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National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

July 1986

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HISTORICAL SECTION

CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

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Authority: DHD 3-3
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Date: NOV 26 1986

CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN CIVIL AFFAIRS/
MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

PART V: GERMANY, GENERAL HISTORICAL SURVEY.

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MAP

BRITISH OCCUPATIONAL ZONE IN GERMANY AS AT 21 NOV 45

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REPORT NO. 176

DECLASSIFIED

HISTORICAL SECTION

Authority: DHD 3-3
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NOV 26 1986

19 Jun 47

Canadian Participation in Civil
Affairs/Military Government.
Part V: Germany, General Historical
Survey.

1. This is the fifth and final report on the Canadian contribution to Civil Affairs/Military Government. Previous reports have been:

- (a) Report No. 140: Part I: Background and Beginnings;
- (b) Report No. 148: Part II: Planning and Training;
- (c) Report No. 149: Part III: France, General Historical Survey, July-October 1944;
- (d) Report No. 172: Part IV: Belgium and the Netherlands, General Historical Survey.

An additional report was prepared by the Historical Officer (Civil Affairs) from information available at Army Headquarters, Ottawa, and was distributed as Report No. 9 of the Historical Section, Army Headquarters, on 8 Oct 46.

2. When it is desired to coordinate the history of the Canadian contribution to Civil Affairs, it is suggested that the Official Historian should refer not only to the reports listed above but also to Report No. 174, "The Canadian Army Occupation Force in Germany, May 1945 - June 1946". Reference should also be made to any history or reports prepared by 30 British Corps or by the Control Commission, since the responsibility for Military Government was handed over by 2 Cdn Corps to the British Corps and one eventually merged in the other; a considerable number of Canadian officers were made available to the Control Commission for Military Government duties with the Control Commission (see Report No. 9, Historical Section, Army Headquarters).

3. The story of Canadian participation in the Military Government of Germany is an unfinished story. It stops abruptly when, on 14 Jun 45, 2 Cdn Corps handed over to 30 Brit Corps the responsibility for the area which they had occupied since the cessation of hostilities.

4. When an area in Germany was first occupied, there was a deceptive simplicity to the administrative problems facing the occupying force. There was usually a certain amount of money in the coffers of the administration, a certain amount of food at or near the local market and a small stock of essential consumer goods readily available. Such was the experience of 2 Cdn Corps as with most of the formations of the Allied Expeditionary Force. 2 Cdn Corps, however, unlike most of the other Allied formations, was withdrawn before the true picture of life in conquered Germany had been revealed.

5. Occupation was synonymous with a drastic curtailment in road and rail transport which was due in part to necessary Military Government restrictions but which nevertheless resulted in considerable administrative difficulties. After

a short time it was found in nearly every case that the administrative machinery had been severely dislocated by the evacuation or suspension of its more compromised elements. An immediate problem was the threat to public safety which resulted from tens of thousands of Displaced Persons being suddenly set free and roaming the countryside. This problem was encountered and dealt with by the Military Government Staff of 2 Cdn Corps during their period of responsibility. The other problems - labour and food shortages, fuel and housing shortages, etc. - had not become critical until 2 Cdn Corps had been withdrawn from the area.

ORGANIZATION

6. In order to enforce the terms of surrender which will ultimately be presented to Germany, it has been agreed by the Governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom (acting also on behalf of the Dominions) that Germany shall be occupied by the forces of the Three Powers.

The code word "ECLIPSE" is defined as "Plans and preparations for the operation of occupying Germany".

The above quotation comes from the Preface to the "ECLIPSE" Pamphlets issued by 21 Army Group in January 1945 (Hist Sec file, AEF 45/21 Army Gp/C/I, Docket IV).

7. At that time the process of occupation had already begun in the course of operations, and the policies, which were designed to be followed in the post-surrender period, were already applicable in many cases.

8. The pamphlets were intended to provide formation commanders and their staffs as well as unit commanders with the necessary information as regards the policy, their operational tasks and their responsibilities, while under command of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force. The first two pamphlets dealt with the general background and gave an outline of the tasks to be carried out in Germany; the remaining twelve pamphlets deal in more detail with specific aspects of the occupation, and Pamphlet 10 deals with Military Government. In it Military Government is defined as:

That form of government which is established and maintained by a belligerent by force of arms over occupied territory and over the inhabitants thereof. It not only operates during the period before organised resistance has ceased, but also the post-hostilities period during which the victorious armies may occupy the entire territory of the defeated state. It remains in effect until a treaty of peace has been signed and ratified, and it is possible that this treaty may provide for the continuance of the occupation in a modified form.


