

NOTE

This is a preliminary narrative and should not be regarded as authoritative. It has not been checked for accuracy in all aspects, and its interpretations are not necessarily those of the Historical Section as a whole.

Ce texte est préliminaire et n'a aucun caractère officiel. On n'a pas vérifié son exactitude et les interprétations qu'il contient ne sont pas nécessairement celles du Service historique.

Directorate of History
National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

July 1986

~~REstricted~~
~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

DOWNGRADED TO RESTRICTED
Authority: DHD 3-1
By RAE for D Hist NDHQ
Date OCT 24 1980

20 Feb 59

REPORT NO.81

HISTORICAL SECTION (C.S.) **DECLASSIFIED**
AUTHORITY: DHD 3-12

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

BY AOE FOR DHIST NDHQ

DATE: NOV 25 1982

PROBLEMS AFFECTING FRENCH-SPEAKING REPRESENTATION

IN THE POST-WAR CANADIAN ARMY

CONTENTS

	<u>Pages</u>
Introduction	
(i) The Problem Recognized	1
(ii) Canadian Army Training School	5
(iii) Collège Militaire Royal de St. Jean	16
(iv) Committee for the Study of Bilingual Problems	23
(v) Creation of Additional French-speaking Units	28
(vi) Battle Honours in the French Language	29
Conclusion	30
References	32

~~CANCELLED~~
~~RESTRICTED~~

~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~

REPORT NO. 81

HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

DECLASSIFIED
AUTHORITY: DHD 3-12
BY: 002 FOR DHIST NDHQ
DATE: NOV 25 1992

Problems Affecting French-Speaking
Representation in the Post-War
Canadian Army

1. The post-war organization of the Canadian Army endeavoured to provide the proper proportion of French-speaking Reserve Force units for the supporting arms and services required by the formations to be mobilized within the Province of Quebec in the event of a national emergency. But until the late spring of 1946 no thought appears to have been given to the necessity of ensuring that French-speaking officers and other ranks were equally well represented in all corps of the Active Force. Unless this could be achieved, however, it would be next to impossible to provide sufficient instructors and trained cadres to cope with such an eventuality. Furthermore, it would be difficult even to provide administrative and training staffs for Reserve Force units in peace time. This Report discusses certain of the efforts made to improve the situation.

2. A helpful approach to an understanding of why French-speaking Canadians live, think, act, and react differently from English-speaking inhabitants of North America is to be found in The French Canadians 1760-1945 by Mason Wade (London, 1955). The attempts to cope with the situation during the Second World War are discussed at some length in A.H.Q. Report No.63.

(i) The Problem Recognized

3. On 6 May 46 Brigadier W.H.S. Macklin (Vice Adjutant General) addressed a memorandum to the Adjutant General pointing out that Brigadier J.P.E. Bernatchez (Deputy Adjutant General (B)) had drawn attention to the "alarming fact" that only 232 of the 1897 officers accepted for service in the Active Force, as of 25 Apr 46, were French-speaking. The situation was not too serious as regards Infantry officers, where the requirement was roughly 30 percent. Here the 131 French-speaking officers already accepted constituted 23.5 percent of the corps quota. But only 7.5 percent of the officers accepted for other arms were French-speaking. The situation was worst as regards R.C.E., where only four French-speaking officers had been found suitable. Because of the fact that the French-speaking element of the pre-war Non-Permanent Active Militia had been predominantly Infantry, great difficulty had been experienced in mobilizing and maintaining units of the other arms and services in which French-speaking personnel might serve during the Second World War. The fact that there had been practically no

Macklin recommended that, after a study had been made, minimum quotas should be reserved within each corps for French-speaking officers and all applications re-examined with this in mind. Since the same problem existed for other ranks, he suggested that similar percentages might be reserved as minimum quotas (1).

4. Although anticipating considerable difficulty in obtaining suitable percentages of French-speaking officers for corps other than Infantry, Major-General E.G. Weeks (Adjutant General) felt that a "determined effort" should be made to solve this problem, at a time when the whole problem of army organization was under discussion. Therefore, he raised the matter during the course of the Military Members' meeting on 9 May, when it was agreed that such percentages should be worked out by the General Staff (2).

5. Proceeding on the assumption that, if the Active Force was "to fulfil its purpose in peace and on mobilization, it should have reflected in it the same proportion of bilingual officers as has the Reserve Force", the Director of Staff Duties produced a table showing the proportion of bilingual units of the Reserve Force to be as follows(3):

R.C.A.C.	23.9	percent
R.C.A.	18.7	"
R.C.E.	27.2	"
R.C. Signals	20.7	"
C.I.C.	22.8	"
R.C.A.S.C.	25.7	"
R.C.A.M.C.	23.8	"
R.C.O.C.	22.8	"
R.C.E.M.C.	22.7	"
C.D.C.	24.4	"
C. Pro C.	22.5	"
C.P.C.	24.4	"
H.Qs.	32.7	"

For purposes of this study, all units in Quebec Command had been treated as bilingual, with the exception of English-speaking Infantry regiments. By this means it was hoped to offset the existence of considerable French-speaking elements in the populations of Eastern Ontario and New Brunswick.

6. After further discussion a policy statement was issued by the Adjutant General's Branch on 11 Jun 46. A minimum of 30 percent of all ranks of the Canadian Infantry Corps and 15 percent of all ranks of other corps was to be reserved for French-speaking personnel. In addition, 25 percent of all ranks on the General List, and of those extra-regimentally employed, was to be reserved for French-speaking personnel. For the present, all corps were to remain under strength if sufficient numbers of these were not available. Moreover, all previously rejected applications were to be re-examined with a view to acceptance in their own or some other corps. Finally, since there were sufficient applications available from infantrymen, an attempt was to be made to transfer suitable officers already accepted to other arms or the services (4).

7. In a memorandum of 20 May, however, Brigadier Bernatchez had already pointed out that such action would not be enough⁽⁵⁾. Since the Royal 22^e Régiment was to be the only Active Force unit of fighting troops stationed in the Province of Quebec, prospective French-speaking recruits would be deterred from enlisting in other corps and having to serve away from their own people. He recommended that sub-units of all the fighting arms be found from French-speaking personnel and localized at Valcartier. He suggested:

One field battery of Artillery
two Armoured squadrons
one sub-unit of Engineers
one sub-unit of Signals.

In addition to making the Army better known in Quebec, closer liaison would be possible with units of the Reserve Force and much needed training demonstrations could be staged. Brigadier Bernatchez also recommended that a recruit training school should be established at Valcartier. (The Directorates of Military Training and Organization had proposed earlier that a central school should be established to train all recruits, but Lieutenant-General C. Foulkes (Chief of the General Staff) had directed that basic training courses should be conducted by each corps school. In order that such "General Military Training" should be uniform throughout the Army, the Director of Infantry had been made responsible for the training syllabi, while instructional personnel were to be qualified by the Royal Canadian School of Infantry.)⁽⁶⁾ Since the R.C.C.C. School at Longue Pointe, Montréal, was the only corps school intended for Quebec Command, French-speaking recruits allocated by District Depots to all other corps, including Infantry, would be undergoing all their training in strange surroundings. This, Brigadier Bernatchez considered, would not be conducive to recruiting⁽⁷⁾.

8. Although fully cognizant of the disadvantages which had faced Permanent Force units by being decentralized prior to the Second World War, both Brigadier H.D. Graham (Deputy Adjutant General (A)) and Brigadier Macklin supported the Bernatchez proposals to "sell" the Army in Quebec⁽⁸⁾. Indeed, Brigadier Macklin bluntly stated his opinion in a letter of 23 May to the Adjutant General:

5. You will remember that before the Great War there was NO French-speaking unit in the P.F. A start was made thereafter by organizing the R. 22^e R. Probably this was about as far as it was practicable to go in 1920 but surely the time has come to take another step? ...if we want French-speaking soldiers in war we must sow the seeds of production in peace (and water them a bit). This would apply under any system of raising men - compulsory or voluntary.
6. For all the talk there has been about "conscription" these past seven years no one has ever explained to me how the Cdn Army could have absorbed the proper proportion of French-speaking manpower

8. I recognize the drawbacks and the difficulties but are not these absolutely inherent in the bilingual nature of the population? They can hardly be solved by evading them. There they are (9).

This letter was passed to General Foulkes who directed, on 31 May, that the Deputy Chief of the General Staff (A) and the Director of Military Training should study the matter (10).

9. In a lengthy memorandum of 20 Jun addressed to the Adjutant General, the views of the General Staff were set forth by Major-General C.C. Mann who had assumed the appointment of Vice Chief of the General Staff only four days before. His memorandum argued that the small element of the Active Force comprising the Field Force should be left alone: any attempt to decentralize its units would nullify the purpose for which it had been organized. He suggested that the key to the problem lay in the organization of the Reserve Force, which was the framework upon which any wartime army must be constructed. Close contact between professional and reserve soldiers would be fostered by French-speaking A. & T. staffs, which might also be expected to foster recruiting among young men who already had some interest in soldiering. French-speaking Canada was well represented in the Active Force through static staff and service troops: this should be sufficient to keep the Army in the public eye and provide a career for many young men within their own province. General Mann wished, however, to give further consideration to the proposal to establish a training school for recruits in the Province of Quebec, since he felt that some success in language training might be achieved while recruits were receiving their basic training and being indoctrinated into military life (11).

