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REPORT NO. 9

DIRECTORATE OF HISTORY
CANADIAN FORCES HEADQUARTERS

27 Jul 66

Canada and Peace-keeping Operations
The Lebanon 1958

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Canada and Peace-keeping Operations
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1. This Report is concerned with Canadian participation in the United Nations Observation Group in the Lebanon (UNOGIL) between June and December 1958. Included are details of the authorization, formation, equipment and employment of the force during the whole period of an operation which the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold of Sweden, described as "the most delicate and hazardous yet undertaken" by that organization.

2. To keep UNOGIL in its proper perspective it has been necessary to include an outline of the political situation in the Lebanon as it has evolved over the years and the international background to the crisis of 1958. The operation itself is of particular interest because it represents a United Nations' reaction to alleged "indirect aggression" and also because of the role played by the Secretary-General in exercising executive authority on behalf of the U.N. Canada's participation, with which the major part of the Report is concerned, included the dispatch of officer observers and stores personnel to Lebanon and the exercise of initiative at United Nations' headquarters in New York.

3. The principal classified sources used for the Report include files of the Department of External Affairs on the Lebanese political situation; Central Registry files which deal with the organization and dispatch of the Canadian group in UNOGIL, and Minutes of the Army Council. The main open sources are: House of Commons Debates; Documents on International Affairs 1958, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs; Ruth B. Russell's United Nations Experience with Military Forces; D.W. Bowett's United Nations Forces; and the series of Reports submitted to the United Nations by the Observation Group in the Lebanon.

The Dilemma of the Lebanon

4. In May 1958 political unrest in the Middle East had reached the point where it threatened to involve the major powers. Canada and other "Middle Powers" were once again called upon to exercise their ingenuity, within the framework of the United Nations and on the spot, to extricate the various participants from a dangerous impasse.

5. The breakdown of law and order in the Lebanon, a small country on the shores of the eastern Mediterranean, had

its seeds in the peculiarities of geography, the social system and in certain events of the area's recent history. "The Mountain", as the Arabs call the Lebanon, is approximately 135 miles long and 25-50 miles wide, with a land area of 4015 square miles divided into four parallel sections, running from south-west to north-east. These are the narrow coastal strip, which is broken at many points by rugged slopes; the Mount Lebanon range; a flat-bottomed valley known as the Bekaa; and adjacent to Syria, the Anti-Lebanon-Harmon mountains. Ethnologically and linguistically, Lebanon is only a continuation of its larger neighbour, Syria. Residents along the eastern and northern borders frequently have close family and tribal ties with their Syrian counterparts. Until the mid-nineteenth century when the Turks took over direct control, the rulers of the large Christian and Druse populations in the mountains managed to retain a certain measure of autonomy for Lebanon within the Turkish Empire. After the First World War, the League of Nations gave France a mandate over the area, including Syria. In 1945 Lebanon achieved separate statehood. (1)

6. The first few years of independence, during which a "middle-of-the-road" foreign policy was followed, were mainly uneventful. Lebanon joined the League of Arab States in 1945 and participated on a small scale in the 1948-49 Arab War against Israel with whom she now shares her southern border. In 1952 the President, Bechara-el-Khoury, had to resign during the third year of his second six-year term. Camille Chamoun was elected in his stead.

7. By 1956 the population of Lebanon was about one and a half millions, of whom a third lived in or near the capital and seaport of Beirut. The country was divided along confessional lines into 11 Christian sects (9 of whom the Maronites (Eastern Uniates) were the most numerous) the Druses, two Moslem sects and those of the Jewish faith. Each group tended to be inward-looking and suspicious of others, this being as true of the relationship between Christian sects as of that between Christians and Moslems. Since membership in a religious community was the basis of all political and social obligations and rights, seats in the single Chamber of Deputies and governmental posts were apportioned according to the relative strength of each religion.(2) Thus the President was always a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Moslem and the Foreign Minister a member of the Greek Orthodox communion. By the Constitution the president was permitted only one six-year term unless an amendment was passed by two-thirds of the Chamber of Deputies.(3) This safeguard was of particular importance since the system of government permitted the president to exercise considerable power and influence.

8. The basis for the distribution of power was the census of 1932, which gave the Christian element a six percent overall majority. Over the years, emigration of Christian Lebanese, a higher Moslem birthrate and the arrival of refugees from Palestine after the Israeli war altered the proportions, until by 1958 the Moslems considered

that they, with the Druses, numbered as much as 65% of the total population.(4) Dissatisfaction over this unresolved problem of representation, and the impact of outside influences on a decaying sectarian system, were the root causes of subsequent events in the Levant.

9. In common with all Middle East countries, Lebanon was deeply affected in late 1956 when strong passions were aroused by the Suez Canal Crisis and the Egyptian-Israeli War. The call of President Nasser of Egypt for Arab unity had been received enthusiastically by the more extreme element of the Sunni Moslems, who began to work towards this goal at the expense of their country's independence. After the British and French landings at Port Said, the Lebanese Prime Minister tried to force the President to sever diplomatic relations with those countries. Chamoun refused and a new Western-orientated government took office amid general unrest amongst the Moslems. (5)

10. Early in 1957 Lebanon accepted aid from the United States under the Eisenhower Doctrine, the only Arab country to do so, but later had to qualify acceptance owing to external pressure from its Arab neighbours and opposition at home. (6) Rioting by pro-Nasser and anti-western elements occurred in Beirut at the end of May, but the following month general elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for the supporters of President Chamoun. A number of powerful Moslem leaders were thereby barred from the Chamber of Deputies and it was contended that polling had been "rigged" in order to return docile members who would allow Chamoun a second term.(7) Uncertainty over the President's intentions bedevilled the Lebanese political scene for the next 12 months as the internal situation continued to deteriorate.(8) The authorities attempted to disarm the populace, but since the carrying of arms was traditional, made little progress towards their objective.

11. Two important events occurred in the Middle East early in 1958. On 1 February Egypt and Syria joined to form the United Arab Republic and 13 days later, on the 14th, the Kingdoms of Jordan and Iraq announced that they had formed the Arab Union.(9) In Lebanon these new groupings divided the population, and a group of Moslems and some Christian leaders tried to promote a policy of "positive neutrality" for their country. Prominent amongst the latter was the influential Maronite Patriarch who saw in the alienation of the Christians from the Moslems the beginning of the ultimate political eclipse of his flock. (10)

12. Having failed to persuade the widely-respected Maronite Army Commander-in-Chief, General Fuad Chehab, to run for president,(11) Chamoun made known his own candidacy on 8 May despite warnings from the American and British ambassadors. The President had no doubts that the Constitution could be amended and informed the Western diplomats that he had the support of Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Turkey, Greece and Italy. At that time Chamoun appeared to consider himself the only man capable of upholding Lebanese sovereignty

and sustaining pro-Western policies; his estimate of the opposition's reaction throughout the country and the extent of the struggle he would precipitate was shown later to be remarkably accurate.(12)

