


Amalgamation of Police Services

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Abstract

Police amalgamation (also referred to as regionalization, consolidation, or merger) has been a focus for administrators of police service delivery since the early 1950s when various provincial governments began to promote the amalgamation of services in adjacent municipal governments in the interests of cost-effectiveness and efficiency. The major justification for police amalgamation has been that significant cost savings would result through achieving economies of scale.

While several studies show that economies of scale can be achieved in some contexts, other research suggests diseconomies of scale may also occur depending on the context and the size of police services being amalgamated.

Police expenditure and crime rate data were collected for nine police services across Canada to help understand the impact of police amalgamation on the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery. Our review found no significant differences in cost-effectiveness and efficiency of service delivery among those police services that had undergone amalgamation and those continuing to operate independently. Several potential implications of police amalgamation for the FNPP are identified and discussed in the context of the legal framework for First Nations policing, Aboriginal governance and funding issues, and the rural and remote locations of many Aboriginal communities.

Author's Note

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Introduction

The issue of the amalgamation, consolidation, regionalization, or merger of police services has been the subject of various local, provincial and federal governmental and non-governmental commissions in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (U.S.) for over 50 years. Debates with regard to this issue have been expressed in terms of whether or not merging police agencies, particularly those serving smaller communities, will lead to more effective and efficient service delivery and what challenges and unanticipated consequences might result. While police consolidation has occurred in Canada in the context of the creation of regional governing bodies for large municipalities and contiguous suburban and rural areas, there have been few police consolidations involving smaller municipalities, their adjacent rural areas, and territories under Aboriginal governance.

First Nations band councils have shown interest in amalgamation because of demands for services that are difficult to meet in the face of high debt levels, deficits, and limited increases in funding under the tripartite policing agreements. In response to the economic and social challenges of policing First Nations communities, the question of what benefits and/or costs might accrue from the amalgamation of services in adjacent communities is important for administrators considering how to optimize service delivery.

This report's objectives are to:

1. study the amalgamation of police services by analyzing the national and international policing literature;
2. conduct a comparative analysis of selected police services in Canada that have undergone amalgamation and those that have not; and
3. identify the benefits, costs, and challenges of amalgamating policing services in First Nations and Inuit communities.

Analytic Approach

In reviewing the literature on the consolidation of police services and assessing the potential impact of amalgamation on the First Nations Policing Program (FNPP), both quantitative and qualitative analytic approaches were used. The quantitative analysis consisted of collecting data for five police services that had undergone amalgamation and four that had not. The data included budgets and financial statements, crime and traffic offence rates, calls for service, population and household composition data, costs associated with amalgamation, and survey measures of community satisfaction with police service before and after amalgamation. The qualitative information consisted of interviews with individuals involved in police amalgamation either as a senior police executive, a member of a police board or commission, a provincial government official, or local elected official. The survey instrument is provided in Appendix A. Information

from the interviews was used to develop case studies of two police services that have undergone amalgamation: Ottawa and Gatineau.

This project is a retrospective study in that it looks at consolidations of services that have already occurred. In doing so, several caveats need to be addressed. First, the transient nature of police assignments and the loss of corporate memory due to limited record-keeping and the retirement of senior officers may inhibit the capacity of some police services to provide accurate information. Second, where information on police amalgamation is available, access to that information may be restricted. Third, in some instances of amalgamation, the merging of newly collected and previously collected data may result in serious inconsistencies. Fourth, financial reports and crime rate information are not readily available on the websites of some police services. While some police services have posted financial reports going back several years, only a few of them have posted their previous year's operating financial statements. A fifth caveat is that while information on police services should be a matter of public record, little such information is available in local libraries. A sixth caveat is that data from Statistics Canada on police resources are not available for police services from smaller communities. Finally, the data received from individual police services may vary from that retrieved from Statistics Canada.

To address these caveats where possible, data covering five years prior to police amalgamation were collected in services where consolidation has occurred. Letters were sent to the chiefs of ten police services requesting them to participate in this project and to provide relevant documents and other information. Five of the ten police chiefs agreed to participate. For two police services, some of the information required was extracted from Statistics Canada reports. In the case of disparities in data between that provided by individual police services and Statistics Canada we elected to use data from the latter in making comparisons. The police services were not identified in the tables as the objective is not to find out about specific services but rather to understand trends in expenditures and growth between police services that have amalgamated and those that have not.

Issues Related to Consolidation

Change is an ongoing theme in the history of police organizations. Over the years, police agencies have been disbanded, boundaries have been altered to include other policing services, and agencies consolidated, with surviving police agencies hiring employees from disbanded agencies and taking over their equipment (Lithopoulos, 2015; Maguire & King, 2004).

During the past five decades the words consolidation (Finney, 1997), amalgamation (Ontario Police Commission, 1994), regionalization (Fairweather, 1978; Loveday, 1990; Government of British Columbia, 2001) and merger (Report of the Independent Police Commission, 2013) have been used to describe the joining of one police organization with another, or the addition or divestment of organizational units. Arguments for the consolidation of municipal services including policing are based on the presumption of substantial economies of scale in their operations. If such economies of scale do exist then greater efficiency and cost-effectiveness can

be realized and a strong economic case provided for the consolidation of police services in adjoining municipalities and contiguous rural areas. The economy of scale argument is important given the general belief that smaller police services have less capacity than larger ones to deliver the full spectrum of policing services (The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 1967; National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1973; U.S. Advisory Commission Intergovernmental Relations, 1976). For example, the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals argued that smaller police services (defined as those with fewer than 10 police officers) should be eliminated through consolidation with larger ones.

Canada, like the U.S. and the UK, has witnessed a major transformation in police organizations in terms of resources and size. In Ontario, there has been a move towards fewer, larger, more centrally controlled police services. Most notably, the amalgamation of several small municipalities resulted in the establishment of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force in 1957 (Ericson, 1982). Fourteen years later, the Niagara Regional Board of Commissioners of Police was established to coordinate the unification of municipal policing resources in the region. Every member of a municipal police service within the new region's boundaries officially became a member of the Niagara Regional Police Force (Fairweather, 1978; Colter, 1993).

