

NOTE

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Directorate of History
National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

July 1986

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HISTORICAL OFFICER,

CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS



South Eastern Command Exercise "TIGER", 19-30 May 42.

1. This Report deals with the participation of 1 Cdn Corps in the important South Eastern Command exercise known by the code-name "TIGER", which took place from 19 to 30 May, 1942.
2. As indicated in Report No. 70, this exercise, set and controlled by H.Q. South Eastern Army, and involving protracted operations between a SUSSEX Army under H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps and a KENT Army under H.Q. 12 Corps, was the culmination of the training programme pursued by 1 Cdn Corps during the winter and spring season. It was one of the largest exercises yet participated in by Canadian forces in this country; in point of number of troops engaged it was probably second only to Home Forces Exercise "BUMPER" (cf. Report No. 49).
3. "TIGER" had a special significance as affording a practical test, not only of the general battleworthiness of the formations engaged and of the results of the training programme pursued in recent months, but also of the physical endurance of the troops, which it was specially designed to try to the utmost. It is probably safe to say that this was physically the most exacting and exhausting large-scale exercise in which the Canadian troops in Britain have yet engaged.
4. The exercise had a further significance in that it provided an experimental test of the "new model" organization for Armoured and Infantry Divisions, under which an Armoured Division consists basically of one Armoured Brigade, one Lorried Infantry Brigade, and a strengthened Support Group, while an Infantry Division consists of two Infantry Brigades and an Army Tank Brigade. This organization was confined in this exercise to the KENT Army, and was not used in Canadian formations; and it now appears that, while it is to be generally adopted in the British Army, divisions of the Canadian Army Overseas will not be so reorganized, for the present at least. This matter will be dealt with in subsequent Reports.
5. The writer had opportunities for personal observation of this exercise, being present in the area on 25-27 May. He paid a number of visits to Control, and also visited H.Qs. 1 Cdn Corps and 12 Corps, and saw everything possible of the actual contacts between the opposing forces.

GENERAL IDEA OF THE EXERCISE

6. For the purposes of "TIGER", KENT and SUSSEX were assumed to be independent hostile countries, separated by a boundary which was the inter-Corps boundary between 1 Cdn Corps and 12 Corps Districts (see Reports Nos. 58 and 72). Lying adjacent was a powerful but neutral state, SURREY, whose threats of intervention in the conflict were frequently utilized by the Director (Lieutenant-General B.L. MONTGOMERY, G.O.C.-in-C. South Eastern Command) for the purpose of influencing the course of the operations. It was largely due to the influence of SURREY that the participating formations covered so much ground during the exercise. The boundary between KENT and SURREY was the north-west boundary of 12 Corps District.

7. STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION OF OPPOSING FORCES. The forces available to SUSSEX and KENT differed materially in kind. The KENT force was very strong in armour, but weak in the air, in artillery and in infantry. SUSSEX, weak in armour, was much superior in all the other three. The relative strengths, as computed at Control for the exercise, were as follows:

	<u>SUSSEX</u>	<u>KENT</u>
Infantry Brigades	10	5
Guns (Field & Medium)	424	192
Tanks	82/88	367
Aircraft	129	40

The writer was told that the KENT air was further weakened during the exercise by the withdrawal of a bomber squadron required for operations.

8. The major elements in the opposing Orders of Battle were as follows:

<u>SUSSEX</u>	<u>KENT</u>
H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps	H.Q. 12 Corps
1 Cdn Div	43 Div
1 Cdn Inf Bde	129 Inf Bde
2 Cdn Inf Bde	130 Inf Bde
3 Cdn Inf Bde	25 Army Tk Bde
3 Cdn Div	53 Div
7 Cdn Inf Bde	158 Inf Bde
8 Cdn Inf Bde	160 Inf Bde
9 Cdn Inf Bde	31 Army Tk Bde
3 (Br) Div	11 Armd Div
7 (Br) Inf Bde	29 Armd Bde
9 (Br) Inf Bde	159 Inf Bde
5 Cdn Inf Bde	12 Corps Tps (incl 2 Med Regt).
SUSSEX Bde (Br)	
1 Cdn Corps Tps incl 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde (less one Army Tk Bn). 2 Cdn Div Arty also under command.	

