DRDC-RDDC-2014-C207

EXAMINING CIVIL-MILITARY COLLABORATION BEHAVIOURS

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PWGSC Contract No. W7719-135235/001/TOR
Task Authorization No. 5235-01

On Behalf of

Department of National Defence

As represented by

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March 2014

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Abstract

The current research was conducted for Defence Research and Development Canada – Toronto Research Centre in support of a 3-year applied research program (ARP) entitled "Training Toolkit for the Comprehensive Approach." Using data from a previous ARP on "JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain" (see Thomson, Adams, Filardo, Flear, & DeWit, 2013), military and civilian collaboration efforts in an operational context were examined to provide the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) with training strategies to enhance civil-military interactions at the interpersonal level. Previous research had military and civilian participants negotiate through two fictional operational scenarios, a Refugee Camp scenario and a Project Security scenario. For the purposes of the current project, each interaction was transcribed verbatim and coded using a revised coding scheme (see Thomson, Brown, Davis, Filardo, & Adams, 2013). The coding scheme consisted of critical variables for collaboration, including communication, relationship building and negotiation styles. Results showed that CAF personnel engaged in significantly more optimal negotiation and optimal relationship building behaviours than their civilian counterparts (representing a non-governmental organization/NGO). In particular, CAF participants showed an interest in their counterpart's concerns and were found to build credibility significantly more often than civilian (NGO) participants. Although there was no significant difference in overall suboptimal negotiation behaviours between CAF and NGO participants, CAF participants displayed significantly more instances of threatening behaviour and were significantly more assertive than their NGO counterparts. In general, optimal collaboration behaviours were positively associated with collaboration outcomes (e.g., a greater sense of power and influence, higher reported trust for counterpart, greater satisfaction with the negotiation outcomes). Conversely, suboptimal collaboration behaviours were negatively associated with collaboration outcomes (e.g., a lower sense of power and influence in the negotiation, less satisfaction with the relationship, and less satisfaction with the negotiation outcomes). The results of the current study helped to generate strategies for civil- military negotiation training. Based on these results, and the existing negotiation literature, it is suggested that future civil-military training for collaboration will require sensitivity and a balance of cooperative and competitive negotiation skills.

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Executive Summary

Examining Civil-Military Collaboration Behaviours

Michael H. Thomson, Andrea L. Brown, and Samantha A. Davis, Human*Systems*® Incorporated; DRDC-RDDC-2014-207; Defence R&D Canada – Toronto Research Centre; March 2014.

A changing dynamic in military engagements across all types of international emergencies has led to the interdependency between the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and civilian organizations, including Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations, and Other Governmental Departments. Collaboration between these organizations, referred to as the comprehensive approach to operations, is sometimes challenging due to a variety of factors (Ball & Febbraro, 2011; Holton, Febbraro, Filardo, Barnes, Fraser, & Spiece, 2011; Meharg, 2007; Winslow, 2002). A number of research efforts have been conducted to address some of these challenges in civil-military collaboration (Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown, & Flear, 2011a; Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown, Flear, 2011b; Thomson, Adams, Filardo, Flear, & DeWit, 2013; Thomson, Adams, Hall, & Flear 2010). More recently, a 3-year Defence Research and Development Canada – Toronto Research Centre applied research program (ARP) entitled "Training Toolkit for the Comprehensive Approach" has been established to develop training tools for CAF personnel operating in the comprehensive environment. In support of this ARP, the current study examined negotiations between CAF and NGO personnel in two fictional scenarios in an attempt to highlight best practices for civil-military negotiation.

Data were previously obtained for a study by Thomson, Adams, and colleagues (2013) in the context of a previous ARP entitled "JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain." Participants were 21 CAF personnel, most of whom had Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) experience/training, and 22 International Development graduate students (representing the civilian NGO sample). Participants were paired into dyads and asked to negotiate through two fictional scenarios (a Refugee Camp scenario and a Project Security scenario). Each participant was paired twice, creating one dyad per scenario, for a total of 42 dyads. The negotiations took place via Skype. Each dyad was previously recorded and, for purposes of the current study, transcribed verbatim. Transcriptions were subsequently coded using an adapted coding scheme (Thomson, Brown, Davis, Filardo, & Adams, 2013), which was meant to be more discrete than the previously used coding scheme, in that it was more specific and provided more detailed descriptions of the type of observed behaviour being coded (c.f. Thomson, Adams, et al., 2013).

Coded instances of optimal and suboptimal negotiation were compared between CAF and civilian NGO personnel. CAF personnel engaged in optimal negotiation behaviour and optimal relationship building behaviour significantly more frequently than their civilian NGO counterparts. Specifically, CAF participants showed an interest in their counterpart's concerns (a negotiation behaviour) and were found to build credibility (a relationship building behaviour) significantly more often than the NGO participants. Although there was no significant difference in overall suboptimal negotiation behaviours between CAF and NGO participants, CAF participants displayed significantly more instances of threatening behaviour and were significantly more assertive than their NGO counterparts.

Coded negotiation instances were correlated with subjective collaboration outcome ratings (i.e., respect, power and influence, trust, satisfaction with relationship, satisfaction with negotiation outcome, and personal performance). In general, optimal collaboration behaviours were positively associated with collaboration outcomes. For instance, participants who engaged in more optimal negotiation behaviours

in the Refugee Camp scenario reported significantly higher levels of power and influence, trust, satisfaction with the negotiation outcomes, and personal performance during the negotiation. Engaging in optimal negotiation behaviours was also significantly correlated with feeling individual power and influence in the Project Security scenario, whereas in that scenario having a negotiation counterpart who engaged in optimal behaviours was significantly associated with heightened reported feelings of relationship satisfaction. Conversely, suboptimal collaboration behaviours were negatively associated with suboptimal collaboration outcomes. For example, participants whose counterparts engaged in more suboptimal negotiation behaviours in the Refugee Camp scenario reported significantly lower feelings of being respected, having power and influence, satisfaction with the negotiation relationship, satisfaction with the negotiation outcomes, and personal performance. Similar results regarding collaboration outcomes were also obtained for optimal and suboptimal relationship-building behaviours. However, qualitative analysis of the CAF-NGO negotiations indicated that, in some cases, seemingly suboptimal negotiation behaviours, such as assertiveness, may also promote effective collaboration, when employed in balance with optimal negotiation behaviours.

The results of the current study suggest that future training should emphasize the development of optimal negotiation behaviours in order to promote effective civil-military collaboration. However, findings also indicate that certain "suboptimal" negotiation traits may also be effective, depending on the negotiation context. Thus, the findings provide evidence of behaviours used in civil-military negotiations that seem aligned with negotiation models. Schneider (2012) holds that effective negotiation requires assertiveness, empathy, and flexibility. Similarly, Goodwin (2005) claims that effective civil-military negotiation is both cooperative and competitive. Results indicate that CAF participants are capable of being both assertive and empathetic, but that flexibility and the balance between assertiveness and empathy may require further training. Furthermore, training needs to acknowledge that negotiations are dynamic and thus no two are the same. Based on observations, suggested strategies and examples are provided for future training for CAF personnel, such as demonstrating friendliness, building trust, and being considerate of others' interests as well as discouraging threatening and disrespectful behaviour.

Table of Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

1. Introduction

The war and subsequent attempts at stabilization in Afghanistan over the past 10 years serve as examples of the changing dynamic of military engagements. Military tours are no longer independent, as success now relies on collaboration with other organizations, both government directed (e.g., Canadian International Development Agency, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade) and non-government directed (e.g., non-governmental organizations such as Doctors Without Borders, the Red Cross; Knight, 2008). Given that the primary objectives of these organizations differ vastly, but that overall goals are often the same and success is interdependent, collaboration often proves to be difficult (Meharg, 2007; Roberts, 2010; Winslow, 2002). For example, the primary focus of the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is most often defence and security against insurgents, whereas civilian agencies such as non-government organizations (NGOs) and other government departments (OGDs) focus on development and sustainability within the local population (Roberts, 2010). And yet, all of the organizations ultimately strive for the country's prosperity and independence.

1.1 Challenges in Civil-Military Interactions

Attempts at collaboration between military and civilian agencies often lead to challenges due to a variety of factors (e.g., Shannon, 2009; Thomson, Adams, Filardo, Flear, & DeWit, 2013; Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown, & Flear, 2011a; Thomson, Adams, Hall, & Flear, 2010). One of the biggest challenges for NGOs is establishing advantageous relationships with the military while also maintaining a neutral identity from the perspective of the local population (Shannon, 2009; Thomson et al., 2011a; Thomson et al. 2010). Indeed, without neutrality, NGOs can become targets themselves in the conflict. As Shannon (2009) reports, NGOs face a multitude of dilemmas with the changing dynamic of international aid, including the increased constraints on their independence and impartiality. These dilemmas have overall left NGOs feeling undermined, both in their day-to-day endeavours and in their (impartial) political stance. If and when they are linked with a military, NGOs are concerned that their identity in the local space can be irrevocably compromised (Thomson et al., 2011a). Indeed, civilian organizations fear for their own safety as well as that of the local nationals.

Another differentiating factor between civilian and military organizations is that the military tends to work on relatively short-term goals compared to NGOs and OGDs, who are more focused on long-term development (Thomson et al., 2011a; Winslow, 2002). This can create frustrations between the two groups, given that daily decision making can ultimately influence the attainment of each group's end goals. For example, in Afghanistan, the CAF conducted quick impact projects (QIP) in order to win the confidence of the local population and demonstrate its own legitimacy within the country. QIPs are low in cost, small in scale, and do not require a lot of time, and thus are ideally suited to a 6-month military rotation. However, development projects undertaken by NGOs are often long-term, meant to sustain a particular resource or capacity well into the future. According to civilian subject matter experts who served in Afghanistan, development projects rarely have a quick turnaround (Thomson, Adams, Hall, Brown, & Flear, 2011b; Thomson et al., 2010). Identification of projects may also be challenging as a result of short versus long timelines. Civil-military development project planning and execution, therefore, can be problematic as expectations differ.

The structure of these organizations presents another challenge to collaboration and negotiation (Roberts, 2010; Thomson et al., 2011a; Thomson et al., 2010; Winslow, 2002). For example, the military is fine-tuned to hierarchy and formality, whereas NGOs are accustomed to lateral or decentralized structure, are often "one deep," and often execute decisions "on the fly" (Roberts, 2010,

p. 213). Research also shows that military personnel tend to be more dominating and controlling in their communication, making it difficult for civilians to get their points across to their CAF counterparts and to feel that their contribution is valued (see Thomson, Adams, et al., 2013). This might be a result of the hierarchical and formal nature of the military's organizational structure or it could be a result of military communication, which is often straightforward and directive. Furthermore, differences in structure between military and civilian agencies can impact how exerted power, influence, and mutual respect (or lack thereof) between these organizations is perceived. Research also suggests that collaboration and negotiation between the CAF and civilian agencies can be challenging when roles are not clearly defined, when responsibilities are unclear, and when trust is impaired or not achieved (e.g., Thomson et al., 2010). Indeed, other research indicates that NGO personnel tend to feel little power and diminished respect when interacting with the CAF due to these issues (Thomson, Adams, et al., 2013).

Despite the differences between the military and civilian communities, each has its own necessary assets to offer the other. For example, civilian organizations, especially smaller ones, often depend on military security and military equipment in order to visit local communities (Ford, Hogan, & Perry, 2002; as cited in Roberts, 2010). Likewise, the CAF benefit from gaining civilian knowledge about the local nationals, humanitarian aid, and development projects (Roberts, 2010). Knight (2008) has stated that "cooperation [between civilian agencies and the military] is needed desperately to address the complex humanitarian emergencies that stem from post-Cold War conflicts" (p. 27). The give-and-take relationship between the two types of organizations highlights the advantages of a comprehensive approach to operations. However, executing this in a way that develops positive relationships, optimal outcomes, and open communication is a challenge, and thus demands continued civil-military collaboration training.

1.2 Negotiation Training

An important element of civil-military collaboration is negotiation (Thomson et al., 2010), and, as such, CAF personnel operating in a comprehensive approach to operations may benefit from negotiation training. Negotiation in general is a complicated skill to master, and perhaps more complicated to train. Although there is a plethora of literature on negotiation training, most of it focuses on situations outside of the civil-military scope (Goodwin, 2005), and therefore lacks situation-specific sensitivity, which by its very nature makes negotiation between civilians and military so intricate.

Schneider (2012) suggests that negotiations cannot just be labeled and subsequently trained by approach or style (such as positions-based or interests-based; see Fisher & Ury, 1981), but rather should be informed by specific descriptions of the actual situation. Some situations require a great deal of empathy and compromise, whereas others require more assertiveness and creativity. Schneider outlines a framework from Thomas (1960; as cited in Schneider, 2012) that emphasizes that, at the very least, if negotiators have the ability to be assertive, empathetic, and creative, and have the ability to manipulate these depending on the situation, they can navigate optimally through a negotiation. The Thomas framework can be found in Figure 1.



Figure 1: The Five Conflict-Handling Modes (CPP, 1996; as cited in Scheider, 2012)

The Thomas framework, Schneider suggests, is useful because it recognizes "the variety of negotiations in which people engage… (and) by including avoiding and compromising, [it] also permits a more nuanced discussion of how negotiation behaviour can vary over the course of a single negotiation" (p. 24). Essentially, the framework indicates that a given negotiation will call upon a person to actively balance the ideal amount of cooperativeness and assertiveness, and that ultimately, collaboration requires some creativity on each negotiator's part.

In an attempt to simplify the Thomas framework discussed above, Schneider presents the Triangle of Effectiveness (Figure 2).



Figure 2: Triangle of Effectiveness in Negotiation (Schneider, 2012)

Schneider's revised framework puts more emphasis on flexibility during a negotiation, stressing that adapting to the situation is what can ultimately lead to negotiation success. Indeed, one characteristic that has been seen as critical for CAF personnel operating in the comprehensive environment is flexibility/adaptability (Filardo, Thomson, Harkness, & Adams, 2013). Schneider also notes that in her previous research (Schneider 2002; as cited in Schneider 2012) she found there to be a difference between "true problem-solving" versus "cautious problem-solving" in negotiation, with the former involving being effective in the areas of assertiveness, empathy, and flexibility. Her results also indicate that true problem-solvers have higher rates of ethical behaviour and friendly personality.

Schneider (2012) also discusses the importance of social intuition and ethicality for successful negotiations. Social intuition is characterized by social awareness and interaction, whereas ethicality incorporates issues of trust and reputation. A negotiator might not always need all five skills (i.e., assertiveness, empathy, flexibility, social intuition and ethicality) within a given negotiation, but rather all should be available at any given time.

Schneider based her framework on her previous research on effective negotiation traits (2002; as cited in Schneider, 2012). Below is her original list of the most effective traits, as well as some ineffective traits, with some average or neutral traits in between (see Table 1).

Table 1: Schneider's (2002; cited in Schneider, 2012) Top Negotiation Traits

Ineffective	Average/Neutral	Effective
Stubborn	Ethical	Ethical
Headstrong	Experienced	Experienced
Irritating	Confident	Personable
Assertive	Self-Controlled	Rational
Confident	Personable	Confident
Argumentative	Rational	Realistic
Arrogant	Assertive	Perceptive
Demanding	Realistic	Self-Controlled
Egotistical		Trustworthy
Quarrelsome		Communicative

It is important to note that assertiveness is considered both ineffective and average as a negotiation trait, underscoring the importance of flexibility within a given negotiation, and the importance of situational context. Some instances or situations will require more assertiveness than others, but this does not mean it will always be ineffective. This is also true for ethicality, for instance, as it is listed under both effective and average.

