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Situation of the Canadian Military Forces in
the United Kingdom, Spring, 1942 : II.

Training Programme of 1st Canadian Corps.

Exercises "BEAVER III",

Apr 42, and "BEAVER IV", 10-13 May 42.

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1. This report deals with the training programme at present being pursued by 1 Cdn Corps, and with Exercise "BEAVER III", carried out 22-24 Apr 42, and "BEAVER IV" carried out 10-13 May 42, which were important parts of that programme.

2. The report is based to a considerable extent on two conversations of the writer with Brigadier G.G.SIMONDS (E.G.S., 1 Cdn Corps), at C.M.H.Q. on 27 Mar 42 and at Advanced H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps on 15 Apr 42. The information thus obtained has been supplemented by use of C.M.H.Q. files. With respect to "BEAVER III", the writer accompanied Brigadier M.H.S.PENHALE (E.G.S., C.M.H.Q.) and Major J.G.K. STRATHY (Q.O.R. of C.) to the area of operations and saw a good deal of the events of 22-23 Apr. He subsequently accompanied Brigadier PENHALE on "BEAVER IV" 12-13 May.

3. **CORPS TRAINING PROGRAMME**

3. The Corps training programme now going forward is a matter of some significance in the history of the Canadian Army Overseas, for Brigadier Simonds points out that it is the most complete programme of progressive training (beginning with individual training, and progressing through that of sub-units and units up to the employment of formations in exercises on the Corps level) yet carried out by Canadian troops in this country. The original training of 1 Cdn Div (1939-40) was interrupted by the operational emergencies of the spring and early summer of 1940; and while a pretty comprehensive programme was pursued by Cdn Corps in 1940-41 (see weekly General Reports, C.M.H.Q. file 4/PROGRESS/2; and Corps Training Instructions, especially No. 3 (19 Jan 41), C.M.H.Q. file 2/TRNG INSTRN/ 3), it was scarcely so complete as the one now drawing to a close.

4. Brief reference to the present programme has already been made in Report No. 60. As laid down in Cdn Corps Training Instruction No. 5 (21 Nov 41) as amended (23 Jan 42), and further amended by Training Instruction No. 6 (25 Feb 42), the stages were as follows :

1 Dec 41 - 15 Jan 42	Platoons, Troops
16 Jan 42 - 28 Feb 42	Companies, Batteries
1 Mar 42 - 31 Mar 42	Battalions, Regiments
1 Apr 42 - 21 Apr 42	Brigades and Div Arty
22 Apr 42 - 24 May 42	Divisions

5. Exercises were arranged as follows (Corps Training Instruction No. 6) :

- (a) During unit training, after 15 Mar, one exercise with troops by each infantry brigade and by the Divisional Artillery, within their own areas and against a skeleton enemy.
- (b) During brigade training, between 1 and 15 Apr, at least one inter-brigade exercise with troops for each brigade of divisions (i.e., two exercises one against one, or one exercise one against two).
- (c) 22-27 Apr, two-sided exercise ("BEAVER III"), involving 1 and 2 Cdn Divs, 1 Cdn Army Tk. Bde, and details 3 Cdn Div and Corps Tps. Controlled by H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps.
- (d) 10-15 May, two-sided exercise ("BEAVER IV"), involving 2 and 3 Cdn Divs, 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde and details 1 Cdn Div and Corps Tps. Controlled by H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps.
- (e) 25-30 May, two-sided exercise ("TIGER"), Cdn Corps vs 12 Corps. Set and controlled by S.E. Army.

6. As Lt.-Gen. CRERAR assumed command of Cdn Corps on 31 Dec 41, the greater part of the programme has been carried out under his direction. The keen personal interest which he has taken in the matter may be traced in his circular letters to Commanders and Commanding Officers (one of which is referred to in Report No. 60). Attention is particularly directed to letter GOC 4-O, of 16 Mar 42, which defines and emphasizes the responsibility of Commanding Officers for the training of their units and lays down the general principles upon which training will proceed. "Before the next three months have elapsed", it declares, the Canadian Corps "must be capable of meeting every requirement of battle". The following paragraphs deal with details of the programme :

7. During training, exercises must frequently include the dusk and the dawn. These are the periods when things are inclined to happen in war. A smaller number of exercises lasting 24 hours or more are better value than a large number of short exercises. A good exercise is one which tests out the administrative arrangements, as well as the tactical efficiency of the unit or formation.

