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REPORT NO. 36

HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

31 Mar 50

The Development of the German Defences
in the Dieppe Sector (1940 - 1942)

Information from German War Diaries

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Information from German War Diaries

1. The substance of the available information from German sources regarding Operation "JUBILEE" (The Raid on Dieppe), on 19 Aug 42, has been laid down in Hist Sec Report No. 10. The present report has been prepared for the purpose of supplying background information on the development of the German defences in the Dieppe sector. The source material has been lent to Hist Sec (G.S.) by the German Military Document Section, Washington, D.C.

2. After the summer of 1941, when the Second World War was beginning to fall into the pattern which led to the ultimate downfall of the Axis powers, the defence of the Continental coasts became a matter of ever increasing urgency and importance to the Germans. It was not long before the responsibility for coastal protection was removed from the realm of routine precautions by individual formation commanders to that of preparations based on broad general policies laid down at the highest level. In order to be meaningful, therefore, an account of the genesis of the Dieppe defences must transcend the mere enumeration of local measures; contain the general orders leading to these measures and, if possible, mirror the strategical considerations on which these general orders were predicated. To a limited degree this is being done in the paragraphs which follow.

COASTAL PROTECTION AGAINST MINOR OPERATIONS
(SUMMER 1940 - AUTUMN 1941)

Situation during Winter 1940/41

3. At the time of the Dieppe operation the defence of the coastal sector from St. Valery-en-Caux to St. Valery-sur-Somme was the responsibility of 302 Inf Div. This formation had been in the sector continuously since 14 Apr 41, when it had relieved 295 Inf Div, which then was moved to Eastern Poland. (G.M.D.S. - 17113/2, 295 Inf Div, Apps to W.D. 2, Misc Docs 12 - 14 Apr 41) It would be interesting to know what measures were taken for the coastal protection of the sector during the earliest days of the German occupation. But the first War Diary of 295 Inf Div, with all its appendices, was virtually destroyed in a fire at the Potsdam Archives, and the few charred remnants now in the hands of G.M.D.S. do not supply the desired information. For the purposes of the present report,

however, the lack of early source material seems to be of relatively small importance. This is due to the fact that at the time in question the German High Command was thinking in terms of offensive action, had little cause for concern regarding major Allied undertakings against the continent and, apart from coastal batteries installed for special purposes, left coastal protection to remain confined to the normal precautions taken by any large formation in occupied territory during war.

4. From 1 Nov 40 onwards, up to and past the time of the Raid on Dieppe (hereafter referred to as "the Raid"), the development of the German defences in the sector is well documented. The earliest available order of 295 Inf Div, "Divisional Order No. 20", of 1 Nov 40, shows the formation, in addition to being responsible for the protection of the coast from Dieppe to St. Valery-sur-Somme, as being engaged in a multitude of occupation tasks like surveillance of civilian traffic, protection of bridges, railroads and signal communications. (G.M.D.S. - 17113/2, 295 Inf Div, Apps to W.D. 2, 1 Nov 40) During the winter 1940/41 the Division in fact was responsible for an area extending from the coast to well over 100 kilometres inland. The dispositions of 295 Inf Div on 15 Nov 40 were shown on a location map, which appears in photostatic form as Appendix "A" to this report. (Ibid, 15 Nov 40) (Photostat 981D295(D2))

5. The attitude of O.B. West towards coast defence at that time was shown in an order issued at the end of October 1940. This order was quoted in 295 Inf Div's Order No. 22, of 12 Nov 40; it read in part as follows:

"The increasing period of time which has elapsed since the western offensive was brought to a successful conclusion should not cause the western German army to forget that we are still at war with the tough and cunning main enemy, and that we are occupation forces in a country whose population has not become inwardly reconciled to defeat, but rather hopes for a reversal of the war situation.

Even though an attempted landing of strong British forces on a large scale is at present not probable, we must still reckon that the enemy - if only for reasons of prestige - will make minor surprise landings in the form of raids, with the object of taking prisoners, of disrupting our preparations, of seizing headquarters and batteries stationed at the coast, etc.

All formations of the Army to which the protection of the coast is entrusted, are hereby charged with a task which has a decisive significance within the framework of the whole conduct of the war. This task entails a well thought out disposition of the coastal patrols, the strictest attention to guard duty and the holding in readiness of tactical reserves. Sustained watchfulness and readiness for

commitment - during the winter months too in particular - must nip every attempted British landing in the bud. Mobile reserves of the various Army headquarters guarantee support for the coastal defence even in the case of larger-scale enemy operations. ... (Ibid, 12 Nov 40) (Photostat 981D295(D3))

6. Not much change occurred during the winter 1940/41 in this attitude of limited concern. Coast defence and occupation duties in the area of 295 Inf Div were supplemented by the execution of various training programmes for Operation "Seeloewe".* One sign of awakening interest in coastal defence might be seen in Divisional Order No. 33, of 14 Jan 41, which required all permanent observation posts, machine-gun, anti-tank gun and artillery positions to be protected by splinter-proof arrangements. (Ibid, 14 Jan 41)

7. By the middle of March 1941, however, somewhat greater emphasis was apparently being laid on coastal defence; the divisional sector had been greatly reduced in depth, and all three regiments of the formation were now quartered at or not far from the coast. A photostatic copy of the Division's location map for 15 Mar 41 appears as Appendix "B" to this report. (Ibid, 15 Mar 41) (Photostat 981D295(D4))

8. At the end of March, prior to the scheduled relief of 295 Inf Div by 302 Inf Div, the boundaries of the Dieppe sector were redrawn, and after 7 Apr 41 the coastal front of the sector extended from Le Tot, west of St. Valery-en-Caux (new boundary) to St. Valery-sur-Somme (unchanged). (G.M.D.S. - 17840/5, 302 Inf Div, W.D. 2, Vol "C" of Apps, Part I, 1 Apr 41) (981D302(D2))

302 Inf Div moves to the Sector (April 1940)

9. 302 Inf Div had been organized in Germany on 14 Nov. 40. The movement of the formation from the homeland to the Channel coast began on 6 Apr and was concluded on 10 Apr 41 (G.M.D.S. - 17840/1, 302 Inf Div, W.D. 2, 6 - 10 Apr 41). On 10 Apr the Division assumed command of the sector. On the same day it took over from the departing Division fifteen French 7.5 cm guns, to be manned by detachments from the regular divisional artillery units (Ibid). The Division remained in the Dieppe sector till the end of November 1942, when it was relieved by 384 Inf Div ** (G.M.D.S. - 24353/1, 302 Inf Div, W.D. 3, 1 Apr - 30 Nov 42, 20. - 30 Nov 42). The

* "Seeloewe": Invasion of Great Britain

** 302 Inf Div appeared on the southern sector of the eastern front in spring 1943 and was destroyed west of the lower Dnepr in the summer of 1944. (Order of Battle of German Army, Mil Int Div, Washington, D.C., 1945)

next higher authorities in the chain of command were: Higher Command 32*, at Rouen, AOK 16 (T)**, at Tourcoing, and Army Group "D", at St. Germain.

10. The slight increase in attention to matters of coast defence in the early part of 1941 may have stemmed from an order of the Armed Forces High Command, which began as follows:

15 Feb 41 The use of strong Army and Air forces in the Eastern theatre in the spring and summer may induce the British to launch operations against the coast of the occupied West area or against Norway, in addition to the operations in the Mediterranean and possibly also against Portugal. Daring British action can be expected (Zeebruegge 1917) ... (G.M.D.S. - OKW/1611a, Fuehrer Directives, Translation U.S. Navy, 15 Feb 41, p. 140)

11. In this connection it may be worth noting that on arrival at the coast, 302 Inf Div (as well as 227 Inf Div on its left, and 321 Inf Div on its right) received instructions from Higher Command 32 for the carrying on of training for Operation "Seelowe", such training to be completed by 30 Jun 41 (G.M.D.S. - 17840/5, 302 Inf Div, op cit, 5 and 13 Apr 41) (Photostat 981D302(D3)). Even if Higher Command 32 at the time had been aware of Hitler's intention to invade Russia in the near future, which seems improbable in the light of the security regulations contained in Fuehrer Directive No. 21, of 18 Dec 40, for Operation "Barbarossa"***, it would have been impossible to let the troops, and thus probably the enemy, become aware of this. Everybody, therefore, to all appearances was still busily training for "Seelowe". This of course despite the fact that at the moment nothing was further from the mind of the Fuehrer than an invasion of England, an undertaking for which he had never shown much

* Elevated to the status of a full fledged Corps Command as Headquarters 81 Inf Corps on 29 May 42 (G.M.D.S. - 24353/1, 302 Inf Div, W.D. 3, 29 May 42)

** Cover name then in force for Headquarters Fifteenth Army

*** ("To crush Russia in a swift campaign") Fuehrer Directives, Transl. op cit, p. 127

appetite.*

12. Untroubled, however, by whatever plans were in the making at higher levels, and by whatever divergencies in outlook must have come from some headquarters being in the picture, and some not, by the middle of April 302 Inf Div was settling down in the sector to carry out its task of coast protection. On 12 Apr 41 the formation issued "Divisional Order No. 1 for Coast Protection".** In this document the situation was described in terms closely resembling the views expressed by O.B. West in October 1940 (para 5 above). The task of the Division was:

Prevention of a landing from the sea and from the air.

To this was added:

According to the views of the Division the focal point of the defence lies at Dieppe.

Command arrangements and conduct of operations were dealt with in the following:

In the defence against an enemy landing attempt, as well as for the preparations therefor, all three Branches of the Armed Forces are under the command of the responsible ground commander of the Army. This includes all headquarters, troops and installations of the "Military Commander" [of Occupied Territory], as well as any

* On 2 Jul 40, Keitel had issued an order beginning with the words:

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander has decided:
A landing in England is possible, provided ...

On 12 Jul Jodl then submitted his first appreciation of the invasion problem. With the signed concurrence of Keitel ("I agree. Keitel"), the document began with the remark: "Die Landung ist schwierig". (Freely translated: "This operation is difficult".) This was an almost unseemly statement for a German general to make; it would either lead to disfavour, or, if accepted, stand as a warning signal spelled in capital letters. One is tempted to wonder whether this sentence had not a dampening effect on Hitler's plans in this regard. (G.M.D.S. - OKW/1566, Miscellaneous High Command Documents, Erste Ueberlegungen ueber eine Landung in England (First Deliberations regarding a Landing In England), 12 Jul 40) (Photostat 981HC(D20))

** To prevent cumbersome repetition, the words "for Coast Protection" will be omitted hereafter from all references to Divisional Orders of the series "For Coast Protection".

other organization in the coastal area which may be regarded as belonging to the Armed Forces. ...

Operations are a matter of mobile defence, based on quickly available reserves and a good system of signal communications.

A photostatic copy and a translation of this document are being retained by Hist Sec (G.S.). (G.M.D.S. - 17840/5, 302 Inf Div, W.D. 2, Vol "C" of Apps, Div Order No. 1, 12 Apr 41) (Photostat 981D302(D4))

13. To some extent the history of the Dieppe defences can be read from the 132 consecutive "Divisional Orders for Coast Protection", which were issued by the formation between 12 Apr 41 and 18 Nov 42. A complete collection of these orders is being retained in photostatic form. (981D302(D4))

Unhurried Work on Field Fortifications
(12 Apr 41 - 21 Oct 41)

14. Coast defence in the sector during this period was being thought of in terms of field fortifications. Divisional Order No. 3, of 18 Apr 41, stressed the necessity of early recognition of an enemy approach and of quickly passing along the information through the chain of command (Ibid, Div Order No. 3, 18 Apr 41) (Photostat 981D302.(D4)). The Division commander had inspected the defence works left by the outgoing formation and, true to the custom observed by incoming units all over the world, had pronounced them to be unsatisfactory and in need of immediate repairs and strengthening. However, no fundamental changes were suggested at the time (Ibid).

15. On its arrival in the sector the Division had been given instructions for the carrying out of training for Operation "Seeloewe" (para 11 above). But on 24 Apr 41, based on orders received from Army Headquarters, the Division issued a revised training programme according to which, in lieu of preparing the troops for amphibious operations, stress was now to be laid on long marches and on intensive training in the tactics of mobile warfare on land. This training to be completed by 15 Jun 41 (Ibid, 24 Apr 41).

16. Following his own reconnaissance, and based on instructions received from Army Headquarters, the Division commander, Maj-Gen (later Lt-Gen) Conrad Haase, on 25 Apr 41, issued "Divisional Order No. 6 (Ibid, 25 Apr 41)(981D302.(D4))". Presumably in clarification of an earlier order regarding command arrangements (para 12 above), it was now stated that components of the Navy, when engaged in tasks of naval warfare, were to remain under the command of naval authorities. In connection with the intended improvement of the coastal defences, the order carried the following:

In view of the fact that the endangered ports of Le Treport and Dieppe will not be attacked directly by the enemy, but rather by landing attempts at nearby points and the formation of a bridgehead, these aspects must be explored and preparations

made for fire on the areas in question. Plans for the required changes to be submitted by 1 May 41 (Ibid).

A further subject being dealt with in the order was the terminology to be used in connection with alarm arrangements:

(a) Continuous State of Alert
(Staendiger Alarmzustand)

(exists at times when attack is NOT expected)

The local reserves of the battalions must be ready for commitment within three hours; the reserves of the regiments and of the Division within six hours.

(b) Advanced State of Alert (called: First Stage)
(Erhoehte Alarmbereitschaft) (1. Stufe)

Troops remain in quarters ready to move off.

All unit and staff commanders remain within reach.

Telephones at headquarters are manned by officers.

If necessary, patrols are sent out.

(c) Highest Degree of Alert (called: Second Stage)
(Hoechste Alarmbereitschaft) (2. Stufe)

Troops fall in at designated places. Local reserves of battalions and regiments move off to designated concentration areas.

Divisional reserve (less Engr Bn) remains at "fall in" place.

Engineer Battalion takes up positions at the southern exit of Dieppe (on both sides of the road to Rouen).

...

(Ibid)

17. On the same day (25 Apr), the Division submitted to Higher Headquarters 32 a report dealing with the present and future measures for the defence of the sector (Ibid, 25 Apr 41) (981D302(D5)). According to this document coast defence plans in the sector were being revised, the regiments were being assigned certain areas in which they were to be responsible for a number of major strongpoints, each of which was to consist of a greater or lesser number of minor strongpoints, such groups of strongpoints to be organized as battle groups for added strength and cohesion. The width of the Divisional sector was approximately 90 kms. On this frontage during the tenure of 295 Inf Div a total of

25 concrete shelters [presumably pill boxes] had been constructed; four of these in the strongpoint Dieppe.

18. This number of 25 concrete shelters in the sector was apparently considered as being sufficient. In an order of 15 May 41, Higher Command 32 had expressed the wish that following the clarification of the planned measures special attention should now be given to the furtherance of work on the field fortifications. This was reflected in the first paragraph of 302 Inf Div's Order No. 12, of 18 May 41. The second paragraph carried the added information:

As a guiding principle for the further development of the positions the Division maintains its previous order to the effect that the installation of additional concrete shelters is NOT intended ... (Ibid, 18 May 41) (981D302.(D4)).