13. The same day that the President announced his decision, a prominent left-wing opposition newspaper editor was murdered in the capital.(13) Widespread riots, sabotage and strikes by Moslems convulsed Lebanon and there were demands for the immediate resignation of Chamoun. The future of the government now depended on the reaction of the Lebanese Army. In Beirut the Foreign Minister, Dr. C. Malik, declared that the United Arab Republic was actively supporting rebel elements by the infiltration of arms and saboteurs from Syria and by its virulent propaganda broadcasts over Cairo Radio; Lebanon prepared a complaint of "massive interference" in its domestic affairs to present to the Security Council of the United Nations.(14)

14. Britain, France and the United States promised assistance against direct foreign interference, and on 13 May the British Foreign Office issued a further warning against "any attempt from outside to overthrow the Lebanese Government." Britain and France, with bitter memories of the Suez Canal Crisis, were more inclined at this stage to intervene than the Americans because they believed that President Nasser was again threatening their oil and other interests in the Middle East. (16)

15. However, over the next ten days the international climate showed some improvement. President Nasser on his return from a state visit to Moscow announced that the United Arab Republic "intended to uphold and respect the independence of the Lebanon."(17) The threat of Western intervention also receded when the United States made it clear that it would not give active military assistance until Lebanon's complaint had been taken to the Security Council; (18) such help could not be given under the terms of the Eisenhower Doctrine without branding the United Arab Republic a Communist state, which for obvious reasons the United States did not wish to do.(19)

16. The next move was made by President Chamoun, who appeared to be reconsidering his intention to run for a second term. In a conciliatory move he offered the premiership to General Chehab.(20) This was not enough for the opposition, who continued to demand the President's resignation on three counts: the conduct of the 1957 General Election; his apparent willingness to call for Western help; and his employment of the Parti Populaire Social (P.P.S., formerly the Parti Populaire Syrien), a semi-military political organization, to help suppress the revolt. When two Cabinet ministers resigned, Chamoun moved quickly to bring Lebanon's complaint to the United Nations while he still had a government backing him.(21)

Lebanese Appeal to the Security Council

17. On 22 May, Lebanon's representative to the United Nations requested the President of the Security Council, who was Mr. Charles S.A. Ritchie of Canada, to call an urgent meeting to consider the matter of his country and the United Arab Republic.(22) This meeting was held on 27 May, but the Council adjourned until 3 June to give the League of Arab States, with which a similar complaint had been lodged, time to meet.(23)

18. An Arab League conference took place in Benghazi, Libya, between 31 May and 6 June but was inconclusive. On word reaching New York of the failure of the Arabs to produce a unanimous decision, the Security Council briefly took up the matter on 6 June, then voted a further adjournment to await the arrival of the League's report of proceedings.(24)

19. The Security Council finally returned to the problem of Lebanon against a background of continuing political stalemate in Beirut, where the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies had convened a meeting for 24 July to elect a new president. In an unsuccessful attempt to placate the opposition, the Prime Minister had stated publicly that there would be no tampering with the constitution. (25)

Authorization for the Formation of an Observation Group

20. Late in the afternoon of 10 June, after speeches by a number of representatives, including the United Arab Republic and Lebanon, a Swedish resolution proposing the dispatch of an observer group to Lebanon under the auspices of the Secretary-General was presented to the Security Council. No further action was taken that day as the Soviet Union's representative indicated that he would need more time or have to exercise his veto power if the matter came to a vote. The next day a number of countries spoke in support of the resolution, and the Canadian representative said, in part:

It has been the consistent view of the Canadian Government that member states of the UN should have the right, and indeed should exercise that right, of bringing to the appropriate body of the UN their anxieties about their relations with neighbouring countries, and particularly, of course, when they consider that there is a threat from without or some form of external interference with domestic affairs. We wholeheartedly agree with those who say that the UN should be prepared to hear these appeals from members for help. And we consider it axiomatic that this response should be particularly sympathetic toward applications from the smaller countries who must rely largely on the UN for their continued existence in independence and peace. (26)

The Swedish resolution was then put to the vote and approved unanimously, except for the Soviet Union, which abstained.

Organization of UNOGIL

21. Secretary-General Hammarskjold, who had first been consulted about the Swedish proposal on 10 June, now moved swiftly to implement it. An Observation Group consisting of an Ecuadorian civilian, an Indian civilian and a Norwegian Air Force officer was appointed. Major-General Odd Bull, who during the Second World War had commanded "little Norway" base in Toronto, was designated "Executive Member" of the group and charged with recruiting and organizing military officers as observers. To get personnel on the scene as quickly as possible the Secretary-General then requested the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization Palestine (UNTSO) to provide temporary observers.(27) One Canadian Army major and nine other officers serving with UNTSO were accordingly sent to Lebanon. UNTSO also provided radio-equipped jeeps and a military observer-base radio system for the use of UNOGIL.

22. On arrival in Beirut, members of the Observation Group and their staff set up their headquarters in a local hotel during the week-end of 14-15 June. Meanwhile Lebanese insurgents were mounting a series of violent attacks on the Government forces. Prominently displayed United Nations flags had little effect and early meetings of the observers were held to the accompaniment of bullets smacking against the walls of the hotel.(28) The Lebanese Government appointed a Minister, assisted by a five-man commission to work with the Observation Group.(29)

23. Having examined the situation at first-hand, Major-General Odd Bull now raised his estimate of the number of observers needed from 60 to 100. The Secretary-General in New York requested help from seven more countries to achieve this total.(30)

Initial Canadian Contribution to UNOGIL

24. A request for officers for UNOGIL was forwarded to Ottawa on 16 June together with a list of the qualifications required.(31) The following day the Cabinet gave approval to the assignment of officers of the Canadian Armed Forces, and Defence Headquarters decided that Army personnel should be sent. That afternoon the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Sidney Smith, made a statement on the Lebanon in the House of Commons. Mr. Lester B. Pearson for the Liberal Party and Mr. H.W. Herridge for the C.C.F. Party

spoke in general support. The Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Pearson, ended his remarks on a note of warning:

I would also express the hope, Mr. Speaker, that if the situation should deteriorate in Lebanon to the point where the legitimate government there might be overthrown as a result of intervention from outside, any further steps that might have to be taken would be taken not by any individual government but under the auspices of the United Nations.(32)

Canadian Contingent to Lebanon

25. Five majors and five captains of the Canadian Army arrived in Beirut by R.C.A.F. aircraft on 21 June. (33) They were at once deployed by the Observation Group to carry out the United Nations' mandate.

26. The establishment of an adequate supervision system was not simple. Of the total 278-kilometre frontier with Syria, Lebanese Government forces controlled only a few kilometres on either side of the main highway linking Beirut to Damascus. Moreover, this road was the only major access to the eastern border from the Lebanese side since the other highways ran parallel to the Anti-Liban-Harman mountains along the Bekaa Valley, in which many bridges and culverts had been destroyed. In the north-east Bekaa Valley, a rebel-held main road connected Baalbeck with Homs in Syria and in the north the frontier could be reached only by the coastal road running north-east from Tripoli through a predominately Moslem area controlled by the rebels.(34) Sections of the main cities of Beifut, Tripoli and Saida were barricaded and to the south-east of the capital a Druse chieftain, Kamal Jumblatt, was in complete control of the Chouf area. Traditionally opposed to any government, the Druses had risen in revolt, not out of sympathy with the Moslems, but because they felt that the Christian element (personified by Chamoun) was disturbing the delicate Lebanese balance by its pro-Western policies.