Goodwin (2005) too considers the balance of competitive and cooperative negotiation. As she explains, a cooperative negotiation does not mean the absence of competition – "to act cooperatively …does not preclude the possibility [to] also act competitively at any stage of the same negotiation" (Goodwin, 2005, p. 28). Goodwin's claim supports Schneider's framework in that she recognizes that some seemingly suboptimal behaviours, such as assertiveness or competitiveness, may be necessary for effective civil-military negotiation. Indeed, Schneider argues that assertiveness is a necessary skill because it is characteristically linked with competence and knowledge, and an overarching drive to get things accomplished. Her previous findings, and her subsequent framework, imply the delicate balance that each and every negotiation requires and further encourages the need to train each of the necessary skills involved, including assertiveness, while avoiding acting arrogant and quarrelsome.

To promote true problem-solving, Schneider (2012) encourages the need for empathy and flexibility training. Empathy is a complex skill, requiring an open mind, solid listening skills, and a willingness to see and feel things from another's perspective. Empathy also requires some sort of intent to build a relationship and to acknowledge others' needs. Flexibility, according to Schneider, is the capacity to successfully navigate the balance between assertiveness and empathy. It is the difference between "simple compromising [and] sophisticated integrative solutions" (Schneider, 2012, p. 30), that is, solutions that allow all parties' interests to be integrated in a way that provides joint value or mutual gains (Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010[1]). Flexibility requires that you have refined both assertiveness and empathy skills and that you recognize when to select more of one over the other. Flexibility enables a person to analyze and respond to the situation at a given moment within the negotiation.

When it comes to civil-military negotiations, nothing is clear-cut, as pointed out above. However, the overarching themes present in Schneider's (2012) theory (i.e., assertiveness, empathy, flexibility, social intuition, and ethicality) are relevant to military negotiations as is evidenced in recent negotiation research investigating the comprehensive approach to operations in the CAF (Thomson, Adams, et al., 2013). For example, in support of a previous applied research program (ARP) on "JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain," Thomson, Adams, and colleagues (2013) examined collaboration themes and also considered perceived power differentials in negotiation success in a civil-military operational context. The study was a preliminary attempt at addressing the gaps in ideal execution of the comprehensive approach. Participants were 21 CAF personnel, most of whom had Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) experience/training, and 22 International Development graduate students (representing the civilian sample or NGOs). Participants were paired into dyads and asked to negotiate through two fictional scenarios. Each participant was paired twice, creating one dyad per scenario, for a total of 42 dyads. The negotiations, which took place via Skype, were examined by use of a negotiation coding scheme that included four behavioural categories: respect, influence strategies (i.e., power), negotiation, and communication.[2] The results showed that respect and disrespect were tightly linked with negotiation success. That is, when negotiations were not optimal, civilian participants indicated feeling less respected. Likewise, power differentiations were found to sabotage successful negotiations, as was evidenced when NGO participants felt that their CAF counterparts were overexerting their perceived power within the negotiation.

1.3 Purpose of the Current Research

Building on "JIMP Essentials in the Public Domain," a new 3-year Defence Research and Development Canada (DRDC) – Toronto Research Centre ARP entitled "Training Toolkit for the Comprehensive Approach" has been established to develop training tools for CAF personnel operating in the comprehensive environment. In support of this new ARP, the overall purpose of the current research is to identify negotiation best practices for the CAF, because "the growth of civil-military liaison work and non-confrontational encounters… to uphold a mandate of neutrality dictate an urgent requirement for any soldier to be able to negotiate responsibly and effectively" (Goodwin, 2005, p. xvi). Following the reasoning of Goodwin (2005) and Schneider (2012), if assertiveness or competitiveness is balanced with optimal negotiation behaviours such as empathy and cooperation, then the CAF can flourish in their civilian negotiations.

[1] For Thompson et al. (2010), negotiations are said to be integrative when all parties' interests are integrated in a way that provides joint value or mutual gains. Negotiations are distributive when parties compete over limited resources (i.e., when one party profits and the other loses).

[2] It is important to note that the focus for Thomson, Adams, and colleagues (2013) was on collaboration, which was meant to encompass, but not be synonymous with, negotiation.

The coding scheme developed by Thomson, Adams, et al. (2013) categorized behaviours as optimal and suboptimal, and referred to all optimal behaviours as integrative and all suboptimal behaviours as distributive. For the purposes of the current project, we adopted a revised coding scheme (Thomson, Brown, Davis, Filardo, & Adams, 2013) to more effectively tap the complexity of civil-military negotiation by incorporating the aforementioned facets of competitiveness and cooperation (see Goodwin, 2005) as well as more accurately differentiating between integrative versus distributive methods (see Thompson et al., 2010). The coding scheme includes three competencies, namely relationship building, negotiation, and communication behaviours. Behaviours within each competency are differentiated between optimal and suboptimal. The revised coding scheme includes behaviour codes that closely resemble each of the five modes noted in Thomas' framework (see Figure 1 above), but is much more discrete, in that it is more specific and gives more detailed descriptions of the type of observed behaviour being coded.

Though behaviours in the coding scheme are coded as "optimal" and "suboptimal," it should be noted that the effectiveness of some collaboration behaviours may depend on the context, and that a balance of different behaviours (whether judged to be integrative, distributive, optimal, or suboptimal) may be needed for effective collaboration. A seemingly suboptimal behaviour, such as assertiveness or competitiveness, could be offset or balanced by a more optimal behaviour such as empathy in an effective negotiation, and could even be judged to be integrative rather than distributive. Similarly, in the original coding scheme, it was considered a suboptimal negotiation behaviour, and therefore distributive, to "suggest a compromise or willingness to concede on an issue," whereas in the revised coding scheme, this type of behaviour (characterized by a willingness to hear your counterpart's interests and concerns to achieve mutual benefits) may be seen as more integrative or (in some cases) as more optimal. Similarly, collaboration behaviours may or may not be considered optimal given the context.

Thus, the current study is intended to help further advance the comprehensive approach training toolkit, with a focus on the CAF's approach to negotiation in particular. The goals of the current research are to identify the potential impacts of different collaboration behaviours on negotiation counterparts and to identify effective strategies used in these types of negotiations.

2. Methods

Data used in this project were collected in a previous task authorization for DRDC – Toronto Research Centre (Thomson, Adams, et al., 2013), in which CAF personnel and NGO personnel worked through two fictional operational scenarios via Skype. These operational scenarios required participants to negotiate organization-specific priorities that sometimes conflicted with their counterpart's interests. Detailed descriptions of the data collection methods can be found in Thomson, Adams, et al. (2013).

2.1 Participants

Military participants were 21 CAF personnel, most of whom had Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) experience and/or training (one participant had Information Operations experience rather than CIMIC experience). Civilian ("NGO") participants were 22 students enrolled in the International Development post-graduate program at Toronto's Humber College. Participant demographics can be found in Table 2 below.[3]

Table 2: Participants' Demographic Information

Variable and Category	CAF (N = 18)		NGO (N = 21)	
	N	%	N	%
First Language				
English	18	100	18	85.7
French	0	0	1	4.8
Other	0	0	2	9.5
Age Range				
22-26	1	5.6	15	76.2
27-31	2	11.1	4	19.0
32-36	1	5.6	1	4.8
37-41	3	16.7	1	4.8
42-46	5	27.8	0	0
47-51	5	27.8	0	0
52 and over	1	5.6	0	0
Gender				
Male	17	94.4	4	19.0
Female	1	5.6	17	81.0
Education (Highest Level Obtained)				
High school	1	5.6	0	0
Some university or college	3	16.7	0	0
University or college degree	8	44.4	18	85.7
Graduate degree	6	33.3	3	14.3

[3] Three of the 21 CAF participants and one of the 22 NGO participants did not provide demographic information.

As can be seen in Table 2, the majority of NGO participants were female and under the age of 27, whereas the majority of CAF participants were male and older than 27 years of age. First language and education were similar between the two groups.

2.2 Scenarios

Participants were paired into dyads for each of two operation negotiation scenarios (Project Security, Refugee Camp). The Project Security (PS) scenario focused on the security of a water irrigation and well development project. The Refugee Camp (RC) scenario focused on the establishment of a refugee camp. In both scenarios, participants had organization-specific negotiation priorities which were clearly identified, in writing, prior to the negotiation. The instructions/goals varied between CAF and NGO participants. For example, in the PS scenario, the CAF participants were instructed to negotiate to keep the forward operating base (FOB) near the village, whereas the NGO participants were instructed to negotiate to have the FOB moved away from the village. The full scenarios, including negotiation priorities, can be found in Appendix A (RC scenario) and Appendix B (PS scenario).[4]

2.3 Procedure

The following section describes the procedure for the current study only. For procedure details regarding the Skype setup and the interactions, see Thomson, Adams, et al. (2013).

2.3.1 Transcriptions

Two members of the research team transcribed, verbatim, a total of 42 Skype recordings of the CAF-NGO interactions. Transcriptions were completed using Express Scribe Pro software, foot pedals, and Microsoft Word 2010. Express Scribe Pro is a software program that allows users to control audio playback while transcribing audio recordings. The average dyad recording was 17 minutes long and took an average of 2 hours to transcribe. Most of the recordings were clear; however, occasionally the audio was muffled due to background noise. Time details were included in the transcripts at points where transcription was not possible. All transcribed dyads were anonymized.

2.3.2 Coding scheme

Following transcription, each dyad was coded using the coding scheme created by Thomson, Brown, et al. (2013) comprising three main competencies for collaboration being examined: negotiation, communication and relationship building. These competencies were broken down into activity and characteristic levels. For example, if a counterpart was respectful by way of acknowledging the other's needs, the appropriate code at the characteristic level was "respect," falling under the "appreciation" activity level in the relationship building coding scheme (see Table 5). For greater detail on the development of the current coding scheme, please see Thomson, Brown, et al. (2013).

The coding scheme for the three competencies can be found in Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5. Note that counterpart is denoted as "CP" in all tables in this report.

[4] Civilian participants represented an NGO in each of the two scenarios.

Table 3: Negotiation Coding Scheme

Optimal		Suboptimal	
Negotiation			
Cooperative	Willingness to hear CP's concerns, interests, goals, etc. to achieve mutual benefits	Competitive	Sees interests as scarce; views alternatives suspiciously; unwilling to listen to CP
Building an understanding of CP's interests	Includes various concerns, goals, hopes, fears that are held in relation to negotiation	Assertive	Taking charge of the situation
Preparation	Understanding one's position including areas where one is willing to compromise	Threatening/ anger expression	Making ultimatums; strategic expressions to convey anger; using scare tactics
Identifying shared areas of interest	Satisfying interests of all parties, convergence	Maintain one's own position	Seeks solutions that benefits oneself without considering other's interests, etc.
Seeking long-term benefits	Shared mission objectives	Seeking short-term gains	No long-term vision to negotiation

Table 4: Communication Coding Scheme

Optimal		Suboptimal	
Expressivity			
Clear	Using words that both parties understand	Unclear	Use of acronyms particular to organization
Direct/concise	To the point; directive statements	Indirect/ inconcise	Compound discussion; unable to determine priorities
Sensitivity			
Elicit input from CP	Ask questions	"One-upping"	Providing examples that devalue the other's experience
Listen to CP	Focus on CP's interests; feedback statements	Interrupting	Not allowing CP to express their full thoughts/views
Summarize yours and CP's points	Ask if CP has understood; summarize what they've said	Assumption of understanding	Assuming you've understood your CP or that they have understood you
Control			
Open and honest	Free info exchange	Closed	Withholding info; classifying info
Turn-taking	Give opportunity for CP to discuss their concerns	Dominating conversation	Providing no opportunity for one's CP to speak
*Note: use of foul language and sarcasm also classified as suboptimal, but unlikely to be evident in interactions			

Table 5: Relationship Building Coding Scheme

Optimal		Suboptimal	
Creating an Effective Atmosphere			
Respecting boundaries	Respecting that CP has a job to do	Taking control of situation	Automatically jumping to the authority position; assertive
Establishing common ground	Finding something in common with CP; same overarching goals/mandate	Polarizing identities	Creating an "us" vs "them" environment; not a team player; excluding CP; resentment toward CP
Validating CP's position	Providing support for CP's beliefs, opinions, presence, work	Undermining CP's position	Pointing out reasons that CP's beliefs, presence, work are/is invalid
Availability/ accessibility	Making time for CP (professionally)	Inaccessible	Making no time for CP, thus creating message that they are not a priority
Neutral space	Willing to meet in a neutral location; working environment, tasks	Establishing dominant space	Meeting only in one's own space; working environment, tasks
Building Trust			
Transparency	Being up front about priorities/intentions/ info	Secrecy	Not being up front about goals/ priorities/info; not inviting CP to meetings
Credibility	Showing your reliability, competence	Non-credibility	Showing oneself to be unreliable; taking advantage of CP
Socializing			
Friendly	Outgoing, willing to talk/socialize with CP	Avoidant	Shyness, unwillingness to interact with CP socially
Appreciation			
Empathetic	Showing sensitivity to CP's feelings	Insensitivity	Ignoring CP's feelings
Avoiding fundamental attribution error	Acknowledging that a situation, not CP, may be to blame for difficult/undesirable outcomes	Fundamental attribution error	Assuming difficulties are a result of something inherent about the CP
Non-judgmental	Accepting opinions without qualification	Stereotyping	Pre-judgments about CP's personality, beliefs, or capabilities
Appreciating contribution	Acknowledging when other has provided something or contributing something they did not need to contribute	Lack of gratitude	Feelings of entitlement
Respect	Regard for CP, their expertise, wishes, opinions, etc.; agree to disagree	Disrespect	Showing no regard for CP, their expertise, wishes, beliefs, etc.

It is important to note that the negotiation coding scheme was altered slightly for this project. Specifically, the description of 'threatening/anger expression' was expanded for this project to include the use of scare tactics (see Table 3). The use of scare tactics to threaten or support a counterpart's argument was not evident when coding collaboration transcripts in previous projects, but was evident while analyzing the current data. As such, the coding scheme was revised to add the use of scare tactics as a description of "threatening/anger expression."

2.4 Coding in NVivo

Each negotiation dyad transcript was individually analyzed using the qualitative software program NVivo8. NVivo8 allows for the organization and classification of optimal and suboptimal instances, according to the corresponding theme in the coding scheme. NVivo8 is able to combine all the occurrences of a particular theme for further analysis. For example, a report can be generated that lists all instances of a particular characteristic code, such as competitive or cooperative. Participant numbers are attached to each coded excerpt, which allowed the researchers to calculate the frequency counts used for data analysis.

A member of the research team read each of the dyad transcripts and coded behaviours representing an occurrence of communication, relationship building, or negotiation competencies. All coding was done at the characteristic level according to the coding scheme, including optimal and suboptimal instances. Coding was conducted at the paragraph or multi-paragraph level. For example, a negotiation counterpart's full response would be coded as one behaviour (e.g., "cooperative"), rather than coding each sentence within the paragraph as multiple instances of the same behaviour. This was done so that each code contained a fuller context of the counterpart's behaviour than a sentence would provide. In addition, the research team agreed that each coded instance would only be coded once. For example, a response would be coded as competitive, but not competitive and assertive. The code that was judged to most accurately reflect the instance was used.

For our analyses, behaviours that related directly to the content of the negotiation script and subsequent outcomes were coded as being negotiation behaviours. Those behaviours that were more personal in nature were coded as relationship building behaviours. For example "Do you have any other priorities or concerns" would be coded as Building an Understanding (Negotiation), whereas "Are you from Canada yourself?" would be coded as Friendly (Relationship Building). Behaviours related specifically to how participants communicated with each other (e.g., interrupting) were coded as communication behaviours.