9. It will be noted that only some elements of 2 Cdn Div participated in "TIGER". The reason for this is that "unavoidable changes in naval arrangements" had made it necessary for the programme of Combined Operations training for formations of 2 Cdn Div and 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde (see Report No. 70) to begin about 20 May 42 if it was to be completed (Letter from H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps, Trg O-2-1, 12 May 42, C.M.H.Q. file 2/TRNG INSTN/3). In consequence H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, 4 Cdn Inf Bde, 6 Cdn Inf Bde, and details of Engineer and administrative units left the Corps District for this special training on 18 May. 14 Cdn Army Tk Bn participated in this training and so missed "TIGER" also. (On these movements, see General Report for 1 Cdn Corps for week ending 23 May 42). 3 (Br) Div, less one brigade, replaced 2 Cdn Div in the Order of Battle of 1 Cdn Corps for "TIGER", and took 5 Cdn Inf Bde under command.

10. 1 Cdn Corps was commanded by Lieut.-General CRERAR, and 12 Corps by Lieut.-General J.A.H. GAMMELL, C.B., D.S.O., M.C. 3 (Br) Div is commanded by Major-General E.C. HAYES.

11. The exercise lasted officially from 2400 hrs on 19 May until 30 May, and personnel of either SUSSEX or KENT armies found in enemy territory were liable to capture from the beginning. The situation at the commencement of the exercise was that SUSSEX and KENT were mobilizing their forces in anticipation of hostilities; but no actual overt act had yet taken place, and the two armies were well within their own frontiers.

BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE EXERCISE

12. The SUSSEX Army concentrated during 19-23 May, with 1 Cdn Div in the area roughly WIVELSFIELD GREEN (7939) - BARCOMBE (8533); 3 Cdn Div immediately to the north in the area HAYWARDS HEATH - FLETCHING (8642); 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde in the area WARNINGLID (6845) - BURGESS HILL; Corps Artillery in the area CRAWLEY - CUCKFIELD (7444); one brigade group of 3 (Br) Div in the WEST HOATHLEY area, and one about CROWBOROUGH, with 5 Cdn Inf Bde near the latter around ROTHERFIELD (9948). The Sussex Brigade (three British Infantry battalions with attached troops) was between HARTFIELD (9154) and GROOMBRIDGE (9656); while on his opposite (right) flank, immediately south of 1 Cdn Div, General CRERAR concentrated a mobile force composed of one reconnaissance Regt, one A. Tk Regt, and one machine-gun battalion. (1 Cdn Corps Operation Order No. 1, Exercise "TIGER", 10 May 42).

13. General CRERAR's plan was to advance upon the commencement of hostilities, and upon gaining contact with the enemy to fight a withdrawing battle, taking toll of the superior KENT armour until he had so reduced it as to permit of offensive action being undertaken. He then proposed to hold with his left and strike with his right, and, pivoting on his left, to advance into KENT.

14. Hostilities being authorized beginning 25 May, General CRERAR on 22 May issued his Operation Order No 2, detailing the action to be taken during the opening phase of operations. This Order provided for an advance

beginning at 0001 hours of 25 May. It was to be made by bounds in three phases, to successive anti-panzer positions. The first objective was a "MONTREAL" line, HORAM (0136) - HEATHFIELD (0239) - MAYFIELD (0249). The second objective was a "QUEBEC" line, BURWASH (1043) - WITHEREENDEN (086452) - WADHURST HALL (0747) - BESTBEECH HILL (0550) - EARLY FM (0351). The third phase involved an advance by reserve brigade groups to a "HALIFAX" line, HAWKHURST (1949) - CRANBROOK STA (1953) - LAMBERSBURST (1155). Provision had already been made in Operation Order No. 1 for the preparation of a complete belt of demolitions to cover the left flank of this advance.