The first judicial inquiry examining police consolidation was the 1968 *Commission of Inquiry into the Administration of Criminal and Penal Justice* in Quebec. The Commission recommended the amalgamation of police services to improve their effectiveness and efficiency, to lessen structural fragmentation where the populations served were less than 10,000, and to enhance the coordination of services. As a result of the Commission's conclusions, the Montreal Urban Community Police Department was formed in 1971 (Provost, 1968).

Since that time several other government and consultant reports have recommended police consolidation or regionalization to reduce fragmentation, inconsistencies, inefficiencies, and costs in service delivery (Ontario Police Commission, 1983; Colter, 1993; Government of British Columbia, 1990; Grant, 1992; Kirby, 1992; Hayward, 1993; Oppal & Graham, 1994; Oppal, 2012). According to Lithopoulos and Rigakos (2004), the general consensus of these reports has been that police services can be more effective and cost efficient if resources are consolidated and re-organized. Lithopoulos (2015), Lithopoulos and Rigakos (2004) and McDavid (2002) noted, however, that there was a lack of consistent empirical research evidence in support of police consolidation or regionalization.¹

¹ Consolidation is also taking place in other countries, such as Sweden which is creating a national police authority with a single headquarters and seven regional police areas. Currently, the police in Sweden are divided into 21 regional or county police authorities, supervised by a National Police Board which is the central administrative authority for the regional police service. See Lindström (2015).

Economies of Scale and Police Amalgamations

Studies of economies of scale in policing services have yielded mixed results.² Hirsch (1959), Schofield (1978) and Gyimah-Brempong (1987) found no evidence of economies of scale in police budgets. Some early studies (Chapman et. al., 1975; Walzer, 1972) found amalgamation resulted in savings mainly in small towns where mergers of departments or centralization of services such as 911 or dispatch have occurred. Southwick (2005) found an economy of scale effect in the policing of population sizes up to 22,350. Studies by Hirsch (1959), Alt (1971), Boaden, (1971), Danzinger (1978), Mehay (1979), Finney (1997), Gyimah-Brempong (1987) and Southwick (2005), however, concluded that there can be “diseconomies” of scale in police expenditures related to the fact that policing is a highly labour intensive activity typically necessitating substantial investment in supervisory structures and personnel (Forsyth, 2010; McDavid, 2002). Ostrom and Parks (1973), Ostrom et al., (1973) and Ostrom and Whitaker (1974) found that small and medium sized police services performed more effectively (frequently at lower cost) than did large police services serving similar neighborhoods and that a high degree of specialization and professionalization was not required for effective service delivery.³ On a similar note, Bentley (2013) found that police consolidation has led to substantial increases in the salaries of sworn police officers, but not civilian staff.

As well as a concern with economies of scale, there is also a concern with public satisfaction with the size of police services. Ostrom and Parks (1973) examined National Opinion Research Center survey responses to crime in 109 cities with populations over 10,000 in the U.S. The authors found that both feelings of safety and ratings of police honesty decreased with increases in city size. Ostrom and Parks looked at city spending on police and found that better service could not be explained by greater per-capita expenditures in the smaller cities. Looking specifically at data from central city respondents, they found a positive relationship between city size (up to 100,000 residents) and positive feelings about police services. Beyond 100,000 residents the direction of the relationship reversed with residents of larger cities expressing less satisfaction with police services than did residents of smaller cities. Ostrom (2000) noted these findings from the 1970s were still valid almost thirty years later. Pachon and Lovrish (1977) found that increasing jurisdiction size did not necessarily result in significantly higher levels of public satisfaction.

Contracting Police Services

While police communities have amalgamated policing services, some jurisdictions in the United States make extensive use of contracting their policing to adjacent police services rather than developing their own independent municipal police service. Nelligan and Bourns (2011:70), for example, found that “30 percent of the 478 cities in California contract with their county sheriff services.” While evidence on the effects of police consolidation is inconsistent, changing

² For a useful discussion of economies of scale see Forsyths (2010).

³ Lewis (2015) recommended that smaller police services in Ontario be amalgamated with other police services. He argues: “The short-term pain will undoubtedly be excruciating, but the long-term benefits— substantial savings in overall policing costs—will eventually outweigh that early discomfort.”

community conditions coupled with the increasing costs and difficulty of providing police services have increased police interest in alternative models. Some of the interest in contracting out police services in the United States might be due to the reluctance of local governments to absorb the long-term pension and health care costs of retired police officers. In California, for example, police officers can retire at age 50 with 90 percent of their best year's salary if they were hired by the age of 20. Fellner (2015) observes that the average annual retirement salary for a San Diego police officer is \$94,425. Many municipal and county governments in California have found that paying for these pensions is unsustainable—thus making contracting of services more attractive.

Wilson and Grammich (2012) and Wilson et al., (2014) have focused on how police are moving towards contracting services (for example, to a sheriff's department) to provide law enforcement to surrounding townships, cities or villages. While contractors aim to recover full costs, the sheriff's office claims its cost is usually 15 to 30 percent less than what the local municipality would incur for providing its own services. The reasons for lower costs include lower employee benefits and overhead due to consolidated jail, dispatch, and record services. A county Sheriff's office examined in Wilson and Grammich's study claims it has not had a contract cancellation in nearly four decades. Contractors may also request a new deputy if the assigned one does not appear to be a good fit with the community (Wilson and Grammich, 2014).

Nelligan and Bourns (2011) examined the effectiveness of contracted police services in California. They found that mean per capita expenditures for contracted services were less than two-thirds (61.4%) that of communities with their own police services. With respect to effectiveness, Nelligan and Bourns found that three of the four contracted police services had higher clearance rates for violent and property crimes although differences in property crime rates were negligible. The investigators qualified these findings by noting that cities that contracted with sheriff's departments tended to be newer and less densely populated. Jurisdictions contracting with municipal governments typically had less taxable business activity, higher median household incomes and lower levels of crime. Lower crime rates have been thought to contribute to some of the cost savings reported above (Nelligan and Bourns, 2011: 88).

