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Directorate of History National Defence Headquarters Ottawa, Canada KIA OK2

July 1986

NOTE

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HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

21 May 53

Canadian Participation in the Korean War, Part I: 25 Jun 50 - 31 Mar 52

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REPORT NO. 62 HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

21 May 53

Canadian Participation in the Korean War, Part I: 25 Jun 50 - 31 Mar 52.

1. The object of this Report is to present a general account of Canadian participation in the Korean War, from its beginning on 25 Jun 50 to the end of March 1952. While the Report deals principally with Canada's military contribution, in particular with her contribution of ground troops, the title has been interpreted broadly enough to permit mention of some of the diplomatic activity arising from the conflict, and to justify a brief account of Canada's share in this activity. This approach was adopted -- after consideration of the various dangers inherent in it -for the reason that it did not appear too early to quote certain speeches and documents that authorized action or stated policies which affected the actual fighting.

2. A variety of sources was consulted in the preparation of the sections which deal with this aspect of the subject, ranging from speeches by members of the Governments involved, or their representatives at the United Nations, through official and officiallyinspired accounts, to editorials and articles in Canadian and American newspapers and periodicals. This study led to the conclusion that, of the mass of fact and conjecture available, four items could -and indeed should -- be included in the Report. The first was, naturally, the Resolutions of the Security Council which established the basis in law for action by the United Nations in Korea. The second was the Resolution of the General Assembly which indirectly authorized military operations by U.N. forces north of the 38th parallel. The third was the treatment by the General Assembly of the situation created by Chinese intervention, and the fourth was the question, raised during the second approach of U.N. forces to the 38th parallel and given emphasis by the dismissal of Gen MacArthur, as to whether the approaching stalemate or "stabilization of a military position" should be resolved by expanding the war to include direct action against China, or by process of negotiation.

3. At the same time, it appeared that three features of Canadian policy were established clearly enough -- and had had sufficient influence on the course of events -- to justify their being mentioned. These features were, briefly, that the conflict should be regarded as a police action, under control and authority of the United Nations, that the area affected by it should be limited to the minimum, and that the fighting should be ended by negotiation if at all possible. In the Report, therefore, action in the United Nations, and Canadian policy on the conflict are discussed within the limits outlined above. 4. In those parts of the Report which deal with the Canadian military contribution, the main emphasis falls on Army matters. However operations of the Navy and Air Force are covered, insofar as they directly affected ground operations or reflected a development in Government policy. The account of the Army contribution is divided into two parts, the first concerning the raising and training of the troops, the second dealing with their employment abroad.

5. The greater part of the material con-tained in the first part was derived from the Historical Records of the Branches at A.H.Q., supplemented by reference to the appropriate A.H.Q. files. In this connection, it is probably worth mention that a part of the material on file lacks adequate safeguards for its preservation. Papers have been written on Branch Discussion Files (B.D.Fs.) and on Top Secret files which, being held by the Directorate principally interested in the subject, have become in effect B.D.Fs. The result of this practice has been, in some cases, the disappearance of valuable papers connected with the early history of the Canadian Army Special Force. It has also made research on certain subjects difficult or impossible since the files subjects difficult or impossible, since the files concerned must be examined in the Directorate which holds them. In addition, a number of important decisions were reached during informal conferences of staff officers. These decisions are recorded in the files, but the reasons which prompted them are frequently omitted. As a result, information on the background of certain significant developments in the story of the Special Force can be obtained only by interviewing the staff officers concerned in these informal conferences, and this source is becoming progressively less accessible as the officers are posted away from Army Headquarters. A third reason for information about certain subjects not being on A.H.Q. files is the fact that responsibility for these subjects, such as administration and training of the Special Force in its early days, was delegated to Commands, and action taken is only imperfectly reflected in A.H.Q. files. The record of actions and decisions on the Chief of The General Staff/Cabinet Defence Committee level is reasonably complete to the middle of November 1950. This, fortunately, was the vital period in the history of the Special Force. The reasons for some decisions taken after this period, however, lie in files and records retained in the Offices of the C.G.S., A.G. and Q.M.G. This material will no doubt eventually become available, but in the meantime lack of access to it has led to gaps in this Report. In general, the portions of the Report which deal with the raising and training of the Force have been made as complete as the limitations outlined above have allowed.

6. The second part of the record of the Army contribution -- that dealing with the operations of Canadian troops in Korea -- is incomplete. Several circumstances contributed to this result, the most important being the quality of the War Diaries available. One of the most serious gaps in the present Report -- a complete lack of information on the development of the Commonwealth base in Nerea and of administrative arrangements made with the United States and with other countries of the Commonwealth -- would not have existed had the War Diary of the Canadian Military Mission, Far East been adequate. Further limitation on the completeness of the record was imposed by the lack of information on the operations of higher formations which had Canadian troops under command. Some useful information was gleaned from the daily reports of G.H.Q. in Tokyo, but these did not prove to be completely satisfactory substitutes for War Diaries and Historical Reports of such formations. In additionk accurate and comprehensive information on operations from the enemy point of view is not yet available, the material received to the date of this Report being more in the nature of propaganda productions than accurate records. In sum, the best that can be said of the account of the operations of Canadian troops in Korea is that it may prove useful during the preparation of a more adequate record.

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TOPOGRAPHY OF KOREA*

7. In view of the fact that the geography of Korea is unfamiliar to most westerners, the following general description, which was prepared by the Directorate of Military Intelligence on the outbreak of the war, has been included in the opening section of this Report.

> Korea ... is a long peninsula extending southeastward from Manchuria. In the northeastern corner Korea adjoins the U.S.S.R. for a distance of about 10 miles. Vladivostok is about 80 miles distant from this corner of Korea.

> The northern third of Korea is occupied by a mass of rough mountains separated from Manchuria by the deeply trenched valleys of the Amnok-kang** and Tuman-gang. Southward from these mountains the Taebaek Range, a long barrier of lower mountains, extends to the end of the peninsula keeping close to the east coast.

Mountain and hill spurs branch from the Taebaek Range westward to the coast of the Yellow Sea. The principal lowlands of Korea lie between these mountain spurs. The lowland of the Naktong-kang (river) opens upon the south coast, but all other large lowlands border the west coast. All the long rivers of Korea, except the Tuman-gang in the north, flow westward from the Taebaek Range and wind through the lowlands. The roughness of the mountains and the wetness of the lowlands with their large rivers and irrigated fields are serious hindrances to movement.

The south and west coasts are highly irregular, with alternated beach-fringed lowlands and rocky headlands, and numerous offlying islands, rocks, reefs, and shoals. Broad drying mud flats and sand bars, and a large tidal range, add to the difficulty of approach along the west and south coasts....

In contrast to the west and south coasts, the east coast is fairly regular, with small beachbordered pocket valleys separated from one another and from the interior by steep mountains with swift streams; approaches from the sea are relatively clear....

The most important artery of transportation in Korea is the double-track railroad running from Pusan in the southeast corner of the peninsula to the Manchurian border at Sinuiju - Antung in the northwest corner, and thence to

*Geographical detail mentioned in this section is shown in Map 1.

**"Kang" and "gang" are alternative representations, in our script, of the Korean word for river. Mukden. This railroad links the chief lowlands and the three largest cities of Korea. The railroad has many vulnerable bridges. Several branches connect the main line of the railroad with ports on the west coast.

The rail systems of the west and the east coasts are connected with one another by two cross lines winding through the mountains. The most important of these lines runs southward from Wonsan ... to ... Secul traversing the mountains by way of a natural corridor; the other runs westward from Wonsan to P'yongyang....

Korea does not have an extensive net of allweather roads. The use of automobiles has never been widespread, and the roads have been laid out chiefly from the military viewpoint. The main road arteries form a great X intersecting at Seoul and extending to the four corners of the peninsula, one highway running from Pusan to Sinuiju, and the other from Mokp'o to Onsong ... by way of Wonsan. Some of the few hard-surfaced roads connect major cities with their nearby ports. Most of the motorable roads are made of macadam. Spring thaws, summer rains and floods, and, in the mountains, landslides, often impede traffic on ordinary roads.

> ((H.S.) 112.3M1023 (D 12), "Korean Handbook", Chap 4, paras 1 to 5)

THE INVASION OF SOUTH KOREA (25 to 30 JUN 50) AND THE REACTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS (25 JUN - 7 Jul 50)*

The Korean War derives its importance principally from the fact that, unlike the disturbances in Palestine, Kashmir and Indonesia, it led to intervention by armed forces placed at the disposal of the United Nations to conduct a police action aimed at restoring the peace.** The object of this portion of the Report is to document the steps by which the United Nations

*Geographical detail mentioned in this section is shown in Map 1.

**These words, commonly used by persons in authority when referring to the fighting in Korea, do little to dispel the cloud which covers certain important aspects of this peculiar conflict. To begin with, the phrase "at the disposal of the United Nations" is misleading, since all forces were not, in fact, so placed, Great Britain, as will be seen (para 30 below), placed her naval forces in Japanese waters at the disposal of the <u>United States</u> to operate on behalf of the United Nations. In addition, there is no record available that the United States placed its forces in Korea "at the disposal of the United Nations". This terminology, also, might be taken to imply a greater measure of control over the operations in Korea than was actually exercised by the United Nations. The second phrase - "police action" - suggests more the form which it was hoped United Nations intervention would take in the future than what actually developed on this occasion. Certainly there is little similarity between the status and action of the U.N. forces in Korea and those of a national police force. Finally, the words "aimed at restoring the peace" give little clue (although seeming to do so) to the object of the fighting, for they do not state the basis on which peace was to be restored. It is impossible, however, without a great deal more information than is now available, to select words which convey a more precise description of these important aspects of the operations in Korea. came to intervene in Korea, and to describe briefly the early stages of the conflict, the principal source for this latter effort being a summary prepared by the Directorate of Military Intelligence ("Korean Handbook", 8 Sep 50, Chap I, paras 4 to 12).

9. The North Korean People's Army began the invasion of South Korea at 0400 hrs, 25 Jun 50, (Korean time). Small formations struck all along the 38th parallel to tie down the South Korean units, while the main attack, supported by tanks, was launched due south on Uijongbu and Seoul. A second strong attack was aimed at Seoul from Kaesong. The South Korean troops, caught by surprise and overwhelmed by superior forces, were not able to offer much more than a token resistance to the well-planned invasion.

10. Comparison of the relative strengths of the two armies offered little hope that the South Koreans would be able to prevent a quick victory. The North Kerean People's Army had a strength of six divisions, supported by three brigades of constabulary and a further 56,000 semi-military police (<u>ibid</u>, para 7). The Republic of Korea Army, (the Army of South Korea), while at a strength of eight divisions, lacked the tank and artillery support enjoyed by its enemy. In addition, it was not trained for a full-scale war, such as had now developed.

11. The location of the invasion and the absence of the Russian delegate from the Security Council were two features of the general world situation which had important - even decisive - effects on subsequent developments. The first contained serious possibilities of a general war, since the 38th parallel formed a line of contact between the Russian and United States spheres of influence. In the second lay a less apparent but no less important possibility of restricting the area affected by the conflict, for the Security Council, freed from the shackles of the veto by the absence of the Russian delegate, was in a position to take action to restore the peace. It should be noted that the Russians, who were boycotting the meetings of all organs and agencies of the United Nations in which representatives of Nationalist China were present, challenged the power of the Security Council to take action on the invasion in absence of the Russian delegate. They based their argument on the five affirmative votes required by the Gharter to give legal effect to decisions of the Council on such matters. The Americans argued that abstantion from voting did not constitute a veto, and cited in support of their case the fact that Russia had abstained from voting on several previous occasions without subsequently challenging the validity of the resolutions passed in her absence ("Department of State press release No. 702", 30 Jun 50, in Union Calendar No. 889, House Report No. 2495, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, Background Information on Korea, Report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs (Washington, 1950), pp 49 and 50

12. A statement issued by the Department of State indicates the reaction of President Truman and his advisers to the attack.

1,

...As soon as word of the attack on Korea was received in Washington, it was the view of the President and of all of his advisers that the first responsibility of the Government of the United States was to report the attack to the United Nations.... A meeting of the Security Council was immediately called on Sunday, June 25, at the request of the United States.

> ("Memorandum of July 3, 1950, Prepared by the Department of State on the Authority of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea", in Background Information on Korea, p. 61)

13. At this meeting, the Council passed its first Resolution dealing with the Korean War which, omitting the preamble, ran as follows:

- I. <u>Calls for</u> the immediate cessation of hostilities; and <u>Calls upon</u> the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel;
- II. <u>Requests</u> the United Nations Commission on Korea
 - (a) To communicate its fully considered recommendations on the situation with the least possible delay;
 - (b) To observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces to the thirty-eighth parallel; and
 - (c) To keep the Security Council informed on the execution of this resolution;
- III. <u>Calls upon</u> all Members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities.

(Background Information on Korea, p. 45)

14. This resolution did not commit the United Nations to any more positive action than it had taken in connection with other breaches of international peace. At least one powerful member, however, considered that such action was required. On 27 Jun 50, the President of the United States issued a statement which committed his country to intervention in Korea, whether or not the United Nations decided to take any form of direct action to defeat the invasion.

> In Korea the Government forces, which were armed to prevent border raids and to preserve internal security, were attacked by invading forces from North Korea. The Security Council of the United Nations called upon the invading troops to cease hostilities and to withdraw to the thirty-eighth parallel. This they have not done, but on the contrary have pressed the attack. The Security Council called upon all members of the United Nations to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution. In these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support.

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war. It has defied the orders of the Security Council of the United Nations issued to preserve international peace and security. In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area.

Accordingly I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.

I have also directed that United States forces in the Philippines be strengthened and that military assistance to the Philippine Government be accelerated.

I have similarly directed acceleration in the furnishing of military assistance to the forces of France and the associated States in Indochina and the dispatch of a military mission to provide close working relations with those forces.

I know that all members of the United Nations will consider carefully the consequences of this latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Charter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of force in international affairs would have far-reaching effects. The United States will continue to uphold the rule of law.

I have instructed Ambassador Austin, as the representative of the United States to the Security Council, to report these steps to the Council.

(<u>Ibid</u>, <u>pp</u> 45 and 46)

15. Important issues hung on the reaction to this declaration of the members of the United Nations. The scope of the preventive action which had been ordered was rather broad. It savoured as much of a crusade against Communism as of limited police action to restore the peace. Russia, if she returned to the United Nations, was certain to be in violent opposition. Support of India, as a leader of Far East opinion, was doubtful. Canada, while supporting the broad policy of the statement as designed to prevent extension of the conflict in Korea, sharply dissociated herself from the neutralization of Formosa (para 29 below). The President's reference to a possible "direct threat to the security of the Pacific area and to United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area" might be interpreted as indicating that he was prepared, on the issue of Korea, to fight a war in defence of threatened national interests. Fortunately, the resolution which was passed by the Security Council, a few hours after the President's statement was issued, concentrated exclusively on Korea, in such terms as to command the widest support.

The Security Council,

Having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace,

Having called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, and

Having called upon the authorities of North Korea to withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th parallel, and

Having noted from the report of the United Nations Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the 38th parallel and that urgent military measures are required to restore international peace and security, and

Having noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to secure peace and security,

Recommends that the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area.

(Ibid, p. 48)

1.

16. In consequence of President Truman's order, United States aircraft attacked planes of the North Korean Air Force, which had initially supported the ground operations of their countrymen as well as making bombing attacks on Seoul and the air base at nearby Kimpo. American citizens were evacuated from Seoul under fighter cover, four enemy planes being shot down in the operation. These casualties were soon increased to eighteen, and North Korean air supremacy was ended.

17. This success, however, did not attract much attention in the United Nations, where interest centred on one vital issue -- the command and control of the proposed collective effort in Korea. As will appear later (para 28 below), this question was the subject of almost continuous discussions in New York and elsewhere. However no information on the nature of these discussions has been released officially. In the absence of any authoritative statement on the matter, no attempt can be made to evaluate the arrangement finally made by the Third Security Council Resolution of 7 Jul 50.

> The Security Council, having determined that the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes a breach of the peace, having recommended that members of the United Nations furnish such

assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area,

(1) <u>Welcomes</u> the prompt and vigorous support which governments and peoples of the United Nations have given to its resolutions of 25 and 27 June1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in defending itself against armed attack and thus to restore international peace and security in the area;

(2) <u>Notes</u> that members of the United Nations have transmitted to the United Nations offers of assistance for the Republic of Korea;

(3) <u>Recommends</u> that all members providing military forces and other assistance pursuant to the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make such forces and other assistance available to a unified command under the United States;

(4) <u>Requests</u> the United States to designate the commander of such forces;

(5) <u>Authorizes</u> the unified command at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in the course of the operations against North Korean fordes concurrently with the flags of the various nations participating.

(6) <u>Requests</u> the United States to provide the Security Council with reports, as appropriate on the course of action taken under the unified command.

(Ibid, p. 53)

18. As has been said, only brief and confusing glimpses are yet available of the organization and operation of the command, under the United States, to which national contingents were to be made available. For one thing, the relationship of this command to that which controlled the operations conducted independently by the United States in respect of Formosa is not revealed in material at hand. In addition, the exact arrangement. under which nations, who had placed forces at the disposal of the U.N., participated in the higher direction of the war is not stated in the sources available. A study of the published material which bears, directly or indirectly, on the Unified Command discloses the following facts which, while they do not present any sort of complete picture, are nevertheless included for the use of a future investigator.

(a) The Command made periodic reports on operations to the United Nations. A document containing excerpts from two of these reports is available ((H.S.) 681.013 (7), G.H.Q., U.N. and Far East Comd, Mil Int Sec, G.S., "United Nations Offensive Operations, 15 September - 15 October 1950").

(b) Mr Pearson has referred to conversations initiated by the U.S. Government on the Canadian view about the question of bombing the Chinese air bases in Manchuria (Department of External Affairs, <u>External</u> <u>Affairs</u>, May 1951, p. 152). Mr Churchill, on the other hand, stated in the British House of Commons that the U.N. Command had no obligation to consult the British Government regarding operations <u>within</u> Korea (Royal Institute of International Affairs, <u>Chronology of</u> <u>International Events and Documents</u>, <u>Supplement to The</u> <u>World Today</u>, Vol VIII, No. 13, p. 409).

(c) On 6 Nov 50, Canada expressed misgivings to the State Department about carrying the campaign to the northern border of Korea. (para 113 below), but her representations do not appear to have had much effect.

(d) The General Assembly passed resolutions which were in effect directives to the U.N. Comd. At least one of these, relating to the conduct of operations north of the 38th parallel ("all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea"), was so general as to permit a great latitude of interpretation (para 109 below). Also there is some presumptive evidence indicating that resolutions of the General Assembly were only binding on the U.N. Comd when the U.S. had voted for them. Mr Pearson, referring to the Indian resolution on the repatriation of prisoners of war (passed in the period subsequent to that covered by this Report), said: "this resolution, <u>having been accepted by the United States Government</u> [own italics], now becomes operative in respect of the Unified Command in Korea" (<u>External Affairs</u>, December 1952, p. 414)

(e) At least the Canadian and British contingents had "charters" "which permitted reference of certain orders to higher Canadian or British military authority (paras 104, 181, 231 below).

19. Meanwhile, in Korea, Seoul had fallen on 29 Jun. The North Koreans regrouped after their capture of the city and launched an attack across the Han river, which flows through the southern outskirts. Following the establishment of a bridgehead across the Han, the enemy forces hesitated, perhaps because the unexpected collapse of the southern forces had caused success to outrun their plans, but more probably because of an announcement, on 30 Jun 50, by the President of the United States that he had authorized the use in Korea of certain supporting ground troops of the United States army (<u>Chronology, Supplement to The World To-day</u>, Vol VI, No. 13, p. 439).

RETREAT TO AND DEFENCE OF THE PUSAN PERIMETER (30 JUN - 15 SEP 50)*

20. If, during this period, there was initial uncertainty as to whether the Korean War would be recognized as a matter for police action under the United Nations, there was equal uncertainty as to whether the first practical example of such action would not end in disaster to the U.N. forces involved. Outnumbered by an enemy who was confident of victory, the United Nations forces fought desperately to save their own lives and, to arrest, for as long as possible, the progress of the North Korean advance.

*Geographical detail mentioned in this section is shown in Map 1. The following account of the principal developments in this bitter struggle is based on a summary prepared by the Directorate of Military Intelligence ("Korean Handbook", Chap 1, paras 13 to 25), supplemented by material from reports of the United Nations Command ((H.S.) 681.013 (D8), G.H.Q., U.N. Comd, Mil Int Sec, G.S., "One Year in Korea, A Summary, 25 Jun 50 - 25 Jun 51", pp 2 to 6).

21. Following their pause on the Han river, North Korean forces captured Suwon, fifteen miles south of Seoul, and pressed further into South Korea. On 7 Jul, their advance first encountered U.S. Army troops, units of 24 U.S. Inf Div, whose combat elements had completed an air move to Korea by 5 Jul. Initially, this American intervention had little important effect on the campaign, since the units employed were under strength and inexperienced. However the Republic of Korea Army, by this time fairly well advanced in its programme of re-equipment and reorganization into two corps, was able to offer some assistance, so that the newborn U.N. forces were at least able to impose delay on the enemy. They held positions on the Kum river until the night of 14/15 Jul, and by 18 Jul were bitterly resisting an enemy attack on Taejon.

22. The move on Taejon was part of the North Koreans' main effort against Taegu and Pusan, directed along the axis Taejon - Kumchon - Taegu. 24 U.S. Inf Div, supported by elements of 25 U.S. Inf Div, at first bore the main weight of the enemy's attack. On 18 Jul 50, the total of U.S. divisions in Korea was increased to three, when 1 U.S. Cav Div began landing at Pohang-dong on the east coast 60 miles north of Pusan. Gradually, as the American divisions were brought up to strength and gained experience, they improved their ability to meet the combination of frontal and flanking attacks characteristic of the enemy's tactics, and imposed greater and greater delays on his advance.

23. In face of this increased U.N. strength, two North Korean divisions were directed south and east in a wide outflanking movement which, being unopposed except by air, soon created a threat to Pusan. To meet this threat, troops were quickly withdrawn from the Kumchon - Taegu axis and deployed to the west of Pusan. This reduction in U.N. forces covering Taegu, together with the threat of being outflanked from the south, forced a more rapid withdrawal on Taegu. By the first week of August, U.N. forces had retreated to a defensive perimeter about Pusan, which ran from Chindong-ni, on the south coast, north along the Naktong river to a point immediately above Waegwan and thence east to the coast at Yongdok.

24. In this perimeter, U.S. troops were joined by 2 U.S. Inf Div and 1st Provisional Marine Brigade. The reinforcement was needed. On the south coast, the enemy pushed to within eight miles of Masan before being driven back. Savage attacks across the Naktong south-west of Taegu and in the area of Waegwan were repulsed. On the east coast, the enemy penetrated south to Pohang-dong along the mountains inland from the sea. These efforts, however, bled the North Korean army white^{*}, and by 15 Sep the forces opposed along the perimeter appeared to be stalemated.

25. Meanwhile, changes in the command structure had taken place. On 12 Jul, Eighth United States Army in Korea (EUSAK) took over command of U.N. ground forces in Korea from United States Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) (<u>Chronology: Supplement to the World To-day</u>, vol VI, no. 14, p. 467) and on 24 Jul 50, the United Nations Command was formed, with General of the Army Douglas MacArthur in command ("One Year in Korea", pp 3 and 4).

POLICY OF THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT

26. Canadian policy on the Korean conflict was characterized by an absolute insistence that the fighting be limited as sharply as possible, and regarded as a police action under authority of the United Nations, not as a war. In support of this policy, the Government was prepared to campaign vigorously within the United Nations, and to apply pressure by way of withholding a Canadian contribution until its wishes had been substantially met. Although it cannot be claimed that Canada was solely responsible for the action in Korea taking the form it did, it can at least be stated that the outcome conformed very closely to the main line of Canadian policy.

27. The first official announcement of Canadian policy on the conflict was made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr L.B. Pearson, to the House of Commons on 26 Jun 50, when, in reply to a question, he asserted that the Korean War had not made the Government more favourably disposed to the setting-up of a Pacific defence council (House of Commons Debates, 26 Jun 50, p. 4117). Later, when the Prime Minister, Mr L.S. St Laurent revealed the Government's attitude to the Korean conflict, it became plain that Canadian policy logically excluded participation in a Pacific defence pact, at least as far as conduct of the operations in Korea was concerned. In his statement, the Prime Minister made a careful distinction between police action and war against any state, and indicated that the situation in Korea would be best met by police action under the United Nations.

> ... Our responsibility in this matter arises entirely from our membership in the United Nations and from our support of the resolution of the security council passed on Tuesday last....

*This is the view of the sources quoted, but the possibility must not be overlooked that the North Koreans replaced some proportion of their good troops, before the Inchon landing, with conscripts raised locally, and withdrew the good troops well north. Available reports on the interrogation of prisoners taken by the U.N. forces after the Inchon landing indicate that a . proportion of these were South Koreans who had been forced into the N.K.P.A. in August or shortly before. Also, the surprising resurgence of the N.K.P.A. in December of 1950 indicates that some troops escaped the Inchon trap or had been withdrawn before it was sprung. Any participation by Canada in carrying out the foregoing resolution - and I wish to emphasize this strongly - would not be participation in war against any state. It would be our part in collective police action under the control and authority of the United Nations for the purpose of restoring peace to an area where an aggression had occurred... It is only in such circumstances that this country would be involved in action of this kind.

... I would add, however, that if we are informed that a Canadian contribution to aid United Nations operations, under a United Nations commander, would be important to achieve the ends of peace...the government...would immediately consider making such a contribution.

(Ibid, 30 Jun 50, p. 4459)

28. On 31 Aug 50, the Secretary of State for External Affairs told the House of Commons about Canada's part in the discussions preceding the resolution which established the Unified Command.

> ...three days after the security council resolution [of 27 Jun-50], it was announced in this place that three Canadian destroyers would move at once into western Pacific waters where...they might be of assistance to the United Nations in Korea.

While they were moving toward the scene of United Nations operations, almost continuous discussions were held in New York and elsewhere as to the way in which the United Nations forces should be organized. The representatives of Canada participated actively in these discussions with a view to making sure that this was to be a genuine United Nations operation under a unified command which would receive authority from the United Nations. We considered this to be no academic matter, but to be a very important principle and one which should be established in a way which would be not only satisfactory for the present but a valuable precedent for the future. This was done when the security council passed an additional resolution on July 7 establishing a unified command and requesting the United States to designate a commander of such United Nations forces as might be made available. We welcomed this resolution because it established the United Nations character of the operations in Korea without limiting unduly the military authority which any commander must have if he is to be successful.

After that resolution was passed, the three Canadian destroyers...were made available on July 12 to the United Nations unified command...

(Ibid, 31 Aug 50, p. 93)

29. Later in the same speech, Mr Pearson explained the strong views held by the Government on the necessity of limiting the area affected by the conflict.

> I would like to emphasize also that it is not the purpose of this government to support any course of policy which will extend the scope of the present conflict in Korea....

This attitude... is the only sensible one; first, because we should do everything we can to minimize the risk of a world-wide war; secondly, because we think that it is vitally important that the high degree of unanimity which has been obtained in the United Nations in condemning the aggression against Korea should be preserved, and third, because we should maintain close co-operation between the free countries of Asia and the western world We have ... been disturbed by statements that seem in our minds to confuse the defence of Korea, which has been assumed by the United Nations, with the defence of Formosa, which has not So far as this government is concerned, we are concerned solely with carrying out our United Nations obligations in Korea or elsewhere. These obligations do not, as I understand them, ...include anything that can be interpreted as the restoration of the nationalist Chinese government to the mainland of China, or an intervention in Formosa.

(Ibid, 31 Aug 50, pp 95 and 96)

30. The question of Canadian aid in Korea was first raised in the form of a request by a senior official of the Secretariat of the United Nations that Canada provide two military observers for service with the United Nations Commission in Korea. Canada agreed to do this (<u>Ibid</u>, 29 Jun 50, p. 4384) and selected Lt-Col F.E. White D.S.O. and W/C H. Malkin D.F.C., A.F.C. (<u>The</u> <u>Ottawa Citizen</u>, 1 Jul 50, p. 1). Her first contribution of armed forces was the placing of three destroyers at the disposal of the Unified Command, as described by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the passage quoted above (para 28). It is worth noting that the timing of this action, and the organization of the material in the Secretary's remarks on the subject clearly suggest that Canada withheld her contribution until she was sure that a genuine United Nations operation was in prospect. In this respect, her practice differed from that of some other Commonwealth countries. On 28 Jun the British Government announced that it had decided to place its naval forces in Japanese waters at the disposal of the U.S. to operate on behalf of the Security Council (<u>Chronology: Supplement to The World Today</u>, Vol VI, No. 13, p. 418). Australia had sent a squadron of transport aircraft to Korea, and placed the R.A.A.F. Mustang fighter squadron in Japan, as well as two naval vessels then in Japanese waters, at the disposal of the United Nations by 30 Jun, (<u>ibid</u>, p. 407)

31. On 14 Jul Mr Trygvie Lie, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, requested the Canadian government to examine its capacity to provide an increased volume of combat forces, particularly ground forces, for service in Korea. Announcing the result of

amount a month of a

the Cabinet's consideration of this request, the Prime Minister said:

...Having in mind the other obligations for the employment of Canadian ground forces, the Cabinet has reached the conclusion that the despatch, at this stage, of existing first line elements of the Canadian Army to the Korean theatre would not be warranted. However, with a view to strengthening the Canadian Army to meet future requirements the Cabinet has authorized recruiting above present ceilings and the acceleration of other aspects of the Army programme. Should a decision be taken by the Security Council of the United Nations to recruit an international force for service, under the U.N. Commander, in Korea, the Canadian Government will give immediate consideration to Canadian participation in such an undertaking....

It has been indicated to the Government that transport by air is an immediate need. The Government has, therefore, decided to provide at once a long range RCAF transport squadron for service in the Pacific airlift....

(External Affairs, August 1950, pp 293 and 295)

32. As a result of this decision, No. 426 (Transport) Squadron R.C.A.F. was ordered to operate with the U.S. Military Air Transport Service. On 25 Jul the squadron moved from Dorval to McChord Air Force Base near Tacoma in Washington, and within 36 hours had despatched planes to Tokyo. ((H.S.) 180.013 (D1), "RCAF in Korean War, 19 Jul 50 to 23 Jun 51", 8 Nov 51)

33. Eighteen days passed before any announcement was made further to the Prime Minister's statement of 19 Jul. During this period, a storm of editorial protest developed against the government's alleged inactivity ((H.S.) 000.5009 (D3), "Korean War, Editorials", August 1950), while in Korea the United Nations forces appeared to move daily nearer to complete defeat. Finally, on 7 Aug, the Prime Minister announced the decision to recruit the Canadian Army Special Force.

>Since our wartime forces were demobilized we have not attempted to maintain, in the Canadian Army, a fully trained expeditionary force available for immediate action outside Canada.

We wanted to get the best value we could for the Canadian taxpayer's defence dollars; and for the Army, the first requirements were for our immediate territorial defence and for a basic training establishment. We have

*This sentence appears to suggest that there was a second reason, other than that given in the first sentence, for Canada's decision not to send ground troops to Korea. If this be so, the second reason is not developed in any subsequent official statement made within the period covered by this Report. developed an air-borne brigade group highly trained for operations in the North and designed to share in the immediate protection of this continent. We have also maintained an establishment for the rapid expansion of the Canadian Army in the event of a general war.

But, at this time, we have no expeditionary force in being. Moreover, before the aggression in Korea, no definite plans existed for the creation of a United Nations force...,

... The Government has therefore authorized the recruitment of an additional army brigade which is beginning on Wednesday. This brigade will be known as the Canadian Army Special Force and it will be specially trained and equipped to be available for use in carrying out Canada's obligations under the United Nations charter or the North Atlantic Pact. Naturally, this brigade will, subject to the approval of Parliament, be available for service in Korea as part of United Nations forces, if it can be most effectively used in that way when it is ready for service. The way in which it could be used in the United Nations force is being discussed with the unified command.

For this new brigade the army wants young men, physically fit, mentally alert, single or married, particularly just as many veterans of the Second World War as possible. The brigade will, of course, include infantry, artillery and other elements. The infantry units will be organized as second bqttalions of the Royal Canadian Regiment, of the Princess Patricia's and the Royal 22nd. The association of the new brigade with these historic regiments will have numerous advantages...