15. This advance duly took place on 25 May, and the second objective, the "QUEBEC" line, was made good. Here or hereabouts contact was made with advancing KENT forces and the SUSSEX advance was suspended. The KENT forces were deployed with 53 Div on the right and 43 Div on the left, while the SUSSEX Army, in accordance with the concentration arrangements above described, had 1 Cdn Div on the right, 3 Cdn Div in the centre and 3 (Br) Div on the left, with the SUSSEX Bde on the extreme left flank. The KENT commander kept 11 Armd Div in reserve well back. It had been intended originally to employ this formation for a thrust in the vicinity of TUNBRIDGE WELLS, but strong resistance presented by the SUSSEX Bde west and south-west of that town led to the abandonment of this plan. 2 Cdn Inf Bde was threatened with encirclement in the BURWASH area in the afternoon of 25 May, but permission to withdraw previous to a general withdrawal was refused by H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps.

16. At 1815 hrs on 25 May, H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps issued Operation Order No. 3. In accordance with General CRERAR's original plan, this provided for withdrawal during the night to the "MONTREAL" position, extending from HORAM on the right to BLACKHAM (9357) on the left. The "QUEBEC" line was to be finally abandoned at 0200 hrs on 26 May.

17. This withdrawal was successfully executed according to plan. During the night of 25/26 May H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps which had been established at PAXHILL PARK near LINDFIELD, returned to its normal "peacetime" position at WAKENHURST PLACE and WORTH PRIORY.

18. During 26 May there was considerable contact with the advancing KENT forces along the MONTREAL line. The writer heard from an artillery umpire at TOWN ROW near ROTHERFIELD that a dangerous KENT attack in this area in the early morning was broken up by a heavy concentration of SUSSEX artillery fire. Some 1900 rounds were fired, and although most of them were in wrong targets, e.g., crossroads which the KENT tank columns had already passed - enough were accurate to ensure success. During the day KENT Churchill tanks in considerable numbers were seen operating in this vicinity.

19. General CRERAR's plan had been not to continue his withdrawal beyond the general line EAST GRINSTEAD - NEWHAVEN. Actually, he had not retired nearly so far, and was already preparing for counter-offensive action (during 26 May 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde was brought up from the rear to a position near CROSS IN HAND, 9941), when Control

took a hand to reverse the situation. On the evening of 26 May the KENT Minister of War, alarmed by the threatening attitude of SURREY, ordered his Army Commander to withdraw across the frontier into his own territory; and 11 Armd Div, which was still uncommitted and during the day had been moving southward, apparently in preparation for an attack on the southern flank, was now ordered into the TUNBRIDGE WELLS area to watch the SURREY frontier.

20. The afternoon of 26 May was very rainy and the troops endured considerable hardship from this and from the resulting mud. Throughout the exercise the weather was unsettled and frequently it was very unpleasant.

21. Thanks to good reconnaissance work, the SUSSEX Army obtained early information of the KENT withdrawal, and during the night of 26-27 May and the following morning it advanced towards the frontier, following the retreating enemy. During the morning the writer saw KENT aircraft repeatedly strafing troops of 1 Cdn Div advancing on the road CROSS IN HAND - BURWASH - HURST GREEN. Shortly after noon the armies were again in contact along the frontier line. During the day there was considerable contact between SUSSEX reconnaissance elements and the KENT troops in their new position. The writer saw some fighting between the Reconnaissance Regiment of 3 (Br) Div and elements of 11 Armd Div on the outskirts of TUNBRIDGE WELLS.

22. In the course of the day the continuing danger from SURREY led the Prime Minister of KENT to order a further withdrawal of his forces to cover the country's vital centres. The whole KENT army was in consequence withdrawn during the following night to the ASHFORD region. It will be observed that the exercise was developing in a manner calculated to impose a heavy physical strain upon the troops, who were marching increasing distances as it progressed. From the QUEBEC position to ASHFORD is some 35 to 40 miles by road.