9. The "ECLIPSE" Pamphlets formed the basis of First Canadian Army Military Government Instruction No. I, which was distributed down to Divisional Headquarters on 25 Jan 45, and was superseded by a revised edition on 9 Apr 45 (W.D., C.A., First Cdn Army, April 1945: Appx 30). The primary object of this instruction was "to provide Commanders and Staffs with basic information as to the organization of

Military Government, and the principle responsibilities of Commanders and Staffs at all levels" (Ibid). This instruction was based on policy directives for Allied Commanders-in-Chief, which had been issued in October 1944, reviewed in the light of subsequent amendments, and was to be read in conjunction with the "ECLIPSE" Pamphlets to which it made repeated references.

10. Both these publications - the "ECLIPSE" Pamphlets and First Canadian Army Military Government Instruction No. I - were of a general rather than a technical nature. Innumerable pamphlets, handbooks and instructions had from time to time been issued by Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, through Military Government channels and these were coordinated by the staff at Headquarters First Canadian Army and as "Functional Instructions for Military Government Officers, First Canadian Army" were issued to Detachment Commanders and specialist officers (Ibid: April 1945, Appx 39; May 1945, Appendices 1, 6, 7, 12 et al).

11. In preparation for the added responsibilities which the Civil Affairs staff would have to assume for Military Government in Germany an increased War Establishment was authorized in the winter of 1944-45 (WE Cdn III/4F/3). By the beginning of May 1945 42 officers held appointments as compared with the total of 16 who had formed the Civil Affairs Staff some nine months before (Ibid: May 1945, Appx 21; August 1944, Appx 10).

12. The increased staff was organized into two main sections - Executive and Administrative - and each section was divided into sub-sections and made responsible for specific functions. The organization of the staff - which, with the change over from Civil Affairs to Military Government, had ceased to rank as a Service and had become a Branch of the Staff - and the "Distribution of Duties" as at 1 Apr 45 was as follows:



(Ibid: April 1945, Appx I)

13. Canadian participation in the Military Government of Germany began in the middle of February 1945, following Operation "VERITABLE" (Hist Sec Report No. 155) and ended

on 14 Jun 45 when responsibility for the area occupied by 2 Cdn Corps was handed over to Headquarters 30 Brit Corps (W.D., C.A., First Cdn Army, June 1945: Appendices 4 and 8).

14. During these four months, Headquarters First Canadian Army was located in the Netherlands and the Civil Affairs/Military Government staff were simultaneously engaged with Civil Affairs in the B-1, C, and B-2 areas and with Military Government in Germany. Although 2 Cdn Corps was the formation directly concerned with Military Government, many of the problems encountered were beyond the scope of a corps staff and these problems therefore became the responsibility of the staff at Army Headquarters.

15. The objects of Military Government in Germany were:

- (a) to impose the will of the Allies upon occupied Germany;
- (b) to care for, control, and repatriate United Nations Displaced Persons;
- (c) to eliminate Nazism;
- (d) to restore and maintain law and order;
- (e) to protect United Nations property and to assume control of Nazi property;
- (f) to establish a suitable civil administration;
- (g) to apprehend war criminals.

(Hist Sec file AEF 45/
21. Army Gp/C/I, Docket IV)

16. Military Government had two things in common with Civil Affairs. It dealt with civilians and its basic organization centred upon the basic detachment with specialized increment officers attached. The similarity ends there because Military Government was designed to govern, whereas Civil Affairs sought and gave cooperation with Allied Civil Administrations in the Military interest.

17. Although it was the aim of Military Government to govern the German people, it was intended that government should be indirect by selecting a suitable German civil administration and by supervision and control of its activities at various levels.

18. The civil administration in Germany was organized into a number of divisions corresponding roughly to the provincial and local administration of Canada. The lowest level was the Gemeinde (or parish) of which any number up to 150 formed a Landkreis (or rural county). The larger towns had also the status of counties (Stadtkreis). The next level was the Regierungsbezirk, which consisted of a group of Landkreis/Stadtkreis (see note), while the Regierungsbezirk were grouped together to form Provinces. (German Basic Handbook, Part II)

19. In order to conform to the civil administration different types of detachments were formed:

- (a) "K" Detachments to control Landkreis/Stadtkreis administration;

- (b) "L/R" Detachments to control the administration of Land/Regierungsbezirk;
- (c) "P" Detachments to supervise the administration at Provincial level.

