

NOTE

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Directorate of History  
National Defence Headquarters  
Ottawa, Canada  
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REPORT NO. 101  
HISTORICAL SECTION (G. 3.)  
ARMY HEADQUARTERS

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4 May 64

A Preliminary Report concerning the Availability  
of material relating to the dispatch of Canadian  
Troops to Cyprus, 1964

1. A survey carried out at Army Headquarters between 16 and 20 April 1964 disclosed a sufficiency of material in the G Branch Operations Room from which a full Historical Report covering the following aspects could be compiled:-
  - a. Diplomatic negotiations leading to the dispatch of a Canadian force.
  - b. military planning.
  - c. movement of the force.
2. Details of operations in Cyprus will become available from contingent and unit diaries.
3. Wall Files examined were as follows:-
  - a. OPS. LOG.
  - b. OPS. MESSAGES (In and Out).
  - c. OTHER BRANCH MESSAGES.
  - d. SITREPS (Including AG Branch and CAG Branch).
  - e. "EXTERNAL" MESSAGES.
  - f. "PERMISSION" (Permanent Mission, New York) MESSAGES.
  - g. AIR MOVE CABLES
  - h. OPS ORDERS
  - j. STAFF MEMORANDA
  - k. BRIEFING NOTES
  - l. PRESS CLIPPINGS
4. The wall Files will be stripped and consolidated into four files which will be retained by DMO & P. Their references are:

HQ 1750-9/80, HQ 2001-9/80, HQ 2501-9/80 and HQ 6001-9/80. These will be made available to this directorate when required.

5. A summary of certain pertinent material is given below under four headings: BACKGROUND INFORMATION; DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS; MILITARY PLANNING; and MOVEMENT OF THE FORCE.

(a) BACKGROUND INFORMATION

(i) General Situation

The present situation in Cyprus developed from a period of tension which built up in the island during the latter part of 1963. This tension was caused primarily by Makarios' attitude to the London-Zurich Agreement. Makarios wished to change the constitutional portions of this agreement, which concerned the Turkish Cypriots' veto in the Legislature; the thirty per cent of the vacancies in the Civil Service allotted to the Turkish Cypriots; and the separate Turkish-Cypriot municipalities within the towns and cities.

In the fall of 1963, Makarios forwarded to Vice-President Kutchuk (the senior Turkish Cypriot in the Government) a thirteen-point memorandum outlining the proposed constitutional amendments. This memorandum was rejected by Kutchuk, and tension in the island increased.

On the 21 Dec 63, Turkish Cypriots fired on Greek Cypriot policemen in NICOSIA, and the fighting in the next few days became serious, both in Nicosia and other parts of the island. As a result of the London-Zurich Agreement, British, Greek Army, and Turkish Army contingents are based on the island.

On the 26 Dec 63, the British authorities, at the request of Makarios assumed control of the situation in an attempt to establish a truce. A British officer, (Maj.-Gen. Young) took command of three British battalions, and the Turkish (650 strong) and Greek (950 strong) battalions. The two units last named, however, have not been used for Internal Security operations.

By the end of December, 1963 an uneasy truce had been established and the British had reinforced their garrison by 2,300 men, including three infantry battalions. At the same time the British convened for the 15 Jan 64 a five-power conference, composed of themselves, the Greek, Turks, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. It was at this time too, that the Turkish Forces in Turkey were placed on the alert.

On the 13 Jan 64, a preliminary meeting of the guarantor powers was held in London, and on the 15 Jan 64, the five power meeting opened. It was soon obvious that this conference was deadlocked on two main issues. The first was the Greek Cypriot desire to rule by majority, whilst granting the Turkish Cypriots minority rights, and the second was the British desire for military assistance on the island. On this latter point, the British wanted a NATO force, and they persuaded the US to offer troops. However, the idea of a NATO force, including US troops, was not acceptable to Makarios, and he rejected the British-US proposals on this score.