27. For a start UNOGIL established a system of permanent observation posts in radio communication with one another, the Headquarters in Beirut and patrolling jeeps, which were painted white and bore the U.N. insignia. The observers, often at extreme danger to themselves, as firing in their vicinity and the mining of roads was frequent, soon managed to penetrate deep into rebel-held territory. A welcome addition to UNOGIL's resources were eight light reconnaissance aircraft and two helicopters flown by six Swedes and four Norwegians. Day air patrols were instituted, and later Harvard aircraft, working in three shifts, were in the air from dusk to dawn.(35) At Headquarters, meanwhile, the Observation Group maintained close contact with the Lebanese Government Liaison Committee in order quickly to investigate infiltration reports and interrogate any prisoners. UNOGIL's methods to date are summed up in its First Report:

The work of the mission has developed in three natural stages. In the first stage a force of military observers was rapidly assembled and

instructed, and the necessary material was procured. In the second, an analysis of the prevailing situation was made and, on the basis of an assessment of possible needs, additional men and material were assembled. This phase has now been virtually completed and the final stage- when the Group can operate at its planned strength - is about to commence. (36)

Internal Developments in Lebanese Crisis

28. Although UNCGIL had a temporary stabilizing effect, the Lebanese dilemma remained unsolved. President Chamoun, disillusioned with his Commander-in-Chief, General Chehab, considered that the Army could, but would not, take effective action.(37) With a force composed of 60% Christians and 40% Moslems, General Chehab was reluctant to commit his troops in an all-out effort, since he feared this would divide the country even more.(38) The rebels, also, were not forcing the issue and many of the noisy skirmishes were remarkable only for the large amount of ammunition fired into the air.(39) At this time the Lebanese Government made two separate attempts to get more outside help. The possibility of joint British-American military intervention was again mooted by President Chamoun in Beirut, and the Lebanese representative at the United Nations was instructed to ask the Secretary-General for a force of 2000-3000 men, under the terms of the Security Council resolution, to police the border with Syria. (40) The Secretary-General, who was preparing to leave for the Middle East, opposed the suggestion to convert UNCGIL into a police force to intervene in the civil war. Britain and the United States, for their part, informed the Lebanese that troop landings would only take place as a last resort if U.N. efforts should fail.(41)

29. Secretary-General Hammarskjold flew to Beirut and attended some of the early Observation Group meetings. He then visited the capitals of Jordan and the United Arab Republic before returning via Beirut to New York on 25 June.(42) The success of the U.N. operation now depended on the avoidance of outside interference in Lebanese affairs and the co-operation of President Nasser. The Secretary-General felt that his trip had been responsible in some measure for obtaining both these prerequisites and that the Middle East had thereby obtained a week's grace for further diplomatic initiatives to find a political settlement.(43)

30. Britain, France and the United States made a new concerted approach to the Lebanese President in early July, their main points being that he should publicly declare he would not run again and perhaps broaden the basis of his present cabinet. Chamoun refused to make any concessions, maintaining that such moves would frighten the Christians into thinking that the West was deserting them. (44)

Rebuffed, the Western nations had further cause for anxiety when they heard reports that the Lebanese Government was contemplating some form of association with the Arab Union of Iraq and Jordan.(45)

First Report from UNOGIL

31. The United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon submitted its first report on 4 July.(46) The contents substantiated what the Secretary-General had said at a news conference in New York the previous day:

to my knowledge we have no repeat
no foundation for believing there is at
present "massive infiltration."(47)

Lebanese official reaction was immediate and hostile. A 13-page rebuttal, which maintained that the original complaint against the United Arab Republic was in no way impaired or invalidated, was sent to the United Nations on 8 July.(48)

32. Despite a cooling of its relationship with the Lebanese Government, UNOGIL continued to expand its patrolling activity. On 14 July the Secretary-General asked Canada to provide three more officers as her share of an additional 25, some of whom were to replace the UNTSC personnel now returning to their original duty.(49) Ministerial approval was given in Ottawa(50) and on 26 July three Army majors were flown to the Middle East in a British Overseas Airways Corporation aircraft.

Anglo-American Troop Landings in Lebanon and Jordan

33. On 14 July, 1958, a coup took place in Baghdad spearheaded by units of the Iraqi Army.* The King, Crown Prince and Prime Minister were murdered and the government overthrown. President Chamoun, acting on press reports only, immediately asked for western military intervention by Britain, France and the United States on the grounds that events in Iraq were the result of a United Arab Republic plot, which could have grave repercussions in Lebanon.(51) In the afternoon of 15 July United States marines landed on the beaches of Beirut "to protect American lives and by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese Government in defence of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity."(52)

*According to an unsubstantiated report from the revolutionary Government of Iraq, President Chamoun had asked for Iraqi help to put down his revolt; as two battalions were passing through Baghdad "they simply stopped and seized power." See William R. Frye, "Lebanon: Story behind the Headlines," Foreign Policy Bulletin, XXXVIII (November 1, 1958), 25-26.

On 17 July British troops were flown into Jordan at the request of King Hussein and his Prime Minister, who feared that their government would also be swept away, (53), and a complaint by that country was lodged against the United Arab Republic in the Security Council. By agreement with the Americans, the British did not take part in the Lebanon landing but it was of vital importance to them.* The collapse of either Jordan or Lebanon, or both, could cause serious repercussions amongst the oil-producing states and sheikhdoms bordering the Persian Gulf.

34. The arrival of United States troops in Lebanon posed a delicate problem for UNCGIL as it had recently succeeded in getting rebel approval to visit all sections of the frontier with Syria.** A press release dated 16 July firmly disassociated the group from all contact formal or informal with the Americans.(54)

Action in the Security Council

35. The Security Council met in emergency session on 15 July to consider a United States plan for the withdrawal of her troops from Lebanon and their replacement by a U.N. force as soon as possible. Cabinet approval had been given in Ottawa for the Canadian representative to support a motion along these lines.(55) Three resolutions, sponsored by the United States, the Soviet Union and Sweden, were then introduced but all failed to get the required votes.(56) An emergency meeting of the General Assembly seemed imminent.

36. Mr. Smith, after talks in Washington with the British Foreign Secretary and the United States Secretary of State, reached U.N. Headquarters on 20 July.*** In a

*The question of French participation was difficult in view of the history of the former mandate. It was solved by having a French cruiser and escorting destroyers visit Beirut for a few hours on 17 July. Article "The American Landing in Lebanon" by the former U.S. Ambassador Robert McClintock, United States Naval Institute Proceedings, LXXXVIII, no. 10 (October 1962), 65-79.