In addition there were "R" detachments to deal with Displaced Persons and refugees, "C" detachments to move forward with Corps (as they had done through France, Belgium and the Netherlands) and Court detachments to deal with the higher Military Government Courts and Prisons (Hist Sec file, AEF 45/Second Army/C/D, Docket I, Chap VII).

GERMAN CIVILIAN POPULATION

20. The German population proved extremely docile throughout the campaign (W.D., C.A., First Cdn Army, April 1945: Appx 29) and there was "no outward show of feeling except indifference towards Allied soldiers" (Ibid, May 1945; Appx 2). It was only when hostilities had ceased that Prussian traits in the character of the people began to reappear. On 15 May 45, Brigadier Wedd wrote:

In all places the German population continues to be relatively orderly and obedient. It is noticeable however that there is a great tendency to place the blame on the Nazi Party, and not, in fact, acknowledge any part of the blame themselves. There is also a noticeable difference in the attitude of the people in the areas which were not fought over, as compared to that in the more rural areas from which the enemy army was driven. This is particularly noticeable in the city of OLDENBURG which has not even experienced air bombardment, and in some cases, the attitude tends to border on arrogance.

(Ibid, May 1945: Appx 20)

POLICE AND PUBLIC SAFETY

21. In the area west of the Rhine the country had been so depopulated and the fighting so severe that no police were found and the comparatively few civilians encountered proved to be cowed and law-abiding (Weekly Reports attached as appendices to War Diaries, Mil Gov First Cdn Army for February and March 1945). A similar situation was met when, at the beginning of April, 4 Cdn Armd Div entered German territory from North-East Holland (Ibid, April 1945, Appendices 29, 41, and May 1945, Appx 2).

22. It was not until the week preceding the surrender, by which time the greatest part of what was to form the 2 Cdn Corps area had been occupied, that the Military Government detachments encountered anything like normal conditions. The report for the period 29 Apr - 5 May 45 states:

The police situation is fairly satisfactory, the numbers found being in most places sufficient to carry out their normal duties, and it has only been necessary to appoint auxiliary police in a few places. Difficulties arise, however, through the local police not being able to exercise control over Displaced Persons and prisoners of war, and also over our own troops...

The German population remains docile, obedient and somewhat fearful. Military Government is accepted as their new master and in certain cases officials have even stated that Military Government is welcome, although, of course, this may be an attempt to gain favour. At any rate, they regard Military Government as a protector, for complaints of looting and rape are quickly reported to detachments, with the plea for protection against roving bands of displaced persons, prisoners of war, etc. They particularly show an obvious fear of Russians and Poles.

(Ibid, May 1945: Appx 19)

23. Following the cessation of hostilities, the "carpet" of Military Government detachments moved in to take over responsibility at their respective levels. They found that the police forces had remained "almost entirely intact" (Ibid, Appx 20), and the vetting of the police, undertaken in order to purge those who had been active Nazis, was completed by 26 May (Ibid, Appx 16). At that time the newly appointed senior officials, having accepted their responsibilities, were reported as "working very hard to prove satisfactory to Military Government" (Ibid).

24. Although the Germans are characteristically amenable to discipline, there can be no doubt that the speed and rigour with which offences against Military Government proclamations and enactments were dealt with by the Military Government Courts acted as a deterrent and contributed to the remarkably low incidence of crime.

25. The first Summary Court was established at Meppen on 20 Apr 45 (W.D., C.A. First Cdn Army, May 1945: Appx 2). It was later transferred to Oldenburg (Ibid, Appx 20) and dealt with "few and minor offences" (Ibid). After the surrender Summary Courts were established at five centres. The procedure followed was to send a legal team consisting of a legal officer, a clerk and an interpreter to the detachments to conduct the court (Ibid, Appx 13). This itinerant court dealt with 42 cases during the first week. Four cases involving illegal retention of firearms were referred to an Intermediate Court which was set up at Oldenburg. All the other offenders received prison sentences except for one who was awarded a fine of 200 Reichmarks (Ibid, Appx 16). The most serious offences committed were illegal retention of firearms. Ten such cases are recorded and the sentences varied from two years' imprisonment to death in two cases. Of the two death sentences one was commuted to 15 years' imprisonment on review, while the other was confirmed (Ibid, June 1945: Appx 2).

