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HISTORICAL SECTION

Date: _____

CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

23 May 49

The Strategic Role of First Canadian Army, 1942-1944

AMENDMENT NO. 1

Insert the following passage after para 230:

THE SURVIVAL OF FIRST CANADIAN ARMY

230A. During the last weeks of 1943 there was considerable doubt in many minds as to whether Headquarters First Canadian Army would survive in the form in which it then existed. Gen Stuart indeed seems to have been of the opinion that this was neither practicable nor desirable. This is clearly indicated in a memorandum dated 20 Oct 43 which he addressed to the Minister after the receipt of Gen McNaughton's cable GS 2572 reporting the views of Gen Paget upon the future of the Canadian Army (above, para 223). In this cable it was reported that it was proposed to place 12 Brit Corps under command of First Cdn Army and that since the Army would now be in effect Anglo-Canadian it would be desirable to include in its headquarters a proportion of British staff officers.

230B. After summarizing Gen Paget's proposals, Gen Stuart's memorandum to the Minister proceeded:

6. I am in favour of this proposal for the following reasons:-

(a) The British will undoubtedly request that, initially at least, this new Army will be commanded by a battle experienced British officer who will be supported by a number of battle experienced British Staff Officers. Such an arrangement, in my opinion, is in the best interests of Canada and of the 2nd Canadian Corps.

(b) If, at a later date in the war, the bulk of our Canadian formations were serving in the same theatre, it would be possible to reconstitute a First Canadian Army by utilizing the framework of the proposed Anglo-Canadian Army.

(c) There is only one practical alternative to Paget's proposal, that is to disband H.Q. First Canadian Army and fit our 2nd Cdn. Corps and our ancillary units into one or more British Armies. Paget's proposal, for the reason stated in (b) above, is the more attractive. I have not given any consideration to the retention of H.Q. First Canadian Army in its present form simply because it is not a practical proposition; the British would not accept it. This is borne out by Paget's proposition.

7. I consider that the organization for Canadian participation in "Overlord" should be stabilized at the earliest possible date. I feel, also, that the present situation is an embarrassing one for Brooke and Paget. That embarrassment may well be causing delay. Brooke, I think, would like to get advice as to the probable attitude of the Canadian Government to a given proposal before such a proposal is forwarded officially. Paget's talk to McNaughton might very well be Brooke's "feeler". On the other hand, Paget might have spoken on his own authority only. I think the former is the more probable.

8. I suggest the following course of action:-

(a) Paget's proposal re 3 Cdn. Div. and 2 Cdn. Army Tank Brigade is, I think, firm. It is a sound proposition. It is already in hand. I suggest that you submit to War Committee for approval.

(b) Paget's proposal re organization of Army is not, as yet, a firm proposal. I consider, however, that it is a sound proposal and I recommend its approval by War Committee on the understanding that acceptance will only be given when and if the proposal is put up to us officially.

(c) Provided (a) and (b) are approved by War Committee, that I proceed to the U.K. and advise McNaughton and Brooke re attitude of War Committee. I would also like to confirm that Brooke and Paget are still of the same mind regarding Commanders of First Canadian Army and 2nd Cdn. Corps. If they are of the same mind, then your presence in the U.K. would be necessary to settle that issue.

(Privy Council Office file D-19-1: Europe, 1943

2300. The final passage of this memorandum presumably refers to discussions concerning Gen McNaughton which evidently took place between Gens Stuart and Brooke at the time of the Quebec Conference. It will be observed that the

C.G.S. was convinced that the appointment of a British officer to command First Cdn Army was inevitable. The event proved that Gen Stuart's judgement of the situation was not accurate. As already noted, the visit of the Minister and the C.G.S. to the United Kingdom resulted in the removal of Gen McNaughton, but the Canadian Army Headquarters continued to exist, essentially in the same form and under a Canadian officer.

230D. During Mr. Ralston's extended visit to the United Kingdom he was evidently able to influence to some extent the decisions taken on the status of First Cdn Army and its relationship to 21 Army Group. On 8 Dec 43 Maj-Gen J.S. Steele, D.S.D., War Office, sent to Maj-Gen Montague at C.M.H.Q. for comment a draft letter which it was proposed to send formally following discussions between the Secretary of State for War and Mr. Ralston. This draft proposed that First Cdn Army should now come under command of C.-in-C. 21 Army Group, and that a proportion of British officers should be appointed to H.Q. First Cdn Army; it also suggested that the commander of the Army should be appointed by the Canadian Government after consultation with the Government of the United Kingdom (C.M.H.Q. file 1/Formations/13).

230E. Mr. Ralston told the War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet on 1 Mar 44 that the form of the clause concerning the manner of appointments of the Army Commander was his suggestion. He said that he had considered it desirable to avoid any implication that the appointment of the Army Commander could be made otherwise than by the Canadian Government; at the same time, since so many British troops would now be included in the Army, it had seemed to him only proper that the appointment should be made after consultation with the United Kingdom.

230F. The formal letter, incorporating amendments suggested by C.M.H.Q., including the substitution of "be detailed to act in combination with" for "come under command of the Commander in Chief", was finally forwarded by the War Office on 4 Jan 44. Its text ran as follows:

I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you that proposals have been submitted by the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, for amending the present relationship between First Canadian Army and 21 Army Group. The existing relationship is defined in War Office letter 79/HD/2082/1 (S.D.1) dated 8th July 1943 as follows:

"The First Canadian Army is associated with 21 Army Group for operational direction and formation training related thereto."

It is now proposed that First Canadian Army should be detailed to act in combination with 21 Army Group.

2. In the event of this being agreed the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, will wish to carry out certain interchanges of formations between First Canadian Army and the British component of his force. In anticipation of this it is therefore considered desirable that certain appointments on the staff of Headquarters First Canadian Army should be filled by British officers. It is proposed that the proportion of British officers should not exceed 50 per cent, the actual numbers of appointments, and the interchange of formations, being agreed mutually between the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group, and the General Officer Commanding in Chief, First Canadian Army.

3. It is further proposed that the Commander First Canadian Army should be appointed by the Canadian Government after consultation with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

4. I am to enquire whether you are in agreement with the proposals set out above. If you concur in these suggestions, I am to request you to cause the issue of the necessary orders for First Canadian Army to act in combination with 21 Army Group.

(G.W. Lambert to Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q.
4 Jan 44, C.M.H.Q. file 1/Formations/13)

230G. On 6 Jan the Senior Officer replied accepting all these proposals and advising the War Office that an Order of Detail would be issued at once (ibid). The Order of Detail (No. 9) was duly issued by Gen Stuart on 7 Jan. It directed that the Canadian forces serving in First Cdn Army "do act in combination with His Majesty's Military Forces raised in the United Kingdom and serving in 21 Army Group, until I, or any other appropriate Canadian Service Authority, shall otherwise direct" (ibid).

230H. In practice, the proportion of British staff officers in H.Q. First Cdn Army was never as high as 50 per cent. Nor did any British Corps come under First Cdn Army until after the arrival of Army Headquarters in France. On 10 Jan 44 Gen Montague wrote to Gen Stuart in part as follows:

Ted Beament has just been in... Beament says that as a result of a conversation between Foulkes and Montgomery he does not think 12 Corps is coming under First Cdn Army, certainly for the present. Furthermore, his view is that no British Corps will be taken over by Cdn Army until on the other side of the water.

Col Beament had also suggested that this might affect "the matter of British staff officers at First Cdn Army" (ibid).

231H. Examination of staff lists indicates that the actual proportion of British Army officers posted to H.Q. First Cdn Army was in the vicinity of 15 per cent. List of Officers holding Command, Staff and Services Appointments in the Canadian Army Overseas Compiled as at 19 Jul 44 shows 28 British officers at H.Q. First Cdn Army out of a total of 200 listed - i.e., 14 per cent.

C.P.S.

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REPORT NO. 182
 HISTORICAL SECTION
 CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF FIRST CANADIAN ARMY, 1942-1944

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REPORT NO. 182

HISTORICAL SECTION

CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS

22 Aug 47

The Strategic Role of First
Canadian Army, 1942-1944

This Report deals with the strategic role of First Canadian Army during the period that it was located in the United Kingdom awaiting an opportunity to participate in active operations. This account cannot be regarded as complete since the narrator has had access only to source material made available at C.M.H.Q.; it is felt that a more complete story cannot be compiled until there has been an opportunity to study documents at a Cabinet level, both Canadian and British. In an effort to avoid as much repetition as possible, from time to time reference has been made to various chapters of the Preliminary Narrative, The History of the Canadian Military Forces Overseas, which has been compiled by the Historical Section, C.M.H.Q.

1. It had originally been assumed that the 1st Canadian Division would proceed to France as part of the B.E.F. and that succeeding Canadian formations, as and when sent overseas, would do likewise. Eventually, as in the 1914 - 18 war, battle-experienced Canadian formations would be grouped into a Canadian Corps and the proportion of non-divisional troops overseas increased accordingly. The fall of France, however, changed everything. The Canadian Government took steps to expedite the despatch overseas of the 2nd Canadian Division and authorized the mobilization of a 3rd and then a 4th Canadian Division for eventual service abroad. In England, General McNaughton's "Canadian Force" became first a mobile reserve and then, with the formation of 7th Corps under his command, a component of G.H.Q. Reserve. Thus Canadians were committed to the defence of the United Kingdom.

2. In the months following Dunkirk the strength of the British Army was increased by the intake of 400,000 men, so that by the end of the year the role of the new Canadian Corps had declined somewhat in relative importance. Gradually the danger of invasion lessened and British formations and equipment were despatched to danger spots in the Middle and Far East. Troops of other Dominions participated in General Wavell's early triumphs over the Italians but still the Canadians remained in G.H.Q. Reserve - with a higher standard of training and efficiency than many of the British formations which were being hurriedly trained and, where possible, equipped. With the Wehrmacht's unexpected attack on Russia, invasion of the British Isles ceased to be a probability and remained only a possibility for the autumn or the following spring.*

* The role of 7 Corps and later Canadian Corps is discussed earlier in this Narrative in Chap VI paras 1-44 and 130-168; Chap VII paras 13-37, 80-94, 153-160; Chap X paras 24-45; Chap XII paras 69-110; Chap XIII paras 143-156.

3. Although it was still desired to retain the Canadian troops in the United Kingdom, it was no longer feasible to leave such a large force south of the Thames in G.H.Q. Reserve. An idea that the Canadian Corps should take over the defence of the Sussex coast seems to have been first suggested on 28 Mar 41 by General Sir Alan Brooke, then C.-in-C. Home Forces, during the course of a conversation with General McNaughton. The latter expressed his willingness to co-operate but hoped "that in assuming the role of a static Corps, the claims of the Canadian Forces to form the spearhead of any offensive would not be forgotten." (1). In reply, Sir Alan Brooke assured General McNaughton that "there was no danger of the claims of the Canadian Forces being overlooked." It was not until the following November, however, that Canadian Corps actually took over the British 4th Corps area and renamed it Canadian Corps area. Although General McNaughton does not appear to have wished his Canadian Corps to remain on the coast longer than the winter of 1941 - 42, General Sir Bernard Paget (then G.O.C.-in-C. South Eastern Command), expressed the opinion that there would be difficulty in finding another corps to replace it (2).

4. It would seem that the first specific official discussion between service authorities regarding the possibility of service for the Canadians in a more active theatre of operations took place at the War Office on 30 Jun 41 between Brigadier E.L.M. Burns, then B.G.S. Canadian Corps, and Brigadier A.W.S. Mallaby, D.D.M.O.(O). During a discussion on future strategy, the latter indicated that "it was understood in the War Office that Canadian troops were not available for employment elsewhere than in the United Kingdom" (3). Brigadier Burns replied:-

... that the Canadian Government had never taken such a stand, but that the position was that it would consider any proposals put forward by the Government of the United Kingdom. In considering such proposals the Canadian Government would rely, to a great extent, on the advice received from the Commander of the Canadian Army Overseas, Lieutenant-General McNaughton. Lieutenant-General McNaughton's views had always been that it was not the province of the Canadian Army Overseas to initiate suggestions for its employment, but he was always ready to advise the Canadian Government in favour of the employment of the Canadian Forces in any theatre where the need of their services could be demonstrated by the authorities responsible for strategic planning, i.e., the C. of S. Committee or the War Office. Lieutenant-General McNaughton, however, had always considered it a principle that the bulk of the Canadian Military Forces should be employed in one theatre, so that Canadian authority over our troops could be properly maintained, and would not favour any course of action that would involve splitting the Canadian Army Overseas into several packets.

The possibility of employing Canadian military forces in the Middle East was then discussed. Brigadier Burns' views were passed along to Major-General J.N. Kennedy (D.M.O.& P., War Office), who pointed out, however, that it would be premature

to raise the issue just then because the requirements for home defence against the possibility of invasion in the autumn precluded the sending of further forces overseas (4).

5. Back in Canada the question of the employment of the Canadian Corps was becoming a subject of considerable political interest, and during his visit to the United Kingdom in August 1941, Prime Minister Mackenzie King made reference to it in the course of his talks to the troops. One such speech reported in The Times (London) of 27 Aug stated:-

Only a day or two ago ... Mr. Churchill told me that he hoped I would realize that the reason the Canadian forces were being retained in these Islands was that he and his colleagues regarded Britain itself as the most important of all parts of the Empire, and that the defence of Britain would be, above all else, the most significant of all the factors that would ultimately determine the outcome of the war.

Mr. Churchill understands, and I want you all to understand, that as far as the dispositions of the troops are concerned, the Canadian Government places no restrictions whatever upon any decision that may be made, other than that the Government itself shall have the opportunity of knowing what is contemplated and an opportunity of expressing views.

All of us in Canada realize that, if you are being kept here in the British Isles rather than being sent to some other theatre of war, it is because the British Government itself regards the United Kingdom as the most important of all the centres of liberty in the world. It is the citadel of liberty, and you have been given the honour of defending that citadel.

Speaking at a Mansion House luncheon in Mr. King's honour on 4 Sep, Mr. Churchill had this to add:-

... It is not their fault; it is not our fault; but there they stand, and there they have stood through the whole of the critical period of the last fifteen months at the very point where they would be the first to be hurled into a counter-stroke against an invader.

No greater service can be rendered to this country, no more important military duty can be performed by any troops in all the Allies. It seems to me that although they may have felt envious that Australian, New Zealand and South African troops have been in action, the part they have played in bringing about the final result is second to none (5).

6. During the same summer months of 1941 the Canadian Corps Commander, who was not entirely satisfied with the extent of his own power to authorize the use of Canadian troops outside the United Kingdom, endeavoured to have this question of policy settled (Chap XIII paras 149 - 156). Back in April 1940, following the inclusion of a Canadian contingent in "HAMMERFORCE", the then Minister of National Defence (Hon. Norman Rogers) had informed General McNaughton that such commitments should not be entered into without both prior reference to himself and the approval of the Canadian Government. Speaking in the House of Commons in Ottawa on 1 Apr 41, the Hon. J.L. Ralston had stated:-

As respects any question concerning the employment of the Canadian Forces on the continent of Europe or elsewhere, the position is clear, namely, that the decision would rest entirely with the Canadian Government.

... the appropriate Canadian Service authority cannot authorize the embarkation of Canadian forces from the United Kingdom without the authority of the Minister of National Defence (6).

On 22 Jul Generals McNaughton and Montague took up the question during the visit overseas of the Minister of Pensions and National Health, pointing out the undesirability of having to make specific requests to Canada for authority to participate in activities where an immediate response might be demanded: such, for instance, as raids on the enemy coast, which might be regarded in the light of normal patrols and protective activities on the part of a beleaguered garrison. The Hon. Ian MacKenzie expressed the view that, whereas the Canadian Government must decide whether Canadian troops would operate in a new theatre, such as the Middle East, it was not intended to restrict General McNaughton from authorizing operations against the continent of Europe from the United Kingdom (Chap XIII, paras 149-150).

7. Before this question could be definitely answered in Ottawa, however, an opportunity presented itself to participate in a proposed expedition to Spitsbergen. (Chap XII paras 13 - 32). In view of the Canadian Prime Minister's statement in the House of Commons on 13 Jun that

We have made known to all the world that our forces overseas are ready to go, and that we are equally ready to have them go wherever their services may count for most (7).

General McNaughton felt that the Canadian Government would approve participation and therefore sent representatives to a meeting held at the War Office on 26 Jul. He took the precaution, however, of sending a carefully worded telegram to Ottawa, explaining his action. The question was taken up by the War Cabinet in Ottawa and, on 31 Jul, the Chief of the General Staff replied that:-

... assuming project has received full consideration and approval of United Kingdom Government War Committee is quite prepared to have you act on your own judgment as to whether to co-operate and to what extent. In arriving

at decision you will no doubt have regard to question as to whether prospects of success are sufficient to warrant risks involved which include not only personnel but possible encouragement to enemy if results negative or worse. We here not in a position to judge of above and other conflicting factors but prepared to leave decision to your judgment (8).

The following day General McNaughton replied that any action taken from time to time would be "strictly in accordance therewith" and that full details would be reported whenever practicable having regard to the needs of security (9).

8. Following the successful completion of the Spitsbergen expedition, the Minister of National Defence, who was then visiting the United Kingdom, suggested that General McNaughton's power be widened to permit immediate action in certain instances. On 26 Oct he requested by telegram that the War Cabinet give this matter consideration, since such minor projects of a similar nature were

... now regarded by U.K. Government as normal extension of duties. Formations in this country and plans for these minor operations are responsibility of C.-in-C. Home Forces. Extreme need secrecy argues against prior submission each case of such plans to Governmental authority. Recommend War Committee of Cabinet now forward McNaughton general authority to act in such cases subject to his own judgment. He will notify Minister by most secret means in general terms prior to event where practicable... (10).

On 31 Oct the Vice-Chief of the General Staff was able to advise General McNaughton informally that the authority given on 31 Jul had been broadened "to cover minor projects of similar and temporary nature." (11). Official confirmation was received next day.

9. During the same visit the question of employment of Canadian troops in pending operations was discussed. Although the advisability of raising this point was questioned, all were agreed that it was intimately associated with the proposed Canadian Army programme for 1942. When questioned on 15 Oct, General McNaughton had to tell Mr. Ralston that "there was very little information available", even the Canadian Prime Minister having been unable to learn anything definite during his recent visit (12). The Corps Commander expressed the view that "it appeared unlikely that the Corps would be able to go abroad in the near future as part of an expeditionary force as it would weaken the position here." It had been repeatedly impressed upon him that "the best service which the Canadian Corps can render is in the United Kingdom until an appropriate opportunity for active employment abroad develops." He suggested the possibility of "raiding" on the Continent during the winter months and said that "excluding the Spitsbergen Expedition all previous expeditions had been cancelled subsequent to plans being laid due to changes in the situation." (see paras 21 - 22) General Crerar raised the question of employing Canadian Corps in the Middle East "either in whole or in part", but General McNaughton replied that "this had never been suggested" by the War Office. He went on to point out that "the

situation in the last war was different from the present in that none of the components of the Canadian Corps at the present time had been proved to be battle-worthy and that no opportunities had presented themselves as in the last war of a division at a time being tested in battle"; he reiterated his view that the "best employment of the Canadian Corps for the coming winter was to remain in Great Britain", but that in the spring "it might be practicable to participate in operations elsewhere... as a Corps..."

THOUGHTS OF RETURNING TO THE CONTINENT (1941)

10. Although a permanent British organization to undertake overseas operations, known as the Expeditionary Force, was not set up until February 1942, the C.-in-C. Home Forces had been making plans during 1941 with such thoughts in mind (see para 22). Shortly before Admiral Sir Roger Keyes was relieved of his post on 4 Oct 41 and was replaced by Commodore Lord Louis Mountbatten in a new appointment of Adviser on Combined Operations, the C.I.G.S. drew the attention of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to the fact that "the programme for landing craft construction already approved was based on small scale operations only and that a return to the Continent would entail a considerably larger programme, especially L.C.T. and L.S.T." (13). The Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed to his recommendation that the Joint Planning Staff should re-examine British requirements, bearing in mind the possibility of using United States construction facilities. In October, therefore, the Joint Planning Staff submitted recommendations, based on the assumption that the initial assault would be made by 17 brigades (including four army tank brigades), that three armoured divisions would be landed as follow-up by D plus 4, and that the build-up would include an additional three armoured divisions. For this force, a requirement of some 2150 L.C.T. was foreseen. An Inter-Service Committee was set up to study the question of construction and design of the needed landing craft and representatives of the Admiralty and the Adviser on Combined Operations were despatched to Washington to ascertain what ships and craft might be constructed there under Lend-Lease to make up British requirements which could not be produced in the United Kingdom (14). The Chiefs of Staff Committee also furnished the C.-in-C. Home Forces with a Directive, instructing him to undertake a large scale raid of some duration, with a target date of Spring 1942. They subsequently issued

... a further directive in which C.-in-C. Home Forces was instructed to undertake a large scale raid of some duration, with a target date of Spring 1942, and to prepare plans in consultation with the A.C.O. and the appropriate Naval and Air Cs.-in-C. All the forces that it was estimated would be available by Spring 1942, were to be placed at his disposal. As far as ships and craft were concerned these amounted to 2 L.S.I.(L), some 10 L.S.I.(M) and (H), 3 L.S.T., 50 L.C.T. and a considerable number of minor landing craft (15)

During December the Adviser on Combined Operations was given command of all landing craft and crews in Home Waters, and the build-up of an amphibious fleet continued as a joint

responsibility with the Admiralty. Combined Operations Headquarters was expanded and a pool formed of planning staff officers. Lord Louis Mountbatten was given a new directive and re-styled Commodore Combined Operations when acting in his executive capacity (16). The stage was thus set for greater activity in 1942.

FORMATION OF FIRST CANADIAN ARMY APPROVED

11. The discussions leading up to and the decision to form a Canadian Army have already been discussed in an earlier chapter of the Narrative. (Chap XIII, paras 170 - 194). Suffice it to repeat again here that it had been the opinion of General Crerar, while still in Ottawa as C.G.S., of both Generals Sir Alan Brooke and Sir Bernard Paget, as well as General McNaughton's own belief, that the Canadian force was growing too big to be handled by one corps commander and that a force or army headquarters was necessary to relieve him of all but the training and commanding of the fighting formations. Although certain difficulties for such a policy were foreseen in Ottawa, the Prime Minister announced in the Canadian House of Commons on 26 Jan 42, while General McNaughton was en route by sea for a liaison visit, that it was proposed to create overseas during 1942

... a Canadian army of two army corps; one army corps to comprise three infantry divisions and two army tank brigades; the other to consist of two armoured divisions. In addition, all necessary ancillary units to serve these two corps will be provided.

To reach this objective it will be necessary: First to convert the present 4th Division into an armoured division and train and equip it for this special role and despatch it overseas in due course; second, to raise, equip, train and despatch overseas another army tank brigade for use with the infantry divisions of the Canadian Corps; third, to raise, equip, train and despatch additional ancillary troops both for the infantry corps and the new armoured corps; fourth, to maintain and reinforce these two corps; fifth, to provide headquarters staff organizations for an army and an armoured corps.

It will, however, be recognized that the ultimate disposition of all troops necessarily depends upon circumstances which determine the course of the war (17).

The actual implementation of the Canadian Army programme for 1942 and the organization of Headquarters, First Canadian Army, are also dealt with elsewhere (Chap XV, paras 1 - 57).

12. On 3 Feb 42 General McNaughton arrived in Canada on his liaison visit and spent the next few weeks at Ottawa in discussing matters of military policy with the Minister of National Defence and the Chief of the General Staff (now General Stuart), and in touring military camps and industrial

concerns to inspect the war effort on the home front. On 6 Mar he had a two-hour conference with members of the Canadian Cabinet, during the course of which he would appear to have been asked to give his opinion as to future Allied strategy and the role of the Canadian Army (18). On 21 Mar General McNaughton set sail from Halifax to return to the United Kingdom.

GENERAL MCNAUGHTON'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON

13. When Prime Minister Churchill arrived in Washington on 23 Dec 41 to confer with President Roosevelt, he was accompanied by the British Chiefs of Staff, who carried on staff talks with their American counterparts until 14 Jan 42. From these discussions an agreement was conceived whereby the forces of the British Empire and the United States were placed under the strategical control of a group in Washington to be known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff.* This comprised the American Joint Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff, or, in the absence of the latter on their normal duties in London, the four senior representatives of the British Joint Staff Mission to Washington, headed by Field-Marshal Sir John Dill. At this first conference it was agreed by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt that "resources would be concentrated first to defeat Germany, the greater and closer enemy, and then Japan." The problem of where Germany could be engaged during 1942 was turned over to the Combined Chiefs of Staff who considered all possible targets for amphibious landings along the coasts of occupied Europe and of North Africa, from Tunis to Dakar. President Roosevelt urged that simultaneous landings be made in Morocco and Algeria, but this suggestion was discarded by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 7 Mar. At this meeting the American Joint Chiefs of Staff favoured an invasion of Northern France (19).

14. At the special request of President Roosevelt, General McNaughton flew to Washington on Sunday, 8 Mar, ostensibly, as he himself believed, to discuss chemical warfare and the setting up in Canada of a Weapons Development Committee. That afternoon he had a short discussion with Sir John Dill and other members of the British Joint Staff Mission. The next morning (9 Mar) General McNaughton, accompanied by Major-General M.A. Pope, M.C.,^{XX} went to

* American Joint Chiefs of Staff - General George C. Marshall, General Henry H. Arnold, Admiral Ernest King and Admiral William D. Leahy; British Chiefs of Staff - Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, General Sir Alan Brooke, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, and Lt-Gen Sir Hastings L. Ismay.

XX General Pope had been appointed representative of the Canadian War Committee in Washington "for the purpose of maintaining continuous contact with the U.K. - U.S. Combined Staffs and the Combined Planning Committees and to represent the War Committee before the Combined Staffs when questions affecting Canada were under consideration." During July 1942 General Pope became head of a Canadian Joint Staff Mission which was to report through the Canadian Chiefs of Staff to the Canadian War Committee on matters of policy (20).

the War Department for a talk with General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the United States Army. After giving the latter an outline of the Canadian Army programme, General McNaughton took pains to emphasize that although "his immediate task was to take his part in ensuring the direct defence of the British Isles, he constantly kept before him the ultimate role of the Canadian Army, which was of an offensive character, namely, a landing and attack against Western Europe." (21)

15. His next visit, at noon, was with the President of the United States; the Canadian Ambassador, Mr. McCarthy, accompanied him to this interview. In opening the conversation, President Roosevelt said that as far as Anglo-American strategical operations were concerned the world fell into three general areas:

- (1) The Pacific, including New Zealand, Australia, the Dutch Indies, and the Malay States;
- (2) The Mediterranean Basin, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, India and the Indian Ocean;
- (3) The North Atlantic lines of communication, the United Kingdom and North-western Europe (22)

16. In the first area - the Pacific - President Roosevelt believed that strategical direction should rest with the United States Government in Washington, in consultation with Australia and New Zealand. United States forces were being sent to these Dominions to compensate them for the divisions they had serving in Egypt, Palestine and Syria, and he hoped that they would realize the advantage of direct American support and not request that shipping be required to move their own troops back home. The President thought that the strategical direction of operations in the second area should lie exclusively with the British Government in London. In such case, the United States would continue to supply aircraft and material but would not send appreciable armed forces.

17. Mr. Roosevelt considered that the strategical direction of the third area - the North Atlantic lines of communication, the British Isles and North-western Europe - was a matter for the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and Canada. General McNaughton then stated his belief that the Canadian force was committed to ensure the security of the United Kingdom as a foothold for an eventual attack on the Continent of Europe; that the Canadians were part of an important strategical reserve, "which sooner or later there would be an opportunity to employ against Hitler, and even in the meanwhile its very presence in England would continue to tie down German divisions perhaps of greater total strength." The President quoted General Arnold's belief that "widespread harassing bombardment, if continued on the scale which it was now possible to develop, might prove decisive, whereas the present policy of heavy attacks on a limited number of objectives, however important, was not proving to have any great value." Continuing, the President said that General Marshall did not altogether agree with General Arnold and

thought that attack by ground forces would also be required. General McNaughton expressed agreement with the views of General Marshall and pointed out that bombing of England had tended to paralyse rather than destroy; with the effects soon wearing off, people became used to bombing and went about in their normal way. Bombing alone would not be enough and it would be necessary to plan for the employment of ground forces on the Continent, whenever the opportunity was offered.

18. The conversation turning to Russia, Mr. Roosevelt emphasized the pressure which Stalin was exerting in order to have another front opened against Germany at the earliest possible date. "He emphasized the political importance of doing this as soon as possible in order to encourage the Russians and to keep them in the war, for ... there was always a grave danger that Hitler might make most favourable offers to the Russians for peace." An offer to return to Russia all lands up to the old frontier might be very tempting to the Russians, "in whom he had not too much faith." As frequently happens, "military considerations might well have to give way to the imperative broad political considerations" (see paras 13 and 34 - 41).

19. The President also wished to hear the views of General McNaughton and Mr. McCarthy as to how his proposals for the organization of strategical planning might be received in London. He indicated that he was going to send their substance to Mr. Churchill that night, but he did not indicate whether Sir John Dill and his associates had been put in the picture. General McNaughton replied that he thought "the people in authority in England were realists, that they recognized that the United Kingdom was now a potential theatre of operations, and ... that they might well welcome relief from responsibility for the Pacific zone". At dinner that evening, when given the gist of the President's remarks, Sir John Dill told General McNaughton that he had not been aware of the precise nature of Mr. Roosevelt's proposals but was glad that they were being made (23).

20. The next day, 10 Mar, General McNaughton called on Brigadier-General Eisenhower, acting Chief of the War Plans Division of the War Department. The latter said that during the past three months, in the War Plans Division, he had "racked his mind" to discover how we could present Germany with a "second front" and the more he had thought about it, the more he had been driven to the conclusion that it would be possible to do so only by attacking Western Europe from the British Isles (24). General McNaughton emphatically agreed and added that "it delighted him to find that the War Department were of the same mind." There was no question in his mind but that the war could only be ended by the defeat of Hitler and the only way of doing it was to attack him from the west. This was the view which he had placed before the Canadian Cabinet, where it had been accepted.

CANADIAN TRAINING IN COMBINED OPERATIONS

21. For a moment it is necessary to go back to August 1940, when a Combined Training Centre (H.M.S. Quebec) was instituted at Inveraray, Ayrshire, and establishments for the training of naval landing craft crews were set up at H.M.S. Northney on Hayling Island and at Warsash in Southampton Water. On 26 Nov 40 General McNaughton and Brigadier Dempsey (B.G.S., 7 Corps) visited H.M.S. Quebec and spent two days watching demonstrations put on by troops of the British 1st Corps which was receiving combined operations training. Arrangements were then concluded for a number of Canadian officers to be received on short courses early in the New Year (25). General McNaughton was given a copy of a training film which had been produced at the direction of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes (Director, Combined Operations); blue prints of a "mock-up" A.L.C. and a scaling ladder were forwarded later so that initial training could be given locally. On 29 Jan 41 a request was made to Home Forces for the brigades of the two Canadian divisions to be given training at Inveraray, following the completion of 1st Corps' sojourn there (26). This, however, did not prove possible. The students of the First Canadian Junior War Staff Course were given a demonstration of the use of landing craft at Hayling Island on 10 Apr and liaison was maintained with this establishment during the sojourn of the 2nd Canadian Division on the coast of Sussex.

22. Throughout this period, as noted above, a large number of raids had been planned and some even mounted, but for various reasons cancelled. The few minor raids carried out did not meet with conspicuous success. Moreover, there were never sufficient craft to meet the requirements of training as well as operations. The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material states: "This apparent inertia in not carrying out a continuous programme of raids seems to have caused some measure of dissatisfaction to C.-in-C. Home Forces." As a possible corollary to this

... the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, in October sought approval of the Chiefs of Staff to carry out raids on the coast of occupied France and the Low Countries so as to provide his troops with battle experience. The Chiefs of Staff agreed these proposals and subsequently issued a further directive in which C.-in-C. Home Forces was instructed to undertake a large raid of some duration, with a target date of Spring 1942 (27).

As early as 6 Sep, General Paget had discussed the possibility of Canadian troops participating in raids against the enemy-occupied coast of France. Although welcoming the idea, General McNaughton "considered it essential that each raid must have a clearly defined object and must be carefully planned down to the last detail" (28). During November plans for two minor operations, "BARITONE" and "CRUPPER" were taken over by Canadian Corps, and on 29 Nov General Montgomery told General Pearkes (then acting Corps Commander) that Canadian Corps should alternate each month with 12 Corps in carrying out raids. Nothing materialized, however, and due to the shortage of landing craft these operations were postponed - three times in fact.

23. Following the move of Canadian Corps to Sussex, Major J.E. Ganong (48th Highlanders) was attached to the South Eastern Command Assault Landing Craft School at H.M.S. Northney as "Canadian Corps Raiding Officer." Detachments from a number of the units of the 1st and 2nd Canadian Divisions received instruction in combined operations technique at H.M.S. Northney before the courses were discontinued, but no opportunity was presented of putting the new training into practice.

24. On 5 Feb 42 General Crerar, as acting Corps Commander, wrote the G.C.C.-in-C. South Eastern Command that while he realized "higher policy" had necessitated the retention of Canadian Corps within Home Forces, the keenness and morale of Canadian soldiers would become more difficult to maintain unless some opportunity was provided to match their skill and courage against the enemy. One solution seemed ready made - participation in small cross-Channel raids:

... I consider that it would be in the general interest if a very high proportion of these prospective raids, if not the total, should be undertaken by detachments from the Canadian Corps. In this way, even if operations on a large scale continue, through force of circumstances, to be denied to the Canadian Army, an opportunity will be given to a considerable number of units to participate in actions against the enemy. In default of a reputation built up in battle the Corps undoubtedly would receive great stimulus if, in the near future, it succeeded in making a name for itself for its raiding activities - a reputation which, incidentally, it very definitely earned for itself in the last war.

General Montgomery replied briefly on 8 Feb to the effect that he hoped to get some A.L.Cs. in March, when Canadian Corps might be able to run its own raids from a base at Newhaven.

25. General Crerar then took the matter up with the C.I.G.S., who agreed that it was important for Canadians to be employed on future raids and arranged for him to meet the Director of Combined Operations, Lord Louis Mountbatten. At this latter meeting, on 6 Mar, General Crerar emphasized the repercussions which might result from the continued inactivity of Canadian troops. Apart from having an adverse effect on morale within Canadian Corps and recruiting in Canada there was the possibility that it might influence the United States against despatching troops to Europe. General Sir Archibald Nye (V.C.I.G.S.) supported General Crerar's case. Lord Louis Mountbatten replied that the proposal to use a wholly Canadian detachment for raids ran counter to the existing policy that "raids would be carried out by the Special Service Brigade ("Commandos") and that Army representation would take the form of 'dilution' of raiding Commandos, with a proportion of troops from the Corps of Home Forces." Nevertheless, he was willing to make an exception, provided the C.-in-C. Home Forces would agree, and to employ the landing craft flotilla of the R.C.N.V.R. which had recently arrived from Canada to work with Canadian troops. At a further C.O.H.Q. conference it was agreed that a Canadian detachment should be organized for combined operations training by 15 Mar 42 (30). As a security precaution, Canadian Corps Training Instruction

No. 7 (16 Mar) envisaged a progressive programme for detachments from the 2nd, 1st and 3rd Canadian Divisions. After a period of preliminary training on land at Seaford, the detachment from the 2nd Canadian Division left for Gourock on 14 Apr and carried out 10 days of intensive training on the landing ship "Princess Josephine Charlotte". It did not prove possible, however, to employ this detachment on an actual operation (see para 27).

26. On the last day of March, Lord Louis Mountbatten had recommended to the Chiefs of Staff Committee that a minor operation ("ABERGROMBIE") be mounted with a force of about 100 men of the Special Service Brigade and 50 all ranks from Home Forces (31). Subsequently, the provision of the Home Forces' detachment was offered to Canadian Corps and the personnel supplied by The Carleton and York Regiment. The object of the raid was to land on the French coast, immediately south of Boulogne-sur-Mer, reconnoitre the immediate area, capture a few prisoners and do whatever damage proved practicable. After a preliminary period of training from 8 - 18 Apr on H.M.S. Prince Albert in Southampton Water, the Canadian detachment (Lieutenant J.P. Ensor) and No. 4 Commando (Major Lord Lovat) moved to Dover. The number of nights suitable for such an operation were limited and it was not until the evening of 21 - 22 Apr that the attempt could be made. Bad luck, however, dogged the two landing craft carrying the Canadians, and faulty navigation prevented them from getting ashore. Morale had been high and disappointment was equally great.

27. The question of further participation by Canadians in such raids^{*} was raised by Brigadier Simonds during the course of a meeting at G.O.H.Q. on 19 Apr; the 2nd Canadian Division's detachment which had been on a training cruise was now available (see para 25). Major-General J.C. Haydon replied that "at the moment they had no suitable objectives" and went on to explain that

... he was perfectly prepared to use a wholly Cdn raiding party but that the selection of personnel rested with G.H.Q. Home Forces, and that he could not specify the tps to take part. He suggested that the best method of approach was direct to G.H.Q. Home Forces, stating that a Cdn det was ready and trained and asking for them to be given priority on the next suitable party. If G.H.Q. Home Forces agreed he would be in a position to ask for them (33).

As a result of a conversation between General Paget and General McNaughton, on 5 May, it was agreed that, insofar as raids by troops controlled by G.H.Q. Home Forces were concerned, the former would keep the Canadian Army Commander informed as to plans, but would otherwise deal through the normal channels of command to First Canadian Army (34).

* On 4 Apr 42 a South Eastern Command Instruction laid down that 12 Corps and 1st Canadian Corps might submit proposals for raids on the frontage from Le Treport to West Kapelle and the Middelburg peninsula. Headquarters, 1st Canadian Corps, subsequently selected three possible objectives on this coast, but these raids died a natural death early on in their planning (32).

28. The channels of communication between the new Headquarters, First Canadian Army, and C.M.H.Q., the War Office, G.H.Q. Home Forces, South Eastern Command and Headquarters, 1st Canadian Corps, already had been set forth by General McNaughton in a letter to Major-General D.G. Watson, D.S.D. at the War Office. 1st Canadian Corps had been placed "in combination with" British forces serving in the United Kingdom and had been placed under the operational command of South Eastern Command. Of importance here, however, are the following paragraphs:-

As the Organization of First Canadian Army Headquarters progresses it is intended to concentrate attention on investigation, study and preparation relating to the employment of the Canadian Forces in an overseas theatre, and in this connection it is desired that a close and intimate liaison be established with the Combined Operations Staff which has recently been set up by the Government of the United Kingdom.

In the event of an emergency in this country First Canadian Army Headquarters will, when sufficiently organized, be made available for an operational role should the Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, so wish. Except in emergency, it is not desired that First Canadian Army Headquarters should take over a sector of the United Kingdom as this would distract attention from the primary tasks indicated above (35).

"ROUNDUP", 1942

29. In the meantime, in London, on 20 Feb 42 the Army Council had issued a directive announcing its decision "to set up in the United Kingdom a permanent organization to undertake overseas operations"; this was to be known as the 'Expeditionary Force' (36). The organization to be set up was to include a permanent commander, with a headquarters staff and a "permanent nucleus of formations and units specially trained in combined operations, and capable of adapting themselves to the special organisations which may be necessary" for:

Operations of limited scope for which a specially organized and constituted force, highly trained in combined operations, will be required. Special forces for this type of operation will always be required, and it has been decided that there shall be included in this organization a number of formations and units permanently earmarked for such operations.

Operations of wider scope, for which, apart from the forces mentioned [above], infantry and armoured formations which have been specially trained in combined operations and also, possibly, formations which need not be specially trained, may be required (37).

30. The permanent nucleus was to consist of one infantry division, one independent brigade group, a Royal Marine division of two (eventually three) brigades and two army co-operation squadrons R.A.F.; together with additional light artillery batteries, light and heavy anti-aircraft artillery batteries, special service tank squadrons and ancillary units (38). For larger operations, additional infantry and armoured divisions and ancillary troops would be required, but, on account of the operational requirements for defence of the United Kingdom, could not be located in an area adjacent to the Expeditionary Force proper nor remain under the command of Headquarters, Expeditionary Force. For overseas operations involving an opposed landing, an Expeditionary Force Reserve would be constituted, consisting initially of an armoured division, two infantry divisions, two army tank brigades, with the necessary corps, L. of C. and base troops. In a second stage the Reserve would be enlarged by a further armoured division and two infantry divisions. Headquarters, Expeditionary Force, would be available to command any overseas project, and to assist the Commodore, Combined Operations, in the supervision of training its formations in combined operations technique. Except when nominated for an overseas expedition outside the sphere of operations of Home Forces, the Expeditionary Force would be under command of the Commander-in-Chief Home Forces (General Paget) for all purposes. Upon being nominated for a definite operation overseas, the Expeditionary Force Headquarters would "work directly under the War Office in close consultation with Commodore, Combined Operations, for purposes of planning and preparation." Since for all combined operations units and formations required the same basic training, they would not normally be withdrawn into War Office control until a specific operation was imminent, and special training required. Expeditionary Force Headquarters when formed would be located at Largs, Ayrshire, as was the existing Headquarters, Combined Training, headed by a Vice-Admiral, a Major-General, and an Air Commodore, Combined Training.