During this period there had been occasional shooting incidents in Cyprus, which eventually led to a serious outbreak of fighting at Ayios Demenos 16 miles south of Nicosia on the 6 Feb 64. This incident sparked a train of fighting at various places on the island, including Bellapais, Limassol, Ktima, Ayios Theodoras, Polis and Ambelikou. The most serious of these incidents was at Limassol where some reports mentioned 50 killed and 100 wounded.

On the night of the 14/15 Feb 64, elements of the 39th Turkish Division at Iskanderun were assault loaded onto ships. The ships sailed but later returned to port.

Meanwhile, politically, the British (realizing that their plan for a NATO Force, and a subsequent COMMONWEALTH Force had failed), submitted the case to the UN, with the aim of obtaining security for the island. At the same time, Makarios also applied to the UN, with the aim of preventing the Turks from exercising their rights under the London-Zurich Agreement of unilateral intervention on the island.

On the 18 Feb 64, the UN Security Council met, but did not reach any firm conclusion. Secretary General U Thant's main effort at mediation had to date consisted of asking Britain, Greece, Turkey and the Cypriots to agree to the composition of an International Force, the financing of it and its commander. With such agreement, it appeared that a UN Force was a possibility.

On 19 Feb 64, the British reinforced their garrison in Cyprus with 200 troops, and the following day a further 16-1800 troops started flying out to Cyprus. With that reinforcement, the British strength in Cyprus was estimated at a little over 9,000 men, including 500 men of the RAF Regiment.

The situation on the island towards the end of February remained very tense, although there were no major incidents probably due to the fact that both factions were awaiting developments in the UN.

(Military Intelligence Brief 2/64 dated 21 February and Intelligence Summary 21-26 Feb 64).

On 3 March, however, fighting broke out at Photta, Temblos and Karmiall, all in the vicinity of Kyrenia. An uneasy truce was maintained in this area during 4 and 5 March, but on the following day serious fighting took place at Temblos and Kazaphani, both villages being Turkish strongholds astride the main road from Kyrenia to Nicosia. At Kazaphani, Turkish defenders surrendered to the Greek Indigenous Forces (see below).

Meanwhile the most serious fighting of the whole crisis was taking place at Paphos, where the Greek Indigenous Forces had captured approximately one third of the Turkish part of the town by the time a truce was imposed on 9-10 March. (Annex 1A to OO 64/1 (Op. "Snow Goose"), 13 Mar 64)

(i) Indigenous Forces

Greek Cypriot's

Greek Indigenous Forces are said to total approximately 30,000 men made up of armed irregulars, the Greek elements of the former Cypriot (town) Police, and the former Cypriot (country district) Gendarmerie. These components have been welded into a homogenous force with an excellent command and control-system and good communications.

Every man can be assumed to be armed with modern personal weapons, and in addition the force possesses medium and light machine guns, mortars and bazooka-type rocket launchers. It has some 40 vehicles (some with protective armour) and bulldozers.

(Ibid.)

#### Turkish Cypriots

Like the Greeks, the Turkish Indigenous Forces are made up of armed irregulars and Turkish elements of the former Cypriot Police and Gendarmerie. Totalling approximately 10,000 men, the composite Force has improved its command, control and communications rapidly in 1964.

Arms and equipment compare unfavourably with the Indigenous Greeks (large numbers of Turks are armed only with shot-guns) which might account for the employment of the force up to now wholly on the defensive.

(Ibid.)

#### (iii) Turkey and Greece

Both countries have the right of unilateral intervention on Cyprus.

#### Turkey

Turkey designated the 39th Infantry Division, based at Iskanderun (about 165 miles Northeast of Kyrenia) as the intervention force. We have noted that on the night of 14-15 February elements of this division were assault-loaded onto ships which sailed in the direction of Cyprus, but later returned to port. Since then, the Turks have maintained their forces at the alert, have held naval manoeuvres in Iskanderun Bay, but so far have not intervened

(Ibid.)

Greece

Greece has reinforced Rhodes (about 300 miles northwest of Kyrenia) and Crete (some 400 miles West of Cyprus) but have not, it is believed, maintained their forces at the same high state of readiness as Turkey.

(Ibid.)

