

NOTE

This is a preliminary narrative and should not be regarded as authoritative. It has not been checked for accuracy in all aspects, and its interpretations are not necessarily those of the Historical Section as a whole.

Ce texte est préliminaire et n'a aucun caractère officiel. On n'a pas vérifié son exactitude et les interprétations qu'il contient ne sont pas nécessairement celles du Service historique.

Directorate of History  
National Defence Headquarters  
Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0K2

July 1986

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY: DHD 3-12

R E P O R T NO. 4

BY Oliver FOR DHIST NDHQ

DIRECTORATE OF HISTORY

DATE: DEC 9 1986

CANADIAN FORCES HEADQUARTERS

22 Oct 65

Canada and Peace-keeping Operations

CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>	<u>PARA</u>
1. Introduction	1	1
2. Canada and the League of Nations	1	4
3. The Second World War	2	8
4. The Creation of the United Nations Organization	4	11
5. Early Attempts to Implement the Charter	5	14
6. The U.N. Guard Force	6	18
7. UNTSO	7	24
8. UNMOGIP and UNIPOM	8	29
9. Korea and "Uniting for Peace"	10	34
10. Intercom	11	38
11. UNEF	13	45
12. UNOGIL	18	60
13. UNOC	19	64
14. UNTEA and UNYOM	21	70
15. UNFICYP	22	72
16. Conclusion	24	78

References

DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY: DHD 3-12

BY ove FOR DHIST NDMQ

DATE: DEC 9 1986

R E P O R T N O . 4

DIRECTORATE OF HISTORY

CANADIAN FORCES HEADQUARTERS

22 Oct 65

### Canada and Peace -keeping Operations

1. This report is essentially the chapter on peace-keeping operations that was prepared for the Centennial volume on Canadian military history. References have been added in the hope that this report may serve as a guide to the sources available for studies of peace-keeping. For material at the Department of External Affairs, reference should be made to Historical Section, CPHQ, Report No. 3.

2. The concept of peace-keeping is the most revolutionary development in the field of international organization since the end of the Second World War. In the progressive evolution of this concept Canada has played, and is still playing, an important role. This country has taken part in more United Nations operations than any other and is, indeed, the only nation to have participated in each of the world organization's peace forces. As a result, Canadian servicemen have performed their duties in Palestine (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization); Kashmir (United Nations Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan), Korea, Gaza and the Sinai (United Nations Emergency Force), the Lebanon (United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon), the Congo (United Nations Organization in the Congo), West New Guinea (United Nations Temporary Executive Administration), Yemen (United Nations Yemen Observer Mission), in Cyprus (United Nations Forces in Cyprus), and along the border between India and Pakistan (United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission). In addition to these U.N. roles, Canadian servicemen have participated in the International Commissions for Control and Supervision for Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam which were created by the Geneva Conference of 1954.

3. Significantly, the political leaders of all parties have endorsed this Canadian role, and there is now perhaps more unanimity on the principle of Canadian participation in peace-keeping operations than on any other aspect of our foreign relations. It was not always so.

### Canada and the League of Nations

4. "Canada," someone once remarked, "was born in an ante-room at Geneva." This jocular statement contained some truth. At the outbreak of the First World War Canada was still a colony, although a self-governing one, but by 1919 a new status had been purchased in blood. This changed position was reflected in Canada's winning independent representation in

the League of Nations, and most important, perhaps, in her right of election to the Council of the new world organization. (2) The League was the capstone of Canada's new world position.

5. However, the Canadian people were slow to realize the magnitude of the achievements of their leaders, and even then their interpretation of these events was faulty. The League was "a latch-key for a young country which had come of age," not a "weapon by which peace might be preserved." (3) The Covenant, insisting on collective security, demanded too much from a small country like Canada, secure in its "fire-proof house, far from inflammable materials," (4) and with but limited interests and power. In sum, the Canadian attitude was to "let the mighty, if they will, guarantee the security of the weak." (5)

6. The inevitable result of this point of view -- one shared, it must be noted, by many other powers, great and small alike -- was gravely to weaken the effectiveness of the League as a security organization. When the post-war period ended and the pre-war period began with the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, the League was already moribund. The Manchurian failure presaged the collapse of sanctions against Italy in the Abyssinian crisis of 1935-1936 (6) and the general ineffectiveness of the League in the few years of peace which remained. Collective security had become a bad joke.

7. The official Canadian attitude did not begin to change until the invasion of Poland in September, 1939. In the special war session of Parliament in that month, the Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King, addressed the neutral nations:

I tell them if they remain neutral in this struggle, and Britain and France go down, there is not one of them that will bear for long the name that it bears at the present time . . . . And if this conqueror . . . . is able to crush the peoples of Europe, what is going to become of the doctrine of the isolation of this North American continent? If Britain goes down, if France goes down, the whole business of isolation will prove to have been a more myth. (7)

The Prime Minister's view were completely correct, but it may be doubted whether they carried much weight with the uncommitted states. Canada had preached the doctrine of the "fire-proof house" far too long to call now for the fireman.

#### The Second World War

8. As the conflict continued and as casualties mounted, the determination to prevent a third world war grew strong in Canada. The best hope, almost all Canadians were agreed, lay in collective security under a new international organization.\*

\*Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Poll, 20 November 1943; "Would you like to see Canada take an active part in maintaining world peace after the war even if that meant sending Canadian soldiers, sailors or airmen to help keep the peace in other parts of the world?" Results: Yes-78%; No-15%; Undecided-7%

But what of the United States? American abstention had crippled the League of Nations and, incidentally, had weakened Canadian faith in the first security organization. The situation was even more difficult in the changed conditions of the early 1940s. Canada could hardly have belonged to a new global organization which might not include the United States and, at the same time, remain a member of the Commonwealth and a partner of the United States in a permanent North American defence arrangement. The stresses this combination of allegiances would have created would have strained even the fabled dexterity of Prime Minister King.<sup>(8)</sup> It was, therefore, a great relief to Canadians when the United States Government showed signs of active participation in the planning for the United Nations Organization.

9. The Canadian Government, of course, was vitally interested in the plans for the new organization. As the magnitude of the Canadian contribution to the Allied war effort became apparent, policy-makers began to concentrate on the ways in which Canada could be assured representation commensurate with this country's share of the burdens of the war. The Prime Minister was the first to state his conception of the appropriate national role. Mr. King conceded that authority and responsibility could not be divided equally among the more than thirty nations then linked together against the Axis powers, but at the same time he rejected the alternative of vesting authority exclusively in the hands of the Great Powers.<sup>(9)</sup> What was desirable, he stated, was that "representation should be determined on a functional basis which will admit to full membership those countries, large or small, which have the greatest contribution to make to the particular object in question. . . ." <sup>(10)</sup> This ingenious argument, in effect recognizing the emergence of a new group of middle powers and drawing attention to the prickliest problem facing any international body, was likely prompted by the difficulties experienced in attempts to win a share of the direction of the Allied war effort for Canada.\* <sup>(11)</sup>

10. Within a few weeks of the Prime Minister's speech an interdepartmental committee had been formed in Ottawa and planning was underway on "post-hostilities problems." Among the subjects this committee studied were the advantages and disadvantages to the nation of organizing world security on a regional basis, international police forces, and the possibility of granting bases in Canada to a post-war United Nations military force.<sup>(12)</sup> These preliminary studies were designed to bolster the Canadian contention that Canada was entitled to a prominent place in any post-war security organization. The Canadian High Commissioner in London, Mr. Vincent Massey, expressed this view to British officials:

The contribution of all of the other United Nations except the four Great Powers is far less than ours. . . . Our war effort, therefore, and our contribution to post-war needs entitle us to a place quite unlike that of any other state, and we hope this will be recognized in concrete form. <sup>(13)</sup>

---

\*One senior Canadian diplomat characterized the nation's role as being "necessary but not necessary enough."

### The Creation of the United Nations Organization

11. The culmination of the planning for the new world organization came at San Francisco between 25 April and 26 June 1945. There representatives of 50 nations drew up and approved the Charter of the United Nations, creating what they hoped would be a viable system of collective security. The Canadian delegation, led by Prime Minister King, but also including the Leader of the Opposition, Gordon Graydon, and the leader of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, M.J. Coldwell,<sup>(14)</sup> played an important role in the diplomatic discussions on the provisions of the Charter.

12. Prior to the departure of the delegation for San Francisco, Parliament had fully debated the question of Canadian participation in the United Nations. Indeed more than 100 Members of Parliament participated in the week-long debate, the most sustained of its kind in parliamentary experience.<sup>(15)</sup> There was little opposition to the resolution that it was in Canada's interest to become a member of "an effective international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security,"<sup>(16)</sup> only five Members voting Nay,<sup>(17)</sup> and the general tenor of the debate provided ample evidence that the country was united on the subject. The attitude of the Canadian people, as reflected in its delegation to the San Francisco Conference, seemed to an American observer "to have been to accept reluctantly the inevitable dominance of the great powers without howling about it, to make such adjustments as were possible to improve the system. . . and [to] take no active part in matters in which Canada had no direct concern. . . ."<sup>(18)</sup>

13. One area in which Canada did have a direct concern was, of course, that of security. Discussions preliminary to the San Francisco meeting at Dumbarton Oaks in 1944 had given great powers to the Security Council of the new organization on all matters of collective security, including the right to conclude agreements with member states for the provision of forces, facilities and assistance in order that the Security Council might impose military sanctions, and the right to employ the armed forces of member states without their consent.<sup>(19)</sup> Although the Canadian delegation was guided in the first place by a desire to see the provisions of the Charter as effective as possible, it was determined on the principle of "no taxation without representation" to secure participation in Security Council decisions involving the use of Canadian troops.<sup>(20)</sup> "I feel sure," said the Prime Minister, "that whenever a particular member was desired to take serious enforcement action, consultation would be a practical necessity. . . . Unless this need for consultation is recognized," he added, ". . . the process of securing public support for the ratification of the Charter will be made considerably more difficult in a number of countries other than the Great Powers."<sup>(21)</sup> Largely as a result of this eminently sensible Canadian objection, the draft Charter was amended to include a guarantee of the right of consultation.