The important point in collective training is to mix it. During company or battery training, the battalion or regiment should be exercised once every ten days or so. During unit training, the formation as a whole should be exercised about once a fortnight.

7. In a further letter, dated 26 Mar 42, General Crerar lays down Corps training policy for the spring and summer of 1942. This letter points out that while the responsibility of preparing for the Corps' role in the "invasion battle" still continues, the Corps cannot play its full part in winning the war by awaiting events : "and we must be ready, should the opportunity occur, to undertake offensive operations on the Continent of Europe." Training policy is therefore defined as follows :

While maintaining existing defences in the Canadian Corps area in good repair, and improving them as opportunity offers (i.e. during period in June allotted to Home Guard training), to train all ranks up to that stage of mental, physical and professional fitness needed to engage successfully in offensive battle against the Germans.

8. A special point is made in this connection :

4. It is certain that in the early offensive operations on the continent, units and formations of the Canadian Corps will need to be able to fight without being accompanied by a mass of transport. It follows that in the training exercises we are now commencing, our infantry battalions, for instance, will need to limit drastically the transport which accompanies them. The infantry soldier must learn to fight with decisive effect with the weapons he can carry himself. Briefly, we must attain speed, simplicity and surprise in every phase of the tactical training which the units and formations of the Canadian Corps are now pursuing.

This principle was followed in Exercise "BEAVER III" (see below), in which 1 Cdn Div, while representing a German invading force, was simultaneously practised in operating with a reduced scale of transport such as would be available in the first instance to a Canadian division carrying out an "invasion" operation against the Continent.

9. The importance of physical fitness is emphasized with the following comment :

As "Tiger" exercise in May (versus 12 Corps) promises to provide some two hundred miles of marching, plus "battle", to formations of the Canadian Corps, a practical test of the steps taken by Commanders to ensure the physical fitness of their troops will be forthcoming.

What is needed, the Corps Commander continues, is high fighting morale. Training now must develop in all ranks the confidence that they can both give it, and take it, harder and better than the enemy : "that they can face up to fatigue, hunger and extreme discomfort and yet fight with full vigor and determination." "In the Canadian Corps, no exercise will be cancelled on account of bad weather conditions, mud, etc. An essential part of the training is to learn how to overcome the elements, as well as the enemy."

10. This letter concludes as follows :

8. Finally, I desire to emphasize the importance of informing all leaders and, whenever possible, all ranks, of the intention of the Commander on commencing a training exercise in order that officers and men may be given a full opportunity of playing intelligently the part required of them. If all ranks know what is expected of them, and have reached that degree of training which ensures quick and sensible re-actions to the circumstances of the moment, then every moment will be turned to useful account. This is the situation we must assure if, in battle, we are to accomplish what is expected of us.

11. Brigadier SIMONDS told the writer on 15 Apr 42 that he considered the results of the programme to that period distinctly satisfactory. The Corps showed the effect of the comprehensive and consistent course of training pursued during the past few months. Efficiency had improved materially. Another influence making for this result was the numerous changes in command (described in Report No. 65), which have had the effect of placing younger and more vigorous officers in command of a large proportion of the units of the Corps. Add to this the steady improvement in equipment in recent months, and it is probably safe to say that the Corps has never been so genuinely battle-worthy as it is to-day.

TRAINING IN COMBINED OPERATIONS

12. In Report No. 58 (para.86), brief reference was made to the training of sub-units of Cdn Corps in combined operations, carried on at HAVANT in the establishment known as H.M.S. "Northney". This establishment has now been closed. Following the elementary training given in it, it had been proposed to develop a centre for more advanced training in the use of assault craft at NEWHAVEN in the Corps area. Suitable naval staff and equipment not being immediately available, however, arrangements were made instead for training selected detachments from formations of Cdn Corps at "one of the establishments under the Directorate of Combined Operations".

13. This plan was outlined in Cdn Corps Training Instruction No. 7 (16 Mar 42), which explained that the detachments would train for six to eight weeks, about half of this period being spent in training on land and the remainder on board an infantry assault ship. The first detachment, from 2 Cdn Div, would embark on such a ship about the middle of April. 1 Cdn Div's detachment was to complete its land training and be ready to embark about the middle of May, and 3 Cdn Div's similarly about the middle of June. Each division's detachment would total 190 all ranks.

