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July 1986

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DATE: DEC 9 1986

Report No. 8

Directorate of History

Canadian Forces Headquarters

Canada and Peace-keeping Operations
The Congo, 1960-64

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DIRECTORATE OF HISTORY
CANADIAN FORCES HEADQUARTERS

16 June 66

Canada and Peace-keeping Operations
The Congo, 1960-64

1. This report is based on an examination of the files of the Department of External Affairs and the Department of National Defence, supplemented wherever possible by secondary accounts. The intention throughout has been to place the Congo operation and Canadian participation in it primarily within a Canadian context. The local politics of the Congo, of course, must be considered in their bewildering complexity, but discussion of this aspects of the problem has been kept to the minimum consistent with an understanding of the events of the years 1960-64.

The United Nations and Peace-keeping: Background

2. The relations between the Great Powers were as strained in mid-1960 as they had ever been since 1945. The collapse of the summit conference of May 1960, precipitated by the U-2 incident earlier that month, ended the cautious hopes for an East-West détente that had arisen during the previous year. Under the able direction of its Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, the United Nations again prepared itself for possible service as a buffer between the nuclear powers and their conflicting ideologies and aspirations.

3. The world organization had some experience of the mediatory role. From 1948 the U.N. had mounted several peace-keeping operations of varying size and complexity. The first had come in Palestine in 1948, followed by Kashmir in 1949, Korea in 1950, Suez in 1956 and Lebanon in 1958. Of these operations, two stood out. Korea was a "freak"--a conventional war with limited aims, nominally directed by the United Nations but in practice controlled by the United States. Suez was strikingly different. Then the U.N. had intervened --with the consent of both super powers--to block an Israeli-Anglo-French attempt to seize the Suez Canal by force and topple President Nasser of the United Arab Republic. A polyglot force with infantry, light armoured vehicles, technical and service units had been rapidly created and deployed along the Israeli-Egyptian border. The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) succeeded in its task of maintaining the peace, and it provided Secretary-General Hammarskjold with a striking personal triumph. Most important, UNEF established the precedent that the U.N. could intervene on a large scale in certain circumstances, and it resulted in the development of certain de facto ground rules for peace-keeping operations. These will be referred to subsequently.

4. In addition, for a year or two before the Congo lapsed into anarchy, Hammarskjold had begun to establish a United Nations "presence" in Africa, hoping thereby to insulate the emerging nations of the continent from the pressures and demands of the Cold War. In a

very real sense, the U.N. Secretariat was almost eager¹ to expand its role on the dark continent.

Canadian Policy on Peace-keeping

5. Canada had participated in each of the United Nations' ventures into peace-keeping. There had been scant enthusiasm² for the task at first, but after the Korean War, Canadian policy came to include a commitment to "any undertaking made by Canada under the Charter of the United Nations. . . ." ³ The formation of UNEF in November 1956 put the capstone on this policy. Mr. Pearson's Nobel Peace Prize and the worldwide acclaim which came to the nation for her role in damping down the Middle East crisis seemed to make participation in peace-keeping a badge of nationhood. Or so it must have seemed to the Canadian government.

6. When the election of 1957 brought a Conservative government to power, the Canadian position on peace-keeping was somewhat modified. "The Minister has observed," the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee wrote to the Acting Under-secretary of State for External Affairs in August 1957, "that these commitments are a very heavy drain on this Department and provide little benefit for the Services. He wishes a review of these commitments with a view to reducing them as soon as possible."⁴ However, perhaps because of strong opposition from within⁵ the Department of External Affairs, nothing was done to reduce the Canadian contribution to U.N. forces.

7. The Minister of National Defence had other problems to worry over. The Avro "Arrow" was scrapped, Canada joined NCRAD and committed herself to accepting the nuclear-tipped "Bomarc" missile from the United States. The R.C.A.F. had only obsolete transport aircraft--North Stars and Flying Boxcars--and there was an urgent need to replace the obsolescent CF-100 interceptor. In addition, beginning in 1959, the government committed itself to a scheme for "National Survival", making plans for mobile support columns, changing the role of the Canadian Army (Militia), and establishing a national warning network to report on nuclear explosions and fallout patterns. This last commitment placed a considerable strain on the resources of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals.⁶

8. In brief, then, the situation in June 1960 was as follows: the relations of the United States and the Soviet Union were close to the breaking point; the U.N. in consequence was preparing itself for possible service as a buffer between the powers and in addition was looking to expanding its activities in black Africa; Canadian defence policy was in a period of flux, equipment was approaching obsolescence, and the manpower of the armed services was stretched by the national survival commitment, particularly with respect to Army signallers.

Congo: Background to Chaos

9. Belgium's administration of the Congo was not notable for its foresightedness. The huge colony--one-

quarter the size of Canada--had been a personal fief of King Leopold II until 1908 when the Belgian government took it over after the brutal treatment of the natives had become an international scandal. The new administration was sternly paternalistic, and neither the natives nor the Belgian settlers had any voice in the government. No Congolese held even an advisory post with the government of the colony.

10. The administration was under the control of the Governor General in Leopoldville, the capital, and the Minister for Colonies in Brussels. Power at the top was shared with the Church and with the giant cartels which dominated the Congo's economic life. The Church's control over education was almost complete, and although there was an impressive system of primary schools, little emphasis was placed on secondary and tertiary education. As late as 1958-59 there were only 104 Congolese attending Lovanium University in Leopoldville, and perhaps 10 to 15 graduates in the colony. The economy was in the grasp of four or five giant companies, in each of which the state held a substantial number of shares--up to 50 percent in some cases. The largest of the companies was the Société Générale de Belgique which controlled the copper mines of Katanga, cotton and sugar production, and many other areas of the colony's economy. The entire organization of the Congo, one American scholar has noted, "contributed, consciously or unconsciously, to the stifling of independence and independent thought on the part of both Congolese and Belgians".⁷

11. The Belgians, however, did develop the country. The gross national product was steadily rising (from £250,000,000 in 1950 to £400,000,000 in 1955, for example); railroads (3000 miles), and roads (87,000 miles) were developed, and 40 airports were constructed. Gradually more money was filtering down to the native population, but the process was slow. Thirty or forty percent of the population was literate, and an impressive welfare organization was in effect. "It is clear," one commentator observed, "that the Belgian colonial system of paternalism, judged from the standpoint of material benefits, was unequaled in African Colonial history."⁹

12. But paternalism was no substitute for independence and freedom, and from 1955 a spirit of nationalism grew quickly in the Congo. The words "self-government" were first used by King Baudouin in a speech in that year, but the Governor General qualified the observation of his monarch with the statement that "it will take¹⁰ generations". Not until 1956 was political education of a rudimentary sort begun with the intention of opening some offices to the Congolese, and political parties formed. Even so, there was yet no timetable for independence, and a 30-year plan suggested by one academic met with official scepticism and disapproval.¹¹

13. General de Gaulle's 1958 visit to Brazzaville, just across the Congo River from Leopoldville, had considerable impact on the development of the Congolese independence movement. "Whoever wishes independence," the French President had said, "can have it as soon as

he wishes."¹² If the French colonies could have independence, the Congolese asked, why not us? The agitation produced by de Gaulle's pledge was instrumental in forcing the Belgians to scale down their estimates of the transitional period to 15 years. This estimate soon proved fanciful, for when riots erupted in Leopoldville in January 1959, Belgian policy turned into its final tragic course. The white population of the city was saved only by calling the "Force Publique"--the white-officered, native-manned colonial army--into action.¹³ The riots resulted in the production of an elaborate timetable designed to move the country toward independence with some speed. No date was mentioned, however.

14. Before the riots, most Belgians had been unaware of the growing demands for independence. The bloodshed of January immediately aroused fears that the Congo might become a Belgian Algeria, and as fears increased, the carefully worked out plans were scrapped and independence was promised for 30 June 1960.¹⁴ In May 1960 the first elections were held, and a native administration, led by Patrice Lumumba, was constituted by the King.

15. Lumumba's government took office on 30 June as planned. Within the week the Force Publique mutinied against its white officers, and in the ensuing panic thousands of Belgian civilians fled the country. Basic services were left untended, and the administration of the sprawling country collapsed. When incidents between

the departing whites and the mutinous soldiers developed, Belgium began flying in troops to protect its nationals.

The Formation of the U.N. Force

16. The first Congolese request to the U.N. for military "technical assistance" was made on 11 July. On the same day the return of Belgian troops and the announced secession of the copper-rich province of Katanga led the Congo government to request American troops. The American government suggested that the request be directed through the United Nations,¹⁵ and on 12 July the Congolese cabled Hammarskjold: "Insistons vivement sur extrême urgence envoi troupes ONU au Congo." There was, Prime Minister Lumumba and President Kasavubu insisted, referring to the intervention of Belgian troops, "actuelle agression extérieure qui menace paix internationale."¹⁶ On the following day, another telegram made it clear that if a U.N. force was not immediately dispatched an appeal for assistance would be made to the neutralist nations that had signed the Bandung Pact.¹⁷ A further cable on 14 July 1960 indicated that the Congo was prepared to ask Soviet aid "si campagnes] occidental ne met pas fin a¹⁸ acte agression contre souverainete republique du Congo."

17. Using Article 99* of the U.N. Charter for the first time, the Secretary-General requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the rapidly developing crisis. When the Council met on 13 July,

*Article 99: "The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security."

Hammarskjold developed his plans:

It is a matter of course that the only sound and lasting solution to the problem which has arisen is that the regular instruments of the Government, in the first place its security administration, are rendered capable of taking care of the situation. . . .

A technical assistance office is being established and a resident representative appointed. I will submit to the Government of the Congo . . . detailed proposals for implementation of my acceptance of the request. . . .

. . . .we must . . . realistically recognize that this work will take some time and that therefore there is an intermediary period during which the Government may find it difficult to operate in the security field with all the needed efficiency. . . .

As is well known, the Belgian government has in the Congo troops stated by the Government to be maintained there in protection of life and for the maintenance of order. . . . I must conclude from the communications received from the Government of the Congo that the presence of these troops is a source of internal, and potentially also of international, tension. In these circumstances, the presence of the Belgian troops cannot be accepted as a satisfactory stopgap arrangement pending the re-establishment of order through the national security force.

. . . Although I am fully aware of all the problems, difficulties and even risks involved, I find that the stopgap arrangement envisaged by the Government of the Congo is preferable to any other formula. It is, therefore, my conclusion that the United Nations should accede to the request. . . and, in consequence, I strongly recommend to the Council to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government of the Congo, to provide the Government with military assistance during the period which may have to pass before. . . the national security forces are able to fully meet their tasks. It would be understood that were the United Nations to act as proposed, the Belgian Government would see its way to a withdrawal.

. . . It follows that the United Nations Force would not be authorized to action beyond self-defence. It follows further that they may not take any action which would make them a party to internal conflicts in the country. Finally, the selection of personnel should be such as to avoid complications because of the nationalities used. In the prevailing situation this does not, in my view, exclude the use of units from African States, while, on the other hand, it does exclude recourse

to troops from any of the permanent members of the Security Council. May I add that in fact it would be my intention to get, in the first place, assistance from African nations. 19

After Hammarskjold's address, the Security Council then proceeded to accept a resolution which authorized the Secretary-General to provide the Congo government "with such military assistance as may be necessary" until the African state's security forces "may be able. . . to meet fully their tasks". The resolution also called upon the Belgians to withdraw their troops. 20

18. The Security Council's action set a number of precedents. This was the first time the Council had been convened under Article 99; the first time the U.N. undertook to provide assistance to a non-member state; and the first time (although it could be argued that the United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon was an earlier instance) that military assistance was furnished for the restoration of internal order. All in all the resolution was a triumph for the Secretary-General. In conversation with the Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations, Hammarskjold attributed his success to the fact that he had the approval of the African states before he addressed the Security Council. In the circumstances, he said, the U.S.S.R., eager to please the neutralist states, had no choice other than to go along. 21

19. In the next few weeks the Secretary-General developed his ground rules for the Congo operation. In part they were based on the lessons and precedents of UNEF, but on the whole they were unique:

- a. The Force was to be under the "exclusive command" of the Secretary-General, responsible only to the Security Council. It could not take orders from the host government and it "must be separate and distinct from activities of any national authorities".
- b. The U.N. must not become a party to internal conflicts. U.N. troops could not be used to "enforce any specific political situation".
- c. The Force must have freedom of movement throughout the Congo.
- d. U.N. troops could use force only in self-defence and should not exercise "any initiative in the use of armed force".
- e. The composition of the Force must be decided by the Secretary-General, although the views of the host country should be considered.
- f. National units in the U.N. Force should take orders only from the U.N. and not from their governments. 2

All that remained was to create the force.

