

NOTE

This is a preliminary narrative and should not be regarded as authoritative. It has not been checked for accuracy in all aspects, and its interpretations are not necessarily those of the Historical Section as a whole.

Ce texte est préliminaire et n'a aucun caractère officiel. On n'a pas vérifié son exactitude et les interprétations qu'il contient ne sont pas nécessairement celles du Service historique.

Directorate of History
National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

July 1986

See Also Special Report of 11 Feb 43
Communications to and from Canada concerning
The Operation (DIEPPE)

DUPLICATE

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: DHD 3-3
by Dee for DHist NDHQ
Date: 7 AUG 1988

SECRET

REPORT NO. 83
HISTORICAL OFFICER
CANADIAN MILITARY HEADQUARTERS



19 Sep 42

Preliminary Report on Operation "JUBILEE" (The Raid on
DIEPPE), 19 Aug 42.

1. This Report presents an outline sketch of the important combined operation in the DIEPPE area, carried out on 19 Aug 42 by a force which included large elements of 2 Cdn Div and other Canadian troops. It will be a considerable time before a complete historical Report on this operation, which was by far the most extensive yet undertaken by the Canadian Army Overseas, can be prepared. In the meantime the document attached as Appendix "A", a draft prepared originally with a view to publication by the Government of Canada, is presented as a preliminary account.
2. After a period of more than two and a half years from the time of the landing of 1 Cdn Div in the United Kingdom, during which there was to all intents and purposes no actual contact with the enemy, the Canadian Army Overseas underwent what was in a definite sense its baptism of fire in the DIEPPE raid. This raid was much the most extensive of the many combined operations which have been undertaken against the enemy-occupied coasts of Western Europe since so much of the continent was overrun by the Germans in 1940. The Canadian Army found the major part of the landing force, providing for the purpose two Infantry Brigades of 2 Cdn Div (4 and 6 Cdn Inf Bdes) as well as an Army Tank Battalion equipped with Churchill tanks, and large detachments of miscellaneous units.
3. This was an extremely hazardous operation involving an attack on a very strong position (the strength of which, moreover, is now admitted to have been somewhat underestimated) and our losses were very heavy. A preliminary report indicates that the total number of Canadian troops embarked for the operation was 4,912 (304 officers, 4,608 other ranks). There returned a total of 2,147 (109 officers, 2,038 other ranks). These figures are to be regarded as merely approximate; in a subsequent report it is hoped to provide final ones. On 15 Sep 42 the Canadian Government announced that the total Canadian casualties in the operation amounted to 3,350 dead, wounded and missing (Times, LONDON, 16 Sep 42). The heaviest losses were suffered by 4 Cdn Inf Bde, which according to the same preliminary figures already mentioned embarked 94 officers and 1,604 other ranks, and brought back 17 officers and 334 other ranks.
4. The brief account of the operation which is attached as Appendix "A" was prepared by the writer as the result of a request received from the Dominion Government for a statement in the form of a "White Paper" which could be given to the public in explanation of the objectives and events of the operation. The writer was instructed to prepare such a document. It was felt that since the enemy was known to have

Authority: DHD 3-3

by QAC for DHist NDHQDate: 17 AUG 1984

captured the copy of the Military Operation Order taken ashore by H.Q., 6 Cdn Inf Bde, security was rather less important than in normal cases, and that it would be possible to present a fairly full account of the operation for the benefit of the Canadian public. In an interview with Brigadiers PENHALE and MANN, at which the writer was present, on 31 Aug 42, Major-General HAYDON, Vice-Chief of Combined Operations, expressed the personal view that in these circumstances it would be proper to prepare the "White Paper" on the basis of the preliminary report of the Military Force Commander (Major-General J.H. ROBERTS, M.C., G.O.C. 2 Cdn Div). The writer accordingly wrote a draft on this basis. This was submitted to General McNAUGHTON for his comments and revised in accordance with them. The draft as thus revised is the document attached to the present Report as Appendix "A".