Shared Resources or Services and Policing

Many policing organizations are also looking at shared service arrangements to address gaps and inefficiencies by bringing together resources, functions, processes and skills from one police organizational unit to create economies of scale, pool skill sets, and to increase standardization. The sharing of resources or services occurs when one police department enter into a "shared-services agreements" with neighbouring municipalities for the "concentration or consolidation of functions, activities, services, or resources into one stand-alone unit" (Burns & Yeaton, 2008:9) (Carizales et al., 2010; Ruggini, 2006). Opportunities for shared-services programs in policing include patrol, dispatch, criminal investigation, training, equipment purchases, human resources, information technology, and financial management (Varga, 2007). Vojnovic (2000) pointed out that in Canada, inter-municipal agreements in the provision of recreation facilities, fire and police protection, and water and sewage treatment are common and have been considered, particularly by smaller municipalities, to be an effective method of service delivery. However, Wilson and Grammich (2012) noted that the evidence on the benefits of shared services is largely anecdotal, and based upon scattered and dated case studies.

Police Consolidation Research in Canada

In Canada, few studies have evaluated the efficiency and effectiveness of police consolidation or regionalization. McDavid (2002) examined the 1996 amalgamation of the town of Bedford, the cities of Dartmouth and Halifax, and Halifax County to create the Halifax Regional Municipality. The amalgamation involved all municipal services including policing. McDavid compared the costs/budgets, material resources, manpower, workloads, crime rates and citizen perceptions of police services before and after the amalgamation. On the basis of 14 indicators commonly used to measure police service performance or to benchmark police services with other policing agencies, McDavid found that, overall, post-amalgamation of police services in the Halifax region was associated with higher costs (in real-dollar terms), no real change in crime rates, lower numbers of sworn officers, lower service levels, and higher workloads for sworn officers. McDavid attributed large increases in post amalgamation expenditures to the substantial salary settlements that had been made as part of the amalgamation process.

With respect to the Nova Scotia amalgamation, McDavid (2002) compared persons who called the police in 1997 and those who called in 1999. Nearly 32 percent of those surveyed in 1997 felt that police services had become worse since amalgamation; nearly 25 percent felt that way in 1999. By contrast, in 1995, 39 percent of survey respondents expected services to get worse with amalgamation. McDavid's study suggested that when predictions were tested, there was a considerable gap between what was expected and what actually happened after police services were amalgamated.

In a study comparing the efficiency and effectiveness of 30 regional versus 30 non-regional police services Lithopoulos and Rigakos (2005) challenged the purported relative effectiveness and efficiency of larger regional police services versus smaller non-regional services in Canada. The authors used four measures to assess efficiency: per capita cost, cost per *Criminal Code* offence, number of officers per 100,000 inhabitants, and number of support staff per 100,000 inhabitants. Three measures were used to assess effectiveness: violent crime clearance rate; property crime clearance rate; and total *Criminal Code* clearance rate. The authors concluded that regional police services were not more cost efficient or cost effective than non-regional police services. Per capita cost differences between regional and non-regional police services, although not statistically significant, were large enough to suggest that regional services were up to \$10 per capita cheaper than non-regional services. On the other hand, the non-regional services demonstrated important, albeit not statistically significant, savings in the cost per *Criminal Code* offence handled, and provided the communities they policed with higher levels of service in terms of the number of officers and support staff employed per 100,000 inhabitants.

Lithopoulos and Rigakos (2005) further argued that police specialization (e.g., criminal investigation) did not have a significant effect on operational effectiveness as clearance rates for violent and property offences were almost identical for regional and non-regional services. These investigators contend that this may be the case because much of policing is local in focus. The authors further noted that small and medium sized police services were more successful than much larger regional services in managing crime and operational costs because larger services were more likely to assign personnel to specialized services such as criminal investigation, traffic control, juvenile services, administration, training, detention, communications, and crime laboratories (Lithopoulos and Rigakos, 2004:348).

An aspect of amalgamation that has not been examined is the loss of local control over police services. Mawby (2011) observes that contracting with larger police services—especially those subsidized by higher orders of government—results in local authorities trading some of their autonomy and local accountability in return for cheaper and more professional police services. As officers are often traveling from larger centers to the contracted communities that they serve, they find connecting with members of the public to be more difficult. While it may be beneficial to taxpayers from reduced policing costs, the social distance between them and the police may increase.

Recently, Found (2012) focused on the extent to which economies of scale are present for fire and policing services based on the population size served. Found collected data (e.g., total service costs, labour costs, household composition, municipal structure, geographic location, and criminal offences) from 445 municipalities in Ontario that existed between 2005 and 2008 and averaged these data over the four years by municipality. After observing that the costs per household for police services in municipalities were minimized when serving a population of about 50,000 Found concluded that there are diseconomies of scale beyond that level. In his words: “cost structure is inconsistent with the unqualified promise of cost savings typically advanced by municipal amalgamation proponents, at least for these two services. Indeed, the data do not support a premise of unlimited capacity to realize municipal economies of scale” (Found, 2012:21).

Comparing Amalgamated and Non Amalgamated Police Services

Expenditure and crime rate data for the years 2009-2013 for nine police services ranging in size based on the communities they serve were examined to understand the impact of police amalgamation on service delivery. Five of the nine police services had previously undergone amalgamation while the other four police services, all representing large to medium size communities, had not.

Table 1, which provides expenditures including salary and wage information for the nine police services, shows that the police service with the largest budget increase had not undergone amalgamation. Table 2 focuses on the percentage change in budgets over the five years. Reviewing the salaries and wages it seems that police amalgamation did not affect trends, that is, there were no significant differences among the police services.

Table 3 focuses on the number of sworn officers in the selected police services. Table 4 provides an overview of the salaries and wages. Again, the data show no significant differences in the numbers of sworn police personnel or in the salaries and wages. Except for one police service, the other five all underwent a major downsizing. The greatest decrease in sworn police personnel was for a non-amalgamated police service.

Tables 5, 6 and 7 focus on crime rates and crime indices. Table 5, which give an overview of the total *Criminal Code* offences (excluding traffic offences), shows that all the police services underwent a decline in the number of calls for service. There were no differences between the police services that had undergone amalgamation and those that had not. Similar trends can be found by comparing scores on the Crime Severity Index (CSI) and the Violent Crime Severity Index (VCSI) (see Tables 6 and 7). Upon reviewing the police budgets and crime rates, the data suggest that there are no significant differences associated with amalgamation.