2.5 Collaboration Outcome Measures

Thomson, Adams, et al. (2013) had participants complete a 70-item self-report questionnaire after finishing the negotiation. We include seven measures from this questionnaire in our analyses, namely:

- Individual respect,
- Individual power and influence,
- Individual trust,
- Perceptions of counterpart,
- Satisfaction with relationship,
- Satisfaction with outcomes, and
- Personal performance.

These measures were deemed to provide insight into the impact that optimal and suboptimal collaboration behaviours had on participants. All measures were completed using a 5-point Likert-type scale response format. More detailed descriptions of the measures and their reliabilities can be found in Thomson, Adams, et al. (2013).

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3. Results

As noted earlier, each negotiation dyad transcript was coded by a research team member for both optimal and suboptimal behaviours relevant to negotiation, relationship building, and communication. In the following sections, we provide the frequency counts for the coded behaviours, compare behaviour frequencies between NGO and CAF participants, and correlate the behaviour frequencies with collaboration outcome measures obtained by Thomson, Adams, et al. (2013). We also offer a list of optimal and suboptimal negotiation strategies identified through the coding analyses.

3.1 Negotiation

In this section, we show the frequencies of negotiation behaviours, compare the negotiation behaviour frequencies between NGO and CAF participants, and correlate the negotiation behaviour frequencies with collaboration outcome measures.

3.1.1 Frequency of negotiation behaviours

Negotiation behaviours were the most frequently coded behaviours in the civil-military interaction dyads. The total frequencies for optimal and suboptimal negotiation behaviours are shown in Table 6.

Table 6: Total Negotiation Behaviours by Activity

Activity	Total Frequency Count	% Frequency
Optimal Negotiation Behaviours		
Cooperative	108	27%
Building an understanding of CP's interests	50	12%
Identifying shared areas of interest	26	6%
Seeking long-term benefits	18	5%
Total Optimal Negotiation Behaviours	**202**	**50%**
Suboptimal Negotiation Behaviours		
Maintain one's own position	79	19%
Competitive	48	12%
Threatening/anger expression	44	11%
Assertive	32	8%
Total Suboptimal Negotiation Behaviours	**203**	**50%**
Total Negotiation Behaviour Frequency	**405**	**100%**

As can be seen in Table 6, the proportion of optimal and suboptimal negotiation behaviours was nearly evenly split. The most frequently observed optimal behaviour was showing cooperation (26%), whereas maintaining one's own position (20%) was the most frequently identified suboptimal negotiation behaviour. Of the optimal negotiation behaviours, 120 (59%) were exhibited in the Project Security dyads and 82 (41%) were exhibited in the Refugee Camp dyads. These percentages were reversed with respect to suboptimal negotiation behaviours in that 115 (57%) were exhibited in Refugee Camp dyads and 88 (43%) were exhibited in Project Security dyads.

A frequency breakdown for CAF participants and NGO participants for optimal negotiation behaviours can be seen in Figure 3.



Figure 3: Optimal Negotiation Behaviour Frequencies by Organization

The mean frequencies of observer codings were assessed using t-tests using organization (i.e., CAF, NGO) as the grouping variable. Overall, CAF participants ($M = 6.14$, $SD = 3.81$) engaged in significantly more optimal negotiation behaviours over the two scenarios than did the NGO participants ($M = 3.32$, $SD = 2.66$), $t_{41} = -2.82$, $p = .007$. We conducted further analyses on these individual behaviour frequencies and found that CAF participants ($M = 2.0$, $SD = 1.90$) engaged in building an understanding of their counterpart's interests significantly more often than did their civilian counterparts ($M = 0.37$, $SD = 0.66$), $t_{41} = -3.81$, $p = .0004$. Although CAF participants engaged in more overall cooperative behaviours (i.e., demonstrating a willingness to hear their counterpart's concerns, interests, and goals to achieve mutual benefits), this group difference was not statistically significant, $t_{41} = -1.41$, $p = .17$. No statistically significant differences were found between the two organizations for identifying shared areas of interest, $t_{41} = -0.46$, $p = .65$, or seeking long-term benefits, $t_{41} = -1.08$, $p = .29$.

A frequency breakdown for optimal negotiation behaviours for CAF participants and NGO participants in each scenario can be seen in Figure 4.



Figure 4: Optimal Negotiation Behaviour Frequencies by Scenario

As can be seen in Figure 4, CAF and NGO participants (taken together) engaged in more optimal negotiation behaviours in the Project Security scenario ($M = 2.90$, $SD = 2.1$) than in the Refugee Camp scenario ($M = 1.98$, $SD = 1.97$), $t_{41} = -2.92$, $p = .005$.

A frequency breakdown for CAF participants and NGO participants for suboptimal negotiation behaviours can be seen in Figure 5.



Figure 5: Suboptimal Negotiation Behaviour Frequencies by Organization

No significant difference was found in overall suboptimal negotiation behaviour frequencies between CAF ($M = 5.95$, $SD = 5.04$) and NGO ($M = 3.54$, $SD = 3.43$) participants, $t_{41} = -1.84$, $p = .07$. However, in looking at Figure 5, it can be seen that CAF and NGO participants participated more often in different types of suboptimal behaviours. We conducted further analyses on these individual

behaviour frequencies and found that CAF participants engaged in significantly more threatening behaviours *(M* = 1.81, *SD* = 2.16) than did NGO participants (*M* = 0.27, *SD* = 0.55), t_{41} = -3.23, *p* = .002. CAF also engaged in more assertive behaviours (*M* = 1.19, *SD* = 1.57) than did NGO participants (*M* = 0.32, *SD* = 0.78), t_{41} = -2.32, *p* = .025[5]. Although, at a descriptive level, NGO participants engaged in comparatively more competitive behaviours than CAF participants (i.e., they saw interests as scarce, viewed alternatives suspiciously, and were unwilling to listen to their counterpart to a greater extent), this difference was not statistically significant, t_{41} = 1.40, *p* = .17. No statistically significant difference was found between CAF and NGO participants for maintaining their own position during the scenarios, t_{41} = -1.21, *p* = .23.

A frequency breakdown for suboptimal negotiation behaviours for CAF participants and NGO participants in each scenario can be seen in Figure 6.



Figure 6: Suboptimal Negotiation Behaviour Frequencies by Scenario

Both CAF and NGO participants (taken together) engaged in more suboptimal negotiation behaviours in the Refugee Camp scenario (*M* = 2.49, *SD* = 2.75) than in the Project Security scenario (*M* = 2.12, *SD* = 2.61), though this was not a statistically significant difference, t_{41} = -0.69, *p* = 0.32.

3.1.2 Impact of negotiation behaviours on outcomes

Of particular interest for this project was the relationship between both own and counterpart's negotiation behaviour frequencies (optimal and suboptimal) and collaboration outcomes. Collaboration outcomes include satisfaction with the relationship, satisfaction with outcomes, perceptions of personal performance, and perceptions of one's counterpart. We also included feelings

[5] A Bonferroni adjustment was not used in these analyses to correct for family wise error rate for a number of reasons. Firstly, there is no consensus as to what defines a "family" of variables. Rather the variables that make up a family are at the discretion of the researcher conducting the analysis. Secondly, the Bonferroni adjustment is conservative in nature and can result in important differences being found non-significant (i.e., type II error). Thirdly, the Bonferroni adjustment implies that a given comparison will be interpreted differently according to how many other analyses were run (Perneger, 1998). Instead of including Bonferroni adjustments, all t-test analyses in this report include the t-score and exact p-value for the reader's information.

of respect, individual power and influence, and trust as collaboration outcomes. These correlations can be found in Table 7 and Table 8 below.

Table 7: Correlations between Counterpart's Negotiation Behaviour Frequencies and Collaboration Outcomes

	Project Security		Refugee Camp	
	CP's Optimal Negotiation behaviours	CP's Suboptimal Negotiation behaviours	CP's Optimal Negotiation behaviours	CP's Suboptimal Negotiation behaviours
Individual Respect	0.21	-0.07	0.20	**-0.36***
Individual Power and Influence	0.30	-0.20	0.11	**-0.35***
Individual Trust	0.28	-0.29	0.30	-0.27
Perceptions of CP	0.25	-0.21	0.18	-0.22
Satisfaction with relationship	**0.33***	-0.06	0.26	**-0.32***
Satisfaction with outcomes	0.10	-0.30	0.25	**-0.42****
Personal performance	0.04	-0.16	0.23	**-0.33***

Note: *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$

For this analysis we conducted correlations between counterpart's negotiation behaviours (total optimal negotiation behaviour frequency and total suboptimal negotiation behaviour frequency) and collaboration outcome scores for each of the scenarios. As can be seen in Table 7, a pattern emerges in which optimal negotiation behaviours are positively correlated with collaboration outcomes and suboptimal negotiation behaviours are negatively correlated with collaboration outcomes, though these correlations are not all significant. Significant correlations were found between counterpart's suboptimal negotiation behaviours and collaboration outcomes in the Refugee Camp scenario. Specifically, having a negotiation counterpart who engaged in suboptimal negotiation behaviour was significantly associated with lowered reported feelings of respect, power and influence, satisfaction with the relationship, satisfaction with the outcomes, and perceived personal performance in the negotiation. In the Project Security scenario, having a negotiation counterpart who engaged in optimal behaviours was significantly associated with heightened reported feelings of relationship satisfaction.

It is important to reiterate that these significant correlations were found for the total optimal negotiation behaviour frequency and the total suboptimal negotiation behaviour frequency. As noted by Schneider (2002), some suboptimal behaviours can be used for effective negotiation. Specifically, Schneider views assertiveness as being ineffective or neutral, depending on the context. As such, it was important to determine if assertiveness would be correlated with collaboration outcomes, such as trust, power and influence, and respect, to see if it was interpreted as suboptimal or optimal in a given context. However, further tests conducted using assertiveness as a predictor found no statistically significant relationships with the correlation outcomes at $p < .05$.

Similar results were also found for correlations between one's own negotiation behaviour frequencies and collaboration outcomes (Table 8).

Table 8: Correlations between Own Negotiation Behaviour Frequencies and Collaboration Outcomes

	Project Security		Refugee Camp	
	Own Optimal Negotiation behaviours	Own Suboptimal Negotiation behaviours	Own Optimal Negotiation behaviours	Own Suboptimal Negotiation behaviours
Individual Respect	0.19	-0.27	0.29	0.10
Individual Power and Influence	**0.36***	-0.06	**0.42****	0.18
Individual Trust	0.11	-0.24	**0.33***	-0.25
Perceptions of CP	0.17	-0.27	0.13	-0.18
Satisfaction with relationship	0.16	-0.26	0.22	-0.20
Satisfaction with outcomes	0.28	0.01	**0.40****	-0.17
Personal performance	0.20	-0.01	**0.46****	-0.07

Note: *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$

As with counterpart's negotiation behaviours, the pattern of results show that own optimal negotiation behaviour frequencies were positively correlated with collaboration outcomes and own suboptimal negotiation behaviour frequencies were generally negatively correlated with collaboration outcomes, though not all of these correlations were statistically significant. Statistically significant correlations were found between own optimal negotiation behaviour frequencies and collaboration outcomes in the Refugee Camp scenario. Specifically, participants reported a significantly greater sense of individual power and influence, individual trust, satisfaction with the collaboration outcomes, and personal performance when they engaged in more optimal negotiation behaviours. Optimal negotiation behaviour frequencies were also significantly correlated with feeling individual power and influence in the Project Security scenario.

Overall, these results indicate that participants had a greater sense of satisfaction with the negotiation, had a greater sense of personal power, felt more respected, and trusted their counterpart more when the participants and/or their counterparts engaged in more optimal negotiation behaviours. The opposite was true when participants and/or their counterparts engaged in more suboptimal negotiation behaviours.

3.2 Relationship Building

In this section, we provide the frequencies of optimal and suboptimal relationship building behaviours, compare the relationship building behaviour frequencies between NGO and CAF participants, and correlate the relationship building behaviour frequencies with collaboration outcome measures.

3.2.1 Frequency of relationship building behaviours

The total frequencies for optimal and suboptimal relationship building behaviours are set out below in Table 9.

Table 9: Total Relationship Building Behaviours by Activity

	Activity	Total Frequency Count	% Frequency
Optimal Relationship Building Behaviours	**Creating an Effective Atmosphere**		
	Respecting boundaries	2	1%
	Establishing common ground	23	16%
	Validating CP's position	5	3%
	Availability	3	2%
	Appreciation		
	Appreciating contribution	2	1%
	Respect	46	33%
	Building Trust		
	Transparency	8	6%
	Credibility	13	9%
	Socializing		
	Friendly behaviour	27	18%
Total Optimal Relationship Building Behaviours		**129**	**89%**
Suboptimal Relationship Building Behaviours	**Creating an Effective Atmosphere**		
	Polarizing identities	7	5%
	Undermining CP's position	5	3%
	Appreciation		
	Lack of gratitude	1	1%
	Disrespect	3	2%
Total Suboptimal Relationship Building Behaviours		**16**	**11%**
Total Relationship Building Frequency		**145**	**100%**

As can be seen in Table 9, the majority of relationship building behaviours observed in the negotiations (89%) were optimal. A small percentage of behaviours that might undermine relationship building were observed over the course of the negotiations (11%). Participants frequently demonstrated respect (33%), friendliness (18%), and attempts to establish common ground (16%).

The breakdown of optimal and suboptimal relationship building behaviours between organizations can be seen in Figure 7 and Figure 8, respectively.



Figure 7: Optimal Relationship Building Behaviour Frequencies by Organization

Overall, CAF participants ($M = 4.19$, $SD = 2.48$) engaged in significantly more optimal relationship building behaviours than did the NGO participants ($M = 1.86$, $SD = 1.55$), $t_{41} = -3.70$, $p = .0006$. In particular, CAF participants engaged in more credibility-building behaviours ($M = 0.62$, $SD = 1.02$) than their NGO counterparts ($M = 0.00$, $SD = .00$), $t_{41} = 2.83$, $p = .007$. CAF participants also engaged more frequently in behaviours coded as establishing common ground and respect (i.e., showing regard for their counterpart and his/her expertise, wishes, and opinions), although these differences were not statistically significant ($t_{41} = -1.96$, $p = .06$ for establishing common ground, and $t_{41} = -1.27$, $p = .21$ for respect). Thomson, Adams, et al. (2013) found that NGO participants reported significantly lower respect scores in the Refugee Camp scenario than in the Project Security scenario. Our results here are consistent with this finding, as 33 of the observed respect behaviours were seen in the Project Security dyads, but only 13 of these behaviours were observed in the Refugee Camp scenario. Care should be taken, however, in interpreting these results where the behaviour frequencies are low.

A breakdown for CAF participants and NGO participants for suboptimal relationship building behaviour frequencies can be seen in Figure 8.



Figure 8: Suboptimal Relationship Building Behaviour Frequencies by Organization

No statistical analyses were conducted for suboptimal relationship building behaviour frequencies due to the very low frequency counts. It can be seen, however, that at a descriptive level CAF participants engaged in more polarizing identity behaviours and disrespectful behaviours than the NGO participants.

3.2.2 Impact of relationship behaviours on outcomes

The relationships between both own and counterpart's relationship building behaviour frequencies (optimal and suboptimal) and collaboration outcomes can be seen in Table 10.

