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REPORT NO. 177

HISTORICAL SECTION

CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

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The Repatriation of the Canadian Military Forces  
Overseas 1945-1947.

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R E P O R T NO. 177

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The Repatriation of the Canadian  
Military Forces Overseas, 1945-1947

1. This report deals with the return of Canadian troops to the Dominion after the conclusion of hostilities in the 1939 - 1945 War. A previous report (No. 174) has recorded the organization and the operation of the Canadian Occupation Force in Germany during the period May 1945 to June 1946. The present account describes the planning for the repatriation of the Canadian military forces in Europe for service in the Far East or for demobilization, and the manner in which that repatriation was effected. The post-war period covered by the report extends until the end of March, 1947, by which time the programme was virtually completed.

PRELIMINARY PLANNING

2. Canada had been at war with Germany only a few months when a Special Cabinet Committee on Demobilization and Rehabilitation was set up at Ottawa by P.C.4068 1/2 of 8 Dec 39. This seemed to be looking very far ahead; but in view of the subsequent events, which sent nearly 300,000 Canadian soldiers overseas, such long time planning was wise policy. Even the lowest "ranker" knew that the war would not last forever and plans had to be formulated early for an orderly reorganization, repatriation, demobilization and rehabilitation of the Canadian Army. To this end a policy had to be drafted and kept up to date as the war progressed through its different phases. Japan's entry into hostilities, and the subsequent formation of a Pacific Force; the defeat of Germany, and the organization of an Occupational Force; the retention of an Interim Army - all these requirements had to be considered when the question arose of demobilizing the armed forces. It meant that no really firm policy could be determined until each situation had arisen and been dealt with in the light of its effect on demobilization. Little did the average man in the army realize the enormous amount of time and effort and serious thought spent by his senior officers in planning and replanning for his return to Canada, his discharge and his rehabilitation. He knew that the army had looked after him this far and would do its best for him in arranging for his return to civil life when the time came for the termination of his services.

3. Early in 1940 C.M.H.Q. learned that the War Office had incorporated in its "A" Branch a section set aside for the study of this subject under the Director of Demobilization (1/Demob/1, Letter, A.G.1. to A.A.& Q.M.G., 16 Apr 40). The section held one conference at this time and prepared a memorandum for submission to the War Council to initiate the framing of policy (1/Demob/1, Letter, A.G.2. to A.& Q., 23 Apr 40). Liaison was established with the War Office Demobilization Committee by C.M.H.Q., who were kept well informed as to the progress of the British planning. (A first draft of the tentative plan was submitted to the War Office Directors on 19 Feb 41 (1/Demob/1, Letter from War Office (19/Demob/22, (DRM)), 19 Feb 41). At the



same time, contact was made with the headquarters of the New Zealand, Australian, South African and United States forces in London, to keep in touch with the progress of their respective demobilization plans. A careful study and scrutiny was made of these, and the results were filed for future reference. Although the plans were all tentative, they proved of great assistance to the newly appointed Secretary of the C.M.H.Q. Demobilization Committee. (1/Demob/1, Memorandum, Secretary to S.O. Inspector, 12 Nov 42)

4. Following the appointment of a secretary to the C.M.H.Q. committee early in November 1942, and his report in the form of a memorandum on a Tentative Demobilization Plan for the Canadian Army, a Central Co-ordinating Committee was formed. This committee was composed of the D.A.G., B.G.S., and D.Q.M.G., and the memorandum was passed to them early in December 1942. After careful study of the Tentative Plan, the Co-ordinating Committee held their first meeting on 2 Feb 43, at which it was decided to appoint sub-committees to deal with each of the following matters:

- (a) Priorities;
- (b) Documentation and Reorganization  
Planning Statistics;
- (c) Medical and Dental arrangements;
- (d) Disposal of Equipment;
- (e) Repatriation of Dependents;
- (f) Transportation and accommodation;
- (g) Legal Aspects (especially regarding  
Interim Army and Remobilization);
- (h) Establishments;
- (i) Rehabilitation;
- (j) Welfare and Discipline of Troops  
during Demobilization period;
- (k) Pay arrangements;
- (l) Financial matters (Regimental)
- (m) Financial matters (Governmental);
- (n) Prisoners of War;
- (o) Education.

(1/Demob/1/2, Minutes of  
Demobilization Committee,  
3 Feb 43)

5. As may be observed from the number of sub-committees appointed to investigate and report on the various subjects, demobilization was going to be a large and important matter for the whole Army. The sub-committees were given their terms of reference, and during the ensuing months they made very detailed studies of the subjects allocated to them; their reports were

submitted to the Co-ordinating Committee in October 1943 and, with certain recommendations, despatched to Ottawa on 10 Nov 43. (1/Demob/1/2, Report, Montague to N.D.H.Q., 10 Nov 43). Shortly after this, the Secretary of the Demobilization Committee returned to Canada to discuss the overseas reports. (1/Demob/1/2, Letter, D.A.G. to A.A.G.(MS), 12 Nov 43).

6. In the meantime there had been appointed at Ottawa a General Advisory Committee (P.C.5421, 8 Oct 40) to the Special Cabinet Committee on Demobilization and Rehabilitation which had initiated various pieces of legislation in Parliament improving the post-war treatment of the forces. A list of the main topics of legislation indicates their significance to the soldier: Veterans Welfare Division, Committee re Canteen Funds, Regulations re Rehabilitation Grants, Civil Servants on Active Service, Pensions to Military Service Personnel in present war, Regulations re Civil Employment Reinstatement, Gratuity for deceased Civil Servants when members of the forces and the Post Discharge Re-establishment Order. The provisions of these Acts were eventually published as Notice Board Information for the Army and were well received by the troops. As a result of the work and findings of the Overseas Demobilization Committee in conjunction with the General Advisory Committee in Ottawa a pamphlet, Back to Civil Life, was issued to all service personnel. It dealt comprehensively with all phases of demobilization and rehabilitation, and detailed in full the benefits which were available on return to civilian life.\*

#### THE PROBLEM OF PRIORITY REPATRIATION

7. The uppermost thought of the individual soldier at this time, however, was to win the war and get back home. Thus to him, when he did think of getting home, the most important and interesting feature of demobilization was the priority of repatriation and how it would affect him personally. Three months after D Day the G.O.C.-in-C., First Canadian Army, expressed himself as being in favour of commitments in the Far East and the Occupation of Germany being met by the nomination of units and not by individuals who submitted claims for preferential treatment. He felt that personnel required for service against Japan must first be returned to Canada. (1/Demob/2, C 64, Crerar to Stuart, 2 Sep 44). It is also noted that General Crerar extended this view to include repatriation to Canada by units rather than by individual selection. Return by unit would simplify administration, discipline, etc., and allow for better reception of the men when they arrived in their home district. It was pointed out, however, that this method would cause more work and delay on arrival in Canada, as the system of general reinforcements which obtained at the stage of operations then reached had deprived units of any remaining territorial affiliation, and it would mean the breaking down of the units into "locality drafts" on arrival at the port of debarkation. Such a plan for repatriation was open to criticism on the grounds that it would have been based on unit priority, instead of the individual

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\* Topics included Rehabilitation Branches, Reinstatement in Former Job, Post Discharge Re-Establishment Order, Vocational Training, University Education, Additional Grants to Pensioners, Unemployment Insurance Benefits, Employment Preference, Treatment Branch, Pensions Commission, The Veterans' Bureau, The Veterans' Land Act, The War Services Grants Act, The Veterans' Insurance Act, with an outline of the Departmental Administration of these benefits.



point score in a low priority unit. (Ibid; GS 3072, Defensor to Canmilitary, 9 Sep 44). At this time, Ottawa also suggested that any Canadian Force for the Far East be represented by a composite formation. (Ibid; GS 3073, Defensor to Canmilitary, 9 Sep 44)

8. The G.O.C.-in-C. First Canadian Army therefore proposed a compromise between the return of individuals in accordance with an acceptable formula for individual points, and the return of units in accordance with an acceptable formula for priorities (1/Demob/1/2, COS 262, Stuart to Ralston, 15 Sep 44). (This referred generally to infantry and armoured units, as these had more local affiliations than smaller units in other services). With regard to individuals it was suggested that a proportion of all ranks with long service overseas should be returned to Canada in accordance with individual priority standing, and that reinforcements being held in the United Kingdom and the operational theatres should be sent to units to compensate in part for the loss of these personnel. Certain key officers and men on staffs and in units would have to be retained, but no difficulty in this respect was anticipated. The scheme would allow the remainder, most of whom were low-point personnel, to return to Canada as units. Being regrouped in this manner on a territorial basis, the unit could proceed direct to the point of demobilization in the same way that the high point score personnel were returned in territorial drafts from all arms (Ibid).

9. The Minister of National Defence did not favour the G.O.C.-in-C.'s proposal of returning complete units to Canada on a priority basis. He recognized the advantages of the scheme, but was more concerned lest an injustice might be done to long service personnel serving in low priority units. He considered that the points system for length of service, overseas service and marital status would overcome this injustice and be fairest to all, both for repatriation and demobilization. (1/Demob/2, GS 3072, Defensor to Canmilitary, 9 Sep 44)

10. The C.M.H.Q. Demobilization Committee favoured the priority release system adopted by the British, i.e., on a basis of age and length of service; but this plan did not seem advisable for Canadians, since the vast majority of overseas personnel were volunteers and not "call-ups" of definite age groups like the British. The volunteer system for overseas service made any scheme of age and length of service unworkable because of wide variations of ages in relation to service.

11. The tentative approval of the Ottawa War Cabinet Committee to principles of Repatriation and Demobilization were outlined in general in a cable dated 23 Sep 44, the policy being tentatively approved on the following basis:-

1. Service requirements to be given first consideration. Such requirements as now visualized are:-

- (a) Any Pacific War commitments;
- (b) Any European Occupational Commitments;
- (c) Western Hemisphere requirements, including continuing operational and non-operational units;
- (d) Such training as may be required to provide reinforcements for (a), (b), (c).



2. Priorities in Demobilization:  
General principle "First In First Out" applied to all ranks and all categories modified by -
  - (a) Length of service overseas to be given priority -
    - (i) In Repatriation;
    - (ii) In Demobilization once arrived in Canada (speed of repatriation would depend on shipping);
  - (b) Consideration to be given to the marital status of personnel.
  - (c) Special cases of discharge, compassionate or otherwise, not to exceed 5 per cent of persons repatriated or demobilized in any one period.
3. Discharge procedure would be carried out continuously to the extent of personnel available, with overseas men given priority. General Service personnel to be given preference over N.R.M.A.
4. Personnel to be posted to their appropriate district depot and granted debarkation leave.
5. Final pre-discharge medical examination to be carried out at District Depot after leave.
6. It was estimated that the overall rate of discharge beginning 31 Mar 45 would be 20,000 per month.
7. It was not intended to grant commissions or carry out enlistment in the post war army until after the final cessation of hostilities. All suitable personnel then serving would be entitled to first consideration in the post war army but applications would be accepted from those already demobilized insofar as vacancies permitted.
8. The Pacific and Occupational Forces would be selected as follows:
  - (a) From those expressing preference and whose training and experience are considered acceptable.
  - (b) By detailing personnel in the lower brackets of the priority scale of demobilization.

- (c) By completing, where necessary, by detailing specialists, even though they be in the high priority bracket.

(1/Demob/2, GS 586, Defensor to Canmilitary, 23 Sep 44)

These were the main points which would affect the troops as individuals when hostilities ceased.

12. At this time, September 1944, operations against Germany were progressing so favourably that her collapse seemed likely before the end of the year. With this prospect in view, the C.M.H.Q. Demobilization Committee, which now became the Demobilization Planning Committee (1/Demob/2, Minutes of Meeting, 31 Aug 44) recommended that an Overseas Director of Demobilization be appointed on account of the increasing importance and volume of work to be done. It also suggested that a special organization be set up in "A" Branch to deal with demobilization problems. This was soon accomplished, and the Reorganization and Demobilization Section was established, with Brig D.K. Tow being appointed as Director. (1/COS/35, GS 546, Defensor to Canmilitary, 8 Sep 44)

13. Committees and sub-committees were revised to constitute the following:

Reorganization and Demobilization Policy committee;  
Reorganization and Demobilization Plans committee;  
Disposal of Equipment committee;  
Financial (Government) committee;  
Legal Aspects committee;  
Rehabilitation and Educational sub-committee;  
Documents, Records and Statistics sub-committee;  
Pay sub-committee;  
Medical and Dental Arrangements sub-committee;  
Welfare and Discipline sub-committee;  
Prisoners of War sub-committee;  
War Establishments sub-committee;  
Repatriation of Dependents sub-committee;  
Transportation and Accommodation sub-committee.

(Ibid)

14. The Director of Reorganization and Demobilization was called to Canada for a conference held on 5 Jan 45, at which the Minister of National Defence presided. Attending were the C.G.S., V.C.G.S., A.G., V.A.G.1., V.A.G.2., D. Reorg and Demob (C.M.H.Q.), D. Org (R) and A.A.D.A. The purpose of the meeting was to review the tentative demobilization plan as outlined by the War Cabinet Committee (see para 11). The Minister wished to produce the policy in its final form to be tabled before the Privy Council as a notice of intention. Following this conference, the Director of Reorganization & Demobilization was directed to discuss the statement of policy with the C. of S., C.M.H.Q., the Army Commander and the G.O.C. 1 Cdn Corps, as the Minister was very desirous of obtaining their views and advice (1/Demob/2, Minutes of a conference held in the office of the Minister of National Defence, N.D.H.Q. at 1100 hrs, 5 Jan 45, re Policy of Reallocation of Canadian Army manpower during any interim period between the defeat of Germany and the defeat of Japan, 12 Jan 45).

"AFTER VICTORY IN EUROPE"

15. In the discussions which followed, the policy agreed on was made firm, and it resulted in the publication in May 1945 of the pamphlet After Victory in Europe. This was distributed to all ranks, who thus had the information in black and white as to what was going to happen to the Canadian Army now that Germany had collapsed.

16. The main points of interest to the individual soldier were fully explained in the pamphlet and they formed the basis of many conversations and discussions among the troops. There were four main topics for officers and men to consider:

- (a) Providing a Far East Force to fight the Japanese. (The Prime Minister had issued a statement on policy as to participation in the war against Japan on 4 Apr 45. (See 1/Demob/2, GS 160, Defensor to Can-military, 5 Apr 45));
- (b) Providing a Force to assist in the occupation and control of Germany;
- (c) Demobilization. Surplus to Far East Force and Occupational Force, personnel would be repatriated and demobilized:
  - (i) Initially by drafts of individuals with the highest point scores for service;
  - (ii) Subsequently by units in order of priority of embarkation for overseas;
- (d) Calculation of Individual Priorities. A Point Score, based on length of service, cut off as at 31 Mar 45 to allow Records to compute scores was worked out in the case of each individual: For one month service in Canada - 2 points; For one month service overseas - 3 points; For a portion of a month overseas - the highest number of points, i.e. 3 points. 20 per cent was added to the score of personnel who were married or who were widowed with dependent children.

(After Victory in Europe)

17. So far, so good. Now that the policy was announced and all ranks knew the terms, it became a matter of determining each individual's wishes regarding continued service or demobilization. To arrive at this, a Reallocation Questionnaire was devised and was distributed to all ranks of the Canadian Army during the month of May. On this Questionnaire (see Appendix "A"), every soldier could express in order his preference for:

- 1. Volunteering for the Canadian Far East Force;
- 2. Service with the Canadian Occupation Force;



3. Reallocation in accordance with individual priorities and the requirements of the service.

18. Answers were tabulated and formed the basis for postings and movements to effect an orderly reorganization of the army. The tabulation by the Records Office of the results for each individual was an enormous task. It meant sorting the Questionnaire into the different choices, placing the information on each individual's records and compiling total statistics.

19. At the same time, Records were busily engaged in calculating individual priority scores as at 31 Mar 45, dealing with long service personnel first to assure no delay in the selection of those with high priority point scores for movement to Canada in the first drafts. This onerous task compelled the Records Office to increase its staff to handle the situation and supply the necessary information in a minimum of time; for it was now known that organization of the Canadian Far East Force was a matter of great urgency, and personnel selected must be posted to Canada without delay. As results later showed, the Records Office performed this work with speed and efficiency, tabulating nearly 90 per cent of the Questionnaires by the end of May, and thereby enabling early movement of Pacific Volunteers and high point score personnel to Canada. (1/Demob/2/4, COS 503, Montague to Gibson and Walford, 30 May 45)

THE CANADIAN DECISION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PACIFIC WAR

20. During the distribution of the Reallocation Questionnaire, and before the results were known, announcement came from Ottawa of the formation of a Canadian Far East Force. Once again long-time planning formed the basis of the announcement. In May 1944, while all the Canadian Army in England were in the last stages of training and preparing for D Day, C.M.H.Q. had received an "Appreciation of Canadian Participation in the Pacific Theatre of War" prepared by the General Staff in Ottawa. (1/FE/1, HQS 20-2, FD 170 (Oprs 181-T Revised), Appreciation of Canadian Participation in the Pacific Theatre of War, 24 Apr 44)

21. As evidence that the situation had been closely considered by the General Staff over a long period of time, it is worth noting that this appreciation was a fourth revision. It discussed the several factors which entered into the question of Canadian participation in the war against Japan, and dealt with the main considerations under three headings - military, political and moral, and commercial.

22. From the military viewpoint it was noted that of the 92 divisions at that time estimated as being available to Japan, a good proportion was believed to be concentrated in Manchuria, held in that area to face a possible Russian threat and not likely to be committed elsewhere as long as that threat persisted. When the German war should end it seemed likely that the British Army would be charged with the major rôle of occupying a large part of Germany and the Balkans, a task in which Russia and the United States could conceivably be expected to share. There arose then the problem of finding sufficiently large bodies of troops available for service in the Far East, and particularly on the Asiatic Continent and in the Japanese home islands, to deal with remaining Nipponese resistance. It seemed possible that the United States would be hard put to add to its commitments in

the Far East.

It follows, therefore, that, while any Canadian participation would necessarily be small in relation to the whole, it would be of great military value as relieving the strain on the overall tasks assigned to the British armies. Shipping will be a major factor in shaping the final plans, and any trained forces that can be provided from the Canadian mainland will have considerable strategic advantages over those from European sources as representing a saving in shipping.

(Ibid)

23. From a political angle Canada, as a Pacific power, a full partner of the United Nations and separately at war with Japan, appeared committed by strong moral and political obligations to full participation. The argument for a Canadian undertaking in the Far East was felt to be stronger on these grounds than for the United Kingdom to participate.

Nor would air and naval participation alone fulfil the "face saving" angle, since it is by troops on the ground that nations are made to feel the impact of a country's war effort. Canadian troops were humiliated at Hong Kong by the Japanese in front of Chinese. It is necessary that this defeat should be avenged against the Japanese and the Chinese may know that Canada is in fact a "Pacific Power" by the presence of Canadian troops both in China and finally in Japan.

Once Germany is defeated there is little doubt that public opinion in the United States will be very strong for **demobilization** of that part of the armed forces not required for the Army of Occupation or to meet the full strategic requirements of the Pacific war. Canada's position will be parallel only insofar as Canadian participation in the Far East is proportionately adequate, and the United States public opinion would no doubt be most critical if Canada were to attempt any demobilization without this prerequisite.

(Ibid)

24. A satisfactory military effort against Japan was commercially desirable in order that Canada might retain the goodwill of China, who was regarded as one of the few remaining potential undeveloped markets of the world. It was foreseen that Japan's place in the economic development of China would be taken over by some other nation, and it was therefore important, if Canada was to compete for this position, that she should make a favourable impact on the Chinese Government and peoples. In discussing the "possible course of the Japanese war" it was appreciated that:

The policy of reducing the outer defences of the swollen Japanese sphere of control, would be long, tedious and costly. Logically, the end can best be obtained by a direct assault on Japan and there can be little doubt that all



other moves will be directed to assisting in that purpose.