23. The SUSSEX forces had already been disposed for a further advance and an invasion of KENT on 28 May. This advance was under way before intelligence of the KENT withdrawal was received; but when the fact and the direction of this movement became clear vigorous pursuit was ordered and late in the afternoon SUSSEX reconnaissance elements were in touch with the enemy near ASHFORD.

24. During 29 May there was considerable fighting along the general line of the railway HYTHE-ASHFORD. 3 Cdn Div surrounded ASHFORD but failed to capture the town. On this day 11 Armd Div was committed to action on a large scale for the first time. The KENT commander had directed it overnight from CHALLOCK LEES (4468) in a wide sweep by way of DODDINGTON (3778). This movement was not detected by SUSSEX air reconnaissance and in the course of the morning 11 Armd Div attacked the flank of 3 (Br) Div. Heavy fighting followed and 29 Armd Bde's tank strength was reduced to about 70. Much of the loss had been inflicted by infantry of 5 Cdn Inf Bde, but this formation itself suffered heavily in an encounter with the lorried infantry brigade of the Armoured Division. 1 Cdn Army Tk

Bde had been ordered to engage 11 Armd Div. It succeeded in making contact with this formation's Armoured Car Regiment and inflicted heavy casualties upon it.

25. General CRERAR had proposed to deliver a great attack on the morning of 30 May and to utilize his superior artillery to crush the KENT forces. At this moment, however, the influence of SURREY was thrown into the balance against SUSSEX. At 1500 hrs on 29 May H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps was informed that the SURREY ARMY was concentrating about SEVENOAKS - EDENBRIDGE - REDHILL, and General CRERAR was ordered to withdraw the whole of the SUSSEX forces across the frontier. H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps accordingly issued orders for the withdrawal, noting that the new situation rendered it "necessary to leave uncompleted our imminent victory over KENT army".

26. During the night 29/30 May the SUSSEX army withdrew behind the line TENTERDEN - BIDDENDEN - YALDING, except for large elements of 3 (Br) Div, and the SUSSEX Bde, which failed to make the line good, due in part at least to traffic difficulties. During the morning of 30 May these forces, including 5 Cdn Inf Bde, were in consequence largely destroyed by 11 Armd Div. Only one brigade (9 Br) of 3 (Br) Div was successfully withdrawn, though with the loss of its M.T.

27. In the course of 30 May 3 Cdn Div also met with misfortune. This formation's Headquarters, not fully understanding the withdrawal order, had assumed that a definite stand was to be made on the TENTERDEN - YALDING line (which was only intended as a "pausing" line) and deployed two brigades upon it (information from Brigadier PENHALE, deriving from General MONTGOMERY's remarks at the conference on the exercise). These brigades could not be extricated to resume the withdrawal, and on the morning of 30 May 29 Armd Bde got round their left flank. "From then on the steady advance of 53 Div drove the 3 Cdn Div back against the elements of 11 Armd Div who had encircled their rear. By 1130 hrs the whole of 3 Cdn Div, less two bns, was ruled to have been destroyed as a fighting force, though a large number of individual parties would have undoubtedly got back" (South Eastern Command "Final Narrative" of the Exercise).

28. In the southern sector 1 Cdn Div made good its withdrawal without great difficulty, only its mobile rearguard being in contact with the enemy. The Division reached the line ROBERTSBRIDGE - WITHERENDEN, behind the SUSSEX frontier, at 1630 hrs on 30 May.

29. General CRERAR had planned to assist the withdrawal by a wide sweep executed by 1 Cdn Army Tk Bde. This was carried out successfully, beginning at 0915 hrs on 30 May, on the line MARDEN (1863) - SUTTON VALENCE - SMARDEN - HIGH HALDEN (3355) - TENTERDEN: a distance of considerably more than 20 miles. During the sweep the Brigade "engaged 29 Armd Bde at MARDEN and destroyed practically the whole of one of their sqns, and it fought also in STAPLEHURST - BIDDENDEN - CRANBROOK and TENTERDEN" (SECO "Final Narrative").