Table 10: Correlations between Counterpart's Relationship Behaviour Frequencies and Collaboration Outcomes

	Project Security		Refugee Camp	
	CP's Optimal Relationship Building Behaviours	**CP's Suboptimal Relationship Building Behaviours**	**CP's Optimal Relationship Building Behaviours**	**CP's Suboptimal Relationship Building Behaviours**
Individual Respect	0.00	-0.14	-0.10	-0.15
Individual Power and Influence	-0.07	**-0.48****	-0.20	-0.18
Individual Trust	0.15	-0.02	0.23	-0.24
Perceptions of CP	0.26	-0.21	0.08	-0.25
Satisfaction with relationship	0.21	-0.24	0.21	-0.25
Satisfaction with outcomes	0.00	-0.23	-0.03	-0.10
Personal performance	-0.08	-0.16	-0.21	0.00

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01

Generally speaking, participants reported higher collaboration outcome scores when their counterpart engaged in more overall optimal relationship building behaviours, and reported lower collaboration outcome scores when their counterpart engaged in more overall suboptimal relationship building behaviours. Despite this general pattern, only one relationship was statistically significant. In the Project Security scenario, participants reported significantly less power and influence when their counterpart engaged in more suboptimal relationship building behaviours.

A similar pattern regarding collaboration outcomes was also found with own optimal and suboptimal relationship building behaviours (Table 11).

Table 11: Correlations between Own Relationship Building Behaviour Frequencies and Collaboration Outcomes

	Project Security		Refugee Camp	
	Own Optimal Relationship Building Behaviours	Own Suboptimal Relationship Building Behaviours	Own Optimal Relationship Building Behaviours	Own Suboptimal Relationship Building Behaviours
Individual Respect	0.17	**-0.34***	0.25	0.06
Individual Power and Influence	0.16	**-0.39***	0.26	0.10
Individual Trust	0.16	-0.27	0.19	**-0.34***
Perceptions of CP	0.28	**-0.55****	0.24	**-0.31***
Satisfaction with relationship	0.18	**-0.42****	0.30	**-0.35***
Satisfaction with outcomes	0.07	-0.06	0.23	0.02
Personal performance	-0.02	0.04	**0.36***	-0.24

Note: *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$

For the most part, participants who engaged in more overall positive relationship building behaviours provided higher collaboration outcome scores, though again these findings were not statistically significant. The only exception was that participants in the Refugee Camp scenario reported significantly higher personal performance scores when they engaged in more overall positive relationship building behaviours. On the other hand, when participants engaged in more overall suboptimal relationship building behaviours they reported significantly lower collaboration outcomes scores. For instance, in both scenarios, participants who engaged in more overall suboptimal relationship building behaviours themselves also reported lowered perceptions of their counterpart and lower satisfaction with the relationship.

As with negotiation behaviours, these findings suggest that, in general, optimal relationship building behaviours are related to more positive collaboration outcomes and suboptimal relationship building behaviours are related to more negative collaboration outcomes.

3.3 Communication

The frequencies of communication behaviours were quite low because exchanges between counterparts were more often coded as examples of negotiation or building relationships. As such, we include the frequencies in Table 12, but do not provide correlations between these frequencies and the outcome measures.

Table 12: Frequency of Communication Behaviors

	Activity	Total Frequency Count	% Frequency
Optimal Communication Behaviours	**Sensitivity**		
	Elicit input from CP	1	6%
	Summarize points	1	6%
Total Optimal Communication Behaviours		**2**	**12%**
Suboptimal Communication Behaviours	**Expressivity**		
	Unclear	6	33%
	Indirect	5	26%
	Sensitivity		
	Interrupting	4	22%
	Assumption of Understanding	1	6%
Total Suboptimal Communication Behaviours		**16**	**88%**
Total Communication Frequency		**18**	**100%**

The majority of the communication behaviours were coded as either unclear or indirect. In these instances, participants used language specific to their organization (e.g., acronyms) or they changed topic several times without making a point that related to the negotiation.

A breakdown showing the communication behaviours for CAF and NGO participants can be seen in Figure 9.



Figure 9: Communication Behaviour Frequencies By Organization

No statistical analyses were conducted for communication behaviours by organization due to very low frequency counts. However, Figure 9 shows that, at a descriptive level, NGO participants were more likely to engage in indirect or interrupting behaviour, whereas CAF participants were more likely to engage in unclear communication behaviour.

3.4 Summary

Clearly, the frequency of optimal and suboptimal behaviours has an impact on participants' perceptions of overall collaboration. For both negotiation behaviours and relationship building behaviours, participants reported more positive perceptions of collaboration when the participant engaged in more optimal behaviours and when their counterpart engaged in more optimal behaviours. On the other hand, participants reported less positive perceptions of collaboration when they or their counterpart engaged in more suboptimal negotiation and relationship building behaviours.

When it comes to relationship building, the participants' own behaviours had more of an impact on collaboration outcome scores than did counterpart behaviours. Specifically, statistically significant negative correlations were found between own suboptimal behaviour and perceptions of counterpart and satisfaction with the relationship for both scenarios, as well as between own suboptimal behaviour and perceptions of trust (RC scenario), respect (PS scenario), and power and influence (PS scenario). As noted earlier, those behaviours deemed to be more personal in nature (i.e., not specific to the negotiation script or goals) were coded as relationship building. The results suggest that there is a strong link between engaging in suboptimal relationship building behaviours and feeling more negatively about the collaboration in general, at least when considering suboptimal behaviours as a whole.

It is important to note, however, that certain suboptimal collaboration behaviours can actually be used for effective negotiation, or may at least be considered neutral (e.g., Schneider, 2002; see also the following sections). The correlations discussed above only address optimal and suboptimal behaviours as a whole. Tests looking at the relationship between assertiveness and collaboration outcomes, for instance, did not yield any significant correlations, and this may be because assertiveness is not always suboptimal behaviour. As such, care should be taken in interpreting these results, and in making statistical inferences, particularly in cases where the frequencies of behaviours are low. In general, the present findings would require validation in future research.

3.5 Optimal Strategies

Given the differences in outcome ratings associated with optimal and suboptimal behaviours, it was important to identify optimal negotiation strategies and to begin thinking about how such strategies could contribute to CAF training. We considered what particular strategies stood out that made the negotiation successful.

To this end, the HSI® research team identified five dyads (dyads 2, 3, 31, and 57 were PS scenarios; dyad 13 was an RC scenario) that were thought to represent optimal strategies. In these dyads, an average of 14 optimal behaviours (across all three collaboration competencies, i.e., negotiation, relationship building, communication) were coded, whereas an average of 1 suboptimal behaviour was coded. It is interesting to note that, despite the majority of CAF participants being male and the majority of NGO participants being female (see Table 2), three of the dyads identified as representing optimal strategies had a male NGO participant and one dyad had a female CAF participant.

The behaviours in these dyads were analyzed for trends to identify optimal strategies when negotiating. Overwhelmingly, the counterparts in these dyads combined optimal negotiation and relationship building behaviours to negotiate a satisfactory outcome for both parties. From this review, we identified five optimal strategies that participants used that we believe are important for successful collaboration outcomes. These included:

- generating alternative ideas that allow for mutually satisfactory outcomes,
- promoting trust (e.g., using past experience to build credible support for an argument),
- demonstrating friendliness (e.g., getting to know your counterpart),
- building an understanding of your counterpart's negotiation position, and
- preceding and following suboptimal statements with optimal statements.

3.5.1 Generating alternative ideas that allow for mutually satisfactory outcomes

The use of creativity may promote "win-win" situations for one's self and counterpart. Within each negotiation script, participants were given a number of priorities that they were trying to negotiate for their respective organization. Some participants, however, were able to generate ways to achieve the same priorities for their organization (e.g., maintain a level of presence to safeguard the project), but also reach mutually satisfactory outcomes for themselves and their counterparts that could not be achieved by strictly adhering to the scripted solutions. The following is an example of generating alternative ideas that allow for mutually satisfactory outcomes and that demonstrate creativity in negotiation.

> ***Civilian (female):*** *... I know we have ability to pre-plan or schedule visits of CAF staff with CIDA* [Canadian International Development Agency] *representatives…to come in, do a quick check-over, communicate about security, that kind of thing, for a day or two. Is that something that seems possible?*
>
> ***Military (male):*** *Sure. And I'm going to offer something a little further, even, if you're willing to come to the FOB* [Forward Operating Base]*, to be able to discuss issues as they come up, as well as a phone number that can be contacted in the event that something happens immediately, we can immediately respond to a security if insurgents come by the project while you're there, because I've seen that sometimes where they'll rough up some of the workers when they know there's other staff not there, and by the time I make a presence patrol, it's almost like, you know you call the fire department, they show up immediately, and deal with the situation at hand.*
>
> ***Civilian (female):*** *That's it.*
>
> ***Military (male):*** *And even if we don't wind up getting them, at least there's the presence there, and the local population can see that we're responding to the threats that are immediate as well as possibly some meetings at our FOB as well. If you're, if you're accepting of that, you can come by with, with very short notice, we'll be there, I'll be there especially, I'll be able to take a concern or whatever or meeting or if you just want to chat about certain things or maybe future developments in conjunction with CIDA and DFAIT* [Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade]. (Dyad 2)

In many of the other negotiation dyads, civilian counterparts would simply deny the CAF scheduled visits by the CAF, as per the instructions. However, in the above instance, the military counterpart first agreed to the civilian's suggestion and then suggested additional methods that would allow the CAF to maintain a presence in order to safeguard the project (i.e., visits to the FOB and an emergency phone number). Not only does this response show that the military counterpart is willing to cooperate with the civilian, but his offers place the power in the hands of his civilian counterpart. That is, the civilian counterpart can choose to visit the FOB or call the CAF in an emergency. At the same time, the CAF participant's suggestion to visit the FOB ensures that one of the CAF's priorities for the negotiation was upheld. The military participant in this example used his creativity to ensure mutually

beneficial outcomes. Variables associated with creativity, such as flexibility and adaptability, have been identified as important competencies for operating in the comprehensive approach (Filardo et al., 2013). The military counterpart also employed two other strategies that we argue are effective for optimal negotiations: using past experience to support an argument ("I've seen that sometimes"), thereby invoking credibility, and getting to know one's counterpart ("we'll be there, I'll be there especially, I'll be able to take a concern or whatever or meeting or if you just want to chat"). These strategies will be discussed in the sections below.

Generating alternative ideas that allow for mutually satisfactory outcomes, therefore, allows both counterparts to achieve their organizations' priorities with few concessions and suboptimal behaviours. To facilitate this, individuals need to be creative, utilizing their capacity to be flexible and adaptive in the situation. In other words, they need to "think outside the box."

3.5.2 Promoting trust (e.g., using past experience to build credible support for an argument)

It is important to develop trust with your counterpart when collaborating. One means of doing this is by demonstrating one's credibility. Participants who had previous experience in similar situations were able to make suggestions and explain why a particular suggestion would be a viable option. This allowed them to have a more comprehensive picture of the situation, which they could share with their counterpart. Even if the suggestion was not agreed upon, the counterpart usually respected the reasoning behind the suggestion and tried to address the issues when proposing another suggestion.

> ***Civilian (male):*** *Is like the 6-month rotation an issue. We don't want to be sort of caught in the middle of a transition time for…if we're relying on some help from the CAF.*
>
> ***Military (male):*** *Sure well…here's what we…first of all we have many, many, many years of experience in situations like this, not just in this country but in other countries prior. So you know yes this is a daunting task but we can do this, we've trained for this. Pre-deployment training has been conducted in the past specific to this need and the people that are coming to replace us…the Canadians that are coming to replace us in a few months have already trained up for this as well…*
>
> ***Civilian (male):*** *Yes. That's…that's great.* (Dyad 13)

In the excerpt above, the civilian counterpart is concerned that the military will be rotated out of operation and then will no longer be able to assist his organization. In this interaction, the military counterpart's reply seeks to assuage the civilian counterpart's concerns by establishing credibility. He first notes that the CAF has much experience in similar situations and also that all CAF personnel are trained to conduct and support these kinds of operations. This prior experience and training works to establish the CAF's credibility as a competent organization that has already had success in similar situations and also that the CAF has reliable soldiers who are trained for just this type of situation.

Developing trust is a vital component of collaboration. And establishing one's credibility has been identified by both military and civilian subject matter experts as a means to accomplish this (Thomson et al., 2011b). This example is a good instance of building trust during negotiations.

3.5.3 Demonstrating friendliness (e.g., getting to know your counterpart)

Getting to know your counterpart through friendly interactions is important to building a relationship and further collaboration efforts. Having a short yet personal discussion (e.g., discussing previous experiences, where counterparts are from, etc.) at the beginning of a negotiation seemed to set a friendly tone to negotiations. Friendly exchanges were used to establish common ground between

counterparts (e.g., if they knew the same people, had the same type of university degree), to establish credibility (e.g., by discussing previous jobs and their locations and experience), and, most frequently, to reduce tension associated with the negotiation.

> ***Civilian (male):*** *Well the first thing is, these projects are very well documented, so like all NGOs, because we're spending other people's money, we have to give a record (laughs). People like to know where their money is going.*
>
> ***Military (male):*** *Tell me about it. I was in Africa, a long time.*
>
> ***Civilian (male):*** *Yes, actually so was I. I spent many, many years actually. I'm one of the older people you'll be talking to here. I actually spent many years in West Africa, both as a child and in a working position, so yes, people want to know where the money is. And with today's technology.*
>
> ***Military (male):*** *I just got back from Goma last January.*
>
> ***Civilian (male):*** *Oh nice… My sister actually lived in Goma for a while. I've lived in Liberia, Guinea, Ghana, Liberia, so. Liberia prior to the war, well couple of years during Taylor's time.* (Dyad 31)

Not only did this exchange establish common ground between the counterparts, but the military participant was able to use this information later in the scenario to negotiate a priority and also to relieve tension.

> ***Military (male):*** *However, the security of the situation is such that I cannot allow something to happen to you.*
>
> ***Civilian (male):*** *That's right. And yes, that's totally recognized.*
>
> ***Military (male):*** *And I'm sure your sister wouldn't want me to let it happen either.*
>
> ***Civilian (male):*** *(laughs) Probably not.* (Dyad 31)

3.5.4 Building an understanding of counterpart's interests

Good negotiation demands that one builds an understanding of one's counterpart's interests, including their concerns, goals, hopes, and fears. In fact, CAF CIMIC and United Nations Military Observer training emphasizes this strategy as critical to operational success. Some of the most positive negotiations that we examined for this project started with one counterpart (usually military) asking the other counterpart general questions about his/her negotiation priorities.

> ***Military (female):*** *… I was just going to ask if you wanted to kind of go over any priorities, I mean obviously you said security was your first. Do you have any other priorities or concerns?* (Dyad 3)

By asking these types of questions early in the negotiation, participants were provided with a reference point (i.e., their stated priorities), from which to start to negotiate. Continuing to ask questions during the negotiations also allowed participants to better understand their counterpart's priorities and concerns:

> ***Military (male):*** *Alright. So part of what you are looking for is help from us. Are you looking for transport from us? What…where do you see the military helping with sort of the aid itself and the limitations?* (Dyad 47)

Having a strong understanding of a counterpart's priorities and needs helped participants avoid misunderstandings that could have negative consequences. This open communication allows for information to be exchanged more readily, broadening counterparts' comprehension of priorities. This strategy also has the potential to help negotiators frame their own interests in a way that is more acceptable to counterparts and to help identify alternative solutions that are mutually satisfactory to both parties. In addition, asking counterparts about their priorities and needs can be perceived by counterparts as a show of respect.