---

\*"In private conversation the USSR representatives had indicated that they accepted the reasonableness of the proposal so far as it concerned Canada but cannot agree to the generalization of the principle. Privately Mr. Novikov had said that there were only four countries that had really fought this war and they were the USSR, the US, the UK and Canada." Memorandum of Meeting of Delegates and Advisors, 19 May 45, D.E.A. 7V(S), vol. 9.

Early Attempts to Implement the Provisions of the Charter

14. The sections of the United Nations' Charter that dealt with collective security had called for the establishment of a Military Staff Committee to consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. The Committee was to advise and assist the Council on all questions relating to military requirements for the maintenance of peace and security and on the employment and command of assigned military forces.\* The entire system of security created at San Francisco, however, was dependent on the continued harmony and cooperation of the Great Powers. By the opening of the second part of the first General Assembly of the United Nations in October 1946, this harmony no longer existed and an impasse had been reached in the discussions of the Military Staff Committee.

15. The Chairman of the Canadian delegation, Hon. Louis S. St. Laurent, Secretary of State for External Affairs, did not attempt to conceal Canadian disappointment at the Committee's failure to reach agreement. He said that Canada was particularly concerned at the failure to make "substantial" progress. "The Government and people of Canada are anxious to know what armed force. . . Canada should maintain as our share of the burden of putting world force behind world law." (22)

16. The Military Staff Committee had first met in London in February, 1946, and soon after had plunged into planning the world peace-keeping force envisaged in the Charter. All its plans were quickly caught up in the incipient cold war, however, and since the discussions were carried on under the shadow of the great power veto, the Committee continued, as a Canadian diplomat put it, "to make progress by almost invisible stages." (23)

17. The main point of contention concerned the size and nature of the proposed force. Perhaps from a desire to enfeeble the United Nations' military resources, or perhaps with the intention of reproducing its own strengths and weaknesses in the international army, the Soviet Union insisted that contributions from the Great Powers should be based on equality -- no great power to contribute more than any other. However, as was pointed out by a senior British officer, this proposal meant, for example, "that the maximum naval force that the United States or the United Kingdom could include in their military agreement would be limited to the size of the Chinese Navy, which. . . at present consists of five decayed gunboats." (24) The other members of the Committee -- the United Kingdom, France, China and the United States -- maintained that contributions should be on the basis of comparability -- each power to contribute what it could best afford. (25) All parties to the dispute were thinking in terms of major fighting forces. The Soviet Union wanted 1200 aircraft, 12 infantry divisions and some 90 warships. The United States demanded a police force of 3800 aircraft, 20 infantry divisions and over 200 warships. Other committee members were thinking along similar lines. (26) These estimates seem ludicrous today when even a small permanent international force would be considered a great step forward. As a result of this disagreement the

---

\* Article 47 of the United Nations' Charter.

Committee was reduced by 1948 to holding meetings "as a matter of routine," (27) and no further discussion of importance was carried on.

#### The U.N. Guard Force

18. Because of the inability of the Military Staff Committee to carry out its assigned tasks, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Trygve Lie of Norway, produced a plan in 1948 for a Guard Force. (28) The Secretary-General asked for a permanent force of three hundred personnel to be located either at Headquarters in New York or at another specified location, and for a reserve cadre of 500 members to be recruited multi-nationally and to be held equipped and ready in their own countries for service at the call of the U.N. It was hoped that the Guard Force might eventually be expanded to a strength of several thousand. (29)

19. The Guard Force was intended to be similar in organization to a military unit, made up of young, physically fit men, commanded by officers and subject to military discipline. (30) Mr. Lie hoped the force would be used to provide personal security for members of U.N. field missions and physical protection for the New York headquarters, field offices and other U.N. property. In addition the Guard Force would provide some technical services for U.N. missions, patrol points neutralized under truce, and exercise supervisory functions at U.N.-sponsored plebiscites. (31)

20. Although Canada and some other nations supported these proposals, (32) the plans were revised in 1949. The new request was for a Field Service of some three hundred men seconded by national governments to provide technical services and for a Field Reserve Panel to consist of a list of qualified persons available for employment as observers. The Communist bloc vigorously attacked these plans on both legal and financial grounds, (33) but nevertheless the General Assembly approved the scheme in November 1949. The Canadian representative at discussions in the committee appointed to study the Field Service, Major General E.L.M. Burns, made suggestions which were important in winning support for the Secretary-General's initiative. (34)

21. Since its establishment in 1949, the Field Service has rendered continuous service to U.N. operations around the world. The fact that there was a need for such a force, however, was perhaps the final admission that the wartime hopes for collective security had collapsed. The disagreements of the great powers seemingly had ended the prospects of planned security under the aegis of the United Nations. All that remained was the desire of men like the Secretary-General to use the United Nations to prevent the cold war from spreading or from turning into a major conflict. The Field Service was a pragmatic attempt to reach this goal. Indeed, from that time to the present, the history of the United Nations' attempts at peace-keeping are a record of pragmatism. The second Secretary-General of the organization, Dag Hammarskjöld, made this pragmatism his policy: "The basic policy line for this organization," he said in 1959, "is that the United Nations simply must respond to those demands which may be made of it. (35) This it has done.



22. United Nations' peace-keeping forces have carried out many roles in the years since the collapse of the Organization's early plans for collective security. In some way each force has expanded the concept of peace-keeping and has contributed to the large body of precedent now available to guide the actions of the Secretary-General and the nations which contribute to his forces. Generally U.N. forces have not operated in a fighting role. The one great exception to this statement, the Korean War, is usually seen by both historians and planners as a response to a particular situation unlikely ever to occur again. (36) The peace forces of the Organization have normally been used in a supervisory capacity to check on truces, armistices, or cease-fires, to patrol disputed borders, cordon off areas of possible disturbance, or maintain internal security in areas in which law and order has collapsed (37)

23. No two forces have been the same, for certain variables affect each operation. Of course, only the attitude of the Great Powers really determines the success or failure of U.N. intervention in a crisis. Similarly, the reaction of countries bordering on the area of hostilities is vital, as is the character of the Secretary-General, and the structure and abilities of the Secretariat (38) The lessons of the past, then, can provide a guide for dealing with current problems, but a guide which must be used with care. At the time of the first U.N. attempts to create a "presence" in 1948, however, there were no precedents for anyone to follow.

#### UNTSO

24. The outbreak of war between the newly-formed State of Israel and her Arab neighbours in May 1948 was the culmination of a long smouldering state of affairs. The United Nations had first become involved in the Palestine problem in April 1947, and for over a year the Organization had attempted without much effect to check the drift towards insecurity and war. The proclamation of the State of Israel on 15 May 1948 was the signal for the outbreak of hostilities, and with this U.N. efforts turned to attempts to establish a truce. Two appeals by the Security Council for a cease-fire were ignored, but a third met with success, and an uneasy period of quiet lasted for four weeks. To police the truce, Belgium, France, and the United States were to supply equipment, technical personnel, and 93 military observers. The first observers arrived on the scene within three days, but despite their efforts, hostilities were resumed on the expiration of the truce. As a result the Security Council invoked Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter, relating to threats to the peace, and imposed a cease-fire of its own. Implementation of this and subsequent directives was the responsibility of the United Nations Truce Supervision Board, or Truce Supervision Organization, as it soon came to be called. (39)

25. In 1949 UNTSO assumed the responsibilities it still carries out. Each Armistice agreement concluded between Israel and the four neighbouring Arab states of Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan in that year provided for the supervision of a Mixed Armistice Commission, composed of the representatives of the two parties, and a Chairman who was to be either the Chief of Staff of UNTSO or an officer designated by him (40)

26. Canada did not become involved in UNTSO until 1954 when the outbreak of renewed fighting along the Israel-Jordan border necessitated a larger observer force.(41) Since that time Canada has supplied approximately 17 Army officers each year for duty in Palestine. From 1954 to 1956 the Chief of Staff of the UNTSO was Major-General E.L.M. Burns, who had commanded the 5th Canadian Armoured Division and the 1st Canadian Corps in Italy during the Second World War.(42)

27. The officers who supervise the fulfillment of the Armistice provisions live and work in trying circumstances. The terrain is inhospitable, the climate uninviting, and the dangers considerable. The story is told of a Canadian officer who had the harrowing experience of returning to his quarters after being pinned down alone in his observation post by mortar fire for four hours only to be bitten by a poisonous snake when he took his boots off.(43) The usual practice is for an officer to spend at least half his one year posting working from outposts or permanent observation posts at which he lives on duty. The rest of his time is taken up with radio duty, investigations, special tasks and administration(44)

28. The Israelis and Arabs have been generally appreciative of the efforts of UNTSO to preserve the peace, but numerous obstacles have impeded the observers' work.(45) On occasion observers have been fired at, and one Canadian officer, Lt.-Col. George Flint, was killed in 1957 while trying to effect a cease-fire on the slopes of Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem. On other occasions UNTSO observers have been denied freedom of access to certain sectors. But, despite the difficulties, UNTSO has usually succeeded in curbing the tensions of this unusually turbulent area. Even at the time of the Egyptian-Israeli war in 1956, with Middle East passions at their peak, UNTSO managed to safeguard peace on the other three frontiers over which it had charge.

#### UNMOGIP and UNIPOM

29. In Palestine, although the political issues involved are as far from settlement as ever, the U.N. did succeed in getting the states directly involved to consent to a cease-fire and then to armistice agreements. In dealing with the dispute between India and Pakistan over the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the United Nations likewise found itself unable to bring the parties to political agreement. Nonetheless, except for sporadic outbursts of fighting, the situation remained under control until August 1965, and the U.N. played an important role in achieving that result. The 1965 war between the two great nations of the sub-continent was a tragic occurrence, and once again the world organization was called to play its part.