(Ibid)

25. Canada's role in the Far East would fall into two parts (aside from co-operation of the R.C.N. and the R.C.A.F.) - to provide troops:-

- (a) to co-operate with the British forces starting from Burma and/or Malaya;
- (b) to co-operate with the U.S. forces on the other flank through Hawaii and the Aleutians (if used by the U.S. for an offensive).

In defining the size and type of force required in Canada, the appreciation saw the need of training troops in Canada immediately in methods of general warfare, to be ready for combined operations in the Western Pacific. Canadian troops in Europe, however, were expected to be of considerably more value during the later stages of setting up bases on the China Coast or Formosa, and in the actual assault upon Japan itself.

26. It was recognized that the movement of Canadian troops to the Far East from Europe would meet many difficulties. It would depend in part on the method of recruitment and the size of the Canadian share of the Army of Occupation of Germany for the second stage of the occupation. The appreciation suggested the following methods of mobilizing the required forces:-

- (a) Using existing formations;
- (b) Calling for volunteers from the Army overseas;
- (c) Extracting certain troops for demobilization based on some determined yardstick (length of service, marital status, etc.), and using the remainder for service in the Far East.

(Ibid)

In summing up the appreciation, the Canadian General Staff suggested that a contribution of a minimum of one Canadian division be used as a basis for discussion, pointing out that it might be called upon to co-operate with the British Forces in Burma or the United States Forces fighting through the Pacific Islands (Ibid).

27. In July 1944 the Canadian Joint Staff Mission in London presented to the British War Cabinet Joint Planning Staff a memorandum outlining the Canadian Government's proposals in regard to the Pacific War, stressing the desirability, both from operational and logistic considerations, of basing the Canadian force on Western Canada for close co-operation with the United States forces, especially as it was felt that operations in the North Pacific would enhance the importance of North-West Canada as a base. (1/FE/1: 1/CJSM/1 (C of S) Aide Memoire on the Employment of Canadian Forces After the Defeat of Germany, 29 July 44)

28. Late in September 1944 the Minister of National Defence was handed a memorandum prepared by the General Staff for discussion with the G.O.C.-in-C. First Canadian Army and



the Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q. (1/FE/1: HQS 9131 FD 2, Appreciation and Appendices, C.G.S. to Minister, N.D.H.Q., 20 Sep 44). This appreciation outlined several alternatives for the composition of a Far East Force, showing the basic factors governing the selections to be:-

- (a) Time;
- (b) Efficiency;
- (c) Territorial representation;
- (d) Demobilization;
- (e) Source of highest trained personnel.

(Ibid)

It pointed out that of the divisions overseas, only two, the 1st and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions, had the component units which reflected an adequate territorial representation from all Military Districts, and it suggested the following five alternative plans for the formation of the Far East Division:-

- Plan A To form new composite (territorial) units;
- Plan B To form a new division from units overseas disregarding present Divisional Orders of Battle;
- Plan C To select the 6th Division as a Far East Force;
- Plan D To select a complete brigade from each of the three divisions now overseas;
- Plan E To use existing divisions as the basis for a Far East Force.

(Ibid)

29. The advantages and disadvantages of each of the foregoing proposals were discussed fully in the memorandum, which was of great assistance for future planning. It aided the Prime Minister of Canada in settling the degree of Canada's participation in the war against Japan when he attended the Quebec Conference in September 1944 (1/Demob/2/4, ADGEN 128, Montague from Walford, 18 May 45), and it led to the Government's approval on 20 Nov of the despatch of one division with ancillary troops as required up to a total of 30,000 - a number which would include one year's reinforcements. This force was to operate in the Central Pacific Area under the higher command of the United States Forces and to be reorganized and re-equipped where necessary to conform with United States tables of organization (1/FE/1, GSO 844, Montague from Murchie, 8 Dec 44).

#### ORGANIZATION OF THE CANADIAN FAR EAST FORCE

30. D.N.D. suggested that the division to provide the framework of the Far East Force was to be selected by the Army Commander from existing formations with such substitution of selected units, if necessary, as was required to ensure country-wide representation. As it was desirable that battle-experienced troops should be used, it was necessary that the

bulk of the force be supplied from overseas. Planning would proceed on the assumption that the force would not be ready for operations until six months after the release of the formation from the European theatre. The selection and reallocation of personnel to comprise the force should take place overseas, preferably in the theatre of operations, to the greatest extent possible. Subject to transportation arrangements the force would then be concentrated in the United Kingdom prior to departure for Canada, where thirty days' leave would be given, after which it would proceed to an assembly area in the Dominion for reorganization, refitting and training (Ibid).

31. In accordance with these suggestions the Army Commander selected 1 Cdn Inf Div to form the framework of the Far East Force (1/FE/1, COS 82, Murchie from Montague, 19 Dec 44). He pointed out that it would seem appropriate for this force to perpetuate as far as was practicable the formations and units of the 1st Division, in order to give the contingent a suitable national territorial composition and the inspiration of a fine military tradition (1/FE/1, C81, Montague from Crerar, 1 Apr 45). General Crerar gave it as his opinion that the

Framework can appropriately be provided by names of units which presently comprise the order of battle 1 Cdn Inf Div.

(1/FE/1, C91, Montague from Crerar, 5 Apr 45)

Following further discussions regarding the formation of the Far East Force, the Minister of National Defence directed that the Pacific Force would be designated the 6th Canadian Infantry Division and that it would include a Canadian tank battalion. Eventually it was announced that unit names of 1 Cdn Inf Div had been selected (see Appendix "B") (1/Demob/2/4, CGS 240, Montague from Murchie, 15 May 45). In the same announcement it was stated that 6 Cdn Inf Div would wear a hexagonal patch made up of the colours of all five existing divisions, plus black to represent the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps. To command the force, the Minister gave instructions that he would

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\* The Armoured unit originally chosen was 4 Cdn Tk Bn, to represent M.D.4. (1/FE/1, CGS 267, Gibson for Murchie repeat Montague, 25 May 45). Later, however, this selection was amended, 22 Cdn Tk Bn (perpetuating the Canadian Grenadier Guards) being substituted. The reasons for the change were given as follows:-

If 1st Division framework is to be maintained intact without additions or omissions from its present organization the only other way to gain representation in a major unit to English speaking Montreal is to turn to selection of an armoured unit. While R.M.R. was representative of English speaking M.D. 4 units in original 1 Div, they have never been an armoured regiment and so are not considered suitable to represent armoured regiments in 6 Cdn Div. While otherwise the proposal is to adhere rigidly to 1 Div units it has been suggested that Cdn Grenadier Guards be selected as title for tank battalion, thus giving desired representation to major unit from Montreal.

(1/FE/1, CGS 323, Murchie from Gibson, 16 Jun 45)



personally make the decision from among three nominations submitted by the Army Commander. Brigade Commanders and staff officers were to be selected by the Force Commander from lists of recommendations by the Army Commander, who would himself appoint O.Cs. of units (Ibid). (A tentative slate of officers to command 6 Cdn Inf Div appears at Appendix "C" (1/Demob/2/C, Officers for CFEF).)

32. As explained in the pamphlet After Victory in Europe, the Canadian Far East Force would be formed only from those personnel who volunteered for inclusion. In this respect, the G.O.C.-in-C. First Cdn Army had held the view, early in September 1944, that he did not agree to the volunteer system being used in forming the Far East Force:

The average man in the Canadian Army Overseas considers that the Japanese Contingent should be provided by active service personnel now in Canada - or who have not been engaged in operations. After they get back to Canada, and the glamour of home-coming wears off a bit, then I think you may get sufficient volunteers - but, not here, and now.

(1/FE/1: Letter, G.O.C.-in-C. to Chief of Staff, 13 Sep 44)

That, however, was in September 1944, when the war against Germany was in full swing and the First Canadian Army was driving along on the heels of the retreating Nazi armies, with every man from the G.O.C.-in-C. down busily engaged in operations. But in May 1945 it was a different situation that faced each man in the army - Germany was defeated in the field and now there were attractive inducements to join the Pacific Force. Volunteers for the Far East would have priority transportation to Canada; they would receive 30 days' leave at home in the Dominion before reporting back for duty with 6 Inf Div; and additional Japanese Campaign pay had been announced as ranging from 30 to 65 cents per day for Other Ranks and 60 cents to a dollar for Officers (see Appendix "D"). There seems little doubt that these were strong incentives to some of the battle-worn men who had hungered for a sight of home and loved ones for periods up to five years. Perhaps, too, the thought that the war against Japan would end before they reached the Pacific (which proved to be the case) was the inducement to some veterans, old and new, which led them to volunteer for the Canadian Far East Force (see para 38 below).

33. Whatever the intention of each individual - and they must be given the benefit of a deep sense of loyalty or spirit of adventure - tabulation of the Reallocation Questionnaire compiled by Overseas Canadian Records Office shows that up to 30 May 45, a total of 24,304 had volunteered. This figure was made up as follows:-

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>
From North West Europe	1404	14,809
From the United Kingdom	1136	6,955

(1/FE/1, COS 503, Gibson and Walford from Montague, 30 May 45)



By 15 Jun 45, the total of volunteers of all ranks had risen to 32,883, and at 28 Jul 45 it had reached 36,125 (Ibid, A9533, Canmilitary to Defensor, 30 Jul 45). Here then was the nucleus of 6 Cdn Inf Div, made up of troops who had gained plenty of operational experience. As might be expected, a "culling" of the original volunteers through age and medical fitness somewhat reduced the numbers.

34. Volunteers had thus been obtained for the Pacific Force; but they were in North West Europe or the United Kingdom. Time was the pressing element, for it had been officially announced that the new force had to report for concentration in Canada and be ready to move to the United States by 1 Sep 45 for refitting and training. To act within this time limit would entail nearly insurmountable obstacles in many ways, but it had to be done. Cdn Sec 2 Ech H.Q. 21 Army Group, working in conjunction with Records, had to produce the volunteers from their different units in the field and start the stream moving to a transit camp on the Continent; form the men into drafts according to their Military Districts in Canada; then move them across the Channel to a Repatriation Depot in England for despatch to Canada. Volunteers were earmarked by Cdn Sec 2 Ech H.Q. 21 Army Group and Records to provide a full establishment for specific units of 6 Cdn Inf Div plus three months' reinforcements. Those surplus to unit W.E.s. were earmarked for posting to a Corps Concentration Area in Canada. (1/FE/1, COS 521, Gibson and Walford from Murchie and Montague, 2 Jun 45)

35. As with other movement of troops, all Services were concerned in this phase of the reallocation plan - there were medical and dental inspections, payments to be made, pay-books and accounts to be verified, foreign currency to be exchanged, clothing and equipment to be checked, individual records to accompany each draft, and transportation by road, rail, sea and air to be arranged. All these operations must work harmoniously in order to ensure a smooth, steady flow of personnel through the stream towards Canada and eventually to Japan. The highest degree of staff co-ordination was required.

36. The hardest problem to be overcome was that of securing the requisite Atlantic shipping. Here the control was not in Canadian hands - allocation of ships had to be obtained from the Allied Shipping Pool, which was under the Combined Chiefs of Staff. On 26 May it was tentatively agreed to allocate to Canada accommodation for 20,000 for the month of June for westward shipping (1/Release/1, COS 515, Montague to Walford, 1 Jun 45). Although the shipping programme was not firm, movement of Far East personnel had to be initiated without delay, and the first drafts were despatched from North West Europe to the United Kingdom on 6 Jun 45 (66/Realloc Regs/1, Circular Letter No. 360, Cdn Sec 2 Ech 21 Army Gp, 2 Jun 45). Other drafts of 500 to 1000 at a time followed from the Continent to England during June, a great number of them being transported by air. By 9 Jul 5266 had been despatched to Canada with 13,361 in the Repatriation Depots ready to move to port (1/Demob/2/6, D.R.&D. Report, 10 Jul 45). A special training cadre of 71 officers and 129 other ranks were returned to Canada by air on 30 Jun under special U.S. arrangements (1/R&D Plans/1/4, Nominal Roll XUK 176 "Green Priority" 29 Jun 45).

37. At this time a complication with regard to supplying personnel for the Pacific Force had developed in First Canadian Army which was reported to C.M.H.Q. by the G.O.C.-in-C. as follows:-

Owing to marked shortages of properly qualified and experienced Commissioned, Warrant and Non-Commissioned Officers in First Cdn Army brought about by system of re-allocation and repatriation on individual priorities presently in force, it is necessary that I now check further losses of such officers as volunteers to C.A.P.F. Can continue to send further volunteers C.A.P.F. amongst private soldiers First Cdn Army if so desired but must point out that a proportion of these have always signed up with the thought that either they would not be compelled or would not need to fulfil their operational obligations on return to Canada and have done so only to get earliest transportation home. My reports indicate this idea is gaining rather than losing strength in minds of troops and in consequence recommend at least a temporary stop acceptance Canada of volunteers C.A.P.F. from either U.K. or First Cdn Army as soon as possible in order to correct this outlook.

(1/Demob/2/6, C 238, Montague  
from Crerar, 9 Jul 45)

To meet this situation Overseas R.O. No. 5987 was published on 17 Jul 45; it restricted automatic withdrawal from units with highest priority return to Canada of officers and other ranks who volunteered for C.A.P.F. <sup>\*</sup> subsequent to 15 Jul 45. The Order provided that such personnel would only be withdrawn:

- (a) Upon specific demand by the Department of National Defence, Ottawa, and
- (b) Provided their release would not prejudice the efficiency of their respective units.

(C.A.O.R.O. No. 5987, 17 Jul 45)

38. In the meantime C.A.P.F. personnel continued their steady flow through to Canada, and by 11 Aug 45, 27,162 had been despatched, with another 1953 in formed drafts at Repatriation Depots awaiting shipment. On that date it was proposed that in view of the imminent surrender of Japan the return of C.A.P.F. personnel as first priority should be discontinued, effective 15 Aug 45 (1/Demob/2/7, COS 742, Murchie and Walford from Montague, 11 Aug 45). The proposal suggested that an early announcement to this effect would improve the morale of personnel awaiting repatriation, as there had been some feeling that a number had volunteered with the ulterior motive of quick repatriation. Concurrence in this proposal was received from Ottawa the same day (1/Demob/2/7, ADGEN 237, Montague from Walford, 11 Aug 45), but two days later an urgent request was sent that no publicity be given to any change in policy in this priority until after V.J. Day. It was further emphasized that plans should be laid for return

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\* Up to 26 Jun, C.M.H.Q. had been referring to the proposed Pacific Force as the Canadian Far East Force; on this date N.D.H.Q. was requested to advise the official designation and abbreviation of the force as it had been noted that Ottawa was using Canadian Army Pacific Force in all references (1/Org C.A.P.F./1, GS 1493, Canmilitary to Defensor, 26 Jun 45). The reply from N.D.H.Q. was to the effect that the official designation was Canadian Army Pacific Force, abbreviated C.A.P.F. (Ibid, GSD 275, Defensor to Canmilitary, 26 Jun 45). This title was then taken into general use for all references.



of the largest possible numbers of high point score personnel in current drafts (1/Demob/2/7, ADGEN 241, Montague from Walford, 13 Aug 45).

39. Thus ended the Priority One return of volunteers for the Canadian Army Pacific Force. The termination of the Force came on 4 Sep 45, when the following message was received by C.M.H.Q.:

Following Press release will be issued here at 1200 hours EDT this date -  
"The Canadian Army Pacific Force is being disbanded. Instructions issued over the week-end by the Department of National Defence have halted movements of Pacific volunteers into assembly areas in Canada and have outlined procedure for the ultimate disposal of all members of the Force. In general the plan is to disband C.A.P.F. units by releasing those who are eligible to return to civil life and by placing other personnel in employment with units already existing within the various Military Districts. Pacific volunteers who are eligible and desirous of retirement or of return to reserve status or discharge will be sent to their District Depots to enter the discharge stream. Others where appropriate may be granted extended leave to return to their civilian occupations. Personnel who wish to remain in the army and those who are not eligible for discharge will be directed to fill vacancies in the Military Districts and to replace on some Home War Establishments personnel who are eligible for and desirous of release. The Canadian Army Pacific Force was under the command of Maj-Gen B.N. Hoffmeister, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D., and its assembly was being rapidly completed in Canada when the war ended. It was to have served as a component part of the American Army and was slated to move to Kentucky for advanced training in American weapons and tactics".

(1/Demob/2/7, CGS 443, Defensor to Canmilitary, 4 Sep 45)

#### THE CANADIAN ARMY OCCUPATION FORCE

40. Following the cessation of hostilities there had always been a considerable amount of discussion among Canadian soldiers about the "Occupation of Germany", and from time to time it was brought to the fore by some announcement made by the Canadian Government regarding this phase of service. What was not generally known was that the General Staff at Ottawa in preparing "Appreciations" for Canadian participation in the war against Japan (see para 26 above) had also taken into consideration what share Canada was to have in the Army of Occupation (see Report No. 174, The Canadian Army Occupation Force in Germany, May 1945 to April 1946), periodically revising its views as the war progressed. The latest revision, Oprs 181-T, 24 Apr 44, was carefully studied by the Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q. before attending the first meeting of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission with the British Chiefs of Staff on 19 May 44 (1/FE/1, COS 93, Murchie from Stuart, 19 May 44).

41. In reporting this meeting to Ottawa, the Chief of Staff stated:-

It was an off-the-record meeting to discuss future procedure and the part that the Canadian Government might wish to play in the occupation of Germany and in the final phase of the war against Japan...

Regarding Cdn Army plans for post armistice participation I pointed out that I had not been briefed and that anything I said represented my personal views only. I said that I felt confident that the Canadian Government would wish the Cdn Army to be represented both in the Occupation of Germany and in the final phase against Japan. I pointed out that so many of our men had been away from home for a long time. We would have to call for volunteers and I thought our maximum contribution might be in the nature of an Inf Div for the Far East and perhaps an Armd Div for the Occupation of Germany.

It was agreed that a communication from Government to Government was necessary in order to find out the views of the Cdn Govt in respect to the part it was prepared to play in the two fields under discussion. This matter will be discussed again in the near future when I have no doubt we will be asked to comment on the phrasing of the proposed communication. It would be helpful to me if I could be given an indication of the extent to which the Government is prepared to go in respect to the Army.

(Ibid)

42. N.D.H.Q. replied that both questions had been given preliminary study in Ottawa, and added:

Up to the present time the only expression of policy by Cdn Government is that the extent and nature of Cdn participation will be decided when the appropriate time comes...

On both European and Pacific matters Cdn attitude and action will undoubtedly be affected by course of events in immediate future and location and future employment of Cdn Army.

(1/FE/1, GS 359, Stuart from Murchie, 4 Jun 44)

Future planning and discussions eventually resulted in approval being given by the Canadian Government, on 11 Dec 44, for the organization of a Canadian Occupational Group (1/Occup Gp/1, GSO 894, Montague from Murchie, 22 Dec 44). (The text of the message containing the Canadian Government's approval is reproduced as Appendix "A" to Report No. 174).

43. The approved plan stated that the group would be organized as an infantry formation of approximately 25,000 men and would form part of the troops required for the British Zone in Germany. This force was to be formed around a division, chosen by the Army Commander, with substitution of selected units to ensure full territorial representation. Personnel would be found from:



(a) Suitable personnel expressing a preference to undertake this duty and who are willing to forego their priority of demobilization and

(b) by detailing those with low priority of demobilization.

(Ibid)

44. Selection of officers and men in the former of these two categories was based upon the results obtained from the Reallocation Questionnaire (see para 17 above). The Questionnaire had given those men who wished to make the army a career an opportunity to express their desire to select continued service, and these, in the main, were the ones who chose to serve in the Army of Occupation. Unlike some who elected a hasty repatriation to Canada by choosing the Far East Force, they had planned further ahead, realizing that if by chance the occupational army was to operate for several years, it would become part of Canada's post-war army and they would be more likely to receive preference in appointment to that army.