31. On 2 Jun General McNaughton visited General Paget at G.H.Q. Home Forces, and, following a discussion of problems raised by the interpretation of the Visiting Forces Acts (see Report No. 180), the conversation turned to the Planning Staff being set up for the Expeditionary Force. The draft plan for the Expeditionary Force showed the Canadian infantry and armoured divisions on their existing establishments. The reorganization of the British formations on to the new establishments would not be complete, since one old type infantry division was shown in each "bridgehead" corps; this step was necessary, according to General Paget, because the "new model" division did not contain enough infantry (39). General Paget suggested that Canadian "G", "I" and "Q" staff officers should be appointed to the Planning Staff. He repeated this offer during a further conversation on 11 Jun, while watching Exercise "YUKON". Thereupon General McNaughton informed the C.G.S. in Ottawa that he was providing a G.S.O.1.(S.D.), a G.S.O.2.(I) and a D.A.Q.M.G. as the Canadian representatives on the planning staff being set up by G.H.Q. Home Forces (40). At this second meeting General McNaughton was also informed that the main Expeditionary Force Planning Staff Committee would be composed of General Sir Bernard Paget (Chairman), Admiral Sir Bertram H. Ramsay,* Air

* Admiral Ramsay was transferred from the post of Naval C.-in-C., Dover, to C.O.H.Q. where he was charged with supervising the Naval Force planning of all future cross-Channel operations, in particular "ROUNDUP".

Marshal Sir Sholto Douglas (C.-in-C. Fighter Command), Major-General Chaney (Commanding General, United States Army in the United Kingdom) and General McNaughton (41).

32. On 8 Jul General McNaughton again discussed the role of First Canadian Army with General Paget. The latter then hoped by 1 Aug to be able to establish an organization of "Regional Commanders" to administer the Home Guard and to carry out the functions pertaining to Home Defence. To a large extent this would free from home defence duties the formations earmarked for the Field Force; similarly, army headquarters would be released from the static administration of their areas, although they would still have to supervise training (42). After such an organization was working, the C.-in-C. Home Forces planned to hold weekly meetings of the Army Commanders concerned with the broad planning for the Expeditionary Force. He agreed that the First Canadian Army should be kept intact and allotted operational tasks as an entity, through its commander.

33. On the following day, General McNaughton visited the C.I.G.S. at the War Office in connection with "JUPITER REVIEW" (see paras 60-69), and expressed his own agreement with the plan^x which General Paget was making for a large scale operation in Europe and with the role which First Canadian Army would be called upon to play (43). He remarked that, if successful, such an operation would win the war; if not, defeat was possible. "The proper timing of the operation was vital", he went on, "and it was most important that it should not be launched until sufficient reserves of men and equipment became available." General McNaughton further stressed the need for continued Canadian control over Canada's own forces and emphasized that operations "must be launched for a military reason and not for political reasons". Conversation then turned to the development and expansion of the Canadian Army Overseas which he pointed out was "now particularly related to and focussed on a campaign in Northwest Europe."

34. During the previous winter the British Joint Planning Staff had also drawn up a paper outlining the strategy which might be followed for 1942 - 43 and the American Joint Planners had worked out a similar paper for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in April. The main points made by the British Joint Planners were:

- (a) To render all possible help in the way of equipment and supplies to Russia so as to keep her armies in being.
- (b) To prevent Germany and Japan joining hands on the northern shores of the Indian Ocean, from which it follows that the maintenance of our position in the Middle East is vital.

x This plan would appear to have been produced on the basis of attacks against half-a-dozen secondary ports covering a great part of the French coast. The conception was to undertake exploitation from those ports where good initial success was obtained. Initial assault was to take the form of attack from the flanks, securing the port in a "pincers" before the final assault. Dieppe was not one of the ports included in this plan (Report No. 159, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 5 Oct 46).

- (c) The defence of Australasia is important but not vitally so.
- (d) That the United Nations should attack Western Europe from the United Kingdom during the summer of 1943 (44).

The American views were outlined to General McNaughton by President Roosevelt during the course of the former's visit to Washington (see paras 15 - 19).

35. In April General Marshall and Mr. Harry Hopkins proceeded to London to lay the official American views before Prime Minister Churchill, the War Cabinet, and the Chiefs of Staff Committee. General agreement was reached that the final blow must be delivered across the English Channel and eastward through western Europe. A tentative date of 1 May 43 was given for this cross-Channel operation, better known by its code name "ROUNDUP", and the build-up of American strength in the United Kingdom for such an effort was to be known as "BOLERO". By this time, however, the German spring offensive on the Eastern Front was under way and the Russians were slowly falling back. It was realized in both Washington and London that everything practicable must be done to reduce the pressure on the U.S.S.R. lest it collapse or sue for peace and "the door be opened wide for a complete conquest of Europe and a probable juncture with the Japanese in the Indian Ocean" (45). Thus an emergency plan was needed. As visualized by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Operation "SLEDGEHAMMER" would provide for a diversionary assault on the French coast at a much earlier date "if such a desperate measure became necessary to lend a hand toward saving the situation on the Soviet front" (46). This would involve the retention of a beachhead throughout the following winter in preparation for a 1943 full scale invasion.

36. Even for such a diversionary operation, however, at least six divisions would be required. The necessary landing craft and vessels to convey such a force across the narrow Channel were not available. Colonel Huell of the War Plans Division, War Department, Washington, told General McNaughton on 17 Apr that the United States Army had contracted for some 7000 A.L.C. and M.L.C., estimated to be the number required to float six divisions, and that he believed that one-third of the requirements would be available by 15 Sep 42 and the remainder by 1 Apr 43 (47). For some time to come the build-up of the United States Army in men and equipment ("BOLERO") would be limited by insufficient shipping; it was hoped that by the end of September there would be three infantry and one armoured division (126,000 men) in Ireland and, should shipping improve, that figure might be raised to 250,000. Naturally the prime task of American shipping was to transport the troops and supplies required for the several garrisons in the Pacific, including Australia.

37. Both among civilians and service personnel in the United States there began to grow up a good deal of enthusiasm for an offensive in 1942 to take the pressure off the Eastern Front, where German armies were driving forward to reach both the oil of the Caucasus and the Volga at Stalingrad. Indeed, in a press communique of 11 Jun, President Roosevelt was quoted as being in agreement on the "urgent task of creating a second front" in 1942.

The British Joint Planning Staff and the Chiefs of Staff Committee on the other hand, had no illusions about the difficulties inherent in launching a cross-Channel assault and maintaining even a beachhead in the face of the overwhelming land and air strength with which the Wehrmacht could counter-attack (48). As the question of launching "SLEDGEHAMMER" reached the more detailed planning stages it was assumed that the American planners would be forced to agree with their British colleagues that shortage of landing craft and an insufficient number of trained formations to participate would make active intervention on such a large scale impossible during 1942. As General Pope summed up the question, writing from Washington to the C.G.S. after a conversation with General Dewing:

... The British Joint Staff Mission, as well as the Chiefs of Staff in London, had thought the matter over pretty carefully and had come to the conclusion that it would be bad tactics to tell their U.S. friends that nothing could be done this summer. Rather did they feel that it would be better for them to welcome the idea, sure in the knowledge that when the Planners in London got down to actual cases, it would be seen that the prospects for this year were really not too promising. I then realized that I had been blinded in part by a British smoke screen.

... it would take an expenditure of the order of 25 per cent of our actual resources to achieve a diversion of possibly less than 5 per cent of the German forces on the Eastern Front. Again, in the circumstances of an impending Russian debacle, Britain would be thinking of her own defence against invasion rather than thinking of invading the continent (49).

Instead, the British Chiefs of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief (Designate) of the Expeditionary Force (General Paget) were considering the continuation of raiding on the St Nazaire pattern^x but on a larger scale, involving operations which might require troops to hold the raided areas for one or two days. Further, the implementation of such large scale raids would have the effect of wearing down the German Air Force's fighter force (50). The only limitation which was put on such raids was that they should not interfere with the preparations being made for "ROUNDUP". Thus, during the year many large-scale assaults were proposed and some were actually mounted; with the exception of the attack on Dieppe (see paras 42 - 59), however, none actually got under way. Among these, mention might be made of "BLAZING" - an attack on Alderney; "IMPERATOR" - a raid on Paris by tanks and armoured cars; and "CLAWHAMMER", a scheme for an attack on the Cherbourg Peninsula in lieu of "SLEDGEHAMMER" (51). In the background also was the Combined Commanders' plan which would appear to have some certain similarities to the invasion plan finally evolved in 1944. It might be noted that, whereas the C.C.H.Q. planners believed that lower Normandy was the only practicable area for

x On 28 Mar 42 a force of some 250 men were landed from M.L.s., M.T.Bs. and the destroyer 'Campbeltown' at St. Nazaire, where the lock gates and installations of the large docks were destroyed. Large casualties were suffered and but few of the military force were evacuated.

a large scale assault, other planners, including those of G.H.Q. Home Forces, still thought of a possible attack on the Pas-de-Calais.

38. On 18 Jun Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alan Brooke returned to Washington for a further discussion of "SLEDGEHAMMER" and "ROUNDUP" and to urge upon President Roosevelt and the American Joint Chiefs of Staff the possibility of an operation in the Mediterranean. The fall of Tobruk on 21 Jun made the situation in North Africa extremely critical, and further discussions in Washington were devoted almost exclusively to what measures could be taken to meet Rommel's threatening drive on Egypt. Further advances, spearheaded by the Afrika Korps, and the still advancing German armies in Southern Russia envisaged a possible loss of the Middle East, the Suez Canal and the vital oil supply in the vicinity of Abadan (52).

39. By this time the "BOLERO" programme had reached sufficient dimensions, especially the build-up of bomber strength by the United States Army Air Force, to necessitate the establishment of an overall headquarters in the United Kingdom. Therefore, on 24 Jun, Major-General Dwight D. Eisenhower arrived in London to take up a new appointment of Commanding General, E.T.O.U.S.A.* and was entrusted with American preparations for a major cross-Channel invasion of North West Europe ("ROUNDUP") and a possible diversionary attack on the Cherbourg Peninsula ("SLEDGEHAMMER").

40. It soon became clear to General Eisenhower that the British considered even a moderately successful Operation "SLEDGEHAMMER" would have little effect on the course of the war on the Eastern Front while a reverse, resulting from the force being inadequate in size and equipment, would prejudice the possibility of a later successful full-scale invasion of North West Europe. Indeed, it seemed to General Marshall, Admiral King and Mr. Harry Hopkins, who arrived in London in mid-July, that the British still held the view that a full-scale invasion of North West Europe would not be possible even in 1943, due to the probable dearth of landing craft and battle-experienced formations. On 22 Jul, the Prime Minister and the Chiefs of Staff Committee rejected the American proposal to launch Operation "SLEDGEHAMMER" in 1942 due to the "poverty of equipment, especially in landing craft, and the short period remaining when the weather would permit cross-Channel movement of small craft" (53). It was finally decided on 25 Jul that the only operation with a fair chance of success in 1942, and one which would get American troops into action, was a landing in French North Africa - formerly known by the code name "GYMNAST" and now to be re-designed and planned as Operation "TORCH" (54). Such was the policy which had been urged by the British Chiefs of Staff to take Rommel in the rear and ease the pressure in the desert, where General Auchinleck's forces had backed up for a stand on the Egyptian border. The American view was that Operation "TORCH" would mean abandoning any hope of launching "ROUNDUP" in 1943 for, in General Marshall's view:

Torch would bleed most of our resources in the Atlantic, and would confine us in the Pacific to the holding of the Hawaii - Midway line and the preservation of communications to Australia (55).

* European Theatre of Operations, United States Army.

41. General Eisenhower was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the forces to be employed on Operation "TORCH" and on 13 Aug he received his Directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington. In addition, he retained command of the United States Army in the European Theatre of Operations (E.T.O.), continued to be in charge of American preparations for "ROUNDUP" and the possible implementation of "SLEDGEHAMMER" should the Russian situation deteriorate to an impossible extent (56).

"RUTTER" AND "JUBILEE"^{*}

42. No large scale amphibious operation had been carried out since the landings and evacuation of Gallipoli in 1915 and it was considered essential that a preliminary operation should be launched on a divisional scale in order to provide a practical test of the equipment and technique developed for amphibious operations before the preparations for "ROUNDUP" reached a final stage (57). Moreover, a sizeable assault fleet was being built up in the early months of 1942 and it was felt that experience should be gained in the handling of L.S.I., L.C.A., and L.C.M. in combination with L.C.T. in a large operation. The areas over which air cover could be provided limited the selection of an objective and, in any return to the Continent, the early capture of a large port was considered essential (58).

43. Early in April, 1942, the "Target Committee" of C.O.H.Q., under the direction of Capt. J. Hughes-Hallett, had begun to examine the possibilities inherent in an attack on the port of Dieppe and on the 14th the project was discussed with representatives of the planning staff of G.H.Q., Home Forces. Between then and the next meeting on 18 Apr two plans were produced by the combined planners. The outline plan finally adopted on 24 Apr called for a frontal attack against Dieppe itself, supplemented by flank attacks against Puits and Pourville; airborne forces would be used to neutralize two heavy batteries of coast defence guns and a heavy air bombardment would endeavour to soften other defences (59). Subsequently it was decided to land some tanks with the leading flights in order to give close support to infantry and demolition parties moving across the open ground between the beaches and the front of the town.

44. On 30 Apr General Montgomery, G.O.C.-in-C. South Eastern Command, disclosed to General McNaughton that G.H.Q. Home Forces had proposed a raid on Dieppe, and that he had been "pressed to agree to a composite British and Cdn Force" (60). He had replied, however, "that it was essential to maintain unity of cmd and that in his opinion the Cdn tps were those best suited." G.H.Q. Home Forces having accepted this view General Crerar (G.O.C. 1st Canadian Corps) had been approached and had nominated the 2nd Canadian Division. Conditions of light and tide would be favourable for such an

* This operation has been described in considerable detail in Reports No. 83, 89, 90, 98, 100, 101, 107, 108, 109, 116, 128, 130, 142, 153, 159, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q.

operation during the week commencing 21 Jun 42.

45. General McNaughton confirmed these arrangements, subject to the details of the plan being satisfactory and receiving his approval. It was also agreed that General Montgomery should proceed with the preparation of plans and advise the G.O.C. 2nd Canadian Division (Major-General J.H. Roberts) so that the latter might be put into the planning picture by C.O.H.Q. Following the completion of Exercise "TIGER", the 2nd Canadian Division would move to the Isle of Wight for combined operations training. In order to provide a security cover for this operation ("RUTTER"), on the same day Training Instruction No. 9 was issued by Headquarters, 1st Canadian Corps, setting forth an elaborate programme of combined training to be carried out by the 2nd, 1st and 3rd Canadian Divisions in that order.

46. On 5 May, G.H.Q. Home Forces issued to the several Commands of the United Kingdom a new Directive on Raids, laying down a procedure of decentralization to be adopted for co-operation with C.O.H.Q. Should the C.-in-C. Home Forces agree with the C.C.O. (who was responsible to the Cabinet for all raids against the Continent) on the outline concept for any raid, the former would then decide from which Command troops would be selected and delegate responsibility for the operation to the Army Commander concerned. It was then up to the Army Commander whether to "retain control himself or delegate not below a Divisional Commander." An outline plan would then be worked out by the combined planning staffs of G.H.Q. Home Forces and C.O.H.Q., assisted by a staff officer nominated by the Army, corps or divisional commander concerned, who would himself attend important meetings and be responsible for concerting the plan with the Chief of Combined Operations. If the outline plan was approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Force Commanders would be appointed and these, with their staffs, would work out a detailed plan (in London). When the detailed plan had been approved, the military force required for an operation against the coast of France or the Low Countries would move to the Isle of Wight for final concentrated training with the Royal Navy and R.A.F. There, operational plans and military training would be under the supervision of the Military Force Commander while combined training with the other services would be the concern of the C.C.O., represented by the Rear Admiral Combined Operations.

47. On 7 May Lt-Gen J.G. des R. Swayne (C.G.S. Home Forces) wrote that he proposed to keep General McNaughton informed personally of the details of the pending Operation "RUTTER" and that the Planning Staff of G.H.Q. Home Forces would be at his disposal any time he required amplification on any point. Concluding, he wrote:-

General Montgomery will be responsible for providing the Canadian Corps and the 2nd Canadian Division with such information as they require, since he is the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief selected by the Commander-in-Chief to prepare the outline plan in accordance with the procedure given... (61).

Replying on the following day, General McNaughton confirmed the consent given for the selection of the 2nd Canadian Division, with certain attached troops from 1st Canadian Corps, to participate in Operation "RUTTER". He proposed to keep in touch with General Swayne through his own G.S.C.1 (Ops), Lt-Col G.P. Henderson, and had also instructed General Crerar to keep him "fully posted from his end as a matter of information, it being understood that all executive action in connection with the preparations would continue to follow the chain of command - G.H.Q. Home Forces - S.E.C.O. - 1 Cdn Corps - 2 Cdn Div". Furthermore, the G.O.C., 2nd Canadian Division had been instructed to proceed with the preparation of plans. On that same day, Canadian officers began to participate in the detailed planning.

48. As submitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 9 May, the outline plan had the concurrence of the G.O.C.-in-C., South Eastern Command. The method of attack, that is by a frontal assault, was closely related to what was then considered a prime necessity for an attempted invasion - the acquisition of an undamaged major port at a very early stage in the operation. It was feared that if reliance was placed upon flank attacks for the capture of a port, the capture might in fact be so long delayed that the harbour would be demolished and unusable by the time it was occupied. The objects of "RUTTER" were to be the destruction of defences in the Dieppe area, the installations at the aerodrome of Dieppe - St Aubin (directly south of the town) and of radar stations, power stations, dock and rail facilities and petrol dumps. It was also proposed to remove invasion barges believed to be in the harbour, obtain secret documents supposedly existing at the divisional headquarters at Arques-la-Bataille and to capture some prisoners. The Admiralty and A.O.C.-in-C., Fighter Command, were to nominate Force Commanders who would command jointly with the Military Force Commander (General Roberts).

49. On 11 and 12 June the plan for "RUTTER" was tested in Exercise "YUKON", which was witnessed by Generals Paget, McNaughton and Crerar. As a result of certain glaring faults, the Chief of Combined Operations (who had been in the United States and not witnessed the Exercise) postponed the Operation until a further exercise could be held. The Canadians remained on the Isle of Wight and during 22 - 24 Jun a second Exercise, known as "YUKON II", was carried out. This went more smoothly from the military point of view but both Generals Paget and McNaughton were concerned over certain of the naval aspects. General Montgomery took up these matters with the Navy and on 1 Jul felt justified in writing to the C.-in-C. Home Forces that he was satisfied steps were being taken to "ensure accurate navigation" and that the question of smoke was being given attention (62). Continuing, he stated:

I am satisfied that the operation as planned is a possible one and has good prospects of success, given:-

- (a) Favourable weather
- (b) Average luck
- (c) That the Navy put us ashore roughly in the right places, and at the right times.

50. Once launched, the Operation could be influenced only by air power, and therefore Lord Louis Mountbatten and General Montgomery were planning to join Air Vice-Marshal Leigh-Mallory at Headquarters, No. 11 Group R.A.F. In view of the particular Canadian responsibility, General Crerar suggested to General McNaughton that one of them should be there also. Accordingly, on 3 Jul, the Canadian Army Commander sent a written request to General Paget for General Crerar to be included in the party of senior officers who would be at No. 11 Fighter Group Headquarters during "RUTTER" (63). Replying for the C.-in-C. Home Forces, General Swayne wrote the next day that there was actually "no room for any more at the Group Headquarters" and, apart from this, it was not considered that General Crerar should be there. "There can only be one man in command of the operation", his letter continued, "and Montgomery will see to it that he keeps Harry Crerar in hourly touch with the situation". On the following day General Paget wrote himself to the same effect.

51. In the meantime, however, General Crerar had discussed the matter by telephone and later personally with General Montgomery. His memorandum of this conversation on 4 Jul contains the following paragraphs:

I opened by informing Commander, S.E. Army that he was making a mistake in attempting to treat the problem of command of Canadian troops as a simple military issue, capable of solution along strictly British channels of command when, in fact, it was a complicated problem, and one involving national policies and Imperial Constitutional relations.

It was true that the Canadian Corps had been placed "in combination" with S.E. Army and that operationally, and through me, the troops comprising the Canadian Corps were under Lieut.-General Montgomery. That situation, however, did not for one moment imply that I could be divested of my responsibility through Lieut.-General McNaughton to the Canadian Government in respect to the manner in which those troops were committed to actual operations. No agreement between C.-in-C. Home Forces, the C.C.O. and himself, or policy laid down by the Chiefs of Staff Committee could affect this constitutional position. In order to illustrate this point in a general way I suggested that the position of the C.-in-C. Home Forces, in respect to Lieut.-General McNaughton and the Canadian Army in the U.K. was very similar to that occupied by Field Marshal Foch in relation to Field Marshal Haig and the B.E.F. in the last war (64).

General Swayne's letter had failed to take into account the question of Canadian responsibility and General Crerar felt that if it continued to be regarded as a "simple and narrow military problem" the issue would be "raised to the highest political levels", where ultimately the decision would go against the attitude which was being maintained by Generals Paget and Montgomery. General Crerar therefore "urged that this attitude be reconsidered at once" for he could foresee "nothing but harm to our relationships and to co-operative effort on the part of all the Empire forces should it be maintained." The memorandum of the interview concludes thus:

Throughout the conversation, which went on for over an hour, Lieut.-General Montgomery was most frank and friendly and during the course of it obviously gained a wider appreciation of the issues that were at stake. Towards the termination he stated that in view of what I had said to him he intended to ring up Lieut.-General McNaughton and suggest that he accompany him to Headquarters, 11 Group, and be with him during the course of the intended operation. He also stated that he would be glad if I, as Commander of the Canadian Corps, could also be with him. He thanked me for my frankness and for the explanation which I had given which had put a different light on the question at issue.

Following the conclusion of the interview General Montgomery telephoned the Canadian Army Commander to say that he had just invited General Crerar to join him at Headquarters, No. 11 Group R.A.F. during the pending operation "RUTTER". He now extended a similar invitation to General McNaughton who accepted.

52. Weather proved unsuitable for the operation to be carried out as planned on 4 Jul and a 24-hour postponement was made. The weather continued unsuitable, however, and on 7 Jul a Naval decision was made that the weather was such that "RUTTER" would have to be cancelled; whereupon the troops were disembarked and returned to their locations in Sussex.

53. Following the embarkation of most of the troops on 2 Jul the ships had been sealed and the men had been informed of the nature of the operation they were about to undertake. Since it would be impossible to keep them from talking, although they were cautioned against mentioning that an actual operation had been contemplated, newspapers in the United Kingdom and Canada were permitted, on 14 Jul, to print a story by Ross Munro of the Canadian Press describing the type of combined training which had been carried out on the Isle of Wight (65).

54. At this time the public demand for some offensive operation was very widespread and Mr. Churchill, among others, was greatly disappointed by the cancellation of Operation "RUTTER". There was also the view, held at the very highest British Service levels, that a preliminary operation on the scale of "RUTTER" was indispensable if it was ever intended to invade France (65). Therefore, at the conclusion of a "post-mortem" conference which had been convened at C.O.H.Q. to study the experience gained through planning and mounting this operation, the probability of the British Cabinet expecting a further divisional combined operation to be mounted that summer was discussed with the Force Commanders by General Haydon and Captain Hughes-Hallett. There appeared to be no other possibility as good as a raid on Dieppe, for which a ready-made plan already existed; moreover, a Force had been trained. The greatest objection to re-doing it was security, all personnel having been fully briefed before its cancellation. Captain Hughes-Hallett thereupon suggested that the Expedition could be remounted without a preliminary concentration; that is, provided General Roberts (the Military Force Commander) was prepared to undertake the operation without further combined training. Subsequently General Roberts informed Captain Hughes-Hallett that he was willing to undertake an operation on this basis. As early as 14 Jul information of the probable resumption of planning on the Dieppe raid reached First Canadian Army Headquarters and it is clear that orders for the revival of the operation were issued before the Allied conferences in London, which do not appear to have commenced before 17 Jul.

55. On 16 Jul a meeting of the Force Commanders took place at which the Plan for a revival of the Operation, now to be known as "JUBILEE", was discussed. It was proposed that the Operation should take place during one of the two periods, 18 - 23 Aug or 1 - 7 Sep. That same afternoon Lord Louis Mountbatten and General Roberts met General McNaughton who gave his approval to "JUBILEE" and instructed the latter to proceed with the planning for the Operation. General McNaughton told Admiral Mountbatten that he wished to have the Military command placed on a different basis and General Crerar named as the responsible military officer. He took the question up with General Paget on the following evening (17 Jul) and it was agreed that "channel of command would run C.-in-C. Home Forces - Comd 1 Cdn Army - Comd 1 Cdn Corps - Comd 2 Cdn Div", with General Crerar being named the responsible military officer under the terms of the Home Forces letter of 5 May (see para 46) (67). Furthermore, the Chief of Combined Operations now was given the responsibility of deciding whether the Expedition should set out. Combined Headquarters would remain at Southampton until the expedition sailed and then move to No. 11 Group R.A.F. Headquarters at Uxbridge.

56. The revived Operation was discussed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 20 Jul and on the following day the first formal meeting of the Force Commanders was held; Captain Hughes-Hallett of C.O.H.C. had now been designated Naval Force Commander. It was agreed to adhere to the original plan of attack and to improve the steps taken to neutralize the fire of the inner coastal batteries; "It was considered preferable that "JUBILEE" town should be submitted to naval fire and not be bombed by the R.A.F." (68). In lieu of airborne troops, two Commandos were to take part. It was agreed further that the 18, 19 and 20 Aug were the best days for a "two tide" operation; a "one tide" operation could be carried out on 22 and 23 Aug. On 25 Jul Lord Louis Mountbatten called General McNaughton to tell him that the Prime Minister and War Cabinet had approved Operation "JUBILEE" in general principle; no date or place had been communicated, however, to the Cabinet. General McNaughton's memorandum of this conversation concludes thus:

It appears that Stalin had cabled the Prime Minister asking what was being done to distract the Germans by raiding. The Prime Minister had been very pleased to be able to reply indicating action was in hand. In consequence he had approved the highest priority in preparation for JUBILEE (69).

57. During the days following 16 Jul General Crerar had been actively engaged in supervising the preparations; on 11 Aug he finally felt justified in writing to General McNaughton that:

I have today gone over in detail the plans for the Exercise, as now agreed to by the Naval, Army and Air Force Commanders, and am satisfied that the revisions made in respect to the previous exercise plans add, rather than detract, to the soundness of the plan as a whole. I am, therefore, of the opinion that, given an even break in luck and good navigation, the demonstration should prove successful (70).

On 14 Aug General McNaughton went over the plan with Generals Crerar and Roberts and was satisfied. It must be remembered, however, that while he considered himself fully responsible for the conduct of the Canadian troops employed, both he and General Crerar had had only very slight control over the actual planning.

58. On 17 Aug a final conference was held by the Force Commanders and the Chief of Combined Operations. The possibility of a preliminary bombardment by heavy bombers was again discussed but was again rejected; it was feared that accuracy would not be high in the circumstances and the destruction caused might impede the progress of tanks through the streets of the town (71). Orders for the Operation were issued on the following day, 18 Aug, and during that afternoon units moved to the port of embarkation. Until the last moment, knowledge that a raid was scheduled for the next morning was limited to a small group of officers in each unit. The story of the actual raid which went in during the early hours of 19 Aug is not part of this narrative and may be read elsewhere in detail.

59. Apart from the battle experience gained by many Canadian officers and men and the practice gained in handling, what was then considered to be a large assault fleet, a number of other lessons were derived by the planning staff of C.O.H.Q. and others. These lessons are, however, described in considerable detail in other Reports dealing with this operation. Of more interest here is the fact that, as a consequence of the planning for "BUTTER", General McNaughton's powers were widened with respect to operations outside the United Kingdom (see para 8). Upon learning from General Montgomery on 30 Apr that Canadian participation was desired, General McNaughton had cabled the C.G.S. as follows:

... Plans are now being made which involve operations of type indicated but on a scale which cannot properly be classed as quote minor unquote. Utmost secrecy must be maintained and no prior reference permissible. (72)

He therefore wished his authority broadened to include operations which were the responsibility of the Chief of Combined Operations. On 2 May General Murchie (V.C.G.S.) despatched a reply to the effect that the War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet had approved General McNaughton's proposal, subject to the same conditions quoted on 31 Jul 41 (see para 7). These were that the Operation should have been fully considered and approved by the United Kingdom Government and that General McNaughton "will no doubt have regard to question as to whether prospects of success are sufficient to warrant risks involved which include not only personnel but possible encouragement to enemy if results negative or worse." Because of confidence in General McNaughton's recommendation the War Committee had given its approval at once but information was requested as to what might be the "upper limits involved" and what Operations came within the responsibility of the Chief of Combined Operations. General McNaughton was able to reply on 6 May that responsibility for planning for Operations on the Continent was shared by Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces, the Chief of Combined Operations and the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command, and that the largest project then contemplated

might involve up to three Canadian brigades (i.e. "RUTTER"). It had been agreed by General Paget and Lord Louis Mountbatten that no operation involving Canadian forces would be launched without General McNaughton's approval.

"JUPITER REVIEW"

60. During these summer months a still further project, designed to bring effective and immediate aid to the Russians, had been pushed by Prime Minister Churchill. On 2 Jun he drew up a memorandum for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, advocating the seizure and retention of two aerodromes in Northern Norway, from which Allied convoys to Russia were being attacked with a consequent large loss of shipping. This Operation, "JUPITER", was proposed as an alternative to a medium "SLEDGEHAMMER" in 1942. Mr. Churchill considered that about 70 bombers and 100 fighters, based on two airfields guarded by 10,000 to 12,000 German troops, were all that prevented entry into Norway:

If we could gain possession of these airfields and establish an equal force there, not only would the Northern sea route to Russia be kept open, but we should have set up a second front on a small scale from which it would be most difficult to eject us. If the going was good, we could advance gradually southward, unrolling the Nazi map of Europe from the top. All that has to be done is to oust the enemy from the airfields and destroy their garrisons (73).

Until the last moment, the Germans would not know whether it was an expedition or another convoy; thus surprise could be maintained. Once "SLEDGEHAMMER" was definitely off, the Russians would support such an operation and there would also be important repercussions on Sweden and Finland. Describing the actual landing, Mr. Churchill wrote: "This is a fierce and hazardous operation, but small beer compared with what we are talking about in "SLEDGEHAMMER". (74). As Mr. Churchill wrote further on 13 Jun, unlike "IMPERATOR" (see para 37), it would be possible to bring superior forces to bear at the point of attack. Furthermore, the Operation would not take place before October, when the hours of daylight would have dwindled.

61. After study by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the proposal was rejected "as being impracticable at the present time". Mr. Churchill refused to take "no" for an answer, however, and requested that the project be reviewed by a new and unprejudiced mind. Mr. Attlee, Deputy Prime Minister, thereupon proposed General McNaughton as the "outsider" best fitted to carry out this investigation (75). Therefore, on 9 Jul 42, General McNaughton was asked to meet the Chiefs of Staff, who informed him that the British Prime Minister and War Cabinet wished him to review Operation "JUPITER". While dubious about the need for such a review, the Chiefs of Staff offered full co-operation and withheld their previous criticisms from General McNaughton so that he would not be prejudiced beforehand.

62. The completion of First Canadian Army was designed to meet the target date given for "ROUNDUP". Thus it was understood from the outset that General McNaughton would not be prepared to commit Canadian troops in what was really a 'sideshow' unless good military reasons justified it, and then only with the full concurrence of the Canadian Government. In a most secret telegram to the Prime Minister and Minister of National Defence General McNaughton stated that the special task

... will not repeat not involve me handing over Comd First Cdn Army even temporarily but for the next few weeks I will have to leave much of detail to others. Fortunately First Cdn Army staff is now fairly well advanced in organization and competent to carry on with collection all Cdn Units under Command in accordance with very satisfactory arrangements made yesterday by Paget which it is hoped to complete early in August (76).

The formation of 2nd Canadian Corps having been delayed, the setting up of a special staff was made more easy; Brigadier Simonds was taken from 1st Canadian Corps and Majors Rowley, Page and Spry from the G.H.Q. Home Forces Planning staff where they were being employed.

63. General McNaughton and his staff made no attempt to study "JUPITER" against the background of other possible Allied commitments, and proceeded on the assumption that it would be undertaken with the maximum force available at a time when Russian Armies were still effectively resisting on the Eastern Front. If the Russian armies were disintegrating the Operation would be pointless and, as consultation with the Russian staff was not possible, all that could be considered was the minimum essential Russian co-operation (77).

64. General McNaughton's review of Operation "JUPITER" was issued to the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 4 Aug. On balance it was considered that "there is little chance of strategical surprise or tactical surprise in respect of the objectives..." (78). Any reasonable prospect of success would depend on a combination of weather conditions making flying impossible and yet suitable for the lowering and beaching of assault craft. Based on meteorological averages, the chances for such a combination, in December when daylight hours were shortest, were about 6-1 against. General McNaughton wrote that:

Russian co-operation in the form of an offensive on the Litva front is essential. Once Russian troops have been committed to this attack, failure on our part to go through with the assault landings might have dire political consequences. Therefore, the final decision to proceed with the Combined Operations must be made when the Russian offensive opens, some ten days in advance of the arrival of assaulting forces off the beaches. It is beyond the powers of meteorologists to give any forecast over such a period and the final plunge must be taken on an incalculable chance that the weather may be favourable.

The operation is an extremely hazardous one. With good fortune quick and decisive successes might be gained - on the contrary, the result might be a military disaster of the first magnitude. In view of the size of the forces involved it is considered that the risks would only be acceptable if politically the results to be achieved were judged to be of the highest importance.

65. The Chiefs of Staff were in full agreement with General McNaughton's conclusions, and, as the Committee's secretary wrote on 11 Sep, they

Entirely endorse your conclusions. They expressed the opinion that this was one of the cleverest and most ably worked out appreciations which they had ever had before them (79).

Mr. Churchill would not yet admit defeat, however, and invited General McNaughton down to Chequers on 19 Sep to discuss further "JUPITER REVIEW" (80). As successive British convoys to Russia were decimated by German submarines and by aircraft based on Northern Norway, the political as well as military importance of getting supplies through assumed almost dominating proportions in the mind of the British Prime Minister. There could be no more useful business, he told General McNaughton, than to make arms and give them to Russia. If Russia were to cease fighting, Germany would have perhaps one hundred additional divisions to employ in attacks through the Caucasus, through Turkey, Spain, Morocco, and West Africa, or for an attack on England itself. Mr. Churchill therefore suggested a new plan which would involve a mission to Moscow headed by General McNaughton. General McNaughton cabled the gist of the interview to C.G.S. in Ottawa, mentioning that Mr. Churchill was ready to ask the Canadian Prime Minister for his services and had hinted that the participation of Canadian troops would be welcomed (81). General McNaughton added, however, that General Brooke still considered the operation impracticable under the conditions envisaged in General McNaughton's appreciation and had not indicated a belief that the Russians "would participate on a large scale." Such a campaign would require considerable reorganization and re-equipment of the three Canadian infantry divisions and would alter the whole basis of the Canadian Army programme, which was based on a fundamentally different type of operation in North West Europe.

66. At a meeting at Chequers on 21 Sep, the proposed mission to Moscow was discussed by Mr. Churchill with the Chiefs of Staff. The latter wished discussion delayed until "JUPITER" could be considered with other projects in a "Joint Appreciation" then in the process of preparation. On the Prime Minister's insistence, however, "JUPITER" was discussed in the light of the general political picture. It was revealed that no further convoys could be run to Russia in the next three months and that no definite undertaking could be given to open a "second front." Following the meeting a draft telegram to Stalin was circulated, proposing that staff discussions should take place and that plans for "JUPITER" would be drawn up and subsequently referred to the Governments of Russia, the United Kingdom and Canada (82). On 22 Sep, Mr. Churchill sent the following telegram to Prime Minister Mackenzie King:

We wish to send McNaughton to Moscow to discuss with Stalin and his experts the possibilities of the Operation "JUPITER" for the examination of which you kindly placed him at our disposal in July. There will be no question of any Canadian commitment. I shall be greatly obliged if you will authorize me to propose his name to Stalin (83)

General McNaughton asked the C.G.S. for an affirmative reply to Mr. Churchill's personal request but added the observation that

... despite the fact that no commitment is specified in Mr. Churchill's cable and should a practical plan evolve from conversation from Moscow which is later approved by Governments of Russia, U.K. and Canada then we are certain to be asked to participate. Adequate training is of the utmost importance and I therefore propose to arrange this before leaving (84).

67. In his reply of 24 Sep, the Canadian Prime Minister stated the opinion of the Canadian Government that it would be unwise to have General McNaughton head a mission which would be faced with the necessity of making political as well as military decisions (85). It was considered that General McNaughton's selection would be bound to lead to speculation about his being picked as commander-in-chief of a United Nations force and would at once "suggest an operation in conjunction with Russia was contemplated and that the Canadian Army would participate." "JUPITER" would be an obvious conclusion for the enemy to reach. Mr. King pointed out that

... General McNaughton would consider and properly so that his paramount responsibility as Commander of the Canadian Army would be to tender to the Canadian Government such advice as he might feel bound to give as to the military feasibility of the expedition. With this responsibility it might be embarrassing to you and to us as well as to him if he were at the same time to represent the United Kingdom Government or Chiefs of Staffs in discussions looking to the adoption after possible modification of a project on which he had already expressed a considered and adverse opinion. This embarrassment might be increased by the fact that the discussions on which conclusions formed would be affected by political as well as military considerations... In our view the operation envisaged is of a scale and significance which brings it within the realm of major strategy decisions in respect of which should be shared by the United States. You are aware of the extent to which U.S. and Canadian forces are co-operating on this Continent as well as in Europe. Were the President not to be advised and his approval obtained in advance of the proposed mission its personnel and its object he almost certainly would feel that he should have been given an opportunity to express his views. In all the circumstances we are of the opinion that it would be unwise to have General McNaughton singled out for the purpose suggested. Our misgivings would not be as strong if General McNaughton were to be a member though not the

head of a combined mission upon which the United Kingdom and the United States were represented. I need not assure you that the views expressed above should not be construed as in any way modifying our fixed policy that Canadian Forces are to be available to be used wherever they can best serve the common cause... (86).

68. In the meantime the whole situation had altered, as far as General McNaughton was concerned, by reason of a Staff Study (J.P.(42) 840, dated 23 Sep 42) giving particulars of the British forces which might be available for Operation "JUPITER". General McNaughton's "JUPITER REVIEW" had assumed a minimum force of five British divisions plus large Russian forces co-operating, but this Staff Study only made provision for a British corps of two divisions and the date selected was so late in the year "as to make tactical surprise unobtainable." Thus "JUPITER" could no longer be considered a "practical operation of war" and General McNaughton reversed his own recommendation that he proceed to Moscow (87). The Chiefs of Staff hastened to assure General McNaughton that this Staff Study had not yet received their own attention and that it now seemed possible to "resolve or mitigate some of the many difficulties and obstacles to the Operation which are set out in that paper." (88). The communication of this message to Ottawa, however, did not affect the issue in the minds of the Canadian Cabinet and, again on 25 Sep, Mr. King replied to Mr. Churchill in his previous vein:

... Aside altogether from any question of commitment on Canada's part it seems to us that to have McNaughton undertake a mission of the kind contemplated without a realistic plan in which he himself has confidence offering at least a reasonable prospect of success upon which military discussions could be based would be to risk results prejudicial to relations with the Soviet Union as well as to McNaughton's own future usefulness. From what we have before us it would seem that plans so far considered do not provide such a background. We have endeavoured to give full weight to the important points you now mention. However everything considered we cannot but feel that the serious issues mentioned in my reply to your previous message would inevitably be raised by a visit to Moscow of the Commander of the Canadian Army as the head of such a mission. Knowing how great your anxieties are we all very much regret not being able to see eye to eye with you in this matter. I can assure you however that we have sought to view it sympathetically in all its bearings (89).

69. It was now clear that Operation "JUPITER" was dying a natural death. Prime Minister Churchill still hoped to send a mission to Moscow, headed by a British officer, but, in view of the mounting opposition from within the British War Cabinet as well as the Chiefs of Staff Committee, it was assumed at Headquarters, First Canadian Army, by 29 Sep, that "JUPITER" would soon "enter the lumber room of lost causes" (90).