Table 1: Police Expenditures for Selected Police Services, 2009-2013 (millions)

Amalgamated Police Services					
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Case 1	231	228	237.4	246.7	256.3
Case 2	86.7	89.5	91.8	91.1	94.6
Case 3	85.3	90.3	96.2	105.2	110.5
Case 4	114.6	119.5	119.9	137.5	144.7
Case 5	145.3	153.6	161.2	172.9	184.7
Mean	117.2	136.1	141.3	150.7	158.2
Non-Amalgamated Police Services					
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Case 6	55.7	59.4	62.8	65.7	69.2
Case 7	27.7	29.1	30.7	31.7	36.7
Case 8	21.4	21.1	22.5	24.8	26.4
Case 9	2.4	2.4	2.7	2.8	3.1
Mean	16.8	28.0	29.7	31.3	135.4

Source: Annual Police Budgets for Selected Police Services. The specific police services used in this study are anonymous as only general trends are being considered.⁴

⁴ The Crime Severity Index is a measure of crime that reflects the relative seriousness of individual offences and tracks changes in both volume of crime and crime severity in Canada.

Table 2: Percentage Change in Police Expenditures for Selected Police Services, 2009-2013 (millions)

Amalgamated Police Services						
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	% Change
Case 1	231	228 (-2.2%)	237.4 (4%)	246.7 (3.9%)	256.3 (3.9%)	11.0
Case 2	86.7	89.5 (3.2%)	91.8 (2.6%)	91.1 (-.76%)	94.6 (3.8%)	9.0
Case 3	85.3	90.3 (5.9%)	96.2 (6.5%)	105.2 (9.4%)	110.5 (5%)	29.5
Case 4	114.6	119.5 (4.3%)	119.9 (.3%)	137.5 (14.7%)	144.7 (5.2%)	26.3
Case 5	145.3	153.6 (5.7%)	161.2 (4.9%)	172.9 (7.3%)	184.7 (6.8%)	27.1
Non-Amalgamated Police Services						
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	% Change
Case 6	55.7	59.4 (6.6%)	62.8 (5.7%)	65.7 (4.6%)	69.2 (5.3%)	24.2
Case 7	27.7	\$29.1 (5.1%)	30.7 (5.5%)	31.7 (3.3%)	36.7 (15.8%)	32.5
Case 8	21.4	21.1 (-1.4%)	22.5 (6.6%)	24.8 (10.2%)	26.4 (6.5%)	23.4
Case 9	2.4	2.4 (0%)	2.7 (12.5%)	2.8 (3.7%)	3.1 (10.7%)	29.2
National % Change from Previous Year (Current \$)*	0	2.7	2.4	4.4	0.3	

Source: Annual Police Budgets for Selected Police Services.* Hutchins (2014) Table 11.

Table 3: Sworn Police Officers per 100,000 Population for Selected Police Services, 2009-2013

Amalgamated Police Services							
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	% Change 2009-2013	% Change
Case 1	150	150	150	150	150	0	0
Case 2	230	228	225	226	197	-16	-33
Case 3	130	133*	135	140	140*	5.9	10
Case 4	130	130	130	140	130	0	0
Case 5	145	149	148	146	134**	-7.6	-11
Non-Amalgamated Police Services							
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	% Change 2009-2013	% Change
Case 6	197	193	197	192	187	-5.1	-10
Case 7	233	159	160	158	141	-39.5	-92
Case 8	19	34	34	34	32	68.4	13
Case 9	14*	14*	14*	14*	14	0	0
Can. Average	200	203.2	202.2	200	197	1.5	-3

Source: Annual Police Budgets for Selected Police Services. Statistics Canada, CANSIM Tables * = Estimated.

** Calculated based on information from Annual Report. Other figures come from Statistics Canada.

Table 4: Salaries and Wages for Selected Police Services, 2009-2013 (000,000)

Amalgamated Police Services						
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	% Change 2009-2013
Case 1	190.1	204.0	214.1	218.1	227.4	19.6
Case 2	66.3	68.4	68	70.5	72.3	9.0
Case 3	68.2	72.2	77.1	84.1	88.4	29.6
Case 4	97.6	101.7	106.1	117.7	121.7	24.7
Case 5	122.4	130.8	137.3	145.2	153.3	25.2
Non-Amalgamated Police Services						
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	% Change 2009-2013
Case 6	49.8	53.4	56.2	60	62.7	25.9
Case 7	25.7	26.4	27.8	30	30.3	17.9
Case 8	19.5	16.9	18	19.8	21.1	8.2
Case 9	1.9	2.0	2.2	2.2	2.3	21.0

Source: Annual Police Budgets for Selected Police Services. Estimated based on 80% of the budget being allocated to salaries and wages this is similar to the percentage for the other three police services.

Table 5: Total *Criminal Code* Violations (Excluding Traffic Offences) for Selected Police Services, 2009-2013

Amalgamated Police Services						
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	% Change 2009-2013
Case 1	58,149	55,367	53,526	54,172	47,874	-17.7
Case 2	28,471	29,623	26,495	24,020	21,770	-23.5
Case 3	16,034	15,362	14,409	14,611	12,653	-21.1
Case 4	28,362	26,043	24,904	24,423	23,188	-18.2
Case 5	30,109	27,420	26,401	27,468	25,078	-16.7
Non-Amalgamated Police Services						
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	% Change 2009-2013
Case 6	11,193	10,527	10,249	9,142	8,431	-24.7
Case 7	8,216	8,215	8,082	8,381	7,949	-3.2
Case 8	NA	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Case 9	1,805	1,193	1,081	1,144	1,005	-4.4

Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM Tables

Table 6: Total Crime Severity Index for Selected Police Services, 2007, 2010-2013