((H.S.) 000.4013 (D3), "Text of Radio Address by Prime Minister", 7 Aug 50 in <u>Montreal</u> <u>Gazette</u>, 8 Aug 50)

THE CANADIAN ARMY SPECIAL FORCE IN CANADA

(7 AUG TO 22 NOV 50)

34. The raising of the Special Force was an historic event on two counts. In the first place, the Force was formed "as a part of the Canadian Army Active Force" (P.C. 3860, 7 Aug 50). Since the Active Force is the Army component of the Regular Forces of Canada (Q.R.(Army) 2.02), units of the Special Force were regular units. Thus the raising of the Special Force represented an increase in Canada's regular army units without parallel in her peacetime history.* In the second place,

*It is necessary, in appreciating the importance of this development, to distinguish between wartime expansion, which has usually taken the form of a "field force" whose life is limited to the duration of the war or emergency, and expansion of the regular forces which, in common custom, is taken to represent a more permanent increase. the force was raised as an <u>expeditionary force</u>, to be sent wherever North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) or United Nations commitments required it to be sent. While Canada had raised large expeditionary forces for service overseas in wartime, she had never in her history maintained a formation abroad in peacetime. A special importance attaches to the raising of the Special Force, as an unprecedented expansion of Canadian regular ground forces, and the story is consequently presented in some detail in this portion of the Report.

Formation

35. In his address of 7 Aug 50 the Prime Minister explained at some length why it was that Canadian defence planning had not provided for an expeditionary force in being. Later, the Secretary of State for External Affairs gave a further statement on the subject.

> Canadian defence policy, therefore, until June of this year, had been based on the concept of providing a small, highly-skilled regular army, charged with responsibility of doing its immediate share of North American defence, especially in the Arctic, and designed to be capable of rapid expansion in the event of a general war which might require Canada to be defended outside of Canada. The furnishing to the United Nations on short notice of expeditionary forces capable of quick deployment in distant areas...had not... entered into our planning....

> > (House of Commons Debates, 31 Aug 50, p. 94)

36. Initially, however, it was considered that the active Force might have to become an expeditionary force, since it was the only source available for any contribution of ground troops which might be made by Canada to the United Nations Command ("C.G.S. Daily Diary - Extracts Concerning the Canadian Army Special Force", p.1 (C.G.S. Historical Record, 11 Jul to 18 Nov 50 held by E.O. Hist)). Accordingly the C.G.S., Lt-Gen C. Foulkes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., requested the Minister to obtain Cabinet approval to raising the ceiling of the Active Force for recruiting purposes (<u>ibid</u>), and this approval was granted (para 33 above).

37. While this submission was working its way up to the Cabinet, a change in thinking took place. On 17 Jul, at a special meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the C.G.S. suggested recruiting a special Korean force. He stated that he anticipated no manpower problem, and that a force specially enlisted for service in Korea could be provided almost as quickly as one based on the Active Force. A further advantage of this proposal was that it would leave the Mobile Striking Force intact for the defence of Canada (<u>ibid</u>, p. 2). The C.G.S. subsequently discussed his proposal with the Minister, Mr Brooke Claxton, and gained the impression that any Canadian contribution would be restricted to a battalion group (<u>ibid</u>, p.3).

38. By 1 Aug the idea of Canada's contribution taking the form of a special force appears to have been accepted, for General Foulkes was submitting detailed proposals about such a force. The detail submitted involved a force of approximately brigade strength, organized to operate within a Commonwealth division, and specially recruited by voluntary enlistment. It was not to contain existing Active or Reserve Force units, but might contain personnel from both these components of the Canadian Army (<u>ibid</u>, p. 4, and Appx "C", C.G.S. to M.N.D., 1 Aug 50).

39. Available records do not show the exact time when it was decided to recruit a force for service abroad, although the decision was probably taken during the eighteen days which intervened between the Prime Minister's announcements of 19 Jul and 7 Aug. What is more important, from the point of view of this narrative, is that decisions about details, on which a recruiting campaign could be based, were not reached until 7 Aug, in a meeting between the Minister, the Adjutant-General, Maj-Gen W.H.S. Macklin, C.B.E., with a Staff Officer, and the Judge Advocate General, Brigadier W.J. Lawson. These decisions were approved by the Cabinet on the same day, and the Army had, for the first time, a detailed direction as to what was to be done. ("Daily Journal of Events, D Org", 7 Aug 50 (A.G. Branch Historical Record, August 1950 - held by E.O. Hist))

Legal authority for the raising of the 40. Force and its designation as the Canadian Army Special Force, as well as for the period of engagement of 18 months, was provided by P.C. 3860, issued on 7 Aug 50 and effective the same day. Eighteen months had been set as the term of service since "the Army would not wish to retain the 'soldier of fortune' type of personnel on a long term basis," ("Extracts from C.G.S. Daily Diary", p. 4), the intention being to disband the Force "after the crisis" ("A.G. Hist Record", August 1950, Appx "A-13", Tel A.G. 1619, A.G. to Comds and Areas, undated). Since the Order in Council established the Special Force "as a part of the Canadian Army Active Force", units of the Force had the status of units of the regular ground forces, a status which, in custom, usually denotes some measure of permanence in the existence of the units concerned. The A.Gs statement, which no doubt reflected the thought of the Minister of National Defence and of his colleagues in the Cabinet, would seem to indicate that the Government regarded the expansion in the number of regular units as temporary only, to be ended when need for the extra troops had passed. In view of this attitude, it is not easy to see why the Government placed the Special Force in the Active Force, instead of in an "active service force" whose life would have been generally understood to be limited. One immediate practical reason for the Government's action, of course, is the fact that the terms of the National Defence Act (N.D.A.) then in effect authorized the formation of "an active service force" only in an emergency, and the existence of a state of emergency had not been declared nor, apparently, was such a declaration planned. This, however, was not an absolute bar to action, since it would have been quite possible to have called an emergency session of the House of Commons and passed an amendment to the Act broadening the conditions on which "an active service force" could be raised. Such an amendment was in fact, passed in September, in The Canadian Forces Act of 1950. In the absence of any positive information, one can only speculate that there may have been some reason for giving an outward semblance of permanence to an expansion which, at the time, was taken to be temporary. Alternatively, there may have been such urgent reasons for haste in forming the Special Force that the delay

involved in amending the N.D.A. could not be accepted; or such amendment might not, at that time, have been considered politically feasible.

41. Thus, in haste and confusion, was the Special Force born, the Cinderella of the Active Force family. As will become apparent, however, those who regarded the Force as a mere temporary expedient required to discharge a transitory obligation to send troops abroad, seriously misjudged the nature and power of the influences at work on Canada and on her armed forces. A continuing and increasing requirement for troops abroad, to which no end could be foreseen, forced important changes in the role of the Regular Forces of Canada, and on the status of the Special Force. In slightly less than two years, units of the Special Force had been elevated to a position of equality with those of the active Force consistent with the former's existing legal position, and had replaced the latter at their home stations in Canada. Meanwhile the Active Force units, designated as elements of a "special force", had taken over positions in Korea.

Recruiting

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42. Recruiting for the Special Force began on Wednesday 9 Aug 50. (para 33 above). One day only intervened between the Prime Minister's announcement and the start of the campaign. The records available do not show any reason for this haste, but they do show some important results, most of which might have been avoided had the announcement and recruiting been deferred until the army had had a chance to prepare for what proved to be a difficult task. It is no exaggeration to say that the recruiting of the Special Force, because of the way in which it was done, affected the character of the Force more than any other single influence which bore on it. For this reason, the record given here of the recruiting phase has been made as detailed as available sources permit.

43. In the first place, Commands and Areas had had little advance warning to enable them to acquire adequate buildings for the reception, messing and accommodation of recruits, or to arrange the necessary supplementing of medical, personnel selection and clerical staffs of the personnel depots. The adjutant-General had authorized depot staffs to be augmented "themoment it becomes apparent that depots are being overworked" (ibid: Appx "A 2", A.G. to M.N.D., 2 Aug 50, para 5), but successful operation of this system depended on early warning. Grasp of this fact may have influenced the Staff Officers who, on 4 Aug, prepared a warning order for two of the Commands. This order was passed by the A.G. to the C.G.S., but it was "considered inadvisable to implement such a move therefore Telegram A.G. 1606 d/4 Aug 50 was destroyed" (ibid: "Daily Journal of Events: Office of the A.G.", 4 Aug 50). The circumstances surrounding the destruction of this wire would appear to establish definitely that Commands had not been warned prior to, and including, 4 Aug. Next day, envelopes containing mobilization instructions, enlistment policy and documentation instructions were sent to Commands, to be opened on receipt of the code word "LOTUS" (ibid, "Daily Journal of Events, D Org", 6 Aug 50). Receipts for the documents are on H.Q.S.2730-151/25, vol 2. On 7 Aug, copies of the radio address which the Prime Minister was to deliver that evening were sent to Commands, and "LOTUS" was notified (<u>ibid</u>, 7 Aug 50).

44. Following receipt of this warning order, and while they were in the midst of hurried preparations, local staffs had their difficulties further increased by receipt of important amendments and additions to the information they had received in the LOTUS envelopes. It is not necessary to tabulate here the various letters and signal messages which spread some conception of the regulations affecting the recruiting through Commands and Areas, since they are readily available in the Historical Record of the Adjutant-General's Branch (<u>ibid</u>: "Daily Journals of Events for Offices of A.G., D. Org, D. Adm, D. Pay", 5 to 31 Aug 50; also Appx "A 13", "C" and "F"). One of the more spectacular examples of delayed transmission of information is to be found in the fact that the French translation of the supplementary declaration on attestation, without which applicants could not be legally enlisted, was sent out at 2010 hrs, 12 Aug 50 (<u>ibid</u>: Appx "C", Tel Org 331, D. Org to Comds, Areas, Pers Depots, 12 2010 Aug 50). The Minister of National Defence had the opportunity of observing some results of this method of promulgating orders during the second day of recruiting in Toronto, when "talking to a man carrying his blankets I found that he was leaving for home* because he was not going to receive a marriage allowance although he Wes twenty-two, which under the regular pay and allowance regulations would prevent his receiving marriage allowance. There was another case with him. I told Colonel Vipond that he should have communicated with Army Headquarters, Ottawa." (H.Q.S. 2730-151/25, vol 3: M.N.D. to C.G.S. and A.G., 11 Aug 50). At 2010 hrs, 11 Aug 50, the A.G. sent the following message respecting payment of marriage allowance:

> THE REGULATION WHICH FORBIDS PAYMENT OF MARRIED ALLOWANCE TO SOLDIERS UNDER TWENTY-THREE IS BEING AMENDED IN RESPECT OF MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL FORCE WHO WILL BE ELIGIBLE FOR MARRIED ALLOWANCE STOP ENSURE ALL WHO ARE ADVISING APPLICANTS KNOW THIS

> > ("A.G. Hist Record", August 1950: Appx "A 13", Tel A.G. 1633, A.G. to Comds etc, 11 2010 Aug 50)

45. The principal regulations affecting officers and men of the Special Force, as far as they had been determined by the end of August, were summarized for the Minister by the Adjutant-General as follows:

Legal Position: By authority of this P.C. [3860] the Canadian army Special Force is established as part of the Canadian army Active Force and therefore personnel enrolled therein are members of the Active Force to all intents and purposes subject to the limitation as to term of service contained in the P.C. which provides:

^{*}It would be interesting to know how this man came to be issued with blankets before being enlisted or, if he had been enlisted, how he thought it possible to "go home".

(a) With respect to men enrolled for service term of service shall be for 18 months or for such further period as may be required in consequence of any action undertaken by Canada pursuant to an international agreement or where the term of service expires during an emergency or within one year of the expiration thereof.

(b) With respect to officers appointed for service - appointment is under clear understanding that it is for same period as is described with respect to men enrolled for service.

Administrative Position: By reason of limitations placed on term of service and by reason of special natures of the duties to be performed by the Special Force, it is intended that certain benefits are to accrue to personnel thereof and certain limitations have been or will be placed on the application of regulations pertaining to the Active Force generally. These, include, inter alia:

> (a) Application to personnel enrolled in the Special Force of benefits under the Veterans Charter as extended by Parliament, including Pension Act.*

(b) Enlistment standards have been lowered with respect to men enrolling in Special Force.

- (i) Age requirement raised to 35 except in case of tradesmen when age may be up to 45.
- (ii) "M" Test requirement reduced to 90 except in case of tradesmen when score must be 115.
- (iii) Restriction on enrolment of married men is removed.

(c) With respect to Pay and Allowances certain special regulations are to apply:

- No deduction of contributions under the Military Pension Act.
- (ii) Age restriction with respect placing on married roll and consequent payment of Marriage Allowance is suspended. It will be noted that Special Force personnel are also entitled to separated family allowance on same basis as any member of the Active Force.
- (iii) Compulsory assignment of pay is required to assure adequate maintenance

*These benefits were not completely defined until much later, in P.C. 5412 of 8 Nov 50. .

of dependents. The amount of this assignment is fixed at total of allowances (Marriage or Separated Family) plus up to a maximum of 15 days pay.*

- (d) Personnel of Special Force are not allowed to move dependents at government expense. Married quarters are not provided for them nor is it intended to pay for the education of their children.
- (e) Special leave regulations will be required for them by reason of the special nature of their service.
- (f) Outfit allowance will not be payable to officers and warrant officers Class I as it is intended that they will receive free issue of clothing and equipment from Q.M. Stores.

("A.G. Hist Record", August 1950, Appx "A 8", A.G. to M.N.D., 30 Aug 50.)

46. During the first days of the recruiting campaign, great numbers of applicants for enlistment flocked to the personnel depots. 1650 were interviewed at the Ottawa depot during August (<u>ibid</u>, para 12(e)). 697 men reported to the depot in Toronto on 9 Aug 50, 432 the next day. The situation in Montreal was similar (<u>ibid</u>, September 1950: Appx "A-6", "Army Enlistment, August 1950. Report by the Op Research Gp, D.R.B.", para 16). The depots, faced with this flood of volunteers and handicapped by the circumstances outlined in the immediately preceding paragraphs, proved incapable of enlisting applicants fast enough. On 11 Aug the Minister of National Defence, who had visited the personnel depot in Toronto on the previous day, made several suggestions to the C.G.S. and the A.G. about means of accelerating the process of recruiting (H.Q.S. 2730 -151/25, vol 3, M.N.D. to C.G.S. and A.G., 11 Aug 50). On 12 Aug 50, the A.G. issued the following order:

PARA TWO

I WISH IT TO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT APPLICANTS ARE TO BE PROCESSED AND ATTESTED IN ONE DAY OR LESS AND NOT IN THREE OR FOUR DAYS AS SEEMS TO BE THE CASE NOW STOP COMMANDS AND AREAS ARE TO PUT THIS RECRUITING INTO TOP PRIORITY AND DEVOTE THE RESOURCES TO IT REQUIRED TO GET MEN ATTESTED AS THEY APPLY STOP...

PARA FOUR

I REPEAT THAT WHAT IS VANTED IS SIGNATURES ON THE ATTESTATION FORM STOP THE REFINEMENTS OF DOCUMENTATION CAN WAIT AND IF NECESSARY COMMANDS CAN ORGANIZE DOCUMENTATION TEAMS AND CLEAN UP THE JOB IN THE CAMPS

> ("A.G. Hist Record", August 1950: Appx "A 13", Tel A.G. 1635, A.G. to Comds, 12 1610 Aug 50)

*The Minister was not empowered to order compulsory assignments until 15 Aug 50 (P.C. 3972, 15 Aug 50). In obediance to a detailed order which had preceded this message (ibid: Appx "C", Tel Org 310, D. Org to Comds etc, 11 1845 Aug 50), documentation and interviews by personnel selection officers were reduced drastically in length, and the recruits poured through the depots.

47. On 18 Aug the C.G.S. reported to the Cabinet that the Special Force was virtually recruited to strength. He recommended that enlistment continue until sufficient reinforcements for twelve months had been recruited. The Cabinet accepted his recommendation and authorized the recruiting of 9979 all ranks for the Force ("Extracts from C.G.S. Daily Diary", p. 6). The personnel depots were accordingly advised not to stop recruiting in any category ("A.G. Hist Record", August 1950: Appx "A 13", Tel A.G. 1675, A.G. to Comds etc, 19 Aug 50) and orders were issued providing for the concentration of surplus men in Petawawa, where they were to be held in special companies of the reinforcement group (<u>ibid</u>, Appx "C", Tel Org 455, D. Org to Comds etc, 19 Aug 50).

48. Then, on 22 Aug, came the railway strike. Commands and Areas were made responsible for the administration of soldiers enlisted or stranded within their boundaries. Quebec Command was ordered to arrange road transport for recruits destined for Petawawa (<u>ibid</u>: Appx "C", Tel Org 433, D.Org to Comds etc, 19 Aug 50). Eastern Command planned to provide air transport to Uplands Airport, from which point soldiers could travel to Petawawa by bus (<u>ibid</u>, "Daily Journal of Events: D. Org", 22 Aug 50). Under the combined effects of the rail strike and the plan for disposition of surplus personnel, the concentration in Petawawa soon assumed formidable proportions.*

49. The peak of the flood passed rather quickly. On 23 Aug recruiting was limited to quotas, (<u>ibid</u>, Tel A.G. 1647, A.G. to Comds etc, 23 Aug 50) although the number still at depots or in transit maintained the flow to units for some time after recruiting was limited**. On 25 Aug 50 it was judged that the volume of recruiting had fallen off to the point where depots might be permitted to remain closed on Sunday (<u>ibid</u>: Appx "C", Tel Org 514, D. Org to Comds etc, 25 Aug 50).

50. There is no precise quantitative data on which to base a description of the situation which existed when the first rush of recruiting had passed, but the following general description can be justified. Approximately 8000 soldiers had enlisted (<u>ibid</u>: Appx "E 16", "Strength of C.A.S.F. Units Reported by Wire", 26 Aug 50). These recruits were at depots, in transit or gathered in what amounted to collecting points in

*There is no record of its exact strength, but a member of the staff estimated that there were at least 4500 men in this group at one time (H.Q.S. 1454 - 151/25, "Hist Records and Diaries: 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp", vol 3: "Personal Recollections of Petawawa, Maj J.W.P. Bryan", 25 Aug 52.)

**Cf "Strength of C.A.S.F. Units Reported by Wire", a daily report by the Director of Army Personnel on enlistment (<u>Ibid</u>, August 1950: Appx "E 16" and September 1950, Appx "D-1") Chilliwack, Shilo, Calgary, Camp Borden, Barriefield, Petawawa and Valcartier, the largest group being in Petawawa (para 47 above and para 65 below). Medical examination of these soldiers had been hasty, and men of low category had been enlisted, as the Department of Veterans Affairs discovered when it began to examine its files. (ibid, September 1950: Appx "A-3", A.G. to M.N.D., 22 Sep 50). Other recruits had been lost altogether, since they had been posted from the personnel depots to units which had not yet been formed (paras 52 to 57 below) or to newly-formed units which, lacking the necessary. administrative staff, further attached them to units of the Active Force (ibid, September 1950, para 5(i)). Documentation was incomplete, (para 46 above) and in some cases erroneous. In Quebec Command, for example, it was discovered that 1400 recruits had been "taken into the Army" without having been attested (ibid, September 1950, para 4 (a)).

51. On 28 Aug 50, orders were issued for a sorting of the Force. Medical categories were to be checked, documentation completed and allocation to units confirmed or changed. 16 Sep was set as deadline for completion of this task (<u>ibid</u>, August 1950: Appx "C" Tel Org 530, D. Org to Comds etc, 28 Aug 50), but it was, in fact, only nearly completed by the third week of October (H.Q.S. 2730 - 151/25, vol 3, Tel Org 818, D Org to Comds etc, 22 Oct 50), and orders were issued as late as 15 Nov 50 on the necessity of expediting discharge of medically unfits (D.H.S. 9-24-1, "25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp (C.A.S.F.)-General (Miscellaneous Material)", vol 1, Tel A.G. 1702, A.G. to Comds etc, 15 Nov 50. By the end of March 1951, when the Force was sorted out and on the eve of sailing for Korea, 2099 had left the army, through discharge, desertion or death. It should be noted that, since total enlistments at this time stood at 10,208 ("A.G. Hist Record", March 1959: Appx "D-2", "Strs as of 1700 hrs, 31 Mar 51"), the Force had roughly maintained itself at the effective strength of 8000 (para 50 above) which it reached during the first three weeks of recruiting.

Order of Battle

52. The development of the Order of Battle of the Special Force went forward with the recruiting. On 8 Aug 50, in a telecommunication conference with G.O.Cs. which had been substituted for a conference in Ottawa ("A.G. Hist Record", August 1950: "Daily Journal of Events: Office of the A.G.", 5 and 7 Aug 50), the C.G.S. named the types of units which were proposed for inclusion in the Force. These were a headquarters, a defence platoon, three infantry battalions, a field regiment, a field ambulance, an infantry workshop plus light aid detachments and a transport company. In addition, an anti-tank battery, a field squadron of engineers and a signal section were to be raised from the Active Force, although recruiting of trained tradesmen for these units was authorized ("Extracts from C.G.S. Daily Diary", p. 5 and Appx "F"). In a submission to the Minister dated 11 Aug 50, General Foulkes requested authority to form these units plus a reinforcement group and an administrative unit, and the Minister approved the submission (H.Q.S. 2001-151/25, "Org and Adm, 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp", vol 1: C.G.S. to M.N.D., 11 Aug 50, T.D. 2). 53. Subsequently, the decision to include Active Force units in the Force was reversed.* In a submission to the Minister dated 14 Aug 50, the C.G.S. requested authority to form an armoured squadron, an independent field squadron and a signal troop, in addition to certain miscellaneous units. The Minister approved on 17 Aug (<u>ibid</u>: C.G.S. to M.N.D., 14 Aug 50, T.D. 4). A sidelight on the time allowed those concerned in the operation to prepare for this change of policy is contained in the record that, on 11 Aug, a verbal message from the Director of Army Personnel was the first notification received by the Director of Signals that R.C. Sigs recruiting would commence. On 14 Aug the first recruits arrived at the Royal Canadian School of Signals ("G.S. Branch: Historical Record: C.A.S.F.", August 1950 (held by E.O. Hist): Appx "A-11", "D Sigs Hist Record, 25 Jun to 18 Aug 50.")

54. On 12 Sep the C.G.S. proposed the formation of an ordnance company, a public relations unit and an historical detachment. The Minister, however, objected to the formation of the public relations unit and the historical detachment as separate units, suggesting that they be attached to the brigade staff (H.Q.S. 2001 - 151/25, vol 1: C.G.S. to M.N.D., 12 Sep 50, M.N.D. to C.G.S., 14 Sep 50, T.D. 8). On 19 Sep, an amended submission proposed formation of the ordnance company and the public relations unit, this latter on the grounds that the unit would have to operate independently. It was agreed that the historical section could be attached as an increment to the brigade staff. The Minister still objected, considering that the overhead was apt to be too high, but finally signed the draft General Order on 29 Sep (<u>ibid</u>: C.G.S. to M.N.D., 19 Sep 50, B.F. by M.N.D., undated, T.D. 8).

55. On the same day, he signed two other draft General Orders, authorizing formation of additional miscellaneous units for movement control, postal services, ordnance liaison, repair and recovery. In addition, the Orders authorized formation of the medical units necessary to form an advanced surgical unit, since the U.S. Army had indicated that it could not provide Canadians with facilities for surgery in forward areas (<u>ibid</u>: C.G.S. to M.N.D., 25 Sep 50, T.D. 11 and 12).

56. Submissions on and prior to 19 Sep had requested authority to form units in the part of the Active Force designated as the Canadian Army Special Force. The draft General Order which accompanied the submission, however, authorized embodiment in the Canadian Army Active Force. As a result of this usage in the General Orders, units formed were Active Force units, not embodied in a "special force" within the terms of paragraph 7 of The Canadian Forces Act of 1950. These terms require designation of units forming a "special force", in order that their members may qualify for benefits under the Veteran's Charter. To correct this condition, a submission was prepared for ministerial authority to embody these units in a "special force". This submission was approved by the Minister on 12 Oct 50, (ibid: D. Org to A.G., A.G. to M.N.D., 30 Sep 50, T.D. 13) approval being reflected in publication of a new Canadian Army Order which cancelled

*No reason for this change is apparent in the sources available.

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57. By 20 Oct, formation of nearly all of the major units of the Canadian Army Special Force had been authorized. A few other units were formed later, it is true, to meet special conditions of service in Korea and Japan (para 102 below) or to take care of reinforcements (paras 83 to 86 below). However all major units in the group formed to take care of reinforcements were left in Canada (para 102 below). It is therefore correct to say that the Special Force units which sailed as part of 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp had nearly all been authorized by 20 Oct, and that the Order of Battle of the Special Force as of that date, which is attached as Appendix "A", is substantially the Order of Battle of 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp.*

Command of the Force and Selection of Officers

58. Brigadier John M. Rockingham C.B.E., D.S.O. was posted to H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Ede as Commander, his appointment being made effective on 9 Aug 50 (Supplements to C.A.Os., Issue No. 200 of 1950, p. 8)** The new Commander had won his rank during the Second World War, when he commanded 9 Cdn Inf Ede the "Highland Brigade" — during the Normandy campaign. After the war in Europe, he returned to civil life in Victoria as an official of the British Columbia Electric Railway Company. At the same time he carried on his military activities as commander of a brigade of the Reserve Force (15 Cdn Inf Ede) in Vancouver. (P.N. 50 - 50, "Immediate Release, Brigadier John M. Rockingham, C.B.E., D.S.O.")

59. On 14 Aug 50 Brigadier Rockingham established a portion of his staff in Army Headquarters (D.H.S. 9-24-3, "25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp (C.A.S.F.) - Mob Orders and Locs", vol 1: SD 1 Letter No 4038, 11 Aug 50), and began his first task -assisting in the selection of senior officers for the Force. Applications from officers of the Reserve were considered, but by 16 Aug, when 120 applications had been studied, only two selections had been made from this group. Of the first seven appointments approved by the Minister, five were from the Active Force ("A.G. Hist Record", August 1950, para 2, and "Daily Journal of Events, Office of D.G.A.P.", 14 Aug 50)

60. From the first, the plan was to centralize the selection of officers in Army Headquarters, although authority to appoint limited quotas of lieutenants had been delegated to G.O.Cs. of Commands (<u>ibid</u>, August 1950: Appx "C", Tel Org 297, D. Org to Comds etc, undated). This authority was sub-sequently withdrawn, and all remaining appointments made by Army Headquarters (<u>ibid</u>, September 1950: Appx "C-4", Tel Org 579, D. Org to Comds, 6 Sep 50). Some difficulty was apparently encountered in recruiting satisfactory officers for the Special Force (<u>ibid</u>, September 1950: "Daily Journal of Events: Office of A.G.", 25 Sep 50), but memoranda written on this subject are not available.

*The Order of Battle referred to is, of course, that which existed during the period covered by this Report.

**When 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp was formed, on concentration in Fort Lewis of the greater part of the C.A.S.F. units, Brigadier Rockingham became Commander of the Group (para 63 below). Prior to that time, the units had been under the G.O.Cs. of the Commands in which they were located (<u>ibid</u>), although the Brigadier had, in fact, exercised a large measure of control over them. 61. In the end, it became necessary to draw rather heavily on the Active Force for Staff Officers, Commanding Officers and Technical Officers, as the following table shows.

CATEGORY	NUMBERS		
	Active Force	Special Force	Total
Officers of H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde (Incl Increments)	21	7	28
Commanding Officers of Units	22	10	32
Technical Corps R.C.E. R.C. Sigs R.C.A.M.C. R.C.E.M.E. R.C.D.C.	7 4 7 14 2	5 1 7 3 1	12 5 14 17 3

(H.Q.S. 1454 - 151/25, vol 3: D. Rec to D. Hist, 28 Aug 52; D. Org to D. Hist, 27 Aug 52)

62. A nominal roll of the Commanding Officers of the units in existence in February 1951 is given at Appendix "B". These officers bore the heavy load of the initial organization and training of their units, and the success which they achieved in the face of apparently insurmountable difficulties represents a feat of soldiering.

Location and Training

63. Initially, and until they were concentrated in Fort Lewis, Brigadier Rockingham had no power of command over units of the Force, which were placed under the G.O.Cs. of the Commands in which they were located (D.H.S. 9-24-0, "25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp (C.A.S.F.) Org-Est and Order of Battle", vol 1: S.D. 1 Letter No 4034, 9 Aug 50). The general principle followed in locating the units was to place them beside their Active Force opposite numbers, who were to be responsible for them during the mobilization period ("A.G. Hist Record", August 1950: Appx "A 13", Tel A.G. 1619, A.G. to Comds etc, undated, para 5). Consequently, the artillery regiment was located in Shilo, the infantry units in Calgary, Petawawa and Valcartier, and other units in Chilliwack, Camp Borden and Barriefield. (D.H.S. 9-24-0, vol 1: S.D. 1 Letter No. 4034, 9 Aug 50).

64. Training prior to the concentration of the Brigade was made the responsibility of the G.O.Cs., who were directed to integrate units of the Special Force with existing active Force units until the completion of the advanced training stage. Advanced training, i.e. training to section level in infantry battalions, was to be completed by 15 Nov 50, and the formation was expected to be completely trained by the middle of February 1951. One interesting feature of the training programme was the revival of instruction in current affairs, limited initially to three subjects - the purpose of the Special Force, the principles of the United Nations and the meaning of Communism and its objectives. (D.H.S. 9-24-1, vol 1: "Cdn Army Trg Instr No 6", 14 Aug 50)

65. The same Instruction provided that active Force units, in addition to training their Special Force counterparts, would also train reinforcements, 1 R.C.R.

2.0

being made responsible for training two-thirds of the infantry reinforcement stream* (<u>ibid</u>: Appx "A"). By 19 Aug 50, however, this latter portion of the plan had been amended, and arrangements were being made to establish an <u>ad hoc</u> training organization in Petawawa for these infantry reinforcements ("A.G. Hist Record", August 1950: Appx "C", Tel Org 435, D. Org to Comds etc, 19 Aug 50). This plan in turn was dropped when the decision was taken to train reinforcements for 2 P.P.C.L.I. in Western Command (D.H.S. 9-24-1, vol 1: Tel G.S. 218, C.G.S. to Comds, 23 Aug 50). Quotas issued subsequently provided for Central Command to train 1224 reinforcements, in addition to 2 R.C.R., whose strength was set at 918. Prairie and Quebec Commands were each made responsible for training reinforcement quotas of 1225, in addition to the second battalions of 1 P.P.C.L.I. and 1 R. 22e R. respectively (<u>ibid</u>: Tel Org 499, D. Org to Comds, 24 Aug 50.

66. Maj-Gen C. Vokes C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., and Maj-Gen M.H.S. Penhale C.B.E., G.O.Cs. of Central and Western Commands respectively, protested against this arrangement, requesting that special establishments be set up for training reinforcements, and that some positions on these establishments be filled from outside the Commands to avoid overloading the first battalions. (H.Q.S. 3201 - 151/25, "Trg General 25Cdn Inf Bde Gp", vol 1: P.S.C.C. 2980 - 151/25, Vokes to A.H.Q., 1 Sep 50 and Tel G.O.C. 666, Army Edmonton to Army Ottawa, 6 Sep 50) These proposals were rejected by A.H.Q., which ruled that, since no additional officers or men were available, the Commands would have to fill vacancies on the ad hoc training establishments from within their own resources (<u>ibid</u>: Tel G.S. 233, V.C.G.S. to G.O.C. Western, 9 Sep 50 and Letter (no file ref), V.C.G.S. to G.O.C. Central, 9 Sep 50). With the shipment of infantry reinforcements at an estimated strength of 1165 (H.Q.S. 2730-151/25, vol 2: Tel Org 560, D. Org to Army Edmonton, 2 Sep 50) from Petawawa to Western Command, the training pattern took shape. Units and reinforcements trained under Command arrangements, which are only imperfectly reflected in the A.H.Q. files. The fact that units, particularly infantry battalions, were actually carved from these masses of men, and put in fair posture for war, speaks volumes for the devotion to duty and professional competence of those who did the job.