5. When, however, this draft was subsequently submitted to Combined Operations Headquarters, the authorities there took exception to many passages in it. It appeared that C.O.H.Q. strongly objected to, among other things, the publication of any material which might seem, even by implication, to admit the loss of the Operation Order. The Chief of Combined Operations (Vice-Admiral Lord Louis MOUNTBATTEN) told Brigadier YOUNG (then B.G.S., C.M.H.Q.) that the publication of this draft would be worth £500,000 to the enemy. Accordingly the draft was revised by the Public Relations staff of C.O.H.Q. (the actual work being done, curiously enough, by a United States officer, Major LAWRENCE, who is a member of that staff). The writer then again revised his account, following the general lines of Major LAWRENCE'S draft, but using as far as possible, under instructions from C.M.H.Q., the words of his own original version as here appended.

6. The revised account, necessarily very much less informative than the one originally approved by General McNAUGHTON, was passed by Combined Operations Headquarters and in due course forwarded to OTTAWA for publication if the authorities there saw fit.

7. It is thought that the original draft here presented, although necessarily hastily written and incomplete, is not wholly without historical value. Accordingly, it is forwarded, pending the completion of a fuller account, the preparation of which will be a matter of months.

8. As already noted, the draft owes much to General ROBERTS' preliminary Report, some passages of which were incorporated in it verbatim. The writer also drew heavily (particularly in the references to preparation and training, and the results of the raid) upon his own notes of General McNAUGHTON'S remarks to a party of visiting Canadian editors, in an interview at HEADLEY COURT, near LEATHERHEAD, on 27 Aug 42.

9. It is worth noting that this operation will be extremely well documented. With a view to the collection of all possible information of operational value, it was directed that all Canadian personnel returning from the operation should make written statements of their experiences. These statements constitute historical sources of unusual interest and value. A large number of files of these, obtained at H.Q. 2 Cdn Div, are at present in the hands of the writer at C.M.H.Q.; and he understands that in many cases, at least, copies of these personal accounts have been placed as appendices upon the War Diaries of the units concerned.

10. The documents relating to the preparation of the "White Paper", and the negotiations with C.O.H.Q. in the matter, are on C.M.H.Q. file 4/PRESS/3/3.

C.P. Stacey

(C.P. Stacey) Major,
Historical Officer.

POSTSCRIPT. - Since the foregoing paragraphs were written, the "White Paper" has been published in Canada by the Minister of National Defence. A moderately complete version appears in The Times (LONDON), 19 Sep 42.

It is now possible to give fuller details of the Combined Operation against the enemy forces in the Dieppe area, carried out on 19 August by forces which included a large body of the Canadian Army Overseas. This account is based upon the preliminary report made by the Military Force Commander (Major-General J.H. Roberts, M.C., G.O.C. 2nd Canadian Division) and upon examination of personal reports made by many participants including a large number of N.C.Os. and private soldiers, and statements by enemy prisoners of war.

OBJECTS AND PRELIMINARIES OF THE OPERATION

The operation against Dieppe had in view both local and larger objects. It was part of a programme designed to compel the enemy to retain and employ in Western Europe military forces and other resources which would otherwise be available for employment elsewhere. It was further considered that such an operation would afford our forces most essential practical experience in the landing on an enemy-occupied coast of a large force, including heavy tanks. Experience of this sort would be invaluable in other operations envisaged for the future.

The local objectives of the raid are defined as follows in the Military Operation Order. The code name "Jubilee" was employed in reference both to the operation and to the town of Dieppe:

"Operation Jubilee is a raid on Jubilee with limited military and air objectives, embracing the destruction of local defences, power stations, harbour installations, rolling stock, etc., in Jubilee, the capture of prisoners, the destruction of an aerodrome near the town and the capture and removal of German invasion barges and other craft in the harbour".