**This optimistic report from the three-man commission in Beirut is not borne out by the views of three Canadian military observers with UNCGIL in their remarks to the Canadian Charge d'Affaires. "Interim Report of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon," 16 Jul 58, D.E.A. 50162-A-40, 6; *ibid.*, despatch no. 331 Beirut to S.S.E.A., 24 Jul 58.

***The meeting, which was also attended by the French Ambassador to the United States, concerned itself with the whole Middle East crisis, including the question of possible Anglo-American intervention in Iraq. Document on D.E.A. 50162-A-40, vol. 6.

further attempt to break the stalemate a Japanese resolution, in the drafting of which Canada had played a major role, was presented to the Security Council on the same day; the basic object of this resolution was to give the Secretary-General greater authority to deal with the new situation in Lebanon. All council members voted in favour except the Soviet Union, who thereby applied the veto.(57)

37. The Japanese resolution represented, with one exception, the general opinion of the Council, and having sounded all members, the Secretary-General now took the initiative by announcing that he would develop UNCGIL under the existing mandate.(58) The basis for the enlargement proposed was to be the Observation Group's Second Interim Report,(59), issued on 17 July, which asked for an increase in strength to 200 for supervision of areas previously barred to observers. To give him advice and support Mr. Hammarskjold re-established the UNEF Advisory Committee, which had been first created by the General Assembly in 1956, consisting of the representatives of Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Columbia, Norway and Pakistan.(60)

The Second Increase in Canadian Contribution to UNCGIL

38. The Department of External Affairs in Ottawa forwarded, at the end of July, a new request for seven more officer observers to serve with UNCGIL.(61) On the recommendation of the Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant-General H.D. Graham, C.B.E., D.S.O., E.D., C.D., one of those appointed was a lieutenant-colonel and, after Cabinet approval had been given, the group joined UNCGIL to bring the Canadian contribution up to 20.(62) Shortly afterwards the number was further increased by the addition of a Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps officer, relief for another who had been temporarily loaned from UNEF to set up UNCGIL's ledgers and accounting procedures.(63)

The Election of a new Lebanese President

39. Political bargaining and consultation intensified during the last two weeks of July as the date of the presidential election approached; amongst those actively concerned in Beirut was Mr. Robert Murphy, President Eisenhower's personal envoy.(64) General Chehab remained the most universally acceptable candidate but his vacillation and reluctance to take action at certain stages of the crisis had lost him some backing, particularly that of Chamoun.*

*This was an unfair criticism of Chehab. Although he was frequently exhorted privately to take firm action, the General never received the necessary public support from the politicians for the unpopular measures required to crush the revolt. Despatch no. 301, Beirut to S.S.E.A., 9 Jul 58, D.E.A. 50162-A-40, vol. 5.

For the pro-western faction the most alarming prospect was the support emerging for Bechara-el-Khoury, who could be relied on to form a government inimical to their interests.(65)

40. In an atmosphere of complete gloom, as a solution seemed as far away as ever, the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies met under military protection on 31 July, and to the relief and amazement of all elected Chehab by a large majority on the second ballot; the Prime Minister and six deputies boycotted the meeting.(66) Rejoicing amongst all sections of the population ensued, but certain of the opposition soon made it clear that they wanted foreign troops evacuated and Chamoun replaced at once. The President, for his part, remained adamant in his determination to continue in office until the end of his term on 24 September.(67)

International Developments

41. Statements condemning American and British action in the Middle East had been published immediately after the landings by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China;(68) a mob demonstrated outside the United States Embassy in Moscow on 17 July and again the following day. However, a joint communique of solidarity(69) was issued by the Heads of State of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, who were attending a Baghdad Pact meeting in Ankara to discuss events in Iraq, the fourth member of that organization. These immediate reactions were followed by letters from Mr. Khrushchev, Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, addressed to President Eisenhower, General de Gaulle of France, Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of Great Britain and Mr. Nehru, Prime Minister of India, proposing a summit meeting on the Mid-East crisis.(70)

42. Prime Minister Diefenbaker informed the Canadian House of Commons on 17 July:

It is clear, therefore, that in responding to the appeal of King Hussein the United Kingdom has acted, as did the United States government a few days ago in respect of Lebanon, with due regard to the ultimate authority and responsibility of the United Nations.(71)

On 20 July the Prime Minister sent messages to President Eisenhower, General de Gaulle, Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Nehru urging that they should not refuse the Russian invitation for a high-level conference.

43. Correspondence continued to pass for the next three weeks, one of the suggestions being that there should be a special meeting of the Security Council with Heads of State attending. No agreement was reached and the convening of an emergency special session of the General Assembly terminated the exchange of letters.(72)

The General Assembly in Session

44. Efforts to convene any form of summit meeting having failed, the Security Council voted unanimously on 7 August for an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly.(73) Mr. Smith, who was present, spoke of Canada's hopes for a solution through Special Meetings of the Security Council but now agreed that an alternative must be found for the easing of tension in the Middle East.(74)

45. The General Assembly held its first meeting on 8 August and by 21 August had held 21 plenary sessions. On 12 August the Soviet Union submitted the first resolution which recommended that British and American troops be withdrawn from Jordan and Lebanon; that UNCGIL be strengthened; and that an Observer Group be sent to Jordan with a view to supervising the withdrawal there.(75) The day following President Eisenhower made a dramatic appearance before the Assembly to present his six points, which suggested means of relieving the immediate and long-term problems of the Middle East.

46. Meanwhile, Canada and Norway had been working behind the scenes to produce something more positive and agreeable to the majority than the Russian proposals. The result was a four-part draft resolution, sponsored by these two countries, with Columbia, Denmark, Liberia, Panama and Paraguay, which was presented on 18 August.*

47. Debate on the seven-power resolution continued until it was terminated by a significant closing of the ranks of the Arab States on 21 August. Sudan, on behalf of herself and nine other countries, including Lebanon and the United Arab Republic, introduced a compromise resolution in which they agreed to respect each others systems of government in accordance with the Pact of the League of Arab States. The Assembly approved the resolution unanimously.(76)

Further Increase in Canadian Contribution to UNCGIL

48. The Secretary-General visited countries involved in the Middle East crisis early in September. Following discussions with Chamoun and President-elect Chehab, a new series of requests were sent out to member nations to bring UNCGIL's strength up to about 500 officers.(77) Reasons for the expansion were twofold:

*On this date Britain and the United States submitted letters to the President of the General Assembly, stating that their forces would be withdrawn either when requested by the Governments of the Lebanon and Jordan, or when as a result of further action by the U.N. their presence was no longer required. Documents on International Affairs, (London, 1962), 327-328.