30. During the advance into KENT, Adv H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps had moved first to HEATHFIELD PARK (27 May) and subsequently to TONGSWOOD HOUSE (9149), whence it returned

to WAKEHURST PLACE at 1400 hrs on 30 May.

31. The exercise ended at 1830 hrs - 30 May. Thereafter all Canadian marching troops "rested for two days in areas in which exercise concluded and then proceeded by march route to their normal area on the Corps front." (General Report for 1 Cdn Corps, week ending 7 Jun 42).

32. During the exercise there was much bold work by Canadian reconnaissance units, a striking example being the manner in which 4 and 8 Cdn Recce Regts, moving "either through or between the areas of 43 and 53 Divs.", penetrated as far as CANTERBURY on 29 May (SECO "Final Narrative").

33. AIR OPERATIONS. There was much air activity on both sides when the weather permitted. An example is the manner in which SUSSEX used its available air units on the morning of 26 May, when, as the result of reconnaissance sorties, between 0800 and 1100 hrs attacks by forces totalling 60 fighters and 18 bombers were directed against KENT troops advancing in the FRANT and BURWASH areas (information obtained at Control, 26 May). SUSSEX was, however, criticized at the conference on the exercise for failing to make full use of its air resources. Incidentally, its handling of them in the last stage was hindered by the capture of ~~the Canadian~~ Air Support Control by a KENT Recce Regt at 1330 hrs on 30 May.

Canadian A.S.C.
did not participate in
this exercise.

C.B.S.

31 Jul 42

34. One combined artillery and air attack by KENT is worthy of notice:

At about 1800 hrs 29 May a wireless intercept was made of a Cdn Corps message summoning a Corps Comd's conference at POTTERS CORNER 4363 at 1900 hrs. The area was attacked at that hour by the fire of one Med Regt and 26 fighters. Pilots reported tents, staff officers of high rank and staff cars among the targets (SECO "Final Narrative").

35. SOURCES. For the days 25-27 May both inclusive the above narrative is based to a considerable extent on information obtained by the writer at Control and on personal observation. For 28, 29 and 30 May, when the writer was not present, it is based mainly on the Narratives issued by Control, and particularly on the Final Narrative, summarizing the whole course of the exercise, issued after its conclusion. (C.M.H.Q. file 3/EX. TIGER/2). This is supplemented by information obtained from Brigadier PENHALE, who attended the conference on the exercise. General MONTGOMERY's "Remarks" at this conference have been circulated (3/EX. TIGER/2) but his sketch of the course of the operations is not included.

LESSONS OF THE EXERCISE

36. The results of the exercise were commented upon by General MONTGOMERY at a conference on 4 Jun in which he dealt particularly with the tactical handling of "new model" divisions. No attempt will be made to deal with this matter here, but the Army Commander's remarks will be found at length on C.M.H.Q. file 3/EX. TIGER/2. Here only a few of the "major lessons from the exercise" as noted by General Montgomery will be summarized.

36. AIR ASPECT. "The importance of very close contact at all times between the General Staff and Air Staff at Corps during operations in which air forces are taking part is still not sufficiently appreciated." This applies "in particular to the preliminary planning stage". "SUSSEX air operations and to a lesser extent those of KENT often appeared 'scrappy' and hastily improvised."

37. The potentialities of the close support squadrons in the attack of ground targets were "not generally realised". SUSSEX did not keep its large air force fully employed. "Attacks should be ordered in strength against the right targets and be repeated as often as necessary. There were not sufficient repeat attacks."

38. CONTROL OF ARTILLERY. "In mobile operations when definite opposition has held up the advance of our forward troops ... the bulk or the whole of the Divisional Artillery will be required to support any attack ordered", and control should be centralized under the C.R.A.