45. Before the completion of the Reallocation Questionnaire, the news was out that the G.O.C.-in-C. First Canadian Army had chosen 3 Cdn Inf Div as the basic formation of the Canadian Occupational Force. He pointed out that it had been the last Canadian infantry division to arrive overseas and that it had satisfactory territorial representation. A target date for completion of organization was set at 30 Jun 45 (1/Occup Gp/1, GS 75, Main First Cdn Army to Canmilitary, 22 May 45). This deadline was met and on 11 Jul 45 3 Cdn Inf Div C.A.O.F., commanded by Maj-Gen C. Vokes, took over its new duties (Ibid, CGS 265, Defensor to Canmilitary, 24 May 45).

46. The reorganized division had been composed of those who volunteered and of low point personnel, but it also included the necessary specialists, who had been compulsorily included even though, in some instances, these had high point scores. Figures later compiled showed that on 4 Sep 45 the number of volunteers posted was 565 officers and 5595 other ranks, while those detailed to serve (low point scores and "key" personnel) totalled 631 officers and 13,280 other ranks (Ibid, All708, Canmilitary to Defensor, 4 Sep 45).

#### WITHDRAWAL OF C.A.O.F.

47. The satisfactory manner in which the Canadian Occupation Force carried on its duties in Germany has been described elsewhere (Report No. 174), but there seems little doubt that when it was announced in December 1945 that the Force would be withdrawn in April 1946, the majority of the troops involved were highly elated. Little time was lost in planning the withdrawal - termed Operation "MAPLE" - with the result that the first units of C.A.O.F. left the Continent in March 1946, and on 15 May 46 command of the area was turned over to the British 52 (L) Inf Div (1/Org CAOF/1/2, GS 594, 3 Cdn Inf Div C.A.O.F. to C.M.H.Q., 9 May 45). The last C.A.O.F. unit was despatched to the United Kingdom on 8 Jun 46 (1/Org CAOF/1/2, Maple 12, Cdn Sec M.C. 52(L) Div to C.M.H.Q., 8 Jun 45). By this time all other Canadian formations of First Canadian Army had been despatched to Canada, including the bulk of the high point personnel of units in the United Kingdom. This made possible a very quick repatriation to Canada of the Canadian Occupational Force. Its term of occupation had

not been long, but it had left a good impression on the people of Germany that will long be remembered.

#### COMPILATION OF POINT SCORES AND MOVEMENT OF CANADA DRAFTS

48. The Overseas Canadian Records Office had been allocated the task of compiling the personal point scores for all personnel before the end of hostilities (9 Apr 45), but the end came so quickly that it was impossible to tabulate these in time to supply the necessary figures to 2 Ech Cdn Sec 21 Army Group, who were responsible for posting high priority point score personnel to Canada Drafts. It was the general policy to move all Pacific Force volunteers as soon as possible after compiling their names from the Reallocation Questionnaire, and at the same time to repatriate as many high point score personnel to Canada as possible depending on available shipping accommodation (66/Realloc Regs/1, Cdn Sec 1 Ech Adm Instr No.37, 28 May 45).

49. This was accomplished by 2 Ech 21 Army Group immediately surveying their records and posting personnel with point scores of over 150 who had not volunteered for the Pacific or Occupational Forces and who were not "key" personnel. The "key" personnel, as usually referred to, included clerks, cooks, butchers, storemen and shoemakers, who were considered an integral part of any unit and whose retention was very necessary in maintaining that unit's morale and administration. In addition to these tradesmen a certain percentage of unit officers, warrant and non-commissioned officers were also placed in this category and were held back from repatriation as individuals. Besides these there were many officers and men who preferred repatriation with their unit to going home as individuals, and such personnel were allowed to remain on that basis. The plan was to repatriate the units by divisions according to their arrival overseas, and to intersperse high point score personnel in Canada Drafts between the divisional moves. In order to fill each point score draft, the number of points required was reduced for each successive movement.

50. This meant a vast amount of detail and planning and cross-posting between units and drafts, but it was soon apparent that the scheme was working very satisfactorily, although there were inevitably some cases of men with high point scores who could not be spared and who thus felt they had a complaint. Rumours of low point score personnel being sent home first caused some grumbling and complaints from the older veterans, a number of whom wrote letters to the Maple Leaf, some of which were later republished in certain Canadian newspapers. The resulting investigation proved that the majority of the complaints were unjustified as affecting the army as a whole. Shipping was not firm at this time (July 1945), and it would have been uneconomic to allow an under-strength draft to proceed from the United Kingdom when it could be easily filled by the inclusion of available non-essential low-point personnel, such as non-tradesmen and general duty men.

51. The reorganization and repatriation scheme made a fairly good start, considering the "sorting out" that had to be done between Pacific and Occupational Force volunteers, the "freezing" of certain "key" personnel in Corps and Services, and the tabulation of all point scores (the main basis of repatriation). By 4 Aug 45, a total of 55,485 (including high priority point score and Pacific volunteers) had been despatched to Canada (66/Move/1, MGA 356, Canmilitary to Defensor, 7 Aug 45).



52. With the "easing out" process of the first drafts of high point score personnel, the army had now arrived at the next phase - the repatriation of individuals who were to follow as "Canada Drafts" in between the repatriation of the divisional units. Highest point score priorities had been pretty well despatched by the time that 1 Cdn Inf Div was ready to move in August, and some basis of point scores for succeeding drafts had to be determined. This had to be approached with a view to a general lowering of point scores and a progressive release of frozen categories to an extent which could be carried out without detriment to the welfare of the remainder. In this regard, the G.O.C. C.F.N. suggested a point score of 130 for all non-essential personnel being returned to Canada between the despatch of 1 and 2 Divs, with a drop in the score to 120 for those going between 2 and 3 Divs, and a general lowering of scores again between the departures of 3 and 5 Divs and 5 and 4 Divs (1/R&D Plans/1/5, G.O.C. 12, H.Q. C.F.N. to C.M.H.Q., 13 Aug 45). The pause during the move of each division would afford time to make readjustments within units and to a limited extent train and re-distribute essential tradesmen and specialists, which in turn would allow the repatriation of a greater number of "key" personnel in the higher point score brackets.

53. At this time (August 1945) an analysis of point scores in the Canadian Army Overseas revealed that there were still 46,260 serving overseas with scores of 150 and over, and 22,528 with under 50 points, the under 50 pointers being allocated for service with the Occupational Force, while the various groups, in intervals of 10 points between these figures, averaged about 15,000 per group (see Appendix "E").

54. One of the greatest obstacles to arriving at any firm figure for lowering point scores very far in advance was that of shipping; another, at times, was that of accommodation in the United Kingdom. Accommodation had been set tentatively at a figure of 45,000, and shipping was sometimes allocated on very short notice; the inter-reaction between these factors frequently necessitated a hurried movement of troops in order that there might be no wastage of the shipping space provided. Nevertheless steady progress was made. A study of the Analyses of Priority Point Scores attached to this report (Appendices "E", "F" and "G"), will give a general idea of the composition of the Canadian Army Overseas in relation to point scores, as it proceeded towards repatriation. With the move of 1 Cdn Inf Div from North West Europe individual point scores were immediately lowered to 140, and the scaling down continued as each division moved out. When 2 Cdn Inf Div was ready to move, the point score was reduced to 110; with 3 Cdn Inf Div it was down to 90 points; and it had dropped to 50 before 5 and 4 Cdn Armd Divs had completed their moves from the Continent.

55. The table at Appendix "H" shows how the release of Canada Drafts was governed by a periodic reduction in point scores and gives the dates of posting of each group to Repatriation Depots. For certain "key" personnel there was never any lowering of point scores, their release being contingent upon obtaining a satisfactory replacement where required. It will be noted that clerks, cooks and butchers, were placed on a priority point score release basis which in every case was much higher than that for general duty personnel at the same date. A factor which allowed more low point score personnel to be released for repatriation was the retention of personnel electing "deferred" repatriation. Such officers and men could at any time express the desire, regardless of their point scores, to remain overseas as long as they were required. It may be

observed that the largest percentage of those who chose "deferred" repatriation had high point scores.

56. The last analysis of point scores tabulated by the Overseas Canadian Records Office (see Appendix "G" was issued on 9 May 46, at which time most of the Occupational Force were in transit. It shows a total of 910 officers and 2611 other ranks with point scores of 150 and over. It is also interesting to note that in the composition of the Occupational Force Volunteers serving at 26 Jan 46, point scores were broken down as follows:-

	<u>Points</u> <u>0-49</u>	<u>Points</u> <u>50 &amp; Up</u>	<u>Total</u>
Officers	51	659	710
O.Rs.	1273	5007	<u>6280</u>
			<u>6990</u>

Point scores came to an end as a consideration in priority repatriation on 21 May 46, when the following Records Message was despatched:-

Further Repat postings will take place on or about 6 June 46. Units will forward nominal rolls of personnel available by above date regardless of point scores.

(66/UK Repat Drafts/1, Memo,  
Extract Records Message R4/4276,  
21 May 46)

#### DISBANDMENT OF THE FIRST CANADIAN ARMY

57. Having thus indicated the way in which the point score system was designed to function, let us see how the operation of the scheme fitted in with the general repatriation programme. On 7 Jun 45, just one month after V.E. Day, First Canadian Army announced measures to end its own existence (66/Army Plans/1, Adm Instr No. 30, 7 Jun 45). A plan was issued to provide for the disbandment of the Army, having regard to the published policy with respect to repatriation and demobilization, the formation of the Occupational Force and the necessity for maintaining a balanced force administratively during the period of disbandment.

58. The basic factors affecting the plan of disbandment were:-

- (a) The manpower drain on the army caused by the immediate despatch of Pacific volunteers - approximately 12,000 personnel.
- (b) The manpower drain on the army caused by the repatriation of long service personnel, which would continue until 31 Jul 45.
- (c) The administrative strain on the army caused by the withdrawal of personnel and equipment required to form 3 Cdn Inf Div C.A.O.F., the target date for this being 30 Jun 45.



- (d) The necessity of releasing British and Allied forces now under command.

(Ibid)

59. In order to ensure that the object would be achieved without continual dislocation of administration, it was essential that the army be reorganized as soon as possible under the administrative control of a minimum number of headquarters, each one controlling a group of sub-formations and units which could be disbanded or repatriated without affecting the remainder of the whole.

60. This regrouping of the army was laid down in seven phases, which are outlined briefly in the following paragraphs. The first phase extended through the preliminary period, during which certain outstanding army commitments would be met and the way cleared for the launching of a full programme of repatriation. It was estimated that the following conditions would have been fulfilled by 15 Jul 45:-

- (a) First Cdn Army has been relieved of responsibility in Germany and all Canadian troops withdrawn with the exception of 3 Cdn Inf Div C.A.O.F.
- (b) British operational troops have passed from command of First Cdn Army.
- (c) H.Q. Netherlands District and troops have passed from under command First Cdn Army.
- (d) 3 Cdn Inf Div C.A.O.F. has passed to command of Hanover Corps District.
- (e) Volunteers for C.F.E.F. despatched for Canada.
- (f) Div groups formed.
- (g) H.Q. of Corps, independent armoured brigades, A.G.R.As. and A.G.R.Es. relieved of all responsibilities and staffs available for reallocation.
- (h) Disbandment of units not being repatriated with Div groups.
- (i) Changes in formation staffs to permit staff officers to be repatriated in accordance with length of service.

(Ibid)

During Phase 1 repatriation would be proceeding by the despatch of long service individuals in drafts on the basis of priority of point scores as described above (para 49).

61. Subsequent phases (Phases 2 to 6) would see the return to Canada of all units with territorial affiliations and the continued despatch of Canada Drafts comprising long service personnel from units which were not to go back to Canada as such. For the purpose of phasing out all units of First Canadian Army not forming part of existing divisional establishments, it was proposed to form five divisional groups. Each phase would be considered completed when main bodies of those groups had passed through the transit camp at Nijmegen. As

noted above (para 52) the proposed order of despatch of the divisional groups was as follows:-

Phase 2	1 Cdn Inf Div Group
Phase 3	2 Cdn Inf Div Group
Phase 4	3 Cdn Inf Div (Cda) Group
Phase 5	5 Cdn Armd Div Group
Phase 6	4 Cdn Armd Div Group

(See Appendices "I" to "M" for units of above) (Ibid)

62. When all units which were to be returned to Canada as such in any one divisional group had been despatched, there would be a residue in the group which had not yet been repatriated in Canada Drafts. This residue would consist of personnel remaining on the strength of R.C.E.M.E., R.C.O.C. and similar units not destined for return to Canada intact, but already depleted by the despatch of drafts of long service personnel. In order to complete the dissolution of the divisional group it would be necessary at the completion of each phase to post such residue to the corresponding unit in a succeeding phase.

63. In Phase 7 - the final phase - there would be formed an army administrative residue under command H.Q. A.Tps Area, comprising those administrative units not allotted to divisional groups. The command would include operational and administrative units scheduled for disbandment. Phase 7 would run concurrently with Phases 1 to 6.

64. In preparing the Order of Battle under which Phases 2 to 6 would be implemented for both divisional and non-divisional units, the Army plan gave full consideration to the following factors:-

- (a) As far as possible non-divisional units have been included in divisional groups corresponding with their date of arrival in the U.K. Exceptions to this are arty units which have been allotted to the div groups on a proportional basis - arty to inf.
- (b) Adm units have been added to each div group where necessary to ensure that each group is capable of functioning as an adm entity.
- (c) The adm units allotted to phase 7 will be used by Heads of Services to strengthen div groups as depletion occurs by the despatch of repatriation drafts.
- (d) It will be noted that non-div units will at times be greatly overstrength, e.g., if 1 Cdn Corps Sigs and other sigs units are disbanded, 1 Cdn Inf Div Sigs may rise to as much as two to three times normal strength.

(Ibid)

65. Repatriation under Phase 1 of the Army plan proceeded during the month of June 1945, as Cdn Sec 2 Ech issued posting instructions for the return to Canada of Pacific Volunteers and highest point score personnel. By the first



week in July Cdn Sec 2 Ech had issued posting instructions to form Canada Drafts which would commence the repatriation of all personnel with long service scores of approximately 150 or over, except those necessarily detained for administrative or other reasons and Occupational Force volunteers. On 4 Jul a second administrative instruction from First Canadian Army outlined further procedure in the despatch of units and the dissolution of divisional groups (66/Army Plans/1, First Cdn Army Adm Instr No. 33, 4 Jul 45). Such were the broad outlines of the plan for the disbandment and repatriation of Units by Divisions of First Canadian Army. Its soundness and efficiency were later proven as each phase passed into history and the number of Canadians on the Continent dwindled to nil. To those responsible for the plan, a tribute is due - it was a good, clean, orderly scheme well done.

66. It only remained now for the plan to be carried through to completion. Phase 1, estimated to be completed by 15 Jul 45, progressed fairly well as scheduled. By that date 3 Cdn Inf Div C.A.C.F. had taken over in Germany, Pacific Force volunteers had been despatched, various headquarters relieved of their responsibilities, long service personnel Canada Drafts sent off and certain units slated for disbandment had been dissolved. (A list of the first units to be disbanded in this way is shown with effective dates in Appendix "N") (1/GS Policy Demob/1, GS Submission 815, 14 Jun 45.)

67. Before the completion of Phase 1, the G.O.C.-in-C. First Canadian Army issued a memorandum to all commanders drawing attention to the fact that "individual priority" system of repatriation would soon come to an end and that the repatriation of the balance and bulk of the army would be almost entirely carried out by the despatch of units, remustered on a territorial basis (1/Demob/2/6, Memo G.O.C.-in-C., 10 Jul 45). It should be recalled here that the G.O.C.-in-C. had from the first favoured very strongly the repatriation of the army by units and divisions rather than by individuals, and while the plan as now in effect called for this to be done, yet with the lowering of point scores for repatriation and the desire of certain personnel to get home on an individual basis rather than to wait for their unit to be repatriated, it could be seen that the units to be despatched would be very much depleted in strength by the time that they were to move.

68. It is interesting to note at this point that the G.O.C.-in-C. had always advocated, and as far as possible directed, that reinforcements be posted territorially. He had written a directive to all Commanders and Commanding Officers on D Day (6 Jun 44) stating that he thought it was desirable that he should explain to them personally the policy of territorial reinforcing which he desired should be maintained to the maximum extent. The reasons for going to considerable administrative trouble in furtherance of this policy were several and important:-

- (a) While on active service, a flow of reinforcements from Canada from the "home station", or its vicinity, to the unit in the field means a lot to the reinforcements (who find mutual friends) to officers and men in the unit (who obtain news of family or friends) and to the locality (which maintains an active, practical interest in the unit which largely represents it). These are "morale building" factors, and every effort should be made to retain them.

- (b) When the war comes to its victorious end - as one of these days it will - the movement back to Canada and the subsequent demobilization of a territorially composed unit is an "administrative dream". Everything under control and everybody happy. It can be a tidy show from start to finish. An organized welcome and efficient arrangements for reception and demobilization at the appropriate locality. Every officer and man finishing his Army job, or going on leave, with great, and good feeling.
- (c) Finally, after demobilization, there can be no more stabilizing influence in any community than the presence of "all ranks" of a unit which represented that locality overseas, who have returned to civil life in that locality. Incidentally - though quite an important factor to those who do return - regimental reunions can be arranged in after years with a minimum of travelling or other difficulties.

(1/R&D Plans/1, Letter  
G.O.C.-in-C., 6 Jun 44)

69. Cdn Sec 2 Ech had been fully apprised of the importance that General Crerar attached to the maintenance of territorial reinforcements and also to the return to their own units of recovered casualties (except for emergent situations when this was not possible and when unit requirements in special trades would interfere). The Army Commander had asked that should this policy be deviated from to any extent, the instances should be brought to the attention of Oi/c Cdn Sec G.H.Q. 1 Ech 21 Army Gp, who would initiate an investigation. He further suggested that adjustments could be accomplished in units of a formation by mutual arrangement should the need suddenly develop (Ibid). This directive was repeated to Commanders and Commanding Officers on 25 Nov 44 (1/R&D Plans/1, Letter to G.O.C.-in-C., 25 Nov 44). However, as later events proved, it was not possible to comply fully with these instructions; reinforcements were at a premium in the infantry arm, and territorial posting could not therefore be adhered to.

70. With these facts in mind, therefore, in his memorandum issued during Phase 1, General Crerar stressed that while the basis of "First Over, First Back", or "First In, First Out", or "High Point Scores Before Low" had a strong sentimental influence, it was not now a rational procedure. Styling such a process "repatriation by disintegration", he declared that should it continue it would not be possible adequately to maintain and administer the troops still remaining; nor would it be easy to bring the units and sub-units, so considerably changed in their personnel, up to the very high standard which they had possessed in the past. The memorandum went on:-

It is quite essential therefore, that everyone of you loyally accept the view that the time has come when "High Point Scores" can no longer be an influencing factor in repatriation, and that the despatch of the balance and bulk of the First Cdn Army must now be done in a selected sequence of Divisional Groups, units and sub-units. The "time factor" of the individual must give way to the "orderly repatriation" of the many. The personal longing to "get home quickly"



must be subordinated to the higher duty of each one of us to think, and act, in terms of the greater good for the greater number.

I want you, also, to take steps to explain to all ranks under your command the need for them to adopt a similar attitude. The majority of very long service, or "high point" personnel, are to be found in the administrative services, the signals, etc. The greatest number of "low point" soldiers are in the ranks of the Infantry - for the very good reason that the infantry arm has suffered by far the heaviest casualties in operations. Yet from the point of view of orderly repatriation and demobilization, it is the "combatant arm" rather than the "administrative service" which should be the first to be released. And if sentimental factors are to dominate the issue, it would be easy, also, to use the additional argument that the infantry man, with, say, five months of very dangerous operational service to his credit, should be released in advance of those in the other Arms and Services, whose duties have not subjected them to the same risks of life and limb.