10. Brigadier Bernatchez was willing to concede that true bilingual units could be the answer only in theory, since those mobilized during the Second World War had quickly proved unsatisfactory and had then lost their French-speaking element. But French-speaking infantry battalions had been able to function satisfactorily, since there had been sufficient bilingual personnel to handle intercommunications. "Full National effort in war will never be possible unless French-speaking units of all arms are organized," he continued in a memorandum of 25 Jun, "because French-Canadians are, by and large, not bilingual and naturally very reluctant to enlist for service in English-speaking units" (12). Such could never be possible, however, unless there was a much better French-speaking representation in all arms of the Active Force. Summing up what he considered to be the pros and cons, Brigadier Macklin suggested to the Adjutant General on 26 Jun:

....the point should be stressed that the proposed new Active Force is roughly 6 times the size of the old PF, and a number of new

In a further letter of 29 Jun Brigadier Macklin informed the Adjutant General that the problem had been discussed with Major-General E.J. Renaud (General Officer Commanding, Quebec Command) who had agreed that the stationing of sub-units of the Active Force in the Province of Quebec was "absolutely essential" to the future of recruiting and popularization of the Army there (14).

11. On 3 Jul General Weeks passed the above correspondence to the Chief of the General Staff, with his own memorandum recommending that sub-units of the Active Force should be localized in the Province of Quebec and that a special training school should be established there for French-speaking recruits. He considered that the practical difficulties envisaged by General Mann would be more than offset by the benefits. Furthermore:

4. I hold the view very strongly that now is the time to make an honest effort to solve this problem rather than adopt half measures which will not be popular and which will lead to the same difficulties which were encountered in the last war.
5. Finally, I am of the opinion that it is most unsound to set up our military structure and leave unanswered the question of what will happen in the event of universal training being adopted. Unless we have a sound nucleus of trained French-speaking personnel, we cannot hope to handle the correct proportion of French-speaking personnel which would be liable for military service (15).

12. After pointing out that the allocation of sub-units of the Active Force to the Province of Quebec would be "extremely unsatisfactory" from a training standpoint, Brigadier S.F. Clark (Acting Vice Chief of the General Staff) now suggested a compromise. His memorandum of 9 Jul envisaged an All Arms Training School within Quebec Command, where all French-speaking recruits would proceed after being processed through District Depots. In addition to administrative and basic training wings, there would be separate Armoured, Artillery, Engineers, Signals and Army Service Corps wings to provide advanced corps training (16). Concurring in this suggestion, General Weeks suggested to General Foulkes, in a minute of 18 Jul, that this was "certainly a step in the right direction" (17). He added, however, that should new units be added to the Brigade Group at any time, arms other than Infantry should be stationed in the Province of Quebec.

(ii) Canadian Army Training School

13. On 26 Aug an establishment of 119 all ranks was drawn up for a Canadian Army Training School.

- (b) To provide limited Special to Arms training for French-speaking soldiers who have completed Basic Training.
- (c) To provide French-speaking soldiers included in (a) and (b) above with a basic knowledge of English.

Training facilities for 205 recruits were to be provided as follows:

General Military Training	- 125
Armoured Sub-Wing	- 15
Artillery Sub-Wing	- 20
Engineer Sub-Wing	- 15
Signals Sub-Wing	- 15
R.C.A.S.C. Sub-Wing	- 15

On the completion of basic training, however, Infantry recruits would proceed direct to the Royal 22e Régiment, R.C.O.C. and R.C.E.M.E. recruits to the R.C.O.C. School and the R.C.E.M.E. Workshop located at Longue Pointe, Montreal, and R.C.A.M.C. recruits to that Corps' School at Camp Borden. This establishment subsequently was approved by Order in Council P.C. 137/444 of 6 Feb 47 but, in view of the drastic reduction in the Army manpower ceiling shortly made by the Cabinet Defence Committee, no action was taken to establish such a school at Valcartier⁽¹⁹⁾.

14. Since it was realized that centralized general military training was desirable for all French-speaking recruits, however, the detachment of the Royal 22e Regiment located at St. Jean, Quebec was soon saddled with the task. But this detachment did not include bilingual officers and N.C.Os. capable of teaching English to recruits within the period authorized - a task possibly better handled by competent civilian teachers. The inevitable result was that an increasing number of recruits completing their general military training were found to have insufficient knowledge of the English language to proceed to advanced or trades training at any of the corps schools. Moreover, the Royal 22e Régiment was faced with a high discharge rate of its own, possibly indicating that greater attention should be paid to its own internal administration and training. These criticisms were despatched to Army Headquarters on 15 May 48 by Major-General R.O.C. Morton (General Officer Commanding, Quebec Command), with the following recommendations:

- (a) That funds be provided to employ a civilian school teacher for at least half a day per diem at St. John.
- (b) That recruits, except infantry, be posted in very small numbers for a period of about three months for "In Job" training to an English speaking unit of their corps. This should be outside Quebec Command. The only way to learn another language is

- (c) That recruits be sent to their Corps School as soon as their C.O. feels that they can absorb instruction there (20).

15. On 13 Jul 48 Colonel F.J. Fleury (Director of Organization and acting Deputy Adjutant General) submitted detailed comments on the above to the Adjutant General. These included the following:

3. KR (Can) 360 provides for compulsory transfer from one Corps to another but, having recruited a man into a Corps, it would be misapplication of this authority to transfer him for no other reason than that he cannot comprehend instruction in English, when adequate facilities for learning English are NOT provided. Some men are willing to transfer but others are NOT and compulsory transfer of such men usually results in a purchased discharge or discharge for misconduct. Further, there is no use having the Personnel Officer select and recommend allocation of French speaking recruits if they are eventually to end up in the R 22e R. To date the Army has NOT provided the French speaking recruit with equal opportunity to the English speaking recruit.
4. Both GOC Quebec Command and D Org consider that the only solution is to have a GMT school for French speaking recruits where civilian teachers are provided for instruction in the English language. Further, it will be necessary to lengthen the period for GMT to provide a minimum of 3 mos additional for the study of English.
5. The principle of centralized GMT training for French speaking recruits of all Corps has been accepted by GS Branch in establishing St. Jean Det R 22e R so this should not present a stumbling block.

*The experience of the Royal Canadian School of Signals is interesting. On 14 Jul 48 the Commanding Officer wrote the Director of Signals that no French-speaking recruits had been received from the General Military Training course given by the Royal 22e Régiment. Moreover:

There has only been one case of a recruit who knew insufficient English to absorb instruction. He was given the choice of a transfer to a French speaking unit or discharge by purchase and chose the latter. In one other instance a recruit claimed he was making poor progress due to

6. Additional values can be obtained from such a school in peacetime. In time this school could be developed into a school which also teaches French to English speaking staff personnel, thus solving the problem of rotating staffs from Quebec Command with the Army as a whole. One other advantage will be the opportunity in peace of developing the means to solve the French speaking problem in war.
7. There is also a need for all Corps to face the bilingual problem and to make sure that each Corps School has adequate bilingual staff. Although it will not be economical to run courses only in French, facilities must be available for a French speaking recruit who has mastered basic English to receive help when the more technical words and phrases are encountered in advanced or trades training. It is apparent from the study on discharges that Corps are not meeting this problem and a number of French speaking recruits with basic English are being discharged under KR (Can) 372 vi(b) (failure to become an efficient soldier) and it is considered that language difficulty is a contributing factor (22).

The Director of Military Training concurred in Colonel Fleury's recommendation that a Canadian Army Training School should replace the Royal 22e Régiment detachment at St. Jean and that the language portion of the course should be extended and instruction given by civilian teachers.

16. On the following day (14 Jul) agreement was obtained at the Chief of the General Staff's weekly conference that, as an immediate measure, one civilian instructor should be employed by the Royal 22e Régiment detachment at St. Jean to teach English (23). As a further stopgap measure, a thoroughly bilingual officer, Major Henri Tellier, was subsequently posted to command this detachment (24).

17. On 12 Oct 48 Brigadier Macklin urged upon the Adjutant General the desirability of having bilingual instructors on the strength of all corps schools and suggested that the ultimate goal must be the organization of a proper French-speaking training centre in the Province of Quebec (25). This last was recommended by the Adjutant General to the Chief of the General Staff's weekly conference on 20 Oct, but General Foulkes held to the view that advanced training should be conducted at corps schools by bilingual instructors. However, he did direct the Vice Chief of the General Staff and the Adjutant General to make further studies (26).

18. The only conclusions that could be deduced from a staff study that had been conducted during the summer months of 1948, by the Director of Military Training in conjunction with the various Corps Directors, were, however

of Military Training recommended that a Canadian Army Training School should be authorized at St. Jean, on a limited establishment similar to that submitted four months earlier (8 Sep) by Quebec Command (28). Although the Chief of the General Staff gave verbal approval at once, an establishment providing for 36 all ranks and eight civilians (but only one qualified civilian teacher), for an authorized training capacity of 125 recruits, was not promulgated until the following March (29).