19. On 4 and 5 Jul 41 the general situation and the tactics of coast defence were discussed at a conference held at the headquarters of Fifteenth Army (Ibid, Extracts from Report on Conference, issued 14 Jul 41) (Photostat 981D302(D7)). At this conference C.G.S. Fifteenth Army said that England at the moment was unable to mount a major landing operation and that no preparations for such a major undertaking had been observed. The attack on Russia, which had begun on 22 Jun 41, was then well under way. Presumably with that fact in mind, the C.G.S. then said that work on the coastal defences, which had hitherto been retarded by lack of materials, and which had been regarded as undesirable by Army Group for reasons of deception, would now no longer suffer from these hindrances.

20. At the end of August the Division issued "Divisional Order No. 27". This order, while not initiating any radical changes, superseded or amended most of the preceding Divisional Orders; its 18 pages give a good picture of the views, tasks and intended tactics of the Division at the time. Probably no more concise and authoritative description is in existence of the defence set-up in the Dieppe sector at the end of the summer 1941. For purposes of reference a translation of this document appears as Appendix "C" to this report. (Ibid, 28 Aug 41) (Photostat and translation 981D302(D4))

21. On 2 Sep the Chief Engineer Officer of Army Group "D", Lt-Gen Schimpf, told the Chief Engineer Officer of Fifteenth Army:

It is necessary to protect our coastal defence installations, and it is no longer necessary to do this in a veiled manner. Our main task is to see that construction material will be made available and that the technical execution be sensible. No big programme like the West Wall is required, but there must be clarity as to what is most important and most urgent, and, therefore, a plan must be made.

(G.M.D.S. - 13887/14, Fifteenth Army, Report of Army Engineer Officer, 2 Sep 41)

22. By the end of September 1941, however, the German High Command was beginning to realize that the Russian campaign, which was to have been a swift and crushing blow, might turn into a long and difficult campaign. As a corollary, coast defence in the West began to appear in a different light, and on 25 Sep; in a forerunner to comprehensive top level directives to follow, Keitel issued the following orders;

With regard to the necessity of protecting our extended coasts and the European countries dependent on us from attacks by the Anglo-Americans, the Fuehrer is of the following opinion:

For warding off enemy operations against the coasts it is of decisive importance to have:

- (a) Far-reaching, effective flat-trajectory guns.
- (b) Long distance torpedoes to be used by torpedo batteries from land.
- (c) Static anti-aircraft guns for the coastal defences.

Re (a) It is necessary to increase the number of medium and heavy mobile flat-trajectory batteries of the Army, especially the 17 cm cannon in howitzer mounts, the 21 cm Skoda cannon (360° traverse guns), as well as the 24 cm guns. In addition heavy naval batteries are to be provided.

Re (b) The Navy is requested to order the use and development of torpedoes for these tasks.

Re (c) As a matter of principle, heavy coastal batteries must be protected against enemy air raids.

Keitel

(Fuehrer Directives, Transl, op cit, p.215)

23. Less than one month later, on 20 Oct 41, the Fuehrer issued a detailed order for the "Consolidation and Defence of the Channel Islands":

... The Channel Islands, which are so important to our convoy traffic, are to be consolidated into an unassailable fortress through vigorous and unremitting efforts. ...
(Fuehrer Directives, op cit, 20 Oct 41)

Thus a new chapter was about to begin in the extravagantly lavish efforts to fortify these little islands for reasons of pride and also for reasons of strategy. To Allied planners all this meant merely that planning had to be adjusted accordingly; to the Germans, however,

the Channel Islands were to become a Moloch, devouring vast quantities of material, of engineering effort and of labour, all of which were sorely needed on stretches of coast with lower construction priorities.

24. In the Dieppe sector all was quiet during the month of September and the greater part of October. On 2 Oct the Division issued a comprehensive training programme for the winter 1941/42. Training was to be for commitment in all tasks against a well equipped, well led and audacious enemy; special care was to be taken that the present employment in coast defence should not lead to unbalanced training. (G.M.D.S. - 17840/5, 302 Inf Div, op cit, 2 Oct 41). On the occasion of a landing exercise, carried out on 15 and 16 Oct for the purpose of checking the defences between Pourville and Quiberville, it had been found that even the steepest coast could be climbed as long as it did not consist of bare chalk. The lessons learned were recorded in a memorandum directing that wire obstacles were to be increased in number and in height, and placed on sites carefully chosen in the light of recent findings (Ibid, 17 Oct). But time was marching on and the pleasant life on conquered shores was drawing to a close.

Abortive Orders for Protection of Important Positions by Concrete Works (22 Oct 41)

25. In May the Division had gone on record as not favouring the construction of further concrete shelters (para 18 above). In accordance with orders received from Fifteenth Army, the Division reversed its stand on 22 Oct 41 and began making plans for the protection of selected positions by concrete works. "Divisional Order No. 30", issued on that day, directed the regiments to submit their requirements. The regiments were made responsible for correct tactical siting and priority arrangements, the actual technical execution to be carried out by Sector Group II/21 of Fortress Engineer Headquarters No. 21 at Le Havre (Ibid; 22 Oct 41) (Photostat and translation 981D302 (D4)). The War Diary of the Division does not show when the planning stage came to an end and whether or when the pouring of concrete began. Progress at best must have been extremely slow, and entries for 13 and 20 Dec indicate that work had been stopped for what looks like jurisdictional squabbles, but may well have been dilatory tactics in anticipation of broader directives from highest levels. (G.M.D.S. - 17840/1, 302 Inf Div, W.D. 2, 13 and 20 Dec 41)

Additional Field Works are being Prepared by the Troops (December 1941)

26. If work on the permanent installations was slow in getting under way, on the other hand much work was being done on additional field fortifications near the coast. On 6 Dec the Chief of Staff of Higher Command 32 had directed the Division to create additional blocking positions in view of the greater number of troops which would be occupying the positions

slated for permanent protection by concrete works.* There is much evidence showing that the reserve **bat-****talions** of the regiments curtailed their training programmes for intensive work on the newly ordered field works. (Ibid, 6, 7 Dec et al)

COASTAL DEFENCE AGAINST POSSIBLE INVASION
(AS OF DECEMBER 1941)

Coast Defence in the West becomes a Major Concern of the German High Command (December 1941)

27. In keeping with the general situation coast defence in the West was now becoming a major concern of the High Command. On 8 Dec, in Directive No. 39, Hitler admitted having been forced on the defensive in the East. Less than one week later Keitel issued an order dealing at length with the development of coast defences in the West. (Fuehrer Directives, Transl, op cit, 8 & 14 Dec 41, pp 231-236).

28. Keitel's order shows that Hitler even then was thinking in terms of a "new West Wall":

14 Dec 41 On the basis of the general surveys submitted to him regarding the state of coastal defence, the Fuehrer has ordered that:

1. The coastal regions of the Arctic Ocean, North Sea and Atlantic Ocean controlled by us are ultimately to be built into a "new West Wall", in order that we can repel with certainty any landing attempts, even by the strongest enemy forces, with the smallest possible number of permanently assigned field troops.

2. For the time being, however, the great strain on our troops and materiel in other quarters compels us to restrict construction according to the following guiding principles:

- a. To continue to build field fortifications and to strengthen strongpoints at the most threatened places by means of permanent installations ...

...

* On the same day the Division had received a pamphlet: "Tactics of British Landing Operations". According to this the British could be expected to land tanks with the very first waves to go ashore, and in consequence the Division commander immediately placed a request for six extra anti-tank guns for the infantry (Ibid, 6 Dec).

3. Regarding priorities for construction, the following principles are to be considered:
- a. Norway has top priority ...
 - b. The Franco-Belgian coast, including the fringe of islands, stands next on the priority list, and especially the areas along the central part of the Channel coast from the Scheldt to the region west of the Seine estuary, and those on the Atlantic south of Brest and from Quiberon to the Gironde, where topographical conditions are favourable to a landing.
Next in importance is construction of defence installations on the projecting parts of Normandy and Brittany, which, although navigationally difficult, are suitable for land operations, and invite the establishment of bridgeheads on account of their large and important harbours.

The enumeration according to priority continued as follows:

- c. Coasts of Holland and of West and North Jutland
 - d. German Bight and northern coast of Holland (least urgent)
- and
- e. Baltic Sea (defences here can be further reduced in favour of other points) ...

One of the most important developments was that the order now made provision for centralized direction of all coast defence construction work:

4. ... The Commander in Chief, Army, is charged with building up the defences.

In the performance of this task he has command authority over the participating parts of the Armed Forces and their commanders, as well as over the units of the Todt Organization assigned to this work. ... Measures for air protection remain in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, Air. ...

...

6. The Commander-in-Chief, Army, is requested to submit the construction plans to the Armed Forces High Command. . . .

Keitel

A few days later, on 19 Dec, Hitler in person assumed the High Command of the Army, the previous Commander-in-Chief, Marshal v. Brauchitsch, became inactive due to a "heart ailment", and para 6 of Keitel's order lost its meaning. (Fuehrer Directives, Transl, op cit, 19 Dec 41, p. 239)

Developments in the Dieppe Sector during January, February and March 1942

29. In the Dieppe sector Marshal Keitel's order of 14 Dec was not followed by an immediate burst of activity. The launching of a vast coordinated programme of construction would require much planning, and problems of organization and procurement would have to be solved before the lowest echelons could swing into action. The first three months of the year were devoted by the Dieppe Division mainly to continued analysis and evolution of the tactical defence scheme, to work on the field fortifications, and to the training of recruits from older age classes, which were arriving to fill the gaps created by the departure of three large drafts for the Eastern front (G.M.D.S. - 17840/1, 302 Inf Div, W.D. 2, Jan, Feb, Mar 42). On 11 Feb, Higher Command 32 advised the Division that requisition had been made for one heaviest battery, one medium battery and one artillery headquarters for the Fortress Area Dieppe* (Ibid, 11 Feb). On 12 Mar Marshal Goering inspected the Dieppe defences (Ibid, 12 Mar).**

* A designation which became obsolete on 2 Jun 42 (para 43 below)

** Goering was apparently well impressed by the work being done at Dieppe, and expressed satisfaction over the excellent cooperation between the different services. He was much put out, however, at finding the Regiments of 302 Inf Div minus 13th and 14th companies, and 2 Bn 571 Inf Regt missing altogether. This was of course a consequence of recent drafts, but General Karl Bodenschatz, Hitler's Air Force Liaison Officer, who had come with Goering, said that the Fuehrer believed the Divisions in the area to be complete, and that he would be informed forthwith of this condition of regiments being not much more than reinforced battalions. Fifteenth Army reported Goering's remarks to Army Group "D", and Army Group informed the Army High Command of these and some other rather strange and irregular remarks of the Marshal. (G.M.D.S. - H22/87a, Kuestenschutz Kanalkueste, 22 Mar 42) (Photo-stat 981CW(D12))

30. With the increase in scope and volume of construction work the necessity arose of creating a working terminology. In "Divisional Order No. 39", issued on 12 Feb 42, the multitude of works was graded into three classes:

I Field Works

II Reinforced Field Works

III Permanent Installations.

Reconnaissance work for the first two categories was the task of the respective sector commanders in co-operation with the corresponding sector group of Fortress Engineer Headquarters No. 21: reconnaissance for permanent installation was to be carried out by special reconnaissance staffs under the command of the Commander of Fortress Engineer Headquarters No. 21 in liaison with Divisional Headquarters. (G.M.D.S. - 17840/4, 302 Inf Div, W.D.2, Vol "C" of Apps, Part II, 12 Feb 42) (Photostat 981D302(D4))

31. The work to be done in the sector was specified in this Divisional Order as follows:

1. Systems of Strongpoints intended for later Development as Permanent Installations:

Only Dieppe with strongpoints Dieppe East, Height 102, Height 4 Vents Fme, Pourville East.

2. Coastal points endangered from land to be protected by one strongpoint or several operating in mutual support:

- (a) Area north of Somme
- (b) Cayeux (including Le Hourdel)
- (c) Ault - Onival
- (d) Le Treport
- (e) Quiberville East
- (f) St. Valery-en-Caux
- (g) Veulettes

3. (Balance of Sector) Stretches of coast which are to be watched:

To be provided with individual small works for the sheltering and support of patrols. This includes individual positions of the G.H.Q. Coastal Artillery, Flak, and other installations of the Armed Forces not situated within the systems referred to under 1. and 2.

(Ibid)

In the same order it was pointed out that considerable time would be required for work on permanent installations to get under way, and that for the time being field works and reinforced field works would be in the foreground of activities. The field works were to be completed by 1 Apr 42. (Ibid)

32. A spate of orders being issued by the Division during March showed that the times of indecision and delay had reached an end. First to appear was a revised issue of the regulations for dealing with landings from the air (Ibid, Divisional Order No. 42, 9 Mar 42) (981D302(D4)). A memorandum issued on 10 Mar dealt in the main with the question of co-operation between the different branches of the Armed Forces:

... In his capacity as commander of the Fortress Area Dieppe*, the commander of 571 Inf Regt is the responsible ground commander in command of all troops of the three Branches of the Armed Forces in the Fortress area. ...

... The Commandant of the Port of Dieppe will make arrangements for the protection of the area from the East mole (incl) to the steep coast to the East thereof (excl) by one platoon of marines.

... The Experimental Company yields four of its French anti-tank guns to 3 Bn 571 Inf Regt for frontal defence of the western rim of Dieppe ...

(Ibid, 10 Mar 42)(981D302(D5))

The forces required for the "Final Solution" (End-loesung) in the Fortress Area Dieppe*, were listed in a memorandum of 11 Mar 42:

One regimental headquarters (Inf)
Two infantry battalions
One engineer battalion (less one company)
One artillery battalion (to be kept mobile)
The promised batteries of booty guns
One naval or G.H.Q. Arty battery

(Ibid, 11 Mar 42)(981D302(D5))

33. The designations by which the various works were to be known in future were laid down on 15 Mar 42 in "Divisional Order No. 44". According to this the set-up in the sector of 571 Inf Regt was as follows:

- A. Strongpoint Puits (Eastern height plus strand)
- B. Fortress Area Dieppe

with:

* See footnote to para 29

Strongpoint Dieppe, subdivided into:

Sub-strongpoint Dieppe I
(Strand of eastern height (exclusive of the height itself))- Eastern Mole (incl)

Sub-strongpoint Dieppe II
(Strand from Western Mole (incl)) -
Tac H.Q. Bn

and with:

Blocking Strongpoint Dieppe East I
(small strongpoint on height south of Puits)

Blocking Strongpoint Dieppe East II
(Eastern height Dieppe including Flak positions)

Blocking Strongpoint Dieppe East III
(small strongpoint east of Le Pollet commanding the eastern rim of city of Dieppe)

Blocking Strongpoint Neuville

Blocking Strongpoint Height 102

Blocking Strongpoint 4 Vents Fme

Blocking Strongpoint Pourville-Eastern Height

C. Strongpoint Pourville-Strand

D. Strongpoint Quiberville, subdivided into:
Sub-strongpoints Quiberville I and II

E. Outpost St. Aubin

F. Outpost Veules-les-Roses

G. System of strongpoints St. Valery-en-Caux
(for details see photostat)

... Strongpoints to be defended to the last ... all strongpoints, sub-strongpoints and blocking strongpoints to be prepared for all-round defence.

