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HISTORICAL SECTION

CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

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by *Lee*  
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for DHist NDHQ

THE CANADIAN ARMY OCCUPATION FORCE IN GERMANY,  
MAY 1945 TO JUNE 1946

SEP 18 1986

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Date: SEP 18 1986

25 MAR 1947

The Canadian Army Occupation Force  
in Germany, May 1945 to June 1946

1. The present report deals with Canadian participation in the occupation of Germany by 21 Army Group from May 1945 to June 1946. The report is divided into two parts. The first briefly describes the magnitude of the task confronting the Allies and the plans laid down to execute these tasks. The second part deals with events immediately preceding VE Day, the collapse of the German Armies, the actual occupation of the British Zone, the Canadian participation and its organization, administration and tasks within this zone. The repatriation of Canadian troops from VE Day till the withdrawal of the last elements from the United Kingdom in December 1946 will form the subject of a separate report.

2. On 11 Dec 44, the Canadian Government approved the participation of Canadian troops in the British Army of Occupation in Germany, Canadian Military Headquarters being advised of this decision in Cable No. 894, dated 22 Dec 44 (C.M.H.Q. file TS. 1/Occup Gp/1).<sup>\*</sup> While this cable was forwarded for advance information only, pending action by Canada to inform the Government of the United Kingdom, it formed the basis for the planning and organization of the Canadian Force, which ultimately was to be known as Canadian Army Occupation Force, (Official title notified in C.M.H.Q. file 6/CAOF/1, folio 27, C.M.H.Q. Adm Order No. 88).

3. In order to obtain a clear picture of the events which followed the collapse of Germany, it is necessary to review the plans that had been formulated before VE Day, under the code name "ECLIPSE", which in turn was defined as: Plans and preparations for the operation of occupying Germany. (Hist Sec file AEF/21 Army Gp/C/I, Docket IV: 21 Army Group Operation "ECLIPSE", The Occupation of North-West Germany: Preface).

4. Operation "ECLIPSE" naturally falls into two main divisions: the planning stage prior to VE Day and the events immediately preceding and following VE Day. This report will consequently deal successively with:

- (a) The plans and scope of Operation "ECLIPSE" before VE Day;
- (b) The events immediately preceding and following VE Day and the taking over of the Canadian area, subsequent operations and administration.

## BACKGROUND FOR OPERATION "ECLIPSE"

5. Detailed instructions for the occupation of Germany, insofar as the many problems could be anticipated and visualized at the time, were issued by 21 Army Group Headquarters in Belgium, in January 1945 (*Ibid*). In actual fact, during the planning stages and while operations were still continuing, occupation had in effect already begun. The rapidity of operations in the latter stages of the war, and the frequent and unexpected turn of events which followed each other in quick succession, necessarily modified the plans in some instances and enlarged upon them in others. Basically, however, the original plans for "ECLIPSE" remained an accurate guide for future problems arising out of the ultimate surrender of Germany.

<sup>\*</sup> See Appx "A".



6. The defeat of the German army in 1918 had never been driven home to the majority of Germans. The great mass of the people had never seen an Allied soldier. The occupied zones were indeed narrow limits, the Allies occupying areas on the east bank of the Rhine with bridgeheads at Cologne, Koblenz and Wiesbaden, each forming an arc with a radius of about 25 miles. Apart from a brief sojourn in the Ruhr by the French, the territory of Germany was unoccupied. The Weimar Constitution, designed to give Germany a democratic form of government, was doomed to failure at the outset. After centuries of autocratic rule, under which awe and worship for the military caste was inherent, the German nation was not prepared for such a sudden change in form of government. This unpreparedness, allied with social and economic problems; the sense of injustice towards Germany in the terms of the Versailles Treaty; the turmoil caused by the various shades of political parties within the democratic framework, all facilitated the rise of discontented leaders who found little difficulty in swaying public opinion. Step by step, Germany was led into Nazism and ultimately into World War II. (*Ibid*, Pamphlet 1, chap 1)

7. In the light of this past experience, the leaders of the Allied countries were determined that on this occasion there would be no half-measure. The occupation would be complete and efficient; Germany's potential to threaten the peace of the world would have to be removed completely; if necessary, the occupation of the whole of Germany must continue for many years to achieve this end. The broad principle underlying the occupation of Germany was briefly stated as:

Operation "ECLIPSE" is designed to ensure that once and for all no possible shadow of doubt shall be left in the mind of a single German that the military might of the Third Reich has been shattered.... (*Ibid*, para 13).

8. This principle envisaged two major tasks:

- (a) Destructive-----to ensure that the military might of the Reich is rendered completely innocuous ... for all time.
- (b) Constructive-----to re-establish law and order so that ... a new German government can emerge and the re-education of the German nation can take place.... (*Ibid*, chap IV, para 1).

9. The future occupation of Germany had been discussed at the Yalta Conference by Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin. It was from the all-embracing principles agreed to at this conference that the plans for "ECLIPSE" were later discussed and formulated in great detail by a planning staff appointed by 21 Army Group. "ECLIPSE" planning staff was keenly aware of the numerous forms of obstruction and evasion that might be employed by the Germans to sabotage effective occupation, an art at which they were particularly adept, as the Allies had learned after 1918. Consequently, detailed plans had to take into consideration such obstructionist tactics as contesting orders or demands on the grounds of obscurity; pleas of non-competence and the appointment of low-ranking representatives with this aim in view; attempts to refer to a higher Allied authority than that issuing the order; producing arguments for not carrying out orders; the exploitation of internal disorders; and endeavours to delay progress by lengthy memoranda, threats, complaints, protests, etc., covering a multitude of trivial matters. Likewise there had to be considered carefully such evasion tactics as furnishing incomplete or false information or withholding information; exploitation of differences in policy or procedure among the "Big Three" Powers; concealment or misappropriation, particularly of war material; the use of police as a cloak for military or quasi-military bodies. (*Ibid*, chap II, para 14).



### OBJECTS OF THE OCCUPATION

10. With these general points in mind, it was now possible to define, in more detailed terms, the objects of the occupation. These were as stated below, and on the whole, were to serve as an accurate guide for all ranks in the British Zone of Occupation:

To carry out, within the area of Germany allotted to 21 Army Group:

- (a) The disarmament, control and ultimate disbandment, of all German military forces, including para-military and police formations, thereby preventing a renewal of hostilities.
- (b) To assist the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, upon request by either, to take similar action in respect of the German Navy and Air Forces (and their auxiliaries), respectively.
- (c) The enforcement of the terms of surrender by the occupation of strategic areas within the British Zone.
- (d) The elimination of Nazism and German Militarism and the arrest of War Criminals and Security Suspects.
- (e) The establishment of law and order, through the medium of Military Government, within the Army Group Zone in Germany. This implies the preservation, or re-establishment, of a suitable German civil administration, to the extent required to accomplish objectives.
- (f) The early relief and repatriation of Allied Prisoners of War and displaced Allied Nationals found in the British Zone, and the minimum necessary control of enemy refugees and displaced persons.
- (g) Protection of Allied property, control of certain properties and conservation of German foreign exchange assets.

(Ibid, Pamphlet 2, chap I, para 17)

11. The objects, though briefly stated, were clear enough. In order to issue more detailed instructions, and ultimately put them into effect, careful consideration had to be given to circumstances in which "ECLIPSE" conditions might arise. Two factors stood out: (a) the probable form of German collapse, and (b) the probable conditions in Germany after the collapse. In the first case it was not anticipated that the Nazi Government would be overthrown by movements within Germany. It was considered therefore that there would be no acknowledgement of unconditional surrender until Germany had suffered a further major defeat (subsequent to January 1945) such as would enable the Allied forces to penetrate deeply into the Reich. It was considered probable that after such a further defeat, the German Army, either on the Western or Eastern front, would lose all cohesion, in which case piece-meal surrenders by local commanders might then take place, with no formal surrender occurring on the whole front. In the second case certain generalizations could be made, but it was appreciated that regional variations might prevail. It would be impossible, the planning staff considered, for the mass of the people, and indeed the armed forces, to escape the conviction of an overwhelming defeat. Sabotage was



anticipated. Resistance by some S.S. Groups, individual fanatics in cities, and guerilla bands in mountain areas was envisaged. (Ibid, paras 19, 20)

12. With these problems in mind, consideration had now to be given to the circumstances in which "A" Day (the first day of Operation "ECLIPSE") might occur. It was appreciated that the time of "A" Day's arrival would have a bearing on final plans. Three cases were therefore visualized:

- (a) "ECLIPSE" conditions occurring now or in the near future, (that is to say, at the time of issue of Operation "ECLIPSE" instructions), when the bulk of 21 Army Group was still outside Germany.
- (b) The second case envisaged 21 Army Group having fought its way 50 to 100 miles inside Germany when "A" Day would occur.
- (c) The last case visualized 21 Army Group having to fight its way through the majority, or the whole, of the Army Group zone before "ECLIPSE" conditions should arise.

(Ibid, paras 25-27)

13. It was considered that the planning would be based on the first instance, that is, "A" Day occurring while the bulk of 21 Army Group was still outside of Germany. Should other circumstances arise, plans would be amended accordingly. It was realized that plans would in a large measure contain elements to meet conditions that might arise out of a combination of any two sets of circumstances or all three, and also that there might be overlapping.

#### PHASES OF THE OPERATION

14. It was calculated that Operation "ECLIPSE" would fall into three main phases, which would most certainly overlap. The Primary Phase would consist of an advance by our forces within existing boundaries (projected as ordered at the time), conducted with the maximum speed consistent with security, with the object of securing certain important strategic areas, deep inside Germany, of extending our air threat, and then of completing the occupation of the British Zone north of the Inter-Army Group Boundary (Ibid, para 32).

15. The Secondary Phase would involve:-

- (a) The disarmament and control of enemy forces remaining in Germany, North Holland and Denmark.
- (b) Mopping up any German troops remaining on the islands within the Army Group Area.
- (c) Possibly, the re-deployment of German divisional groups awaiting disbandment from provisional to intermediate (and in some cases final) concentration areas.
- (d) Initial work in connection with the destruction of German war potential.
- (e) Priority discharge, and possibly the commencement of general disbandment.



- (f) The re-distribution of our forces within the British Zone. This was most likely to take place towards the end of the Secondary Phase, would be spread over a period of time and would entail:-
- (i) Taking over from the Americans (and, possibly, from the Russians) those parts of the British Zone initially occupied by them.
  - (ii) Handing over to the Americans the BREMEN - BREMERHAVEN Enclave and to the Russians any portion of their zone which may initially have been overrun by us.
  - (iii) The establishment of HANNOVER, WESTPHALIA, RHINE PROVINCE and (if not already done) SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN Corps District.

(Ibid, para 33)

16. The Final Phase would include:-

- (a) Completion of the disbandment of the German armed forces, including paramilitary organizations.
- (b) Reduction in the strength of 21 Army Group to the number of formations and units required for the long term occupation of Germany.
- (c) Completion of the destruction of the German war potential.
- (d) Continued garrisoning of Germany.