"TORCH" AND THE AUTUMN OF 1942

70. During July 1942 the future composition of First Canadian Army was discussed at C.M.H.Q. and at Headquarters, First Canadian Army, with emphasis being given to the provision of ancillary troops to provide a balanced force. Discussion took place at weekly intervals, and finally on 5 Aug a "Third Proposal" for the composition of the Canadian Army Overseas was drafted, calling for the despatch overseas of a further 127,137 all ranks before 1 May 43 to bring the overall strength up to 253,116 (91). Although later investigation into the manpower situation was to throw doubt on the ability to achieve this build up and eventually to result, in January 1943, in the establishment of a "manpower ceiling" of 232,100 all ranks, yet the "Third Proposal" continued to be the guide in negotiations for the balance of 1942.

71. General Stuart (C.G.S.) came overseas to participate in these discussions and on 3 Aug accompanied General McNaughton to the War Office for a discussion as to the target date for the completion of First Canadian Army. Working with 1 May 43 as the target date for "ROUNDUP", General McNaughton informed General Nye (V.C.I.G.S.) that the Canadian Army Overseas would then have an estimated deficiency of 39,000 all ranks; although special measures might well mitigate against this total, he wondered whether the target date should be left at 1 May or put back some months (92).

72. General Nye replied by first giving a general summary of the strategical situation. Either the Russian Armies remained in the field, containing the Wehrmacht, or they collapsed and permitted German strength to be moved to the West; alternatively, some portion of the German forces might be moved to the West while still containing the Russians. He agreed with General McNaughton that actually a mean would be struck and that an Expeditionary Force landing in France probably would have to contend with some 50 to 70 additional German divisions. In such circumstances "ROUNDUP" would be possible in 1943 only if there should be a definite and pronounced crack in morale within Germany itself as a consequence of bombing, hunger and other hardships; "if this occurred we should have been guilty of unpardonable lack of preparation if we were not in a position to take advantage of the situation to launch an attack in North West Europe." General McNaughton agreed, and added, that in such circumstances, the question of battle reserves would have little significance and that such an operation could be carried out without a full scale of reinforcements. The Canadian Army Commander suggested that the Target Date might be put back to 1 Jun 43; General Nye considered this to be a reasonable suggestion. Following the meeting, Generals McNaughton and Stuart agreed that first attention should be given to completing the provision of units required for First Canadian Army and the building up of reinforcement scales left until later.

73. Then on 10 Aug, during the course of a conference attended by Generals Stuart and Letson (A.G.), General McNaughton outlined what he considered might be the future possible role of First Canadian Army. He spoke generally of the "important assignment tentatively allotted in combination with other Allied forces" and stressed the necessity of building up a two-corps Army comprising three

Infantry divisions, two armoured divisions and two army tank brigades:

... Any reduction from this composition would mean that the Cdn force proceeding abroad would, from necessity, be allotted a less important role and probably would be decentralized under British or other Allied command. This could only result in an acceptance by Canada of an inferior role in the total allied war effort, which would reflect adversely upon public opinion generally at home and abroad (93).

He further remarked that such a splitting up of the existing organization would result in a very marked decrease in the effect that Canada could have on the enemy.

74. During September, General McNaughton discussed the probability of certain future operations with General Brooke and also with General Paget. Since it had not been intended that Canadian troops should participate in Operation "TORCH", General McNaughton had not been informed either of the decision to launch Operation "TORCH" or of the progress of its detailed planning; nor had he been told that a decreasing amount of emphasis was being placed on "ROUNDUP" as a possibility for the spring of 1943 (94) (see para 40). The latter operation was still thought of as a full-scale invasion of France on the general frontage Pas-de-Calais (inclusive) - Seine North - Seine South - Cherbourg by British, Canadian and American formations (95). The role assigned to First Canadian Army at this time was that of "following up" through a bridgehead secured by the American Army. Due to the decline in rate of movement of American troops to the United Kingdom, the target date for "ROUNDUP" had had to be set back, but the administrative staffs were continuing their planning studies. Moreover, it already appeared possible, if not probable, that unless there should be a definite crack in German morale, it would not be possible to mount a full-scale invasion of North West Europe even in 1943. Operation "SLIDGEBAMMER" (which had envisaged one or two Canadian divisions in its six) had definitely been abandoned, as had a similarly conceived American "limited" operation against the Brest Peninsula; the latter, due to the insufficient cover which could be provided by fighter aircraft, while the former had been cancelled because the shortage of landing craft and shipping would not enable the landing force to be built up as rapidly as the German counter-attacking formations. A further Operation, "WEBBOB", which would have involved six divisions in the capture and retention of the Cherbourg Peninsula had also become dormant.

75. With uncertainty surrounding the implementation of Operation "ROUNDUP", on 2 Sep 42 General Paget discussed with General McNaughton plans for an invasion of the Continent by a force of about seven divisions, to be known as "OVERTHROW" (96). In order to rehearse the troops taking part in the several stages from D - 10 to D - 1, it was proposed to hold a training exercise, "CAVENDISH", during a period beginning 5 Oct. General McNaughton was asked to make available 1st Canadian Corps Headquarters, one or possibly two Canadian Infantry divisions and the 5th Canadian Armoured Division. During "CAVENDISH" troops would move forward towards the ports in staging areas and the stores required would actually be handled. The stated object was: "To exercise formations in the planning and movement of troops prior to and including embarkation for a

Continental operation." *

76. With the organization and training of the First Canadian Army proceeding on the assumption that its future role would be participation in Operation "ROUNDUP", General McNaughton was somewhat disconcerted by General Paget's views on future operations. He therefore visited the C.I.G.S. at the War Office on 17 Sep, in order to have the situation straightened out. The Canadian Army Commander explained that he was "under some considerable embarrassment through lack of stability in plans" for operations in which First Canadian Army had been asked to participate (98). The postponement of "ROUNDUP" and the institution of "TORCH" and other schemes of which he had been given only the vaguest particulars made it extremely difficult to proceed with the build-up of the Canadian Army Overseas. Canada's manpower resources would be stretched very considerably to provide 250,000 men overseas by 1 May 43, an undertaking which would necessitate a monthly flow of 8000 to 10,000 across the Atlantic. The need to meet such a Target Date had been impressed upon the C.G.S. and the Adjutant General during their recent visit. Now, without warning and without official notification, a major change had been made in future strategy. Not only would General McNaughton's relations with the Canadian Government be affected, the latter would have its confidence shaken in the manner in which the British War Cabinet was directing the war effort. General McNaughton did not want to "interject" himself into the British direction of the war, yet he considered it unwise to leave matters to chance, and thought that he should have "more complete and more timely information of plans as they developed"; only thus could he adjust his policy "to the requirements of the situation and avoid needless waste of efforts or political repercussions which might be critical."

77. General Brooke agreed, but pointed out that "his difficulty was not in not wanting" to give General McNaughton constant information but that the existing basis, on which he had to work, was so unstable that even now it was impossible to say definitely what were the actual plans. There had been an American shift in emphasis away from "ROUNDUP" and towards operations in the South Pacific but now the viewpoint was moving back to Europe and to Hitler as the Number One Enemy. "ROUNDUP" was again under discussion for a somewhat later date and "TORCH" was also "under emphasis", although the contributions to be made by the several countries had now altered. Sir Alan Brooke also mentioned that the American troops arriving in the United Kingdom "were very far from being full trained" and this was becoming more evident from the studies being made for Operation "TORCH".

78. It was agreed, before the interview closed, that General McNaughton should pay visits to the C.I.G.S. at two or three week intervals, since the latter considered that this

* This Exercise was first postponed and then cancelled. Previously units of the 1st Canadian Division had been warned that they were to take part in an important exercise, although no details were made available (97).

was the only way he might be kept informed of the changes in plans which "came by evolution and transition and not by definite decisions." (99)

79. During the course of a meeting held on the evening of 3 Oct to acquaint the Minister of National Defence and the C.G.S. with the latest information on operational planning, General McNaughton described his interview with General Sir Alan Brooke and the personal arrangement which had been made. General McNaughton again stressed that as a result of the unsatisfactory arrangement which had existed he was "unable adequately to advise the Minister of National Defence" (100). He pointed out to Mr. Ralston that

... in view of the large industrial production of Canada, and the large military, naval and air contribution which Canada was making to the allied war effort... the Canadian Government had a right to have a voice in the direction of future planning of the war.

He felt it necessary to add, however, that "any approach to this subject must be made with a sympathetic outlook towards the British Government and its military advisers in view of the many difficulties through which they had passed." Pending further direction from the Canadian Government, General McNaughton planned to carry on with the organization and training of the Canadian Army as "originally intended". He was against any attempt to split the Canadian Army, just as was the Commander of the Canadian Corps in the previous war, and pointed out that it "could bring the greatest effect against the enemy by operating as a self-contained force serving under their own officers and as a truly Canadian organization".

80. These views of General McNaughton were confirmed by General Stuart on 15 Oct, following a visit paid with Mr. Ralston to see Mr. Churchill and Sir James Grigg. During this meeting, the Minister of National Defence requested that active employment should be found for the Canadian Army at the first opportunity (101). As related to General McNaughton, Mr. Ralston told Sir James Grigg and Mr. Churchill that there were no strings on the employment of the Canadian Army, either in whole or in part:

... the Government of Canada wished it to be used where it would make the greatest contribution; that the Canadian Government were ready to consider any proposals; that before reading a decision on any specific project they wished my [i.e. McNaughton's] advice; that in this connection... the British authorities should arrange to keep me [McNaughton] more closely informed than had been the case in the past.

The Secretary of State for War had seemed very appreciative of the way in which the Canadian Army had accepted a role in the defence of the United Kingdom (102).

81. General Stuart also told General McNaughton of a confidential talk with Sir Stafford Cripps (Lord Privy Seal), in the course of which the latter had also expressed views on the inadequacy of the existing machinery for the higher direction of the war and had advocated the setting up of a

combined staff divorced from departmental routine (103). Then, on Friday 23 Oct, Sir Stafford Cripps visited General McNaughton at Army Headquarters to discuss the same topic again. General McNaughton explained why he considered the present set-up unsatisfactory, with the Chiefs of Staff "being worn out in the exploration of fantastic projects" (105). Plans were evolved and changed so rapidly that it was impossible to complete the planning for any of them; thus the deferment of "ROUNDUP" had dislocated the programme set up to complete First Canadian Army. In the existing arrangements, the Chiefs of Staff reported to the Minister of Defence (Mr. Churchill) who reported in turn to the War Cabinet. Sir Stafford Cripps then revealed that General McNaughton's "JUPITER REVIEW" paper had never been placed before the Cabinet. General McNaughton stated that the Canadians "had the best will in the world to co-operate with the British authorities and had in fact met every request they had made, but this sort of thing made it very difficult... to act sensibly in guiding... preparations which were now on a very large scale involving plans for a couple of hundred thousand troops or so, of which about 170,000 were now in the U.K. with supply lines and projects of all sorts stretching back across the Atlantic in time and space to Canada". It was his own personal view that the War Cabinet should give stability to the plans being formulated and not allow them to be decided by the Minister of Defence in person. Sir Stafford agreed that the present set-up was "a 'War Lord' with strategy in London and in Washington dictated by whim". It was agreed that General McNaughton should also discuss the matter with Field Marshal Smuts who was then in London.

82. After visiting Canadian troops on 5 Nov Field Marshal Smuts discussed pending operations with General McNaughton at the latter's headquarters. As an African, the Field Marshal considered it most important to gain a firm hold on the Mediterranean: following the successful conclusion of the current operations in North Africa the way might be open for decisive action against Italy or through the Balkans (106). General Smuts queried the availability of large enough forces to undertake an invasion of North West Europe in 1943 and indicated his own belief that the Canadian Army should be prepared to serve elsewhere than in Europe.

83. The same problem came up for discussion following a luncheon given by Hon. I.S. Amery, Secretary of State for India, on Sunday, 8 Nov. Mr. Amery advanced the view that part of the trouble lay with the Canadian Government, which had been "averse" to joining any formal governmental body in London, but not so "diffident" about linking up with committees in Washington (107). General McNaughton pointed out that it had been necessary for Canada to start the war from scratch; building up her three fighting services and a war industry had thus been largely a domestic issue, closely linked with the task of preserving national unity. Now, however, the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan was in full swing, industry was turning out war material and, above all, there was a highly trained Canadian Army in the United Kingdom as yet not committed to battle. Thus it had now become a

x During the course of a luncheon on 16 Jul, the Hon. I.S. Amery (Secretary of State for India and Burma) had suggested that a super Chief of Staff should be set up over all three services but admitted that he knew no one who could fill such a position (104).

practical necessity for the Canadian Government to be represented in the formulation of military policy. Mr. Amery further expressed the hope that Prime Minister King might find it possible to come to London by air every few months to attend an Imperial Conference or to meet with the War Cabinet, citing the example of Sir Robert Borden in 1917 and 1918. General McNaughton did not believe, however, that an Imperial War Cabinet, without a permanent Planning Staff reporting to it direct, would be worth while; to this Mr. Amery was inclined to agree.

DEFENCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

84. The possibility that the Wehrmacht might still attempt an invasion of the United Kingdom had been explored during the summer of 1942 and on 28 Sep, General Paget submitted to the War Office an appreciation of what he considered to be the minimum forces required for defence (108). In his opinion, invasion was still a possibility in 1943 and steps should be taken to remedy any deficiencies. He estimated that the Germans had sufficient landing craft to put ashore, through beaches, the following by D plus 8: 26 infantry regiments and 15 independent tank battalions in the assault, and a further 12 infantry and six armoured divisions in the follow up phase. Although the greater part of the force would probably be deployed against South Eastern Command, an additional force might still be landed in East Anglia. Should a landing in either area prove satisfactory for exploitation, London might be captured by D plus 14, in which event the capture of another port in the initial stages would not prove necessary. It was estimated that the reduced scale of airborne attack would limit it to "small worthwhile objectives" both before and during the invasion. The Combined Planning Staff did not consider that the Germans had any better chance of securing local air superiority or of overcoming British light naval forces operating in the Dover area than had been envisaged by the earlier Dewing Report.

85. There were not sufficient troops available to deny the enemy the use of every beach but it was necessary that the several army commanders should have sufficient forces to contain the main German landings until a suitable opportunity to counter-attack was presented to the G.H.Q. Reserve. The superiority of the latter's armour had to be assured; this would necessitate the linking of a proportionate number of infantry formations. It was estimated that the defence of South Eastern Command alone would require 18 infantry and four army tank brigades in the coastal area, plus three divisions (new model) as a corps reserve and an army reserve of one infantry and one armoured division. G.H.Q. Reserve itself would require at least two armoured and three infantry (new model) divisions. The defence of the United Kingdom as a whole required the presence of 30 divisions of all types, whereas only 24 were available. General Paget considered therefore that the six-division deficit might be made up by the United States Army. On 5 Oct a copy of this Appreciation was sent to General McNaughton for his information, although it had not yet received the approval of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

86. As early as 10 Sep, the newly appointed G.O.C.-in-C. South Eastern Command, Lt-Gen J.G. des R. Swayne, expressed his misgivings to General McNaughton regarding the weakness of the defence of the United Kingdom should Operation "TORCH"

be proceeded with. The next intake of manpower from industry was not due to begin until November, after which there would be 45,000 per month until a total of 250,000 was reached. These could be formed either into base and L. of C. troops for an operation in Europe or could be incorporated into units required for home defence - but not both (109). General McNaughton suggested that an Army was needed in G.H.Q. Reserve and pointed out the analogy to the role of 7 Corps in 1940. Due to the non-availability of British troops, General McNaughton agreed to leave in Sussex three brigade groups under command of a low establishment (L.E.) British divisional headquarters for local defence while the remainder of the 1st Canadian Corps was withdrawn inland to train for "ROUNDUP".

87. Due to the exodus of British troops^x in the offing ("TORCH"), at a further meeting on 15 Sep General McNaughton felt it necessary to agree to leave 1st Canadian Corps District in being and under the operational command of General Swayne for anti-invasion and anti-raid duties (110). For all other purposes 1st Canadian Corps would be under command of Headquarters, First Canadian Army. General McNaughton agreed to arrange the constitutional position under the Visiting Forces Act so that Canadian troops could be placed under operational command of South Eastern Command should the situation warrant it.

88. General Paget brought up the subject of home defence on 17 Oct, during the course of a conversation at the War Office to discuss the subsidiary operations which might be necessary for the successful implementation of Operation "TORCH" (see paras 98 - 100). After the departure of the formations embarking on "TORCH" there would be only 23 British and Canadian divisions left out of the 30 he considered to be the minimum required for home defence. Should the "TONIC" and Northern Task Force of four divisions^{xx} also depart there would be only 19 left. According to General McNaughton's memorandum of this interview, the C.I.G.S. does not appear to have viewed the danger of invasion in a serious light. General Brooke believed that there would be a three months' period of definite warning and, unlike General Paget, he placed a high value on the R.A.F. to counter any German attempt to cross the Channel (111).

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE MANPOWER CEILING

89. As a result of the various discussions which had been held during the visit of the Minister of National Defence and the C.G.S., it was apparent to General McNaughton that it would not be possible just yet to reach any conclusion as to the rate of build-up of units and reinforcements required to complete the Canadian Army Overseas because of:

- (a) many uncertainties in the statistics of the Manpower situation in Canada.

x The British First Army formations were 6th Armoured Division, 46th and 78th Infantry Divisions and 25th Army Tank Brigade.

xx Only two divisions and an armoured brigade appear to have actually been allocated to this Force (see para 98).

- (b) difficulties in reaching a conclusion as to the proper balance between allocations to War Industry and between the Sea, Land and Air Forces.
- (c) doubts as to extent to which women may replace men in industry and in the rearward service of the Armed Forces (112).

As already noted elsewhere, clarification came early in the new year, but meantime the "Third Proposal", revised from time to time, served as the basis for planning the development of the Canadian Army for a Target Date of 1 Oct 43 rather than 1 May 43. Priority was given also to the building up of reinforcements for the three infantry divisions which might be required for operations in advance of the new target date of 1 Oct 43.

90. Following the return of the C.G.S. to Canada, investigation began to disclose that, in addition to manpower difficulties, there were likely to be increasing difficulties in maintaining the flow of troops overseas during 1943; for example, the shipping available to the end of April 1943 would suffice only to bring the reinforcement pool up to the required standard. Such a situation would leave the First Canadian Army without the number of rearward units required if it was to act as a self-contained army (113). This was pointed out by General McNaughton, but the C.G.S. replied from Ottawa on 15 Nov that the situation would have to be accepted. It would not be possible to permit of the formation of further new units and, General Stuart added:

... Consequently and without waiting to end of year we have to accept the conclusion that it is not feasible to plan for a composition of the First Canadian Army such that it could operate wholly independently with all Canadian Base L. of C. and Army troops which after all would seem to be envisaging the ideal.

... I have recommended and A.G. agrees that our objective as to the strength of the First Canadian Army Overseas should be limited first to presently authorized, formed and forming units overseas. Second to presently authorized units designated for overseas service formed or forming in Canada. Third to personnel for establishment increase... Fourth to units that we might be able to make available directly or by conversion from home defence formations. Fifth reinforcements at proposed new battle casualty rate (114).

General McNaughton accepted this limitation, imposed by manpower and shipping, and replied on 17 Nov that:

Under these circumstances I recognise also that it may not be possible to operate as a Cdn Army. I propose now if you agree to place situation before C.I.G.S. at War Office and obtain his view as to the best form our contribution can take (115).

91. When General McNaughton raised the issue with the C.I.G.S. on 19 Nov, the latter expressed his belief that the Canadian figures needed downward revision (i.e. from 40,000 all ranks per division) and that the quotas for infantry and armoured divisions were "too generous under the conditions in which an attack on the Continent would be contemplated" (116). General Brooke further expressed himself as against any suggestion that one of the Canadian divisions should be earmarked for the British Home W.E. and held ready against the possibility of being broken up to provide reinforcements. He considered that the possibility should be maintained of operating as a self-contained Canadian Army; permanent establishments in the United Kingdom could be pared down to enable the Canadian Army to supply its own quota of rearward units required for an invasion of the Continent under the conditions which were then being visualized.

92. Sir Alan Brooke then outlined the current strategical concepts. He spoke of the coming winter offensive which the Russians were planning against and through the German line of "hedge-hogs" which had to suffice in place of a continuous Eastern Front. Italian morale was weakening and would require a stiffening of German troops. The attitude of General Franco was hardening against the Axis, and there already was a decreasing possibility of Canadian troops being required for Operation "TONIC" (see paras 98 - 107). It was also evident that the C.I.G.S. considered the danger of a German invasion attempt of the United Kingdom now to be negligible. He also spoke of the possibility of a crack in German morale after the coming winter, with its hardships and increased bombing. When General McNaughton questioned whether this would be sufficient to justify an attack on the Continent in the early spring, the C.I.G.S. had to admit that this was "more of a hope than an expectation" and that such a possibility would grow greater with spring and autumn. General McNaughton's memorandum of the interview concludes:

All through the conversations with the C.I.G.S. and D.M.O. a note of high optimism was evident - Germany might crack in the early spring - possibly in the summer - certainly in the fall of 1943. We must be ready to put in the finishing blows when the opportunity came... Equally evident was their high regard for Cdn troops and for the way in which we had accepted any task proposed, shown no resentment at the constant changes, and gone ahead with our preparations without complaint and without causing any embarrassment to the War Office (117).

93. U-Boat sinkings, particularly of personnel ships, were very serious and a lift capacity of 30,000 men had been lost on Operation "TORCH". As a counter, operations of a limited nature might have to be undertaken against the Bay of Biscay submarine bases at Cherbourg, Brest and St. Nazaire in April or May 1943. One such contemplated raid called for the employment of 169,000 men; at that time there would be only eight British divisions (including Canadian) available and possibly five United States divisions if the "BOLERO" programme were advanced. After some discussion it was agreed that the Canadian Army programme should be framed to provide for:

By April 1943 - Large scale raids of limited scope and duration on the U-Boat Bases in Bay of Biscay ports. The 3 Inf and 2 Armd Divs should be up to strength with reasonable reinforcements available in the U.K.

By 1 August 1943 - We should be ready to go on the Continent in strength to stay there holding a bridgehead of limited depth from the coast, should a definite crack in German morale be evident. We need not have full Army, L. of C., etc. tps, as under the conditions envisaged, these might be extemporized; nor would we need under these conditions a large scale of reinforcements.

By 1 October 1943 - He Brooke would like to see the full structure of the Cdn Army completed (118).

94. These developments made it necessary for General McNaughton to give serious consideration to the possibility that Canadian formations might have to be detached to serve with British corps or armies. It had already been decided to reorganize the Canadian armoured divisions on British lines but now, in the interests of economies in manpower and possible closer co-operation with British formations, it was decided to adopt British war establishments as a whole, except for minor necessary variants. On 2 Dec 42, instructions were therefore issued accordingly (119).

95. Explaining this last move to his senior staff officers, General McNaughton said that previous planning had envisaged the employment of First Canadian Army as a separate, self-contained army, in an assault upon North West Europe, in the defence of the United Kingdom or in minor operations against the enemy. The situation was now changed and the Canadian Army must adopt British establishments so that its formations could act in close co-operation with the British Army against the "belly of the enemy" (120).

96. The task of co-ordinating the work of reorganizing the Canadian Army Overseas was entrusted to a Canadian Army Planning Committee composed of representatives of C.M.H.Q. and First Canadian Army. This committee, virtually identical with an ad hoc committee which had been meeting since mid-July 1942 and had drafted the three "Proposals" referred to above (see para 70), held its first meeting on 16 Nov 42. The task set the Committee was to plan the completion of the Army in three stages as follows (121):

- 1 Apr 43: One corps composed of one armoured and two infantry divisions, to be ready to participate in large scale raids of limited scope and duration.
- 1 Aug 43: Two corps comprising three infantry and two armoured divisions with essential army troops, to be ready to secure and hold a bridgehead on the Continent of limited depth.
- 1 Oct 43: Force of 1 Aug 43 plus G.H.Q. and L. of C. troops and base units, to be ready to operate as a Canadian Army on the Continent with all essential rearward services.

Economy in manpower would not be great, and whereas the first stage would be completed with the manpower available and

priority shipping for 10,000 all ranks a month from Canada, the third stage was still beyond the realms of practical possibility (122). Discussions were continued with the War Office during December and on the 21st of the month the Director of Staff Duties told General McNaughton that the War Office would contribute up to 9000 men per Canadian division as a permanent commitment to complete the "tail" of the Canadian Army and more if necessary until the Canadian quota was fully available (123). Since the role envisaged for First Canadian Army was that of a "follow through" rather than an assault force, special units such as docks operating companies and beach groups were not necessary, and the British component, or "tail" would consist largely of heavy and anti-aircraft artillery, labour and engineer units (124). Approval for the reorganization of the armoured divisions was granted in Ottawa on 23 Dec 42, and for the balance of the formations and units on 7 Jan 43 (125). On the basis of completing these new establishments and providing reinforcements for three months' wastage at the intense rate, as well as including the establishments of C.M.H.Q. units, a maximum figure revised to 232,100 all ranks was produced. Subsequent to 15 Jan 43, all planning proceeded on the basis of keeping the total strength of the Canadian Army Overseas within this "manpower ceiling" of 232,100 (126).

97. The following points were brought out during the course of a conversation between Generals Stuart and McNaughton on 12 Feb 43:

General Stuart said that now the manpower ceiling for the Cdn Army had been fixed he considered that the internal organization of Cdn Army Overseas was a matter for General McNaughton's own decision, subject to: First - confirmation by N.D.H.Q. and by the War Cabinet where necessary; Second - the retention of three months reinforcements at intense rate; Third - that capital increase will be limited to extent necessary to fall within replacement of battle casualty commitment of 5,000 per month as from 1 Sep 43. General McNaughton replied that he was satisfied that the total manpower now allotted to the Army in the U.K. by the Cdn War Cabinet was sufficient to develop the balanced army he had proposed and that he felt the total represented a just and proper contribution by Canada in present circumstances. It was agreed that every effort would be made to ensure a steady flow of approximately 5000 personnel monthly as reinforcements for the First Cdn Army after the target date 31 Aug had been reached (127).

Confirmation of this understanding was contained in an N.D.H.Q. telegram of 6 Mar 43; this was followed a week later by a warning from the C.G.S. that planning would have to recognize that the manpower ceiling had only two components, which must be adhered to: "first the figure of 232,100 representing total strength and 3 months' reinforcement at intense rate, and second a flow of 5000 men per month subsequent to 1st September" (128).

"TONIC" PLANNING

98. When explaining the details of Operation "TORCH" to Generals Paget and McNaughton at the War Office on 17 Oct, the C.I.G.S. had outlined two further possible operations. If adequate support was to be provided for Operation "TORCH", the naval and air forces would require the free use of Gibraltar.

The recently enlarged North Front airfield was commanded by Spanish guns and even if Spain were not forced into the war as an active partner of the Axis she might be compelled, through German pressure, to take steps to neutralize this airfield or to allow the Luftwaffe to make use of certain air bases on neutral soil. On the other hand, should Spain become a belligerent, German and Spanish troops would endeavour to capture Gibraltar and in any event deny its use to Allied shipping by controlling the mainland; in which case the Royal Navy would require another base. One alternative was to seize Spanish Morocco with a British "Northern Task Force"^x of two infantry divisions and an armoured brigade. The other was to occupy the Canary Islands - an operation given the code name "TONIC".

99. The C.I.G.S. told General McNaughton that, as a result of the representations made by the Minister of National Defence to obtain active employment for the Canadian Army (see para 80) he was now offering one or other of the projects to the Canadians (130). He was, however, opposed to Canadian participation in the Northern Task Force, which might be engaged in a continuous operation involving close association with British, American and other troops. Thus the necessity of maintaining a self-contained Canadian force would create added administrative difficulties. Sir Alan Brooke also was anxious that any Canadian force employed should be returned to the balance of First Canadian Army at an early date as he "attached great importance to keeping them as a well-balanced, self-contained organization for Home Defence and eventual employment on the Continent." Thus he considered that the Northern Task Force should be provided by formations of Home Forces and the "TONIC" Operation left to the Canadians. Thereupon General Paget accepted the first task and nominated the British 1st and 4th Divisions for the Northern Task Force, stating that he would decide on the corps headquarters and armoured brigade later.^{xx}

100. In response to General Brooke's invitation thus to undertake Operation "TONIC", the Canadian Army Commander replied that he would like to study the outline plan; then, if he considered it to be a practicable military operation, the necessary authority could be sought from the Canadian Government. He contemplated naming General Crerar as the Military Force Commander and such portions of 1st Canadian Corps Headquarters as might be required, together with the 1st and 3rd Canadian Divisions. General McNaughton's memorandum of this interview goes on to state that:

... what we desired, and I was sure this was the view of the Government and people of Canada also, was that Cdn Army should be so used as to make the maximum contribution of which it was capable; we would act in whole or part and would give most careful consideration to any project; we could not act without the approval of our Government except as regards Home Defence and raids on the Continent of Europe of limited duration. He might be sure that prompt consideration would be given and

/recommendations

* The Naval plan for Operation "TORCH" called for the employment of Western (Casablanca), Central (Oran) and Eastern (Algiers) Naval Task Forces to convey the American and British formations to their assault areas. Captain Butcher states that this Northern Task Force was created at the request of General Eisenhower (129).

xx Subsequently the British 1st Corps (Lt-Gen F.E. Morgan).

recommendations made in respect to "TONIC". We were not particularly concerned with fighting for its own sake or glamour, nor did I think that a prolonged wait for a proper opportunity to strike would have an adverse effect on morale. Our officers and men were far too sensible.

101. The specific object of Operation "TONIC" was the acquisition of La Luz as a fleet base and, incidentally, the harbour of Santa Cruz, as well as the flying boat base at Grand Canary. On the assumption that Allied troops would not be "invited" to occupy the Canaries, Operation "TONIC" was planned as an armed invasion (131).

102. As early as March 1941 plans had been initiated for the organization of a striking force for combined operations in any theatre but aimed at the possible need to occupy the Canary Islands should the Wehrmacht strike through Spain and attempt to close the Straits of Gibraltar. By summer this force was assembled with General Alexander and Rear Admiral H.L.H.K. Hamilton as Military and Naval Force Commanders, and a full-scale rehearsal of what was referred to as Operation "PILGRIM" (Canaries) was held in August at Scapa Flow. Revisions were made to the Plan in September and in March 1942, but by the following summer "TONIC" had succeeded "PILGRIM" as the projected operational safeguard. Obviously there was no certainty that this operation would be undertaken. By the late summer of 1942 General Franco seemed to be cooling off in his attitude towards Hitler and Mussolini and more likely to resist any attempt to make his country a battle ground. The whole situation could be altered at any time, however, by a Russian reverse or a further German drive in the Middle East; thus the need for Operation "TONIC" remained a distinct possibility until the end of the year. In the words of a report subsequently issued by the Joint Planning Staff:

If the Germans were in Spain, the amount of shipping which could be passed through the Straits of Gibraltar would be severely limited so that Casablanca would become the main port of transit for the whole of French North Africa. And in these circumstances, we cannot ignore the possibility, however remote it may be, that the Germans might base heavy ships at Lisbon or Corunna. Dakar is too far to the south for a fleet operating from there to give cover to our North African supply route. Therefore, the original object of the operation, viz. to acquire the use of La Luz as an alternative fleet base in the event of Gibraltar becoming unusable still holds good (132).

103. After studying the appreciation drawn up by the British Joint Planning Staff, General McNaughton despatched a telegram to Ottawa on 18 Oct requesting authority to undertake the operation. On 22 Oct the C.G.S. replied in the affirmative, "subject always to when the detailed plans are worked out to your being satisfied as to its military feasibility and value compared with risks involved and as to the adequacy of resources and of arrangements for transportation and support." (133). On the following day General McNaughton passed this information on to the C.I.G.S.:

I name Lt-Gen H.D.G. Crerar, Comd 1 Cdn Corps, as the Commander of the Canadian land forces which will be composed of the required elements of H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, 1 Cdn Div, 3 Cdn Div and such other detachments of units and services as may be found to be necessary and available (134).

104. In order to supply "cover" and maintain the utmost secrecy the official announcement to C.M.H.Q. on 19 Oct stated that a Canadian Planning Staff was being opened at the War Office (123 Whitehall Court), in order that certain selected officers from First Canadian Army should obtain practice in planning possible operations and that a desirable liaison should be established with the appropriate branches at the War Office. Actually, General Crerar and his small staff from 1st Canadian Corps were commencing to plan a possible Operation "TONIC". On 4 Nov, General McNaughton issued General Crerar with his Directive as Military Force Commander:

In accordance with arrangements which I have made with the Chiefs of Staff Committee, you have been nominated as Military Commander for an operation against the Canary Islands should it be decided to undertake this operation. The object of the operation is to seize and hold the Islands of Grand Canary and Teneriffe, with a view to securing for our own use the harbours at La Luz and Santa Cruz, and the flying boat bases in Grand Canary.

An estimate of the forces required for the operation is shown in the outline plan. You will examine this outline plan jointly with the Naval and Air Force Commanders who have been issued with similar directives. You should consult the Chief of Combined Operations and you should obtain any assistance you require from the Executive Planning Section of the Joint Planning Staff, through which your contacts with British Government Departments should be made. You will arrange any necessary alterations to the outline plan through the Executive Planning Section. You will in conjunction with the Naval and Air Force Commanders report to the Chiefs of Staff on completion of your examination (135).

Rear Admiral Hamilton was re-appointed Naval Force Commander, but again no Air Force Commander was appointed (136). To add to General Crerar's difficulties it was not possible to get the active co-operation of Rear Admiral Hamilton, who continued to be absent from London on other duties. None the less General Crerar considered that

... the time at the disposal of the members of the Canadian Planning Staff is being put to very good advantage. All members who are not actually required to get on with preparatory work are either "sitting in" with their War Office or Combined Operations opposite numbers, or attending, temporarily, Courses of Instruction, such as that now being given to Div Staffs at Largs. I am quite sure that the knowledge these officers are now obtaining will serve a most valuable future purpose, whatever happens to "TONIC" (137).

Planning was also made more difficult by the absence of detailed air photographs; after due consideration, the Chiefs of Staff came to the conclusion that "from the political point of view, air photographs should not be taken at present" (138). Toward the latter part of December, unfortunately, the limited combined training being given to the 1st Canadian Division had to be suspended. "The fact of the matter is", wrote Lord Louis Mountbatten to General McNaughton, "that, largely due to the North African expedition, Combined Operations Command has got into very low water both as regards crews and craft." (139). In order to meet possible future operations, the C.C.O. was forced to concentrate his energies towards the repair and reconditioning

of landing craft and the training of naval crews.

105. In view of the pre-occupation of a small part of 1st Canadian Corps Headquarters with Operation "TONIC" and the certainty that, should the preliminary stage be passed, the greater part would be involved in this operation, it was felt that a further Canadian corps headquarters should be formed to administer and command the 2nd Canadian Division, rear parties from the other two divisions, and corps troops units which would be remaining in Sussex. Moreover, it was planned to bring a British low establishment division into Sussex (see para 86). Under the circumstances, General McNaughton told General Swayne on 2 Nov that he would expedite the formation of Headquarters, 2nd Canadian Corps (140). At first it would exist merely on a nucleus basis, merely relieving such personnel of 1st Canadian Corps Headquarters as were presently engaged on "TONIC" planning. As soon as the Headquarters 2nd Canadian Corps was prepared to take over, however, the existing 1st Canadian Corps Headquarters would be withdrawn to Cobham, Surrey, where it could devote all its attention to planning for "TONIC". On the return of the "TONIC" Force to South Eastern Command, General Swayne suggested that the Canadians should be disposed with two infantry divisions forward under 1st Canadian Corps Headquarters, while the 2nd Canadian Corps of the re-equipped 2nd Canadian Infantry and 5th Canadian Armoured Divisions would be held in reserve.

106. On 19 Dec the Chiefs of Staff Committee virtually decided to shelve "TONIC" following the receipt of a report by the Joint Planning Staff to the effect that it was "most improbable that Germany would attempt to move into Spain against Spanish resistance during the winter, even if she had the necessary forces, and that next spring she is unlikely to have the forces available unless unexpectedly Russia collapses" (141). Instructions were issued therefore merely to complete the paper planning; this General Crerar proceeded to do to the best of his ability, although handicapped by the absence of the Naval Force Commander and the lack of beach photographs.

107. It was not until 28 Dec, however, that General McNaughton learned officially of this decision. Although the blame for this negligence could be laid on the Secretariat of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, General McNaughton's opinion was that there was "obviously something wrong with the machinery which failed to keep him fully informed with the progress of planning" (142). As a result of this mishap, on 31 Dec the C.I.G.S. agreed to investigate the machinery for liaison with First Canadian Army "during the planning stage of any operation in which it may be involved" (143). Sir Alan Brooke further agreed that the Senior Combatant Officer of the Canadian Army in the United Kingdom should be kept fully informed of the progress of such planning, and that copies of all papers issued to Force Commanders should be sent to him for perusal. It was agreed that the Canadian Planning Staff could be disbanded as soon as the "TONIC" papers were completed. This view was officially confirmed by the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 7 Jan 43, although the outline plan was to be kept available should circumstances eventually call for action.

DELAY IN THE SECOND FRONT

108. With the end of 1942 initiative was slowly shifting from the Axis to the Allied Powers. Both in the United Kingdom and in the United States the past summer had seen anxiety expressed for the safety of Russia's armies and questions had been raised by the people's representatives as to when a "Second Front" would materialize. Fortunately, the summer had been weathered and the autumn had brought victories to negate the need of the British War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff to sacrifice their limited resources on wild ventures. German Armies had been held at Stalingrad; the victory of the Eighth Army at Alamein and the "TORCH" landings in North Africa had placed the enemy on the defensive in the Mediterranean; in the South West Pacific, with the clearing of Guadalcanal and a slow advance into New Guinea, the Americans and Australians had now definitely turned the corner in their fight against the Rising Sun. To what extent available resources would permit of vigorous offensives in 1943 yet remained to be seen, for shipping and material alone could make these possible; in the Atlantic the U-Boat was still unconquered and in the Pacific miles of ocean separated the tiny island bases in Allied hands from the Japanese home islands.

109. By now Canadian troops had been in the United Kingdom for three years and as yet had seen no real fighting. In 1940 the Canadian people had understood the situation and in the following year public utterances by Prime Minister Churchill and the Canadian Prime Minister himself had helped to still a growing clamour for action. The year 1942 had brought with it the creation of a separate Canadian Army but only a day's bloody action at Dieppe by troops of the 2nd Canadian Division. Canadian newspapers and members of the parliamentary opposition were maintaining that the Canadian Army was too large for the country's available manpower should casualties become heavy, and that there was some secret motive behind the failure of Canadians to join their comrades in arms in North Africa. Exclusion from Operation "TORCH" was, therefore, the chief topic raised during General McNaughton's third anniversary press conference on 18 Dec. He replied to the correspondents that the Canadian Army was ready to be used anywhere but that the plans set out for him to study had not concerned North Africa:

If our plans had been taken up, then we would have carried out those plans, leaving others to take up the reserve. The fact that Canadians have not as yet seen decisive action is due only to developments of the war (144).

On being further asked whether Canadian troops would be in action soon, General McNaughton replied that he believed "the day was not far distant when the Canadians would be able to do their part".

110. In his conversation with the C.I.G.S. and with the Canadian Minister of National Defence, General McNaughton had urged the necessity of Canada's participating in the higher strategical direction of the war and had pointed out the difficulties he faced in building up an Army organization when the target was firm neither for time nor place. In the early stages of the war he had felt justified in waiting until the Chiefs of Staff Committee had divulged plans for Canadian participation but conditions had now changed, partly at least in the method by which strategical planning was actually directed, and it was no longer possible to leave to chance the employment of a five division army. As it was, the Canadians had been asked to study

and prepare for a number of operations which had failed to materialize.

111. The troops of other Dominions had been engaged from 1940 onward and Australians were fighting close to home. The remnant of a small Canadian Force was languishing in Japanese hands, but these troops had been despatched direct to Hong Kong from Canada and had not formed part of the Canadian Army Overseas. While it was true that no one wanted the casualty lists of the 1914 - 18 war to re-appear, yet there was a danger that the war might be brought to an early close without the Canadian Army being seriously engaged. Despite the work of the Canadian Navy and Air Force and the increasingly larger quantities of war material and foodstuffs which were being poured into the Allied war effort, Canada would not have a firm seat at the Peace Conference unless her army had borne itself in battle.