30. Hostilities had first broken out in Kashmir with the end of British rule in 1947 and the founding of the successor states of India and Pakistan. The Security Council created the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan in January 1948 to investigate the situation in Kashmir, and three months later authorized it to employ military observers. In fact it was not until January 1949, after much fighting and a subsequent cease-fire, that the first military observers arrived(46)

31. The first intimations that Canada would be asked to join in the work of the Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan came early in December 1948, and a formal request for four to six officers was received the next month (47) After taking into account that Canada was a member of the Security Council, the Cabinet agreed to the U.N. request,\* and four officers from the Canadian Army (Reserve) were selected for duty in Kashmir. (48) This number was increased to eight in the fall of 1949, (49) and shortly thereafter officers of the regular army began to fill the Canadian posts in UNMOGIP. After a marked increase in tension in the area in 1963, the number of observers in the force was increased from 34 to 40, and the Canadian contribution was raised to nine officers. (50) In addition Canada supplied a Caribou aircraft with an air and ground crew in 1964. (51) With the addition of three officers and five technicians of the Royal Canadian Air Force the Canadian contribution totalled 17, the largest national group in UNMOGIP.

32. The conditions of service for military observers in Kashmir are exceedingly rigorous, and have been described by experienced soldiers as "the toughest military assignments in the world." (52) A report submitted by one team of observers bears out this assessment. The observers reported that one of their number had been hospitalized for lack of oxygen at 18,380 feet elevation, that they had been sick five times because of bad food, and that they were afflicted with fleas, ticks and saddle-sores. (53) The observers' normal duties were often hazardous as well as uncomfortable. Brigadier H.H. Angle, a Canadian and the Chief Military Observer of UNMOGIP, was killed in an air crash in 1950. (54) Other officers risked their lives in attempts to keep the peace. One observer who had witnessed a confrontation between an Indian and a Pakistani patrol jumped into his U.N.-marked jeep as the two groups started firing at each other and drove into the path of fire with the U.N. flag flying from his vehicle. Both patrols withheld fire, and with the arrival of more observers the cease-fire was restored. (55)

33. The original task of the Military Observer Group was to mark the cease-fire line between the contending parties, and this was accomplished in 1949. Following this, the observers took up their posts on both sides of the line and began the routine tasks which they carried out until 1965.

---

\*There was little enthusiasm in meeting this request. The matter was referred to the Cabinet by Hon. Brooke Claxton, and in his words, the Cabinet was "allergic" to the proposal, wondering why Canada had been asked and who else had accepted. Memorandum, E[scott] R[eid] to S.S.E.A., 15 Jan 49, D.E.A. 5475-CX-2-40, vol. 1. The decision as to whether or not Canada should participate was left to the Prime Minister and the S.S.E.A. to make. There can be no doubt that Mr. Pearson carried the day. He even offered to have External Affairs pay the costs involved for two of the four officers requested. Copy of letter, S.S.E.A. to Minister of National Defence, 18 Jan 49, H.Q.C. 2719-34/174, vol. 1.

The A.G.L. McNaughton Papers held in this Directorate contain one drawer (Cabinet 10, drawer 2) of material which relates to the Kashmir problem. In any full study this should be consulted.

The observers reported on troop movements, kept count of the military supplies and personnel in their areas, and assisted local commanders in resolving minor disputes. As in Palestine the observers had no power to enforce the cease-fire but could only report violations to their headquarters(56) and as a result they were helpless in the face of the large-scale fighting that flared along the borders between India and Pakistan in August and September 1965. A new U.N. force with a wider mandate was a necessity, and following the cease-fire of mid-September the United Nations India-Pakistan Observer Mission was created. Major General Bruce MacDonald, a Canadian officer who had been serving with the U.N. in Cyprus, was appointed commander of the UNIPOM, and the Canadian government also provided an R.C.A.F. Air Transport Unit with three Caribou and six Otter aircraft and a number of observers from the Navy, Army and Air Force.

#### Korea and the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution

34. UNTSO and UNMOGIP illustrate the achievements of the United Nations in 'freezing', if not resolving, troublesome situations. A growing awareness that disputes on far-off frontiers might lead to Great Power involvement and to an uncontrollable spread of fighting made the member states of the world organization willing to use U.N. machinery to extinguish brushfire wars. The pattern of these developments changed drastically in 1950 with the invasion of South Korea.

35. In Korea, for the first time, the U.N. had to deal with a major military conflict in which the Great Powers were vitally concerned. The tried methods of conciliation and persuasion, of mediation and observation, were almost useless in the face of open, purposeful aggression. As a result the U.N. was forced to organize and use collective military action against the aggressors. In so doing, the organization broke new and significant ground. To 1950 it had been assumed that the charter's provisions for collective security could never be implemented, largely because of Soviet intransigence. The initial actions of the Security Council, the only body with authority to act, were effective in the Korea crisis only because the Soviet Union fortuitously happened to be boycotting the Council in protest against the continued representation there of the Republic of China. There was no reason to believe that such good fortune would be repeated in any other crisis, and, indeed, the special circumstances of June and July 1950, merely emphasized the limited reliance that could be placed on the Security Council as an effective instrument of security. The result was the passage of the "Uniting for Peace" proposals, introduced by the United States and co-sponsored by Canada and six other nations(57)

36. The Uniting for Peace resolution provided a method of evading the threat of paralysis posed by the unprincipled use of the veto. In essence, in cases where the veto blocked action, the resolution transferred the responsibility for peace and security from the Security Council to the General Assembly to deal with threats to the peace or acts of aggression. Speaking in the debate, Mr. Pearson told the General Assembly:

We are not going to repeat the mistakes of the thirties when collective security was betrayed. . . and when states fell one by one. . . . Nor are we going to repeat the mistakes of June 1950 when we were not organized to carry out quickly the collective security obligations we had undertaken when we signed the Charter(58)

The resolution also asked member states to maintain within their own forces, elements trained, organized and equipped for prompt service at the call of the U.N. The Canadian Government had anticipated this by authorizing on 7 August 1950 "the recruitment of an additional Army brigade. . . specially trained and equipped for... the United Nations..(59)

37. However, investigation was to show that while virtually all the non-Communist states were prepared to assert the Assembly's authority on security questions, they were not yet ready to provide the physical means necessary to make it effective. Canada's offer of a special force for the United Nations remained a pioneer venture that failed to stimulate any general emulation! Although this lack of response was disappointing, it did not deter the Canadian government from regarding its stand-by force as an essential in its foreign and defence policy.(60)

#### Intercom

38. The first and only peace-keeping operation in which Canada has participated outside the United Nations resulted from a conference held in Geneva in the summer of 1954 to consider the serious crisis ensuing from the war between the French and the Viet Minh in Indo-China.(61) In an effort to prevent the conflict from expanding into a war between the Great Powers, the Conference drew up three Agreements, one for each of the successor states of the former French Indo-China. Each agreement provided for an International Commission to supervise and control its implementation, and Canada, India and Poland were asked to staff these Commissions. The United Nations could not deal with this problem, primarily because Communist China, one of the parties principally concerned, was not a member.

39. Canada had not been invited to participate in the Geneva Conference on Indo-china, and the request that she assist in staffing the International Commissions came as a complete surprise.(62) On 28 July 1954, after careful investigation had disclosed what was felt to be a reasonable chance of success, the Canadian Government accepted this new peace-keeping role.(63) Within a few days diplomats and senior military officers from the three states forming the Commissions met in New Delhi and drafted the terms upon which they would operate.(64) The Commissions for Laos, Cambodia, and Viet Nam were established on 11 August 1954, and within a month approximately 140 Canadians from the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence were on duty in Indo-China.(65)

40. The immediate military functions of the three Commissions were carried out fairly successfully. The first task in Viet Nam was to ensure that the cease-fire was obeyed, order restored, and the military forces of the disputants transferred to their respective zones. In Cambodia and Laos

similar tasks were carried out with equal success.(66) But this was the part of the armistice, the end of fighting, on which there was mutual agreement. In carrying out its long term role of controlling the entry of military personnel and war materiel, the record of Intercom has been less satisfactory.(67)

41. The Geneva Agreement on Viet Nam outlined the steps to be taken to prevent the importation of arms. Points of entry were established, inspection teams formed, and patrols sent out. The Canadian and Indian members of the Commission made vigorous efforts to ensure that appropriate control was achieved, but the work of Intercom quickly turned into an endless series of procedural disputes with the Communist Poles. The result, wrote an experienced Canadian diplomat.

was that in the North the I[n]ternational C[ontrol] C[ommission] was unable to observe violations of the arms control stipulation but never able to maintain adequate inspection to be assured that no violations were taking place, In the South the struggle was with the indifference and reluctance of the authorities and the persistent effort of the Americans to press the terms of the Agreement farther than they could properly be stretched! The violations in the South were, needless to say, observable, and the attitude of the Americans was negative but decent; The Commission was in a position to prove Southern but not Northern violations. The Southerners and Americans inevitably complained and increasingly insisted that the known if not proved disregard of the arms control provisions by the Communists not only justified but made essential their doing likewise.(68)

For similar reasons the Intercom proved unable to control infiltration from North Viet Nam to the south. The dilemma is clear. The existence of an ineffective inspection system can serve to conceal Communist violations and expose those who act more openly. On the other hand, to abandon the inspection system totally or to resign from the Commission would jeopardize what remains of the Geneva accords and make an already critical situation more serious.(69)

42. In Cambodia and Laos, if not in Viet Nam, the International Commissions achieved some success. The Cambodian Commission in particular accomplished its tasks quickly and has existed in token form only since 1956.(70) The reunification of Laos in 1958 under a coalition government apparently ended the work of the Commission there, but unfortunately the coalition collapsed in 1961. A new Geneva Conference was then called, and the International Commission was revived.\* The situation in Laos continues to be a troublesome one.

43. The frustrations of coping with Communist intransigence make life trying for the Canadian personnel in Indo-China, and it is unfortunate that the conditions of service are so onerous. The climate is appalling, and the all-pervading dampness produces spectacular effects. At some points in

---

\*Technically, the Laos Commission now operates under the 'Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, July 1962,' and not under the Geneva accords of 1954.

Laos, one officer reported, boots and shoes fill to the top with blue mold overnight; another officer told of clothing being ruined in two or three days.(71) Often stationed at remote jungle outposts, Intercom observers are thrown on their own resources. An officer with no taste for contemplative study and intellectual pursuits could find his Indo-China tour highly unpleasant, for there is scant relief from the frustrating task of attempting to maintain the peace in the midst of near war.