20. Initially, the general impression at New York was that Hammarskjold was thinking in terms of a small cadre of French-speaking officers to assist the Congolese in restoring order.²³ It was variously believed that these advisers would come from the United Nations forces in Egypt or Palestine, and it seemed possible that some Canadians might be included.²⁴ The outcome was rather different. The Commander of the United Nations Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) in Palestine, Major-General Carl Von Horn of Sweden, was transferred to the Congo to take command of the new force,* but the force he was to lead was to be a major one. By July 15, more

*Von Horn had a difficult time getting to the Congo. For five days he waited in Jerusalem "while chartered planes broke down, crashed, or just failed to arrive" before he could get to Leopoldville. He finally arrived on 18 July. [L.P. Bloomfield, "Headquarters-Field Relations," International Organization, XVII (Spring, 1963), 379.]

than 1200 troops were on the ground, and within a month the total had soared to 14,000 men from 24 states--and with almost as many languages.²⁵ A task of unprecedented magnitude was underway. Whether or not the United Nations could control such a force was as yet undetermined.

The Canadian Response to the Crisis--July 1960

21. The possibility of a Canadian contribution to the U.N.'s Congo force had been raised in Parliament on 12 July. The Prime Minister, Mr. Diefenbaker, replied that "until United Nations plans have been formulated there is no question of requests for assistance from member governments". A second query led to the response that the Army's stand-by battalion "is available, but subject to the direction of the government. . . ." Within²⁶ Army Headquarters, however, planning for a possible contribution had already begun in the Directorate of Military Operations and Planning under the authority of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff. The Army was on the alert, a caller from External Affairs was told, because it was believed logical that the U.N. would need French-speaking personnel. From the logistical point of view, the Army source said, the Congo was just about the worst place in the world to send Canadians,¹¹ but it could be done if necessary. The stand-by battalion, 2 R.C.R.,* could be ready in five days, and the Army maintained a list of 100 officers under instructions to be ready for rapid overseas posting. If necessary, these officers could be ready in 36 hours.²⁷

*The memorandum says 2nd R.22ieme R., but this is an error.

22. On the following day, 13 July, the mission in New York reported that the Secretary-General hoped to select officers from UNTSO for the Congo. In addition, small countries in Europe and the Americas might be approached. Canada was specifically mentioned as a possible country, the mission reported, but it was the Ambassador's assumption "that there is no question of making any prior offer of Canadian assistance. . . ."²⁸ This was a proper assumption, and in the House of Commons the next day the Prime Minister dealt at some length with the possible areas of Canadian assistance:

. . .the secretary general is proceeding with his plans for putting in motion the long term program of administrative assistance. . . . In particular, he is arranging for the temporary secondment of UNTSO officers and in an initial request he asked that Canada agree to the secondment of two Canadian officers. He has also been considering whether R.C.A.F. aircraft at present on duty with UNEF should be used in this emergency for ferrying supplies and personnel to the Congo.

The government is responding favourably to requests of this kind because it believes that this is the most useful contribution which Canada can make in the current situation. If there are additional requests of the same nature they will be considered seriously.

Mr. Diefenbaker then went on to say that Canada, if asked, might be able to make "an effective contribution" of foodstuffs.²⁹

23. The Prime Minister had revealed the intentions of the government to the House. The same day, instructions were sent to New York to Ambassador C.S.A. Ritchie: "You should continue to discourage any such request from the Secretariat [i.e. for military assistance]."³⁰ The

Canadian view was given the Secretary-General on 14 July, and Mr. Ritchie was emphatic in advising him that the government did not wish expectations raised that a Canadian contingent would be forthcoming.³¹ As a result of the day's events, a message was sent by Army Headquarters to the commands in Canada: "It is unlikely that Canadian troops will be requested for the U.N. force to restore law and order."³²

24. The Prime Minister also had indicated to Parliament that Canada had been asked to agree to the secondment of two Canadians from UNTSO to the Congo force. In fact, before the government had received the request, the U.N. had already made arrangements for the officers to leave Palestine with Von Horn.³³ This sequence of events annoyed the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General S.F. Clark. He objected to the U.N.'s action in seconding personnel without consultation with him. "While I concur in the nomination of these two officers for this task," he wrote the Minister, "I recommend that in future requests of this nature the selection of personnel concerned be left to me."³⁴

25. On 15 July 1960, the U.N.'s requests of Canada increased. The first request of the day was for three more UNTSO personnel, and this was quickly approved.³⁵ This was followed by an exploratory approach for signal, quartermaster, and maintenance personnel. Henry Labouisse, formerly the Director of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency and now the Secretary-General's appointee to organize the U.N.'s Congo force, asked if Canada could assist in the

fields of communications and logistics.³⁶ This request was passed directly to the Prime Minister. He gave no positive reaction, one of his assistants wrote, "but I was left with the impression that his inclination might be to respond favourably if a specific request were received".³⁷ A memorandum to the Cabinet prepared by the Secretary of State for External Affairs Mr. Howard Green, on 15 July, was not as favourable in tone:

The Secretary-General has been made fully aware that the Government of Canada did not wish any expectation to be arcused that military assistance from Canada would be forthcoming. . . .

Any request for communications and logistics specialists is outside the scope of those which the Government has announced it was prepared to consider [presumably in Mr. Diefenbaker's House speech on 14 July 1960].³⁸

No details on U.N. requirements were forthcoming, beyond a mention that signallers should be on approximately the same scale as in UNEF (i.e., a signal squadron) and that the logistics personnel would be on a lower scale than those provided for the Egyptian force.³⁹

26. An additional request on 15 July was for food.⁴⁰ On the following day the government announced that it was prepared to lift 20,000 lbs. of canned pork and 20,000 lbs. of whole milk powder to the Congo, using R.C.A.F. North Star aircraft.⁴¹ A few days later the government authorized the use of these aircraft in refugee evacuation, providing that priority be given to Canadians.⁴²

27. The United Nations next asked for R.C.A.F. assistance in establishing an airlift between Europe and the Congo. The Secretariat estimated that 50,000 lbs.

per day would be necessary,⁴³ and Canada and Italy were the only nations asked to assist in this task. The flights were to be for a 30-day period only, the Secretariat said, and the costs would be paid by the U.N.*⁴⁴ On 20 July the U.N. asked if the aircraft authorized to transport refugees could be used to fly food instead,⁴⁵ and on the following day approval was given.⁴⁶ The government, Mr. Green told the Commons,

has decided to put the four North Stars now in the area at the disposal of the United Nations for a period of 30 days. The necessary aircraft, crews and maintenance personnel will be provided to maintain four active aircraft for the purposes specified. A senior R.C.A.F. officer is being sent to Leopoldville to co-ordinate these activities. ⁴⁷

The senior R.C.A.F. officer in question was Air Commodore F.S. Carpenter. In an address at the Royal Military College on 17 Jan 61, Air Commodore Carpenter indicated the speed with which the R.C.A.F. met the government's demands upon it. Orders, he said, had been received to send 25 technicians and some 5000 spare parts at 1415 hours. By 1717 hours the same day, the men and parts had left R.C.A.F. Station Trenton.⁴⁸ This was possible because the R.C.A.F.'s 436 Squadron had completed the necessary inoculations for Congo service on 15 July.⁴⁹

28. No such speed was possible in the case of the Army's contribution. On Sunday, 17 July, a paper was produced in the Directorate of Military Operations and

*The request for Cabinet approval of the use of R.C.A.F. aircraft was made in a memorandum to the Cabinet by the Secretary of State for External Affairs on 20 July 1960. This memorandum was prepared without the assistance of the R.C.A.F., and this provoked a stiff note from the Chief of the Air Staff who believed that it was his duty to recommend the employment of his personnel. [Letter, C.A.S. to C.C.C.S., 22 Jul 60, R.C.A.F. S-003-100-85/147, vol. 1.]

Planning which clearly laid out the situation as the Army saw it. No details of exact requirements were available and none would be until the Force Commander, General Von Horn, had had time to form his plans. The conclusions of the paper, therefore, were based on the Canadian experience with UNEF. Exclusive of staff officers, the D.M.C.&P. planners noted,

it would be preferable for Canadian Army elements to be employed as formed units or sub-units as opposed to operating as individuals or in small detachments for the following reasons:

- a. The efficiency of any element will be noticeably higher if the soldiers are under Canadian control and discipline.
- b. The aspects of purely Canadian administration which must be carried out. . . cannot be efficiently carried out for individuals and small detachments.
- c. The maintenance of any technical equipment such as radio sets to be supplied by Canada would probably have to be carried out by Canadians. This would not be possible if it were dispersed with small detachments throughout the Force.
- d. While a limited number of French-speaking personnel can be included in these elements, the majority of both communications and logistics personnel will be English-speaking.
- e. The security and general health of Canadian soldiers cannot be guaranteed if they are required to live with and as part of African units.

29. The most likely form of signal support envisioned for the Congo force by D.M.C. & P. planners was a modified brigade signal squadron. The implications of such a contribution were as follows:

- a. Each such signal squadron would consist of approximately 5 officers and 183 men.
- b. The dollar value of the equipment for each such squadron is calculated to be \$794,000.00.

- c. Provision of signal squadrons would have serious operational implications on the Canadian Army.
- (1) RC Signals is unable to meet current commitments in Canada primarily because of its survival role. Units of the Canadian Army Signals system are under strength as a result of the new national survival alert warning system, the associated extension of the operating hours of the Canadian Army Signal System, and the organization of increment "D" in Petawawa. RC Signals is not up to strength at Alert and is committed to sending a signal troop to Northern Army Group in Europe. BRIDGE and EASE will require further personnel.* It is unlikely that the RC Signals will be able to meet all these commitments until mid-1962. To provide one signal squadron it would be necessary to interchange personnel with other squadrons, to replace those who are underage for overseas service, temporarily unfit or otherwise unsuitable for service in the Congo. The operational efficiency of the remaining squadrons would be reduced.
 - (2) The Canadian Army holds no reserve of signal equipment and, in nearly all cases, it would have to be withdrawn from the brigades in Canada. This equipment could not be replaced until new deliveries were received as a result of procurement initiated now and the brigade(s) would therefore be non-effective for up to two years.

Similar problems existed if Canada were to provide a regimental signal organization rather than a squadron. Provision of R.C.A.F. and R.C.N. assistance, the planners had been advised, could only be accomplished at the expense of current operational commitments.

30. The Army could provide a "limited number" of staff officers, however, and a composite organization sufficient to provide supply services for a U.N. Force of 6000 could be found from within the R.C.A.S.C. field

*BRIDGE and EASE were parts of the national survival scheme.

force elements. Approximately 12 officers and 128 men and stores valued at \$300,000 would be necessary. "The result of providing this unit," the paper stated, "would be an immediate reduction in the effectiveness of RCASC support for the Brigade Groups located in Canada. . . ." Should the signals and logistics units be supplied, a staff to "cater for the purely Canadian administrative needs" would be necessary, and this would require some 25 officers and 125 men. The conclusion of the paper was that the provision of signallers would result in serious operational difficulties. "RC Sigs is less able to provide personnel than any other corps of the Canadian Army with the possible exception of the RCAMC. Some other form of support is preferable."⁵⁰

31. On the basis of this paper, Lt.-Gen. Clark, the C.G.S., wrote the Minister of National Defence on 19 July that the army was very short of signallers. He indicated that the deficit was about 400, and stated that there were no uncommitted logistics personnel immunized for service in Africa. However, the 2nd R.C.R., the stand-by battalion, could be ready within five days if an infantry battalion was needed. The R.C.R. had its own signal element.⁵¹ Apparently if a French-speaking unit was preferred, the 1st Lt. 22e R.⁵² was the choice.