19. Actually the Canadian Army Training School began to function only on 10 May 49, when Lt. J.J. Lefebvre was taken on strength from the St. Jean detachment of the Royal 22e Régiment, which was to perform most of the administrative and "housekeeping" duties. Although Capt. A.J. Charbonneau, M.C., reported for duty as chief instructor on 1 Jun, a commanding officer did not arrive until 5 Jul. This period, preceding the appearance of Major J.A. Berthiaume, has been well described as a "transitory one" during which the School "barely existed" (30). By August 1949 it was realized that the language instruction being given was inadequate for recruits who were to proceed to corps schools where all instruction would be given in English:

To achieve [even] this...one civilian teacher, Mr. Raincourt was available. It follows that with the one and only English teacher, and with four weeks only being devoted to teaching English, little could be accomplished in this direction. To this must be added the fact that the low salary^{*} paid to the English teacher, could not result in securing a well qualified man (31).

20. Mr. Raincourt was released in December 1949 and his duties taken over by Lt. L.G. Brisebois, R.C.A.S.C. and Cpl. F. Clempson: neither of these "had special qualifications but they were capable instructors and possessed one most important quality, a very high interest in the recruits" (32). According to the School's Annual Report:

The English Wing was now operating in the right direction but, with only two English Instructors, the work which could be done was limited by the number of periods which each instructor could give in any one day. By taking them to the limit and forcing them to carry out night work consistently for correcting papers, preparing lessons and producing training aids, each instructor gave seven periods a day. This was far too much but we were after results and we wanted them badly (33).

* Hired by Civil Service Commission and paid as a Clerk Grade 3.

Only on 1 Mar 50 was Lt. J.A.D. Seguin, R.C.O.C., who had had some experience in Language training, posted to the School.

21. Following study of the U.S. Army's language training methods, liaison with the R.C.A.F. School of a similar nature at Aylmer, Ontario^M and consultation with university authorities in the Montreal area, it was recommended that the time allotted to teaching English to the average recruit should be extended to 16 weeks. On 30 Mar 50 General Morton urged the necessity of action upon Army Headquarters, pointing out that there would be insufficient accommodation at St. Jean for both the continuing detachment of the Royal 22e Régiment and an enlarged Canadian Army Training School made necessary by the numerous failures from existing courses (34). The Vice Chief of the General Staff (Major-General H.A. Sparling) directed, therefore, that "the establishment proposed by Quebec Command be examined sympathetically and that we base our calculations on a CATS which is self sufficient and, in addition, is capable of administering to one rifle company of the R 22e R." (35). The resulting review recommended that, even though the course might be extended to an average length of 20 weeks for both general military training and language instruction, there were bound to be variations and thus only an approximation was possible: at the outset recruits should be classified as to "learning ability", since some men might require as much as six months' language instruction(36). Effective 27 Jun 50, a new establishment made provision for an English language training wing of one captain, six lieutenants, four sergeants and three corporals to teach 150 recruits (intake of 30 per month).

22. But fresh problems arose almost at once. During August the detached company of the Royal 22e Régiment joined the balance of that unit at Valcartier, leaving the Canadian Army Training School responsible for what had been really a combined establishment at St. Jean. The increase in the Army's manpower ceiling and the formation of the Canadian Army Special Force demonstrated the need for more bilingual instructors and suggested that possibly 500-600 French-speaking recruits might have to be processed annually by the Canadian Army Training School. In a letter of 2 Oct 50 directed to Brigadier Bernatchez (Deputy Chief of the General Staff), General Morton emphasized that the recently increased establishment was inadequate to cope with the 360 recruits then undergoing training. Furthermore, both civilian advisers^{AM} considered that more (actual) language instructors were required (37).

^MFrom time to time suggestions had been, and continued to be, made that C.A.T.S. should be moved away from the Montreal area, where recruits found it too easy to use only the French language during after-duty hours, and located in a purely English-speaking environment. As well as being considered unacceptable to the inhabitants of the Province of Quebec, however, it was argued that the French-speaking recruits would be likely to stick together clannishly if located in strange surroundings.

Brigadier Bernatchez agreed that a larger establishment, capable of handling 250 recruits (at a planned monthly intake of 40) was necessary. Only with ad hoc help from the Active Force and the employment of "calls out" from the Reserve Force, as he pointed out to the Vice of the General Staff on 29 Nov, had it been possible to handle the following training loads (38):

11 Aug	-	141
18 Aug	-	196
25 Aug	--	238
1 Sep	-	279
6 Oct	-	360
13 Oct	-	363
3 Nov	-	346
17 Nov	-	347

On 1 Dec General Sparling agreed that the training period should be lengthened to 24 weeks (8 weeks general military training and 16 weeks language instruction) and that thought should be given to a revised establishment catering to a monthly intake of 40 recruits (39).

23. On 31 Jan 51 Quebec Command reported that 421 recruits were undergoing training and requested the Director of Military Training to hasten the establishment increases. According to this letter:

A splendid course is being conducted there at present by Miss Gaynor, and much benefit is expected to be derived therefrom. However, these benefits will be neutralized by the inefficiencies caused by over-crowding and lack of staff unless steps are taken in the immediate future to rectify the situation (40).

Miss Gaynor had arrived at St. Jean only on 14 Jan 51 to devote two months to teaching her methods to the instructional staff of the Canadian Army Training School. On 1 Feb this diarist wrote:

The new method of teaching English advocated by Miss Gaynor is now being used in all classes. Instructors receive two periods a day on methods of teaching and Miss Gaynor is closely supervising classes. She is more aware now of the actual difficulties facing us (41).

Only on 9 Mar was a larger establishment approved by the Vice Chief of the General Staff (42).

24. Due to the expansion of the Active Force, however, limitations had had to be placed upon the numbers of French-speaking recruits despatched to the Canadian Army Training School to learn English (see para 59). Canadian Army Training Instruction No.27 of 9 Jul 51 specified that all French-speaking (non-bilingual) infantrymen recruited for service in Korea should be despatched to the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade Reinforcement Group at Camp Wainwright for training by the 3rd Battalion, Royal

to C.A.T.S. for English language instruction, with a view to their becoming bilingual N.C.O.s. and instructors. Such numbers would, however, be governed by the need for reinforcements in Korea and by the necessity of restricting the intake to 40 per month for all corps (43). French-speaking infantrymen enlisted for service in Europe with the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade were to be despatched directly to units for training. As it was, however, 527 soldiers passed through C.A.T.S. during the fiscal year 1951-1952 and were posted to corps schools or units as follows (44):

RCAC	3
RCA	20
RCE	3
RC Sigs	10
RCIC	376
RCASC	42
RCAMC	26
RCOC	13
RCEME	25
RCAPC	4
C Pro C	3
RCDC	2

527

25. Perhaps more emphasis might have been directed towards obtaining, and keeping, capable language instructors. On 12 Apr 51 Major-General W.H.S. Macklin (Adjutant General) drew attention to the fact that the Chief Instructor was a Major J.E. Archambault "who can't be posted beyond Quebec because his English is so weak!" (45). Brigadier Bernatchez explained that, when the appointment of Chief Instructor had been upgraded to major in November 1950, Captain Archambault had been recommended for promotion because: "This officer was previously superseded due to low Pulhems which precluded posting to regimental duty, is not fully bilingual to accept posting to RCS of I [Royal Canadian School of Infantry], and his desire [sic] to keep his children at school in Quebec" (46). But Brigadier Bernatchez insisted that Miss Florence Gaynor had considered Major Archambault to be "fully bilingual": he understood English perfectly and, although he spoke with an accent, it was good colloquial English. The Establishment Committee at Headquarters, Quebec Command seems to have had some idea of the problem, for a recommendation was made on 16 Oct 51 that six assistant instructors should be upgraded from corporal to sergeant because:

- (a) Past experience has shown that personnel in the rank of Corporal today have not sufficient experience, and are not sufficiently qualified themselves to cope with the multitude of problems involved in teaching a new language to the CATS recruits.
- (b) The teaching of English to French-speaking students requires a technique of instruction, a psychological approach, and a helpful attitude that can only be found in personnel

This request was granted. But the continuing problem is set out very clearly in the English language training company's annual Historical Report for 1951-1952:

4. In early January, (1952) the GOC Québec Command, Major-General Bernatchez, visited this Unit and called for volunteers for Korea. Recruits could volunteer whether their training was completed or not. In this company, all our recruits but 19 volunteered and the Company's strength decreased from 67 to 19 overnight. The remainder of the Company continued training as one class for a few days and then training was suspended altogether as far as English was concerned. The balance of our personnel was placed on Guard. One class resumed training on 4 Feb 52 and the other the 25 Feb 52.
5. The drafts...created a welcome slack period, which was well utilized. All the available instructors were placed on a project consisting of preparing 600 lesson plans for the 20 week English Courses. Some 300 lesson plans were prepared and are still in the process of being screened and revised as required. It is hoped that those lesson plans when all finished will be screened and revised, then compiled as an additional guide to the instructors. It will also standardize the techniques of instruction employed in the teaching of English. However, the project is proving to be a long one and it is not expected to be completed for another three months and then only if enough experienced personnel is available to work on it.
6. This fiscal year is notable for its great flow of ever changing instructors. A total of 34 instructors worked in the Company at some time or other during the year....only 4 instructors have spent the year with the Company. That is to say that 30 instructors were employed for varying periods of time as English instructors and then left. It will readily be seen that such a turnover of instructors is indubitably detrimental to language training or any other training for that matter. There has not been one class yet which has kept the same instructors throughout the course. That situation makes for a lack of continuity. It must also be noted that of those 30 instructors very few were qualified and none had experience in this line of instruction. Therefore, the results were not what they should have been had qualified instructors been posted and allowed to remain....
7. The library acquired a good number of new books.... However, the recruits have only 30 minutes daily to go and select a book, namely from 1230-1300 hours. At present, there is no

26. During July 1952 the Canadian Army Training School moved from St. Jean to Valcartier, in order to make way for the Collège Militaire Royal de St. Jean (see para 47). During that autumn the function of C.A.T.S. was revised to provide the following:

- (a) The training of French-speaking recruits other than infantry in basic training and corps orientation. The course will be of 8 weeks duration and instruction will be given in the French language. This course will not include formal English language training. Estimated intake is approximately 70 per month.
- (b) The training of English-speaking officer and NCO instructors in the French language. Duration of these courses will be 20-24 weeks, with two courses to be run each year. Estimated training load for each course - 25.
- (c) The training of French-speaking soldiers who have completed corps training as follows:
 - (i) Junior Leaders Course - 8 weeks.
 - (ii) English language training - 20 weeks.