(Ibid, para 34)

17. Having defined the phases of occupation in general terms, the planning staff turned its attention to certain co-ordinating factors with Allied troops and with services. It was appreciated that in the course of operations, British, American and Russian troops would be fighting within each others' future occupation zones when "A" Day occurred. It was considered therefore that the first phase of "ECLIPSE" would be carried out by the troops actually on the ground, and that readjustments within each zone would require the setting up of appropriate liaison and co-ordinating machinery. This changeover and readjustment of troops in the various zones would find Phase One of "ECLIPSE" merging into Phase Two. At some period during Phase Two the supreme command would pass from the then supreme commander to a Tri-partite (British - American - Russian) Control Council to be set up in Berlin.  
(Ibid, paras 35 - 38)

18. Occupational responsibilities anticipated some of the problems that would devolve upon the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force and upon services in the Army. It was necessary therefore that close liaison between 21 Army Group and other services be maintained, as it was realized that the Army would have to give considerable assistance to the Naval and Air Force elements. Briefly, this assistance consisted in providing administrative services which were an Army responsibility under the agreed procedure in the field; and within the Army's resources, providing assistance to the Navy in carrying out the control, disarmament, discipline, employment, disbandment of the German



Navy, naval coast artillery, naval infantry, instructional and research establishments. Wherever possible the Army would assist the Navy with regard to the custody and primary disposal of German naval war material, installations and defences. The Army was to provide similar assistance to the Royal Air Force insofar as it affected the German Air Force disarmament and disbandment. (Ibid, paras 39 and 40)

19. The objects to be achieved in the Primary Phase were:

- (a) To occupy as rapidly as possible certain strategic areas of Germany within the Army Group boundaries up to the points of contact with the Russians;
- (b) To take initial action to ensure our own security and the security of Allied Prisoners of War;
- (c) To extend the area occupied to include the whole of the Army Group area, within existing boundaries, projected as may later be ordered.

(Ibid, chap II, para 2)

20. Depending upon the limits reached by the Russian advance and on the Inter-Army Group boundary at the time, the main objectives to be secured by the First Canadian and Second British Armies were:

- (a) To secure the crossings over the RHINE north of the Inter-Army Group boundary.
- (b) To secure successively the BREMEN, HAMBURG and KIEL areas and the Lines of Communication to them ...

(Ibid, para 4 (a) )

It was also foreseen that additional tasks would have to be undertaken, either simultaneously or on completion of the tasks outlined above, according to the forces available at the time. These were:

- (a) Despatch minimum forces into North-West HOLLAND to disarm and concentrate Germans there and to open maintenance routes;
- (b) Disarm and concentrate German armed forces encountered, particularly in the area NORTH of the main thrust to BREMEN;
- (c) One British Division with ancillary troops to be despatched to BERLIN under American Command. <sup>H</sup>

(Ibid, para 4 (b) )

21. With plans as far advanced as they now were, consideration could be given to boundaries. These were initially defined as follows:

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<sup>H</sup> A Canadian composite unit, equivalent to one battalion with a brass band was ultimately detailed to form part of this force to take part in the Victory parade in Berlin. (W.D., G.O.C.-in-C., First Cdn Army, 12 June 45)

29  
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- (a) Between Ninth US Army and First US Army--  
all inclusive to Ninth Army: WESEL - HAIM -  
DETMOLD - HILDESHEIM - BRUNSWICK - BERLIN.
- (b) Between Ninth US Army and Second British  
Army-- inclusive to Second Army: XANTEN -  
exclusive MUNSTER - inclusive HANNOVER -  
GIFHORN - SALZWEDEL (with running rights  
for Second Army through MUNSTER and for  
Ninth Army through HANNOVER).
- (c) Between Second British Army and First  
Canadian Army--all inclusive to Second Army:  
REES - RHEINE - OSNABRUCK - DIEPHOLZ (with  
running rights for Canadian Army) - NIENBURG -  
SOLTAU - LUNEBURG - exclusive LUBECK.

(Ibid, para 4 (c) )

22. With these objects and objectives now more clearly defined, the planning staff turned its attention to additional commitments which would in all likelihood arise after the surrender of Germany. These were in many respects extensions arising out of problems previously foreseen, but which required greater definition. They included a wide range of subjects, the most important being appropriate action against enemy units which refused to surrender; security of Ls. of C.; security measures in general; special targets; protection of German military records and archives; guarding of signal installations; arrest and detention of war criminals and security suspects; the establishment of Military Government; seizure of war materials and disarmament. In view of the numerous problems that would arise concerning the civilian population, the administration in early stages would devolve entirely upon military bodies. Consequently the subject of displaced persons received close attention, and careful thought was given to the matter of frontier control, information services and concentration camps. (Hist Sec file AEF/21 Army Gp/C/I, Docket IV: 21 Army Group Operation "ECLIPSE", The Occupation of North-West Germany; Preface)

23. It was foreseen that functions which had been outlined for the First Phase would overlap into the Secondary Phase, and that commitments outlined for both the earlier phases would overlap into the Final Phase. This overlapping was admitted as an essential part of Operation "ECLIPSE", since it was obvious that with the collapse of Germany certain immediate measures had to be taken, and that these would be continuing functions even if modified or extended.

24. Briefly therefore, the objects to be achieved in the Secondary Phase were:

- (a) The completion of the occupation of the area north of the Inter-Army Group boundaries (including all islands and the area of Germany north of the Kiel canal, giving priority to the capture of the ports not already in our hands and, in particular, the Cuxhaven, Hamburg, Bremen and Bremerhaven. A major commitment will be the opening of Hamburg.
- (b) The further disarmament and commencement of general disbandment of the German sea, land and air forces, and of para-military organizations.
- (c) The establishment of law and order and Military Government throughout the Army Group area.



- (d) The establishment of frontier control, followed by the abolition of the Rhine - Ijssel and Kiel Canal Barrier Zone.
- (e) The destruction or capture of enemy holding out in Dunkirk and the Islands off the North German coast.
- (f) The despatch of a force to disarm and control German forces in Denmark if the situation at the time so demands.
- (g) The re-deployment of 21 Army Group to conform to the British National Zone<sup>x</sup> including the handing over of the Bremen enclave to the Americans.

(Ibid, chap III, para 2)

25. While it was appreciated that the majority of the Allied formations in Germany would be tied down to garrison and guard duties, the widespread distances in the British zone would affect the ultimate organization of the British occupying force. The Hannover Corps district for example was nearly 200 miles across from east to west and approximately 180 miles from north to south. Rhine Province was about 220 miles from north to south. The need for mobile reserves was therefore appreciated as particularly important in the British zone. Canadian mobile units were destined to form part of this reserve. This phase envisaged additional and more detailed tasks, among which can be mentioned guards for supply trains; escorts for road convoys; the disposal of war material; German war factories; Allied prisoners of war; Military Government commitments; and, if it had not capitulated at this time, Dunkirk was to be dealt with when convenient. (Ibid, chap III, paras 21 et seq)

26. As it was fully appreciated that the Final Phase would not come into effect for a considerable time, detailed plans could not be formulated at this stage of planning (January 1945). Rather, the objects and commitments as laid down were more in the nature of a forecast in outline of the course of events rather than definite statements of fact. As noted earlier, this phase did foresee the completion (or continuation) of primary and secondary phase tasks left uncompleted.

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<sup>x</sup> Definition of British Zone of Occupation within Germany :

The British Forces under a British Commander will occupy the territory of Germany west of the following line:

From the point on LUBECK BAY where the frontiers of SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN and MECKLENBURG meet, along the western frontier of MECKLENBURG to the frontier of the province of HANNOVER, thence along the eastern frontier of HANNOVER to the frontier of BRUNSWICK, thence along the western frontier of the Prussian province of SAXONY to the frontier of the province of HESSEN-NASSAU. Thence along the northern and western frontier of HESSEN-NASSAU to the River Rhine, thence southwards along the central navigable channel of the River RHINE to the international boundary between FRANCE and GERMANY. (See map, Appx "F")

(Ibid, chap III, para 2)



27. The objects of the Final Phase fell into two divisions, Short Term objects and Long Term objects, as follows:

#### SHORT TERM OBJECTS

- (a) To complete the demilitarization of Germany in the shortest possible time. This includes the disposal, by removal from Germany or destruction in Germany, of all remaining war equipment, the destruction of all fixed defences in the priority laid down, and the final and complete disbandment of the German armed forces and the destruction of German war potential.
- (b) To repatriate all Allied prisoners of war and all displaced persons still remaining in Germany.
- (c) On the conclusion of (a), to reduce the strength of 21 Army Group to the minimum numbers of formations and units required for long-term occupation of the British Zone in Germany.

#### LONG TERM OBJECTS

- (a) To ensure that the Germans have no opportunity of reviving their ability to make war.
- (b) To complete the eradication of Nazism and German Militarism.
- (c) To re-educate German youth.

(Ibid., chap IV, paras 2,3)

28. Short-term tasks involved the completion of those commitments already referred to in the Secondary Phase as well as permanent commitments, which included the security of lines of communication; protection of headquarters; guards for arrested war criminals; Military Government and control of information services. Permanent commitments would also include the continuation of protecting Ls. of C., and headquarters; unearthing war criminals and security detainees; guarding of radio transmitters, and the institution of Military Government to complete outstanding tasks from Primary and Secondary Phases. (Ibid., paras 7 to 24)

29. Not the least of the problems to be faced by an occupation force in Germany was the setting up of a suitable form of Government after the total collapse of the German military machine, which in view of the country's political organization, would drag the governing machinery with it into chaos. The importance attached to Military Government by Allied Commanders can best be understood by definition and by a statement of its responsibilities and some of its objectives as visualized by the planning staff:

#### DEFINITION

Military Government has been defined as that form of government which is established and maintained by a belligerent by force of arms over occupied territory and over the inhabitants thereof. It not only operates during the period before organized resistance has ceased, but also the post-



hostilities period during which the victorious armies may occupy the entire territory of the defeated state. It remains in effect until a treaty of peace has been signed and ratified and it is possible that this treaty may provide for the continuance of the occupation in a modified form.

#### RESPONSIBILITY

- (a) The responsibility for government of the occupied territory rests with the military commander under whose control the territory has come. Military Government in Germany has been announced by a proclamation, which contains general declarations of policy and action directed to the inhabitants of the occupied territory. Proclamations, laws, ordinances, notices and directives of general interest to the German public will be published and posted in such manner as the Military Government may determine ...
- (b) The Military Governor of the area occupied by the British/United States forces will be the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, from whom all authority will derive.
- (c) The policy of Military Government will be initially, and until assumed by the Control Council, the responsibility of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force.
- (d) The Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, has had delegated to him by the Supreme Commander responsibility for Military Government in his area, and has, with certain exceptions, e.g. collective punishments ... re-delegated his powers to Army Commanders, who in turn may re-delegate their responsibility and authority (except in the case of collective punishments) to Corps Commanders.
- (e) Military Government is a command responsibility and will be administered through the normal military chain of command.