32. The problem of an Army contribution now passed into the hands of the Cabinet. On 19 July, pressed for a decision in principle by the U.N.,^{52a} the Cabinet

met and discussed the possibility of contributing
signallers to the Congo force.⁵³ Evidently there was
no desire to give blanket approval to the U.N.'s vague
requests,⁵⁴ and the Department of External Affairs⁵⁵
was instructed to seek more precise details. It seems
clear that the Cabinet was divided, with the Minister
of National Defence, armed with the D.M.C. & P. paper,⁵⁶
confronting the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

33. The Cabinet discussed the question again on
21 July. Mr. Green presented a memorandum⁵⁷ for discussion
in which he told his colleagues that General Von Horn in
the Congo was being asked for detailed lists of his
requirements. The commander of UNEF had also been asked
if he could spare some of the Canadian signallers
there, but he had refused this request.⁵⁸ The Secretary-
General was most anxious for a reply, the memorandum
continued, and such a reply would not be a blanket
commitment. "The Secretariat has throughout contemplated
that the Canadian authorities would be the ones to
provide specific figures for the size of any commitment
made." In these circumstances, Mr. Green asked that
the U.N. be advised that a maximum of 150 personnel
would be made available. The Cabinet agreed to prepare
a detachment of signallers and sufficient service
personnel for four logistics depots,⁵⁹* but it was also

*Record of Cabinet Decision, Meeting of 21 Jul 60,
d/22 Jul 60. The Cabinet also agreed to suggest to
the U.N. that it might be advisable to allow a small
group of UNEF signallers to serve as an advance
party.

decided that all personnel would have to be fully immunized before leaving for the Congo.⁶⁰ All in all, this would take three weeks, and as the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs was informed by External Affairs' U.N. Division, "This is being done without commitment as to whether the squadron will be sent to the Congo." The Cabinet "has reserved the right to review the position. . . ."⁶¹

34. There was now authority for the Army to begin warning personnel and to commence inoculations.⁶² Planning could also get underway, and information was beginning to come in from New York. On 20 July, the D.G.P.C., Brigadier R.M. Bishop, and the Director of Signals, Colonel J.B. Clement, flew to New York, for talks with the Secretariat officials and with General H.T. Alexander, a British officer attached to the Ghanaian forces who had acted as commander of the U.N. Forces until Von Horn arrived from UNTSO.⁶³ On 21 Jul, Col. Clement reported that the U.N.'s requirements were for a divisional net covering four brigades and spread out to ranges of up to 1500 miles. For this purpose, the Director recommended AN/GRC 26 sets. The signallers would also require a cipher capability, air-ground communications for Leopoldville and three out-stations, a divisional switchboard, six 510 sets, and the capability of operating for 24-hour periods. The four U.N. brigades

*Immunization needed: three cholera shots, seven days apart; one yellow fever shot, 21 days to take; smallpox; polio; plague; and up-to-date TABTD. [Memorandum, D.L.(1) to U.N. Div., 20 Jul 60, D.E.A. 6386-C-40, vol. 1; Memorandum, Surgeon General to D.P.C., 28 Jul 60, R.C.A.F. S-300-100-8/115, vol. 1.]

would be sited at Leopoldville, Luluabourg, Bukavu, and Stanleyville. To provide this service, the estimated requirement would be for eight officers and 100 men.⁶⁴

35. Planning for the contribution of signallers had begun at a meeting called by the D.G.P.C. on 20 July.⁶⁵ The signallers would concentrate at Barriefield Camp, Kingston, and the troops would fly from Trenton to the Congo. Organizational and logistical planning was authorized and preparation was made for a reconnaissance party--a colonel and a small staff--to proceed to the Congo.⁶⁶ The reconnaissance party was to be the nucleus of the Canadian contingent's headquarters.⁶⁷

36. Proposed establishments for the Canadian contingent were also being prepared. The liaison or reconnaissance party, to be commanded by Col. Albert Mendelsohn, R.C.E.M.E., was to consist of six officers and 10 other ranks; the signal squadron would consist of eight officers and 110 men; and the logistics depots would be staffed by 39 officers and 314 men.⁶⁸ On 22 July personnel selection was begun, with the highest priority being given those whose inoculations were up to date.⁶⁹ Two days later a request from the C.G.S. for permission to concentrate the personnel earmarked for the Congo was refused by the Minister. A letter on the following day, 25 July, again asked permission. Troops were being selected from across the country, the C.G.S. wrote, units had to be formed and vehicles made ready. If concentration was not begun soon, officers would not have time to get to know their men. As the target date for the dispatch

of the first troops on "Mallard"* was 11 August 1960, concentration was necessary now.⁷⁰ This request, too, was refused, the Minister minuting that he would allow concentration as soon as the government authorized it.⁷¹

37. Within the Congo the need for signal personnel was desperate. As a result, the U.N. was forced to fall back on civilian resources. The C.G.S. was advised by an officer of the Canadian delegation in New York of the change:

Halstead explained that the United Nations had not received from the Canadian Government a firm commitment to provide the signals squadron it had asked for and it was operationally necessary to deploy the brigades. General Von Horn had organized his communications from Force. . . Headquarters to the Brigades from civilian resources. . . .⁷²

The U.N.'s request of Canada now was for a message control centre for CNUC (as the Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo was known), a signals office, dispatch riders, linemen, and five air/ground/air nets. The signals requirement would be 12 mobile radio terminals, eight with cipher capabilities.⁷³ Information from the Secretary-General's military adviser, Brig. Rikhye, was that Canada could stand down on the request for logistics units.⁷⁴ The U.N. intended now to get these troops from the Sudan and the United Arab Republic.⁷⁵ The urgency of the requirement for signallers, however, could not be stressed enough.⁷⁶

*The code name "Mallard" was assigned to the operation on 26 July 1960. (Memorandum by D.G.P.C., 26 Jul 60 [114.3(1(D15)).])

38. In an effort to facilitate the flow of military information from U.N. headquarters to Ottawa, the C.G.S. recommended that a lieutenant-colonel be attached to the Canadian mission.⁷⁷ This request was endorsed by the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, Air Marshal F.R. Miller:

I strongly recommend this--provided--Canada is to make some contribution--if we are not going to contribute it would look strange to have a liaison officer accredited to the Military Adviser to the Secretary General U.N. 78

Approval was granted, and Lt.-Col. H.S. Johnson of D.M.C. & P. was dispatched to New York on 28 July 1960.⁷⁹

39. On the morning of 28 July, the Cabinet met to consider the revised U.N. request for signallers. Approval was granted for a contribution of not more than 200 signallers and a maximum Canadian contribution of 500 all ranks. The reconnaissance party was authorized to proceed to the Congo, and the Cabinet decided that Canadian troops would not be deployed in advance of brigade headquarters.⁸⁰

40. The Cabinet's decisions were amplified at a conference called by the C.G.S. at 1645 hours on 28 July, 1960. The announcement of the Canadian contribution would be made in Parliament, Gen. Clark said. Until that time, the Minister was anxious that there be no publicity. No warning orders would be dispatched until after the House announcement, and no concentration of troops or equipment could begin until then. The Minister had been most emphatic that no troops would be employed

in the Congo below brigade level. The reconnaissance party would have to advise on the practicability of this. The C.G.S. also indicated that he expected difficulties with both the Minister and the C.C.C.S. in getting authority to have a Canadian headquarters created for the Congo contingent. It was, therefore, essential that the reconnaissance party get all possible information on such things as medical and dental facilities, cooks, supplies, etc., in order to support his submission.⁸¹

41. Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced the Canadian contribution to the Congo force on 30 July,⁸² and on 1 August parliamentary approval was given to the government's resolution authorizing the contribution.*⁸³ The debate provided ample evidence that there was impressive unanimity of opinion about the value of U.N. forces and their contribution to peace.

42. The Army's contribution at last was settled, but now the role of the A.C.A.F. was in doubt. Four North Star transports, Mr. Green had said on 21 July, had been put "at the disposal of the United Nations for a period of 30 days".⁸⁴ Apparently, however, the aircraft had been authorized to transport only supplies and equipment,⁸⁵ and difficulties arose after reports

*On 2 Aug 60, S.D.1 letter no. 60/38 authorized the formation of a Canadian headquarters, United Nations Forces in the Congo, and of No. 57 Canadian Signal Squadron with effect from 27 July 1960. The Squadron was to concentrate at the School of Signals and the Headquarters at the R.C.E.M.E. School. (Copy on [410.Congo (D1)].)

were received that the R.C.A.F. aircraft had ferried troops inside the Congo. As a result, Mr. Pearkes and Mr. Green agreed on 23 July to send the following telegram to the Canadian representative in Leopoldville (an officer of the Department of Trade and Commerce):

From now on use of R.C.A.F. North Star is to be restricted to the transport of supplies and equipment for the U.N. force from Pisa to Leopoldville by shuttle service for a period of 30 days from July 21. The use of these aircraft for the transportation of troops is not authorized by Cabinet and is to cease forthwith. 86

The Ministers were aware that their ruling eliminated the use of the R.C.A.F. aircraft in transporting refugees and in the emergency transportation of food-stuffs. 87

43. After briefings in New York, 88 Air Commodore Carpenter arrived in the Congo to discover that there seemed to be little requirement for additional external airlift capability. The urgent need was for air transport within the Congo, and Dr. Bunche, Hammarskjold's representative in Leopoldville, and General Von Horn both hoped that the Canadian government would allow 89 the aircraft to be used in this fashion. There was also an urgent need for air transport staff, and the U.N. hoped that Carpenter could take charge of the 90 operation.

44. The government's response to these requests came on 1 August when the Prime Minister told the House of Commons that

we are acquiring at once two Caribou aircraft. . . for airlifting supplies to Canadian forces. A third will be made available in September and a fourth in October. . . . Even though only two such aircraft are available at the moment, this action will ensure that the Canadian force will receive proper commissariat assistance.

Furthermore, we are in a position to supply six or seven R.C.A.F. officers to organize the United Nations air transport force. . . . 91

Apparently this offer was made without consultation with the U.N.⁹² and apparently the Caribou aircraft, a type not yet in service with the R.C.A.F.,⁹³ would be available only for the support of the Canadian contingent.*⁹⁴ As there still appeared to be no intention of allowing the North Stars to operate on the internal airlift, the C.C.C.S. asked on 1 August 1960 for their return to Canada to assist in transporting the Canadian contingent to the Congo. Because there was no evident requirement for external airlift, and because the need for the signallers was pressing, the U.N. Secretariat agreed.⁹⁵

45. Consideration was also being given to using the R.C.N. to ferry troops and equipment to the Congo. The use of the aircraft carrier Bonaventure was considered, but the ship was scheduled for drydock. Cape Scott, a maintenance vessel, was available and had⁹⁶ accommodation for 10 officers, 200 men and 15 vehicles. A request to the U.N. for the capabilities of the Congo port of Matadi,⁹⁷ however, was met with the reply that the U.N. hoped Canada could find speedier methods to

*The Air Transport Unit, to consist of the four Caribou and four North Stars, was authorized on 2 August 1960. The decision to provide the Caribou was made by the Cabinet on 30 July, 1960. ["Organization Order 8.13, R.C.A.F. Air Transport Unit (Congo), 2 Aug 60," R.C.A.F. 895-8/115, vol. 1: Record of Cabinet Decision, Meeting of 30 Jul 60, d/3 Aug 60.]

get her signallers and their equipment to the Congo. Because of the desperate need for the signallers, Brig. Rikhye indicated that he could arrange for the United States Air Force to transport the heavy signals equipment. After this U.N. protest, the possibility of sea lift⁹⁸ does not seem to have been considered again.


Canadians in the Congo--August, 1960

46. The ten members of the reconnaissance party were the first Canadian Army personnel to arrive in the Congo, landing by commercial aircraft on 1 August.⁹⁹

The party's primary role was to determine personnel and equipment requirements generally, and in particular to justify the provision of a Canadian headquarters for the contingent. (This latter task was presumably rendered unnecessary when the government authorized the formation of a headquarters on 2 August.) The reconnaissance group commander, Col. Mendelsohn, was also warned not to make any commitments except within the agreed Canadian policy and organization; not to allow the Army to become involved in Katanga, the self-professed independent province; and not to comment on Canadian policy in any of his messages to Canada.¹⁰⁰

47. The situation discovered by the reconnaissance party was surprisingly calm, and the city of Leopoldville was modern and impressive. The "immensity of the task is just beginning to be realized", the preliminary reconnaissance report concluded, "and the need for an efficient communications set-up and logistical organization is becoming daily more urgent".¹⁰¹

48. The U.N. organization in the Congo, as reported to Ottawa at this time, was as follows: ¹⁰²



The organization of CNUC's military component, the reconnaissance party reported, would be controlled from headquarters in Leopoldville. Eight subordinate territorial commands, all in cities with major airports, would come under the headquarters: Goma, Matadi, Coquilhatville, Libenga, Inonga, Stanleyville, Luluabourg, and the Leopoldville headquarters area itself. The U.N. was not organizing on a brigade basis, as had been foreseen by Ottawa officials, but on a territorial system. As a result, the Minister of National Defence granted approval for the Canadians to be employed at district ¹⁰³ or area headquarters.