The estimated training load for the two courses will be 100 (49).

On 19 Jan 53 the first course for English-speaking personnel got under way, with six officers and 10 other ranks in attendance (50).

27. Following the inauguration in January 1953 of a scheme to enlist and train soldier apprentices for the Canadian Army a further small increase was granted to the establishment of C.A.T.S. Actually the (two and later three) civilian school teachers provided by the Department of Labour were employed to teach English to all French-speaking recruits, rather than just the apprentices (51). Following a year's instruction at C.A.T.S. these potential driver mechanics, clerks (administrative) and medical assistants were to proceed to the respective Corps Schools. Early in 1954, however, the training of R.C.A.M.C. apprentices was discontinued and, with effect from 1 Sep 56, apprentice training of the others was transferred to the R.C.O.C. School at Longue Pointe (52).

28. During the summer of 1954 courses were instituted for Militia personnel: these included eight weeks for 316 recruits, eight weeks for 114 junior N.C.Os., two weeks for C.O.T.C. officer cadets and one week courses on drill and general duties (53). The following summer this programme was expanded (54).

29. During the spring of 1957 the School's principal effort was the training of French-speaking recruits

recruits might continue to the R.C.A.C. School at Camp Borden after a minimum of eight weeks' language instruction. Once again, however, this School's annual report is most revealing:

The recruit, who has reported has been found to be very good, he is young, the average is in his late teens, he has had a good schooling and a better than average 'M' score on personnel selection tests.

They have expressed a desire to learn English. It appears that amongst our French Canadian population there is a growing awareness of the value of being able to speak both languages. Some recruits have joined the Army with this purpose in mind and have signified a further desire to be posted to an English speaking community to permit them to learn English more quickly. Amongst our recruits we have also had a few of German, Hungarian, and of other origins who have required (sic) to learn English before being able to complete their military training.

A language course of eight weeks is very short indeed, even as a volunteer how much French could an English speaking person learn in this short time? This special short course has been most successful with candidates who have learnt English at school, as a second tongue, but had not had the opportunity of hearing it spoken and practising it at home.

With the normal 20 weeks English course, presently well attended, the candidates are qualified as future bilingual instructors. Most Corps are represented on this longer course by potential and junior Non-Commissioned officers. These have had corps training and on qualifying can help their corps form bilingual cadres.

The seventh French language course is now in progress for English speaking Officers and Senior Non-Commissioned Officers who have volunteered to study French. Results to date are good with over 80 candidates qualifying, many of which are now employed with French speaking Units or with Units stationed near predominantly French speaking communities. Again conversation is stressed, but a good knowledge for reading and writing French is acquired (55).

30. Although the Directorate of Military Training at Army Headquarters has always been aware of the fact that the training given at C.A.T.S. fell somewhat short of the ideal, there seems to be no alternative to making the best possible use of available personnel as instructors. A curb has been placed on attempts by corps to

instructors in a purely military environment has its disadvantages, it has proved necessary to employ a number of school teachers to conduct both English and French language training (56).

(iii) Collège Militaire Royal de St. Jean

31. The subject of "officer production" for the post-war Army will be discussed elsewhere at some length, but it is necessary here to provide enough background information to make understandable its bilingual aspects.

32. Although the Royal Canadian Naval College at Royal Roads, British Columbia, was slated to provide a two-year course for Naval and Air Force cadets entering in the autumn of 1947, the question of tri-service training and the establishment of an Armed Forces College was already under consideration when that year opened. On 20 Feb 47 General Foulkes (Chief of the General Staff) secured Mr Claxton's agreement that:

- (a) there should be firstly a uniform standard of academic training for entrance into the three Services, namely, university degree, a three-year Arts standard with a degree in various sciences for technical Arms.
- (b) that rank and seniority on entrance to the Forces should be the same (57).

Furthermore, the following two systems of producing officers should be closely integrated to ensure that candidates of neither might acquire an unfair advantage:

- (a) COTC as presently conducted by the Army which should be the source of the majority of technical officers for the three Services as well as the bulk of the normal intake for the three Services.
- (b) That an Armed Services College should be an auxiliary source providing the following:
 - (i) Selections from the ranks of all three Services for commissions. This should be up to 20% of the annual intake of all Three Services.
 - (ii) Additional bilingual officers for all three Services.
 - (iii) Additional candidates from the public

Only general military training should be given at an Armed Forces College during the academic year; specialized training of a service nature would be reserved for the summer months and integrated with the programme being conducted for C.O.T.C. cadets.

possible to arrange for a Military Academy wing at Laval University in Quebec City. Both suggestions were subsequently studied in a memorandum covering all aspects of the suggested Armed Forces College. It was recommended that a Quebec wing of the College should be affiliated with Laval, which would provide academic training while the federal government provided dormitory and purely military facilities. Should the French-speaking population support the plan for a few years, the establishment of a completely separate college would be justified (58).

34. Submitting this proposal to Mr Claxton on 10 Mar 47, General Foulkes pointed out that the Royal Canadian Navy and Royal Canadian Air Force had not been advised of its full implications. He suggested, however, that the problem might now be discussed with Laval authorities (59).

35. Although this course does not appear to have been pursued, plans were made to re-open the Royal Military College of Canada as a Canadian Services College in the autumn of 1948, when Royal Roads would also become a Canadian Services College. Only two or three cadets of the last purely Naval and Air Force intake into Royal Roads were, however, French-speaking Canadians. In a memorandum of 8 Oct 47 addressed to each of the three Chiefs of Staff, Mr Claxton stressed that continuation on such a basis would make it "quite impossible" to have "well balanced armed forces" in Canada (60). The answer that otherwise qualified candidates "were not up to scratch in mathematics" was not good enough:

Quite obviously it is far more important that we should have some representation of Canadians of French origin, than that we should expect the candidates from French Canada to be qualified in all the subjects to the same extent as those who have a totally different type of training.

Mr Claxton felt that two things would have to be undertaken simultaneously:

- (1) Provide for candidates from French Canada special training before entrance; and
- (2) allow entrance with good general qualifications even if there is a deficiency in mathematics and provide special instruction in mathematics and English so as to bring them up to the ordinary standard at the end say, of the first year.

Once again, however, no action was taken and no further thought seems to have been given to the problem for some time.

36. On 3 Jan 50, the Director of Organization advised the Adjutant General (Major-General W.H.S. Macklin) that the Director of Infantry had suggested that an effort should now be made to provide that corps with its own

bilingual, young Reserve Force officer cadets who were completing a course at The Royal Canadian School of Infantry under Method "B" of the Command Contingent Programme of the Canadian Officers' Training Corps had expressed a desire to join the Active Force. Although they were between the ages of 19 and 22 and had been recommended as suitable officer material, no provision existed for making such appointments. Therefore, the Director of Organization suggested that a limited number of bilingual officers qualifying for Reserve Force or Supplementary Reserve commissions under the Command Contingent C.O.T.C. Plan might be accepted against the French-speaking shortage of Active Force officers. He suggested four possible methods:

- (a) Direct entry in the rank of lieutenant.
- (b) Appointed in the rank of lieutenant and despatched to university at public expense to obtain the required academic degree.
- (c) Prior to being commissioned under the Command Contingent Plan, to be enrolled in the Active Force as an other rank and despatched to university at public expense under the plan for upgrading of other ranks to commissioned rank through university at public expense.
- (d) Direct entry of Reserve Force other ranks into the Active Force as selected officer candidates who will be upgraded to commissioned rank through university at public expense (61).

In a memorandum of 11 Jan 50 addressed to the Vice Chief of the General Staff, General Macklin requested an opinion on this "hoary problem" and suggested that special measures would be necessary if a solution were ever to be attempted:

I am not so worried about the infantry where we have some 26% French speaking officers, but in other arms the percentage is lower and in some very low indeed (62).

Major-General H.D. Graham was not prepared, however, to recommend a policy which would permit "special treatment" for French-speaking candidates. In his minute of 18 Jan he suggested that the Adjutant General might raise the question at an early meeting of the Military Members (63).

37. The deterioration of the international situation into what is commonly referred to as the "cold war", and the acceleration of the N.A.T.O. programme undertaken early in 1951, made it obvious that, for many years to come, Canada's armed forces would be considerably larger than had been anticipated by the post-war organization. Therefore, the Chiefs of Staff Committee established a sub-committee to study the problem of how to produce a far larger number of junior officers. During April 1951

to the fore as a result of a proposal that Laval University might establish a two or three year course leading to a bachelor's degree in military science (65). Although Mr Claxton considered that the handicaps facing young French-speaking Canadians were exaggerated, he directed that this possible solution be included in a study aimed at a possible revamping of the whole nature of officer training (66). In answer to questions raised in the House of Commons that a Services College be established to train French-speaking officers, Mr Claxton stated on 27 Jun that he had discussed with Monsignor Roy (Archbishop of Quebec) and university officials the possibility of establishing a special course at Laval (67).