This operation was most carefully prepared in advance in every detail. Before the employment of Canadian military forces was approved by Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C.-in-C., First Canadian Army, he had satisfied himself that the objectives were worth while and that the means available were likely to be adequate for the task in hand. Detailed planning of the operation began on the 8th May last. The work of planning was long and exacting, involving repeated conferences between senior officers of the three fighting services, and the preparation of a very careful administrative scheme. The planning of the enterprise, so far as the Canadian military forces were concerned, was directed by General Roberts, the Military Force Commander.

The officers charged with planning the operation had at their disposal a great mass of information relating to the Dieppe area collected from many sources. The proposed operation was checked on a large-scale model of the area to be raided, and when the plans were complete a most thorough understanding had been established between the three services.

The forces to be employed in the enterprise were subjected to an intensive special programme of Combined Operations training. The Canadian military units chosen to participate proceeded to a training area on the English coast where the plans could be tested by actual exercises under conditions approximating to those in the Dieppe area itself.

In the first instance the plans as developed were tried out in a full-scale exercise in which the whole force landed on a section of the coast and established a temporary bridgehead in the manner proposed for the actual operation. Subsequently the results of this exercise were carefully analyzed and the plans modified accordingly. Another full-scale exercise then took place and the arrangements as modified were found to be much more satisfactory than before. After further analysis and consideration it was decided that the operation might now proceed.

It had at first been proposed to conduct the raid in June, but arrangements could not be completed in time, and it was postponed until early in July, when conditions of moon and tide would be satisfactory for such an enterprise. At this period, however, the weather, a most important element in Combined Operations, was so unfavourable that it was found necessary to make a further postponement until the following month. It was therefore scheduled for the period in August when conditions would be suitable. As the date approached, very careful preparations were made for the assembly of the troops in the points of embarkation. Every effort was made to ensure secrecy during the movement of troops to the ports. All stores, equipment, reserve ammunition, etc., were loaded on the assault ships in advance of the troops.

Thanks to the precautions taken, it is believed that the enemy, in spite of the size of the force involved and the long period of training and preparation, had no information that a specific operation against the Dieppe area was projected. However, in view of the obvious danger of attack on his Western front, he had been strengthening his position on the French coast generally. The Germans on the French coast were in what may be called a state of general alert. Nevertheless the fact that parts of their garrison in the Dieppe area obtained early knowledge of our enterprise was apparently due, not to any leakage of information, but to a completely fortuitous incident which took place as our forces were approaching the French coast on the night of the operation.

While General Roberts, as already noted, commanded the Military Force for the operation, the Naval Force Commander was Captain J. Hughes-Hallett, R.N., and the Air Force Commander was Air Commodore T. Leigh-Mallory, C.B., D.S.O. The whole operation was under the general supervision, and the plans were subject to the approval, of Vice-Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, G.C.V.O., D.S.O., Chief of Combined Operations. Canadian plans were concerted with the latter by Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar, D.S.O., General Officer Commanding a Canadian Corps.

The Canadian military force involved was composed basically of large elements of two brigades of the 2nd Canadian Division commanded by Brigadiers W.W. Southam and S. Lett, and a battalion of the 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade. In addition, detachments of all arms and services played essential parts in the operation. Units of the 2nd Canadian Division were chosen because, although these troops had been in the United Kingdom since 1940, they had had no opportunities for active employment such as had fallen to troops of the 1st Canadian Division in France in June of 1940 and in the expedition to Spitsbergen. The 1st Canadian Army Tank Brigade was the first Canadian armoured formation to arrive in the United Kingdom. All the troops chosen for the enterprise were in a high state of general training, apart from the additional and special training which they received for this operation.

In addition to the Canadian force, the military units employed included detachments of the 3rd, 4th and Royal Marine Commandos of the Special Service Brigade, and small detachments of United States and Fighting French troops.