112. The question was well put in a letter written by General Pope in Washington on 28 Nov 42 to the C.G.S. in Ottawa:

Whether we like it or not British strategy is based firstly, on the premises that the armies of the United Nations will be unable to force their way across the English Channel or the Straits of Dover and to establish themselves, by assault, on the shores of Western Europe so long as the power of resistance of the German Armies remains even approximately what we know it to be today. They therefore hold that when the time comes for our armies to cross the narrow seas into France and the Low Countries they will do so by march table and not by attack orders. (This, as you will recall, is pretty well the view Crerar held all the time he was C.G.S.) (145).

General Pope felt that the British view would prevail; that operations during 1943 should be based on the Mediterranean in view of the inability to build up sufficient forces and material for "ROUNDUP". The British Prime Minister hoped to entice Turkey into the war but, in any case, planned to undertake operations in the Central Mediterranean against the "soft belly of the Axis": as General McNaughton had been told at Chequers on 19 Sep (re "JUPITER REVIEW"), Mr. Churchill favoured "containing the enemy at the centre and sorties to outflank" (146).

113. General Pope considered that the retention of the Canadian Army in the United Kingdom during 1943 would thus be "tragic" and that "considerations of self-respect" demanded that a more active part should be taken. He therefore suggested that the Canadian Army reverse its policy of "intransigence" and "go to the mountain" (147). The problem was not made easy by the fact that the First Canadian Army was a self-contained force and that it would not be easy to find a theatre or an operation where it could readily act as such. It was his fear that, rather than attempt to find such an ideal situation, the Chiefs of Staff would leave the Canadian Army sitting in the United Kingdom until such time as a break in German morale would enable an Allied Expeditionary Force to land and re-occupy North Western Europe in the face of very little opposition. Even should an attempt be made to send out a two-division corps - which could not be split under any circumstances - the offer might prove difficult of acceptance by the British commanders on the spot. He therefore suggested that active employment for one or two divisions (with the fewest possible restrictions to their use) should be requested.

BATTLE EXPERIENCE WITH THE FIRST ARMY

114. Following the Allied landings in North Africa - without Canadian participation - General Stuart despatched the following telegram from Ottawa on 9 Nov:

In view of statement of C.I.G.S. to me that shipping space would not permit of any large numbers of Canadians being sent to Middle East to get battle experience will you advise what proposals you have in mind regarding despatch of observers to active fronts (148).

On 14 Nov General McNaughton replied that he was keeping the question under consideration but that, with operations in North Africa still in a fluid state, he did not feel justified in bothering the C.I.G.S. at the moment (149). Subsequently, however, he concluded satisfactory arrangements with the War Office whereby 150 Canadian all ranks would be attached for a three months' period to General Anderson's First Army in Tunisia. Personnel selected (majors and below, sergeants and above) were to be employed as normal reinforcements but, while on loan to the British Army, all expense would continue to be borne by the Canadian Government. On 1 Dec General McNaughton wrote the Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., that apart from ten vacancies reserved for personnel from Canada, and two lieutenant-colonels, selection should be carried out by the Junior Selection Committee Overseas (150). Then on 22 Dec, C.M.H.Q. was informed that General McNaughton had concluded arrangements with Major-General Galloway, D.S.D. War Office, for a further 50 Canadians to be despatched under the same arrangements each month, beginning with January 1943. It might be noted that an Order of Disposal was signed by Generals McNaughton and Montague on 10 Dec 42 to permit Canadians to be attached to United Kingdom military forces serving outside the United Kingdom; on 6 Jan 43 a complementary Order was signed on behalf of the Army Council.

115. The first party of 78 officers and 63 other ranks^x disembarked at Algiers on 3 Jan and proceeded to base depots from where, after some delay in the case of the first group, they were posted by 2nd Echelon to British units. Wherever possible, Canadians were posted into existing vacancies; otherwise they were carried supernumerary to establishment until they could thus be absorbed (151).

116. This arrangement was continued until April. Due to the approaching termination of fighting in North Africa it was learned on 21 Apr that the First Army would no longer require combatant officers. It was found possible, however, to continue the despatch of officers from the administrative arms to work with Army Service Corps, Ordnance, 2nd Echelon and Graves Registration units which would be continuing to function normally after fighting had ceased (152).

117. A mild furore had been caused in the Canadian Press following a British United Press broadcast on 6 Jan that a small detachment of Canadian troops had arrived in North Africa. On

x The ten officers from Canada did not arrive in time to be despatched with the First Group from the United Kingdom. Only five were found suitable for inclusion in the next draft; the others were attached to Canadian units in England for experience and later sent to North Africa in the role of observers only.

learning that they were just observers (official reply for security reasons) the whole question of non-participation in active operations was again raised by Canadian newspapers. The following editorial which appeared in the Winnipeg Free Press on 13 Jan, headed "DISAPPOINTING", perhaps better expressed the feelings of the thinking public than many of the tirade-armchair strategists' efforts:

When it was announced that a party of Canadians had joined the Allied forces in North Africa and that its members were being dispersed among the units there in order to gain practical experience in modern fighting, there was general approval of an enlightened move by the Canadian command. Our army overseas has been training hard, some of it for three years now, but for various reasons has not yet met the enemy, save in the raid on Dieppe. Excellent as its training may be, there are limitations to the value of these tactics and mock engagements. Those engaged in it pit their minds only against men trained in the same school as themselves. Experience in Africa, on the other hand, would bring them up against the veterans of the Wehrmacht with their differently cultivated imagination and genius in war sharpened now by three years of hard campaigning on many fronts. When the news was announced, this newspaper expressed the hope that a certain number of Canadian brigade and divisional commanders were included in the mission to Africa, for it is these men whose intelligence and skill will dictate the fate of the men under their command when the army goes into full action.

The composition of the Canadian African detachment is not yet known, but it has been announced that the officer in charge is a colonel. If this means that he is the most senior officer on the spot, the Department of Defence, through lack of vision, is botching a first-class opportunity. Where are the brigadiers and generals? If they are not in Africa, they are in England, and what are they doing there? They are, presumably, continuing to perfect the manoeuvres which they have been carrying out against each other for years. The process is a useful one, but it is not to be compared with a week or a fortnight or a month of actual fighting experience, even if their rank compels them to play only the role of observers in Africa. Almost all our senior commanders in England are veterans of the last war but, with the exception of General Roberts, who spent some hours cruising off Dieppe last August, not one of them has had modern battle experience and not one of them has met the brilliant and re-vitalized German army which, by clearing its mind of the lessons of the last war, has won most of the battles in this one. It may be that the absence of brigadiers and divisional commanders will retard the process of training in England, but since the general staff has pointed out that modern weapon training is endless, a few weeks or months away from it would prove disastrous only to an established routine. It has been by following routine that we have been often beaten in this war, and it may be permitted to suggest that injection of a

little imagination into the minds of those directing our war effort would do a lot of good.

118. Although true, circumstances unknown to the general public had not made it possible for Canadian senior officers to visit active theatres to view modern war in the making. The task of fitting the Canadian Corps to play a part in the defence of England and later the problems caused by expansion into a First Canadian Army had fully occupied those who would have preferred to see active campaigning. This fact was regretted by none more than General McNaughton. For example, on 26 Sep General Crerar had received a note from General Montgomery in Libya asking him to "visit this active front and learn how we make war in fact" (153). Due to the fact that General McNaughton was uncertain of his own movements during the next few weeks (re "JUPITER REVIEW"), he reluctantly had to refuse General Crerar's request to be also absent from First Canadian Army (154).

119. With Operation "TONIC" definitely shelved and the first party of Canadians already with the First Army, General Crerar again raised the point on 16 Jan 43. General Montgomery had renewed his earlier invitation (10 Dec) and General Crerar considered that it might be easier to visit the Eighth Army than General Anderson's command. Again, however, there was a projected Operation ("BRIMSTONE") in the offing for the 1st Canadian Division (155) (see paras 125 - 129). On 8 Feb General Paget informed the Canadian Army Commander that a small party of senior officers was proceeding by air to Tripoli for a short visit and that there was room for one Canadian; since the C.-in-C. Home Forces wanted General McNaughton to continue with preparations for Exercise "SPARTAN", General Crerar was nominated. This party of eight (including General Paget and Lieutenant-Generals Gammell, Swayne, Morgan and Templer) spent the four days 14 - 17 Feb at Headquarters Eighth Army attending a Study Period held for British and American senior officers. Reporting to General McNaughton later General Crerar noted:

I saw nothing new in General Montgomery's tactics - even though the technical application of fire and movement to each battlefield problem always invites a particular treatment. I saw, however, a clear understanding of each military situation which faced him and a firm, intelligent appreciation of how the principles of war should be applied to overcome it (156).

120. Subsequently Brigadier G.G. Simonds was given an opportunity of visiting the Eighth Army. Arriving on 1 Apr he spent a few days at main army headquarters studying its organization in the planning stages of the forthcoming operation against the Akarit Line and was then attached to 10 Corps (Lt.-Gen. Horrocks). During the attack through the Wadi Akarit gap he accompanied the corps commander's recce group as an observer; he remained with 10 Corps until the fall of Soussse. One of his comments on active service conditions, as noted in his subsequent report was that:

There is an appreciable difference in tempo at an Army or Corps HQ during an exercise and during a real battle. The slowing effect of fire is never felt in exercises and this has its reactions at Formation HQ. Situations do not develop or change so quickly under real conditions as when they hinge on the instantaneous decision of an umpire. Providing the system of passing information is good - and it seemed exceptionally good throughout Eighth Army - the situation develops

at a slower pace. Neither Eighth Army nor 10 Corps were staffed on the continuous shift principle. At night, duty officers functioned, though the principals were always immediately available, on telephone or remote control in their caravans, if required (157).

CANADIAN PLANNING STAFF

121. Although it has been agreed that the special planning increment to Headquarters, 1st Canadian Corps, could be disbanded as soon as the "TONIC" plans were completed (see para 107) it was subsequently decided to carry over a permanent nucleus staff during the periods when planning for a specific Operation was not in progress. When informed of this proposal on 6 Jan 43, General Brooke "fully agreed" that it would have advantages (158). The remaining members of the planning increment moved to Devonshire House, (London). It was not until 28 Jan 43 that a limited GSD 602 establishment^x of nine officers and ten other ranks, headed by Lt-Col C.F.J. Finlay (who remained as A.A. & Q.M.G.) was authorized and work could proceed officially. On 1 Feb a Directive was issued by First Canadian Army Headquarters setting forth its terms of reference as follows:-

- (a) The primary function of CPS will be to build up and maintain an organization where all information relating to the planning and conduct of Combined Operations will be collated and co-ordinated. This data will be available for the use of any staff that may be set up to plan a specific operation, and will serve as a guide for the policy to be adopted in training and equipping the Canadian Forces.

Specific instructions will be issued by HQ First Cdn Army if CPS is required to undertake any work that does not fall within the general definition of "Combined Operations."

- (b) The following points are given as a guide for the collation of data required, but will not be taken to limit the scope of CPS within the general terms of sub-para (a) above:
 - (1) New doctrines on the employment of troops in Combined Operations, including experiences and lessons learned from actual operations.
 - (11) New ideas on establishments, scales of equipment, loading of vehicles, etc.

x On 23 Mar 42 the Army Commander had been given authority by Defensor Telegram GSD 602 to set up provisional establishments to cover experimental and temporary organizations and to count their personnel against the reinforcement pool (159).

- (iii) In collaboration with SD (Tech) CMHQ, details of any new equipment and new technical developments for use in or connected with Combined Operations.
 - (iv) Details of available facilities for all types of training in Combined Operations, and of courses on which vacancies may be required for training an adequate number of specialists for the Canadian Forces. Direct liaison in this connection will be maintained with C.M.H.Q. (G(Trg)). A record will be kept of all officers and other ranks who have received such training and instruction.
 - (v) All possible information concerning Combined Operational text books and manuals, both existing and projected, and direct liaison in this connection will be maintained with CMHQ (G(Trg)).
 - (vi) Details of an outline planning procedure and time table on corps and divisional level, scales of equipment and any other pertinent information which may be used as a foundation and starting point for any staff set up to plan a particular operation. Specific instructions on the type of planning for which preparatory work is to be done will be issued as required by G Branch, HQ First Cdn Army.
- (c) CPS will keep the appropriate branch at HQ First Cdn Army fully informed on any doctrines, ideas, or developments in order that they may be given early consideration, and if considered advisable, tested in exercises or "dryshod" trials (160).

Questions of policy were to be referred to the B.G.S., First Canadian Army and administrative and technical matters directly to the D.A. & Q.M.G. and Heads of Services. The Canadian Planning Staff was also permitted to deal directly with the Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, C.O.H.Q. and G.H.Q. Home Forces on all questions related to combined operations.

122. During February the staff worked on the compilation of a set of reference books containing, in a summarized form, the relevant information on the planning and conduct of combined operations. These might be handed over to a formation charged with planning an operation rather than having the latter staff plough through a number of bulky files; included was a Data Book and an Order of Battle Planning Book (161). During this time Lt-Col Finlay was employed as the Canadian representative at G.H.Q.(Plans) Home Forces on the preparation of a Pamphlet, "Army Planning for a Large Scale Cross-Channel Combined Operation - 1943." During the latter part of March, the Canadian Planning Staff was instructed to concentrate on planning for a cross-Channel operation in which First Canadian Army would have a follow-up role (162).

ENTERING 1943

123. As will be evident from the preceding paragraphs the end of 1942 found the British and American Chiefs of Staff and political heads still holding divergent views as to what should be the overall strategy for the coming year. The British Joint Planning Staff had reported to the Chiefs of Staff Committee that far more landing ships and craft had been employed on Operation "TORCH" than "prudently" could be spared if a return to North West Europe was to be made in 1943; furthermore, the problem of British manpower was becoming even more acute (163). Thus, even if an over-riding priority were given to "ROUNDUP", it would not be possible to launch an assault during the year with more than four to six brigades. On the other hand, even if this Operation were put aside for the year and successes in the Mediterranean exploited, operations would be limited to one at a time and even the capture of Sicily might be beyond Allied resources. Prime Minister Churchill was very hopeful, however, that Turkey might be induced to enter the War as an ally and that a campaign might be launched through the Balkans (164). On the other hand, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff desired to concentrate on "ROUNDUP" since they did not attach as much importance to the securing of open communications through the Mediterranean as the British, who were accustomed to think of it as a life-line of Empire.

124. In January 1943 Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt, with the Combined Chiefs of Staff in attendance, met at Casablanca ("SYMBOL"). As it was apparent that the Axis would shortly be cleared out of North Africa, the chief question was what to do next. The decision arrived at was to assault Sicily ("HUSKY") "with the target date as the period of the favourable July moon" (165). The amassing of forces and equipment in the United Kingdom for a return to the Continent was to be resumed as soon as possible, in the event that there should be a collapse of German morale or the necessity of building up a limited bridgehead to divert attention from the Russian front. Plans were also to be prepared for raids against North West Europe during the year, for the primary purpose of provoking air battles (later known as Operation "POINTBLANK"). The R.A.F. and U.S.A.A.F. were directed to increase the intensity of their strategical bombing assault on German industry - day by day, around the clock. For this last purpose, shipping which might otherwise have been used to bring American and Canadian troops overseas had to be diverted to the United States Army Air Forces build-up (see paras 127 - 128).

125. On the last day of 1942 General McNaughton had visited the War Office to learn from the C.I.G.S. of a projected operation against Sardinia^x or Sicily, which might involve the employment of one Canadian infantry division. Although the plan was only in a very preliminary stage and the British corps which had been held ready for the Northern Task Force might be

x On 8 Dec 42 a meeting was held at A.F.H.Q., Algiers, to discuss the invasion of Sardinia (Operation "HIRSES") by two British brigades and an American division from the United States. The suggested target date was 30 Mar 43, depending, however, on the capture of Tunisia and the gaining of mastery of the air. Brigadier Sugden was detailed to draft an appreciation for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It is of interest that Lt-Gen F.E. Morgan (Commanding 1st British Corps) was visiting General Eisenhower and attended this meeting (166).

used, the Chiefs of Staff Committee had considered that the Canadians would not like to be left out (167). General McNaughton agreed with this conclusion and again expressed his willingness to explore any proposal for the employment of Canadian troops.

126. By 6 Jan 43 it had been decided that the conquest of Sicily should be brought forward at the Casablanca Conference as a Joint Allied Operation (Operation "HUSKY") but that the occupation of Sardinia might still be mounted as a British Operation under the code name "BRIMSTONE". On that day General McNaughton met Brigadier Simpson (D.D.M.O.(O)) and the C.I.G.S. at the War Office for a further discussion of this latter operation. Brigadier Simpson stated that the Canadian division would be placed in a British corps, commanded by General F.E. Morgan and with a total strength of three divisions or nine infantry brigades. It was the further intention to use the Canadian division for a limited time and then return it to First Canadian Army in time for possible operations against North West Europe (168). General McNaughton told him that, as a result of a consultation with General Crerar, he was nominating the 1st Canadian Division and that it would adopt British W.Es. throughout in order to simplify loading and landing tables. It was agreed that reinforcements would be provided from Canadian Sources and that a detachment of the Canadian Section G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon would proceed with the Force. It was further intimated that General Morgan should not be approached at the moment but that more information would be available within two weeks. To the C.I.G.S. General McNaughton indicated that he had every confidence in the G.O.C. of the 1st Canadian Division (Major-General H.L.N. Salmon) whom he felt certain could keep out of difficulties and function correctly within the constitutional arrangements for a mixed force.

127. At a Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting on the same day, Lord Louis Mountbatten stated that landing craft would be available by the end of February to train the "BRIMSTONE" formations and that naval crews (although no spare crews) would have reached a reasonable state of training. The following formations had already received basic training in combined operations (169):

1st Division (two brigades)
4th Division (three brigades)
1st Canadian Division (one brigade)
101st Royal Marine Brigade.

The remainder of the 1st Canadian Division could be given basic training between the middle of February and the middle of March, and by the end of the latter month rehearsals could be carried out for six brigades of the Force. Furthermore, there would be 50 to 75 per cent spare crews available by that time. If considered necessary, a fourth division could be trained during May. By 24 May, eight brigade groups would have completed rehearsals, although there would be sufficient landing craft to launch only seven brigades in the assault.

128. On 30 Jan, Maj-Gen J.A.C. Whitaker, Director of Military Training at the War Office, requested that the 1st Canadian Division should be made available to complete its combined operations training during the period 15 Feb - 22 Mar and that this should be given higher priority than participation

in Exercise "SPARTAN".* It was also proposed to train the 3rd Canadian Division in this technique during the period 13 Apr - 18 Jun (170). The 2nd Canadian Division was therefore substituted for the 1st Canadian Division in the forthcoming Exercise "SPARTAN". Training in combined operations was carried out for the 1st Canadian Division, although General McNaughton had been told by General Brooke on 9 Feb that the tentative plan for carrying out "BRIMSTONE" had been dropped (see para 140) and that the whole of First Canadian Army would be available for operations based on the United Kingdom (171).

129. Going back to 10 Jan 43 for a moment, General McNaughton then outlined to a conference of his senior officers what he knew of the plans for 1943. Up until this time it had been assumed that the Canadian Army would operate as an entirely self-contained force and therefore it had been possible to adopt special establishments which were peculiarly suitable (172). Now, however, the situation had changed and the Canadian Army had to be prepared to "contribute the maximum effect against the enemy whenever and wherever it was required"; thus it would have to be trained and organized so that it might take its place, in close co-operation with British formations, in minor operations against the "belly of the enemy". On occasion it might be necessary to place Canadian divisions under the command of a British Corps or to have British divisions under the command of a Canadian Corps. The target date for operations in North West Europe - should there be a crack in German morale - was set for 31 Aug 43, but it was probable that raids might have to be mounted earlier against German U-boat bases on the coast of Brittany and Bay of Biscay (see paras 103 - 106). By 1 Oct at the latest, allowing for delays, General McNaughton hoped to have the build-up of First Canadian Army completed; due to limited shipping facilities, however, it would be necessary to accept a "tail" of 9000 British personnel in each divisional slice (see para 96). The building up of a three months' reserve of reinforcements (at intense rates) in the United Kingdom was being given first priority and he "would not sanction the participation of a Cdn formation in any operation unless a reasonable number of reinforcements were available in the U.K. to give it endurance".

130. In order to get further information to enable him to work out the detailed composition of army, G.H.Q., L. of C. and base units, General McNaughton visited the C.-in-C., Home Forces at St. Paul's School (Hammersmith) on 10 Feb. The Army Commander asked General Paget whether First Canadian Army, or some of its formations, would have the task of initial assault or whether it would be used as a follow-up army to exploit out from the bridgehead. Due to limited manpower the Canadian Army could not find the specialized units required for both roles.

131. General Paget replied that "his mind had long been clear" that the Canadian formations should be used to exploit the bridgehead and that they should be organized for this mobile role (173). It had already been decided that the initial attack should be under the command of Headquarters First Canadian Army and for purposes for assault and landing the British 1st Corps (Lt-Gen F.E. Morgan) of three infantry divisions would be placed under it. The 1st and 2nd Canadian Corps would be used to

* As already noted, the training of the 1st Canadian Division in basic combined operations procedure had been initiated in November - December 1942 in preparation for a possible Operation "TONIC" but had had to be cancelled on 28 Dec due to shortage of landing craft and the need to overhaul those used on "TORCH" (see para 94).

follow through and exploit initial success. As soon as "certain progress had been made" an army under Lt-Gen Swayne would land on the left of First Canadian Army; in a still later phase, an army would be brought in under the command of Lt-Gen J.A.H. Gammell. General Morgan was being made responsible for developing the technical aids necessary to conduct landing operations in the face of opposition. Continuing, General Paget stated that

... the initiation of the campaign depended on there being evident some deterioration in German morale, otherwise with the forces available it would probably not be practicable to make a lodgement on the coast. What was contemplated was an all out intensive blow of limited duration.

When questioned as to the number of reinforcements available, Brigadier Rees (BGS(Plans)) replied that the British formations would have only "first reinforcements" - that is, scaled at 28 days' intensive rates. It was planned to take abroad only 21 days' reinforcements at these rates and if additional men were required they would have to be found from the War Office pool or the new intake. Since very little could be expected from these sources, it was accepted that, if the campaign should be of any duration, the British formations taking part would have to be regarded as a wasting asset. General McNaughton gave the Canadian picture as the build-up of three months' reinforcements, at intense rates, in the United Kingdom and a flow of about 5000 a month thereafter from Canada. It was thereupon agreed that the Canadian picture was "very much better" than the British. It should be noted that, as a consequence of Operation "TORCH", there was less than a single American division in the United Kingdom.

132. Discussing the question two days later with General Stuart, who was then in London, it was agreed that if operations should become imminent before the reinforcement build-up was completed General McNaughton would keep out of the order of battle sufficient formations to ensure proper maintenance of the forces actually committed to battle (see para 99). The 2nd Canadian Army Tank Brigade would be retained from the order of battle in any case until the C.A.C. reinforcement pool was sufficiently large, and General McNaughton told the C.G.S. that he could withdraw a brigade or even a division from the existing order of battle to ensure that there were sufficient infantry reinforcements available (174). General Stuart pointed out in turn that the three divisions in Canada could be counted on as "capital reserves" which could be called upon to meet an emergency in the latter stages of the war.

133. General McNaughton also told the C.G.S. that he had been asked to provide up to 25 per cent of the staff officers required by the G.H.Q. Expeditionary Force; although he considered this a "high compliment" to the Canadian Army he did not consider that it would be possible to spare so many staff officers.

134. The high priority given to the build-up of the U.S.A.A.F. in the United Kingdom, in accordance with the decision made at Casablanca, meant that there would be a delay of several months before the "BOLERO" programme would get back into its stride. Thus, on 5 Apr, General Brooke told the Canadian Army Commander that as there was then less than a single American division in the United Kingdom, the study of plans for operations against North West Europe in the near future was limited to the employment of British and Canadian formations. He confirmed that General Paget was the "Commander-in-Chief Designate" of the Expeditionary

Force and, although it was "somewhat speculative", plans "might require" an essay against the Continent in the autumn of 1943 (175). The role of First Canadian Army was that of the advance from an established bridgehead seized by a specially trained British formation under its command. Such an operation was to be studied in the forthcoming G.H.Q. Exercise "SPARTAN", in which the "British" side would be directed by General McNaughton and his own army headquarters.

135. Then on 12 Apr General Paget held a conference at G.H.Q., Home Forces, to discuss possible operations during the balance of the year. As yet the possible operations had not been planned even in outline but it was believed that, by late summer, there would be sufficient landing craft available to lift three to four divisions, of which only one at most could be an assault division (176). There were two real possibilities: a limited opposed operation by a force of three or four divisions, one of which would do the initial assault; and a return to the Continent in the event of German resistance collapsing. General Paget explained that the C.I.G.S. had ruled that the first operation would be done by the First Canadian Army while in the latter the British Second Army would also participate. Although no landing craft would be available until June and even then the number to be made available was not known, it would be necessary to draw up a programme for combined operations training.

136. Subject to any limitation which he might have to make later, General McNaughton agreed to accept responsibility for the limited operation (177). It was also agreed that the 1st Canadian Division would be the assault formation in 1943 and probably also in 1944, when British divisions of 1st Corps would also be trained for such a role. In 1944 the Canadian Army would supply its own quota of special assault units^x but for 1943 the 79th Armoured Division would have to supply the complement of specialized armoured corps units required by the 1st Canadian Division (178). Due to the shortage of landing craft, a good deal of the basic training would have to be given inland by trained cadres, but it was thought that from June onwards at least one Canadian brigade could receive actual practical training; the 1st Canadian Division and the Headquarters, 3rd Canadian Division, had already undergone such training; later basic training could be given to the 5th Canadian Division and refresher training to the 2nd Canadian Division. Limited training facilities in Scotland and elsewhere dictated that formations trained for an assault role in 1943 would also have that role should operations not materialize until 1944.

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137. In order to further the "round the clock" bombing programme which was just getting under way as the only immediate method of crippling the German war effort, Mr. Churchill sent a personal telegram to the Canadian Prime Minister on 14 Mar pointing out the necessity of having to cancel certain Canadian troop sailings in favour of transporting ground crew personnel of the U.S.A.A.F. to the United Kingdom. The inability to launch

* Four self-propelled artillery field regiments, one assault tank regiment, two Flail tank squadrons, two assault companies R.E. and two Beach Groups.

even a limited operation in the face of Russian insistence for help rendered the early start of the bomber offensive a necessity. The first intimation General McNaughton had of this curtailment of the build-up of First Canadian Army was a telegram from the C.G.S. in Ottawa. In the absence of the C.I.G.S., due to ill-health, he thereupon visited Sir Archibald Nye (V.O.I.G.S.). After learning the particulars, General McNaughton sent a telegram to Ottawa on the following day pointing out that such a step would delay the completion of the Canadian Army until December. Nevertheless

since the decision given in Mr. Churchill's cable is based on the judgement of those who have the strategical direction of the war there seems nothing for us to do but make the best of it. If you agree we will at once review our detailed programme accordingly and advise (179).

138. In fact no delay turned out to be necessary. Ottawa secured the agreement of the War Department in Washington to the over-berthing of the "Queen Elizabeth" and "Queen Mary"; by moving over 15,000 men each per trip instead of 11,000 it was possible to meet the scheduled needs of both the U.S.A.A.F. and the Canadian Army (180).

139. The storm in the tea cup was thus over, from a materialistic point of view. There remained, however, the question of information on strategic plans which had been becoming insistently more important as the months of 1942 came to a close and which had been settled on an ad hoc basis by Generals Brooke and McNaughton (see para 78). The personal liaison meetings with the C.I.G.S. had sufficed to keep the Canadian Army Commander in the strategical picture up to now, falling some definite inter-governmental procedure of allowing Canada a place at the councils of the great. The unexpected illness of General Brooke and the failure of the V.O.I.G.S. to inform General McNaughton of the Chiefs of Staff recommendation to curtail the Canadian Army shipping programme now disclosed the inadequacy of such a set-up. It had also disclosed that General Stuart on his visit to the United Kingdom in early February had been led astray as to the implications of the Casablanca Conference and had got the idea that much of the musings he had heard were actually in line with decisions made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (181).

140. The employment of the First Canadian Army in a limited operation against North West Europe (as explained by General Paget on 10 Feb) seems by now to have been shelved as a practicable operation of war and there was no evidence of German morale collapsing. That this was news to both the Canadian Prime Minister and the C.G.S. is evident from the following telegrams. On 18 Mar General Stuart's telegram to General McNaughton read in part as follows:

... Has there been a change in the plan outlined to us? If there is little possibility of Canadians being employed as planned this year then War Committee consider, and I agree, that we should urge re-examination of one and perhaps two divisions going as early as possible to an active theatre.

The last thing we wish is a premature intervention on the Continent. It would be suicidal to attempt such an operation if conditions were not ripe. If it is not thought that operations other than raids are feasible this year, then in my opinion we should press for early representation in North Africa. P.M. had mentioned desirability of re-examination in preliminary cable to Mr. Churchill (182).

Prime Minister Mackenzie King's telegram to Prime Minister Churchill of the previous day read in part as follows:

Your telegram No. 56 of March 14th came as a very serious shock to us, particularly in the light of the report we had received from the Chief of the General Staff of his recent talks with the C.I.G.S. regarding future employment of the Canadian Army. Given the task assigned to it, and the probable timetable set for that task, we saw the force of the objections to the suggestion that at least part of the Canadian forces should be employed at any early date in the North African theatre. Withdrawal of transport allocated to carry Canadian troops will postpone projected completion and reinforcement of Canadian Army, and presumably entail considerable postponement of operation discussed with Chief of General Staff. In circumstances the strong considerations with which you are familiar in favour of employment of Canadian troops in North Africa appear to require earnest re-examination (183).

It would appear that the operation referred to by General Stuart and the Canadian Prime Minister was that outlined by General Paget to General McNaughton on 10 Feb 43 (see paras 130 -131). If the information later learned by General Pope in Washington is correct, however, the projected "side-show" would seem to have been of an even more limited nature, to destroy the U-Boat bases at Cherbourg, Brest or St. Nazaire within a period of two or three days (see paras 93 - 96).

141. In his reply, dated 20 Mar, Mr. Churchill stated that everything possible would be done to expedite Canadian sailings (see above) but that he had been advised that "the postponement of the balance until early in the July - September quarter will not affect the availability of the Canadian Army for whatever operations are undertaken this year" (184). It was planned to send only one further division^x to North Africa and:

... This is already committed and under special training. Plans are therefore too far advanced to permit of a Canadian Division being sent in its place and no further divisions are likely to be required.

x On 25 May 43 General Pope learned in Washington from Brigadier W. Porter (Director of Plans, War Office) that back in March the Joint Planning Staff in London had suggested including some Canadians in the additional forces to be despatched to the Mediterranean but that Mr. Churchill had ruled that they were to be kept intact in the United Kingdom (185).

I fully realize and appreciate the anxiety of your fine troops to take an active part in operations and you may be sure that I am keeping this very much in mind.

In his own reply to the C.G.S. on the same day, General McNaughton mentioned that:

... The plain unpleasant fact is that neither Massey nor I were given any information or even hint of the changes. I believe that this was not a consequence of any intent but a fault of the system under which I have relied on C.I.G.S. personally to keep me sufficiently in the picture so that we could act sensibly and with reasonable foresight.

The Canadian Forces in this country are now so substantial and such a major part of the reserves available for operations anywhere that I believe we should now insist on the establishment of a formal link with C.G.S. Committee which would ensure that we shall know any plans under contemplation which may in any way affect us. If you agree I would like authority to explore this with Brooke when he returns to duty.

My view remains (1) that Canadian Forces in whole or part should be used where and when they can make the best contribution to winning the war, (2) that we should continue to recognize that the strategical situation can only be brought to a focus in Chiefs of Staff Committee, (3) that proposals for use of Cdn Forces should initiate with this Committee, (4) that on receipt of these proposals I should examine them objectively and report thereon to you with recommendations.

I do not repeat NOT recommend that we should press for employment merely to satisfy a desire for activity or for representation in particular theatres however much I myself and all here may desire this from our own narrow point of view (186).

142. This request evidently received favourable consideration in Ottawa, for on 31 Mar the C.G.S. was able to reply, authorizing General McNaughton to approach the C.I.G.S. on the question of closer liaison, since even the British Army Staff in Washington seemed to know more about projected operations. General McNaughton's view that proposals for the employment of Canadian troops should be initiated by the Chiefs of Staff Committee was, however, not found acceptable in Ottawa. According to General Stuart, insistence on the employment of Canadian troops was based on "that vital quality morale and in order to get battle experience" (187).

143. Therefore, on 5 Apr, General McNaughton visited the C.I.G.S., who had by now recovered from his illness. After discussing the tangle which had occurred over shipping, the C.I.G.S. regretted that their close liaison had broken down and suggested that in future it should rest on some basis other than personal conversations (188). He considered that General McNaughton might well attend all meetings of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to ensure that he obtained "adequate background knowledge upon which to base plans for the future employment

of the Cdn Army". General McNaughton replied that he had "no desire to interject himself" into the meetings of the Chiefs of Staff Committee nor did he feel that he could spare the time away from his many duties connected with the Canadian Army; furthermore, much of the information which he would obtain at such meetings would be "no concern" of the Canadian Army. He suggested, therefore, that a first grade Canadian staff officer might be appointed to the secretariat of the Chiefs of Staff Committee for liaison duties; this officer could keep General McNaughton informed of matters which would be of interest to the Canadian Army and indicate to which meetings of the Chiefs of Staff Committee he might be invited. General Brooke agreed in principle with this suggestion but did not believe that such a step would be adequate. He promised, however, to take up the whole question with the Chiefs of Staff and the War Cabinet within the next few days.

144. On the following day General McNaughton received a letter from General Sir Hastings Ismay, adviser to the Minister of Defence, suggesting that, whenever he was in London, General McNaughton might visit the Cabinet Offices Information Room in order that he could be put in the current picture (189). The whole question of closer liaison was discussed within British circles but General McNaughton does not appear to have been given any concrete answer until 27 Apr, on which day he visited Sir Hastings Ismay at the Offices of the War Cabinet. General McNaughton said that public opinion in Canada was being incited to demand action and question whether a proper contribution was being made to the conduct of the war (190). He outlined the role which the Canadian Army had played as a "general strategical reserve" and emphasized that the danger of dissipating it prematurely was realized by all.

145. General Ismay's own proposal was that Mr. Churchill should institute a practice of writing regularly to the Canadian Prime Minister so that the latter might know in advance of pending strategical developments and particularly those which might involve Canadian troops. He also spoke of Mr. Churchill's difficulty in "opening up" on paper, as opposed to his conversational powers of expression. Furthermore, plans were subject to change on short notice and even "British Cabinet Ministers were never informed of dates of operations nor of particular objectives, in fact they were left very nearly in the dark". There was "in fact a one-man direction of the British part in the war" and it was General Ismay's own view that no help would come from having a Canadian minister in the War Cabinet nor could the channel Dominions Office - High Commissioner be expected to develop.

146. General Ismay repeated his offer of 6 Apr and the Canadian Army Commander replied that he would visit the Cabinet Offices Information Room whenever his routine permitted it. In turn, General Ismay undertook to inform him whenever any new developments made it advisable for him to come to London. He went on to speak of difficulties which had arisen in the case of Australia, contrasting that situation with the "generous and unqualified support given by the Prime Minister of Canada to his colleague, the Prime Minister of Britain". Probably such co-operation had "led to too much being taken for granted." He agreed with General McNaughton that it was essential for such information to go directly to the Canadian Prime Minister from the British Government, in place of its reaching Ottawa by way of Washington.

147. As a corollary to the decision taken at Casablanca that the build-up of men and equipment for an assault upon North West Europe should be resumed as soon as possible, the Combined Chiefs of Staff appointed Lt-Gen F.E. Morgan to the post of Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Designate). Brigadier-General Barker, United States Army, was appointed as his Deputy Chief of Staff. His staff, charged with the creation of an outline plan for an assault on North West Europe, eventually was to have duplicate British and American officers in each appointment. The "ROUNDUP" Administrative Planning Staff was wound up and incorporated within the new organization, which was to be known by its initials C.O.S.S.A.C. and would have direct liaison with the Admiralty, War Office, Air Ministry, C.O.H.Q. and other British Government Ministries (191). The C.O.S.S.A.C. staff was intended to deal with only the headquarters of army groups and armies; all detailed planning would be carried out by these more subordinate headquarters.

148. On 13 Apr General Morgan visited First Canadian Army Headquarters to talk over future plans with General McNaughton. After discussing the composition and duties of his staff, General Morgan said that the Supreme Commander (yet to be appointed) would have three army groups at his disposal - each consisting of about 15 divisions: one under General Paget consisting of a British and a Canadian Army and two American army groups (192). As well as planning for this long term operation, General Morgan stressed that attention would have to be focussed on the more immediate problem of an attack against North West Europe in the event of a crack in German morale. In the latter event it would be possible to effect reductions in the establishments of rearward echelons, and this cutting of the "tail" was being stressed by Prime Minister Churchill. First Canadian Army should now be trained, organized and equipped solely with service in North West Europe in mind; the possibility of service in a variety of theatres should no longer be entertained. The defence of the United Kingdom would remain the responsibility of G.H.Q., Home Forces, operating on a considerably reduced establishment.

149. General McNaughton replied that while he was ready to accept "operational direction" from General Paget as Commander of the Army Group, it would have to be understood that, as Senior Combatant Officer of the Canadian Army Overseas, he had responsibilities to the Canadian Government (193). Thus he would have to continue to have direct access, when necessary, to the C.I.G.S. He accepted General Morgan's offer to receive a senior Canadian staff officer for liaison duties with C.O.S.S.A.C. He further agreed to furnish a personal assistant (grade two) and 12 Canadian staff officers for appointment to C.O.S.S.A.C.

150. The substance of this conversation was despatched to Ottawa but knowledge of the existence of C.O.S.S.A.C. was to be confined to the Minister of National Defence and the C.G.S. (194). General McNaughton proposed that General Turner, whose health had now recovered considerably, should be appointed Canadian representative on General Morgan's staff (195). He further wrote that he would be glad to put the C.G.S.'s personal representative (Brigadier R.B. Gibson), in the strategical picture on his arrival from N.D.H.Q.; Brigadier Gibson would be given access to all the information gained from Generals Brooke, Paget and Morgan... "out of which I am gradually securing some light on intentions and plans of the probable role to be proposed for Cdn Army." On the following day, 18 Apr, approval for the

retention of General Turner to serve as General McNaughton's contact with C.O.S.S.A.C. was despatched from Ottawa (196).

151. Meanwhile, on 17 Apr, General Turner had been introduced to the first meeting of the C.O.S.S.A.C. staff as an observer so that General McNaughton in his capacity as the "accredited military representative of the Canadian Government" in the United Kingdom (but not as G.O.C.-in-C., First Canadian Army), should "be kept fully in the picture as regards policy and general plans" (197). General Morgan opened the meeting by explaining that "a great deal of planning had been done by various agencies but little had been achieved as no real directions had been given until the meeting at Casablanca". It had there been decided that:

- (a) Operations against N.W. Europe should be instituted at the earliest possible date but not before 1944.
- (b) A British Supreme Commander with an American Deputy should be appointed.

He intended to keep the staff small so as to deal only with the larger questions and leave details to others: from being largely a co-ordinating agency at the outset it would gradually evolve into the complete staff required by the Supreme Commander. Particular emphasis was placed on the fact that no Allied Forces, other than British and American, were to be brought into the planning until the Combined Chiefs of Staff so directed and that the existence of C.O.S.S.A.C. was to be kept a secret, as long and as effectively as possible. The force to be employed would consist of approximately 100 divisions of which 15 would be British and Canadian and the remainder American. Most of the latter were still in the United States. General Morgan had no executive power, but he was authorized to report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff what preparations would be necessary to implement his plans. Should these plans be approved, they would be issued to the respective Commanders-in-Chief of Army Groups who would be responsible for detailed planning.

152. The Chiefs of Staff Committee were "lukewarm" toward the appointment of General Turner as a liaison officer with C.O.S.S.A.C., and the C.I.G.S. thought that the Canadian liaison should be at a higher level as the planning to be carried out by C.O.S.S.A.C. would be too particularized for General McNaughton's purpose (198). At the second C.O.S.S.A.C. meeting, at Norfolk House, on the morning of 24 Apr, however, General Morgan explained that, although the exact position of General Turner had not been settled, the Chiefs of Staff Committee had "tacitly conceded" that the proposed liaison between General McNaughton and C.O.S.S.A.C. was desirable (199).

153. It now developed that although the C.O.S.S.A.C. Directive had been somewhat amended by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington it was still not firm. Sufficient had been agreed on, however, to show that the planning tasks would comprise (200):

- (a) A deception scheme extending over the summer of 1943 with a view to pinning enemy forces in Western Europe and keeping alive the expectation of cross-channel operations on a considerable scale in 1943; this to include amphibious feints with the object of bringing on air battles between the R.A.F. and the U.S. Air Forces in the U.K. on the one hand and the Luftwaffe on the other.