38. At its meeting of 6 Jul the Chiefs of Staff Committee discussed the points made by Mr Claxton. It was agreed that the standards for short-term and permanent commissions should remain unchanged. The Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee was directed to report on the problem, giving particular attention to a proposal whereby French-speaking students would be given a subsidized one-year course at French-speaking universities to prepare them for entrance into the Services Colleges (68).

39. After discussing the Laval proposal with its originator, Father Jacques Garneau who had been a wartime chaplain and now was assistant secretary there, Brigadier Bernatchez (Director General of Military Training) had already submitted a memorandum to the Vice Chief of the General Staff. The basic problem was for educational authorities in Quebec to orient more French-speaking students towards the Services. Although students at Classical Colleges could find their way into the Services via university C.O.T.C. contingents, he did feel that French-speaking representation at the Canadian Services Colleges should be increased. But, as his memorandum continued:

11. I am of opinion that the opening of a separate and self-contained college in Quebec should be resisted because of the principle of safeguarding the principle of one army and also because it would be illogical to train French-speaking officers entirely in Quebec when it is so essential and so much in their interest that they should become good bilinguals. We should, however, take every practical step to make our military colleges national in character. I believe that French and English should be compulsory subjects at the colleges to such an extent that all graduates should be fluent bilinguals.

12. I am further of the opinion that as long as the colleges remain as they are, scientific colleges requiring senior matriculation for entrance, there is a strong case to have a preparatory one year course conducted in Quebec. This can be done possibly at Laval and/or at the University of Montreal. English and mathematics would be the main subjects to be taught. If

we initiated such a preparatory course and handed that task to the religious authorities of the French speaking universities, I believe we could tap the classical colleges as well as the other schools and secure adequate representation. I recommend this course of action before the opening of the present colleges.

13. There may even be a case, especially if the military colleges were to be enlarged, to have one year of the regular course conducted at some location in the Province of Quebec...(69).

General Sparling agreed that the product of the Quebec educational system was at a disadvantage compared with students from the rest of Canada as regards having a good grounding in mathematics and science. He did not think, however, that French Canada should look upon the language problem "as a form of discrimination because it is worth noting that the English language has been accepted as the international medium within NATO and there is no doubt, too, that the English language is accepted by continental countries as the medium for international business dealings" (70).

40. Father Garneau explained his proposal at a meeting of the Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee on 9 Jul 51 (71). During further discussion by the Vice Chiefs on 16 Jul it emerged that acceptance of the Laval proposal would mean inaugurating a form of government subsidies for education; this might lead English-speaking universities to advance training schemes of their own. It was agreed after considerable discussion that any solution would have to dovetail into whatever plan Dr Solandt's committee might consider necessary for the long-term production of officers. It was agreed that the following were the major obstacles mitigating against French-speaking students applying for entry to the two Canadian Services Colleges:

- (a) families in Quebec do not want their sons to leave their provincial environment at an age which would be required were they to enter one of the Services Colleges; objections are not so strong when the boys are older;
- (b) the families desire that their sons obtain some form of degree as a result of their schooling; and
- (c) the fundamental difference in the classical education and the scientific education given in other provinces makes it difficult for Quebec students to compete at the Services Colleges (72).

The Chiefs of Staff Committee discussed these findings at some length on 25 Jul and then referred the problem to Dr Solandt's sub-committee for further study (73).

41. On 14 Sep the subject was reviewed at some length by the Defence Council. The Minister of National Defence pointed out that it was necessary, for political reasons, to take some action. He thought the best plan would be to

separation of English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians in the services, but General Foulkes (Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee) emphasized that the Laval proposal should receive careful consideration, since this was the first time that French-speaking Canadians had approached the Services with a suggestion which might increase their representation therein. He thought, and Mr Claxton agreed, that an attempt should be made to work out a compromise. It was decided that General Foulkes should follow up the matter and keep the Minister informed (74).

42. The recommendations made by Dr Solandt's committee on the procurement and training of officers for permanent commissions in the three Services did not meet with the approval of the individual Chiefs of Staff. Each raised objections; although each service could cater to immediate and temporary needs with its own programme for granting short-service commissions, there was no agreement on the standards desired for "career" officers. General Foulkes finally had to point out that neither the Minister of National Defence nor the Cabinet would welcome a proposal whereby each Service would train its own officers in a separate college. There was no possibility of establishing a third college. Indeed, the Minister of Finance had asked why all officer training could not be concentrated in one college. Pressure also was being exerted on all members of N.A.T.O. to economize on any service matters which would not assist directly in raising and equipping their contributions to the common goal (75).

43. During the course of the Parliamentary debate on the Speech from the Throne the question of establishing a Services College for French-speaking Canadians was (again) raised by Mr Leon Balcer (29 Oct) and Mr A Gauthier (26 Nov) (76). In a memorandum addressed to General Simonds on 5 Nov, Brigadier J.V. Allard^M opposed the creation of such an establishment, which would increase the existing feeling of "segregation"; but he did suggest that a Services College preparatory school might be established (77).

44. Following his appointment as General Officer Commanding, Quebec Command, Major-General Bernatchez became convinced that the recruiting of French-speaking Canadians as other ranks would be helped by the establishment of a new training course for officers. On 9 Feb he outlined his views in a letter to the Vice Chief of the General Staff:

While the Service Colleges exist in their present form I believe that we should establish in the Province of Quebec a pre-Service College course for French-speaking personnel who are potential Service College students. I suggest that this should be in the nature of an assessment course, with the students spending the academic year concentrating on mathematics and English. The entrance requirements for such a course would be completion of grade eleven for students with some background in higher mathematics and English, and grade twelve for students who do not possess credits in these subjects.....

It is interesting to note that an analysis of the provincial representation at our Service Colleges shows quite clearly that the majority of students at RMC and Royal Roads come from the environs of Kingston and Victoria respectively, with a decreasing representation of students the further you go away from these two centres. It is for consideration then, that the establishment of a first year Service College at the Citadel might well not only increase our representatives from Quebec but also from the Maritime Provinces who at the present time send so few to the Service Colleges (78).

He further suggested that the first or recruit year for students attending R.M.C. might be given at the Citadel.

45. On 11 Feb the Bernatchez proposal was discussed by the Army Council. Although General Macklin (Adjutant General) thought that such a school might better be located in New Brunswick, he considered that here was a chance to provide something tangible for the new General Officer Commanding, Quebec Command (79). The Personnel Members Committee subsequently included this proposal in its study of officer production. On 6 Mar its recommendations were forwarded to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (80). Since these provided the basis for the compromise solution that had been sought to the divergent views of the separate Chiefs of Staff, tentative agreement was reached at the next weekly meeting. General Foulkes then undertook to secure Mr Claxton's approval (81).

46. Mr Claxton and General Foulkes subsequently visited Laval receiving confirmation of their view that the university was not interested in operating a one-year academic course of the type now envisaged. The alternative plan of operating the preparatory course on a service basis was then presented to and accepted by the Canadian Cabinet. Should the number of entries justify it, a two-year further course, similar to that given at Royal Roads, could be added (82). On 12 Jun Mr Claxton outlined the new officer training programme in the House of Commons, pointing out that it had been discussed with representatives of the 32 universities and colleges which already were participating. The following paragraphs of his statement are relevant:

I have also to announce that a new service cadet college is to be established at St. John's (St. Jean) in the province of Quebec, twenty-five miles from Montreal.

At the outset the college will give a one-year course for students who have the equivalent of a junior matriculation. The new college is primarily designed to meet the special circumstances of French-speaking candidates, but will be open to students from all over Canada.

If the numbers available justify it, the course will be extended to second and third year. The position of this college will be under constant review to ensure that it meets the situation.

The new college will, it is expected, have very close relations with Laval university and the university of Montreal as the authorities of both universities have generously offered to co-operate in every way possible.

The new college will be on precisely the same footing as R.M.C. and Royal Roads, with the same uniform and conditions of service (83).

47. Aside from the fact that the Royal 22e Régiment would have been affected, the barracks at the Citadel in Quebec City had been considered unsuitable as college dormitories and lecture rooms (84). Therefore, it had been decided to move the Canadian Army Training School to Valcartier (see para 26) and utilize the mixture of temporary and permanent buildings it had been occupying at St. Jean. Additional permanent buildings could be constructed, if and when required. Her Majesty The Queen approved the title "Collège Militaire Royal de St. Jean" and preparations were speeded to secure staff, draft a curriculum and improve accommodation against a mid-September opening date for 128 cadets (of whom 45 were English-speaking). Lt.-Col. M.L. Lahaie was recalled from command of the 79th Field Regiment, R.C.A. in Germany to assume the appointment of Commandant with the rank of colonel. For the time being, the Canadian Army was made responsible for administration of the College (85). In view of the "good press" all across Canada and the number of applications received for the first course, the Cabinet approved a recommendation to introduce the further two-year course and place "C.M.R." on the same basis as Royal Roads (86), some weeks before the Governor-General officially opened the new institution on 13 Nov 52. The story of the operation and expansion of Collège Militaire Royal de St. Jean may, however, be more appropriately told elsewhere.