- (a) to increase U.N. presence in Lebanon and thereby expedite withdrawal of United States troops
- (b) to further the aims of the Arab sponsored resolution passed during the Emergency Meeting of the General Assembly.(78)

49. UNCGIL's stores, as has already been noted, were organized on the Canadian system. With the impending rapid build-up, Canada was asked to send two quartermaster warrant officers, one staff sergeant and three sergeants or corporals for stores duty with UNCGIL and as replacements for two corporals on loan from UNEF.(79) Two days later, on 17 September, U.N. Headquarters made a final request for 50 Canadian officers, who were required for a short term only as it was planned to start withdrawing UNCGIL at the beginning of 1959.(80) The Cabinet gave its approval on 21 September, and within the next two weeks the officer group of lieutenants, captains and majors, including a doctor,(81), and six stores personnel were flown to Beirut by commercial airline at U.N. expense. On arrival, some of the newcomers were attached to UNCGIL Headquarters, by now organized on full military lines; here they joined Canadians headed by Lieutenant-Colonel A.M. Millar, Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, who held a key appointment in charge of ground operations with a Canadian major as his deputy.(82) The remainder dispersed all over Lebanon to take up duties in a rapidly expanding network.

50. By late September 1958, UNCGIL was manning 33 positions of all kinds. This total was to reach a maximum of 49 as the number of ground observers rose to 469.(83) The country was divided into six areas for purposes of observation and patrolling, one controlled by HQ Beirut and the others by Stations at Tripoli, Baalbeck, Chlaura, Marjayou and Saida. Each Station HQ had an international staff of six officers and was responsible for Sub-Stations, Observation Posts and Traffic Check Posts in its area. In the North Bekaa, for instance, teams of four to eight observers were sent out from Baalbeck to each Sub-Station for a tour of duty and were then returned to local headquarters for a 48-hour rest period as stand-by patrol; the Posts were manned on a 24-hour basis by two to four observers to watch the rail crossing and roads to the border between Syria and Lebanon. All units kept in touch with one another and main headquarters, which organized air patrols from Beirut airport by radio or dispatch jeep. Observers patrolled constantly in their white-painted jeeps,* and life was by no means uneventful. They were occasionally fired on, frequently stopped by armed men and quite often robbed, albeit in a friendly way.(85) In general, society

*UNCGIL's vehicle pool increased from 173 to 290 and the daily rate of patrolling rose from 219 hours in mid-September to 491 hours in mid-October and 932 hours at the end of that month.

in the country districts carried on in a traditional atmosphere of centuries-old feuding and banditry. The observers were merely tolerated since the village headmen wanted no trouble with the United Nations.

51. Canadian Army officers were intermingled with those from 20 other nations(86) until the Observation Group was finally dissolved; they had representatives at each of UNOGIL's Stations, where invariably one of the Canadians took on the vital task of controlling stores. They served their turn on the various Station, Sub-Station and Post duties and provided invaluable professional knowledge for an organization many of whose members had had little previous military experience.(87)

Change of Regime in Lebanon

52. The Lebanese were becoming more and more impatient with the frustrating conditions and economic losses due to the Moslem strike. Most had had enough, except the extreme elements, and a welcome sign was the return in Army vehicles of 120 Syrian commandos from the rebel quarter of Beirut to the Syrian border on 31 August.(88) Conditions improved generally throughout the country as various leaders promised loyalty to Chehab. UNOGIL noted the change in its Third Report but pointed out the new problem that was developing:

the situation in regard to the possible infiltration of personnel and the smuggling of arms across the border is that, while there may have been limited importation of arms into some areas prior to the Presidential election on 31 July, any such movement has since markedly diminished. A virtual truce has prevailed since about that time in most of the disturbed areas. However, acts of brigandage and lawlessness, unconnected with the political movement, are being increasingly reported. Many of these lawless acts are motivated by economic considerations as normal life throughout the country has been severely disrupted by the prolonged state of civil strife.(89)

A battalion of American marines* had been withdrawn in mid-August and in a further move to ease tension a second battalion was re-embarked on 15 September.(90)

*The total U.S. force deployed to Lebanon consisted of 5790 marines and 8508 Army troops. They remained within the Beirut beach-head while in the country. For a comprehensive report on the American landings see Marine Corps Historical Reference Pamphlet "Marines in Lebanon 1958" by Jack Shulimson (Washington, D.C., 1966.)

53. A rash of kidnappings by Christians of Moslems and vice versa took place around Beirut on 20 September following the abduction of a pro-Chamoun newspaper reporter, who was believed to have been tortured before being killed.(91) In spite of this atmosphere of revived confessional strife, General Chehab was installed as President three days later without incident. In a sense, this brought back to power a princely dynasty, founded by the "Prince of the Mountain," Emir Bashire Shehab, that had last ruled over an autonomous Lebanon in the mid-nineteenth century; the modern family consists of both Christian and Moslem members. 91A

54. President Chehab announced his first Cabinet on 25 September. A four-man group, it was headed by a Sunni Moslem Prime Minister, who had led the rebels in Tripoli.(92) It contained no representative of the former "loyalist" faction which had supported the previous government. Hailing this as a great victory, the Moslems opened up their section of Beirut, the Basta, while the bitterly-disappointed Christian Phalangists threw up barricades and declared a strike, which proved to be far more effective than the previous Moslem one.(93) The roles of the two main factions had now been reversed. A paralysed capital remained under curfew and from his mountain retreat, ex-President Chamoun exercised considerable influence to bring down the government.(94) At last, on the eve of a general strike by the Trade Union Federation which would have effected all public utilities, the contending parties reached agreement. The Chamber of Deputies gave a vote of confidence to a new Cabinet, which included the leader of the Phalangists as Deputy Prime Minister. In short order commercial life began to return to normal for the first time since early May.(95)

U.S. Marines and Army Withdrawn from Lebanon

55. Mr. Hammarskjold's report to the security Council, dated 30 September, on his recent mission to the Middle East indicated that:

to help in upholding the purposes...of the charter in relation to Jordan in present circumstances, a senior U.N. official has been appointed as a special representative of the Secretary-General in Amman. Jordan, with liaison offices in Damascus and Beirut.

He did not consider that any special arrangements were required for Lebanon itself, beyond the strengthening of UNCGIL.

but that the question will have to be reviewed in the light of development of a "good-neighbour" policy in the area after the U.S. withdrawal. (96)

56. During the next eight days the British, followed by the Americans, informed the Secretary-General officially that they had agreed with the Governments of Jordan and Lebanon to withdraw their troops within stated periods.(97) On 10 November, 1958, the Secretary-General relayed the news to the General Assembly in New York that these arrangements had been carried out.(98)

UNOGIL Disbanded

57. With the prospect of a resumption of normal diplomatic relations between Lebanon and the United Arab Republic and the return of the latter's Ambassador to Beirut, UNOGIL was no longer required. Prime Minister Rashid Karame stated on 30 October that the Secretary-General was being so informed.(99) UNOGIL's Fifth, and last, Report, recommending its own disbandment, was published on 14 November.(100) Two days later Lebanon formally asked that the complaint against the United Arab Republic, submitted on 22 May, be deleted "from the list of matters before the Security Council."(101) In his letter accompanying these documents Mr. Hammarskjold reported on the action taken:

in view of the statement of the Government of Lebanon and the recommendation of the Observation Group, I have immediately instructed the Group to present, in consultation with the Government of Lebanon, a detailed plan for withdrawal. I have taken this step under the authorization given to the Secretary-General in the Security Council resolution of 11 June 1958 to take the necessary steps for the implementation of the Security Council's decision. The instruction given to the Observation Group implies that I consider the task of the Group as completed and that my remaining duty under the resolution thus covers only the necessary measures for the liquidation of the operation. (102)