(Ibid, 15 Mar 42)(Photostat
981D302(D4))

34. Plans for strengthening the artillery in the Dieppe sector were mentioned on 18 Mar 42 in "Divisional Order No. 46":

... It is intended to convert the 10 cm G.H.Q. Coast Artillery batteries into 15 cm batteries of 6 guns each. Apart from the static coast battery 265, an additional 15 cm G.H.Q. coastal battery will be moved to the Fortress area Dieppe.

(Ibid, 18 Mar 42)(981D302(D4))

Fuehrer Directive No. 40 (23 Mar 42)

37. The most important and comprehensive directive regulating coast defence command and related problems appeared on 23 Mar 42 in the form of Fuehrer Directive No. 40. Any previous orders and instructions not in agreement with the new directive were annulled by it; any subsequent changes were mainly amplifications or interpretations (Fuehrer Directives, Transl, op cit, 23 Mar 42). The preamble contained statements regarding the clearly existing danger of enemy landings in the near future, the possibility of such landings occurring at even the most improbable places, and the recognized British preparations for landings on the open coast. General tactical instructions directed the various intelligence and reconnaissance organs to make every effort at early recognition of enemy preparations, state of readiness and eventual approach. In view of the possibility of the enemy achieving surprise in spite of this, all troops which might be exposed to such surprise were ordered to be in a state of full alert at all times. The necessity was re-stated of one Commander being responsible in any sector for the preparation and the carrying out of the defence by the forces of all branches of the Armed Forces. It would be the task of such commanders to destroy the enemy's means of transportation and his landing troops and to bring about the collapse of the attack off the coast if possible, but after the coast had been reached at the very latest. Enemy forces which had succeeded in landing were to be destroyed or thrown into the sea by immediate counter-attacks. Coastal sectors most likely to be chosen as landing places by the enemy were to be built up as fortified areas, less endangered stretches of coast were to be defended from a system of strong-points to be built, the least important sectors were to be patrolled. Fortified areas and strongpoints would have to be made suitable for protracted defence against superior enemy forces; they were to be defended to the last. Responsibility for the preparation and execution of coastal defence in the West was delegated to O.B.West, who was to carry out this task in direct subordination to the Armed Forces High Command.*, **

* In March 1942 v. Rundstedt had been reappointed O.B.West.

** Lengthy interpretations of Directive No. 40 from the Navy's point of view were issued by Admiral Raeder on 27 Mar and 11 Apr 42. Submarine bases, ports and coastal sectors were graded according to their strategical importance and consequent need of protection. Dieppe was not mentioned. (Fuehrer Directives, op cit)

O.B.West in Charge of Western Coast
Defence (28 Mar 42)

38. On 28 Mar 42, O.B.West notified the Army commanders that he had assumed responsibility for Coast Defence in the West. Marshal v. Rundstedt's message was quoted fully in a memorandum issued by 302 Inf Div on 1 Apr 42. A photostatic copy and translation of this document appears as Appendix "D" to this report (G.M.D.S. - 24353/4, 302 Inf Div, Vol "C" of Apps, 1 Apr 42) (Photostat 981D302(D6)). Orders henceforth would be clear and to the point, and no longer the propaganda-laden emanations of a shrewd but labyrinthine mind.

Developments in the Dieppe Sector during
April, May and June 1942

39. By 9 Apr the various components of the Division had occupied the positions assigned to them according to what was designated as "The Final Solution" (G.M.D.S. - 24353/1, 302 Inf Div, W.D. 3, 9 Apr 42). On 20 Apr the Division gave orders for the immediate extension of strongpoint construction to all positions, quarters and installations in the rear areas of the sector. (G.M.D.S. - 24353/4, 302 Inf Div, W.D. 3, Vol "C" of Apps, Div Order No. 51, 20 Apr 42) (981D302(D4))

40. At the end of April O.B.West began to regulate matters of coast defence by means of four concurrent series of orders:

1. BASIC ORDERS (Grundlegende Befehle)
(G.M.D.S. - H22/85, O.B.West, Grundl Bef, 28 Apr 42 - 21 Apr 43)(Photostat 981CW(D11))
2. BASIC OBSERVATIONS (Grundlegende Bemerkungen)
(G.M.D.S. - H22/84, O.B.West, Grundl Bem, 27 May 42 - 6 Jun 43)(Photostat 981CW(D12))
3. INDIVIDUAL ORDERS (Einzelbefehle)
(G.M.D.S. - H22/86, Einzelbefehle, 28 Apr 42 - 23 Nov 42)(Photostat 981CW(D13))
4. SPECIAL ORDERS (Sonderanordnungen)
(G.M.D.S. - H22/95, Befehle des O.B.West fuer die Kuestenverteidigung, Sonderanweisungen, 9 May 42 - 25 Mar 43)(Photostat 981CW(D14))

These volumes of orders are being retained by Hist Sec (G.S.) in photostatic form for purposes of reference. Not all orders issued by O.B.West during the period in question are contained therein however; some of the missing ones are to be found in the records of 302 Inf Div. This formation usually re-published important O.B.West orders as part of their own Divisional orders, adding comment and interpretations to paragraphs of specific interest.

41. With the beginning of spring weather, and put on their guard in particular by the raid on St. Nazaire in the last week of March, the Germans had become very sensitive to rumours concerning prospective Allied raids at the West coast. According to the War Diary of the Armed Forces High Command, Hitler, on 7 Apr 42, expressed the hope that the attack on St. Nazaire had aroused the troops in the West and put them on their mettle. And in the same source, on 10 Apr 42, the following was entered:

The Fuehrer has information from abroad to the effect that the British and Americans are planning "a great surprise". He sees two possibilities; either a landing or the use of the new massed bombs.

(G.M.D.S. - OKW/1771, W.D. April, May and June 1942, 7 and 10 Apr 42) (981HC(D21))

Of the German High Command War Diary for 1942 only the portions for the months of April, May and June are in Allied hands. Available parts are being retained in photostatic form; translated excerpts therefrom appear as Appendix "E" to this report.

42. A slight change in Alarm terminology (para 16 above) was ordered in O.B. West's Basic Order No. 4, of 13 May 42. First and second stages of alert remained unchanged in essence, but what was originally designated as "Continuous State of Alert" (Staendiger Alarmzustand) was now divided into two separate stages:

- (a) Permanent Readiness for Defence, and
- (b) Readiness for Action (Gefechtsbereitschaft)

"Readiness for Action" was a more advanced stage of readiness and was to become effective from time to time upon receipt of specific orders to that effect. (G.M.D.S. - 24353/4, 302 Inf Div, W.D. 3, Vol "C" of Apps, 16 May 42) (981D302(D4))

43. 302 Inf Div apparently never ceased using the term "Coast Protection", but O.B. West always used the more appropriate term "Coast Defence". In Basic Order No. 7, of 28 May 42, he laid down some definitions:

1. RESISTANCE NEST (Widerstandsnest)

A small self-contained defence work. The crew consisting of one or several sections, with or without heavy weapons.

2. STRONGPOINT (Stuetzpunkt)

Consists of several Resistance Nests. Garrison consisting of the crews of the nests of resistance and of local reserves, if any. Total strength

from one platoon to one company with heavy weapons.

Batteries, Flak Batteries and Air Force Installations may also be called "Strongpoints".

3. GROUP OF STRONGPOINTS (Stuetzpunktgruppe)

Consists of several strongpoints with mutual fire support grouped for the defence of a relatively small fortified area under unified command.

Garrison in strength of one company or battalion at least, and with the weapons needed for long-range and close-in fighting as well as for defence against armour and attack from the air.

Groups of Strongpoints to be named after localities.

4. DEFENDED AREA (Previously "Fortress Area")
(Verteidigungsbereich, previously Festungsbereich)

A Defended Area comprises the all-round defence by fortifications of larger and particularly important localities, like U-boat pens, larger ports and estuaries.

The garrison consists of the troops in the area and their local reserves. The operational reserves will be stationed outside the Defended Area.

Defended Areas are also to be named after localities. ...*

(Ibid, 2 Jun 42)(Photostat 981D302(D4))

* In coastal defence terminology the word "fortress" reappeared at the beginning of 1944, when Hitler on 19 Jan designated the following important harbours as "Fortresses" (Festungen):

Ijmuiden & Hook of Holland	St. Malo
Dunkirk	Brest
Boulogne	Lorient
Le Havre	St. Nazaire
Cherbourg	Gironde estuary north and south

(Fuehrer Directives, Transl, op cit, Vol II, p.119, 19 Jan 44)

On 3 Mar 44 the Channel Islands Jersey, Guernsey and Alderney were added to this list of fortresses, which were to be defended to the death. (Ibid, 3 Mar 44).

44. Pursuant to O.B. West's order containing new definitions, on 9 Jun 42, 302 Inf Div issued a revised list of designations for defended localities in the Divisional sector. Apart from serving for purposes of identification, the list is useful as a roster of the sector defences then existing or under construction; it is, therefore, being quoted here in full:

Strongpoint Fort Mahon (with G.H.Q. Coastal
Arty Bty)
with Resistance Nest Mahon-Dunes
and Resistance Nest Mahon-Road

Resistance Nest Quend Plage
Resistance Nest Quentin-North
Resistance Nest Quentin-South

Strongpoint Battery Quentin

Strongpoint Crotoy
with Resistance Nest Crotoy-North
and Resistance Nest Crotoy-South Bay

Resistance Nest Hourdel

Strongpoint Cayeux
with Resistance Nest Cayeux-North
and Resistance Nest Cayeux-South
and Resistance Nest Cayeux-Ruin

Strongpoint Battery Cayeux (G.H.Q. Coastal
Arty Bty)

Strongpoint Ault-Onival
with Resistance Nest Four Houses
Onival-East
Ault I
Ault II
Ault-East

Strongpoint Group Treport
with Strongpoint Mers

divided into:

Resistance Nest Blengues Ferme
Resistance Nest Heiligenbildhoehe
Resistance Nest Mers-East

with Strongpoint Port
with Strongpoint Treport

divided into:

Resistance Nest Mont Huon
Resistance Nest Bergnase

Strongpoint Battery Mesnil-Val
Resistance Nest Staff Headquarters Mesnil-Val
Resistance Nest Criel
Strongpoint Battery Berneval

Defended Area Dieppe

with Sector Dieppe-East (incl. Puits and
Neuville)
with Sector Dieppe-South
with Sector Dieppe-West (incl. Pourville-
East)

Strongpoint Battery Varengoville
Resistance Nest Quiberville
Resistance Nest St. Aubin
Resistance Nest Veules-les-Roses

Strongpoint Valery-en-Caux

Strongpoint Veulettes

For reasons of security,
Resistance Nests prepared for
the special installations of
the Air Force are not
mentioned.

St. Valery-sur-Somme is to be
regarded as a rearward strong-
point, but to be provisioned
nevertheless.

(Ibid, Div Order No. 72, 9 Jun 42)(Photo-
stat 981D302(D4))

45. On 14 Jun 42 the Dieppe Division
prepared a location statement of the Anti-Aircraft-
Artillery units in its sector. (As they were com-
ponents of the Air Force, these units were rarely
mentioned in the records of German Army formations)
According to this document there were then in the
sector:

Flak Sub Group Dieppe (Major Bergmann)
(431 Flak Regt(of 116 Flak Div)

Dieppe	1 heavy battery	7.5 cm (French)
	1 medium battery plus one troop	3.7 cm Flak 30 5 cm Flak 41
	1 light battery	2 cm
Le Treport	1 light battery	2 cm
Paluel	1 medium battery	3.7 cm

In addition to this requests had been made for one
medium battery for St. Valery-sur-Somme, and one for
Cayeux.

(Ibid, 14 Jun)(Photostat
981D302(D5))

46. It has been shown (para 41 above) that already in April the Germans were conscious of the probability of imminent Allied landing operations. During the second half of May there was a noticeable increase in the number of rumours and predictions of such events. According to an entry of 19 May 42 in the War Diary of the High Command (Appendix "E" to this report) a British landing operation under the command of Vice Admiral Mountbatten was being planned, and on 24 May the German Foreign Office gave warning of an allegedly imminent British landing on the west coast of Jutland (*ibid*). Full tide in the flood of rumours and reports was reached in the middle of June. On 11 Jun, 302 Inf Div was informed of agents' reports according to which large-scale British landings were to be expected between 17 and 20 Jun on the big airfield near the Hague, at Les Sables d'Olonnes (60 kms NW La Rochelle), these attacks to be accompanied by a diversionary undertaking at Le Treport (G.M.D.S. - 24353/4, 302 Inf Div, W.D. 3, vol "C" of Apps, 11 Jun 42) (Photostat 981D302(D5)). More and more the Germans were led to think in terms of an invasion for the purpose of creating a "second front". An order issued by 302 Inf Div on 13 Jun began:

According to a reliable source the British intend the installation of a second front in Belgium and France prior to 22 Jun. This is confirmed by other reports, which indicate that preparations for an invasion are being carried on in England at high pressure.

(*Ibid*, Div Order No. 74, 13 Jun 42)(981D302(D4)).

The whole situation was of course a part of the war of nerves, and no major operation did materialize, but the Germans were thoroughly alarmed. In the sector of 302 Inf Div the night of 25/26 Jun was apparently being regarded as a particularly critical time, and on orders from Higher Command 32 all artillery reserves in the Dieppe sector remained limbered up all night for immediate intervention in any fighting at the coast. (*Ibid*, Div Order No. 81, 25 Jun 42) (981D302(D4))

47. Spring had now turned into summer - and soon the watchful waiting would be interrupted by the violent action on the beaches of Dieppe. Before turning to the description of later events it might be well to mention in passing two developments which had taken place since the reappointment of Marshal v. Rundstedt as O.B. West. On 24 Apr Lt-Gen Hilpert had been replaced as C. of S. O.B. West by Maj-Gen Zeitzler (W.D. OKW, *op cit*, 24 Apr 42), and on 29 May Higher Command 32 had been up-graded to a full-fledged Corps Headquarters as H.Q. 81 Inf Corps. (302 Inf Div, W.D. 3, *op cit*, 29 May 42)

Developments shortly before the Raid on Dieppe
(1 Jul - 19 Aug 42)

48. At the height of the summer 1942 the German campaign in the East seemed to be going rather well, but for this very reason the Germans became increasingly apprehensive of an Anglo-American invasion for the purpose of providing some relief for the hard pressed Russians. In these views and apprehensions the Germans were artfully confirmed by all manner of British measures of deception. On 3 Jul 42, in Basic Order No. 10, an order of the type which often precedes events of great importance, O.B. West made it abundantly clear that the forces in the West were fully responsible for protecting the back of the forces fighting in the East: "It is our historic task to prevent at all costs the creation of a 'second front'". All commanders of strongpoints, groups of strongpoints and defended areas were now to be sworn solemnly to defend their positions under any and all circumstances, to the last man and with their own lives (G.M.D.S. - 24353/4; 302 Inf Div, W.D. 3, Vol "C" of Apps, Div Ord No. 90 for Coast Protection, 4 Jul 42) (Photostat 981D302(D4)). Accordingly, on 6 Jul 42, in the presence of all officers down to the rank of captain, the commander of the Defended Area Dieppe was solemnly sworn to defend the area to the death. (302 Inf Div, W.D. 3, op cit, 6 Jul 42)

49. Tension was heightened on 7 Jul, when the commander of Fifteenth Army issued an order in which he described the days from 10 - 24 Jul as being most favourable for the expected enemy landing attempts. Everything was to be ready by 2000 hrs 10 Jul; at that time every last gun of the Divisional artillery was to be in the best possible position and ready to fire (G.M.D.S. - 24353/4, 302 Inf Div, Vol "C" of Apps, Quoted in Div Order No. 94 for Coast Protection, 9 Jul 42) (981D302(D4)). At the same time, however, due to the small capacity of its port not being the type of harbour the Allies would be likely to choose for an invasion base, Dieppe was downgraded from a "Defended Area" to a "Group of Strongpoints". (G.M.D.S. - H22/85, Grundlegende Befehle (Basic Orders) of O.B. West, op cit, Basic Order No. 11, 8 Jul 42) (981CW(D11))*

* It has been shown (para 43 above) that Dieppe was not one of the places which were named "Fortresses" in January 1944, which explains also why in the end it was not defended to the last.