26. The main threat to law and order came from the Displaced Persons, who, once they had been liberated, roamed the countryside committing every conceivable crime, including murder (Ibid, May 1945: Appendices 13 and 16). At first these "minor disturbances" were quickly and easily dealt with (Ibid, April 1945: Appx 41), but in the period of confusion immediately preceding and following the cessation of hostilities they proved quite uncontrollable. The German police, being unarmed, were in no position to deal with them, and it was not until the stragglers were collected and put into camps by nationalities that any measure of control was achieved (Ibid, May 1945: Appx 13). Even then, bands of armed Russians would loot and pillage the surrounding countryside. A solution, which was

partially successful, was provided by arranging for small detachments from adjacent units to patrol the roads and streets in the neighbourhood of the camps. This led inevitably to clashes between our troops and the Russians. On one occasion, the local commander, exasperated by the fact that his patrols had been forced to arrest 30 Russian Displaced Persons in one night and fearful of the effect that his obvious lack of control might have on the civilian population, threatened to search the camp and disarm the inmates (W.D., C.A., 2 Cdn Corps, 3 Jun 45). The seriousness of the situation is reflected in the following extract from the Military Government report for the period 20-26 May 45:

The problem of proper discipline in Displaced Persons Camps and particularly those containing Russians is causing some concern, as while these citizens may be kept more or less in order during the daytime, there are many complaints of bands of marauders raiding farms, etc, by night. Patrols have been carried out by units of nearby formations, and marauders have been apparently all armed with some sort of weapon, particularly sawed-off rifles and found with various items of loot, chiefly food. The Russian officers in charge of the camps are being urged to take strong disciplinary action, but so far without much success insofar as strong measures are concerned.

The officer in charge at the large camp at ADELHEIDE has recommended that he be provided with a certain number of rifles in order to arm a Russian guard for the Camp and the Army Commander has given his concurrence to the proposal. It is however, important that formation units in the vicinity respond to any demands for assistance by the Military Government officers in charge of the camps.

So far, these occurrences have not caused any serious repercussions, but it is feared that if they are not checked, not only will they seriously upset the general feeding programme, but graver consequences may be expected after the return of German Prisoners of War to their homes as agricultural workers. It is in fact probable that if some protection is not guaranteed the German farmers they will take active measures themselves, and the measures they may take may easily in turn grow to forces that may be turned against the Occupational forces.

It is interesting to mention that in the Russian camps, the Russian officers immediately on their arrival set about the organization of military units. These are organized in battalions of a thousand, officers and non-commissioned officers are appointed and they immediately set about doing squad drill. This is an advantage from a Military Government standpoint in that it keeps them occupied and under control, but it is apparent that the Russian Liaison Officers have come there with instructions to undertake such an organization.

(W.D., C.A., First Cdn
Army, May 1945: Appx 16)

27. On 4 Jun 45, the head of the U.S.S.R. Mission, accompanied by several assistants, called at Headquarters 2 Cdn Corps. The question of discipline was discussed fully and the Russians undertook to ensure:

- (a) that arms would not be carried by Russian troops and Displaced Persons outside the precincts of their own camps.
- (b) that no purchasing or requisitioning would be authorized.

(W.D., C.A., 2 Cdn
Corps, 4 Jun 45)

Although no further instances of lawlessness on the part of Displaced Persons are recorded during the remaining ten days that 2 Cdn Corps were responsible for the area, when 30 Brit Corps took over an additional task of the occupying troops continued to be "to control and curb the number of crimes committed by Displaced Persons" (Hist Sec Report No. 174, para 63).

28. During the entire period the policy of non-fraternization was maintained. Although this policy was later relaxed (Ibid, para 74), it was noted:

Few cases of fraternization by troops have been reported, and very few have been prosecuted. There have been more cases of rape than fraternization.

(W.D., C.A., First Cdn
Army, May 1945: Appx 20)

DISPLACED PERSONS

29. It had been appreciated in planning that the care and control of Displaced Persons would constitute the chief problem for Military Government during the operational phase. This task was increased by the addition of the responsibility for the evacuation of westbound ex-prisoners of war (other than British and United States) (Hist Sec file, AEF 45/Second Army/C/D, Docket I, Chap VII).