#### PRIMARY OBJECTIVES

- (a) Imposition of the will of the Allies upon occupied Germany.
- (b) The control and care of displaced persons.
- (c) The apprehension of war criminals.
- (d) The elimination of Nazism and Fascism.
- (e) The restoration and maintenance of law and order.
- (f) The protection of United Nations' property.
- (g) The establishment and preservation of a suitable civil administration.

(Ibid, Pamphlet 10, chap I, paras 1, 2, 4)

30. So widespread were the problems anticipated, that the planning staff gave lengthy and careful considerations to the many forms and situations which might confront the Allies upon the eventual collapse of Germany. This in turn produced comprehensive and detailed instructions to Allied Commanders, and at the same time provided an outline of the then existing German Civil administration. (See Pamphlet 10, Operation "ECLIPSE")



31. The foregoing paragraphs give a very broad outline of Operation "ECLIPSE", an outline which, nevertheless, sets out the magnitude of the task visualized by the Allied Nations, and the general instructions under which this task might be carried out. The comprehensive manner in which every aspect of the tremendous problem ahead was considered and planned for in advance is illustrated by the all-embracing nature of the following list of pamphlets, which contain, insofar as could be visualized, guiding principles for the occupation of Germany:

Pamphlet 1	General.
Pamphlet 2	General outline of the tasks to be carried out in Germany.
Pamphlet 3	The Naval and Air Force plans.
Pamphlet 4	Control and administration of the German Forces.
Pamphlet 5	Para-military organizations and police forces.
Pamphlet 6	Counter-intelligence.
Pamphlet 7	Disarmament.
Pamphlet 8	Disbandment.
Pamphlet 9	Allied Prisoners of War.
Pamphlet 10	The Military Government of Germany.
Pamphlet 11	Control of information services and public entertainments.
Pamphlet 12	Movements and transportation.
Pamphlet 13	Signal communications in Germany.

(Hist Soc file AEF/21 Army Gp/C/1 Docket IV: 21 Army Group Operation "ECLIPSE", The Occupation of North-West Germany)

#### CANADIAN ARMY OCCUPATION FORCE IN GERMANY

32. Late in the evening of 4 May 45, an historic message reached First Cdn Army from 21 Army Group Headquarters:

GO 411 A SECRET. ALL OFFENSIVE ACTION WILL CEASE FROM RECEIPT THIS SIGNAL. ORDERS WILL BE GIVEN TO ALL TPS TO CEASE FIRE 0800 HRS TOMORROW SATURDAY 5 MAY. FULL TERMS OF LOCAL GERMAN SURRENDER ARRANGED TODAY FOR 21 ARMY GP FRONT FOLLOW. EMPHASISE THESE PROVISIONS APPLY SOLELY TO 21 ARMY GP FRONT AND ARE FOR THE MOMENT EXCL OF DUNKIRK. ACK.

(W.D., Ops Branch, First Cdn Army, May 1945: Appx 12)

"A" Day had come---eleven months less one day after the landing of Allied troops on the beaches of Normandy. The war machine of the Third Reich was shattered. Operation "OVERLORD" was history; Operation "ECLIPSE" was now a fact.

33. With the closing days of April 1945, the imminence of a total German collapse was becoming increasingly evident. In Holland and along the coast, dispersed pockets of resistance still held out; in Germany, while some stiff fighting was still in progress, signs of disintegration were obvious. By 3 May, Oldenburg had fallen to 2 Cdn Inf Div (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Div, May 1945); on 4 May 3 Cdn Inf Div and Polish Armd Div (then under command First Cdn Army), were before Aurich and Jever, threatening assault unless the German commander surrendered (W.D., H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Div, May 1945). In view of surrender negotiations that were then going on between Field Marshal Montgomery and Admiral



Doonitz, the attack was postponed. 4 Cdn Armd Div was operating in the area of Varel (W.D., H.Q. 4 Cdn Armd Div, May 1945), 5 Cdn Armd Div in the Groningen area and 1 Cdn Inf Div in the area between Rotterdam and Amsterdam (W.Ds., H.Q. 5 Cdn Armd Div and H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Div, May 1945).

34. The end of hostilities presented a confused picture. Scattered units of the German Army in North-Western Europe surrendered to local commanders; other units continued fighting. Some of the German troops were properly formed units; other troops were mere "bodies of men" lacking unity, cohesion and control. Some German commanders did not know the locality of other formations or units; in numerous cases they could not give the strength of their own commands to Allied Commanders. The German civil machinery too, had collapsed in utter confusion.

35. It was chiefly because of these unpredictable chaotic conditions that some of the detailed instructions contained in Operation "ECLIPSE" could not be applied in their entirety. Nevertheless, the lessons learned and information gained from this planning proved a sound basis and of great value. Owing to the manner in which the collapse came, with no formal surrender until practically the whole of Germany had been overrun, it was not possible to use "ECLIPSE" machinery for control purposes as had been envisaged. "ECLIPSE" did however, provide the requisite information and the basis for planning for the various tasks arising from military control and occupation. (Cabinet Office file Box 113 BAOR/437/Ops: Sellar's Report, Notes on "G" and Administrative Activities of 21 Army Gp, May - July 1945).

36. The original plans for "ECLIPSE" had anticipated using the German chain of command to control, disarm, document and disband the German Army. The manner in which the German defeat came about made the use of this machinery impractical. As a result an 'ad hoc' organization was set up. A "German Headquarters" was therefore created for the purpose of controlling the surrendered troops, organising them into certain selected concentration areas, obtaining information as to numbers and arranging for their maintenance. From this 'ad hoc' organization would emerge an organization which, when the time came, would be in existence for the gradual disbandment of the German Army. (Ibid)

37. The original "ECLIPSE" plans for establishing a number of concentration areas, each of some 40,000 surrendered troops, dispersed over the British zone and controlled by British brigades was not practicable under the circumstances of the surrender. Instead large concentration areas were selected in sectors where the surrendered Wehrmacht were actually found. The 150,000 German troops in Holland who were surrendered by General Blaskowitz to the First Cdn Army, were marched across the IJsselmeer causeway and Northern Holland to the Aurich Peninsula. Upon the disbandment of 2 Cdn Corps this concentration area came under 30 Corps District. (Ibid)

38. During the final days of the campaign there was abundant evidence that the German Army was conscious of its total defeat. There had been local parleys and local surrenders. The climax of these minor negotiations was reached on 2 May with the proceedings for the surrender of Hamburg. The negotiations which began in Hamburg led on 3 May to the despatch by Doenitz of envoys to Tactical H.Q. 21 Army Group, then at Lunenburg Heath. By this time the Commander-in-Chief had ordered a pause in the advance to be made on a line passing through Hamburg and Lubeck. Some fighting was still in progress with German remnants in the Cuxhaven and Emden peninsulas.



39. Little time was lost in putting the first phase of "ECLIPSE" into operation. Following the capitulation of the German Forces facing 21 Army Group, General Crerar issued orders to Col-Gen Blaskowitz on 6 May, informing him that the G.O.C. 1 Cdn Corps (Lt-Gen Foulkes) would accept his surrender and signature on behalf of the existing command (G.O.C. 2 Cdn Corps had already accepted the surrender of German forces in Oldenburg area).

40. Immediately troops of 1 Cdn Corps began to move into Western Holland to liberate the areas occupied by the Twenty-fifth German Army and disarm the German forces. The process of disarmament and disposal of this huge force was speedily initiated by Canadian troops, and by 25 May the disarmed Twenty-fifth Army began its long trek to the concentration area of the Aurich Peninsula. After crossing the IJsselmeer causeway, they were taken over by 2 Cdn Corps. (*Ibid*)

41. The extensive relief measures planned by the Allies could not be brought into operation immediately. Consequently, responsibility for immediate measures for the relief and rehabilitation of the northern and southern provinces of Holland and Utrecht devolved on First Cdn Army. The problems confronting the Canadian troops were manifold. These included the integration of these provinces with the territories previously liberated; the supply of food and fuel; the urgent need for medical supplies; the evening up of distribution of imported and existing Dutch stocks (much food and medical supplies in the first few days were brought in by all forms of sea, land and air transport). Not least among the problems was the restoration of displaced persons; the distribution of the population to minimize the danger of overcrowding consequent on flooding and military operations, and the restoration of rail, road and water transportation. Assistance was also given in re-establishing Dutch authorities to carry out normal functions; and while Canadian troops were awaiting repatriation, valuable help was given in gathering the harvest. In fact, by 12 May, a regular ferry-lorry service was operating for the larger cities. (Hist Sec file AEF 45/First Cdn Army/C/E, Docket 1; Army Commander's Report to Minister of National Defence; and Sellar's Report, *op cit*).

#### TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS AND LABOUR

42. With the end of hostilities the transportation commitments of 21 Army Group increased considerably. In addition to their extensive responsibilities in Belgium and Holland, transportation services had to undertake the control and rehabilitation of transportation in a large area of Germany in which the railway system covered a route mileage equivalent to almost the whole of that of England. The co-operation of the German transportation organizations, particularly in the lower regions, and the genuine desire of their employees to see the services restored, alone made it possible to commence operation to a sufficient degree to meet the requirements of the military forces and Military Government. (Sellar's Report, *op cit*).

43. To meet some of the transportation problems, regional control teams were set up to operate the German railway system through the R.B.D.<sup>x</sup> officials and organizations. A large number of railway men were encouraged to return to work on railways by direct contact on the spot, without waiting for the reorganizing German railway authorities to act. It was then found desirable to set up a central German control organization to work alongside the 21 Army Group Railway Directorate to deal with day to day railway problems between the R.B.Ds. and with the allocation of



rolling stock. One of the problems was the restoration of conditions and terms of employment similar to those in effect before the occupation, in order to encourage German railway workers to return to work. Facilities were arranged with Military Government to enable R.B.Ds. to obtain the money with which to pay their employees. A very high proportion returned to work as a result of this policy. (Ibid)

44. An extensive reconnaissance of all roads, bridges and canals in the British zone was undertaken and a plan of the main roads to be developed was evolved. Many bridges, particularly on autobahns and over main water obstacles, had been destroyed, and a vast amount of work was undertaken to clear the debris and construct and strengthen bridges and raise the level of these constructions to permit the navigation of waterways. (Ibid)

45. Implementation of the first phase of "ECLIPSE" operations in Germany fell to 2 Cdn Inf Div, commanded by Brigadier A.B. Matthews, and ancillary troops, with divisional headquarters located at Aurich. Headquarters 2 Cdn Corps was located at Bad Zwischenahn, where on 5 May, German General Straube surrendered to Lt-Gen G.G. Simonds, Comd 2 Cdn Corps. This formal surrender took place in an hotel overlooking Lake Zwischenahn. A wooden tablet in the room where the instrument of surrender was signed bears the following inscription:

In this room on 5 May 1945, consequent on the capitulation of the German Forces in N.W. Europe, Lt-Gen G.G. Simonds, G.O.C. 2 Cdn Corps, in the presence of Div Commanders and Senior Staff Officers of the Corps met Gen. der Infanterie Erich Straube and issued orders for the surrender of all German land, sea and air forces in North Friesland.