- (b) Plans for a return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration at any time from now onwards with whatever forces may be available at the time.
- (c) Full scale invasion of the Continent in 1944.

154. General Morgan said that preliminary studies already made it evident that one of the main "bottlenecks" was lack of technical transportation units; those available would suffice for only three divisions. Unless a satisfactory solution could be found, particularly in the event that action was hurried by German disintegration, it would be necessary to ask Canada and the United States to loan personnel experienced in technical transportation, particularly docks operation. The production of landing craft in the United States would also have to be looked into. Brigadier-General Barker said that the United States Army was planning to despatch 1,000,000 men to the United Kingdom before the end of the year and another 500,000 in the three following months of 1944; of these, however, 400,000 would be Air Force personnel. General Morgan pointed out that this flow should be arranged so that, in the event of German disintegration, properly co-ordinated components might participate in the return to the Continent.

155. Shortage of landing craft and crews would likely preclude any large campaign in 1943 but plans would have to be made to prey on the enemy's nerves, anywhere from the Bay of Biscay to the North Cape. In order to keep the Germans apprehensive, General Morgan wished the following to be given serious consideration:-

- (a) Setting up of Expeditionary Force organization both in the U.K. and U.S.A. and making certain that the enemy are made aware of this.
- (b) Concentrations of ground forces in coastal areas on large scale Exercises, e.g. Scotland vis a vis Norway; South of England vis a vis Pas de Calais, etc.
- (c) Collection and concentration in suitable harbours of numbers of small craft such as were utilized in the evacuation from Dunkirk.
- (d) Construction of aerodromes and landing fields in appropriate localities.
- (e) Publicity (unexaggerated) to planning for operations against the Continent.

156. When questioned as to what information might be forwarded to the C.G.S. in Ottawa, General Morgan told General Turner that he would appreciate the Canadian Army Commander treating all information learned to date as being for his own personal use only. General Turner would be informed when it was considered that information could be forwarded to Canada (201).

OPERATION "HUSKY"

157. With the formation of C.O.S.S.A.C. it seemed that First Canadian Army had at last been assigned to take part as a self-contained entity in a firm operation - the invasion of North West Europe - and that at last plans could proceed with only that object in view. It was only a bare ten days, however, before there was a new and sudden turn of events. While

discussing C.O.S.S.A.G. Planning at Norfolk House on the afternoon of 23 Apr, General McNaughton was suddenly summoned to the War Office by the C.I.G.S. Sir Alan Brooke stated that the chance of an operation against North West Europe during 1943 "was now very small", and in view of the "insistent requests" made by the Canadian Minister of National Defence and C.G.S., Mr. Churchill had given him a Directive^x that Canadian participation was to be arranged for the next operation (203). Thereupon, the C.I.G.S. invited General McNaughton to agree to the participation of one infantry division, one army tank brigade and certain ancillary units in an Operation ("HUSKY"), based on Tunisia, against Sicily. He added that the 3rd British Division, being replaced, would be "very disappointed" and that his own staff at the War Office had opposed a switch being made at this late stage. The C.I.G.S. said that the change had been made on his own decision; even his senior staff officers had not appreciated the need for a change. General McNaughton could have only 48 hours to make a decision.

158. General McNaughton replied that "participation of Cdn formations in any operation should not be based upon a desire to give the Canadians action for action's sake, but that participation should be based upon the principle of what was best in the general interest." However, he welcomed the opportunity and asked to study the plans so that he could make a recommendation to the Canadian Government. The Canadian Army Commander requested that a formal request be made in writing; on receipt of which he would cable Canada. Pending further study of the Plan and approval by the Canadian Government, General McNaughton was ready to authorize training and preparations, on a provisional basis, for the 1st Canadian Division (Major-General H.L.N. Salmon) and the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade (Brigadier R.A. Wyman).

159. Sir Alan Brooke went on to relate that detailed planning for the British 3rd Division was well advanced and that there would be little enough time to complete arrangements for the Canadian formations to participate. The Canadian division would be placed in a corps under the command of either Lt-Gen B.G. Horrocks or Lt-Gen Sir Oliver Leese - and in General Montgomery's Eighth Army. He also read aloud Prime Minister Churchill's Minute approving the inclusion of Canadian troops in Operation "HUSKY": "subject to the proviso that there should be no complications in the arrangements for command". General McNaughton replied that he did not want to have Canadian formations broken up unnecessarily but, if operations required it, this might have to be accepted.

160. During the course of a later conversation with Maj-Gen J.N. Kennedy (D.M.O., War Office), General McNaughton learned that the "HUSKY" Plan had been submitted to General Eisenhower and accepted, with some modifications (204). As planning was

* In a letter to the C.G.S. from Washington General Pope wrote that he had been informed that the Planners had had a meeting about the middle of April "with Mr. Amery to decide whether or not the New Zealanders were to be included in Husky. When it was decided they were not to be so employed Amery then pumped hard for us, saying that it was imperative to find us a measure of action. The matter was then settled in our favour within a matter of 48 hours. Amery had doubtless been filled by Eden, who, in turn, had been well primed by you a few days previously in Ottawa" (202).

being done in North Africa it would be necessary for General Salmon and certain of his officers to fly out to Cairo. General McNaughton then despatched a warning telegram to the C.G.S. and, following the receipt of an official written request from the C.I.G.S., sent off a more detailed telegram requesting authority to participate in "HUSKY". The latter telegram explained, however, that the arrangements for command and control of Canadian troops participating in these operations would be the same as those for the British formations which were being replaced (205).

161. On 25 Apr General McNaughton was able to inform the C.I.G.S. that the Canadian Government had authorized participation in the Operation, "subject to the usual limitation on my powers, namely, that I shall examine the general plans and recommend their acceptance..." (206). On the following day he was able to write General Brooke that, after having gone over the plans with Generals Salmon and Ramsden (G.O.C. British 3rd Division), he was of the opinion that "HUSKY" was a "practical operation of war"; accordingly he had despatched a telegram to the Canadian Government requesting that final approval should be given to Canadian participation.

162. During the course of a conversation with General Ismay at noon on the following day (27 Apr) General McNaughton mentioned the possibilities, and advantages, of bringing back the Canadian component of "HUSKY" later to rejoin the First Canadian Army (207). General Ismay replied that no one yet knew what would come after "HUSKY"; in any event, it would be a good thing for Canada to have a division in an active theatre so that officers from other Canadian formations could be rotated for experience.

163. On 29 Apr news was received of the death of General Salmon and other officers in an airplane crash near Barnstaple, Devon, on their way to North Africa. Thereupon General Simonds was appointed to command the 1st Canadian Division; plans were proceeded with for Canadian officers to visit the Planners in Cairo. The actual handover of the uncompleted planning by British 3rd Division to officers of Headquarters, 1st Canadian Division, augmented by members of the Canadian Planning Staff, took place on 25 Apr. The Canadian Force was to form part of the Eastern Task Force (Force 545), with the 1st Canadian Division and one tank regiment assault loaded as Force "A" for the actual assault and the remainder of the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade and ancillary units as Force "B" of the Army Reserve Force. Since the whole Force would be maintained from the Middle East after the first phase, it was agreed that the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade should be re-equipped with Sherman tanks (Chrysler engines) before leaving Scotland. As a general principle, General McNaughton agreed that the Canadian Force "would adopt British stores and equipment wherever possible in order to simplify the task of provision and maintenance" (208). To conform with Middle East establishments, General McNaughton gave approval to the conversion of the infantry battalions from three (back) to four rifle companies and the reorganization of The Saskatoon Light Infantry into three infantry brigade support groups and a small headquarters.

164. During discussions with General Nye on 25 Apr and with General Ismay on 27 Apr, General McNaughton had pointed out that the Canadian commanders would be placed under command of General Alexander, "the reason being that the only legal formula we had was the Visiting Forces Act which did not give authority to place Canadian troops under other than a British comd" (209). General Ismay suggested that someone should explain the position to General Eisenhower: this was subsequently done by General

McNaughton, in a telegram to A.F.H.Q. The final word on this matter appeared in General McNaughton's letter of 3 May to the C.I.G.S.:

On 28 April 1943, I received a cablegram advising that I might expect an Order in Council authorizing the detailing of the forces in whole or in part 'in combination' under the Visiting Forces Act, together with appropriate instructions which would include the retention by the Cdn Commander of his right of reference to the Cdn Government.

On 1 May 1943, I received by cable the text of the Order in Council above referred to, namely, P.C. 3464 dated 29 April 1943.

This Order in Council deals with 'the serving together'; the placing in and withdrawal from 'in combination'; 'attachment'; and 'command' of the combined forces. It provides for our relations with the Naval, Military and Air Forces of any part of the British Commonwealth and unlike the previous Orders in Council which it replaces, it is not restricted geographically to Europe nor to the Military and Air Forces of the United Kingdom or of Australia and New Zealand.

... I am also instructed that 'Canadian participation is subject to the retention by the Senior Cdn Combatant Officer of the force concerned of the right to refer to the Cdn Government, through me, 'in respect of any matter in which such forces are, or are likely to be, involved or committed.' I am informed that later instructions will issue in respect to awards for gallantry, etc.

I have carefully studied these instructions, and in the result I am satisfied that a thoroughly practicable and satisfactory system for the command and administration of our forces can be set up... (210).

165. Then on 19 Jun, General McNaughton issued his 7th Order of Detail, placing the 1st Canadian Division, the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade and certain ancillary units "in combination with all the Naval, Military and Air Forces of the several parts of the British Commonwealth and serving in or based upon or operating from the Continent of Africa or embarked in the United Kingdom for the purpose of any such service" (211). In the Directives issued to General Simonds and Brigadier Wyman he pointed out that they were entitled to withdraw their forces from 'combination' should "the orders and instructions issued to you by the Comd Combined Forces... not... represent a practicable operation of war or are otherwise at variance with the policy of the Government of Canada on any matter; provided always that by so doing an opportunity is not lost nor any part of the Allied Forces endangered." The Directive further stated:

You continue to enjoy the right to refer to the Government of Canada in respect to any matter in which the forces under your command are or are likely to be involved or committed or on any question of their administration which may require correction.

Reference to the Government of Canada will be made by you through me and only when the remedial or other action deemed by you to be necessary has been represented to the Officer Comd the Combined Force and he shall have failed to take appropriate action (212).

166. "A" and "Q" matters were settled as a result of a visit by Brigadier A.W. Beament and Lt-Col D.K. Tow to North Africa in April - May. A small Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon, headed by Lt-Col Tow as A.A. & Q.M.G., was authorized for location at Headquarters, 15 Army Group, to deal with the following matters which could not be dealt with through normal channels: "(a) to provide a direct liaison on all except operational matters between the Canadian service authorities in the United Kingdom and the Commander-in-Chief, (b) to act as a channel of communication on administrative matters between the Canadian Force Commander in the field and the Canadian service authorities in the United Kingdom, or the Commander-in-Chief, as might be appropriate and (c) to provide a Canadian Staff Element at the Headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief to assist and advise the principal Staff Officers concerned in matters which were peculiarly Canadian" (213). There would be, however, no Canadian representative at intervening headquarters. A small Canadian Section was also authorized for G.H.Q. 2nd Echelon, to deal largely with the question of reinforcing the Canadian Force. Despite their somewhat misleading nomenclature, both these Sections were purely Canadian establishments which subsequently increased in size.

167. It was decided that reinforcements would be held on the basis of two months at intense rates - 396 officers and 5732 other ranks. Although this was considerably higher than the holdings for corresponding British formations, General McNaughton had explained to General Nye that the step was being taken deliberately "in order that battle casualties may be returned to the United Kingdom to educate other Canadian troops in battle craft" (214). General Nye agreed that this was a "very sound policy" and he was "sure shipping would be available". General Simonds had agreed to co-operate but, in a letter to General Montague, stated that he could not "accept in any sense the view that 1st Canadian Division is a 'battle school' through which the maximum number of untried reinforcements is to be passed" (215). General Montague replied that the division might expect to get back a "proper proportion of recoverable casualties" but that the policy laid down by General McNaughton would otherwise have to be adhered to.

168. A more detailed account of the planning, training, preparation and implementation of Operation "HUSKY" appears in Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q. Reports (Nos. 126, 127, 132, 135, 136) and therefore the further history of this Force will not be described again here.

A QUEST FOR MORE OPERATIONAL EXPERIENCE

169. At the third weekly C.O.S.S.A.C. meeting, held at Norfolk House on the morning of 1 May, General Morgan announced that his Directive had now been approved on both sides of the Atlantic, with the addition of "as early as possible" after the words "Full scale invasion of the Continent in 1944" (see para 163) (216). In connection with accompanying deception schemes it was agreed, after discussion, that widespread threats from the Spanish border to Norway would be more effective than mere attention to more localized areas. Owing to the shortage

of labour and materials it was necessary that any construction prepared in connection with deception plans in Southern and South Eastern England should fit in, as closely as possible, with plans for a later full scale invasion of North West Europe. Also, plans for the return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration should be devised so as to engender the belief that actual assault was scheduled for 1943.

170. Efforts were being made at this time also to decrease the size of the "tail" of the Expeditionary Force for North West Europe and thought was being given to the idea of keeping static rear echelon maintenance facilities in the United Kingdom. Moreover, the composition of FFC.36 was again fluid, as a result of further British manpower difficulties (217). The intake into the British Army had been 25,000 per month but after May it was going to decline to a monthly 4,000. The British Army had an existing deficit of 140,000 including 80,000/90,000 required for the "tail" of First Canadian Army; moreover it was supposed to be wasting at the rate of 11,000 per month (218). Just prior to the decision to include Canadian troops in Operation "HUSKY" the composition of the Anglo-Canadian Army Group for an unopposed landing in North West Europe had been estimated as:

Canadian Army equivalent	- 6 divisions
Second Army	9 divisions
Army Group Reserve	1 Airborne Division
	1 Royal Marine Division
	1 Polish Armoured Division.

Behind this there would remain only five low establishment divisions and some independent brigades and beach groups, which might later be utilized to replace brigades decimated by battle. Even should a Chiefs of Staff proposal to extend the 25,000 a month intake for a further four months (and thereafter 15,000 a month) be found acceptable there would be no reinforcements available for the nine divisions of Second Army. On 5 May, General McNaughton told Brigadier R.B. Gibson, on a liaison visit from N.D.H.Q. (see para 150) that such plans did not rest on a "realistic basis"; in the draft of a telegram despatched to N.D.H.Q. he wrote:

... The alleged reason given for request to substitute 1 Cdn Div and 1 Cdn Army Tank Bde and ancillaries for British 3rd Div and other units to satisfy request for activity said to have been made by Canada. My own view is that real reason is related to desire to maintain number of British Divisions in Expeditionary Force vis-a-vis U.S. and ourselves. My reasons for recommending this operation have of course no relation to either of these considerations (219).

171. This subject was touched on again, during a visit General McNaughton paid to Norfolk House on the afternoon of 17 May 43. General Morgan agreed that the proposal to maintain nine British divisions for the Expeditionary Force was "fantastic" (220). Unless the world shipping situation improved so that other formations might be returned to the United Kingdom from overseas theatres, he thought that it would not be possible to maintain more than six British divisions in North West Europe. In any case the Anglo-Canadian Army Group, consisting of about 12 divisions, would be only a very small part of the 100 divisions which the G.O.S.S.A.C. planners envisaged as necessary for any full scale campaign in North West Europe.

172. During the course of a conversation at the War Office on 19 May General Montgomery assured the Canadian Army Commander that the maintenance of formations was of "first importance" and that he could be relied on not to break up the two Canadian formations detailed for Operation "HUSKY" (221). Later that afternoon General Paget stated his belief that the despatch of a Canadian Force to Sicily would "very much upset the balance of First Cdn Army" (222). General Paget advised General McNaughton not to plan to put Canadians into the "assault" as well as the "follow up" role. It would be preferable to concentrate either on the problem of the "advance from a bridgehead" or that of following the assault divisions into a bridgehead. General Paget proposed to keep the British 1st Corps directly under G.H.Q. Home Forces and hoped that close liaison would be maintained with First Canadian Army since it might prove necessary to place this Assault Corps under command of the latter for a particular operation. General McNaughton was able to assure him that a Canadian liaison officer was being attached to the 79th Armoured Division to watch developments in assault technique.

173. Then at the C.O.S.S.A.C. weekly conference on 22 May, attended by General Turner, General Morgan circulated a paper he had prepared on the need for "Battle Experience", pointing out that such a lack would limit the operational capabilities of troops destined for the invasion of North West Europe (223). There was a limit to the effect to be gained from realistic training and battle inoculation since troops were aware that the "man behind the gun" was doing his best to miss them. There would be no time to acclimatize men gradually to battle conditions in the pending campaign:

... On this side of the water, our troops are "at peace". On the far bank (which in one place is hardly more than twenty miles away) those same troops will find themselves in the heart of the most intense battle the world has ever known. We must seek a means of palliating the intense nervous and moral shock of this rapid transition.

Existing means of drafting back a limited number of individuals for "certain reasons" and then absorbing them into formations in the United Kingdom was "too haphazard", what was needed was "some positive system whereby at best complete battle-trained formations shall be transferred to this country to form the nucleus of our invasion armies". If this should prove impossible, at least small battle-trained nuclei should be returned to inculcate a proper battle spirit into the formations still in the United Kingdom. General Turner was asked to inform the Canadian Army Commander that C.O.S.S.A.C. would be glad to co-operate in any scheme designed to give Canadian formations in the United Kingdom the benefit of more individuals with actual battle experience.

174. The question of battle experience for Canadians was discussed with General Nye on 27 May, at which time he approved of General McNaughton's plan to bring back to the United Kingdom all Canadian casualties from Operation "HUSKY" (see para 157), in order that they might later be absorbed in the formations destined for North West Europe (224). General Nye said that there was no intention of sending abroad any further Canadian formations and that, on the contrary, it was probable that the 1st Canadian Division and 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade would be returned to the United Kingdom at a not distant date (see para 199). The V.C.I.G.S. went on to say that Canadian planning

should make provision for their return before large scale operations were undertaken against North West Europe.

175. Meantime, Prime Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt and the Combined Chiefs of Staff had been meeting again at Washington ("TRIDENT") to begin co-ordinating Allied strategy for the final, and decisive, stages of the war. A target date for the assault on North West Europe was set for 1 May 44. By the beginning of August an outline plan for what was to be known as Operation "OVERLORD" was to be in the hands of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (225). General Morgan's views on the need for battle tried formations found acceptance and General Eisenhower was directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to arrange for the return of seven divisions (three British and four American) to the United Kingdom, beginning by 1 Nov 43. At the subsequent conferences held at Algiers (29 May - 3 Jun) General Eisenhower was instructed to plan such operations in exploitation of the conquest of Sicily as would knock Italy out of the war. There was a decided possibility that the withdrawal of seven divisions from the Mediterranean might come at an awkward time, but, on the other hand, as General Marshall points out in his Report: "it was our purpose to avoid the creation in Italy of a vacuum into which the resources of the cross-Channel operation would be dissipated as the Germans had bled themselves in the North African campaign" (226).

176. Discussing the implications of the Washington Conference with General McNaughton on 12 Jun, General Nye again advanced the view that "it should be assumed that 1 Cdn Div and 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde will be returned to the U.K. in the late fall of 1943" (227). While the advantages of keeping the Canadian Army together were realized at the War Office, General McNaughton was asked to bear in mind the possible necessity of his receiving additional British divisions under command. To this General McNaughton replied that steps had been taken to place the Canadian Army on similar war establishments to those of the British Army and to co-ordinate its system of supplying stores and equipment with the War Office so that such an eventuality could be met. Although interim tasks for First Canadian Army were not discussed, General McNaughton gained the impression that the War Office had no particular task in mind for the next few months and he could thus place all his formations on a more or less equal priority for mobilization. Subsequently it was decided that an army tank brigade would be disbanded and that infantry battalions would go on the new war establishments on 1 Aug. Present mobilization priorities would be maintained but those formations not yet on the list would be brought up to 80 per cent of their strength in order to make possible unit training during the summer (228).

177. Having learned from General Nye that General Paget was now destined to command the Anglo-Canadian Army Group, General McNaughton visited the latter on 17 Jun. General Paget was to become responsible for operational plans and training while a new C.-in-C., Home Forces, General Sir Harold E. Franklyn, was being appointed to look after general administration within the United Kingdom. The Army Group, which was being given the number "21", would consist of the British Second Army, the First Canadian Army and probably a third army to be made up from divisions and miscellaneous units which would be returning from the Mediterranean (229). General Paget confirmed the understanding that the 1st Canadian Division and 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade would be included among the formations returning to the United Kingdom. He wished to have one Canadian Division trained in an assault role and it was agreed that, because of its special training and by then experience, the 1st Canadian Division could

assume such a role on its return to the United Kingdom. General Paget said that the outline plan being formulated contemplated First Canadian Army having its own assault divisions under command and that it would follow them in to enlarge the bridge-head. He was aiming for a total of five assault divisions, of which two would probably be American, but the great difficulty was shortage of landing craft.

178. General Paget had hoped to get the British divisions of 1st Corps concentrated for assault training but the C.I.G.S. had just told him the day before (16 Jun) that this training would first have to be given to a further Canadian division to meet a possible further commitment in North Africa (see paras 124 - 128). General McNaughton replied that he was naming the 3rd Canadian Division for such a role "BRIMSTONE") but that, following the return of the 1st Canadian Division, it would revert to being a normal infantry division. In the training of the 3rd Canadian Division with the British 1st Corps, General Paget agreed that the Beach Groups would be British and that the 79th Armoured Division should furnish D.D. tanks and crews. Due to the limitations imposed by the manpower ceiling, General McNaughton was doubtful whether a Beach Group could be formed later from Canadian sources.

179. General Paget intended to use mixed corps in the large scale exercises being planned for the autumn and asked what had been done to give 1st Canadian Corps Headquarters experience in the handling of armoured formations. General McNaughton replied that he was planning to regroup his armour between the two corps; in this connection he envisaged the 2nd Canadian Division and 5th Canadian Armoured Division grouped under command of Headquarters 1st Canadian Corps while the 4th Canadian Armoured Division and 2nd Canadian Army Tank Brigade would be under command of the 2nd Canadian Corps. The latter headquarters would be responsible for any planning required within the next few months (230).

180. On 19 Jun, however, General Kennedy (D.M.O.) cautioned General McNaughton that, though the present intention was to return the 1st Canadian Division and 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade to the United Kingdom in the autumn, "plans were necessarily indefinite, as what was done would depend on the development of the strategical situation" (231). It had been agreed at the "TRIDENT" Conference that strategic plans would be reviewed at the end of July or in early August.

EXERCISE "STARKEY"

181. In addition to planning for forthcoming assault operations the C.O.S.S.A.C. Planners were also faced with the necessity of providing a "deception" scheme extending over the whole summer of 1943, with a view to pinning down German forces in Western Europe, and plans for an unopposed return to the Continent ("reverse Dunkirk") in the event of a German disintegration. Both these latter projects were closely linked with the preparations under way for a 1944 Operation "OVERLORD", as has been already seen, but some mention might be made specifically here of the "deception" schemes, in particular the part proposed for First Canadian Army in Exercise "STARKEY".

182. By the end of May the "deception plans" evolved by C.O.S.S.A.C. envisaged three "feints" designed to pin down enemy troops and bring on air battles with a view to crippling the strength of German fighter aircraft (232):

- (a) Against NORWAY which is being studied in co-operation with SCOTTISH Command.
- (b) Against BISCAY COAST which is entirely an AMERICAN effort.
- (c) Against PAS DE CALAIS which would be staged from S.E. ENGLAND.

It was argued that in addition to being good for public morale the implementation of "deception plans" and their subsequent cancellation would raise the spirits of the troops, even when told that the invasion had been called off because the "enemy coastal defences had not been sufficiently softened." On 11 Jun the C.O.S.S.A.C. Planners were told that the first paper prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee on tendencies towards a German collapse had contained "nothing very definite". Although it stated that Allied bombing had produced considerable physical strain there was "no evidence of panic in the badly-raided areas"(233).

183. On 24 Jun Exercise "STARKEY" was explained to General McNaughton and Brigadier Foulkes (B.G.S.) during the course of a conference on "deception exercises" conducted by Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory (A.O.C.-in-C., Fighter Command).^x The object was to focus enemy attention on the Pas-de-Calais area and to endeavour to gauge the effect of air bombing on coast defences, batteries and other defence installations (234). From a week before the designated D Day large forces of bombers and fighters, concentrated in Kent, would undertake "round the clock" attacks on coastal installations, focal points, railway junctions and other suitable targets. Two old battleships and accompanying destroyers would continue the bombardment on D Day to make the enemy believe that invasion was actually pending. To heighten the illusion, barges, landing craft and cross-Channel shipping would be concentrated; the military part of the scheme would take the form of a First Canadian Army concentration in Kent, with camps, dumps, and M.T. parks being set up. In the second part of the scheme - if the enemy "cracked" - First Canadian Army and 83 Group R.A.F. would cross the Channel in any type of craft and occupy the coastline.

184. Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory was trying to rush things, however, for First Canadian Army did not have the facilities to take over Kent area from the existing 12 Corps, and, by September, it probably would have only three divisions and an army tank brigade available for such a role. Furthermore, should it land on the Continent and not be adequately reinforced by all the resources in the United Kingdom, there was the distinct probability that a German counter-attack would roll it back into the sea. General McNaughton pointed out that any return to the Continent in connection with Exercise "STARKEY" should be co-ordinated at a higher level with the main plan of Exercise "RANKIN" (return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration). General Turner informed him later, however, that there was no intention of proceeding with "RANKIN" as part of "STARKEY". If it became advisable actually to land on the Continent as a result of German disintegration, the

^x Subsequently appointed C.-in-C., Allied Expeditionary Air Force.

Operation would be directed and controlled on a higher level (235). Thus it was only on 7 Jul that the Naval and Air Force Staffs commenced detailed planning of this "feint operation" at Stanmore; it was not possible for the 21 Army Planners to get started until somewhat later (236).

185. The Air phase of "STARKEY" was carried out during late August and early September at the time when military formations were engaged in Exercise "HARLEQUIN"^x, but bad flying weather adversely affected the reaction of the German Air Force which it had been hoped would have appeared in more strength.^{xx} Certain lessons were learned, however, and experience gained in handling Resistance Groups and controlling the British press (238).

VISIT TO NORTH AFRICA

186. During General Montgomery's visit to the United Kingdom in May 1943, the Canadian Army Commander had discussed with him the possibility of visiting the Middle East in order to observe at first hand the arrangements made for the administration of the Canadian component of Operation "HUSKY". Subsequently, General McNaughton gained the concurrence of the C.I.G.S. to make such a visit. Then on 17 Jun General Stuart had telegraphed from Ottawa his desire to witness the conduct of a combined operation. Further approval was obtained from the C.I.G.S. for General Stuart to accompany General McNaughton and the visit was cleared with General Eisenhower who replied that he would be glad to see them on or around 8 Jul for about a week (239). The party left England by air on 7 Jul and reached A.F.H.Q., Algiers, the following evening. Main Headquarters, 15 Army Group, was visited the day (10 Jul) the operation went in and, in the next few days, a number of visits were made, including a personal interview with General Eisenhower. On its arrival at Malta on 15 Jul the Canadian party was informed by General Alexander that the Eighth Army Commander had turned down a request for it to visit Sicily "owing to the shortage of transport". In this connection, it would appear that General Montgomery had originally desired the visit to take place during the course of the Operation rather than just as it was getting under way (240). General Stuart's telegram of 17 Jun to General McNaughton:

It is important for reasons of which you are aware that I should obtain first hand information in the conduct of combined operations. Consequently I am anxious to proceed to North Africa as an observer for about one week or ten days

had put a somewhat different complexion on the matter. He stayed on and subsequently spent a few days in Sicily. General

^x Exercise "HARLEQUIN" was designed to test arrangements for passing troops designed for overseas enterprises through concentration and assembly areas to embarkation points.

^{xx} One of the major objects of Operation "POINTBLANK" - the all-out bombing effort against Germany - was to make the Luftwaffe fighters take the air and be destroyed; a successful "OVERLORD" depended on Allied Air Supremacy (237).

McNaughton felt, however, that he could not spare any further time away from his duties in England, and after inspecting a number of administrative installations in North Africa flew back, arriving at Prestwick on 20 Jul. For him, the journey had been a disappointment.

187. When this incident was discussed with the C.I.G.S. on 21 Jul General McNaughton did not find a sympathetic listener; indeed the former mentioned a similar instance in which Field Marshal Smuts had been asked to forego visiting South African troops during the North African campaign. General Brooke was inclined to ignore the special circumstances surrounding General McNaughton as Senior Combatant Officer of the Canadian Army Overseas and the importance of his visiting Canadian troops during their first campaign. The C.I.G.S. went on to speak of General McNaughton's efforts to keep the Canadian Army together, mentioning Exercise "VICTOR"; thus General Brooke had been influenced against proposing participation in operations which would involve only a portion of the Canadian Army (241). In turn, General McNaughton felt it necessary to remind the C.I.G.S. that he had taken up every opportunity offered for the employment of even a portion of the Canadian Army.

RETENTION OF THE CANADIAN ARMY

188. On 16 Jul General Morgan had been able to inform his C.O.S.S.A.C. staff that the outline Invasion Plan for "OVERLORD" had been submitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee on the previous day. Also, during the previous week he had been assured by Mr. Henry Stimson, U.S. Secretary for War, that Germany was still accepted as the main enemy to be dealt with first, and that it was felt in Washington that this could best be done by invading North West Europe rather than by further operations based on the Mediterranean (242). Furthermore, the time had now come when C.O.S.S.A.C. must be considered as an executive rather than a mere planning organization. The Naval and Air Force staffs were already in existence and the military would have to implement its side of the picture. General Morgan also mentioned that agreement had been reached with the Joint Planning Staff on the question of the operational line to be pursued in the event of German disintegration; the latter organization was submitting a memorandum to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (see para 231). In any event, the Chiefs of Staff had already directed that plans for re-entry into Norway should be proceeded with, irrespective of whether signs of German disintegration became visible. Speaking on 23 Jul General Morgan added that the most urgent problem now facing C.O.S.S.A.C. was planning for a return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration (Operation "RANKIN").

189. On his return to the United Kingdom from Sicily General Stuart once again raised the question of further Canadian participation in the Mediterranean, aimed at gaining experience for a further division and a corps headquarters. To go back somewhat, to 6 May, when Operation "BRIMSTONE" (invasion of Sardinia) was once again being considered by the War Office and A.F.H.Q. and there was the possibility of a further division being required from the United Kingdom.^x The B.G.S., C.M.H.Q., was then

x Due to the length of time considered necessary to sweep the minefields between North Africa and Sicily the Italian Admiralty expected Sardinia to be invaded first. Following the capture of certain British documents Hitler became convinced of such a course and thus Sicily was ill-prepared to meet the assault of 10 Jul. On the other hand, the Duce and Italian military leaders had held that Sicily was the greater danger point (243).

approached by General Galloway (D.S.D., War Office) regarding the state of training and availability of the 3rd Canadian Division for an operation based on North Africa. It was made clear, however, that this division would be employed entirely separately from the 1st Canadian Division and that there was no possibility of employing a Canadian Corps. General McNaughton therefore despatched a warning telegram to the C.G.S., making the following comment:

I must point out and warn you that if this request is made and accepted it will end the conception on which we have been proceeding namely that Canada's contribution to the War could best be through her own army (244).

190. It was learned the next day that the project was "very definitely cooling" and General McNaughton was never officially approached (245). General Stuart's telegram in reply raised another point, however:

In view of probability of further request I assume you will be exploring with Troopers the possibility if request met of grouping our 2 divisions and ancillary troops in one operation under Canadian Corps HQ. I appreciate that the C-in-C might prefer to place each of our divisions in experienced British Corps with prospect of grouping later. On the other hand our Corps HQ need battle experience as much as our divisions and while dispersion if necessary is accepted on the principle we have all along expressed there are obvious reasons for minimizing dispersion if feasible by keeping together the components selected for field force. We would appreciate your views in this connection.

... It would appear that there is not much likelihood of the Canadian Army as a whole being employed in 1943. I cannot see that the employment of approximately 1 Corps in Africa this year would necessarily prevent the employment of the Army as a whole in 1944 (246).

On 9 May General McNaughton cabled that the request was now unlikely but that he had intended to put forward General Stuart's suggestion to group the two divisions under a Canadian corps headquarters "if circumstances warranted." The following warning note was, however, added:

I think you will agree that if a corps of two divs plus ancillaries were positioned in Africa during 1943 it is very unlikely that they could be brought back to North West Europe for 1944. Time, space and shipping would be determining factors (247).

191. Then on 27 Jul, in an effort to learn what further plans were pending, General Stuart accompanied the Canadian Army Commander on a visit to C.O.S.S.A.C. General Morgan pointed out that the 1944 presidential election might have considerable influence on United States policy, which was based on an implementation of Operation "OVERLORD". British policy, however, seemed to favour the mounting of further operations in the Mediterranean. It was still possible to mount Operation "OVERLORD" from the United Kingdom by a target date of 1 May 44 but the complete resources of both Great Britain and the United States would have to be directed to such an end. Personally, General Morgan was not entirely confident that preparations could be completed by that date and was

inclined to agree with General McNaughton that the target date might well be not before 1 Sep 44 (248).

192. General Morgan spoke further, when questioned, of a possible "adverse effect on Anglo-American co-operation" should additional Canadian formations be despatched to the Mediterranean from the United Kingdom (see para 207). Such an action might not be detrimental if Canadian troops were sent out in exchange for British divisions. The Canadian C.G.S. again raised the importance of Canadian divisions obtaining battle experience; if further operations were to be conducted in the Mediterranean, the Canadian Government felt that an additional division and a corps headquarters should be provided from the First Canadian Army. If the target date was to be as late as seemed to be indicated (1 Sep 44), it would probably be possible to re-assemble First Canadian Army in the United Kingdom in time for "OVERLORD". In general, the future seemed so indefinite that General Stuart was prompted to venture the remark that "C.C.S.S.A.C. plans seemed to be based more on political than military considerations" (249).

193. Two days later the Hon. J.L. Ralston arrived in the United Kingdom by air, and, in company with the C.G.S., visited Army Headquarters for lunch. In addition to discussions with Generals McNaughton and Stuart, the Minister of National Defence also had short conversations with General F.E. Morgan and Air Vice Marshal Dickson. During the more personal talks it seemed evident to General McNaughton that both the Minister of National Defence and the C.G.S. evidenced a strong desire to see the Canadian Forces in the Mediterranean built up to the strength of a corps, by exchanging Canadian for British divisions, even if there was no certainty that they could later be brought back to the United Kingdom. The C.G.S. pointed out that in such an event the Army Headquarters would be redundant as an operational command and that it might be combined with C.M.H.Q. to form a static headquarters for administering all Canadian troops in the European and North African theatres (250). On the other hand, if First Canadian Army were held in the United Kingdom for Operation "OVERLORD", which might be as late getting under way as 1 Sep 44, it would mean another long wait - unless Operation "RANKIN" should prove to be a reality.

194. General McNaughton gave warning of the political implications which might result should the First Canadian Army disappear. The shipping situation would likely improve, however, and make it possible to have formations returned from North Africa in time for participation in a 1944 "OVERLORD". Thus First Canadian Army might still serve as an entity. His memorandum of this discussion states his own position as being strictly impersonal:

... He would advocate and support the course which he considered right for the most effective contribution to winning the war, now and for Canada thereafter, even if it meant the disappearance of the Army and the operation of a number of separate Canadian contingents scattered over the globe. In consequence, what he would say on this matter must not be taken as any special pleading. Without this assurance, he would not feel inclined to make any statement whatever. He then reminded the Minister and C.G.S. that every step forward in the development of Cdn Forces in the U.K. had been taken on the advice and suggestions of the British authorities. These proposals he had supported because in the light of existing

/circumstances

circumstances at the time he had felt them to be sound and proper to the best contribution which Canada could make to the winning of the war. Neither the Minister nor the C.G.S. questioned the correctness of these decisions (251).

195. Doing away with the Canadian Army would be no economy, as had been suggested, for all its units were required to meet F.F.C. Plan No. 36 (see para 170). Should the First Canadian Army Headquarters be dissolved it would be necessary to form a further British army headquarters. As it was, Second Army was considerably less advanced in training than First Canadian Army. General McNaughton went on to doubt the reality of the 21 Army Group set-up, which he felt might be a "facade", although he had received repeated assurances that it and F.F.C. 36 represented a "real and firm intention" and that if necessary British divisions would be provided for the Canadian Army. Even now, however, the British commitment for 21 Army Group was short 88,000 - just under the commitment for the "tail" of First Canadian Army.

196. General McNaughton went on to point out that if the American strategical view, "backed by predominantly strong forces", should prevail, Canadian divisions exchanged for British divisions in North Africa would sit there on garrison duty in an inactive theatre. No one would be any further ahead. He felt himself that a Canadian Corps in the Mediterranean would be a useful contribution should operations continue to develop there. There should be an agreement, however, that the Canadian Force be returned to the United Kingdom if the decisive attack against Germany was to be launched from there.

197. General Stuart spoke of having to "gamble" on the "probability that the British view of continuing in the Mediterranean would prevail". General McNaughton urged that the Minister of National Defence and C.G.S. go to Washington and insist on taking part in the formulation of strategical policy. To this Mr. Ralston was forced to reply that the existing position was "contribution without representation" and that it was impossible to gain entry into the higher political councils in Washington. It was finally agreed that Mr. Ralston should attempt to get some indication of future plans from Prime Minister Churchill before returning to Canada.

198. During his visit to the Mediterranean, General Stuart appears to have discussed the matter with Generals Eisenhower and Alexander who seemed agreeable to a further Canadian division being despatched to replace an existing British formation in the Mediterranean (252). Then on 3 Aug the Minister of National Defence and General Stuart took up the question with the C.I.G.S., together with that of the retention of First Canadian Army itself. General Brooke replied that, should one of the Canadian Corps move elsewhere, he could not see the need for an army headquarters remaining in the United Kingdom (253). The C.I.G.S. went on to state that conditions had changed since the time when a decision had been given to approve the formation of a First Canadian Army and, if asked to give an opinion for the Canadian Government now, he would recommend its abandonment.

199. The substance of this conversation was given to General McNaughton on the morning of 5 Aug. Mr. Ralston denied that the despatch of a complete corps to the Mediterranean necessarily implied the break-up of First Canadian Army, but rather that the sole purpose was to gain battle experience for more troops and senior officers. Thereupon General McNaughton agreed that such a step need not necessarily mean the break-up of the army, provided that the Canadian formations were returned in time for

an "OVERLORD". General McNaughton impressed on the Minister that the "important thing for Canada at the end of the war was to have her Army under comd of a Canadian" (254). He would be glad to develop the G.O.C. 1st Canadian Corps through battle experience and then let him take his place as Army Commander. After all, an Army in being would be a "more real measure of the weight which would be attached to the voice of a country" at the peace conference. Nothing definite could be said in the way of advising the Canadian Cabinet, however, until the forthcoming global strategical plan became known.

200. On the afternoon of Saturday, 7 Aug, a few hours before he was due to fly back to Canada, the Minister of National Defence informed General McNaughton that the forthcoming Conference to decide on future strategy would be held at Quebec instead of Washington. This did not mean, however, that Canada would have any intimate relation with the proceedings other than as host; Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt, with their staffs, would control the conference ("QUADRANT") but no doubt the Canadian Government would be informed of the day-to-day decisions (255). No decision regarding the despatch of further Canadians to the Mediterranean was possible until after the decisions of the Quebec Conference but meantime arrangements had to be made to continue to reinforce the 1st Canadian Division and 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade. Both Generals McNaughton and Kennedy (D.M.C., War Office) agreed that plans still should be based on the assumption that the Canadian Force would be returning to the United Kingdom by November (256).

201. As indicated, the Canadian Prime Minister and Chiefs of Staff did not participate in the discussions at Quebec during the days 12 - 21 Aug, but the general outline of the proceedings and the conclusion arrived at were gleaned by General Pope as a result of personal conversations with members of the British Joint Staff Mission who had proceeded from Washington to assist the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The following information is, therefore, taken from the Report which General Pope submitted to Prime Minister Mackenzie King and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff (257).

202. The same pull had gone on as at previous conferences. The British were keen to pursue the enemy to the farthest limits of the Italian peninsula while the Americans thought that any diversion from "OVERLORD" was neglect of the primary object - defeat of Germany.^x The British Chiefs of Staff had never been

^x As viewed by the German Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, the implementation of the British policy in the Mediterranean had the following result:

The Axis powers' loss of the Mediterranean war freed Britain from danger in the Middle East and so made possible the allied landing in Italy and the breaking of the Italian ally. The German position was therefore worsened, both from the standpoint of geography and deployment of her forces. It was these operations alone that enabled the Allies to make their decisive attack against the German fortress in Europe. However heavy the Russian pressure in the East, the additional weakening of the German forces on the Western Front in Europe decided the war.