44. Why, then, does Canada not declare the whole structure raised at Geneva a farce and go home? The answer, states one authority,

is that [the Geneva Agreement] remains as a tacit recognition of the anxiety of the powers to limit and control the situation in Indo-China, to recognize some mutuality of interest in avoiding all-out conflict, to respect the Geneva disposition to bargain even without observing all the provisions of a bargain once made. It is significant that neither the Communist powers nor the United States call for a repudiation of the Geneva Agreements. Each demands rather than the other side live up to their terms. There are demands for a renegotiation...not for...denunciation.

"It seems, therefore," concludes this account, "to be the often humiliating duty of the I[nternational] C[ontrol] C[ommission] to stay in place, acting as a presence, a reminder of the involvement of the great powers."(72) Probably the Canadian Government shares this view.

#### UNEF

45. By 1956, the United Nations and several of its member states including Canada had accumulated a sizeable body of experience relating to peace-keeping operations. Observer groups were functioning in Kashmir and Palestine, a large and growing number of officers from many countries had gained valuable experience in dealing both with the United Nations and with obdurate nationalities, and a climate of opinion which accepted the value of U.N. forces was developing throughout most of the world. All these factors were to play their part in the resolution of the most dangerous international crisis since the end of the Second World War.

46. The Suez Affair of October and November 1956, brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.(73) The fighting in the Middle East which began with the lightning Israeli invasion of Egypt on 29 October and which was followed by an Anglo-French combined operation directed at the Suez Canal, faced the world organization with its most severe test. In grappling with this terrible crisis, which threatened to involve the Soviet Union and the United States as well, the United Nations created an international police force designed to separate the combatants and police the border between them. The Canadian role in the events of the Fall of 1956 was a vital one and, undoubtedly, the most valuable contribution Canada has ever made to world peace.

47. The idea of a United Nations police force in the Middle East was not a new one -- as early as 1953 Canadian spokesmen had broached the idea in discussions with interested parties -- but these attempts had failed, and similar efforts in 1955 and 1956 had also been unsuccessful.(74) A full-scale crisis, however, re-awakened interest in the idea, and fortunately the U.N. was in a position to act. Thanks to the Uniting for Peace resolution of 1950, a veto in the Security Council did not eliminate the possibility of action to restore peace. This resolution was invoked for the first time, overriding the vetoes of France and the United Kingdom, co-sponsors of the proposals in 1950, and a special emergency session of the General Assembly met on 1 November, 1956.

48. The delegates to the Assembly session were in an angry mood. The seemingly successful Hungarian revolution had raised hopes for an early end to Soviet colonialism, an event loudly hailed in the West. But now, Britain and France, the old colonial powers, had intervened in the Middle East. Early in the morning of 2 November, the aroused Assembly quickly passed a resolution calling on the parties involved in the fighting to agree to an immediate cease-fire, to withdraw behind the armistice lines established in 1949, and to ban the introduction of military supplies into the area.(75)

49. The Canadian Government abstained on this resolution, and it was only after the vote had been taken that Hon. Lester Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, was able to speak and state Canada's position.

I regret the use of military force [he said]... but I regret also that there was not more time, before a vote had to be taken, for consideration of the best way to bring about that kind of cease-fire which would have enduring and beneficial results.... We need action, then, not only to end the fighting but to make the peace.... I therefore would have liked to see a provision in this resolution... authorising the Secretary-General to begin to make arrangements... for a United Nations force large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out.... My own government would be glad to recommend Canadian participation in such a United Nations force, a truly international peace and police force.(76)

The Canadian suggestion met with quick acceptance from delegates seeking to avoid catastrophe, and after consultations with Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, friendly governments, and the Cabinet in Ottawa, Pearson produced a resolution calling for a study of the possibility of such a force.(77) This resolution was passed by the General Assembly on 4 November by a vote of 57 to 0, with 19 abstentions.

50. Later that same day, the Secretary-General met informally with Pearson and several other delegates and improvised the plan requested in the Canadian resolution.



Taking advantage of the presence of UNTSO in the area, the Secretary-General appointed Major-General E.L.M. Burns, its Chief of Staff, as head of a United Nations Command. Burns would be provided with a staff, and soon thereafter infantry would be sent.(78) The General Assembly subsequently approved this plan (79) but the British and French nevertheless persisted with their military operations.(80) A cease-fire was not agreed to until the Secretary-General presented his final proposals for the force to the General Assembly on 6 November.

51. Hammarskjold's report, delineating the principles and procedures upon which the peace force would operate, was a vitally important document, not only for the immediate crisis, but also for all future U.N. peace-keeping operations. The most important of his provisions was that which barred permanent members of the Security Council from participation in the force within the war zone. Political control was vested in the Secretary-General alone, although an advisory committee was established to assist him. The force, soon to be christened **the United Nations Emergency Force**, would be "more than an observer's corps, but in no way a military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it is stationed." UNEF was to be a political neuter, and it was not intended to impose the will of the world body on the combatants; its sole purpose was to assist in the restoration of peace. The entire action of the United Nations, the report continued, was based on the "recognition by the General Assembly of the unlimited sovereign rights of Egypt." (81) With the acceptance of this report, UNEF was created on paper. The difficult task of shaping an effective force yet remained. In these efforts, too, Canada was to play a role of the first magnitude.

52. The Canadian government was proceeding with planning for its pledged contribution to UNEF. Discussions were held in Ottawa to consider such questions as supplies, the possibility of using Naples as a forward base for the force, the attachment of a military advisor to the Canadian delegation at U.N. Headquarters, and the choice of the infantry battalion to be sent to Egypt. The tenor of the discussions, with their emphasis on the problems of logistics, was to set the tone of the Army's role in UNEF. Canada alone among the contributors to the international force evinced a realistic interest in the prosaic details of administration and supply.(82) When, therefore, Prime Minister St. Laurent announced the Canadian contribution of a unit of "battalion size," he was able to add the key phrase "augmented by ordnance, army service, medical and dental detachments." In so far as was possible the Canadian contingent would be self-contained. The Prime Minister also announced the government's willingness to fly the troops to the Middle East on R.C.A.F. aircraft and to ship supplies and equipment on board the aircraft carrier H.M.C.S. Magnificent. The Magnificent would also be used to provide a small hospital, force headquarters, and a communications link to Canada.(83)

53. Simultaneously, planning was going ahead in New York. Three senior officers, representing the three branches of the Army -- operations, personnel and supply, or G, A and

Q - had joined the group of military men advising the Secretary-General. These able, experienced officers, fully in touch with the capabilities and resources of their branches, made a contribution to joint planning that was valuable out of all proportion to Canada's numerical representation on the Military Advisory Group.(84) As had been foreseen in Ottawa, the problems facing UNEF's organizers were primarily logistical. How could UNEF be maintained? How could it be administered efficiently? Offers of troops were pouring in from countries as varied as Colombia, Denmark and India. An additional complicating factor, later noted by General Burns, was that "Nearly all offers were of infantry, practically no administrative units being proposed in the first instance."(85) Some of the countries offering troops, it soon became clear, would not even be able to supply the initial equipment, and especially the vehicles, necessary to support their contingents.(86) In a paper presented to the Military Advisory Group on 10 November, the Canadian liaison officers took a large step toward overcoming these problems.(87)

54. The first point in their presentation, which established the principles of supply and command for UNEF, dealt with the location, responsibilities and functions of the main base. The Canadians suggested that the United States be asked to supply the base from its extensive Mediterranean resources. This, they maintained, would ensure adequate supplies of military equipment for the peace force, and, as the base would be in Naples, would not violate the Secretary-General's prohibition of Great Power participation in the war zone. Their second point recommended the consolidation of headquarters and support units and urged that, as the command structure was largely English-speaking, these units be English-speaking. As their last point the Canadian officers suggested that the size of the force be fixed! These proposals received unanimous support and subsequently were largely carried out. The organization of UNEF was now well in hand.

55. Suddenly, but perhaps not unexpectedly, Egypt raised difficulties over Canadian participation in the force. Secretary-General Hammarskjold had attempted to anticipate Egyptian objections by immediately accepting offers of troops only from "non-controversial" nations, and he had included Canada in this group. The Egyptian complaints were first revealed in Cairo to the Commander of UNEF. While readily acknowledging Canada's independence in foreign policy, General Burns later recalled, the Egyptian foreign minister stated that "the trouble was that Canadian soldiers were dressed just like the British soldiers, they were subjects of the same Queen -- the ordinary Egyptian would not understand the difference, and there might be unfortunate incidents."(88) The difficulty over uniforms was further compounded when it became known that the Canadian infantry unit selected was the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada. "There is no regiment in the Canadian forces that I respect more than the Queen's Own," General Burns wrote, "but it did seem an unlucky choice, in view of the Egyptian argument."(89) On the advice of the U.N. Secretariat that these difficulties were only temporary, the government decided that there was as yet no need to change the form of the Canadian contribution. But after several days of fruitless wrangling, the Canadian position hardened, and Pearson emphatically informed the Secretary-General

that we felt it absolutely essential to the success of this effort that neither Egypt nor any other country should impose conditions regarding the composition of the force. I told him that on this matter we would negotiate only with him... although we recognized... that he should discuss these matters with Egypt....(90)

56. Hammarskjold was in Egypt discussing the composition and duties of the force with President Nasser. On November 17 he sent a message to Pearson which, while affirming that Canada was welcome as a state from which elements of UNEF could be drawn, stated that the most important contribution at present would be air support. The question of ground troops, the Secretary-General believed, could best be settled later. "The present situation seems to be one where it is not a lack of troops for the immediate task but of possibilities to bring them over and maintain their lines of communication."(91) As a result of this message, and as a result of the growing realization of the need for administrative personnel, the departure of the Queen's Own Rifles was delayed.(92) Instead the 300 service troops originally intended to support the infantry battalion were flown to Egypt to administer the whole UNEF until further arrangements could be made.(93) The first Canadian troops landed at Abu Suweir, Egypt on 24 November, ten days after the arrival of the first UNEF personnel.