(Inscription observed and copied by the narrator)

46. Due to the nature of the German collapse many problems demanded immediate attention and energetic measures on the part of the occupying troops and Military Government detachments working through military channels. Chief among these was the disarmament and concentration of surrendered German troops, the control and welfare of the civilian population, and provision for displaced persons and liberated prisoners of war who were migrating in large numbers to the Canadian area, as well as to other areas within the 21 Army Group Zone.

47. The surrendered Germans were concentrated without delay in the area north of Ems - Jade canal. In fact, by 29 May, some 120,000 prisoners had been concentrated. By 22 June, this number had increased to some 200,000, consequent upon the arrival of the surrendered Twenty-fifth German Army from Holland.

48. Civil government machinery had to be established without delay, a task that was admirably carried out by Military Government working through military channels. Their problems were numerous. It had to be driven home to Germans that their country had suffered a total and crushing defeat. They had to be impressed with the fact that German governing machinery had completely collapsed and that the government of the various areas was that set up by the Allied forces and administered through Military Government, and instructions and orders issued by this body were to be obeyed and carried out promptly, backed by the military forces if necessary. The distribution of food, clothing, fuel and the control of services were additional problems that came within the scope of Military Government machinery.



## 2 CDN INF DIV'S PERIOD OF OCCUPATION

49. Units of 2 Cdn Inf Div were located in the most important cities and towns, while mobile units were strategically placed to patrol wide areas. Guards were provided for concentration areas, and personnel provided to control and man communications. With the initial stages of reorganization in the British Zone, 2 Cdn Inf Div came under command of 30 Corps District. On 15 June the division moved its headquarters from Aurich to Bad Zwischenahn. (W.D., H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Div, 15 Jun 45)

50. While these many tasks were being dealt with during the initial stages of the occupation, the transition from fighting to occupational duties brought with it new problems for our troops. They had more leisure time on their hands, and mentally they were not keyed up to the pitch of the days of intense action. To fill in much of this spare time, new measures were soon introduced which urged all ranks to take advantage of the various courses provided by the army through educational services. All forms of sports were organized within the units of the division and sports meets took place on a division level. Auxiliary Services provided a wide range of entertainment which included moving pictures and stage shows.

51. Gradually, as had been visualized by the planning staff, the first phase of "ECLIPSE" merged into the second phase. First phase commitments, however, necessarily overlapped into the second phase, while some of them were automatically continuing functions. It became increasingly evident that the organization of the proposed occupational force would have to be adjusted to meet its particular operational requirements. Late in May 1945, the Commander of 2 Cdn Inf Div was informed that his formation would be relieved by 3 Cdn Inf Div, which was then reorganizing and was to be the official Canadian occupying force in Germany. On 9 Jul 2 Cdn Inf Div began its move into Holland and ultimately to Canada. By 11 Jul 3 Cdn Inf Div, Canadian Army Occupation Force<sup>1</sup>, commanded by Maj-Gen C. Vokes, had taken over its new duties. The brigades of the reorganized division bore the distinguishing prefix "2" before their respective numbers. They were initially commanded as follows:

Brigadier T.G. Gibson, D.S.O., 2/7 Cdn Inf Bde, C.A.O.F.  
Brigadier M.P. Bogert, D.S.O., O.B.E., 2/8 Cdn Inf Bde, C.A.O.F.  
Brigadier W.J. McGill, D.S.O., 2/9 Cdn Inf Bde, C.A.O.F.

(W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q. 2 Cdn Inf Div, April to July 1945; AEF/First Cdn Army/C/E: Army Commander's Report to Minister of National Defence; and C.M.H.Q. file 1/Occup Gp/1: Cable Defensor to Comilitary, CGS 265, 25 May 45)

52. 3 Cdn Inf Div with ancillary troops became Canada's official contribution to the Allied occupation forces in Germany. The tasks to be encountered, and the role to be played, were vastly different from the role of the Canadian Army up to VE Day. At a garrison theatre in Aurich, Maj-Gen Vokes explained in considerable detail the responsibilities of C.A.O.F. and the responsibilities of officers and men alike. He gave the general outline of the training and educational programme that would be followed during its period of occupation. On the behaviour of all ranks would Canadians as a whole be judged. To gain and hold the respect of all Germans as well as with other occupying forces, required constant supervision and irreproachable discipline. 3 Cdn Inf Div C.A.O.F., he said: "... was to be the 'show piece' of the Canadian Army". (W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Div (C.A.O.F.), 13 Jul 45)

<sup>1</sup> The name 3 Cdn Inf Div (C.A.O.F.) was adopted to distinguish the formation from the former operational division.



53. The termination of combined command in Germany coincided with the general reorganization of the allied zones, very much in the manner that had been foreseen in the planning of the operation. This was officially notified by a cipher message issued by the Supreme Commander:

TERMINATION OF COMBINED COMMAND AND  
DISSOLUTION OF SUPREME HEADQUARTERS  
ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IS  
SPECIFIED IN S-95710, DATED 6 JULY  
AND S-96169 DATED 9 JULY WILL  
BECOME EFFECTIVE 0001B HOURS 14 JULY.

(Cabinet office file: 21 A. Gp/O/572/  
Ops (B), Boc 73, file No. 433)

54. The regrouping of formations and units within 21 Army Group area was rapidly reaching a firm basis. By 2 Oct 30 Corps District area (commanded by Lt-Gen Sir B.G. Horrocks, K.B.E., C.B., D.S.O., M.C.), which included the Canadian Occupational Force, had completed its redeployment as follows:

- (a) Province of Hannover less:
  - ( Stadtkreis Wesermunde,
  - ✕ ( Landkreis Wesermunde,
  - ( Landkreis Osterholz, and
  - that portion of Landkreis
  - Blankenburg which lies
  - east of River Warne Bode.
- (b) Land of Brunswick.
- (c) Land of Oldenburg - less Landkreis Wesermarsch.
- ✕✕ (C.A.O.F. file 5-0-1, 30 Corps District Gen Ldm  
Instr No. 130, 2 Oct 45)

55. Within the Canadian occupation area, the chief problems that faced C.A.O.F. upon assuming its occupational role were:

- (a) Getting the population through the winter. This involved the provision of food, accommodation and the handling of refugees, and the prevention and control of disease.
- (b) Fuel.
- (c) Transportation.
- (d) Dealing with the German youth. It was with this class of Germans that Nazism made its greatest strides, and their re-education along democratic lines required a careful selection of leaders from among the Germans themselves and equally careful supervision on the part of Military Government and the Army. (Hist Sec file C.A.O.F./CF, Docket II: Report on Organization and activities of the C.A.O.F., Part III)

56. The Canadian occupation area varied little throughout the whole period of Canadian participation. The area as at December 1945 is representative of the C.A.O.F. occupation, when the Canadian force was responsible for the Regifungsbesirke Lurich and Land Oldenburg. (Regifungsbesirke, abbreviated Reg-Bez are administrative areas similar to provincial counties. Within these Reg-Bez are

✕ Taken over by U.S. Forces.

✕✕ This and all subsequent C.A.O.F. file sources refer to 3 Cdn Inf Div C.A.O.F. files. See Appx "G".



Stadtkreise and Landkreise, the former normally consisting of a town of over 20,000 inhabitants; the latter are rural areas and in some cases may contain towns of some size.) Within the Reg-Bez Aurich, C.A.O.F. was responsible for Landkreise Aurich, Leer, Norden, Wittmund and Stadtkreise Emden. In Land Oldenburg were Landkreise Ammerland, Friesland, Oldenburg, Vechta and Stadtkreise Delmenhorst, Oldenburg and Wilhelmshaven. (Ibid, Part IV; and C.A.O.F. file 201/Op Instrs/1/G: 25 Jul 45)

#### THE TASKS OF C.A.O.F.

57. During the early stages of the occupation the tasks of C.A.O.F. were a reiteration of the tasks laid down in Operation "ECLIPSE": (a) destructive, and (b) constructive. These tasks were carried out within the Canadian area as follows:

- (a) Control, disarmament and disbandment of the Wehrmacht.
- (b) Elimination of the Nazi Party by counter intelligence personnel.
- (c) Acceptance by the Army in general and by Military Government in particular of the responsibility for:
  - (i) The establishment of Military Government.
  - (ii) The protection, care and evacuation of Allied prisoners of war.
  - (iii) The deployment of displaced persons.
  - (iv) The re-establishment of German refugees.
  - (v) The prevention of starvation and disease.
  - (vi) The control of information services.
  - (vii) The re-education of the German youth.
  - (viii) Ensuring that the Germans have no opportunity of reviving their ability to make war.

Of the foregoing items (b) and (c) (vii) and (viii) were recognized as long term objects while the remainder were short term objects. (C.A.O.F. file 45/3 Cdn Inf Div/C/F, Report on Organization and Activities of the C.A.O.F., Part V; and C.A.O.F. file 265/Op Instrs/1, Op "ECLIPSE" Notes No. 1, 21 July 45)

59. The establishment of the German concentration area north of the Ems - Jade canal was one of the problems which demanded constant vigilance to prevent escapes and to maintain order while the process of disbandment was in progress. After a few months of concentration, the prisoners became restless, not having heard from their relatives and families for many months. As a result many attempted and some succeeded in crossing the Ems - Jade canal in an effort to return to their homes. Heavy guards had to be established all along the canal and the chief obstacles illuminated by searchlights. (W.D., "G" Branch, 3 Cdn Inf Div, C.A.O.F., February 1945: Appx 54)

60. During July, August and September it was known that a large number of German soldiers had left the concentration area without being properly documented and discharged. It was believed that in most cases they had returned to their homes and to work on the land. In some cases they were men who had deserted from the Wehrmacht to escape arrest. The increased number of escapes was



due in a great measure to the withdrawal of the searchlights by B.A.O.R. for use in other parts of the British Zone. Now that the harvest had been gathered, and that winter was setting in, it was important that these be rounded up. As a result, an operation was instituted in the form of "sweeps". (C.A.O.F. file 209/Security/1/G: Order for Security Checks, No. 913/OP/TJN/45, 2 Nov 45). These consisted of sudden raids, without warning, in the dead of the night. The following instruction was issued by the commander of the Canadian force:

Brigades will be responsible for carrying out the search ... all searches will be carried out as properly organized military operations, no previous warnings being given to the inhabitants. Troops, in conjunction with FS, will move out by night, as secretly as possible, to surround the selected place of search. At first light, a thorough check will be made of all inhabitants, particularly males. All those who are unable to establish their identity satisfactorily, who are not in possession of a proper discharge certificate, or who, for any other reason, give cause for suspicion, will be detained for interrogation, after which, if they are still under suspicion, will be disposed of to Mil Gov if they are civilians, or to the PW cage if they are Wehrmacht deserters.