67. It was planned that officer training would run concurrently with the basic and advanced training of other ranks, under Commanding Officers. G.O.Cs. were made responsible for overall supervision, and Brigadier Rockingham for direction.** The training programme called

*The "infantry reinforcement stream" referred to in these sources was not, at this time, a very precisely defined body of man. In general, it consisted, or would consist, of what was left of the large group in Petawawa after the second battalionshad taken enough men to bring themselves to strength.

**The effect of this arrangement was for Brigadier Rockingham to issue the training directives which were to be followed by Commanding Officers, while G.O.Cs, supervised the operation of the system within their respective Commands. for refresher training until 30 Sep 50, tactical exercises without troops until 15 Oct, skeleton exercises until 1 Nov and, finally, preparations for advanced training, these last to be finished by 15 Nov. (D.H.S. 9-17-0, "Cdn Army Trg Instrs", vol 1: "Cdn Army Trg Instr No 7", 30 Aug 50) As in the case of the training of men, the record of this officer training lies at Command level, though certain results of it are reflected in the story of the formation in Fort Lewis (para 91 below).

Equipment

68. At a special meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 17 Jul 50, the C.G.S. cited, as one advantage of sending a brigade rather than a regimental combat team to Korea, the fact that a brigade would be provided with British-type equipment, in the use of which Canadian troops had been trained ("Extracts from C.G.S. Daily Diary", p. 2). He appears to have attached importance to avoiding a change of equipment if at all possible, for on 16 Aug 50 he stated that he had considered re-equipping the C.A.S.F. with equipment from the United States, and had decided against it, on the ground that such a move would involve major changes in the minor tactical doctrine of the Force, and much of the value of the experience of soldiers in the Force would be lost (<u>ibid</u>: Appx "N", C.G.S. Conference No. 93, 16 Aug 50).

69. The general lines of this directive appear to have been followed, but the record of the equipping of the Special Force is such as to preclude the forming of positive conclusions. An attempt was made to piece the story together, but for reasons given in the introduction (para 5 above), the initial survey revealed that the task would take too long to complete. The attempt was accordingly abandoned, although the information which was obtained during the survey is given in the following two paragraphs, for the use of subsequent investigators.

70. The successive War Establishments of each type of unit in the Special Force are held by the Directorate of Staff Duties (Staff Duties 2) at Army Headquarters. From them, it is possible to learn the various equipment entitlements which were established. Among the more important items were the replacement of Canadian vehicles by U.S.pattern vehicles, the authorization of the issue of six medium machine guns to each infantry battalion, and the taking into use of American mortars and rocket launchers.

71. Brigadier Rockingham participated in the discussions on entitlements of equipment. Every decision to change or modify equipment was based on his experience or that of his Commanding Officers, or on reports from Korea ((H.S.) 410B25.009 (D5): "Comments on draft of Hist Sec Report No 62 by Brigadier Rockingham", 1 Jul 53).

Plans and Movements

72. Although the Special Force had not been raised specifically for employment in Korea (para 33 above), planning went ahead on the assumption that it would, in fact, fight in that country. On 9 Aug 50, the C.G.S. announced that he proposed to investigate the possibility of sending the force to Japan or Hawaii by the middle of November ("Extracts from C.G.S. Daily Diary": Appx "G", C.G.S. Conference No. 90, 9 Aug 50, para 3). Later in the same month, he wrote the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General Joseph Lawton Collins, to enquire whether it would be possible to have the Force complete its training in Japan some time after the end of October (<u>ibid</u>: Appx "O", Foulkes to Collins, 21 Aug 50). General Collins replied that General Macarthur questioned the political wisdom of training U.N. forces in Japan, particularly those supplied by nations which were not participating in the occupation, but was willing to accept the Canadian troops in Okinawa (<u>ibid</u>: Appx "S", Collins to Foulkes, 8 Sep 50). General Foulkes agreed that Okinawa was acceptable, and that the proposed date of movement, late in November, was satisfactory (<u>ibid</u>: Appx "U", Tel G.S. 234, Foulkes to Collins, 11 Sep 50).

73. During the same period, the House of Commons passed The Canadian Forces Act of 1950 (<u>House of Commons</u> <u>Dehates</u>, 8 Sep 50, p. 503). One of the purposes of this Act, as explained by the Minister of National Defence, was to extend the legal grounds for placing the forces on active service. Previously these grounds had been limited by The National Defence act to the existence of a state of emergency. By The Canadian Forces Act, they were to be enlarged to include the consequences of action undertaken by Canada under the United Nations Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty or any similar instrument for collective security (<u>ibid</u>: 7 Sep 50, p. 459). During the debate on the Bill, the Prime Minister stated that no resolution authorizing the sending of troops to Korea would be presented (<u>ibid</u>: 8 Sep 50, p. 495) but that an Order in Council would be prepared, under authority of the new act, to place the armed forces on active service. This Order would state the Government's plans for employment of the Special Force, and Parliament could, if it saw fit, express disapproval of these plans when the Order was presented. (<u>ibid</u>: 8 Sep 50, p. 495). Since no effective opposition to this Order in Council developed, the Cabinet presumably considered itself authorized to employ the Special Force in Korea, for, in a note dated 25 Sep 50, service of the Canadian Army Special Force was formally proffered to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (H.Q.S. 2001 - 151/25, vol 1: P.C. 4631, 25 Sep 50, T.D. 14).*

74. On 26 Sep, outline plans for the movement of the Special Force overseas were completed when the C.G.S. signed a warning order which provided for an advance party to sail around the middle of October, the main body to follow during the last week of November (<u>ibid</u>: Tel SD 1510, C.G.S. to Comds etc, 26 Sep 50). Previously, the Canadian Military Mission, Far East (C.M.M.F.E.) had left Canada for Japan on 20 Sep, in order to provide a means of liaison with the United Nations Command and to

*A document of some historic importance.

prepare for arrival in the theatre of Canadian troops (W.D., C.M.M.F.E., 20 Sep 50 and "Extracts from C.G.S. Daily Diary": Appx "Y", C.G.S. to Comd C.M.M.F.E., 21 Sep 50).

75. The orderly execution of this plan was rudely disturbed by events in Korea. The landings at Inchon and the subsequent pursuit of the shattered enemy across the 38th parallel, which was crossed by American and British forces on 9 Oct 50 (para 111 below), radically altered, or appeared to alter, the requirement for additional ground troops in Korea. As a result, the planners began to consider alternative employments for the Special Force. On 29 Sep, the C.G.S. outlined a plan for inclusion of the Special Force, if it should not be required in Korea, in a training division to be formed as part of the NATO Integrated Force ("Extracts from C.G.S. Daily Diary", p. 7). In addition, conversations with the United States began at various levels, to determine the sort of contribution required from Canada in the changed situation. Finally, in the last week of October, the C.G.S. telephoned the V.C.G.S. from Washington to report that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff had recommended to the State Department that the Canadian contribution be reduced to one battalion for non-combat service ("C.G.S. Hist Record": "Record of V.C.G.S. Decisions", 26 Oct 50). On 30 Oct, in response to a request from the C.G.S. in Washington, the M.A. to the C.G.S. got in touch with Brigadier Rockingham and informed him that there was every possibility that the Minister would make an announcement from Washington to the effect that 2 P.P.C.L.I. would be sent to Korea, and that remaining units of the C.A.S.F. would train in Fort Lewis during the wintor 1950/51 (<u>ibid</u>, "C.G.S. Daily Diary, 10 Oct to 18 Nov 50", 30 Oct 50).

76. On 6 Nov, orders were issued confirming the change in plan for movement of the Special Force. 2 P.P.C.L.I., with a small administrative element, was to sail during the last week in November, and the main body of the force was to concentrate in Fort Lewis, which had been chosen as staging camp in the previous movement plan (para 74 above), and train there until further notice. The advance party, which had sailed for Pusan* on 21 Oct (W.D., Adv Water Party, 21 Oct 50), was to return to Fort Lewis (D.H.S. 9-24-3, "25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp (C.A.S.F.) Mov Orders, Locs", vol 1: Tel S.D. 1832, C.G.S. to Comds etc, 6 Nov 50).

77. The movement took place as planned, the concentration in Fort Lewis being completed by 22 Nov 50 (D.H.S. 9-24-4-1, "25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp, C.A.S.F.: Hist Officer's Monthly Summaries", vol 1: Summary No 2). It was not without incident, however, for 2 R.C.H.A. lost 17 killed in a train collision at Canoe River on 21 Nov 50

^{*}It is established that there was a last-minute change, from Okinawa to Korea, in the destination of the Force, including the advance water party (H.Q.S. 5800-151/25, "Tn: Overall Policy: C.A.S.F.", vol 1: Tel Q.C. 195, Defensor to Canmilitry, undated.) but available sources give no indication of the reason for this change. The fact that D.S.T. raised a query as to whether the commander of the advance water party had been informed of the change of destination (ibid: Tel T.M.D. 122, 1 M.C. Gp to D.S.T., 25 Oct 50) might be taken to indicate that the change was made suddenly.

("A.G. Hist Record", December 1950: Appx "A 6", A.G. to J.A.G., 20 Dec 50 and "Monthly Summary" No. 2) Delay, too, developed in the return of the advance water party, whose movement was not completed until 7 Jan 51 (W.D., C.M.M.F.E., 7 Jan 51).

78. It is to be noted that the concentration of the Force in Fort Lewis was not complete. The base post office in Vancouver and the Seattle movement control group, as well as C.M.M.F.E., remained where they were, since they were at their operational stations. Certain other medical and transport units remained in their Canadian stations, at or near nil strength, the intention being to bring them to strength in Active Force officers and N.C.Os. when the force moved abroad (D.H.S. 9-24-3, vol 1: S.D. 1 Letter No. 4119, 22 Nov 50).

79. On completion of the move, the group of units which had concentrated in Fort Lewis formed 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp (<u>ibid</u>). Thereafter, use of the term "Canadian Army Special Force" practically ceased as a collective reference to the units which concentrated in Fort Lewis, and to those which later moved to Korea. The group, of course, continued to be a "special force" within the meaning of para 7 of the Canadian Forces Act, and the personnel who had enlisted under special terms of service were referred to as Special Force personnel, to distinguish them from other soldiers of the Active Force who had enrolled on regular terms of engagement. The formation, however, was called 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp, and this designation will be used subsequently in this Report.

25 CDN INF BDE GP IN FORT LEWIS (22 NOV 50 - 19 APR 51)

80. In addition to the departure of 2 P.P.C.L.I. for Korea, three principal developments occurred during the period spent by 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp at Fort Lewis. The first was the adoption of a more compact form of organization of the reinforcements already enlisted, and the creation of a system of training and supplying reinforcements. The second was the completion of a programme of concentrated training which, in less than five months, fitted the Brigade for action. The third, a truly historic development, was the growth of a new concept of the status of the Brigade within the Canadian Army, a change which was reflected in the attempt, made prior to the departure overseas of the formation, to reengage Special Force personnel under Active Force terms of service.

The Departure for Korea of 2 P.P.C.L.I.-25 Nov 50

81. 2 P.P.C.L.I. moved to Fort Lewis by train, leaving Wainwright on 19 Nov 50. On 23 Nov, with other units of 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp, it paraded before the Minister of National Defence, and two days later left Seattle on the U.S.N.S. <u>Pvt Joe P. Martinez</u> for Pusan. Embarkation strength was 927, including personnel of the administrative increment which, on arrival, were to be added to the Commonwealth maintenance chain to take care of the Battalion (W.D., 2 P.P.C.L.I., 19 - 25 Nov 50; D.H.S. 9-24-3, vol 1, S.D.I Letter No. 4116, 13 Nov 50). Immediately prior to the Battalion's departure, the Directorate of Military Training estimated that it would be ready for action by 15 Mar 51 (H.Q.S. 3201-151/25, vol 1: D.M.T. to D.G.M.T., 20 Nov 50).

Organization of Reinforcements

82. When it appeared that the Brigade would not be required for service in Korea (para 75 above), plans were made to organize the infantry reinforcements into battalions. One battalion was to be formed to replace 2 P.P.C.L.I. when that unit sailed for Korea. Then, when it was clear that the Brigade would not be despatched to Korea, two infantry training battalions were to be organized. (D.H.S. 9-24-0, vol 1: H.Q.T.S. 2000-2/1(S.D.1), 10 Nov 50)

83. Accordingly, when 2 P.P.C.L.I. left for Pusan, formation of 3 P.P.C.L.I. was authorized with effect 30 Nov 50. It was to operate on the same establishment as the other two battalions and be located in Fort Lewis as the third infantry battalion of the Brigade (<u>ibid</u>: S.D.1 Letter No. 4128, 30 Nov 50). The actual forming of the unit, however, took some time, since officers and warrant officers had to be collected from all over Canada, and the equipping of the unit to field service basis had to be completed. In spite of these difficulties, 3 P.P.C.L.I. performed the remarkable feat of reaching a battalion-level state of training by March 1951. ((H.S.) 410B25.009 (D5): "Comments on draft of Hist Sec Report No 62 by Brigadier Rockingham", 1 Jul 53)

84. The next important development in the organization of reinforcements was the creation of infantry and artillery training units. On 9 Dec, the Minister authorized the formation of 3 R.C.R. and 3 R. 22e R. as infantry training battalions. These units were to be located in Fort Lewis, and were to operate on a reduced establishment, personnel being foun from the existing group of reinforcements (H.Q.S. 2001-151/25, vol 2: C.G.S. to M.N.D., 8 Dec 50 and Draft General Order signed by M.N.D. on 9 Dec 50, T.D. 30). Subsequently "G" Battery, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery ("G" Bty R.C.H.A.) was formed as an artillery training unit, on the same terms as the infantry training battalions (D.H.S. 9-24-0, vol 1: SD 1 Letter No 4138, 18 Dec 52).

85. The plan in effect at this time provided that training of reinforcements for Arms other than Infantry and for all Services would take place at the appropriate Corps schools. Infantry reinforcements, additional to those in the training battalions, were to be trained by the three first battalions (<u>ibid</u>: S.D. 1 Letter No. 4137, 14 Dec 50). This proved to be so heavy a load that it affected the training programmes of the first battalions, and two steps were taken to relieve them. On 29 Jan 51, the establishment of each of the training battalions was increased to that of a normal infantry battalion (<u>ibid</u>: S.D. 1 Letter No. 4156, 29 Jan 51; H.Q.S. 2001-151/25, vol 3: G.C. Leech to V.C.G.S., 6 Jan 51). On 5 Feb, the Minister approved a recommendation of the C.G.S. that three training companies be formed to relieve the first battalions of the responsibility for training the remaining reinforcements (H.Q.S. 2001-151/25, vol 3: C.G.S. to M.N.D., 2 Feb 51 and Draft General Order, 5 Feb 51, T.D. 34). Although operating on a separate establishment, these training companies were to be attached to the first battalions, to absorb their traditions. In practice, the companies — at least the one attached to 1 R.C.R. — continued to create a problem, since they contained a high proportion of undesirables who had been enlisted in the first rush and had gradually settled to the reinforcement company during the organization of the second and third battalions (<u>ibid</u>: Tel R.C.A. 3374, Army Petawawa to Army Ottawa, 25 Apr 51).

86. Formation of a headquarters, designated Headquarters No. 25 Canadian Infantry Brigade Replacement Group (H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde Replacement Gp) was authorized with effect 14 Mar (D.H.S. 9-25-0, "25 Cdn Inf Bde Replacement Gp - Org and Est", vol 1: S.D. 1 Letter No. 4197, 28 Mar 51). This Headquarters completed a move to Wainwright on 9 May 51, where, under Brigadier W.J. Megill C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D., it commanded a training organization composed of Ld S.H.(R.C.) less "C" Sqn, 1 R.C.H.A., 23 Fd Sqn, 3 R.C.R., 3 P.P.C.L.I., 3 R. 22e R., 25 Composite Trg Coy and the necessary Services. The function of this organization was to train replacements for 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp and recruits for Active Force units of three Arms - Armour, Artillery and Infantry. In addition, the Group was to hold and continue the training of replacements for units of other Corps in 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp, who had received their initial training at Corps schools. Officers were also to be trained after they had qualified at the appropriate Corps schools (<u>ibid</u>: S.D. 1 Letter No. 4228, 21 Apr 51: W.D., 25 C.I.B.R.G., 9 May 51).

Training

87. Fort Lewis, the home station since 1946 of 2 U.S. Inf Div, is fifteen miles from Olympia, in the State of Washington. It is a large camp, 100,000 acres in extent, and contains accommodation and essential civilian services for a population of 50,000. 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp was assigned the North Post, and the Headquarters was located 2[±]/₂ miles from the Camp Headquarters ("Brief for Visit of M.N.D. to Fort Lewis, 14 and 15 Apr 51", (held Def Secretary)).

88. The small arms ranges, training areas and battle indoctrination courses in the camp were more than adequate for the needs of the Brigade, especially since a very large proportion of them had been made available to Canadians (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 24 Nov 50). It was found later, however, that the terrain of some training areas was hardly varied enough to be entirely satisfactory, and the numerous restrictions on the use of live ammunition proved a handicap. In addition, the constant rain and the proximity of large cities hampered training (H.Q.S. 3640-151/25, "Trg Reports and Returns, 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp", vol 1: "C.A.S.F.: Year End Report on Trg", 1 Jan 51).

89. The restrictions on the use of live ammunition in heavier weapons were overcome by despatching the armoured squadron, the artillery regiment and the anti-tank platoons from the support companies of the infantry battalions to the ranges at Yakima, 80 miles east, for firing practice. 2 R.C.H.A. went as a unit, while the armoured squadron and the anti-tank platoons sent troops and sections in succession (<u>ibid</u>; W.D., 2 R.C.H.A., 17 Dec 50, 21 Jan 51; W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde December 1950: Appx "12", "C.A.S.F. Trg Instr No. 3", 11 Dec 50).

90. While the Brigade was concentrating in Fort Lewis, the Headquarters issued a directive on the training to be done there. Training to platoon and company level was to be completed early in February. Infantry companies were to be put through controlled field firing exercises using all supporting arms during February, following which the three infantry battalions and supporting arms were to be exercised in controlled field firing as units. The whole programme was to be completed by the middle of March (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, November 1950: Appx "XX", "C.A.S.F. Trg Itstr No. 2", 18 Nov 50). 91. The programme got off to a rather slow start (<u>ibid</u>, 27 Nov 50) but good progress was reported by Brigadier Rockingham on 1 Jan 51 (H.Q.S. 3640-151/25, vol 1: "C.A.S.F.: Year End Report on Trg", 1 Jan 51). The armoured squadron, equipped with self-propelled anti-tank guns, was training drivers and doing exercises in troop manceuvre at Fort Lewis. In addition, it was sending one troop every two weeks to Yakima. 2 R.C.H.A., in Yakima, had already progressed to the point where it was doing regimental shoots. 2 R.C.R.'s training, however, had proved to be insufficiently advanced for platoon exercises. The Brigadier considered that this had resulted in part from the system of training officers and men separately, and ordered a two-week review of basic and section training, to be conducted by the officers. 2 R. 22e R., which was behind the other units in November (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 27 Nov 50), had made remarkable progress, and was planning to spend the month of January in a training area, doing exercises under operational conditions. 3 P.P.C.L.I., which had started late (para 83 above) and made slow progress, was not expected to be ready for another three months. The Services were, for the most part, performing their operational roles in Fort Lewis and rapidly becoming trained for action.

92. During this period, the officers of Brigade Headquarters were given a course in passing verbal messages by wireless (D.H.S. 9-24-4, "25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp (C.A.S.F.)-Hist Offr's Weekly Summaries", No. 10). In addition, exercise "AIRSTRIP", a tactical exercise without troops, was held on 21 Dec. Its purpose was to standardize battle procedures for attack, and give the officers practice in issuing verbal orders. Fifty percent of the officers of the infantry battalions and supporting arms attended (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 21 Dec 50, and Appx "9", "Warning Order, Ex AIRSTRIP", 7 Dec 50).

93. The first six weeks of 1951 saw the infantry battalions reporting continued progress (W.Ds., 2 R.C.R., 3 P.P.C.L.I., 2 K. 22e R., January and February 1951). 2 R.C.R. did a two-week review of basic training and then, after Exercise "KIWI" (para 94 below), a ten-day battalion exercise, "SHAKEDOWN!" Lt-Col Dextraze and his "gars" of 2 R. 22e R. spent a rainy month out on a training area in Exercises 'LITTLE JOE" and 'BIG JOE!" 3 P.P.C.L.I., which did not draw its Brens and Stens until 10 Jan 51, was somewhat behind the other units, and did not take the field for collective training until 5 Feb 51.

94. Several exercises were conducted by Brigade Headquarters during January and the first part of February (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 5 Jan to 1 Feb 51). On 5 Jan, Main Headquarters carried out a practice loading of operational vehicles. Exercise "MADIGAN", held on 22 Jan, was an exercise in communication between the various headquarters within the Brigade. A night move to a concentration area was involved, followed by a tactical advance and preparation for a brigade attack. 2 R.C.R. prepared and occupied a defensive position, which was studied by officers of the Brigade on 24 Jan as Exercise "KIWI". On 31 Jan, Brigade Headquarters moved to a training area, where it operated for a period in its vehicles. Exercise "UBIQUE," conducted by 2 R.C.H.A. on 1 Feb, was an indoor exercise in planning fire support for an attack.

95. The "IGNES BELLUM" series (<u>ibid</u>, February and March 1951), though followed by two other exercises, represented the culmination of the Brigade's training programme. The exercise situation created for Phase I was an infantry company in the advance, supported by an allotment of weapons from the support company plus a battery of field artillery. Two platoon attacks followed by a company attack were required. Each infantry company in the Brigade was put through this exercise during the period 5 to 12 Feb. Phase II, from 14 to 20 Feb, was a battalion attack followed by consolidation on the objective. Each battalion was supported by a troop from the armoured squadron, a troop of field engineers and a detachment from the signal squadron. Phase III, held on 7 Mar 51, was an attack in three phases by the whole Brigade. Live ammunition was used throughout all phases of the exercise, both by "enemy" and "own" troops.

96. "IGNES BELLUM" was followed by Exercise "SCRAMBLE" an exercise in rapid movement during each of the operations of war. Unfortunately, the weather conditions were so bad that Brigadier Rockingham was forced to terminate the exercise at midnight on 11 Mar. Shortly afterward, processing of the Brigade's vehicles for shipment overseas began. As a result, it was no longer possible to conduct formation training, and the Brigade passed the remainder of its stay in Fort Lewis in physical training, range firing and practice of patrolling and night operations. A fair amount of hill climbing was done, to accustom the troops to this activity before they reached Korea. In addition, a sand table exercise — "FINALE" — was carried out on 30 and 31 Mar, to teach the conduct of the withdrawal. ((H.S.) 410B25.009 (D5): "Comments on draft of Hist Sec Report No 62 by Brigadier Rockingham", 1 Jul 53)

Attempted Conversion of Personnel from Special Force to Active Force Status

97. By the beginning of 1951, important changes had taken place in the strength and dispositions, actual and proposed, of the Regular Forces of Canada. The nation which, prior to the invasion of South Korea, had not maintained an expeditionary force in being as a matter of policy (para 33 above), now had a brigade group proffered to the United Nations, plus three destroyers, an infantry battalion and a squadron of transport aircraft actually serving in the Far East. In addition, she was planning to participate in the Integrated Force under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (House of Commons Debates, Mr Speaker, 30 Jan 51, p. 1). Finally, no end to these commitments was in prospect.

98. These changes had an important effect on the status, within the Canadian Army, of the Special Force, "Where formerly it had been regarded as a temporary addition, to be disbanded as soon as need for it had passed (para 40 above), it now came to be considered a more or less permanent element of the Active Force, in the sense that the time when it could be safely disbanded appeared to be well in the future. However, the terms of service under which personnel of the Force had engaged made assumption of this new role difficult, since these terms of service had all derived from the former view of the Force. Re-engagement of personnel under Active Force conditions was required if the Special Force were to consist of the pro-fessional soldiers, willing to serve for comparatively long periods, which were needed to give practical effect to the Force's new position.

*This and the following paragraph summarize the contents of the planning papers on the subject of conversion of personnel of the Special Force to Active Force status ("A.G. Hist Record", January 1951: Appx "A-3", "A-4", "A-17", "C-3") and the final plan (<u>ibid</u>, March 1951: Appx "C-2", A.G.I. 444, 3 Mar 51). programme. The exercise situation created for Phase I was an infantry company in the advance, supported by an allotment of weapons from the support company plus a battery of field artillery. Two platoon attacks followed by a company attack were required. Each infantry company in the Brigade was put through this exercise during the period 5 to 12 Feb. Phase II, from 14 to 20 Feb, was a battalion attack followed by consolidation on the objective. Each battalion was supported by a troop from the armoured squadron, a troop of field engineers and a detachment from the signal squadron. Phase III, held on 7 Mar 51, was an attack in three phases by the whole Brigade. Live ammunition was used throughout all phases of the exercise, both by "enemy" and "own" troops.

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100. An associated development was the termination of enlistment under Special Force terms of service. This had been reduced to limited quotas on 23 Aug 50 (para 49 above) and discontinued in all Commands, except Quebec Command, on 11 Dec 50 ("A.G. Hist Record", December 1950: Appx "C-11", Tel Org 42, D. Org to Army Montreal, 9 Dec 50; Appx "C-12", Tel Org 43, D. Org to Comds (excl Que), 9 Dec 50). It was discontinued entirely on 21 Mar 51 (<u>Ibid</u>, March 1951: Appx "C-11", Tel Org 382, D. Org to Comds, 20 Mar 51).

Plans and Movements

101. There was a good deal of uncertainty, during the early part of the Brigade's stay in Fort Lewis, as to where it would ultimately be sent. As late as 12 Feb 51, the Q.M.G., Brigadier [as he then was] J.D.B. Smith, C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D., was writing memoranda to the C.G.S. and V.C.G.S. on preliminary planning being carried out in his Branch for movement of the group to Europe (H.Q.S. 5800-151/25, vol 2: Q.M.G. to D.M. (through C.G.S.), 2 Feb 51, T.D. 7; Q.M.G. to V.C.G.S., 12 Feb 51, T.D. 9). On 21 Feb, however, when the Minister of National Defence announced the decision to send the remainder of 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp to join 2 P.P.C.L.I. in Korea, his statement made no mention of these plans.

> ...Yesterday inquiry was received from the unified command of the United Nations forces in Korea as to whether training of the balance of the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade was complete, and if so, could it be sent to form part of the United Nations Forces in Korea?

This training is almost complete, and the government agreed today that the other elements in the Brigade group should shortly proceed to Korea and join the second battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry there...

(House of Commons Debates, 21 Feb 51, p. 563)

102. The warning order for the move was dated 19 Mar 51 (H.Q.S. 2001-151/25, vol 3: S.D. 1 Letter No. 4196, 19 Mar 51). Signal, Medical and Ordnance units which had remained in Canada (para 78 above) were to move to Fort Lewis and sail with the Brigade. The greater part of the units listed in the Order of Battle of the C.A.S.F. for 20 Oct 50 (para 57 above) were to leave, with the exception of C.M.M.F.E. and 2 P.P.C.L.I. which were already in the Far East, and of a movement control unit, a medical liaison detachment and the base post office, whose duties required them to remain in North America. Also 26 Cdn F.S.T.* and 25 Cdn F.D.S.* were to remain in Canada pending completion of their organization. 20 Cdn Fd Dental Det,* less five Clinics which were to accompany the Brigade, was likewise to remain in Canada. A base signal troop and a field punishment camp, which had been added to the Order of Battle; were to sail with the Brigade. "G" Bty R.C.H.A., the third battalions, and 20 Cdn Fd Dental Det were to move to Maihwright when the Brigade had left (para 86 above).

103. The C.G.S., Lt-Gen G.G. Simonds C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D., visited the Brigade from 18 to 21 Mar ("Weekly Summary", No. 22). Following his departure, Brigadier Rockingham left for Korea and Japan on 23 Mar, returning on 3 Apr (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 23 Mar and 3 Apr 51). The Governor-General of Canada, Viscount Alexander of Tunis, and the Minister of National Defence paid a farewell visit on 14 and 15 Apr (<u>ibid</u>, 14 and 15 Apr 51), and the Brigade sailed on 19, 20 and 21 Apr 51. Three ships, the <u>Marine Adder</u>, the <u>General Patrick</u> and the <u>President Jackson</u> were the transports used (<u>ibid</u>, 19, 20 and 21 Apr 51; "Jeekly Summary", No. 27).

104. Prior to the departure of the Brigade, a Command Instruction was issued. Paragraph 11 of this instruction -- the final paragraph quoted below -- is most significant. In its original form this paragraph permitted Brigadier Rockingham direct reference to the C.G.S. should orders be given to commit Canadian troops it an operation which, in his opinion, would involve unnecessarily large casualties. The Brigadier was given a special code to use in any direct reference which might be necessary, and Lt-Gen Simonds held the only other copy. However the original wording was amended, at the instance of the J.A.G., to that shown below, in order to avoid objection on the part of the U.N. Comd. As will appear later (para 181 below), Brigadier Rockingham almost had occasion to resort to this direct reference in at least one instance ((H.S.) 410B25.013 (D 22), "Interview with Brigadier Rockingham, 1000 hrs 17 Nov 50").

> Your role will be to participate in operational or occupational duties within the territorial limits of Korea under the control of the Commander, United Nations Forces, Korea.

Before engagingin operations, except in self-defence, you must ensure that your troops have had sufficient time in the theatre for indoctrination and are operationally fit.

¹25 Cdn F.D.S. sailed on 8 Jul 51 (M.D., 25 Cdn F.D.S., 8 Jul 51), 20 Cdn Fd Dental Det on 21 Aug 51 (W.D., 20 Cd, Fd Dental Det, 21 Aug 51). Nothing was done about completing the organization of 26 Cdn F.S.T., and in February of 1952 a notation that it was to remain at nil strength was published in an edition of the Command and Location List (5th Edition, "The Command and Location List", February 1952) There is no law establishing a legal relationship between Canadian Forces and the United Nations Forces as a whole, nevertheless it will be necessary for you to establish a working arrangement in this regard. Therefore, upon arrival in the theatre it will be necessary for you to consult with the Commander, United Nations Forces, concerning this matter.

The principle of the separate entity of the Canadian Force, however, shall at all times be maintained. While the grouping of forces is a matter for the operational command to decide, it is anticipated that in the normal course of operations or other activities of the United Nations Forces, your tasks and undertakings will be so allotted or arranged, having regard to the size of the Canadian Force, that its Canadian entity will readily be preserved.

You will be the Senior Canadian Army Officer in the Far Eastern theatre. The Commander, Canadian Military Mission, Far East, will be your representative at Headquarters, United Nations Command and Headquarters, British Commonwealth Occupation Forces. Commander, Canadian Military Mission, Far East, will be responsible for obtaining and representing your views to these Headquarters on any matter which may arise.

No limitation is placed on your direct channel of communication on any matter with the Chief of the General Staff.

> ((H.S.) 410B25.016 (D2), "Comd Instr to Comd 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp", 13 Apr 51)

105. On 10 May, a further Instruction was issued, in amplification of the original Instruction. It is possible that this was made necessary by the decision for 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp to be incorporated in the Commonwealth Division, since the reference to this incorporation is the only significant addition to the previous Instruction.

> You will be responsible for discipline and purely Canadian administration of all Canadian troops in the Far Eastern theatre. You may delegate the responsibility for discipline and Canadian administration of Canadian troops not part of First (Commonwealth) Division, to the Commander, Canadian Military Mission, Far East, if you so desire.

You will be responsible for maintaining the Canadian identity of Canadian support and service elements now in 25 Canadian Infantry Brigade Group when they become part of the support and service units of the Divisional Troops of the First (Commonwealth) Division, United Nations Forces.