50. Two days later, on 9 Jul, Hitler showed his concern in an order containing the announcement:

In the event of an enemy landing I will proceed in person to the West and assume charge of operations from there.

(Fuehrer Directives, Transl, op cit, Vol II, pp 34/36)

One of the immediate measures which the Fuehrer demanded at that time was the immediate transfer to the area of O.B. West of 1 S.S. Div ("Adolf Hitler") and 2 S.S. Div ("Das Reich"),* (ibid). He referred to accumulating intelligence reports about heavy concentrations of ferrying vessels along the southern coasts of England, and declared the following coastal areas to be threatened in particular:

In the first place, the Channel coast, the area between Dieppe and Le Havre, and Normandy, since these sectors can be reached by enemy planes and also because they lie within range of a large portion of the ferrying vessels.

(Ibid)

51. As was so often the case when the Germans were ready and waiting - nothing unusual occurred on 10 Jul. At 0235 hrs Corps had given telephonic orders for "Increased Readiness for Action", and the order had been passed along to the regiments and units. At 1150 hrs, however, the Corps Intelligence officer called the Division and explained that no reports of actual embarkations or similar signs of impending attack had been received, but that the Russians had again urged the British Government to open a second front, and that this had been the reason for Rundstedt's orders. (302 Inf Div, W.D. 3, op cit, 10 Jul 42)

52. One reflection of the growing anxiety was a telephone call on that day from Corps announcing an immediate and drastic increase in the authorized establishment of the Dieppe Division (ibid). Details of the upward revision were set forth in a memorandum issued by the Division on 15 Jul. According to this all related measures were to be carried out as quickly as possible, 31 Aug was given as the extreme time limit for the completion of any last details. The most important additions to be made were the following:

* Later on, in October 1942, these two Divisions were moved to the coast of Normandy, where they relieved 7 Fl Div. On O.B. West's sit maps for 1942 the latter Division was shown for the last time on 26 Sep.

Infantry

- each rifle company - two light mortar sections
- each M.G. company - one heavy mortar platoon
(of 6 heavy mortars)
- each regiment - one light infantry gun
platoon (of 2 light in-
fantry guns)
- the infantry anti-tank
platoon to be reorganized
as an infantry anti-tank
company consisting of
 - 2 platoons - 3.7 cm A.-Tk
guns
 - and
 - 2 platoons - 5 cm A.-Tk
guns

Artillery

each artillery battalion - to have a third
battery.

Therefore creation of a
3rd, 6th and 9th battery

(3rd bty: 4 - 8 cm field
guns)
(6th bty: 4 lt fd hows)
(9th bty: 4 lt fd hows)

In addition to this there were to be substantial in-
creases in signal, supply and medical personnel.
(G.M.D.S. - 24353/4, 302 Inf Div, W.D. 3, vol "C" of
Aprs, 15 Jul 42 (981D302(D5))

53. In view of the presence near the coast
of so many different types of artillery, and in view
of the fact that during the successive stages of a
defence action many batteries would be receiving
orders from different command posts, O.B. West now
issued two orders, setting forth in condensed form
the tasks and designations of the various artillery
components. The two documents were republished by
the Division on 24 Jul; for purposes of reference
photostatic copies and translations thereof are
being retained as Appendix "F" to this report.
(Ibid, 24 Jul 42) (981D302(D4))

54. During the last week of July tension
abated and the troops were granted some alleviations.
Entries for July in the War Diary of the Division
indicate that approximately ten tank turrets had
been allocated and were to be installed (13 Jul),
that the heavy anti-aircraft battery at St. Valery-
sur-Somme was withdrawn from the sector and moved
to Boulogne (19 Jul), and that sporadic air attacks
and reconnaissance flights over the sector had been
continuing throughout the month. (302 Inf Div,
W.D. 3, op cit)

55. On 25 Jul, on orders from O.B. West, a Panzer Division had been alarmed and moved towards the coast in a dress rehearsal of commitment as an operational reserve.* In "Basic Observations No. 6", of 28 Jul, O.B. West then told the troops on the coast of his being fully satisfied that in the case of actual hostilities the Division in question would have succeeded in destroying the enemy or driving him off the beaches during the first day of the operation. Iron resistance in their strongholds, therefore, was imperative and could not fail to lead to a successful end-result. (G.M.D.S. - 24353/4, 302 Inf Div, W.D. 3, Vol "C" of Apps, Div Order No, 100, 30 Jul 42) (981D302(D4))

56. In the sector of the Dieppe Division the first ten days of August were relatively quiet; there were some signal and fire-control exercises, and 2 Coy 49 Pz Engr Bn (10 Pz Div) was present in the sector from 2-7 Aug for the purpose of checking and enlarging the mine-fields at Le Treport. According to an entry in the Divisional War Diary, by 10 Aug the following total numbers of mines had been laid in the whole sector:

8,923 T Mines
6,359 S Mines
274 Miscellaneous Explosive Charges

(302 Inf Div, W.D. 3, op cit)

57. During the nights from 10-20 Aug, however, a combination of lunar and tidal conditions would be favouring Allied landing operations, and Fifteenth Army in consequence had ordered for this period the maintenance of the highest degree of watchfulness and readiness for action. In compliance with this order, every night from high-tide to sunrise 302 Inf Div was kept alerted according to the scale required by "Threatening Danger", which explains in part the quick reaction of the Division to the

* This formation was 6 Pz Div, which was well placed in the area west of Rennes for quick intervention at St. Nazaire, Lorient, Brest or St. Malo, as the occasion demanded.

In this connection O.B. West reported to OKH/Ops:

27 Jul ... The alarm exercise of 6 Pz Div, carried out under the direction of O.B. West on the basis of an assumed war situation, was a dress rehearsal for the case "St. Nazaire". The result was satisfactory and proved that 6 Pz Div, (with elements from 100 Pz Bde with approximately 100 tanks) is capable of attacking the enemy at the focal point on the day of landing.

(G.M.D.S. - H22/247, O.B. West, Verstaerkung der Abwehrbereitschaft (Strengthening of Defence Preparations), 10 Jul - 18 Nov 42, 27 Jul 42) (Photostat 981CW(D13))

developments in the early hours of 19 Aug (G.M.D.S. - 24353/4, 302 Inf Div, W.D. 3, Vol "C" of Apps, Div Ord No. 105, 8 Aug 42) (981D302(D4)). It has been noted in this connection that the Divisional records for the month of August are devoid of the previously frequent references to agents' reports regarding forthcoming landings, and are devoid in particular of any references which might have shown that the Dieppe sector was believed to have been singled out for any forthcoming Allied operation.

INFLUENCE OF DIEPPE ON GERMAN POLICY

58. The course of events during the Raid has been recorded in a series of reports; it is not the subject of the present study and is not being dealt with here. Also being omitted is a description of the post-raid developments in the sector; this for the reasons that the invasion eventually passed over the beaches of Normandy, and that after the raid the coastal defences of this particular sector were never again of any specific interest from the point of view of Canadian operations. An analysis of the developments during the later stages of German preparations against invasion might be carried out to greater advantage on the basis of the German documents dealing with the closely similar measures in the sector of 716 Inf Div at Caen.

59. The Raid occurred at a time when Allied and German planners were equally anxious to obtain criteria for the conduct of future operations in the West. It is for this reason that the implications of the Raid were being analyzed and evaluated at high levels with a degree of care and interest not normally accorded to an undertaking of such relatively small proportions. One of the aspects still in need of clarification at the time of writing is the question of possible influences of the Raid on German policies in the West. Recently acquired information has now opened the road to a more thorough exploration with regard to the existence or non-existence of such influences on German dispositions and on Hitler's attitude towards the creation of the Atlantic Wall.

Dispositions in the West

60. On 9 Jul Hitler had sounded the alarm and ordered measures for the immediate strengthening of the forces in the West (para 50 above). The history of the subsequent changes in the order of battle of the anti-invasion forces can be traced from a series of reports from O.B. West to the Army High Command (G.M.D.S. - H22/247, Staerkung der Abwehrbereitschaft (Strengthening of Defence Preparation), 10 Jul - 18 Nov 42 (Photostat 981CW(D18))). A close inspection of these reports leads to the conclusion that neither strength nor dispositions in the West were changed materially as a result of the Raid on Dieppe. Early in September, however, the Germans received information regarding British concentrations on the Isle of Wight and in the South of England

(G.M.D.S. - 24353/5, 302 Inf Div, W.D. 3, Vol "C" of Apps, Appx 127, Div Order No. 116, 7 Sep 42)(Photostat 981D302(D4)). As a result of this O.B. West made a change in the dispositions of his Army Group Reserve:

1210 hrs 4 Sep 42

O.B. West to 7 Fl Div (For information to Seventh Army)

Due to landing attempts to be expected in the coastal sector Caen-Cherbourg, the Fuehrer desires 7 Fl Div to move forward.

7 Fl Div therefore moves to the area Balleroy - St. Lo - Guilberville - Caumont, to be available on shortest notice for commitment between Caen and Cherbourg.

The movement is to be carried out quickly.

Strong combat elements must be in the new area by the morning of 5 Sep. 7 Fl Div reports execution of order directly to O.B. West, for information to Seventh Army and 84 Inf Corps.

O.B. West

(G.M.D.S. - 28863/2, Seventh Army, W.D. 13, Apps 1 - 30 Sep 42) (Photostat 981CW(D15))

61. In the latter part of the month the Germans were being kept on the qui vive by British radio stations advising the French population to leave the coastal zones (G.M.D.S. - 24353/1, 302 Inf Div, W.D. 3, 18, 26, 29 Sep 42). But at the beginning of October there was a considerable increase in the number of alarming items; on 6 Oct O.B. West was informed of the recrudescence of reports about imminent landings, and in the evening of 9 Oct the Armed Forces Operations Staff signalled:

Due to numerous reports regarding increasing threat to the coastal area Cherbourg the Fuehrer has ordered:

S.S. Div (D.R.) and S.S. Div (A.H.) to be concentrated in the areas of St. Lo and Mezidon.

165 Inf Div to be set up as an operational reserve to defend the landfront of the harbour strongpoints.

Artillery Reserve of O.B. West to be moved as soon as possible to an area permitting quickest commitment on Norman as well as Breton peninsulas.

O.B.West has been warned by telephone.

OKW/WFST/Ops(H) No. 003667/42

(G.M.D.S. - H22/88, Kuestenschutz Kanal-
kueste, 6 and 9 Oct) (Photostats 981HC(D22))

The two SS Divisions had been complete in the area of O.B.West since the end of July. Their moving nearer to the coast at the beginning of October was partly due to the necessity of relieving the departing 7th Fliieger Division, and partly to the intelligence reports which had led Hitler to believe in the existence of an imminent threat to the Cherbourg area. Any subsequent arrivals, departures and organization of formations during the balance of the year were either related to the build-up for the occupation of Vichy France or the demand for divisions to replace the high-grade formations then moving to the Eastern front.

Coastal Defence Programme

62. It has been seen that as early as December 1941 Hitler had visions of protecting the Atlantic coast by means of a "new West Wall" (para 28 above). During the spring and summer of 1942 some progress was made in converting the field defences into a network of strongpoints, groups of strongpoints and defended areas. Due to the unavailability of the High Command War Diaries for the period in question it has not been possible to determine the exact date at which Hitler decided definitely to go ahead with the Atlantic Wall project. From a series of documents which have recently come to hand it appears certain, however, that the decision to build a continuous line of defences was made in the early days of August 1942. According to "Documentary Notes" prepared by General Jacob, then General of Engineers and Fortresses at the Army High Command, the problem of protection for the West Coast was being dealt with at a Fuehrer conference on 2 Aug 42. Present were: Hitler, Keitel, Jacob, Lt.-Gen Buhle (OKH, Org), and Hitler's three Adjutants. After a brief description of the weaknesses in the present set-up - interlarded with the usual excursions into the field of minutiae - the Fuehrer said that an unbroken line would have to be insisted on at all costs: "During the winter, with fanatical zeal, a fortress must be built which will hold in all circumstances". And: "An attempt is to be made to develop the coast after the pattern of the West Wall." (G.M.D.S. - H22/87a, Kuestenschutz Kanalkueste, 3 Aug 42) (Photostat and translation 981HC(D18))

63. Despite these apparently positive utterances the conference of 2 Aug seems to have been a rather vague affair, leaving the impression that the Fuehrer was speaking for the purpose of making up his own mind. By 13 Aug, however, a firm decision had been made, and Hitler was ready to demand action. General Jacob's notes for the

conference on that day contain the following:

Notes on the Fuehrer Conference regarding
the Atlantic Wall

on

13 Aug 42 (2140 hrs - 0050 hrs)

1. Present

The Fuehrer
Reichsminister Speer
Field Marshal Keitel
General of Engineers Jacob
Lt-Gen Buhle (Org)
Rear Admiral Kankel
Ministerial Director Dorsch [Stenographic
Service]
Maj-Gen Schmund
Col Scherff [Hitler's Adjutants]
Lt-Col Claus

2. The Fuehrer expounds: (not quoted verbatim)

The Fuehrer wants to prevent the opening of a second front at all costs.

There is only one front; the other front can only be a defensive one, held by small forces. ... Russia has not yet been obliterated; at critical moments the British might create difficulties. Already the Fuehrer has been forced to move some first-class formations from the East to the West.

THEREFORE THE FUEHRER HAS DECIDED TO
BUILD AN IMPREGNABLE FORTRESS ALONG THE
ATLANTIC AND THE CHANNEL COAST

(Ibid) (Photostat 981HC(D23))

According to Jacob's notes the Fuehrer then explained that he was able to gauge the resistance value of the live forces - the individual divisions - but not that of the individual defence works. Apart from the insufficiency of the defence works, their indefinite resistance value made it difficult for him to make the best possible disposition of the forces. And, furthermore, he said: "The stronger the fortress, the smaller the number of troops required". After this somewhat threadbare exposition the Fuehrer restated his intention of creating a fortress "which could be taken neither frontally nor from the rear, except

by an attack lasting for weeks."* (Ibid)

64. Nearly one week later the German defences were being tested at Dieppe. While those parts of the defence mechanism, which were actually called into play, seemed to have functioned smoothly enough, the Germans could not fail to realize that future undertakings would be supported from the sea and from the air. Shortly afterwards, on 25 Aug, O.B. West issued Basic Order No. 14: "Development of the Channel and Atlantic Coast Defences". A photostatic copy of the document is being retained by Hist Sec (G.S.); a translation appears as Appendix "G" to this report (G.M.D.S. H22/85, Grundlegende Befehle, op cit, 25 Aug 42) (Photostat 981CW(D11)). In this order Rundstedt gave notice to all concerned of the fundamental change which had taken place in coast defence planning:

25 Aug 42 The Fuehrer has ordered: During the winter half-year 1942/43 the coastal defences in the area of O.B. West are to be strengthened by using all forces and means for the construction of permanent fortifications according to the principles employed at the West Wall. This is to be done in such a manner as to make seem hopeless any attack from the air, sea or land, and to create a fortress which cannot be taken either frontally or from the rear. Towards this end 15,000 fortifications of a permanent nature are to be built in the area of O.B. West during the winter half-year 1942/43. (Ibid)

* Nothing was said about the economic aspects of the undertaking; and probably nothing valid could have been said. The fundamental purpose of any fortification is to discourage attack. Had the Germans not been opposed by powers of vastly greater industrial capacity, and had they been in a position to create and maintain great bomber fleets as mobile reserves of fire power, then such an Atlantic Fortress might have forced the flow of events into different channels. As it was, however, due to the inexorable effects of time and economic potentials, the Atlantic Wall was destined to remain something of a bluff.