49. Within Canada the organization of the signal squadron and the headquarters was progressing. Personnel

for the squadron began arriving at Barriefield Camp on 31 July.¹⁰⁴ Processing was begun immediately, but there were the inevitable problems: "Appeared that no positive steps being taken by the [R.C.E.M.E.] School to have people inoculated, kitted, inspected medically and dentally," the diarist of the headquarters noted on 2 August, "so the unit organized its own system of processing."¹⁰⁵ The major difficulty was with inoculations. "Now realize that inoculations will be the key to having personnel dispatched as soon as possible," the headquarters' diary noted on 3 August 1960. The personnel scheduled for the Congo were given a short course on the pistol and S.F.G. range, and refresher instruction was given in map-using and first aid.¹⁰⁶ By 11 August, the squadron had a strength of 17 officers and 192 other ranks--16 above the authorized establishment.¹⁰⁷ The bulk of the signallers for the Congo squadron had been found from the field units, the Director of Survival Operations and Planning was careful to point out, thus weakening their efficiency in their assigned roles in support of the infantry brigades and in survival planning.¹⁰⁸

50. The exact requirements in equipment for the U.N. Force were still unclear. On 3 August 1960, Col. Mendelsohn advised Ottawa that the five air/ground/air nets requested on 27 July 1960 were no longer needed. There were also changes in the detailed requirements for the AN/GRC 26 sets and in the vehicle needs for the squadron.*¹⁰⁹ In any case, the required radio sets

*Requirements now were for 10 Type "A" teams (previously the need had been for 8 Type "A" and 4 Type "B" teams) A Type "A" team consisted of nine personnel and had a cryptographic capability. The "B" team had two fewer men and no cipher capability. [Annex A to Movement Instruction 2/60, 17 Aug 60, H.C.S. 2001-120/73, vol. 5]

had to be purchased from the United States Army. On 5 August 1960, the Treasury Board approved

the procurement from the United States Army of 13 AN/GRC 26D radio stations, required to equip the Canadian Unit to the Congo, at a cost of 350,000, chargeable to funds available in the current year's estimates, it being understood that the above amount will eventually be recovered from the United Nations. 110

51. The problem of a secure communications link from the Congo to Canada was another vexing problem to the C.G.S. The R.C.A.F. had sent a 1000-kw. single side band transmitter to the Congo on 2 August, but this set, being capable of voice transmission only, could not be considered secure.¹¹¹ Presumably as a result of this fear,* the Director of Signals communicated with his British counterpart on a confidential basis, asking if the Canadians in the Congo could set up a communications link to Nairobi, Kenya, and thence by existing networks to Ottawa.¹¹² Presumably this approach was successful, for the Leopoldville-Nairobi-Ottawa link was set up and used.¹¹³

52. Other details were being settled. From New York the government was advised that matters of jurisdiction and status would be the same as in UNEF.¹¹⁴ From Leopoldville, Col. Mendelsohn advised the C.G.S. that each officer in command of a signal team would have the authority to rent accommodation for his men.¹¹⁵ No final decision on the contingent commander was made immediately, although

*The C.G.S., General Clark, was an officer of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, and he was probably more conscious of the need for communications than other officers in his position might have been.

Mendelsohn was authorized to act as commander ad interim.

Finally, on 12 August, Mendelsohn was recommended to be the commander, and his selection was agreed to by the Minister on 16 August.¹¹⁷

53. On 8 August the Soviet Union protested the inclusion of Canadian troops in the Congo force. The memorandum, left with the Secretary-General by Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations Ruznetzov, was not a demarche, Ottawa was advised, and the Russians did not appear to place too much importance upon their move. Unofficial translations of the note, however, did not sound mild and inoffensive:

As known, Canada is a member of the NATO military bloc which also includes Belgium which has committed an aggression against the independent Congo. In these conditions the despatch to the Congo Republic of Canadian troops, or of troops of any other state belonging to a military bloc of which Belgium is a member, would constitute nothing but assistance to the aggressor from his military ally. 118

The Soviet objections had not been totally unexpected. On 20 July, the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Norman Robertson, had spoken with the Soviet Ambassador in Ottawa. The Ambassador then had said that no NATO troops should be included in ONUC, but he had later accepted the possibility that because of language problems some support troops might have to be included.¹¹⁹ This Canadian interpretation was confirmed from U.N. headquarters on 21 July when Canadian officers were advised that Canada was selected "despite being a NATO power, because of the bilingual capability of [its] troops."¹²⁰ The Secretary-General's reaction to the

Soviet protest was released on 8 August:

It has not . . . been possible to solve the basic communications problem through units from countries contributing troops to the force. . . . Nor has it been possible to solve the basic problem on short notice by recruitment of personnel and purchase of equipment through civilian channels.

Canada was in a unique position among the nations in having available adequate trained communications personnel with a facility in both French and English and in also having available the necessary equipment. 121

The Russians raised a further protest on August 20 in a press conference, but there was little support given the Soviet stand at the United Nations. 122

54. Indeed the U.N. was increasing its requests of Canada. General Von Horn had taken three Canadians from UNTSO with him to Leopoldville, 123 and five more officers from UNEF arrived shortly thereafter. 124 On 6 August, the U.N. asked for a major to act as Transport Officer, a Food Services Officer and three food services N.C.C.s, and a provost section of 10 or 12 men. 125 These requests were approved by the Minister on 9 August 1960. 126 By 12 August, seven Canadian Army officers were on the CNUC staff, including six from UNTSO. The five UNEF officers were also staff-employed, but on a temporary basis. 127 In addition, the R.C.A.F. had seven officers employed at CNUC headquarters, including the air commander. There were also four officers in the country who were slated to become part of the Air Transport Unit when it was set up. The estimated officer commitment by the R.C.A.F. was 78, the bulk of whom would be Flight Lieutenants in charge of North Star and Caribou aircraft. 128

55. The question of the Caribou aircraft was a troublesome one. The Canadian offer of the aircraft had been made without consulting the U.N. on 30 July. Two Caribou had been purchased immediately and air and ground crews were being trained in operation and maintenance. Apparently the aircraft were to be used only in direct support of the Canadian contingent, and this posed legal problems. The aircraft had to be under U.N. control, the Department of External Affairs pointed out, or the R.C.A.F. personnel would have no status as U.N. personnel. This would necessitate a special Congo-Canada agreement.¹²⁹ A compromise was eventually reached by Mr. Green and Mr. Pearkes: the Caribou would be under the operational control of the U.N. commander, but priority would be given to Canadian needs.¹³⁰ As a result, the government's official notification to the U.N. of its offer stated: "When space is available, or if all the aircraft are not fully required for the needs of the Canadian troops, then they could be used for other U.N. purposes within the Congo." The plan was that two Caribou would be in the Congo by 15 August, 1960, a third by the end of September, and a fourth by October.¹³¹

56. The first reaction of U.N. officials to the Caribou offer was a favourable one on the grounds of need, but it was Secretary-General Hammarskjold's decision to refuse the offer.¹³² The ostensible reason for the rebuff was that it was not politically advisable to add

100 more personnel from Canada to the Congo force. The Soviet Union, Canadian officials were told, had protested against signallers; they would likely protest more strongly against aircrew.¹³³ There is undoubtedly an element of truth in these remarks. More likely, however, was that the Secretariat resented the manner in which the offer had been made. The Canadian liaison officer in New York commented on this point some years later:

. . . no country could publicly announce in their own country before any announcement was made by the United Nations and before any identification of the problem was given to the United Nations, that they were going to contribute to the force, and what the form of their contribution would be. Because if this ever took place it would open the door for every country in the world to do this. . . Canada's contribution would have been welcome, I should think, had it been offered through me or through the delegation in New York, quietly to the Secretary-General, but it had been announced in the House of Commons. It was not quite the way to handle the problem. 134

There were subsequent efforts by the R.C.A.F. to have the Secretary-General's decision reversed but to no avail.¹³⁵ As a result, two of the Caribou were eventually assigned to UNEF to replace two of the three obsolete Dakotas there.¹³⁶

57. By 9 August, the first party of signallers was ready to depart for the Congo. Nine personnel, including the commanding officer of the squadron, two

*After a meeting at N.D.H.Q. on 13 Sep 60, an officer of External Affairs saw strong pressure developing to get the Caribou "out of the country" as soon as possible. [Memorandum for USSEA, 14 Sep 60, D.E.A. 6386-C-40, vol. 1.]
The Cabinet agreed on 14 Sep 60 that the S.S.E.A. would "discuss informally" the question of the aircraft with U.N. officials during the forthcoming General Assembly. [Record of Cabinet Decision, Meeting of 14 Sep 60, d/22 Sep 60.]

jeeps and miscellaneous stores, left Trenton for Leopoldville on board an R.C.A.F. North Star. ¹³⁷ The route was Trenton-Gander-Lajes, Azores-Dakar-Accra-Leopoldville, a distance of 6,320 miles, and a flying time of almost 34 hours. ¹³⁸ Flights left almost daily for the next three weeks, and a total of 194 Army and 6 R.C.A.F. personnel, 173,332 lbs. of stores, 6 jeeps ¹³⁹ and 3 trailers were transported by the R.C.A.F.

58. In addition, the U.S.A.F., using C-124 Globemaster aircraft, transported the heavy signal equipment and some personnel to various points in the Congo. The R.C.A.F. at first had believed that it could make its own arrangements with the U.S.A.F. for the assistance, ¹⁴⁰ but the Americans proved unwilling to help unless the request came through the United Nations. ¹⁴¹ The early estimate of the total weight to be carried by the American Globemasters was 404,625 lbs., consisting of five $\frac{3}{4}$ -ton trucks and trailers, thirteen $\frac{1}{2}$ -ton trailers and thirteen $2\frac{1}{8}$ -ton trucks. ¹⁴² In all 13 flights were made beginning on 18 August, nine to Leopoldville, one to Elisabethville,* one to Stanleyville, one to Luluabourg and one to Coquilhatville. The lift ¹⁴³ was completed by 2 September 1960.

59. The arrival of the main body of the Canadian contingent came during a period of growing unrest in Leopoldville. Superficially, the city was calm, but

*The restriction on the employment of Canadians in Katanga was lifted after a request from the C.G.S. on 15 August 1960. The Minister agreed on 18 August. [Docs. On H.Q.S. 2001-120/73, vols. 4 and 5.]

the attitude of the Congolese government to the U.N. troops was changing:

The newcomer soon learns that while the Congo government invited the UN to come in their country to establish law and order and restore the economic life, the Prime Minister and at least some of his colleagues are antagonistic to white troops, in particular, and to the UN Forces generally. It is becoming more obvious with each passing day that a police state is in the making and the presence of the UN is a deterrent to the process. The declaration of martial law on 16 Aug started a series of actions apparently designed to embarrass the UN and to remove possible sources of opposition to the plans of the Government. These actions include the introduction of identification cards for all UN personnel, civil and military, immediate checks at all ports of entry and at airports. . . . It is possible that these pinpricks are due to an inferiority complex in a young bewildered government but the pattern suggests the machinations of some guiding hand which has as its object the total evacuation of the UN Forces in order to allow free reign for a police state. 144

60. The U.N. organization in the Congo, the same military correspondent reported, was thus far unable to administer efficiently the complex of problems besetting the operation:

CNUC is primarily a civilian organization with a military component. Starting with a handful of UN officials under Dr. Bunche and a small group of officers, mostly Canadian, borrowed from UNBF and UNTSO(P), this organization has mushroomed into a tremendous and awesome establishment, lacking cohesion, know-how and any real practical authority. For weeks, civilians, officers and other ranks have been pouring in from all over the world; people who have little in common and who are tied by strings which prevent or restrict their use. This rapid expansion of HQ CNUC, seemingly without any plan, has resulted in most of the effort being directed at their own administration to the detriment of the 18,000 troops spread over a territory as large as the whole of Ontario but without its means of communications. . . . This situation together with an almost total lack of telephonic communication between offices and an impossible accommodation setup has caused intolerable

delay, confusion and frustration right from the start and the end is not yet in sight. . . .
. . . .If there is a basic plot for UN military operations in the Congo, it has been one of the best kept secrets in history. What action should be taken by the UN Forces in case of riot, internecine war or insurrection is also unknown. Even if a directive on these aspects were issued, it is more than probable that it would be couched in empty phrases which would preclude effective action or at least permit avoidance of a distasteful task. All in all, it is extremely difficult to understand just what is the purpose of the UN Forces in the Congo. . . . 145

The situation was not promising, and almost immediately some Canadian soldiers became the focal point of a major incident.

61. At approximately 1130 hours on 18 August, two signals detachments were at Leopoldville's N'Djili airport preparing to fly to Coquilhatville and Stanleyville to reconnoitre sites for the establishment of signal stations. The Coquilhatville group had boarded a U.N. plane and the other group was still in its jeeps waiting for the second aircraft to be refuelled. The War Diary of the Canadian headquarters described the subsequent events:

Congolese soldiers approached this latter group and begun to arrest them on the grounds that they were Belgian paratroopers. The Canadians were searched and made to lie on the ground where they were kicked and hit with rifle butts. Capt JCAA Taschereau, CIC of the Stanleyville group, was hit on the side of the head with a rifle butt and almost knocked unconscious. Another Canadian had a rifle butt broken over his back. Some of the Canadians were forced to strip to their underwear. After about five minutes they were forcibly placed in the back of a truck. The Coquilhatville group meanwhile were still in their aircraft and saw the incident taking place. The plane was warming up and had not started to move. Congolese troops surrounded the plane, forcing it to shut down its engines, and told the passengers to get out. Before getting out the

Canadians removed their side arms, and in some cases their parachutist wings. They were not beaten but were mishandled as they too were made to get into the truck. Just as they got into the truck a Ghana officer and a squad of his men approached the truck and tried to delay the Congolese until reinforcements could be brought up. They succeeded in doing this for about another five minutes until sufficient Ghana troops could be mustered to control the Congolese and the Canadians were removed to the control tower building. . . . The whole incident took about twelve minutes 146

No serious injuries resulted from the incident, but the affair highlighted the unstable situation in the Congo and the U.N.'s uncertain mandate.*

62. In late July, Major-General H.T. Alexander, the British commander of the Ghanaian troops, had persuaded the troops of the Armée Nationale Congolaise (A.N.C.) in Leopoldville to disarm, but this decision was overruled by higher authorities.¹⁴⁷ The U.N. Command had issued a paper on principles and methods for internal security on 2 August. "Firing, even in self-defense," the key principle stated, "should be resorted to only in extreme instances. Any effort to disarm members of the United Nations forces is to be regarded as a legitimate cause for self-defence."¹⁴⁸ In the case of the N'Djili incidents, however, where there were large numbers of the A.N.C., the Canadians undoubtedly followed the correct course in passively submitting with such stoicism as they could muster to the beatings.