14. This arrangement was implemented as planned. After a period of preliminary training on land at SEAFORD, the 2 Cdn Div detachment left on 14 Apr 42 for GOUROCK, on the CLYDE, where they boarded H.M.S. "Princess Josephine Charlotte", which carried them to LOCH NA KEAL, Isle of MULL. (The "Princess Josephine Charlotte", an armed vessel carrying seven assault landing craft, was in the cross-Channel service to OSTEND before the war. She participated as a carrying-ship in the raid on ST. NAZAIRE on the night of 27-28 Mar last.) Here they lived on the ship during ten days of intensive combined training, in the course of which the men got very little sleep. During the day repeated landing exercises were carried out from the vessel, which lay at anchor in the harbour; and at night practice attacks were made. The work was perhaps heavier than it would have been in other circumstances, due to the fact that the naval personnel in charge of the landing craft were themselves in training and were inexperienced in this work.

15. The climax of the training was a night attack delivered by the Canadian detachment, operating from the "Princess Josephine Charlotte", against the Isle of BUTE, in the mouth of the CLYDE, which was defended by two Commandos (Special Service Troops) and Home Guard detachments. The attackers were ruled to have captured four of their six objectives.

16. The information in paras. 14 and 15 derives from Mr. ROSS MUNRO, of the Canadian Press, and Corporal GRAYSTON, of the Canadian Army Film Unit, both of whom were present

throughout and who took many cinema and still photographs of the training. Mr. MUNRO, who for many months past has enjoyed unusual opportunities for observation, remarked that this was the "toughest" course of training he had yet seen Canadian troops undergo. The men of the detachment, he said, had hoped that they would be employed on an actual raid against the enemy, and were extremely disgusted when this did not take place.

17. 1 Cdn Corps Training Instruction No. 9 (30 Apr 42) announced that training in combined operations would now be "advanced a further stage to include the training of units and then formations as a whole." Personnel of detachments which had completed training as described in para. 13 above would be "returned to parent units and employed as a cadre to develop combined operations technique within the latter." In the case of the 2 Cdn Div detachment, this action would be taken forthwith. Formations would be prepared to proceed to an area suitable for combined training with the Royal Navy in the following order:-

2 Cdn Div
1 Cdn Div
3 Cdn Div.

2 Cdn Div would be in readiness to move after the conclusion of Exercise "TIGER" (above, para.5). It is understood that 1 Cdn Div's special detachment will undertake its sea training about the same time.

EXERCISE "BEAVER III"

18. Exercise "BEAVER III" was scheduled to last from 22 Apr to 27 Apr, but actually developed so rapidly that it came to an end on 24 Apr.

19. In this exercise 1 Cdn Div represented an invading German force landed in the LITTLEHAMPTON - WORTHING area to exploit a bridgehead already gained. It was allowed only a very reduced scale of transport, amounting in the case of an infantry battalion to only fourteen vehicles apart from carriers and motor-cycles, and was thus precluded from "ferrying" its infantry, who had to march in the old-fashioned way. The Division's orders were to seize HORSHAM, and to engage and destroy any British reserve formations thrown in against it.

20. It was assumed that Cdn Corps had been relieved in Sussex on 15 Mar 42 and withdrawn into G.H.Q. Reserve; and 2 Cdn Div (with its full scale of transport) was now thrown in, in fulfilment of this role, with orders to advance and counter-attack any German forces which might move north from the LITTLEHAMPTON - WORTHING bridgehead. 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde was moved into the HAYWARDS HEATH area (it was assumed, by rail from BASINGSTOKE) and was to come under command 2 Cdn Div at 1200 hrs 23 Apr.

21. It will be observed that this scheme involved withdrawing 1 and 2 Cdn Divs temporarily from their normal roles on the coast (see Report No. 58), and it was necessary to provide other means of protection against possible enemy raids during the course of the exercise. This was done by moving troops of 3 Cdn Div into 1 and 2 Cdn Divs' normal areas; these took over the tasks of forward battalions on 20 Apr (General Report for 1 Cdn Corps, week ending 25 Apr). Other troops of 3 Cdn Div, including 7 Cdn Recce Regt, took part in the exercise on the "enemy" side, under command of 1 Cdn Div.