Building an understanding of one's counterpart's interests is necessary for successful collaboration, but requires strong communication skills. Specifically, it demands sensitivity (i.e., the ability to ask the appropriate questions and the ability to listen to one's counterpart's responses). It also requires open communication, so that information can flow freely. Building a relationship in advance (i.e., showing trust and respect), might be a foundation from which open and sensitive communication can emerge.

3.5.5 Preceding and following suboptimal statements with optimal statements

If suboptimal statements were employed by participants, either by choice or unintentionally, a way to mitigate their impact was to either follow them up or precede them with an optimal statement. Making suboptimal statements (e.g., competitive statements, maintaining own position) can be viewed as being aggressive, can frustrate the counterpart, and might even be interpreted as being disrespectful. But demonstrating optimal behaviour, such as acknowledging a counterpart's concerns and experiences during negotiation, maintains that the counterpart is being listened to and that she/he is respected. Behaving optimally following a suboptimal statement may help to reduce the tension when maintaining one's own position. Similarly, making optimal statements after suboptimal statements may also serve to show that a counterpart is respected and re-establish a positive mood for the negotiation.

> ***Military (male):*** *Ok I see that a lot of your objectives are the same as ours.*
>
> ***Civilian (female):*** *Right, exactly.*
>
> ***Military (male):*** *With one main difference. The security situation is such with the terrorists still there and we really have to be in the area, a lot. And I would ask you to consider the murder of the local people is due to the fact that we're not around enough. And my commander will not accept…us just vacating the area. That can't happen. With the, at the high level that the NATO* [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] *plan calls for the neutralization of the terrorists in the area so we have to be there. You know, we really have to impose that upon you. But the idea of dismantling our FOB base and replacing that with regular patrols, we'll get out of your face a bit, I think my superior would go for that and I can take that back to him. Now in terms of us coming to visit the site and having a look, coming under the authority of CIDA, I think that's very reasonable and I think my boss would be in favor of that.* (Dyad 27)

In this scenario, the civilian had just outlined her negotiation priorities. The military representative responded by establishing common ground between the two counterparts, specifically by noting that they have similar objectives ("I see that a lot of your objectives are the same as ours"). He then maintained his own position that the CAF needs to remain in the area. His response was firm ("we really have to impose that upon you"). This response runs the risk of insulting and/or angering his counterpart. However, the CAF member followed his suboptimal statements with more optimal statements, conveying the message that the military is willing to cooperate and is listening to the civilian's concerns. He underscored that the position that he is arguing is particularly important to the CAF and NATO plan, but that he was willing to adopt the civilian's other priorities as a consequence.

In addition, being very clear and direct with respect to one's priorities, even if this may be suboptimal to one's counterpart, will ultimately illuminate those priorities that are not negotiable, which should further, rather than frustrate, the negotiation. Thus, seemingly suboptimal behaviours, such as asserting or maintaining one's position, may actually be conducive to effective negotiation. However, it is important to follow suboptimal responses with more optimal responses in order to re-establish the relationship and cooperation; by doing so, an ideal balance is potentially achieved.

3.5.6 Optimal Training Example

The five optimal strategies identified above are optimal collaboration skills that could be included in a comprehensive approach training toolkit. Training these skills can help to ensure that CAF personnel achieve their collaboration priorities, while at the same time build and maintain positive relationships with NGOs, OGDs, and other organizations in their area of operations. As was discussed earlier, the optimal strategies appeared to positively impact the negotiation process, in that engaging in these strategies allowed participants to gain a better understanding of their counterpart (both their priorities and who they are as people), helped participants to establish trust (i.e., their own and their organization's reliability and competence), and also helped to reduce tension while negotiating. In Table 13, we provide an example of a negotiation dyad in which mainly optimal strategies were used and could act as a training aid in the comprehensive approach toolkit.

Table 13: Example of Optimal Collaboration Strategies (Dyad 57)

CP	Dialogue	Strategy
Civilian	*I know that the Canadian Forces has been involved in the past, digging wells and delivering some materials and that's just been amazing for the project, but I think at this point we need to bring down the involvement, just in terms of the perception of the community, so that we're reducing our risk. Security-wise.*	Optimal statement before suboptimal statement
Military	*I totally agree with you. Actually, I could not agree with you more.*	Cooperative statement
Civilian	*Ok. (laughs) Ok. Great …We've had you guys visiting our sites and also providing security from your base, so, as part of that reduction in involvement, we were hoping to still continue with the on-site visits but maybe put in place structure.*	Maintain own position
Military	*Yeah…I think that basically visiting directly your personnel on the site actually puts some of your members in danger, and I talk by experience, right? So I'm in the position where I understand fully your point of view on that. …Because every time we do go visit you, it puts, especially those locals, when they go back home at night, they have a lot of intimidation and it could be even life repercussions also.*	Promote trust
Civilian	*Yeah. Yeah great. So I think from my perspective, so are you saying that you wouldn't not want to continue the visits to the site? Because from our end, we're ok with that, but we'd have to go over some guidelines. But if you, sorry, what's your position on it?*	Build an understanding of CP's position
Military	*Well first of all, if we're talking about the visits, I mean, if you're offering me the chance to visit then yes we would like to continue to visit, but it doesn't have to be a visit that specifically targets the workers, it can be a visit that's more vague, like we go in the region, ok, and we talk to not only your personnel but to every personnel, so from the insurgents' point of view, we're actually not targeting anybody, we're just going, we're talking to anybody, you know?*	Generate alternative idea

In this example, the counterparts use a preponderance of optimal negotiation strategies to achieve their priorities. The civilian wants to reduce CAF involvement in the project and to have scheduled visits. To broach these topics, the civilian participant is respectful of the military counterpart, who at the same time maintains his own position. The military participant uses his experience to establish not only his credibility and promote trust, but also to communicate his agreement with his counterpart's interests. Rather than assuming what the military counterpart is agreeing to, the civilian asks questions to build an understanding of the military's position. The military participant then proposes an alternative solution that allows him to both agree to the civilian agency's priorities and at the same time achieve his priority of maintaining a level of CAF presence. Used in combination, these strategies allowed the participants to achieve their priorities while at the same time maintain a very friendly and respectful atmosphere.

3.6 Suboptimal Strategies

The HSI® research team also identified five collaboration dyads (dyads 17, 30, 41 were Project Security scenarios; dyads 7 and 36 were Refugee Camp scenarios) that represented the use of suboptimal strategies. In these dyads, an average of 13 suboptimal behaviours (across all three collaboration competencies, i.e., negotiation, relationship building, communication) were coded, whereas an average of 4 optimal behaviours were coded. All the dyads identified as representing suboptimal strategies had male CAF participants and all but one of the NGO participants was female.

Within these dyads, the use of suboptimal behaviours created misunderstandings, frustration, and even anger. Below we identify five suboptimal strategies used by participants in these dyads, including:

- using suboptimal behaviours to respond to ("mirror") suboptimal behaviours,
- consistently maintaining own position,
- using threatening expressions as an attempt to change the counterpart's position,
- making disrespectful statements, and
- using organization-specific language.

3.6.1 Mirroring behaviours (using suboptimal behaviours in response to suboptimal behaviours)

It is hard to avoid setting a pattern of interaction. Once suboptimal behaviours arise, these can set the tone of the negotiation, in which suboptimal behaviours (e.g., competitive statements, maintaining own position) are met with further suboptimal behaviours. Our observations of poor negotiations showed this mirroring phenomenon. In suboptimal examples, participants who appeared to be feeling insulted and misunderstood commonly reacted with suboptimal behaviours.

> ***Military (male):*** *Don't you think it's pretty obvious that if we leave, the people who work at the project are still going to be a target? ...so wouldn't you agree that* [you're] *putting these people at risk, just by virtue of paying them for the project?*
>
> ***Civilian (female):*** *... we're working, yes, and we are putting them at somewhat of a risk, but that risk increases when we are connected to you…*
>
> ***Military (male):*** *So it's only the CF that basically brings the risk?...Try to see if you understand that you're a target as well and you make them a target regardless.*

> ***Civilian (female):*** *We are a target, but we're not so much a target when we're indirectly associated,* [compared to] *when we're associated with you.* (Dyad 30)

The aggressive stance of the military participant almost made it necessary for the civilian participant to respond in kind. The civilian responded by maintaining her position that she wanted no CAF involvement in her project. The military participant replied with another competitive statement to which the civilian responded again by maintaining her position. Both participants responded by digging in and maintaining their positions.

Sometimes a counterpart will realize that a negotiation is not productive and will change strategies. In such situations, it is not helpful for the other counterpart to continue with suboptimal negotiation strategies.

> ***Military (male):*** *Right. Okay. The camp will have to be expanded. I mean that's obvious.*
>
> ***Civilian (female):*** *And you'll do that for us?*
>
> ***Military (male):*** *Yeah, I can't confirm that we can actually build another camp. You know we're willing…you know we're kind of stretched thin as it is. You know we have other responsibilities besides the refugees.*
>
> ***Civilian (female):*** *So you want us to move, you want us to do it on your schedule, and what's the benefit for us?* (Dyad 7)

Overall, this civil-military interaction was very competitive. At this point, the civilian counterpart had started to cooperate and asked for the CAF's assistance. The military counterpart, on the other hand, did not appear to read the situation, and responded with a negative reply. The result was a return to a more competitive negotiation.

These examples highlight the negative impact that continued suboptimal strategies can have on negotiation outcomes. It is important to recognize that negotiation behaviours can be mirrored; indeed, we observed that suboptimal negotiation strategies were often met with suboptimal negotiation strategies. Being aware of one's own behaviour and the impact that this behaviour can have on another's behaviour is critical to setting the appropriate tone for civil-military interactions.

3.6.2 Consistently maintaining one's own position

Maintaining one's position is antithetical to interest-based negotiation, which encourages parties to understand what everyone's needs are and to strive to achieve mutual benefits. As such, having a counterpart that consistently maintains his or her own position (i.e., seeks solutions that benefits themselves without considering the other's interests) can be frustrating and may be viewed as a suboptimal negotiation strategy. Observations of civil-military interactions suggest that the typical response to this strategy is to aggressively oppose the position. As stated in the section above, the aggressive response puts the counterpart on the defensive, and may lead them to argue more vehemently to maintain their position. Again, if not mitigated by other more optimal responses, these negative responses will likely result in a cycle of competitive statements followed by further positional negotiation.

> ***Civilian (female):*** *That's fine. I think as long as you make sure that we are not connected and associated, we don't want to associate ourselves directly with, in open areas, to let them know we're working together, because the minute we do that, we put ourselves at risk.*
>
> ***Military (male):*** *Ok and what. So you don't like the risk? You don't like our presence beside your workers. What DO you like about us?*

> ***Civilian (female):*** *Well…we appreciate the fact that you have helped us with the project before…it's just now that after the recent attacks, what we're saying is, we're noticing…that the insurgents, if they see that we're working with or something like an organization like CF, they're going to then attack…so we're trying to continue our work in obviously a safe and secure manner, but we're just saying that, let's put a distance between us.* (Dyad 30)

In this negotiation, the military counterpart continuously argued against the civilian counterpart's requests. Unfortunately, the response was that both participants maintained their positions more firmly as the negotiation continued.

As previously suggested, negotiation is built on a good balance between cooperation and competition in order to satisfy all parties in the process (Goodwin, 2005). However, consistently maintaining one's own position sends the message to the counterpart that one is only in it for oneself and is neither concerned with the counterpart's interest nor in their input.

3.6.3 Using threatening expressions

It is never a good idea to use threats to win a position in a negotiation, especially when good collaboration outcomes include mutual gains and a positive relationship. We observed participants using threats or scare tactics to try to persuade their counterparts to see their position. These examples tended to put a counterpart on edge and to negatively impact the negotiation outcomes.

> ***Military (male):*** *Ok now, you realize, though, part of the insurgents' kind of baseline, is that anybody who cooperates with the government and NATO forces are sort of automatically marked for death anyway...*
>
> ***Civilian (female):*** *Yes. But however…right now the beneficiaries are not safe if we continue working with you…*
>
> ***Military (male):*** *So yeah, you do realize, regardless of if we're there or not, it's, you're on the line right? …and the closer to completion your project gets, the more you're going to get attacked, so it ends up being unsuccessful.*
>
> ***Civilian (female):*** *Yes we do understand that. And that's why with like heavy hearts we're making this decision to not be in partnership with you at this time. (*Dyad 29*)*

The military participant was attempting to scare his counterpart into cooperation. His intent was to have the civilian counterpart change her position. However, the use of scare tactics failed to have the intended impact and, in fact, led the civilian to repeatedly maintain her position – that she wanted nothing to do with the CAF. In effect, this kind of interaction can fracture the relationship.

Using threatening expressions can not only backfire in a negotiation but can also tarnish the reputation of an organization, as the following example shows:

> ***Military (male):*** *Okay…if a full frontal insurgent attack was to occur on your irrigation project from the insurgency and obviously we're nearby…do we stop and let you die or do we interact at that time?*
>
> ***Civilian (female):*** *Well…that would be up to your commanding officer and what your mandate is on that … at that time I think it wouldn't be about…what kind of relationship we have…it would be about what is the immediate need and who needs to be…whose lives need to be saved.*
>
> ***Military (male):*** *The thing is, is if we don't have any sort of…positive current situational awareness of what you're actually doing on the ground and where you're doing it…you know*

it could make it very difficult to intervene and…and protect you if…if you were to come under insurgent attack. And I'm just… talking from past experience with civilians working in the area of operations.

Civilian (female): *Um. The thing is now I'm a little cautious with discussing this as I don't want to think that I need to make some kind of arrangements in order to preserve my life or my staff in the event of an attack.* (Dyad 17)

In the above example, the military participant may not have been implying that the CAF will not provide aid to NGOs who are not actively working with the CAF, but this is how the civilian participant interpreted the statements in this particular exchange. Here, the military participant's statements may be tarnishing the reputation of the CAF from the civilian's perspective, and diminishing the civilian's respect for and trust in the CAF.

Thus, rather than furthering collaboration efforts, our observations show that the use of threats can negatively impact the immediate relationship and may also tarnish the reputation of one's organization.

3.6.4 Making disrespectful statements

Collaboration is made possible by the contributions of those involved. It is necessary, therefore, to show respect for your collaboration counterpart's expertise, wishes, as well as opinions. Failure to do so may have a negative impact on the relationship and the overall interaction. We observed instances where participants were disrespectful to their counterpart, and these disrespectful behaviours led to more competitive interactions and seemed to undermine the credibility of the interlocutor. The following example of disrespectful behaviour shows a failure to acknowledge the role and mandate of one's counterpart, which can negatively impact trust.

Military (male): *So you as an NGO why don't you work on improving the hospitals in Quana?*

Civilian (female): *Me as a UN* [United Nations] *rep, I don't actually do that. I'm here to specifically work with refugees. I'm not here…to build hospitals. That's a very long-term thing….that takes fundraising, donors, assessments.* (Dyad 36)

This civil-military exchange shows how the failure to understand a collaboration counterpart's role and mandate can erode trust. In this case, the question posed by the military counterpart might be perceived by the civilian counterpart as a personal attack, since it seems to have little relevance to the situation. In addition, the military counterpart's competency is undermined because of his lack of knowledge.

Undermining the counterpart's position is another form of disrespect.