Amalgamated Police Services						
	2007	2010	2011	2012	2013	% Change 2007-13
Case 1	76.6	57.9	57.9	57.0	52.1	-32
Case 2	106.3	96.8	87.4	74.28	68.6	-35.5
Case 3	81.4	89.9	63.6	65.9	56.9	-30.1
Case 4	71.5	68.6	64.1	59.3	56.8	-20.6
Case 5	167.1	51.87	47.87	45.12	40.8	-75.6
Non-Amalgamated Police Services						
	2007	2010	2011	2012	2013	% Change 2007-13
Case 6	189	139.7	129.6	121.5	114.6	-39.4
Case 7	72.7	70.9	66.1	58.3	61.2	-14.8
Case 8	105.9	107.6	107.2	107.0	96.9	-8.5
Case 9	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Can Average	95.2	87.2	77.6	75	68.7	-27.8

Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM Tables based on year 2009

Table 7: Total Violent Crime Severity Index for Selected Police Services, 2007, 2010-2013

Amalgamated Police Services						
	2007	2010	2011	2012	2013	% Change 2007-13
Case 1	77.4	57.2	63.9	58.2	56.1	-27.5
Case 2	125.3	93.4	78.1	92.4	84.8	-32.3
Case 3	69.6	73.1	61.8	71.4	65.1	-6.5
Case 4	-7.4	6.6	1.9	-13.4	-8.07	9.1
Case 5	167.3	63.5	54.8	56.2	50.8	-69.6
Non-Amalgamated Police Services						
Case 6	185.1	163.1	128.1	116.9	112.3	-39.3
Case 7	62.9	64.3	56.4	53.8	53.6	-14.8
Case 8	86.9±	92.3	99.4	94	85.2	-2.0
Case 9	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Can. Average	97.7	93.7	85.3	81.4	73.7	-24.6

Source: Statistics Canada, *CANSIM Tables* based on year 2009

Case Study Analysis

To conduct the case studies on the amalgamation leading to the establishment of the current Gatineau Police Service and the amalgamation resulting in the current Ottawa Police Service, interviews were conducted with individuals who were involved with these organizational changes either as a police executive, regular member of the police services, member of a police board, or an employee of a municipality or the province. Data collected from Statistics Canada were also used. Furthermore, a review of police budgets and other reports were reviewed to collect any information from five years prior to amalgamation and the most recent five years. Finally, other reports such as board minutes and reports on police amalgamations were reviewed. The objective was not to evaluate these police services, but to identify trends based on the interviews and other information and to see how they might apply to the FNPP.

Gatineau Police Service

In 2001, the Quebec government introduced legislation that merged municipalities in the provinces' five major metropolitan areas and to create five new large cities, including Gatineau which was founded after merging the municipalities of Hull, Gatineau, Aylmer, Buckingham, and Masson-Angers (Quesnel, 2000a). According to Quesnel (2000b) and Wolfe (2003), in their analysis of the mergers of municipalities in the province of Quebec, noted that the Gatineau-Hull amalgamation of 2002 has been viewed as a “forced merger” opposed by the mayors and councilors of some the municipalities concerned (notably Gatineau and Aylmer) and a large segment of the public. In 2002, the police services of Hull, Gatineau, Aylmer, and Buckingham, were merged with that of Masson-Angers (previously policed by the Sûreté du Québec) to form the Gatineau Police Service.

To further understand the amalgamation resulting in the creation of the Gatineau Police, attempts were made to contact mayors from the five regions, individuals responsible for the transition of the policing services, individuals who worked in one of the police services prior to amalgamation and individuals currently working in the police services. Unfortunately, no interviews were granted.

Ottawa Police Service

In 1995, the Ottawa Police Service and those of the cities of Gloucester and Nepean⁵ along with the three police Service boards for these cities were merged to form the Ottawa-Carleton Regional Police Services (OCRPS). Full amalgamation of the police services did not occur until January 1, 1997 (Ford, 1996).⁶ One outcome of the amalgamation was the provision for the

⁵ Under the provisions of s.32.1 to 32.4 of Bill 143, on January 1, 1995, the Police Services Boards of the Municipalities of Gloucester, Nepean, and Ottawa were dissolved and replaced by the Ottawa-Carleton Police Services Board and the Regional Corporation (OCPRS) stood in place of the area municipalities for all purposes related providing policing services to those communities.

⁶ The respective police services amalgamated prior to the amalgamation of the municipalities of Ottawa, Gloucester, Cumberland, Nepean, Kanata, and Vanier and the townships of West Carleton, Rideau, Goulbourn, and Osgoode. The Ottawa-Carleton Regional Municipality became the region of Ottawa-Carleton on January 1, 2001.

OCRPS to take over policing responsibilities in areas formerly served by the OPP within the Ottawa-Carleton region. This was accomplished gradually over a 3-year transition schedule.

Prior to the amalgamation of police services, various reports looked at the regionalization of police services among other municipal services (Regional Municipality of Ottawa-Carleton – Finance Department, 1974; Mayo, 1976; Bartlett, 1988; Marin, 1993). Many of these reports provided some analysis with regard to the advantages and disadvantages of police consolidation. According to an Ottawa Police report (1992:1) there are two main reasons for considering the amalgamation of regional police services: “[F]irst it may be a more economical avenue for providing a police service, and secondly, a more efficient and effective police service may be possible at the same costs, if not for less.”

In their 1992 report for the Chief of the Ottawa Police Service, the authors provided a summary of the literature examining whether police regionalization has been successful. While no sources or references were provided to support their arguments, the authors concluded: “Today, almost two decades later, the question becomes ‘Was regionalization a success?’ The evidence indicates it has been. That none of Ontario’s regional police agencies have chosen to opt out and return to the original municipal system speaks volumes. Furthermore, current trends towards regionalization in British Columbia, New Brunswick, London, Ontario and within the RCMP, underscore regionalization of police services is an efficient, economical alternative to the municipal policing model and ... not a passing fad” (Ottawa Police, 1992:4).