22. General Greer was Director, and the staff of H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps acted as Control from an Advanced H.Q. established at DANNY (721340), near HURSTPIERPOINT.

23. This exercise developed with great speed from the beginning. General PEARKES (G.O.C. 1 Cdn Div), in the capacity of commander of the "invading" force, threw his division forward from his bridgehead in the early morning of 22 Apr with such speed (in spite of the transport limitation) that by the middle of the day it was in contact immediately south and south-east of HORSHAM with troops of 2 Cdn Div, which was advancing from an area south-west of TUNBRIDGE WELLS in which it had been assembled in readiness. The G.O.C. 2 Cdn Div (General ROBERTS) had decided that instead of throwing forward his mobile elements to try to forestall the enemy on the high ground south-east of HORSHAM he would take time to concentrate and put in a deliberate attack. In the late afternoon the party from C.M.H.Q. had some glimpses of contact between "enemy" forces (R. 22e R. and SASK.L.I. (M.G.)) and troops of 2 Cdn Div attacking in the vicinity of SEDGEWICK CASTLE.

24. During the night of 22-23 Apr and the following morning a confused situation developed. General Pearkes organized a heavy bombardment of HORSHAM with his field and medium guns (having 1 Cdn Med Regt under his command) and followed it up with an infantry attack. On the morning of 23 Apr General Pearkes, at his H.Q. near the crossroads at BROOKS GREEN (566443), told Brigadier PENHALE that 75 per cent of HORSHAM was in his hands, and subsequently we found H.Q. 1 Cdn Inf Bde established in the town. However, the point was made by some observers that 1 Cdn Div had perhaps paid too much attention to HORSHAM and too little to the "British" formations coming into action against it, and if the subsequent "British" operations had not been hampered by the umpires, 1 Cdn Div might have found itself in serious difficulties.

25. 2 Cdn Div had also attacked early on 23 Apr, with the consequence that the two opposing forces became intermingled. For example, the ESSEX SCOTTISH (2 Cdn Div) and the 48th HIGHLANDERS (1 Cdn Div) (1) became confused together in the area between HORSHAM and CHRIST'S HOSPITAL, and as instructions given by the umpires to resolve the confusion and separate the parties were not received (or not understood) by both sides, the situation continued unsatisfactory for some hours (information from Lt.-Col. J.E.GANONG, O.C. 48 HIGHS).

26. At noon this day 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde came under command of 2 Cdn Div, and during the afternoon the party from C.M.H.Q. saw 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn (CALGARY REGT) moving westwards towards SHERMANBURY PLACE (650380). This formation was to deliver an attack that evening, in conjunction with 2 Cdn Div, north-westerly towards HORSHAM. The writer heard subsequently from Lt. Col. ANDREWS (O.C. 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn) that this attack was mounted, but was suspended as the result of an umpire's ruling that it could not have been delivered before dark.

27. In accordance with the plan for the exercise drawn up in advance, during 23 Apr the G.O.C. 88 German Div (1 Cdn Div) was informed that a reinforcing convoy had been delayed, and was ordered to withdraw into his bridgehead. This withdrawal was successfully effected.

(1) 48 HIGHS were acting on this occasion as part of 3 Cdn Inf Bde. To confuse the enemy, General Pearkes had carried out a general inter-change of battalions for the Exercise; thus, 3 Cdn Inf Bde (composed normally of R. 22e REGT, CARLETON AND YORK REGT, and WEST NOVA SCOTIA REGT) comprised for "BEAVER III" R. 22e REGT, 48 HIGHS, and SEAFORTH.

The mobile elements of 1 Cdn Div, and most if not all of the artillery, were pulled back on to the DOWNS in the vicinity of the WASHINGTON Gap and took up a strong defensive position. In the case of 3 Cdn Inf Bde, at least, the infantry withdrawal did not begin until the early hours of 24 Apr, and although it was well carried out this brigade could not get on to the DOWNS before daybreak, and took up a position at their feet (information from Lt.-Col. Ganong).