(Ibid, "Comd Instr", 10 May 51)

THE INCHON LANDINGS, OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE 38th PARALLEL AND CHINESE INTERVENTION (15 SEP - 14 DEC 50), WITH ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENTS IN THE UNITED NATIONS.*

106. On 15 Sep 50 (Korean time), X U.S. Corps, controlling 7 U.S. Inf Div, 1 UIS. Marine Div and South Korean units, made an amphibious attack on Wolmi island at the mouth of the harbour of Inchon. ("One Year in Korea", pp 5, 6; (H.S.) 681.013 (D 8), G.H.Q., FECOM, Mil Int Sec, G.S., "Intelligence Summary", Nos 2927 to 2929). Three Canadian destroyers - "Sioux", "Athabaskan" and "Cayuga" - were among the naval units supporting the operation ((H.S.)120.013 (D2), "R.C.N. in Korea", p. 1). Within two days the attacking forces had captured Kimpo airfield, near Seoul, and on 28 Sep the whole of the Seoul area was under their control ("One Year in Korea", p. 6).

107. At the same time, Eighth U.S. Army broke out of the Pusan perimeter and began a swift advance on Seoul, to kink up with the U.N. troops in that area ("Int Summary", Nos 2929 to 2932; "One Year in Korea", pp 6 and 7). This contact was established on 26 Sep 50, when elements of 1 U.S. Cav Div joined forward units of 7 U.S. Inf Div near Osan, 30 miles south of Seoul ("Int Summary", Nos 2939 and 2940). Meanwhile South Korean troops had raced up central Korea, and up the east coast. By the end of September these units, particularly the ones on the east coast, stood near the 38th parallel (<u>ibid</u>, Nos 2944 to 2946).

108. Progress on the western sector, however, was slower. Uijongbu, ten miles north of Seoul, was not captured by 1 U.S. Marine Div until 5 Oct 50 (<u>ibid</u>, No. 2948). Two days later, X U.S. Corps was withdrawn from the Seoul area; the formation was committed in northeast Korea as soon as the South Korean advance had opened a port for its use ("One Year in Korea", p. 7 and para 111 below). In addition IX U.S. Corps, consisting of 2 and 25 U.S. Inf Divs, was left south of Seoul to deal with the scattered enemy in that area (para 113 below). These dispositions left I U.S. Corps and two South Korean corps to continue the advance north. This the South Koreans did, reaching Tongchon, an important centre on the east coast 60 miles north of the 38th parallel, on 6 Oct 50 ("Int Summary", No. 2951).

109. These military developments created an urgent need for decision, in the United Nations, as to what was to be done about sending non-Korean troops across the 38th parallel. The issue was debated in the Political Committee of the General Assembly, to which it had been transferred from the Security Council when it became apparent that veto by the Russian delegate, who had returned to the Council on 1 Aug 50, could effectively prevent any action by the Council on Korea (External Affairs, October 1950, p. 364). The group which had supported intervention in Korea found it extremely difficult to work out a clear-cut recommendation. Their hope, as expressed by Mr L.B. Pearson, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, was that the North Koreans would surrender and repudiate the government which had led

*Geographical detail mentioned in this section is shown in Map 1. them to a disastrous defeat (<u>ibid</u>, p. 365). However. the North Koreans had not surrendered, in spite of Gen MacArthur's demand (<u>ibid</u>, p. 363) that they do so. Finally, the United Kingdom and seven other countries sponsored a resolution which provided, among other things, that "all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea" (<u>ibid</u>, p. 366). Discussing this resolution later, the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs gave the interpretation which was placed on this phrase at the time, and outlined some of the considerations which had led to its approval.

> We then took a decision which authorized General MacArthur to use his own judgement whether to cross this particular line or not to cross it...One of the factors in a good many minds at that time...was the hope, indeed the expectation, that the crossing of this line might not result in a rush for the Manchurian or Russian border....

> ...Although military considerations are important, political considerations are equally important, possibly more important. When a decision was taken last October to authorize the United Nations Commander to cross this line if he saw fit, there were political reasons behind that decision as well as military. The political reasons were that the United Nations felt that it should authorize necessary action to liberate and unify all of Korea. That is what we hoped would happen as a result of that decision, but unfortunately it did not happen.

I think most of us saw in our minds at that time certain dangers in that decision. Those dangers turned out to be much greater than we had realized. Possibly we were wrong in not realizing that.

(House of Commons Debates, 20 Mar 51, pp 1442 and 1443)

110. The U.S.S.R. and its bloc had no such difficulty. They contended that both sides should cease hostilities, and that U.S. and other foreign troops should leave Korea (<u>External Affairs</u>, October 1950, p. 368). This, as the Indian delegate, Sir Benegal Rau, pointed out, would leave the South Koreans at the mercy of the North Koreans. He argued that a comformise resolution should be worked out, but his proposal was defeated (<u>ibid</u>, p. 369). The Peking government also took an indirect part in the debate when its Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, announced on 5 Oct 51 that China would not stand idly by if U.N. forces crossed the 38th parallel (<u>ibid</u>, December 1950, p. 426). In spite of this warning the General Assembly accepted the United Kingdom resolution on 7 Oct 50. Sir Benegal Rau abstained from voting, on the ground that the resolution appeared to authorize U.N. forces to enter North Korea and remain there until unification had been achieved. This, he considered, might prolong North Korean resistance and even extend the area of the conflict (<u>ibid</u>, November 1950, p. 398).

111. Provided with a very broad authority to use his own discretion about advancing into North Korea, Gen MacArthur began operations north of the 38th parallel. On 9 Oct 50, 1 U.S. Cav Div crossed the line in an advance on Pyongyang, the capital of Worth Korea, which it entered three days later ("Int Summary", Nos 2953 and 2963). The day following this entry, X U.S. Corps commenced landing at the port of Wonsan, which had been captured by 3 R.O.K. Div on 11 Oct 50, (<u>ibid</u>, No. 2954; "One Year in Korea", p. 8). This deployment created two thrusts into North Korea, one by Eighth U.S. Army up the west coast and the other by X U.S. Corps inland and north from the Wonsan-Hungnam area" on the east coast. These two thrusts were separated by division of command, X U.S. Corps being directly under G.H.Q. in Tokyo, and by formidable mountain barriers through which only the most tenuous of contacts was possible. Historically, they were joined in the crushing defeat which both suffered.

112. Initially, while the build-up continued on the east coast, the advance in the western sector was the more spectacular. Its progress was more rapid than prudent. On 26 Oct 50, elements of 6 R.O.K. Div reached the Yalu river, the northern boundary of Korea, at Chosan ("Int Summary", No. 2970). A continuous front was not maintained, the advance being largely confined to the roads running north to Chongju, Taechon, Unsan and Tdepyong. Increasing resistance to this movement was encountered which, on 28 Oct 50, developed into heavy attacks against II R.O.K. Corps south of Onjong. These attacks disorganized the South Koreans, and forced a general withdrawal to the Chongchon river (<u>ibid</u>, Nos 2969 to 2980).

113. In spite of the fact that the presence of substantial Chinese forces was revealed by this attack, and that it had created a sufficiently serious threat to force a general withdrawal of Eighth U.S. Army, the advance north was again resumed in the west.** IX U.S. Corps came up the west coast from south of Seoul on 5 Nov 50 ((H.S.)681.013 (D 7), U.N. Comd, "G-3 Ops Report", No. 134). 3 U.S. Inf Div landed at Wonsan ("G-3 Ops Report", No. 141). By the third week of November 1950, the main bodies of the formations in the western sector stood slightly further north than they had when the Chinese first attacked. In the eastern sector, Hyesanjin and Chongjin were reached on 21 and 25 Nov 50 (<u>ibid</u>, Nos 150 to 157). 24 Nov 50 was selected as D Day for a general attack north in the western sector, to be followed, a day or so later, by a parallel attack in the east (<u>ibid</u>).

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114. Then, on 26 Nov 50, a massive Chinese offensive developed against the front in the west, between Taechon and Tokchon (<u>ibid</u>, No. 155). Two days later, units of X U.S. Corps came under heavy attack in the area of Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, near the Chosin reservoir (<u>ibid</u>, No. 157). In face of this offensive, a general retreat was ordered. In the east, a defensive perimeter was established about Hungnam, from which port evacuation of the surviving elements of X U.S. Corps was completed by 24 Dec 50** ("One Year in Korea", p. 12). In the west,

*The Hamhung-Hungnam area had been taken by the South Korean Capitol Division on 17 Oct 50 ("Int Summary", No. 2961).

**On 6 Nov 50, Canada expressed misgivings to the State Department about carrying the campaign to the northern border (<u>House of Commons Debates</u>, L.B. Pearson, 2 Feb 51, p. 56).

***This date may have given rise to ironic recollection that the war was to have been won "by Christmas". Eighth U.S. Army retreated 70 or 80 miles to positions south of Pyongyang in the ten days which followed the Chinese attack ("G-3 Ops Report", No. 164). By 14 Dec 50, the Army held positions on the Imjin river north of Seoul (<u>ibid</u>, No. 173). It is worth noting that, while Canadian ground troops were not committed in these operations, Canadian naval forces had supported the evacuation of base installations through Chinnampo, the port of Pyongyang ("R.C.N. in Korea", p. 1).

115. Within the United Nations, Chinese intervention had two principal consequences.* The first was a series of attempts to negotiate with the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China. The second was the naming of China as an aggressor in Korea, and the consideration of measures to be employed to meet her aggression. During this period, Canada was one of the principal supporters of the policy of negotiating, or attempting to negotiate. At the same time, she used all her influence in an attempt to delay the naming of China as an aggressor until it was clear beyond any doubt that negotiation was impossible. When she could delay this action no longer, she succeeded in ensuring that it was done with the least possible prejudice to future possibility of negotiation.

116. Attempts to negotiate were complicated by the fact that the Peking Government, directly and through the Russian bloc, attempted to centre discussion on its charges of U.S. aggression in Formosa. A group of members outside the Russian bloc, on the other hand, attempted to confine the discussion to the terms of a settlement in Korea. The result was a series of debates and procedural manoeuvres which effectively prevented any substantial progress toward ending the war in Korea.

117. On 14 Dec 50, the General Assembly approved the establishment of a Cease-Fire Committee, to be composed of the President of the Assembly and two other members. The President nominated Sir Benegal Rau of India and L.B. Pearson of Canada to serve with him. This committee experienced great difficulty and delay in its attempts to reach an understanding with Peking. As a result, the United States began to press for consideration of her resolution naming China as an aggressor in Korea. Canada attempted to persuade the U.S. to agree to further postponement, but failed. However, the Canadian representative was successful in arranging amendments to the resolution which ensured the continuation of attempts to negotiate. On 1 Feb 51, the General Assembly passed the amended U.S. resolution, in face of a warning by Sir Benegal Rau, whose Government was in direct touch with Peking, that by so doing it was ending all hope of a peaceful solution to Far East questions (House of Commons Debates, L.B. Pearson, 2 Feb 51, p. 60).

*This paragraph, and the two which follow, summarize information contained in articles on the Korean crisis prepared in the Department of External Affairs, and a statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs ("Korean Crisis", <u>External Affairs</u>, December 1950, January and February 1951; <u>House of Commons Debates</u>, L.B. Pearson, 2 Feb 51, pp 51 to 61).

TRAINING OF 2 PIPICILI. IN KOMEA (18 DEC 50 -15 FEB 51). THE RESUMPTION AND TERMINATION OF THE CHINESE OFFENSIVE.*

118. The U.S.N.S. <u>Pvt Joe P. Martinez</u>, bearing 2 P.P.C.L.I., docked at Pier 2 in Pusan harbour at 1500 hrs, 18 Dec 50 (W.D., 2 P.P.C.L.I., 18 Dec 50). The trip from Seattle had been relatively uneventful (<u>ibid</u>, November and December 1950), although it had been enlivened by consideration of the news from the battle front (para 114 above). The partially-trained unit (para 81 above), which had sailed on what was thought to be the eve of final victory (<u>Chronology</u>, <u>Supplement to The World Today</u>, Vol VI, No. 23, p. 759), found itself reading reports in the ship's newspaper about operations the reverse of victorious (W.D., 2 P.P.C.L.I., December 1950, Appx "9" and "11"). Speculation on the future employment of the Battalion became the principal occupation of all ranks (<u>ibid</u>, 8 Dec 50).

119. On arrival in Pusan, 2 P.P.C.L.I. moved to a staging camp in the harbour, where it remained until 27 Dec 50, drawing and preparing its equipment and stores (<u>ibid</u>, 18 to 27 Dec 50). Two days later, it had completed a move to a training area near Miryang, on the main supply route from Pusan to Taegu (<u>ibid</u>, 29 Dec 50). It had barely established itself in this area, when the front began to move south towards it.

120. Since 14 Dec 50 Eighth U.S. Army had held its positions on the Imjin river north of Seoul (para 114 above) without major contact. Then, on 1 Jan 51, the Chinese resumed their offensive in attacks directed at Seoul and Wonju ("One Year in Korea", p. 13). III ROK Corps, to the north of Wonju, was disorganized and overrun ((H.S.) 112.3M1023 (D 16), "Cdn Army Int Review", January 1951, pp 2 and 3). This collapse of the right flank forced a general withdrawal to the south of Seoul, which was abandoned on 4 Jan ("One Year in Korea", p. 13). Four days later, the withdrawal in the western sector ended on Line "D", approximately forty miles south of that city ("Cdn Army Int Review", January 1951, p. 2). Canadian naval forces were once again involved in the withdrawal of U.N. ground forces, when R.C.N. destroyers supported the evacuation of Inchon ("R.C.N. in Korea", p. 2)

121. While I and IX U.S. Corps, who held this western sector, experienced only minor enemy contacts after the withdrawal to Line "D", heavy fighting continued on the central sector ("Cdn Army Int Review", January and February 1951, "Ops in Korea"). There U.N. forces strove to hold an escape route open for divisions which had been overrun, and to establish a continuation of Line "D" to the east coast. In addition, they were engaged in mopping up or driving northward the enemy divisions which had penetrated the sector. X U.S. Corps, which had been reorganizing after its defeat in north-east Korea (para 114 above), was committed early in January. The Headquarters of the Corps, controlling one of its original U.S. divisions - the 7th - as well as 2 U.S. Inf Div and three South Korean divisions, opened at

*Geographical detail mentioned in this section is shown in Map 1. Chungju and took over the sector about Wonju ("G-3 Ops Report", No. 193). Of the Corps' two other U.S. divisions (paras 106 and 113 above), 3 Div went to I U.S. Corps, while the Marine Div was committed to operations against guerrillas in the area of Pohang-dong. Line "D" was finally extended to the east coust, but on 11 Feb the enemy attacked again, first against Wonju and subsequently further east, in the area of Chechon and Yongwol. These attacks were contained, however, and by 20 Feb the central front was quiet.

122. Meanwhile, I and IX U.S. Corps had been gradually advancing toward the Han river ("Cdn Army Int Review", January and February 1951, "Ops in Korea"). Initially, strong patrols ranged forward to establish contact, but by the end of January this type of action had been replaced by full-scale divisional attacks. By 20 Feb, I U.S. Corps had closed up to the south bank of the Han river in the area below Seoul. IX U.S. Corps had also reached the Han in the area of Yangpyong, and, further west, held positions north and north-east of Yoju. On the central front and further east, other formations of Eighth U.S. Army joined this advance as the Chinese offensive ended. By the end of February, the whole of the Army was on the move again toward the 38th parallel.

While these events were taking place, 123. 2 P.P.C.L.I. spent the month of January near Miryang, in section and platoon training under company arrangements (W.D., 2 P.P.C.L.I., January 1951 and Appx "52", "B" Coy Sitrep). Some weapon training was also done, particularly on U.S. mortars and rocket launchers with which the Battalion had been equipped on landing. Realism was added to this training by the operational duties which the unit was required to perform during this period. These began with reconnaissance of the roads south and east of Taegu, in preparation for a possible emergency move to a sector east of the city. In addition, posts were prepared for the defence of each company area in the event of an attack by guerrillas. On 14 Jan 51, "C" Coy left the battalion to prepare positions in a sector of the defensive perimeter, "RADAR", which was being established about Pusan. The Company's sector lay near Sinchon, a small village immediately to the east of Samnangjin,* on the edge of an area in which guerrillas had been active. "B" Coy was subsequently dispatched to patrol an area near Sinchon. During this operation, the Company located caches of ammunition and engaged several parties of the enemy.

124. In spite of these interruptions - or perhaps because of them - remarkably rapid progress was made in training. Within three weeks, exercises on company level were being conducted. These culminated in an exercise arranged by the C.O., which took place during the last three days of January and the first day of February (<u>ibid</u>, 29 Jan to 1 Feb 51). It was a combined tactical and field firing exercise in the advance to contact, over a prepared course. On 2 Feb 51, a battalion scheme, "MAPLE LEAF", was started. It was designed to exercise the entire unit in the advance, attack, defence and withdrawal. "MAPLE LEAF" ended on 7 Feb 51, and eight days later, the main body of the unit began to move to the front (<u>ibid</u>, 2 to 15 Feb 51).

*20 miles north of Seoul.

125. The destination of the move was Changhowon-ni, 10 miles south of Yoju. On arrival, the unit was to come under command of 27th British Commonwealth Infantry Brigade (27 Britcom Inf Bde). These orders reflected a change in the original plan which was to employ 2 P.P.C.L.I. with 29th Independent Infantry Brigade Group (29 Indep Inf Bde Gp) (W.D., 2 P.P.C.L.I., 8 Feb 51 and Appx "20", C.G. EUSAK to Comd 2 P.P.C.L.I., 9 Feb 51)

2 P.P.C.L.I. IN THE SECOND U.N. ADVANCE TO THE 38th PARALLEL (17 FEB - 19 APR 51). FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF U.N. POLICY ON THE KOREAN WAR.*

126. On 16 Feb, while 2 P.P.C.L.I. was on the move to join it, 27 Britcom Inf Bde was committed on the western end of the X U.S. Corps sector. The front assigned to 27 Bde lay on the right end of the western sector of the Army front, which was advancing despite the fact that heavy defensive fighting was in progress further east (paras121, 122 above). The Brigade was to advance north-east, in the general direction of Hongchon, from positions immediately north of Yoju, under command of 2 U.S. Inf Div. On 17 Feb, however, the boundary of IX U.S. Corps was moved east, to permit X Corps to concentrate its forces further to the right (para 121 above) against a shift in the Chinese attack ("Cdn Army Int Review", February 1951, pp 3 and 4). As part of this change, 27 Bde came under command of IX Corps, and advanced on the right of the Corps' front, with 1 U.S. Cav Div on its left. On 21 Feb, however, 6 ROK Div was deployed on the right of the IX Corps front. As a result 27 Bde was relieved of its responsibility for the Corps boundary, and continued its advance between 1 Cav Div and 6 ROK Div ("G-3 Ops Report", Nos 236 to 238). In a few days, this movement became part of a general advance on the 38th parallel of all the U.N. forces at the front in Korea (para 122 above).**

127. 27 Bde was a seasoned formation, having participated in the Korean War since the defence of the Pusan perimeter (Eric Linklater, <u>Our Men in Korea</u> (London, 1952), p. 10). It consisted of two British battalions, 1st Battalion, The Middlesex Regiment (Duke of Cambridge's Own) and 1st Battalion, The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Princess Louise's), with an Australian unit, 3rd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (<u>ibid</u>, pp 15, 16 and 22). Since a New Zealand field artillery regiment was in support, the addition of a Canadian unit made the formation a fairly representative Commonwealth brigade.

*For 2 P.P.C.L.I.'s first advance see Map 10 -"Second U.N. Advance (A)" and Map 2. For the second advance see Map '10 - "Second U.N. Advance (B)" and Maps 3 and 4.

**The difficulties encountered in attempting to record this sort of advance from the point of view of the higher formations involved are discussed in some detail subsequently (paras 176 to 179 below), in the record of the third U.N. advance on the 38th parallel. At this point it is perhaps sufficient to say that, lacking the War Diaries of 27 Britcom Inf Bde and of any of the higher U.S. formations involved, it is not possible to present more than a battalion-level record. However the operations recorded may prove to be representative of the action across the entire front. 128. 2 P.P.C.L.I. arrived at Changhowon-ni, 10 miles south of Yoju, on 17 Feb, and came under command of 27 Bde as planned.* Two days later, the Battalion moved to Chuam-ni (8339), within the Brigade area, and at 1100 hrs on the same day advanced north up the valley, with the object of capturing Hill 404 (8542). The hill was taken without opposition, but evidence that there had been enemy in the area was provided by the bodies of 65 U.N. soldiers, surprised in their sleep some time previously and slain beside the road up which the unit advanced.

129. On 21 Feb, the Battalion moved east to the general area of Sangsok (8942) and resumed its advance up the valley running north from that village. Hills ranging from 800 to 1400 feet in height rose on either side. Rain and snow fell, turning the roads and tracks into quagmires. Soon fog began to fill the valley. In spite of these difficulties, the advance continued. First contact with the enemy was made by "D" Coy, when it came under fire near Chohyon (8943) from the high ground to the north-east. This burst of fire was the only opposition encountered, and by 1700 hrs Tactical Headquarters was established in the little village of Wol-li (8845), with the companies deployed on the surrounding high ground.

130. Next day, the Battalion continued up the valley, clearing the heights on either side. "C" Coy sustained the unit's first battle casualties in an attack on Hill 444 (8749), when it lost two killed and one wounded. As the advance neared Point 419 (8950) at the head of the valley, opposition increased, possibly because this height controlled a pass leading into the next valley. Finally, at 1900 hrs, the C.O. decided to consolidate and prepare for a battalion attack on the hill next morning.

131. This attack went in at 0900 hrs on 23 Feb, "C" and "D" Coys being committed. Strong resistance was encountered and neither company succeeded in reaching the objective. At last, with night coming on and casualties of six killed and eight wounded to consider, the C.O. ordered the two companies to dig in for the night below the high ground (8950) to the left of Point 419.

132. Next day "D" Coy attempted to get on to Point 419 by advancing along the high ground from the right. The Company went in after preparatory artillery and air bombardment, and succeeded in reaching the forward edge of the objective. Here it came under fire from both flanks as well as from the front, and was forced to retire and dig in short of the objective. To the east, the Australlians also failed in an attack on Hill 614 (9050). In view of this situation, further attacks on Point 419 were suspended. The Battalion patrolled from its company positions until 27 Feb, when the Australians succeeded in capturing Hill 614. As a result of this success, Point 419 became untenable by the enemy, being dominated by Hill 614, and 2 P.P.C.L.I. took it on 28 Feb

*Except where otherwise indicated, the material in paras 128 to 138 has been drawn from W.D. 2 P.P.C.L.I., 17 Feb to 13 Mar 51).

without serious opposition.

133. By the first of March, the Brigade held positions at the apex of a long salient, with 1 Cav Div and 6 ROK Div on its left and right. The Middlesex and the Argylls moved into positions on Hill 484 (8853) and 450 (9053) respectively, while 2 P.P.C.L.I. went into reserve. The forward positions lay on the edge of a valley running east and west, with the village of Hagal-li (9055) on the floor of the valley almost immediately below them. There the Brigade sat, waiting for the line to be straightened and the flanks secured.

134. The terrain which faced the Brigade differed in one important respect from that already traversed. Previously, the valleys had run generally north and south, carved by rivers draining south into the Han. Now they ran east and west, the high ground between them interposing a series of formidable obstacles to the Brigade's advance north-east.

135. At first, it appeared that the enemy intended to offer the maximum resistance on each of these natural lines of defence. On 7 Mar, the Brigade attacked again on a two-battalion front, with 2 P.P.C.L.I. left and 3 R.A.R. right. The battalions' objectives were two features, Hills 532 (9056) and 410 (9255) almost directly opposite the positions of the Middlesex and the Argylls. "D" Coy of 2 P.P.C.L.I. attacked Hill 532 frontally, while "A" Coy went in from the left flank. Although "A" Coy made reasonably good progress at first, neither company was able to get on to the objective, and at 1600 hrs the C.O. ordered "D" Coy, which had six killed and twenty-eight wounded, to withdraw. "A" Coy consolidated where it was and "B" Coy later dug in on the lower slopes of Hill 532, immediately below a Chinese position.

136. Although the "D" Coy attack failed to achieve complete success, it had been pushed home most gallantly. Pte L. Barton, batman to the platoon leader of the leading platoon, particularly distinguished himself when, his leader \therefore and several members of the platoon being wounded, he rallied the remainder and led their advance. He was himself wounded three times, but carried on until ordered to be evacuated. A good part of the ultimate success of the attack may be attributed to his bravery, for which he was awarded the Military Medal (P.N. 171-51, "Citation, Pte Leonard Barton").

137. "D" Coy's lack of success had been matched by equal failure on the left and right flanks of the Brigade. The troops of 1 Cav Div on the left did not get across the valley, and on the right 6 ROK Div trailed some 6000 yards in rear. Within the Brigade, the Australians on the right of 2 P.P.C.L.I. had failed to capture Hill 410.

138. Next morning', all was changed. The Chinese had apparently made a withdrawal during the night, for "B" Coy took Hill 532 without opposition, and counted 47 enemy dead in the area. On 9 Mar, the Middlesex and the argylls occupied positions on the next line of high ground to the north, and 2 P.P.C.L.I. took Hill 685 (9258), immediately in front of the argylls, on the 10th. The Brigade's final attack of the advance went in on 11 Mar. During this attack, 2 P.P.C.L.I. on the left of the Brigade's front, captured Hill 642 (9564) north of the village of Changmal (9462). The Middlesex appear to have been in the centre, and the Australians on the right. On the 12th the Middlesex were in reserve, having been relieved by the Argylls. On 13 Mar, a Regimental Combat Team from 1 Cav Div relieved the Brigade, which moved to the rear in Corps reserve. 2 P.P.C.L.I.'s area was near the village of Sanggwang-ni (7951).

139. A day or so after the relief of 27 Bde, it became clear that the enemy had abandoned his stubborn delaying action and had begun a withdrawal. Seoul was liberated by 1 ROK Div on 16 Mar ("G-3 Ops Report", No. 265). On 19 Mar, Hongchon was captured, 1 Cav Div closing on it from the west and the Marine Div from the east ("Cdn Army Int Review" March 1951, p. 2). Two days later Chunchon fell to 1 Cav Div (<u>ibid</u>). During the last week in March, 187 U.S. Airborne Regt was dropped near Munsan, twenty-five miles north-west of Seoul. Although this drop did not trap as great a number of enemy as had been hoped, it did eliminate an enemy salient in the area south of Munsan (<u>ibid</u>). By 28 Mar, the front line lay approximately 10 miles south of the 38th parallel, except for an enemy salient on the Imjin river in the west, and a South Korean salient north of the parallel on the east coust ("G-3 Ops Report", No. 277).

140. Once again, the question of crossing the 38th parallel began to be discussed within the higher levels of command, and among the members of the United Nations ("The KoreanCrisis", <u>External Affairs</u> Feb - Apr 51). The discussion revealed that, if the U.N. forces were to remain in Korea, two courses of action were open. The first was to try again for complete victory by reinforcement of U.N. forces in Korea, and by authorizing operations outside the borders, particularly operations against the Chinese bases in Manchuria. The second was to accept stalemate or "stabilization of a military position" (<u>House of Commons Debates</u>, L.B. Pearson, 20 Mar 51, p. 1443), in the hope that subsequent negotiations would end the conflict.

141. General MacArthur established himself as protagonist of the first course, and by so doing quickly revealed that the course commanded no support at all among the members of the United Nations. It was proven subsequently, during the great debate on the conduct of the war in Korea which his dismissal provoked, that the course also failed of popular support in the United States. Thus, in effect if not by formal declaration, the United Nations adopted the course of accepting a stalemate and trusting negotiation, as the less undesirable of the two alternatives.

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142. While these discussions were in progress, 27 Britcom Inf Bde was sent into the line again. On 24 Mar it came under operational control of 24 U.S. Inf Div in IX U.S. Corps ("G-3 Ops Report", No 274), and on the following day completed a move west to Pyongmal (5683) in the Division's sector (<u>ibid</u>, No. 275). At that time 24 Div was advancing toward the 38th parallel on an axis to the west of Kapyong (6987), with two R.C.Ts. forward (<u>ibid</u>). On 28 Mar the right team - 19 R.C.T. - was withdrawn. 27 Bde and 21 R.C.T. novedforward, and the Division was then advancing with the Brigade and two R.C.Ts. forward, 27 Bde being in the centre with 5 R.C.T. on its left and 21 R.C.T. on its right (<u>ibid</u>, No. 277). . 143. The Brigade's axis ran up the valley of the Chojong river, a tributary of the Pukhan.* The advance began approximately five miles south of the head of the valley, which at this point in its length ran north and slightly east. The mountains on each side rose to heights of between 2,000 and 4,000 feet, their slopes scalloped with gullies. The crest line was continuous, and roughly paralleled the floor of the valley. Brigade Headquarters planned to move up the valley road, with the battalions clearing the hills on either side. 2 P.P.C.L.I. was given the task of advancing along the crest line to the east of the valley.

At 1420 hrs on 28 Mar, 2 P.P.C.L.I. reached the positions of 3 Bn, 19 R.C.T., the unit it was to relieve. These positions lay on the crest line, 3,000 yards north-east of Porunggol (5887), and gave a view of the terrain over which the unit was to advance. The prospect was not entirely pleasant. Snow lay four to five feet deep on the shaded slopes, and the line of the crest was broken by steep rock faces and cut by gullies. There were no roads on which a vehicle could move, and this circumstance dictated supply by trains of South Korean porters, called "rice burners", and also limited battalion supporting weapons to one section of 81 mm mortars.

145. The advance started from Hill 929 (6090) on 29 Mar, and had passed north over five hills by the end of the month. Fortunately, the unit did not encounter any serious resistance as it scrambled forward over the rocky slopes and plunged through the snow fields. The main problem was supply, and credit for the advance belongs equally to the porters who each night performed almost superhuman feats of endurance to bring the supplies forward. On 31 Mar the advance halted before Hill 1250 (6298). 21 R.C.T. to the right put in an attack on the ridge line dominated by this hill, but failed to take it. They did, however, succeed in getting on Hills 974 (6497) and 834 (6597). It was at the beginning of this advance that Brigadier Rockingham visited 2 P.P.C.L.I. As we have seen (para 103 above) he had left for Japan and Korea on 23 Mar, and six days later he was climbing a steep slope in the area of Hill 929 in search of the forward companies of the Patricias. The Brigadier gained a clear impression of the difficulties of the Korean terrain during this trip, for his guide took him by mistake to a ridge held by the Argylls. As a result, he was forced to descend this thousand-metre ridge and climb another equally high before he found the leading companies of 2 P.P.C.L.I.; it was not until midnight that he began his final descent over the steep, snowcovered slopes. ((H.S.) 410B25.009 (D5): "Comments on draft of Hist Sec Report No 62 by Brigadier Rockingham", 1 Jul 53)

146. By 31 Mar, the Brigade's advance had reached the head of the Chojong walley. As a result it was moved east to the valley of the Kapyong river, to resume its advance north-west up that walley. On 1 Apr, 2 P.P.C.L.I. captured Hill 1250 and took up positions on Hill 974. The other battalions relieved the remaining units of 21 R.C.T. ("G-3 Ops Report", No. 282). On the same day, the boundary of I U.S. Corps was moved east to include the sector of 24 Div, which passed to operational control of the Corps. Next day, 27 Bde was released from control of 24 Div and came directly under IX U.S. Corps (<u>ibid</u>, Nos 282 and 283) The result of these changes was that 27 Bde, in its advance up the Kapyong valley, became left flanking formation of IX U.S. Corps, with 24 U.S. Inf Div of I U.S. Corps on its left, and 6 ROK Div of IX U.S. Corps on its right.

147. During the early part of this operation, 2 P.P.C.L.I. remained in Brigade reserve in the area of Sorakkae (6302), while the other units pushed north-east.

Unless otherwise stated, material in paras 143 to 147 has been derived from W.D., 2 P.P.C.L.I., 28 Mar to 19 Apr 51. On 7 Apr, the unit was given the task of clearing a crest line from Pangnipko-chi (6607) to Point 719 (6410), parallel to a similar line on the left which had already been cleared by the Australians. The unit crossed the 38th parallel on the next day, and on 11 Apr took Point 719. During this advance, casualties from "A" Coy were evacuated by helicopter. On 14 Apr, the Brigade's axis was switched to the north-east. Two days later, 2 P.PiCiLII. captured Hill 826 (6513) on this new axis, while the Australians made a parallel advance on the left. These last advances were made against heavier resistance than had been encountered previously. In view of this fact, and of the additional fact that the Brigade had an open right flank, no further advance was attempted. The Brigade contented itself with limited patrol activity until it was relieved by troops of 6 ROK Div, which came up on the right and took over on 19 Apr. On relief, the formation moved to an area immediately north of Kapyong, in Corps reserve.