65. When Rundstedt issued this order the Raid on Dieppe was still in process of evaluation by the military hierarchy. Approximately one month later, on 29 Sep, in the meeting room of the Cabinet in the Chancellery, and in the presence of Marshals Goering and v. Rundstedt, Hitler delivered a three-hour oration on the subject of the Atlantic Wall. On this occasion Hitler made copious reference to Dieppe. According to the synopsis of the Operations Section, Army High Command, the following was said in this connection:

... France remains the most likely choice for a landing, mainly because here the enemy would require chiefly small vessels, and these he can build in sufficient number, then approaching the coast on a suitably wide front with prospect of success. At Dieppe he has recently presented us with his latest types of landing vessels and tanks.

Above all I am grateful to the British for having confirmed my views by their various landing operations, and for saving me from appearing as a visionary before those who are forever saying: "Where then are the British going to appear? Here on the coast there is definitely nothing wrong; we bathe every day and we have never seen one yet."

The Fuehrer describes the Dieppe operation as very instructive for both sides. In particular he stresses the point that, regarding the failure of the operation, this time both sides should avoid wrong conclusions, contrary to a previous occasion in military history. The British should not label such operations as hopeless, and we should not underestimate the danger. As a parallel in military history, the Fuehrer examined the tank battle at Cambrai in World War I in some detail. The surprise attack by the British with 367 tanks failed despite a deep penetration, and was a failure less on account of technical faults, then inherent in tanks, than on account of true British tactical inelasticity. Then too, the British followed a hard and fast programme (as at Dieppe), arranged for hours ahead, after which period the upper and subordinate leaders lacked freedom of decision, thus missing the chance of possibly bringing about the complete and decisive collapse of our front and the consequent victory of the Allies.

After the failure of this operation wrong conclusions were drawn by both sides. The British threw all blame on the shortcomings in technical and fighting qualities of the recently invented tanks.

They were on the point of scrapping the whole tank brigade. But there was one man (Fuller), who devoted himself with iron determination to the retention and further development of the tank, and who finally reached his goal, in spite of the opposition of the military bureaucracy. But unfortunately there was no such man in Germany. The erroneous conclusion reached in Germany after the Cambrai battle was: "The tank is nothing but a bogey to frighten children with. It has been proved that artillery can deal with them, and that they can accomplish nothing against troops of high morale." And so by reason of this erroneous conclusion the disastrous decision was made to stop production of tanks and anti-tank weapons; which decision led to a situation in which we could no longer hold in check the lead gained by our enemy.

In this war, a novelty analogous to the use of tanks at Cambrai in World War I, is the first large-scale and unsuccessful landing operation at Dieppe. As it should never be assumed that the enemy will draw wrong conclusions therefrom, so we too should avoid the mistake of thinking that the British have realized that even now they can do nothing against our coastal defence. The enemy will not give up the idea of forming a second front, for he knows that it is definitely his only remaining chance of achieving victory. And so I regard it as my task to begin immediately doing everything humanly possible to increase the defence potential of the coastal area.

(G.M.D.S. - H22/88, Kuestenschutz Kanal-
kueste, 3 Oct for 29 Sep 42) (Photostat
and Translation 981HC(D16))

The foregoing seems to indicate that the Dieppe operation strengthened Hitler in his resolve to go ahead with the construction of an "Atlantic Wall". German documents for the balance of the pre-invasion period show clearly how this programme was hampered by a chronic lack of men and materials, by the over-riding preoccupation with construction work on the

Channel Islands, and by the progressive paralysis of transportation due to Allied bombings.

66. This report has been prepared by Capt A.G. Steiger, Historical Section (G.S.).

A. G. Steiger, Capt.

for (C.P. Stacey) Colonel,
Director
Historical Section (G.S.).

I

LIST OF APPENDICES

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II

LIST OF PHOTOSTATS AND TRANSLATIONS

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APPENDIX "A"
to H.S. Report No. 36

295 INF DIV

LOCATION MAP

15 Nov 40

981D295 (D2)

Ref: para 4

Unterkunftsraum der 295. Inf. Div. STAND VOM 15.11.40.

KÜSTE NORD

KÜSTE SÜD

MITTE

OST

- Bou. Kol 99
- I/517
- II/295
- III/295
- 4. b. 9 AR 295
- 5. B. 517
- 14/511
- 547



APPENDIX "B"
to H.S. Report No. 36

295 INF DIV

LOCATION MAP


15 Mar 41

981D295(D4)

Ref: para 7

PHOTO IDNO

Unterkunft der 295. Inf. Div. Stand vom 15.3.41

Divisional Boundary.... 



APPENDIX "C"
to H.S. Report No. 36

302 INF DIV.

DIVISIONAL ORDER NO. 27

28 Aug 41

(Translation)

981D302(D4)

Ref: para 20

28 Aug 41

Re: Total Commitment

Divisional Order No.27
for Coast Protection

1.) The Enemy:

Looking at the situation as a whole, British landings and enemy relief operations are quite possible and we are duty-bound to govern ourselves accordingly.

The following possibilities must be considered:

- a) Major landings may have the object of making harbours unserviceable or of blocking them.
- b) Minor raids - mostly carried out under cover of darkness or fog - may have as objectives:

Destruction of harbour installations and coast batteries.

Destruction of roads, railways and industrial installations.

Capture of sentries and patrols.

Seizure of headquarters.

Interruption of telephone communications.

- c) Landing of agents from small vessels at night and in fog.
- d) Landing of parachutists and airborne troops.

2.) 302 Inf Div is responsible for coastal protection in the sector Quend Plage - St Valery-en-Caux.

Task: Prevention of a landing from the sea or from the air.

In the opinion of the Division the centre of gravity of the defence lies at Dieppe.

3.) Order of Battle of the Division:

a) Coastal Sector North:

572 Inf Regt: Hq Valery-sur Somme

- (1) One battalion in sector north of the Somme
 - (2) One battalion in sector south of the Somme
 - (3) One battalion as regimental reserve
- (69)

The latter is placed in such a way that it can be committed either in the direction of the mouth of the Somme or in the direction of Le Treport.

b) Coastal Sector Centre:

570 Inf Regt: HQ at Eu

- (1) One battalion in sector astride Le Treport.
- (2) One battalion as regimental reserve.

The latter is placed in such a way that it can be committed either in the direction of Le Treport or of Criel-Plage.

c) Coastal Sector West:

571 Inf Regt: HQ at Varangeville

- (1) One battalion astride Dieppe.
- (2) One battalion in sector from Pourville to Valery-en-Caux.
- (3) One battalion as regimental reserve.

The latter is placed in such a way that it can be committed in the direction of Pourville and Dieppe.

d) 302 Arty Regt: HQ at Dieppe

- (1) One battalion in the sector of 572 Inf Regt and 570 Inf Regt
- (2) One battalion in the sector of 571 Inf Regt.

e) Divisional Reserve:

- (1) One battalion from 570 Inf Regt
- (2) One battalion from 302 Arty Regt
- (3) 302 Anti-Tk Bn

Divisional Reserve is placed in such a way that it can be committed either in the direction of Dieppe or of Le Treport.

4.) Boundaries:

a) Right divisional boundary (at the same time Corps boundary):

Quend Plage, Monchaux (the village in the zone of 302 Inf Div), the river Authie, the remainder of the boundary coincides with that between the French command and the Belgian command [Military Commanders of occupied territory].

170

b) Left Divisional Boundary:

Le Tot (4 km west of St Valery-en-Caux), St Sylvain, Ingouville (the village in the zone of 302 Inf Div), the railway at Doudeville, Motteville.

c) Rear Boundary of the Operational Zone of the Division:

Dompierre (exclusive) - Crecy-en-Ponthien - Hautvillers - Ouville - Pt Port (inclusive) - Railway line at Cahon, Woincourt - Woincourt road, Beauchamps (exclusive) - Sept Meules (excl) - Envermeu (incl) - St Aubin-le-Cauf (incl) - Le Bois Robert (excl) - Auppegard (incl) - Gueures (excl) - railway line Gueures, St Vaast - Dieppedalle.

d) Rear Boundary of Divisional Area:

Dompierre (excl) - Pt Port (incl) - Cahon (incl) - Rambures (incl) - Aumale (incl) - Molagmes (incl) - Railway line Molagmes, Serqueux, Motteville.

5.) Chain of Command:

- a) Following a decision by OKW regarding the "Chain of Command for Coast Defence" in resisting an enemy landing, as well as in making preparations therefor, all three branches of the Armed Forces, including all administrative centres, troops and installations belonging to the military commands, as well as all other organizations in the coast zone which may be considered as belonging to the Armed Forces, will be subordinated to the competent ground commander of the Army.

Unified command in each sector through the competent ground commander is the basic principle, that is for all elements of the Armed Forces and other formations within the operational zone of the Division.

In the operational zone the infantry regimental commanders are the competent ground commanders for their sectors, the battalion commanders for their sub-sectors.

- b) In the operational zone everything must be rehearsed with a view to enemy attacks and attempted landings.

The prerequisite for this is:

- (1) A knowledge of the command posts and units of all components of the Armed Forces in the sector.
- (2) There must be the closest contact and co-operation with these components. Naval installations and forces which are charged with the tasks of sea warfare remain under the naval commands.

Flak artillery may be brought up if the air situation permits, but it must revert as soon as possible.

A systematic evacuation of the inhabited districts is not contemplated at present.

6.) Reconnaissance:

It must be clearly recognized that on account of the width of the sector and the weak forces, it is of the utmost importance that enemy operations be identified in good time and the information quickly passed on, and that a state of readiness for defence and of alert be established immediately. All reconnaissance results, including those of the coast artillery, Navy and Air Force must be reported immediately, with speed and certainty. In the case of important happenings, it is appropriate to make a preliminary report, followed by one giving exact details. It is important that the Division should first have quick information of the particular sector in which enemy operations have been identified.

The sharpest constant enemy observation - especially at night and in fog - and sharp guard-service in the entire operational sector must have no gaps, and contact between the observer and the competent commander must be secure, in order that even at night and in fog and under enemy fire the handing in of reports is completely reliable. Thus at night and in fog the posting of additional sentries is necessary, and additional patrols between the sentries are required. The fundamental rule is: "At night and in fog; doubled sentries and doubled patrols".

In future the Division will be notified of the approach of enemy vessels to the coast by the Aircraft Warning Service, when the vessels are within 20 km of the coast. The Division will immediately pass on the information to the regiments. 302 Arty Regt is to inform the GHQ coast artillery immediately.

Compare with the attached instruction on coast protection reports (Appx 1).

All observation posts must have visual contact with their neighbours on left and right. This is possible at nearly all points on the coast and guarantees a prompt recognition of the situation in the sector of the neighbouring unit, and under certain conditions the prompt support of this unit.

7.) Conduct of Battle:

Conduct of battle is to be such that attempted enemy landings lead to defeat and destruction of

At the sector boundaries the defence must overlap.

The intermediate area between the strong-points is to be guarded by observation during the day, at night or in fog by patrols.

The staffs must arrange their own protection.

The elements assigned to the front line must be billeted in direct proximity to their firing positions. Preparations are to be made ensuring that the garrison will be on hand immediately in case of an alert. A distance taking 10 minutes to cover is too great.

Mutual contact with the neighbouring units, with the heavy weapons and with the observation posts of the artillery must be assured. The commanders of the various weapons must maintain contact with each other.

The commanders of all weapons must have an exact knowledge of each other's tasks, command posts, positions, observation posts, firing positions, and effective zones. There should be no doubt at all on these points. Important reports must be quickly passed from unit to unit.

Mutual Support:

Instructions are to be given regarding action to be taken in case of attack on neighbouring strongpoints or unguarded intermediate terrain.

Command posts are to be constructed for regiments, battalions and commanders of strongpoints. In case of enemy bombardment alternate positions must be available for the command posts. This is important above all for the commanders of heavy infantry weapons and artillery. Telephone lines must be installed for the command posts.

All instructions and tasks for commanders of strongpoints and works, as well as for sentries and patrols are to be put down shortly and clearly in writing.

There must be reserves of ammunition and of food.

- b) All heavy infantry weapons (heavy machine guns, anti-tank guns, infantry guns and captured guns) must be committed with due regard to the foregoing instructions. With the exception of the heavy machine guns of the reserves, they are to be distributed among the strongpoints in order of priority.

There must be clear orders regarding the subordination of all heavy weapons.

17A

PHOTODUPLICATION

Firing plans must be drawn up against all possible landing attempts by the sectors and sub-sectors in co-operation with the artillery and taking into account all available weapons in the sector. It is important that strong fire from all available weapons be concentrated before the threatened points. Every weapon anywhere within range must be committed against a penetration area. Target plans must be drawn up.

Commitment of Anti-Tk Guns:

The commitment of anti-tank guns in each regiment remains unchanged.

Attention must be paid to the training of an additional anti-tank gun crew for each gun. The 3rd guns not committed with the anti-tank gun platoons revert to the respective regimental reserves.

One anti-tank gun platoon from 302 Anti-Tk En with a full allotment of ammunition is assigned to the sub-sector Dieppe, to which it is subordinated as regards discipline and supplies. This platoon will be relieved directly at intervals of three weeks.

French Captured Guns:

- (1) The captured guns allotted to the regimental sectors are committed as follows:

572 Inf Regt at:

- a) Strongpoint Cayeux (4 guns and
(2 British M.C.s
- b) Strongpoint Ault-Onival 2 mountain guns

570 Inf Regt at:

- a) Strongpoint Le Treport (5 guns and
(4 British M.G.s
- b) Strongpoint Criel 2 mountain guns

571 Inf Regt at:

- a) Strongpoint Dieppe (4 guns and
(4 British M.G.s
- b) Strongpoint Pourville 2 guns
- c) Strongpoint Valery-sur Somme 2 mountain guns

- (2) The crews will be detailed by the infantry regiments concerned. They form the cadre for the infantry gun companies to be assigned later.
- (3) The infantry regiments will carry out the further training of all crews for these captured guns. Reliefs for these crews must also be trained. The training personnel is to be chosen in direct agreement with 302 Arty Regt.

Preparations must be made for barrage fire before harbours and threatened parts of the front.

This must be included in the firing plans.