58. No objection being voiced, the Security Council agreed to the deletion as requested by Lebanon.(103) The Secretary-General met his Advisory Committee for the last time on 25 November to outline arrangements for the ending of UNOGIL, whose personnel were already dispersing.(104) Vehicles were to be sent to UNTSO in Jerusalem; as much office, medical and other supplies as required would be turned over to UNEF or the U.N. Jordan operation, while the rest, including aircraft, would be sold in Lebanon. Of the Canadian military observers, three arrived in Montreal on 24 November, and by Christmas the remainder had left Lebanon.(105)

Conclusions

59. The organization and dispatch of the Canadian contingent for UNOGIL presented little challenge to the armed forces; a total of 71 officers and six Army NCOs, seconded to the Department of External Affairs, were flown, mostly by commercial air lines, to Lebanon, where they did not have to be kept supplied with large quantities of stores. In Lebanon the observer group as a whole was generally understaffed and under-equipped for the task it had to perform; UNOGIL was also at a disadvantage owing to the ad hoc nature of its organization.(106) It is noteworthy that the group was formed on a nucleus from the existing UNTSO and relied to a large extent on U.N. Middle East organizations for technical help.

60. Unarmed observers on the ground suffered the handicap of being unable to establish supervision without rebel approval; their mandate did not permit them to act as policemen in the civil war. The use of air power by UNOGIL was a significant part of the operation but its effectiveness was limited by inability to follow up all aerial reports on the ground. There was undoubtedly some infiltration of men and arms into Lebanon in the early stages of the rebellion from outside sources wishing to capitalize on the situation.(107) By mid-July 1958 the dispute had reverted to being mainly an internal matter. Intervention by United States forces, therefore, was an embarrassment to the Observation Group as it damaged local confidence which had been laboriously established over the preceding month.

61. UNOGIL is one of the few peacekeeping operations which has not required a military presence over a long period to maintain a precarious status quo. It provided a temporary pacifying influence throughout Lebanon, thus giving the Lebanese time to settle their affairs and return to a logical neutral role as the merchant traders of the Levant. Whether the arrival of the American marines in Beirut may not have finally shocked the Lebanese leaders into ending their ruinous confrontation remains a debatable point.

62. For Canada, the Middle East crisis of 1958 demonstrated once again that the United Nations organization, with all its imperfections, was still the vital key to the maintenance of international stability.

63. This report was prepared by Mr. J.D.F. Kealy.

D. J. Goodspeed, Lt Col
(C.P. Stacey)
Directorate of History, CFHQ.

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APPENDIX "A"

Letter from the permanent representative of the Lebanon to the United Nations, Mr. Azkoul, to the President of the Security Council, 22 May 1958.

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request you, in your capacity as President of the Security Council, to call an urgent meeting of the Council to consider the following question:

'Complaint by Lebanon in respect of a situation arising from intervention of the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.'

The said intervention consists, inter alia, of the following acts: the infiltration of armed bands from Syria into Lebanon, the destruction of Lebanese life and property by such bands, the participation of United Arab Republic nationals in acts of terrorism and rebellion against the established authorities in Lebanon, the supply of arms from Syria to individuals and bands in Lebanon rebelling against the established authorities, and the waging of a violent radio and press campaign in the United Arab Republic calling for strikes, demonstrations and the overthrow of the established authorities in Lebanon and through other provocative acts.

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APPENDIX "B"

Resolution adopted by the
Security Council regarding the
Lebanon, 11 June 1958.

The Security Council,

Having heard the charges of the representative of Lebanon concerning interference by the United Arab Republic in the internal affairs of Lebanon and the reply of the representative of the United Arab Republic,

1. Decides to despatch urgently an observation group to proceed to Lebanon so as to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders;
2. Authorizes the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to that end;
3. Requests the observation group to keep the Security Council currently informed through the Secretary-General.

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APPENDIX "C"

First report of the Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold, on the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 11 June 1958, 16 June 1958.

1. The Security Council, in its resolution of 11 June 1958 concerning the complaint by Lebanon, requests the Observation Group authorized by that resolution 'to keep the Security Council currently informed through the Secretary-General'. The Observation Group, two of whose members have not yet arrived in Lebanon, will hold its first meeting in Beirut this week, probably on 19 June. As no information may be expected from the group prior to that date, this report is submitted as an interim measure, to inform the Security Council of the steps that have been taken to date by the Secretary-General, under the authority given to him, toward implementing its resolution.
2. The three members of the Observation Group have been appointed. They are: Mr. Galo Plaza of Ecuador, Mr. Rajeshwar Dayal of India and Major-General Odd Bull of Norway. The Observation Group will constitute itself and determine its own procedures. Military officers in the capacity of observers are assisting the Group. Major-General Bull has been designated as 'executive member of the Observation Group, in charge of military observers'. Major-General Bull arrived in Beirut early on the morning of the fifteenth, Mr. Galo Plaza is scheduled to arrive on the seventeenth and Mr. Dayal is expected on the same day.
3. On 11 June, I appointed Mr. David Blickenstaff as Secretary of the Observation Group, and Mr. Shiv K. Shastri as Assistant Secretary. Mr. Blickenstaff arrived in Beirut on 12 June and Mr. Shastri on 14 June. In the days immediately following, the operation was provided with the secretariat staff required. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, from the beginning, on an emergency and temporary basis, has readily afforded all necessary administrative and other co-operation. This has in no way involved an association of UNRWA with the operation. The headquarters of the Group was established in a Beirut hotel, close to its telecommunications facilities, where all of the staff members, including the observers, are housed.
4. On 11 June, I requested the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, Major-General von Horn, to afford temporary assistance

APPENDIX "C"

First report of the Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold, on the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 11 June 1958, 16 June 1958.

toward the execution of the Security Council's action by detaching ten United Nations military observers from Truce Supervision Organization duty to the Observation Group operation in Lebanon, five of whom were to arrive on the twelfth and another five not later than the fourteenth, under the command of an officer of sufficient rank. The first five military observers arrived in Beirut on the afternoon of the twelfth and a second group of five arrived there on the afternoon of the thirteenth. They were under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel W.M. Brown. On 14 June, the Chief of Staff in Jerusalem agreed to provide another five United Nations military observers.