But, the head, even more than the heart, requires to be employed in the intricate business of repatriating and demobilizing a large army. And so, let the argument and the chatter cease, and let all ranks get down to the worthwhile business of bringing themselves, and their units, to the highest level of physical fitness and soldierly behaviour, of raising their vocational and educational standards, of enjoying, though not abusing, the recreational facilities which are extensive and good and, finally, maintaining the friendliest relations with the Dutch people, throughout our enforced stay in their country.

(1/Demob/2/6, G.O.C.-in-C. Memo, 10 Jul 45)

71. It is doubtful, as evidenced by figures shown below, whether the Army Commander's appeal had the effect of maintaining unit strengths at anywhere near War Establishment strength by the time they arrived in Canada. A breakdown of the numbers of personnel whom it was intended to return to Canada by units and as individuals shows the following proposed strengths for the Divisional Groups in each of Phases 2 to 7:

<u>Phase</u>	<u>Div Group</u>	<u>All ranks in Groups</u>	<u>All ranks in Disbanded Units</u>
2	1 Cdn Inf Div	16,912	7,125
3	2 Cdn Inf Div	17,004	7,894
4	3 Cdn Inf Div (Cda)	14,172	7,456
5	5 Cdn Armd Div	11,891	6,060
6	4 Cdn Armd Div	11,584	6,405
7	A.Tps, L. of C., etc		20,126
		<u>71,563</u>	<u>55,066</u>

(66/Army Plans/1, First Cdn Army  
Adm Instr No.33, 4 Jul 45,  
Appendices A,B,C,D,E,F.)

In contrast, however, the figures of actual despatches tell a very different story. Holdings and despatches reported as of 25 Jan 46 - the date by which the last unit had returned to Canada - reveal that Canada Drafts accounted for very many more personnel than did despatch by units.

<u>Types of Personnel</u>	<u>Holdings (25 Jan 46)</u>	<u>Despatched 8 May to date</u>
Canada Draft C.A.P.F.	Nil	28,227
Canada Draft Repat	17,316	108,215
Units	Nil	29,381
Others	2,450	41,650
<u>Totals</u>	<u>19,766</u>	<u>207,473</u>

(66/Tp Moves/1/4, A.1090, Canmilitary to Defensor, 25 Jan 46)

72. The above results indicate that of unit War Establishment strengths of 71,563 (see para 71 above) proposed for return as such to Canada, the actual numbers of personnel repatriated with those units only totalled 29,381. It would thus appear that the bulk of the Canadian Army were repatriated as individuals, totalling, up to this date (when all Divisional Groups had been despatched to Canada) 125,531 as Canada Drafts and present holdings.\* The despatch of the last Divisional Group, and the concurrent running down of Phase 7 of the original plan, completed the repatriation of the First Canadian Army, which thus ceased to exist.

#### REORGANIZATION OF REINFORCEMENT UNITS INTO REPATRIATION DEPOTS

73. In the early stages of planning by the Reorganization and Demobilization Committee and Sub-Committees, the matter of accommodation in the United Kingdom for repatriates had come to the fore. At its first meeting on 19 Mar 43, the Transportation and Accommodation sub-committee suggested that

\* The following schedule shows how the move of the Divisional Groups proceeded:

<u>Div Group</u>	<u>First Unit Arrival in U.K.</u>	<u>Last Unit Despatch to Canada</u>
1 Cdn Inf Div	31 Aug 45	16 Oct 45
2 Cdn Inf Div	19 Sep 45	23 Nov 45
3 Cdn Inf Div (Cda)	6 Nov 45	18 Dec 45
5 Cdn Armd Div	4 Dec 45	22 Jan 46
4 Cdn Armd Div	14 Dec 45	22 Jan 46

(1/R&D Plans/1, Vols 7 and 8)



"as the area around Aldershot and Bordon is always likely to remain a Canadian Area, the accommodation available there should be used as the basis of a plan for holding and evacuating through the United Kingdom" (15/Demob/1, Report of Demobilization Sub-Committee on Transportation and Accommodation, 26 May 43). This suggestion, in effect, was a good one, for it would be an easy matter to retain the accommodation already being used for reinforcements and training depots employing the existing staffs and organization; it would only be a matter of reversing the order of movement from reinforcements going forward to that of an army being repatriated (Ibid). Eventually that was what transpired, with some upheavals which were all ironed out in good time.

74. It was a far cry from March 1943 to March 1945, when reinforcements on hand in the United Kingdom numbered 2736 officers and 31,461 other ranks fit or in training for despatch forward (1/R&D Plans/1, M.G.A. Letter, 30 Mar 45). It was the Army Commander's intention that on cessation of hostilities all reinforcements in North West Europe and the United Kingdom should be sent to field units for posting on a strictly territorial basis, even though it resulted in some units going over the War Establishment strength. The result of this would be to empty out the reinforcement units and at the same time build up with low point personnel units in the field. Such personnel could either be repatriated with the units, directed to the Occupational Force, or held for general duties on the Continent while the bulk of higher point personnel were being repatriated (see para 81 below). (Ibid)

75. In view of these plans the Director of Reorganization and Demobilization suggested in mid-April that the ultimate form of the existing reinforcement organization in the United Kingdom should be:-

H.Q. C.R.U. (Canadian Reinforcement Units)

1 C.G.R.U. (Canadian General Reinforcement Unit)

1 Cdn Repat Depot

Repatriation Depots

It was proposed that these should be built up to a minimum holding of 45,000, having in mind the estimated shipping available within two months after V.E. Day. He also suggested that Repatriation Depot Establishments should be drafted to match the existing War Establishments of Reinforcement Units and Infantry Training Regiments. These latter units could be disbanded on a date set by H.Q. C.R.U. when they had shrunk to nil strength while the new Repatriation Units were correspondingly growing. (1/R&D Plans/1/2, D.R. & D. Letter, 18 Apr 45)

76. To facilitate the conversion from Reinforcement Units and Infantry Training Regiments, it was suggested that Swindon Camps be taken over to clear barracks required for a concentrated Repatriation Depot. In view of the poor accommodation and anticipated difficulties of administration at Swindon, however, it was later decided, at a conference held at C.M.H.Q. on 23 Apr 45, that 2 Cdn Repat Depot should be opened in accommodation selected by H.Q. C.R.U. by 5 May 45. It would have accommodation for 5000 all ranks in one locality, and troops vacating this area would move to the Sussex Camps. It was also decided that as reinforcement holdings in the United Kingdom were reduced by despatches to the Continent, surplus Permanent Establishment personnel and accommodation would be converted to repatriation functions as under:-

- (i) Infantry. As reinforcement holdings are reduced the remaining holdings will be regrouped and C.I.T.Rs. thus released will be converted to Repat Depots. One or more C.I.T.Rs. will be retained to hold and despatch C.I.C. reinforcements to continent.
- (ii) Arms other than Infantry. As reinforcement holdings are reduced it is proposed to set up a 2 C.G.R.U. with Coys holding reinforcements for all Corps other than Infantry and not at present held by 1 C.G.R.U. The function of 2 C.G.R.U. would be to hold and despatch reinforcements to the continent. Personnel and accommodation thus released will be utilized for repat purposes.

(1/R&D Plans/1/2, M.G.A. Report,  
24 Apr 45)

77. At the same time, it was decided that 1 Cdn Repat Depot - formerly existing as 1 N.E.T.D. - would be allotted Ontario and Huron camps as additional accommodation, with personnel in these two camps being moved to Morval Camp at Cove (Ibid). 2 C.A.R.U. was, at this time, occupying Ontario and Huron Camps, and the move to Morval Camp was completed by 5 May 45, when 1 Cdn Repat Depot took over the vacated accommodation, and in so doing expanded to four Wings:- Tweedsmuir, Superior, Ontario and Huron, with additional accommodation for Nursing Sisters and C.W.A.C. personnel in Bramshott Hospital. Included in the same movement instruction was the order providing for the transfer of Nos. 2 and 4 Cdn Inf Trg Regts from Jasper, Laurentide and Algonquin Camps in the Witley area. 2 C.I.T.R. was moved to tented camps in Sussex (Middleton, Conyboro and Plumpton Place) and 4 C.I.T.R. went to Beaumont Barracks in Aldershot, with its Training Battalions being placed in tented camps in the Tweseldown and Bourley area. This move allowed H.Q. "E" Group and Nos. 1, 2 and 3 C.A.C.R.U.s. to vacate their accommodation near Blackdown and move into the Witley Camps. 2 Cdn Repat Depot now came to life in the Blackdown area on 1 May 45. (1/R&D Plans/1/2, M.G.A. Reports, 30 Apr 45)

78. Although hostilities had not yet ceased, this preliminary reshuffling of units was necessary to initiate the repatriation plan. Plans were going forward for the ultimate conversion of Reinforcement Units to Repatriation Depots - it was only a matter of awaiting V.E. Day and clearing all Reinforcement Units of reinforcements. Four days after V.E. Day, on 12 May 45, a meeting was held in the office of the D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., to put into operation the plan for the reorganization of C.R.U. In view of fast moving events, it was now necessary that the plan be immediately approved and ready for issue to all concerned within a week. It was stressed that in general the principle to be followed throughout was that the soldiers' wishes were to be catered for to the maximum extent consistent with the defined policy and administrative necessities. Agreement was reached that initially seven Repatriation Depots should be provided, with others to be added at a later date as they might be required. These changes would be initiated as the movement of reinforcements forward permitted the necessary adjustments to be made; the order of priority depended on future developments.

79. The seven Repatriation Depots, with control decentralized to H.Q. C.R.U., were to be formed in the areas and grouped for command under the existing local group headquarters as follows:-



<u>Unit</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Under Command</u>
1 Cdn Repat Depot	Thursley - Bramshott Area	"E" Group H.Q.
4 Cdn Repat Depot	Witley Area	
2 Cdn Repat Depot	Blackdown - Woking Area	"B" Group H.Q.
3 Cdn Repat Depot	Cove Area	
5 Cdn Repat Depot	Aldershot Area	"A" Group H.Q.
6 Cdn Repat Depot	" "	
7 Cdn Repat Depot	" "	

(H.Q. 14 Cdn Inf Trg Bde was to be redesignated "A" Gp H.Q. at the appropriate time) (1/R&D Plans/1/2, Minutes of Meeting, 12 May 45).

80. The creation of the new Depots meant the disbandment of the following reinforcement and training units:-

- 1, 2 and 3 Cdn Armd Corps Reinforcement Units
- 1 and 2 Cdn Artillery Reinforcement Units
- 1 Cdn Engineer Reinforcement Unit
- 1 Cdn Signals Reinforcement Unit
- 1, 3, 4 and 5 Cdn Infantry Training Regiments
- 1 Cdn Ordnance Mechanical Equipment Reinforcement Unit.

To absorb the personnel of these disbanded units it became necessary to create the following:-

- (i) 2 Cdn Gen Rft Unit to hold and train rfts for C.A.C. and Arty, this Unit to be located in Quebec and St Lucia Bks, Bordon.
- (ii) 3 Cdn Gen Rft Unit to hold and train rfts for Engrs, Sigs, Ord and R.C.E.M.E., this Unit to be located in Martinique Bks, Bordon, where additional space would be available for educational courses.

(Ibid)

All remaining infantry reinforcements were to be absorbed into units of the existing 13 Cdn Inf Trg Bde (see Appendix "O") Training Regiments of 14 Cdn Inf Trg Bde were to be disbanded and their personnel transferred to Garrison Battalions for the field, 5, 6 and 7 Repat Depots, or into the training regiments of 13 Cdn Inf Trg Bde. 1 C.A.S.C.R.U. and 1 C.G.R.U. in Aldershot were to continue as previously, with increased emphasis on the provision of cooks, drivers, Provost and clerk reinforcements. They were to come under the command of "C" Group H.Q., as would 2 and 3 C.G.R.U.s. in Bordon. "F" Group H.Q. was to command all static units in the Bordon area. The need for this number of Reinforcement Units was to be re-assessed at a later date, and it was proposed that subsequently 1 C.A.S.C.R.U. might be absorbed by 3 C.G.R.U. and that 13 Cdn Inf Trg Bde might be reduced to about two battalions, with a corresponding reduction in the number of C.G.R.U.s (Ibid).

81. Approval had been granted for three Brigade Headquarters, nine Garrison Battalions and the increments to go forward to field units in North West Europe (see para 74), and action would be taken to move these as soon as the Army Commander wished. Training Directive No. 4, 2 May 45, issued by C.M.H.Q. outlined in full the training policy for all personnel of all corps within the reinforcement stream on cessation of hostilities with Germany, and stressed the fact that filling of demands for the theatre was the over-riding factor (1/R&D Plans/1/2, Trg Directive, 2 May 45).

82. As the reinforcements vacated accommodation in starting their forward movement to the Continent, it was possible to form Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 Repat Depots, their War Establishments taking effect 30 May 45. Included in the discussions for the original seven repatriation depots had been a suggestion that they should be designated by Arms of the Service. This was provided for in the reorganization plan, but owing to the many factors involved a strict adherence to this arrangement was impractical in application (a table showing in outline the reorganization plan of Nos. 1 - 7 Repat Depots and the various Reinforcement Units appears in Appendix "O").

83. The change-over was smooth and effective, for the plans were well made - the repatriation stream was on the way. High point personnel were the first arrivals, followed by the initial draft of Pacific Force volunteers on 6 Jun 45. The First Canada Draft (serials 1 to 10) were allocated to 3 Cdn Repat Depot (C.M.H.Q. Adm Order No. 70, 1 Jun 45). Soon the Depots, with an approximate accommodation for 30,000 were functioning smoothly and at capacity. Shipping estimates had been set at 50,000 for the first three months, but additional unexpected allotments of sailing space were made, and it became necessary again to increase the depot accommodation for the repatriation stream. The number actually carried on shipping during June, July and August totalled 63,731 (see Appendix "S").

84. To discuss the expansion of accommodation for repatriation personnel, a meeting was held in the office of the D.A.G., C.M.H.Q., on 25 Jun 45. Suggestions were made that tented camps should be utilized, but H.Q. C.R.U. were of the opinion that the use of these was undesirable and would bring about a feeling of being discriminated against on the part of those who were routed through such accommodation. There were also no entertainment facilities for tented camps. The following decisions were made:-

- (a) To form 8 Cdn Repat Depot, using as a nucleus the P.E. (Permanent Establishment) of 2 N.E.T.D. and placed under command of "B" Gp H.Q.
- (b) To form 9, 10 and 11 Cdn Repat Depots in the Sussex Area, using the P.E. of the Inf Trg Regts being disbanded and placed under command H.Q. 13 C.I.B. converted to a Group H.Q.

(66/Repat Meeting/1, Notes of Meeting, 25 Jun 45)

85. Action along these lines soon produced the desired results. 8 Cdn Repat Depot was formed (effective 26 Jun 45) occupying Blenheim, Malplaquet and Tournai Barracks in Farnborough. 9, 10 and 11 Cdn Repat Depots were organized (effective 20 Jul 45) in the areas of Haslemere, Leatherhead and Forest Row respectively. This completed the reorganization of C.R.U., and except for 7 Cdn Repat Depot moving from Aldershot



to Horsham area and minor expansions of some of the Repatriation Depots as nearby accommodation later became available, there were no further changes. It was not, however, until 30 Aug 45, that H.Q. Canadian Reinforcement Units was officially re-designated H.Q. Canadian Repatriation Units (1/Org R.U./1/5, C.M.H.Q. Adm Order No.110, 4 Sep 45).

#### MOVEMENT THROUGH THE REPATRIATION DEPOTS

86. The Repatriation Depots were all located in areas familiar to Canadians. Nearly every Canadian in the army had passed through Aldershot or had been stationed there at some time in his sojourn overseas. An "army town", if ever there was one, of huge, old, cold, dilapidated, broken down and condemned barracks, with large parade "squares"; but a town of kindly civilians, who were outraged by the Canadians' demonstrations there in July 1945, and who retaliated afterwards by granting them "The Freedom of Aldershot" in a fitting ceremony! Farnborough - which was really an extension of Aldershot, without that town's entertainment facilities in the way of "flicks" and pubs, and without such good railway service for "nipping off" to London for evenings or weekends - a point which probably recalls to the minds of thousands of Canadians the last train from Waterloo to Aldershot. Enlargement of the ordeal is not necessary to those who have made this trip! Woking and Blackdown - where originally the C.A.C.R.U.s. were located, and one took refresher courses in tank driving, wireless and tank gunnery, and found an A.T.S. camp nearby! Cove - where Engineers and Signals had a Reinforcement Unit. Haslemere and Horsham - familiar territory to thousands, and Petworth, not too far from Brighton and Hove, where Canadians had been stationed during the war. Forest Row near East Grinstead, in beautiful Sussex and well known to countless field units. Leatherhead - always mentioned with rather a superior attitude (Army Headquarters was at Leatherhead) (See Appendix "P" for a list of the locations of Repat Depots and Wings). So, as the army gradually wended its way back to Canada through England, Canadians with familiar unit and divisional patches were seen in their old haunts all over the country from Lands End to John O'Groats, with Wales and Ireland getting their share of the boys on their last leave.

87. It had taken nearly four years to bring Canada's five divisions overseas, but it took just ten months from V.E. Day to send over 231,000 repatriates back to the Dominion. (This figure does not include 8500 casualties returned on hospital ships, or approximately 600 by air lifts during the same period). The Repatriation Depots could have handled larger numbers than this, but shipping was at all times the controlling factor which regulated the flow of personnel through the depots. The general principle was always not to keep repats "hanging about" too long while awaiting shipment home, but to hold them the minimum time which would permit completion of documentation and a short leave before despatching them to Canada. Although this system inevitably kept Repat P.E.s. in the constant state of either doing too much in too little time, or doing nothing with plenty of time, it was, on the whole, most efficient.

88. For the purpose of co-ordinating the movement of drafts and units from North West Europe to the United Kingdom, a Control Room was set up at C.M.H.Q. This Control Room called forth drafts as shipping became available, allocated the Canada Draft serials, and advised Repatriation Depots through H.Q. C.R.U., the designating numbers as each was formed. It was in constant communication with 1 and 2 Ech, Records, Movement

Control, and H.Q. C.R.U., and being located at C.M.H.Q. was the terminus of communications between Canada, the United Kingdom and the European Continent (66/Realloc Regs/1, Adm Instr No. 37, 28 May 45).

89. Entertainment of troops at the Repatriation Depots was well looked after by the Auxiliary Services, who provided cinema shows with three changes weekly, and brought in every available E.N.S.A. and Canadian Army Show. In addition, the Educational Services organized educational tours to different points of interest, usually employing road transport to complete a round trip in one day. Occupational Shops and Rehabilitation Training Schools were established where troops could fill in their time while waiting movement. These proved of great value and were well received by the men. Many of the men will long remember the time spent in organised work on English farms, while others profitably used more than one leave working in shops and factories in various parts of England. It was all good experience for these men; it kept them busy and it laid a ground work for their return to civilian life.

#### THE DISBANDMENT OF C.M.H.Q. UNITS

90. With the completion of Phase 7 of the disbandment programme of First Canadian Army - by which time all high point personnel, Pacific Force Volunteers and units had been despatched to Canada - the gradual disbandment of the Repatriation Depots began. Official dates of disbandment were as follows:-

7, 9, 10 and 11 Cdn Repat Depots	28 Jan 46
2, 5, 6 and 8 Cdn Repat Depots	15 Feb 46
3 Cdn Repat Depot	3 Mar 46

(1/Org R.U./1/5 General Staff  
Submission 1113, 29 Dec 45, and  
C1119, 8 Jan 46)

There remained 1 and 4 Cdn Repat Depots still in existence. 1 Repat Depot was handling all transient drafts, while 4 Repat was to look after the repatriation of 3 Cdn Inf Div C.A.O.F. When this task had been completed, 4 Cdn Repat Depot was disbanded, on 13 July 46, followed by H.Q. C.R.U. on 22 Jul. 1 Cdn Repat Depot was left to repatriate the 9000 Canadians still composing the Canadian Army Overseas at this date.