Alternate Positions:

For all heavy weapons (especially for those committed in pill-boxes), and for captured guns alternate positions with observation posts must be prepared.

It must be quite clear at what stage the alternate position must be occupied, in order that fighting can be continued against an enemy who has made a penetration.

c) Artillery:

Two battalions from 302 Arty Regt are committed; one battalion will be held in readiness as mobile reserve in the St Vaast area.

The artillery has the task - in addition to opposing attempted landings directly before the strongpoints - especially of dealing with any possible landing attempts on either side of the harbours of Le Treport and Dieppe. For this purpose alternate positions with observation posts are to be prepared and developed.

Firing plans must be drawn up for the individual batteries, combining infantry and artillery. Above all there must be strong concentration of fire on possibly threatened points.

According to the intended operational effect additional observation posts and firing positions fulfilling all fighting requirements must be decided on, and preparations made for their speedy occupation and the establishment of communications. With the infantry it must be decided in what situations the advanced artillery observers are to be committed, and from where they can fulfil their tasks. For the observation organs horses or motor cycles must be kept nearby. The tractive power for the gun is to be kept in close proximity to the firing position, should this appear necessary.

In the case of the battery from 302 Arty Regt at Hurt, the limbers are to be kept close by, in order that the battery can quickly be rendered mobile, and the alternate position taken up. Preparations are to be made for commitment in the direction of Le Treport.

A special order follows for commitment of a static heavy battery and for construction of the firing positions, the observation posts and the signal communications.

With a view to mutual support contact is to be maintained with the commander of 770 and 799 GHQ Arty Ens, which have coast batteries in the divisional zone. 770 Arty Comd Post has wire connections with the command post of 302 Arty Regt.

In case of readiness for action or readiness for alert (Stage 2) 302 Arty Regt assigns an artillery liaison detachment to 570 Inf Regt and one to 571 Inf Regt.

- d) For opposing enemy landing attempts and for the preparations therefor, 302 Engr Bn is tactically under 571 Inf Regt. On Stage I becoming effective, the engineer company billeted at St Nicolas is to move forward to Arques-la-Bataille, and to remain there in a state of readiness for further employment at the disposal of 571 Inf Regt. An orderly to be stationed at Divisional Headquarters.
- e) The reserves are to be kept nearby, but not stationed in such a way that they will be involved in the fighting from the outset.

The commanders of reserves must be fully acquainted with the positions. The various reconnoitred routes for bringing up the reserves must be known, and in the case of the reserves down to and including the battalion reserves. The leaders must know accurately the time required to concentrate the reserves at the place of assembly, and the time required to reach the predesignated locations.

Quartering must be compact, in units of not less than one platoon. The leader must be with his unit.

There must be alternate quarters ready (including stables) to fall back to in case of enemy action.

A counterthrust or counterattack must hit the enemy before he has enough heavy weapons on shore at his disposal. In case of an enemy landing, each regiment and each battalion is responsible for restoring the situation by prompt counterthrust. The various possible

schemes of commitment, that may result in throwing the enemy into the sea, must be prepared and constantly practised with the troops. Personnel for reconnaissance must be held ready and schooled for their duties, especially their leaders. Instruction for these will include map studies of the sector.

- f) For defence of the North, Centre and West Coast Sectors the three sector commanders are fully responsible. For defence of the harbours of Le Treport, Dieppe and St Valery-en-Caux a battalion commander will be made responsible.

The Division reserves the right to use the reserve battalion of the North Sector for the defence of the harbour of Le Treport, the reserve battalion of the Centre Sector also for defence of the harbour of Dieppe.

- g) (1) The following preparations will be made:

Coast Sector North: Commitment of the reserve battalion south or north of the mouth of the Somme and in the direction of Le Treport.

Coast Sector Centre:

- 1.) Commitment of 570 Res Bn* at Le Treport.
- 2.) Commitment of 570 Res Bn and 572 Res Bn at Le Treport under command of 570 Inf Regt.
- 3.) Commitment as in 2.) and 302 Anti-Tk Bn under command of 570 Inf Regt.
- 4.) Commitment as in 3.) and 570 Res Bn of the divisional reserve and the artillery battalion of the divisional reserve under command of 570 Inf Regt.
- 5.) Commitment as in 3.) and 4.) less 572 Res Bn under command of 570 Inf Regt.

Coast Sector West:

- 1.) Commitment of 571 Res Bn at Dieppe under command of 571 Inf Regt.
- 2.) Commitment of 571 Res Bn at St Valery-en-Caux under command of 571 Inf Regt.
- 3.) Commitment of 571 Res Bn and the engineer battalion at Dieppe under command of 571 Inf Regt.

* Note: In this paragraph "Res Bn" is not a designation, but a reference to whatever battalion of the regiment at the moment was part of the sector's tactical reserve .

- 4.) Commitment as in 3.) and 570 Res Bn (Div Res) and the artillery battalion (Div Res) under command of 571 Inf Regt.
- 5.) Commitment as in 4.) and 302 Anti-Tk Bn (Div Res) under command of 571 Inf Regt.

(2) The following are to be determined:

Routes of approach
Assembly position areas
Switch line positions
Observation posts
Firing positions
Arrangements for signal communications

- (3) All senior commanders and all company and battery commanders are to be instructed in the actual terrain on the approach and commitment possibilities. All defensive measures are to be re-examined after relief of the battalions committed.
- (4) The commanders of reserves are to be provided with corresponding instructions.

8.) Alert and Assembly Orders:

A quick alert is an important part of an effective defence.

- (1) Readiness for action as regards elements committed in the main line of resistance.
- (2) Readiness for alert concerns reserves only.
- (3) Readiness for action:
 - a) The normal condition for the elements committed is constant readiness for action, that is, they are prepared to repulse an attack at any time. In general daylight occupation.
 - b) Increased readiness for action (Stage I): Reinforcement of sentries, patrols, occupation of observation posts, gun positions, etc.
In general occupation by night or in fog. Reserves are in Alert Stage I.
 - c) Highest degree of readiness for action (Stage II): Occupation is complete and prepared for defence in expectation of an imminent or identified attack.

Reserves are in Alert Stage II.

- (4) Readiness for alert:
 - a) Permanent State of Alert (Stage I), that is, when an attack is not expected. The

not expected. The local battalion reserves must be ready for commitment within 3 hours, the regimental and divisional reserves within 6 hours. In all formations and headquarters an officer must be constantly within reach.

- b) Increased State of Alert (Stage I): For the entire sector or part of a sector in accordance with the prevailing situation:

Troops remain in their quarters ready to move.

In all units and headquarters the commanders must be within reach.

Headquarters telephones must be in charge of an officer. Observation posts must be occupied.

Under certain conditions patrols must be sent out.

- c) Highest degree of Alert (Stage II)

Falling in at alert stations.

Local battalion and regimental reserves reach their pre-arranged assembly areas.

The Divisional Reserve remains in alert stations.

Units of the Divisional Reserve (one battalion 570 Inf Regt, the Anti-Tank Battalion and the Artillery Battalion) immediately send out liaison officers on motor cycles to the Divisional Command Post at Arques-la-Bataille.

Headquarters telephones to be attended by an officer till the troops move off.

- (5) If owing to a special situation a sector commander orders a higher stage of readiness for action and alert, this is to be reported immediately to the Division.

The neighbouring formations are to be informed on principle of an increased degree of readiness, as also of cancellation of same.

- (6) Frequent alert exercises are to be held by day and by night as a preliminary [training] for defence against enemy landings. In particular the quickest possible attainment of Stage II must be practised over and over again.

- (7) All necessary measures for establishment of readiness for action and alert are to be laid down in "Orders for Preparedness".

Goal: "Utmost speed in reaching the condition of preparedness".

- (8) Preparations for the alert are to be made:
- a) With assault equipment only
 - b) With field equipment and arms. In a) troops must be ready to move off in $1\frac{1}{2}$ hours; in b) in 4 hours.
- (9) Alert assembly areas must be decided on.
- (10) Furthermore, arrangements must be made for alerting the combat vehicles etc of the infantry and the limbers of the artillery, as also their maintenance in the highest state of preparedness for action. There must be contact with the vehicles.

In case of an alert the teams of horses at present with the infantry in the front line are to be withdrawn into reconnoitred assembly positions, the limbers of the artillery, if too far distant, are to be brought forward.

9.) Opening of fire on Sea Targets:

- (1) See attached instruction (Appx 2)
- (2) See instruction for harbour officers (Appx 3)

10.) Rendering the Reserves Mobile:

a) Bicycles: Allotted as follows:

- (1) To the battalion of each regimental reserve:
Bicycles for one company (therefore a total of bicycles for three companies)
- (2) To the divisional reserve battalion:
Bicycles for one company
- (3) To the battalion reserves of 572 Inf Regt:
Bicycles for 2 half companies to each company (that is a total of bicycles for one company)

These bicycles are static equipment, and in case of relief are to be handed over to the incoming units.

Additional bicycles have been requested.

- b) Automobiles: In Alert Stage II the following are to be in readiness: For the battalion (for one reinforced rifle company or for a machine gun company) in the regimental reserve of 572 Inf Regt: the light motor vehicle column of the division at Gamaches.

The 302nd light motor vehicle column is to remain in its quarters in a state of prepared-

ness for withdrawal in case of:

- (1) Alert Stage I (increased preparedness) and
- (2) Alert Stage II (highest state of preparedness)

In they are required the Division issues the order for commitment.

The loading areas and routes are to be laid down and marked by the infantry battalion in direct cooperation with the commander of the light motor vehicle column.

Permission for intended loading exercises is to be requested from the Division.

- 11.) Resistance to enemy Paratroops and Airborne Troops:
See Divisional Order No.25 for Coast Protection.

12.) Ammunition Allotment:

- a) The infantry regiments have at their disposal the portion of the ammunition allotment assigned to the troops plus the portion of a light horse-drawn column, which they did receive on 27 Apr 41.

- b) The artillery battalions committed at the front have at their disposal the portion of the first ammunition allotment assigned to the troops and that from the column which has been brought up. The portion assigned to the column is to be stored with the limbers or in the firing position as circumstances may dictate.

The battalion in divisional reserve has at its disposal only the portion of the first ammunition allotment assigned to the troops.

- c) For the French captured guns there is a store of 500 shells for each gun; for the French mountain guns 500 shells for each gun.

- d) In the ammunition dump of the Division at Gamaches there are stored:

- (1) The load for the first light motor vehicle columns (302 Inf Div/Supplies/WuG.Az.74 No.79/41 Secret 2 May 41)

- (2) The share of the artillery reserve battalion.

- (3) The second ammunition allotment for the Division.

- e) If a gun unit relieves a mortar unit or vice versa, the Commander of Divisional Supply Services arranges the ammunition exchange operation for the column.

- f) In storing the ammunition, the safety regulations must be adhered to; protection against the effects of weather must be guaranteed, and camouflage ensured.
- g) In case of especially high expenditure of ammunition (barrage fire) or continuous engagements, reports on supplies of ammunition on hand are to be submitted daily.
- h) The leaders of the parties bringing up the ammunition must be familiar with the routes to the positions.

13.) Signal Communications:

- a) 302 Sig Coy maintains the network (telephone and radio network) of 302 Inf Div.

GHQ Communication Centrals: Arques-la-Bataille, Dieppe and Eu, also the communication central at Gamaches.

The units under command of the Division are to apply to 302 Sig Coy for an allotment of lines and telephone connections. Any unauthorized connections or alteration of existing connections are strictly forbidden.

- b) In conjunction with the divisional network the guarantee of good signal communications is indispensable for the chain of command. The signal network must still be improved in many respects. In particular badly laid lines should be re-laid. The goal to be striven for is at least two separate lines from regiment to battalion and from the battalion to the strongpoints.

In making preparations for defence the most pessimistic view should be taken: the collapse of telephone communications. Preparations must be made for the employment of radio and messengers, in important cases of special liaison officers.

Messengers and dispatch riders must know the area. The pre-arranged use of duplicate service by radio and signal lamp communications is to be continued. The radio detachments assigned to the regiments by 302 Sig Coy take up their duties when Alert Stage II comes into force - if they have not already had orders to do so.

Captain Brose is available on request as adviser to the infantry regiments and the artillery regiment.

Apart from this, all measures for the speedy relaying of orders or of an alarm are to be

safeguarded, the arrangements made are to be examined, for instance, sufficient barrage fire sentries to relay [orders for] barrage fire to the batteries and captured guns, sentries outside the dugouts to receive an alarm, etc. Routes to the front and parallel to the front must be reconnoitred in case communications are interrupted by bombardment, destruction or an enemy push. The number of bridges and their condition must be ascertained.

- c) Telephone lines are not to be laid in the line or even in front of the individual installations, but they must be behind them (approximately 150 metres away, according to the terrain) and with branch lines to the instruments in the positions. Otherwise the maintenance men could not work.

Procedure to be adopted in the event of the telephone exchanges going out of commission is to be determined beforehand.

- d) The quick and certain laying out of ground panels for conveying information to the Air Force is to be practised. The prescribed symbols are laid down in H.Dv 423 "GH, Sig Tables" of 24 May 38.

Practising with ground panels must take place at times when no aerial activity is to be expected.

14.) Position Construction:

See Divisional Orders Nos. 12, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20 and 21 for Coast Protection.

15.) Handing in of Reports:

- a) Regarding "Reports in Coast Protection" of Pamphlet (Appx 1).
b) Handing in of reports from staffs to divisions (Appx 4).

16.) Territorial Regulations:

a) Station Headquarters

- (1) In all districts occupied by troops station headquarters are to be organized and occupied. If several units are in the same place, the unit with the senior-ranking commander takes over command of the station headquarters.

There are station headquarters at the following places:

Dieppe	Regtl HQ 302 Arty Regt
Eu	Regtl HQ 570 Inf Regt
Valery-sur Somme	Regtl HQ 571 Inf Regt
Arques-la-Bataille	Divisional HQ

- (2) For disciplinary purposes a station officer is to be appointed. Road and tavern patrols will be carried out.
- b) Contact is to be maintained with the competent area headquarters of Abbeville, Dieppe and Forges-les-Eaux.
- c) Taps: For ORs 2300 hrs
For NCOs 2400 hrs
For WOs 0100 hrs
- d) For additional regulations see Divisional Orders:
Ops No.168/41 secret 19 Apr 41
Ops No.202/41 secret 29 Apr 41.

17.) Active and Passive Air Protection:

All necessary measures for resisting enemy aircraft and for preventing air raid damage are to be constantly examined. (Placing of machine guns on twin mounts for anti-aircraft defence at specially favourable and especially important points, transmission of air alarms also in the position, procedure of the staff in case of air alarm)

Care is to be taken that the position for the twin mounts lies in direct proximity to the position of the machine guns for coast defence.

Because of enemy aerial activity, all marches are to take place under field conditions in company strength only (not in battalion formation). During the march, while resting and during the exercises air raid protection must be maintained.

Cellars and air raid shelters are in some cases still insufficient; these are to be improved.

Organization of the fire-fighting service (Armed Forces Auxiliary commands): Attention is called to 302 Inf Div/Ops Journal No.530/41 secret of 24 Jul 41.

18.) Anti-Gas Service:

Special attention is to be paid to the anti-gas service; see the special divisional order already issued.

All troops committed in the front line carry a respirator at all times.

19.) Reliefs:

Orders for the relief of the battalions in the front line will be issued by the Division.