(iv) Committee for the Study of Bilingual Problems

48. In August 1950 a Committee was appointed at Army Headquarters to study the bilingual problems faced by the Canadian Army. According to the official announcement:

During the Second World War, the lower percentage of enlistments from the Province of Quebec, compared to the other Provinces, can be attributed to a considerable degree to the following:

- (a) Prior to the Second World War, French Canadian representation in arms other than infantry was inadequate and did not provide for wartime expansion.
- (b) The reluctance to form other than infantry units on the grounds that it was impracticable owing to language and technical reasons.
- (c) The language handicap which limited a man's opportunities for qualifying for employment except in a few fields and, consequently

localization of French-speaking sub-units of the Active Force at Valcartier Camp (see paras 3 - 12), current correspondence with Corps Directors regarding this last proposal, a comparison of Reserve Force units by Commands, statistics on the enlistments and wastage of other ranks, and similar data for the Canadian Officers Training Corps and Services Colleges.

49. During the autumn information was sought on other points, such as the best means of providing an adequate number of French-speaking instructors at corps school^a and the desirability of translating additional training manuals into French. Thus the Committee was not able to hold its first meeting until 22 Dec 50, when the following were present: Brigadier J.P.E. Bernatchez (Chairman and Deputy Chief of the General Staff), Colonel F.A. Clift (Director of Military Training), Colonel J.S. Ross (Director of Organization), Lt.-Col. G.M.C. Sprung (Director of "Q" Operations and Planning), Lt.-Col. G.H. Spencer (Deputy Director of Staff Duties), and Major M.L. Lahaie (Secretary). A further four meetings were held during January, but Brigadier Bernatchez and Colonels Clift and Ross were the only members to attend them all; the Directors of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps, Royal Canadian Artillery and Public Relations (Army), and a representative of the Chief Engineer, were invited to those meetings which discussed matters of particular interest to them (89).

50. The Report which was submitted to the Vice Chief of the General Staff on 1 Feb 51 comprised five pages of "Conclusions and Recommendations". Although the first "Conclusion" was not new, re-statement served a useful purpose:

The Committee is of the opinion that the operational language of the Canadian Army above unit level must be English. Within a combatant unit, the French language can be used for all purposes as long as the majority of officers and all signallers are bilingual for liaison and for communications with higher or flank units or formations. Similarly, in the case of the Services, sufficient bilingual officers and other ranks must be available to permit efficient servicing of English-speaking units and formations (90).

Although not all the Committee's recommendations were feasible, certain main points emerged. The Army as a career should be more highly publicized, particularly in Eastern Quebec Area, and schools and colleges asked to interest their students in the Services Colleges; a squadron of tanks and a battery of field artillery should be localized in Quebec Command immediately, to stimulate recruiting as well as assist in the field training of Reserve Force units in the All Arms training area, which should be created at an enlarged Valcartier Camp;

^aAt his weekly conference of 29 Jun 50 the Chief of the General Staff had requested that arrangements be made to conduct certain courses at Corps Schools in French so that vacancies might be available for NATO countries; this would

bilingual instructors should be found from both English-speaking and French-speaking personnel; more training manuals and films should be provided in the French language; facilities should be provided for trades training courses to be conducted in the French language since, as a rule, tradesmen need not be bilingual and could be trained more quickly in their own language.

51. Despite practical objections raised by the Adjutant General to certain of these recommendations, the Deputy Chief of the General Staff and the Director of Military Training proceeded to draw up a programme for consideration by the Vice Chief of the General Staff (91). In a memorandum of 8 May 51, however, General Macklin suggested to General Sparling that even some of the revised proposals were impracticable. For example:

...what is the use of saying that we will give first priority in the posting of bilingual instructors to the schools when I have not got any subalterns to reinforce the Royal 22e Battalion in Korea?

At the basis of this whole bilingual problem is the fact that the French-speaking Canadian, in the mass, does not join the Army. The educated French Canadian, in the mass, goes into the Church, or the law or almost any profession other than military. Our bilingual difficulties are going to continue until the leaders of French Canada really put their backs behind the Army wheel and begin sending their sons into the Army (92).

In consequence, Brigadier Bernatchez redrafted his proposals, limiting them to what the Adjutant General considered to be practicable at the moment (93).

52. Replying to a request from the Minister of National Defence for a copy of the Committee's Report, General Simonds (Chief of the General Staff) wrote to Mr Claxton as follows on 24 Sep 51:

2. You will note that one of the main recommendations the Committee has made is that an all-arms training area in the Province of Quebec be established, this training area to enable peacetime positioning, in the Province of Quebec, of units of corps in addition to infantry. We are now pressing for the extension of Valcartier Camp in order that such a training area can be made available; Valcartier is the only place suitable for such a camp.

3. We are now in the process of posting 13 English-speaking lieutenants to the R 22e R to make up for the deficiency of officers in that unit, and at the same time to improve the bilingual capabilities of these officers and, eventually, the Army at large.

4. We are also investigating the use of well-established schools for the teaching of French in the Province of Quebec. The language school conducted in the summer at Trois Pistoles does not exactly meet our requirements, as, in the summer we are faced with our peak training load, and therefore, releasing personnel to attend the course there is extremely difficult. We are, however, continuing to investigate the possibility of having personnel attend other schools during the remainder of the year.

5. Since this report was written the position has improved to the extent that we now have in being more French-speaking units and therefore we are now able to post French-speaking recruits to these units where they can undergo their recruit training. It is our intention that, following the completion of such training, personnel who appear to be NCO material will be sent to the Canadian Army Training School at St. Jean, where they will learn English. In this way the trained soldier will learn English and should then be capable of bilingual instruction; heretofore, of course, it has been our practice to send the recruits to CATS where they learned English first and thence to a unit for their military training (94).

53. When Lt.-Col. J.G.L. Poulin took over command of the 3rd Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment at Camp Wainwright later that autumn, he found himself with the above mentioned 13 English-speaking subalterns. Even though several of them were slow to pick up a working knowledge of French, the fact that at least 50 percent of the other ranks (including all N.C.Os.) spoke English made it possible for them to function satisfactorily as platoon commanders (95). Most of these officers completed a normal tour of three-four years with the unit and other English-speaking officers have since served with the Royal 22e Régiment.

54. Due to the fact that all the officers serving on the Committee for Bilingual Problems were shortly posted away from Army Headquarters, the Directorate of Military Training had to report on 1 Feb 52 that little had been accomplished. Circumstances (i.e. the demands of the Korean War and the despatch of the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade to Germany) had prevented the Adjutant General's Branch from completing its survey of bilingual officers and other ranks, posting bilingual instructors to corps schools, and exchanging French-speaking personnel with those of English-speaking units. Action subsequently was taken, upon a suggestion advanced by the Vice Adjutant General that it might be easier to teach French to existing instructors than to try and produce bilingual instructors by first teaching English to the French-speaking recruits and then training them to an instructors' level in military matters (96), and a French language wing was added to the Canadian Army Training School (see para 26).

stationed at Valcartier in order to attract French-speaking recruits. He later advised the Quartermaster General, however, that it was his intention merely to send such sub-units to Valcartier for a month or two in the summer, after additional land had been acquired for use as training areas (97).

56. Having devoted considered time to the study of the French language in order to become bilingual himself, Hon. Brooke Claxton had taken exception somewhat earlier to what he considered were ill-founded criticisms of the recruiting publicity being directed at the French-speaking population. "The greatest obstacle to our getting French speaking officers and men," he had written General Simonds on 29 Feb 52, "is their feeling that they don't get a fair show in the armed forces; that in fact the armed forces are 'English'" (98). Continuing this memorandum suggested that the following policy should be adopted and publicized:

- (a) The possession of French is a positive military asset leading, other things being equal, to accelerated promotion.
- (b) Every French speaking soldier in the armed forces is entitled to be dealt with in the French tongue as regards such matters as trials, examinations for promotion, trades qualifications, etc.
- (c) The language of instruction in units predominantly French should ordinarily be French.
- (d) In units which are predominantly French and which are parading alone, the language of command should be French.
- (e) All orders, correspondence, communications, etc. to French speaking personnel should be French and in the parts of Quebec, Eastern Ontario and New Brunswick where French predominates, all orders, etc. should be issued automatically in both French and English....

57. In his detailed reply of 5 Mar 52 General Simonds contended that, with regard to points (b), (c), (d) and (e), "we have gone as far as it is practicable to go in meeting the desires of French-speaking Canadians" (99). It would be virtually impossible to conduct operations in war on a bilingual basis. Furthermore:

Time is the essence of the successful conduct of operations in war. We could never afford to give the time at an operational orders conference to repeating everything in both English and French, and it is equally apparent that in handling urgent operational messages being transmitted to units or formations both English-speaking and French-speaking that two versions would have to be transmitted

bilingualism and was instrumental in providing for the use of French orders on ceremonial occasions in Quebec province, but as I have tried to explain above, I believe we have reached the limit of what we can do unless we are to accept military handicaps which would be detrimental to the fighting efficiency of our forces. It is perfectly true that there are armies in the world from countries which are bilingual which operate on a bilingual basis. I know of no such country or such army which has established an outstanding military record for itself. The day may come when the preponderance of those serving in the Canadian Army may be of French-speaking origin. If and when that day comes, I suggest that the Canadian Army might make French its language for all purposes instead of English, but I feel duty-bound to recommend against a bilingual system which I am sure would seriously detract from the military effectiveness of the army.