(iv) Canadian Involvement

Early in February the British and US Governments submitted proposals to President Makarios concerning the dispatch to Cyprus of an International Force to be drawn from NATO countries. Canada had, by then, been consulted by both the British and Americans, and had agreed to give sympathetic consideration to a formal request, should one be made, for a contribution of some 750 men to an international Force of about 10,000 made up of about 4,000 British, 1200 American, and 800-1200 troops drawn from several other countries (NATO plus Ireland and Sweden). The Canadian Government stipulated that agreement for the force should be reached with the Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish governments, and that the force should have appropriate links with the United Nations. (Msg., External to High Commissioner, London, 25 Feb 64). British and American proposals were not acceptable to Makarios, who preferred an enlarged British force, a broader Commonwealth force with perhaps Swedish elements, and a specifically United Nations force, in that order (Msg., High Commissioner, London, to External, 14 Feb 64).



The hint that Canada might be called upon to contribute to a Commonwealth Force was dropped on 16 February by the British Foreign Secretary (R.A.B. Butler) publicly - inappropriately enough - on his arrival at Montreal on a flying visit to Canada with Prime Minister Douglas-Home, (Ottawa Journal, 17 Feb 64). Three days later, the leader of the Canadian Government made a statement in the House outlining the conditions which would have to be met before he would commit Canadians to an international force. These conditions included an appropriate link with the United Nations, a good prospect of early political settlement in Cyprus, agreement by the Government of Cyprus to the presence of the force, and Canadian approval of the composition, terms of reference, and political guidance for the force (Msg., External to High Commissioner, London, 25 Feb 64). As with the NATO Force, the proposal to send a Commonwealth Force foundered, as will be seen, and the problem was referred to the UN Security Council.

On 4 March, the Security Council resolved that a force should be sent to Cyprus (Resolution S/5575) and on that day U Thant asked the Canadian Government to contribute a battalion group to the peacekeeping force. (Msg, External to PERMISNY, 17 Mar 64)

The Canadian Government authorized on March 14 under Order-in-Council PC 1964-389 the maintenance on active service of officers and men of the RCN, Canadian Army and RCAF not exceeding twelve hundred in number at any one time as part of or in immediate support of a United Nations Peacekeeping Force in the Republic of Cyprus.

(Ibid.)

(b) DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS

(i) REACTIONS TO PROPOSED NATO FORCE

In January, a British-American approach was made to the NATO powers concerning the despatch of a NATO Peacekeeping Force to Cyprus. The reactions of those countries, contained in External messages, are summarized below:-

Norway

3 Feb 64. "If all parties clearly accept the plan, and if other NATO governments support it, Norway would undoubtedly participate to some extent at least."

Belgium

3 Feb 64. "Agreed in principle provided Makarios accepts idea and other NATO countries will also participate. Reported that Makarios would not wish German and Italian troops in Cyprus because they were former enemies. This embarrassing in light of apparent French position. Belgians added that if countries like Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands participated, Belgium would be willing to do so."

Germany

3 Feb 64. "Concerned about Public Relations to presence of German soldiers in view of memories of last war. Waiting for Makarios' reply to UK/USA request to decide on German response."

Netherlands

4 Feb 64. "Dutch cabinet has decided in favour of participation in NATO Peacekeeping Force provided only that it is accepted by Makarios. Unlike the Belgians, the Dutch have not made explicit conditions that other NATO countries also participate."

Portugal

5 Feb 64. "In the opinion of Sec Gen, Ministry of Foreign Affairs will not agree to contribute troops since this would run counter to traditional Portuguese policy of non-intervention in domestic affairs of independent states and since Cyprus has not requested such aid." On 10 February, Portugal "refused to participate."

Denmark

7 Feb 64. "If Makarios accepts, and if broad support from NATO countries, would furnish a 580 man contingent."

France

12 Feb 64. "French refused to participate." This had "increased resistance of already lukewarm Germans and Italians."

As we have seen, Makarios opposed a NATO Force. The reasons might be as given to the Canadian Ambassador in Cairo by the Cypriot Ambassador, a Greek, who reported that the Greek Cypriots "did not like the NATO label, primarily because of US participation. The appearance of the USA immediately excited and brought the Soviets into the fray."