57. The Canadian strength in UNEF was soon increased. Early in December General Burns decided that more administrative personnel were urgently needed, and he suggested to the Secretary-General that Canada be asked to provide these troops "instead of the infantry battalion originally proposed."(94) As a result the government agreed to send a signals squadron, a R.C.E.M.E. infantry workshop, two transport platoons, and an R.C.A.F. communications squadron. An armoured reconnaissance squadron was also prepared for UNEF service, but was not despatched until March 1957. With the arrival of the additional Canadian servicemen on 12 January 1957, the Canadian strength in Egypt exceeded one thousand, fully one-sixth of the force.(95) In the decade since the establishment of the force, almost 9000 soldiers and airmen have served in UNEF.

58. The Canadian servicemen in UNEF, apart from those in the reconnaissance squadron engaged in patrolling the armistice line, perform functions not essentially different from the ones they undertake at home. Their prosaic tasks of administration, however, must be done by someone, and it is a shared belief of both U.N. and Canadian officials that UNEF could not operate without the Canadian contribution. The morale of the troops is high, but, understandably enough, rotation back to Canada is the high point of the soldier's service.(96)

59. The value of UNEF cannot be underestimated. Although its creation has not led to a permanent solution of the political problems in the area, UNEF did prove that in certain circumstances the United Nations could react quickly and in some strength to halt fighting and prevent its resumption. Both the Egyptians and the Israelis are fully aware of the

services to peace provided by the force.(97) For the United Nations itself, UNEF was no less important. It was the first major peace-keeping force, the first forceful exercise of power by the Secretary-General in a peace-keeping role, and the first force to be based on principles clearly applicable in the future. The worth of the knowledge gained at Suez was to be clearly demonstrated before much time had passed.

#### UNOGIL

60. UNEF was successful in its task of stabilizing the border between Egypt and Israel, but this was not the only trouble spot in the Middle East. Early in June 1958, the tiny half-Moslem, half-Christian nation of Lebanon came to the Security Council of the United Nations with charges that the United Arab Republic was aiding Lebanese rebels. The situation in the Lebanon was a confused one, with local politics inextricably entangled with the policies of the Great Powers and with oil interests.\* The one certainty, however, was that the situation was potentially dangerous, and therefore the Security Council authorized the formation of a new observer force, the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon.(98)

61. Because of the need for haste in this most delicate situation, Secretary-General Hammarskjold turned first to the UNTSO in Palestine and drew ten officers from that long established body to act as the nucleus of the new force. Included in this first group was one Canadian officer,(99) Shortly thereafter a request for ten officers was received in Ottawa and quickly approved.(100) During the months of June and July 1958, UNOGIL's strength rose to approximately 130 observers, equipped with jeeps and light aircraft. Observer teams patrolled all accessible roads in the border areas both by night and by day; a system of permanent observer posts was established at key locations; and a reserve of observers was established to cope with emergencies.(101) Lebanon appeared to be well on the way to stabilization until a new crisis wracked the area.

62. On 14 July 1958 a revolution in nearby Iraq overthrew the monarchy and government. The King and all pro-Western political figures were killed and their bodies dragged through the streets by mobs. Fearing for its survival and

\*The Lebanese crisis was primarily of internal origin and was occasioned by President Chamoun's attempts to seek a constitutional amendment which would authorized him to hold the Presidency for a second term. This provoked a revolt because, in the delicately balanced religious situation in the Lebanon, a second term for a Christian president posed dangers to the Moslems. Because Chamoun was pro-Western, however, he managed to extract a blanket promise of support from the United States and the United Kingdom; this included a pledge of intervention with force if necessary. According to some sources, Anglo-American intervention could not be justified without adequate preparation of public opinion, and the Lebanese thus produced their complaint of intervention from Syria. Documents on ibid., vols. 2 and 3. See also the superb piece of reporting in William R. Frye, "Lebanon: Story Behind the Headlines," Foreign Policy Bulletin, XXXVIII (November 1, 1958), 25-26.

acting only on the basis of press reports, 102, the Lebanese government appealed to the United States for aid, and the following day American Marines landed on the beaches near Beirut.\* A few days later British troops flew into Jordan to assist the hard-pressed government of that country. The Anglo-American operations were designed to protect Jordan's flank and deter outside intervention on behalf of the Lebanese rebels.(103)

63. Predictably, American intervention in Lebanon produced Soviet charges of aggression, but as a result of the ensuing debate at the United Nations, Secretary-General Hammarskjold flew to the Middle East to investigate. His decision was to strengthen UNOGIL further, and Canada was invited to contribute an additional 50 officers to the observer group.(104) Eventually the observer force in UNOGIL reached a strength of 591, and the Canadian contribution totalled 77 officers and men.(105) The increased force contributed to the pacification of the Lebanese borders, and the United States troops withdrew early in November. UNOGIL reported on 17 November that its task was completed in view of the total absence of reports of smuggling and infiltration, and by 9 December 1958, the main body of the force had departed from Lebanon.

#### UNOC

64. The Lebanese political crisis had been satisfactorily resolved by the United Nations despite the interest of the Great Powers in the area. That the result was satisfactory was a tribute to the perseverance and skill of the Secretary-General and to the willingness of the middle powers to continue the peace-keeping functions they had assumed in 1956 with UNEF. Both the Secretary-General and the middle powers were soon to be tested again in a new theatre, the Congo.

65. Long before the Congo lapsed into anarchy in the summer of 1960, Secretary-General Hammarskjold had begun to increase the U.N. "presence" in the area, hoping thereby to insulate the emerging nations of the African continent from the pressures and demands of the Cold War. The onset of the crisis of July 1960, then, was almost welcomed by the U.N. Secretariat, for here was a chance to expand the positive functions of the Organization as a force for progress.(106) Almost before the world was aware of it, a peace-keeping operation of unprecedented magnitude and complexity was in being. An international military force of 19,000 troops, a United Nations political team, and an extensive civilian administrative organization were all in the field. Financial difficulties plagued the Organization throughout the operation,(107), and

---

\*The U.S. intervention posed problems for UNOGIL: "One rather amusing aspect of UNOGIL's concern to dissociate itself from the U.S. military operation involved the display of the U.N. label on the jeeps used by observers. Soon after the observers began their patrols the white vehicles which they use... were ...marked with the Arabic translation of the words "United Nations." The observers were disconcerted to learn on or shortly after July 15 that the Arabic translation of "United Nations" is identical with the Arabic version of "United States," and it seemed that this confusion was contributing sharply to the difficulties of patrols in extreme Opposition area. The Arabic label was hastily painted out." Despatch no. 373, Beirut to S.S.E.A., 20 Aug 58, (D.E.A.) 50162-A-40, vol. 7.

problems were increased with the death of Secretary-General Hammarskjold in an air crash in September 1961. The U.N. emerged from the Congo crisis in 1964 weaker in many ways than it had been in 1960, but the effort had had to be made.

66. The Canadian contribution to the United Nations Organization in the Congo was small in numbers, but of vital importance. The first request was for the secondment of two officers from UNTSO for duties with the UNOC staff in Leopoldville.(108) This was followed by a request for three more officers,(109) and then by a call for five specialist officers from UNEF.(110) On 28 July, following a U.N. appeal for signals personnel,(111) and despite a serious shortage of qualified technicians,(112) the government authorized the provision of a maximum of 500 personnel, including 200 signallers, for UNOC.(113) The R.C.A.F. also participated in the operation. Four North Star aircraft transported a Canadian contribution of 40,000 lbs. of food to the Congo (114) and were then used in logistical support of UNOC.(115) The internal airlift was under the command of a Canadian officer, and the R.C.A.F. also supplied some ground crew and technicians.(116)

67. The signals role was the main Canadian commitment. The officers and men of 57 Canadian Signals Squadron had been concentrated at Barriefield Camp, Ontario, in early August 1960. There they had been documented, immunized, and equipped for their tropical posting, while technicians had prepared the signals equipment for the climatic conditions of the Congo by varnishing every wire in the radio sets as a precaution against fungus.(117) The first signallers arrived in the African nation on 19 August, and within a short time the entire squadron was in place. The task of the Canadians was to man the Leopoldville message centre for UNOC headquarters and to staff seven regional centres scattered throughout the interior. The signallers worked solely through and for the United Nations and had nothing to do with Congolese radio traffic.(118) Their work was dull, but necessary. Some other Canadians, however, had hair-raising experiences.

68. Lieutenant Colonel P.A. Beyer, a Canadian officer attached to UNOC headquarters, took part in an operation which rescued a number of missionaries held prisoner in Kwilu Province in 1964. When he landed by helicopter in the town of Kisandji on 27 January 1964:

There was much waving of arms, yelling and jabbing and spitting at me but I kept insisting that we go to the Mission to carry on the talks. The Chief then suddenly demanded to know what the ring on my right hand represented. As one of the Jeunesse indicated that he wanted it and was motioning that he would cut it off, I explained it was a wedding ring. The Chief then began to ask a series of questions about my family.... The result.... was that the Chief suddenly embraced me whereupon the Jeunesse tried to pull us apart. It was during this moment that [I was hit] from behind with the flat of [a] machete.... The Jeunesse were now arguing as to who was to kill me.... The man put the pistol against my stomach, thumbed back the hammer and pressed the trigger but the pistol did not fire since I had forgotten to put a round up the chamber....(119)

Eventually, Lt.-Col. Mayer escaped from this mob and rescued the missionaries. In all more than 100 were saved in a series of similar operations. Mayer's heroism, and that of Sgt. J.A. Lessard of the Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Régiment who had worked with him on the rescue operations, was recognized by the award of the George Medal.