63. The Canadian reaction to the attacks was

*The Secretary-General criticized the Ghanaian troops for their passive behaviour in the face of the attack on the Canadians. The Ghanaian officers angrily denied the charge. [E.W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo (Washington, 1965), 35.]

sharp. The Prime Minister telegraphed Prime Minister Lumumba on the day of the incident:

I have learned today with very grave concern that Canadian service personnel on United Nations assignments have been molested and subjected to humiliating treatment in your country.

Yesterday another incident occurred in which an Air Force officer and his assistant were prevented from carrying out their duties. We were then inclined to believe that what had taken place must have been due to a misunderstanding as to their identity and the nature of their mission.*

The latest incident puts both occurrences in a different light. . . .

Such totally unwarranted and unjustified attacks on Canadian service personnel are of a most serious character. I expect an immediate assurance that effective measures will be taken to ensure that the forces under your control will refrain from threatening the security of Canadian personnel who proceed to your country on friendly and peaceful missions in the performance of tasks determined by the United Nations. 149

Mr. Diefenbaker's indignation was strengthened by the fact that he had seen Lumumba in Ottawa at the end of July. The Congo leader then had asked for French-speaking technicians, and the Prime Minister had promised assistance. The press had quoted the Congo premier as saying that he had approached Canada for help because Canada had no colonialist past. "Canada's background was similar to the Congo's in that it had emerged from colonial status to freedom and could understand his land's problems." The Congolese, he added, looked on Canadians as "honest and sincere people." ¹⁵⁰ Evidently the exigencies of international politics had cooled the friendly relations of late July.

*An incident on 15 August was apparently that referred to by Mr. Diefenbaker. S/L Roberts, the R.C.A.F. P.R.O., and a corporal driver were roughly handled by a mob in downtown Leopoldville. [W.D., Canadian Headquarters, U.N.F.C., 15 Aug 60.]

64. There was some speculation at New York that the beating of white troops might be part of a pattern, possibly deliberately inspired by the Congolese government. The Ambassadors of Norway, Sweden and Ireland, however, believed that the prompt Canadian protest might have a salutary effect. ¹⁵¹ Dr. Bunche, the Secretary-General's representative, commented on the incident as follows:

I pay high tribute to the forbearance and courage with which our colleagues. . . endured this intolerable interference with duties undertaken in the aid of the Congo Republic. They might so easily, and effectively, have dealt with the situation in their own way. Instead, in the interest of the United Nations, they exercised patience and restraint of the most commendable nature. . . . I thank them and congratulate them on their conduct in the face of needless and senseless provocation. 152

65. The effect of these protests was not great. Lumumba accused the Canadians of provoking the airport incident by not identifying themselves, and he charged that the "unimportant" affair was "blown up out of all proportion. . . so that [Hammaraskjold] could influence public opinion". ¹⁵³ A few days later, however, the Congo leader changed his tune: "I asked for the French-speaking technicians myself during my trip to Canada. It was not for this that I invited them". ¹⁵⁴ Lumumba blamed the incident on the "excess of zeal" of the Congolese soldiers. This was as close as the African Prime Minister ever came to making an apology, but on 27 August, the excessive zeal of the A.N.C. again resulted in another incident, once more directed at the Canadians.

66. The incident took place at Stanleyville. A signal detachment under Captain J.J.B.L. Marois, had landed in a U.S.A.F. plane direct from Canada without incident and had gone to its quarters in the city.

Capt. Marois' statement of the incident follows:

As soon as I entered the room I proceeded to undress to take a bath. I was wearing shorts when the door flew open and I along with fellow Canadians was ordered to dress by Congolese gendarmes at gunpoint and to accompany them. As we were in the lobby, Capt Pariseau [a Canadian officer already in Stanleyville], who had been submitted to similar treatment previously, inquired of the officer in charge, Congolese Capt Comd KABUNGO, where these persons were being taken and for what reason. The officer assured him that no harm would come to them, but that they had to be taken for identification and that this was a measure of political appeasement. 155

The Canadians were beaten, taken to a police station, stripped and generally mistreated until their release some two hours later. In the meantime, a second U.S.A.F. Globemaster with two Canadians and additional equipment on board landed at Stanleyville. One of the Canadians was struck in the face with a rifle butt and knocked down. The other Canadian, seeing his companion bleeding profusely, threw himself across him in an effort to absorb the blows. The second signaller received blows on the back and suffered cracked ribs and minor fractures. 156
Eventually all the Canadians were released. One of the men involved, Cpl. W.L. Bear, probably spoke for his fellows when he gave his statement after the incident:

. . . I couldn't help thinking that our Canadian responsible heads, political or otherwise had not thought too much when they sent us into such an area without adequate protection. In fact as soon as I can, I'll ask for my release from the army, that is how much I feel about it. As long as I am in the army I will do my duty. I only wish I had a fighting chance but here we are hopelessly outnumbered. . . . 157

67. The Canadian reaction to this latest outrage was quick. "It will be impossible for Canadian civilian experts and Canadian service personnel performing non-combat duties to remain in the Congo," the delegation in New York was advised by Ottawa, "unless their personal security can be ensured by UN forces, even if necessary against Congolese security elements. . . ." ¹⁵⁸ The Stanleyville incident was not the last, and the situation thereafter was far from calm, but the signallers nonetheless got down to their tasks and the Canadian contingent began to settle in.

Settling In

68. As early as the middle of August, it had become obvious that the position of the Canadian headquarters in the Congo was anomalous. From Leopoldville, Col. Mendelsohn telegraphed the D.G.P.C., Brig. Bishop, on 17 August about a proposed increase in the strength of the headquarters from 52 to 70 all ranks. "Need for all these personnel not understood," he said, "and see no employment for many. Conditions here very different from those forecast when establishment prepared." ¹⁵⁹ By the end of August, the position of the headquarters was being questioned by the U.N. Command. After a new request was received for a lieutenant-colonel to be Chief Signals Officer, Mendelsohn recommended that the position be filled:

Canadian H.C. U.N.F.C. not in good position to protect interests of 57 Signal Squadron in operational matters. Chief Signal Officer would be on staff of H.C. ONUC while Canadian H.C. is below H.C. and its function is being strongly questioned because it does not appear to contribute to operation of ONUC. 160

The reaction at Army Headquarters to this telegram was to point out with some heat that the Congo headquarters was not intended for an operational role but only to look after purely Canadian administrative needs. On the basis of the Congo commander's representations, there was no disposition to delete the headquarters from the establishment. ¹⁶¹ As a result of this impasse, Col. Mendelsohn returned to Ottawa in mid-September, ¹⁶² carrying with him a brief on his plans for the creation of a new unit, 57 Canadian Signal Unit.

69. Mendelsohn's long brief clearly presented his reasons for requesting a change in the composition of the Canadian contribution:

The position of Canadian Headquarters vis-a-vis Headquarters CNUC has been ambiguous since the arrival of the Canadian Force. On the one hand, it performs no apparent useful function for the benefit of CNUC since 57 Signal Squadron is responsible directly to Headquarters CNUC for operational purposes; on the other hand, by its intervention on behalf of 57 Signal Squadron, the Headquarters inevitably finds itself in the difficult position of appearing to criticize the handling of the Signal Squadron by its operational headquarters.

The formation of two separate Canadian units was apparently based on the assumption that the Headquarters would eventually perform liaison with CNUC and provide direction in Canadian matters in respect of more than one unit. This question has been discussed at length with the responsible UN authorities here and it is now quite clear that, because of the political implications, no call is to be made on the Canadian Army for other than communications personnel and equipment.

This was an unassailable assessment by the senior Canadian officer on the scene. In addition, Col. Mendelsohn pointed out, there were purely Canadian administrative problems:

The current organization creates problems of command and control which, in my view, cannot be satisfactorily resolved while the Canadian Force operates as two separate units. While the Canadian Commander is forced to intervene with Headquarters CNUC on behalf of 57 Signal Squadron, he is not a communications expert and is therefore in a difficult position to discuss matters from a technical point of view. The Squadron Commander on the other hand, is of too junior a rank and position to deal with most members of the staff with any degree of equality. 163

This view was concurred in by the Signal Squadron C.C.,
164
Major R.C. Bindoff. Furthermore, the lack of administrative personnel in the squadron forced the headquarters to assume control of many administrative matters that should have been under the control of the signallers. How could the situation be resolved?

In order to facilitate coordination and remove the unnecessary duality of control which exists at present, the two units must be amalgamated and formed into one signal unit with an administrative squadron and a communications squadron operating under a single commander. Furthermore, in order to perform the task most efficiently, the officer commanding this unit must be a signal officer. 165

70. Where then would the senior Canadian officer, presumably a colonel, fit into this single unit organization? Col. Mendelsohn suggested three alternative plans. First, the commander of the signal unit could be a colonel and could delegate the powers of a commanding officer to his squadron commanders. But there were serious drawbacks to this proposal. The commander's influence on CNUC plans and decisions would be limited, and he would in effect be subordinated to the Chief Signal Officer at CNUC headquarters, a lieutenant-colonel. In addition the commander would continue to be isolated from CNUC headquarters and to have no influence on staff

planning likely to affect Canadian troops. The second solution would be to give the Chief Signal Officer the rank of Colonel so that he could be at once the commander of the signal unit and the C.S.C. If this solution was adopted, Col. Mendelsohn speculated, the commander could exert influence on planning, but he might be forced into the position of having a dual loyalty "which might affect his stand as CSC or his value as Canadian Commander." The third recommendation, and the one favoured by Mendelsohn, was to have a lieutenant-colonel as C.S.C., to have a lieutenant-colonel command the signal unit, and to have the Canadian commander integrated into the liaison section of CNUC headquarters. "The Canadian Commander in this case would have ready access to all information liable to affect the employment of Canadian troops while at the same time retaining a sufficiently independent position to attend to Canadian problems." This solution, Mendelsohn added, appeared acceptable to CNUC headquarters. The Canadian commander then went on to detail the organization of the communications and administrative squadrons. His proposals would entail the addition of 33 other ranks to the total number now in the Congo.¹⁶⁶

71. Mendelsohn's recommendations were passed on to the Vice Chief of the General Staff and were sent to the C.G.S. virtually unchanged.¹⁶⁷ Gen. Clark, however, did not accept the proposed reorganization, and on 16 September wrote the Minister with his suggestions. He preferred the first scheme suggested by Col. Mendelsohn:

that the commander of 57 Signal Unit should be a colonel and the C.S.C. a lieutenant-colonel.¹⁶⁸ The Minister agreed to this,¹⁶⁹ and Col. Mendelsohn was returned to Canada, taking up the position of Commander of the R.C.E.M.E. School; Major Bindoff was promoted Acting Lieutenant-Colonel and made C.S.C.; and Col. Paul Smith was sent to the Congo to become the first commander of 57 Signal Unit.¹⁷⁰ The Canadian headquarters was disbanded on 27 October, and 57 Canadian Signal Squadron was redesignated 57 Canadian Signal Unit with effect the next day.¹⁷¹

72. Col. Mendelsohn's visit to Ottawa also served to present the first full look at the Congo problem for officers at N.D.H.Q. Communications facilities were insecure, and reports had to be couched in guarded terms.¹⁷² Mendelsohn was very bitter about the U.N.'s conduct of military operations and its role in the political situation. General Von Horn, he believed, was lacking firmness, and his staff, while impressive in rank, was woefully inefficient. The Canadian officer doubted that the headquarters could conduct the operations of 18,000 men--as there were then in ONUC--even in the best of conditions. In addition, Mendelsohn was bitter about the preference being shown to Africans. NATO nationals were not consulted about operations, and the Canadians had not even been asked their views on the signals organization. As a result, it was difficult to set up adequate communications, morale was low, and there was fear of renewed Congolese attacks.¹⁷³

73. This was an unhappy situation. While Mendelsohn was in Ottawa the situation worsened perceptibly. Food was running low, fresh rations were very short, and there were difficulties in getting supplies through U.N. channels. ¹⁷⁴ On 15 September, 1960 the war diarist of the Canadian headquarters noted the following:

We have on hand two days fresh rations plus ten days pack rations. The UN supply depot can provide an additional four days rations. The big problem seems to be the lack of supply ships coming into the seaport at Matadi. . . . Generally the ration situation is not good. We are entirely dependent on the UN for all rations with the exception of some pack rations we brought with us from Canada. These packs, however, had to be used to supplement the rations supplied by the UN in the early stages of our setting up in the Congo. When the first ration indent was submitted to the UN on 26 Aug 60 foodstuffs were plentiful, but as the days went by the supply started to decline in both quantity and quality. Canned milk was depleted by 15 Sep 60 and even before that at least one fifth of the cans received were bad. Powdered milk is now being issued in lieu. . . . The average cost of rations provided by the UN is approximately \$5.00 per day per man. . . . Fresh tomatoes for example cost 70¢ per kilo. The cooks do a good job with what they have but the ration scale does not come close to comparing with what the troops are used to in Canada. 175

On 16 September a request was wired to Ottawa for additional rations, but Army Headquarters refused to fill the request so long as the contingent still held pack rations. If necessary later, the reply did affirm, ¹⁷⁶ rations would be flown in.