(ii) REACTIONS TO PROPOSED COMMONWEALTH FORCE

The NATO proposal having foundered, a British approach was made to certain Commonwealth countries. Their reactions are summarized as follows:-

New Zealand

Preliminary view on 13 February was that "NZ will provide a token force, but is stretched to the limit with present and potential commitments."

Australia

"Decision against Australian participation on grounds of other pressing military commitments closer to home."

India

"Will decline to participate in COMWEL Force on overt ground that Indian military resources are already fully extended in regard to Pakistan and China. India will support and participate in a UN Force."

Jamaica

"Contribution could only be a minimal token."

Again, in the view of the Cypriot Ambassador in Cairo, as given to the Canadian Ambassador, a Commonwealth Force would be tolerable only if drawn from the "white" Commonwealth to the exclusion of Africans and of "coloured" generally.

It was therefore evident from a review of "acceptable" Commonwealth participants, as the High Commissioner in London reported on 4 February, that a Canadian contribution would be absolutely vital to the operation. Ten days later he advised Ottawa that Makarios preferred

(a) an enlarged British force (b) a broader Commonwealth force with perhaps Swedish elements (c) a specifically UN Force. The first had little appeal in Whitehall. As for the second, it seemed virtually impossible to secure enough troops from Commonwealth sources, even with Canadian participation. The third alternative seemed to offer the only possible solution.

The matter of providing a UN Peacekeeping Force was considered by the Security Council on 18 February without reaching a firm conclusion.

(iii) THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING FORCE

While the Security Council deliberated the question and composition of an international force, the Department of External Affairs made it clear that Canada had as yet made no commitment to contribute. A message from External to the High Commissioner in London, dated 25 February, reads as follows:-

We are concerned over reports emanating from New York and London that the Canadian Government has committed itself to supply a contingent of approximately battalion strength. There is NO Canadian Government commitment. When originally approached some weeks ago by the British and Americans, we agreed to give sympathetic consideration to a request were one made to us, for a contribution of some 750 men to an international force of about 10,000 made up of some 4000 British, 1200 American and 800 to 1200 each several other countries mainly NATO plus perhaps Irish and Swedes, providing agreement were reached with Cypriot, Greek, and Turkish governments. We indicated the desirability of such force having appropriate links with the UN. Last Wednesday, after the question of participation by US forces and also the question of German and Italian participation had become unlikely, the Prime Minister indicated in the House five conditions on which Canada would consider a request for participation in an International Force. These conditions included an appropriate link with UN and Canadian approval of composition, terms of reference, and a provision for political guidance to the force, as well as a good prospect of fairly early political settlement. Conditions were amplified and left with U Thant and a copy given to UK and American Governments (courtel 377 Feb 20) which in addition specified that views being expressed were without commitment.

The Security Council resolved on 4 March to send an international force to Cyprus, and on that day U Thant made a verbal request for a battalion group from Canada.

On 17 March, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs (Paul Martin) sent the following message to the Permanent Mission, New York:

Note to Secretary General which you are authorized to transmit bearing date March 14. I have the honour to refer to your oral request of March 4 asking the Canadian Government to contribute battalion group to peacekeeping force to be established in Cyprus pursuant to Security Council resolution S/5575 of March 4/64 and to my discussion with you on March 13 on the same subject.

Following approval of a resolution by Parliament on March 13, Canadian Government authorized on March 14 under Order-in-Council P/C 1964-389 the maintenance on active service of officers and men of RCN, Canadian Army and RCAF not exceeding 12 hundred in number at any one time as part of or in immediate support of a UN Peacekeeping Force on Republic of Cyprus. Canadian contingent is now en route to Cyprus by Air (RCAF Air Transport Command) and sea (RCN). Advance Party including Commander of contingent, Col. EAC Amy, arrived at Nicosia on March 12. Contingent itself will arrive between March 16 and March 23.

The Canadian Government has noted para 6 of resolution S/5575 providing that stationing of force shall be for a period of 3 months and your statement to Security Council at time resolution was adopted that force could be extended beyond 3 months only by a new action by council.