69. UNOC terminated its duties on 30 June 1964. The force withdrew before full stability was achieved, a decision necessitated by the continuing difficulties in financing the operation.(120) The international peace-keeping force had encountered many frustrations in the course of discharging its complex task, but on balance it succeeded in facilitating the re-integration of secessionist Katango province and in maintaining a reasonable state of security within the Congo.(121) Most important for the future was that UNOC was the first explicit deployment of U.N. military power entirely within a sovereign state.(122)

#### UNTEA and UNYOM

70. While the Congo operation was still in progress, the United Nations was called on to participate in two more peace-keeping ventures, both of which set new precedents for the Organization. In West New Guinea/West Irian, the United Nations Temporary Executive Administration assumed the entire administration of the former Dutch colony from 1 October 1962 until sovereignty was transferred to Indonesia on 1 May 1963.(123) In Yemen, the United Nations Yemen Observer Mission was charged with supervising the cease-fire and disengagement agreements between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. The Mission performed its task from 11 June 1963 until 4 September 1964. In each of these operations the U.N. provided the umbrella under which disengagement could take place.(124) This was a service to world peace, of course, but it was even more of a service to the disputants. As a result, Indonesia and the Netherlands shared all the costs of UNTEA, and Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic divided the expenses incurred in the operation of UNYOM.(125)

71. Canada participated in these two operations, represented in both cases primarily by officers and men of the Royal Canadian Air Force. In West New Guinea, where the main military force was provided by a battalion of Pakistani infantry, the R.C.A.F. provided five officers and eight ground crew, along with two float-equipped Otter aircraft. The usual task of the Canadians was to operate a regular flight from Biak over the jungle to Fak Fak carrying U.N. officials and freight.(126) The Yemen Observer Mission was first staffed by a group of Military Observers seconded from UNTSO, eventually including five Canadian Army officers, and by two Canadian aircraft borrowed from UNEF.(127) A Yugoslav reconnaissance squadron soon took up ground patrol duties in the desert country, and it was joined by a Canadian air unit which at its peak strength numbered approximately 50 officers and men. These two operations received very little publicity in the world press, but their contributions to peace were nonetheless real. Both UNTEA and UNYOM prevented any escalation of the disputes, and both helped to create an atmosphere conducive to political settlement.

UNFICYP

72. Even in the jet-age 1960s the crises in Yemen and New Guinea had seemed far away. The situation in Cyprus, on the other hand was much closer to the Canadian consciousness. Cyprus was a fellow Commonwealth country, torn asunder by fighting between its Greek and Turkish inhabitants. Both Turkey and Greece were NATO partners of Canada, as was the United Kingdom which had been involved in attempts to keep the peace on the Mediterranean island since the beginning of fighting in 1955.(128) As tension increased on the island in 1963 and early 1964, the New York Times commented editorially that this island of 3750 square miles and 580,000 inhabitants "threatens to embroil Europe, the United States and even the whole world in its petty communal strife.... The Cyprus issue could become the classic example of how international conflicts become world conflicts."(129) In these circumstances, an international force to keep the peace while negotiations were carried on was a necessity. Canada was to play a key role in the establishment of such a force.

73. Although the United Nations had been seized of the situation on the island for some time, the first attempts to establish a peace force were made under the auspices of NATO and the Commonwealth. These efforts collapsed, largely because of the insistence of the Greek Cypriots that the only acceptable force would be one under United Nations control.(130) The failure to place an international force on Cyprus contributed to the deterioration of the situation, and on 11 March 1964 Turkey issued an ultimatum that it would intervene in defence of the Turkish Cypriots unless a United Nations force was on the island within a few days. "It is generally conceded," wrote a former U.N. official,

[that] it was Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Martin, who saved the peace. Mr. Martin flew down to New York on March 12 and had lengthy discussions with [Secretary-General] U Thant.... The following day, Friday 13, Mr. Martin, back in Ottawa, made a series of telephone calls -- to Ankara, to Stockholm, to Helsinki, to Dublin, to Washington, and to New York. At 6 p.m. U Thant announced that a U.N. Force made up of troops from Canada, Ireland, Sweden and some of the British troops already in Cyprus would be constituted.... And on the same fateful day, Turkey issued a statement welcoming the establishment of the Force. The danger of war had been averted -- but by a narrow margin.(131)

74. The Canadian Parliament authorized Canadian participation in the UNFICYP in an evening session on 13 March. Addressing the House of Commons, Prime Minister Pearson announced that



the Canadian contribution would consist of the First Battalion, the Royal 22<sup>e</sup> Regiment\* and a reconnaissance squadron of the Royal Canadian Dragoons.(132) The force would be airlifted to Cyprus by the R.C.A.F.'s Transport Command, and vehicles and materiel would be shipped on board the aircraft carrier H.M.C.S. Bonaventure.(133) A reconnaissance party for the contingent arrived in Nicosia on 15 March, and the first flight of the main body landed the following day. The prompt arrival of the Canadian troops, the Canadian High Commissioner in Nicosia reported to Ottawa, was "the turning point in the Cyprus crisis,"(134) and indeed the situation did ease perceptibly for a time. With the arrival of the Bonaventure on 30 March, and the government's decision on 10 April 1964 to authorize the provision of a brigade headquarters for Cyprus,\*\*(135) the Canadian contribution was complete.

75. At the time UNFICYP was established the Canadian government agreed to bear all the costs involved in transporting the contingent to Cyprus and in maintaining it there. This was a departure from the longstanding Canadian position that all U.N. members should bear the costs involved in peace forces, but the government recognized that the deployment of UNFICYP could not wait for the resolution of lengthy financial negotiations.(136) It should be noted, too, that Great Britain and Ireland also pay the expenses of their contingents, and that some 35 U.N. members contribute to the \$2 million monthly cost of the force!(137)

76. The Canadian troops in UNFICYP are deployed along the strategic Kyrenia Road, linking Nicosia to the North coast of the island, and are responsible for maintaining a convey system on it. Other U.N. troops relieved the Canadians in December 1964 of the task of patrolling the "green line" dividing the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot quarters of Nicosia. This had been a frustrating task, but their relief did not free the Canadians of danger. Patrols were often fired at from the hills along the country roads, and there were some near misses. "One bullet hit 45A Car and went through the rear jerri-can, back deck, tarp and ricocheted off the turret missing the car commander... by inches," reported the War Diary of the Royal Canadian Dragoons of one typical day. "No fire was returned."(138) The nature of the Cyprus situation required a high degree of discipline of every officer and man. One senior Indian officer with the force, General Thimayya, told the Canadian High Commissioner that "he was very much impressed with the Canadians here..." He added that he was particularly

---

\*There was evidently doubt as to the value of the R.22e R. in Cyprus, likely because of language. Note, 4 Feb 64, (DEA) 21-14-1-Cyp, vol. 1. On 6 Mar 64, the Governor-General, in his capacity as Honorary Colonel of the Regiment, presented his views to an official of External Affairs. General Vanier believed that decision not to send the Van Doos would have obvious political implications and should be avoided. "On the other hand, he believed that a Canadian force contribution which included a generous mixture of French and English-speaking Canadian soldiers would be an appropriate reflection of the cooperative federalism we are trying to build in Canada." Memorandum for S.S.E.A., 6 Mar 64, (D.E.A.) 21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, vol. 1. The effect of this representation is unknown, but the government did decide in the end to send the R.22e R.

\*\*The brigade headquarters was closed down on 1 September 1965 in what was officially described as a U.N. "economy measure."

impressed with the junior officers who knew their jobs and stayed cheerful in trying circumstances.(139)

77. At the time of writing no negotiations were in progress between the parties to the dispute, although these had been called for in a U.N. report issued in March, 1965. Until substantial progress is made toward agreement on the basic issues, it is likely that UNFICYP will be required on Cyprus to preserve the status quo. It is equally likely that Canada will maintain her representation -- and her reputation -- in the force.

### Conclusion

78. Canada has participated in ten peace-keeping operations -- all that there have been. What has made this country's participation a virtual sine qua non for these forces? The answer is complex, but perhaps the most important factor has been the willingness of Canadian governments, regardless of their political complexion, to participate in joint efforts to keep the peace. United Nations forces are irksome, they involve casualties, expense, and political and military difficulties; they can be embarrassing; and not every nation is interested in participating. Another factor of vital import is the Canadian reputation for objectivity and impartiality. Canada belongs to NATO and the Commonwealth, and is linked with the United States in defence pacts. Despite this Canadians have managed to project an image of reasonableness, and there is also no blemish of colonialism on the nation's record. All this would be of little value in peace-keeping, however, were it not for the capabilities of the defence forces of the Dominion. Unlike most other middle and small powers, Canada has a military organization capable of transporting and maintaining its troops anywhere and **anytime**. This is a great asset.

79. But why should Canada involved herself in all the world's squabbles? Why should Canada spend money on peace-keeping? The obvious answer, and one no less true for being obvious, is that peace is every nation's business. The period of no commitments is dead and gone forever. The Suez crisis, the Cyprus situation and the India-Pakistan War posed clear threats to world peace, and other conflicts could easily have escalated into full-scale conflagrations. And yet peace still prevails, albeit shakily. It may not have been the United Nations which preserved the peace, but even the most virulent critics of the Organization would have to admit that it helped. Surely this is reason enough. Furthermore, Canadian prestige and influence at the United Nations can be attributed in part to our role as a peace-keeper. Suez and Cyprus are battle honours on the flag of Canadian diplomacy. Finally, on a more practical level, Canada's U.N. commitments provide independent sources of information on world trouble spots.(140) All these factors play their part in maintaining Canadian interest in peace-keeping.

80. The Canadian leadership in the field was demonstrated at the Ottawa Peace-Keeping Conference of November 1964, which was called on Canada's initiative.(141) Representatives from 23 countries which had either contributed substantially to U.N. operations or had placed stand-by units at the call of the Organization met to review their experiences and discuss

informally ways of improving peace-keeping operations. The Canadian government had no preconceived ideas regarding the conclusions that might emerge from the discussions, and it looked on the opportunity for an exchange of views as valuable in itself. And although no immediate decisions resulted, the informal contacts made should be invaluable in any future operations. A general recognition of the value of stand-by forces and preparatory planning was also noted, and this could also be helpful. (142)

81. No one in the 1930s, that "low dishonest decade," could have foreseen the Canadian role in the years since 1945. Canadian isolationism is dead, and its resurrection seems most unlikely. The shrinking of the world has given new responsibilities to every nation, but very few are willing to pick up the burden. If peace is maintained and a nuclear holocaust averted, the credit may well go to those nations that took steps to prevent wars. Canadians can take justifiable pride in the role they have played.