148. When troops of 6 ROK Div relieved 27 Bde on 19 Apr, the entire front of IX U.S. Corps lay north of the 38th parallel. The other Corps of Eighth U.S. Army had also crossed this line, the only sector still to the south being the left flank of I U.S. Corps. This flank from a point below the junction of the Imjin and Hantan rivers, ran south-west away from the parallel, following a line two or three thousand yards below the south bank of the Imjin (<u>Ibid</u>, No. 299).

THE CHINESE APRIL OFFENSIVE IN THE WEST (22 APR - 1 MAY 51). 27 BRITCOM INF BDE IN THE KAPYONG ACTION (23 - 26 APR 51).**

149. During the advance to the 38th parallel, evidence had accumulated of a formidable enemy build-up in the area north of the line Chorwon-Hwachon, opposite I and IX U.S. Corps ("Cdn Army Int Review", April 1951, pp 1 and 2). Just before midnight on 22 Apr, Chinese and North Korean troops launched an offensive from this area against the two Corps, both of which were ordered to withdraw ("G-3 Ops Report", No. 303). In the sector of IX U.S. Corps, with which this narrative is principally concerned, the attack fell on 19 and 2 ROK Regts of 6 ROK Div, in their positions seven or eight miles north of the sector (para 147 above) in which 27 Bde had been relieved (<u>ibid</u>, Nos 303 and 304). The record of the movements and operations of the Division during the next four days is not clear. In spite of this uncertainty, some developments which were reported to G.E.C. in Tokyo (<u>ibid</u>, Nos 303 to 308) are outlined below, for the reason that they concerned, or came intimately to concern, the operations of 27 Bde.

150. The first shock of the attack hurled the two Regiments some 10 miles south, where they are reported as having established positions by 1130 hrs on 23 Apr. The positions of 19 ROK Regt were three miles south of the line on which 27 Bde had been relieved, and in its former sector (para 147 above), while those

*The daily reports from the U.N. Comd give the date of this relief as 17 Apr ("G-3 Ops Report" No. 297) but there is no doubt that it actually took place on the 19th, as stated in W.D., 2 P.P.C.L.I., 19 Apr 51.

**Geographical detail mentioned in this section is shown in Maps 5 and 10. of 2 ROK Regt extended the line four miles to the right (<u>ibid</u>, No. 303). A further retreat of eight miles followed. 7 ROK Regt, which had been in reserve, joined this retreat after an abortive move north to assist the other two Regiments (<u>ibid</u>). By 1930 hours, the Regiments had halted this withdrawal and had begun to move north, to positions some four miles forward (<u>ibid</u>). Here they appear to have been put to complete rout and sent streaming down the Kapyong valley (<u>ibid</u>, Nos 304 to 306).

151. Had 27 Bde's reserve area been selected with some such eventuality as this rout of 6 ROK Div in mind, it could not have been better chosen to place the Brigade near a position in which it could hold open an escape route. The reserve area lay in the valley of the Kapyong river, north-west of its junction with the Pukhan and immediately north of the town of Kapyong (6987). At this point the valley was 3000 yards wide, but to the north of the Brigade area, the hills on either side converged, and the valley, thus narrowed, turned north-east for four miles. The river flowed down this stretch in three sweeping curves, dominated by Hill 677 (6893) on the west and Hill 504 (7493) on the east. Opposite Hill 504, the valley turned sharply north-west for three miles. At this bend, an unnamed stream entered the Kapyong from the north-east from the village of Somok-tong (7294). As the Kapyong valley turned north-west, it ran across the north-east face of the lower slopes of Hill 677, which thus dominated both arms of the valley. In addition, the north-west arm was dominated by Hill 794 (6996), almost due north across the river from Hill 677. Between these two hills, the valley narrowed sharply, and then opened again as it continued to its head, some ten miles to the north-west. Continuous crest lines ran west from Hill 677 and east from Hill 504, connecting in both cases with north-south crest lines and furnishing an avenue of approach to both hills.

152. This was the area in which 27 Bde was ordered to establish a defensive position in order to hold open a route along which 6 ROK Div could withdraw.* The Middlesex, with three companies, were given the high ground in the vicinity of Hill 794; the Australians, with 72 U.S. Tk Coy attached, were to cover the area north and east of the bend in the river, in positions extending to Hill 504. 2 P.P.C.L.I. was to hold Hill 677. Since the enemy had shown a disturbing tendency to invade the gun areas and interrupt the gunners at their work, one company of the Middlesex was detached to protect a troop of 16 N.Z. Fd Regt, which was in support of 19 ROK Regt.

153. The Australians were the first to be attacked. They had deployed in their positions by 2000 hrs, 23 Apr, and two hours later the two companies on the ridge running north-east from the village of Somok-tong were heavily engaged. It is worth noting, as an example of the enemy's tactic of developing the attack in depth, that 2 and 19 ROK Regts were being smashed at

^{*}Unless otherwise stated, all material in paras 152 to 160 is derived from W.D., 2 P.P.C.L.I., 22 Apr to 1 May 51.

almost the same time, seven miles further north (para 150 above). The attacks on the ridge were beaten off, and the enemy then diverted his main effort to the Australian companies holding the high ground leading to Hill 504. These attacks continued throughout the night and by 0900 hrs 24 Apr, the C.O. was forced to relinquish control to his Company Commanders, to bring their troops out as best they could. Battalion Headquarters moved to a position within the area held by the Middlesex, who had withdrawn from their exposed position on Hill 794 and taken a stand on the high ground within the southernmost of the three curves of the Kapyong river. 72 Tk Goy made eleven trips from the former Australian position to evacuate the wounded, a task which was completed by 1400 hrs. During the engagement, the Australian casualties totalled 155.

154. Meanwhile, 1 Cav Div, which was in Army reserve, had despatched 5 R.C.T. to Kapyong. The formation was attached to the Brigade with effect 1800 hrs, 24 Apr, and at the same time took up positions in rear of 2 P.P.C.L.I. and the Middlesex, in the general area of the junction of the Pukhan and Kapyong rivers ("G-3 Ops Report", No. 304).

155. Until the withdrawal of the Australians, 2 P.P.C.L.I. had remained relatively undisturbed. The unit had deployed to cover the north face of Hill 677, with "A" Coy at 700935, "B" Coy at 682947, "C" Coy at 692938 and "D" Coy at 682933, Tactical Headquarters opened near Tungmudae (7092) at 0400 hrs, 24 Apr, but the companies had already been on the ground for some six hours. At 0700 hrs, enemy were detected immediately in rear of the Headquarters. To meet this threat, the C.O. moved "B" Coy south, to a hill at 706927 immediately east of Tactical Headquarters. Tanks of 72 Tk Coy, by this time engaged in supporting the withdrawal of the Australians and evacuating their wounded, opened fire on the Company as it occupied the hill, wounding one man slightly. In this new position, "B" Coy observed enemy movement to the north and east, in the area of the village of Naechon (7092). This movement increased, and by 2200 hrs the forward platoon of "B" Coy was under attack. It was overrun during this push, but most of the men were able to fight their way back to the main Company position, which succeeded in stopping the enemy thrust. At the same time as the attack was in progress against "B" Coy, a small group of enemy was machine gunned out of the valley behind Tactical Headquarters, and shortly afterwards a larger body was caught in the same fire as it forded the Kapyong at 702919. During the attack on "B" Coy, Private Wayne Robert Mitchell, a Bren gunner, distinguished himself by the skill and resolution which he displayed in performing his fire tasks. For this action, he was subsequently awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal (P.N. 263-51, "Citation, Pte Wayne Robert Mitchell").

156. At 0130 hrs, 25 Apr, movement was heard in the "D" Coy area, in the vicinity of 10 Pl which was covering the ridge leading to Hill 677 from the west. This movement was followed by an attack which, one hour later, had enclosed the Platoon on three sides. The same attack partially overran the area of 12 Pl, and both members of the crew of a medium machine-gun which was supporting 10 Pl from the 12 Pl area were killed at their posts. By 0300 hrs, 12 Pl had been driven back to Company Headquarters, and 10 Pl had been cut off. At this critical moment the Company Commander, Capt J.G.W. Mills requested the artillery to lay down defensive fire right on top of his Coy H.Q. and succeeded in stemming the enemy's advance. Undeterred by the reverse, the enemy persisted in attempting to invade the Company area from the west, but was driven off each time by artillery fire. At last, with the approach of daylight, the attack subsided and 12 Pl was able to reestablish itself between 10 Pl and Company Headquarters. The "D" Coy area had been maintained intact, and Capt Mills was awarded the Military Cross for his bravery (P.N. 171-51, "Citation, Capt John Graham Wallace Mills"). Pte K.F. Barwise of the same company was also awarded the Military Medal for the courage he displayed during the reoccupation of the 12 Pl position, in particular for his single-handed recapture, of the M.M.G. (P.N. 322-51, "Citation, Pte Kenneth Francis Barwise").

157. By contrast with the preceding night, the daylight hours of 25 Apr were quiet. 10 Pl held its lonely hill, well out from the rest of the company. Although subjected to heavy fire, it remained free from attack, as did the other sectors of the battalion perimeter: It appeared, however, that the Battalion was surrounded, the area at the base of the position, through which supply vehicles would pass, being definitely held by the enemy. Failing normal supply, Lt-Col Stone requested an air drop, which was made at 1030 hrs. At 1400 hrs patrols from "B" Coy reported the road clear, and the C.O. requested that additional supplies be brought up by vehicles as soon as possible. The Middlesex are reported ("G-3 Ops Report", No 305) as having cleared enemy groups from the rear of 2 P.P.C.L.I.'s position by 0900 hrs, but no further information on this action is available.

158. By late afternoon of the 25th, the area was quiet, and the Battalion was able to take stock of the situation. The record it surveyed was good. It had maintained its positions intact, and these positions covered what may safely be considered the ground vital to the defence of the Brigade area. In addition, its relatively light casualties of 10 killed and 23 wounded ((H.S.) 133.065 (D 578), vol 1, "Korean Cas") testified to the skill with which the position had been organized and defended: Lt-Col Stone's outstanding leadership during this action was subsequently mentioned in the Citation to the award of a second bar to his Distinguished Service Order (P.N. 53-52, "Citation, Lt-Col James Riley Stone D.S.O., M.C.").

159. At 2359 hrs that night, H.Q. 28 Britcom Inf Bde took over from H.Q. 27 Britcom Inf Bde. Previously, on 23 Apr the Argylls had been relieved by 1st Battalion, The King's Own Scottish Borderers ("G-3 Ops Report", Nos 304 and 306).

160. The remainder of the story is quickly told. On 26 Apr, 28 Bde was relieved by 5 R.C.T., 1 Bn relieving 2 P.P.C.L.I. On relief, the Brigade moved south-west, to an area north of the junction of the Chojong and Pukhan rivers, near the village of Nongol (6279). From Nongol the Chojong valley runs generally north on a course parallel to that of the Kapyong, and ten miles west of it. 24 Div, which had been on the left of 6 ROK Div, had been conducting a withdrawal on an

*As a result of this relief, neither battalion was actively committed in the Kapyong action. axis parallel to that of the South Korean formation ("G-3 Ops Report", Nos 302 to 312). In its latter stages, this withdrawal followed the Chojong river, and the positions of 28 Bde were sited to cover the southern end of the route, at the point where it turned south-west down the valley of the Pukhan. On 27 Apr, the boundary between I and IX U.S. Corps was moved west; 24 Div came under operational control of IX Corps and was given control of 28 Bde and 6 ROK Div (<u>ibid</u>, No. 307). The Brigade moved again on the same day; and established positions south of the junction of the Kuun and Pukhan rivers, covering the withdrawal of 24 Div down the Pukhan. Next day the Brigade came under control of IX Corps and completed a move to a reserve area near Yangpyong 30 miles due east of Seoul where it remained until the end of April. On 1 May, it came under operational control of 24 Div (<u>ibid</u>, No. 311) and relieved 19 R.C.T. in positions on the Han river near Tokso-ri, 10 miles due east of Seoul.

161. The gallant stand of 3 R.A.R. and 2 P.P.C.L.I. at Kapyong was later recognized, when both these units were awarded Presidential Citations. "A" Coy, 72 Hy Tk Bn was also included, in view of the support which it had given during the operation. These Citations indicate the value of the action fought by these units in making possible a more or less orderly withdrawal, and preventing a complete collapse of the front in the Kapyong area ((H.S.) 145.2P7065 (D1); "Citation, 2 P.P.C.L.I., Korea").

162. By 1 May the enemy offensive had ended and the withdrawal of Eighth U.S. Army had stopped. The front line, in comparison with that of 22 Apr, had changed noticeably. On the latter date, it had followed the south bank of the Imjin to the point where the river turns sharply north at its junction with the Hantan. Here the line rose to the area of Yonchon, and then ran east to the coast at Yangyang. On 1 May, the fronts of I and IX Corps lay 40 miles south of Yonchon. In the Secul area, a semi-circle of defensive positions had been occupied north of the city, with each end resting on the Han river. To the east of Secul, the line ran to the south bank of the Han, cutting off the tip of a sweeping northward loop in the river. To the right of this loop the line ran due east and then north-east to Sabangu. From Sabangu it continued to rise northeast to positions on the coast immediately north of Yangyang. ("G-3 Ops Report", Nos 302 and 311)

163. In I Corps, I R.O.K. Div had completed a withdrawal from positions south of the Imjin to the western sector of the defensive line north of Seoul. To its right, 1 Cav Div held positions in the line astride the Seoul-Uijongbu road. 25 Div had retreated from positions on the Uijongbu-Kumhwa road approximately 20 miles north of the 38th parallel to a sector east of 1 Cav Div, its area including the territory within the northward loop of the Han east of Seoul. 29 Indep Inf Bde Gp, having fought a most gallant defensive action in the area of the Imjin-Hantan junction, had retreated to positions on the Kimpo peninsula. 3 U.S. Inf Div was in reserve, having been roughly used by the enemy during its withdrawal from the Yonchon area, before being replaced by 1 Cav Div. (<u>ibid</u>, Nos 302 to 311)

164. The boundary between I and IX Corps crossed the Han at the tip of the northward loop. In the IX Corps sector, 24 Div was on the left. The Division had ended its withdrawal from positions east of the Uijongbu-Kumhwa road by deploying on both sides of the Pukhan river, north of its junction with the Han. Within its sector, 2 P.P.C.L.I. was on the extreme left, in the area of Tokso-ri and just east of the tip of the northward loop. 6 R.O.K. Div lay to the right of 24 Div, the South Korean formation having apparently recovered sufficiently from its defeat west of Hwachon to enter the line again. 1 Marine Div, on the right of the IX Corps front, held a line running north-east to the boundary with X Corps immediately east of Sabangu.

165. On completion of the withdrawal, comparative quiet settled over the front. In the west, I and IX Corps dug, mined and wired their positions against a possible resumption of the Chinese offensive. (W.D., 2 P.P.C.L.I., 1 to 20 May 51) To the north, the Chinese shifted their forces east, in a move which proved to be preparatory to a blow at the eastern end of the line (paras 173 and 174 below). Meanwhile, on the broad Pacific, 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp drew closer and closer to the inhospitable shores of Korea.

THE THIRD U.N. ADVANCE TO THE 38th PARALLEL. ROLE OF 25 CDN INF BDE GP AND 2 P.P.C.L.I. IN THIS ADVANCE, AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS TO 27 JUL 51.

166. The Marine Adder and the General Patrick docked at Pusan on 4 May 51, and completed unloading on the following day (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 4 and 5 May 51). On the 6th, the <u>President Jackson</u> landed 2 Cdn Adm Unit, 25 Cdn Rft Gp and associated signals, movement control, postal and dental units at Kure in Japan (W.D., 25 Cdn Rft Gp, 6 Apr 51; Appx "3", "U.S.S. <u>President Jackson</u> - Debarkation Plan for 6 May 51"). Brigadier Rockingham met the troops who landed at Pusan. He had flown from Vancouver on 24 Apr, arriving in Tokyo on the 26th, and had spent the interval between his arrival and that of the Brigade in liaison visits to C.M.M.F.E. and the U.N. Comd in Tokyo, as well as to H.Q. Eighth U.S. army in Taegu. In Pusan he found it necessary to visit Brigadier General Paul F. Yount, the Commanding General of the port of Pusan, to arrange for a more speedy unloading of the Brigade's equipment. ("Weekly Summary", Nos 28 and 29)

167. On arrival, the units were transported to various staging camps in the Pusan area, where they spent the next six days in drawing stores and equipment, and removing the preservative which had been placed on them for the ocean voyage (<u>ibid</u>, Nos 29 and 30). During this time the front was quiet across the whole of the peninsula, the situation which existed on collapse of the Chinese offensive continuing substantially unchanged all along the line ("G-3 Ops Report", Nos 315 to 325). Several changes in the equipment to be used in operations were made during this period, the most notable being the conversion of the armoured squadron from M 10 selfpropelled anti-tank guns to Sherman tanks, and the issue to the infantry battalions of 75 mm recoilless rifles in lieu of 17 pounder towed anti-tank guns (<u>ibid</u>, No 30; W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 6 May 51). 168. The first of these changes resulted from an important modification of the view held as to the role of the squadron. Previously, the unit's primary role had been considered to be the anti-tank defence of the Brigade area. In preparation for tasks associated with such a role, the squadron had been equipped with selfpropelled anti-tank guns, and had trained in deployment for anti-tank defence. However Brigadier Rockingham

for anti-tank defence. However Brigadier Rockingham considered it necessary for the infantry to get the experience of being supported by tanks in the attack and defence, and had ordered the squadron to conduct tank/ infantry training in Fort Lewis, using its self-propelled guns as tanks for this purpose ((H.S.) 410B25.013 (D 22), "Interview with Brigadier Rockingham, 1000 hrs 17 Nov 52".)

169. On arrival in Korea, the Brigadier learned that very few enemy tanks were being encountered, and that tank support of infantry was essential. In addition, he discovered that tank-ambushing parties, for whose grenades the open turret of the M 10 would provide a convenient receptacle, were active at the front, and even along the lines of communication. In view of these facts, he sought and obtained authority from A.H.Q. to re-equip the squadron with Sherman tanks. This change made possible the employment of the squadron in tank support of infantry, and at the same time left unchanged its capacity to provide anti-tank defence of the Brigade area, should it become necessary to do so (<u>ibid</u>).

170. On 11 May, training exercise "CHARLEY HORSE" began. It was designed to harden the troops and practise them in the tactics and procedures to be followed during an attack in mountainous country. The two infantry battalions put their companies through the exercise in turn, the last company of 2 R. 22e R. going through on Tuesday, 15 May ("Weekly Summary", No. 30). Immediately afterward, the Brigade began to move north, on the track of 2 R.C.H.A. which had preceded the formation and put its gun groups into action on 17 May in support of 28 Britcom Inf Bde (para 164 above) on the Han river (W.D., 2 R.C.H.A., 17 May 51).

171. The orders for the Brigade's move provided that wheeled vehicles, carrying as many troops as possible, would move by road and that the remaining soldiers, with tanks, heavy engineer equipment and miscellaneous vehicles would travel by rail, parties leaving on the 16th, 17th and 18th. Elements of the Brigade going by road would travel in three groups, the first leaving on 15 May and the other two on the 16th and 17th. The road to be followed was the main supply route via Pusan - Taegu -Taejon - Suwon, and the concentration area lay near Kumnyangjang-ni, ten miles east of Suwon.* The road move was expected to be completed on 19 May, but no arrival time was given for the parties travelling by rail, who would require to be transported from Suwon to the Brigade concentration area (4.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, May51, Appx "11", "Nov to Conc Area", 12 May 51; <u>ibid</u>, "Rail MovInstr No. 1 Cdn, Pusan - Suwon")

172. Had the front remained as quiet during and immediately after the Brigade's move as it had been since the arrival in Pusan, the formation would have had a good

*Map 1.

chance to get its feet well.under it before going into the line. Events, however, did not move that way. The Brigade's movement coincided with two important developments at the front, both of which, as will be seen later, operated together to cause a good deal of uncertainty and scurrying to and fro during the period immediately preceding the Brigade's first action.

173. The first change in the situation occurred on the dentral and eastern sectors of the front, which came under heavy attack around the middle of the month, just as the Brigade was starting to move north. This attack developed from normal contacts, which increased in number and severity until, by 16 or 17 May, it was apparent that an enemy attack - and perhaps an offensive was in progress.* Prior to this attack, the affected sector ran almost due north-east from a point 15 miles west of Hongchon to the coast at Taepo-ri. This line was held by X Corps, III ROK Corps and I ROK Corps. The main weight of the push appears to have been directed against III ROK Corps in the centre. This hapless formation, already roughly handled in a previous offensive (para 120 above), was this time smashed so completely that the front of X Corps had to be extended to that of I ROK Corps on 22 May, to fill the gap created by the destruction of III ROK Corps. By 23 May, the enemy had achieved his maximum gains. At that time the line ran west from Kangnung near the coast to Hajinbu-ri, from there northwest to the area of Chaun-ni whence it fell south-west to the X Corps left boundary at a point 10 miles north of Hongchon. ("G-3 Ops Report", Nos 325 to 335).

174. Except for the collapse of the South Korean divisions, the retreat appears to have been a reasonably orderly affair, each division withdrawing through blocking positions, behind a screen of mobile task forces whose mission was to delay and harass the advancing enemy. 3 U.S. Inf Div was taken from army reserve in the Seoul area and placed under command of X Corps, which deployed it on the right of the Corps front. Here it conducted a withdrawal from positions north-west of Hajinbu-ri to positions immediately west of that centre. The Division appears to have bolstered the most seriously threatened sector, taking under command such South Korean units as remained operational and generally filling a large part of the gap created by the disintegration of III ROK Corps. By 24 May, the Chinese attack had lost its momentum completely, and advances of X Corps and 1 ROK Corps are recorded as these formations joined the attack which was already in progress on the western end of the line (ibid).

175. This advance in the west, on the fronts of I and IX U.S. Corps, constituted the second important change to develop in the situation at the time of the move of 25 Bde. The attack began on 20 May, the morning after the last units of the Brigade reached the concentration area. As will be seen later (para 182 below), it provided relief to the tense situation in which the Chinese offensive in the east had placed the Brigadier, but it deprived the formation of any

*For geographical detail mentioned in paras 173 and 174, see Map 10 - "Chinese Offensive - Eastern Sector". opportunity of getting its first taste of battle in a defensive position on a relatively quiet sector, as had seemed possible a fortnight previously. Instead of static defence, the Brigade found itself taking part in a general advance of Eighth U.S. army on the 38th parallel, the third of such advances.

176. As in the case of the second movement of the U.N. forces on the 38th parallel (para 126 above), it is extremely difficult to derive from the sources now available any clear idea of the development, on Army level, of this third advance. The only information at hand at the time of writing on operations above the level of brigade or equivalent formation are the daily reports on operations from the United Nations Command, with an incomplete set of similar documents from Army, and scattered reports from some of the Corps, the latter two sources being attached as Appendices to the War Diary of H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde. A study of these situation reports would appear to justify the conclusion -or impression - that the advance was largely a matter of regimental groups moving forward abreast, with due regard for progress on the flanks. The majority of the actions recorded are advances to contact, followed by contact engagements on regimental or, more frequently, battalion and company level. There do not appear to have been any of the corps or army battles for heavily defended lines, such as characterized the fighting on the comparable terrain of Italy during the Second World War, nor were there any sweeping manoeuvres on divisional level or higher to encircle enemy forces or seize vital centres of communication. The record of the operations of Canadian troops during this advance reinforces the impression that each formation of brigade size ran its own show within its boundaries, the effect of the The record of the operations operations of adjacent troops being purely local.

177. A second source of difficulty in recording the advance from the point of view of the higher formations lies in the fact that the object of the operation is not stated in the material available. Previously, on the occasion of the second EUSAK advance to the parallel, the United Nations appear to have been more disposed to accept military stalemate and to trust to negotiations than to expand the war in the hope of reaching a decision. Since that time, nothing had been done in the way of authorizing an expansion of the Korean War, from which it might be deduced that the majority opinion in the U.N. still favoured stabilization of the military situation, and negotiation. If this was the case, and if the U.N. Comd responded to this trend of opinion, then the most logical object would have been to occupy the best defensive line in the vicinity of the 38th parallel, at the lowest cost in casualties to U.N. troops and the highest to the aggressor force. A final statement on this question, however, must await the gaining of access to the records of the U.N. Comd.

178. It is equally difficult to describe the operations of the enemy. The contacts recorded are those normally associated with a withdrawal, and it appears reasonably certain, from the fact that Eighth Army did not have to mount any major "set-piece" attacks, that the Chinese and North Koreans were prepared to surrender ground to and even immediately north of the parallel. However the possibility that the enemy intended to hold further south than he actually did, and failed for lack of tank, artillery and air support must be noted. In other words, the comparatively minor engagements which were fought do not necessarily indicate that the enemy's intention was to conduct a withdrawal. They might equally well indicate lack of power in the defence. Whatever the enemy's intention, the important fact is that he did not — or was not able — to impose more than a harassing and delaying effect, of a local nature, on the U.N. advance.

179. These tentative conclusions as to the nature of the U.N. advance, if accepted, dictate the plan for any record of it. The advance appears to have been a movement forward of regimental groups, strung out abreast across the peninsula, against opposition which each group was able to overcome by itself or in conjunction with its immediate flanking regiments. It would seem, further, that the action in any one regimental sector substantially mirrored that which took place in other sectors. Consequently, a description of the action on the fronts manned by Canadian troops becomes, in extension, a description of the advance as a whole. The following account therefore concentrates almost exclusively on the fighting of Canadians, and only touches on the front as a whole when it becomes necessary to record the position of the front line on any particular day.

180. This advance, however, was still in the future as 25 Bde crawled up the road towards Suwon and Kumnyangjang-ni. Brigadier Rockingham had preceded the formation, in order to acquaint himself with the task assigned to the Brigade, and supervise the preparations for its reception. On Thursday, 17 May, he attended what appears to have been a briefing conference presided over by Lt-Gen James A. Van Fleet, the Commanding General of Eighth U.S. Army. Lt-Gen Frank Milburn and Maj-Gen Hoag, Commanding Generals of I and IX Corps respectively, also attended, with the Commanders of 3, 24 and 25 U.S. Inf Divs. General Van Fleet stated that a full-scale enemy attack appeared to be developing on the central sector, and that he was ordering 3 Div to Wonju, as reserve for X Corps. One of the formation's regiments, the 65th, was holding positions on the south bank of the Han river, in the loop south of Tokso-ri'; and he proposed to have 25 Bde replace this Regiment. He asked when the Brigade would be ready and, on being told by Brigadier Rockingham that the formation was still on the move, but could be deployed by last light on Sunday, the 20th, he agreed to the timing (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 15, 16 and 17 May 51).

181. Subsequently, however, something went wrong with this arrangement, and the Brigadier was ordered to commit the Brigade by 0900 hrs on 19 May. When the order was received, the formation was still on the move, 2 R.C.R. being due in at 0200 hrs, 19 May. The other two battalions were at least two hours behind 2 R.C.R. In addition, the infantry, who were travelling by train, had only their rifles and fifty rounds of armunition with them. Their wireless sets, mortars, aircraft recognition panels, spare ammunition and so forth were being moved by road, and would require to be distributed to the units on arrival -- and the time of this arrival was by no means certain. In view of this situation, Brigadier Rocking ham protested the order, on the ground

*For geographical detail mentioned in paras 181, 182, see Map 9 and Map 10 -- "Chinese offensive -- Eastern Sector". that his troops would not have sufficient time to prepare for action. Throughout the night 18/19 May, the Chiefs of Staff at Corps and Army continued to repeat the order, which the Brigadier continued to protest, suggesting at one stage that he was prepared to be relieved of his command rather than commit his troops before they were ready. Although he did not resort to his direct channel to the C.G.S. (para 104 above) on this occasion, he very nearly did so. ((H.S.) 410B25.013 (D22), "Interview with Brigadier Rockingham, 1000 hrs 17 Nov 52; (H.S.) 410B25. 009 (D5): "Comments on draft of Hist Sec Report No 62 by Brigadier Rockingham", 1 Jul 53)

182. Fortunately, the dispute did not come to final issue, for on 19 May the plan for relief of 65 R.C.T. by 25 Bde was cancelled, though 65 R.C.T. was still to vacate its position on 20 May and move east as part of 3 Div (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 19 May 51). The Brigade was placed under operational control of I U.S. Corps ("G-3 Ops Report", No. 329) and ordered to a concentration area near Haechon, immediately south of the 65th's positions (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde., 19 May 51). There it was to await final assignment of a task in the Corps offensive which was to commence at 0530 hrs on 20 May (ibid).

183. The general tactical situation of I Corps at the beginning of this attack did not differ materially from that which had existed on termination of the Chinese offensive in April (para 163 above)* The I Corps line ran generally 5 to 10 miles north of Seoul, but dipped southeeast to its intersection with the boundary between I and IX Corps at a point which was now north of the loop in the Han, east of Seoul. The inter-corps boundary had been projected north-east from this junction, and the I Corps zone extended from the west coast to this boundary. Within the Corps zone, 1 ROM Div was on the left, with, to the east, 1 Cav Div and 25 Inf Div. 29 Indep Inf Bde Gp still held positions on the Kimpo peninsula ("G-3 Ops Report, No. 239). 25 Bde, as we have seen, was in Corps reserve, on orders to concentrate in the Haechon area and be prepared to support the advance of 1 Cav Div or 25 Div if the offensive went well. If it did not succeed, or suffered a reverse, the Brigade was to occupy the positions which would be vacated by 65 R.C.T. when it moved east on the 20th (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 19 May 51; Appx "12", "Notes for Comd's '0' Gp", 20 May 51). One source ("Cdn Army Int Review", June 1951, p.1) states that the aim of the attack, at this stage, was to relieve the pressure on the central and eastern fronts.

184. By midnight of 23 May, 1 Corps had made important gains. 1 ROK Div was in Munsan, 1 Cav Div had advanced to a line three or four miles north of Uijongbu, and 25 Div had conformed on its right, although 25 Div's front inclined to the south-east. To the east, IX Corps had made a similar advance (paras 197 and 199 below) and X Corps and 1 ROK Corps had ceased their retreat and were to make advances next day ("G-3 Ops Report", Nos 333 and 334). Thus, on 24 May, what had been a diversionary effort on the part of I and IX U.S. Corps became a general Army "bounce-back" offensive, in which X Corps and I ROK Corps joined ("Cdn Army Int Review", June 1951, p.1). In the sectors of I and IX Corps three report lines were established. The northernmost of these -- "KANSAS" -- ran from Munsan in the west to the point where the Seoul-Uijongbu-Yonchon road crossed the 38th parallel. From this point it followed the

*For geographical detail mentioned in paras 183, 184, see Map 10 -- "Third U.N. Advance". parallel east (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, June 1951, Appx "5", A.M.S., L 552 (Second Edition), KOREA, 1:250,000, Sheet NJ 52-9 (SEOUL), "Overprint Covering Corps and Divisional Boundaries and Report Lines"; <u>ibid</u>, Appx "8", "25 Div Op Instr No. 170", 24 May 51).

185. On that same day, 25 Bde was placed under command of 25 Div, and moved from Haechon to an assembly area north-east of Uijongbu, near Sunae-ri (3583).* The 10th Battalion Combat Team, Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea (10 B.C.T.), which had been placed under command of the Brigade, moved with it, and 2 R.C.H.A. came under command once again (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 24 May 51).