30. The general plan was to hold Displaced Persons at natural barriers and to set up assembly centres at or near each barrier. Each assembly centre was to be sorted out as quickly as possible into a transit centre and a number of eastbound national camps, each under its own director. Thus each assembly centre could hold or could repatriate either east or west (Ibid).

31. It was not until the end of April 1945 that the problem of Displaced Persons and ex-prisoners of war became acute in First Canadian Army area. Until then the comparatively small number of both categories that were uncovered during and subsequent to Operation "VERITABLE" were repatriated through the Netherlands or evacuated through Corps refugee camps and the Army transit camp to rear areas (W.D., C.A., First Cdn Army, February 1945: Appendices 8 and 10; and Ibid, March 1945, Appx 8).

32. At the beginning of April, when formations of 2 Cdn Corps were beginning to enter Germany from North-East Holland, the enemy resistance was severe and the rate of advance was

slow. This was fortunate from the Military Government point of view for it gave the staffs at Headquarters 2 Cdn Corps and at Headquarters First Canadian Army an opportunity to organize the necessary machinery to absorb the expected flow of Displaced Persons. This machinery consisted of a Barrier Zone along the geographical frontier between the Netherlands and Germany and the preparation of assembly centres on the line of the rivers Rhine and Ijssel (Ibid, April 1945: Appx 29).

33. The establishment of Frontier Control Posts was undertaken by the Netherlands Military Administration and the following quotation from a report made by the Military Government staff of 2 Cdn Corps indicates that this was proceeding satisfactorily:

Organisation by the Dutch is in the process of completion for the establishment of Frontier Control Posts and Assembly Centres for all stragglers attempting to cross the Frontier regardless of nationality. They will be retained at the frontier and moved to Assembly Centres at Enschede, Hengelo, Ondenzaal, Almelo and Hardenbergh.

(Ibid, quoted from
2 Cdn Corps report)

34. During the month of April, as the enemy resistance weakened and the speed of our advance increased, numerous camps and groups of Displaced Persons were uncovered but they were comparatively easy to control. A "stand fast" order had been issued and, on 24 Apr 45, Brigadier Wedd wrote:

Generally speaking, the stand fast order is being satisfactorily exercised in the forward areas, and the arrivals back at the Barrier Zone on the Ijssel other than Westbounders, whose return has been organized by transport, has not reached great proportions.

(Ibid: Appx 41)

35. By the end of April static national camps had been established in Germany for Poles, Russians and Italians and held 11,387 of which the bulk were Displaced Persons (Ibid, May 1945: Appx 2). In one week the Barrier Zone and static camps in the Netherlands had received 4000 Westbounders and had evacuated or repatriated two thirds of them (Ibid). But these activities were negligible in comparison with what was to follow. With the advance to the north into Leer, there was a surge of Displaced Persons and ex-prisoners of war. Each day saw one or more additional camp coming under control of 2 Cdn Corps for which more personnel was required. By 3 May 45 there were 22 camps holding a total of some 12,000. There was a great shortage of transport and supplies which made it difficult to carry out evacuation from the collecting centres (W.D., C.A., 2 Cdn Corps, May 1945: Appx 4).

36. The problem, which so far had been easy to control had, with the numbers uncovered reaching progressively greater proportions, become intensified. This was welcomed by the Military Government staff for, as the report of the period 29 Apr. - 5 May 45 states:

This intensification has served to bring the Army proper and particularly formation staffs to realize that Military Government operations are the

responsibility of the Army as a whole; that the Military Government Branch has not the resources to do more than direct the operations, and that Military Government must be given high priority in its demands on the resources of the Army.

This was particularly evident in the matter of the transport so essential to care for the quick evacuation of westbounders, whether P/WX or Displaced Persons, and for the transfer of eastbounders to camps organized by nationalities.

The situation in that part of GERMANY within the Army boundaries will require a great deal of organization and all the Military Government resources at our disposal have been sent forward to supplement the very meagre number of detachments provided in the general carpet for this area, and while a good many local decisions had to be taken "in extremis", generally speaking, problems have been overcome. Individual officers of Military Government Staffs and of the detachments have of necessity had in many cases, to operate alone, but the resources have, in general, been such as to keep the situation in hand.