39. The most important artillery lesson of the exercise was that an artillery fire plan in support of an attack must be based upon the most accurate information of enemy dispositions that can be obtained. This information may come from gunner O.P.s. and forward infantry observers, supplemented by reconnaissance and "intelligent guessing from the ground as to probable enemy localities". To plan concentrations merely from a one-inch map with no attempt at reconnaissance is to ensure a costly failure.

40. THE NEW MODEL ORGANIZATION. Some of General MONTGOMERY's concluding remarks on the employment of "the new model army" should perhaps be especially noted. The structure of this army, he said, "is such that it must be put into battle properly":

Success is going to depend more than ever on the close co-operation of all arms, and on the proper use of air power

62. The new model organization is definitely a success and it has come to stay. It is quite useless for commanders to say they want more infantry, or more something else.

Such statements really mean that the commander does not know how to make the best use of what he has got.

He will get no more infantry and it is no use asking.

He must train the infantry he has got to:
live hard,
move light,
fight simply,
and to have very great powers of endurance.

The new model organization will be accepted with enthusiasm, and all commanders will learn how to make the best use of it.

41. The Army Commander ended by stating that July, August and September would be devoted in the South-Eastern Army to training on the lines just indicated. "The

utmost use will be made of the South Downs, and other similar areas, to carry out Brigade exercises with live ammunition; these will be designed to practise and demonstrate the co-operation of all arms in battle together with the co-operation of air forces."

PERFORMANCE OF CANADIAN TROOPS

42. Turning from the general to the purely Canadian aspects of the exercise, it seems clear that, despite the tactical misfortunes of the last day, the performance of Canadian formations was of a high order and reflected the useful effects of recent intensive training. A case could probably be made for regarding this as the most satisfactory large exercise in which the Canadians have yet participated.

43. General MONTGOMERY had consciously designed this exercise to be a severe test of the endurance of the troops, and the writer has known of no exercise of comparable scope in which the units engaged were pushed to such extremes of physical effort. Every attempt was made to reproduce the conditions of actual operations. In particular, rations were limited to "an active service scale", and transport was cut, the infantry being obliged to march throughout the exercise. General MONTGOMERY's own description of the conditions and comment upon the results may be quoted:

The exercise lasted eleven days. Throughout, all troops had only the hard scale of rations; mobile canteens were forbidden to operate; troops were forbidden to purchase supplies of food or drink from civil sources. Administration under war conditions was thoroughly tested.

No M.T. was allowed to be used for the carriage of infantry or other dismounted personnel, and most infantry units marched over 150 miles during the course of the exercise. When the operations ceased many infantry soldiers had no soles to their boots. Some infantry units had marched and fought over 250 miles of country when they got back to their normal locations.

The powers of endurance of the troops were stretched to the limit, and two very tired Corps faced each other when operations ceased.

A great many lessons emerged from the exercise. These could not have been learnt unless the powers of endurance of the troops had stood up to the demands made on them.

I congratulate the troops of the S.E. Army on a really fine performance.

44. On the work of the Canadian units and formations particularly, it is important to note the following telegram (GS 1851, CANMILITRY to DEFENSOR - C.M.H.Q. file 4/PROGRESS/2/2) despatched on 1 Jun 42:

SECRET For Stuart from McNaughton.

Further to GS 1850 General Report 1 Cdn Corps for week ending 31 May on Tiger Exercise.

x Minister and War Cabinet will like to know that in the opinion of both General Montgomery and myself results reflect the satisfactory state of

tactical training and endurance now reached by Canadian units and formations taking part. This Exercise was specially designed to test capabilities to the limit. It lasted eleven days in all during which some units marched on foot as much as 250 miles which is about the life of army boots on English roads. Much of this marching was tactical at forced pace. Transport was cut to minimum and troops lived hard under conditions approximating active service. Hardships and heavy tasks accepted by troops most cheerfully and though now very tired they have come through these strenuous tests with enhanced morale and confidence in themselves. Staff work, road discipline and supply arrangements were on the whole excellent. I was particularly pleased with Crerar's conduct of the operations of 1 Cdn Corps.