5. The United Nations observers, in vehicles painted white with United Nations insignia, began active reconnaissance on the morning of 13 June in Beirut and its environs. Officials of the Group in Beirut, from the beginning, requested of the Lebanese authorities that the United Nations observer teams be accorded complete freedom of movement throughout the government-held areas. Beirut headquarters informs us that in a few initial trips 'of uncertain and dangerous nature', pilot jeeps manned by Lebanese troops have been used to check roads half an hour in advance of the United Nations teams and half an hour behind them. The observer teams have in each subsequent instance proceeded without pilot vehicles. We are also advised that the initial purpose of the patrols and road reconnaissances was to have United Nations observers and vehicles appear in as many areas as possible as soon as possible. In consequence, the observer teams have covered most main road areas in government-held regions, and have reached and entered areas not held by government forces. The observer teams are now working according to a schedule, and the plan being followed is to have them probe further each day in the direction of the frontier. Their observation task in connexion with any 'illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese' borders is greatly complicated by the fact that, as reported by the Observation Group headquarters in Beirut, only a small part of the total frontier appears to be controlled by government forces. The observer teams are composed of two observers, each with a radio-equipped vehicle, and one radio officer with a communication jeep. The three members of the team in their vehicles operate in a convoy at safe intervals and keep in constant communication with each other.

APPENDIX "C"

First report of the Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold, on the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 11 June 1958, 16 June 1958.

6. As of 15 June, the observer teams have proceeded as far as Tripoli, Baalbek, the Syrian border on the main Beirut-Damascus road, Marjayoun and Rashaya, some places having been visited several times and some twice daily. The immediate aim, we are informed, is to establish field stations: one to be at Tripoli, for the northern border areas, in the expectation that freedom of movement will be obtained in the area not under the control of government forces; one in the Baalbek area, and one at Marjayoun. From each of these places the observers are attempting to proceed into the frontier areas. In the initial and unavoidably hazardous stage, it has been of great value to have the services of the experienced observers of the Truce Supervision Organization. It is reported that so far the United Nations observers have generally met with a good reception, particularly in Beirut.
7. Communications and transportation for the immediate needs are adequate but will have to be considerably expanded. The operation thus far has received from the Truce Supervision Organization fourteen jeeps, thirteen of which are radio-equipped, and a military observer-base radio system, which has been in operation since 13 June. For communications beyond Lebanon, Truce Supervision Organization radio facilities are employed.
8. On a basis of careful assessment of needs by the members of the operation now in Beirut, and in view of the planned method of operation of the observers, as described above, the number of military observers is being increased to one hundred, and an urgent request has been made of fourteen Governments to provide officers for the purpose.
9. Immediately upon arrival in Beirut, the United Nations representatives in the operation, both civilian and military, established contact with the appropriate Lebanese authorities with a view to facilitating its work. The Lebanese Government has designated a minister to be in charge of relations between the Government and the Observation Group, and has set up a five-man commission to assist in this purpose, as indicated in the letter of 15 June from the Prime Minister of Lebanon to Major-General Bull (annex I).
10. The status of the United Nations Observation Group its privileges and immunities, etc, have been defined in a letter of 13 June from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Foreign Minister of Lebanon (annex II).

APPENDIX "C"

First report of the Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold, on the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 11 June 1958, 16 June 1958.

11. Members of the operation have indicated from Beirut the need for a small number of light aircraft of reconnaissance type, together with helicopters. Steps have been taken to meet this need.

12. In view of the urgency of the situation in Lebanon, I considered that it would involve an unwarranted loss of time to request the three members of the Observation Group to assemble in New York prior to their arrival in Lebanon. For only one of them was it convenient to visit United Nations Headquarters en route. The other two were to proceed directly to Beirut. In view of all the circumstances and the character of the task of the Observation Group, I have decided that I should give assistance to the Group by being present when the three members assemble in Beirut and by attending the Group's first meetings there.

ANNEX I

Letter dated 15 June 1958 from the Prime Minister of Lebanon to Major-General Odd Bull.

I have the honour to inform you that the Lebanese Government, at a meeting held on 12 June 1958, has taken a decision nominating His Excellency Dr. Albert Moukheiber, Minister of Health, as Minister in charge of relations between the Government of Lebanon and the United Nations Observation Group.

A Commission has also been formed to assist Dr. Moukheiber in the fulfillment of this mission, composed of: Emir Farid Chehab, Director General of the Surete Generale, Edward Chorra, Director of International Relations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Captain Francois Ginadrh, Representative of the Lebanese Army Headquarters, Mr. Raja Hamaday, representative of the Ministry of Finance.

The mission of this commission is to take all necessary measures to facilitate the task of the United Nations Observation Group, to supply said Group with all information coming to the knowledge of the Lebanese Government about infiltration of arms and armed men and other material across the Lebanese border, and to assure the contact between the various sections of the Lebanese administration and your Group.

APPENDIX "C"

First report of the Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold, on the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 11 June 1958, 16 June 1958.

The office of this Commission will be in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I would be very grateful if you would channel all communications with the various departments of the Lebanese Government through this Commission which stands ready at all times to answer your requests and to facilitate your work.

ANNEX II

Letter dated 13 June 1958 from the Secretary-General to the Foreign Minister of Lebanon concerning the status of the United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon.

Sir, I have the honour to refer to the resolution of 11 June 1958, by which the United Nations Security Council decided to despatch urgently an 'observation group to proceed to Lebanon so as to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese borders', and authorized the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to that end.

In view of the special importance and difficult nature of the functions which this Observation Group will perform, I would propose that, with the operation as now envisaged, your Government might agree to extend to the Observation Group consisting of three senior members of the United Nations Secretariat-over and above the status which they enjoy under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations-the privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities which are enjoyed by diplomatic envoys in accordance with international law. The privileges and immunities necessary for the fulfilment of the functions of the Observation Group also include freedom of entry, without delay or hindrance, of property, equipment and spare parts; freedom of movement of personnel, equipment and transport; the use of United Nations vehicle registration plates; the right to fly the United Nations flag on premises, observation posts and vehicles; and the right of unrestricted communication by radio, both within the area of operations and to connect with the United Nations radio network, as well as by telephone, telegraph or other means.

APPENDIX "C"

First report of the Secretary-General, Mr. Hammarskjold, on the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 11 June 1958, 16 June 1958.

It is my understanding that the Lebanese Government will provide at its own expense, in agreement with the representative of the Secretariat, all such premises as may be necessary for the accommodation and fulfilment of the functions of the Observation Group, including office space and areas for observation posts and field centres. All such premises shall be inviolable and subject to the exclusive control and authority of the Observation Group. I likewise understand that your Government will, in consultation with the Observation Group, provide for necessary means of transportation and communication.

If these proposals meet with your approval, I should like to suggest that this letter and your reply should constitute an agreement between the United Nations and Lebanon, to take effect from the date of the arrival of the first members of the Observation Group in Lebanon.

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APPENDIX "D"

Statement by President Eisenhower announcing the dispatch of United States forces to the Lebanon on 14 July, 15 July, 1958.

Yesterday morning, I received from President Chamoun of Lebanon an urgent plea that some United States forces be stationed in Lebanon to help maintain security and to evidence the concern of the United States for the integrity and independence of Lebanon. President Chamoun's appeal was made with the concurrence of all members of the Lebanese Cabinet.

President Chamoun made clear that he considered an immediate United States response imperative if Lebanon's independence, already menaced from without, were to be preserved in the face of the grave developments which occurred yesterday in Baghdad whereby the lawful government was violently overthrown and many of its members martyred.