91. During the six months that followed C.M.H.Q. units were disbanded in quick succession, and on 21 Feb 47 1 Cdn Repat Depot itself ceased to exist (C.M.H.Q. Adm Order No. 53, 12 Feb 47.) Next day C.M.H.Q. went on to a reorganized War Establishment, with a strength of 30 officers and 65 other ranks, which it was intended to deplete gradually until complete disbandment at a date



tentatively set as 1 Aug 47.<sup>x</sup> By 31 Mar 47, C.M.H.Q. had been depleted through repatriation and the strength return at that date showed a total of 20 officers and 45 other ranks still remaining (1/Demob/1/3, Muster Roll, 31 Mar 47).

92. A directive issued at A.H.Q. on 9 Jan 47 outlined the Final Stage of Demobilization of the Canadian Army (Active). It provided for all ranks being discharged by 31 Mar 47, with the exception of a certain number of essential personnel, who might not be employed later than 30 Sep 47 (see Appendix "R") (Ibid).

93. Following the depletion of C.M.H.Q. a small military staff was established in London, headed by the newly designated Army Adviser to the Canadian High Commissioner, effective 17 Mar 47, with the following appointments:<sup>xx</sup>

Army Adviser  
G.S.O. 1 and Joint Secretary  
G.2 Liaison Officer  
G. Tech Liaison Officer  
Camp Commandant

(Ibid: Table of Organization  
No. 5591 (B) 1)

The main duties of this staff, which was commanded by Brigadier H.D. Graham, C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D., were to provide liaison between the War Office and the Canadian High Commissioner's Office, and to carry out administration of the reorganized C.M.H.Q., personnel of the Canadian Army (A.F.) on courses in England, and the

* Branch	Officers	Other Ranks
J.A.G.	1	1
S.D.	2	-
Int Sec	1	-
G. Br Clerks	-	3
Hist Sec	9	7
Sigs	1	9
Pers	1	-
C.R.	-	3
Claims	1	1
D.A.B.	-	1
C.W.B. (Immigration)	4	7
Pay	2	4
Records	1	3
Camp & G.D.	-	10
D.A.Q.M.G.	1	1
Ordnance	2	-
Quartering	2	1
M.C.	2	4
Transport	-	10
	<u>30</u>	<u>65</u>

(Ibid: Serial 56/1 C.M.H.Q. W.E.  
Cdn IV/85/8, 22 Feb 47; Adm Order  
No. 53, 12 Feb 47)

xx Effective 22 Apr 47, the name was changed to Senior Canadian Army Liaison Officer, designated in the establishment of the Canadian Army Liaison Establishment, London (1/Demob/1/3).

Overseas C.A.(A) List (to which were attached personnel on leave pending U.K. discharge, apprehended Canadian deserters, and personnel released from civil prisons on completion of sentence). (Ibid)

94. Canadian Army personnel discharged in the United Kingdom to 31 Mar 47, numbered approximately 500 officers and 2400 other ranks. While these personnel suffered the loss of some amenities due on discharge, i.e., free medical and dental treatment, hospitalization and certain rehabilitation credits, they were allowed free transportation to Canada within six months of date of discharge.

#### THE PROBLEM OF SHIPPING - HOW THE TROOPS GOT HOME

95. Reallocation, reorganization, repatriation, demobilization - these words became familiar to all ranks of the Canadian Army Overseas as soon as the war ended. Plans and schemes were laid for each phase well in advance, but the main factor affecting the whole issue was the question of shipping. It was not a matter of transporting a platoon, or company, or regiment, brigade or division - it meant transporting over 300,000 personnel across the Atlantic from the United Kingdom to Canada.

96. Immediately after V.E. Day, the people of Canada began pressing for the return of service personnel, and the service personnel themselves were no less anxious to be home. The Canadian Government, in spite of very early action to secure all shipping available, was being pressed from all sides to speed up the repatriation scheme and get the soldiers back into civilian jobs. Wives wanted their husbands home, mothers their sons, girls their sweethearts, children their fathers, and above all, industry wanted men back as soon as possible to operate the plants which were being converted from war to peacetime production. But what availed all the wishing and longing if the ships were not available to transport these men?

97. It was not a matter that could be settled by the Canadian Government alone - shipping was controlled by the Combined Chiefs of Staff through the Allied Shipping Pool, and Canada could only put in a bid for tonnage. The United States had millions of troops overseas who were just as anxious to get home as the Canadians; Britain had other millions scattered over the globe, and her need for shipping was just as pressing as any of the Allies. At the same time, plans had to be formulated for the re-deployment of the forces required to continue the war against Japan, even though, as events transpired, such plans with all their implications concerning shipping problems, had to be drastically changed when Japan surrendered. Instead of using ocean transport to carry more Americans, British and Canadians against the Japanese and to transport stores and equipment for them, it became a matter of bringing home, not only the troops in the European theatre, but the Far East forces as well. In addition, consideration had to be given to repatriating prisoners of war and interned civilian nationals from Burma, Japan and China, with liberated prisoners of war being given priority over all. Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were in a similar position to Canada in their shipping requirements. Like their sister Dominion they had demobilization plans drawn up and wanted them executed with the least possible delay. Such were the demands which the Combined Chiefs of Staff had now to try to meet in allocating sufficient shipping to satisfy the requirements of all the Allies.



98. With its demobilization plans in mind, the Canadian Government, in November 1944, while discussing plans for the re-deployment of its forces in Italy with the British Government, drew attention to the fact that it desired to make it clear that the rate of repatriation of Canadian personnel was to be proportionately equal to that of American troops. It was pointed out that a large number of Canadian troops had served abroad for a considerably longer period than had Americans. There appears to have been no actual request for shipping at this period, the intention being only to keep Canada's future requirements to the fore (1/Release/1, Telegram No. 221, Dominion Govt to D.O., 14 Nov 44).

99. After the Combined Chiefs of Staff conference at Yalta, British and American planners were requested to examine the problem for the employment of shipping arising out of the re-deployment which would follow victory in Europe. By 15 Mar 45 Ottawa was informed by the Canadian Minister at Washington that this Committee had produced a paper which forecast for six months in advance shipping requirements classified as follows:-

- (a) Moves of approved operations;
- (b) Other moves of military nature;
- (c) Other moves, e.g. repatriation of civil servants from the Far East etc.

(1/Release/1, CGS 122, Defensor to Canmilitary, 15 Mar 45)

100. This paper which was reported to include all Empire requirements, had been presented to the British Chiefs of Staff, who had in turn submitted it to the Cabinet, asking for guidance regarding the degree of political importance attached to various moves. Ottawa was anxious to obtain information as to what provision had been made for Canadian requirements in the proposals, particularly with regard to movement of a Canadian Force for service in the Far East and the repatriation of long service personnel. C.M.H.Q. was requested to obtain this information in order to have the opportunity of considering the adequacy or otherwise of proposed allotment of shipping space (Ibid). In seeking this information from the War Office through the Canadian Joint Mission Staff, C.M.H.Q. was informed that no statement of provision for any specific requirements, including Canada, could be given out until assessment of total requirements in conjunction with the United States had been made (1/Release/1, COS 287, Canmilitary to Defensor, 23 Mar 45).

101. Further information was soon received in a letter from the D.M.O., War Office, on the subject of the re-deployment and repatriation of Canadian forces. This communication stated that at the Crimea Conference, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had directed that a combined re-deployment plan should be prepared and submitted for their consideration by 1 Apr 45, and that a British team had recently left for Washington to assist in its preparation. But until the plan had been completed and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the War Office was unable to indicate what provision would be made for the re-deployment and repatriation of Canadian Forces. However, the request put forward by the Canadian Government in the previous November (Tel No. 221, 14 Nov 44) would be taken into account. In regard to the movement of a Canadian land force for participation in the Far Eastern war, the War Office had no further information than that which had emerged in the course of the Quebec Conference in September 1944, and assumed that the numbers

to be returned to Canada under this head would be 30,000 Far East force (1/Release/1, Tel COS 291, Camilitary to Defensor, 24 Mar 45).

102. More definite information was available on 30 Mar 45, when the Q.M.G., War Office, notified C.M.H.Q. that although the rate at which Canadian personnel would be repatriated could not be forecast with accuracy until the Re-Deployment and Repatriation Plan had been completed and approved, the present indications were that shipping would be available to move to Canada for the six months' period following V.E. Day:

- (a) All prisoners of war;
- (b) About two-thirds (estimated 22,400) of the forces for the war against Japan;
- (c) About 50,000 personnel for repatriation.

(1/Release/1, War Office Letter, 30 Mar 45)

103. On receipt of the above information C.M.H.Q. took immediate action; Ottawa and G.O.C.-in-C. First Canadian Army were informed and were asked for suggestions. The Dominion Government despatched a telegram to the Canadian High Commissioner advising him that it was very much concerned about the shipping problem for repatriation at the end of the war, and that as the Chiefs of Staff had been considering shipping requirements lately, it was felt that some indication should be made of the monthly rate at which it would be possible to effect repatriation of Canadians not required for the Far East Force. Since the Government understood that all, or nearly all troop carrying capacity on the North Atlantic would be of British registry, it would appear that the British Staff should be in a position to say what tonnage would be allotted to Canada and when, in order to meet this pressing need. The Canadian people attached great importance to this matter and an indication was requested as soon as possible as to the probable decision (Extract from files Canada House, London, External to Dominion Office, Tel No. 81, 2 Apr 45).

104. At the same time, N.D.H.Q. estimated that - dependent upon administrative arrangements overseas - it would appear possible to make available in the six months after V.E. Day shipping for 90,000, and it requested the earliest appreciation of the maximum numbers per month during that period which could be made ready for despatch to Canada if the shipping were available. N.D.H.Q. also pointed out that apart from the desire to repatriate the greatest possible number of long-service personnel there was the urgent need of increasing the manpower pool in Canada, particularly for production of foodstuffs for the United Kingdom and for the continuation of increased mutual aid commitments (1/Release/1, CGS 159, Defensor to Camilitary, 5 Apr 45). The G.O.C.-in-C. First Canadian Army and C.M.H.Q. discussed fully the figures of 90,000 as submitted by N.D.H.Q. and reached the decision that as it would be possible to handle a larger number than this - estimated at 140,000 - N.D.H.Q. should request a minimum of at least 150,000 shipping for the six months' period (1/Release/1, GS 958, Camilitary to Defensor, 16 Apr 45).

105. After examination of all the pertinent factors, N.D.H.Q. decided on a figure of 150,000, and asked C.M.H.Q. to request this allotment, advising that Headquarters that the Canadian High Commissioner had been asked to make strong representations to the United Kingdom Government in support



of this request. This bid was to cover requirements of all Canadian services, and the allocation of shipping between them was to be co-ordinated by the Canadian Joint Staff Mission. The breakdown of shipping by months was to be worked out by C.M.H.Q. in accordance with availability of personnel. (1/Release/1, CGS 185, Defensor to Canmilitary, 2 May 45)

106. It was also pointed out that Canada could handle 12,500 in any one week or 15,000 over a ten-day period without undue dislocation of railway traffic, assuming that the drafts were made up of personnel to be distributed across Canada roughly proportionately to enlistments by provinces. If the necessary additional shipping were available the Government was prepared to accept consequent disadvantage to civilian traffic and adjust its programme to conform. In this event as much advance notice as possible should be given in order that preparations could be made to assemble the rolling stock needed (Ibid).

107. In asking the Canadian High Commissioner in London to support this bid for shipping, the Canadian Government suggested several points to use as a basis to press home to the United Kingdom Government the urgency of the Canadian need. The Ministers responsible felt that great difficulty and unrest would be bound to ensue unless the proposed allotment of shipping to Canada was very much improved and the allotment of shipping proceeded with on a basis which recognized the principle of priority of "first over, first back". To this end the Government wished strongest possible representations made to the appropriate authorities in London. The High Commissioner was reminded:-

In this connection you will recall the Prime Minister's discussion with Mr. Roosevelt, when it was agreed in principle that service personnel whether Canadian or American, should be brought back from Europe to North America in strict chronological priority, based on their length of service.

(1/Release/1, Tel No. 1033,  
External to Dominion, 1 May 45)

Reference was also made to the proposed allotment, as already notified to C.M.H.Q. and N.D.H.Q., of approximately 80,000 for the six months following V.E. Day, a figure which was regarded by the Cabinet Committee as very inadequate in view of there being nearly 400,000 Canadians, including dependents, overseas. The Canadian Government expected at least equal treatment with the United States forces on the principle of "first over, first back" and in no event would an allotment of less than the stated minimum of 150,000 be acceptable. It was emphasized that Canada was prepared to take any shipping space in excess of this minimum, should it become available. Another strong argument to be re-emphasized was one peculiarly applicable to Canadians - their length of service overseas away from home (Ibid).

108. On 3 May 45, the C. of S., C.M.H.Q., submitted a formal request to the Under Secretary of State, War Office, for shipping of a minimum of 150,000 all ranks of the three services from the United Kingdom to Canada. This was followed by another telegram from the Canadian Government to the High Commissioner in London, which declared that the Government had given further consideration to the urgent question of the provision of shipping for the repatriation of Canadians, and that as a result of a full examination of the situation by the Departments of Munitions and Supply and National Defence, it had been concluded that if adequate additional space could not

be provided from United Kingdom sources, the only practicable alternative course by which the minimum accommodation necessary could be obtained would be to recall 30 oil-burning cargo ships of Canadian ownership. These were at present employed by the United Kingdom Ministry of War Transport and could be converted for the carriage of from 500 to 700 men. In the general interest, however, this course would involve serious results which the Canadian Government wished to avoid if at all possible. Such a measure would mean a reduction in cargo capacity from North America to Europe of 750,000 tons or more during the next twelve months; it would inevitably entail serious interference with the construction of transport ferries in Canada for the British Admiralty, and would slow down urgent ship repairs in Eastern Canadian yards. Yet the Canadian Government might be compelled to adopt this procedure:

Please inform the United Kingdom Government authorities that the matter is regarded as of such urgency and importance that the Government will nevertheless be compelled to take this course if additional space cannot be made available in accordance with the representations contained in our earlier telegrams.

(1/Release/1, Tel No.1069,  
External to Dominion Office,  
4 May 45)

109. That the Canadian High Commissioner was pressing urgently for this shipping is evidenced by the fact that on 10 May 45, he wrote a two-page letter to the Under Secretary of State, outlining in full detail all factors bearing on the case, ending his letter:-

My Government, in requesting me to make these representations, has asked me to stress its appreciation of the complexity of the whole shipping question and its realization that re-deployment to the Far East must have first claim. The domestic problems resulting from the absence from Canada for so long a period of so many of her service personnel, however, make it necessary to request this provision for a minimum 150,000 as the only possible means of meeting an extremely difficult situation.

(1/Release/1, Letter, Canadian  
High Commissioner to Secretary  
of State, 10 May 45)

In the meantime, the Canadian High Commissioner had made personal contact with Lord Leathers, Minister of War Transport, to press further for Canadian requirements (1/Release/1, C. of S. Memo, 29 May 45)

110. On the same day that the Canadian High Commissioner wrote to the Under Secretary of State, the Dominions Office informed the Canadian Government that shipping allocations covering the next six months were now made, and that the Canadian quota was set as follows:-



	<u>First Quarter</u>	<u>Second Quarter</u>	<u>Total</u>
V.I.R.* (R.C.A.F.)	55,000	Nil	55,000
Cdn Div (C.F.E.F.)	20,000	Nil	20,000
Repatriation	25,800	25,900	51,700
Ex P.W.	5,500	Nil	5,500
			<u>132,200</u>

(1/Release/1, Tel No.101, D.O.  
to Dom Govt, 10 May 45)

111. Receipt of the above figures caused considerable consternation at N.D.H.Q. and C.M.H.Q. While it was a better allotment than the provisional offer of 30 Mar, it was still below the minimum requirements of 150,000. It was not known whether the first quarter was to date from 1 Jun 45 or 1 Jul 45, although it was later established that the date was 1 Jul 45, which latter date was to replace V.E. Day as the basis for estimating shipping for the first six months' period. The allotment of 55,000 R.C.A.F. was the greatest surprise, as it had already been decided that the Canadian Joint Staff Mission would co-ordinate shipping between the services. The C. of S. C.M.H.Q. discussed this figure with the Air Commodore Commander-in-Chief, R.C.A.F., who was unable to say who had computed it or how many would actually be despatched. It was therefore assumed by the Chief of Staff that the R.C.A.F. intended returning all personnel in the Bomber Squadrons presently in 6 Bomber Group, plus such supplementary personnel that Canada might want to include when the squadrons were reconstituted in Canada for the Far East Force (1/Release/1, C. of S. Letter, 14 May 45).

112. The C.G.S. and C. of S. C.M.H.Q. now reviewed the whole situation with the Canadian High Commissioner. The latter expressed the opinion that any further action to solicit War Office support was inadvisable, as the allotment of shipping was a matter which rested between Lord Leathers and the American authorities, and he was satisfied that no pressure could be applied by the War Office (1/Release/1, C. of S. Memo, 29 May 45). In the meantime the High Commissioner had received further instructions from Canada to continue pressing for the 150,000 allotment. Information had been received by C.M.H.Q. of the American plans for the return of United States troops. On a comparative basis there would be 69 per cent moved from Europe in the first six months compared to Canada's 30 per cent (if we only obtained 132,000 shipping for the same period; it would be 40 per cent on a basis of 150,000) (Ibid).

113. On 26 May 45, an unexpected allocation of shipping for four drafts of 5000 each for the month of June was made to C.M.H.Q. Although the provision was not firm, action had to be taken immediately to ensure that personnel would be ready to fill the drafts - a very difficult problem on short notice. The following decisions were made as to their composition:-

First Draft - Backlog in U.K. of Rotational Duty,  
Liberated P.Ws. and Walking Wounded.

Second Draft - 2060 held over from previous Rotational Duty  
Drafts, Walking Wounded, Instructors, I.P.Ws.,  
Compassionate, etc., 1100 High Priority  
personnel ex U.K. in Canada Drafts, 740  
Forestry Corps personnel from disbanded  
companies, 1100 Parachute Corps personnel  
including 1 Cdn Para Bn.

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\* Very Long Range.

Third Draft - 5000 High Priority personnel ex N.W.E. as Canada Drafts.

Fourth Draft - 5000 volunteers for C.F.E.F. as Canada Drafts.

(1/Release/1, COS 515, Canmilitary to Defensor, 17 Jun 45)

Shipping figures, however, now available, reveal that 15,607 Canadian personnel were transported in June 1945, so it must be assumed that the unexpected allocation of four drafts of 5000 each was not met (Hist Sec file, C.M.H.Q./Q/H, Docket III, Vol 1, Atlantic Westbound Sailings).