Military (male): *we…engage local nationals so…you know like some of their questions, some of their responses or concerns about irrigation…you know could indirectly be transferred from the local nationals to you during these small meetings…farmers are the…are the heart and soul of this place and…yeah a lot of concerns within the communities. Cause I don't think you have the people or the mandate to…to talk to the local nationals to the extent where…you know they're going to be able to pass all this on to you.*

Civilian (female): *Right…our strength is the fact that we do have 20 local employees …who talk to their community members…they're adding value to their community…they work with the community and they spread kind of a good impression. Our reputation is dependent on them too.*

> ***Military (male):*** *And as much as we talk to the local farmer or the local unskilled worker, which I'm thinking maybe your…your workers are….unskilled or possibly skilled, I'm not sure, but…yeah we centre around….sort of the higher level. You know the police chiefs, the mayors, the elders…you know the older folks that live in the communities have such a huge impact on what goes on.* (Dyad 17)

Although probably not his intent, the military participant here undermined the civilian participant by disregarding the importance of the local employees working for the NGO and stating that the CAF works with "higher level" or more influential people. Not only does this show disrespect for the work that the NGO is doing, but it also shows disrespect for the local NGO employees. Furthermore, this statement hurts the military counterpart's credibility because the statement implies that the military does not understand the importance of locals' word of mouth for building the NGO's reputation.

It is vital to successful collaboration to elicit from one's counterparts their expertise in order to further collaborative outcomes. A failure to acknowledge the roles and mandates of one's counterpart is not only disrespectful but can also erode trust.

3.6.5 Using organization-specific language

One way to enhance communication in collaboration is to avoid the use of acronyms or professional terminology that excludes those outside the community. Both military and non-military professions use different terms and acronyms to describe a number of artifacts (including activities, objects, roles, etc.). Moreover, framing the situation in a particular organization-specific way can also prevent shared understanding, which is an important element of collaboration. Careful use of language during civil-military interactions can avoid confusing and alienating one's counterpart as well as promote a shared perception. The following example shows how framing the operation in particular organization-specific terms can thwart shared understanding and potentially hamper collaboration.

> ***Military (male):*** *Well…yeah. Well we are…we are…we are on the same level when it comes to agreeing that we have to share the battlespace or the area of operations.*
>
> ***Civilian (female):*** *Right but see for me…for me it's not a battlespace, it's the project. So I just can't have…I just want to bring…really bring that home that I want no* [CAF] *involvement on my projects.* (Dyad 17)

"Battlespace" is the term used by the military to frame the operational space, whereas the civilian counterpart sees this space as a development project, and is, therefore, primarily concerned with the project – a non-military response to the situation. The civilian clearly does not envision herself working in a "battlespace," and takes offense to this term and to this framing of her work. In effect, this interaction, and the language that is used, polarizes the two positions – reflecting a military response and a development response.

Shared understanding in civil-military collaboration may be furthered through a unified interpretation of the space in which both parties share and operate as well as an avoidance of organization-specific jargon and acronyms.

3.6.6 Suboptimal Training Example

As discussed earlier in this report, the nature of military engagements has changed in recent years. The success of CAF missions now relies on collaboration with NGOs and OGDs. The results from this study suggest that suboptimal strategies may be associated with more negative collaboration outcomes. Specifically, suboptimal strategies may result in misunderstandings, resentments, and even anger between counterparts, particularly if they are not balanced effectively with optimal strategies. It

is, therefore, important that CAF personnel are trained in how to identify alternative strategies that can provide an effective balance of cooperativeness and competitiveness without undermining collaboration outcomes.

We provide an example of suboptimal strategies used in one of the civil-military dyads in Table 14. For each response, we identify the suboptimal activity being used and provide optimal strategy suggestions that could be used instead to achieve a better balance – for instance, a greater preponderance of optimal behaviours – and thus a more optimistic outcome.

Table 14: Example of Suboptimal Collaboration Strategies (Dyad 7)

CP	Dialogue	Activity	Suggestions
Military	*Ideally we'd be able to fulfill this role, this extra food, water, medical for the next 3 months and then hopefully in that time you'd be able to get yourselves set up. Get the IOs and the NGOs up here operating and that way it'd be a lot better for everyone. Now you said-*	Maintain position	Start the sentence with an optimal behaviour.
Civilian	*So you guys going to build the camp for us then...making sure it has appropriate drainage, making sure…that the terrain is right, that there's a perimeter, that all the people are settled properly and transport them for us?... If we actually move up to Feawana, …I need assurances from you that you will make sure that …you guys will build that and make sure that it's ready before the people come. I'm not shipping people up there unless I know that you've got a site that's appropriate for them. And frankly I don't see the point in shipping people who are already settled here…*	Interrupting, Competitive, (Eroding trust)	Build an understanding of the CP's position.
Military	*Well ultimately…it's the Government of Garna's choice…all these people are essentially guests in their country and I think it would behoove us to support what they want. And they want to move these refugees north up to Quana….If we don't we find it sustainable to move them right now, how would it be better if civil war broke out within this country? It would be terrible…So I believe and, in concurrence with the Garna government, that we should be moving these people north in order to prevent further disasters.*	Maintain position, threatening	Identify alternative solution. Use past experience to explain position.
Civilian	*No I understand completely and I would like to work with the Garna government where possible, but they are a signatory to the UN and the UNHCR* [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] *guidelines and they say that my priorities are not the government, but the population's themselves. And once they have come into this country and have asked for refuge and declared refugee status, there's certain legal requirements…*	Competitive	Identify alternative solution. Use past experiences to explain position.

This example has a number of exchanges that demonstrate each counterpart's commitment to their position. As the interaction continues, it is apparent that the counterparts are frustrated and priorities are not being met. When the military participant maintains his own position, he does so without regard for the civilian's interests. In response, the civilian counterpart interrupts her counterpart with

distrust ("I need assurances from you") and as such a competitive response. Interrupting her counterpart before he had finished explaining his position prevented a better understanding of the situation and an opportunity for both to propose better strategies for the scenario. Her competitive response appears to have put the military on the defensive, and as such he responds by maintaining his own position and adopting a threatening posture ("how would it be better if civil war broke out"). His civilian counterpart further responds with a competitive statement. Their responses might have been more productive if they had suggested alternative solutions that would be more acceptable to both parties and if they had used their past experiences to explain their position more concretely. Further, such an alternative approach may have been more conducive to building trust.

3.7 Collaboration "DOs" and "DON'Ts"

As suggested earlier, the effectiveness of any particular collaboration behaviour will depend on the context and, to a degree, on the balance of optimal and suboptimal behaviours in a negotiation situation. Nevertheless, we have also seen that certain collaboration behaviours tend to be associated with better collaboration or negotiation outcomes. In the following two tables, we provide examples found in this project of optimal behaviours that tend to enhance collaboration and of suboptimal behaviours that tend to frustrate collaboration.

Table 15: Examples of Optimal Collaboration Behaviours

Collaboration Behaviour	Example
Cooperating	**Military**: What I'm suggesting, what I'm going to suggest, is that the Force, within the FOB that's close to the village, do more for training and involvement with the locals and national security forces, and show their support and other endeavors on that line, rather than involving them in the actual project because, to me, it doesn't make sense, why would we build it? It's not ours. (Dyad 2) **Civilian:** Definitely the transport will help because it's a lot of people to move. Only other things I can think of is maybe some assistance in coordinating the physical transportation and helping manage, people manage; we are kind of limited with our staff so that's always a constraint. We're willing to work with you if you can help us out in that respect. (Dyad 8)
Building an understanding of CP's interests	**Military:** Can I just ask when you said that if you have camps that are over 10,000 and that obviously reduces it. Why is that? Is it just because of the large number? (Dyad 14) **Military:** Can you explain to me the rationale for what 60 days requires so I can bring that understanding to my chain of command, to see if we have some ability to perhaps aid some of the things you're doing? (Dyad 8)
Identifying shared areas of interest	**Military:** We both obviously want your project to succeed and I assume we both want the people to support the government agencies including yourself. And I believe we both can concede that the CF and…and/or other government agencies could potentially help your organization some…we could provide logistical support while also minimizing our face time per se on the locals. (Dyad 16)

Collaboration Behaviour	Example
Seeking long-term benefits	**Military**: So if [the local population] have a stakehold in this, they're part of the stakeholders, this is very important to them, it allows them to be partial to the process and involvement, control of their own destiny, and employment as well. (Dyad 2) **Military:** And what we would like to see happen is, whilst working with you, we would like to coordinate with other government agencies…to provide long-term sustainment plan. We don't want to leave anyone in a lurch; we want to invest in whatever is required to provide long-term stability in the area. So we would work with your agencies, and as well, within our other government civilian agencies to ensure long-term development in the area to provide an infrastructure. (Dyad 8)
Demonstrating respect	**Military:** I think the last thing we want to do is get in the way of the important work that you guys are doing. (Dyad 1) **Military:** And again, we're simply concerned about the safety of you as contractors, as employees of the government…We're not necessarily there to meddle in the actual development side of things…we're not experts in that, you guys are the experts. (Dyad 26)
Establishing common ground	**Military:** I understand that we both want what's best for the refugees. (Dyad 39) **Military:** Do you plan to come out to the…come out to this area? Could we set up a regular schedule…coordination meeting between the two of us, so that again we're not tripping over each other. We're working in the same direction. We're accomplishing the same goals. (Dyad 32)
Being friendly	**Military:** Why did you decide to go work for an NGO overseas? Are you a Canadian yourself? (Dyad 26) **Military:** How are things on your side of the world today? (Dyad 53)
Establishing credibility	**Military:** There's no problems in those areas. Provision of food, medical aid, and water is something we're very good at. Now, we have service capacity coming in and we definitely want to support the NGOs that are also available to come up here and work with us. (Dyad 24)

Table 16: Examples of Suboptimal Collaboration Behaviours

Collaboration Behaviour	Example
Maintaining one's own position	**Military:** We're not going to be able to move the FOB…so the FOB, it's going to stay there. (Dyad 19) **Military:** I believe the camp is better in the north…you know. Maybe structurally it's not as good, maybe there's not as much support from the area but…you know…we can work towards moving this…that stuff up there. It's better in a security situation or security wise and I explained why I think. That's why I think we should move it up there. (Dyad 7)
Being competitive	**Civilian**: you are discussing a potential issue and we're looking at an issue that's actually happening and we're not addressing. (Dyad 37) **Civilian:** just to uproot the [refugees] that are already here and somewhat settled already in the Feawana camp, it just, it's a disruption, it's an expensive disruption as well as just psychologically to coordinate and logistically, it's just more of a, it causes a greater challenge than the advantages, I assume. As well, it's a lengthy process. So we, I guess our stance is more, any new arrivals, any new refugees would be you know located to the Quana camp. (Dyad 6)
Expressing threats/anger	**Military:** If we don't find the solution…you know…if we don't we find it sustainable to move them right now, how would it be better if civil war broke out within this country? It would be terrible. So by allowing…you know…by allowing them all to remain in Feawana, we're taking the risks of further degrading the security situation in Garna. It's already…you know…it's already bad enough. We don't need to exacerbate the situation. So I believe and, in concurrence with the Garna government, that we should be moving these people north in order to prevent further disasters. (Dyad 7)
Being assertive	**Military:** I believe it is again in your organization's best interest to have… (Dyad 16) **Civilian:** The thing is though that if you guys come, you need…there are certain rules or restrictions. (Dyad 34)
Undermining CP's position	**Military:** we are wearing the uniform, we're seen as Canadians, and you're using local nationals that are not really flying our flag. So we want to make sure that we're seen to have…on the international and local level as having a Canadian presence there. (Dyad 35)
Polarizing identities (thinking in terms of "us vs. them")	**Military:** we understand that you guys want to look impartial, but you know I just need to make sure that you understand that there's still the big picture going on, you know, unfortunately there is fighting going on in other parts of the country and we need to know that your organization, the civilians and the other NGOs in the area, have protection, and we have to be available to provide that. (Dyad 27)

Error! Reference source not found. provides a summary of optimal and suboptimal collaboration behaviours. We also frame these behaviours in terms of collaboration "DOs and DON'Ts" – although we recognize that even suboptimal behaviours can be used effectively in certain situations. If suboptimal behaviours are to be used, then they should be used with caution – that is, with attention to the context, to the tone and delivery used, and to the balance of optimal and suboptimal behaviours used in a specific situation. These behaviour suggestions are meant to simplify the optimal and suboptimal strategies presented above, with a focus on the optimal and suboptimal characteristics coded in the interactions. Whereas the strategies are more detailed, are more complex, and can be

situation-specific, the following list of DOs and DON'Ts serves to be more of a quick reference guide.

Table 17: Summary of Optimal and Suboptimal Collaboration Behaviours ("DOs and DON'Ts")

Collaboration "DOs"
• **Do** cooperate • **Do** build an understanding of counterpart's interests • **Do** identify shared areas of interest • **Do** seek long-term benefits • **Do** show respect • **Do** establish common ground • **Do** be friendly • **Do** establish your credibility
Collaboration "DON'Ts"
• **Don't** be competitive • **Don't** use threatening/angry expressions • **Don't** think "us" vs "them" • **Don't** maintain your own position at the expense of your counterpart's interests • **Don't** be too assertive

4. Discussion

The purpose of the current study was to help further advance the comprehensive approach training toolkit by considering a number of civil-military collaboration efforts and identifying particular behaviours that could be construed as optimal and suboptimal. In this study, we analyzed transcripts of fictional operational negotiation scenarios between CAF and NGO participants from a previous research effort (Thomson, Adams, et al., 2013), and focused on negotiation, relationship-building, and communication behaviours. Through these analyses, we were able to identify some of the optimal and suboptimal collaboration behaviours that are related to collaboration outcomes. We also identified optimal negotiation strategies that participants used during civil-military collaboration, as well as suboptimal negotiation strategies.

Part of the difficulty in managing negotiations between the military and NGOs may be differences in the types of collaboration behaviours that they employ. In this analysis, we were able to identify similarities and differences in collaboration behaviours between the two groups of participants. With respect to negotiation behaviours, for instance, military and civilian participants were similar in that they frequently engaged in cooperative behaviours, but also maintained their own position. Differences were also found. Specifically, military participants engaged in significantly more threatening and assertive behaviours, whereas civilian participants engaged in more competitive behaviours (albeit non-significantly). It seems the civilians were invested in winning their priorities against their older, more experienced military counterparts.

It is important to reiterate the fine balance of behaviour in a given negotiation, such as the use of increased optimal behaviour to balance out any suboptimal behaviour and/or traits, as outlined in Schneider's previous research (2002, 2012). We mention that both CAF and NGO personnel often maintained their own position, and we note that consistently maintaining one's position is a behaviour that should be used with caution. At the same time, an effective negotiation often requires that counterparts be clear on what their needs are, and therefore, counterparts need to explain and defend their position to a certain degree. In this way, it is recognized that the use of negotiation behaviours is contextually dependent and that maintaining one's own position, for example, can be considered either an effective or ineffective negotiation trait, depending on how it is used, the tone, the balance of optimal/suboptimal behaviours, and so on. This contextual balance should be kept in mind when considering the suggested "DOs" and "DON'Ts" presented within this report.

4.1 Implications

Knowing that there are differences in how military and civilian counterparts behave during collaborations can be important for CAF training for the comprehensive approach. For example, CAF training could address the impact that threatening behaviour may have on negotiations. This could be done by providing examples of threatening behaviour and pointing out how NGOs may react to such statements. Training could then focus on alternative approaches to negotiating a priority that do not involve threats or scare tactics. CAF training could teach military trainees how to identify when a civilian counterpart is using competitive behaviour and how to encourage greater cooperation in this situation. Unlike their military counterparts, the civilian participants did not have any negotiation training. As such, they may have construed the process as more of a competitive scenario (i.e., positional-based negotiating for a "win" outcome) as opposed to a more cooperative scenario (i.e., interest-based negotiating for a "win-win" outcome). A greater understanding of interest-based

cooperative negotiation should promote strategies that help relieve tension in a negotiation and ultimately achieve mutually satisfactory outcomes for both parties.