In response to this appeal from the government of Lebanon, the United States has despatched a contingent of United States forces to Lebanon to protect American lives and by their presence there to encourage the Lebanese government in defense of Lebanese sovereignty and integrity. These forces have not been sent as any act of war. They will demonstrate the concern of the United States for the independence and integrity of Lebanon, which we deem vital to the national interest and world peace. Our concern will also be shown by economic assistance. We shall act in accordance with these legitimate concerns.

The United States, this morning, will report its action to the emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. As the United Nations charter recognizes, there is an inherent right of collective self-defense. In conformity with the spirit of the charter, the United States is reporting the measures taken by it to the Security Council of the United Nations, making clear that these measures will be terminated as soon as the Security Council has itself taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

The United States believes that the United Nations can and should take measures which are adequate to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. It is apparent, however, that in the face of the tragic and shocking events that are occurring nearby, more will be required than the team of United Nations observers now in Lebanon. Therefore, the United States will support the United Nations measures which seem to be adequate to meet the new situation and which will enable the United States forces promptly to be withdrawn.

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APPENDIX "D"

Statement by President Eisenhower
announcing the dispatch of United
States forces to the Lebanon on
14 July, 15 July, 1958.

Lebanon is a small peace-loving state with which the United States has traditionally had the most friendly relations. There are in Lebanon about 2,500 Americans and we cannot, consistently with our historic relations and with the principles of the United Nations, stand idly by when Lebanon appeals itself for evidence of our concern and when Lebanon may not be able to preserve internal order and to defend itself against indirect aggression.

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APPENDIX "E"

Draft resolution submitted to
the Security Council by Japan,
22 July 1958

The Security Council,
Having further heard the charges of the representative of
Lebanon concerning interference by the United Arab Republic
in the internal affairs of Lebanon and the reply of the
representative of the United Arab Republic,

1. Requests the Secretary-General to make arrangements
forthwith for such measures, in addition to those envisaged
by the resolution of 11 June 1958, as he may consider
necessary in the light of the present circumstances, with
a view to enabling the United Nations to fulfil the general
purposes established in that resolution, and which will,
in accordance with the Charter, serve to ensure the
territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon,
so as to make possible the withdrawal of United States
forces from Lebanon;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
Security Council on the arrangements made;
3. Calls upon the Governments concerned to co-operate
in the implementation of this resolution.

APPENDIX "F"

Resolution of the General Assembly regarding the situation in the Lebanon and Jordan, 21 August 1958.

The General Assembly,

Having considered the item entitled 'Questions' considered by the Security Council at its 838th meeting on 7 August 1958',

Noting the Charter aim that States should practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours,

Noting that the Arab States have agreed, in the Pact of the League of Arab States, to strengthen the close relations and numerous ties which link the Arab states, and to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these States, and to direct their efforts toward the common good of all the Arab countries, the improvement of their status, the security of their future and the realization of their aspirations and hopes,

Desiring to relieve international tension,

I

1. Welcomes the renewed assurances given by the Arab States to observe the provision of article 8 of the Pact of the League of Arab States that each member State shall respect the systems of government established in the other member States and regard them as exclusive concerns of these States, and that each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of government;

2. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations to act strictly in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, of non-aggression, of strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs, and of equal and mutual benefit, and to ensure that their conduct by word and deed conforms to these principles;

II

Requests the Secretary-General to make forthwith, in consultation with the Governments concerned and in accordance with the Charter, and having in mind section I of this resolution, such practical arrangements as would adequately help in upholding the purposes and principles of the Charter in relation to Lebanon and Jordan in the present circumstances, and thereby facilitate the early withdrawal of the foreign troops from the two countries;

APPENDIX "F"


Resolution of the General Assembly
regarding the situation in the
Lebanon and Jordan, 21 August
1958.

III

Invites the Secretary-General to continue his studies now under way and in this context to consult as appropriate with the Arab countries of the Near East with a view to possible assistance regarding an Arab development institution designed to further economic growth in these countries;

IV

1. Requests Member States to co-operate fully in carrying out this resolution;
2. Invites the Secretary-General to report hereunder as appropriate, the first such report to be made not later than 30 September 1958.




*Staff:- 1 Commander (Lt-Colonel)
1 Operations Officer
1 Supply Officer
1 Assistant Supply Officer
1 Transport Officer
1 Information Officer
HQ Patrol.

**Staff:- 4-8 Observers commanded
by a Major or Captain.

UNCGIL

ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY STAFF



APPENDIX "I"

Requirements and Conditions for
Observers with the United Nations
Observation Group in Lebanon,
10 September, 1958.

QUALIFICATIONS

1. Regular active military service experience of several years, including experience of command. Combat, or combat troop training experience is desirable as background for proper analysis and evaluation of situations.
2. Ability to drive jeeps and cars in normal traffic conditions and in rugged, open country. This is an important safety factor. The Observers should have at least two years' driving experience and should hold a valid national driving license.
3. Some experience in conducting investigations, questioning witnesses, and preparing reports.
4. The Observer should be impartial and objective. He should have patience, an even temperament, maturity and discretion.

Rank Officers of the rank of Lieutenant, Captain and Major only are acceptable.

Age and Health 25 to 45 years old. They should be in good physical condition, able to put up with hardships under field conditions. They should be inoculated against smallpox, cholera, typhoid and para-typhoid (TAB). They should bring their health records with them.

Languages Knowledge of English, the working language of the mission, is essential. It is used in internal communications, in voice-radio, and in the preparation of reports. Knowledge of French and Arabic is also useful but not essential.

CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

1. United Nations pays travel costs by air from home country to the mission area, and return. Officers should bring with them a set of six passport photographs.
2. Observers are authorized to bring by air, at United Nations expense, 44 pounds (20 kilos) excess baggage for uniforms; they are authorized to ship by sea, also at United Nations expense, 440 pounds (200 kilos) in personal effects.

APPENDIX "I"









Requirements and Conditions for
Observers with the United Nations
Observation Group in Lebanon,
10 September, 1958.


3. United Nations pays a subsistence allowance equivalent to \$10.00 per day.* This is partly payable in local currency and partly in US dollars.
4. Officers should retain active service status with their own Governments and should be in receipt of their regular service salary. This is not reimbursed by the United Nations.
5. There are no leave entitlements while on mission service.
6. Throughout his service with the United Nations, the officer is under the normal discipline of his own national service for all matters not connected with United Nations duties, and under the discipline of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, or of the senior officer designated by him, with respect to his United Nations functions.
7. In the event of death or total disability owing to service with the United Nations, the United Nations undertakes the obligation of compensating the officer or his estate in the amount of twice his annual salary or \$15,000 whichever is the greater. Compensation for partial disability will be pro-rated in proportion to the disability.

*The sum of \$12.50 per diem was actually paid.



LEBANON
OPERATIONS OF UNOGIL

-  Station
 -  Sub-Station
 -  OP and Traffic Check Post
 -  Station Boundary
- Roads Patrolled:
-  Main Road
 -  Minor Road
 -  Track
 -  Railway



SECRET

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