(W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Div, C.A.O.F., October 1945: Op Instr No. 4, 7 Oct 45)

61. Orders were received from headquarters of the British Army of the Rhine (B.A.O.R.) to stop up the rate of discharge of German Wehrmacht. Soon the Canadian force was moving some 3,000 Wehrmacht every alternate day to various places of discharge in the British Zone and the French and Russian Zones. These discharges required increased guards for both train and lorry convoys. Considerable difficulty was experienced in these moves due to the condition of the railway road beds and some of the highways which had been heavily damaged as a result of the war.

62. In addition to providing guards for the foregoing commitments, guards had to be provided for certain civilian internment camps in which were kept war criminals and civilian suspects. As the individual war criminals were apprehended in the various localities in the British Zone, they would be interned in one of the many internment camps. From these they would be despatched to prisons or to war crime trials being held throughout Germany. While these internees were in transit from one camp to another to the appropriate war crimes trial our soldiers continued to guard them. (W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Div, C.A.O.F., February 1946: Appx 54). In conjunction with Military Government officials, it was one of the C.A.O.F. responsibilities to interrogate German officers, other ranks and civilians. Many of these were Wehrmacht in prisoner of war cages, some in civilian camps and others persons who had either escaped from concentration areas or suspect civilians. (C.A.O.F. file 204/Int/1/G: Intelligence Gen). Among the war criminals tried within C.A.O.F. area was Brigadeführer Kurt Meyer, whose trial opened at Aurich on 10 Dec 1945. The sentence of death passed upon him was commuted to life imprisonment. (C.A.O.F. file 220/War Crimes/Meyer/1: Complete file on Kurt Meyer; and C.A.O.F. file 204/Int/3, Intelligence Summaries: Special Interrogation Report Brigadeführer Kurt Meyer, Comd 12 S.S. Pz Div "Hitler Jugend," 6 June - 25 Aug 1945)



63. Displaced persons constituted a major problem for both the military personnel and Military Government. In any one sector it was possible to find people of every nationality who were destitute and who did not wish to remain in Germany. Their morale was exceedingly low because they had had no communication with their families or relatives and friends, in some cases for as much as five years. In conjunction with Military Government, this necessitated the establishment of camps throughout all zones for the purpose of administering them, and their repatriation. These displaced persons, who early in the war had been torn from their homes, wished in some form or other to retaliate against the defeated Germans. Retaliation in the Canadian area in some cases took the form of murder, rape and robbery. It therefore became an additional task of our troops to control and curb the number of crimes committed by displaced persons. The scope of C.A.O.F. responsibilities widened still further due to trouble caused by the depredations of Polish D.Ps. in the Canadian area. As a result it was necessary to establish an isolation camp in Kaserne Mitte on Borkum Island. To this camp were sent Polish D.Ps. who were found responsible for the disruption of the normal functioning of D.P. camp routine within the Divisional area. (C.A.O.F. file 201/Op Instrs/1/G, 3 Cdn Inf Div C.A.O.F. Op Instr No. 5, 29 Oct 45)

64. To conform with international agreements it was necessary that Soviet citizens be repatriated. In October 1945 there were about 2,000 in the Canadian Division's area. They had been offered through Military Government channels the facilities for returning to Russia, but apparently either through ignorance or a desire to remain in Germany they had not taken advantage of them. "The Army have now been ordered to assist in this repatriation .." (C.A.O.F. file 9-0-26/5, Occupation Instructions General, folio 50; W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Div C.A.O.F., February 1945: Appx 54; and C.A.O.F. file 209/Russian/1/G: letter re Soviet repatriation, 8 Oct 45)

65. The city and naval base of Wilhelmshaven was also a commitment of C.A.O.F., working in conjunction with the Royal Navy. The German ships then at Wilhelmshaven had to be guarded against acts of sabotage, a task which in all employed some 1,000 soldiers. Guards had to surround the town by day and by night, and on the docks soldiers patrolled continually to prevent scuttling of ships by German naval personnel. (C.A.O.F. file 9-0-26/5, Occupation Instructions General).

66. Airfields, ammunition dumps and military installations within the Canadian area demanded much attention as had been forecast in the "ECLIPSE" plans. Airfields were demolished or converted for the use of our own or friendly aircraft by R.C.E. units. Ammunition dumps presented a serious problem. It was appreciated that it would be impossible to allow German civilians free access to the vast amounts of explosives with which they could do great damage to roads, bridges and military installations. Further guards were therefore provided to guard these throughout the long winter months. Some of the larger bombs if allowed to deteriorate might detonate, thereby causing damage to the vicinity of the dump and endanger the lives of our troops. Our demolition experts therefore had to face many risks to dispose of these. To the engineers fell the task of destroying gun emplacements, bunkers, signal centres, forts, underground shelters and other military installations. In the Canadian area were many dumps containing food, vehicles, clothing and other war materials which were of value to the Allies for reparations and also to Military Government for use in the re-establishment of normal civilian life in Germany. Here again Canadian troops were employed to guard these stores and to transport them from one part of Germany to another. (C.A.O.F. file 9-0-26/5, Occupation Instructions General).



67. Under the newly organized Canadian Army Occupation Force, the army education programme was broadened. On 14 Jul, the following instruction was issued from Headquarters:

"... In addition to military training an extensive programme of educational training is to be carried out in accordance with 3 Cdn Inf Div COF Training Instruction No. 1 so that personnel will be better qualified to fit into civilian occupations when they are demobilized.

(W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Div, C.A.O.F., July 1945; Appx 31)

68. Upon the disbandment of Canadian Forces in Holland, 3 Cdn Inf Div (C.A.O.F.) took the responsibility of training Dutch troops in driving, mechanical maintenance and weapons. On completion of this training these Dutch officers and non-commissioned officers returned to train Dutch troops. Various types of training of our own troops were pursued, chiefly to produce trained non-commissioned officers and tradesmen. Many Canadians took advantage of the latter to fit them for their ultimate return to civilian life. (C.A.O.F., file 202/TRG GEN/1/G: Instructions, 27 Oct 45)

69. Immediately hostilities ceased, the Military Government organization began to assume control, its objects being:

- (a) to de-nazify the civil and political administration of Germany and,
- (b) to reconstruct it on a democratic basis.

Military Government was in support of and under command of the military forces in any area. The General Officer Commanding any formation was the Military Commander and the Military Governor of his own area. He in turn was responsible to the Commander-in-Chief, British Army of the Rhine for any action he might take. It was Military Government who operate and supervise roads, railways, canals, intercommunications, food stocks, rationing systems, the finance and commerce, the education and rehabilitation, and also the public safety of Germany. Close co-operation between military forces and Military Government was therefore essential in the effective occupation of Germany. (W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Div, C.A.O.F., February 1946; and C.A.O.F. file 236/Mil Gov/1: 821 LR Det Mil Gov, Oldenburg, Fortnightly Report No. 4, 8 Sep 45)

70. With the cessation of hostilities it became apparent that in order to re-establish the successful administration of the European countries a type of frontier control had to be set up immediately. In the Canadian area, this was done from the beginning of the occupation period. The task was to patrol the Dutch - German border, checking movements of various nationals from Holland to Germany and vice versa, all the time working in close co-operation with Field Security, Intelligence and Dutch Frontier guards. As the civil administration became more firmly established it was necessary to work in conjunction with German customs service. This frontier control was carried out by mounted patrols, armoured cars and static posts at the main crossings over the frontier. (C.A.O.F. file 209/Frontiers/1/G: Instructions, 23 Mar 46)

71. Further to complicate occupational responsibilities, black-market activities increased from month to month in all zones of occupation. This had been caused by the disruption of communications and the havoc wrought by the armies fighting on the continent during the past six years. It was further aggravated by the great number of displaced persons who had been brought to Germany by force and also by the number of homeless Germans who



were forced from the large populated areas to the smaller towns and cities. As the winter months progressed the situation became increasingly grave. Due to other responsibilities which took a higher priority, it had not been possible for the military forces to take adequate steps to stamp out this evil. However, by the spring of 1946, the military forces, in conjunction with Military Government, had made great strides in curbing black market operations. (W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Div, C.A.O.F., February 1946: Appx 54)

#### ATTITUDE OF CIVILIAN POPULATION

72. The attitude of the civilian population towards the occupying was reflected in various ways. Outwardly, the Germans appeared quite mild and resigned to the defeat of the German armies and the occupation of Germany. Beneath this, however, one was conscious of the existence of German pride, a pride which, despite the reverses of Germany, has not been beaten down. In many instances, the defeat of Germany did not appear to impress them as a great catastrophe. They had merely lost a war which, one gathers from their attitude, was only one war among others - yet to come. Few Germans cared to discuss their defeat; some would make guarded remarks; while others contended that the war was lost through an unfortunate error of judgement on Hitler's part -- that of attacking Russia before having disposed of Britain after the fall of France. (Hist Sec file C.A.O.F./A/1: Report on Germany; Report by Maj C.E. Brissette, April 1946)

73. While outwardly the German appeared to be quite mild, and co-operative enough, this did not follow in all age groups, nor did it follow in all parts of Germany. If the older generations appeared to be the most co-operative, and at the same time held any animosity towards the Allies, they concealed the fact and were active enough in direct co-operation with occupational forces and Military Government. This co-operative spirit was less noticeable among the males between the ages of say 14 to 26 or 27 years of age. Many of this latter class were definitely uncooperative, if not hostile to Allied occupation and efforts in Germany. Again some in this class appeared to be most co-operative on the surface yet deliberately did all they could to impede Allied efforts. It was mainly in this group that one detected a simmering hatred for the Allies. It is true that they would verbally deny hindering tactics, but judging by their lack of co-operation and not infrequently their untruthfulness, one was forcibly impressed that they were still Germans, intensely so, and that Allied interference in their future was most unwelcome. (Ibid).

#### FRATERNIZATION

74. Two problems, in so far as our own troops were concerned, were to prove serious matters for the command of C.A.O.F. These were fraternization and the general morale of Canadian soldiers. C.I. sitreps throw considerable light on the two subjects. The non-fraternization ban that had been imposed at the outset of the occupation had in some instances an adverse effect on the morale of the occupying troops. In mid-July 1945, however, the G.O.C.-in-C. 30 Corps sent a message to all formations to the effect that the time had come to relax the rule of non-fraternization. This message read in part:



... I wish to congratulate all ranks on the magnificent way in which they have carried out the non-fraternization policy in spite of great temptation. It is now considered that the German people has learned its first lesson thanks to the effort of our troops ... In this (the second stage) our soldiers must play their part. You may now talk to all German persons in public places and on the streets because by intercourse between the two people it is hoped to lead the Germans into a Democratic way of life ... do not yet enter their homes or entertain them in yours ...