(W.D., C.A., First Cdn Army, May 1945: Appx 19)

37. In order to assist 2 Cdn Corps the full resources of the Military Government Staff at Army Headquarters were put at their disposition. All the available detachments were brought forward and others, which had been deployed in the Netherlands, were withdrawn and sent into Germany until the 18 detachments, which had been under command of Corps at the beginning of May, were increased to 35 by the end of the month (Ibid, June 1945: Appx 5).

38. At 2 Cdn Corps a control and maintenance plan was put into force. All westbounders - French, Belgians, Dutch - were evacuated through the R.C.A.S.C. maintenance routes and channels. For the eastbounders, national areas were allotted and a maintenance plan drawn up by Supply and Transport in cooperation with Military Government (W.D., C.A., 2 Cdn Corps, May 1945: Appx 4).

39. Formations were called upon to assist Military Government and Liaison Officers reported daily the situation in divisional areas as to the numbers evacuated both east and west bound (W.D., C.A., First Cdn Army, May 1945: Appx 20).

40. By 17 May 45 all the westbounders had been evacuated, the national static areas for the Russians and Poles had been set up and 69,649 Displaced Persons and ex-prisoners of war were distributed in 32 camps (W.D., C.A., 2 Cdn Corps, May 1945: Appx 4).

41. In addition to segregating the Russians and the Poles, it was necessary to reserve the area north of the Ems - Jade Canal for the Wehrmacht who were being moved there from West Holland. The Polish area was organized with the full cooperation of the Polish Division and lay astride the River Ems from Leer to Lingen (W.D., C.A. First Cdn Army, June 1945: Appx 13). The camp accommodation in this area was found to be inadequate and it was found necessary to evacuate certain villages in order to create Polish villages.

42. By 14 Jun 45, when responsibility was handed over to 30 Brit Corps, the segregation of Displaced Persons and ex-prisoners of war as well as the final movement into national areas was completed (Ibid, June 1945: Appx 2).

43. The U.S.S.R. Mission had arrived and taken over control of the Russian camps (W.D., C.A., 2 Cdn Corps, 4 Jun 45) and, since it seemed probable that the Polish people would remain in their static area for some time, arrangements were being made to have school books specially printed and a survey of the colony was made to select suitable teaching personnel (W.D., C.A., First Cdn Army, June 1945: Appx 2).

44. The final report shows a total of 80,884 distributed as follows:

	<u>Ex-prisoners of War</u>	<u>Displaced Persons</u>
Russians	19,740	24,996
Poles	4,025	19,250
Italians	19	9,622
Others	2,020	1,212
Totals	25,804	55,080

(Ibid: Appx 4)

CIVIL MAINTENANCE

45. No mention is made of the problem of Civil Maintenance until 11 Apr 45, when "functional reports covering food and other supplies in Germany from the point of view of procurement, demand and issue procedure, accounting and rationing" were in course of preparation (W.D., C.A., First Cdn Army, April 1945: Appx 16).

46. The problem of Civil Maintenance was in fact a long term one since the area that 2 Cdn Corps was to occupy was essentially a productive one. During the period of responsibility, there was never any fear of immediate starvation conditions arising since the country produced potatoes, cheese, butter and grain (Ibid, May 1945: Appx 2). The spring seeding was well in hand and therefore, for the present, the shortage of labour, which was largely due to the freeing of Displaced Persons who had proved the main source of farm and other labour, was not as serious as it might have been (Ibid, April 1945: Appx 41).

47. At the end of April a centralized food control had been set up to provide food for Displaced Persons who were being segregated into camps by nationalities as they were uncovered. The system followed was that weekly demands were made to the Kreis Food Controller who was responsible for drawing the food from that part of the Kreis where it was available (Ibid, May 1945: Appx 2).

48. Following the surrender, the main problem became the feeding of the surrendered German army. A map was obtained showing all the large milling concerns, dairies and produce-handling centres. Since these plants were situated near to the chief agricultural districts, the map served as a guide as to which areas would best be able to maintain large bodies of troops from local resources (Ibid: Appx 20).

49. In order to provide the maximum farm labour and to conserve as much as possible the transportation of goods from the rural areas to the towns, a plan was also drawn up for the evacuation to farms and rural areas of as large a proportion as possible of the rural populations (Ibid).