45. One additional fact may be quoted from the General Report for 1 Cdn Corps for the week ending 31 May 42: "After long marches throughout the course of the exercise in the closing stages some infantry units marched as much as 38 miles in about 18 hours."

WOLF FORCE

46. The participation of 1 Cdn Corps in this exercise involved its temporary withdrawal from its normal anti-invasion role in SUSSEX (see Report No. 72) and certain ad hoc arrangements had to be made to replace it. It was not considered that a large-scale invasion attempt by the enemy was an immediate possibility, but it was necessary to make provision against raids of minor character. This was done by organizing a force known as WOLF FORCE, which was provided mainly by the Canadian Reinforcement Units. The work of this force is not the least interesting aspect of Exercise "TIGER".

47. The actual participation in the exercise of mobile columns provided by the Canadian Reinforcement Units was suggested by General MONTGOMERY on 18 Mar 42. C.M.H.Q. however took exception to this proposal, and it was pointed out that (a) the Reinforcement Units were not at present "in combination" with the United Kingdom forces under the Visiting Forces Act; (b) in spite of this, arrangements had been made that in emergency certain agreed troops from C.R.U. would come under command of G.O.C. ALDERSHOT - but these were allotted to certain specific tasks in ALDERSHOT DISTRICT; (c) the primary role of the Reinforcement Units was the provision of reinforcements for Canadian field units. This proposal was therefore not proceeded with. (Documents on C.M.H.Q. files 3/EX. TIGER/2 and 3/PLANS/2/2). Troops of the Reinforcement Units did, however, get an opportunity for operational employment during the exercise in the units of WOLF FORCE.

48. After some preliminary discussion, the arrangements for the formation of this force were discussed at a meeting presided over by Brigadier PENHALE at C.M.H.Q. on 29 Apr 42 (minutes on C.M.H.Q. file 3/REINF/1). The arrangements finally made may be studied in C.M.H.Q. Operation Instruction No. 8 of 1942 (4 May 42), Cdn Reinf Units Ops Instruction No. 3 (3 May 42), C.M.H.Q. Administrative Order No. 102 (6 May 42), and 1 Cdn Corps Operation Instruction No. 48 (5 May 42), all to be found on 3/REINF/1. A brief summary follows.

49. Since the role of WOLF FORCE was limited to protection against raids, only the positions of the actual forward battalions of 1 Cdn Corps (nine in number) (cf. Reports Nos. 58 and 72) required to be held. For this purpose nine ad hoc battalions were formed, on a special War Establishment providing for three companies and a headquarters platoon, the total strength being 326 all ranks excluding attached personnel. In addition a detachment of A.Tk artillery (110 all ranks) was provided to man twelve static 2 pr guns; and detachments of Services were also found.

50. Each of the nine "WOLF BATTALIONS" took the name of the unit whose sector it was to hold; thus 2 WOLF BN. relieving in the LITTLEHAMPTON area, was known as "48 Highrs WOLF". Moreover, the personnel provided from C.R.U. were found to a considerable extent from among men of the unit concerned, any deficiencies being met by supplying men of the other units served by the same Divisional Reinforcement Unit.

51. The field units of forward formations of 1 Cdn Corps left behind them, for incorporation in their WOLF battalions, the "special increments" now attached to them. The increments of 1 and 2 Cdn Div units not actually holding forward positions were allotted to the WOLF battalions of adjacent units in such positions; thus the 1st WOLF BATTALION (HASTINGS AND PRINCE EDWARD REGT) had the increment of the ROYAL CANADIAN REGT as well as that of HAST & P.E.R. This considerably reduced the number of men which C.R.U. actually provided.