74. Another grievance arose out of the varying pay scales of different contingents. The special service allowances paid (all on the presumption that the U.N. would eventually refund the money) were as follows: Sweden, Norway and Denmark--all ranks \$10

per day; Argentina and Brazil--\$19 to \$30 per day depending on rank; United Arab Republic and Indonesia--\$3 to \$10.50 per day depending on rank. Other nations received similarly inflated amounts.¹⁷⁷ The Canadians, on the other hand, received only the normal foreign allowance pay for their rank and 86¢ per day from the U.N. This situation was not remedied until 31 December 1960 when the Cabinet settled on an allowance of \$100 per month for Congo service.¹⁷⁸ This figure was evidently much below the sum expected, and plans were made to send an Interservice Pay Committee to the Congo to secure justification for a higher allowance.*¹⁷⁹ Worse yet, the allowance was made payable with effect from 1 December 1960--not from the commencement of the operation. This resulted in heated complaints that those who had suffered through the worst months of service in the Congo would not even be given the allowances for their pains.¹⁸⁰ It was only with the greatest difficulty--and after letters had been sent to the press and to soldiers' Members of Parliament--**

*The notification of the allowance was couched in unusual terms: "Notwithstanding strong efforts made here to have allowance approved effective date members CDN forces first arrived Congo, unlikely that approved date of 1 Dec 60 will be changed. Moreover original intention was that 100.00 dollars be approved as interim measure subject to review following on the spot investigation to be made by fact-finding team from Ottawa. Decision now taken that rate of allowance as approved following review by Cabinet is firm and investigating team will not be despatched." [Tel. CANARMY to Leopoldville, 6 Feb 61, T.D. 57 Canadian Signal Unit, February, 1961, Annex 52.]

**A sample letter sent from Leopoldville by "A disheartened Canadian soldier" is appended as Annex 60 to ibid.:

'This letter is by no means meant to be a ritualistic army gripe over poor meals, lousy working conditions and complaints about the treatment we receive from the brass, though the first two still apply. . . .

Canada, after six months of debating the issue, has finally consented to pay an allowance of one hundred dollars a month to her troops here in the Congo, effective

that permission was finally granted in March 1961 for the allowance to be paid retroactive to the individual's date of arrival in the Congo. ¹⁸¹

75. Another crisis of sorts developed out of charges in the press that the Canadians were the "scruffiest" soldiers in the Congo. "The Canadians in the Congo," Peter Worthington of the Toronto Evening Telegram charged, "resemble a refugee retreat. . . . They are an embarrassment to themselves, their officers, their army, and their country. . . . The only troops almost as shaggy as ours," he said, "are Moroccans or possibly Tunisians. . . . It's not all the fault of the uniform. Quite often you see Canadians wandering around Leopoldville with buttons missing, holes in socks, clothes dirty, shoes unshined and run down at the heels." ¹⁸² The C.G.S. put enough credence in this report to wire the Canadian commander in the Congo:

Although Worthington's story must be gross exaggeration would like full report on the situation. I know you realize the importance that our soldiers be turned out as clean and neat as possible having regard to uniform issued for tropical wear and that they conduct and carry themselves to the highest standards and in the best traditions of the Canadian Army. 183

1 DECEMBER 1960. Our unit commenced arriving on the first of August 1960 and were immediately a target for beatings, suspicions and the vilest forms of vocal abuse. We were forced by necessity to eat boiled rice as a staple food, in lieu of beef or pork we ate buffalo and zebra, even a basic necessity as bread was denied us . . . what we can't accept is the discrimination shown against those of us who have been here since the darkest days of the early stages of the UN operation. Why in God's Name does Canada figure we are less deserving of the special allowance than our replacements will be. . . . The UN is by no means an extravagant organization yet they pay all civilians in their employ here a round sum of twenty dollars per day in addition to their high annual incomes. . . ."

The C.G.S. was assured that Worthington's story was a "gross misconception. . . based on an isolated incident or two." A close check would be kept on dress and deportment in the future.¹⁸⁴

76. The conditions in the Congo were such as to place a strain on all but the fittest soldiers. Many of the Canadians sent there, however, were older men with records indicating previous histories of instability. A medical officer's report pointed out that many soldiers should never have been posted to the Congo--but no one had examined their records or given them a medical examination before dispatching them.¹⁸⁵ Perhaps because of this, but more likely because they were not used to the Congo climate, the Canadians regularly had a high rate of illness.* With the consideration in mind that Congo service involved considerable strain, the Army and the R.C.A.F. agreed in October 1960, upon a six months tour of duty in the Congo.¹⁸⁶

77. The multifold crises and complaints could not be allowed to interfere with the essential tasks of the Signal Unit. The reorganization of October 1960 gave the unit a strength of approximately 280 all ranks¹⁸⁷ **and four elements: Headquarters, Communications Squadron, Administrative Squadron, and an CNUC

*According to Monthly Health Reports [on 144.9.009 (D66)] the Canadians rarely had an illness rate less than double that of the CNUC average. The incidence of V.D. was not particularly high, however.

**In mid-November 1960, the U.N. asked for an additional 16 signallers. The C.G.S. was reluctant, but the only alternative was to have another country provide the needed service. [Memorandum, C.G.S. to Minister, 25 Nov 60, H.C.S. 2001-120/73, vol. 10.]

Headquarters detachment. The headquarters, under command of the colonel, comprised an adjutant, the R.S.M., orderly room clerks, and a public relations section. The Administrative Squadron was formed from pay, medical, C.M., transport, food services, movement control, pioneer, chaplain and general duty sections. The Canadian detachment at ONUC Headquarters was made up of a military police section of 12 men and of a number of officers on the staff of the Headquarters. All these personnel were based on Leopoldville.

78. The Communications Squadron was the heart of the unit. The squadron was based in Leopoldville, but detachments, numbering from four to seven at different times, were scattered throughout the interior. Detachments in the course of the unit's service were stationed at Matadi, Goma, Coquilhatville, Stanleyville, Kindu, Elisabethville, Albertville, Kamina, Bukavu, Luluabourg and Kongola. The normal staff of an out-station consisted of one officer and nine men. The officer often was not a member of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals. The men would all be tradesmen: radio and telegraph operators; teletype operators; cryptographers; radio equipment technicians; and teletype and cypher equipment technicians. In Leopoldville, the squadron operated a tape relay centre, a message centre, a crypto centre, a transmitting station, a dispatch rider service, and the Headquarters' telephone system.¹⁸⁸

79. Despite the collapse of the plans for the Caribou unit, the R.C.A.F.'s contribution to the ONUC

operation was a significant one. On 1 September, the U.N. formally requested two North Star flights a week between Pisa and Leopoldville for an indefinite period. The government agreed--but only for a 90-day period after which the commitment would be subject to review. The cost of these flights amounted to 467,632.74 over the three months. Most of this expense was the operating cost of the North Star aircraft, each hour of operation costing 243.23. The cost of the initial airlift in July and August, 1960--some 600,000--was not charged to the U.N.

80. The R.C.A.F. also provided several officers for ONUC's air staff, including the commander, the Chief of Air Operations, and a telecommunications officer.* On 12 October, the U.N. asked Canada to provide 27 radio technicians from the R.C.A.F. to install and operate radio stations in support of the air transport operations. Although he was vehemently against increasing the R.C.A.F. establishment in the Congo, the Chief of the Air staff felt he had no option but to agree. Air transport would be under the control of an R.C.A.F. officer, and if Canada did not provide the personnel, they would come from another nation. The result would be language problems and other difficulties. Despite the C.A.S.'s reaction, the Cabinet refused the request at its meeting of

*R.C.A.F. strength in the Congo had been as high as 57 all ranks in August, 1960. By the beginning of December, 1960, however, strength had declined to about 15. [Docs. on R.C.A.F. 300-8/115, T.D. 0336P, vol. 1.]

28 November. Further discussions with the air commander were held, but it did not seem opportune to raise the issue again.¹⁹⁴

81. There were other problems confronting the air commander:

Aside from very unsatisfactory state U.N. Air Transport from technical point of view [the air commander wired the C.A.S.] by effectiveness almost equally hamstrung by complications of organization, language and difficulties between nationalities making up force. I do not wish to suggest complete despair but this whole mess must be streamlined under at least a unified air headquarters speaking French and English. . . .195

In addition, the number of available aircraft was too few. In mid-November 1960 there were 11 C-119 aircraft in service--but only a few were operational at any one time.¹⁹⁶ In mid-December, the transport force had a grand total of 46 aircraft of many different types, but only 150 maintenance personnel from many different technical backgrounds.¹⁹⁷

The Political Situation

82. Many of the difficulties of ONUC sprang from the chaotic political condition of the Congo. The new African nation was an arena in which a variety of forces jostled in an atmosphere of confusion and mistrust. Colonialism and anti-colonialism, United States and Soviet interests, internationalism, Pan-Africanism and nationalism all were present in varying degrees.

83. The root of the original difficulties of July and August 1960 lay in the erratic personality

of Lumumba. There seemed little doubt at the time that Lumumba was under the influence of certain Communist advisers--even Hammarskjold believed this. 198 Certainly the Prime Minister showed little interest in cooperating with the U.N. in its efforts to restore order from the chaos of the Congo. The first real difficulty arose over the problem of the secessionist province of Katanga. There Premier Moise Tshombe, with the assistance of Belgian officers and civilian advisers, had established an oasis of relative tranquility. Tshombe persistently refused to admit U.N. troops, and Lumumba demanded that the U.N. Forces expel the Belgians from Katanga and compel Tshombe to end his secession. Hammarskjold could not do this, however, without violating all his ground rules for ONUC. The result was that the Secretary-General personally led the first ONUC contingent into Katanga, but this action, while demonstrating the U.N.'s right to freedom of movement, did nothing to resolve the political impasse.

84. Meanwhile, toward the end of August 1960, Lumumba began receiving shipments of Soviet military aid. This was followed by demands that the U.N. pull out of the Congo, attacks on Hammarskjold's impartiality, and criticism of white U.N. troops. The situation became even more complicated on 5 September when President Kasavubu announced that he had dismissed Lumumba as Prime Minister. Shortly afterwards, Lumumba was arrested by the A.N.C., but this did not destroy his support. There were now two contenders for power,

and the situation remained in flux for a year. Some of the contributors to ONUC took sides in the dispute, and this inevitably affected the operation of the Force. The dispute reached its peak in New York, however.

85. Premier Khrushchev had arrived in New York for the General Assembly's 1960 session, and he led the attack on the Secretary-General and his Congo policies:

The Colonialists decided to get a puppet government created. . . they have been doing this work through the United Nations Secretary General, Mr. Hammarskjold, and his staff. This is shameful. . . .

The Assembly should give a rebuff to the Colonialists and their stooges and call Mr. Hammarskjold to order. . . .

It is the opinion of the Soviet Government that. . . only the troops of the countries of Africa and Asia should be left in the Congo. . . . 199

The Soviet Premier then called for a "troika" arrangement in place of the present one-man Secretary-General. The resulting political conflict in New York crystallized the divisions in the Congo. Lumumba became the Communist candidate and Kasavubu became the Western choice. The seating of the Kasavubu faction at the U.N. was a ²⁰⁰ victory of sorts for the West in this struggle.