The Canadian Government have noted also provisions of para 6 of resolution S/5575 concerning financial arrangements for force namely -- all costs pertaining to it being met in a manner to be agreed upon by them and by Governments providing contingents and by the Government of Cyprus. Secretary General may also accept voluntary contributions for that purpose.

The Canadian Government regards arrangements for financing of UN Force as a departure from established practice and from what is desirable. The Canadian Government has consistently held that financing of UN Peacekeeping Operations should be the collective responsibility of whole membership and that UN cannot continue to carry on such operations unless satisfactory arrangements are made in accordance with that principle. Recognizing however that deployment of a UN Force in Cyprus could not wait upon lengthy financial negotiations, Canadian Government has decided to assume all costs of a Canadian contingent for a 3 month period as well as costs of transporting our men and our materials to Cyprus without prejudice to its established position on financing.

On 18 March, External passed comments on Canadian representation in the International Force to the Permanent Mission, New York, for transmission to the UN Secretary General. These comments were:-

1. Canadians in UNIFCYP command structure are to ensure that, except in special and temporary circumstances, the Canadian battalion and Recce squadron operate together as a unit under Canadian command and that sub-units or detachments will be commanded by Canadian officers.
2. That if possible Canadian officers should have a say in the allotment of operational tasks to Canadian units, and
3. That Canada should receive representation commensurate with the size of the Canadian contribution in the International Force HQ and at the Brigade or Zone level.

#### INTERNATIONAL FORCE HQ

We had assumed that Britain would get the position of Deputy Commander (Maj-Gen Carver). Canada as the largest contributor after Britain would get the Chief of Staff position. We would be prepared to find a Brigadier or Colonel for the position. In any case we are most desirous to have senior Canadian representation on the International Force HQ Staff. We will also be prepared to consider the provision of officers for other positions at International Force HQ.

BRIGADE OR ZONAL HQ

We had thought that the Secretary General would wish to distribute Canadian, Swedish, Irish and Finnish contingents among the three British brigades and largely to maintain their present structure. In these circumstances we would not have sought a position in command of a Brigade or Zone HQ, although we would wish appropriate representation in that HQ, say in position of brigade major. However, if as indicated the Secretary General intends to leave only one Brigade under British command then we would like appropriate Canadian representation in the integrated Brigade or Zone HQ in which Canadians are serving.

(c) MILITARY PLANNING

Military Planning towards Canadian participation in an international peacekeeping force for Cyprus began as early as February, 1964.

(i) Early Activity

On 18 February DMO & P outlined for DGPO the steps that had been taken on the assumption that 1 R. 22e R. (the standby battalion) plus a reconnaissance squadron and administrative elements, would comprise the force. The following documents had been drafted (with certain omissions which could only be filled in when further information became available):-

An Operation Order (the purpose of which was to get the force organized in Canada and moved to Cyprus).

Terms of Reference for the commander, including an appendix on finance.

An Administrative Order.

Submissions for Ministerial or PC Authority foreseen as necessary.



By the end of February, the documents had been drafted to the fullest extent possible as well as an establishment for Contingent HQ and administrative elements, a radio diagram, a Signals instruction, and movement priorities. In addition certain administrative precautions had been taken, but always related to some other activity, e.g., 200 shields and clubs for riot control had been manufactured at the Montreal Penitentiary against a possible requirement; and a routine enquiry was set on foot in the US as to the availability of riot-control grenades.

D Pers were requested to confirm, as a routine measure, the availability and fitness of personnel earmarked for UN standby. (HQS 2001-9/80 (DLO & P 1A).)