Without the Mediterranean positions secured, the British Command would, however, not have had the freedom from movement in its rear, and the forces to spare to carry out a landing in France. The loss of the Mediterranean was therefore the turning-point of the war. The importance of this position and the effect it could have on the whole war, was not recognized by the German Command, although there was no lack of representations and warnings on this matter (258).

hopeful of an early all-out assault on North West Europe:

... They have never felt that the combined Commonwealth - United States land forces could successfully challenge the more or less unbroken strength of the German Army. They have long held that this desired end, in the main, must and would be brought about by the Russians. In the meantime their strategy has been to weaken the European Axis wherever opportunity could be found - or made. In no other way could Russia be afforded effective aid. The events of the last nine months had gone far in this direction...

They were just as anxious as their American colleagues to finish off Hitler, which could be done only by an assault against North West Europe, but they realized that over-precipitate action would result in costly failure. Thus the day should be held off until Russian pressure from the east and the mounting bombing offensive had commenced to disintegrate the German will and ability to resist. The elimination of Italy would further strain Germany's limited resources, tie up additional divisions in the Balkans and "make the contemplated cross-Channel operation a matter of practical politics." As General Pope saw it, military plans must be flexible:

In this perhaps is to be found the greatest point of difference between the British and American military minds. The former hold that war is an art subject to broad principles rather than a science constrained by hard and fast rule. The United States High Command on the other hand appear always to be loath to vary a programme or scheme of things laid down and agreed, on a previous occasion. Neglect to adhere to the Trident Conference plans they argued during the opening days of the Conference, might well cause us to lose the war. On their side, the British maintained that neglect to alter both pace and direction in order to take quick advantage of a favourable opening, such as, for example, the rapid disintegration of Italian military strength, was perhaps the surest way of failing to ensure victory.

203. The Conference finally agreed that Italy should be occupied to a line Florence - Pisa, from which the Floesti oilfields and southern Germany could be brought under air attack. The British further hoped to replace the three divisions which were being returned to the United Kingdom from the Mediterranean so that General Eisenhower's forces would not be left short-handed. They also felt that "OVERLORD" would not be possible before 1 Sep 44, if then, but no word of this was allowed to reach the ears of American Joint Chiefs of Staff. Should there be a repetition of 1918, however, the Allies must be ready and able to exploit German disintegration.

204. On paper, at least, the preliminary plans for "OVERLORD" as submitted by General F.E. Morgan were approved and C.O.S.S.A.C. was directed to proceed with more detailed planning (259).

OPERATION "TIMBERWOLF": THE DECISION TO FORM
A CANADIAN CORPS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

205. Meantime, on 18 Aug, General McNaughton had set out for North Africa with Brigadier Walford (D.A. & Q.M.G. First Canadian Army) on an invitation from General Alexander to visit Canadian troops in action. On 20 Aug they had conversations with Generals Eisenhower and Gale (Chief Administrative Officer) at A.F.H.Q. regarding the possible development of Canadian participation to corps strength should it be decided that the Mediterranean theatre of operations would be remaining active (260). On the following day General McNaughton's party reached 15 Army Group Headquarters in Sicily, in time for lunch, and then spent the next two days visiting units of the 1st Canadian Division and 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade. On the 24th he visited General Dempsey at 13 Corps and went on to have dinner and spend the night with General Montgomery. The latter said that the Canadians had done well: "they had been well trained but had lacked battle experience", which had been given them by the Eighth Army (261). He spoke very highly of General Simonds but said he should be taken back to the United Kingdom and given an armoured division: "it was most important that promising comds should have experience both with inf and armour; then they would be really good if they became corps comds" (see para 210). He went so far as to advocate that 25 per cent of the Canadian Force should be exchanged with troops in the United Kingdom, starting within the next few weeks. Subsequently arrangements were made to have 250 battle experienced personnel sent back to the United Kingdom on the 3 Sep draft, and a larger number on the following drafts. The necessary action was also taken to convert the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade into an armoured brigade (less motor battalion) on Middle East establishments. On the morning of 27 Aug the party started back by air on their return trip to the United Kingdom.

206. As a result of the Quebec Conference, on 1 Sep, the War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet proposed directly to Prime Minister Churchill that the Canadian force in the Mediterranean should be built up to the strength of a Corps. Mr. Churchill had thereupon cabled from Washington for the War Office to investigate all possible ramifications of such a step; upon receipt of its report, he then proposed to take up the question with the United States Government and, if appropriate, with the Canadian Government (262).

207. In the absence of the C.I.G.S., General McNaughton arranged to see General Nye on 2 Sep; the latter advised that the present plan was to withdraw eventually seven divisions from the Mediterranean - three British and four American; two further British armoured divisions were standing by in the Middle East to go to the support of Turkey should she be persuaded to enter the war (263). General Nye pointed out that if an additional Canadian division were despatched to the Mediterranean it would mean that one less American division could be despatched to either the United Kingdom or to the South Pacific, since all movement had to be governed by global allocation of shipping. It was considered therefore that the result would be the deployment of one less division against the enemy in 1944.^x The V.C.I.G.S.

x The fallacy of such an argument is exposed in para 212.

further advised General McNaughton that, should it be considered necessary to despatch an additional Canadian division to the Mediterranean, the War Office would favour the building up of a complete Canadian Corps, with basic corps troops. Such a corps of two Canadian divisions would have to be considered "more or less a permanent commitment" as it was "highly improbable that shipping would be available in time for it to return to the U.K. by the target date of 1 May 44, and unlikely for operations by 1 Sep 44" (264). It was estimated that the Germans had 16 - 18 divisions in Italy and that, after the withdrawal of seven allied divisions, General Eisenhower's command could not be further reduced. Thus to withdraw the Canadian Corps later would necessitate its replacement by two British divisions from the United Kingdom (see para 269).

208. General McNaughton's query as to what type of division would be required elicited the answer "infantry", as there was already more armour in the Mediterranean area than was "appropriate". The Canadian Army Commander then commented that this would leave but two armoured divisions, an assault infantry division and an armoured brigade in the United Kingdom. General Nye replied "most emphatically" that this would not effect First Canadian Army as it was "very probable" that British formations would be placed under command; disbanding First Canadian Army would be very unwise since it was in a much more advanced stage of training and organization than the British Second Army (265).

209. During the course of a conversation with General McNaughton on 14 Sep the C.I.G.S. reiterated the same difficulties to building up a Canadian Corps in the Mediterranean. He added that the 1st Canadian Division was not being included in the three British divisions scheduled for return to the United Kingdom (266). General McNaughton thereupon asked whether this decision would hold good into the late spring of 1944, to which the C.I.G.S. replied that the 1st Canadian Division might be considered for return as eighth division, "if circumstances required the move of an additional div over the seven" (see para 268). General Brooke also implied that the target date set at 1 May 44 for "OVERLORD" was a bit premature; both on account of "build-up" and the state of the weather in North West Europe and the Channel either 1 Jun or 1 Jul 44 would be a more realistic date. In any event, it was agreed that the Canadian Army programme should continue as already planned - to complete the development and training of its formations with a view to participation in an assault on North West Europe.

210. This decision was referred to Ottawa but, barely two days later, on 16 Sep, General Stuart sent the following telegram to General McNaughton:

External Affairs have despatched wire to Massey asking him to convey to Mr. Churchill personally a message from Minister which was discussed with Prime Minister asking that further, and it is hoped favourable, consideration be given to formulating arrangements to make despatch possible (267).

General McNaughton discussed the matter with Mr. Massey but as late as 29 Sep the possibility of despatching another division and corps headquarters to the Mediterranean seemed so remote that General Stuart cabled, suggesting that the Army Commander once again take up the question of replacing General Simonds in order to give

battle experience to a further commander.*

211. On the following day, however, Mr. Churchill was visited by Mr. Massey who, ignoring the fact that on 19 Sep the British Prime Minister had sent a negative reply to the Canadian request for the despatch of a further division to the Mediterranean, asked whether this decision might now be re-considered. According to the Canadian High Commissioner, Mr. Churchill replied, "I will have another try", and had stated that he would get an early decision from the Chiefs of Staff Committee (269). This information was conveyed to Ottawa, and on 4 Oct the High Commissioner wrote to Prime Minister Churchill; conveying a later message from the Canadian Prime Minister:

The Cabinet War Committee have considered your telegram No. 143 of September 19th. We all deeply regret outcome of our representations and only hope, for the reasons conveyed to you by me in London and reiterated at the two meetings of the War Committee in Quebec, that the possibilities mentioned in your paragraph 3 may develop in such a way as to make project for employment eventually possible.

We should be very grateful if you would let us know if it would be of assistance to you in trying to arrange the matter to have us mention the project and the reasons therefor to the United States authorities to ascertain their reaction. They have been most understanding with us in connection with matters of this kind, particularly special service force and Kiska.

We fully realize that this does not bulk large in the overall strategy. We know you do appreciate, however, that it does affect our Army generally and particularly the potential usefulness of our troops overseas, both in units and staffs. We are sure you appreciate, too, that they have carried out faithfully the allotted, but trying, tasks of defence of Britain and that we are concerned to do everything which may help to ensure that they are prepared as completely as possible for the offensive when it comes. We feel that this project would be of great value for this purpose (270).

212. On 7 Oct, the C.I.G.S. told General McNaughton that the project might be acceptable if the Prime Minister gave his approval (271). The War Office had re-examined the Canadian proposal on the basis of an exchange of personnel only - which would not involve any additional shipping. It was intended

* On 30 Aug General McNaughton had despatched a telegram to the C.G.S. suggesting that General Montgomery's recommendation of withdrawing General Simonds after the start of the next operation and sending him back to the United Kingdom to gain experience commanding an armoured division be followed (see para 205). There was no criticism of General Simonds but it was felt that he needed a rest and a change. The matter had been discussed with General Crerar, who was anxious to obtain battle experience and who would be willing to serve as a divisional commander under General Dempsey, although senior to him. The question was taken up with the C.I.G.S. who had suggested, however, that no change should be made at the moment (268).

to return to the United Kingdom the 50th and 51st Divisions and the 1st Airborne Division. In order to enable "six year" men to be returned home it was now intended to bring back also the 7th Armoured Division, 30th Corps Headquarters and its corps troops. General Brooke had proposed to the Prime Minister that a Canadian corps headquarters, corps troops and a division could be despatched to replace these latter, taking over the equipment already available in the theatre. In view of the fact that to send an infantry division would leave only a Canadian Corps of two armoured and one infantry divisions in the United Kingdom it seemed preferable to both the C.I.G.S. and General McNaughton that the 5th Canadian Armoured Division should be despatched. General McNaughton now nominated General Crerar and 1st Canadian Corps Headquarters; corps troops up to shipping capacity should be selected from the 1st Canadian Corps. The 5th Canadian Armoured Division could take over Sherman tanks available in the theatre, provided they were equipped with 75-mm guns. As regards mechanical transport, a proportion of Canadian vehicles were already being despatched to the Mediterranean; as that theatre was "coming on to American type" and all British - American equipment was being pooled, General McNaughton agreed that the Canadians could use American models (272).

213. After surmising that the Canadian Government would concur in his selection of formations and units to proceed to the Mediterranean, General McNaughton asked what would be the future of First Canadian Army. In England, there would be remaining the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry Divisions, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade, 2nd Canadian Corps Headquarters and corps troops, plus those not leaving with the 1st Canadian Corps, a comprehensive quota of army troops and an Army Headquarters. General Brooke replied that no decision could be made until after a Supreme Commander had been appointed - which would be very soon. He referred, however, to a plan being put forward by C.O.S.S.A.C., calling for one British Army of three corps in the assault rather than two armies.

214. When this information was referred to Ottawa, authority was sent back to go ahead with arrangements, pending a definite decision from Prime Minister Churchill. General McNaughton thereupon despatched a telegram to the C.G.S. expressing the following personal opinion:

This being so and the decision now having been taken by the Canadian authority competent to decide the policy, I find that there is nothing more in fact or opinion which I can usefully add now (273).

Meanwhile a meeting of senior officers had been called at C.M.H.Q. on 8 Oct to settle the administrative details of the move, which subsequently was given the code name "TIMBERWOLF".^{*} The Army Commander announced that the intention was to build up a balanced corps in the Middle East, consisting of the 1st Canadian Division, 5th Canadian Armoured Division, 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade, an A.G.R.A. of one field and three medium artillery regiments, hospitals to scale and rear echelon units as required. The scale of reinforcements provided was to remain at two months' "intense" rates. Responsibility for

^{*} An account of the movement of 1st Canadian Corps to the Mediterranean is contained in Report No. 170, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 10 Feb 47.

equipping the 1st Canadian Corps would rest with A.F.H.Q. and for security cover, the move was to be considered as a staff study. Plans called for "TIMBERWOLF" Force to proceed direct to Catania (Sicily) and take over there from 30th Corps. When, on 12 Oct, the British Government made an official request for the employment of further Canadian troops in the Mediterranean, the War Committee of the Canadian Cabinet immediately signified its acceptance (274).

215. When it had been decided that the battle experienced 7th Armoured Division was required in the United Kingdom to take part in Operation "OVERLORD", General Alexander had made plans to have it replaced by personnel of the 1st Armoured Division, which had seen no action since the close of the Tunisian campaign. It was not until 13 Oct that General Alexander learned from a War Office signal to A.F.H.Q., repeated to 15 Army Group, that the Chiefs of Staff Committee had decided to exchange a Canadian Armoured Division for the 7th Armoured Division (275). This signal pointed out that such a step would meet the Canadian desire to form a Canadian Corps in the Mediterranean and it was believed that its implications on the build-up for "OVERLORD" would be "negligible".

216. General Alexander immediately objected to A.F.H.Q. that "he already had in the Mediterranean as much armour as could be usefully employed in Italy and would have preferred another infantry division" (276). He further protested that he had not been consulted on a proposal "which must vitally affect his order of battle and plan of campaign." It was impossible in the near future to find employment for a further corps headquarters; moreover, the existence of a Canadian corps headquarters was also liable "to affect the flexibility desirable to the employment of divisions" (277). The War Office replied that the possible military disadvantages were outweighed by other considerations which made it advantageous to have a complete Canadian Corps operating in the Mediterranean; moreover, it had not been possible to give the customary warning for such a step. On 19 Oct, therefore, General Eisenhower advised the Chiefs of Staff by telegram that the movement of Canadians to the Mediterranean Theatre could be accepted in the shipping already scheduled to move British and United States divisions to the United Kingdom. The telegram went on to comment, however, that:

While the arrival of these troops at this time is likely to cause us considerable embarrassment General Alexander advises me, and I agree, that, appreciating the political considerations which may be involved, we accept the Canadian Corps Headquarters, Armoured Division and non-divisional troops. In view of our total build-up we shall eventually be glad to have this HQ.

The aspect which causes me most concern is the pressure I anticipate will be put upon me to get these troops into action at an early date. I cannot guarantee to do this because:

First, the equipment being released in Sicily by 30 Corps and 50 and 51 British Divisions is already heavily depleted and almost fully mortgaged as reserves for the British forces now engaged on the mainland, who are already drawing upon this supply almost as fast as it can be moved up to them. We are already importing equipment as fast as port capacity will allow and

/this

this equipment is earmarked for formations and units already in this theatre. Even on the existing programme we have a shipping backlog which is likely to take many weeks to clear. The additional commitment for re-equipping the Cdns can not therefore be met by additional shipments which would remain in the ports undischarged.

Second, a large proportion of the non-divisional troops will have to be disembarked in North Africa for administrative reasons, and will necessarily have to take a low priority in the long lists of units to be transported overseas to Italy, since these priorities must be determined strictly on an operational basis. For example, we are now moving forward elements to complete units already in the field, service troops to operate the lengthening L of C and will shortly begin large scale movement of the Strategic Air Force whose medium bombers are now operating at extreme range.

Third, the equipment of 7 Armoured Division does not correspond with that of Cdn Armd Div and a period of training will be essential to accustom the Cdns to new types. This applies particularly to wireless equipment.

I have elaborated these points because I would like it made clear in advance that necessarily there will be considerable delay in equipping the Cdns and in bringing them into action (278).

217. On 21 Oct the Chiefs of Staff informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington that:

We are prepared to accept unavoidable delay in bringing Canadians into action. Position will be explained to C.M.H.Q. Eisenhower will not release personnel of 7 Armoured Division until operational situation permits (279).

General McNaughton discussed the discouraging equipment situation with General Weeks (D.C.I.G.S.) who subsequently flew out to Algiers to study the picture at close quarters.

218. Meanwhile, with the campaign continuing and no steps being taken to withdraw the Canadian Force from Southern Italy, General Simonds had queried the Eighth Army Commander and then General McNaughton (by telegram) as to future policy (280). General McNaughton immediately replied that the present operations were still "within Directive"; that 15th Army Group should by now be fully informed about Operation "TIMBERWOLF";* that General Crerar was proceeding by air to the Mediterranean with a new Directive; and that Brigadier Beament who was going out to take over a new appointment of O.i/c Cdn Section, 1st Echelon, would deal with other points (including scale of reinforcements) raised by General Simonds (282). On 20 Oct, General McNaughton signed a Directive that all Canadian troops serving in the Mediterranean should be considered as under the command of General Crerar, and an order of

* On 16 Oct, however, General McNaughton received a telegram from General Montgomery stating: "Have never heard of Timberwolf..." (281).

Detail (No. 8), placing the troops which would comprise the 1st Canadian Corps in the Mediterranean "in combination" with "all the Naval, Military and Air Forces of the several parts of the British Commonwealth and serving in or based upon or operating from the Continent of Africa or embarked in the United Kingdom for the purpose of any such service." The Order further directed that "they shall so act upon their embarkation in the United Kingdom until I, or any of the other appropriate Canadian service authorities named in the said designation of the Minister of National Defence of Canada of 29 Apr 43, shall otherwise direct..." (283). General Crerar, and the commander of any force detached from him, would continue to enjoy the right of reference through General McNaughton to the Government of Canada "in respect of any matter in which the forces under your comd are, or are likely to be, involved or committed or on any question of their adm which may require correction" (284).

219. General Crerar's party proceeded by air and on 29 Oct he visited General Montgomery^x at the latter's tactical headquarters at Campomarino, south of Termoli; the Eighth Army Commander forecast a re-grouping of his forces early in the New Year which would require the addition of another corps headquarters. On the following day the Canadian Corps Commander visited General Alexander who "showed himself in complete sympathy with desire of Canadian Government to bring all Cdn forces in this theatre under command H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps at earliest practicable date" (286). With effect from 1 Nov, General Simonds took over command of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division, in order to gain experience in commanding an armoured formation, and Brigadier Vokes was promoted to command the 1st Canadian Division, which he had earlier done in an acting capacity. Following the arrival of the first flight, Corps Headquarters was located in Sicily while the troops of the 5th Canadian Armoured Division settled in near Naples.

A MIXED ARMY

220. To go back somewhat, to the preparations which were continuing under the direction of C.O.S.S.A.C. for the invasion of North West Europe. Following his return from the Quebec Conference, General Morgan announced at the weekly staff meeting on 3 Sep that C.O.S.S.A.C. was now an operational headquarters. A Supreme Commander had not yet been appointed, but General Morgan's directive had been amended so as to charge him with the responsibility of preparing for the implementation of the plans which were, or might be, approved (287). In order to convert it into an operational staff, General Morgan emphasized that an early reorganization of C.O.S.S.A.C. was necessary. One other result of the "QUADRANT" Conference was that President Roosevelt had directed that a proportion of the ship-building facilities in the United States be diverted from naval and merchant vessel

x On 28 Oct General Montgomery had written the Commander, 15 Army Group, asking that General Crerar be sent to see him as soon as he arrived:

... Important point to make quite clear to him is that I cannot accept a Cdn Corps H.Q. in my Army at present and that the Corps H.Q. and Corps Troops must assemble in North Africa or Sicily and wait there until shipping and maintenance situation allow of their being brought over. 5 Cdn Armd Div can release 7 Armd Div in due course, but will be quite unable to operate as a div for some months (285).

construction to that of landing craft (288), the continued shortage of which had given all Planners much worry during the two previous years.

221. The amended Directive to C.O.S.S.A.C. had set the sphere of responsibility for the Supreme Commander (Designate) as France, the Low Countries and Denmark, and the co-ordination of effort between operations in North West Europe and the Mediterranean Theatres. As an alternative to an invasion of France, should circumstances render this impossible, plans were to be prepared for the invasion of Norway, particularly the southern portion, and the occupation of Denmark from bases in southern Norway; such operations would be based on the assumption that Sweden did not immediately enter the war (289). It had been further agreed that a Publicity and Psychological Warfare Branch should be set up and that a Visual Misdirection Committee would work with the C.O.S.S.A.C. Planners to further the work of deception. Plans for the return to the Continent in the event of German disintegration (Exercise "RANKIN") were proceeding on the basis that Germany would be divided into three zones - British, American and Russian - and that the British and United States Armies would enter the Continent by the most direct routes (see paras 230 - 237).

222. The despatch of the "TIMBERWOLF" Force seemed to have put an end to any dreams of a purely Canadian Army participating in the knock-out blow which would culminate in Berlin, and for which end the First Canadian Army had been built up.

223. On 18 Oct 43 General Paget, accompanied by his C.G.S. (Maj-Gen W.D. Morgan) visited General McNaughton to discuss the changes in Canadian Army organization which would prove necessary consequent upon the implementation of "TIMBERWOLF". Describing the present plans for the assault against North West Europe General Paget said that it had been assigned to 21 Army Group, which would be composed of an American Army, Second Army and an Anglo-Canadian Army (290). Later an American Army Group would be formed. Shortage of assault craft would be the limiting factor both in the assault and follow up phases. General Paget proposed to place the 3rd Canadian Division and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade under the command of 1st British Corps, which in turn would be under the command of the American Army detailed for the assault role. He wished the Canadians to supply a portion of the corps troops for 1st British Corps and also some of the staff for this headquarters; as the 3rd Canadian Division contained a British beach group and other ancillaries it would be necessary to have a small British element at its headquarters. These views apparently were those of General Paget, since as yet no Directive had been issued by C.O.S.S.A.C.

224. On 25 Oct General McNaughton despatched a further telegram to Ottawa based on information he had been able to obtain from Generals Paget and Weeks during a two-day visit to the School of Infantry. The C.O.S.S.A.C. Directive was ready for issuance, just as soon as the appointment of a Supreme Commander was announced. F.F.C. 36 had "ceased to have any validity as basis of plans" and a new Field Force table, based on "realistic figures" as regards British manpower, was being prepared at the War Office (291). Close liaison between 1st British Corps and the 3rd Canadian Division already had been established but General McNaughton realized that "full co-ordination" would be required:

After the most careful and impersonal review I have come to the conclusion that under the conditions which have come into existence no other course is now open but to accept Paget's proposals for the present and until the progress of the war makes possible a recollection of Cdn units and formations in a homogenous Canadian Army.

You will realize that profound changes in our system of organization will be necessary and in particular since the commander of the proposed Anglo-Canadian Army will be a subordinate of C-in-C 21 Army Gp with large numbers of British troops under comd it will not be practicable for him to discharge also the functions of Canadian Senior Combatant Officer in this theatre.

225. On the following day, therefore, the C.G.S. replied that the Minister of National Defence and he would be leaving by air to discuss General Paget's proposals with the C.I.G.S. and General McNaughton (292).

226. In order to provide the most up-to-date information for the Minister of National Defence and the C.G.S. on their arrival, General McNaughton visited the War Office on 4 Nov and had a long talk with Sir Alan Brooke regarding the fate of First Canadian Army Headquarters and its staff, which included a number of very able and well trained officers. General Brooke replied that two armies were the minimum requirement for 21 Army Group. There was neither the time nor material to create another British Army; therefore, unless the Supreme Commander (when appointed) had other ideas, General McNaughton could count on there being a definite role for First Canadian Army Headquarters (293). He added that a British Corps would be added to complete First Canadian Army.

227. The assault plan was not yet firm but General McNaughton indicated his willingness for the 3rd Canadian Division to be grouped with the British 1st Corps under General Crocker for such a purpose (294). It was agreed that the British element for Headquarters, First Canadian Army, could be limited to an "A" staff, since the problems in "G" and "Q" and the training of British and Canadian officers for them were similar. There would also need to be a small Canadian staff component at Headquarters 1st British Corps. The actual composition of such components was worked out between Generals Paget, W.D. Morgan (C.G.S., 21 Army Group) and McNaughton on 10 Nov, during the course of a conference at St. Paul's School. It was also proposed to set up a Canadian Section at G.H.Q., 1st Echelon, 21 Army Group, which would be the sole channel of communication between First Canadian Army and C.M.H.Q. Specialized Canadian units, such as 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion, and G.H.Q. and L. of C. troops which might be placed under British Command, would clear their business through the C i/c Canadian Section, G.H.Q. 1st Echelon, 21 Army Group, rather than through First Canadian Army. In general, however, General McNaughton expressed a wish to keep all engineer, transport and other special units (irrespective of classification as G.H.Q. or L. of C. units) under command of First Canadian Army since they represented merely a normal army quota.

228. On that same day (4 Nov) the Minister of National Defence and General Stuart arrived by air from Canada to discuss the future of First Canadian Army. After an inconclusive interview with General McNaughton, they visited Generals Brooke and Paget on the following day. Then to General McNaughton's surprise on 8 Nov he was informed by Mr. Ralston and the C.G.S. that, after having consulted with Generals Brooke and Paget, he was no longer found acceptable to command the Canadian Army in the field (295). This opinion was subsequently confirmed personally by General Paget. Temporary ill-health during early December made it necessary for the Army Commander to relinquish his command, with effect 26 Dec, and return to Canada with General Turner, whose position at C.O.S.S.A.C. had by now become redundant. No attempt is made in this Report to analyse the events leading to General McNaughton's resignation; this matter will be dealt with separately. As a temporary measure only, General Stuart assumed the appointments

of Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q., and Acting Army Commander.

229. The question now facing the Canadian authorities was the selection of a successor to General McNaughton. The C.I.G.S. had indicated that General Crerar might be acceptable, after further experience in Italy. But considering the difficulties in the way of equipping 1st Canadian Corps and the little likelihood that a place could be found for the Corps headquarters in an early operation, it did not appear probable that General Crerar would be able to obtain very much operational experience before it became necessary to begin the final preparations for "OVERLORD" (296). It had been suggested that a British officer might be given the appointment, since there was the previous war's precedent of Generals Alderson and Byng, but the Minister of National Defence did not consider that such a course would be acceptable to the Canadian people. Although a new name, Anglo-Canadian Army also had been broached. Mr. Ralston had held out for the retention of First Canadian Army - in name at least (297).

230. Meanwhile, General McNaughton was instructed to proceed with the reorganization of First Canadian Army along the lines tentatively approved by General Paget. The British 12th Corps^x would come under command of First Canadian Army about the middle of December (although it would participate in Exercise "LIMBER" during the second week of the month) and a British element of some 36 officers would be attached to the First Canadian Army Headquarters. War establishments for First Canadian Army would follow 21 Army Group recommendations to the War Office for Second Army, plus special increments for solely British and Canadian matters (298). The organization of the assault force was still not firm but the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade were to be grouped for training with 1st British Corps by the beginning of December. At this time, General Paget believed that 1st British Corps would comprise:

3rd Canadian Division - assault role;
3rd British Division - assault role;
49th British Division - reserve;
probably an American Division.

RANKIN CASE 'C'

231. Beginning with a hope in 1942 and continuing throughout 1943 as wishful thinking on the part of many in high political circles was the hope that the conditions of 1918 would appear and that the effect of the increasing bomber offensive, coupled with resulting industrial and food shortages, the wasting effect on the Eastern Front and war weariness, would result in a disintegration in German morale. Should such a condition arise it would be a relatively simple matter for British and American Armies to land in North West Europe, brush aside limited local resistance to liberate subject peoples and march on Berlin, where they would link up with the Russians. A perusal of Bomber Offensive would indicate to what extent such a hope was based on wishful thinking, for Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris writes that the strength of Bomber Command and the United States Army Air Force was insufficient until early 1944 to create the destruction which would be necessary to create such a condition (299). No possibility could be left unexplored, however, and thus the Joint Planning

^x Such a step was never taken and no British formation came under command of Headquarters, First Canadian Army, until 23 Jul 44, at which time it assumed command of 1 British Corps only.

Staff and C.O.S.S.A.C. devoted considerable time and thought during 1943 towards preparing for such an eventuality. As already indicated in this narrative such plans were given the general code name of "RANKIN".

232. The chances of a full scale Operation "OVERLORD" had been quoted as three or four to one against by various British senior officers in Washington during the spring of 1943 and even as late as November General Pope reported that the odds still seemed to be two or three to one against (300). British manpower and resources were being taxed to the limit, and whether it was official policy or merely wishful thinking on the part of a number of high ranking officers, a "RANKIN" would be highly preferable to an "OVERLORD" and just as satisfactory a way to win the war. The implications of Exercise "STARKEY" have already been discussed (see paras 181 - 185) and from time to time General Turner was able to inform General McNaughton of the progress being made with "RANKIN" planning. At the meeting on 17 Sep General Morgan reviewed an Appreciation issued by the Joint Intelligence Committee on the probability of German collapse (301). In the summer of 1918 insufficient attention had been focussed on political and economic factors and the military situation had alone given rise to the conclusion that victory could not be achieved until 1919. The Joint Intelligence Committee now concluded, however; that bearing in mind the similarity of conditions in Germany in 1918 and 1943 it was reasonable to assume that a German collapse was not a "remote possibility", even allowing for the more strict political control over the country. Economic life had been disturbed by the blockade and heavy air raids; the latter had also adversely affected civilian morale; moreover, there was the defection of Italy and the conviction growing among Germany's allies and the neutrals that she could no longer win. During the next two months planning for "RANKIN" proceeded at a high level under the direct supervision of Admiral Sir John Tovey, General Paget and Air Marshal D'Albiac. "RANKIN" planning envisaged three possibilities, namely, German collapse before 1 Jan 44, before 1 Mar 44 and 30 Apr 44 (302).

233. It was not until 19 Nov that the general outline of Operation "RANKIN CASE 'C'" was imparted to the corps commanders of 21 Army Group during a C.-in-C.'s conference. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had directed that plans be made, with a target date of 1 Jan 44, for a "return to the Continent in the event of GERMAN surrender and the cessation of organized resistance in the EUROPEAN theatre" (303). On 23 Nov, therefore, a Joint Plan was issued at Army level, though it contained the following preamble: "There is no evidence of imminent GERMAN collapse, but the possibility is one which cannot be ignored" (304).

234. It would be impossible to foretell the conditions which might be existing, should it be decided to convert the Exercise into an actual operation. The German High Command might be still in control; there might be an attempt to set up a central revolutionary government before the Allies arrived; there might be a complete disappearance of central authority, even among the Wehrmacht, and anarchy ruling. Depending on the extent to which central authority had been broken down there might be large scale movements of German troops back home and of foreign workers trying to leave Germany; fear of a Russian occupation might well induce a large German civilian movement westwards, with the numbers running into millions. Inevitably the energy of the Allied Forces would be taxed by widespread epidemics, looting and other disorders. For the purpose of Operation "RANKIN CASE 'C'" national spheres of sovereignty were defined as:

British Sphere

North West Germany, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark and the Channel Islands.

United States Sphere

Southern Germany and France

Russian Sphere

Eastern Germany (less Berlin which is to be an international zone garrisoned by forces of all three Allies)

235. Responsibility for the occupation of the British sphere, less Norway and the Channel Islands, would fall on the Commanders-in-Chief of the Nore and 21 Army Group and the Air Officer Commanding 2nd Tactical Air Force. In addition, token United States forces would be located in Holland, Belgium and Denmark, under the command of 21 Army Group. The joint object of these commanders would be to "establish as rapidly as possible balanced land and air forces within their sphere of operations with a view to enforcing the terms of surrender and assisting in the relief and rehabilitation of the liberated countries." The portion of Germany lying within the British sphere of occupation was to be divided between the Second Army (8 and 30 Corps) and the First Canadian Army (2nd Canadian and 1st and 12th British Corps) as follows:

First Canadian Army

Rhineland Province
Province of Hesse Nassau (including portions of Hesse and Brunswick)
Province of Westphalia

Second Army

Schleswig Holstein
State of Hamburg
Province of Hamburg (including portions of Brunswick)
State of Schaumburg Lippe
State of Oldenburg
State of Bremen

Headquarters of the 2nd Tactical Air Force and 21 Army Group would be located at Munster while 83 Group R.A.F. and First Canadian Army would have their headquarters near Dusseldorf. The Tactical Air Force would be disposed finally so that its aircraft could give cover to the whole area occupied by 21 Army Group.

236. On "A" (Armistice) Day a Flag Officer and a party of Royal Marines would proceed to the Hook of Holland to meet German surrender representatives. On the following day the Navy, Army and Air Force would send reconnaissance parties to Antwerp and Rotterdam; two battalions of the 6th Airborne Division would be dropped near Brussels and a further battalion at The Hague. Around "A" plus three advance parties of the occupying forces would begin moving into Holland and Belgium. Troops of First Canadian Army and ground parties of 83 Group R.A.F. would start moving through Rotterdam and Antwerp by "A" plus seven, and after securing their L. of C., would proceed as rapidly as possible to occupy their allotted areas in Germany.

237. On 25 Nov, Brigadier Foulkes (B.C.S.) held a conference at Headquarters, First Canadian Army, to explain to certain of the Administrative Staff that both operational and administrative plans would have to be drawn up for the participation of the Army in "RANKIN CASE 'C' " (305). A Joint Planning Room was set up at Headley Court and provision made for Headquarters 2nd Canadian Corps to do its own planning. On 27 Nov the members of the Canadian Planning Staff arrived at Headley Court to participate in the planning and on the last day of the month it was possible to issue a first draft of First Canadian Army's Operational Instruction. On 24 Dec a copy of the 21 Army Group Operation Instruction, complete with appendices, was received and on 30 Dec it was possible to issue a similar document for First Canadian Army. By 13 Jan 44 similar documents had been prepared by the Headquarters staffs of the 2nd Canadian and 12th British Corps. Planning details were not finally completed until well into February but "RANKIN CASE 'C' " was by now relegated to a staff study, since a full scale assault on North West Europe seemed an obvious necessity. The planning had not been in vain, however, for a number of valuable lessons, particularly in "Q" matters were incorporated into the "OVERLORD" detailed plans (306).

APPOINTMENT OF A SUPREME COMMANDER

238. Detailed planning for "OVERLORD" was being handicapped by delay in appointing a Supreme Commander. The Naval and Air Force Commanders-in-Chief were functioning, but, as General Morgan told his staff on 20 Nov, until a Supreme Commander was appointed, he himself would have to fill a dual role. As General Morgan had summed it up in a submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

Detailed planning by Army Group and Army Commanders, as well as Naval and Air Commanders, cannot start until either the Supreme Allied Commander is appointed or a decision on the system of command and control for the operation is given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Indeed, the absence of a Supreme Allied Commander and lack of that decision is delaying the progress of Operation 'OVERLORD' at every turn. It cannot be too strongly stressed that, until all the Commanders responsible for carrying out the operation have had their roles clearly indicated, firm detailed plans cannot be prepared.

It is not only as regards the preparation of detailed plans that this lack of higher direction makes itself felt, but it penetrates to the equally important sphere of training (307).

239. The complications and delays caused by failure to appoint a Supreme Commander earlier are also commented upon unfavourably by Major-General Sir Francis de Guingand in Operation Victory:

It is only right that the commander who is to lead the troops should be the one who makes the plan. In certain major operations such as our invasion of Europe a tremendous amount of preliminary planning can and should be undertaken, but the ultimate commanders should be the ones who decide upon the actual plan and, if possible, should be appointed in time to superintend the training and detailed planning stages.

... I am convinced that the delay in announcing the various appointments was quite unjustified. These should have been made in November at the latest, and the reason for not doing so was, I believe, mainly political - Churchill's intense desire to capture Rome before the changes occurred, and also it was thought that the Russians might think we intended to "pipe down" in Italy if Montgomery and others left the theatre too early (308).

240. During the late autumn of 1943 the old pull between the Mediterranean and North West Europe had begun to re-assert itself, however, and it was considered essential that a further conference of the British and American war leaders should be held at Cairo before they proceeded to Teheran to acquaint Marshal Stalin with their views on strategy for 1944. Prime Minister Churchill and his advisers were eager to continue exploitation of the Italian situation, especially since no other avenue was presented for active operations during the coming winter. A continuance of operations in Italy, and possibly the Balkans, during the months when preparations for "OVERLORD" would only be tying up landing craft and troops might possibly result in the opening up of the Aegean route through the Dardanelles to the Black Sea: such would hasten the delivery of supplies to Russia, and also might induce Turkey to enter the war (309). Thus the heavy loss of life inherent in a cross-Channel operation might be avoided and the war won on the Eastern Front, by the Ally with the greatest manpower. No complete agreement was reached at Cairo.

241. During the Teheran Conference of 28 Nov - 1 Dec Marshal Stalin indicated that his Allies should launch their "Second Front" not later than May 1944 and meantime continue the offensive in Italy in order to contain the maximum number of German troops during the winter (310). Therefore it was agreed that build-up should be accelerated in the United Kingdom but that sufficient landing craft should be left to the last moment in the Mediterranean for the purpose of carrying out amphibious operations as dictated by the tactical situation.

242. After the Teheran Conference the Combined Chiefs of Staff returned to Cairo to work out their plans in more detail. While here, it was agreed that General Eisenhower should be appointed Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, although public announcement was delayed for some days. In due course, General Montgomery was appointed to command 21 Army Group in place of Sir Bernard Paget, and arrived in the United Kingdom on 2 Jan 44 with his Chief of Staff, Major-General de Guingand. Generals Eisenhower and Montgomery had had an opportunity to examine the Outline Plan for Overlord prior to leaving North Africa; while "agreeing with the broad scope of the operation and the selection of the assault area" they "nevertheless felt that the initial assaulting forces were being planned in insufficient strength and committed to too narrow a front" (311). General Montgomery was therefore given permission to alter the existing plan so as

To extend the frontage of attack;

To increase the strength of the assault, and subsequent build-up;

To alter the command set-up for the opening phase (312).

It had been proposed that the three division assault would be in charge of an American Task Force Commander (see para 223) but previous experience had taught General Montgomery that it would be necessary to assault by formations in depth. Thus the increased initial force of five assault, plus two follow up, divisions would

be taken from the British Second and United States First Armies which would land side by side. These two armies would be commanded by General Montgomery himself. At a later stage the First Canadian Army and Third U.S. Army would land. The role of First Canadian Army was confirmed by General Montgomery during an interview he gave to Brigadier C. Foulkes (B.G.S., First Canadian Army) on 8 Jan 44. Brigadier Foulkes' memorandum of this interview includes the following paragraph:

I then discussed "OVERLORD" and Gen Montgomery informed me that it was not his intention to put 12 Corps under First Cdn Army until after the assault, and they would come under command "in situ". He agreed that it would be beneficial to keep 2 Corps free from any planning commitments until as late as possible. He confirmed that the Cdn Army would be used as a follow-up army (313).

CANADIAN PREPARATIONS FOR "OVERLORD"

243. Apart from a few last minute changes made necessary by the limitations imposed by the "manpower ceiling", the composition of the Canadian component of First Canadian Army remained firm.^x The despatch of units from Canada had been completed in September 1943 and the remaining months had been devoted to the shipment of reinforcements to the United Kingdom, although it had not been possible to maintain the monthly flow of 5000 originally planned. The British units allocated as a "tail" for Canadian formations became an integral part of First Canadian Army during the winter months of 1944.

244. One change which should be mentioned, however, concerned air support for First Canadian Army. When 2nd Tactical Air Force was formed in June 1943, it had been decided that the first formed Group should work with First Canadian Army since the Second Army headquarters had not yet been completely organized (Chap XIV, paras 203 - 204). Therefore, the R.C.A.F. component was placed in No. 83 (Composite) Group and the still-forming No. 84 Group R.A.F. affiliated with Second Army. During the following months No. 83 (Composite) Group was given special training and equipment so that it might support the assault phase. On 26 Jan 44, however, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory told those attending his fourth conference as Air C.-in-C., A.E.A.F.^{xx} "that No. 83 (Composite) Group would now support the Second British Army which was the first to go into the assault, in the new plan, and not the 1st Canadian Army, as in the original plan" (314). The latter would be supported by No. 84 Group R.A.F. and it was agreed that the R.C.A.F. Reconnaissance Wing would be transferred to this Group, in place of No. 35 Reconnaissance Wing. The proposal to exchange these Canadian squadrons was not carried out, however, nor is it referred to in the subsequent conferences held by Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory. It is very probable that the transfer of the specially trained R.C.A.F. squadrons from No. 83 Group to No. 84 Group could not have been accomplished at this late date without

x In order to remain within the limits of the "manpower ceiling" it proved necessary to disband the Headquarters, 1st Canadian A.A. Brigade, both L.A.A. regiments hitherto included in army troops and The Royal Montreal Regiment, by then a motor battalion. The composition of First Canadian Army is dealt with in Report No.168, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 12 Dec 46.

xx Allied Expeditionary Air Force.

dangerously weakening the air support for the initial assault (315).