He was convinced that moderate French-speaking Canadians appreciated what was being attempted and suggested that only a vociferous minority of extremists was intent upon creating a separate French-speaking army in Canada.

(v) Creation of Additional French-speaking Units

58. The expansion of the regular component of the Canadian Army, undertaken as a result of increased commitments in an era of "cold war", and periodic reorganization of its units and formations to conform to changes in tactical doctrine, did make it possible to increase the number of its French-speaking and/or bilingual components.

59. During August 1950 a 2nd battalion of the Royal 22e Régiment was mobilized as part of the Canadian Army Special Force for service with the United Nations. Effective 9 Dec 50, a 3rd Battalion, Royal 22e Régiment was authorized to handle French-speaking reinforcements for the Canadian Army Special Force (100). During May 1951 Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal was one of 15 Reserve Force Infantry regiments selected to provide two companies for service in Europe: one company for the 1st Canadian Infantry Battalion of the 27th Canadian Infantry Brigade and the other for a relieving 2nd Canadian Infantry Battalion (101). Since Canada would be required, from 1 Jan 54, to provide the balance of a 1st Canadian Infantry Division in Europe by "M plus 180 days," action was taken during the summer and fall of 1953 to reorganize the existing four infantry brigades and the three airborne battalions of the Mobile Striking Force into a more compact and manageable regimental organization. The 1st Canadian Infantry Battalion became the 3rd Battalion, The Canadian Guards; by means of cross-postings it soon became a bilingual unit (102). Unlike the Royal Canadian Regiment and Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, the Royal 22e Régiment retained its existing third battalion (103).

60. The decision to establish the nucleus of a divisional L.A.A. regiment made it possible to form a French-speaking 3rd L.A.A. Battery at Picton, Ontario during 1954 (104). But, although the battery was recruited up to strength from the Province of Quebec, its personnel were not readily absorbed into the English-speaking atmosphere of Picton and many families became unhappy at having to live away from their own people (105). Therefore, in a submission of 14 Oct 55, Colonel A.J.B. Bailey (Director of Artillery) recommended that, to ensure its continued success, the battery should be relocalized in the Province of Quebec. Although this recommendation was rejected, Colonel Bailey remained convinced that this would be a sound move: should the battery be stationed in Montreal where there were no units of the Canadian Army (Regular), it would be relatively simple to journey back to Picton occasionally for firing practice (106).

61. Commenting upon the draft of a proposal, prepared within the Directorate of Staff Duties, as to the feasibility of reallocating a proportion of arms other than Infantry to the Valcartier-Quebec City area, Colonel Bailey wrote on 30 Apr 56 that he had already recommended (9 Apr) to the Director General of Military Training that X (Light) Battery of the 3rd Regiment, R.C.H.A. should be designated a French-speaking sub-unit and localized at Valcartier (107). Since some time would elapse before short-range guided missiles could be available for its new role as medium artillery, the 90 bilingual officers and other ranks available would have an opportunity to get organized as a Battery. The move of X Battery from Camp Gagetown to Valcartier was completed on 7 Feb 58 (108).

62. During the spring and summer of 1956 serious consideration also was being given to a further reorganization of the Canadian Army (Regular), which was to result in the 3rd (i.e. bilingual) and 4th Battalions of The Canadian Guards being reduced to nil strength and replaced in the order of battle by a third armoured regiment. After various alternatives had been considered, it was decided that initially the new armoured regiment should include one French-speaking squadron (109). Thus, following authorization of the 1/8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's) with effect from 29 Jan 57, a nucleus of R.C.A.C. bilingual officers and other ranks was posted to Valcartier, where "A" squadron was to be localized (110). Command was given to Major A.J. Charbonneau (see para 19). Recruiting was undertaken on the understanding that the men would be taught English, an additional task for C.A.T.S. (see para 29). (The balance of the regiment was formed, over a period, at Camp Gagetown.) During February 1957 the French-speaking personnel of the (bilingual) 3rd Battalion of The Canadian Guards, about to be disbanded, were screened with a view to transfer to either "A" squadron of 1/8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's) or the Royal 22e Régiment (111).

63. In consequence, Valcartier has become much the sort of camp envisaged by certain French-speaking officers in 1946. Its garrison presently includes A squadron of the 1/8th Canadian Hussars (Princess Louise's), X Battery of the 3rd Regiment, R.C.H.A., an R.C.E. Works Company, a Signals detachment of Eastern Quebec Area, the 2nd Battalion and Regimental Depot of the Royal 22e Régiment, a Field Ambulance

battle honours for the First and Second World Wars recorded and emblazoned in the French language. An investigation was subsequently undertaken by the Historical Section (G.S.) on behalf of the Battle Honours Committee, which had been formed to deal with claims arising from service during the Second World War. One point which clearly emerged was that, although the request had originated with the Royal 22e Régiment, any change in policy would have to be made applicable to all French-speaking regiments and cover all campaigns (112).

65. Although the honour "North West Canada, 1885" had been officially instituted only in 1929, the bilingual aspect had arisen as early as 1890 when the 65th Battalion "Mount Royal Rifles" had taken into wear, without authorization, a collar-badge bearing the words "Butte aux Francais, 1885" to commemorate the part played by a detachment at Frenchman's Butte on 27 May 85. In 1919 the Chief of the General Staff refused a request from what was by then the 65th Carabiniers (Mont-Royal) for a new cap badge bearing the same inscription. In 1931 a new collar-badge was approved for what had become Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, on condition that the words "Butte aux Francais, 1885" be replaced by those of the authorized battle honour. Since this N.P.A.M. regiment was now composed entirely of French-speaking personnel, its commanding officer argued that the words "Nord D'Ouest Canada, 1885" [sic] should be inscribed. But the Adjutant General, Chief of the General Staff and Deputy Minister of National Defence were agreed that this request should be refused. In a minute of 24 Jul 31 the Chief of the General Staff wrote: "I consider that battle honours must be shown exactly as awarded by His Majesty whether in Militia List, on colours or elsewhere...." The officer commanding, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal was informed accordingly and, despite further protests, this decision was adhered to.

66. But, as is evident from the earlier paragraphs of this Report, a vastly different attitude had been adopted towards bilingual problems by 1956. Therefore the Battle Honours Committee recommended that the Department of National Defence should take action to have the names of the appropriate battle honours translated into French. Since Her Majesty The Queen was Colonel-in-Chief of the Royal 22e Régiment and Le Régiment de la Chaudière (which had made a similar request), and all battle honours are awarded in the name of the Sovereign, the Governor General was requested on 30 Apr 58 to obtain her approval for such a change. On 15 May 58 the Governor General's secretary wrote the Minister of National Defence that Her Majesty had been "pleased to approve the recommendation that battle honours should be recorded and emblazoned in French on the Colours of the French-speaking Regiments of the Canadian Army". In addition to "Nord-Ouest du Canada, 1885", the number of battle honours requiring translation comprised six for "La Grand Guerre", and 56 battle honours and three campaign honours for "La Deuxième Grande Guerre". The Royal 22e Régiment also is entitled to "Corée" for its service during the fighting in Korea.

peculiar to bilingualism (113). During October 1958, however, Dr Marcel Chaput of the Canadian Army Operational Research Establishment did produce a confidential study entitled "The Proportion of French-Canadian Soldiers in the Canadian Army". Working from statistics provided by the National Defence Personnel Machine Records Bureau and the Directorate of Manning, Dr Chaput drew the following conclusions:

- (a) The representation of French-Canadians in the Army is lower than their representation in the population of Canada. The discrepancy is most marked in the higher ranks and more demanding trades.
- (b) For Canada as a whole, French-Canadians enlist about as readily as other Canadians. The deficit in enlistment of French-speaking soldiers from Quebec is compensated by relatively large enlistment of French-Canadian soldiers for the other provinces.
- (c) On the average, French-Canadian soldiers do not stay in the Army as long as non-French-speaking soldiers.
- (d) Since no significant difference is noted between French and non-French overall enlistment rates, any remedial measure designed to increase the French Canadian representation in the Army should aim at reducing the wastage differential rather than attempting to increase the number of French-speaking recruits.
- (e) Wastage differential of the noted magnitude results in additional burden in recruiting, training and processing which in turn represents additional costs of sizeable proportions (114).

Although French-speaking Canadians account for 29 percent of the population of Canada, they constitute only 14 percent of the officers and 21 percent of the other ranks in the Canadian Army. (Only Infantry, with 30 percent French-speaking representation, is as French as Canada). But, although the percentage of French-speaking Canadians among newly commissioned officers and recruits during the period 1953-1957 was somewhat higher, this was offset by the fact that 23 percent of all officers and 30 percent of all other ranks leaving the Army were French-speaking (115). It is understood that Dr Chaput is continuing his studies along these lines.

68. This Report was written by J. Mackay Hitsman.

J. Mackay Hitsman

REFERENCE NOTES

Unless otherwise specified, references are to files of the Army Division of Central Registry, Department of National Defence.