An approach was made to the War Office (through CALE) for information as to British strengths on the island (or in transit) with locations and proposed dispositions. This information was furnished (Canniltry to Canarmy, Secret msg G5062 dated 21 Feb 64) and kept up-to-date in subsequent messages. Also by the end of February, JAG had studied the question of force status in some detail, and had submitted a memorandum to the Deputy Minister together with a recommended draft message to the United Nations on the subject. This had been discussed with External, and a draft message of instruction to the Permanent Mission in New York was prepared by them. The UNEF status agreements were used as the basis of discussion.

measure, the availability and fitness of personnel earmarked  
It was recommended that the proposed Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) should contain these important clauses:

- (a) Force would be authorized to take such action, including use of force, as is necessary to defend itself and to fulfil its task.
- (b) Service authorities would have exclusive criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction over persons subject to military law. (The UNEF SOFA was quoted as a good example.)
- (c) The settlement of claims would be a matter for the Cyprus Government.
- (d) The NATO SOFA would apply to the (British) Sovereign Base Areas.
- (e) members of the force would have powers of arrest, detention, and custody in respect of persons found committing or suspected of having committed offences.
- (f) SOFA must spell out relationship between forces going in and those already there.
- (g) UN should provide Chairman for negotiating SOFA with Cyprus Government. Sending nations would provide members for committee along with British, Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot authorities.

Colonel B. Dalton (Col. G.S., MFl War Office)

who had been MA to the British High Commissioner in Cyprus from 1960-2, visited Ottawa on training matters. On 26 February he gave a briefing to most of the senior officers concerned at AHQ. The briefing was considered "very worthwhile". (File HQS 2001-9/8 (Ops Room).)

On 6 March, the CG3 (after discussions with the minister) directed that a precautionary message be issued which would enable the staffs, units and sub-units concerned to make preliminary arrangements in case the Government approved the despatch of a contingent to Cyprus. This went out in the form of a warning order at 061751Z Mar 64, and Operations Centres in G, A, and Q Branches opened on a 24-hour basis at the same time.

At 1430 hours the DGPO briefed the AHQ planning staffs, Commander Canadian Contingent and his staff, RCN and RCAF representatives on the current status of the Cyprus situation. He made these points:

- (a) Canadian force, if sent, would probably be known as the Canadian Contingent, United Nations, Cyprus.
- (b) The Canadian Government had not made a decision and precautionary warning message had been approved to enable the completion of planning which would be required if a Canadian force were authorized to proceed to Cyprus on short notice.
- (c) The force would consist of 1 R. 22e R. (less one rifle company, heavy mortars and heavy anti-tank weapons) with an armoured reconnaissance squadron of the RCD under command, a transport platoon and administrative supporting elements as required to make the force self-contained.
- (d) The administrative tail would be called forward as required. It would NOT go automatically.

- (e) The force would move by air and sea using Camp Valcartier as the concentration area for the air move and Camp Gagetown as the concentration area for the sea move.
- (f) HMC3 BONAVENTURE was returning from the Mediterranean and would be used for the move of the sea tail.
- (g) Equipment was to be prepared but not moved unless specially authorized.
- (h) All personnel were to be warned of the possible operation but not moved.
- (j) All papers for the Minister's signature were to be prepared and held pending governmental decision. These papers were under study, and held by DMO & P.
- (k) Terms of Reference for Commander would not be completed until it became possible to include all details.
- (l) **CO 1 R. 22e R. and OC Armoured Recce Sqn RCD had been** called in for briefing at AHQ (they arrived at about 1630 hours and were briefed by the CGS and the DGPO prior to the detailed staff briefing in the GS Conf Room by DMI, DMO & P, D Org, DQOP, D Mov and Commander Canadian Contingent (Col. Amy)).

On the following day discussions continued between the CO, 1 R. 22e R. (Lt.-Col. Woodcock) and OC, Armoured Reconnaissance Squadron (Maj. Beament).

Many points were resolved on the spot; others required staff investigation, and these included obtaining films on peace-keeping operations, the dress appropriate to Cyprus at this time of year, and the painting of vehicles (white was recommended, but the decision had to be left to the United Nations).