82. This report has been prepared by Lieut. J.L. Granatstein.

(C.P. Stacey)  
Director

#### REFERENCE NOTES

1. Department of External Affairs, Information Division, Statements and Speeches, No. 64/32, 1. [Cited hereafter as S&S.]
2. See Henry Borden, ed., Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs, (2 vols.; Toronto, 1938), II, 951-961.
3. Alexander Brady and F.R. Scott, Canada After the War, (Toronto, 1943), 126-127.
4. Senator Dandurand to the Assembly of the League of Nations, quoted in James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, (Toronto, 1964), 3-4.
5. G.P. de T. Glazebrook, A History of Canadian External Relations, (Toronto, 1950), 312.
6. See Walter A. Riddell, World Security by Conference, (Toronto, 1947), Chapters VI-XVII.
7. House of Commons Debates, 8 Sep 39, 22.
8. Brady and Scott, 139. See also L.B. Pearson to N.A. Robertson, 6 Oct 44, Department of External Affairs file [cited hereafter as D.E.A.] 7V(S), vol 3; Ibid., Ambassador in Washington to Secretary of State for External Affairs, [S.S.E.A.], 13 Oct 44.
9. See also ibid., Under Secretary of State for External Affairs [USSEA] to Prime Minister, 16 Sep 44.
10. House of Commons Debates, 9 Jul 43, 4558. See also J.W. Holmes, "Canadian External Policies Since 1945," International Journal, XVIII (Spring, 1963), 139; Draft Memorandum on Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for Communication to UK, UK, USSR and Chinese Governments, 30 Dec 44, D.E.A., 7V(S), vol. 4.
11. Ibid., Pearson to Robertson, 1 Feb 44, vol. 1.
12. Docs. on H.Q.T.S. 9128-4 and H.Q.T.S. 9128, vol. 2, folio 5. See also Historical Section (G.S.) Report No. 90, paras, 16-21, and Gen. M.A. Pope to Pearson, 3 Apr 44, [112.3M2(D468)].
13. Vincent Massey, What's Past is Prologue: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable Vincent Massey, C.H., (Toronto, 1963), 427. See also Tel. No. 188, King to Churchill, 28 Sep 44, D.E.A. 7V(S), vol. 3.
14. Department of External Affairs, Report on the United Nations Conference on International Organization, (Ottawa, 1945), 12-14. See also Maurice A. Pope, Soldiers and Politicians: The Memoirs of Lt.-Gen. Maurice A. Pope, C.B., M.C., (Toronto, 1962), 270.
15. House of Commons Debates, 19-28 Mar 45, 10-313.
16. Ibid., 19 Mar 45, 10.

17. Ibid., 28 Mar 45, 313.
18. Clyde Eagleton, "The Share of Canada in the Making of the United Nations," University of Toronto Law Journal, (Lent term, 1948), 333 note. See also USSEA to Prime Minister, 11 Jun 45, D.E.A. 7V(S), vol. 8, and Ibid., Note for file, 12 Jun 45.
19. Appendix A to Report on United Nations Conference, 91-93.
20. Ibid., 37.
21. Ibid., 38; Pope, 272!
22. Department of External Affairs, Report on the Second Part of the First Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations... (Ottawa, 1947), 165. Cf. "Canadian Military Commitments and their Possible Effect on the Expansion of the Active Force," 21 May 46, H.Q.T.S. 9138-3, F.D.2, 8-9!
23. Ambassador in Washington to USSEA, 25 Jan 47, D.E.A. 50188-40, vol. 1. See also W.R. Frye, A United Nations Peace Force, (New York, 1957), 53; Department of External Affairs, Canada and the United Nations, 1948, (Ottawa, 1949), 73; Note on the Military Staff Committee, 17 Dec 47, D.E.A. 50188-40, vol. 1. [Kardexed]
24. Ibid., Ambassador in Washington to USSEA, 25 Jan 47.
25. Joint Planning Committee 19-11, 1 Sep 48 [112.3M2(D346)].
26. Ibid.
27. United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1948-1949, (New York, 1949), 46.
28. Ltr. No. 68, Permanent Delegate to U.N., New York to S.S.E.A., 21 Jun 48, D.E.A. 5475-DK-40, vol. 1.
29. Report of Secretary-General 1948-9, 45.
30. U.N., General Assembly, Official Records, Supplement #19 (New York, 1949), 6.
31. Joint Planning Committee 19-12, 4 Apr 49 [112.3M2(D619)]
32. Memorandum to Cabinet, 15 Oct 48, D.E.A. 5475-DK-40, vol. 1; Minutes of Meeting of Chiefs of Staff Committee, 12 Apr 49 [112.3M2(D119)].
33. External Affairs Bulletin, (August, 1949), 10.
34. Ibid., (December, 1949), 30.
35. Quoted in L.B. Pearson, "Keeping the Peace," Survival, VI(July-August, 1964), 150.

36. Joint Planning Committee report, 28 Aug 61 on H.Q.S. 2001-210/O, vol. 5; Pearson, "Keeping the Peace," 151; F.H. Soward and E. McInnis, Canada and the United Nations (New York, 1956), 124ff.
37. See memorandum, Director CAORE to S.A./C.G.S., 12 Jun 61, H.Q.S. 2001-210/O, vol. 4; ibid., L.J. Byrne, "An Analysis of the Requirements for the Support of U.N. Military-Type Operations," vol. 5; docs. on D.E.A. 50191-F-40, vols. 1 and 2.
38. Ibid., Ltr. No. 240, Canadian Mission to U.N. to USSEA, 3 Apr 62, vol. 1.
39. The best readily available summaries of the background of the Palestine crisis are David Brook, Preface to Peace: The United Nations and the Arab-Israeli Armistice System (Washington, 1964); "The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine," External Affairs Bulletin, (June, 1959), 131-135; Lt.-Gen. E.L.M. Burns, Between Arab and Israeli (Toronto, 1962), Chapter II. D.P.R.(Army) Information Bulletin 15/60, "Canadian Service Commitments in Palestine," 22 Mar 60, [400.019(D2)], is totally unreliable.
40. The armistice agreements are printed in United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 4th Year, Special Supplement No. 1, (New York, 1950).
41. Memorandum, "Canadian Military Commitments to U.N. Truce Supervision Teams," 25 Oct 57, D.E.A. 12076-40, vol. 3.
42. Burns, 5-9.
43. Letter No. 67, Permanent Mission, New York to USSEA, 23 Jan 59, D.E.A. 50134-40, vol. 41. See also "Notes on Mr. Martin's Trip to the Middle East 8-24 Sep 58," 10 Oct 58, D.E.A. 50131-A-40, vol. 9; and E.H. Hutchison, Violent Truce (New York, 1955).
44. Letter, Senior Canadian Observer, UNTSO, to D.Pers. (Coord), 5 Mar 60, H.Q.S. 2719-34/248, vol. 4.
45. Tel., Tel Aviv to USSEA, 7 Jun 65, D.E.A. 21-13-UNTSO, vol. 1.
46. Sylvain Lourie, "The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan," International Organization, IX (Winter, 1955), pp. 19-21. (A copy of this article will be placed on Kardex.)
47. Tel. No. 584, Canadian Delegation to U.N., Paris, to S.S.E.A., 9 Dec 48, 5475-CX-2-40, vol. 1; Tel. same to same, 7 Jan 49, H.Q.C. 2719-34/174, vol. 1.
48. Minister of National Defence to S.S.E.A., 26 Jan 49, D.E.A. 5475-CX-2-40, vol. 1.
49. Ibid., USSEA to Deputy Minister of National Defence, 15 Jul 49.
50. External Affairs Bulletin (August, 1964), 394.
51. Ibid.; documents on H.Q.C. 2719-34/174, vols. 8-9.

52. Ibid., "Report by General Jacob L. Devers, USA (retired) on UN Observers in Kashmir", September, 1951, vol. 3; see also Memorandum, 23 March 50, D.E.A. 5475-CX-2-40, vol. 1. (A copy of this will be placed on Kardex.)
53. Report by Maj. Kauffman and Capt. Seutin, Srinagar, 20 Sep 49, (Army) H.Q.C. 2719-34/174; vol. 2.
54. Maj. H.S.C. Archbold to A.G., 24 Jul 50, H.Q.C. 2719-34/174, vol. 2. See also Memorandum, 17 May 55, D.E.A. 5475-CX-2-40, vol. 5. [Kardexed]
55. Lourié, "The UNMOGIP", 29.
56. Ibid., 28.
57. "Peace-keeping Activities of the United Nations," Statement by G.S. Murray, Head UN Division, to Orientation Course, D.M.I.; 18 Mar 63, (D.E.A.) 50191-F-40, vol. 2. (A copy will be placed on Kardex.); "Canada's Obligations to the United Nations and International Operations," a paper prepared for the House of Commons Special Committee on Defence, July, 1964. (Secured from U.N. Division, External Affairs.) (A copy will be placed on Kardex.)
58. S.&S. no. 50/45, Statement by Mr. Pearson to U.N. General Assembly, 3 Nov 50.
59. Department of External Affairs, Canada and the Korean Crisis (Ottawa, 1950), 33-4!
60. Soward and McInnis, 138-141.
61. See "Indo-China Notes -- 1954" [112.3M1012(D22)] and B.B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams, (New York, 1964).  
Delegate
62. Telegram, Permanent/ to U.N., Geneva, to S.S.E.A., 19 Jul 54. [112.3M2 (D659), vol. 1].
63. Minutes of Conference held by V.C.G.S. with Senior Military Advisors..., 23 Aug 54, [112.3M2 (D568), vol. 1]; External Affairs Bulletin, (August, 1954), 257-259; Pacificus, "Canada in Indochina," International Journal, XI (Autumn, 1956), 270-271.
64. External Affairs Bulletin (August, 1954), 260-262.
65. Personnel Strength of Military Component Canadian Delegation, [685.005 (D1)].
66. "Impressions of the Account of the Work of the Canadian Delegation Indochina, Account by Brig. R.M. Bishop....," 12 Jan 59, [685.005 (D1)]; Geneva Conference on Indochina, Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities...20 July 1954, IC/42/Rev.2. (Copies of these agreements will be placed on Kardex). (Secured from External Affairs).
67. J.W. Holmes, "Peace-keeping in Asia," a paper prepared for the Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford, September, 1964, 15. (A copy of this paper will be placed on Kardex).