To help increase our understanding of police amalgamation of the Ottawa, Nepean, and Gloucester police services, individuals either involved in the process or familiar with police amalgamations were asked to provide their insights on whether or not cost savings had been achieved through amalgamation. The consensus was that there were no cost savings per se with respect to police operations. The following reasons were given by various individuals. One respondent pointed out that there were no cost savings because the province provided a special assistance grant for a study to develop a new communication system and pay for its implementation.⁷ Another person noted that when the police services merged, vehicles and other equipment required immediate replacement. A few years prior to police amalgamation, some of the police forces did not spend monies on upgrading or maintaining their fleet or replacing any of their communications equipment (e.g. radios). These police forces basically opted to “not worry about the costs of life cycle deficit” and thus to delay replacing capital equipment and when the police services did merge, substantial costs were incurred to immediately replace vehicles to ensure officer safety. The absence of cost savings was also attributed to a new police budget for the OCRPS that was created by merging the existing police budgets of the previously independent police services for a three year period. The result was an essentially “status quo” budget which increased by only a few percentage points after four years. Another reason given was that that

⁷ To substantiate this view, a report presented by Ottawa Chief of Police Brian Ford (1996) stated that the amalgamation process required a one-time capital investment to create the technological infrastructure needed to support regional wide policing services. The provincial government provided a grant of \$18 million and the Ottawa Carleton Police contributed \$12 million. The province provided an additional \$4.3 million grant for the telephone communication project.

labour agreements and “settle costs” in conjunction with the merger led to the adoption of the highest wages and benefit package of the various police services that were consolidated. Yet another rationale for limited cost savings was dropping the rank of 4th class constable and the allocation of the money saved to the other ranks. A final reason given was the introduction of the social contract by the Ontario New Democratic Party government and the effects of the resulting austerity measures on public services, including the police.

Some individuals interviewed were of the opinion that any savings accrued were related to the efficiencies in terms of managing cases and information of having a larger organization with one record keeping department, one identification unit, one canine unit, and one special weapons’ and tactics (SWAT) team.

In terms of the changes to policing resources that occurred during police amalgamation, the respondents provided some interesting insights. One individual noted that the police officers working on the front line continued to patrol in the areas where they had worked prior to amalgamation. The argument presented was that they did not want the police officers to be moved into a new patrol area. The merger of the policing organizations was disruptive for some front line officers who were resistant to changing patrol areas. In addition, some middle management staff was moved to different police stations. For example, an inspector working in Nepean prior to the merger might be transferred to a station in Ottawa or Gloucester. The idea was to assist middle management to adjust to the new working environment.⁸ There was also the challenge of dealing with union provisions limiting the movement of patrol officers. Prior to the amalgamation, management negotiated to remove a union agreement clause limiting the movement of patrol officers (e.g., no more than five kilometers from their place of residence). However, after two years, the patrol officers were then moved to new patrol areas. At the same time, the patrol areas were also redesigned, ostensibly to better serve the communities. According to the respondents, these patrol areas were redesigned not only to include the merger of the three cities but also to take into account rural areas previously patrolled by the OPP.

Another point rose during the interviews concerned changes to policing resources related to similar positions held by sworn officers in one service and by civilians in other police agencies. This posed a challenge given the perception that the civilians tended to be more qualified than police officers occupying the same positions. Eventually, the civilians were assigned those positions and the sworn officers either persuaded to retire or moved to another unit.

There was a question with regard to the impact of police amalgamation on “service levels.” One individual noted that the issue of service levels was never fully understood (“what does a service level mean?”) by the police organizations. One individual noted that there were no performance measures or indicators to measure whether there were any changes in service levels. Another individual expressed the view that service levels remained the same and improvements did not really occur until three to four years after the introduction of the new policing structure. They also

⁸ See O’Donoghue (1999) whose guidebook presents the implications of amalgamation.

pointed out that senior municipal officials from Nepean and Gloucester constantly alleged there had been a decrease in service levels without providing evidence to support their claims.

With respect to the impact of police amalgamation on the front line officer's workload, many interviewees noted that the actual workload in terms of responding to calls did not change. However, some officers argued that there was a real increase in workload associated with learning how to operate within the Ottawa-Carleton system, becoming familiarized with new patrol areas, working under a new management structure, and managing new equipment.

Questions were also raised about public perceptions of police amalgamation. A few of the interviewees mentioned the concern of some members of the public that they were not receiving as comprehensive a level of policing as before. One individual mentioned that the general concern raised at public meetings was based on the degree of familiarity of police officers with the area being policed. In the words of one individual, "I knew the police officer before the merger and now I don't." Another individual mentioned that the police amalgamation was an exercise in "political policing" ensuring buy-in from the communities and addressing the perceived concerns of the mayors. Three individuals expressed the view that the mayors viewed police amalgamation as an end to their jobs as the cities were going to merge in the next few years. This opposition from the mayors and some senior municipal officials appeared to be the main barrier to police amalgamation as it became a "lightning rod" for the larger issues involved in the merging of all the municipalities.

There was also opposition to the policing of the rural areas of the region by some members of the public who stated that they were upset that the OPP would no longer provide service to their area. While the OPP provided a different approach to policing rural areas, it was suggested that the 1998 ice storm was an opportunity for the OCRPS to provide emergency services in rural areas. These communities witnessed how the OCRPS could respond to situations in rural areas and this resulted in greater acceptance by rural residents.

On questions related to changes in crime rates, all the respondents noted that there were no meaningful changes in crime rates or in clearance rates. Finally, on being asked to provide closing comments the individuals made the following points:

1. Even if amalgamations of policing services create diseconomies of scale in some instances, there are some key operational benefits including better information systems, better integration of investigations for a particular region, better opportunities for promotion and training for officers, better leadership in some areas, and improvements in policing standards.
2. "Amalgamation is less about money than getting better policing operations, if police amalgamation is about saving money, don't do it."
3. Police organizations with different policing cultures can find it challenging to adapt to other policing cultures. For example, a superintendent who becomes head of a unit with a different police service might seek to hire people from his old organization. Seldom were police officers from the other police services seamlessly integrated. It takes around 20

years to shift the mentality whereby police executives seek to reward colleagues from the “old force.”

4. “Don’t change the front line. It’s best to change middle management and work on merging services within police operations. For police services in proximity to each other consideration should first be given to sharing services.”
5. Significant challenges to police amalgamation are getting agreement from police unions and their membership and getting middle management to cooperate with and support these operational changes.