50. The general situation following the surrender appeared satisfactory, as is reflected in the report for the week ending 12 May 45:

Present indications are that food stocks are adequate in all areas except for local shortages where heavy influxes of Displaced Persons coincide with temporary disorganization of the local procurement organizations. Agriculture is going ahead well, plans being under way for supplementary sowing of vegetables and pulses. Large food stocks exist at AURICH, OLDENBURG, EMDEN and WILHEIMSHAVEN.

Shortages of civilian transport and communications are proving a serious handicap in the organization of food collection from farms.

The Regional Office for the entire 2 Canadian Corps area, at OLDENBURG, has been taken over complete with staff and records. This office controls an area of 19 Kreis and almost 2 million population, and steps are being taken to continue, through this office, the control of food production, distribution, rationing and price control.

2 Canadian Corps are putting into operation a comprehensive maintenance plan for all Displaced Persons Camps in their area. Under this scheme, three collection zones will be set up, each with a good depot to amass and distribute local resources. These depots will be supplied from 'B' Sub-Depot 10 Civil Affairs Inland Depot with any rations necessary to supplement local food-stuffs. Necessary military staffs and transport are being provided.

(Ibid)

51. On 15 May 45 a Food Team, consisting of five officers, was installed at Oldenburg and began to prepare plans to:

- (a) make a survey of all local production;
- (b) put the members of the German Wehrmacht on the land to replace the Displaced Persons who had previously been the main source of farm labour in the neighbourhood;
- (c) draw up ration scales for Displaced Persons and civilians.

(W.D., C.A., 2 Cdn Corps,
entries 15 May 45 and
20 May 45)

52. By the end of the month, the Regional Food Detachment had drawn up census forms by which it was expected that a complete census of stock and crops throughout the area would be available within a month (W.D., C.A., First Cdn Army, May 1945: Appx 16).

53. A uniform ration scale had been established which was similar to that in operation prior to occupation. The calory value was:

Children to 6 years	-	1033	calories	per	day
7 to 18 years	-	1327	"	"	"
over 18 years	-	1120	"	"	"
Heavy workers	-	1580	"	"	"
Very heavy workers	-	1988	"	"	"
Nursing mothers)	-	1700	"	"	"
Expectant mothers)	-				

(Ibid)

Small reserve stocks were in the possession of the local population and these, together with vegetables and eggs, which were readily available, ensured for the time being that minimum nutritional requirements were met. (Ibid).

54. By the time that the area was handed over to 30 Brit Corps the feeding problem had been crystallized into three main tasks:

- (a) The feeding of United Nations Displaced Persons and Prisoners of War Camps. This was handled centrally by a special Control Headquarters, Commander, Royal Canadian Army Service Corps which had been set up in cooperation with Military Government, 2 Cdn Corps at Oldenburg and had three regional depots at Oldenburg, Meppen and Leer. All the camps were eventually absorbed into this central maintenance plan. The organization worked smoothly directing the supply of indigenous foodstuffs through the Regional Food Office.
- (b) The feeding of the civilian population. This had become increasingly better organized and more uniform as the Regional Food Officials obtained better means of communication with Kreis Food Offices and could both obtain up-to-date information and make known policies and directives.
- (c) The supply of extra rations for miners in the Ruhr and Westphalia. This was organized by the Regional Food Office, directed by the Military Government Regional Food Team.

(Ibid, June 1945:
Appx 2)

55. There remained many difficulties which, at the time of the hand-over to 30 Brit Corps, still hindered the working of the overall food scheme. These, as given in the report for the week ending 8 Jun 45, were:

- (a) Lack of transportation to move glut surpluses of perishable produce, milk and eggs to large consumer areas.
- (b) The purchase by Military units of foodstuffs direct from farmers instead of through normal trade channels with Military Government assistance.

(c) Lack of cold-storage and salt and fuel for processing plants prevents the storing of present perishable surpluses for next winter.

(d) Lack of transport cuts down the haulage of live cattle to slaughter houses and locally killed meat will not keep without cooling facilities.

(Ibid)

56. Included among the matters for which the Military Government Regional Food Team were responsible was agriculture. If acute starvation conditions were to be avoided during the next twelve months, it was essential that, in addition to the ration scale being strictly enforced, an intensive effort be made to bring all available land under cultivation. During the closing phases of the war some 400 tractors had been requisitioned by the Wehrmacht from 2 Cdn Corps area. It was considered that 350 was the minimum essential replacement although the lack of tractors was to a certain extent off-set by the manpower released for farm work by making available personnel of the surrendered army and by the release to farmers of ex-Wehrmacht horses (Ibid).