The troops embarked at several different points in order to disguise from the enemy the fact that there was any concentration of forces. Large naval forces were made available to protect the craft carrying military personnel during the channel crossing, and to provide bombardment cover for the landing. Very comprehensive arrangements had been made for the provision of air cover by the Royal Air Force. The Military Force Commander and the Naval Force Commander embarked together on a destroyer which served as Headquarters Ship, and a duplicate Headquarters was provided in a second destroyer (on which the senior military officer was Brigadier

C.C. Mann) in case this Headquarters Ship should be destroyed or seriously damaged. The Air Force Commander directed the air operations from a Headquarters in England which was considered the most convenient point for the control of the very large number of squadrons employed; but he was represented afloat in the Headquarters Ship by Air Commodore A.T. Cole, C.B.E., M.C., D.F.C., whose task it was to advise and assist the Naval and Military Force Commanders. This officer was in turn assisted by an adequate staff of officers of the Royal Air Force.

Before the force sailed all ranks were fully briefed in their respective tasks, and appropriate maps, air photographs, and the latest available intelligence were issued. In order to escape observation by enemy aircraft, the expedition sailed under cover of darkness. It left shore at dark on the 18th of August and made direct passage to Dieppe.

The town of Dieppe lies at the mouth of the River D'Arques, which provides a fairly spacious harbour lying to the south and east of the town. East of the river and harbour is a lofty headland overlooking the town and a similar headland lies immediately to the west of the town. On a great part of the coast in this vicinity cliffs make a landing from the sea virtually impossible, but there are areas of low ground providing avenues into the interior in the vicinity of Puits, a little more than a mile to the East of the river, and at Pourville, situated at the mouth of the River Scie about a mile and a half west of the town. The beach immediately in front of Dieppe itself is suitable for landing operations, but the approach to the town is obstructed by a sea-wall which the Germans had turned into a more formidable obstacle by the use of heavy barbed wire, while the beach is also commanded from the headlands on either side.

The plan for the operation provided that the first assault should be delivered by Commando troops against enemy coastal batteries at Varengeville, roughly five miles west of Dieppe, and Berneval, roughly six miles east of the town. The capture of the enemy guns at these points was considered essential to the safety of our naval vessels and the successful execution of the landing operations. Simultaneous with the commando attacks at these points, Canadian forces were to land at Pourville and Puits. From the former point troops were to penetrate inland and destroy an aerodrome five miles south of Dieppe; while the troops landed at Puits were to secure the headland east of Dieppe, from which the enemy would otherwise be in a position to menace landings attempted on the beach in front of the town itself. Half an hour after the four landings just described, the main attack was to be delivered against the front of the town, following a naval and air bombardment designed to neutralize the defences. Heavy tanks were to be employed in this attack in support of the Canadian Infantry.

THE COURSE OF THE OPERATIONS

At Varengeville the operation proceeded according to plan. Here No. 4 Commando, commanded by Lt.-Col. Lord Lovat, M.C., landed successfully, carried the enemy battery which was their objective, captured prisoners, destroyed the guns and their ammunition dumps and subsequently withdrew.

On the other flank at Berneval No. 3 Commando, commanded by Lt.-Col. R.G. Durnford-Slater, met with a misfortune which affected the whole subsequent course of the operation. At 3:30 in the morning the landing craft carrying this force, which was scheduled to land at 4:50, encountered five or six enemy armed vessels which were acting

as escort to a tanker. A naval engagement ensued. As a result not only were the landing craft carrying the Commando dispersed, but the German troops holding the defences which were the objective on this flank were unquestionably warned of the approach of our force. Due to these circumstances only a small proportion of the Commando force intended for this duty succeeded in landing in the Berneval area; but the men who actually landed, although too few to attack the enemy battery, sniped at the gunners throughout the operation, and to a certain extent succeeded in interfering with their fire.