28. It had been anticipated in the plan of the exercise that 25-26 Apr would see a formal attack by 2 Cdn Div on the enemy bridgehead. Actually, the exercise concluded about noon on 24 Apr, by which time, however, it is understood, 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde had managed to put in an attack against the DOWNS position.

29. The most striking feature of this exercise was, perhaps, the speed with which 1 Cdn Div moved in spite of its exiguous transport and the increasing exhaustion of the marching infantry. (From FINDON, on the northern edge of the bridgehead, to HORSHAM is about 16 miles by road.) The moral would seem to be that an infantry division if boldly handled can strike a swift and effective blow, even when deprived of all troop-carrying transport, when conditions are favourable; and it is even possible that a reduction in the scale of transport may, within limits, have the effect of accelerating operations. At least, it has the important result of reducing road congestion.

EXERCISE "BEAVER IV"

30. Exercise "BEAVER IV" was a contrast with "BEAVER III" in almost every respect. For one thing, the weather, which for the latter exercise had been fine and dry, was wet for "BEAVER IV". The drought which had lasted for more than a month was broken by rain on 10 May, and during the exercise there was further rain. The operations were conducted, in consequence, in the pervasive mud of Sussex. Moreover, this exercise moved much less speedily than its predecessor, and ran almost the whole of its prearranged course.

31. The general scheme of the exercise as planned was precisely similar to that of "BEAVER III". 2 Cdn Div now played the part of the invading German formation, with the same reduced scale of transport, and 3 Cdn Div enacted one variant of its own normal role of counter-attack from Corps Reserve; while 1 Cdn Div on 8 May 42 assumed the anti-raid role of 2 Cdn Div for the duration of the exercise. General Crerar again acted as Director, and Control, staffed by Adv H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, was established on 9 May at FIRLE PLACE (908261), south-east of LEWES.

32. The enemy landing on this occasion was assumed to have taken place on the normal front of 2 Cdn Div, between BEXHILL and PEACHY HEAD, with the result of the establishment of a bridgehead running as far inland as NINFIELD, HAILSHAM, POLEGATE and EASTDEAN. From this bridgehead 2 Cdn Div advanced in the early hours of 10 May, with orders to strike north-west, secure bridgeheads on the west bank of the River OUSE between UCKFIELD and LEWES (both exclusive), seize HAYWARDS HEATH, and destroy any British reserve formations sent against it. It made good progress and duly attained the line of the OUSE.

33. 3 Cdn Div had been assembled north-west of HORSHAM. It had under command all its own brigades, including 9 Cdn Inf Bde, which had just (6 May) been relieved by a British brigade in the counter-attack role relating to the TANGMERE group of aerodromes (General Report for 1 Cdn Corps, week ending 9 May 42). It now advanced towards the position of 2 Cdn Div, and for a time the two opposing forces confronted each other without coming to grips. The inclination of General PRICE (G.O.C. 3 Cdn Div) seems to have been to defer attacking until 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde came under his command (at 1200 hrs on 11 May) and could be utilized. Finally he was ordered by Control to put in an attack.

34. As in the case of "BEAVER III", plans had been made to instruct the invading formation to withdraw, the idea being that the 3 Cdn Div attack should "hit nothing" when delivered. This was successfully effected; the withdrawal of 2 Cdn Div into its bridgehead was carried out with a smoothness which General Crerar told Brigadier Penhale he found very satisfactory, and the 3 Cdn Div attack on the morning of 12 May, had it been delivered, would have been a blow in the air. H.Q., 3 Cdn Div, however, had received word of the withdrawal. It is understood that its first information on this point came from some of its Field Security personnel who were working behind the "enemy" lines in civilian clothes.

35. During 11 May the commanders of both forces were "casualtied" by Control. Brigadier SALMON succeeded General PRICE in command of 3 Cdn Div, and Brigadier WHITEHEAD (who had been commanding 2 Cdn Div in the absence of General ROBERTS) was succeeded by Brigadier LETT.