186. By midnight on 24 May, 25 Div's tactical situation was as follows. The Division's left boundary ran generally parallel to the Secul-Uijongbu-Yonchon road, and approximately 5000 yards east of it. Since it was the right-flanking division of I Corps, its right boundary fell on the inter-corps boundary as previously described. Within this sector, the Division was advancing with three regiments forward. 35 R.C.T. was on the left, 1st Turkish Armed Forces Command (1 T.A.F.C.) in the centre and 24 R.C.T. on the right. The interregimental boundaries divided the Division's front into three approximately equal portions. In general, light opposition had been encountered since the attack began on the 20th, engagements on company level being most frequently reported. On the 24th, the three forward formations had continued to move north against light opposition, and by midnight were on a line generally parallel to that which they had held 24 hours previously, and three or four miles further north. (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, May 1951: Appx "8", "Periodic Ops Report -25 Div", Nos 40, 43, 44 and 48)

187. The plan (<u>ibid</u>, June 1951: Appx "8", "25 Div Op Instr No. 170", 24 May 51) for the operations of 25 Div on 25 May did not involve any important departures from those followed during the preceding days of the attack. The advance was to be continued through Phase Lines "TOPEKA", "QUEBEC", "MONTREAL" and "KANSAS", the last-named being on the 38th parallel. 25 Bde was to pass through 1 T.A.F.C., which would clear its zone to the 89 northing grid-line prior to relief, and "press attack aggressively in zone 250800 K May 51 to Phase Line TOPEKA, prepared to continue the attack to Phase Line QUEBEC, MONTREAL and KANSAS on order" (<u>ibid</u>, para 4 (a)). The Brigade was to "employ armour in vigorous thrusts to keep enemy off balance" (<u>ibid</u>, para 4 (c)), an admonition which occurred frequently in the Operations Instructions of 25 Div.

188. Task Force "DOLVIN" was formed (<u>ibid</u>, para 6), commanded by Lt Col Welborn Dolvin (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, May 1951, Appx "4", "Ops Log", 24 2200 and 24 2210 May 51; The Secretary of the Army, <u>Official Army Register</u>, Vol 1, <u>United States Army Active and Retired Lists</u>, <u>1 Jan 50</u> (Washington, 1950)), and composed of three companies of a tank battalion, one infantry battalion, a company of engineers, a tactical air control party and a signals detachment. Its task was to move from its assembly area not later than 0730 hrs on 25 May and

*For geographical detail mentioned in paras 185 to 188, see Map 9. "execute rapid Inf-Armored thrust to seize and secure Objective A" (ibid, para 6 (b)) which it was to hold until a link-up had been effected by the main forces. Objective "A" lay on the 38th parallel, within the boundaries of 25 Bde, and 25 Bde's task was to follow the Task Force in a bold thrust to Line "KANSAS" on the 38th parallel, where strong defensive positions were to be established (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 24 May 51). It may be remarked in passing that this device of sending a task force in advance of the infantry, presumably to shake up the enemy and hamper his withdrawal, was widely employed across the front during the third advance on the parallel, and had also been generally used during the second advance.

189. The valley of the Pochon ran up the Brigade's zone, and Brigadier Rockingham planned (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 24 May 51) to move his Headquarters up the valley road, 2 R.C.R. clearing the heights on the left and 2 R. 22e R. those on the right" Each battalion was to have a troop of tanks under command, and a detachment of engineers to accompany it. This, the Brigade's first operation, was given the codename "INITIATE", and its resemblance to the operations of 27 Bde should be noted.

190. Starting somewhat later than was planned;* the Brigade moved off at 0930 hrs 25 May, following Task Force "DOLVIN" (<u>ibid</u>, 25 May 51). No opposition was encountered until mid-afternoon, when 2 R.C.R. was fired on by a small party of enemy on Hill 407 (4197). 2 R. 22e R. also made contact during the day with a small force immediately north of Hill 329 (4593). At last light both battalions occupied tight defensive positions north of Changgo-ri (4295) (<u>bbid</u>). The advance continued a further 4000 yards up the valley next day. 2 R.C.R. on the left encountered some opposition, but 2 R. 22e R.'s only contact was with stragglers and deserters (<u>ibid</u>, 26 May 51). On 27 May the Brigade established positions covering Line "KANSAS", after a further advance which was made without contact (<u>ibid</u>, 27 May 51). The Canadians took over from Task Force "DOLVIN" the following day, on high ground overlooking the 38th parallel in the area west of Samdalbat (4705). On the same day, a tank/infantry patrol from "C" Sqn Ld S.H. (R.C.) and 10 B.C.T. moved forward six miles north of the parallel, but made no contact (<u>ibid</u>, 28 May 51).

191. Operation "FOLLOWUP", an advance by the Brigade north of the 38th parallel, began on 29 May, with 10 B.C.T. left and 2 R. 22e R. right. It covered the route already reconnoitred by the patrol of the previous day, and halted at Unchon (4915), where it encountered its first opposition (<u>ibid</u>, 29 May 51). It would appear that the enemy's time-table of withdrawal was being disrupted to a certain extent, for tanks of "C" Sqn, which were moving on the left with 10 B.C.T., discovered a large abandoned dump of gasoline and ammunition (<u>ibid</u>). The advance was to be resumed on the 30th with 10 B.C.T. on the left and 2 R.C.R. on the right. Since Hill 467 (5016), the probable source of the fire encountered on the previous day, dominated 2 R.C.R.'s axis of advance, a plan

*For geographical detail mentioned in paras 189 to 196, see Map 6.

**The late start is explained by the fact that Task Force "DOLVIN" was in such a state of disorder as it crossed both its own start line and that of 25 Bde that Brigadier Rockingham withheld his attack until the Force was clear, to avoid increasing the confusion ((H.S.) 410B25.009 (D5): "Comments on draft of Hist Sec Report No 62 by Brigadier Rockingham", 1 Jul 53. was made to put in a battalion attack on this feature. "A" Coy 2 R.C.R. was to push rapidly up the road to the west of the hill and capture the village of Chail-li (5018); "B" Coy was to cover the left flank by occupying positions on Hill 162 (4817), while "C" Coy was given the task of capturing Hill 269 (5017), which lay between Chail-li and Hill 467 ((E.S.) 145.2R13013 (D2), "Report on Battle of Chail-li", 17 Jan 52). The main assault, that on Hill 467, was assigned to "D" Coy (ibid).

192. The account (ibid) of this action clearly shows that the advance had reached a line which the enemy was determined to hold, at least for a period. "A", "B" and "C" Coys got on to their objectives with relative ease, but "D" Coy encountered the fiercest resistance from troops markedly superior to the bedraggled specimens which had been encountered earlier in the advance. At the same time that "D" Coy was having a difficult time on Hill 467, "A" Coy in the village of Chail-li came under attack. Rain, mist and wind assisted the enemy, who worked toward the spur bordering the road on the southern outskirts of the village, interposing themselves between "C" and "A" Coys, each of whom thought, when it saw the movement, that the other was occupying the spur.

193. During the attack on "A" Coy in Chail-li Gnr K.W. Wishart, a driver operator for a forward observation officer with the company, stood by his set under very heavy enemy fire, transmitting orders for the artillery concentrations which broke up the enemy attack and which also subsequently covered the Company's withdrawal from its dangerous position. For his steadiness, he was awarded the Military Medal. (P.N. 263-51, "Citation, Gnr Kenneth Wilfred Wishart") In the same action, Pte J.A. Sargent of "A" Coy distinguished himself by the skill and courage which he displayed in handling a Bren gun, while covering the Company's withdrawal. He also was awarded the Military Medal. (Ibid, "Citation, Pte John Archibald Sargent")

194. Meanwhile "D" Coy had scaled the precipitous western peak of Hill 467, and had dropped into the draw leading to the main peak, some 300 yards distant. Enemy mortar and machine gun fire was heavy. One machine gun, in particular, made advance along the draw impossible, since it was sited on the very summit of the peak, completely dominating the approach. Several attempts were made to knock it out, but they all failed, and the forward platoons remained where they were in the draw, driven to ground by its fire.

195. At Brigade Tactical Headquarters, Brigadier Rockingham was considering the situation. He did not find it promising. The Brigade's advance had created a deep salient in the enemy lines, so that the units were left without protection on the flanks. On the right, the closest troops were 8000 yards behind, while the forward line of the left-flanking unit was 7000 yards back. ((H.S.) 410B25.009 (D5): "Comments on draft of Hist Sec Report No 62 by Brigadier Rockingham" 1 Jul 53) In addition, 2 R.C.R.'s attack was failing. "A" Coy was in a fair way to being surrounded; "D" Coy was pinned on the rocky slopes of Hill 467 by very heavy fire while "C" Coy, between "A" and "D" Coys, had found that its fire could not reach the enemy moving against the other two companies, so that it was reduced to the role of a helpless spectator. In view of these facts, the Brigadier decided that it would be unwise to continue the attempt on Hill 467 further. Accordingly, he ordered 2 R.C.R. to withdraw, and then organized his units into as compact a defensive area as possible. As a further measure of security, I Corps placed 2 Bn, 65 U.S. Inf Regt, under operational control of the Brigade, which ordered the battalion to occupy positions on the feature south of 2 R.C.R. (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 30 May 51).

196: On 31 May, the Brigade maintained its positions and patrolled, under command of 3 U.S. Inf Div (<u>ibid</u>, 30 and 31 May 51). This formation had been released from control of X Corps in the central sector on the 30th and had moved to the sector of I Corps, where it was employed on the axis previously covered by 25 Div ("G-3 Ops Report", Nos 340 and 341). Next day the Brigade, less 2 R. 22e R. and 2 R.C.H.A., was relieved by 65 R.C.T., which assumed control of 10 B.C.T. (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 1 Jun 51). On relief, the Brigade moved into reserve positions in the general area 4604, while 2 R. 22e R. held positions on the right flank of 65 R.C.T., and 2 R.C.H.A. remained in support of the formation (<u>ibid</u>). Thus was completed the "blooding" of 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp. The formation had acquitted itself well in its first fighting, and the casualties of 6 killed and 54 wounded, which were incurred between 28 and 30 May, testified to the sharp engagements which had been fought ((H.S.) 133.065 (D 578), vol 1, "Korean Cas").

197. Meanwhile, to the right of I Corps, IX Corps had also been advancing.* Its movement north, like that of I Corps, began on 20 May and, again like I Corps, its advance started from the general line of the positions which it had held since the latter part of April, when its retreat before the Chinese offensive ended. This line ran from the 2 P.P.C.L.I. positions in the Tokso-ri area eastward to a point five miles west of Hongchon.** The left boundary inclined north-east, and the right boundary curved north-west, so that the Corps was advancing into a narrowing front. Within the Corps sector 24 Inf Div was deployed on the left flank, with 2 and 6 ROK Divs in the centre and 7 Inf Div on the right, the frontage held by each of the U.S. divisions roughly equalling that held by 2 and 6 ROK Divs together ("G-3 Ops Report", No. 330).

198. From the limited information available in the daily reports of the U.N. Comd and the War Diary of 2 P.P.C.L.I., it would appear that this advance of IX Corps resembled that of I Corps so closely as to make any detailed separate description unnecessary. The fact that 24 Div had 28 Bde under operational control attracts some attention to that Division's sector, but the Brigade's share in the operation was of so brief a duration and so lacking in important incident that even this interest is limited.

*For geographical detail mentioned in paras 197 to 199 see Map 10 - "Third U.N. Advance".

** The boundary had been moved east, closer to Hongchon, on 18 May ("G-3 Ops Report", No. 328), presumably to permit X Corps to concentrate its forces further to the east against the Chinese offensive. 199. At the start of the IX Corps attack on 20 May, 24 Div had 28 Bde and 19, 5 and 21 R.C.Ts. deployed from left to right across its front. 28 Bde was pinched out early in the offensive, being reported on 25 May as maintaining positions extending east from the 2 P.P.C.L.I. area near Chinbo-li (4377) (<u>ibid</u>, Nos 330 and 335; W.D., 2 P.P.C.L.I., 24-26 May 51). Here the Brigade remained, while the rest of the Corps passed on north. Little had occurred to distinguish this advance from previous operations of the formation. There had been a succession of similar hills to climb, similar resistance which vanished during the night, similar delays while troops on the flanks conformed (W.D., 2 P.P.C.L.I., 20 to 26 May 51). Possibly because of its impending departure to join 25 Bde, 2 P.P.C.I.I. was given a comparatively minor role in this advance, and on 27 May the unit was withdrawn from 28 Bde, moving due south to Sambi-ri (4061) on the north bank of the Han (<u>ibid</u>, 27 May 51). At the same time, it came under command of 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp, and spent the next few days preparing to rejoin the Brigade (<u>ibid</u>, 27 May to 2 Jun 51).

200. During the last days of May and the first days of June, the three Commonwealth brigades were gathered into one area, presumably in preparation for the forming of 1st Commonwealth Division" The concentration area selected lay about Ibamjana (2393), approximately nine miles due south of the junction of the Imjin and Hantan rivers (2507). 29 Indep Inf Bde Gp moved from its positions on the Kimpo peninsula to the new concentration area on 28 May, and 28 Britcom Inf Bde joined it on the following day from the IX Corps area ("G-3 Ops Report", Nos 339 and 340). Both formations were attached to 1 Cav Div for operational control (<u>ibid</u>), and both were deployed on the line "KAMSAS", south of the Imjin, with 29 Bde left and 28 Bde right. 29 Bde's front extended from Ouldong (1500) to the area of Hill 152 (2105), while 28 Bde held the line between Hill 152 and the Imjin-Hantan junction (<u>ibid</u>, Nos 340 and 341)** On 2 Jun, 2 P.P.C.L.I. and 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp, less 2 R. 22e R. and 2 R.C.H.A., arrived in the concentration area (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 2 and 3 Jun 51). Next day, these two units moved from the 3 Div front (para 196 above), 2 R. 22e R. going into reserve in the Brigade area while 2 R.C.H.A. went into action in support of 28 Bde (<u>ibid</u>).

201. By 3 Jun, the front line of Eighth U.S. Army had advanced almost to the position which it was to occupy during the remainder of the period covered by this Report, though two major operations were to prove necessary for the advances which covered the remaining distance^{***} On the I Corps front, 1 ROK Div was on the south bank of the Imjin in the area of Munsan. The remainder of the south bank, to the point where the river curved north at its junction with the Hantan, was held by 29 and 28 Bdes. At the Imjin-Hantan junction, the line ran north along the east bank of the Imjin to a point roughly opposite Yonchon (3117), whence it swung

*Map 7.

**The Brigades held this same general area until -- and for some time after -- the formation of 1 Comwel Div.

*** Map 10 -- "Third U.N. Advance".

practically due east. 1 Cav Div was in this sector, its elements on the Imjin facing west while those in the area of Yonchon faced west and north. 3 U.S. Inf Div lay to the east of 1 Cav Div, and faced generally north, as did 25 U.S. Inf Div on the right of the I Corps front. IX and X Corps continued the line practically due east, but the Capitol Division of I ROK Corps had pushed a salient up the east coast almost to Chodo-ri in the I ROK Corps sector ("G-3 Ops Report", No. 344).

202. South of the Imjin-Hantan junction, in the Commonwealth concentration area about Ibamjana, lay 25 Bde.* From 2 Jun until 18 Jun the formation remained there, as reserve of I Corps (<u>ibid</u>, Nos 344 to 359). During this period, Brigadier Rockingham and the C.Os. of the units prepared plans covering the defensive tasks assigned by I Corps, and maintained the routine normal to a formation in reserve (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 2 - 18 Jun 51).

203. One of the more important tactical features of the I Corps front was the enemy salient bounded by the Imjin river. At its junction with the Hantan, this river swung sharply south-west, and the I Corps advance had flowed around the curve, fronting up on the east-west and north-south stretches of the river. As will appear later, the tip of the salient lay dangerously close to the supply route from Seoul through Uijongbu to the Yonchon area. Ultimately, Operations "MINDEN" and "COMMANDO" removed this salient, but during June the only countermeasure taken was a continuous attempt to dominate as much of the salient's area as possible. This was done by establishing "patrol-bases" across the Imjin, from which patrols ranged through the salient ("G-3 Ops Report", Nos 342 to 371). These "patrol-bases" were defended areas of battalion or brigade size set up in no man's land at various distances ahead of the forward defended localities, and it had become almost a regular practice to establish them whenever a formation was on the defensive.**

204. On 2 Jun, 2 P.P.C.L.I. was again attached to 28 Bde ("G-3 Ops Report No. 344), for the purpose of establishing such a "patrol-base" in the tip of the salient. 28 Bde and troops of 1 Cav Div enclosed this tip, the boundary between them being the junction of the Imjin and Hantan rivers. Initially, it had been planned to cross from south to north in the sector of 28 Bde, but a flood made a crossing in this direction impracticable, and the crossing was ultimately made on the 6th, in the Cav Div sector (W.D., 2 P.P.C.L.I., 1 to 6 Jun 51; Appx "11", "28 Britcom Inf Bde Op Instr No (not numbered)", 9 Jun 51). The crossing place was at the ferry site at 268114, and "D" Coy occupied an area about 263116, covering the western approach to this crossing. "A" and "C" Coys occupied a position based on Hill 194 at 258103. The remainder of the unit stayed on the east side of the

*For geographical detail mentioned in paras 202 to 204, see Map 7.

**References to these "patrol-bases" occur frequently in the daily reports of the U.N. Comd covering periods when Eighth U.S. Army was on the defensive. The reports for the period 1 to 20 May contain examples ("G-3 Ops Report", Nos 311 to 330). river (W.D., 2 P.P.C.L.I., 4 and 6 Jun 51). This battalion position, somewhat unusual when judged by Staff College standards, covered an area 1400 yards by 1000 yards, and was divided practically in the middle by a river which had already demonstrated its capacity to become a formidable obstacle with great suddenness. 2 P.P.C.L.I.'s task was to hold a bridgehead on the western bank, and to provide a firm base from which patrols furnished by other units of 28 Bde could probe into the <u>terra incognita</u> to the west of the Imjin. On 9 Jun, Brigadier G. Taylor, D.S.O., the Commander of 28 Bde, visited the area and stated that he felt "an all out Chinese attack is due sometime between the 12th and 15th of June on the I Corps front with the probability that the 28 Bde occupying the hinge position. would be called upon to bear the brunt of the attack" (<u>ibid</u>, 9 Jun). In spite of this dire prediction, enemy contacts were limited to mortar fire, although the patrols established the existence of Chinese positions a few thousand yards away (<u>ibid</u>, 7 to 11 Jun 51). On 11 Jun, 2 P.P.C.L.I. was replaced by 2 R. 22e R., and moved back to the Brigade concentration area. 2 R. 22e R. remained in the position until 19 Jun, and its experiences generally resembled those of 2 P.P.C.L.I. (W.D., 2 R. 22e R., 11 to 19 Jun 51).

205. By 18 Jun, the eastern end of the I Corps front had advanced to the southern outskirts of Chorwon." To the west the Corps front lay on the Imjin, from that river's junction with the Han eastward to its junction with the Hantan. From this latter junction the line ran north along the east bank of the Imjin to an area roughly opposite Yonchon whence it curved north-east to Chorwon, forming the line "WYOMING", and then continued due east to positions immediately south of Kumhwa. The boundary between I and IX Corps passed to the east of Kumhwa, and the fronts of IX and X Corps conformed generally to the east coast, still maintained a salient to Chodo-rl. ("G-3 Ops Report", No. 359; W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 18 1120 K Jun 51)

206. On 18 Jun, 25 Bde was placed under command of 1 Cav Div and given the task of relieving 28 ROK Regt and 65 R.C.T. of 3 U.S. Div on the Chorwon end of "WYOMING", 1 Cav Div's eastern boundary having been moved further to the right to include the ground formerly held by these elements of 3 Div. (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 18 Jun 51). The Brigade

*For geographical detail mentioned in paras 205 to 212, see Map 10 - "Third U.N. Advance", and Map 11. left its area south of the Imjin, where it had been in reserve since the first part of June, and was in position on "WYOMING" by noon on the 19th (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 19 Jun 51). 2 R. 22e R. joined it here on the same day from its "patrolbase" on the Imjin, and the formation was complete again (W.D., 2 R. 22e R., 19 Jun 51). Referring to the move of the main body of the Brigade, Brigadier Rockingham later wrote:

> There was an incident of considerable interest during this manoeuvre. I was ordered to move the Brigade at approximately 2300 hours, 17 Jun, but was unable to get a route on which to move the twenty-five odd miles. Nor could I get 1 Corps or either of the divisions concerned to give me an assembly area into which to put my troops when I arrived at the other end. What actually happened was that I started, accompanied by my commanding officers to reconnoitre the route and the assembly area, without leaving any instructions with the main body of the Brigade as to its move. As we reached each bridge or cross-road and found it was suitable, I would transmit orders to the Brigade Major over the wireless, giving him the route which the Brigade was to follow. I had ordered them to move about two hours behind us and our relative positions were maintained until we reached the portion of the line in the 3rd Division area where we were to take over. A very hasty reconnaissance was made by myself and the COs who then returned to the side of the road and led their units straight into the line.

This was only possible because the enemy was not close to our positions and because of the excellent communications which existed in the Brigade. We had also considerable experience in movement by this time and such a move would not be recommended for a less experienced formation.

> ((H.S.) 410B25.009 (D5): "Comments on draft of Hist Sec Report No 62 by Brigadier Rockingham", 1 Jul 53).

207. Once the Brigade was in position, its front stretched for 7500 yards south-west from the western outskirts of Chorwon, which were included in its sector (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, June 1951, Appx "6", "Disposition of 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp, 19 2115 K June 51"). To the right, the positions of 3 Div carried the line generally due east, and the Division was reported as patrolling forward of this line ("G-3 Ops Report" Nos 359 to 370). To the left, 1 Cav Div's positions continued "WYOMING" south-west to the general area of Yonchon, and from there south, along the east bank of the Imjin, to the Imjin-Hantan junction. The Division had three "patrol-bases" west of the forward defended localities at Yongjong-ni (2217), Pam-Kogae (2523) and Chura-dong (2930) ("G-3 Ops Report", Nos 359 and 360). Deep patrols into no man's land were the order of the day, and 25 Bde was soon to join in this activity.

208. Within the Brigade's sector, 2 P.P.C.L.I. was on the left and 2 R.C.R. on the right, with 2 R. 22e R. in reserve in rear of 2 R.C.R. (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, June 1951, Appx "6", "Disposition of 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp, 19 2115 K Jun 51"). 2 P.P.C.L.I.'s position lay on the southern edge of a narrow valley, dominated by high ground on the far side. 2 R.C.R. was on high ground on the southern edge of the Chorwon plain, which stretched away to the north-east. The Brigade faced north-west, but its boundaries ran north and south. Within these boundaries, ahead of the forward defended localities, extended an area of hills interspersed with narrow valleys whose floors were quite level.

209. On 21 Jun, 2 R.C.R. provided the infantry element of the first deep patrol into no man's land. The patrol was composed of two troops of tanks, two companies of infantry, one troop of field artillery and a tactical air control party. A firm base was established on the high ground immediately north-east of Chungmasan (4039), following which a troop of tanks, a company of infantry and the tactical air control party continued on the route. A strong enemy position was located on Hill 730 (3850) and brought under air attack, before the patrol commenced to retire (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, June 1951, Appx "4", "25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp Ops Report No. 11, 20 1800 K to 21 1800 K Jun 51").

210. This patrol initiated a series of deep incursions into enemy territory which was to last until the middle of July. No attempt, however, will be made to describe the numerous patrols in detail, since they were practically identical in composition and route. Even the contacts which were made resembled each other strongly. In view of this fact, the following general description of the patrols is taken to provide adequate information on this period of the Brigade's operations.

> An examination of the proposed patrol routes for the 2 RCR and 2 PPCLI tomorrow shows that they are very dependent on dry weather to enable them to bring up their artillery and tank support. Due to the length of the patrols at least one battery of the 2 RCHA has to be moved 4-5,000 yards ahead of the Brigade FDLs in order to support the patrols adequately. In addition, whenever it rains, a full troop from 57 Fd Sqn has to be sent with the tanks to construct bridges and build approaches to the numerous streams and deep narrow canals or irrigation ditches. After the tactical elements of the patrol have been pushed out ahead, it is not unusual to have engineer dump trucks carrying crushed rock and gravel out to fill in

crossings and soft spots in order to insure the unimpeded return of the patrol's vehicles. The lack of equally vigorous patrolling by the flanking units has made unprotected flanks 10-20,000 yards long quite commonplace. TO cover these flanks the individual battalions have been forced to expend a considerable force, drawn from their patrol strength, to picket their flanks in order to prevent surprise and encirclement of their patrols. The net result of this drain upon the already limited strength of the patrols has been the substitution of fire power, in the form of the battalion's 81 mm mortars and the MMG platoon, for men on the ground. The half-tracks carrying the mortars and the MMG are brought in tactical bounds behind the advancing patrol as far forward as is necessary to support the patrol onto its final objective. In many cases this means building road ahead of them as much as 10,000 yards ahead of the FDLs.

The maximum strength of the patrols put out by the battalions is determined by the necessity of keeping at least two companies in the FDLs. The inclusion of the mortars and MMGs in the patrol is necessitated by the need for close fire support if the exposed flanks are to be protected and the relatively small patrolling force is to achieve its objective and extricate itself in the event that it encounters determined enemy resistance.

The terrain in this area has made the rotation of the battalions very difficult and this has meant that each battalion, including the reserve battalion, has had to take its turn at patrolling. Because of the very open flanks, each battalion has had to leave at least two companies in their FDLs, thus limiting the size of their patrols and placing the burden of the wiring and digging of the defense on two companies at a time. For the most part the weather has been very hot and the danger of heat exhaustion in the hills is very great. The length of the patrols and the height of the hills climbed, an average of 450 metres, makes this patrolling more tiring than is normal with the result that the troops quickly become exhausted and at least one day of rest is essential before going on another patrol.

This type of very aggressive patrolling cannot be considered standard for "KOREA", nor can the form of these patrols be regarded as standard tactics in this country. The purpose in including this discussion of these patrols is to try and show that great emphasis is placed on the versatility and the ability of the men and officers to adapt themselves to rapidly changing circumstances; not to lay down any pattern for patrols in any other part of "KOREA" or on any other front in the world.

(<u>Ibid</u>., 4 Jul 51)

211. increased. As the patrols went on, the danger

Enemy reaction is now evident to the increasing long and dangerous patrolling being carried on by this brigade. During the first week in July the enemy confined himself largely to observation from a safe distance, but they are now coming further forward to meet our penetrations with gradually increasing strength. The difficult going and the restricted means of access to the line of hills now being held by the enemy has meant that each patrol must follow the same route out and in on each patrol. The only tactic that can be used to prevent a successful counter-patrol by the enemy against our extended flanks has been the alternation in the weight thrown against the enemy. First strong patrols on the right supported by a small patrol on the left and then the reverse. It is apparent from the enemy's inability to successfully engage either patrol that as yet he does not hold the ridge line in sufficient strength to take effective action against us in the valley. It is equally obvious that the day is soon going to come when he will be able to do so and the Bde Comd repeatedly cautions the bn comds about this eventuality.

(Ibid, 10 Jul 51).

212. These long and exhausting patrols were varied by shorter but probably no less irksome ones, such as those put out to cover the Jack Warner show (<u>ibid</u>, 12 Jul 51). Even amenties such as "live" shows, however, failed to make the stay in the Chorwon area a pleasant one, and it may be supposed that the Brigade learned with relief, on 14 Jul, of its impending replacement by the Turkish Brigade (<u>ibid</u>, 14 Jul 51).

213. On the 16th, 25 U.S. Inf Div replaced 1 U.S. Cav Div in the latter's sector, and assumed command of 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp ("G-3 Ops Report", No. 387). Two days later, the relief of 25 Bde took place as planned. The Brigade, however, did not go into reserve. Instead, by late afternoon of 18 Jul, it was deployed in the line again, immediately north of the Imjin-Hantan junction, in the same general area as that in which 2 P.P.C.L.I., followed by 2 R. 22e R., had maintained a "patrol base" (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 17 and 18 Jul 51).* 28 Bde was on its left, and 27 Inf Regt of 25 U.S. Inf Div was on its right. The sector of 25 Bde which lay between these two formations was 5000 yards long, its focal point being the ferry at 269115.**

*For geographical detail mentioned in paras 213 to 217, see Map. 7.

**Unless otherwise stated, material in paras 213 to 217 derives from a Report prepared by the Hist Offr of 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp ((H.S.) 410B25.013 (D3), "Report on the Imjin River Incident"). 214. Within this sector, 2 R. 22e R. was deployed in the area of Hill 183 at 222142; 2 P.P.C.L.I. with 25 Recce Coy of 25 Div under command, was on the east bank south of the ferry crossing, while 2 R.C.R. held a bridgehead covering the western approaches to the ferry. In addition to the south ferry, there were three other crossings, the major one being a second ferry, the north ferry, 6000 yards further up stream at 256171. Between these two ferries were two fords, one of which was also served by a footbridge. The Brigade's position was of vital importance, since it lay directly in the path of any Chinese attack which aimed at cutting the important main supply route of 25 and 3 Divs in the Chorwon area (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf-Bde, 16 Jul 51).

215. The first complication developed shortly after the Brigade had got into position, when 25 Div insisted that troops be placed at 213170 to cover the western approaches of the northern ferry. Consequently, one infantry platoon and the anti-tank platoon of 2 R. 22e R., plus a troop of tanks from "C" Sqn, were deployed 4500 yards west of the ferry, the tanks crossing by one of the fords. As if to emphasize the precarious position of this tiny group, 3000 yards from the 2 R. 22e K. area on Hill 183, the Chinese put in an attack on the latter position early on the morning of the 19th. During the afternoon of the same day, a platoon of 27 Inf Regt was sent across the river to occupy positions at 247171, also covering the western approaches to the north ferry, but separated from the Canadians by 3500 yards. Further attacks on the main 2 R. 22e R. position on the night 19/20 Jul prompted Brigadier Rockingham next day to increase the strength of the group on the approaches to the north ferry by the addition of two more infantry platoons, bringing it to a full infantry company with an anti-tank platoon and a troop of tanks attached. At the same time he moved the group to positions about 239171, 2500 yards closer to the north ferry. The infantry company was supplied by 2 R. 22e R., and it was replaced in the main 2 R. 22e R.

216. These changes in the dispositions of his Brigade were not the only worries which beset Brigadier Rockingham at this time. He also had the river to consider. A heavy rain had started to fall on the 19th, arousing fears for the safety of the communications with the elements of the Brigade west of the Imjin. These fears proved to be justified. At 2135 hrs on the 20th, at the same time as 2 R. 22e R. was reporting enemy activity which appeared to presage a major attack on the Battalion, the south ferry became inoperable and was moored to the bank; shortly before midnight the north ferry went out. Then, at 0045 hrs on the 21st the footbridge carried away and came downstream toward the south ferry, breaking its cables, setting it adrift and sweeping out the telephone lines across the river. At this moment, all the combat elements of 2 R. 22e R., three rifle companies from 2 R.C.R. and one from 2 P.P.C.L.I., as well as the platoon from 27 Inf Regt, the troop of tanks, and 75 assorted vehicles were across the Imjin, absolutely isolated from the eastern bank except for artillery communications. In addition, the force was broken into three widely separated groups, with terrain which was difficult going even for infantry separating the southern two groups from the one to the north. At the same time, the enemy, who must have suspected that the force was isolated, and who knew that the weather made air support impossible, was giving indications of an intention to mount a full-scale attack.

217. Fortunately for all concerned, the remainder of the story provides an anticlimax to the dramatic moment when the drifting footbridge erased nearly all communication with the troops west of the river. One hour afterward, 2 R. 22e R. came up on the artillery channel with the information that the front was relatively quiet. At 0900 hrs on the 21st, the Brigadier ordered the force to concentrate in the vicinity of the 2 R.C.R. bridgehead positions. However it was found to be impossible for the tanks to get south, and as a result the order was changed to provide for the northern group to concentrate near the position of the platoon from 27 Inf Regt, while 2 R. 22e R. moved east to the 2 R.C.R. positions. These movements were completed by late afternoon the same day. The night 21/22 Jul was quiet again, but the ferries could not be repaired and supply of the troops on the west bank was limited to what could be taken across by power boat. On the morning of the 22nd, 25 Div ordered all forces withdrawn across the river, but after some discussion this order was amended to the withdrawal of all the force less the companies from 2 R.C.R. The execution of this withdrawal was a protracted affair, complicated by breakdown of the ferry service and by the fact that the capacity of the north ferry had to be increased to enable it i to carry the four tanks back. The movement was practically completed by noon on the 24th, and two "half-tracks" of 2 R. 22e R., which had drowned while trying to ford the river earlier, were recovered next day. On 26 Jul, 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp came under operational control of I U.S. Corps, and moved to an assembly area in rear of 28 and 29 Bdes south of the Imjin (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 25 and 26 Jul 51). By this move the Commonwealth Brigades were concentrated again and, as it proved, were on the eve of coming under command of Headquarters lst Commonwealth Division.