(W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q.  
3 Cdn Inf Div, C.A.O.F.,  
July 1945: Appx 29)

75. Early reports on the new fraternization policy showed that there had been very little mixing between civilian and military personnel. This it was felt was due not only to an aloofness on the part of civilians, but because the great majority of the soldiers demonstrated that they were not particularly interested in the German people. (Ibid, August 1945: Appx 16). Even by the end of August 1945 there was little evidence of much fraternization. In most cases it was attributed to language difficulties. Some German girls were averse to be seen with British soldiers because of the disapproval of their friends, and also for fear of reprisals. (Ibid; Appx 78)

76. Fraternization, as time went on, was not without its darker side, as an entry in a November report indicates:

Another unit reports a statement made by two German women during an interview who gave warning against Schnapps (a home-brewed type of gin) sellers and fraternizing frauleins. These women say there is a distillery in the Jever area where potato schnapps or V2 juice is made, probably by German soldiers. This liquor is sold on the Black Market and is meant to undermine the health of allied soldiers, who, when drunk are contacted by the fraternizing frauleins who knowingly carry VD germs.

(Ibid, November 1945: Appx 12)

Fraternizing is still causing unpleasant incidents, mainly Germans threatening women for going out with allied soldiers. Generally, it is difficult to take action against the offenders, for in most cases the girls will neither testify nor make formal complaint. However, two cases were rewarded by Mil Gov with 30 days.

(Ibid: Appx 50)

Fraternization however, gradually increased, and unpleasant incidents lessened. An extract from a February 1946 report points to an amelioration of conditions:

Fraternization is increasing and even officers are holding whispered conversations of "that beautiful blonde" they saw downtown. Several men had expressed their desire to marry German girls.

(Ibid, February 1946; Appx 58)



# GENERAL MORALE

77. While fraternization had to an extent a morale effect on occupation troops, other factors had to be considered, factors which required the constant attention of the authorities. In August 1945, one unit reported: "It is believed that the morale of the Div has suffered in that no information as to policy re occupation troops has been issued." (W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Div, C.A.O.F., July 1945: Appx 29; and C.A.O.F. file 305/RETURNS/1 FD 5: folio 4) By the end of the same month most indications showed that morale was on the up-grade as a result of the victory over Japan; a definite policy on service in C.A.O.F.; the provision of Canadian Army shows and the fact that canteens were to be operated by members of the C.W.A.C. One unit however (R.C.A.S.C.) reported lowered morale because the troops of that unit were at the time living under canvas. (Ibid: Appx 48) Entertainment contributed greatly to the gradually improving morale of the troops, as evidenced by an extract from a September 1945 report:

Morale of troops continues high. Several bns have reported that an active sports programme has done much ...

(Ibid, September 1945: Appx 78)

78. Under occupation conditions, it was inevitable that the morale would fluctuate from time to time, and for diverse reasons.

Morale of troops fluctuates, varying in different districts and depending on recreational facilities and comforts. One unit reported that the morale varied in accordance with their expectation of getting home.

(Ibid, November 1945: Appx 12)

Two extracts from reports of January and February 1946 reflected a new high in the morale standing of our troops in Germany:

Morale reported as high, due in part to the possibility of C.A.O.F. breaking up at an earlier date than expected.

(Ibid, January 1946: Appx 42)

Morale of troops reported as having received a tremendous boost with the news that C.A.O.F. would be going home.

(Ibid, February 1946: Appx 58)

The enthusiasm generated by the report of early return to Canada stemmed perhaps from an address given on 25 Nov 1945, by Field Marshal Montgomery to 700 officers of C.A.O.F. at Maple Leaf barracks at Aurich. Here he outlined generally present and future conditions in the British zone. He also said Canadians would be going home as soon as possible next year (1946). (Ibid, 25 Nov 45)



# THE WITHDRAWAL OF C.A.O.F.

79. As far back as January 1945, a tentative decision had been reached to provide a Canadian Occupational Force of some 25,000 all ranks, but the period of occupation had not then been decided upon. It was felt by the Canadian Government that upon the cessation of hostilities with Germany, Canadian Forces should be repatriated from European theatres as quickly as circumstances would permit. (Hist Sec file C.A.O.F. /A/T: Miscellaneous Privy Council file extracts; and C.M.H.Q. file 1/ORG CAOF/1/2, General Policy for withdrawal and repatriation of C.A.O.F.: folio 87). As a result of high level discussions as to the future occupation of Germany, it became increasingly evident that the Canadian Government would have no voice in the direction of the policy for the control of Germany. Consideration was also given to the fact that many of our troops had been overseas for six years. There had been exchanges of cables between the Canadian Government and the British Government on the subject. A cabinet level decision of 8 Dec 45 was transmitted to the British Government stating that the withdrawal of the Canadian Occupation Force would begin in April 1946, and that all personnel now overseas would be repatriated by the autumn of 1946. (Ibid)

80. Little time was lost in laying plans for the withdrawal of Canadian troops. On 7 Jan 46, the G.O.C. and the A.A. & Q.M.G. of C.A.O.F. went to B.A.O.R. Headquarters to discuss the withdrawal of the Canadian Forces. On the same day they proceeded to C.M.H.Q. in London to discuss the matter with Lt-Gon Murchio, Chief of Staff. (W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Div, C.A.O.F., 7 Jan 46). Again in February officers of C.A.O.F. and C.M.H.Q. liaison officers went to Headquarters 30 Corps District to work out further details of the move of C.A.O.F. and the taking over of the Canadian area by the 52 (L.) British Division. It was ultimately decided that the provisional commitments of C.A.O.F. would continue until 1 May, and the Divisional area commitment during April would be carried out by five major units to be established at the following localities:

2/7 Cdn Recce Regt	at	Leer
One battalion		
7 Cdn Inf Bde	at	Aurich
One Artillery Regiment	at	Wilhelmshaven
One Infantry battalion	at	Oldenburg
C.H. of O. (H.Q.)	divided between the civ	
	internment camp at Esterwegen	
	and Stadkries Delmenhorst.	

(Ibid, 25 February 1946)

81. Little time indeed was lost in putting into effect the withdrawal of the Canadian Army Occupation Force. On the 10 Mar 46 the following units were notified that all their operational commitments would cease forthwith:

2/4 Cdn L.A.A. Regt, R.C.A.
2/14 Cdn Fd Regt, R.C.A.
4 Wpg Rif
4 Regina Rif
2/18 Cdn Fd Coy, R.C.E.

These units were to form the bulk of the first draft for return to the United Kingdom and ultimately to Canada. Their orders were "to be prepared to move anytime after 31 March". (Ibid, 10 Mar 46) Actually the above units, less 4 Regina Rif, embarked for the U.K. on 23 Mar, with 1 C.I.C. Band replacing the Regina Rif. H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Div (C.A.O.F.) embarked on 7 Jun, and the last detachment to leave was 2 Ech H.Q., C.A.O.F., who embarked the



following day. The repatriation of Canadian Forces in N.W. Europe will be the subject of a later report.

82. The last entry in the war diary of C.A.O.F., dated 15 May 46, reads:

15 May, Weather: Rain and cool. Command of this Div area turned over 52 (L.) Inf Div.

Thus, six years and nine months after Canada had declared war, and two years almost to the day after D Day, Canadian troops withdrew from the soil of a defeated Germany. 2

83. This report was prepared by Major C.E. Brissette, E.D., C.I.C.

*G. A. L. Nicholson Major*  
for (C.P. Stacey) Colonel  
D.D. Hist Sec  
CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS



APPENDIX "A"

TEXT OF MESSAGE DEFENSOR TO CANMILITRY 22 DEC 44

(C.M.H.Q. file 1/Occup Gp/1, fol 1)

GSO 894  
TOP SECRET

NO CIRCULATION

MONTAGUE FROM MURCHIE

PARA I ON 11 DEC GOVERNMENT APPROVED FOLLOWING POLICY OUTLINED PARAS TWO THREE AND FOUR AS BASIS FOR CDN ARMY PARTICIPATION ARMY OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY DURING STAGE TWO WHICH IS THE ADJUSTMENT AND DISARMAMENT PERIOD WHERE THE TROOPS WHO TOOK PART IN THE ATTACK ON GERMANY ARE RELIEVED BY ARMY OF OCCUPATION.

PARA II THE CDN FORCE TO COMPRISE ONE OCCUPATIONAL GROUP ORGANIZED AS AN INFANTRY FORMATION OF APPROXIMATELY 25,000 MEN. THIS WILL BE ORGANIZED AROUND A DIVISION TO PROVIDE A SELF ADMINSTRATING UNIT. THE DIVISION TO PROVIDE FRAMEWORK OF THIS FORCE IS TO BE SELECTED BY ARMY COMMANDER WITH SUCH SUBSTITUTION OF SELECTED UNITS AS MAY BE REQUIRED TO ENSURE COUNTRY WIDE REPRESENTATION.

PARA III THIS FORCE WILL FORM PART OF THE TROOPS REQUIRED FOR BRITISH ZONE OF OCCUPATION IN GERMANY.

PARA IV PERSONNEL FOR CANADIAN FORCE WILL BE FOUND (A) FROM SUITABLE PERSONNEL EXPRESSING A PREFERENCE TO UNDERTAKE THIS DUTY AND WHO ARE WILLING TO FOREGO THEIR PRIORITY OF DEMOBILIZATION AND (B) BY DETAILING IF NECESSARY THOSE WITH LOW PRIORITY OF DEMOBILIZATION.

THE SELECTION AND REALLOCATION OF PERSONNEL TO COMPRISE THIS FORCE WILL TAKE PLACE OVERSEAS ALTHOUGH PROVISION WILL BE MADE (IF NECESSARY) FOR VOLUNTEERS FROM CANADA.

PARA V LENGTH OF TIME FOR WHICH THIS FORCE WILL BE MADE AVAILABLE STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION.

PARA VI THE FOREGOING IS FORWARDED FOR YOUR ADVANCE INFORMATION ONLY AND PENDING ACTION BY CANADA TO INFORM UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT.

PARA VII REQUEST THAT FOREGOING SHOULD BE COMMUNICATED TO THE ARMY COMMANDER FOR HIS INFORMATION.



APPENDIX "B"

LETTER TO UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE (U.K.) FROM CHIEF OF STAFF,  
C.M.H.Q.