The full effect of the unfortunate encounter with the tanker and her escort became apparent when the Canadian attack was delivered against the beach at Puits. Here the Royal Regiment of Canada, commanded by Lt-Col D.E. Catto, had been scheduled to land at 4:50. Mainly as a result of action taken to avoid the naval engagement, this unit landed about 20 minutes late, and instead of reaching shore in the twilight hour considered most suitable for such an operation, "touched down" in broad daylight, while moreover the enemy garrison, who were manning formidable prepared defences and were well provided with machine guns and mortars, had been placed on the alert by the action at sea. The consequence was that the Royal Regiment of Canada came under fire even before landing, and under very intense fire at the moment of touching the beach. Although the troops rushed to the attack with the greatest gallantry and attempted to close with the enemy, the regiment suffered extremely heavy casualties and nothing more than a temporary lodgement was obtained.

The consequence of this repulse was that, in spite of continuous naval bombardment and the work of close support bombers, the heavy and light guns sited on the headland east of Dieppe and in the face of the cliff were never permanently neutralized. This considerably affected the success of the landings on the main beaches.

At Pourville, more remote from the scene of the naval engagement, a greater degree of surprise was obtained. Here the South Saskatchewan Regiment, commanded by Lt-Col. C.C.I. Merritt, landed with comparatively little initial opposition and captured their first objectives, taking a considerable number of prisoners and clearing enemy positions. Subsequently, the Queen's Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada, commanded by Lt-Col. A.G. Gostling, who was killed immediately he stepped ashore, passed through the bridgehead established by the South Saskatchewan Regiment, and, under the command of Major A.T. Law, penetrated about two miles inland on the west side of the River Scie. During this advance they inflicted considerable losses on the enemy. They had not reached the aerodrome, which was their objective, when they received the order to withdraw.

On the beaches fronting Dieppe itself, the attack was made on the right by the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry, commanded by Lt-Col. R.R. Labatt, and on the left by the Essex Scottish, commanded by Lt-Col. F.K. Jaspersen. These units were closely followed by the first wave of tanks of the 14th Canadian Army Tank Battalion (Calgary Regiment) commanded by Lt-Col. J.G. Andrews. Although the Dieppe defences had been heavily engaged before the assault by naval bombardment and waves of Hurricane Bombers, the troops came under heavy fire from concealed posts in the two headlands to the west and east of the beaches and also from artillery sited under cover of the first line of buildings, which was able to fire directly into the assault craft as they landed. The first wave of tanks came under direct fire as soon as they came out of the landing craft, and while some immediately got on to the boulevard in front of the town and penetrated further, others did not get off the beach.

The intense fire to which the landing craft were subjected interfered with the Engineers' programme of assault demolitions. In

certain cases the demolition stores could not be landed, and in some they were destroyed before they could be used; in others, Engineer personnel became casualties. The sea-wall, in consequence, was not breached to the extent that had been planned, and some of the tanks were unable to cross it. Despite the fact that a number of these were soon immobilized by damage, their crews continued to fight their guns with the greatest courage, engaging the batteries which were firing on the landing craft, and on the evidence of witnesses contributing to the safe withdrawal of some of the latter.

About one hour after the first landing at this point, information received indicated that the beach was sufficiently cleared to permit the landing of the floating reserve. In consequence the Fusiliers Mont-Royal, commanded by Lt-Col. D. Menard, were ordered to land and establish themselves on the beach and on the edge of the town of Dieppe. The Royal Hamilton Light Infantry had succeeded in capturing the Casino, which was a prominent feature on the front of the town and was strongly fortified, but the strong road blocks across the heads of the streets leading into the town and the heavy fire brought to bear from the houses facing the Esplanade and the beach prevented further progress except by small parties of various units which penetrated for some distance at a number of points. Large numbers of the troops were unable to advance beyond the wire obstacles on the beach, which were swept by extremely heavy fire, and the Essex Scottish in particular were exposed to heavy fire from enemy mortars and suffered very numerous casualties.