Understanding the First Nations Policing Program and Amalgamation

The FNPP was introduced in 1992 to provide a standardized national approach to policing Aboriginal communities while enabling them to establish their own self-administered police services. A cornerstone of the FNPP is that the Canadian Government has provided funding in partnership with provincial governments, which have primary jurisdiction over policing, to negotiate and implement tripartite agreements involving the federal, provincial, and First Nations governments. This was accomplished through a cost sharing arrangement whereby the FNPP is funded by the federal (52%) and provincial (48%) governments and managed by Public Safety Canada. In addition, the FNPP provided a strong enticement for Aboriginal participation in the FNPP as they had no obligation to contribute to the direct costs of establishing and maintaining their self-administered police services (Lithopoulos & Ruddell, 2013; Kiedrowski, 2013).⁹

The study of amalgamation in self-directed First Nations Administered police services, however, is limited somewhat by their overall low number and wide dispersal throughout the nation. Table 8 shows that there were 37 First Nations Self-Administered (SA) policing agreements in Canada accounting for over one-half (56%) of all FNPP police officers at the end of the 2012-2013 fiscal year (Office of the Auditor General of Canada, 2014). The remainder of Aboriginal communities is serviced through contracts mainly with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), OPP (Ontario Provincial Police) or Sûreté du Québec, although some communities also contract with regional police services.

⁹ For the 2011/12 fiscal year, the federal and provincial/territorial governments’ total contribution to First Nations policing was \$233 million. The federal government provided \$122 million and the provincial/territorial governments allocated \$111 million. See Kiedrowski (2013).

Table 8 Overview of FNPP Policing Agreements, January 2015

FNPP Policing Agreement	Number of agreements	Population covered	Number of communities policed	Officers
First Nations Self-Administered	37	163,100	162	781
RCMP Community Tripartite Agreement (CTA)	117	155,240	199	362
Other Agreements	8	13,058	20	32
Total	162	331,398	381	1,197

Twenty-nine of the 37 First Nations self-administered police services are located in Ontario and Quebec while the other four located in Alberta, and once each in British Columbia, Saskatchewan and Manitoba. While First Nations policing falls under the FNPP mandate, the current system of First Nations policing as illustrated in Annex A can be viewed as individualized in that it serves individual, albeit geographically contiguous communities.

One Attempt at First Nations Amalgamation of Policing Services

While police amalgamations were occurring throughout Canada, an attempt was made to integrate the Louis Bull Police Service (LBPS) with the Local Battle River district of the RCMP (now known as Wetaskiwin RCMP Detachment).

The LBPS, located on the Louis Bull Reserve near Hobbema, Alberta, was the first fully autonomous, First Nation governed police service in Canada. It began with limited powers of enforcement, in July 1984, and by 1987 was granted authority by the Alberta government to investigate all crimes (Johnson, n.d).

The integrated model called for the LBPS to work directly with the local RCMP in responding to calls for service and for the two agencies to share vehicles and other equipment. The integrated model eliminated the Louis Bull community's locally operated dispatch service and provided for all calls to the LBPS and the RCMP to be handled by the Southern Alberta Operational Communication Centre in Red Deer.

The integration agreement calls for the police officers to respond jointly to problems in any of the four First Nations: Louis Bull,¹⁰ Ermineskin, Samson, and Montana. The LBPS would further

¹⁰ The Louis Bull Tribe is one of the Four Nations of Hobbema.

provide a police officer to the Community Response Unit established by the RCMP to deal with growing drug and gang violence. Additionally, a community officer would be hired to provide community programming and programs for schools and the Hobbema Cadet Corps. Under the integration arrangement, both an RCMP officer and a LBP officer could respond to any call for service within the four communities. A memorandum was signed to establish the integration of the two policing services.

The communities involved were all supportive of an arrangement providing additional police officers.¹¹ In 2008, the Louis Bull administration legally incorporated the police services changing the name from LBPS to Louis Bull Police Services, Inc. The objective of incorporating the police was to avoid legal and financial liability (Simons, 2008). Problems ensued, however, because the federal and provincial governments contended that the name change and the incorporation of police services voided the tripartite policing agreement between the LBPS and the federal/Alberta governments and subsequently they withdrew funding. Although the federal and provincial governments expressed support for the continuation of the four police services in question, they declined to provide funding.¹² The local RCMP detachment thus became responsible for policing these four First Nations.

¹¹ Based on personal interviews with individuals involved in the process.

¹² Based on personal interviews and follow up notes.

Implications of Amalgamation for First Nations Policing Services

The previous section of the report focused on examining police amalgamation where several factors are associated with merging policing organizations. The literature and interviews conducted revealed that police amalgamation was more or equally likely to result in diseconomies of scale rather than cost reductions. Given these findings on police amalgamation, it is important to understand how the existing research might affect the FNPP. This section of our report examines the key implications of police amalgamation for the FNPP. Particular focus is given to understanding the potential consequences of police amalgamation and alternatives to merging organizations such as sharing policing services.

Legal Framework for Amalgamation or Municipal Agreements

There are jurisdictional implications for police amalgamation under the FNPP. Off reserve, the amalgamation of police services generally occurs in three situations. First, police amalgamation can occur as a result of a provincial government passing legislation to implement major municipal mergers that include police services.¹³ Second, the Councils of two or more municipalities may enter into a municipal agreement for the provision of police services for one or more municipalities by the Board of another municipality (e.g., the case of the Cape Breton police). Third, two or more boards may agree that one board will provide some police services to the other or others according to the conditions set out in the municipal agreement. However, the process used for amalgamating police services off reserve may not be applicable to First Nations policing services.

First Nations police services are established and governed by a First Nation or band council usually under the auspices of a police commission. Subsection 81(1) (c) of the *Indian Act* allows a band council to pass a bylaw for the purpose of “the observance of law and order,” which is the statutory authority to establish a police service and a police commission. The police commission employs First Nations constables under the provisions of provincial policing legislation. In Ontario, for example, the commissioner of the OPP under section 54(1) of the *Police Services Act* appoints First Nations constables and gives them peace officer status. Under these arrangements, for a Chief and Council to amalgamate a police service in one jurisdiction with that in another, the First Nation community would need to approve such a plan using their consultative processes and protocols (e.g., community values and traditions). Once the community accepts such a direction, the Chief and Council will be required to pass a Band Council Resolution (bylaw).