Previous research has identified mutual respect, shared power and trust as conditions for effective collaboration (Thomson et al., 2010). And failing to meet these conditions can frustrate civil-military collaboration efforts (Thomson et al., 2011a). Findings from the current project suggest, however, that mutual respect, power, and trust, as collaboration outcomes, are more likely to occur when both negotiation counterparts engage in more optimal collaboration behaviours. Conversely, mutual respect, power, and trust are less likely to occur when negotiation counterparts engage in more suboptimal collaboration behaviours. This pattern can most clearly be seen with negotiation behaviours. Respect, power and trust were all positively correlated with both own and counterpart's optimal negotiation behaviours and were all negatively correlated with own and counterpart's suboptimal negotiation behaviours.

In the Refugee Camp scenario, for example, significant negative correlations were found between both respect and power and the counterpart's suboptimal negotiation behaviours. Significant positive correlations were found between both power and trust and own optimal negotiation behaviours. These findings suggest that suboptimal negotiation behaviours had more of an impact when the counterpart was engaging in them, whereas optimal negotiation behaviours had more of an impact when it was the participant him/herself engaging in them. Future research would be needed to validate and further explore the mechanisms of these findings.

In our analyses, we also correlated collaboration behaviour with participant perceptions of their counterpart, satisfaction with the relationship, satisfaction with the collaboration outcomes, and personal performance. The general pattern of results was once again that suboptimal behaviours were associated with more negative subjective ratings and optimal behaviours were associated with more positive subjective ratings. For example, in the Refugee Camp scenario, participants reported significantly less satisfaction with the relationship, less satisfaction with the outcomes and poorer perceived personal performance when their counterpart engaged in more suboptimal negotiation behaviour. Yet participants also reported greater satisfaction with the outcomes and better perceived personal performance when they engaged in more optimal negotiation behaviours. In both scenarios, personally engaging in suboptimal relationship-building behaviours was associated with significantly lower relationship satisfaction scores.

The findings from the current study provide a strong argument for training optimal collaboration behaviours to CAF personnel who will be working closely with civilians in a comprehensive environment. As the comprehensive approach requires military and non-military organizations to work together to achieve their goals, it is important that good relationships are established to ensure effective collaboration. Our results show that optimal negotiation behaviours are associated with a greater sense of respect, power in a negotiation, trust for the collaboration counterpart, personal performance, positive impressions of counterparts, satisfaction with the relationship, and satisfaction with the negotiation outcomes. The reverse was true when counterparts engaged in more suboptimal behaviours. Therefore, it is important that CAF training for the comprehensive approach focuses on optimal collaboration behaviours and ways to minimize suboptimal collaboration behaviours (or ways to use the latter, such as maintaining one's position, with appropriate caution). This project begins to delineate examples of optimal and suboptimal collaboration behaviours that can be incorporated into training scenarios.

An important finding from this research is that optimal and suboptimal negotiation behaviours are related to a counterpart's overall impression of the negotiation, which may influence their behaviour in future negotiations. For example, NGOs negotiating with dominating and threatening CAF

members will most likely feel dissatisfied with the negotiation. These NGOs might then approach future negotiations by matching CAF's suboptimal negotiation behaviour. Indeed, the findings showed a mirroring phenomenon across dyads. That is, participants mirrored their counterpart's suboptimal behaviour. Likewise, optimal negotiation strategies that were associated with NGOs feeling positive about the negotiation may encourage more optimal strategies when negotiating with the CAF in the future.

Although CAF participants engaged in significantly more optimal collaboration behaviours than their civilian counterparts, they also engaged in significantly more threatening and assertive behaviours. It is therefore important, once again, that CAF training include methods to effectively incorporate more optimal negotiation behaviours. At the same time, training should also acknowledge that a small number of the suboptimal behaviours observed in the current research can also be seen as neutral or effective, depending on the context. For example, both CAF and NGO personnel maintained their own position during negotiations, and as we noted earlier, an effective negotiation often requires that a counterpart be clear on what their interests are. In this way, it is recognized that one's perception of negotiation behaviours can be contextually dependent and can be considered neutral, effective, or ineffective, depending on the delivery and tone. Furthermore, effectively balancing these seemingly suboptimal behaviours with optimal behaviours can help to achieve the ideal balance of negotiation behaviours described by Schneider (2012). Such balance should help to minimize some of the negative collaboration outcomes found in this study, particularly those associated with the use of suboptimal behaviours.

Despite the wide range of negotiation literature available, very little of it addresses specifically civil-military contexts. General negotiation training paradigms are not always the most relevant given the sensitivity of military negotiations (Goodwin, 2005). However, Schneider's (2012) model of negotiation effectiveness, and her examples of ineffective and effective negotiation traits (Schneider, 2002; cited in Schneider, 2012) can be linked to the current research findings. For example, an optimal strategy identified in the present research is the use of alternative ideas to allow for mutually satisfactory outcomes. Although participants were given a set of negotiation priorities and suggestions to achieve these priorities, in some instances participants identified alternative solutions to achieve the same priorities in ways that were more palatable to both parties. This creative thinking supports the importance of Schneider's notion of flexibility in reaching a desired outcome. The use of non-scripted ideas also supports Schneider's framework given that achieving mutually satisfactory outcomes requires both counterparts to recognize the needs of the other (i.e., to be empathetic), while also asserting their own position. Empathy is a key element of Schneider's framework, which is characterized by listening and inquiring (in our coding scheme this idea is subsumed under sensitive communication). These same skills were used by participants when they were trying to build an understanding of their counterpart's position. That is, participants gained an understanding of their counterpart's priorities and concerns by asking questions and acknowledging the other's interests. Taking the time to ask questions and show concern for the other's interests is perhaps the simplest way to be cooperative in negotiation.

We were also able to identify suboptimal strategies used by CAF and NGO participants. For example, when a counterpart acts in a negative way, such as by being demeaning or disrespectful, one of the most common responses is to simply react in much the same way. While mirroring a counterpart's behaviour might seem like an appropriate way to handle the situation at the time, it can undermine the negotiation itself. This finding suggests again the importance of empathy in a negotiation, in that if both parties are taking the time to understand and honestly care about their counterpart's position, then there should be less need for adversarial behaviour. Further to this, if counterparts are consistently maintaining their own position, then they may not be taking the time to understand the

interests of their counterpart. Not only might they be failing to act empathetically, but they may also be adopting stubborn and headstrong behaviours, both of which are found in Schneider's (2002; cited in Schneider, 2012) list of ineffective negotiation traits.

Communication is a challenging variable within the civil-military sphere (see Thomson et al., 2010), and thus the way words are exchanged between counterparts is very important to consider within any negotiation. Using threatening statements (e.g., veiled threats and scare tactics) toward a counterpart should generally be avoided in negotiation. For example, despite knowing that going into a certain area is dangerous, overtly telling a civilian counterpart that they are "going to die" if entering the area may create hostility between the two parties, as our data showed. It is best to avoid threatening statements, and if a warning must be made, it should be carried out with sensitivity to the nature of the situation. Use of disrespectful statements that fail to acknowledge a counterpart's contribution to the collaboration enterprise should also be avoided. As reflected in Schneider's (2012) model, one cannot be empathetic to one's counterpart if one is disrespecting them or their interests.

4.2 Limitations

A limitation to the current research that merits consideration is that NGO participants had disproportionately less experience in their field compared to their CAF counterparts. As was reported in Thomson, Adams, et al. (2013), the majority of CAF participants (95%) had at least 10 to 15 years of military experience, and had prior negotiation training, whereas the NGO participants were students relatively early in their career and had "somewhat less exposure to negotiations in complex environments" (p. 78) as well as limited negotiation training. This may account for why the CAF overall had more instances of coded behaviour, given that they were perhaps more inclined to take control of the negotiation. The NGOs, despite their wide range of related experience, may not have felt as well equipped, in terms of actual experience or training, for the particular negotiation at hand. Future negotiation research should be conducted to see if similar results are found when CAF and NGO counterparts are matched on level of experience and prior negotiation training.

Another potential limitation to this study is that only one coder analyzed the transcripts in NVivo. Future work, using the current coding scheme, should include more than one coder and a measure of inter-rater reliability.

4.3 Next Steps

Despite the limitations, the current study achieved its intended goal of providing examples of collaboration best practices for the CAF in training for the comprehensive approach to operations. This study fills a gap in the military negotiation literature, which to date has primarily focused on military negotiation in general and not with civilian agencies specifically (Goodwin, 2005). Furthermore, previous studies that have investigated civil-military negotiation have been more theory-based and not empirical (e.g., Roberts, 2010). Therefore, the current study helps set the groundwork for investigating the effectiveness of various collaboration practices in civil-military interactions in the future.

From here, future CAF research should aim to validate the effectiveness of the various collaboration strategies identified in this study by correlating them with performance. Ideally, multiple raters should be used, to assess both collaboration behaviours and performance. If sufficient sample sizes allow, future work should also investigate systematically whether the gender composition of the negotiating dyad makes a difference to collaboration behaviours or performance. Schneider (2012) argued that effective negotiation requires flexibility between empathetic and assertive behaviours, and in the current research it is evident that increased optimal behaviour helps foster negotiation. Future work

should aim to address, train, and evaluate the effectiveness of such behaviours within the CAF, by way of encouraging optimal behaviour in particular, by learning to be aware of the possible effects of suboptimal negotiation behaviour, and by achieving the optimal balance in a given situation. This is not to say that CAF personnel do not already practice many of the techniques discussed above, but rather that, with training and education, they can become even more effective in their day-to-day interactions with the various civilian agencies with which they interact. In particular, using the data gathered here to support the development of training scenarios will contribute to an evidence-based training tool that will help promote the growth of civil-military collaboration skills.

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Appendix A: Refugee Camp Scenario

A.1 Background Information

About 6 months ago, Garna was divided by a 5-year conflict between the Garna government and its Armed Forces (GAF) and the Garna rebels. The Garna government implemented new political and social policies that the rebels opposed. The GAF have largely defeated the rebels and the government is beginning to stabilize the country and gain international support. The core leaders of the Garna rebels have signed a tentative peace accord with the Garna government, though there are still small pockets of resistance from more radical members of the rebels in and around the southern capital, Feawana. The Garna government fears that if these pockets of resistance gain in momentum, it could undermine the tenuous peace agreement, sending the country back into civil war.

Exacerbating the tension is the conflict next door in neighbouring Kartoofoo. The Kartoofian Government Army (KGA) and the Kartoofian Resistance Party (KRP) are engaged in a similar civil conflict. Like Garna, the Kartoofian government has introduced political and social reforms which the KRP oppose and seek to overturn. In recent months, the KRP has made significant strategic gains in the south-western part of Kartoofoo. These advances in Kartoofoo are problematic for Garna. Intelligence reports indicate that the remaining Garna resistance in and around Feawana is supported by the KRP. Any gains by the rebels in Kartoofoo are viewed as a gain for the rebels in Garna by the Garna government.

As a result of the ongoing conflict in Kartoofoo, thousands of Kartoofian refugees have entered Garna for safety. In fact, there are an estimated 20,000 refugees just outside Feawana. Another 10,000 Kartoofians are already housed in a refugee camp just outside the south-eastern city of Quana in Garna. The Quana refugee camp has been operating for just under 2 months, though not under ideal conditions. The international community is requesting a refugee camp be set up outside of Feawana before the situation further escalates into a humanitarian crisis. However, because Feawana is within 20 km of the border between Garna and Kartoofoo, and is directly adjacent to a region of Kartoofoo that is currently occupied by the KRP, there is growing concern in the Garna government that KRP elements will pose as refugees and move arms and money to the Garna rebels through the Feawana refugee camp. The Garna government would like to move the refugees north to the Quana refugee camp in order to prevent the Garna rebels from gaining a greater foothold in Feawana through KRP support. This proposal has been met with resistance from the international community based on the assessment of a number of international organizations (IOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that currently operate in Garna.

A.2 Confidential Instructions to the CF CIMIC Operator

The Canadian Forces (CF) have been deployed to Garna by the request of the Garna government to help stabilize the country following the conflict. You and your unit are part of this larger CF contingency, which has been in the country for 3 months. The CF base is on the outskirts of Quana. The CF's primary role is to provide security and border control in the south-eastern regions of Garna (approximately 100 km north-east of Feawana), in the Quana region, an area used frequently during the conflict to smuggle arms from Kartoofoo into Garna. As a Garna rebels stronghold during the civil war, this region was decisive during the war and saw some of the most intense fighting. Much of the city's infrastructure has been damaged and it is very hard on the population at the present time. Aid has been slow to move into this region.

At present, the greatest threat in the Quana region is providing a safe haven for KRP elements fleeing Kartoofoo as the KGA advances along its western border to the south. However, most intelligence reports suggest that if KRP elements are to cross into Garna, this will occur with the recent surge of refugees into Feawana. And since the Garna resistance elements are largely in and around Feawana, the CF has not seen any substantial combat or troop movement (neither Garna rebels nor KRP) in the Quana region. CF command believes that its assets could be utilized by the Garna government to destroy the remaining Garna elements in Feawana. However, there seems to be no political will to move CF assets to the Feawana area, except in a humanitarian capacity (i.e., provide limited aid and security to the refugees if necessary).

Given the intense hostilities in the region of Quana during the conflict, many aid agencies are not well established there. Instead, the IOs and NGOs in Garna have the greatest presence in and around the capital of Feawana. Currently, they are only able to deliver aid using military assets. In response, the CF has participated in a number of humanitarian activities while stationed in Quana. They provide the much needed food, water and medical aid to refugees in the Quana camp as well as provide security within the camp. The humanitarian aid delivered by the CF, therefore, has been a valued asset.

The CF wants to eventually transfer most of its humanitarian efforts (except some medical provisions and transporting food) to the IO and NGO community as soon as possible, so that the CF can carry out its primary role of providing security and border control. The CF suspects that if the refugees remain in the Feawana area, then the CF will be asked by the Garna government to provide humanitarian aid and some security, dividing their force. This would diminish its capacity to provide security and border control in the Quana region. Instead, the CF would prefer that the 20,000 refugees in the south (Feawana) join those in the Quana refugee camp because they believe this will speed the transfer of humanitarian aid and contain the refugees in one camp. The CF has plenty of aid resources at its current base to support the additional refugees (including food, water, and medical supplies) temporarily. More importantly, it can provide some security within the camp. The CF also can provide logistical support to other aid agencies that operate out of Quana, though currently these are few in number. Given logistics, the support to refugees in Feawana would be less.

You are a CIMIC Operator. You have been involved in coordinating CF humanitarian efforts within the Quana refugee camp. You speak directly with Rita Mooria, a Garna government representative, about CF humanitarian activities. On behalf of the Garna government, she tells you that CF presence within the refugee camps deter KRP elements from using it as a safe haven. She further tells you that her government wants to move the refugees from Feawana to the current camp and wants the CF to use its assets (e.g., vehicles) to help move them and then provide further humanitarian support to the expanded refugee camp in Quana. The Garna government believes that this proximity will prevent the KRP from providing arms and money to further the rebels' destabilization campaign in and around Feawana. At the same time, Rita informs you that international aid donors are pressuring the Garna

government to keep the refugees in the current location. The Garna government recognizes that this is a difficult balancing act and it is looking for the CF to negotiate the refugee issue with a representative from the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Rita informs you that the UNHCR representative supports the assessment for keeping the Kartoofian refugees in Feawana and is looking forward to an opportunity to speak with you.