(C.M.H.Q. file 1/Occup Gp/1 (DCGS) fol 22)

12 Jan 45

TOP SECRET

The Under Secretary of State,  
The War Office,  
Whitehall, S.W.1

OCCUPATION OF GERMANY

1. The Canadian Government have now communicated to the Dominions Office a statement of their policy of participating in the occupation of Germany after that country has been defeated.
2. The Canadian Force will consist of one Occupational Group, organized as an Infantry formation of approximately 25,000 men. It will be organized on the framework of a division so as to be a self-administering formation. This force will form part of the troops required for the British Zone of Occupation in Germany.
3. The personnel for this force will be found as follows:
  - (a) From suitable personnel who express a preference to undertake this duty and who are willing to forego their priority of demobilization.
  - (b) By detailing, if necessary, officers and men with a low priority of demobilization.
4. The division which will provide the framework of the force is to be selected by the Army Commander, but with such substitution of selected units from other formations as may be necessary to ensure Dominion-wide representation. The selection and reallocation of personnel for the force will take place overseas, but provision will be made, if necessary, for volunteers from Canada.
5. Having in mind the fact that a noticeable number of Canadian troops are now in their sixth year of service overseas, and that a considerable portion have now served three years or more abroad, the Canadian Government hold the view that upon the cessation of hostilities with Germany, Canadian forces should be repatriated from the European theatres as quickly as circumstances will permit. At this stage, therefore, they feel unable definitely to undertake to furnish occupational forces for the whole period of military control in Germany. They propose, therefore, to review the present decision towards the end of the next fiscal year, i.e. prior to 31 Mar 46. They hope by then that it may be possible better to assess the length of the period of full military control of Germany, the strength of the occupational forces which can be provided by our European allies and the requirements of the Japanese war in manpower and shipping.

(Sgnd) (P.J. Montague) Lieut-Gen.,  
Chief of Staff,  
CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS



APPENDIX "C"

TEXT OF MESSAGE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA TO DOMINION OFFICE

(C.M.H.Q. file 1/Occup Gp/1 (DCGS) fols 19 & 20)

FROM: CANADA (GOVT)

TO: D.O.

NO. 9 TOP SECRET

9 Jan 45

We have given a good deal of consideration to the question of the provision of Canadian forces for occupational duty in Germany after the defeat of that country has been achieved. You will recall that this matter has been referred to in several teleggrams between us during the last 18 months. It was also discussed with Mr. Churchill and the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff on the occasion of the Quebec Conference last September. There has been further consultation through service channels. The particular matter of the possible use of Canadian troops for temporary occupation in Austria and North-east Italy was recently dealt with in an interchange of teleggrams with you teleggram No. 207 29th November.

2. We have now decided to provide, for a period yet to be determined, one army occupational group of approximately 25,000 all ranks for duty within the British zone of occupation in Germany, and 11 R.C.A.F. squadrons to be stationed partly in Germany and partly in the United Kingdom. Both the War Office and the Air Ministry have been advised to this effect through service channels, and further details of our undertaking under this head can continue to be worked out in this way. There are, however, some overall considerations of policy which we feel should be communicated inter-governmentally.

3. We hold most firmly to the view that, upon cessation of hostilities with Germany, Canadian forces should be repatriated from the European theatres as quickly as circumstances will permit. A noticeable number of our troops are now in their sixth year of service overseas. A considerable proportion have now served 3 years abroad. In any event the average length of overseas service of Canadian forces must be considerably higher than that of the United States forces. Consequently when fighting against Germany has ended there will be a natural and insistent demand here in Canada, as well as amongst our troops abroad, that they should be brought home in the shortest possible time and certainly with no less despatch than that with which American forces will be returned to the United States.

4. We are well aware that the difficult problem of sea transportation will continue for a considerable time after the defeat of Germany and that the early repatriation of all our forces, no matter how much this will be desired, will not be possible of achievement. Nevertheless, we must say that it would be both unwise on our part and misleading to you were we, at this stage, definitely to undertake to furnish occupational forces for the whole period of military control in Germany.

5. In these circumstances we take the view that our present decision should be reviewed towards the end of the next fiscal year, i.e., prior to 31st March 1946. By that time much that now is hypothetical should be clearer. We should by then be better able to assess the length of the period of full military control of Germany, the strength of occupational forces which can be provided by our European allies, and the requirements of the Japanese war in manpower and shipping. It is uncertain moreover for how long after the fighting ends it will be politically possible to provide Canadian occupation forces in view of the fact that the plans for the control of Germany give the Canadian Government no voice in the direction of policy.



## APPENDIX "D"

ORDER OF BATTLE - 3 Cdn Inf Div C.O.F.

(W.D., H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Div (C.A.O.F.), July 1945: Appx 25)

Appx 'A' to  
201/0 of B/1 G  
dated 14 Jul 45

### PART I (Div Element)

#### HEADQUARTERS UNITS

H.Q. 3 Cdn Inf Div C.O.F.  
1 Increment (A) - Adm  
2 Increment (D) - PT  
3 Increment ( ) - Occupation

#### ARMoured CORPS

2/7 Cdn Recce Regt C.O.F.

#### ARTILLERY

H.Q. R.C.A., 3 Cdn Inf Div C.O.F.  
2/12 Cdn Fd Regt C.O.F.

H.Q. 2/12 Cdn Fd Regt C.O.F.  
2/16 Cdn Fd Bty C.O.F.  
2/11 Cdn Fd Bty C.O.F.  
2/43 Cdn Fd Bty C.O.F.

2/13 Cdn Fd Regt C.O.F.

H.Q. 2/13 Cdn Fd Regt C.O.F.  
2/44 Cdn Fd Bty C.O.F.  
2/22 Cdn Fd Bty C.O.F.  
2/78 Cdn Fd Bty C.O.F.

2/14 Cdn Fd Regt C.O.F.

H.Q. 2/14 Cdn Fd Regt C.O.F.  
2/34 Cdn Fd Bty C.O.F.  
2/66 Cdn Fd Bty C.O.F.  
2/87 Cdn Fd Bty C.O.F.

2/3 Cdn A. Tk Regt C.O.F.

H.Q. 2/3 Cdn A. Tk Regt C.O.F.  
2/4 Cdn A. Tk Bty C.O.F.  
2/94 Cdn A. Tk Bty C.O.F.  
2/52 Cdn A. Tk Bty C.O.F.  
2/105 Cdn A. Tk Bty C.O.F.

2/4 Cdn L.A.A. Regt C.O.F.

H.Q. 2/4 Cdn L.A.A. Regt C.O.F.  
2/69 Cdn L.A.A. Bty C.O.F.  
2/32 Cdn L.A.A. Bty C.O.F.  
2/100 Cdn L.A.A. Bty C.O.F.

#### ENGINEERS

H.Q. R.C.E., 3 Cdn Inf Div C.O.F.

2/3 Cdn Fd Pk Coy C.O.F.  
2/3 Cdn Div Br Pl C.O.F.  
2/6 Cdn Fd Coy C.O.F.  
2/16 Cdn Fd Coy C.O.F.  
2/18 Cdn Fd Coy C.O.F.

#### SIGNALS

Sigs 3 Cdn Inf Div C.O.F.



PART I (Div Element) Cont'd

INFANTRY

- 3 C.H. of O (M.G.) C.O.F.  
Increment (A)
- 2/3 Cdn Def and Emp Pl C.O.F.
- H.Q. 2/7 Cdn Inf Bde C.O.F.
- 2/7 Cdn Inf Bde Ground Def Pl C.O.F.
- 4 R. Wpg R. C.O.F.
- 4 Regina Rif C.O.F.
- 4 Q.O.R. of C. C.O.F.
- H.Q. 2/8 Cdn Inf Bde C.O.F.
- 2/8 Cdn Inf Bde Ground Def Pl C.O.F.
- 4 C. Scot R. C.O.F.
- 3 R. de Chaud C.O.F.
- 3 N. Shore R. C.O.F.
- H.Q. 2/9 Cdn Inf Bde C.O.F.
- 2/9 Cdn Inf Bde Ground Def Pl C.O.F.
- 3 H.L.I. of C. C.O.F.
- 3 S.D. & G. Highrs C.O.F.
- 3 Nth N.S. Highrs C.O.F.

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT

- H.Q. R.C.A.S.C. 3 Cdn Inf Div C.O.F.
- 2/7 Cdn Inf Bde Coy C.O.F.
- 2/8 Cdn Inf Bde Coy C.O.F.
- 2/9 Cdn Inf Bde Coy C.O.F.
- 2/3 Cdn Inf Div Tps Coy C.O.F.

MEDICAL

- 2/5 Cdn F.D.S. C.O.F.
- 2/7 Cdn F.D.S. C.O.F.
- 6 Cdn F.D.S. C.O.F.
- 10 Cdn F.D.S. C.O.F.
- 2/7 Cdn Fd Hyg Soc C.O.F.

ORDNANCE

- 2/3 Cdn Inf Div Ord Fd Pk C.O.F.
- 1 Cdn Offrs Shop (Mob) C.O.F.

ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL  
ENGINEERS

- H.Q. R.C.E.M.E. 3 Cdn Inf Div C.O.F.
- 2/7 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp C.O.F.
- 2/8 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp C.O.F.
- 2/9 Cdn Inf Bde Wksp C.O.F.
- 2/62 CDN L.A.D. (A) (7 Cdn Recce Regt C.O.F.)
- 2/32 Cdn L.A.D. (B) (Arty Units C.O.F.)
- 2/33 Cdn L.A.D. (B)
- 2/30 Cdn L.A.D. (B) (2/3 Cdn Fd Pk Coy C.O.F.)
- 2/31 Cdn L.A.D. (B) (Sigs C.O.F.)
- 2/36 Cdn L.A.D. (A) (2/7 Cdn Inf Bde C.O.F.)
- 2/37 Cdn L.A.D. (A) (2/8 Cdn Inf Bde C.O.F.)
- 2/38 Cdn L.A.D. (A) (2/9 Cdn Inf Bde C.O.F.)

POSTAL

- 2/3 Cdn Inf Div Postal Unit C.O.F.
- Increment (A)
- Increment (A) two

PROVOST

- 2/4 Cdn Pro Coy C.O.F.



PART I (Div Element) Cont'd)

INTELLIGENCE

3 Cdn F.S. Sec Incl Incr (A)	)	
2 Cdn F.S. Sec Incl Incr (A)	)	
4 Cdn F.S. Sec Incl Incr (A)	)	
1 Cdn Area Security Office	)	under comd
2 Cdn Area Security Office	)	for local
3 Cdn Area Security Office	)	adm only
1 Cdn A.R.I.T.	)	
20 Cdn F.S. Sec	)	
Cdn G.S.I. (b) Det	)	

PART II (Brit Fmns and Units Under Comd)

4 Brit A.G.R.A.

3 Mod Regt R.A.  
 13 Mod Regt R.A.  
 65 Mod Regt R.A.  
 68 Mod Regt R.A.  
 79 (Scottish Horse) Mod Regt R.A.  
 51 Hy Regt R.A.  
 356 Indop S.L. Bty R.A.  
 400 Indop S.L. Bty R.A.  
 4 L.A.A. S.L. Bty R.A.  
 4 A.G.R.A. Wksp R.E.M.E.