218. Meanwhile, on the higher political and military levels where lay direction of the war in Korea, the tacit decision to accept military stalemate and attempt to end the war by negotiation was in process of being put into execution. Eighth U.S. Army had reached a line (para 205 above) which was to remain virtually unchanged during the remainder of the period covered by this Report, and, in fact, to the time of writing. The second part of the programme - negotiation - had begun on 10 Jul, following Mr Malik's* broadcast of 23 Jun (<u>Chronology, Supplement to The World Today</u>, Vol VII, No. 13, p. 400; No. 14, p. 419). These negotiations, however, had produced no important results by the end of March 1952, and no attempt will be made to trace their course, except to record (para 265 below) the one development - the "unofficial truce" - which affected the actual fighting.

*The Russian delegate to the Security Council.

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FORMATION OF 1st COMMONWEALTH DIVISION (28 JUL 51). OPERATIONS TO MINDEN (8 SEP 51) and COMMANDO

(3 OCT 51)*

219. Available sources do not give complete information on the discussions and planning which preceded the decision to form a Commonwealth division. It is known, however, that Lt-Gen Foulkes had such a possibility in mind as early as mid-July of 1950 when, at a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, he outlined a proposal** to form a Canadian brigade to operate within a Commonwealth division ("Extracts from C.G.S. Daily Diary", p. 2). At that time he pointed out that Canadian forces would be more likely to retain their identity with such a division, that commanders would be more familiar with its organization and system of command, and that training would be facilitated, since training of the Canadian Army had followed the British pattern and had been based on equipment of the type used by the United Kingdom.

220. A few days later, he raised the subject again, this time at a meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee, when he explained that integration of national contingents in Gen MacArthur's command would present a problem for which the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff had no immediate solution (<u>ibid</u>, p. 3). In view of this fact, he argued that the most useful form of assistance would be a Commonwealth division which could function as a self-contained formation with its own supply lines. The Committee agreed that a Commonwealth division would be most appropriate. At the same time, the War Office began exploratory conversations with the Canadian Joint Staff in London and, through the United Kingdom Army Liaison Staff, with the V.C.G.S. in Canada on the subject of Canadian participation in a scheme to provide a brigade group for Korea (<u>ibid</u>).

221. On 16 Aug 50, as the Canadian Army Special Force was taking shape both in plans and on the ground, the C.G.S. again returned to the idea of a Commonwealth division. On that date he wired Brigadier R.W. Moncel D.S.O., O.B.E., Army member of the Canadian Joint Staff (London), requesting him to explore the possibility of the C.A.S.F. forming part of a Commonwealth division, or at least connecting to the Commonwealth supply line in Korea (<u>ibid</u>, p. 6). Brigadier Moncel replied that the War Office favoured the idea of a Commonwealth division, but would not assume a commitment to field one until the size of the contributions proposed by other Commonwealth countries was known. Subsequently, the Directorate of Staff Duties at Army Headquarters prepared papers on the manpower implications of a proposed Canadian contribution to a Commonwealth division (<u>ibid</u>).

*Geographical detail mentioned in this section is shown in Maps 7, 8, and 10" - "Third U.N. Advance".

**This proposal was one of four prepared at this time. The other three, however, do not appear to have been seriously considered, and they are therefore not outlined in this Report. Some detail about them is available in "Extracts from C.G.S. Daily Diary", pp 1 to 5. 222. This planning continued, and agreement to form a Commonwealth division was reached before 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp left for Korea, or while it was en route. On 1 May 51, Mr Brooke Claxton announced to the House of Commons that the Group would form part of "The First (Commonwealth) Division, United Nations Forces" (House of Commons Debates, 1 May 51, p. 2553). From that time until the Division had taken its place on the Order of Battle of Eighth U.S. Army, its history is a record of the assembling of its constituent parts in the area south of the Imiin, culminating in the assumption of command by H.Q. 1 Comwel Div on 28 Jul 51.

223. The assembling of the three formations which were to become the brigades of the Division has already been recorded (paras 200 and 217 above). With this went a parallel assembling of command and staff elements, and of maintenance units or increments to maintenance units required to make the Division "operational", and to complete the organization of its maintenance system. On 1 Jul, the first flight of the Canadian Section, British Commonwealth Hospital arrived in Kure (W.D., Cdn Sec, Brit Commonwealth Hosp, 1 Jul 51). While there is no evidence that this unit was formed as a Canadian contribution to the "divisional slice", or that it would not have been formed in any event, since Canadian troops were being hospitalized in the British Commonwealth Hospital, there is no doubt that it became, in effect at least, a Canadian contribution to the maintenance organization supporting the Division.

224. Meanwhile, on 11 Jun, the G.O.C., Major-General A.J.H. Cassels, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., arrived in Kure, where he met members of the Division's Staff and Heads of Arms/Services. These included Lt-Col E.D. Danby D.S.O., G.S.O. I, who had arrived in Kure on 8 Jun with Capt E.R. Blais, G.S.O. III (Int) (W.D., C.M.M.F.E., 8 Jun 51). The Canadian element of the Headquarters increased as the latter took shape, until, on 28 Jul, it included seven officers (W.D., Cdn Sec, H.Q. 1 Comwel Div, 28 Jul 51). On 1 Aug, the Canadian element was organized as a unit of the Canadian Army, under the designation "Canadian Section, Headquarters First (Commonwealth) Division" (Supplements to C.A.Os., Issue No. 245 (Part B) of 1951). On 24 Jun, the British elements of he Staff and Services of the Headquarters together with 1 Commonwealth Divisional Signal Regiment and 28 Field Engineer Regiment arrived in Pusan, and the Headquarters was set up, for the first time, in Seaforth Camp near that city. (H.Q.S. 1750-121/1, "Reports and Returns -- 1 Comwel Div", vol 1: "Periodic Report 2 May -- 15 Oct 51", Appx "B", "Diary of Op Events 1951", p. 1)

225. A partial Order of Battle of the Division as of that time, covering the major Arms, is attached as Appendix "C".

226. The formation of the division brought a great change to Brigadier Rockingham's command. Previously, he had commanded a force which might be considered, in some respects at least, a division in miniature, complete with its own Arms and Services. Now he held direct operational control of only three infantry battalions and the armoured squadron. He was, in sober truth, much reduced, as of course was Brigadier Brodie of 29 Bde, and it stands greatly to the credit of all concerned that the transition was made with the absolute minimum of friction or confusion ("Periodic Report, 2 May to 15 Oct 51", para 8).*

227. Incorporation of 25 Cdn Inf Bde in the Division brought changes in the organization for command and control of the Brigade. Previously, as the commander of an independent brigade, the Brigadier had exercised direct operational and administrative control over all Canadian units forward of H.Q. Eighth U.S. Army. 25 Cdn Rft Gp and 2 Cdn Adm Unit in Kure were placed under the command of C.O., 25 Cdn Rft Gp, and Comd C.M.M.F.E. exercised administrative direction over these units. L. of C. troops in rear of Army Headquarters were controlled by the appropriate service adviser at H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde. ((H.S.) 410 B 25.013 (D 22), "Interview with Brigadier Rockingham, 1000 hrs 17 Nov 52")

228. After incorporation of the Brigade in 1 Comwel Div, all Canadian units of the former Brigade Group remained under Brigadier Rockingham's administrative control from purely Canadian aspects, e.g., discipline, promotion, transfer and so forth. He had operational control of the infantry battalions and the armoured squadron, but the other units of the Group came under operational control of H.Q. 1 Comwel Div, although they were used, for the most part, in support of 25 Bde (ibid).

229. While the units and formations of the Division operated together with remarkable smoothness from the start, the same good relationship was not immediately established between H.Q. 1 U.S. Corps and the Division. One of the first difficulties encountered was that of persuading the Corps to move 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp to the Commonwealth area. On this subject, Maj-Gen Cassels reported as follows:

> My major worry during this time was to persuade I US Corps to assemble the three brigades in such locations as to make them controllable as a division. 28 and 29 Brigades were very conveniently sited side by side on the KANSAS line. 25 Canadian Bde was miles away in the CHORWON area. I was assured that by the time I took over they would be brought back into a reserve area behind 28 and 29 Brigades. I went forward on 21 July and found that 25 Brigade had been moved, but instead of being put in reserve had been lent to 25 US Inf Div (later relieved by 1 US Cav Div) to protect their left flank, and that I was expected to take it over in that location. As this put all my brigades in the front line, and as the CANADIANS were separated from the others by two rivers, both of which were in

*An example of the sort of situation which arose during the transition from Brigade Group to Brigade status is provided by an incident involving 57 Fd Sqn. Brigadier Rockingham had ordered it to construct a tactical road into the position of one of the battalions, while the C.R.E. had arranged for the unit to level an air strip at Divisional Headquarters (W.D., 25 Cdn Inf Bde 27 Jul 51) flood I protested strongly. After three days of argument and discussion it was agreed that 25 Brigade should move to a reserve area behind 28 and 29 Brigades.

("Periodic Report, 2 May to 15 Oct 51", para 5)

Although I Corps finally agreed to the 230. movement of 25 Bde to the Commonwealth sector, it retained control over the Brigade as "mobile reserve" at least for a few days. The task assigned, as quoted by Bde H.Q., was "to be prepared to operate offensively anywhere in Corps zone, with first priority in zone of 28th and 29th Infantry Brigades" (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, July 1951, Appx "9", "25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp Op Instr", 26 Jul 51). When H.Q. 1 Comwel Div assumed command of 28 and 29 Bdes on 28 Jul, there was some uncertainty in H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde as to whether the Brigade would be joining the Division immediately or Brigade would be joining the Division immediately, or would remain for a time under control of I Corps. At 0950 hrs 28 Jul, the Brigade Major queried Corps Headquarters on the matter, observing that authority to join 1 Comwel Div had not yet been received. Corps replied that "it was definitely on" for the Brigade to join the Division and that a message was being prepared. It added that there was some speculation that the Brigade would only be employed on authority of H.Q. I Corps (ibid, Appx "4", "H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp Log", 28 Jul 51). This arrangement was actually confirmed later on. Although 25 Bde had become part of the Commonwealth Division, the Division was only able to use the Brigade within its sector after obtaining authority from H.Q. I Corps. Other than this somewhat nebulous control of 25 Bde, 1 Comwel Div had no reserve ((H.S.) 410B25.013 (D 22) "Interview with Brigadier Rockingham, 1000 hrs 17 Nov 52").

231. As the Division began to operate, the G.O.C. experienced difficulty in perceiving the reason behind some of the orders he received. In some cases, also, he considered the operation involved in the order to be militarily unsound. His report on this matter sheds some light on the arrangements for control of the Division at the higher levels of command.

> My main trouble during this period was to convince I Corps that, though we were more than ready to do anything that was required, we did like to know the reason behind it. On many occasions I was ordered, without any warning, to do things which I considered militarily unsound and for which there was no apparent reason. Eventually I asked the Corps Commander for an interview where I put all cards on the table. I pointed out that we worked quite differently to them, and it was impossible to expect that we could suddenly change our ways to conform with American procedure. I then asked that, in the future, we should be given our task, the reasons for that task and that we should then be left alone to do it our way without interference from the Corps staff. The Corps Commander could not have been more helpful and, since then, things have been much better and both sides are happier. Nevertheless I regret that I cannot state that everything

is now completely right. There is no doubt that they look at military problems in a very different light to us and I never know for certain what the future plan is likely to be. There have been at least five occasions when I considered invoking my directive and referring the matter to Gen "ROBERTSON . I am glad to say that, so far, this has been unnecessary, but I cannot help feeling that the day may come when I really shall have to do so. I can assure you that I shall avoid it if possible.

("Periodic Report, 2 May to 15 Oct 51", para 9)

232. When the Headquarters assumed command of 1 Comwel Div, the formation held a front of 11,000 yards, a sector of line "KANSAS", on the south bank of the Imjin river, from that river's junction with the Hantan westward to the boundary of I ROK Div ("Diary of Op Events 1951", p. 4).* 25 U.S. Inf Div, replaced by 1 Cav Div on 31 Jul ("G-3 Ops Report", No. 402), was on the right ("Diary of Op Events 1951", p. 4). Within the sector of 1 Comwel Div, 29 Bde was on the left, and 28 Bde on the right. 25 Bde lay in rear, at least during the periods when it was not employed elsewhere (<u>ibid</u>). The main enemy positions were 6000 to 8000 yds north of the Imjin, which was in flood but which could be crossed by boats or rafts (<u>ibid</u>).

233. The sharp curve in the Imjin river at its junction with the Hantan, where the former changed from a southerly to a south-westerly course, formed the boundaries of a triangular salient into the I Corps lines, and the front of 1 Comwel Div lay along the southern arm of this salient. Previous activity in the area within this curve had indicated that, in the main, enemy positions there were temporary posts. However there was always the possibility, noted by Brigadier Rockingham when the Brigade occupied positions on the eastern side of the salient, that the enemy might attack east across the Imjin and sever the north-south supply route which ran to Chorwon. This threat prompted vigorous and deep patrolling into the salient, in which activity 1 Comwel Div became involved almost immediately. In fact the whole story of the operations of the Division, from its formation to the date of this Report, may be summarized as patrols into the salient, followed by occupation of the area in Operations "MINDEN" and "COMMANDO".

234. From 28 Jul, when H.Q. 1 Comwel Div assumed command, until early in September when the Brigade went into the line, 25 Bde was "in reserve". Its activities during this period are recorded in some detail in this and succeeding paragraphs, for the reason that they illustrate a somewhat unusual employment of the reserve. In the first place, the Brigade was responsible for preparing plans for action in the event of an enemy penetration of the Corps area. These plans

^{*}In the same general area, that is, which 28 and 29 Bdes had held since the concentration of the Commonwealth Brigades (para 200 above).

(W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, July 1951, Appx "9", "25 Cdn Inf Bde Op Instr No. 1", 31 Jul 51) involved counter-attacks against possible enemy penetrations at any one of four points on the portion of the line "KANSAS" which lay within the Corps boundaries. They also provided for establishment of blocking positions to cover withdrawal of elements of 1 Cav Div, and for movement of the Brigade to the eastern end of the Corps front. In addition, the Brigade prepared plans for recapture of the bridges at Seoul, should they be seized by enemy paratroops (<u>ibid</u>, August 1951, Appx "7", "25 Cdn Inf Bde Op Instr No. 2, Op HORATIUS", 10 .ug 51). There is no mention of rehearsal of any of these possible tasks, but the reconnaissance of the areas involved and the making of appreciations and plans provided active employment for Brigadier Rockingham and his Commanding Officers (<u>ibid</u>, 27 to 31 Jul and 10 Aug 51).

235. Within the Division, as has been shown, the Brigade occupied a somewhat equivocal position. However it must have taken seriously the possibility of its being required to perform tasks in defence of the Division's area, for it issued a plan (<u>ibid</u>, August 1951, Appx "7", "25 Cdn Inf Bde Op Instr No. 4", 28 Aug 51) on 28 Aug covering five possible counter-attacks to restore the areas of the forward brigades. Whether 25 Bde was at that time also responsible for the Corps tasks is not entirely clear. Fortunately, discussion of the Brigade's role is rendered academic by the fact that no enemy attack developed during August to put the Corps and Divisional plans to the test, and by the further fact that, during the period, 25 Bde was employed for part of the time on other tasks and would not have been available quickly, or at all, as reserve for either Corps or Division.

236. The first of these employments outside the Division's area occurred early in August, during Operation "SLAM"*. This Operation consisted of patrols in strength across the Imjin, troops of 1 Comwel Div crossing from the south and elements of 1 Cav Div crossing from the east. In the plan, 25 Bde was to occupy positions along the east bank of the Imjin, north of its junction with the Hantan, as the positions were vacated by 5 Cav Regt, the formation detailed to conduct the patrol for 1 Cav Div. On 3 Aug 25 Bde, less 2 R.C.R., came under command of 1 Cav Div and occupied positions from the Imjin - Hantan junction north for 11,000 yds, with 2 P.P.C.L.I. on the left and 2 R. 22e R. on the right. Next day, two battalions each from 29 and 28 Bdes crossed the Imjin and began to move north and west as 5 Cav Regt conformed on the right. 5 Cav Regt encountered some resistance, but 1 Comwel Div advanced 6500 yds north of the Imjin without contact. As it had done before, the Imjin flooded, forcing resort to air supply in the 1 Comwel Div sector and delaying the withdrawal of the troops there until last light on 6 Aug.

*Material in this paragraph is based on a summary of operational events contained in one of Maj-Gen Cassels' periodic Reports ("Diary of Op Events 1951", p. 5) and on the War Diary of H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 2 to 8 Aug 51). On 8 Aug 25 Bde was relieved and moved back into the Comwel Div's area.

237. Operations "DIRK" and "CLAYMORE"* followed. The first was a patrol by 2 R.C.R. north across the Imjin to Hill 187 (1414) and 152 (1713). "A" Coy crossed at 175057, south of Sindae, on 13 Aug and established a firm base. Next day the remaining companies crossed, and on the 15th they advanced to the vicinity of the two hills, where they encountered heavy opposition. From this opposition, it was concluded that the unit was getting dangerously close to the main enemy positions, and a withdrawal, which was completed late on the 15th, was ordered. Subsequently Ptes G.G. Rowden and C.O. Bell were each awarded the Military Medal for the skill and daring with which they handled their Bren guns on contact with the enemy during this patrol (P.N. 278-51, "Citation, Pte Gordon George Rowden and Pte Curtis Ora Bell").

238. Operation "CLAYMORE", a patrol by 2 P.P.C.L.I. and 2 R. 22e R. over the Imjin, took place between 22 and 24 Aug 51. The battalions crossed at Sumuso (262134), established firm positions in the vicinity of Misan Myon (2011) and patrolled as far as Hills 187 (1516) and 208 (1817). Only light and transient opposition was encountered, but the enemy came up on the wireless net twice requesting a parley. This experience resembled that of 2 R.C.R. when it received a note, during its patrol, suggesting that a party be organized.**

239. On conclusion of the patrol, 2 K. 22e R. returned via the ferry at Sumuso and moved to an assembly area at Saetongjae (3012), where it met 2 R.C.R. (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 24 Aug 51). 2 P.P.C.L.I. returned due south, and went back to its former position (<u>ibid</u>). The purpose of this move was to place 25 Bde, less one battalion, in rear of 1 Cav Div, to support 5 Cav Regt while it adjusted its positions (<u>ibid</u>, 20 Aug 51). 25 Bde moved back to the area of 1 Comwel Div on the 28th, and on 4 Sep relieved 28 Bde on the right of the Division's front (<u>ibid</u>, 28 Aug and 4 Sep 51).

240. Operation "MINDEN", the Division's first move forward into the no man's land within the curve of the Imjin, began on 8 Sep, when 28 Bde crossed the river and established a bridgehead covering two crossings, one at Sindae and the other at the ferry site at 232098 (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 8 Sep 51). Class 50 bridges were constructed on these crossings, and on 11 Sep the Division moved north out of the bridgehead with 29 Bde left and 25 Bde right, the objective being a line from Sanggorangpo (1105) to Chung-gol (2115) (ibid, 8 to 11 Sep 51; "Diary of Op Events 1951", p. 7). It should be noted that occupation of this line would remove the salient bounded by the curve of the Imjin, and thereby diminish the flank threat to the north-south supply route to Chorwon (ibid, 8 to

*Material in this and the succeeding paragraph is based on "Diary of Op Events 1951", p. 6 and on W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 12 to 25 Aug 51.

**These incidents may have been temporary local effects on the battlefield of the truce talks at Kaesong, which had started on 10 Jul (External Affairs, August 1950, p. 275) following Mr Malik's broadcast of 23 Jun. 11 Sep 51; "Diary of Op Events 1951", p. 7)* By 12 Sep, the move had been completed ("Diary of Op Events 1951", p. 7). 12 ROK Regt of 1 ROK Div "tied in"on the left at Sanggorangpo, its line to the west running south of the Imjin ("G-3 Ops Report", No. 445). 5 Cav Regt of 1 Cav Div was on the right at Chung-gol, the Cav Div's positions continuing the line north-east toward Chorwon (ibid). The inter-brigade boundary divided 1 Comwel Div's front roughly in half, and the Samichon in turn divided the front of 29 Bde (ibid). At this time, then, the Division lay on line "WYOMING", with line "KANSAS" in its rear along the south bank of the Imjin.

241. The part played by 25 Bde in Operation "MINDEN" was not a particularly stirring one and its casualties of 3 killed and 10 wounded were light ((H.S.) 133.065 (D578), vol 1, "Korean Cas"). The general area which the Brigade was to occupy lay about Misan Myon(W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 10 - 11 Sep 51). Part of the Brigade's objective was already held by one of the battalions of 28 Bde (<u>ibid</u>, 9 Sep 51), and previous patrols had already explored the territory pretty thoroughly. 2 P.P.C.L.I. crossed the Imjin on the 10th, under command of 28 Bde, and occupied positions about Misan Myon (<u>ibid</u>, 10 Sep 51). Next morning, 25 Bde assumed command of the battalion again, and sent 2 R.C.R. and 2 R. 22e R. across the Imjin, to occupy positions left and right respectively of those held by 2 P.P.C.L.I. (<u>ibid</u>, 11 Sep 51).

242. On 12 Sep "B" Coy 2 R. 22e R., whose position centred on Hill 172 (201140), put in an attack on three features at 194143, 188145 and 191150 (Hill 222), to clear the enemy from them so that work on the defences of the main position could be carried on without interference (<u>1014</u>, 12 Sep 51; Appx "8", 25 Bde Sitrep, 12 2000 Sep 51). The Company succeeded in capturing 188145, but enemy on Hill 222 proved too strong to be dislodged and the Corpany was ordered to return to Hill 172 (<u>1014</u>, also Appx "3", 25 Bde Ops Log, 12 Sep 51; ".D., 2 R. 22e R., 12 Sep 51). Although the attack had failed to achieve complete success, it had been pushed home most gallantly. Subsequently the part played by two officers, Capt J.P.R. Tremblay and Lt J.P.A. Therrien, in this attack was mentioned in their Citations, Capt Joseph Patrick René Tremblay and Lt Jean Paul André Therrien"). Cpl J.G. Ostiguy and Pte R. Gagnon, of "B" Coy also distinguished themselves and were ewarded the Military Medal (**F.N.** 300-51, "Citations, Cpl Jean Gerard Ostiguy and Pte Romeo Gagnon")** Next day "D" Coy took the features without opposition, and counted 36 enemy dead*** 1 K.S.L.I. occupied the area on the 14th, while 2 R. 22e R. completed work on its position (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 13 and 14 Sep 51; W.D., 2 R. 22e R., 13 Sep 51). On 17 and 18 Sep, the British unit was relieved by smaller groups from 2 R. 22e R. and 2 P.P.C.L.I. (<u>1014</u>, 17 and 18 Sep 51). Routine patrols and a great deal of mining, wiring and digging occupied 25 Bde after this relief, until the commencement of Operation "COMMANDO" early in October.

*The new line represented an extension of "WYOMING" across the base of the salient. Previously, "WYOMING" had run from Chorwon to the Yonchon area. After "MINDEN", it would run from Chorwon across the Imjin to Sanggorangpo.

**The date of action is given as the 13th in these Citations, but this must be an error.

***It is Brigadier Rockingham's recollection ((H.S.) 410B25. 009 (D5): "Comments on draft of Fist Sec Report No 62 by Brigadier Rockingham", 1 Jul 53) that "B" Coy took the objective (presumably including Hill 222), but this idea is not supported by any of the sources quoted.

OPERATION "COMMANDO" (3 to 8 OCT 51). SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITY TO 31 MAR 52.*

243. Operation "CUDGEL", from which "COMMANDO" developed by process of amendment, was a rather complicated and ambitious undertaking, involving all four divisions of I U.S. Corps - 1 ROK Div, 1 Comwel Div, 1 Cav Div, 3 Inf Div (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, September 1951, Appx "11", "1 Comwel Div 0.0. No. 3, Op CUDGEL", 27 Sep 51). Advances were to be made to a line "JAMESTOWN" which, in the case of 1 Comwel Div, was 6000 to 8000 yards forward (north-west) of "WYOMING" ("Diary of Op Events 1951", p. 9). A further advance to line "FARGO", 4000 to 5000 yards beyond "JAMESTOWN", was also planned, to be made on orders of H.Q. I Corps ("1 Comwel Div 0.0. No. 3", paras 2(b), (c), (d) and 15). 1 ROK Div and 1 Comwel Div, on the left of the Corps front, were each to stage two - battalion raids on D minus 2 (<u>ibid</u>, paras 2(b) and 4(b)). 3 Inf Div and 1 Cav Div were to attack on D"Day, followed by 1 Comwel Div on "D" plus 2, while 1 ROK Div was to be prepared to seize a sector of line "FARGO" on orders of H.Q. I Corps (<u>ibid</u>, paras 2(a) and (b), 3). All attacks were to be prefaced by occupation of the outpost lines held ferward of "WYOMING" (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 23 Sep 51). Changes in both right and left boundaries of 1 Comwel Div was to take over from troops of 1 Cav Div west of the Imjin river ("1 Comwel Div 0.0. No. 3", para 4(b)). On "D Day 1 ROK Div was to relieve elements of 1 Comwel Div Was to fine was to relieve elements of 1 Comwel Div 1000 yards west of the Samichon, thus narrowing the area west of the river held by 1 Comwel Div (<u>ibid</u>, para 2(b)).

244. In the final Corps plan for operation "COMMANDO", as far as it is reflected in the Order of 1 Comwel Div (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, September 1951, Appx "ll", "1 Comwel Div Op Instr No. 13, Op COMMANDO," 30 Sep 51), the Operation had been re-named "COMMANDO" and the raids had been dropped, as had the notion of the divisions attacking in succession. Both 1 ROK Div and 1 Comwel Div were to attack on "D" Day, with 1 Cav Div and 3 Inf Div. The boundary changes proposed in "CUDGEL" were still to be made as planned, except that 1 ROK Div was to relieve all elements of 1 Comwel Div west of the Samichon. "D" Day was set at 3 Oct 51. Preliminary moves within 1 Comwel Div required by the plan for the Operation began on 28 Sep, when 2 R. 22e R. relieved 1 Bn of 5 Cav Regt in the area Kangso-ri (2017) -Tokchol-li (2116) - Yongjong-ni (2217) - south bank of the Imjin at 220187. One hour after the move of 2 R. 22e R. began, 2 R.C.R. started to move by companies to new positions roughly 2000 yards forward, in the area Hill 152 (1713) - Kochon (1711) - Hansa-dong (1712) - heights 700 yards east of Hill 152. 2 P.P.C.L.I. followed to new positions in the area Hill 222 (1915) - heights 500 yards north-east of Sokchangsang-ni (1814) - Ochon (1914) - high Øround 500 yards east of Segol (1916) (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 27 and 28 Sep 51; Appx "ll", Trace "Operational Phase, OSMOSIS").

*Geographical detail mentioned in this section is shown in Map 8.

245. Completion of this set of moves, to which the name Operation "OSMOSIS" had been given, placed 2 R.C.R. and 2 P.P.C.L.I. in the Brigade's former outpost line, as required in the original planning for "CUDGEL" and retained in the plan for "COMMANDO". The move of 2 R. 22e R. completed the adjustment of the right boundary of 1 Comwel Div. Adjustment of the Division's left boundary was completed on 1 Oct, when 15 Regt of 1 ROK Div took over all territory west of the Samichon from 29 Bde ("G-3 Ops Report", No. 464).

246. 1 Conwel Div planned to make the attack in three phases ("I Comwel Div Op Instr No. 13", para 5(a)). In Phase I, 28 Bde would attack on the right of the Division's front^{*} on D Day ("Diary of Op Events 1951", p. 9), with 1 K.S.L.I. left going for Hills 208 (1817) and 210 (1617), 1 K.O.S.B. in the centre capturing the dominating feature, Hill 355 (1718), and 3 R.A.R. on the right with Hill 199 (1920) as its objective (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 29 Sep 51). Since this plan committed all three battalions of 28 Bde, a reserve was to be created by placing 1 R.N.F. of 29 Bde under command of 28 Bde on D Day ("I Comwel Div Op Instr No. 13", para 7(c)). In Phase II, which was to take place on D plus 1, 25 Bde was to seeze a line of high ground 3000 yards forward of "WYOMING". Phases I and II of the attack were planned over two successive days in order to allow each Brigade in turn to be supported by the whole of the Division's artillery and part of the Corps artillery ("Diary of Op Events 1951", p. 9). Phase III was to be the exploitation by both 25 and 28 Bdes to the line "JAMESTOWN" (<u>ibid</u>). 29 Bde, employing one battalion, was to secure the left flank of 25 Bde up to "JAMESTOWN", where the battalion was to be relieved by 25 Bde on completion of Phase III ("I Comwel Div Op Instr No. 13", para 9). The comparatively minor role assigned to 29 Bde is explained by the fact that one battalion from the United Kingdom not later than 11 Oct. In view of this fact, it was planned to use individual battalions rather than the Brigade as a whole ("Diary of Op Events 1951", p. 10). For some reason, 29 Bde selected 1 R.U.R. to guard the flank of 25 Bde (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 29 Sep 51), although this battalion was the one scheduled for relief ("I Comwel Div Op Instr No. 13", para 10).

247. 25 Bde's detailed plan divided the Brigade's attack into three phases (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn, Inf Bde, 29 Sep 51; Appx "11", "Confirmatory Notes to Bde Comd's Verbal Orders for Op COMMANDO", 1 Oct 51). In Phase I 2 R.C.R. and 2 P.P.C.L.I. were to advance to the line of high ground 3000 yards forward, 2 R.C.R. capturing the feature north-west of Chommal (1413) and Hill 187 (1414), while 2 P.P.C.L.I. secured Hill 187 (1516), and took over from I K.S.L.I. on Hill 210. I R.U.R. was to occupy the feature north-east of Yongdong (1310), the height at 154122 and Hill 179 (1513)

*There is no doubt that the plan was for a unit of 28 Bde to relieve 2 R. 22e R. when the latter moved left (para 248 below), and so provide a secure position through which the remainder of the Brigade could attack. This statement, however, does not find clear justification in the sources available.

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not later than two hours before Phase I began. Phase II was the capture by 1 R.U.R. of its sector of the line "JAMESTOWN" - the features south of Karhyon-ni (1311) and Pangnae-dong (1312), that north-east of Kunsan-dong (1313), as well as Hill 127 (1311).

248. In Phase III of the Brigade attack (<u>ibid</u>), 2 R.C.R. would secure the feature north-east of Hamurhan (1314) and the height north-west of Ochon (1415). 2 P.P.C.L.I. was to capture Hill 159 (1417) and the high ground south of it at 148164 and 142169. 2 R. 22e R. was to move from its position on the right of the Brigade's front on D Day, relieve 2 R.C.R., and remain in 2 R.C.R.'s former area as Brigade reserve. On completion of Phase III it was to relieve 1 R.U.R. on "JAMESTOWN", the former unit moving back to the Imjin to await relief by 1st Battalion, The Royal Norfolk Regiment (1 R. Norfolk) ("1 Comwel Div Op Instr No. 13", para 10).*

249. As of the date of this Report, only one official source of information is available on the development of Operation "COMMANDO" in the sector of 28 Bde - the Report of Maj-Gen Cassels ("Diary of Op Events, 1951", pp 10 to 12).** Here it is shown that 28 Bde attacked at first light on 3 Oct, in Phase I of the Operation. At the start, all went well, but strong enemy opposition was encountered by 1000 hrs, and at last light 1 K.S.L.I. was 1000 yards short of Hill 210, while 1 K.O.S.B. was the same distance from its objective, Hill 355. 3 R.A.R. on the right had succeeded in securing Hill 199. On relief by 1 ROK Div, 1 R.N.F. had moved to an assembly area in rear of 28 Bde, where it came under command of the Brigade. There was no enemy contact during the night, and the attack was resumed at first light on the 4th. 1 K.S.L.I. took Hill 210, and by 1300 hrs 1 K.O.S.B. had fought its way on to Hill 355. Capture of these two features completed Phase I of the attack, albeit somewhat behind schedule, in that Phase II, at least initially, proceeded concurrently with Phase I.