You have spoken with your CO about the issue. You have shared some of your observations about the Quana camp with your CO, such as potential overcrowding in the camp, inadequate drainage when it rains (leaving pools of stagnant water), and Garna security elements being a bit "rough" with the refugees. Both you and your CO agree that the movement of 20,000 more refugees might not be sustainable. However, the CF position is to support the Garna government. He offers CF assets to deliver aid on a temporary basis in the hope that the 20,000 refugees move to Quana. Your CO believes that if co-located, the CF can provide aid to 30,000 people more efficiently than if they were distributed (10,000 in Quana and 20,000 in Feawana). Your CO explains that CF military assets close by will provide increased security to the refugees and ought to minimize KRP elements holding up or operating (smuggling weapons and money) in the camps. An increased CF presence in and around the camp might also deter the Garna security elements that are "rough" with the refugees. The current location also ensures that refugees do not mix with the local population in Feawana. The Garna government wants as many Kartoofians as possible to return home to Kartoofoo as quickly as possible. The CF is committed to the mission for another 3 months, with the option of another 6-month rotation. Your CO wants to move the refugees ASAP. If possible, he would like this to occur in the next 2 weeks.

You have four main priorities that you would like to get agreement on. First, you care most overall about supporting the Garna government and bringing the refugees north to the Quana refugee camp. Second, the CF is willing to provide security within the camp, but this is only feasible if the location is Quana. The CF can only provide minimal assets to Feawana to provide the proper security while still providing a robust force in the Quana region. Third, you can provide the necessary aid (food, water, and medical) more efficiently if all of the refugees are in Quana. Finally, you would like to move the refugees to Quana within 2 weeks using your military assets.

A.3 CF Outcome Measures

Priority 1: The location of the camp

Score
Stays in Feawana = 10 points
Moves to Quana = 30 points

Priority 2: Security

Score
Providing security in Feawana = 10 points
Providing security in Quana = 20 points

Priority 3: Aid

Score
Providing food, water, medical aid in Feawana = 10 points
Providing food, water, medical aid in Quana = 20 points

Priority 4: If agree to move the refugees, timeframe for moving them

Score
2 weeks = 30 points
4 weeks = 20 points
6 weeks = 10 points
8 weeks = 10 points

A.4 Confidential Instructions to the UNHCR Camp Administrator

You work for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. You have been the representative in Garna ever since the Kartoofian refugees have come to Garna. Your head office is in Feawana. You have a few staff distributed throughout the country. You have a few providing support to the refugees primarily in Quana. Though originally few in number, the UN has sent a number of personnel to assist with the arrival of the Kartoofian refugees and you have been asked to assist in the management of the refugee camp.

The assessment that you have been provided regarding the Quana refugee camp and the proposed Feawana camp is as follows. The proposed camp in Feawana is a desirable location because it is on a sloping terrain, thereby providing natural drainage from rain (unlike the Quana refugee camp) and little potential for pooled stagnant water. Stagnant water can produce diseases such as malaria and dengue fever, since it can become a breeding ground for the mosquitoes that transmit the diseases. The Quana refugee camp already holds 10,000 people. The addition of 20,000 more people would make it 30,000. The smaller the camp, the easier it is to manage when it comes to fire risks, security problems, and spreading other disease. Moreover, the shelters for the proposed Feawana camp will adhere to conventional standards (e.g., ensure that the minimum distance between two shelters is 2 metres), which is unlikely with a population of 30,000. It is believed that there is a higher probability of advancing a range of services (e.g., psycho-social supports, family reunification and education) within the proposed Feawana location than the alternative location in Quana. Given the fighting in Quana during the war, medical services and facilities in general (e.g., hospital for delivering babies) are much better in Feawana than in Quana. However, aid has been slow to arrive in Garna, and there is a shortage of food and water in the country as a whole. Aid from any source would be most welcomed. As well, given that the GAF is primarily concerned with destroying the current Garna rebel resistance in and around Feawana, there is little security available for the refugee camp in Feawana. You have heard from your staff in the Quana camp that the Garna security elements there have been seen to be "rough" with the Kartoofian refugees.

You understand that the CF has been in the country for about 3 months and they are based outside of Quana. They have been assisting with humanitarian aid at the Quana refugee camp, but their primary role is to provide security along the Garna and Kartoofoo border. You understand that the CF is willing to provide assistance temporarily, but they want to decrease their current humanitarian role so that they can focus their efforts on providing security and border control in the Quana region. Security provided to the refugee camp would be a great asset to your efforts as well as aid. Knowing military rotations are typically 6 months, however, you wonder how long the CF will be staying and what impact this will have for your needs. The Garna government has asked you to speak with the CF CIMIC Operator to work out the location and logistics for the Kartoofian refugees in the south currently in Feawana.

You have four main priorities that you would like to get agreement on. First, you want to keep the Kartoofian refugees in Feawana because the conditions are more favourable for ensuring that refugee camp standards are upheld. You are willing to send any new refugees to Quana, but you know that it could be expensive and psychologically disruptive to move those who have already started to settle. Also, to move the refugees to Quana would likely take 60 days to coordinate, and you are uncertain about CF assets and time. Again, military rotations are usually 6 months and you do not know the CF commitment beyond that. Second, you want the CF to provide security within the refugee camp. This is vital to successfully managing the refugee situation. Third, you want to ensure that there is humanitarian aid (food, water, and medical) coming from the CF as this is in short supply. Finally, if

the refugees must move to Quana, then, realistically, you'll need 6-8 weeks to coordinate this. Uprooting that many people is a major operation, and this will take time.

A.5 NGO Outcome Measures

Priority 1: The location of the camp

Score
Stays in Feawana = 30 points
Moves to Quana = 10 points

Priority 2: Security

Score
Gaining security in Feawana = 10 points
Gaining security in Quana = 20 points

Priority 3: Aid

Score
Gaining food, water, medical aid in Feawana = 10 points
Gaining food, water, medical aid in Quana = 20 points

Priority 4: If agree to move the refugees, timeframe for moving them

Score
2 weeks = 10 points
4 weeks = 10 points
6 weeks = 30 points
8 weeks = 30 points

Appendix B: Project Security Scenario

B.1 Background Information

For the past 10 years, Canada has been conducting counterinsurgency operations in Coddlestan as part of a multinational NATO force. Though the insurgent network Zarki has been largely ousted from the country, there are still radical elements inside Coddlestan that continue to disrupt NATO operations. Moreover, the Hishite regime that was overthrown at the beginning of the war continues to be a major threat to the Coddlestan government's efforts. Prior to the war, the Hishite regime hosted the Zarki terrorist network.

The Canadian government has embraced a Whole of Government (WoG) approach to its operations in Coddlestan, utilizing all branches of government including the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Corrections Services Canada (CSC), and the Canadian Forces (CF). To date, the CF is the largest component of the Canadian mission, though there are increasing numbers of civilians from other government departments (OGDs) being added to the mission as the hostilities decrease or become contained.

For the past couple of years, CIDA has been awarding development projects in Coddlestan to a number of different Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). One particular project includes the development of a well and water irrigation system in a small town, Singon, just outside the capital, Usam. The Canadian NGO responsible for this contract is Water Management for the Future (WMF), which currently has four international personnel onsite, employing and managing approximately 20 Coddlestan labourers and farmers. They have been working on this project for approximately 4 months.

Before the war, Singon and the surrounding area were Hishite strongholds, and had a number of Zarki terrorist training camps located nearby. As a result, there are a number of radical elements still in the area. Combining their efforts, the Zarki and Hishite insurgents have been known to conduct hit and run assaults on NATO forces or lay improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Though primarily focused on targeting NATO personnel, the disruption of development and diplomatic efforts is also viewed as a victory for the insurgents. Anyone seen associating or "corroborating" with NATO (combatants or non-combatants), therefore, are considered legitimate targets by these radical elements. For example, in recent weeks, two local Coddlestans from Singon, working with NATO forces as translators, were abducted and killed. Other civilians have been killed by sporadic small arms fire and mortar activity in and around Singon. These actions are meant to terrorize the local population.

Because CIDA projects fall under the auspices of the WoG approach, the CF have been tasked with providing the necessary security to ensure that the project contract is fulfilled. The main CF base in Coddlestan is approximately 20 km south of Singon, on the outskirts of Usam. Rather than sending regular patrols, which is also plausible, the CF has deployed a platoon to a Forward Operating Base (FOB) to provide continuous surveillance for the project (i.e., providing continuous, all-encompassing surveillance to the Singon area). The FOB is on the outskirts of Singon. According to the CF, any involvement with the project such as helping to dig wells, build walls, provide materials, also helps promote a positive image to the locals. A core principle of counterinsurgency operations is winning the "hearts and minds" of the local population. At the same time, the CF uses this opportunity for regular patrolling to collect whatever intelligence they can from the local population regarding the Zarki and Hishite activities.

B.2 Confidential Instructions to the CF CIMIC Operator

The CF have been in Coddlestan for 10 years supporting NATO operations against the Hishite regime and Zarki terrorist network, and have been based in Usam throughout most of the conflict. Though most of the radical elements have been eliminated from Usam, the surrounding area contains the strongest resistance to NATO operations, as local populations in this region were traditionally supporters of the Hishite regime. Although there continues to be regular insurgent activity, at this point in the conflict, the removal of radical elements from the area would be considered a major victory, and this it is believed will partially depend on winning the hearts and minds of the local population.

You are a CIMIC Operator. You have had experience working with CIDA representatives in the past, helping them coordinate some of their development programs. Your CO informs you that the support from the local population for the Hishite and Zarki elements has diminished, but the locals will comply with them more out of fear than loyalty. He also informs you that there seems to be an increase in local support toward the new government of Coddlestan, as a direct consequence of the development and diplomatic efforts they have been involved in. Despite the recent abduction and killing of two Coddlestans, your CO argues that keeping a CF platoon in Singon is a good way to gather intelligence, provide security and gain local support. He also believes that Coddlestan support would increase if the CF were seen participating in the well and water irrigation development project (such as helping dig wells, etc). He also would like to see regular site visits to the water irrigation project to strengthen public relations and ensure security to the completion of the project.

Your CO asks you to go and speak with the project manager from Water Management for the Future (WMF). He informs you that the WMF is advocating for less CF presence in the area and no CF involvement in the well and water irrigation project at all. As the removal of radical elements in this region is seen as decisive for the conflict, and the Singons continue to provide useful intelligence, it is important that the CF maintains regular contact with the local population. From a military perspective, the region is still hostile and the project is viewed as a means to help win the hearts and minds of the Coddlestans.

You have three main priorities. First, your CO explains that you need to maintain some level of presence in order to safeguard the project and prevent radical elements from gaining support from the local population. Upholding the status quo, i.e., maintaining continuous surveillance by operating out of the FOB, allows the CF to stay close to the project and interact with the local population. You do not want to let the radical elements think that you have moved back from your current position, so that they can re-establish themselves. Also, according to your CO, this is a WoG endeavour and your unit must ensure that its objectives are achieved. Second, he would like to see regular site visits as this is a way of convincing the local population that the CF supports development projects that promote their infrastructure and prosperity for the future. A couple of visits per month would be ideal. Third, your CO would like to see some of the guys help with the project. He thinks that this will promote a positive image of the CF both in Coddlestan and at home.

B.3 CF Outcome Measures

Priority 1: Providing security

Score
Status quo, continuous surveillance, FOB = 30 points
3 weekly patrols from Usam = 20 points
1 weekly patrol from Usam = 10 points

Priority 2: On-site visits of CF with CIDA representatives

Score
No visits = 0 points
1 Visit/month= 10 points
2 Visits/month= 20 points

Priority 3: Project involvement

Score
No involvement = 0 points
Some involvement (e.g., CF digging wells, delivering materials) = 10 points

B.4 Confidential Instructions to Project Manager, Water Management for the Future

You are the Water Management for the Future (WMF) Project Manager of the well and water irrigation project in Singon. At present, you and your staff have regular contact with the CF personnel stationed in Singon. You get along well enough with the soldiers and highly appreciate the security that they provide in the region as a whole. You have met with them at a neutral site to avoid putting your beneficiaries at risk. These meetings have been friendly enough, and they keep you informed about security (i.e., radical elements in the region). But your ultimate concern is for the safety of you and your project team.

You know that radical elements target non-combatants if they think they are associated or corroborating with NATO forces as recent events show. To minimize the risk of being targeted, the WMF want to maintain a professional distance from the CF. You believe that this distance will help to maintain your organization's neutrality and impartiality in the eyes of the local community and, more importantly, the Hishite and Zarki insurgents. As an NGO, it is important that WMF is seen as providing service to those in need and adhering to its mandate, without being seen as overtly siding with or supporting NATO forces. In the past, the CF had provided support to the project (e.g., digging, moving materials, etc.). This was useful and welcomed before you employed local Singons. But currently, CF support is no longer required nor desired. It is vital for your project to reduce the potential harm to your staff from the sporadic small arms and mortar activity, and potential abductions. You believe that this risk is increased because of the continued CF presence. Your Executive Director has asked that you speak to a CIMIC Operator to determine a suitable degree of civil-military interaction.

You have three priorities. First, to mitigate the risk to you and your staff, you would like absolutely no involvement of CF personnel in the project. You have qualified Coddlestan staff as well as your own WMF staff's expertise to rely upon for meeting the goals of the project. In this particular project, CF involvement has been minimal and you do not want to foster a false impression that you are associating too closely with or corroborating with NATO, as this may provoke a negative retaliation by the Zarki and Hishite radical elements around Singon. Second, you and your Executive Director think that site visits from CF personnel would be okay, provided that CF personnel do not come unannounced, that the site visits are scheduled by WMF, the visits are accompanied by CIDA representatives, and these visits are few in number. Third, you would like to see the continuous CF presence replaced with patrols. You believe that as long as the CF remains in the area on an on-going basis, the project and its personnel may be considered a target, increasing their risk. It is clear that the Zarki and Hishite element's feud is with NATO forces and not the development projects, though they seem willing to extend this to include development projects. In your view, the CF FOB (forward operating base) in Singon is way too close to the project, which, at times, draws sporadic gun fire and mortar activity, not to mention the possibility of IEDs (improvised explosive devices). Though security is important, you believe that one patrol per week would suffice.

B.5 NGO Outcome Measures

Priority 1: Project involvement

Score
No involvement = 30 points
Some involvement (e.g., CF digging wells, delivering materials) = 0 points

Priority 2: On-site visits of CF with CIDA representatives

Score
No visits = 20 points
1 Visit/month= 10 points
2 Visits/month= 0 points

Priority 3: Providing security

Score
Status quo, continuous surveillance, FOB = 0 points
3 weekly patrols from Usam = 5 points
1 weekly patrol from Usam = 10 points

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List of Acronyms/Abbreviations

CAF/CF	Canadian Armed Forces/Canadian Forces
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIMIC	Civil-Military Cooperation
CO	Commanding officer
CP	Counterpart
CSC	Correction Services Canada
DFAIT	Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
DRDC	Defence Research and Development Canada
FOB	Forward operating base
GAF	Garna Armed Forces (fictional)
IED	Improvised explosive device
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Government Organization
OGD	Other Government Department
PS	Project security (scenario)
QIP	Quick impact projects
RC	Refugee camp (scenario)
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
WMF	Water Management for the Future
WoG	Whole of Government