86. There is little point in detailing further the Congo political scene. Lumumba was killed in mysterious circumstances in February 1961, and immediately became a martyr. Tshombe resisted efforts to re-integrate Katanga into the nation, but after many vicissitudes secession was ended and Tshombe even became President of the re-united Congo. The importance of the political

crises there was that the West in large measure forfeited the "splendid opportunity" to have non-white peoples accept responsibility for a peace-keeping operation. By hanging those "irrelevant and mischievous" labels-- pro-Soviet and pro-West--around Congolese necks, the Great Powers drove the Congolese to become what they were called. Initially convinced of the need to insulate the Congo from the Cold War, the Americans found it increasingly difficult to stay out of the situation. For the Soviet Union, the Congo affair was one ideally suited to Marxist tenets. The states that backed the Western position gave the impression of still supporting the colonialists, and the irresponsible Lumumba became the symbol of African rights against the white man. ²⁰¹

Doing the Job, 1961-64

87. As has been indicated above, Canadians had some misgivings about the ability of some U.N. personnel in the Congo. The troubled political situation did little to ease these fears. In late November 1960, the air commander, Air Commodore C.G.W. Chapman, reported his opinions in a pessimistic telegram. "The Supreme Commander," he said, referring to Von Horn, "is confined to quarters and is in fact non-effective." All decisions were being made by the Secretary-General's Special Adviser, Rajeshwar Dayal, an Indian who had first come to the Congo in September. Dayal was assisted by an overwhelmingly Indian staff, none of whom spoke French and all of whom were nervous in the unfriendly Congo. ²⁰² In addition, Brig. Rikhye, Hammarskjold's Military Adviser, was all too prominent in the Congo. Instructions from Dayal or Rikhye were often implemented without even

being referred to Von Horn.²⁰³ The Supreme Commander, all reports agreed, was weak, indecisive, unable to control his staff and contemptuous of the civilians in ONUC.²⁰⁴ Partly as a result of these complaints from Canadians in the Congo about Von Horn and the "Indian empire", C.S.A. Ritchie, Ambassador in New York, spoke to the Secretary-General in December 1960. Ritchie urged that Von Horn's position be clarified and that Rikhye be returned to the United States. Hammarskjold indicated that his Military Adviser's power had probably come about because of the lack of energy of Von Horn, and he criticized the actions of the American and British ambassadors in the Congo. The U.S. Ambassador, Mr. Timberlake, he said, was in close touch with the Belgians, and his apparent aim was to build up a government entirely committed to the West. The Congo, Hammarskjold said, was a "pocket" of the old Dulles policy. What was needed in his opinion was a broadly based neutralist government with a western orientation.²⁰⁵ But, regardless of the activities of the American Ambassador, the fact remained that in the opinion of Canadians the Indian predominance at ONUC headquarters was jeopardizing the success of the U.N.'s mission in the Congo.²⁰⁶

88. Perhaps because of the Canadian complaints, the U.N. soon asked Canada to provide bilingual staff officers.²⁰⁷ In the circumstances the government could only comply,²⁰⁸ although there was a severe shortage of officers able to speak both Canadian languages.²⁰⁹ By

1962, Canadians were holding 16 positions on ONUC's staff. According to Canadian reports they were fulfilling important roles:

From the standpoint of the UN operation, the employment of Canadian officers has two advantages:

- (1) where they are bilingual, they provide almost the only staff capable of communicating with the Congolese effectively. . . .
- (2) in all cases, it is apparent, from any questioning of the officers themselves, that they do most of the work of their branch or section. This is borne out by the remark made to me by the Chief of Staff. . . to the effect that the Canadian officers were vital to his organization and shouldered far more than their fair share of the work. 210

A diagrammatic table of the ONUC staff showing the positions filled by Canadians at this time is attached as Annex "B".

89. The political situation continued to deteriorate in the early months of 1961. General Mobutu, the commander of the A.N.C., was suspicious of the U.N. Force--and its Ghanaian and Guinean troops and Indian staff officers in particular, suspecting them of being overly sympathetic to Lumumbist factions. Incidents increased, and the Canadians again were involved. On 27 February 1961, two Canadian officers and two men were beaten, kicked, and robbed by A.N.C. para-commandos. Their weapons were also taken. ²¹⁰ As a result of this and other incidents, the entire Leopoldville U.N. garrison was placed on "Alert Status JUPITER", the second highest state of readiness. Troops were armed, vehicles moved in pairs, and unit guards were strengthened. 212 At 2115 hours on 1 March the Canadian commander, Col.

P.D. Smith, spoke to the Canadian contingent in dramatic and revealing circumstances:

. . . in the semi-darkness Col. Smith stood before the men. He told them that a new order had been issued to UN forces whereby it was now compulsory for them to fire in protection of their weapons. It stated, he said, that UN troops would not in future be disarmed.

The unit's reaction to this announcement was an immediate outburst of clapping and shouting which lasted a full ninety seconds. . . . When the noise calmed down Col. Smith concluded by saying he was proud of his men and their attitude.* 213

In a subsequent dispatch to the C.G.S., Col. Smith told of the new U.N. attitude. "I have no doubt that in present temper [of the Canadians] it will be obeyed,"
214
he added.

90. The first test came within a few days. The Canadian signal detachment at the seaport of Matadi was attacked and overrun by A.N.C. troops. The events, as reported to the C.G.S., were as follows:

Outline of events in Matadi 4/5 Mar in so far as CDNS were concerned. Details obtained by questioning members of det. All started their statements by referring to good relationship between Canadians and ANC prior to events. At approx 1030 hrs 4 Mar a fully armed and equipped Sudanese section appeared at the CDN loc and took up a defensive posn complete with LMG pointed directly at an ANC guard house approx 60 yds away. Capt Belanger [the detachment commander] was out at the time getting rations. He had sometime previously asked the Sudanese whether they were going to provide a guard.

Immediately the Sudanese set up their LMB the ANC did likewise. Belanger returned at approx 1130 hrs. He immediately went to investigate what was happening. He spoke to ANC who wanted to know why the Sudanese had come. Belanger explained that they, the ANC, had always had a guard and now we had one too.

*Presumably this order derived from the U.N. resolution of 21 Feb 61 which authorized "the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort." [R.I.I.A., Documents on International Affairs, 1961 (London, 1965), 736.]

Belanger says he was surprised by the size of the Sudanese guard as he had thought he would get one or two men at the outside. He believes Sudanese were probably influenced by the previous days events at Banana [another U.N.-A.N.C. incident]. After speaking to the ANC Belanger returned to the det villa and was discussing the sit with SSgt Harris when firing started at approx 1140 hrs. It is not known for certain who fired first but it is believed it was the ANC.

Firing continued until approx 1350 hrs. The ANC used small arms and 37mm AP. All this firing was directed against the CDN villa. For the first minute or two the Sudanese returned the fire after which time the defence was largely conducted by the CDNS [of whom there were nine]. Though they did little firing. At 1350 hrs Belanger received a telephone call advising him that a cease-fire had been arranged. Up to this time one Sudanese had been wounded and an ambulance came and evac him. On departure of the ambulance ANC started to converge on the house. Belanger who was just outside unarmed attempted to inform the ANC the truce was still on and at the same time advised the detachment to take cover. He started to go with the ANC to find an officer when firing started. ANC dispersed but about half of them were between him and villa. As he could not get back to villa he attempted to get to main Sudanese camp some 600 yds away. This also proved impossible. Belanger never managed to get either to villa or Sudanese camp but was not taken prisoner. He got back to his quarters after battle was over. From approx 1600 hrs det was under command of SSgt Harris. Firing continued practically all afternoon. . . . By 1615 hrs there appeared to be no assistance forthcoming. The villa had between 15 and 20 large holes in it and it was getting dark. After destroying the cipher eqpt the det surrendered. . . . Our men were separated from the Sudanese and were well treated though all personal effects were taken from them.

Sudanese cas at the CDN villa were one killed and four wounded.

The Canadians were soon released and flown to Leopoldville.

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Capt. Belanger followed the next day. Further

investigation put the question of who fired first in doubt. As Col. Smith said, "When two groups of excited and jittery Africans facing each other at short range with weapons loaded and cocked someone is certain to

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open fire."

91. The incident at Matadi did nothing to ease the strained relations between U.N. troops and the Congolese. When, therefore, the Force Commander issued an address to the U.N. troops stressing that ONUC's role was to "help" the Congolese,²¹⁷ the Canadian reaction was unfavourable. "The Adjutant," the war diarist wrote,

considered postponing publication of this instruction since the general feeling of unit personnel, after such incidents as the Feb 27 incident, and MATADI, was not ripe for such exhortation. However it was published. The reaction amongst all ranks was as expected. It provided material for many sarcastic jokes amongst the men for a whole week. The commendable spirit of the General's remarks was lost. 218

92. After Matadi the number of incidents declined, and the signallers' role became stabilized. Life in the detachments scattered around the interior became routine, and the passing of the day's messages usually took little time. In November, 1961 detachments were located in²¹⁹ the following centres:

	Offrs	Sr NCOs	Men	Total
Leopoldville	26	49	140	215
Stanleyville	1	2	6	9
Luluabourg	2	3	6	11
Bukavu	1	3	5	9
Elisabethville	1	2	7	10
Kamina	1	3	6	10
Albertville	2	1	8	11
	34	63	178	275

93. There seemed little inclination in Canada to accept an increased commitment in the Congo. A request in November 1961 for 40 bilingual personnel to set up a security service in the Congo was rejected,²²⁰ as was a request in May 1962 for eight additional military

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police. By early 1963 the Army was looking forward
to an early reduction in the number of signallers committed
to CNUC. 222 The R.C. C.S. was still in a difficult
manpower position, committed as it was to supplying
personnel for three isolated postings--UNEF, CNUC and
the Yukon and Northwest Territories. 223 In February
1963 the C.G.S., now Lt.-Gen. Geoffrey Walsh, wrote to
the C.C.C.S. that "The Army is hard pressed to find
bilingual officers and particularly signals. To all
intents and purposes", he emphasized, "I have reached
the limit of my ability to find positions from within
the Army's ceiling and rank structure". 224 The following
month it was definitely decided that while Canada
would maintain her current commitments to CNUC, no
further commitments would be accepted. 225

94. Some army officers in the Congo were occupied
in other than routine tasks. A R. 22e R. officer, Lieut.
J.T.F.A. Liston, was awarded the M.B.E. for his action
in rescuing a wounded Congolese lying in a minefield.
Liston "prodded about 12 yards through a minefield. . . .
the mines were live and his actions were at the risk
of his life." 226 Lt.-Col. P.A. Mayer, the U.N. Liaison
officer with the A.N.C., and Sgt. J.A. Lessard were both
awarded the George Medal for their part in the rescue of
106 missionaries in early 1964. Several times the
two Canadians with Nigerian, Swedish, Norwegian and
Brazilian soldiers and airmen, risked their lives in
daring helicopter rescues. Col. Mayer described his
experiences at the town of Kisandji on 27 Jan 64:

There was much waving of arms, yelling and jabbing and spitting at me but I kept insisting that we go to the Mission to carry on the talks. The Chief then suddenly demanded to know what the ring on my right hand represented. As one of the Jeunesse [a loosely organized, militant group responsible for the attacks on missionaries and others] indicated that he wanted it and was motioning that he would cut it off. I explained it was a wedding ring. The Chief then began to ask a series of questions about my family. . . . The result. . . was that the Chief suddenly embraced me whereupon the Jeunesse tried to pull us apart. It was during this moment that [I was hit] from behind with the flat of [a] machete. . . . The Jeunesse were now arguing as to who was to kill me. . . . The man put [my own] pistol against my stomach, thumbed back the hammer and pressed the trigger but the pistol did not fire since I had forgotten to put a round up the chamber. . . . 227

95. The role of the R.C.A.F. was increased in the Congo during 1961 despite personnel shortages. The U.N.'s air transport system had not been an efficient one despite the best efforts of the air commanders, all from the R.C.A.F., and language difficulties and maintenance problems had hampered operations. In September, 1961 the U.N. made an urgent appeal for additional transport assistance. After some delay, Canada responded with an offer of two C-119 aircraft complete with ground crew personnel and a detachment of 12 technical supervisors. The total personnel to be committed totalled 61. The Cabinet decision was made on 23 September 1961; the aircraft left Downsview the next day.