114. As soon as it became apparent that no firm decision for the request for 150,000 shipping space was forthcoming, Mr. Mackenzie King sent Mr. Churchill a telegram on 5 Jun 45, stating that he would be grateful if the British Prime Minister would give this urgent matter his personal attention. Mr. King pointed out that although the offer of 132,000 (which was taken to be firm) was an increase over earlier estimates and therefore appreciated, it was still far short of the amount required. When the number of personnel actually destined for Pacific operations was deducted, Canada would be entitled to absolute priority in the allocation of Atlantic shipping for approximately 100,000, but it appeared that the figures of the Minister of War Transport had been calculated without reference to what was considered should be the underlying principle. This principle was based on the Prime Minister's talks with Mr. Roosevelt on the repatriation scheme, by which American and Canadian troops were to be returned on a "first over, first back" basis, applicable to both nations on an equal footing. The telegram also urged that some substantial improvement would have to be made by one means or another, in view of public demand for the early return of service personnel, and also because of the importance to the national economy of personnel being returned in sufficient numbers to co-ordinate demobilization with re-conversion of industry. Mention was made of the possible conversion of 30 Canadian freighters to troopships, but it was emphasized that the Canadian Government was hesitant to resort to such extreme measures. While it was realized that shipping commitments for a long term were difficult to make in existing circumstances, it was felt that an immediate allotment of a minimum of 150,000 for the six months, with some indication of a further allotment capable of lifting the balance of Canadians within the subsequent six months, would go far towards a solution of this most anxious problem. (1/Release/1, Tel No.136, Prime Minister of Canada to Mr. Churchill, 5 Jun 45)

115. There was no immediate reply from Mr. Churchill, and in the meantime newspapers were carrying articles on shipping which, according to military circles, were over optimistic and misleading. In this regard, the C. of S. in reporting the shipping situation to Ottawa and G.O.C.-in-C. First Canadian Army, referred to recent pictures of the two "Queens"<sup>x</sup> and a story of their 25,000 capacity each fully allotted to United States forces, as well as to publicity given a report that United States forces were being flown home at a rate of 3000 per month. All these reports came to the attention of Canadian troops, who made adverse comparisons. The C. of S. believed that whatever the shipping situation happened to be, good or bad, the troops should be kept informed, and he realized that the present allotted capacity was so limited that disappointment was bound to be widespread and serious:

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<sup>x</sup> The "Queen Mary" and the "Queen Elizabeth"



Although so far Canadian troops have behaved very well and everything is being done and will continue to be done in the way of welfare, education, etc., to keep them happy and busy, it is anticipated that unless there is a substantial increase in present shipping allotment there will be danger of widespread discontent before end of year.

(1/Release/1, COS 625, Canmilitary to Defensor, 2 Jul 45)

The Canadian troops at Aldershot did not wait long - they rioted on 4 Jul 45. It was a senseless act, but the shortage of shipping was attributed as being one of the main factors causing the disturbance.

116. It was also reported to N.D.H.Q. on 2 Jul 45 that an allotment of shipping to Canadian services for 126,000 had been confirmed for the period of six months from 1 Jul 45. This provided for 26,000 per month during July, August and September and a total of 48,000 for October, November and December. The allotment was divided between the Army and R.C.A.F. in the proportion of 65 per cent and 35 per cent respectively, until C.A.P.F. personnel were despatched, when the division would become 88 per cent and 12 per cent respectively. On the basis of this calculation the Army total was 101,530, for the six-month period, which would leave more than 125,000 army personnel still overseas after 1 Jan 46. On this aspect of the problem the C. of S. reported to Ottawa:-

It is understood from the Q.M.G. on recent visit that shipping picture will be better in 1946 and that we can have reasonable expectations of more generous allotment after 1 Jan. From morale point of view, however, important period is the balance of the current year during which higher point scores will be despatched and undoubtedly the great majority of the troops waiting repatriation will be very disappointed if they are not able to be home for Christmas. This disappointment will be shared by their families at home. It is appreciated that there is no prospect of obtaining shipping for all troops involved but no matter how well facts are presented to troops it is certain that picture will appear to them most unreasonable and unsatisfactory if substantially more than half cannot be returned by end of year.

(Ibid)

117. On receipt of the information that Canada had been allotted shipping for 126,000, N.D.H.Q. released to the press an announcement covering the whole situation. The report showed that the Government had taken every means to obtain a shipping allotment of a minimum of 150,000 and that representations were still in progress to increase the quota that had been given. This announcement, however, issued in the midst of negotiations between the Canadian High Commissioner and the Dominions Secretary, proved to be somewhat embarrassing to the High Commissioner, who had not been consulted in advance as to its publication and contents. Nevertheless he was advised to continue to press for the larger figure and to explain suitably the statement issued by N.D.H.Q. He was also advised that the Prime Minister was sending a further telegram to Mr. Churchill

although it was not expected that Mr. Churchill could give it his personal attention until after the Berlin Conference. The message to the High Commissioner added:

The disturbances at Aldershot emphasize the importance of securing repatriation of at least 150,000 this year and the statement published here certainly did not indicate acquiescence in any lower figure.

(1/Release/1, Tel No. 1564,  
External to Dominion, 6 Jul 45)

118. On 6 Jul 45, Mr. Churchill replied to the Canadian Prime Minister's cable of 5 Jun, stating that the figure of 132,000 was for guidance in planning and was not intended as a firm offer, and that in fact various changes in the operational background had already necessitated a new review of our troops' shipping commitments during 1945. On the basis of this revised plan Canada would be able to send back 146,200 men by the end of the year, which was very little short of the 150,000 requested. This estimate was offered as a planning figure which might or might not be exceeded, but it was hoped that it would be possible to give a high priority to the repatriation of the remainder of Canadians in 1946 in common with those of the other Dominions. Mr. Churchill referred to the alternative means suggested, to convert the cargo vessels of Canadian ownership:-

I feel sure you will agree that these disadvantages outweigh the small increase to the troop-shipping capacity in the Atlantic which would result.

(1/Release/1, Tel No. 148, Dominions  
Office to Canada (Govt),  
6 Jul 45)

In dealing with President Roosevelt's promise to Mr. King, Mr. Churchill replied as follows:-

You also referred to President Roosevelt's promise to you that the first over, first back principle should be applied to the return of Canadians and Americans across the Atlantic. The position as between the United States and ourselves is that, as a result of discussion, we have undertaken to make available to the United States certain British troopship capacity for re-deployment purposes. The United States authorities were not entirely satisfied with this assistance and would have liked to press us for more. Our present deployment plan is based on our original undertaking to the United States and we cannot give them any more capacity without a corresponding reduction in the rate of repatriation of British Commonwealth forces. We feel, therefore, that an appeal by you to the United States authorities would merely result in the United States Government demanding yet further assistance from us which as I have already shown could only be given at the expense of the capacity available to the British Commonwealth.

(Ibid)



118. Before the above telegram was received in Ottawa, the Prime Minister had despatched a second telegram to Mr. Churchill (1/Release/1, Tel No. 164, Canada (Govt) to Dominions Office, 6 Jul 45). These two apparently crossed in transmission, for the Canadian High Commissioner advised Ottawa against sending the second cable, telling Ottawa in part:-

I am satisfied that United Kingdom authorities in extremely difficult situation have done all they could to meet Canadian position and that further representations would not be successful.

(1/Release/1, Tel No. 1901,  
Massey to External, 7 Jul 45)

The second cable, however, had gone forward, the Prime Minister drawing attention in it to the fact that the present allotment was only 126,000 and again requesting the urgent necessity of obtaining a minimum of 150,000. He was quite insistent that at least a further allotment of 24,000 should be made to bring the total up to the minimum required, adding:-

It is considered of the highest importance in the interest of maintaining morale and discipline of Canadian forces overseas that we should be able to satisfy our troops that their repatriation is being accomplished at a responsible rate and that they are being treated fairly in comparison with other nations.

(1/Release/1, Tel No. 164,  
Canada (Govt) to Dominions  
Office, 6 Jul 45)

119. Mr. Churchill's telegram quoting the figure of 146,200, in comparison with the 126,000 allotment which had already been made, caused considerable surprise and conjecture at N.D.H.Q., C.M.H.Q. and at Canada House. It was difficult to understand the basis on which the British Prime Minister had arrived at this figure. After several conferences at C.M.H.Q., and exchanges of telegrams between the High Commissioner and Ottawa, it was finally assumed that Mr. Churchill had based his quotation, not on the six months' period from 1 Jul 45, but rather on the period from when reallocation began, which included June shipping understood not to enter into the matter. (It had already been stated that the six months' period from V.E. Day, for the purpose of shipping, was to be considered as from 1 Jul 45). In view of this assumption the High Commissioner despatched another letter to the Secretary of State, pointing out the discrepancy and again urging a revision of the Canadian shipping allotment so that it could be increased to 150,000 (1/Release/1, Tel No. 1906, Massey to External, 9 Jul 45).

120. From all the foregoing, it can be seen that the Canadian Government explored every possibility and made every effort to obtain for the return of Canadian service men and women, the largest possible allotment of shipping from the Allied Shipping Pool. When one considers the difficulties that faced the Allies at the end of hostilities with Germany, it becomes a continuing source of wonder and a matter of great tribute to the genius of the planners responsible that eventually the repatriation of the troops of all nations engaged in the European conflict was carried out with efficiency, although probably in the minds of a very small number of Canadians, not with despatch.

121. In addition to its effort to obtain all sea transport possible, the Canadian Government also explored the possibility of employing Canadian produced Lancaster aircraft and United States transport planes to supplement the means of returning personnel (1/Release/1, P.C.S. 17, Secretary of C.S.C. Ottawa to C.J.S.M. London, 22 May 45). As the outcome of this move does not appear to have been announced, it may be assumed that nothing came of it. Nevertheless some 500 - 600 Canadian personnel were repatriated by airlifts in scheduled passenger flights during 1945 (66/Tp Moves/1/2: A.A.G. Letter 11 Oct 45). Considerably less speedy than such a means of transportation was the utilization in 1945 of cargo ships to carry 1406 personnel. A cargo passage to some of the men turned out to be in the form of a "Cook's Tour"; the boats were scheduled for stops at Iceland and Newfoundland and some were even routed through the Panama Canal to Vancouver. In addition, a certain number of Canadian Naval vessels which had been operating in European waters were pressed into service and carried 2912 army personnel back to Canada in 1945 (Hist Sec file CMHQ/Q/H, Docket III, Vol 1, Atlantic Westbound Sailings). All in all, no opportunity was missed to get every man possible back to Canada by every available means.

122. It would be difficult to form an opinion as to what the picture of shipping would have been if Japan had carried on the fight longer than she did. Fortunately this eventuality did not arise. The Canadian Government's six months' objective was met. The total number of Canadians transported home on troopships during the period 1 Jul 45 to 31 Dec 45 was as follows:-

July	31,991
August	14,799
September	35,196
October	17,792
November	13,500
December	<u>38,923</u>
Total	<u>152,201</u> <sup>*</sup>

(Ibid).

(For a more complete analysis see Appendix "S".)

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\* During what may be termed the "critical" period of repatriation from a shipping angle - from June 1945 to February 1946 - Canada had a variety of ships on the westbound Atlantic sailings. During this period the "Pasteur" carried 19,843, "Scythia" 8948, "Samarita" 4629, "Duchess of Bedford" 6567, "Cameronia" 6628, "Empress of Scotland" 6711, "Mauretania" 10,234. "Queen Mary" (1 trip) 6157, "Queen Elizabeth" (7 trips from October 1945 to February 1946) 71,912, "Nieu Amsterdam" (3 trips) 19,755, and the following made one trip each: "Duchess of Richmond", "Britannic", "Monarch of Bermuda" and "Georgic". The "Ile de France" was kept in Canadian service longer - from July 1945 to June 1946 - carrying 57,205 in 9 trips, while the "Aquitania" after making one trip in June 1945 was taken off to return again in January 1946 and up to March 1947 had taken to Canada 19,607 army personnel. (Hist Sec file CMHQ/Q/H, Docket III, Vol 1, Atlantic Westbound Sailings)



## THE MOVEMENT OF WIVES AND DEPENDENTS

123. There was one other feature that entered into the shipping problem where Canadians were concerned - the return to Canada of the wives and children of servicemen. There was probably a greater agitation for an early passage raised by the individuals affected during the critical period of 1 Jul 45 to 1 Jan 46 than at any other time. At that time it was the intention to repatriate all service men possible, but included among these personnel were many who had married overseas and who wanted their wives with them in Canada at the earliest possible moment. To arrange this was, of course, impossible. In the first place, wives and children could not just be loaded into troopships and despatched to Canada. They were scattered all over the British Isles and parts of Europe; there was extensive documentation to be effected for each individual and they had to be concentrated conveniently for movement to the ports - all of which meant untold work for a large staff. At these concentration points they had to be housed and fed and medical and nursing care had to be provided. Laundry was always a difficult problem.

124. The difficulty of providing shipping was ever in the background, and wives and dependents were advised by the Canadian Wives Bureau, C.M.H.Q., to complete their applications for transportation early. This applied particularly to those married before V.E. Day so that every effort could be made for their despatch before repatriation of the Army commenced. To a certain degree, this plan was successful (as borne out by figures shown in "Appendix T") - in May 1945 a total of 1781 was despatched; by October, with the Army's return in full swing, the monthly total had declined to 194, and the movement did not regain momentum until January 1946 when the bulk of the Canadian Army had been despatched. From February 1946 most of the wives and children were sent to Canada in Canadian hospital ships, which continued to make two round trips each per month for several months. In the period June 1944 to February 1947, a total of 65,150 wives and children were despatched to Canada by the Canadian Wives Bureau, C.M.H.Q. (See Appendix "T").

125. Thus it may be said that the repatriation of the Canadian Army Overseas was carried out efficiently in all its phases, with comparatively few complaints from military personnel or the general public. The whole scheme required careful study and planning in the many-fold effort to fulfil Canada's military and civil requirements following the defeat of Germany - the formation of a force to fight Japan, another to take part in the occupation of Germany, and at the same time the repatriation of as many men as possible to civil life. Behind it all lay the shipping problem - which the man in the ranks regarded only as a ship to take him home, little realizing that arrangements of this nature were carried on at the highest level and that shipping had to be distributed among the 26 Allies. Nevertheless, all obstacles were met and overcome, and the result was an administrative achievement of which the Canadian Army might well be proud. It is safe to say that in general the Canadian scheme of repatriation and demobilization and the efficiency of its execution compared favourably with that of any other force engaged in World War II.

12. This report was prepared by Capt. M.B. Huffman,  
R.C.A.P.C.

*M.B. Huffman, Capt*

(C.P. Stacey) Colonel  
Director Historical Section

REALLOCATION QUESTIONNAIRE - CANADIAN ARMY

(NOTE: YOUR PRESENT ENGAGEMENT IS TO SERVE IN THE CANADIAN ARMY UNTIL THE TERMINATION OF THE PRESENT WAR (WHICH INCLUDES THE WAR WITH JAPAN) BUT THE GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED THAT ONLY THOSE WHO VOLUNTEER WILL SERVE IN THE CANADIAN FAR EAST FORCE.

CORPS

UNIT

FMN

THE OBJECT OF THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS TO ENABLE YOU TO EXPRESS YOUR PREFERENCE IN REGARD TO CONTINUED MILITARY SERVICE AND EVERY QUESTION MUST BE ANSWERED.

THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA DOES NOT BIND ITSELF IN ANY WAY TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE PREFERENCES EXPRESSED, BUT INSOFAR AS THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE SERVICE PERMIT, AN ENDEAVOUR WILL BE MADE TO REALLOCATE PERSONNEL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR WISHES.)

- 1 Regimental Number \_\_\_\_\_
- 2 Rank \_\_\_\_\_ (indicate whether acting or confirmed)
- 3 Surname (in block letters) \_\_\_\_\_
- 4 Christian names (in full) \_\_\_\_\_
- 5 Insert "X" in applicable space.  
 Married \_\_\_\_\_ Single \_\_\_\_\_ Widower \_\_\_\_\_  
 Widower or divorcee with dependent children \_\_\_\_\_
- 6 Date of birth \_\_\_\_\_  
 (day month year)
- 7 Medical Category \_\_\_\_\_ or grading 

P	U	L	H	E	M	S
- 8 Present employment in Unit \_\_\_\_\_  
 (Carpenter, Driver Mechanic, General Duty etc)
- 9 If in receipt of Trades Pay, state group \_\_\_\_\_
- 10 Do you wish to VOLUNTEER for service in the Canadian Far East Force? (Insert "X" in applicable space) Yes ☐ No ☐
- 11 IF (a) you volunteer for the Canadian Far East Force but are not accepted OR (b) you do not wish to volunteer for the Canadian Far East Force indicate your wishes in regard to continued military service by placing the figures 1 (First Choice) and 2 (Second Choice) after the following:  
 (i) Service with the Canadian Occupation Force ☐  
 (ii) Reallocation in accordance with individual priorities and the requirements of the service ☐
- 12 To which Military District in Canada do you wish to be despatched if:  
 (a) You volunteer and are accepted for service with Cdn Far East Force - M.D. \_\_\_\_\_  
 (b) You are reallocated for demobilization - M.D. \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_ Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Certified all questions answered

CO or Adjutant

(For use by Records 2 Ech only)



1 CDN INF DIV UNITS AND DESIGNATION IN

6 CDN INF DIV AND ONE TK BN.

Cannon Coy 1 Cdn Inf Regt	The Saskatoon Light Inf (MG).
1st Cdn Inf Bn	The Royal Cdn Regt.
2nd Cdn Inf Bn	The Hastings & Prince Edward Regt.
3rd Cdn Inf Bn	48th Highlanders of Canada.
Cannon Coy 2 Cdn Inf Regt	The Saskatoon Light Inf (MG).
1st Cdn Inf Bn	Princess Patricia Cdn Light Inf.
2nd Cdn Inf Bn	The Seaforth Highlanders of Cda.
3rd Cdn Inf Bn	The Loyal Edmonton Regt.
Cannon Coy 3rd Cdn Inf Regt	The Saskatoon Light Inf (MG).
1st Cdn Inf Bn	Royal 22E Regt.
2nd Cdn Inf Bn	The Carleton and York Regt.
3rd Cdn Inf Bn	The West Nova Scotia Regt.
6th Cdn Inf Div Recce Tp	The Royal Montreal Regt.
22nd Cdn Tk Bn	The Cdn Grenadier Guards CAC.