245. Canadian formations remained concentrated in Sussex and Hampshire during the closing months of 1943 and the ensuing winter, engaged in final training and preparations. On 30 Jan 44 the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade were placed completely under the command of 1st British Corps and the final stage, collective assault training, got under way (316). Then in April, as part of the Cover Plan for "NEPTUNE", to delude the Germans into believing that the assault would be delivered in the Pas-de-Calais area, Headquarters of 2nd Canadian Corps and a great part of its corps troops moved into the Dover area of Kent. The 2nd Canadian Infantry Division made a similar move and set up its headquarters in that city. During the first days of March General Montgomery had made a five day tour of Canadian formations, speaking to over 100,000 troops, and this was followed by more formal visits from His Majesty the King, Prime Minister Mackenzie King and General Eisenhower.

246. This was also a period which saw many changes in command, with older officers giving way to younger men who had gained "this war experience" in North Africa, Sicily and Italy. General Simonds assumed command of the 2nd Canadian Corps and Brigadier G. Kitching also returned from Italy for promotion to the command of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division. Command of the two armoured brigades went to Brigadier R.A. Wyman and Lt-Col E.L. Booth, who had seen active service in Italy. Among other officers who returned from that theatre of operations to take over senior appointments were Brigadiers A.B. Matthews, G. Walsh and J.C. Jefferson. The 2nd Canadian Infantry Division now came under the command of Major-General C. Foulkes, who latterly had been B.G.S., First Canadian Army. He was followed in this appointment by Brigadier C.C. Mann, who had had a share in the planning and execution of the raid on Dieppe.

247. On 8 Feb 44 General Stuart felt justified in cabling the Minister of National Defence in Ottawa that General Crerar's absence until the end of March would not in any way prejudice the progress of preparations for "OVERLORD":

There is nothing that he could do that is not being done. The battle experience he is getting will be invaluable later on and Cdn Army planning will not begin until some time after he returns. Montgomery's views re training fit in nicely to our present situation. He insists on complete decentralization of training. I am following this policy... As you probably know 21 Army Group is practically the old HQ Eighth Army. I am taking advantage of their experience to offset my own shortcomings. You need have no fears about results. (317)

On the same day telegrams crossed and General Murchie wanted to know, in case questions should be asked in the House of Commons, whether there had been any break in the continuity of planning since General McNaughton had vacated the command of First Canadian Army (318). General Stuart was able to reply that:

Continuity of planning has not been affected in slightest degree. Planning on high level has not been called for yet on account of role of First Canadian Army being follow up rather than leading army. Above type of planning will not in our case begin for another six weeks (319).

General Stuart considered, however, that no information beyond the first sentence quoted should be divulged.

248. On 13 Feb Mr. Ralston wrote to General Stuart regarding the maintenance of proper safeguards to ensure that Canada should be able to continue to control the handling of the Canadian component of First Canadian Army. As it stood, Canada's ultimate rights and responsibilities under the terms of the Visiting Forces Act could be exercised by "(a) withdrawing from combination, or (b) direct reference by the Commander of the Canadian Forces to the Government in respect of any operation of which he did not approve" (320). Mr. Ralston admitted that these were cumbersome procedures and "embarrassing to exercise" but necessary to Canada's autonomous position. He and several others were wondering, however, whether a better working arrangement might not be made whereby "Canada would be 'in on' the planning at a high level". Then the Canadian Commander would know ahead of time what was being planned for his troops, and would not be faced with the necessity of having to decide whether or not the completed plan should or should not be accepted. No other Dominions were involved in "OVERLORD" so there would be no question of establishing a precedent should such a step prove feasible. Mr. Ralston wrote that the Canadian component was just as important to Canada as the United States component to that country and also mentioned the special consideration General Montgomery had given to General Freyberg's New Zealand oversize division in Italy:

You will understand that I am not talking about strategic direction of the war. I am talking about the tactical dispositions to carry out that strategy.

I know that McNaughton had Turner at C.O.S.S.A.C. but I cannot believe that he did anything more than simply carry back to McNaughton what was going on and I question whether his position there was regarded as one of right. It would rather seem to me he was simply being granted the courtesy of liaison.

I know the Government feels strongly about this, and I think with you there it can be put on a sound and workable basis (321).

249. On 18 Feb General Stuart replied by telegram to the effect that he did not believe there was an issue in the case of the Canadian Army:

... Both the War Office and Montgomery have told me specifically that they fully recognize the special position of the Canadians. I am confident that we are amply covered by the accepted right to withdraw from combination and the accepted right of appeal. In Crerar and Simonds we shall have two very strong characters and two field commanders in whose judgement I have the greatest confidence. Neither will commit their command to an operation unless the plan has a reasonable prospect of success with the resources

available. In conversation with Simonds recently he told me that he had objected to the original plan for the crossing of the Straits of Messina. The plan was changed to accord with his proposals. The real solution to this problem is to get the right commanders. I consider that we now have them.

... There are two aspects of planning involved. The first concerns planning in the field after an Operation has been launched... We must rely upon our own commanders. I cannot see any possibility of initiating in the field any such procedure as you suggest without the most unfortunate consequences. It would be a retrograde step just at the time when US and British formations are operating under one another's commanders without any strings attached. It would imply a lack of confidence which would be an unreality as far as the Canadian Army is concerned. The Army here has complete confidence in Montgomery's ability to plan and conduct a campaign successfully. Moreover, Montgomery will not play unless all his Commanders have complete confidence in him. He would look upon the proposal you suggest as being expressive of a lack of confidence in himself. The result would be that either Montgomery or the Canadians would have to leave 21 Army Group. Surely the raising of an alleged constitutional issue which in reality is not an issue at all as far as the Army is concerned is not worth such a price. The second aspect concerns the initial stage of planning before the Operation is launched. There is a great deal more time for planning in the initial stage and consequently there is ample opportunity to discuss the general and detailed plan on high level. The objections to your proposal also apply in similar degree to this stage of planning. In any case the general plan we are interested in has now been made and there will be no more such plans for some months to come not in fact until Germany has been beaten.

I can assure you that I shall keep a very careful watch on constitutional relationship with the UK in so far as the Army is concerned. I do suggest however at a time such as the present when everybody in the British Army over here are putting everything they have got into preparations for the vital assault on the continent that we abstain from raising the constitutional issue in army relationships until there is cause to do so. I maintain that such cause does not exist at the moment so far as the Army is concerned (322).

250. Regarding the question of the Army Commander, General Stuart was loath to press for Crerar's return to the United Kingdom at this time. It was General Montgomery's view that General Crerar should prove himself in the field. As General Stuart's telegram to the Minister of National Defence pointed out, General Montgomery would be

... delighted to have Crerar as an Army Comdr provided Alexander reports that his work in the field proves that he is fitted for such an appointment. He insists at this stage on having senior commanders that have proved themselves in battle. He will not go into battle otherwise. He is not attempting to dictate to us or to the Americans

other than to say please elect a Commander who has proved that he can do the job. I have no grounds to argue with Montgomery over this point because of course he is absolutely right. I know that Crerar will prove himself to be a most capable Commander in the Field. He will not only command the Canadian Corps but will actually command the Eighth Army for a definite period. I fully appreciate that our inability to announce McNaughton's successor makes it most difficult for the Government and for yourself. I do feel however that when the announcement is made coupled with a short statement of the experience he has had in Italy that it will have a great deal more weight than if made now. By delaying the announcement you are giving your critics more rope to hang themselves with. I shall see Brooke within the next few days and find out when Alexander's report can be expected. I am sure we cannot expect it until after 15 March when Crerar will have had six weeks in the line with his Corps.

... All the senior people at the War Office have greeted me with open arms so to speak and I know that they will lean over backwards to meet any wishes we may have provided those wishes do not prejudice the successful outcome of important field operations. Montgomery may be difficult at times not because of any desire to interfere with Canadian Autonomy but because he has only one major thought these days and that is winning his next battle (323).

251. The Minister of National Defence was not clear, however, on the actual procedure being employed in planning for "OVERLORD" and therefore sought information as to when the Chief of Staff (C.M.H.Q.) and the Canadian Army Commander would be in a position to submit reports to the Canadian Government regarding the feasibility of the Operation; General McNaughton had rendered such a report in the case of Operation "HUSKY" (see paras 159 - 161). Mr. Reiston wanted to be able to "assure Canadian homes that Canadian staff and Commanders are assured of timely opportunity to get all the information they need so as to be in a position to exercise their judgement for the benefit of the Canadian troops for whom they are responsible to Canada" (321). In his reply, dated 24 Feb 44, General Stuart went to some pains to explain exactly how "OVERLORD" was being planned (325). The basic army plan was being prepared by General Montgomery in close association with the naval and air force commanders. The three service plans were then co-ordinated by General Eisenhower and submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. General Montgomery then informed his Army Commanders of the task assigned to 21 Army Group and the part each army would play. Each Commander then, in association with the Naval and Air Force Commander who would be supporting him, would work out his own plan. Constant contact would be maintained at all levels during the detailed planning so that major or minor changes could be handled quickly. Once an Army Commander's key plan had been approved by 21 Army Group, his corps and divisional planners could get busy on their more detailed tasks:

... I outline this procedure to you to show that planning on army level presents both time and opportunity for careful study and for the request of such additional facilities or resources as in the opinion of the Army Comdr are required for the successful accomplishment of his assigned task.

In the case of a field operation as opposed to an amphibious operation the procedure is similar but the time element differs. In the field the operations are less complicated and therefore less time is required. You can be assured however that with Montgomery in command there will always be ample time for planning and adequate preparation. He fights his battles to win and he knows that he cannot win unless his battles are carefully planned and prepared down to the last detail.

252. General Stuart wrote that he and two of his principal staff officers at Headquarters, First Canadian Army, were in the picture as regards the 21 Army Group "key" Plan. Because of the role allotted to First Canadian Army, its tactical operational planning could not begin until that of the other armies had been completed. Thus General Crerar would be available in the United Kingdom by the time it became necessary to commence detailed army planning - in about six weeks. He went on to point out that Canada could not expect representation in the formulation of the original 21 Army Group Plan:

... We have every right to expect however that we can have the Plan altered as it affects Canadian Army if our detailed Army planning indicates sound reasons why it should be changed.

... The purpose of our own Army Planning is to provide the detailed examination and to recommend such changes as appear necessary resulting from this detailed examination. I can assure you that in due course the Army Commander will transmit his views to the Canadian Government as to the feasibility or otherwise of the part to be played by Canadian troops in the forthcoming operation (326).

253. During a visit to the War Office on 11 Apr, General Stuart learned that a favourable recommendation had been made to the British War Cabinet regarding a Canadian Government request to have the senior officers representing its three Services in London "sit in" periodically with the Chiefs of Staff Committee to discuss future plans in which Canadian Forces might be involved (327). Official British concurrence having been obtained, a Canadian Joint Staff Mission, comprising General Stuart, Admiral Nelles and Air Marshal Breadner, came into being during May to act as a link with the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the two Supreme Allied Commanders with whom personal contact could be made from time to time.^x

CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS

254. On 21 Apr 44 General Stuart wrote to the Army Commander suggesting that the time had now arrived to "get the official covering approval of the Canadian Government to the actual participation" of First Canadian Army and the 3rd Canadian Division in Operation "OVERLORD" (328). Since General Crerar might find difficulty in framing an opinion on the lines suggested, the Chief of Staff had drafted the following paragraph as a guide:

x This subject is dealt with on file 1/CJSM/1 which is in the possession of the Secretary, Canadian Joint Liaison Mission, London, England.

I have carefully studied the plan as a whole and am satisfied that it represents a feasible operation of war and I recommend that the Canadian Government officially approve the participation of the First Canadian Army in this operation. The tasks of First Canadian Army include the movement overseas when a bridgehead has been established; the taking over of a defensive sector of the bridgehead and the mounting of an offensive based upon the bridgehead. I am satisfied with the arrangements made in respect of the movement overseas and to the taking over of a defensive sector of the bridgehead. The plan for the subsequent advance from the bridgehead will depend upon a number of factors which can not be determined until the bridgehead has been secured and the First Cdn Army has taken over its sector of defence. In these circumstances, it will be appreciated that, at the present time, I am not in a position to express an opinion regarding the initial offensive task allotted to the First Cdn Army (329).

In regard to the 3rd Canadian Division he suggested the following:

I have discussed the assault task allotted to 3 Cdn Div with General Keller. He is satisfied with the plan and is confident that his division, with the resources placed at his disposal, has every prospect of bringing the plan to a successful conclusion. I agree with the views of General Keller.

255. Replying on 24 Apr, General Crerar wrote that such covering approval, "if not formally transmitted, was definitely conveyed by the action taken before my appointment to command First Canadian Army, which resulted in the Canadian field formations and units in the U.K. being made a component of 21 Army Group." (330). Such a view was obviously held by the War Office, 21 Army Group and S.H.A.E.F. and General Crerar considered that "the time has now past [sic] when the action you suggest can have useful significance. Indeed, its occurrence might well produce unfortunate reactions, both military and political." He fully appreciated his responsibilities to the Canadian Government and Army, but pointed out that

... Such responsibilities are inescapable, at all times. No written statement from me to the effect that I have satisfied myself that what has been planned, and ordered by Higher Command, is a feasible operation of war can either lighten, or increase, them.

So far as the immediate future is concerned, I can say that I have great confidence in the higher direction and command of General Sir Bernard Montgomery, C-in-C, 21 Army Group. I believe that the plan of operations, as a whole is sound and with reasonable fortune, will produce decisive success.

As you are aware, the 3 Cdn Inf Div is not at present under my operational command but, for the time being, is one of the Assault Divisions of 1 Brit Corps, (Second Brit Army). The technique which is being employed by Second Brit Army for the assault is, almost in its entirety, that developed by me when 3 Cdn Inf Div was under my command in 1 Cdn Corps. I believe that the lessons of DIEPPE have been fully extracted and applied in this technique and that the 3 Cdn Inf Div, and other Second Brit Army assault formations, will generally be successful in the initial, and vital landing operations.

256. General Keller had full confidence in the assault landing plans,^x and his report to General Crerar had concluded:

In conclusion may I point out that given favourable weather with reasonable naval and air support the Canadians will physically be the point or tip of the wedge to be driven into the enemy in Western Europe - a proud honour, for which we have adequately prepared ourselves (331).

257. Continuing his letter to the Chief of Staff, General Crerar wrote:

As you are aware, the First Canadian and 3rd US armies commence to land some days after the assault and are given roles of exploitation. The task allotted to First Cdn Army (which after assembly in the bridgehead will include one or more British Corps in addition to 2 Cdn Corps) has been tentatively defined. The possible problem has been appreciated by me and my proposed plan of action in the circumstances visualized, is now under consideration by, and discussion with, HQ 21 Army Group. It is obvious, however, that any plans drawn up at this stage are mainly exploratory, and that the actual role of First Cdn Army, when its time for action comes, may be quite different from the conception of today. No purpose is achieved, therefore, in commenting upon the tactical problem presently under study (332).

The text of these letters was despatched to Mr. Ralston by telegram, with the statement by General Stuart that he concurred in the views expressed by the Army Commander as to the confidence in the way the coming operation was being handled (333).

258. On 27 Apr, however, the Chief of Staff received a telegram from the Minister of National Defence to the effect that the placing of First Canadian Army (less 1st Canadian Corps) "in combination" did not "carry automatic approval of any plan formulated for or task allotted to Canadian formations" (334). The Canadian Government had practically no knowledge of the Plans and, with its responsibilities to the people of Canada, would expect a report from the Army Commander advising "whether or not he is satisfied that the tasks allotted are feasible operations of war and whether

x Although the issue of D.D. tanks was somewhat tardy and water-proofing material was still in short supply, General Crerar had been assured that these deficiencies would be made up.

in his opinion the plans formulated for Canadian formations with the resources which are to be made available can be carried out with reasonable prospects of success". Since this was a direct matter between the Canadian Government and the Commander First Canadian Army, Mr. Ralston could not see how there could be any undesirable reaction from the Allies. Further, the Canadian Government fully shared confidence in the higher direction and command of General Montgomery.

259. This telegram was discussed by Generals Stuart and Crerar with the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Norman Robertson) on 29 Apr, following which the Army Commander produced a statement for transmission to Ottawa, stating his belief that the part Canadians were to play in the forthcoming invasion of North West Europe was a feasible operation of war, with reasonable prospects of success (335).

260. Before official instructions should be issued by the Canadian Government to the Army Commander, General Stuart suggested that General Crerar and he would like to see them in draft. This was acceptable to Ottawa and a draft was despatched by telegram on 11 May. The comments of Generals Crerar and Stuart dealt chiefly with the paragraphs mentioning the possibility of 1st Canadian Corps serving in the same theatre but not under the command of First Canadian Army, and the withdrawal from combination should it be felt that there was not "a practicable operation of war" with the resources available or it should be at variance with the policy of the Government of Canada. After a further interchange of telegrams, a Defensor telegram of 19 May set forth the official instructions for the G.O.C.-in-C., First Canadian Army.

261. The Army Commander's Instructions noted that Canadian formations had been placed "in combination" with 21 Army Group and that the Commander-in-Chief might carry out certain interchanges of formations between First Canadian Army and the British component of his Force.

262. As a result of the reports submitted by General Crerar, participation in the forthcoming operation was approved. Certain relative extracts from the instructions were as follows:

8. You and the Comd of any Canadian Force not operating under your command, either by reason of its being detached therefrom or otherwise, continue to enjoy the right to refer to the Government of Canada in respect to any matter in which the said Canadian Forces are, or are likely to be, involved or committed or in respect of any question of their administration. Unless you consider that the circumstances warrant otherwise, such reference will be made only when the remedial or other action deemed by you or by the Comd of such Canadian Force to be necessary has been represented to the Officer Commanding the Combined Force and he shall have failed to take appropriate action. Any such reference from any Canadian Commander in the Western European theatre will be made through you. Any such reference from G.O.C. 1 Cdn Corps in the Allied Armies in Italy will be made through the Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q. In the case of references made to the Chief of Staff it will be his responsibility to obtain the views of the Army Commander

for transmission to the Government of Canada in respect of such matters as have significance to the Canadian Field Army as a whole.

9. In deciding whether to exercise the authority to withdraw the Canadian Force, or any part thereof under your command from 'in combination'... you will consider all the circumstances including, but not in any way to be restricted to, the following:
- (a) Whether in your opinion the orders and instructions issued to you by the Commander Combined Forces represent in the circumstances a task for the Canadian Forces which is a practicable operation of war;
 - (b) Whether in your opinion such task with the resources available is capable of being carried out with reasonable prospects of success;
 - (c) Whether in your opinion such orders, instructions or tasks are at variance with the policy of the Canadian Government;
 - (d) Your appraisal of the extent of prospective losses to the Canadian Force in relation to the importance of the results prospectively to be achieved;
 - (e) The effect of such withdrawal in preventing the success of the operation as a whole;
 - (f) All other factors which you may consider relevant. The authority to withdraw should normally be exercised by you only after reference to the Government of Canada but, where the exigencies of the moment do not permit such reference, you have, in deciding whether or not to exercise this authority, full discretion to take such action as you may consider advisable after considering all the circumstances as above. When a Canadian division or other junior formation not operating under your command is operating under the orders of the G.O.C.-in-C. 21 Army Group, or pursuant to orders issued under authority delegated by him the considerations set forth above in this paragraph will apply equally with respect to the withdrawal of such division or junior formation from 'in combination'. The Officer Commanding such division or other junior formation has not himself the power to withdraw and this, if necessary, can be effected only by you on reference to you by such Officer Commanding which reference the latter has power to make under paragraph 8 of these instructions...

13. You will keep the Minister of National Defence constantly informed as to the foregoing matters.
14. Your channel of communication on all questions including matters of general policy will be to the Chief of the General Staff through the Chief of Staff at Canadian Military Headquarters, London (336).

263. Paragraph 11 of these instructions, dealing with 1st Canadian Corps, was not considered satisfactory by the Cabinet War Committee, so the following was substituted in a Defensor telegram of 25 May:

11. At the request of the Government of Canada certain formations of the First Canadian Army were despatched to the Mediterranean Theatre with the objects at that time of increasing the effectiveness of the Canadian participation in the war and obtaining battle experience. Now that those objects have been gained the Government of Canada regards it as highly desirable that as soon as military considerations permit such formations now serving in the Mediterranean Theatre as well as field formations and units elsewhere should be grouped under unified Canadian Command (337).

264. Another question raised at this time was the political relationship of the Commander, First Canadian Army, to Headquarters 21 Army Group and to S.H.A.E.F. The fact that General Crerar had not been notified that General Eisenhower was planning to pay a visit to the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division prompted him to suggest to the Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q., on 13 May that now was the time to clarify matters on the political level - when Prime Minister Mackenzie King was in the United Kingdom (338). After some thought, General Stuart wrote the C.I.G.S. on 18 May, in an effort to prevent "any embarrassing incidents occurring in the future":

As you know I am not anxious to tie any strings to Canadian Formations cooperating with those of the U.K. or the U.S. There is one string, however, that we must insist upon and that is the right of reference to the Canadian Government of our senior commander in any theatre. The corollary to this is that in the Western European theatre of operations Harry Crerar serves, in a sense, in a dual capacity. He commands the First Canadian Army and he is also the Canadian national representative in respect to all Canadian Formations and Units serving operationally in that theatre even though some may not be under his operational command. This dual role is inescapable because the Canadian Government quite rightly holds the senior Canadian Commander in any theatre responsible for all Canadian Formations and Units employed operationally in that theatre.

I know that you and your assistants at the War Office understand and recognize our special position in this regard.

A recent event suggests to me that perhaps 21 Army Group and S.H.A.E.F. do not recognize our special position and consider that Harry Crerar has no responsibility for Canadian Formations and Units that are not directly under his operational command...

I hope you do not misunderstand me. As you know Harry and I and the whole Canadian Army have complete confidence in the commanders concerned. All I ask is that Harry's responsibility for all Canadians in the theatre, whether under his actual command or not, be recognized by 21 Army Group and by S.H.A.E.F. The application of this recognition would not involve any interference in the normal chain of command, it would merely call for consultation in the pre-planning stage.

I am sure you will agree that Montgomery should discuss this matter with Crerar at an early date in order to clear up any misunderstanding before the show starts. Montgomery would then be in a position to explain to S.H.A.E.F. (339)

265. On the following day the C.I.G.S. personally told General Stuart that he had taken the action suggested (340). Then on the afternoon of 25 May, General Stuart had a long talk with General Montgomery. In the course of the conversation, the Commander-in-Chief, 21 Army Group said that he had already discussed the constitutional issue fully with both Prime Minister Mackenzie King and the Minister of National Defence; he had expressed the same views then and both Mr. King and Mr. Ralston had agreed (341). The letter which he later despatched to General Stuart varied in detail slightly from this conversation but the following relevant extracts were forwarded on to the Canadian Army Commander:

I am so glad we had that talk last night, it cleared the air and we know how we stand. I understand your viewpoint very clearly. You understand my viewpoint, and I have explained to you my technique of "grouping".

We all want to win the war as soon as we can.

I admit the right of Crerar to refer any point to his Government, whenever he likes - through you I presume.

I admit that Crerar is responsible for the general welfare and administration of all Canadian troops in the theatre of war.

I do not admit that Crerar has any operational responsibility for Canadian troops serving temporarily in another Army.

I do not admit that Crerar has any special right to be consulted by me when making my plans for battle - apart from the normal consultation I would have with my Army Commanders at any time (342).

In his letter to General Crerar, the Chief of Staff went on to state that General Montgomery would likely stick to the views expressed above and that no useful purpose could be gained by further discussion. Continuing, however, he added that:

... I feel also that in practice, it will be possible for you to act in accordance with the wishes of the Canadian Government without infringing upon Montgomery's policy as explained above.

I admit that Montgomery's views may not be in strict accord with the spirit of the Visiting Forces Act. There will always tend to be a conflict as between the constitutional and the military side of any given situation. In the case we have been discussing I feel, and I think you agree, that any such conflict should be decided in favour of the military side if it is claimed that the success of military operations may otherwise be prejudiced. Montgomery certainly makes this claim and I feel that we must accept it (343).

266. The following day General Crerar replied to the effect that although he had the greatest respect for General Montgomery as a field commander, "political relations, international, or inter-Imperial, have not been his study, however, and these cannot always be reduced to that 'forceful simplicity' which is his special genius in the matter of military operations":

... though in practice I expect to be treated, and to behave, as any other Army Comd, in principle, I just am not. I am the Cdn Army Comd, and, as such, am in a different category to the British Army Comd. Incidentally, I do not think, for a minute, that Monty assumes the same attitude to, and powers over, Bradley, USA, as he does in respect to Dempsey - a situation which you might investigate...

To be quite frank, while I consider that the principle must be maintained (and certainly the Cdn Government will not think otherwise) I do not foresee an issue ever arising. To start with, and as stated, I have great faith in Monty and am convinced that he will never allow a British Army Comd to commit Cdn, or other troops, to useless and impossible tasks. Then, I believe I am a reasonable man, with my main ambition to contribute valuably towards the winning of this war. In consequence, I have no intention of allowing my special Canadian position to intrude to the detriment of the general good. To put it briefly, although there is here a conflict between a political principle and its practical application in the field, I do not foresee any real trouble arising.

So far as consultation with me is concerned, when making his plans for battle, again I see no actual dangers because during "normal consultation" I will always have the opportunity of representing any special Canadian factor (344).

267. General Crerar subsequently talked the matter over with the C.I.G.S., who seemed to be very clear on the constitutional issue. Notwithstanding anything General Montgomery might say, Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke conceded that General Crerar was bound to be responsible to the Canadian Government for the operational employment of all Canadians in 21 Army Group; he did not think, however, that a situation would ever arise where there would need to be any drastic intervention (345). General Crerar considered, however, that the Chief of Staff, C.M.H.Q., might well clear up the constitutional principle with the War Office.

268. On 16 Jun, therefore, General Stuart addressed a demi-official letter to the C.I.G.S., setting forth General Montgomery's views as to the relationship of the G.O.C.-in-C., First Canadian Army, to himself and showing where it was considered that these views were "out of line" with the Visiting Forces Act. General Stuart thought that the main difficulty arose from General Montgomery's interpretation of "operational responsibility", which to him meant that "Crerar would require to be consulted and to approve orders issued by another Commander to Canadian troops not under Crerar's command." Both Generals Stuart and Crerar did not desire this - a practical impossibility:

... At the same time, any Canadian Formation Commander, temporarily serving under other higher command, has the right to, and indeed by Government instructions must, appeal through Crerar, to C-in-C 21 Army Group if such Canadian Formation Commander considers that the demands made on him and his troops are, beyond doubt, improper, and remedial action has been refused. In this national sense, and in this very remote contingency, Crerar has an "operational responsibility" from which he will not be released by the Canadian Government.

Crerar does not expect to be consulted more than any other Army Commander as regards operational plans, but the Canadian Government does expect Crerar to be consulted prior to any regrouping of Canadian Formations which would result in their detachment from Canadian command. In practice, no issue should ever arise because Crerar will have an opportunity to discuss any particular Canadian issues during what Montgomery describes as "normal consultation".

For the reasons I have given, I feel that issues will never really arise between the C-in-C 21 Army Group and the Canadian Army Commander even though the former tends to "turn a blind eye" to the latter's separate national responsibilities. In the circumstances, therefore, I do not press that these constitutional points be now clarified with Montgomery. He has immense military responsibilities at this time and nothing should be done to "take his eye off the ball". I do consider it important, however, that there should be no misunderstanding between the War Office and C.M.H.Q. at any time, concerning the relationships and responsibilities of the Canadian Commander - hence this letter (346).

269. The C.I.G.S. replied the following day to the effect that he felt confident that no difficulties should arise, "but should you feel that at any time there was a danger of a misunderstanding please let me know at once" (347). Regarding the

points raised in General Crerar's official instructions referring to the steps necessary to re-unite all Canadian formations under the command of First Canadian Army, Sir Alan Brooke replied separately that they should be "conformed to as soon as military and shipping considerations make it possible" (348).

CONCLUSION

270. Circumstances did not permit the re-union of First Canadian Army during the summer of 1944, which saw First Canadian Army heavily engaged in Normandy and 1st Canadian Corps advancing to the Gothic Line. With hopes of an early German collapse in North West Europe the Canadian Government was desirous of seeing its Army re-united as soon as possible after the cessation of hostilities (349). This question seems to have been raised by Canada at the second Quebec Conference, but since the war continued no positive action was possible. The Combined Chiefs of Staff were able to decide at their Malta Conference, at the end of January 1945, that the situation on the Italian Front would permit of the transfer of up to five divisions to North West Europe. Opportunity was taken therefore to include 1st Canadian Corps among the formations moving on Operation "GOLDFLAKE" (350). Thus First Canadian Army was re-united for the final operations in Holland, leading up to the surrender.

271. This Report was written by Captain J.M. Hitsman, General List.

J.M. Hitsman, Capt
(C.P. Stacey) Colonel
Director Historical Section

NOTES TO ACCOMPANY REPORT NO. 182

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

Except where specifically stated all references are to C.M.H.Q. files; in which case the file reference only will be given. Secret War Diaries of Units and Formations will be referred to as W.D., name of unit or formation, and date.

In the case of the following references which are quoted frequently, the following abbreviations will be used:

Crerar Diary - General Crerar's Personal War Diary.

McNaughton Diary - General McNaughton's Personal War Diary.

Pope Diary - War Diary of Major-General M.A. Pope, M.C.,
Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff Mission,
Washington, D.C.

Eisenhower Report - Report by the Supreme Commander to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in Europe of the Allied Expeditionary Force 6 June 1944 to 8 May 1945, London, 1946.

Marshall Report 1945 - Biennial Report of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army July 1, 1943, to June 30, 1945, to the Secretary of War, London, 1945.

1. W.D., A/Q Branch, H.Q. Cdn Corps: March 1941, Appx "P", Notes of a meeting between Corps Comd, Cdn Corps and C.-in-C. Home Forces at Ford Manor, Lingfield, at about 1800 hrs on Friday, 28 Mar 41. A good deal of the material which appears in this introductory section has already appeared in the Preliminary Narrative, Chaps XII paras 69-110 and Chap XIII paras 143-156.
2. Report No. 61, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 13 Feb 42, contains copy of letter Paget to McNaughton, 6 Sep 41.
3. W.D., "G" Branch, H.Q. Cdn Corps: June 1941, Appx LVII, Memorandum of Conversation between Brigadier A.W.S. Mallaby, C.B.E., D.D.M.O.(O) The War Office, and Brigadier E.L.M. Burns, B.G.S., Cdn Corps, at 1100 hrs, 30 Jun 41.
4. Ibid: Mallaby to Burns, 30 Jun 41.
5. Canada and the War. The Lord Mayor's Luncheon in Honour of the Prime Minister of Canada, Ottawa 1941, p.16.
6. Debates, House of Commons, Ottawa, 1 Apr 41.
7. Ibid, 13 Jun 41.
8. 3/Cdn Corps/4: Tel GS 203, Defensor to Canmilitary, 31 Jul 41.
9. Ibid: Tel GS 1513, Canmilitary to Defensor, 1 Aug 41.
10. Ibid: Tel GS 2322, Canmilitary to Defensor, 26 Oct 41.
11. Ibid: Tel GS 284, Defensor to Canmilitary, Stuart to McNaughton, 31 Oct 41.

12. 1/Conf/10/2: Minutes of Conference with Mr. Ralston at C.M.H.Q. 15 Oct 41.
13. Hist Sec file COHQ/C/F Docket III: The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, March 1946, p.14.
14. Ibid, pages 9 and 14, 15.
15. Ibid, p. 16.
16. Ibid.
17. The Globe and Mail, Toronto, 27 Jan 42.
18. McNaughton Diary: 6 Mar 42.
19. Marshall Report 1945, p.8. See also Morison, Samuel Eliot, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume II, Operations in North African Waters, October 1942 - June 1943, New York, 1947, pp. 11-12.
20. Pope Diary: 18 Mar and 1 Jul 42.
21. McNaughton Diary: March 1942, Lieut-General McNaughton's Visit to Washington 8-11 March 1942, memorandum by General Pope.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. 1st Cdn Corps file 1/296/G: Dempsey to Hope, 2 Dec 40.
26. Ibid: Cdn Corps Commander to G.H.Q. Home Forces, 29 Jan 41.
27. The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, 1946, p.16.
28. Report No. 86, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 21 Nov 42.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid: See also Report No. 70, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 18 May 42. At Gourock the detachment boarded H.M.S. Princess Josephine Charlotte, an armed vessel carrying seven assault landing craft and which had participated in the raid on St. Nazaire, and proceeded to Loch Na Keal, Isle of Mull. There, 10 days of intensive training in combined operations was carried out by the men, who lived on the ship; landing exercises by day and practice attacks by night. Climax to the training came with a night attack, from the "Princess Josephine Charlotte" against the Isle of Bute (in the mouth of the Clyde) which was defended by two Commandos and Home Guard detachments. The Canadians were ruled to have captured four of their six objectives. See also Report No. 86, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 21 Nov 42.
31. Report No. 81, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 26 Aug 42, gives a detailed account of the part played by the Canadian detachment in Operation "ABERCROMBIE". Failure of the two landing craft carrying the Canadian detachment to get ashore would seem to have been the result of the inefficiency of the compasses with which they were equipped and, still more, the inexperience of the junior R.N.V.R. officers in charge of them. The detachment of No. 4 Commando, commanded by Major Lord Lovat succeeded in landing, although some distance north of the intended beach; a bridgehead was established and fighting patrols sent out but there was no close contact with the enemy before the party re-embarked.

32. Report No. 86, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 21 Nov 42.
33. Report No. 81, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 18 May 42.
34. McNaughton Diary: 5 May 42.
35. Ibid: April 1942, file PA 3-6, McNaughton to Watson, 19 Apr 42.
36. 6/Exp Force/1: Circular letter 20/Misc/2093 (S.D.5) on Formation of the Expeditionary Force, 20 Feb 42.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid: June 1942, Appx A, Memorandum of a discussion on 2 Jun 1942 at GHQ, Home Forces between C.-in-C. Home Forces and G.O.C.-in-C. First Cdn Army. General Paget also told General McNaughton that he had suggested to General Marshall that United States troops should not be despatched to the United Kingdom until they were fully trained and fit for operations.
40. 6/Exp Force/1: Tel GS 1997, Canmilitary to Defensor, for Stuart from McNaughton, 12 Jun 42.
41. McNaughton Diary: June 1942, file PA 3-6, Memorandum of a Discussion on 11 Jun 42 between C.-in-C. Home Forces and G.O.C.-in-C. First Cdn Army.
42. Ibid: July 1943, file PA 3-6, Memorandum of a Discussion by Lt-Gen McNaughton with C.-in-C., Home Forces, on 8 July 1942. The rubber and petrol situation permitting, General Paget hoped to hold large scale manoeuvres late in September; it was agreed that the 1st and 3rd Canadian Divisions, the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade and as many as possible of the army field and medium artillery regiments of First Canadian Army should participate.
43. Ibid: 9 Jul 42.
44. Pope Diary: 3 Apr 42. General Dewing told General Pope that the American planners took a more "sanguine" view of the difficulties involved in planning a major invasion operation whereas the British planners, from long experience, "laid great store" on the most careful planning and preparation from the administrative point of view.
45. Marshall Report 1945, p.8.
46. Ibid.
47. McNaughton Diary: April 1942, file PA 3-6, Memorandum, Visit of Colonel Huell, U.S. Army, 17 Apr 1942. An unexpected call from Prime Minister Churchill had prevented General Marshall himself from visiting General McNaughton. Colonel Huell told him that an attack on the Continent might be necessary for political reasons. Also, because of accommodation problems in the United Kingdom similar to those facing the Canadian Army, American Engineer units were being despatched overseas ahead of fighting formations to construct camps.
48. Pope Diary: 1 May 42. General Dewing appears to have told General Pope that the British could see more obstacles to an assault on North West Europe than their more enthusiastic, but less experienced, American associates and they had no intention of being "slap-dash about it". General Pope also learned that Prime Minister Mackenzie King, on a visit to Washington two

weeks previously, expressed the view, influenced by the fact that the First Canadian Army would undoubtedly be involved in the assault that such an operation should only be undertaken "if the premise was unmistakably sound and the plan worked out to the last detail."

In this connection it might be noted that, from a general appraisal of My Three Years with Eisenhower by Captain Butcher, it would appear that until his visit to Inveraray to make a routine inspection of the pre-"TORCH" exercises, General Eisenhower remained overly confident in the ability of American troops to be placed into combat without experience. In his diary entry for 19 Oct 42 Captain Butcher notes:

... The troops looked fine - full of spirit, agile and in good physical condition. But Ike was bothered at the lack of experience of the lieutenant, captain and major grades, who did not seem to know what to do after the troops got on the beach. This was a criticism applicable to most of the landings we saw during the night... As a matter of fact, the whole demonstration was disappointing, and Ike felt pretty low on the return trip. (pp. 147-8).

See also Morison, Samuel Eliot, History of United States in World War II, Volume II: Operations in North African Waters October 1942 - June 1943, Boston 1947, pp. 11-15.

49. Ibid: 1 May 42.
50. Ibid. See also The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, p. 19.
51. Report No. 159, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 5 Oct 46.
52. Marshall Report 1945, p.9.
53. Ibid. See also Morison, Samuel Eliot, History of United States in World War II, op cit.
54. Ibid. Also see Butcher, Captain Harry C., My Three Years with Eisenhower, New York, 1946, p.33 et seq.
55. Marshall Report 1945, p.9.
56. Butcher. My Three Years with Eisenhower, p.33
57. Report No. 159, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 5 Oct 46.
58. The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, p. 19
59. Report No. 100, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 16 Jul 43. This report contains a detailed account of the planning for Operations RUTTER and JUBILEE; additional material appears in Report No. 153 of 22 Mar 46 and Report No. 159 of 5 Oct 46.

At a further meeting held on 25 Apr, presided over by Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, the representatives of G.H.Q. Home Forces explained the reasons leading them to favour a frontal attack. This course would appear to have been adopted, partly at least, at the instigation of General Montgomery (G.O.C.-in-C., South Eastern Command) who thought that the procedure of envelopment from the flanks would be too slow; there were too many possibilities of the troops being landed miles away on either side and being held up before they could reach the town. It would be difficult to

achieve surprise if this procedure was adopted; tanks landed at Quiberville would have to cross two rivers en route to Dieppe. Doubt about a frontal assault was expressed by the Naval planners, although not on naval grounds. To allay further objections to a frontal attack, however, a fundamental feature of the outline plan was to be a heavy air bombardment of the town, timed to precede, by as short a time as possible, the arrival of the first flight of infantry and to be of maximum intensity.

60. Report No. 100, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 16 Jul 43; and additional material in Report No. 153, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 22 Mar 46.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. Report No. 159, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 5 Oct 46, states that following the return of Mr. Churchill and General Brooke from Washington in June, a conference was called to ask for opinions on the proposed Operation against Dieppe. Those present included General Brooke, General Ismay and Brigadier Hollis, Lord Louis Mountbatten and Captain Hughes-Hallett. The Prime Minister was worried about it being another Tobruk and asked Lord Louis Mountbatten if he could "guarantee success." When reassured that the troops were all right, the C.I.G.S. followed with the statement that if it was ever intended to invade France it would be necessary to launch a preliminary operation on a divisional scale. Thus the Dieppe operation was essential.
67. Report No. 100, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 16 Jul 43.
68. Report No. 159, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 5 Oct 46.
69. McNaughton's Diary: July 1942, Memorandum, Operation JUBILEE, 25 Jul 42.
70. Report No. 100, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 16 Jul 43.
71. Ibid. The C.M.H.Q. Narrative (C.B. 04244, para 47) states:

The Military Force Commander remained of the view that the destruction which it would cause would make the passage of tanks through Dieppe very difficult, if not impossible, and, the decision not to carry out such a bombardment was therefore maintained.

Writing on 18 Mar 43, General Roberts commented:

The original plan for bombing envisaged two or three minor bombing raids on DIEPPE, prior to the operation. As these had not been carried out, it was felt that a large scale attack, probably inaccurately placed, would merely serve to place the enemy on the alert. This was a considerable factor.

At all stages it was insisted that bombing could only be carried out by night, and inaccuracy, rather than accuracy, was guaranteed.