36. 2 Cdn Div having successfully withdrawn behind the River CUCKMERE, the counter-attack force followed it up in the course of 12 May, under instructions from Control to strike against its left flank. This advance of 3 Cdn Div encountered serious traffic difficulties. It was carried out along only two roads (whereas the Corps Commander pointed out to Brigadier PENHALE that four were available), and these two converged on LEWES. 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde had been sent in advance but did not clear this town before the leading troops of the division entered it. To make matters worse, elements of 11 Armd Div (British), returning from an exercise of their own, simultaneously attempted to pass through LEWES in the opposite direction. LEWES is a bad bottleneck at the best of times; and about midday of 12 May it is reported to have presented a scene of extreme confusion.

37. In the late afternoon of 12 May Brigadier PENHALE and the writer saw elements of 7 Cdn Inf Bde moving southward on the FOREST ROW-DANEHILL-LEWES road, with their rear north of CHAILEY; and elements of 8 Cdn Inf Bde moving through LEWES and on towards ALCISTON.

38. The material in paras. 33-36 derives mainly from information obtained at Control on the evening of 12 May, chiefly from Brigadier SIMONDS.

39. H.Q. 3 Cdn Div was now set up at BISHOPSTONE (north-west of SEAFORD), with H.Q. 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde at POVERTY BOTTOM a mile or so away. H.Q. 2 Cdn Div was established in a group of houses in a side street at the east end of EASTBOURNE (about 062197). The "enemy"

bridgehead on the coast now extended from about ST. ANTHONY'S HILL (064203) to BELLE TOUT (995144); and the bulk of the troops of 2 Cdn Div were disposed on the DOWNS covering EASTBOURNE, on the general line POLEGATE - EASTDEAN - INTRENCHMENT (995145). The bridges across the CUCKMERE had been blown.

40. The 3 Cdn Div plan for an attack on the enemy's new position was for 8 Cdn Inf Bde to advance across the CUCKMERE (using folding boat equipment) on the night of the 12th-13th (zero being 0200 hrs) and establish a bridgehead to enable the Engineers to bridge the river. Thereafter 8 Cdn Inf Bde would come into divisional reserve, and the main attack would be delivered by 7 Cdn Inf Bde (right) and 9 Cdn Inf Bde (left), each supported by an army tank battalion working in three echelons. Zero was tentatively set for 1200 hrs 13 May, but was later put back to 1300 hrs.

41. This plan was duly executed. Although in theory the CUCKMERE was bridged at four places, and the Engineers deployed their material at all four, only one bridge was actually thrown - at EXCEAT BRIDGE, where a small box girder bridge was put across and completed (it was understood) by about 0700 hrs on the 13th.

42. The final attack, with which the exercise concluded, provided a very interesting spectacle, as seen from the track running north-east from FRISTON towards HILL COTT. The Churchill tanks came forward across the great ridge of downland between FOLKINGTON and FRISTON HILL, crossed the FRISTON-JEVINGTON road and climbed the opposite slope to attack the enemy defended localities on and about WILLINGDON HILL. Close behind the first echelon of tanks came the infantry of 3 Cdn Div, advancing rapidly across the green slopes in precise textbook formations (several sections in perfect arrowheads), with the second echelon of tanks in rear. The whole development of the attack was in plain view on a front of perhaps three miles; and tanks and infantry might have suffered considerably as they crossed the open ground, the more so as the "enemy" had a number of 6-pounder A. Tk guns in position. A very heavy covering artillery barrage had been arranged, however, and many of the defending guns would doubtless have been neutralized.

43. The leading elements of the attack appeared to be late (though only by a matter of a few minutes) in crossing their start line; and the units in the centre were well ahead of those on the flanks. On the left this was due to the fact that "enemy" elements in JEVINGTON had not been "unmired out" and that they held up the left flank by fire.

44. This exercise is of special interest as the first occasion on which 3 Cdn Div has participated in an exercise on the Corps scale. This division may be said to have become operational only at the time of its move into Sussex at the end of November, 1941 (see Report No. 58). Its performance should therefore perhaps be judged by comparison, not so much with those of 1 Cdn Div and 2 Cdn Div in "BEAVER III", as with those of the same divisions in "FOX" and "DOG", in February, 1941 (see Reports Nos. 11 and 13). It will be recalled that both the older divisions had traffic difficulties in these exercises.

45. It should be recorded that, although "BEAVER IV" was conducted under adverse conditions of weather, the

troops, both of 3 Cdn Div and other formations, continued to present a general appearance of cheerfulness, and the impression left with the spectator was one of decided fitness and efficiency.

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