An assessment of the situation in Cyprus by the Joint Intelligence Group, Cyprus (British) was received on 10 March (Message, High Commissioner London to External, 00 101425/03)1964). The situation was appreciated briefly as follows:

- (a) Difficult period was approaching (which might last some weeks) in which the authority of the British Peacekeeping Force was likely to be reduced due to the approaching end of its mission and the UN Force not having been created and its commander designate (Lt.-Gen. Prem Singh Giyani of India) not yet able to assume control of events.
- (b) The Greek Cypriots were expected to take advantage of this situation to erode the Turkish Cypriot position, and while seeking to avoid major trouble, were expected to provoke as many incidents as they could with this objective in mind. It was considered likely that Makarios would attempt to manoeuvre the UN Force into a position where in maintaining law and order, they would be in fact assisting Greek Cypriot Forces in their efforts to subdue the Turks.

(c) Attitudes to UN Force (Local reactions to the Security Council Decision to send a Peacekeeping force to Cyprus).

Greek Cypriots were clearly satisfied with the resolution, arguing that it superseded the London and Zurich Agreement. A further case for Greek Cypriot satisfaction was the fact that the resolution maintains, and perhaps strengthens, the safeguards against Turkish intervention which have existed since the formation of the joint peacekeeping force.

Turkish Cypriots were alive to the dangers of the interim period, and could be expected to press for the early arrival of the UN Force. They would be likely therefore to insist on terms of reference for the UN Force designed to prevent manoeuvres by Makarios in attempting to use the UN Force in furthering Greek Cypriot aims.

"The Turkish Cypriots are in a deteriorating position and this could lead them to a state of desperation."

The period 6-11 March was marked by further planning. On the 6th, directorates in Q Branch were instructed to account for all expenditures in connection with 'SNOUGOOSE' separately (QMG Branch Sitrep No. 1 dated 11 Mar 64 - HQS 6001-9/80 (DQOP Q 1 A)). On the 9th, the movement, loading and unloading plan for HMCS Bonaventure was outlined. (G Branch Sitrep No. 2, 9-11 Mar 64 - HQS 2001-9/80 (DMO & P)).

Two days later, five sets of maps showing the town plans of all major towns and cities in Cyprus (less Nicosia) were received; the Operation Order and Administrative Order were updated to reflect the current planning situation.

(Ibid.)

(ii) Final Planning

On 13 March, G Ops advised "G" hour for the operation -- 130900Z Mar 64 (0400 hours local time); Operation Order 64/1 (Op SNOWGOOSE) was issued on the 13 March subject to a "Stop Order" as the Government's decision had not yet been taken. There was to be no publicity; D Mov announced that the first aircraft (for the advance party) would depart RCAF Uplands for RCAF Trenton at 1100 hours (local time) on 13 March; authority was issued by Q Branch to HQ Camp Petawawa to move medical stores from Petawawa to Movement HQ, Ancienne Lorette, P.Q. ("A" Branch Sitrep for period ending 0800 hrs, 13 Mar 64.)

On the same day, Q Branch detailed the action taken to prepare stores and vehicles for shipment, and issued instructions to paint vehicles white (Q Branch Daily Progress Report (HQ 6001-9/80 (DQOP Ops) dated 13 Mar 64)).

On the 14th, advice was received from the Navy that Bonaventure had arrived at Halifax and was preparing to load army personnel and equipment. The estimated date of departure for Famagusta was given as 18 March, or on completion of loading (Navy HQ to Army HQ, msg. P141200Z, 14 Mar 64.)


AHQ Sitreps for the following days reflect steady progress with the movement plan and intense UN activity both in Cyprus and New York. It was then known that Sweden would supply a battalion (approximately 900 men) for the UN Force, but that was not expected to be in Cyprus until about 10 April. Finland would also supply a battalion of the same strength but it would be "some weeks" before it would arrive. Ireland had promised 500 men as soon as parliament approved the offer, but parliament was in recess until after Easter. There was one report that Austria was considering sending troops, but they might be the staff of the Austrian Army Hospital in the Congo. (AHQ Sitreps 4-7.)

A note of thanks from the Secretary General of the United Nations was passed to the Canadian Government on 18 March.

(a) MOVEMENT OF THE FORCE

Q Branch Sitreps covering the movement of the Canadian Contingent to Cyprus are attached as Appendix "A".

6. This report was compiled by Captain J.A. Swettenham.

  
(J.A. Swettenham)  
*Capt.*

4 May 1964