68. Ibid., 16-17.
69. Ibid.
70. Memorandum, D.M.O.&P. to D.G.P.O., 10 Sep 56 [410.019(D1)]; W.D., M.C.C.D., Saigon, February, 1965, Annex G.
71. "Liaison Report by Lt. Col. Mooney, 6-17 Oct 54," Appendix C, and "Report on Liaison Visit to Indochina by Lt.-Col. Rochester, 25 Oct 54", Appendix B, [112.3M2 (D658), vol. 2].
72. Holmes, "Peace-keeping in Asia," 20.
73. See James Eayrs, The Commonwealth and Suez, (London, 1964) and Gabriella Rosner, The United Nations Emergency Force (New York, 1963).
74. House of Commons Debates, 29 Nov 56, 166-167.
75. U.N. General Assembly, Official Records, First Emergency Special Session, Supplement #1, Resolution 997 (ES-1).
76. Ibid., Plenary Session, 1 Nov 56, 35. See also D.E.A. ~~50134-40, vols. 19-21~~ (T.S.) (The Eden-St. Laurent correspondence).
77. Ibid., Supplement #1, Resolution 998(ES-1); House of Commons Debates, 27 Nov 56, 57; S.&S. 56/23. See also Memorandum, 2 Nov 56, D.E.A., 5475 DW-51-40, vol. 1.
78. Frye, 7-8; Report No. 94, Historical Section (G.S.), 13-14; Herbert Nicholas, "Peace Forces and the Changing Globe; The Lessons of Suez and Congo," International Organization, XVII (Spring, 1963), 324.
79. General Assembly, Official Records, Supplement #1, Resolution 1000(ES-1).
80. Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden, K.G., P.C., M.C.: Full Circle (London, 1960), 819.
81. General Assembly, Official Records, Annexes, Agenda Item 5, Doc. A/3302.
82. Report No. 94, 22.
83. Press Release, 7 Nov 56. Quoted in Department of External Affairs, The Crisis in the Middle East, October-December, 1956 (Ottawa, 1957), 26; "General Instructions for Conduct of Operations of HMCS Magnificent," 16 Nov 56, [112.3M2 (D638), vol. 1].
84. Report No. 94, 24. The diaries of the Liaison Team are held in the Section, [410.019(D4)].
85. Burns, 90.
86. Report No. 94, 26.
87. Ibid., 50.



88. Burns, 198; House of Commons Debates, 27 Nov 56, 62. See also Tel. No. 189, Cairo to External, 11 Nov 56, and Memorandum for file, 12 Nov 56, D.E.A. 50366-40, vol. 1.
89. Burns, 209.
90. House of Commons Debates, 27 Nov 56, 62-63.
91. Ibid., 63; Tel. Poleg 1300, S.S.E.A. to External, 17 Nov 56, D.E.A. 50366-40, vol. 1; ibid., tel. Poleg 1293, 17 Nov 56; ibid., tel. No. 780, Delhi to External, 15 Nov 56.
92. Ibid., Tel. Poleg 1505, Candel New York to External, 30 Nov 56, vol. 2.
93. Burns, 215; Globe and Mail, 20 Nov 56; W.D., CBUME, 25 Nov 56.
94. Burns, 234; Col. M.R. Dare and Lt.-Col. G.K. Wade, "The Canadian Army Contingent United Nations Emergency Force," Snowy Owl (1957), 27.
95. Report No. 94, 42.
96. Ltr. No. 296, Permisny to USSEA; 24 Jun 57 [112.342.009 (D251), vol. 1; docs. on D.E.A. 5475-CX-2-40, vol. 7. See also Historical Section (G.S.), Report No. 78
97. Letter ME-259, U.S./S.E.A. to Cairo, 23 Jun 60, D.E.A. 50366-40, vol. 16; ibid., Memorandum, "Nature and Role of UNEF", 14 Nov 57, pocket file; Brian J. Urquhart, "United Nations Peace Forces and the Changing United Nations: An Institutional Perspective," International Organization, XVII (Spring, 1963), 338-354.
98. Docs. on D.E.A. 50162-A-40, vol. 3.
99. Ibid., Tel. No. 926, Permisny to External, 16 Jun 58.
100. Docs. on ibid., vol. 4.
101. "Summary Report, 1958, No. 34," D.E.A. 50162-A-40, vol. 5; ibid., tel. No. 1030, Permisny to External, 4 Jul 58.
102. Ibid., memorandum, 14 Jul 58.
103. See ibid., tel. 1107, Permisny to External, 19 Jul 58, vol. 6.; ibid., despatch No. 331, Beirut to S.S.E.A., 24 Jul 58.
104. USSEA to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, 18 Sep 58, H.Q.S. 2719-34/182, vol. 1.
105. Canada and the U.N., 1958, 19.
106. J.W. Holmes, "The United Nations in the Congo," International Journal, XVI (Winter, 1960-1961), 7-8. See also King Gordon, UN in the Congo: A Quest for Peace (New York [?], 1962).

107. W.H. Barton, "Who Will Pay for Peace? The UN Crisis, Behind the Headlines, XXIV (April, 1965).
108. Memorandum, 15 Jul 60, 6386-C-40, vol. 1.
109. Ibid., "Possible Canadian Contribution to UN Forces in Congo, Synopsis #1 -- Events to 1000 hrs. 19 Jul 60," H.Q.S.G. 2001-120/34 (D.M.O.&P. 3A).
110. "Possible Canadian Contribution... Events to 1400 hrs, 25 Jul 60," H.Q.S.G. 2001-120/73, vol. 2 (D.M.O.&P. 3), [114.3Q1 (D15)].
111. Memorandum, 12 Jul 60, D.E.A. 50366-40, vol. 17, docs. on D.E.A. 6386-C-40, vol. 1.
112. Ibid., Memorandum to S.S.E.A., 19 Jul 60.
113. Ibid., Memorandum, 28 Jul 60.
114. Op. cit., "Possible Canadian Contribution... 19 Jul 60."
115. Docs. on D.E.A. 6386-C-40, vol. 1.
116. Docs. on ibid., vols. 1-2. See also ibid., "Notes on United Nations Military Operations in Congo," 28 Nov 60, vol. 7.
117. W.D., H.Q., U.N. Forces Congo, 1-5 Aug 60.
118. "In the Cause of Peace," External Affairs Bulletin (July, 1962), 202; Lt. A.E. King, "57 Canadian Signals Unit in the Congo," D.P.R. Release, January, 1963, [144.9.009 (D57)].
119. Lt.-Col. P.A. Mayer, "Operation Jadex One, A Chronological Account of the Rescue Operations in Kwilu Province (24 Jan-3 Feb 64)," 25 Feb 64. [144.9.009 (D47)].
120. "Draft -- Canada and the United Nations -- Congo," 26 Mar 65, (DEA) 21-14-6-ONUC-1, vol. 1.
121. Canada, Department of External Affairs, Report of the Department of External Affairs, 1964 (Ottawa, 1965). 6.
122. Arthur L. Burns and Nina Heathcote, Peace-Keeping by United Nations Forces (New York, 1963), 3.
123. The best description of the background and operations of UNTEA is in Paul W. Van der Veur, "The United Nations in West Irian: A Critique," International Organization, XVIII (Winter, 1964), 53-73. (A copy of this article will be placed on Kardex.) See also "UN Administration Leaves West Irian," External Affairs Bulletin, XV (June, 1963), 240-3, and Alastair M. Taylor, "'Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea' Becomes 'Irian Barat'" International Journal, XVII (Autumn, 1962), 429-435.

124. Tel. V-196, External to Permisny, 2 May 63, D.E.A. 11282-B-40, vol. 1. ibid., memorandum, "United Nations Presence in Yemen," 2 May 63, (A copy of this memorandum will be placed on Kardex).
125. Tel., Permisny to External, 16 Aug 62, H.Q.S. 2001-120/230, vol. 1; External Affairs Report 1964, 6.
126. Docs. on D.E.A. 50409-A-40, vol. 1.
127. Memorandum, 31 May 63, (D.E.A.) 11282-B-40, vol. 1; ibid., letter, Brig. Purves to USSEA, 13 Aug 63.
128. S.&S. 64/11, Address by Hon. Paul Martin, 4 May 64; J. King Gordon, "The U.N. in Cyprus," International Journal, XIX (Summer, 1964), 328. On the situation generally, see "Cyprus," External Affairs Bulletin, (May, 1965), 164-166; S.&S. 64/7; and S.&S. 64/4. (Copies of the S.&S. will be placed on Kardex.)
129. Quoted in Gordon, "UN in Cyprus," 334.
130. Memorandum, 29 Jan 64, D.E.A. 21-14-1-Cyp, vol. 1., docs on D.E.A. 21-14-6-UNFICYP-8, vol. 1.
131. Gordon, "U.N. in Cyprus," 339-340.
132. Quoted in "External Affairs in Parliament," External Affairs Bulletin, (April, 1964), 181.
133. W.D. R.22eR., 15-16 Mar 64; tel. Op 188, Ganarmy to Cencom, et. al., 14 Mar 64, D.E.A. 21-14-6-UNFICYP-4, vol. 1.
134. Tel.No. 39, Nicosia to External, 31 Mar 64, D.E.A. 21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, vol. 1.
135. Tel. DL-797, External to Permisny, 10 Apr 64, D.E.A. 21-14-6-UNFICYP-1, vol. 1.
136. Letter, Paul Tremblay, Permanent Representative at U.N., to Secretary-General, 18 Mar 64, D.E.A. 21-14-6-UNFICYP-4, vol. 1.
137. External Affairs Bulletin, (May 1965), 165.
138. W.D., Recce Sqn. R.C.D., 2 Jun 65.
139. Telegram 492, Nicosia to External, 14 Aug 64, D.E.A. 21-14-6-UNFICYP-4, vol. 2.
140. Memorandum, "Canadian Military Commitments to the United Nations," 2 Aug 57, D.E.A. 5475-CX-2-40, vol. 1.
141. Aide-Memoire, "Proposed Conference on United Nations Peace-keeping Operations", 14 May 64, D.E.A. 21-14-1-2, vol. 1. (A copy will be placed on Kardex).
142. The record of the Conference will be placed on Kardex. See also Circular doc. No. A 1/65, "Report on Meeting of Military Experts... Ottawa, November 2-6, 1964," 20 Jan 65, D.E.A. 21-14-1-2. (A copy will be placed on Kardex.)