(1/FE/1)

- - - - -

Slate of Officers (Tentative) of 6th Cdn Inf Div (CAPF)

<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>APPT</u>
Maj-Gen	B.M. Hoffmeister	Div Comd
Lt-Col	W.C. Dick	C of S
Lt-Col	H.A. Phillips	Lt-Col AG
Major	E.W. Cutbill	Major Inf Regt Ops & Trg
Lt-Col	W.W. Reid	Inf Bn Comd
Lt-Col	J.P. Ensor	Inf Bn Comd
A/Lt-Col	G.A. Turcotte	Inf Bn Comd
Lt-Col	G.A. Browne	Comd 155 mm FA Bn
Lt-Col	S.W. Thomson	Inf Bn Comd
Lt-Col	P.W. Strickland	Inf Bn Comd
Brig	J.D.B. Smith	Regtl Comd
Brig	J.M. Rockingham	Regtl Comd
A/Brig	A.E. Wrinch	Lt-Col Comd Sig Coy
Brig	H.A. Sparling	Div Arty Comd
A/Lt-Col	E.A.C. Amy	Comd Tk Bn
Lt-Col	M. Young	Comd 105 mm FA Bn
Major	J.H. Gowan	Lt-Col Inf Regt Exec
A/Major	G.M.C. Sprung	Lt-Col Int
Major	A.J. Scotti	Major Div Pro Marshal
Major	R.S. Graham	Lt-Col Inf Regt Exec
Brig	J.P.E. Bernatches	Regtl Comd
Lt-Col	R.T. Bennett	Lt-Col I.O.
Lt-Col	A. Birks	Comd 105 mm FA Bn
Lt-Col	L.H.C. Payne	Inf Bn Comd
Lt-Col	J.A. Dextrase	Inf Bn Comd
A/Col	J.L. Sparling	Lt-Col Div QM
A/Lt-Col	J.M. Houghton	Inf Bn Comd
Lt-Col	J.T. Truman	Lt-Col Div Ord (Eme)
Lt-Col	J.R. Stone	Inf Bn Comd
Major	T.R. McCoy	Lt-Col Inf Regt Exec
Lt-Col	C.H. Drury	Lt-Col Supply G4



<u>RANK</u>	<u>NAME</u>	<u>APPT</u>
Major	O.L. Roberts	Major Sup S4 Inf Regt
Major	L.E. Sarantes	Major Supply G4
Major	D.R. Ely	Major Div Arty Air Offr
Captain	R.T. Findlater	Major Arty Sup S4
A/Major	R.O. Funston	Major Arty Int
A/Major	R. Kirk	Exec Major 105mm F.A. Bn
A/Major	N.W. Reilander	Capt Liaison Pilot
A/Lt-Col	A.H. Lowe	Comd Inf Reinf Bn
A/Col	G.L.M. Smith	Lt-Col Surgeon Replacement Depot.
A/Col	H.E. Tieman	Lt-Col Div Surgeon
Major	P. Hart	Lt-Col Personnel G1
A/Major	G.R. Filliter	Major Sup S4 Inf Regt
A/Major	A.I. Matheson	Major AG Assist
Major	F. Klenavic	Major Inf Regt Ops & Trg
Major	R.D. Prince	Major Inf Regt Ops & Trg
Major	R.J. Orr	Major Exec Inf Bn
Major	W.H. Mathews	Major Exec Inf Bn
A/Lt-Col	G.D. Johnson	Lt-Col HQ Comd
Major	E.C. King	Major Ord Maint Coy
Major	T.P. Lownsborough	Lt-Col Arty Ops Trg
Captain	E.G. Devlin	Not earmarked
Lieut	W. Willis	Not earmarked
Lieut	R.K. Palmer	Lieut Arty Aids
Lt-Col	M.C.S. Brown	Comd Engr Bn
Major	E.M.D. McNaughton	Exec Major 155 mm F.A. Bn RCA
Major	R.F. Walker	Exec Major 105 mm F.A. Bn CIC
Lt-Col	W.A.B. Anderson	Col Arty Exec
Lt-Col	K. Coates	Comd Medical Bn
Captain	N.L.J. Mould	Lt-Col Div Chemical
Lt-Col	R.H. Webb	Comd 105 mm F.A. Bn

Short one Major Sup S4 Inf Regt

(1/FE/1)

JAPANESE CAMPAIGN PAY

	Daily Rate Other than CWAC	CWAC
Officers of the rank of-		
Major and above.....	\$1.00	.80
Captain.....	.90	.70
Lieutenant and 2nd Lieutenant.	.75	.60
Other Ranks-		
Warrant Officer, Class I.....	.65	.50
Warrant Officer, Class II.....	.55	.45
Warrant Officer, Class III, )		
Squadron, Battery or Company )		
Quartermaster-Sergeant..... )	.50	.40
Staff Sergeant..... )		
Sergeant..... )	.45	.35
Lance-Sergeant, Corporal and )	.35	.30
Lance-Corporal..... )		
Private Soldier.....	.30	.25

Amdt  
No. 147

G.O. 350  
1945

Copy of paragraph 400 Financial Regulations  
and Instructions for the Canadian  
Active Service Force Canada.



## CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

## RECORDS OFFICE

15 Aug 45

ANALYSIS - PRIORITY POINT SCORES CAO

Priority Points	UK			CAOF & CFN			GRAND TOTAL	
	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>
Under 50	670	6290	6960	221	16238	16459	891	22528
50 - 59	232	2988	3220	258	6743	7001	490	9731
60 - 69	257	3883	4140	290	8783	9073	547	12666
70 - 79	381	4734	5115	548	12648	13196	929	17382
80 - 89	414	4618	5032	680	13258	13938	1094	17876
90 - 99	343	3493	3836	841	10845	11686	1184	14338
100 - 109	256	3164	3420	804	12057	12861	1060	15221
110 - 119	273	2379	2652	612	9795	10407	885	12174
120 - 129	153	2637	2790	527	9366	9893	680	12003
130 - 139	270	2672	2942	630	10341	10971	900	13013
140 - 149	232	2283	2515	606	8277	8883	838	10560
150 & Over	1739	12641	14380	3821	33619	37440	5560	46260
	<u>5220</u>	<u>51782</u>	<u>57002</u>	<u>9838</u>	<u>151970</u>	<u>161808</u>	<u>15058</u>	<u>203752</u>

(66/Tp Moves/1)

## CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

## RECORDS OFFICE

5 Jan 46

## APPENDIX "F"

			<u>CAOF</u>		<u>UK &amp; CFN</u>		
<u>Priority Points</u>			<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Other Ranks</u>	<u>Total ALL Ranks</u>
0	-	9	7	24	10	208	249
10	-	19	3	1537	14	999	2553
20	-	29	9	3083	97	1809	4998
30	-	39	46	3163	220	2600	6029
40	-	49	73	3308	188	3807	7376
50	-	59	77	1262	261	5386	6986
60	-	69	87	1344	318	7252	9001
70	-	79	101	1252	510	10219	12082
80	-	89	73	795	663	10664	12195
90	-	99	53	505	491	5958	7007
100	-	109	51	566	406	5518	6541
110	-	119	41	490	290	3227	4048
120	-	129	38	498	230	2572	3338
130	-	139	50	560	267	2510	3387
140	-	149	56	431	248	1799	2534
150	-	159	42	358	226	1258	1884
160	-	169	52	315	219	1156	1742
170	-	179	70	210	199	770	1249
180	-	189	44	178	195	633	1050
190	-	199	64	186	193	748	1191
200	-	209	36	75	117	331	559
210	-	219	28	60	98	334	520
220	-	229	23	58	100	317	498
230	-	239	36	80	140	400	656
240	-	Over	15	16	47	107	185
No Point Score					2	18	20
			<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
			1175	20354	5749	70600	97878
			<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>

(66/Tp Moves/1)



CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS  
RECORDS OFFICE

9 May 46

APPENDIX "G"

Priority Points	CAOF		UK & CFN		Total ALL Ranks
	Officers	Other Ranks	Officers	Other Ranks	
0 - 9	12	42	5	120	179
10 - 19	7	214	6	769	996
20 - 29	22	1189	42	1496	2749
30 - 39	49	1485	63	1932	3529
40 - 49	33	1649	66	1602	3350
50 - 59	35	352	43	511	941
60 - 69	32	350	67	504	953
70 - 79	34	415	66	608	1123
80 - 89	29	306	51	489	875
90 - 99	27	272	36	399	734
100 - 109	36	313	46	391	786
110 - 119	28	49	51	317	445
120 - 129	19	287	45	308	659
130 - 139	31	333	40	352	756
140 - 149	41	243	67	311	662
150 - 159	30	161	64	219	474
160 - 169	43	142	67	289	541
170 - 179	49	85	81	237	452
180 - 189	31	68	77	210	386
190 - 199	38	92	76	270	476
200 - 209	26	30	60	141	257
210 - 219	21	34	34	145	234
220 - 229	15	31	63	152	261
230 - 239	24	40	76	198	338
240 - 249	9	8	26	59	102
No Point Score	8	-	18	19	45
(Temp. Docs. & recent TOS from RCAF control)					
	<u>729</u>	<u>8190</u>	<u>1336</u>	<u>12048</u>	<u>22303</u>

(66/Tp Moves/1)

SETTING UP OF CANADA DRAFTS BY POINT SCORES

<u>Instr Issued</u> <u>Date</u>	<u>Points</u>	<u>Available at</u> <u>Repat - Date</u>
19 Jul 45	150 or over	10 Aug 45
13 Aug 45	140 or over	17 Sep 45
4 Sep 45	130 or over	17 Sep 45
4 Sep 45	190 <sup>x</sup> or over	17 Sep 45
10 Sep 45	110 or over	28 Sep 45
2 Oct 45	140 <sup>x</sup> or over	9 Oct 45
9 Nov 45	90 or over	5 Dec 45
15 Nov 45	120 <sup>x</sup> or over	5 Dec 45
12 Dec 45	100 <sup>x</sup> or over	28 Dec 45
24 Dec 45	50 or over	20 Jan 46
9 Jan 46	50 <sup>x</sup> or over	20 Jan 46
14 Mar 46	40 or over	22 Mar 46
27 Mar 46	20 or over	7 Apr 46
21 May 46	0	6 Jun 46

\* Denotes point score release for Clerks, Cooks and Butchers.

Release of Staff Officers as at 20 Sep 45:

1st Grade - 190 Points

2nd Grade - 180 Points

3rd Grade - 170 Points

(66/UK Repat Drafts/1)

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APPX A PART I TO FIRST CDN ARMY  
ADM INSTR NO 33

PRIORITY OF UNITS  
TO BE RETURNED TO CANADA  
AS UNITS FROM 1 CDN INF DIV GP

Serial	Unit or Sub-Unit	Territorial Affiliation
1	2	3
1	1 Cdn Army HQ Def Bn (RMR)	MONTREAL
2	A Bty RCHA	KINGSTON Ont
3	B Bty RCHA	KINGSTON Ont
4	C Bty RCHA	WINNIPEG
5	8 Cdn Fd Bty	MONCTON
6	10 Cdn Fd Bty	ST CATHARINES
7	7 Cdn Fd Bty	MONTREAL
8	77 Cdn Fd Bty	REGINA
9	19 Cdn Fd Bty	WINNIPEG
10	92 Cdn Fd Bty	EDMONTON
11	SASK L I (MG)	SASKATOON
12	R 22e R	QUEBEC
13	CARLT & YORK	WOODSTOCK
14	51 Cdn A Tk Bty	OTTAWA
15	57 Cdn A Tk Bty	QUEBEC
16	90 Cdn A Tk Bty	FREDERICTON
17	27 Cdn A Tk Bty	MONTREAL
18	2 Cdn Fd Pk Coy	TORONTO
19	1 Cdn Fd Coy	HALIFAX (incl det from 7)
20	3 Cdn Fd Coy	OTTAWA (incl det from 1)
21	RCR	LONDON
22	48 HIGHRS	TORONTO
23	HAST & PER	TRENTON
24	L EDMN R	EDMONTON
25	SEAFORTH OF C	VANCOUVER
26	4 Cdn Fd Coy	MONTREAL (incl det from 5)
27	PPCLI	WINNIPEG
28	WEST NSR	BRIDGEWATER
29	1 Cdn Inf Bde Coy	CALGARY
30	2 Cdn Corps Tpt Coy	TORONTO
31	9 Cdn Fd Bty	TORONTO
32	29 Cdn Fd Bty	GUELPH
33	40 Cdn Fd Bty	HAMILTON
34	2 Cdn Med Bty	CHARLOTTETOWN
35	3 Cdn Med Bty	KINGSTON
36	12 Cdn Fd Coy	WINNIPEG (incl det from 12)
37	33 Cdn Fd Coy	EDMONTON (incl det from 11)
38	34 Cdn Fd Coy	TORONTO
39	4 Cdn Recce Regt (PLDG)	OTTAWA
40	5 Cdn LAA Bty	MONTREAL
41	2 Cdn LAA Bty	YORKTOWN
42	54 Cdn LAA Bty	BRANTFORD
43	8 Cdn HAA Bty	CHARLOTTETOWN
44	1 Cdn HAA Bty	MONTREAL
45	11 Cdn HAA Bty	WINNIPEG

APPX A PART I TO FIRST CDN ARMY  
ADM INSTR NO 33  
(cont'd)

PRIORITY OF UNITS  
TO BE RETURNED TO CANADA  
AS UNITS FROM 2 CDN INF DIV GP

Serial	Unit or Sub-Unit	Territorial Affiliation
1	2	3
1	TOR SCOT R (MG)	TORONTO
2	2 Cdn Fd Coy	TORONTO
3	R REGT C	TORONTO
4	FUS MR	MONTREAL
5	13 Cdn Fd Coy	CALGARY
6	RHLI	HAMILTON
7	ESSEX SCOT	WINDSOR
8	2 Cdn Fd Bty	OTTAWA
9	14 Cdn Fd Bty	COBOURG
10	26 Cdn Fd Bty	SARNIA
11	5 Cdn Fd Bty	MONTREAL
12	28 Cdn Fd Bty	NEWCASTLE
13	73 Cdn Fd Bty	MAGOG, Montreal
14	11 Cdn Fd Coy	SARNIA
15	RHC	MONTREAL
16	18 Cdn A.Tk Bty	REGINA
17	20 Cdn A.Tk Bty	LETHBRIDGE
18	108 Cdn A.Tk Bty	TRAIL
19	23 Cdn A.Tk Bty	CALGARY
20	13 Cdn Fd Bty	WINNIPEG
21	91 Cdn Fd Bty	CALGARY
22	21 Cdn Fd Bty	SASKATOON
23	R DE MAIS	MONTREAL
24	CALG HIGHRS	CALGARY
25	CAMERONS OF C.	WINNIPEG
26	S. SASK R.	WEYBURN
27	8 Cdn Recce Regt	SWIFT CURRENT, CLIMAX, REGINA
28	14 Cdn Fd Coy	REGINA
29	1 Cdn Rd Constr Coy	MONTREAL
30	38 Cdn LAA Bty	WINNIPEG
31	17 Cdn LAA Bty	MACLEOD
32	16 Cdn LAA Bty	VANCOUVER
33	11 Cdn Armd Regt (a)	OSHAWA
34	12 Cdn Armd Regt (a)	TROIS RIVIERES, Montreal
35	14 Cdn Armd Regt (a)	CALGARY
36	12 Cdn Med Bty	LONDON
37	45 Cdn Med Bty	LINDSAY
38	18 Cdn Med Bty	PORT ARTHUR
39	25 Cdn Med Bty	TORONTO
40	58 Cdn Med Bty	LEVIS
41	50 Cdn Med Bty	MONTREAL



AFPX A PART I TO FIRST CDN ARMY  
ADM INSTR NO 33  
(cont'd)

PRIORITY OF UNITS  
TO BE RETURNED TO CANADA  
AS UNITS FROM 3 CDN INF DIV GP

Serial	Unit or Sub-Unit	Territorial Affiliation
1	2	3
1	CH OF O (MG)	OTTAWA
1a	1 Cdn Corps Def Coy (Lorne Scots)	BRAMPTON
2	6 Cdn Fd Coy	NORTH VANCOUVER
3	18 Cdn Fd Coy	HAMILTON
4	16 Cdn Fd Bty	GUELPH
5	11 Cdn Fd Bty	HAMILTON
6	43 Cdn Fd Bty	GUELPH
7	34 Cdn Fd Bty	BELLEVILLE
8	66 Cdn Fd Bty.	MONTREAL
9	81 Cdn Fd Bty	SHAWINIGAN FALLS, Montreal
10	QOR OF C	TORONTO
11	R.DE CHAUD	MEGANTIC, Quebec
12	N.SHORE R.	NEWCASTLE
13	HLI OF C.	GALT
14	SD AND G. HIGHRS	CORNWALL
15	NTH NS HIGHRS	AMHERST
16	7 Cdn Recce Regt	MONTREAL
17	REGINA RIF	REGINA
18	1 C. SCOT R.	VICTORIA
19	R. WPG RIF	WINNIPEG
20	69 Cdn LAA Bty	BRANTFORD
21	32 Cdn LAA Bty	BELLEVILLE-KINGSTON
22	3 Cdn Fd Pk Coy	PETERBOROUGH
23	100 Cdn LAA Bty	LISTOWEL
24	105 Cdn A.Tk Bty	FREDERICTON, N.B.
25	4 Cdn A.Tk Bty	PETERBOROUGH
26	94 Cdn A.Tk Bty	QUEBEC
27	52 Cdn A.Tk Bty	WEYMOUTH
28	44 Cdn Fd Bty	PRINCE ALBERT
29	22 Cdn Fd Bty	CALGARY (ADMT.7)
30	78 Cdn Fd Bty	RED DEER
31	87 Cdn Med Bty	KENTVILLE
32	5 Cdn Med Bty	VANCOUVER
33	55 Cdn Fd Bty	LONDON
34	63 Cdn Fd Bty	GUELPH
35	99 Cdn Fd Bty	WINGHAM

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APPX A PART I TO FIRST CDN ARMY  
ADM INSTR NO 33  
(cont'd)

PRIORITY OF UNITS  
TO BE RETURNED TO CANADA  
AS UNITS FROM 5 CDN ARMD DIV GP

Serial	Unit or Sub-Unit	Territorial Affiliation
1	2	3
1	61 Cdn Fd Bty	EDMONTON
2	71 Cdn Fd Bty	BRANDON
3	107 Cdn Fd Bty	CRANBROOK
4	41 Cdn LAA Bty	SIMCOE
5	47 Cdn LAA Bty	MAPANEE
6	88 Cdn LAA Bty	WINDSOR
7	3 Cdn Armd Recce Regt	TORONTO
8	5 Cdn Armd Regt	HAMPTON
9	98 Cdn A.Tk Bty	PORT ELGIN
10	49 Cdn A.Tk Bty	TORONTO
11	82 Cdn A.Tk Bty	GASPE
12	16 Cdn A.Tk Bty	
13	1 Cdn Fd Sqn	HAMILTON
14	PERTH R.	STRATFORD
15	60 Cdn Fd Bty	REGINA
16	37 Cdn Fd Bty	PORTAGE LA PRAIRIE
17	76 Cdn Fd Bty	INDIAN HEAD
18	CB HIGHRS	SYDNEY
19	2 Cdn Armd Regt	WINNIPEG
20	9 Cdn Armd Regt	KELOWNA
21	10 Cdn Fd Sqn	CALGARY
22	WESTMR R. (MOT)	NEW WESTMINSTER
23	6 Cdn Armd Regt	LONDON
24	10 Cdn Armd Regt	WINNIPEG
25	1 Cdn Armd C. Regt (RCD)	TORONTO
26	IR R.C.	TORONTO
27	11 Cdn Indep MG Coy	HALIFAX
28	2 Cdn Corps Def Coy (PEILH)	CHARLOTTETOWN

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APPX A PART I TO FIRST CDN ARMY  
ADM INSTR NO 33  
(cont'd)

PRIORITY OF UNITS  
TO BE RETURNED TO CANADA  
AS UNITS FROM 4 CDN ARMD DIV GP

Serial	Units or Sub-Units	Territorial Affiliation
1	2	3
1	96 A.Tk Bty	EDMONTON
2	65 Cdn A.Tk Bty	GRENFELL
3	3 Cdn A.Tk Bty	GANANOQUE
4	14 Cdn A.Tk Bty	MONTREAL
5	6 Cdn Fd Pk Sqn	LETHBRIDGE
6	8 Cdn Fd Sqn	TORONTO
7	9 Cdn Fd Sqn	SASKATOON
8	95 Cdn Fd Bty	CALGARY
9	110 Cdn Fd Bty	BROADVIEW
10	17 Cdn Fd Bty	WINNIPEG
11	70 Cdn LAA Bty	BRANDON
12	102 Cdn LAA Bty	DUNDAS
13	101 Cdn LAA Bty	MOOSOMIN
14	29 Cdn Armd Recce Regt	MEDICINE HAT
15	LAKE SUP REGT (MOT)	PORT ARTHUR
16	18 Cdn Armd C. Regt	WINNIPEG, PORTAGE LA PRAIRIE VERDUN
17	25 Cdn Armd Del Regt	ST THOMAS
18	21 Cdn Armd Regt	OTTAWA
19	22 Cdn Armd Regt	MONTREAL
20	28 Cdn Armd Regt	VANCOUVER
21	27 Cdn Armd Regt	SHERBROOKE
22	ALG R	NORTH BAY
23	LINC & WELLAND R.	ST. CATHARINES
24	31 Cdn Fd Bty (SP)	TORONTO
25	36 Cdn Fd Bty (SP)	COBOURG
26	83 Cdn Fd Bty (SP)	HAMILTON
27	A. & SH OF C.	HAMILTON
28	10 Cdn Indep MG Coy	SUSSEX
29	4 Cdn Armd Tps Wksp	TORONTO