52. The field units also left for each WOLF battalion a Second in Command, and Q.M. Stores personnel including Quartermaster and R.Q.M.S.; and for each WOLF infantry company an O.C. or (in cases where the Reinforcement Unit could provide "a suitable officer with experience in the area" to act as O.C.) a Second in Command, as well as Stores personnel. This arrangement was calculated to ensure effective liaison, and efficient action in case of enemy attack.

53. WOLF FORCE was commanded by Brigadier F.R. PHELAN, D.S.O., M.C. (Officer-in-Command, C.R.U.) from a Force H.Q. established at FEN PLACE (791550), near TURNERS HILL. He was assisted by a staff provided by the British Static Element of the Staff of H.Q. 1 Cdn Corps District (see Reports Nos. 58 and 72), augmented by officers from C.R.U. Command of the four right WOLF battalions was exercised by Colonel J.R.S. LOUGH, D.S.O., M.C., from a RIGHT SECTOR H.Q. established at KNEPP CASTLE (normally housing H.Q. 1 Cdn Div), and of the five left battalions by Colonel M.K. GREENE from a LEFT SECTOR H.Q. at HEATHFIELD PARK (housing formerly H.Q. 2' Cdn Div and at present H.Q. 3 Cdn Div).

54. Advance Parties of WOLF FORCE from C.R.U. moved into 1 Cdn Corps District on 10 May; and the main body moved on 17 May under arrangements made by H.Q., C.R.U. (C.R.U. Movement Order No. 1, 14 May 42: C.M.H.Q. file 3/REINF/1). H.Q. WOLF FORCE opened at FEN PLACE at 1400 hrs on 17 May, and took over command of the normal front of 1 Cdn Corps at 1600 hrs on 18 May.

55. Relief of WOLF FORCE units on the conclusion of the exercise was carried out piecemeal as units of 1 Cdn Corps returned to their areas. Message O.565 from 1 Cdn Corps (originating at 1140 hrs on 2 Jun) advised that H.Qs. 1 Cdn Corps, 1 Cdn Div and 3 Cdn Div would

assume responsibility for their sectors forthwith (as noted in Report No. 72, 3 Cdn Div had relieved 2 Cdn Div in the left forward sector). The message continued: "While units of WOLF FORCE continue to man the coast COMD will be exercised through the WOLF SECTOR HQ to the WOLF BNS concerned."

56. The units of WOLF FORCE returned to ALDERSHOT on 2-4 Jun 42.

57. The relationship of WOLF FORCE to the relief of 2 Cdn Div by 3 Cdn Div in the left forward sector is a rather complicated one. Partly presumably with a view to keeping the relief secret, no reference to it is made in any of the documents relating to the organization of WOLF FORCE, which simply assume that 2 Cdn Div remains in the sector. As noted in Report No. 72, however, command passed to H.Q. 3 Cdn Div on 14 May 42. The "special increments" taken over by WOLF FORCE in the left sector were nevertheless those of the 2 Cdn Div units lately in the area; and at the end of the exercise these were returned to their Reinforcement Units with their WOLF BATTALIONS (WOLF FORCE movement Order No. 1, 2 Jun 42), while those of 1 Cdn Div units went back to their field units. In the latter stages, WOLF BATTALIONS which had at first borne the name of a 2 Cdn Div unit bore instead that of a 3 Cdn Div unit: thus 6 WOLF BN, which had been "CAMERONS OF C. WOLF", now became "C. SCOT. R. WOLF".

58. The work of WOLF FORCE was carried out in a very satisfactory manner. On 19 May Brigadier PENHALE informed the Senior Officer, C.M.H.Q., that the movement of C.R.U. troops on 17 May was reported to have taken place "in excellent order and conditions of good march discipline". In general, Brigadier PENHALE reported, he felt that "a very satisfactory standard of staff duties has been maintained." (3/REINF/1).

59. On 26 May General MONTAGUE, accompanied by Brigadier PENHALE, "toured the front" held by WOLF FORCE and inspected its anti-raid dispositions.

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