72. Special Report, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 11 Feb 43, contains a more detailed account.
73. First Cdn Army file PA 1-7-1: War Cabinet Chiefs of Staff Committee, Operation "JUPITER", Memorandum by the Prime Minister, General Ismay for C.O.S. Committee, Most Secret Co. D.106/2, 2 Jun 42.
74. Ibid. Mr. Churchill's plan called for the establishment of six squadrons of fighter and two or three of bomber aircraft at Murmansk as a first step. Next a division would be landed from the sea at Petsamo and a brigade group at the head of the Gulf of _____ to master the airfield. Additional supplies for a three to four month period would be sent in a week later and the force would then have to be self-contained for that period, until it would be possible to send a further convoy. September or October was suggested as a suitable period for the initial assault. During the winter months the "snow tanks" being developed in Canada could be brought into use and the enemy would be at as much disadvantage in attacking.
75. McNaughton Diary: 9 Jul 42. A more detailed account of JUPITER REVIEW is included in Report No. 167, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 3 Dec 46. According to Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1942, Admiralty, June 1947, p.1. et seq Hitler was worried about Norway:

"In particular British raids on Norway greatly disturbed Hitler. Supplemented by persistent rumours and a complex political situation in Scandinavia, these raids convinced Hitler that a full scale invasion of Norway was imminent. He believed that Sweden was on the point of joining the Allies, and he saw that a pincer movement on Norway - a British attack by sea and a combined Russian and Swedish attack by land - would enable the Allies to join forces and seriously hinder the German advance on the Eastern Front.

Hitler's fear of invasion of Norway began towards the end of 1941 and persisted throughout the following year. It coloured his entire strategy against the Western Powers, and even after the Allied landings in North Africa he still insisted that Norway was the danger zone in Germany's defences."

He decided to meet this potential threat by transferring the bulk of the German Navy to Norway and strengthening the Luftwaffe squadrons. Thus in March the three capital ships in Brest made a run for it up the Channel. (Chap XII para 100).

76. First Cdn Army file PA 1-7-1: Tel OS 2386, Canmilitary to Defensor, McNaughton to Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence and C.O.S. only, 9 Jul 42. See also General McNaughton's Personal War Diary: July 1942, Memorandum of Lieut-General McNaughton's visit with the Prime Minister on 12 Jul 42. During the course of a conversation with Mr. Churchill at Chequers on 12 Jul, General McNaughton was told that his review of JUPITER was a "study without commitment to employ Canadian Troops" but that Canadians "naturally knew about cold climates."
77. First Cdn Army file PA 1-7-1: Operation "JUPITER", War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, War Office Fortress, August 4, 1942. Printed for the War Cabinet, August 1942.
78. Ibid.

79. Ibid: Secretary Chiefs of Staff Committee to McNaughton, 11 Sep 42.
80. McNaughton Diary: 22 Sep 42. General McNaughton related that he felt the Prime Minister "was seeking to persuade - perhaps flatter - me into a course of action re 'Jupiter' on which he had set his heart, knowing full well that as originally conceived it did not command the minds of his Chiefs of Staff."
81. First Cdn Army file PA 1-7-1: Tel GS 3284, Canmilitary to Defensor, McNaughton to Stuart, 20 Sep 42.
82. Ibid: Tel GS 3305, Canmilitary to Defensor, McNaughton to Stuart, 22 Sep 42.
83. Ibid: Tel 2108, Prime Minister to Prime Minister, 22 Sep 42.
84. Ibid: Tel GS 3305, Canmilitary to Defensor, McNaughton to Stuart, 22 Sep 42.
85. Ibid: contained in Tel GS 2300, Defensor to Canmilitary, Stuart to McNaughton, 24 Sep 42.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid: Tel GS 3325, Canmilitary to Defensor, McNaughton to Stuart, 24 Sep 42.
88. Ibid: Hollis to McNaughton, 24 Sep 42.
89. Ibid: contained in Tel C.G.S. 475, Defensor to Canmilitary, Stuart to McNaughton, 26 Sep 42.
90. Ibid: Memorandum by Brigadier Simonds, 29 Sep 42.
91. Report No. 168, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 12 Dec 46. 1/Cdn Army/2 Composition Cdn Army Overseas, Third Proposal 5 Aug 42.
92. McNaughton Diary: August 1942, Appx B, Memorandum, Discussion with V.C.I.G.S., War Office, on 3 Aug 42.
93. Ibid: August 1942, file PA 3-6, Notes of a Conference held in Lt-Gen McNaughton's office, H.Q. First Cdn Army, on morning of 10 Aug 42.
94. Ibid: September 1942, Appx B, Memorandum of meeting of General McNaughton with General Paget on 2 September 1942 and Appx I, Memorandum of General McNaughton's Meeting with Sir Alan Brooke - 17 Sep 42.
95. Ibid: October 1942, Appx B, Memorandum, Minutes of a Meeting held in General McNaughton's office at 1720 hrs, 3 Oct 42.
96. Ibid: September 1942, Appx B, Memorandum of meeting of General McNaughton with General Paget on 2 September 1942.
97. This information is based on First Cdn Army file PA 1-10-1 and personal knowledge of Major D.H. Cunningham (formerly O1/c War Diaries, C.M.H.Q.) who at this time was Transport Officer of The Carleton and York Regiment.
98. McNaughton's Diary: September 1942, Appx I, Memorandum of General McNaughton's Meeting with Sir Alan Brooke - 17 Sep 42.
99. Ibid.

100. McNaughton Diary: October 1942, Appx B, Memorandum Minutes of a meeting held in General McNaughton's office at 1720 hrs. 3 Oct 42.
101. Ibid: Appx I, Memorandum 19 Oct 42 and Appx J, Memorandum 18 Oct 42.
102. Ibid: Appx E, Memorandum, Discussion of Army Comd with Lt-Gen Stuart (C.G.S.) at C.M.H.Q., 1600 hrs 15 Oct 42.
103. Ibid: Appx J, Memorandum, 18 Oct 42.
104. Ibid: 16 Jul 42.
105. Ibid: October 1942 (Private and Secret), Memorandum Discussion with Sir Stafford Cripps, 23 Oct 42.
106. Ibid: November 1942, Appx H, Memorandum of Conference, General McNaughton - Field Marshal Smuts - Mr. Waterson, 5 Nov 42.
107. Ibid: (Secret and Private) Discussion with Hon. L.S. Amery, Secretary of State for India, 8 Nov 42.
108. First Cdn Army file PA 1-0: Examination of Forces required to defend the United Kingdom, 28 Sep 42.
109. McNaughton Diary: September 1942, Appx E, Memorandum of Meeting with General Swayne (S.E.C.C.) on 10 September 1942.
110. Ibid: 15 Sep 42 and Appx I, Memorandum of General McNaughton's Meeting with Sir Alan Brooke - 17 Sep 42.
111. Ibid: October 1942, Appx I, Memorandum, 19 Oct 42.
112. Ibid: October 1942, Appx H, Memorandum of questions arising during the visit of Minister of National Defence, 26 Oct 42.
113. Report No. 168, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 12 Dec 46, contains a more detailed account of the implementation of the Army programme. Also 1/Cdn Army/1/2: Tel GS 3789, Canmilitary to Defensor, for Stuart from McNaughton, 9 Nov 42.
114. Ibid: See also 1/Cdn Army/2: Tel C.G.S. 615, Defensor to Canmilitary, for McNaughton from Stuart, 15 Nov 42.
115. 1/Cdn Army/1/2: Tel GS 3890, Canmilitary to Defensor, 17 Nov 42.
116. McNaughton Diary: November 1942, Appx P, Memorandum of Conference with C.I.G.S. re Manpower on 19 Nov 42.
117. Ibid: In view of the statements made by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris in Bomber Offensive (London, 1947) regarding the actual strength of Bomber Command and the limited amount of damage which could be, and was, caused to German cities and industries during the early months of 1943, General Brooke's optimism is a bit hard to understand. Indeed it can only be thoroughly grasped after realizing that both the opponents and proponents of all-out strategic bombing had but very hazy ideas as to the extent of the possible damage. Also see note 299.
118. Ibid.
119. 1/Cdn Army/1/2: Organization First Cdn Army, 2 Dec 42.
120. McNaughton Diary: January 1943, Appx M, Minutes of a Conference held at H.Q. First Cdn Army at 1120 hrs, 10 January 1943.

121. 1/Conf Plans/1: B.G.S., First Cdn Army, to Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., 25 Nov 42.
122. Ibid: Summary of Manpower Required, 18 Dec 42.
123. 1/Cdn Army/1/2: Tel GS 4182, Canmilitary to Defensor, 21 Dec 42.
124. Ibid: Memorandum by Brigadier Rodger, 23 Dec 42.
125. Ibid: Tel CGS 693, Defensor to Canmilitary, 23 Dec 42, and Tel CGS 16, Defensor to Canmilitary, 7 Jan 43.
126. Report No. 168, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 12 Dec 46, and 1/Cdn Army/1/2: Tel CGS 38, Defensor to Canmilitary, 15 Jan 43 and Tel GS 422, Canmilitary to Defensor, 26 Feb 43.
127. Ibid: Extract from Memorandum of Conversation, 12 Feb 43.
128. Ibid: Tel CGS 139, Defensor to Canmilitary, 6 Mar 43; Tel CGS 149, Defensor to Canmilitary, 13 Mar 43; also 1/Cdn Army/1/3: Tel GS 589, Canmilitary to Defensor, 20 Mar 43.
129. Butcher, Captain Harry C., My Three Years with Eisenhower, p. 158.
130. McNaughton Diary: October 1942, Appx I, Memorandum, 19 Oct 42.
131. Report No. 167, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 3 Dec 46, contains a more detailed account of the planning done for Operation "TONIC".
132. First Cdn Army file PA 1-11-1: War Cabinet, Joint Planning Staff, Operation "TONIC", Report by the Joint Planning Staff, 16 Dec 42.
133. Ibid: Tel CGS 552, Defensor to Canmilitary, Stuart to Canmilitary, Stuart to McNaughton, 22 Oct 42.
134. McNaughton Diary: October 1942, Appx M, McNaughton to Brooke, 23 Oct 42.
135. First Cdn Army file PA 1-11-1 has a copy of the Directive.
136. Ibid: Memorandum of 22 Dec 42 by General Crerar contains his following statement: "As indicated in the minutes of this meeting, the ability of the Force Commanders to carry out these instructions is negatived, in a practical sense, by the continued preoccupation of the Naval Force Commander on other duties."
137. First Cdn Army file 7-1-2 (Ops): Crerar to McNaughton, 8 Dec 42.
138. Ibid: Page to Mann, 19 Nov 42.
139. Ibid: Mountbatten to McNaughton, 23 Dec 42.
140. Ibid: Memorandum of discussion by Lt-Gen A.G.L. McNaughton with Lt-Gen Swayne at S.E.C.O. at 1645 hrs 2 Nov 42.
141. First Cdn Army file 7-1-2 (Ops): Report by the Joint Planning Staff, Operation "TONIC" (circulated for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff), 16 Dec 42, and Memorandum on Operation TONIC to Executive Planning Section, Joint Planning Staff, 22 Dec 42.

142. McNaughton Diary: December 1942, Appx K, Memorandum to telephone conversation General McNaughton - General Kennedy, DMO, War Office, 28 Dec 42.
143. Ibid: Appx O, Memorandum of Conversation General McNaughton - General Brooke, C.I.G.S., War Office, 31 Dec 42.
144. Ibid: December 1942, Appx J, Press Conference held in Army Comd's office, 1800 hrs, Thursday, 17 Dec 42.
145. Pope Diary: 28 Nov 42.
146. McNaughton Diary: September 1942, Appx I, Memorandum of General McNaughton's meeting with Prime Minister Churchill on 19 Sep 42.
147. Pope Diary, 28 Nov 42.
148. First Cdn Army file PA 1-0-3: Tel CGS 603, Defensor to Cannilitary, for McNaughton from Stuart, 9 Nov 42.
149. Ibid: Doucet to Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., 14 Nov 42, enclosing draft telegram to be despatched to Ottawa.
150. Ibid: Rodger to H.Q. First Cdn Army (Attn P.A.), 7 Dec 42. For more details of these attachments see Report No. 95, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 12 May 43.
151. Ibid: Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., to A.G.lb(x), War Office, 11 Jan 43. A telegram had been received at the War Office on 8 Jan from A.F.H.Q. recommending that Canadians be carried surplus to unit establishment since it was "clearly most undesirable displace British personnel to make vacancies in establishment" when the former were only going to be there for three months. General Montague had replied that the whole purpose of the attachments would be defeated as it was desired to obtain the maximum amount of training and experience possible in a short time and this could not be done if the Canadians were merely carried as supernumeraries.
152. Ibid: Memorandum by Lt-Col Spry, 21 Apr 43. Following his return from North Africa in July, General McNaughton informed the Senior Officer (McNaughton to Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., 23 Jul 43) that Major-General Gale, M.G.A., A.F.H.Q., had offered to take two Canadian Officers on a four months' attachment for instruction in "Q" Plans and Movements. On completion of this attachment General McNaughton hoped to replace them by two further officers.
153. First Cdn Army file PA 1-3-1: Crerar to McNaughton, 27 Sep 42.
154. Ibid: McNaughton to Crerar, 28 Sep 42.
155. Ibid: Crerar to McNaughton, 16 Jan 43.
156. Ibid: Report on Visit to 8th Army, by General Crerar, 21 Feb 43, Appx J.
157. First Cdn Army file PA 1-3-3: Report of Visit to Eighth Army by Brigadier G.G. Simonds, 29 Apr 43.
158. McNaughton Diary: January 1943, Appx G, Memorandum of Conversation General McNaughton - General Brooke, C.I.G.S., War Office, 1215 hrs 6 Jan 43. See also W.D. Cdn Planning Staff: January 1943, Appx I, copy of establishment. Month's diary tells of early development.
159. Report No. 168, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 12 Dec 46.
160. W.D. Cdn Planning Staff: February 1943, Appx I, Terms of Reference Cdn Planning Staff, 1 Feb 43.

161. Ibid: 6 Feb 43.
162. Ibid: 1 Feb 43 and 22 Mar 43.
163. The Evolution & Development of Combined Operations Technique and Material, p.22.
164. Ibid, p. 23, see also Pope Diary: 11 Nov and 28 Nov 42.
165. Marshall Report 1945, p.10.
166. Butcher, Captain Harry C., My Three Years with Eisenhower, p. 218.
167. McNaughton Diary: December 1942, Appx O, Memorandum of Conversation General McNaughton - General Brooke, C.I.G.S. held at War Office at 1700 hrs, 31 Dec 42.
168. Ibid: January 1943, Appx F, Memorandum of Conversation General McNaughton - Brigadier Simpson, D.D.M.O.(O), War Office, 1130 hrs, 6 Jan 43.
169. First Cdn Army file PA 1-12-1: Extract from C.O.S.(43) 4th Meeting (O), War Cabinet, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Assault Shipping and Landing Craft, 6 Jan 43.
170. Ibid: Whitaker to McNaughton, 30 Jan 43.
171. McNaughton Diary: February 1943, Appx I, Memorandum of Conversation Lt-Gen McNaughton - Gen Sir Bernard Paget, C-in-C, Home Forces, 10 Feb 43.
172. Ibid: January 1943, Appx M, Minutes of a Conference held at H.Q. First Cdn Army, at 1130 hrs, 10 January 1943.
173. Ibid: February 1943: Appx I, Memorandum of Conversation Lt-Gen McNaughton - Gen Sir Bernard Paget, C-in-C, Home Forces, 10 Feb 43.
174. Ibid: Appx "N", Memorandum of Conversation General McNaughton - General Stuart at C.M.H.Q., 1530 hrs, 12 Feb 43.
175. Ibid: April 1943, Appx I, Memorandum of Conversation General McNaughton with General Sir Alan Brooke, C.I.G.S., War Office, at 1530 hrs, 5 Apr 43. See also 1/Cdn Army/1/2: Tel GS 4260, Camilitary to Defensor, for Stuart from McNaughton, 2 Jan 43.
176. First Cdn Army file PA 1-0-4: Minutes of a Conference held by C-in-C Home Forces with GsOC-in-C, South Eastern Command and Canadian Army at 1000 hrs, 12 April, at GHQ Home Forces.
177. Ibid. Training facilities for combined operations were limited and General Paget had offered to assist General McNaughton in setting up a distinctly Canadian centre, possibly on the Bristol Channel.
178. Ibid. Also see C.M.H.Q. file 1/SPEC ASSAULT/1, the folios of which discuss the reorganization of the 79th Armoured Division. This division, under the command of Major-General Percy Hobart was not designed to operate as a complete formation, but its brigades would be allotted to support other formations for particular operations. During 1943 it was engaged in the further development of techniques for beach assaults, in conjunction with the British 1st Corps, and for assaults against inland defences, in conjunction with the British 1st and 12th Corps. A trial organization of one brigade of DD tanks and one brigade of Scorpion vehicles was tried out.

General McNaughton hoped that, for 1944, it would be possible to supply a quota of Canadian specialized assault units to serve with the "assault" 1st Canadian Division; such later proved impossible, however, due to the limitations imposed by the manpower ceiling and the shipping programme.

179. First Cdn Army file PA 5-0-33: Tel GS 570, Canmilitary to Defensor, for Stuart from McNaughton, 16 Mar 43.
180. Ibid. The involved correspondence on this file eventually disclosed that the difficulty could be overcome by taking a common sense point of view and overberthing ships which hitherto had conveyed troops across the Atlantic in somewhat more luxurious surroundings than "troopers" plying to other parts of the world. This "muddle" seems to have been caused purely by too arbitrary planning which left no room for improvisation and might have been avoided if an attempt had been made in the beginning to solve the problem, instead of curtailing existing programmes as an easy way out.
181. Ibid.: Tel CGS 160, Defensor to Canmilitary, for McNaughton from Stuart, 18 Mar 43. See also Pope Diary, 25 May 43, which included a letter he sent to General Stuart containing information learned from Brigadier W. Porter, D Plans, War Office, who was in Washington at the "TRIDENT" Conference in Washington:

As I said the other day, C.I.G.S. told me that he had advised you and Andy against participation in a contemplated operation because at the time he had quite another in mind for you. I shall go into this a little later.

In the meantime let me say that much of what you were told during the first few days of February seems to have been a lot of moonshine. Casablanca produced nothing more than an agreement to carry out Husky and to continue building Bolero so as to be prepared to launch Round-Up or, more probably, a reverse Dunkirk should the situation this summer become such as to make either of the two last-named a practical proposition.

... However, last winter some consideration was given to a side show - on a big scale perhaps but nevertheless still a side show - on the other side of the Channel. So far as I can gather it was to be a short-term affair of two or three days' duration, involving the employment of about three divisions. The idea seems to have been rather short-lived. Such, apparently, is the "other operation" that C.I.G.S. had in mind when you last saw him in London.

182. Ibid.
183. Ibid.: No. 47 Cypher, for Prime Minister from the Prime Minister, Canada (Govt) to D.O., 17 Mar 43.
184. Ibid.: Cypher No. 60, D.O. to Canada (Govt), for the Prime Minister from Prime Minister, 20 Mar 43.
185. Pope Diary: 25 May 43.
186. First Cdn Army file PA 5-0-33: Tel GS 598, Canmilitary to Defensor, for Stuart from McNaughton, 20 Mar 43.
187. Ibid.: Tel CGS 196, Defensor to Canmilitary, for McNaughton from Stuart, 31 Mar 43.

188. McNaughton Diary, April 1943: Appx I, Memorandum of Conversation General McNaughton with General Sir Alan Brooke, C.I.G.S. War Office, at 1530 hrs, 5 Apr 43.
189. Ibid: Appx GGG, Memorandum of a Discussion Lt-Gen McNaughton - Lt-Gen Ismay at War Cabinet Offices, 1230 hrs, 27 Apr 43.
190. Ibid.
191. Ibid: Appx "X", Memorandum of Conference held at HQ First Cdn Army 1730 hrs 13 Apr 43.
192. Ibid.
193. Ibid.
194. First Cdn Army file PA 1-0-6: Tel GS 840, Canmilitary to Defensor, for Stuart from McNaughton, 16 Apr 43.
195. Ibid: Tel GS 855, Canmilitary to Defensor, for Stuart from McNaughton, 17 Apr 43.
196. Ibid: Tel CGS 277, Defensor to Canmilitary, for McNaughton from Stuart, 18 Apr 43.
197. McNaughton Diary, April 1943: Appx FF, COSSAC Memorandum No. 1, 19 Apr 43.
198. Ibid: Appx NN, Memorandum No. 2, COSSAC, 22 Apr 43, and Appx OO, Memorandum No. 3, COSSAC, 26 Apr 43.
199. Ibid: Appx ZZ, Memorandum No. 4, COSSAC, 24 Apr 43. General McNaughton had already decided that General Turner should continue to live at Headquarters, First Cdn Army, although he was working at Norfolk House. For security reasons, the latter's only contacts with C.M.H.Q. Department of Munitions and Supply and Canada House would be Brigadier N.E. Rodger (B.G.S., C.M.H.Q.). General Turner would report direct to General McNaughton on all matters of policy, including items to be reported back to the C.G.S. in Ottawa.
200. Ibid.
201. Ibid.
202. Pope Diary, 25 May 43. General Pope was informed by Brigadier W. Porter, during the course of the "TRIDENT" Conference in Washington, of some of the discussions which had gone on behind the scenes in London and the factors which had influenced the selection of a Canadian component to take part in Operation "HUSKY".
203. McNaughton Diary: April 1943, Appx PP, Memorandum of a Discussion General McNaughton - General Sir Alan Brooke, (C.I.G.S., War Office) at 1700 hrs, 23 April 1943.
204. Ibid: Appx RR, Memorandum of Conversation General McNaughton - Maj.-Gen. Kennedy (DMO(O)) at the War Office, 1830 hrs, 23 April 1943.
205. First Cdn Army file PA 1-14-1: Tels GS 906 and 907, Canmilitary to Defensor, for Stuart from McNaughton, 23 Apr 43.
206. Ibid: McNaughton to Brooke, 25 Apr 43, and 26 Apr 43.
207. McNaughton Diary: April 1943, Appx GGG, Memorandum of a Discussion Lt.-Gen. McNaughton - Lt.-Gen. Ismay at War Cabinet Offices, 1230 hrs, 27 Apr 43.

208. Report No. 126, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 16 Nov 44, gives a detailed account of the preliminaries of Operation "HUSKY".
209. McNaughton Diary: April 1943, Appx GGG, Memorandum of a Discussion Lt.-Gen. McNaughton - Lt.-Gen. Ismay at War Cabinet Offices, 1230 hrs, 27 Apr 1943.
210. Report No. 126, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 16 Nov 44.
211. McNaughton Diary: June 1943; Contains copy of directive.
212. Ibid.
213. Report No. 126, Historical Officer, C.M.H.Q., 16 Nov 44.
214. Ibid.
215. Ibid.
216. McNaughton Diary: May 1943; Appx "B", Memorandum No. 5, COSSAC, 1 May 43. Should a return to the Continent prove necessary, American troops direct from the United States would have to be landed in France.
217. Ibid: Appx "G", Minutes of a Conference held at HQ First Cdn Army, 1645 hrs, 3 May 43.
218. Ibid: Appx "M", draft Tel GS 1014, Canmilitary to Defensor, for Stuart from McNaughton, 6 May 43. It would appear that the British Chiefs of Staff were fully aware that there would be neither the personnel nor equipment to attempt an opposed landing in North West Europe during 1943.
219. Ibid.
220. Ibid: Appx EE, Memorandum of a Conversation General McNaughton - General Morgan (COSSAC) at Norfolk House, 1515 hrs, 17 May 43. General Morgan said he was satisfied with the present arrangement whereby General Turner was Canadian Liaison Officer to COSSAC. General Morgan went on to state that he had found General Paget "exceedingly difficult to work with" and doubted that he would be appointed to command the Anglo-Canadian Army Group as, in his opinion, he was "too narrow-minded" for such a task. General McNaughton stated that he had always been quite satisfied to take "operational direction" from General Paget in matters concerning the defence of the United Kingdom but that as the Canadian Army was self-contained he had had very little to do with G.H.Q. Home Forces in an administrative way.
221. Ibid: Appx "II", Memorandum of Conversation General McNaughton - General Sir Bernard Montgomery, KCB, DSO, GOC-in-C, Eighth Army, at the War Office, 1430 hrs, 19 May 43.
222. Ibid: Appx JJ, Memorandum of a Conversation General McNaughton - General Paget (C-in-C, Home Forces), at GHQ, Home Forces, at 1600 hrs, 19 May 43.
223. Ibid: Appx NN, Memorandum No. 9, COSSAC, 23 May 43.
224. Ibid: Appx WW, Memorandum of a Conversation General McNaughton - Lt.-Gen. Sir Archibald Nye (VCIGS) at the War Office, 1600 hrs, 27 May 43.

225. Ibid, June 1943: Appx "K", Memorandum No. 14, COSSAC, 9 Jun 43. The object had been set forth by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as: "to secure a lodgment on the Continent from which further offensive operations can be carried out and which will include Continental ports through which the initial assault and build-up forces can be augmented by follow-up formations from U.S. etc."
226. Marshall Report 1945, p.11.
227. McNaughton Diary: June 1943, Appx "R", Memorandum of Conversation General McNaughton - Lt.-Gen. Sir Archibald Nye, VCIGS, at the War Office, 1500 hrs, 12 Jun 43.
228. Ibid: Appx "T", Minutes of a Conference held at HQ First Canadian Army, 1600 hrs, 15 June 1943. See also Report No.168, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 12 Dec 46 for a detailed account of the changes in organization of First Canadian Army.
229. Ibid: Appx "V", Memorandum of Conversation General McNaughton - General Paget, 1130 hrs, 17 Jun 43.
230. McNaughton Diary: July 1943, Appx "A", Memorandum No. 18, COSSAC, 2 Jul 43.
231. Ibid: June 1943, Appx "Z", Memorandum of a Discussion General McNaughton - Maj-Gen. Kennedy, D.M.O., at the War Office, 1200 hrs, 19 Jun 43.
232. Ibid, May 1943: Appx AAA, Memorandum No. 12, COSSAC, 30 May 43.
233. Ibid, June 1943; Appx "O", Memorandum No. 15, COSSAC, 11 Jun 43.
234. Ibid: Appx JJ, Memorandum on Discussion regarding Deception Exercises, 24 Jun 43.
235. War Diary of Major-General G.R. Turner: 26 Jun 43.
236. McNaughton Diary: July 1943, Appx "A", Memorandum No. 18, COSSAC, 2 Jul 43.
237. Butcher, My Three Years with Eisenhower, p. 448.
238. McNaughton Diary: August 1943; Appx "S", Memorandum No.25, COSSAC, 27 Aug 43, and Appx "T", Memorandum No. 26, COSSAC, 27 Aug 43.
239. Ibid: July 1943; Appx "J", Report on Visit to North Africa, 6-20 July 1943, by Lt.-Gen. A.G.L. McNaughton, CB, CMG, DSO, GOC-in-C First Cdn Army.
240. Ibid. Also May 1943, Appx WW, Memorandum of a Conversation General McNaughton - Lt.-Gen. Sir Archibald Nye (VCIGS) at the War Office, 1600 hrs, 27 May 43.
241. Ibid, July 1943: Appx "M", Memorandum of a Conversation with General Sir Alan Brooke at the War Office, Wednesday, 21 July 1943.
242. Ibid: Appx "L", Memorandum No. 20, COSSAC, 16 Jul 43.
243. Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1943, Admiralty, May 1947, pp 25-26, 30, 32, 35 and 59. See also Report No. 14, Historical Section (GS), AHQ, 15 Apr 47.

244. First Cdn Army file PA 1-14-1: Memorandum, by Lt-Col Spry, 6 May 43 and Tel GS 1022, Canmilitary to Defensor, for Stuart from McNaughton, 6 May 43.
245. Ibid: Memorandum by Major Cunningham, 7 May 43. Also PA 1-12-1: Memorandum by Lt-Col Spry, 24 Jul 43, states that with "the continued success of the North Africa campaign the Chiefs of Staff Committee decided that the mounting of Operation "BRIMSTONE" was not necessary."
246. First Cdn Army file PA 1-14-1: Tel CGS 448, Defensor to Canmilitary, for McNaughton from Stuart, 8 May 43.
247. Ibid: Tel GS 1050, Canmilitary to Defensor, for Stuart from McNaughton, 9 May 43.
248. McNaughton Diary: July 1943, Appx "U", Memorandum of Conversation Lt-Gen A.G.L. McNaughton - Lt-Gen K. Stuart - Lt-Gen F.K. Morgan, at Norfolk House, 1500 hrs, 27 July 1943.
249. Ibid.
250. Ibid: Appx "X", Memorandum of a discussion Hon. J.L. Ralston - Lt-Gen McNaughton - Lt-Gen Stuart at HQ First Cdn Army, 29 July 1943.
251. Ibid.
252. Pope Diary, 3 Aug 43.
253. McNaughton Diary: August 1943, Appx "F", Conversation General McNaughton - Hon J.L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence - General Stuart, CGS, 5 August 1943.
254. Ibid.
255. Ibid: Appx "J", Discussion General McNaughton - Hon J.L. Ralston, Minister of National Defence - Lt-Gen K. Stuart, CGS, at HQ First Cdn Army, 7 August 1943.
256. Ibid: Appx "P", Memorandum of a discussion, Lt-Gen McNaughton and Maj-Gen Kennedy, D.M.C., War Office, 17 Aug 43.
257. Pope Diary: 28 Aug 43.
258. The War at Sea in the Mediterranean: Essay by Vice-Admiral Weichold, German Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, Admiralty, 1947, p.102.
259. McNaughton Diary: August 1943, Appx "T", Memorandum No. 26, COSSAC, 27 Aug 43.
260. Ibid: Appx "R", Report on Visit to North Africa and Sicily 18-28 Aug 1943, by Lt-Gen A.G.L. McNaughton, CB, CMG, DSO, GOC-in-C, First Cdn Army.
261. Ibid.
262. First Cdn Army file PA 1-18-1: Tel GS 2385, Defensor to Canmilitary, to McNaughton from Stuart, 1 Sep 43.
263. McNaughton Diary: September 1943, Appx "A", Memorandum of a Conversation - Lt-Gen A.G.L. McNaughton - Lt-Gen Sir Archibald Nye, VCIGS, at the War Office, 2 Sep 43.

264. Ibid.
265. Ibid.
266. Ibid: Appx "G", Memorandum of a Conference with General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, at the War Office, 1530 hrs, 14 Sep 43.
267. First Cdn Army file PA 1-18-1: Tel GS 949, Defensor to Canmilitary, for McNaughton from Stuart, 16 Sep 43.
268. Ibid: Tel GS 973, Defensor to Canmilitary, for McNaughton from Stuart, 29 Sep 43. See also copies of telegrams on First Cdn Army file PA 6-9-S-7.
269. First Cdn Army file PA 1-18-1: Telegram, Massey to External, 30 Sep 43.
270. Ibid: Massey to Churchill, 4 Oct 43.
271. McNaughton Diary: October 1943, Appx "E", Memorandum of a Discussion with General Sir Alan Brooke, CIGS, War Office, Thurs, 7 Oct 43.
272. Ibid.
273. First Cdn Army file PA 1-18-1: Tel GS 1021, Defensor to Canmilitary for McNaughton from Stuart, 8 Oct 43. In reply see Tel GS 2518, Canmilitary to Defensor, 11 Oct 43.
274. Ibid: Tel GS 1039, Defensor to Canmilitary, for McNaughton from Stuart, 12 Oct 43.
275. Operations of British, Indian and Dominion Forces in Italy 3 September 1943 to 2 May 1945: Part I, The Conquest of Southern Italy 3 September 1943 to 26 March 1944, Section A, Allied Strategy, Chapter II, Operations 21 September 1943 to 26 March 1944, British Historical Section, Central Mediterranean, pp 7-8.
276. Ibid.
277. Ibid.
278. First Cdn Army file PA 1-18-1: Tel NAF 477, Algiers to HQ ETOUSA and Agwar for Action, 19 Oct 43.
279. Ibid: Tel OZ 3288, Air Ministry to Britman, Washington, 21 Oct 43.
280. Ibid: Tel ACG 21, 15 Army Group (from Tow) to Canmilitary, to General McNaughton from General Simonds, 14 Oct 43.
281. Ibid: Cipher GS/2177, C-in-C. Middle East to War Office, for General McNaughton, Canadian Army, from General Montgomery, 16 Oct 43.
282. Ibid: Tel GS 2545, Canmilitary to 15 Army Group (Rear), to Tow for Simonds from McNaughton, 15 Oct 43.
283. McNaughton Diary: October 1943, Appx "N" contains copies of the Directive given to General Crerar and other relevant documents.
284. Ibid.

285. See Report No. 170, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 10 Feb 47, for an account of the movement of 1st Canadian Corps to the Mediterranean.
286. Crerar Diary, 1 Nov 43.
287. McNaughton Diary: September 1943, Appx "B", Memorandum No. 27, COSSAC, 4 Sep 43.
288. Ibid.
289. Ibid: September 1943, Appx "H", Memorandum No. 30, COSSAC, 17 Sep 43; and Appx "M", Memorandum No. 32, COSSAC, 24 Sep 43.
290. 1/COS/7: Tel GS 2572, Canmilitary to Defensor, for Stuart from McNaughton, 19 Oct 43.
291. Ibid: Tel GS 2671, Canmilitary to Defensor, for Stuart from McNaughton, 28 Oct 43.
292. Ibid: Tel GS 1138, Defensor to Canmilitary, for McNaughton from Stuart, 29 Oct 43.
293. McNaughton Diary: November 1943, Appx "B", Memorandum of Meeting with OIGS at War Office, 1 Nov 43.
294. Ibid.
295. Ibid: Appx "F", Memorandum of Discussions with Col Ralston (Minister of National Defence) and Lt-Gen K. Stuart (CGS), 10 Nov 43. See also First Cdn Army files PA 5-0-3-2 and PA 6-9-C-8-1.
296. Ibid.
297. Ibid.
298. Ibid.
299. Harris, Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir Arthur, Bomber Offensive, London, 1947, pp 263 and 265. In his concluding chapter, summing up the effect of Bomber Offensive, Sir Arthur Harris writes:

... it was not until 1944 that our strength and equipment was anything like equal to our task, though even then we only had a force of between a third and a quarter of what had been originally estimated as necessary for the bombing offensive against Germany.

In the last three months of 1944 a greater weight of bombs was dropped than in the whole of 1943. Moreover, it was only in the last few months of 1944, just when production in Germany began to fall most rapidly, that we were allowed to use any considerable part of our force against German industrial cities. Over the entire period of the war only 45 per cent of the Command's whole effort was against German cities, so that in fact we were using for the main offensive a force which was not only less than one-quarter of the strength originally planned, but nearer one-eighth.

It is an obvious and most certain conclusion that if we had had the force we used in 1944 a year earlier, and if we had then been allowed to use it together with the whole American bomber force, and without interruption, Germany

/would

would have been defeated outright by bombing as Japan was; the two atom bombs only added three per cent to the already existing devastation, and their use against two cities merely gave the Japanese, as all American authorities agree, a pretext for immediate surrender when they had already been defeated by area bombing of the same kind as that used against Germany. To have had the force we built up in 1944 a year earlier would have been perfectly feasible, and this is not an absurd speculation like wondering what aircraft could have done in the Battle of Waterloo. We were only prevented from having that force by the fact that the Allied war leaders did not have enough faith in strategic bombing. As a result, the two older services were able to employ a large part of the nation's war effort and industrial capacity in the production and use of their older weapons, and were also able, when the older weapons failed, to get what amounted to more than half our existing bomber force used for their own purposes.

... But I am quite certain that if we had had an adequate bomber force to attack Germany a year earlier, that is, in 1943, or if we had not had the pre-invasion bombing and the bombing of the V-weapon sites to divert us in 1944, we should never have had to mount an invasion on anything like the scale that proved necessary. Once again let me point out that in the last three months of 1944 Bomber Command had dropped as great a weight of bombs as in the whole of 1943; there was no reason at all why we should not have been as ready for the offensive in 1943 as in 1944 except that we did not get the men, aircraft, and equipment when we asked for them, and we were always being diverted from the main offensive by the demands of other services. As the Americans also suffered continuously from similar diversions without these diversions the result would have been the inevitable and total collapse of Germany and there would have been no need for the invasion.

300. Pope Diary: 11 Nov 43. General Pope wrote that... "the calmness with which this referred to, as to be carried out when conditions are suitable, if ever, is what made me wonder if the gentle art of deception is not being played."
301. McNaughton Diary: September 1943, Appx "H", Memorandum No. 30, COSSAC, 17 Sep 43.
302. Brereton, Lewis H., The Brereton Diaries, New York, 1946, p.219.
303. Operation "RANKIN" - CASE "C": Joint Plan by Commander-in-Chief Nore, Commander-in-Chief 21 Army Group and Air Officer Commanding 2 Tactical Air Force, 23 Nov 43.
304. Ibid.
305. W.D., H.Q. First Cdn Army "A" Plans: January 1944, Appx "A", is W.D. of "RANKIN CASE C", 16 Nov 43 to 22 Jan 44.
306. Lee-Richardson, Major J., 21 Army Group Ordnance: The Story of the Campaign in North West Europe, Germany, 1945, p.12.
307. Ibid: Appx "K", Memorandum No. 38, COSSAC, 12 Nov 43.
308. De Guingand, Major-General Sir Francis, Operation "VICTORY", London, 1947, pp 470-471.

309. Butcher, Captain Harry C., Three Years with Eisenhower, p.447 et seq; and Martel, Lieutenant-General Sir Giffard, The Russian Outlook, London 1947, pp.113-118 and 158-162.
310. Ibid.
311. Eisenhower Report, p.3.
312. Operation Victory, op cit., p.344.
313. Stuart file SIT REPORTS Italian theatre and N.W.E.: Memorandum by Brigadier C. Foulkes on Visit to Gen Montgomery, Saturday, 8 Jan 44.
314. 24/AEF/1/6: Minutes of the Fourth Conference held by the Air C.-in-C., A.E.A.F. at Bentley Priory, Stanmore, 26th January 1944.
315. Ibid: Burchill to Stacey, 24 Aug 46.
316. Report No. 147, Historical Section, C.M.H.Q., 3 Dec 45.
317. 1/COS/6: Tel GS 396, Canmilitary to Defensor, Ralston and Murchie from Stuart, 8 Feb 44.
318. Ibid: Tel GS 69, Defensor to Canmilitary, Stuart from Murchie, 8 Feb 44.
319. Tel GS 410, Canmilitary to Defensor, Murchie from Stuart, 9 Feb 44.
320. Ibid: Ralston to Stuart, 13 Feb 44.
321. Ibid.
322. Ibid: Tel GS 518, Canmilitary to Defensor, Ralston from Stuart, 18 Feb 44.
323. Ibid.
324. Ibid: Tel GS 2442, Defensor to Canmilitary, for Stuart from Ralston, 21 Feb 44.
325. Ibid: Tel GS 588, Canmilitary to Defensor, Ralston from Stuart, 24 Feb 44.
326. Ibid.
327. 1/COS/7: Tel COS 47, Canmilitary to Defensor, Ralston from Stuart, 12 Apr 44.
328. 1/COS/6: Stuart to G.O.C.-in-C., First Cdn Army, 21 Apr 44.
329. Ibid.
330. Ibid: Crerar to C. of S., C.M.H.Q., 24 Apr 44.
331. Ibid.
332. Ibid.
333. Ibid: Tel COS 60, Canmilitary to Defensor, Ralston from Stuart, 25 Apr 44.
334. Ibid: Tel GS 3021, Defensor to Canmilitary, for Stuart from Ralston, 27 Apr 44.

335. Ibid: Crerar to C. of S., C.M.H.Q., 29 Apr 44.
336. Ibid: Murchie to Crerar, 19 May 44.
337. Ibid: Tel GS 342, Defensor to Canmilitary, Stuart from Murchie, 25 May 44.
338. Ibid: Crerar to Stuart, 13 May 44.
339. Ibid: Stuart to Brooke, 18 May 44.
340. Ibid: Stuart to Crerar, 19 May 44.
341. Ibid: Stuart to Crerar, 26 and 29 May 44.
342. Ibid: Stuart to Crerar, 29 May 44.
343. Ibid.
344. Ibid: Crerar to Stuart, 30 May 44.
345. Ibid: Crerar to Stuart, 10 Jun 44.
346. Ibid: Stuart to Brooke, 16 Jun 44.
347. Ibid: Brooke to Stuart, 17 Jun 44.
348. Ibid: Brooke to Stuart, 19 Jun 44.
349. Ibid: Tel C 80, G.O.C.-in-C., First Cdn Army to Canmilitary, Stuart from Crerar, 4 Sep 44; Tel COS 234, Canmilitary to G.O.C.-in-C., First Cdn Army, Crerar from Stuart, 6 Sep 44; Tel COS 235, Canmilitary to Defensor, Murchie from Stuart, 6 Sep 44.
350. Eisenhower Report, pp.117-118.