- - - - -

First Units disbanded under  
General Staff Submission No. 815, d/14 Jan 46

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Effective date</u>
2nd Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment Platoon RCASC	11 Jun 45
Chief Engineer (Works) RCE	15 Jun 45
No. 2 Field Surgical Unit RCAMC	24 May 45
No. 3 Field Surgical Unit RCAMC	24 May 45
No. 5 Field Surgical Unit RCAMC	24 May 45
No. 8 Field Surgical Unit RCAMC	24 May 45
No. 11 Field Surgical Unit RCAMC	24 May 45
No. 1 Field Surgical Unit RCAMC	1 Jun 45
No. 4 Field Surgical Unit RCAMC	1 Jun 45
No. 6 Field Surgical Unit RCAMC	1 Jun 45
No. 7 Field Surgical Unit RCAMC	1 Jun 45
No. 2 Field Transfusion Unit RCAMC	1 Jun 45
No. 1 Exhaustion Unit RCAMC	10 Jun 45
No. 2 Exhaustion Unit RCAMC	10 Jun 45
No. 3 Wireless Intelligence Section (Type A) C Int C	10 Jun 45
No. 18 Canadian Special Employment Company	25 Jun 45
No. 3 Canadian Reallocation Centre Type 'C'	25 Jun 45

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PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF CRUs

HQ CRU

Bks  
OUDENARDE

Area  
ALDERSHOT

Offrs  
126

OR  
852

'A' Group (14 Inf Trg Bde)

'B' Group

5 Cdn Repat Dep - RCA

2 Cdn Repat Dep - Services

Bks	Area	Offrs	ORs
Beaumont	Aldershot	174	1690
Warburg	"	64	1242
Willems	"	78	1527
TOTAL		316	4519

Bks	Area	Offrs	ORs
Dettingen	Blackdown	237	2170
Frith W.	"	14	531
Frith E.	"	61	520
Inkerman	Woking	164	2070
TOTAL		476	5281

6 Cdn Repat Dep - Inf

3 Cdn Repat Dep - RCE & RC SIGS

Bks	Area	Offrs	ORs
Albuhera	Aldershot	75	1746
Badajos	"	80	1412
Barrosa	"	75	1735
TOTAL		230	4893

Bks	Area	Offrs	ORs
Delville	Cove	136	2276
Guillemont	"	136	2315
Morval	"	136	1326
TOTAL		408	5917

'C' Group

7 Cdn Repat Dep - Inf

1 CGRU Pro & Gen

Bks	Area	Offrs	ORs
Salamanca	Aldershot	80	1421
Talavera	"	80	1376
Waterloo W.	"	48	814
Waterloo E.	"	28	1448
TOTAL		236	5059

Bks	Area	Offrs	ORs
Corunna	Aldershot	126	1780
Chetwood Ter	"	154	82
Maida	"	115	1252
Grant Sq	"		210
TOTAL		395	3324

'E' Group

1 Cdn Repat Dep - General

2 CGRU - CAC, RCA

Bks	Area	Offrs	ORs
Huron	Bramshot	102	1001
Ontario	"	102	1165
Superior	"	99	1355
Tweedsmuir	Thursley	72	848
TOTAL		375	4369

Bks	Area	Offrs	ORs
Quebec	Borden	99	1440
St. Lucia	"	256	1445
TOTAL		355	2885

CWAC - NURSES

Bramshott Bramshott  
Gen Hosp

As  
Required

3 CGRU - (RCE, RC Sigs, RCOC, RCEME)

Bks	Area	Offrs	ORs
Martinique	Borden	118	2240

4 Cdn Repat Dep - CAC

1 CASCRU

Bks	Area	Offrs	ORs
Algonquin	Witley	220	2910
Jasper	"	136	2103
Laurentide	"	195	2539
TOTAL		551	7552

Bks	Area	Offrs	ORs
Blenheim	Fiborough	69	1688
Melplauquet	"	102	1288
TOTAL		171	2976



PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF CRUs (CONT'D)HQ CRU'F' Group13 Cdn Inf Trg Bde

<u>Accn</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>
Knepp Castle	Sussex	20	487
2 CITR		<u>All Ranks</u>	
Middleton	Sussex	1500	
(tented camp)			

1 Cdn B Wksp (incl 7 CWAC)

<u>Bks</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>
Canada Huts	Borden		744
Guadaloupe	"	80	2314
Havannah	"	27	1222
TOTAL		<u>107</u>	<u>4280</u>

6 CITR

<u>Accn</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>
Petworth 1	Sussex	52	1280
" 2	"	67	1272
" 3	"	45	840
TOTAL		<u>164</u>	<u>3392</u>

4 VRD - 1 CCOD(plus 2, 3)  
(Cdn Gen )  
(Pnr Coy )

	<u>Offrs</u>	<u>ORs</u>
Louisburg E Borden	23	894
Louisburg W "	11	622
Exmoor Qtrs "	35	112
TOTAL	<u>69</u>	<u>1628</u>

7 CITR

Southey Hall	Sussex	55	676
Dunley Hill	"	56	796
Fairmile Camp	"	48	765
TOTAL		<u>159</u>	<u>2237</u>

23 & 24 Cdn Spec Emp Coy

Louisburg S Borden	730
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MT TECH Stores Coy & Special SAL

Oakhanger Borden	31	1124
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8 CITR

Chelwood Gate	Sussex	49	720
Sheffield Pk	"	48	1392
Pippingford Pk	"	56	1123
Chaplewood Manor	"	56	796
TOTAL		<u>209</u>	<u>4031</u>

9 CITR

The Vicarage	Sussex	11	48
Fryern	"	12	190
Golf Club House	"	18	49
West Chiltonington	"	82	1164
Speer Hill	"		1000
(tented camp)			
TOTAL		<u>123</u>	<u>2451</u>

1/Org Con/1/2 (SD1(b))  
14 May 45

Copy of Fo 196 1/R&D PLANS/1/7

CDN REPAT DEPOTS AS OF 20 OCT 45

REPAT DEPOT	RLY STA FOR INCOMING DRAFTS	RHQ & WINGS BKS	CO
1 Repat HQ	Haslemere	Tweedsmuir Camp	Col W.B.K. Gordon Lt-Col J.R. Barber (2i/c)
1 Wing		Tweedsmuir Camp	Lt-Col.B.M.MacIntyre
2 Wing		Superior Bks	Maj J.E. Tipler
3 Wing		Huron Camp	Maj J.B. Lindner
4 Wing		Ontario Camp	Maj W.O. Stockdale
2 Repat HQ	Farnborough Main Farnborough North	West Frith	Col. W.T. Ibbott Lt-Col G.C. Howitt (2i/c)
1 Wing		Dettingen Bks	Lt-Col W.A. Copeland
2 Wing		E & W Frith	Lt-Col W.E. Greenlay
3 Wing		Inkerman Bks	Lt-Col S.C. Clegg
3 Repat HQ	Farnborough Main Farnborough North	Morval	Lt-Col K.G. McCullagh Lt-Col H.G.S.Woods (2i/c)
1 Wing		Morval	Lt-Col G.O. Gamble
2 Wing		Guillemont	Lt-Col F.T. Portsmouth
3 Wing		Delville	Lt-Col L.F. McDonald
4 Repat HQ	Haslemere	Algonquin Camp	Col R.E.A. Morton Lt-Col C.E.S. Walls (2i/c)
1 Wing		Algonquin Camp	Lt-Col A.O. Hood
2 Wing		Laurentide Camp	Lt-Col J. Smith
3 Wing		Jasper Camp	Lt-Col H.F. Pierce
5 Repat HQ	Farnborough Main Farnborough North	Willems	Lt-Col W.G. Myatt Lt-Col V.S.G.Richman (2i/c)
1 Wing		Willems	Lt-Col H.W. Sterne
2 Wing		Warburg	Lt-Col D.R. Corbett
3 Wing		Beaumont	Lt-Col R.W. Thompson
6 Repat HQ	Farnborough Main Farnborough North	Barrossa	Col F.M. Matheson Lt-Col F.M. Mitchell (2i/c)
1 Wing		Albuhera	Lt-Col E.T. Jacques
2 Wing		Barrossa Bks	Lt-Col R.P. Bouley
3 Wing		Badajos	Lt-Col C. Foster

CDN REPAT DEPOTS AS OF 20 OCT 45

REPAT DEPOT	RLY STA FOR INCOMING DRAFTS	RHQ & WINGS BKS	CO
7 Repat HQ	Horsham	Denne Pk	Col W.S. Murdock Lt-Col G.F.P. Bradbrooke (21/c)
1 Wing		Denne Pk	Lt-Col R.M. Wynn
2 Wing		Strood Pk	Lt-Col C.A. Scott
3 Wing		Five Oaks Woodale	Lt-Col R.L. Tindall
4 Wing		Woodale Tilgate	Maj R.C. Patterson
5 Wing		Bucksgreen	A/Lt-Col R.R. Church
8 Repat HQ	Farnborough Main Farnborough North	Blenheim	Col K.C. Bjorn Lt-Col W.A. Georgeson (21/c)
1 Wing		Blenheim	Lt-Col A.D'A. Marks
2 Wing		Malplaquet	Lt-Col J.W. Powell
3 Wing		Tournai	Lt-Col D.F. Bourgoyne
9 Repat HQ	Haslemere	Petworth No. 1 Camp	Col J.A. Wilson Lt-Col R. White (21/c)
1 Wing		Petworth No. 1 Camp	Maj H.F.S. Blades
2 Wing		Petworth No. 3 Camp	Maj A.J.A. Baxter
3 Wing		Petworth No. 2 Camp	Maj T. Upton
4 Wing		Barkfold	Lt-Col W.B. McQueen
5 Wing		Brownings	Maj E.R. Talbot
10 Repat HQ	Leatherhead	Southey Hall	Lt-Col J. Runcie ( ) (21/c)
1 Wing		Southey Hall	Lt-Col A.C. Ross
2 Wing		Dunley Hill	Lt-Col H. Massue
3 Wing		Fairmile Camp	Lt-Col R.B. Forbes
11 Repat HQ	Forest Row	Chelwood Corner	Col J.D. Forin Lt-Col J.E. Anderson (21/c)
1 Wing		Chelwood Manor	Lt-Col R.N. Wilson
2 Wing		Pippingford Park	Lt-Col A.M. McMillan
3 Wing		Sheffield Park (Nos 1 & 2)	Lt-Col B.R. Richie



ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER

NO. 53

12 FEB 47

CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS IN GREAT BRITAIN

1. DISBANDMENTS

- (a) Approval is granted for the disbandment of the u/m unit wef 31 JAN 47. (Auth CGS 139).

Serial 548/1 - NO 1 Printing & Stationery Detachment, RCASC

- (b) The a/m unit will disband under instrs CMHQ.

6/1 Print Det/1/2 (SD&T)  
1/Org RCASC/1/4

2. DISBANDMENTS

- (a) Approval is granted for the disbandment of the u/m units and increments wef 21 FEB 47. (Auth CGS 139)

<u>Serial</u>	
520/1	Overseas Canadian Records Office
608/1	NO 1 Signal Company CMHQ, RC Sigs
800/1	NO 1 General Duty Company CMHQ, VG of C
801/1	Canadian Barracks Services, RCASC
519/1	Canadian Military Headquarters Transport Company, RCASC
	NO 1 Increment Type "A" to Serial 519/1-Canadian Military Headquarters Transport Company, RCASC
2387/1	Chief Paymaster Overseas
444/1	Overseas Postal Depot Type "B", CPC
2503/1	Canadian Treasury Office Overseas
2567/1	Office of the Judge Advocate General, Canadian Army Overseas
5667A/1	NO 1 Detachment Type "A", Office of the Judge Advocate General, Canadian Army Overseas
2641/1	Canadian Wives Bureau Type "E"
	NO 2 Increment Type "B" to Serial 2641/1 - Canadian Wives Bureau Type "E"
	NO 3 Increment Type "C" to Serial 2641/1 - Canadian Wives Bureau Type "E"
	NO 4 Increment Type "D" to Serial 2641/1 - Canadian Wives Bureau Type "E"
	NO 5 Increment Type "C" to Serial 2641/1 - Canadian Wives Bureau Type "E"
290B/1	NO 1 Canadian Repatriation Depot Type "R" (Lorne Scots)
290C/1	Headquarters NO 1 Canadian Repatriation Depot Type "R" (Lorne Scots)

2. Disbandments (cont'd)

NO 4 Increment Type "A" to Serial 290C/1 -  
Headquarters NO 1 Canadian Repatriation Depot  
Type "R" (Lorne Scots)

290D/1 1 Wing (A) NO 1 Canadian Repatriation Depot  
Type "R" (Lorne Scots)

290D/1 3 Wing (B) NO 1 Canadian Repatriation Depot  
Type "R" (Lorne Scots)

1/Org Misc/1/8  
1/Org Sigs/1/5  
1/Org Gen/1/2  
1/Org RCASC/1/4  
1/Org Pay/1  
1/Org Postal/1/2  
6/Records/1/2  
6/CMHQ Sigs Coy/1  
6/CMHQ GD Coy/1  
6/Bk Serv/1/2  
6/CPC/1/3  
6/CMHQ JAG/1/2  
6/Wives Bureau/1  
6/1 Repat Dep/1

REORGANIZATION

3. CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

- (a) Approval is granted for the reorganization of Serial 56/1 Canadian Military Headquarters on WE Cdn IV/85/8 wef 22 Feb 47. (Auth CGS 139).
- (b) The a/m Reorganization will be effected under instrs of CMHQ.
- (c) Copies of the WE will be issued separately to all concerned.

6/CMHQ/1 (AG1)  
105/CMHQ/1

FORMATION

4. OVERSEAS CA(A) LIST

- (a) Approval is granted for the fm of Overseas CA(A) List wef 15 Feb 47.
- (b) The a/m List will form under instrs CMHQ.

105/CMHQ/1

Sgd 'H D Graham'  
(H D Graham) Brigadier  
Chief of Staff  
CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

DISTRIBUTION

List "A"

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

HQ 54-27-47-1 (Org)

OTTAWA, 9 JAN 47

Policy - Final Stages Demobilization  
Discharge of Officers and Other Ranks CA(A)

1. All officers and other ranks who are not members of the Canadian Army (Active Force) will be demobilized by 31 MAR 47, except as provided for hereunder:
  - (a) Officers and other ranks accepted into the Interim Force who have elected to continue to serve to 30 SEP 47;
  - (b) Officers and other ranks of the CA(A) whose retention is considered absolutely essential may be retained for a longer period, in no case to extend beyond 30 SEP 47, provided:
    - (i) Authority is received for each individual case from Army Headquarters;
    - (ii) A definite date when such officer or other rank will be demobilized is submitted with the application;
    - (iii) A certificate is supplied by the GOC to the effect that the retention is essential.
2. Since depots, as now set up, are not in a position to discharge all such individuals at the one time, discharge will have to be gradual, however, all arrangements will be completed including the granting of all leave entitlements, with the exception of leave which is being commuted, to ensure final demobilization by 31 MAR 47.
3. Except in cases where contrary arrangements have been made, the above policy will apply equally to former members of the Permanent Force with the exception that their leave on retirement will not have to be completed prior to 31 MAR 47.

W.H.S. Macklin (Brig)  
for (E.G. Weeks)  
Major-General  
Adjutant-General

Distribution (for action)

Org 1812

All Commands  
CMHQ  
Commander, Canadian Army Staff, Washington  
Comd RMC  
Comd Army HQ  
Office of the Minister of National Defence  
Administration, DND  
Heads of Branches  
Vice Heads of Branches  
Deputy Heads of Branches  
All Directors



## C.M.H.Q. MOVEMENT CONTROL TABLE

APPENDIX "S"	TROOP SHIP			BERTH SHIP			HOSPITAL SHIP			H.M.C.S. (NAVAL)		
	CDN ARMY PERSONNEL			CDN ARMY PERSONNEL			CDN ARMY PERSONNEL			CDN ARMY PERSONNEL		
	OFFRS	O.R.	TOTAL	OFFRS	O.R.	TOTAL	OFFRS	O.R.	TOTAL	OFFRS	O.R.	TOTAL
<u>ATLANTIC WESTBOUND SAILINGS</u>												
<u>YEAR 1945</u>												
JAN	65	133	198	-	-	-	35	455	490			
FEB	499	3473	3972	-	-	-	67	1124	1191			
MAR	276	2768	3044	-	-	-	52	1159	1211			
APR	501	4808	5309	-	-	-	123	1419	1542			
MAY	560	3982	4542	-	-	-	71	1139	1210	10	-	10
JUN	1363	14244	15607	-	-	-	180	1435	1615	31	-	31
JUL	2941	29050	31991	-	-	-	107	1461	1568	5	51	56
AUG	1148	13651	14799	29	428	457	99	1048	1147	34	746	780
SEP	2578	32618	35196	39	190	229	35	414	449	32	589	621
OCT	1287	16505	17792	36	190	226	49	795	844	21	331	352
NOV	1185	12315	13500	51	187	238	-	-	-	16	486	502
DEC	2552	36371	38923	90	166	256	39	410	449	41	519	560
TOTAL FOR 1945	14955	169918	184873	245	1161	1406	857	10859	11716	190	2722	2912
<u>YEAR 1946</u>												
JAN	2547	35424	37971	2	-	2	31	426	457	7	430	437
FEB	821	9856	10667	46	496	542	48	450	498	7	437	444
MAR	752	7098	7850	-	-	-	41	248	289	50	821	871
APR	473	5894	6367	-	-	-	54	151	205			
MAY	479	5710	6189	-	-	-	47	141	188			
JUN	904	10914	11818	-	-	-	40	98	138			
JUL	329	2469	2798	-	-	-	43	118	161			
AUG	387	2601	2988	-	-	-	39	78	117			
SEP	157	1222	1379	-	-	-	71	138	209			
OCT	108	1021	1129	-	-	-	19	22	41			
NOV	107	912	1019	3	-	3						
DEC	119	646	765	-	-	-						
TOTAL FOR 1946	7183	83767	90950	51	496	547	433	1870	2303	64	1688	1752
<u>YEAR 1947</u>												
JAN	99	846	945									
FEB	(Estimate) 105	622	727	2	-	2						

(Hist Sec File: CMHQ/Q/H/Docket III,  
Vol 1, Atlantic Westbound Sailings)

DEPENDENTS OF ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE  
RETURNED TO CANADA THROUGH THE  
CANADIAN WIVES BUREAU, C.M.H.Q.

	<u>Adults</u>	<u>Children</u>
<u>1944</u>		
June	6	-
July	157	65
August	242	156
September	411	225
October	592	362
November	626	321
December	1030	667
<u>1945</u>		
January	190	78
February	539	157
March	1904	1191
April	1471	679
May	1096	685
June	823	518
July	281	73
August	497	124
September	269	42
October	173	21
November	255	43
December	264	22
<u>1946</u>		
January	827	240
February	3166	971
March	4021	1369
April	2880	683
May	4408	1817
June	4802	2441
July	3571	1511
August	5409	2593
September	2819	1689
October	1003	560
November	133	55
December	781	510
<u>1947</u>		
January	389	245
February	3	2
	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	45035	20115
	<hr/>	<hr/>

The above figures were compiled from the shipping records of the Canadian Wives Bureau, C.M.H.Q., March 1947.

Files used in compilation of this Section:-

1/Demob/1- 1 to 8  
1/Demob/2- 1 to 8  
1/R&D Plans/1- 1 to 9  
1/Release/1  
1/GS Policy Demob/1  
1/Org RU/1/5  
4/Progress/4/13  
66/Army Plans/1  
66/Realloc Regs/1  
66/Repat Meetings/1  
66/UK Repat Drafts/1  
66/Tp Moves/1  
66/Tp Moves/2  
1/Org CFEF/1  
1/Discharge/1  
Hist Sec File C.M.H.Q./Q/H/ Docket III, Vol 1,  
Atlantic Westbound Sailings  
1/Demob/3  
Shipping Record, Canadian Wives Bureau, C.M.H.Q.