1. HQ 154-1-6: Macklin to A.G., 6 May 46.
2. Ibid: Weeks to C.G.S., 9 May 46.
3. Ibid : Pangman to V.C.G.S. (through D.C.G.S.(A).),
13 May 46.
4. Ibid: Memorandum, "French-Speaking Representation Post War Active Force", 11 Jun 46 .
5. Ibid: Bernatchez to A.G. (through D.A.G.(A). and V.A.G.),
20 May 46.
6. HQ 3322-1, vol.1: Spry to D.C.G.S(A)., 13 Feb 46 and succeeding folios.
7. HQ 154-1-6: Bernatchez to A.G.(through D.A.G(A). and V.A.G.), 20 May 46.
8. Ibid.; also Macklin to A.G., 23 May 46.
9. Ibid: Macklin to A.G., 23 May 46.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid: Mann to A.G., 20 Jun 46.
12. Ibid: Bernatchez to A.G.(through D.A.G.(A). and V.A.G.),
25 Jun 46.
13. Ibid: Macklin to A.G., 26 Jun 46.
14. Ibid: Macklin to A.G. 29 Jun 46.
15. Ibid: Weeks to C.G.S., 3 Jul 46
16. Ibid : Clark to D.C.G.S(B)., 9 Jul 46.
17. Ibid: Macklin to A.G., 13 Jul 46; Weeks to C.G.S.,
18 Jul 46.
18. HQS 404-8-17: Proposed Establishment, Canadian Army Training School - Valcartier, 26 Aug 46.
19. Ibid: correspondence on file.
20. HQ 2140-84/C2, vol. 1: Morton to Army Headquarters,
15 May 48 and preceding folios.
21. HQS 2001-84/C2: Shirreff to Army Headquarters, Attention:
D Sigs, 14 Jul 48.
22. HQ 2140-84/C2, vol.1: Fleury to A.G., 13 Jul 48.
23. HQS 214-10-17-3, vol.3: C.G.S. Weekly Conference No 45

26. HQTS 710-10-17-3, vol. 3: C.G.S. Weekly Conference No. 50, 20 Oct 48.
27. Correspondence on HQS 2001-84/C2 and HQ 2140-84/C2, vol.1.
28. HQ 2140-84/C2, vol.1: De Rome to Army Headquarters, 8 Sep 48; Moncel to V.C.G.S., 8 Dec 48.
29. Ibid: Canadian Army Training School, Table of Organization, 12 Mar 49.
30. Annual Historical Report, Canadian Army Training School, 1949-1950, p.2
31. Ibid., p.3.
32. Ibid., Annexure 7, p.2.
33. Ibid., p.2.
34. HQ 2140-84/C2, vol. 2: Morton to Army Headquarters, Attention - V.C.G.S., 30 Mar 50.
35. Ibid: Rolph to D.S.D., 25 Apr 50.
36. Ibid: Canadian Army Training School Establishment, July 1950.
37. Ibid: Morton to Army Headquarters, Attention: D.C.G.S., 2 Oct 50.
38. Ibid: Bernatchez to V.C.G.S., 29 Nov 50.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid: Dick to Army Headquarters, Attention: D.M.T., 31 Jan 51.
41. Annual Historical Report, Canadian Army Training School, 1950-1951, Historical Diary, 1 Feb 51.
42. HQ 2140-84/C2, vol.2: Bernatchez to V.C.G.S., 8 Mar 51; Canadian Army Training School Establishment, effective 9 Mar 51.
43. Copy on Hist 9-17-0, vol.1. This instruction was cancelled with effect from 10 Mar 53.
44. Annual Historical Report, Canadian Army Training School, 1951-1952, Annexure 5.
45. HQTS 1435-2: Macklin to V.C.G.S., 12 Apr 51.
46. Ibid: Bernatchez to V.C.G.S., May 51.
47. HQ 2140-84/C2, vol.2: "Minutes of a Meeting of the Quebec Command Establishment Committee", 16 Oct 51.
48. Annual Historical Report, Canadian Army Training School, 1951-1952, Annexure 3.

51. Documents on HQ 2140-84/C2, vol.2. See also Annual Historical Report, Canadian Army Training School, 1952-1953, Annexure 6.
52. Documents on HQ 2140-84/C2, vol.3.
53. Annual Historical Report, Canadian Army Training School, 1954.
54. Ibid: 1955, Appendix "A".
55. Annual Historical Report, Canadian Army Training School, 1957, Appendix "A".
56. Telephone conversations with Lt.-Col. W.H.V. Matthews of the Directorate of Military Training on 3 Oct 57 and 15 Oct 58.
57. HQC 715-10-1-3, vol.3: Foulkes to V.C.G.S., 20 Feb 47.
58. CGS BDF Officer Production, vol.1: Memorandum, "The Armed Forces College", 10 Mar 47.
59. HQC 715-10-1-3, vol. 3: Foulkes to the Minister, 10 Mar 47.
60. HQ 154-1-6: Claxton to C.G.S., 8 Oct 47.
61. Ibid: Ross to A.G. (through D.A.G.), 3 Jan 50.
62. Ibid: Macklin to V.C.G.S., 11 Jan 50.
63. Ibid
64. CGS BDF Officer Production, vol.2: Simonds to the Minister, 26 Nov 51.
65. Correspondence on HQTS 1435-2.
66. HQTS 1435-2: Claxton to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 3 Jul 51.
67. Debates, House of Commons, Canada, 1951, p. 4782.
68. HQTS 1435-2: "Extract from Minutes of 55th Meeting of Defence Council held Fri. 14 Sep 51."
69. Ibid: Bernatchez to V.C.G.S., 4 Jul 51.
70. Ibid: Sparling to D.G.M.P., 6 Jul 51.
71. Ibid: "Extract from Minutes of 16th Meeting of Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee held Mon. 9 Jul 51."
72. Ibid: "Extract from the Minutes of the 17th Meeting of the Vice Chiefs of Staff Committee held 16 Jul 51."
73. Ibid: "Extract from Minutes of Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting No. 502, held 25 Jul 51".
74. Ibid: "Extract from Minutes of 55th Meeting of Defence

76. Debates, House of Commons, Canada, 1951, pp. 492 and 1348.
77. CGS BDF Officer Production, vol.3: Allard to Simonds, 5 Nov 51.
78. CGS BDF 18-0, TD 1: Bernatchez to Army Headquarters (Attention: V.C.G.S.), 9 Feb 52.
79. Ibid: Macklin to C.G.S., 11 Feb 52.
80. CGS BDF Officer Production, vol.3: Falardeau to Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 6 Mar 52.
81. Ibid: Foulkes to Chiefs of Staff, 15 Mar 52.
82. Ibid: "Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes of a Special Meeting held on Monday, 26 May, 1952 at 0930 hours in the Defence Council Room, National Defence Headquarters".
83. Debates, House of Commons, Canada, 1952. p. 3150.
84. CGS BDF 3-3-1, vol.1: Bernatchez to Army Headquarters, Attention: V.C.G.S., 29 Apr 52.
85. Correspondence on HQC 2001-82/3, vols. 1 and 2.
86. CGS BDF 3-3-1 vol.1: Simonds to the Minister, 11 Aug 52; "Notes of a Meeting on the Collège Militaire Royal held in the C.G.S. Office, 14 Oct 52, 1630 hrs".
87. HQTS 1435-2: Memorandum, "Bilingual Problems in the Canadian Army", 3 Aug 50.
88. HQTS 1300-75/lw, vol.1: C.G.S. weekly Conference No. 86, 29 Jun 50.
89. HQTS 1435-2: "Report of Committee on Bilingual Problems", 1 Feb 51.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid: Macklin to V.C.G.S., 10 Feb 51; Bishop to A.G., 11 Apr 51.
92. Ibid: Macklin to V.C.G.S., 8 May 51.
93. Ibid: Bernatchez to A/V.C.G.S., 16 Jun 51.
94. Ibid: Simonds to the Minister, 24 Sep 51.
95. Telephone conversation with Lt.-Col J.L.G. Poulin, Deputy Director of Infantry, 16 Sep 57.
96. HQTS 1435-2: Bishop to A.G. 11 Apr 51.
97. Ibid: Clark to V.Q.M.G., 27 Oct 53.
98. Ibid: Claxton to C.G.S., 29 Feb 52.
99. Ibid: Simonds to the Minister, 11 Apr 51.

101. Documents on HQTs 2000-1, TD 2.
102. HQS 2885-2/1, vol 1A: Ross to D.A.G., 29 Sep 54.
103. Correspondence on CGS BDF 15-1, TD 5.
104. Documents on HQS 2001-316/1.
105. HQS 2001-316/1: Coffin to Army Headquarters, Attn: D Arty, 1 Mar 56 and enclosure.
106. HQS 2001-2/3, vol.1: Bailey to D.S.D.(Attention: Lt.-Col. E.M.D. Leslie), 30 Apr 56.
107. Ibid .
108. Documents on HQ 2001-301/3X
109. Documents on HQS 2001-1/2, vol.1.
110. Documents on HQC 2001-202/5R.
111. Documents on HQC 2001-612/0.
112. This section is based on documents on HQC 1075-2, TD 6262.
113. Documents on HQTs 1435-2 and D.R.M.L. Report No. 152-1, Interim Report on Canadian Armed Forces Procedures for Training French-Speaking Recruits by E.J. Brazeau (Defence Research Board, Department of National Defence, Ottawa, March, 1955). This last is, however, merely a very slight booklet, confining itself to sociological generalities.
114. Marcel Chaput, The Proportion of French-Canadian Soldiers in the Canadian Army. (Canadian Army Operational Research Establishment Memorandum No.58/12, October 1958), pp. 25-26.
115. Ibid., pp 7 and 12.