250. Phase II, the attack of 25 Cdn Inf Bde to secure high ground 3000 yards forward of "WYOMING", began at 1100 hrs, 4 Oct while 1 K.O.S.B. was still fighting for hill 355 (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 4 Oct 51). 2 R.C.R. advanced with "A" Coy left and "B" Coy right, "A" Coy passing through the forward defended localities of 1 R.U.R., which had established itself in the area it had been required to secure prior to "H" hour. Neither company encountered any opposition, and within two hours 2 R.C.R. was on its objectives, with "D" Coy on Hill 187 (1414), "A" Coy on the feature above Chommal and "B" Coy on the height east of

*It will be noted that Phase I of the Brigade attack was Phase II of the Division's attack, and that Phases II and III of the Brigade operation formed part of Phase III of the Division's effort.

**The War Diary of H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde contains very little information on the attack of 28 Bde, and at least one of the items of information given is wrong. The Diary states that "D" Day was postponed to 4 Oct (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 3 Oct 51), which is obviously not the case. Naeochon (1515). 2 P.P.C.L.I. began its advance on the right of the Brigade's front at the same time as 2 R.C.R. It also had two companies up. "D" Coy, on the left, advanced on Mangun-ni (1715), passed through it and seized the feature 500 yards to the north. "A" Coy, of the right, advanced to the feature east of Kamagol (1616). "B" Coy cleared the ridge running north from Sogu-ri (1714) and relieved "D" Coy which then moved across the next valley to take Hill 187 (1516), the Battalion's main objective. This feature was held by the enemy, and it took two hours of fighting to get the Company on it. Meanwhile "A" Coy set out to relieve the company from 1 K.S.L.I. on Hill 210, and "B" Coy 2 P.P.C.L.I. passed through "B" Coy 2 R.C.R. east of Naeochon, to capture the height immediately north of the R.C.R. company.

251. With the capture of Hill 187 (1516) by 2 P.P.C.L.I., Phase II of Operation "COMMANDO" may be considered complete, since 2 R.C.R. had already seized its main objective, Hill 187 (1414). 1 K.S.L.I. had entered on Phase III, having established itself on Hill 227 (1518), and 25 Bde began in turn to make the advances required for Phase III (<u>ibid</u>). In the sector of 2 R.C.R., "C" Coy passed through "D" Coy on Hill 187 (1414) and seized the height 500 yards north-east of Hamurhan (1314) by late afternoon of the 4th. It did not encounter any enemy troops during its advance, but it was heavily shelled by enemy artillery presumably controlled from Hill 166 (1215) west of the valley. At the same time "B" Coy, which had been relieved on the Naeochon feature by "B" Coy 2 P.P.C.L.I., began to advance along the spur toward the hill mass north-west of Ochon. The Company came under heavy fire from its objective, and had difficulty in extricating its leading platoon.

252. The successful withdrawal of this platoon appears to have been made possible by the accuracy of the covering fire provided, great gallantry being shown in the direction of this fire. Lt M.T. O'Brennan, a forward observation officer with "B" Coy, pushed forward to get better observation of the enemy positions. Although his wireless operator was killed and he himself was wounded, he continued to direct the fire of his battery until evacuated as a stretcher case. His devotion to duty was an important factor in the success of the Company's withdrawal, and he was awarded the Military Cross (P.N. 53-52, "Citation, Lt Matthew Terrance O'Brennan"). After he had been evacuated, L/Bdr F.M. Dorman took over, and won the Military Medal by continuing to pass fire orders under very heavy enemy mortar and machine-gun fire (<u>ibid</u>, "Citation, L/Bdr Francis Merton Dorman"). Pte W.D. Fugh, a signaller of "B" Coy, went forward from the Company's firm base when the wireless operator with the Company Commander was wounded. Recovering the set and the aerial under heavy fire, he reestablished the communications necessary to the direction of the tank and mortar fire. For the outstanding devotion to duty which he showed, Pte Pugh was awarded the Military Medal (P.N. 300-51, "Citation, Pte Wilfred Denis Pugh"). 253. Cpl E.W. Poole, the N.C.O. in charge of the "B" Coy stretcher bearers was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medal for the courage which he displayed while evacuating the wounded. The first casualties, in particular, were struck down among thick underbrush on steep slopes. Cpl Poole searched them out under heavy fire, his disregard for his own safety enabling him to save the lieves of at least five men (P.N. 53-52, "Citation, Cpl Ernest William Poole").

254. In the meantime 2 P.P.C.L.I. had also been advancing (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 4 Oct 51). "C" Coy worked its way along the ridge from Hill 187 (1516) to the heights 800 yards west. "A" Coy set out for Hill 159 (1417). At this point the resistance which "B" Coy 2 R.C.R. had encountered and the lateness of the day caused the advance to be suspended. "B" Coy 2 R.C.R. was brought back into line, and "A" Coy 2 P.P.C.L.I. was stopped short of its objective. Thus, at the end of 4 Oct, the forward line of the Brigade ran north-east from the heights above Hamurhan, which were held by "C" Coy 2 R.C.R. To the right of this Company, "B" Coy, 2 R.C.R. To the right of this company, "B" Coy, 2 R.C.R. was short of the feature northwest of Ochon, "C" Coy 2 P.P.C.L.I. was on the feature west of Hill 187 (1516) and "A" Coy 2 P.P.C.L.I. had halted on the approaches to Hill 159. To the left of the Brigade's front, 1 R.U.R. had gained all its objectives without difficulty.

255. On 5 Oct the advance was resumed (ibid, 5 Oct 51). "B" Coy 2 R.C.R. occupied the feature northwest of Ochon after it had been reported clear by a patrol of scouts and snipers; "B" Coy 2 P.P.C.L.I. dug in on Hill 159", and "A" Coy 2 P.P.C.L.I., secured the heights 800 yards south-west of Sanjom-ni (1417). When 2 R. 22e R. relieved 1 R.U.R., all three battalions of the Brigade were forward, along the edge of the Nabu-ri valley. 2 R. 22e R. had "A" Coy on the heights north-east of Taraktae (1212), "B" Coy on the feature south-east of Kunsan-dong (1313), "C" Coy south of Karhyon-ni (1311) and "D" Coy on Hill 127.

256. The companies of 2 R.C.R. and 2 P.P.C.L.I. were in the positions whose occupation has already been described. 2 R.C.R. had "A" and "D" Coys on the feature above Chommal and on Hill 187 (1414) respectively, in positions which they had occupied during Phase I of the Brigade's attack. "C" Coy was on the heights above Hamurhan and "B" Coy was on the feature jutting out into the Nabu-ri valley north-west of Ochon. 2 P.P.C.L.I. had "D" Coy on Hill 187 (1516) which it had taken in Phase I of the Brigade's attack. "A", "B" and "C" Coys were on the heights south-west of Sanjom-ni, on Hill 159 and on the heights west of Hill 187 (1516) respectively.

257. Thus, late in the afternoon of 5 Oct, 25 Cdn Inf Bde was on line "JAMESTO'/N", with 1 Bn of 12 ROK Regt on the left and 1 K.S.L.I. on the right (<u>ibid</u>). Ahead of the Brigade lay the Nabu-ri valley whose western edge was dominated by Hills 166 (1215) and 156 (1217). 2 R. 22e R. overlooked a broad level plain, but 2 R.C.R.

*The Company had previously moved to Hill 210 and taken over "A" Coy's objective.

258. Phase III of Operation "COMMANDO" did not finish so easily or so quickly on the front of 28 Bde. Here all efforts on the 5th were devoted to the capture of Hills 217 (1621) and 317 (1722) which were just short of the final objectives on line "JAMESTOWN" in the Brigade's sector (Diary of Op Events 1951", p. 11). 1 R.N.F. attacked Hill 217, while 3 R.A.R. fought for Hill 317. Both units succeeded in capturing their objectives, but 1 R.N.F. was thrown off Hill 217 by an enemy counter-attack just before last light. Next day the attack on Hill 217 was resumed. Once again 1 R.N.F. succeeded in getting on it, but was again forced to withdraw. On 8 Oct, however, the unit occupied the hill without contect, the enemy having apparently withdrawn during the night 7/8 Oct. (Ibid, pp 11 and 12)

259. With the capture of Hill 217, 1 Comwel Div's part in Operation "COMMANDO" was completed." It had not been completed without cost, as was shown by the casualties of 58 killed and 262 wounded (ibid). 25 Bde, with 4 killed and 28 wounded, had escaped lightly ((H.S.) 133.065 (D578), vol 1, "Korean Cas"). On 8 Oct, then, the Division lay on the "JAMESTOWN" line between the Samichon and the Imjin river. It held a front of approximately 21,000 yards, with seven battalions in the front line, one battalion in a back-stop position and one battalion in reserve. Maj-Gen Cassels considered that a larger reserve would have been desirable but found it impossible to reduce the number of units in the front line without leaving gaps so large that they could not be accepted. As it was, the forward battalions were very thin on the ground and gaps existed in many places. In short, the G.O.C. believed that the Division was not capable of holding a large-scale enemy offensive. (H.Q.S. 1750-121/1, vol 1: "Periodic Report 15 Oct 51 to 15 Feb 52", para 3.) Lines "WYOMING" and "KANSAS" lay behind the Division, the latter extensively developed during a long period of occupation. In the tortured landscape ahead, the enemy main line was much closer than it had been previously.

260. The Chinese began to test the Division's new positions almost immediately after the completion of "COMMANDO", and the Division reciprocated in kind. On the night 13/14 Oct, a heavy attack was put in on 2 P.P.C.L.I. "A" and "B" Coys were attacked simultaneously, and "D" Coy's position was assaulted half an hour later. Some penetration was made between "A" and "B" Coys, but this was sealed off by M.M.G. fire. None of the company positions was invaded and the enemy withdrew before dawn (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 12 and 13 Oct 51). Operation "PEPPERPOT", a raid by one company from each of the three battalions of 25 Bde, took place on 23 Oct. The aim of the raid was to occupy Hill 166 and blow up the enemy positions there. In addition, two objectives to the north of Hill 166 were to be seized, to obtain observation into the next valley and the ridge beyond it. 2 R. 22e R. was assigned the attack on Hill 166; 2 R.C.R. and 1 P.P.C.L.I. were given the two objectives to the north. Although the

[&]quot;It is not possible, with the information available, to say whether "COMMANDO" remained a Corps operation after amendment of the plan. It may well be that it was reduced to an operation of 1 Comwel Div, activity on other divisional fronts being in support of the attack of 1 Comwel Div. On the other hand it is equally possible that it remained a Corps operation, and it may even have formed part of an Army effort whose plan and object are not revealed in the material at hand. In any event, 1 ROK Div on the left of 1 Comwel Div, and 1 Cav Div on the right did, in fact, make conforming advances ("G-3 Ops Report", Nos 466 to 476).

companies from 2 R.C.R. and 1 P.P.C.L.I. reached their objectives with relative ease, the resistance encountered on Hill 166 by the company from 2 R. 22e R. proved too strong, and the company was forced to withdraw without completing its task ("Periodic Report 15 Oct 51 to 15 Feb 52", Appx "A", "Diary of Op Events 15 Oct 51 to 15 Feb 52", p. 1; W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 19 to 23 Oct 51; (H.S.) 410B25.009 (D5): "Comments on draft of Hist Sec Report No 62 by Brigadier Rockingham", 1 Jul 55). One interesting feature of the raid was the tremendous smoke screen which was placed on the ridge when the infantry were ready to withdraw, still in daylight. As the screen was laid, the enemy reacted by firing all his defensive fire tasks, made up of artillery, mortar and machine gun fire. This reaction, however, had been anticipated, and our troops wer given time to get clear of the enemy's defensive fire tasks by the expedient of preceding the smoke with heavy H.E. concentrations on the next ridge to the west. These concentrations led the enemy to believe that a further attack was in prospect, and he withheld firing Fis defensive tasks until the smoke came down, by which time our troops had withdrawn beyond the lines of this fire. A new arrival in Korea got its first taste of action during this raid, when the P.P.C.L.I. company was chosen from 1 P.P.C.L.I., whose relief of 2 P.P.C.L.I. was opmpleted on 4 Nov (W.D., 1 P.P.C.L.I., November 1951, Appx "M", Tel Comd 160, H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde to Army Ottawa, 4 Nov 51).

261. The enemy attacks continued in November, and increased in strength. During the night 2/3 Nov, "A" and "C" Coys 2 R.C.R. Successfully repulsed a series of attacks, although the forward platoon of "A" Coy, commanded by Lt. E.J. Mastronardi, was forced back to the main Company position (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Bde, 2 and 3 Nov 51; "Diary of Op Events 15 Oct 51 to 15 Feb 52", p. 2). Prior to this withdrawal Lt Mastronardi had conducted the defence of his platoon area with great skill and tenacity, inflicting very heavy casualties on the enemy and forcing him to deploy the better part of a battalion in an attempt to overcome the determined resistance of one platoon. Lt Mastronardi directed the platon's withdrawal with equal skill, bringing back all his wounded and his weapons. In the morning, he returned to the position which he had been forced to abandon and discovered 21 enemy dead in the area. In addition, he took five wounded prisoners. The skill, courage and power of leadership which Lt Mastronardi displayed during this action were recognized by award of the Military Cross (P.N. 322-51, "Citation, Lt Edward John Mastronardi"). Late in the afternoon of 4 Nov, very heavy attacks were launched against the 28 Bde front. 1 K.O.S.B. was forced off Hills 217 and 317, its effective strength being reduced to two rifle companies in the process. One outstanding feature of the attack was the volume of enemy artillery fire which supported it. It was estimated that 90 to 120 rounds per minute fell on the front of 28 Bde during the hour before the attack ("Diary of 0p Events 15 Oct 51 to 15 Feb 52", p. 2). On the evening of 5 Nov, "D" Coy 1 P.P.C.L.I. repulsed a heavy attack, probably a diversion? effort connected with the attacks on 28 Bde (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 5 Nov 51). In Operation "TUFFT" 2 R. 22e R. raided Hill 166 on 9 Oct, employing "C" Coy and the Scout Fl. Part of this force succeeded in reaching the top of the hill in very confused fighting before the raiding troops were ordered to withfraw (151, 9 and 10

262. Heavy fighting continued in this sector until 22 Nov, when 28 Bde was relieved by 7 Regt of 3 U.S. Inf Div and a new right boundary was established for the Division, making 3 Div responsible for Hills 217 and 317. It had been planned previously for 29 Bde to take over a sector west of the Samichon from 1 ROK Div and for 28 Bde to go into reserve on relief by 7 Regt (<u>ibid</u>, pp 6 and 7). These changes in boundary were made after repeated representations by the C.O.C that 1 Comwel Div was over-extended. They reduced the front to 16,000 yards, and relieved the Division of the area in which the enemy had been most active. Maj-Gen Cassels reported that on completion of the relief he felt more secure in the Division's position, though he still did not feel confident that the formation could cope with a really large-scale offen-sive ("Periodic Report, 15 Oct 51 to 15 Feb 52", para 3).

263. One result of the relief of 28 Bde and the change in the Division's boundaries was the move of 2 R. 22e R across 25 Bde's front, from the left flank to the right. Here it was to take over positions from two companies of 1 K.S.L.I. and a part of the area of 1 P.P.C.L.I. 29 Bde was to extend its boundary east to take in the former 2 R. 22e R. positions, so that the Division had 29 and 25 Bdes in the line, with 25 Bde on the right flank. 2 R. 22e R. was in its new positions at 1100 hrs, 22 Nov, right up against the sector which had seen such bitter fighting. Events, as it proved, were not to belie the rather ominous possibilities suggested by this proximity to the contested area. At 1628 hrs, 23 Nov, the Chinese launched attacks against the Americans on Hill 355 and against "D" 2 R. 22e R. which was on the saddle between Hills 355 and 227. At 1745 hrs, an 0.P. of 2 R.C.H.A. reported enemy on top of Hill 355, and 7 Regt confirmed five minutes later that the hill had been lost. This enemy success placed "D" Coy, and in fact the whole of 2 R. 22eR., in a very dangerous situation, since Hill 355 dominated the battalions's position* However, the Company, though under almost continuous attack from 1630 hrs or 25 Nov to 2230 hrs 25 Nov, maintained its position, suffering heavily in the process. Total unit casualties were 14 killed and 37 wounded, nearly all of them from "D" Coy ((H.S.) 133.06! (D578), vol 1, "Korean Cas"; W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 21 - 24 Nov 51; W.D., 2 R.**22e** R., 22 - 25 Nov 51).

264. The action was distinguished by the outstanding leadership of the Company Commander, Capt Roal Liboiron, and by the gallantry of several men in the unit. Capt Liboiron, who was awarded the Distinguished Service Order, maintained his Company positions intact under very heavy fire, in the face of attacks by wave on wave of enemy. Moving from position to position, he directed artillery and mortar fire on the enemy, rallied his men and led them to repel all attacks (P.N. 9-52, "Citation, Capt (A/Mai) Réal Liboiron"). Cpl L. Major, D.C.M., won a bar to his Distinguished Conduct Medal when he led the Scout and Sniper Platoon in a successful attempt to recapture positions from which 11 Pl had been forced to withdraw. Under his leadership the Platoon fought its way from trench to trench into 11 Pl's former position, overcoming an enemy six times their number. Cpl Major then organized the defence of the position, moving from one point of danger to another, under heavy fire as he directed his men and encouraged them to hold against overwhelming odds (<u>ibid</u>, "Citation, Cpl Leo Major D.C.M."). L/Cpl J.P.A. Harvey, having been given the task of protecting the rear and the left flank of 10 Pl which the enemy attempted to encircle, moved two Bren guns under heavy fire into positions covering the Platoon. Here he most gallantly repulsed successive enemy attacks, an action for which he was awarded the Distinguished Conduct Medel (<u>ibid</u>, "Citation, L/Cpl J.Seph Paul André Harvey").

[&]quot;Hill 355, in fact, dominated the whole of the Brigade's front. It was difficult to learn the plan of the U.S. troops who had been forced to withdraw from the feature, but it was finally ascertained that they intended to "sneak" a platoon quickly to the positions which they had vacated. (W.D., H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 23 Nov 51.)

A day or so later, a lull fell on the front of 1 Comwel Div. On 27 Nov, orders were received from I Corps that, in general, future operations were to be curtailed to those strictly necessary for the security of maintaining positions ("Diary of Op Events 15 Oct 51 to 15 Feb 52", pp 5 to 7). This Order appears to have been connected in some way with the agreement on a demarkation line which was reached at Kaesong on that same date, but the connection is obscure*, In any event, the Division's front gradually returned to normal after a period of quiet, although the fighting did not again, at least during the period covered by this Report, reach the intensity of the operations of November (ibid, p. 7 et seq).

266. The four months from December 1951 to March 1952 dragged out in the nerve-racking monotony of static warfare. During the first part of the period, there was some debate over Operation "VIKING", a raid 6500 yards deep into enemy territory by two battalions supported by tanks. I Corps had ordered the Division to prepare plans for this raid, but the G.O.C. succeeded in having it cancelled for the time ("Periodic Report, 15 Oct 51 to 15 Feb 52", para 4).** On 11 Dec 51, 1 P.P.C.L.I. conducted a raid on enemy positions in the area of Hill 227, and became involved in a sharp skirmish which resulted in the unit losing 1 killed and 24 wounded ("Diary of Op Events, 15 Oct 51 to 15 Feb 52", p. 9). On 19 Jan 52, 25 Bde was relieved by 28 Bde, after having been in the line since 4 Sep 51 ("Weekly Summary", No. 66). On relief the Brigade moved back to the Imjin, where it engaged in reconnaissance of the reserve positions and planning for their occupation - activities inseparable from the role of a reserve brigade (<u>ibid</u>, Nos 66 to 73).

267. Operation "SMARE", which affected the whole of Eighth U.S. Army, took place during the period 10 to 16 Feb 52. On this Operation, Maj-Gen Cassels reported as follows:

> This operation affected the whole of 8 UNITED STATES army. Briefly it entailed stopping all artillery, tank and mortar fire and all patrolling for the period 10 to 16 February. Also all movement in the front line was to be cut to an absolute minimum. The aim was to make the enemy so curious that they would come in some strength to see what was happening and we could then kill them in large numbers and capture some prisoners.

*The actual agreement entered into at Kaesong on 27 Nov established a demarcation line from which both sides were to withdraw two kilometers at a time specified in the Armistice Agreement. In view of the fact that hostilities were expected to continue until the Armistice was signed, provision was made for revision of the line should an armistice not be concluded within 30 days of the time when this demarcation line was agreed to. (External Affairs, December 1950, pp. 410 and 411). It is possible that agreement as to the location of this demarkation line was mistakenly taken to include provision for a partial cessation of hostilities on the line.

**Maj-Gen Cassels speaks rather strongly about this raid, which he considered pointless and potentially wasteful of manpower (<u>ibid</u>). My own view wes that the operation would give the enemy exactly the opportunity he wanted to improve his defences on the forward slopes and to work his way forward with impunity. As we had spent the previous month using every possible means to force the enemy back and off the forward slopes, and had destroyed many of his bunkers, I protested strongly against this operation. I was overruled.

I regret to say that the result has been exactly as I and all my commanders anticipated. The enemy is now right down the forward slopes in very deep and strong bunkers and all our previous efforts have been completely nullified. The enemy sent out a few patrols and found we were still there and then calmly proceeded with his digging. We are now trying to force him back again but it will take a long time and considerable effort.

> (Periodic Report, 15 Oct 51 to 15 Feb 52", para 6)

268. On 10 Mar, toward the end of the period covered by this Report, 25 Bde went back into the line again, relieving 29 Bde in its positions on the left of the Division's front, astride the Samichon ("Weekly Summary", No. 73). Routine activity followed until 26 Mar, when the enemy put in a sharp attack on an outpost platoon of 1 P.P.C.L.I. which was located on the spur south-west of Umdalmal (1010). This attack was followed by a thrust against a 2 R.C.R. outpost on Will 163 (0910). The R.C.R. group was forced to withdraw, but the P.P.C.L.I. held firm until the attack ended at 0300 hrs. Canadian casualties were 8 killed and 13 wounded (<u>ibid</u>, No. 76).

269. This action might be taken to mark the close of a period in the history of 25 Bde. The units had fought their way to the 38th parallel, and slightly beyond. On that line they had endured many months of static operations. Now relief was in sight, for troops fresh from Canada were already on the Pacific, en route to replace the veterans in Korea. The war was destined to drag on, but for the original units of 25 Bde, the turn of March into April marked the end of their fighting in Korea — or a relief in it.

270. This Report was prepared by Maj. H.W. Thomas. It has been examined by Brigadier Rockingham, and all amendments suggested by him have been incorporated in the text.

H.W. T. Arman My

for (C.P. Stacey) Colonel, Director Historical Section (G.S.)

APPENDICES

"A" -- Order of Battle, C.A.S.F., 20 Oct 50.
"B" -- C.Os. of C.A.S.F. units, February 1951.
"C" -- Partial Order of Battle, 1 Comwel Div, June 1951.

Appx "A" to Report No. 62

Order of Battle, C.A.S.F., 20 Oct 50
Headquarters, 25th Canadian Infantry
Brigade (HQ 25 Cdn Inf Bde) including:
Increment A - Postal Detachment
Increment B - Field Security Detachment
Increment C - Historical Detachment
Increment D - Field Hygiene Detachment
A Squadron 1st/2nd Canadian Armoured
Regiment (A Sqn 1/2 Cdn Armd Regt)*
Hobrache (Hoda The can came hobe)
2nd Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
(2 R.C.H.A.)**
60th Constion Independent Rield
57th Canadian Independent Field Squadron (57 Cdn Indep Fd Sqn)
Squaron ()) our indep in Squi
25th Canadian Infantry Brigade
Signal Squadron (25 Cdn Inf Bde Sig Sqn)***
2nd Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery
Signal Troop (2 R.C.H.A. Sig Tp)
No. 25 Canadian Infantry Brigade
Ground Defence Platoon
(25 Cdn Inf Bde Ground Def Pl)
2nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian
Regiment (2 R.C.R.)
2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian
Light Infantry (2 P.P.C.L.I.)
2nd Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment
(2 R. 22e R.)
No. 54 Canadian Transport Company
(54 Cdn Tpt Coy)
No. 38 Canadian Motor Ambulance
Company (38 Cdn M.A.C.)
No. 25 Constian Field umbulance
No. 25 Canadian Field Ambulance (25 Cdn Fd Amb)
(2) oun ru sano,
No. 25 Canadian Field Surgical
Team (25 Cdn F.S.T.)
And the second
*Redesignated as C Squadron Lord Strathcona's
Horse (Royal Canadians)(C Sqn Ld S.H. (R.C.)) (Supple-
ments to C.A.Os., . Issue No. 226 of 1951, C.A.O. 76 - 2)
**Redesignated as 2nd Regiment Royal Canadian Horse
Artillery (2 R.C.H.A.) (Supplements to C.A.Os., Issue
No. 251 of 1951 (Part B), C.A.O. 76 - 2)
***Reduced to a troop and redesignated as 25th

***Reduced to a troop and redesignated as 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Signal Troop (25 Cdn Inf Bde Sig Tp) after 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp was incorporated in 1 Commonwealth Division (Supplements to C.A.O.'s, Issue No. 263 of 1951 (Part B), C.A.O. 76 - 2) No. 26 Canadian Field Surgical Team (26 Cdn F.S.T.) No. 25 Canadian Field Dressing Station (25 Cdn F.D.S.) No. 25 Canadian Field Transfusion Team (25 Cdn F.T.T.) No. 25 Canadian Infantry Brigade Ordnance Company (25 Cdn Inf Bde Ord Coy) No. 191 Canadian Infantry Workshop (191 Cdn Inf Wksp)

No. 192 Canadian Light Aid Detachment (Type B) (192 Cdn L.A.D. (B))

No. 193 Canadian Light Aid Detachment (Type B) (193 Cdn L.A.D. (B))

No. 20 Canadian Field Dental Detachment (20 Cdn Fd Dental Det)

No. 25 Canadian Prevost Detachment (25 Cdn Pro Det)

No. 25 Canadian Public Relations Unit (25 Cdn P.R. Unit)

Canadian Military Mission, Far East (C.M.M.F.E.)

Canadian Base Post Office (Cdn B.P.O.)

No. 1 Canadian Movement Control Group (1 Cdn M.C. Gp)

No. 2 Canadian Movement Control Group (2 Cdn M.C. Gp)

No. 1 Medical Liaison Detachment (1 Med Liaison Det)

No. 1 Canadian Ordnance Liaison Establishment (1 Cdn Ord Liaison Est)

No. 2 Canadian Ordnance Liaison Establishment (2 Cdn Ord Liaison Est)

No. 25 Canadian Support Workshop (25 Cdn Sp Wksp)*

No. 25 Canadian Reinforcement Group (25 Cdn Rft Gp)

No. 2 Canadian Administrative Unit (2 Cdn Adm Unit)

Canadian Lines of Communication Postal Unit (Cdn L of C Postal Unit) No. 1 Canadian Welfare Unit (at nil strength)

'(H.Q.S. 2000-151/25, vol 2: S.D. 1 Letter No. 4106, 1 Nov 50)

*Reduced to nil strength (S.D. 1 Letter No. 4373, 23 Nov 51)

Appx "B" to Report No. 62

C.Os. of C.A.S.F. Units, February 1951

Unit	C.O.
H.Q. 25 Cdn Inf Bde	*ZK 4050 Brigadier J.M. Rockingham C.B.E., D.S.O.
"A" Sqn 1/2 Cdn Armd Regt	ZL 2717 Maj J.W. Quinn
2 R.C.H.A.	ZK 107 Lt-Col A.J.B. Bailey D.S.O., M.B.E., E.D.
57 Cdn Indep Fd Sqn	ZB 450 Maj D.H. Rochester
25 Cdn Inf Bde Sig Sqn	ZL 116 Maj D.H. George M.C.
2 R.C.R.	ZH 106 Lt-Col R.A. Keane D.S.O.
2 P.P.C.L.I.	*ZK 4311 Lt-Col J.R. Stone D.S.O., M.C.
2 R. 22e R.	*ZD 4622 Lt-Col J.A. Dextraze D.S.O.
54 Cdn Tpt Coy	**TC 2944 Maj R.C. Laughton
38 Cdn M.A.C.	*ZC 4551 Lt W.S. Brown
25 Cdn Fd Amb	ZD 553 Lt-Col B.L.P. Brosseau M.C.
25 Cdn Inf Bde Ord Coy	ZL 1077 Maj L.V. Patrick M.B.E.
191 Cdn Inf Wksp	*ZK 4587 Maj R.E. Hallam
192 Cdn L.A.D.(B)	ZB 622 Capt R.C. Rivers
193 Cdn L.A.D. (B)	ZB 2054 Capt H.D. McLaughlin
20 Cdn Fd Dental Det	ZH 2883 Lt-Col G.E. Shragge
25 Cdn Pro Det	ZC 2228 Maj R.I. Luker

*Enrolled in the Active Force from the Special Force **Had not enrolled in the Active Force

C.O.
ZP 2294 Maj C.C. McDougall
ZB 2235 Capt M.G. Corbeil
*ZM 4618 Capt R.V. Hyde
*ZK 9648 Maj A. Egarton
ZP 1648 Maj W.G. Finney
ZB 2823 Capt F.B. Revell
ZC 724 Maj W.A. Down
*ZK 4142 Lt-Col G.C. Corbould D.S.O., E.D.
ZD 112 Lt-Col T.H. Carlisle E.D.
*ZC 4909 Capt W.L. Ford
(H.Q.S. 1454 - 151/25, vol 3: D. Rec to D. Hist, 28 Aug 52)

*Enrolled in the Active Force from the Special Force.

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Appx "C" to Report No. 62

Partial Order of Battle, 1 Comwel Div, June 1951

25 Canadian Infantry Brigade

Brigadier J.M. Rockingham, C.B.H., D.S.O., E.D.

2nd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (2 P.P.C.L.I.

2nd Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (2 R.C.R.)

2nd Battalion, Royal 22e Regiment (2 R. 22e R.)

28 British Commonwealth Infentry Brigade

Brigadier G. Taylor, D.S.O.

Lst Battalion, King's Own Scott sh Borderers (1 K.O.S.B.)

lst Battalion, King's Shropshire Light Infantry (1 K.S.L.I.)

3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3 R.A.R.)

29 British Infantry Brigade - Block Inchica

Brigadier T. Brodie, C.B.E. D.S.O.

lst Battalion, The Royal Northumberland
Fusiliers (1 R.N.F.)

lst Battalion, The Gloucestershire Regiment
 (1 Glosters)

lst Battalion, The Royal Ulster Rifles
 (1 R.U.R.)

Armoured Units

8th King's Royal Irish Hussars (8 H.)

"C" Sqn, Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) ("C" Sqn Ld S.H. (R.C.))

H.Q. Royal Artillery

Brigadier W.G.H. Pike, D.S.O.

2nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery (2 R.C.H.A.)

16th New Zealand Field Regiment (16 N.Z. Fd Regt)

45 Field Regiment R.A. (45 I'd Regt)

170 Light Battery R.A. (170 L; Hty)

11 (Sphinx) Light Anti Aircra^{*}t Battery R.A. (11 L.A.A. Bty) H.Q. Royal Engineers

Colonel E.C.W. Myers, C.B.E., D.S.O.

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28 Field Engineer Regiment R.E.

64 Field Park Squadron R.E.

(H.Q.S. 1750-121/1, vol 1: "Periodic Report, 2 May - 15:Oct 51", Appx "B", "Diary of Op Events 1951", pp 2 and 3)


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
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1.	 Korea
2.	 Operations, 2 P.P.C.L.I., 19 Feb - 13 Mar 51.
3.	 Operations, 2 P.P.C.L.I., 28 - 31 Mar 51.
4.	 Operations, 2 P.P.C.L.I., 1 - 19 Apr 51.
5.	 Operations, 2 P.P.C.L.I., 23 - 26 Apr 51.
6.	 Operations, 25 Cdn Inf Bde Gp, 25 May - 1 Jun 51.
7.	 Operations, 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 2 - 18 Jun, 18 Jul - 7 Sep 51.
8.	 Operations, 25 Cdn Inf Bde, 8 Sep - 8 Oct 51.
9.	 Situation, 25 U.S. Inf Div, 24 2400 K May 51. Planned Operations to Commence 25 May 51.
10.	 Front, Eighth U.S. Army, 1951.
11.	 Patrols, Chorwon area, 19 Jun - 18 Jul 51.

















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