96. The Cabinet also agreed to supply a group of 11 or 12 technicians to "assist in the control of the Force's fighter aircraft operations". By November 1961, the U.N. was involved in active operations against Katanga province, and this resulted in the provision of

fighter aircraft by the Ethiopians. The first U.N. request for air control technicians had been rejected as the R.C.A.F. was very short of personnel in this trade.²³² The U.N. made further representations, however, and the government changed its position. The decisive factor apparently was that the U.S.A.F. had provided expensive equipment to ONUC on the condition that only the R.C.A.F. would operate it.²³³

97. The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Hugh Campbell, was interested in cutting down the R.C.A.F.'s commitments to ONUC. In October 1961 he addressed a memorandum to the V.C.A.S.: "Would you develop with A.M.P.[Air Member for Personnel] a case for us to get out of the Air Commander's job in the Congo?"²³⁴ The requested case was developed early in December. A Canadian air commander had been agreed to at first only because it was anticipated that the R.C.A.F. would have a large unit in ONUC, the Minister was told. When, in September 1961, the U.N. decided to build a fighter component, the responsibilities of the air commander came to include those of conducting offensive and defensive operations. In these circumstances, the country providing the largest contribution to the U.N.'s air force should provide the commander.²³⁵ This view evidently was accepted, and Canada did not provide the air commander again until the last six months of the Congo operation.²³⁶

98. The R.C.A.F. contribution was being limited in other ways as well. A request in May 1962 for additional flying control teams was refused "due to the heavy commitments of the R.C.A.F."²³⁷ Later that year

the CNUC flights not directly in ~~support~~ of the Canadian contingent were cancelled because of the "recent financial policy."²³⁸ The R.C.A.F. had been providing two flights per week from Pisa to Leopoldville for CNUC purposes, over and above the twice monthly rotational flights for Canadian Army personnel. The only flights now to be undertaken would be a bimonthly Yukon and a bimonthly North Star to Leopoldville in support of the contingent. In the telegram to the Canadian delegation in New York advising of this decision, the point was made that Canada had been providing air support since September 1960. It was now time for other countries to do their share.²³⁹

99. The question of air support remained quiescent until May 1963, when it was raised in the Cabinet by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Martin,* who, apparently without consulting the Department of National Defence, proposed that the present civilian air operations in the Congo should be replaced by an R.C.A.F. air transport detachment.²⁴⁰ There was little inclination in Air Force headquarters to accept this course. The operation would require five North Star aircraft and the scraping together of personnel from all across the country;²⁴¹ in addition, the cost for three months would be between 2.3 and \$2.9 millions.²⁴² The Air Council agreed that the commitment should not be assumed, and the Minister of National Defence, Mr. Hellyer, supported his service advisers.²⁴³ The proposal was not carried out.

*The Conservative government had been defeated in the election of April 1963.

100. There were other problems for the R.C.A.F. In November 1961 an R.C.A.F. Yukon was seized by the Congolese authorities who had not been advised that a new type of aircraft would be flown into Leopoldville by the R.C.A.F. Apparently, the Yukon was mistaken for a Soviet aircraft.²⁴⁴ As a result, the Cabinet decided to bar the Yukon from the Congo, and it was only with the greatest difficulty that the R.C.A.F. was able to get permission to resume Yukon flights.²⁴⁵ In January 1962, further complications developed when the French Foreign Office suspended overflights of France by R.C.A.F. aircraft on ONUC missions. The decision, the Canadian Ambassador in Paris was advised, had been made on the highest levels, but was not aimed at Canada. In the end, the flights were allowed to continue, but a new formula would have to be worked out, the Canadian representative was told.²⁴⁶ A few months later, reports were received in Ottawa that R.C.A.F. aircraft had been used to fly refrigerators to the Congo. The refrigerators apparently were subsequently looted and shipped to India consigned to a senior Indian Army officer. A minute to this telegram was reassuring: "According to AOC ATC [Air Officer Commanding, Air Transport Command]²⁴⁷ we're snow white."

Training the Congolese

101. One of the major causes of the troubles in the Congo was the undisciplined nature of the Armee Nationale Congolaise. Had the A.N.C. been responsive to command--and had the Belgians left a trained cadre of

native officers as their legacy--the story might well have been a happier one. The mutiny of the A.N.C. in July 1960 precipitated the troubles and led to U.N. intervention. For the next four years, many efforts were made to train the Congolese, and in these efforts it was inevitable that Canada should become involved.

102. The first request for Canadian assistance came on 2 August 1960 from Accra, Ghana. In a personal message to Prime Minister Diefenbaker, President Nkrumah said that Ghana was possibly going to train Congolese officer cadets at the Ghana military academy. Canadian aid in the form of French-speaking officers and men and academic instructors was necessary. General Alexander, the British officer commanding the Ghanaian forces supported the request. "He would not want other than Canadian service personnel to assist." ²⁴⁸ A supporting telegram from the High Commissioner in Accra urged favourable consideration. ²⁴⁹

103. In the next few days, Canadian representatives discussed Nkrumah's proposal with American and British officials. Both allied nations agreed that it would be useful if Canada could assist--but only if the Ghana scheme was under the aegis of the United Nations. ²⁵⁰ Apparently, however, the Ghanaian request had been made without consultation with the U.N., and as a result Secretary-General Hammarskjold made his own request to the Prime Minister for assistance in training the Congolese army. ²⁵¹ The immediate response to the U.N.'s request was favourable, and the government

indicated that it might be willing to provide from 50 to 100 personnel. More information was needed, however.²⁵² Conversation with the Secretary-General in New York produced the suggestion that Canada should tell Nkrumah that all aid to the Congo should go through the U.N.,²⁵³ and this was the course that was followed.²⁵⁴ Whether the U.N.'s suggestion was a serious one or whether it was intended merely to head off Nkrumah's initiative is unclear. In any case, action lapsed for some time.

104. In October 1960, it was evidently suggested that Canada should train Congolese officer cadets in Canada. The proposal was discussed with the Minister by the C.G.S. on 17 October. The C.G.S. told Gen. Pearkes that he would prefer to have the U.N. set up an officer training corps in the Congo and to send French-speaking officers there. The advantages of this course, were four: there would be no need for a bilateral agreement with the Congolese if the training was carried on in the Congo under the U.N.; there would be problems with pay and other matters if the Congolese were trained in Canada; there would be security problems; and there would likely arise what were euphemistically called "social" problems.²⁵⁵ Once again the subject lapsed, only to be raised once more in April 1961. At an Army Council meeting the matter was discussed, and this time the C.G.S. instructed the Vice Chief of the General Staff to draw up a plan for training a group of Congolese in Canada and for sending them back to the Congo to form a nucleus of instructors under Canadian supervision.²⁵⁶

Once again, however, nothing came of these suggestions.

105. Towards the end of 1961 the topic was revived. In November, soundings began to be heard that the U.N. would ask for French-speaking officers to train the A.N.C. There were problems, the C.G.S. reported to the Minister, in meeting any such request. For example, there were only 50 French-speaking majors in the infantry. Of these 35 were ineligible, and the rest were needed in their current employment. In addition, the Army as a whole was short 484 officers.²⁵⁷ As a result, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee advised the Department of External Affairs that he was doubtful if his Department could accede to a U.N. request for assistance.²⁵⁸ A request was nonetheless received from the U.N. on 23 December 1961 for 15 French-speaking officers to staff a training academy for Congolese officers. A memorandum to the Cabinet by the Minister of National Defence, dated 23 January 1962, recommended that this request be refused.²⁵⁹ Apparently, the Minister's advice was accepted, but some commitment to provide six or seven officers from the retired list was evidently made.²⁶⁰ In any case, nothing was done.

106. In July 1962, the United States sent a military advisory team to appraise the needs of the A.N.C. By February 1963, the Americans had approached several countries, including Canada, and had asked them to participate in the re-training of the A.N.C.²⁶¹

Canadian planning appears to have been based on the premise that the proposed contribution would consist of a brigadier to be in charge of the training scheme; officers for movement control courses; bilingual officers to serve as training and administrative officers for A.N.C. battalions; and a commitment to staff the military academy long envisioned for the Congo. ²⁶² As it turned out, however, the request when it came was for technical assistance--i.e. communications. This, the Chief of the General Staff said, was impossible. Signallers were still in short supply, particularly French-speaking ones, and there would be difficulties with equipment. ²⁶³ However, the American plan became mired in discussions at the U.N. and died. The government did not entertain any thoughts of contributing to the A.N.C. retraining programmes thereafter, and such nations ²⁶⁴ as Italy, Israel, and Belgium carried the burden.

Liquidating the Commitment

107. By the beginning of 1963, plans were being drafted for the "run-down" of the U.N. Force in the Congo. In that month, Col. W.S. Hamilton, the Commander of 57 Canadian Signal Unit, reported that current planning envisaged a force of some 6000 by mid-1963. Whether the Canadian contribution could be cut substantially in such an event was unclear as yet. ²⁶⁵ In February 1963, however, the C.C.C.S. was advised that U.N. plans now were for a 30% reduction in strength from 18,000 to 13,000 by mid-1963. The Canadian strength at this stage was 38 officers

and 268 men from the Army, and five officers and seven men from the R.C.A.F. ²⁶⁶ By March, it was definitely known that the Canadian contribution would have to remain substantially the same despite the coming reduction in U.N. strength.

108. In April the decision was made to reduce the force to a strength of 7000-8000, and efforts were to be made to cut the strength of the signal squadron by 100 all ranks, thus releasing men for the Divisional Signal Regiment. ²⁶⁷ By the beginning of August 1963, the strength of the squadron was down to 223 all ranks, and plans were in hand for the complete shut-down of operations by the end of the year. ²⁶⁸ Once again, plans were changed. Early in September, the decision was made to maintain a small force in the Congo at least until June 1964, the funds ²⁶⁹ for this to be provided primarily by the United States. The Canadian position was to support the American policy, and the Army was prepared to agree to the retention of Canadian troops in the Congo until the ²⁷⁰ summer of 1964.

109. Clearly one of the major problems facing the U.N.--and the problem largely responsible for the reduction in strength of ONUC--was finances. Since 1961 the United Nations had been imperilled by the large cost of its peace-keeping operations and deprived of funds by the refusal of Soviet-bloc nations and France to contribute funds for this purpose. The dispute came close to destroying the world organization,

and a settlement was not reached until early 1965,
after the close of the Congo operation.²⁷¹

110. The U.N. Force continued to function with some difficulties as the June 1964 deadline approached. The Commander of the U.N. Forces in the closing stages was a Nigerian officer, Maj.-Gen. Ironsi, and he was not the most efficient of commanders. In October 1963, the Army had agreed to provide a brigadier to be Chief of Staff of ONUC,²⁷² and it was reported that this officer was carrying the load for the incompetent commander.²⁷³ The planning for the close-out of operations progressed rapidly and in May and June the signals squadron was steadily shrinking in numbers. The various out-stations were shut down, and on 30 June 1960 only 56 Canadians were left in the Congo. "Reveille came early this morning," the war diarist for the unit noted in that day's entry, "but nobody seemed to mind."²⁷⁴ The last draft of Canadians returned to Canada in an R.C.A.F. Yukon.

111. In all, some 1900 Canadians served in ONUC. Their task was at once boring, dangerous and important, but their duties were competently performed. Such difficulties as arose in the preparations for the Canadian contribution were probably more political than military. Despite severe shortages of skilled

tradesmen, both the Army and the E.C.A.F. met the challenges with which they were faced--and in a highly creditable fashion.

112. This report has been prepared by Lieut. J.L. Granatstein.

C.P. Stacey
Director

PROCEDURES INVOLVED IN SENDING
A CANADIAN CONTINGENT TO A
U.N. PEACE-KEEPING OPERATION

a. Governmental

1. Request from Secretary-General of U.N.
2. Joint submission by Minister of National Defence and SSEA to Cabinet.
3. Order-in-Council authorizing contribution.
4. Approval by Parliament within ten days if a substantial contribution is involved.
5. If the force is approved, Department of National Defence assumes responsibility for personnel and equipment, and the Department of External Affairs assumes responsibility for negotiating conditions of service and making necessary arrangements with the U.N. and the host country. 275

B. Military (with effect until integration)

1. Army

- a. Coordinating body was D.M.C.&P., and particularly M.C.2 (Joint and Combined Plans and Operations)
- b. D.M.C.&P. had close touch with D.M.I. and direct communications with the Military Adviser, Permis, New York.

2. Air Force

- a. Until 1 Mar 62, Air Force arrangements were handled by the Directorate of Transport and Rescue Operations. After this date, responsibility was shared with the Directorate of Air Force Movements.
- b. The airlifts to UNEF and ONUC were handled by the Director of Materiel Supply.


3. Joint Staff

- a. Coordinated all Army-Air Force matters.
- b. Communications channels to C.C.C.S. and Minister. 276

- C. D.M.O.&P. (until integration)*
1. Preparation and maintenance of log book.
 2. Call conference with coordinating directorates.
 3. Warning Order to be sent to all concerned and to include:
 - a. State of readiness
 - b. Leave policy
 - c. Security
 - d. Preliminary moves
 - e. Administrative action for personnel and equipment.
 4. Liaison with R.C.A.F. and External Affairs.
 5. Preparation of informal briefing pamphlet for troops.
 6. Maps.
 7. Issue of sitreps.
 8. Production of terms of reference.
 9. Information centre set up and arrangements made for representatives of other services, directorates as required.
 10. Ensure names of individuals are notified to commands as soon as possible so administrative instructions and warning orders can be passed.
 11. Obtain authority to concentrate elements of force.
 12. Prepare tactical doctrine for force relative to employment and area.
 13. Prepare instruction on care of troops and administrative problems relating to area in which troops will serve. 277

*"Check list of action required in relation to a U.N. request for Police Forces," n.d., [H.Q.S. 2001-120/73, vol. 1.]

ONUC MILITARY STAFF--CANADIAN POSITIONS ★
October, 1962



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Annex "B"

★ Canadian positions are underlined.

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