31 Brit A.A. Bde

64 H.A.A. Regt R.A.  
 98 H.A.A. Regt R.A.  
 174 H.A.A. Regt R.A.  
 102 L.A.A. Regt R.A.  
 105 A.A. Bde Wksp R.E.M.E.

301 Brit Inf Bde

616 Regt R.A.  
 617 Regt R.A.  
 619 Regt R.A.  
 301 Brit Inf Bde Sigs Sec  
 301 Brit Inf Bde L.A.D. (A)

305 Brit Inf Bde

639 H.A.A. Regt R.A.	}	under comd 30 Brit Corps for Adm
7 Belg Fus Bn		
9 Belg Fus Bn		
80 L.A.A. Wksp R.E.M.E.		
305 L.A.D. R.E.M.E.		
220 B.I.S.		
645 Coy R.A.S.C.		

557 S.L. Bty R.A.(M.L.)

101 Control Sec

PART III (Corps, Army G.H.Q. and L. of C. Increments to the Div Element)

ENGINEERS

1 Cdn C.R.E. Wks C.O.F.  
 1 Cdn Wks Sec C.O.F.  
 2 Cdn Wks Sec C.O.F.  
 3 Cdn Wks Sec C.O.F.  
 1 Cdn Engrs Stores Pl C.O.F.



PART III (Corps, Army, G.H.Q. and L. of C. Increments to the Div Element) (Cont'd)

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT

2 Cdn M.A.C. C.O.F.  
3 Cdn Inf Div Sec (Army Catering Pool) C.O.F.  
5 Base Tpt Pl C.O.F.

MEDICAL

7 Cdn Gen Hosp  
16 Cdn Gen Hosp  
50 Brit F.D.S.

ORDNANCE

2/203 Cdn Inf Ord Sub Pk C.O.F.  
3 Cdn M.L.B.U. (A) C.O.F.  
7 Cdn M.L.B.U. (B) C.O.F.  
1 Cdn Sal Unit C.O.F.  
1 Cdn Fwd Maint Stores Sec C.O.F.  
2 Cdn Fwd Maint Stores Sec C.O.F.

ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL  
ENGINEERS

2/3 Cdn Inf Tps Wksp C.O.F.

PAY

3 Cdn Fd Cash Office C.O.F.

DENTAL

5 Cdn Dental Coy C.O.F.

MISCELLANEOUS

6 Cdn Aux Services Sec (C) C.O.F.  
6 Cdn Fd Edn Sec (B) C.O.F.  
3 Div Det 1 Cdn Fd Historical Sec C.O.F.  
1 C.I.C. Band C.O.F.  
2 C.I.C. Band C.O.F.  
3 C.I.C. Band C.O.F.  
4 C.I.C. Band C.O.F.  
3 Cdn Inf Div Reception Camp C.O.F.

PART IV (Miscellaneous under comd)

B Flt 661 Air O.P. Sqn

1 Cdn Town Major  
2 Cdn Town Major  
3 Cdn Town Major  
4 Cdn Town Major  
5 Cdn Town Major

6 D.C.U.  
8 D.C.U.  
9 D.C.U.



APPENDIX "E"

TEXT OF MESSAGE RE WITHDRAWAL OF C.A.O.F.

(C.M.H.Q. file 1/Occup Gp/1, fol 216)

CGS 400

UNCLASSIFIED

MONTAGUE FROM MURCHIE

YOUR COS 728 AND LETTER REFERRED TO IN PARA TWO THEREOF.

PARA ONE. FOLLOWING PRESS STATEMENT WILL BE RELEASED AT 1000 HRS EDT REPEAT 1000 HOURS FRIDAY 10 AUG 45.

BEGINS:- FURTHER INFORMATION RESPECTING THE REPATRIATION FROM OVERSEAS OF CANADIAN ARMY PERSONNEL AND THE TERMS OF SERVICE OF PERSONNEL WITH THE CANADIAN ARMY OCCUPATION FORCE IS CARRIED IN THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE. THE REPATRIATION OF CANADIAN PERSONNEL FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM AND EUROPE IS PROCEEDING AS RAPIDLY AS SHIPPING CAN BE SECURED. UP TO 31 JULY 1945 SINCE VE DAY ABOUT 70000 SERVICE PERSONNEL HAVE REACHED CANADA OF WHICH ABOUT 49700 ARE ARMY. THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR AUGUST CONTEMPLATE A TOTAL SERVICE QUOTA OF SOME 34000 OF WHICH THE GREATER MAJORITY HAVE BEEN ALLOCATED TO THE CANADIAN ARMY. THE ONLY CANADIAN COMMITMENT IN THE EUROPEAN THEATRE IS IN RELATION TO THE CANADIAN ARMY AND AIR FORCE CONTINGENTS WHICH IT HAS BEEN AGREED WILL BE PROVIDED FOR THE PRESENT PHASE OF THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY. THE ARMY CONTINGENT IN THIS FORCE COMPRISES THE RECONSTITUTED 3RD CANADIAN DIVISION AND CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE AND L OF C UNITS TALLING ABOUT 25000 ALL RANKS. APART FROM KEY PERSONNEL WHO HAVE NECESSARILY HAD TO BE RETAINED THE UNITS HAVE BEEN RECONSTITUTED FROM PERSONNEL WHO HAVE ELECTED TO SERVE WITH THE CAO F AND OTHERS DETAILED FROM INDIVIDUALS WITH LOW PRIORITY POINT SCORES FOR DEMOBILIZATION. CANADIAN OCCUPATION FORCES WILL SERVE FOR A LIMITED PERIOD ONLY AND INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF THESE FORCES WILL NOT IN ANY EVENT BE REQUIRED TO SERVE ON SUCH DUTY FOR LONGER THAN TWO YEARS. AS SHIPPING BECOMES AVAILABLE IT IS INTENDED TO PROCEED WITH THE REPLACEMENT OF ALL INDIVIDUALS



WHO HAVE ELECTED TO SERVE IN THE CAOF. THE FIRST OBJECTIVE IN RESPECT TO LEAVE WILL BE TO ENSURE THAT ALL PERSONNEL WHO HAVE BEEN AWAY FROM CANADA FOR MORE THAN TWO YEARS WILL BE GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO RETURN FOR THIRTY CLEAR DAYS OF LEAVE AT THEIR HOMES. PERSONNEL SERVING WITH THE OCCUPATION FORCE CONTINUE TO ENJOY INCOME TAX EXEMPTIONS AND ALL POST-DISCHARGE BENEFITS UNDER THE WAR SERVICE GRANTS ACT 1944 AND ALL OTHER REHABILITATION BENEFITS AND PRIVILEGES WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE TO THOSE RETURNING TO CANADA FOR DEMOBILIZATION. -- ENDS

PARA TWO. PLEASE INFORM HIGH COMMISSIONERS OFFICE

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APPENDIX "F"

TEXT OF MESSAGE RE WITHDRAWAL OF C.A.O.F. 15 FEB 45

(C.M.H.Q. file 111/Orders Gen/6, fol 46)

FROM - G 3 CDN INF DIV CAOF 151955A 15 FEB 46  
TO - 1 CDN CRE WKS CAOF - RCASC 3 CDN INF DIV CAOF -  
2/3 CDN INF DIV POSTAL UNIT CAOF - 5 CDN DENTAL  
COY CAOF - COMD ADM GP - 2 AREA SECURITY OFFICE -  
2 CDN FS SEC CAOF - AUX SERVICES - PMCT -  
OIC 2 ECH HQ CAOF

BT

GS 364 (.) THE FOLLOWING IS PROPOSED TEXT OF STATEMENT OF  
PRIME MINISTER ON WITHDRAWAL OF CAOF (.) NOTE THERE MAY STILL  
BE AMENDMENTS TO TEXT (.) TEXT BEGINS (.) THE P R I M E  
M I N I S T E R M R M A C K E N Z I E K I N G ANNOUNCED  
TODAY THAT THE WITHDRAWAL FROM GERMANY OF THE C D N TPS  
IN THE OCCUPATION ARMY WOULD BEGIN EARLY IN APR AND THAT WITH  
PRESENT SHIPPING FORECAST ALL TPS NOW IN GERMANY SHOULD BE  
BACK IN C D A BY SEP OR OCT (.) IN MAKING THE ANNOUNCEMENT  
MR K I N G RECALLED A STATEMENT HE HAD MADE IN THE HOUSE  
OF COMMONS ON APR 4 OF LAST YEAR IN WHICH HE INDICATED THAT  
FROM TIME TO TIME AS CONSIDERATIONS OF SAFETY AND SECURITY  
PERMITTED REDUCTIONS WOULD BE MADE IN THE SIZE OF THE OCCUPATION  
FORCES (.) AT THE OUTSET C D N PARTICIPATION IN THE  
OCCUPATION OF GERMANY WAS A NATURAL DEVELOPMENT FROM OUR  
PARTICIPATION IN THE MIL OPS IN NORTHWEST EUROPE (.) UNLIKE  
THE UNITED KINGDOM THE UNITED STATES THE SOVIET UNION AND  
FRANCE C D A IS NOT (NOT) ONE OF THE OCCUPYING POWERS AND  
IS N O T A MEMBER OF THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION (.) THE  
C D N CONTINGENT HAS CONSISTED ONLY OF ONE DIV WITH ANCILLARY  
TPS IN THE B R I T OCCUPATIONAL ZONE (.) CERTAIN OF THE  
OTHER EUROPEAN ALLIES WHICH WERE NOT (NOT) IN A POSITION TO  
SUP CONTINGENTS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE OCCUPATION ARE NOW  
BECOMING INCREASINGLY ABLE TO SHARE IN OCCUPATION DUTIES (.)



NOW THAT THE GREATER PART OF THE C D N ARMY HAS BEEN  
REPATRIATED THE MAINT OF A SMALL OCCUPATION FORCE THOUSANDS  
OF MILES FROM HOME HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT (.)  
ASIDE FROM GRAVE DIFFICULTIES IN CERTAIN ASPECTS OF ADM AND  
THE OVERHEAD REQUIRED TO PROVIDE HQ SERVICES AMENITIES ETC  
FOR THE C D N FORCE IS INEVITABLY QUITE OUT OF PROPORTION  
TO ITS SIZE (.) AS HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED ONE SQN  
OF THE RCAF WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE OCCUPATION FORCE AT THE  
END OF MAR 46 AND THE REMAINING SQNS WILL BE WITHDRAWN ON  
30 JUN (.) AS A RESULT OF NEGOTIATIONS NOW IN PROGRESS  
REMAINING SQNS MAY BE WITHDRAWN AT AN EARLIER DATE (.)  
ENDS (.) ALL INFM

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## APPENDIX "G"

### REFERENCES

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Cabinet Office file, 21 A. Gp/0/572/Ops (B), Box 73, file No. 433

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## LEGEND

- ZONE BOUNDARIES
- INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
- PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES
- U.S. ENCLAVE BOUNDARY
- C.A.O.F. AREA BOUNDARY

# BRITISH OCCUPATIONAL ZONE OF GERMANY (AS AT 21 NOV 45)

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 MILES

## RUSSIAN ZONE

POSEN

STENDAL

BRANDENBURG

FRANKFURT

C.A.O.F.  
AREA

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 MILES