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- 20.) Divisional Orders Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9-11, 13, 17, 22, 23 for coast protection are cancelled by this order and are to be destroyed; as well as:

Ops Journal No.48/41, 30 May 41 re Booty guns.
Ops Journal No.435/41g, 23 Jun 41 re Coast defence.
Ops Journal No.469/41g 2nd edition, 3 Jul 41 re Relief.
Ops (no number), 3 Jul 41 re Rendering the Divisional Reserve mobile
Ops Journal No.71/41, 26 Jul 41 re Firing Experience with M.G.s on aerial targets.
Ops Journal No.546/41g, 28 Jul 41 re Coast Protection.

- 21.) Divisional Headquarters at Arques-la-Bataille.

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Distribution:

570 Inf Regt	4 + 3 for Strongpoints
571 Inf Regt	4 + 8 for Strongpoints
572 Inf Regt	4 + 6 for Strongpoints
302 Anti-Tk En	3
302 Arty Regt	4
302 Engr En	2
302 Sig Coy	1
Comd Supply Services 302 Inf Div	4
Bakery Coy 302 Inf Div	1
Butchery Coy 302 Inf Div	1
Ration Office 302 Inf Div	1
Medical Coy 302 Inf Div	1
Veterinary Coy 302 Inf Div	1
Ambulance Train 302 Inf Div	1
Field Post Office 302 Inf Div	1
Field Police 302 Inf Div	1

In the house:

Commander	1
Ops	4
Supplies	1
Intelligence	1
Personnel	1
Administration	1
Medical	1
Veterinary	1
Camp Commandant	1

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Note: 15 pages of appendices are available in photostatic form, but not translated.

APPENDIX "D"
to H.S. Report No. 36

O. B. WEST TAKES CHARGE OF
COAST DEFENCE IN WEST

28 Mar 42

(Photostat and Translation)

981D302(D6)

Ref: para 38

302. Infanterie-Division
Abt. Ia Tgb.Nr.182/42 g.Kdos.

Div.Stabs-Qu., den 1.4.42

Bezug: H.K.XXXII Ia Nr.199/42 g.Kdos.

Betr.: **Befehlsführung**

35 Ausfertigungen
14. Ausfertigung

Nachstehend wird Abschrift des Fernschreibens
des Heeres-Gruppen-Kommando D Ia Nr. 587/42 g.Kdos.
vom 28.3.1942 übersandt.

Für das Divisionskommando
Der erste Generalstabsoffizier

[Handwritten signature]

Abschrift !

Fernschreiben
des Heeres-Gruppen-Kommando D
vom 28.3.1942.

Der Führer und Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht hat mit Weisung Nr. 40 vom 23.3.1942 die Verteidigung der Küste als Wehrmachtsaufgabe erklärt und die Verantwortung für die Vorbereitung und Durchführung ihrer Verteidigung eindeutig und ohne Einschränkung für den Bereich des Oberbefehlshabers West einschl. Niederlande in dessen Verantwortung gelegt.

Für diese Aufgabe ist der Oberbefehlshaber West unmittelbar dem Oberkommando der Wehrmacht unterstellt. Ich befehle hierzu:

Alle verfügbaren Kampfkräfte und Kampfmittel der Wehrmachtteile, der Gliederungen und Verbände ausserhalb der Wehrmacht und der eingesetzten Deutschen zivilen Dienststellen unterstehen dem Oberbefehlshaber West für jede Vorbereitung zur Verteidigung der Küsten und für die Verteidigung selbst. Nur die Seestreitkräfte und die Streitkräfte der Luftwaffe für operative Kriegsführung unterstehen der Kriegsmarine bzw. der Luftwaffe.

Für die Zusammenarbeit mit diesen folgen Weisungen.

Ich übertrage im Rahmen dieser Aufgaben diese Befehlsbefugnisse auf alle Kommandobehörden bis zu den Abschnittsbefehlshabern, soweit ihnen die verantwortliche Verteidigung der Küstenabschnitte obliegt. In Sonderheit bestimme ich die Kommandeure der im Küstenschutz eingesetzten Divisionen des Heeres zu verantwortlichen Befehlshabern im Sinne der Führerweisung.

Mit Feindangriffen jeder Art ist zu rechnen.

Alle Truppen, die irgendwie überraschenden Feind-

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angriffen ausgesetzt sein können, haben stets im Zustand voller Abwehrbereitschaft zu sein. Jedes Nachlassen der Aufmerksamkeit ist aufs schärfste zu bekämpfen. Keine Befehlsstelle und kein Verband dürfen beim Versuch einer Feindlandung eine Rückwärtsbewegung antreten. Wo deutsche Männer an oder in der Nähe der Küste eingesetzt sind, müssen sie bewaffnet und für den Kampf ausgebildet sein. Ich ersuche alle Kommandobehörden und Dienststellen, diesen Befehl allen ihnen unterstellten Dienststellen und Verbänden beschleunigt weiterzugeben und alle in ihrem Dienstbereich ausserhalb der Wehrmacht eingesetzten Organisationen und Verbände sowie die etwa in ihrem Dienstbereich eingesetzten deutschen zivilen Dienststellen sofort zu benachrichtigen und zu den auf sie entfallenden Aufgaben heranzuziehen.

Die Weisung des Führers bzw. Zusätze Ob. West hierzu gehen den Kommandobehörden noch zu.

Der Oberbefehlshaber West
I.V. gez. von Rundstedt
Generalfeldmarschall
Oberbefehlshaber West

Heeresgruppenkommando D Ia Nr. 587/42 g.K.

Der Oberbefehlshaber der 15. Armee
Ia Nr. 1666/42 g.Kdos.

A.H.Qu., den 29.3.42

15 Ausfertigungen
8. Ausfertigung

Ich gebe vorstehenden Befehl der H.Gr. (Ob. West) bekannt mit folgendem Zusatz:

- 1.) Der Befehl klärt die Befehlsverhältnisse einwandfrei.
- 2.) Aus diesem Befehl erwächst den Kommandeuren der Truppen des Heeres eine sehr viel grössere Verantwortung wie bisher.
- 3.) Die bisherige Regelung sah eine Zusammenarbeit mit dem Wege kameradschaftlicher Verbundenheit vor.

Ich erwarte, dass diese kameradschaftliche Zusammenarbeit auch weiterhin der oberste Leitgedanke bleibt.

gez.: H a a s e

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PHOTO. NDHQ

1 Apr 42

Ref: Higher Command 32, Ops No.199/42 Secret

Re: Chain of Command

A copy of Army Group "D"'s teletype message No.587/42 Secret dated 28 Mar 42 is submitted herewith.

For Divisional Headquarters
Staff Officer 1

Copy

Teletype message from Army Group "D"

28 Mar 42

In Instruction No.40, dated 23 Mar 42, the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht has declared the defence of the coast to be the task of the Wehrmacht, O.B.West to be responsible, solely and without limitations, for preparations for and execution of coast defence within his sphere of operations, including the Netherlands.

For this task, O.B.West is directly under the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht.

I issue the following orders therefor:

All available military forces and equipment of the three branches of the Wehrmacht, of the affiliations and formations outside the Wehrmacht, and of the German civilian administrative organs committed, are subordinated to O.B.West where any preparations for defence of the coast and the defence itself are concerned. Only the operational forces of the Navy and the Luftwaffe are subordinated to the Navy or to the Luftwaffe.

Instructions for cooperation with these services follow.

Within the framework of these assignments, I transmit this authority to all headquarters down to the sector commanders, insofar as responsibility for defence of the coastal sectors devolves upon them. In particular I appoint the commanders of the divisions committed in coastal defence responsible commanders in accordance with the meaning of the Fuehrer Instruction.

Enemy attacks of every sort are to be expected.

All troops that may be exposed to any sort of surprise enemy attack are to be in a state of constant and com-

plete readiness for defence. Any relaxation of watchfulness is to be strictly checked. In the event of an attempted enemy landing, no command post and no formation may make any movement to the rear. Any German men committed on the coast or in the vicinity thereof must be armed and trained for fighting. I require that all headquarters and administrative centres immediately relay this order to the administrative centres and formations in their commands, and that they immediately inform all organizations and associations outside the Wehrmacht which are within their sphere of influence, as well as all German civilian administrative centres which may be in their administrative zones, and to direct them to their allotted tasks.

The Fuehrer Instruction and O.B.West's supplements thereto will go out to the various headquarters.

for von Rundstedt
Field Marshal
O.B.West

Army Group "D"/Ops No.587/42 Secret

C.-in-C. Fifteenth Army
Ops No.1666/42 Secret

29 Mar 42

I announce the foregoing Army Group Order (O.B.West) with the following supplement:

- 1.) The Order makes the chain of command perfectly clear.
- 2.) A far greater responsibility for the army commanders than has hitherto been their share results from this Order.
- 3.) The regulations which have existed hitherto provided for cooperation by means of comradely association.

I expect this friendly cooperation to remain the prevailing attitude.

HAASE

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APPENDIX "E"
to H.S. Report No. 36

ARMED FORCES OPERATIONS STAFF

WAR DIARY

APRIL, MAY AND JUNE 1942

(Translated Excerpts)

981HC(D21)

Ref: para 41

War Diary OKW/WFSt, April May and June 1942

- 7 Apr 42 The Fuehrer speaks of the British attack against St Nazaire, saying that it was to be hoped that the troops on the west coast had been aroused thereby and all forces put on their mettle.
- 10 Apr 42 The Fuehrer has information from abroad to the effect that the British and the Americans are planning a "great surprise". He sees two possibilities; either a landing or the commitment of the new massed bombs.
- 13 Apr 42 In accordance with the order of 7 Apr, the Naval High Command reports to the Fuehrer on the events at St Nazaire, and points out the lack of sea reconnaissance and of combatant troops in the coastal forefield. In conclusion the Fuehrer requires that the most important strongpoints on the coast be made so secure that an enemy raid could not succeed.
- 16 Apr 42 A report arrives from C.-in-C. Seventh Army, accompanied by an enclosure from Army Gp "D". Both documents indicate possible dangers on the west coast, especially in the sector of Seventh Army, in which there are numerous important German naval bases. As directed by the Fuehrer, the Chief of Staff OKW orders that Seventh Army be strengthened by one division, which will be taken from the Channel sector. In addition one panzer division will be stationed as reserve in the Lille area, from where it will be able to intervene either in a westerly or a northerly direction.
- 19 Apr 42 Reichsminister Gen Constr Insp Speer and Gen of Engrs and Fortresses Jacob report to the Fuehrer on fortification construction progress in Norway and France. A speeding up of the work will only be possible if the transport situation improves. ...
- 24 Apr 42 At about 1200 hrs Lt-Gen Hilpert hands over as Chief of Staff O.E. West to his successor Maj-Gen Zeitzler, and submits a memorandum on the situation in the West. (OEW/ops 55/42 top secret, in records of WFSt/ops/Army)
- 17 May 42 Gen of Engrs and Fortresses at Army High Comd Jacob reports to the Fuehrer on progress of fortification construction in the West. The coastal area is divided into fortification zones: at present only field fortifications have been constructed. The Fuehrer orders that, where permanent construction would be created, defence installations should have priority over construction work for supply services.

PHOTO:NDHQ

- 19 May 42 Section "Foreign Armies West", General Staff, Army reports a planned British landing operation by Vice-Admiral Mount Batten (see Deputy Chief Armed Forces Operations Staff, 19 and 20 May 42).
- 24 May 42 The Foreign Office has reports regarding an allegedly imminent British landing on the west coast of Jutland.
- 26 May 42 Orders regarding a possible British landing operation in Norway.
- 30 May 42 The Fuehrer orders the strengthening of the Army forces in Northern Jutland.
- 1 Jun 42 Strengthening of forces in Northern Jutland to be carried out with personnel from the Replacement Army.
- 23 Jun 42 An appreciation of the situation by O.E.W. on 22 Jun draws attention to a striking gathering of small vessels on the south coast of England in the sector Portsmouth - Southampton - Poole - Portland, and at Exbury (sic). An increase in railway and cable sabotage. The arrest of 12 leaders of a resistance organization at Moons (sic) on 22 Jun 42, who were preparing a general sabotage operation to take place during the next few days, indicates a possible connection with the planned British landing operation.
- 25 Jun 42 The Fuehrer again expresses strong anxiety about the attempted enemy landings in the West, and states that our defence forces in that area are too weak. A massed landing of paratroops and gliders must be reckoned with, which might - even before the landings from vessels take place - lead to a disruption of the traffic arteries which are important for the movement of our reserves. The Fuehrer approves the proposal of Col-Gen Halder for the conversion of 23 Inf Div, which is in transit to the West, into a panzer division, and requires that the following formations be retained in the West as a reserve until further notice: 6, 7 and 10 Pz Divs, S.S. Div "Reich", 7 Flieger Div, and Regiment "Goering", which is to be increased to a brigade and to receive a panzer battalion in addition; also adequate air forces. As the Fuehrer has already decided after discussion with the Naval High Command, the Navy is to hold a reserve of U-boats in readiness for immediate intervention in the event of a sudden enemy operation.
- 26 Jun 42 In consequence of the gathering of small vessels on the south coast of England, the Fuehrer orders that S.S. Div "Reich", after

PROCESSED

reorganization, is to be transferred to the West immediately. In the event of the resistance power of the Russians in future operations being less than expected, the Fuehrer is also considering transferring S.S. Div "L.A.H." and S.S. Div "T" to the West. In this case the three S.S. divisions will be placed under the S.S. Corps Headquarters which is in process of formation.

- 28 Jun 42 Report from O.E.W. to the effect that at the beginning of June the number of small vessels assembled on the south Coast of England had increased to 2,802.
- 29 Jun 42 The Fuehrer receives Gen Zeitzler (Chief of Staff, Army Gp West), Reichsminister Speer and Gen of Engrs and Fortresses Jacob, who report on the progress of fortification construction in the West. The Fuehrer first points out that Anglo-American plans for a large-scale landing must be reckoned with, which will have as an object the creation of a "second front", this being required from the enemy's point of view for political reasons, both internal and external.

O.E.W. reported on 6 Jun that WFSt, in co-operation with G.H.Q., examined the question of strengthening the forces in the West. (For further details see the War Diary of Deputy Chief WFSt). The Chief OKW issues a comprehensive order.

PHOTO IN HQ

APPENDIX "F"
to H.S. Report No. 36

O.B.WEST

DESIGNATION AND TASK OF THE VARIOUS
ARTILLERY ELEMENTS ON THE COAST

14 Jul 42

(Photostat and Translation)

981D302(D4)

Ref: para 53

Geheim

302. Infanterie-Division
Abt. Ia Tgb.Nr. 946/42 geh.

Div.Stabs-Qu., den 24.7.1942.

Betr.: Aufgaben der Artillerie-
Kommandeure in der
Küstenverteidigung.

Divisionsbefehl Nr. 98
für den Küstenschutz.

Nachstehend wird Einzelbefehl des Oberbefehlshabers
West Nr. 14 abschriftlich zur Kenntnis gebracht.

Für das Divisionskommando
Der erste Generalstabsoffizier

Verteiler:

Lt. Entwurf

Abschrift:

Oberbefehlshaber West
(Oberkommando Heeresgruppe D)
Ia/Stoart Nr. 899/42 geh.

H.Qu., den 14.7.1942.