57. In order to ensure maximum food production, the following instructions were given to the German agricultural authorities:

(a) Ploughing all available grass land.

(b) Reduction of livestock and ploughing up pastures.

(c) Reduction of food crops in favour of grain and potatoes.

(d) Elimination of flowers and such luxury crops as asparagus and strawberries.

(e) Propaganda and active assistance to ensure that all householders and town-dwellers make maximum efforts to cultivate vegetable gardens for themselves.

(Ibid)

58. In addition, and in order to implement these policies, arrangements were made with Second Brit Army, who controlled the Provincial Military Government Detachment at Hanover to draw the vegetable seed requirements from indigenous stocks which were under their control (Ibid).

FINANCE

59. It was intended that Military Government should supervise the German financial system. After the surrender, this was facilitated by an instruction given by Nazi officials that non-Nazis with necessary qualifications should report to and put themselves at the disposal of Military Government (W.D., C.A., First Cdn Army, May 1945: Appx 19). Largely because of this instruction it became a comparatively simple matter to find suitable trained personnel to replace the Nazis who had fled. This was, of course, true not only of financial institutions but throughout the various spheres of official life.

60. In February and March, when the areas around Cleve, Goch and Udem were occupied, there were no financial problems with which to cope since all financial institutions had been closed and evacuated in the autumn of 1944 (Ibid, February 1945: Appx 10, and March 1945: Appendices 2 and 8). Certain allied interests were, however, discovered and, under Property Control, arrangements were made "for owners to take protective measures so far as conditions permit" (Ibid, March 1945: Appx 8). Eventually, when the battle had passed over this area and it became necessary to attempt to set up more normal conditions of life, plans were made to establish a new central bank for the Kreis of Cleve. A representative board of seven directors was set up and by-laws governing the new institution were drawn up but, before the bank opened for business, responsibility for the area passed to Second Brit Army (Ibid, April 1945: Appx 16).

61. Entry into Meppen and Elton in April was not accompanied by the wholesale material destruction which had preceded and accompanied the taking of Cleve and Goch. By 14 Apr 45 banks in both centres were open for business, having been issued with Military Government instructions (Ibid: Appx 29). Withdrawals were limited to 100 Reichmarks per week and deposits exceeded withdrawals (Ibid: Appx 41).

62. For a time, just before and following the surrender, there was a great deal of looting and burning by German troops, ex-prisoners of war and Displaced Persons as well as by our own troops (Ibid, May 1945: Appx 2). This resulted in loss of large sums of currency and the destruction of important documents and, although banks in large centres were opened as quickly as possible, small agencies in out of the way places had to remain closed until their security could be assured (Ibid).

63. By 5 May 45 the situation in the rear areas was "fairly normal". Deposits exceeded withdrawals, the collection of local taxes had restarted and local budgets were being prepared (Ibid: Appx 19).






64. Once Military Government detachments were deployed in the 2 Cdn Corps area, progress was rapid. By 26 May 45 practically all banks except those in isolated localities were operating under full Military Government control. Budgets for all the larger centres had been submitted and those for outlying areas were coming in as fast as communications permitted (Ibid: Appx 16). A point of considerable satisfaction was the rise in cash holdings due to deposits largely exceeding withdrawals (Ibid: Appx 13)

65. At one point, eleven bank managers were charged in Military Government Courts for failure to render complete statements within the seven days allotted (Ibid) and it became necessary to investigate the conduct of two others who were suspected of "serious infringements of Instructions to Financial Institutions" (Ibid, June 1945: Appx 4). These were exceptional cases for generally the bank managers showed themselves to be obedient and cooperative.

66. This report has been prepared by Major A.K. Reid, General List, Historical Officer (Civil Affairs), Canadian Military Headquarters.

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LEGEND

-  ZONE BOUNDARIES
-  INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
-  PROVINCIAL BOUNDARIES
-  U.S. ENCLAVE BOUNDARY
-  C.A.O.F. AREA BOUNDARY

BRITISH OCCUPATIONAL ZONE OF GERMANY

(AS AT 21 NOV 45)

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 MILES

RUSSIAN ZONE

C.A.O.F. AREA



0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 MILES