At 9:30, about four and a half hours after the initial landings, the enemy had brought into action a number of mobile batteries, mortars and additional infantry, and it was clear that not only was the complete capture of the planned objectives now impossible but also that it had become necessary to make immediate plans for withdrawal. The decision was accordingly made to withdraw at eleven o'clock, which necessitated abandoning the tanks which had been landed, in order to re-embark personnel. At the same time the craft carrying the remaining tanks and troops who had not been landed, were ordered to return to England.

Full support was given by the Air Force and the ships' guns to cover the withdrawal, but by this time the enemy had organized very heavy fire on both the beaches and the sea approaches which made it practically impossible for the landing craft to approach. In addition dive-bombers attacked the ships and craft lying off Dieppe. In spite of heavy casualties to both personnel and craft, the Navy most gallantly went in again and again to every beach until it was known that our men on the beaches in front of the town were either killed or overwhelmed, when any further efforts would have been of no avail. Every possible effort was made by the Navy to get the assault craft into the beaches. The Headquarters destroyer, among other ships, closed the beach until it almost grounded, in an attempt to support the withdrawal by fire and to pick up survivors.

Similarly, on the beach at Pourville, the Cameron Highlanders and the South Saskatchewan Regiment were subjected to very heavy fire in withdrawing, and while, thanks to the untiring efforts of the Officers and N.C.Os. and the unfailing gallantry of the Navy, a large proportion of these units was safely withdrawn, they nevertheless suffered heavily at this stage.

The expedition returned to England under an umbrella of Air Force fighter cover which prevented any serious interference by enemy aircraft. In England, dispersal arrangements were most efficiently organized by the Canadian headquarters concerned, and all returning officers and men were given hot food on arrival. The wounded were immediately dispatched to hospital and the remainder were returned to their unit areas.

NAVAL AND AIR SUPPORT

The splendid assistance given by the Royal Navy has already been referred to. Throughout, it was beyond praise, and there are on file statements by many members of the Canadian military forces, from private soldiers upwards, which testify to their deep understanding and appreciation of the manner in which the Naval forces ran all risks to assist the troops.

Air cover and bombing were likewise magnificent, and drew similar warm tributes from the troops and from the Navy. Throughout the operation, both the Air Force and the Navy provided smoke screens which were highly effective, except in the area closest to shore (where a slight offshore breeze appears to have interfered) and which greatly reduced casualties to ships and personnel.

It should be noted that both Canadian sailors and Canadian airmen played a distinguished part in these operations. Considerable numbers of Canadian Naval Officers and ratings were engaged on board the Naval vessels, and numerous cases of gallantry by them are recorded. At one point, light craft ventured into extremely heavy fire to rescue men of the Royal Regiment of Canada, who were clinging to the bottom of an overturned landing craft close to the shore. One of these rescue craft was commanded by a Canadian Officer; on another a Canadian rating and an English rating sacrificed their lives in saving these soldiers.

Two Army Co-Operation Squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force attached to formations of the Canadian Army Overseas participated in the operation. Both did gallant work and suffered losses. Canadian Fighter Squadrons likewise played a brilliant part. Many Canadian airmen served in Royal Air Force squadrons engaged in the operations.

CONDUCT OF THE TROOPS

Throughout this operation the conduct of all ranks of the Canadian military forces engaged, and their determination to capture their objectives, were beyond all praise. Although they came under the heaviest forms of artillery, mortar and machine gun fire, there was not the slightest hesitation on the part of anyone, and all ranks evinced a keen desire to come to grips with the enemy. Literally hundreds of documents relating to the operation have now been examined. There is no suggestion in any one of these that so much as one man of the Canadian Army failed in his duty.

Where all did well, it is perhaps invidious to quote individual cases of gallantry, but two such cases are mentioned here merely as examples of the manner in which Canadian officers and men maintained the traditions of the Canadian Army and the honour of their country.