Betr.: Aufgaben der Artillerie-
Kommandeure in der
Küstenverteidigung.

Einzelbefehl des Oberbefehlshabers West
Nr. 14.

Ich befehle folgende Regelung für den Bereich Ober-
befehlshaber West:

- 1.) Der Höhere Artillerie-Kommandeur 301 übt gemäss seiner besonderen Dienstanweisung die Befugnisse eines Inspektors der Artillerie aus, der die Ausbildung der gesamten Artillerie des Heeres im Bereich Ob.West überwacht und die Zusammenarbeit der artilleristischen Kampfführung an der Küste im Auftrage des Oberbefehlshabers West überprüft.
- 2.) Die Artillerie-Kommandeure im Bereich Oberbefehlshaber West sind bodenständig (für 302.I.D. Arko 117, Rouen). Sie sind Truppenvorgesetzte der Heeresartillerie - auch der Heeres-Küstenartillerie - ihres Befehlsbereiches. Sie leiten deren Ausbildung gemäss den für das Heer erlassenen Ausbildungsvorschriften und sind zuständig für ihre Versorgung mit Waffen, Gerät und Munition.

PHOTO.NDHO

- 3.) Die Heeres-Küstenartillerie ist der Marine taktisch für Seeszielbekämpfung unterstellt. Ihr Einsatz erfolgt nach den Weisungen der zuständigen Marine-Befehlshaber. Ihre Ausbildung für den Kampf gegen Seeziele ist Aufgabe der Marine. Durch enge Zusammenarbeit zwischen den zuständigen Seekommandanten und Artillerie-Kommandeuren sind alle Wirkungsmöglichkeiten auf Land weitgehendst zu berücksichtigen.

Der Artillerie-Kommandeur vertritt bei jedem Einsatz neu zugeführter oder bei Verlegung vorhandener Heeres-Küstenartillerie die Belange seines General-Kommandos, besonders in Hinsicht auf die Landzielbekämpfung.

- 4.) In enger Zusammenarbeit mit dem zuständigen Flak-Befehlshaber ist sicherzustellen, dass die Flak weitgehendst in den Feuerplan für die Landzielbekämpfung mit einbezogen wird. Im Einvernehmen mit den Flak-Vorgesetzten sind Anordnungen für den Einsatz im Erdkampf zu erlassen. Im Flugmeldewesen ist engste Zusammenarbeit anzustreben.
- 5.) Die Marine-Artillerie ist im Benehmen mit den Seekommandanten hinsichtlich ihrer Ausbildung und ihres Einsatzes gegen Landziele zu beraten. Der Seekommandant gibt die hierfür notwendigen Anordnungen.
- 6.) Die Feuerleitung der im Kampf gegen Landziele eingesetzten Batterien der Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe und Heeresküsten- bzw. Heeresartillerie hat der zuständige Artillerie-Kommandeur.
- 7.) Die Artillerie-Kommandeure sind grundsätzlich bei Planung und Ausbau artilleristischer Anlagen für die Heeres- oder die Heeresküstenartillerie zur zuständigen Front durch die Festungs-Pionierstäbe zu beteiligen.

Der Oberbefehlshaber
gez. von Rundstedt
Generalfeldmarschall

Verteiler:

Inf.Regt. 570 = 1
Inf.Regt. 571 = 1
Inf.Regt. 572 = 1
Art.Regt. = 1
Flak-Untergr. = 1
Abt. Ia = 1
K.T.B. = 1

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302. Infanterie-Division
Abt. Ia Tgb.Nr. 945/42 geh.

Div.Stabs-Qu., den 24.7.1942.

Betr.: Kennzeichnung der ver-
schiedenen Artillerie.

Divisionsbefehl Nr. 99
für den Küstenschutz.

Oberbefehlshaber West befiehlt durch Einzelbefehl
Nr. 16:

Zur Vereinheitlichung der Kennzeichnungen der im Be-
reich Ob.West eingesetzten Artillerie sind folgende Be-
zeichnungen befohlen:

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| Heeres-Küstenartillerie | - | Batterien des Heeres für
Seezielbekämpfung (Land-
zielbekämpfung möglich). |
| Divisions-Artillerie | - | Batterien der Divisionen
des Heeres. |
| Stellungs-Batterien
(Küste) | - | Ortsfeste Batterien, durch
Personalstämme des Heeres
bzw. der Marine bedient,
für Seezielbekämpfung
(Landzielbekämpfung mög-
lich). |
| Landeabwehrgeschütze | - | Ortsfeste Einzelgeschütze,
höchstens Züge, von Personal
des Heeres oder der Marine
bedient. |
| Marine-Küstenartille-
rie | - | Batterien der Marine für
Seezielbekämpfung (Land-
zielbekämpfung teilweise
möglich). |
| Flak-Artillerie
der Luftwaffe,
der Marine und
des Heeres | - | Batterien zur Luftabwehr
(See- und Landzielbekämpfung
möglich). |

Die Begriffe Geräte-Batterien, Personal-Batterien sind
organisatorische Begriffe und haben mit dem Einsatz nichts zu
tun.


PHOTO NDHQ

Die Division befiehlt hierzu:

Die Gerätebattr. des A.R. 302 behalten ihre bisherigen Namen A. bzw. B. unter Wegfall der Bezeichnung "Gerätebatterie".

Div.Befehl Nr. 77 für den Küstenschutz - Ziffer 2 b - wird aufgehoben. *AK*

Für das Divisionskommando
Der erste Generalstabsoffizier



Verteiler:

Inf.Rgt. 570	= 1
Inf.Rgt. 571	= 1
Inf.Rgt. 572	= 1
Art.Rgt.	= 1
Flak-Untergr. Dieppe	= 1
Abt. Ia	= 1
Kriegstgb.	= 1
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H.Q. 302 Inf Div
Ops Journal No. 946/42 Secret

24 Jul 42

Re: Coast Defence Tasks of
Artillery Commanders

Divisional Order No. 98
For Coast Protection

Below is a copy of O.B.West's Individual Order No. 14.

For Divisional H.Q.
G.S.O. 1

Distribution:

As in draft

Copy

O.B.West
(H.Q. Army Gp "D")
Ops/Arty Staff Offr No. 899/42 Secret

14 Jul 42

Re: Coast Defence Tasks of Artillery Commanders

O.B.West's Individual Order No. 14

I order the following regulations for the area of
O.B.West:

- 1.) Sen Arty Comd No. 301, as the representative of O.B.West, by virtue of his special service instructions, exercises the authority of Inspector of Artillery, supervises the training of all army artillery in the area of O.B.West, and examines the combined artillery tactics on the Coast.
- 2.) The Artillery Commanders in the area of O.B.West are stationary (for 302 Inf Div, Arty Comd 117, Rouen). They rank above the senior officers of the Army Artillery - also above the G.H.Q. Coast Artillery - in their spheres of command. They direct training in accordance with the training instructions issued for the Army, and are the competent authorities for their supplies of arms, equipment and ammunition.
- 3.) The G.H.Q. Coast Artillery is under tactical command of the Navy for firing on sea targets. Commitment is in accordance with the directions of the competent naval commanders. Training for firing on sea targets is the task of the Navy. All possible

action against targets on shore is to be considered to the greatest possible extent in close cooperation between the competent naval commanders and the artillery commanders.

Regarding commitment of newly brought up or transferred G.H.Q. Coast Artillery, the artillery commander represents the interests of his Corps Headquarters, especially with regard to fire on land targets.

- 4.) By closely cooperating with the competent flak commander, it must be ensured that the flak is included to the utmost extent in the firing plan for the bombardment of land targets. Instructions for land fighting are to be issued in agreement with the senior flak officers. Closest cooperation is to be striven for by the Aircraft Warning Service.
- 5.) In arrangement with the naval commander the Naval Artillery is to be advised on training and commitment against ground targets. The Naval Commander gives the necessary instructions herefor.
- 6.) The competent Artillery Commander is in charge of the fire control of the batteries of the Navy, Air Force, Army Artillery and G.H.Q. Coast Artillery when firing on land targets.
- 7.) In the planning and development into a fixed front of the Army Artillery and G.H.Q. Coastal Artillery installations the Artillery Commanders will invariably be consulted by the Fortress Engineer Staffs.

The Commander-in-Chief
(signed) v. RUNDSTEDT
Field Marshal

Distribution:

570 Inf Regt	- 1
571 Inf Regt	- 1
572 Inf Regt	- 1
Arty Regt	- 1
Flak Sub-Gp	- 1
Ops	- 1
War Diary	- 1
	<hr/>
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24 Jul 42

Re: Designations of the Various
Types of Artillery

Divisional Order No. 99
for Coast Protection

In Individual Order No. 16 O.B. West orders:

In order to unify the designations of artillery committed in the zone of O.B. West the following terms will be used:

- | | |
|---|--|
| G.H.Q. Coast Artillery* | - G.H.Q. batteries for attacking sea targets (land targets possible). |
| Divisional Artillery | - Army divisional batteries |
| Position Batteries
(Coast) | - Static batteries manned by army or naval personnel, for attacking sea targets (land targets possible). |
| Land Defence Guns | - Static individual guns, at most platoons, manned by army or naval personnel. |
| Naval Coast Artillery | - Naval batteries for attacking sea targets (land targets sometimes possible). |
| Flak Artillery
Air Force
Navy and
Army | - Anti-aircraft batteries (sea and land targets possible). |

The terms equipment batteries, personnel batteries are concerned with organization and have nothing to do with commitment.

In this connection the Division orders:

The equipment batteries of 302 Arty Regt will retain their former designations "A" and "B", while dropping the term "Equipment Battery".

Divisional Order No. 77 for Coast Protection - para 2b - is cancelled.

For Divisional Headquarters
G.S.O. 1

* "G.H.Q. Coast Artillery" is not a literal translation but indicates the organizational subordination more precisely than would the literal translation "Army Coast Artillery", which might be thought to mean the coastal artillery of one particular Army.

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NOTE:

LAND BASED NAVAL ARTILLERY - COMMAND ARRANGEMENTS

In this connection the following statements are of interest:

In the case of the land-based naval artillery the Navy retained control of fire on water-borne targets. This control was not transferred to the German Army until there was a definite landing. This arrangement gave rise to continuous disagreements between tactical conceptions of the Navy and the Army (Heer), which were evident even in the choice of firing positions. (Zimmermann, Bodo, Lt Gen, 1st Ops Offr O.B. West, U.S. Hist Div, MS # B-308, pp 9 & 10)

The regulations for the subordination of the coast artillery, and the directive for its conduct of fire missions, were disapproved by the Army Commanders-in-Chief in almost all theatres. The Navy, however, cited its combat experiences against naval targets and rejected all compromise. In the face of the very firm stand and the bitter opposition of the Navy, it proved impossible to modify the arrangements. (v. Buttlar, Horst, Maj Gen, OKW/WFST, Chief of Army Operations, U.S. Hist Div, MS # B-672, Part 18)

O.B.WEST

BASIC ORDER NO. 14

25 Aug 42

(Translation)

981CW(D11)

Ref: para 64

25 Aug 42

O.B. West Basic Order

No. 14

(Development of the Channel and Atlantic Coasts)

- 1.) The Fuehrer has ordered that during the winter half-year 1942/43, O.B. West's coastal defence shall be strengthened by permanent fortress-like construction, employing all forces and means available, and adopting the principles followed in the construction of the West Wall, in such a way that no attack from the air, the sea or the land shall appear to have any prospect of success, and that a fortress shall result which cannot be taken either frontally or from the rear.
- 2.) With this aim in view, during the winter half-year 42/43 15,000 fortified installations of permanent fortress-like construction will be constructed within the zone of O.B. West.

These installations have the following objects:

- a) Of protecting the U-boat bases and the harbours which offer a possibility of success to a major enemy landing by a continuous and deep defensive belt at such a distance that destruction of the U-boat pens and capture of the harbours can be prevented with certainty.
 - b) Of protecting the smaller harbours by a defensive belt which is compact, yet leaves enough room for our artillery.
 - c) Of guarding and protecting the heaviest batteries.
 - d) Of fortifying the coasts continuously throughout their entire length, after the pattern of the Upper Rhein front, including the guarding of steep foreshores by flanking installations.
- 3.) The general distribution of the fortified installations will be as follows:
 - a) Mil Comd Netherlands: 1,500 - 2,000
 - b) Fifteenth Army: 5,000 - 5,500
 - c) Seventh Army: 5,000 - 5,500
 - d) First Army: 1,500 - 2,000

- 4.) The construction of the permanent fortifications will be carried out by the Fortress Engineer Administrative Centres and the O.T. Reconnaissance and Orientation are the responsibility of the divisional and lower-level reconnaissance staffs.

- 5.) Reconnaissance and orientation staffs will be appointed immediately by the divisions and the regiments. Their task is to reconnoitre and determine the defence zones, the strongpoint groups and pill-box positions, to orient the fortress engineers, to support them while they work and to see that the work progresses. They must be constantly informed regarding construction to be done, and they must be able to report thereon. They consist of an older, far-seeing, experienced officer as leader, specialists in artillery, anti-tank guns, machine guns, etc, and if possible a representative of the fortress engineers and the O.T. They are responsible to their regimental and divisional commanders. The staffs are to be set up immediately, and the work is to begin at once.

- 6.) The following are to be begun immediately:
 - a) A general reconnaissance. This will serve the purpose mainly of determining the focal points for work and materiel, so that an immediate commencement may be made with these.
 - b) A detailed reconnaissance. This is to determine the area of the defence zones, and their dependence on natural obstacles, etc.
 - c) A reconnaissance of individual points, which will determine [the type and place of] the individual defence works.

The general and the detailed reconnaissances are to be carried out immediately in conjunction. The reconnaissance of individual points is at first to determine one half of the construction works (but within the framework of the entire programme).

- 7.) The work is to be begun and carried out in accordance with the following principles:

In the army zone there are tactical and technical centres of gravity.

Tactical centres of gravity are those which have the greatest operational significance in the army sector.

Technical centres of gravity are those possessing the most favourable conditions for transport of materiel and for labour.

The focal points of labour are to be suited to the tactical and technical centres of gravity.

It is important that the work be begun as soon as possible and under the most favourable conditions. All works pass at once from field to permanent construction. Resumption of work, on the basis of the new data supplied by the reconnaissance and orientation staffs, to take place not later than 15 Sep 42.

8.) Reports are to be submitted as follows:

- a) Immediately by teletype the names of the commanders of each divisional reconnaissance and orientation staff with their ranks and the branches to which they belong (as in para 5).
- b) By 5 Sep 42 the result of the general reconnaissance (focal points for labour and materiel as in para 6a).
- c) By 10 Sep 42 in quadruplicate, the result of the detailed reconnaissance, shown on a map 1 : 80,000 (as in para 2a, 2b and 6b).
- d) By 10 Sep 42 in quadruplicate, shown on a map 1 : 200,000, the continuous fortified front with defended areas, strongpoint groups and installations.
- e) By 15 Sep 42 in quadruplicate, a schematic overall construction plan of the fortified installations allotted to the Mil Comd Netherlands and the Armies (as in para 3), showing the number of installations to the kilometre in the individual defence sectors (coast defence sectors).

9.) It is intended to hold a conference on fortification construction. A relevant order follows.

O.B. West
v. RUNDSTEDT
Field Marshal

Special Distribution

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