		
S&T Tpt Coys		100%	-	76%	50%		
Meds		99%	-	75%	75%		
Ord		95%	-	70%	50%		Lorries dis- infector NOT yet available.
REME		95%	-	56%	40%		Deficient 18 load carrying vehs due daily.
Misc		98%	-	76%	50%		
I Cdn Armd C Regt (RCD)		100%	70%	59%	50%		
<u>1 CDN CORPS ARTY</u>							
1 Cdn Med Regt		100%(A)	75%	80%	75%	100%	only 5 guns out of 16 in action.
2 Cdn Med Regt		98%	80%	40%	50%		
5 Cdn Med Regt		98%	100%	100%	100%		
7 Cdn A Tk Regt		98%	75%	47%	50%	100%	Complete in qties but NOT in types.
1 Cdn LAA Regt		98%	75%	64%	50%	100%	9 short but 9 guns held this area for this unit.
11 Cdn A Fd Regt		98%	80%	52%	50%	100%	
1 Cdn Svy Regt		98%	90%	90%	50%		
(NOTE: (A) Lorries 3-ton GS held are 4x2's. for operational purposes, 4x4's are essential)							
<u>1 CDN INF DIV</u>							
1 Cdn Inf Bde		88%	85%	70%	90%	100%	
2 Cdn Inf Bde		85%	85%	70%	90%	100%	
3 Cdn Inf Bde		78%	85%	70%	80%	100%	
Div Tps		85%	85%	77%	82%	100%	

Arm or Service, Formation or Unit	Tks	'B' Vehs	SIG Eqpt	Warlike Stores	G1098 Stores	Guns	Remarks
<u>5 CDN ARMD DIV</u>							
Armd Bde	90%	95%	90%	95%	100%	98%	incl 9 Cdn Armd Regt
Inf Bde	-	95%	95%	95%	100%	98%	
Recce Regt	7%	85%	10%	70%	70%		
<u>Div Tps</u>							
Arty	70%	100%	85%	95%	100%	100%	
Sigs	-	100%	95%	85%	100%		
RCASC	-	99%	-	80%	100%		
Meds	-	98%	-	85%	100%		
Others	20%	95%	90%	90%	100%		

(Hist Sec file Italy: 1944/
1 Cdn Corps/R/F, 10 Feb 44)

Table
 Indicating action taken re request for
 additions and amendments to Approved Composition
 Canadian Troops Mediterranean Theatre

GS (SD1) - 5 Feb 44

Request (a)	Number Required (b)	Involving man- power increases		Action Approved Declined (e)
		Offrs (c)	ORs (d)	
Cdn Base Censor Secs	4	8	16	Declined
1 Cdn Rec Coy less 1 Sec	1	5	94	Approved
1 Cdn Tunnelling Coy Less: 1 and 2 Dets	1	4	124	Approved
3 Cdn Gen Hosp (200)	1	37	100	Approved
Revisions to WE for Cdn Sec 1 Ech		16	40	Approved
Town Majors - Class 1	1	2	7)	Approved
Class 2	1	1	4)	
Class 3	2	2	6)	
1 Cdn Spec Wireless Sec (B)	1	2	74)	Approved
1 Cdn Wireless Int Sec	1	3	17)	
Spec Wksp for Base Units	1	1	42	Declined
300-bed Increments to:				Approved
14 Cdn Gen Hosp	1	27	42)	
15 Cdn Gen Hosp	1	27	42)	
Tpt added to WE of Gen Hosp				Approved
1200 - @ 11	2		22	
600 - @ 10	2		20	
200 - @ 3	1		3	
Base Sig Sec				Approved
New WE 2 51				
Less: Dele- tion 2 Ech 25		2	26	
Add 1000 Conv Beds	1	14	93	Approved Conditional
An Ambulance Train	1	2	34	Declined
Cdn Gen Hosp (600)	1	80	151	Declined
A Base Lndy to serve Hosp Installation	1	5	173	Provided in a dif- ferent form than requested
Increment to Fwd Base Rft Bns for Two Units	2	8	26	Approved in Principle
Increment to 5 Pro Coy (5 Cdn Armd Div)	1	1	49	Deferred

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
HQ GHQ Tps RCE		7	25)	Declined
Fd Coys	3	21	744)	
Fd Pk Coy	1	5	180)	
Rd Constr Coy	1	8	206)	
Tipper Coy	1	10	390)	
Br Coy	1	20	717)	
Mech Eqpt Sec	1	2	74)	
1 Cdn Research Lab	1	6	9	Approved
1 Mob Offr Shop	1	1	5	Approved
Increment to 1 Cdn Adv Dep Med Stores	1	1	1	Under consideration
Additional S & T for 5 Cdn Armd Div - proposed as a 3-pl Tp Carrying Coy	1	10	312	Approved
Reorganization A Tk Btys - Towed (4 and 7 Cdn A Tk Regts)	4		56	Approved
Anti-Malarial Control Units	4	4	24	Approved
Concert Parties	2	2	50	Approved
Cdn Gen Pioneer Coy - for posting psychiatric cases Adm skeleton only	1	9	60	Approved in Principle
DR (Lt car) Sec	1		26	Approved in Principle
		353	4084	

MGA


Above will serve to indicate "state" of submissions received, approved, declined or pending. The total demands are, you will agree, impressive, in the light of our contingency reserve and prospective commitments elsewhere.

(Sgd.) M.H.S. Penhale,
Brigadier, GS,
CINHQ.

5 Feb 44

SUMMARY		
Disposal	Personnel	
	Cffrs	CRs
Approved	159	1084
Decision Pending	10	76
Declined	184	2924
Totals:	353	4084

(C.M.H.Q. file
1/AAI Gen/1,
fol 225 G & H)



ALBERS
 A.F.H.Q.