Lt-Col. C.C.I. Merritt of the South Saskatchewan Regiment acted with most distinguished gallantry throughout the operation. When his battalion was held up by very hot fire at a bridge on which many men had fallen, this officer walked back and forth across the bridge, waving his helmet and calling, "See, there is no danger here". He then led his men across and cleared the commanding enemy positions on the other side. After many acts of bravery during the day, including personally disposing of a sniper, and organizing and leading parties for the destruction of enemy machine gun posts which were harassing his men, this most gallant officer was last seen collecting automatic weapons and organizing a defensive position to cover the withdrawal of the last parties of his unit from the beach.

Lance-Sergeant G.E. Hickson, of the 7th Field Company, Royal Canadian Engineers, was assigned to a demolition task in the town, and landed with the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry. As fire was too heavy to move directly to his objective, he attached himself to an infantry platoon, and when this Platoon's officer and senior

N.C.Os. were put out of action, he took command and led them to the Casino. Here he used an explosive charge to enter through the walls and reached a large concrete gun emplacement. He blew in the steel door of the gun emplacement with another charge, killing the gun crew, and subsequently destroyed the 6-inch naval gun in the emplacement as well as two machine guns. He then re-organized the remaining men of the platoon and in the face of heavy enemy opposition led them into the town as far as the Church of St. Remy. Only when he found his party alone and unsupported did he withdraw it to the Casino. Subsequently he was among the last men to be evacuated from the beach.

Such deeds as these will long be remembered.

RESULTS OF THE OPERATION

It is obvious from the above narrative that a great part of the limited and local objectives of the raid were not attained. The demolitions actually effected were on a much smaller scale than had been hoped for, although considerable damage was done. Prisoners were taken, however, and a great deal of information concerning enemy dispositions and methods was obtained.

From the point of view of larger results of the raid, little can be said at present. The operation is still being most carefully studied with a view to extracting from it every possible lesson which will assist us in the future prosecution of operations in Western Europe or elsewhere; and the value of the experience gained at Dieppe will appear only in the future course of the war. At the present time, no public analysis of the lessons learned is possible without giving assistance to the enemy.

One thing, however, can be stated with complete confidence. The organization of combined command worked out in such detail in advance of the operation functioned perfectly. In particular, the method of organizing the close support effort and the fighter cover provided by the R.A.F., a new method of control here employed for the first time, proved to be most satisfactory. The three services worked together in perfect co-operation, and in this respect the result of the operation has been to afford complete confidence in the effective co-ordination of the efforts of the three services in Combined Operations.

One further special point may be made. This extensive raid compelled the enemy to concentrate air squadrons from many distant points and to commit a large force to action. This gave the R.A.F. a valuable opportunity, and in the intense air fighting over Dieppe the German air force suffered an important defeat.

For the lessons learned and the advantages gained the forces engaged, and particularly the land forces, paid a very heavy price. The history of similar operations in the past serves to indicate that heavy losses are to be expected in amphibious operations of this type directed against a fortified coastline held by a determined and alert enemy. The landing operations in Gallipoli in the last war are a case in point. At Dieppe the losses suffered were in great part due to the misfortune of the chance encounter with the escorted German tanker, which served to warn the garrison of the defences, and, to some extent, to disturb the time-table for the attack. The margin giving success in operations of this type is always a very narrow one, and very small circumstances are frequently sufficient to turn the balance.

The Canadian units engaged in the Dieppe operation gained combat experience which will be of great value to them in future operations. The troops have returned from the operation with added confidence in themselves and, in particular, in the leadership of their officers and N.C.Os., which throughout the operation was of the very highest order. All ranks of the units concerned, and especially those which suffered most heavily, are anxious for another opportunity

of contact with the enemy which will enable them to exact from him a further reckoning for the losses which they have suffered on this occasion. The heroism both of those who fell and those who returned will be a source of future inspiration to all ranks of the Canadian Army.