There are instances when amalgamation does not meet the needs of a First Nation community. Most First Nations communities have expressed the desire for a style of policing, different from

¹³ Under the *Ontario Police Services Act* (6)(1) there is a provision for the amalgamation of police services by the councils of two or more municipalities where the other services of the municipalities have not undergone amalgamation.

that provided off reserve (Kiedrowski, 2013, Lithopoulos and Ruddell, 2011), which expresses values that can be described as integrative, restorative, and community-oriented rather than exclusionary, retributive and focused on individuals (Kiedrowski, 2013; Lithopoulos and Ruddell, 2011; Linden et al., 2001). First Nations police services play a broad law enforcement and public service role and often attempt to use alternative policing techniques and approaches.

Police amalgamation involving the FNPP may have an impact on the tripartite policing agreement. This agreement may need to specifically address the responsibilities of the administration of that agreement under a potential police amalgamation arrangement. In particular, the agreement may need to develop policies providing for cooperation and coordination in instances where one police organization is off reserve and another on reserve.

Finally, there are implications with respect to the two police services and the size of the communities that are to amalgamate. When police amalgamations are intended to save money, they are not recommended if the population of the community to be served is more than 36,000 residents (Ostrom, 1973). This follows from the observed decrease in costs for a community with a population from 25,000 to 36,000 and increases in costs for communities with a population between 36,000 and 50,000 (Southwick, 2005; Lithopoulos and Rigakos, 2005; Found, 2012). The geography of these communities should also be taken into account in these decisions as isolated communities have different needs and higher costs than their urban counterparts (Ruddell, et al., 2014).

Shared Services Agreements

The use of shared services agreements as an alternative to full amalgamation has implications for the FNPP. The literature reviewed suggests that shared services are the “concentration or consolidation of functions, activities, services or resources into one stand-unit” (Burns & Yeaton, 2008:9). Varga (2007) pointed to opportunities for shared services programs in policing including dispatch, patrol, criminal investigation, training, and equipment purchases. Other areas of shared services in policing include specialty squads (SWAT, dive teams, arson investigation), training academy, prisoner transport, vehicle maintenance, court security, and crime laboratories. Murphy (2009) noted that in the United States, several law enforcement agencies shared services in the area of 911 and dispatch in order to upgrade to the next generation of equipment and to share the annual maintenance costs. In one particular instance, police services cooperated to build a communication center combining dispatch, emergency management, a crime laboratory, integrated technology, and a data server.

Ruggini (2006) and Honadle (1984) provided a number of examples of successful shared services arrangements. These shared services fall into areas such as joint procurement and record management. Peel et al. (2012) give an example of how the sharing of specific police services in Erie County in New York State where there was an inability to have a full consolidation of policing services.

The shared services approach has several implications for the FNPP. Shared services may be considered especially where there are significant increases in the costs of police personnel and possible limited increases under the existing tripartite policing agreements. Furthermore, there

must be willingness of a First Nations policing service to consider the opportunity associated with shared services and a willingness to work collaboratively. Under a shared service arrangement, decisions may be complicated as they involve working with two or more police organizations as well as their political stakeholders.

The implications for the FNPP under a shared service agreement may include the following: assessing the costs for shared services; performance standards; legal issues (e.g., liabilities, agreement, approval of budgets); and personnel (e.g. union staff, sworn police officers, civilians) just to name a few of the critical issues (Kortt et al., 2012).

To establish a shared service arrangement, the FNPP requires a feasibility study to assess whether such an arrangement is viable. If the decision is to allow for a shared service arrangement, First Nations police might involve a third party or establish a committee or task force to collect data on workloads and budgets, identify which services will be shared, identify the potential sources of savings (e.g., increased automation, reduction in operating facilities and maintenance costs) and establish shared service arrangements (e.g., start with a non-police function such as vehicle maintenance and building services).

Finally, a broader implication of moving towards a shared service arrangement for the FNPP is whether shared services will reduce the costs of policing in First Nations. While the objective of shared services is to reduce the costs, the savings may be lower than expected or not be achieved at all (Paagman et al., 2015; Carrizales, 2010; Wilson et al., 2014).

Funding Costs

The funding of First Nations policing services has implications for how a merger between two or more policing services may occur. First Nations policing services are funded in a different manner than are off reserve police services. Tripartite policing agreements are not standardized and have clauses unique to each agreement. This must be addressed when contemplating the amalgamation of First Nation police services.

Costs of municipal police agencies are funded by tax levies and provincial subsidies. However, First Nations police budgets are based on tripartite agreements negotiated between the federal, provincial, territorial and First Nations governments, which fund for policing services. Tripartite agreements stipulate that the federal government pays 52 percent and the provincial or territorial government 48 percent of the cost of First Nations policing services. These tripartite policing agreements must be reassessed and renegotiated if police amalgamation occurs.

There are also implications related to the financial inequalities affecting many First Nations communities. If they merge their policing services, costs may rise given the usual practice of newly merged services to adopt the highest service levels and salary costs among the pre-merger services. Police amalgamation tends to result in substantial increases in the salaries of sworn police officers from some agencies as they now match the salaries of the highest remunerated police services (Sancton, 2001). As a result, the tripartite funding arrangements will most likely result in increased per capita costs after amalgamation occurs.

Characteristics of First Nations Policing

The specific characteristics of each First Nations police organization may have significant impact on any police amalgamation. First Nations policing usually requires a rural policing model (Jones et. al., 2014) as First Nations communities are overwhelmingly located in rural, often geographically isolated, areas of the country. The trend in Canada for the amalgamation of small-town services may have an impact on the FNPP. For example, some small-town police services such as the Borden-Carleton Police Department in Prince Edward Island (with one part-time and two full-time officers) was disbanded to reduce municipal policing costs. On May 1, 2012 this agency ceased to exist after local political leaders decided that it was more economical to contract for police services with the RCMP rather than maintain their own micro-sized police service (CBC, 2012). In Ontario, the 30-member Pembroke Police Service, which had existed for 135 years, closed in 2013. The town of 14,000 residents now contracts with the OPP at a lower per capita cost (Singer, 2012; Uhler, 2013). Brunet (2015) goes one step further in arguing that police services in rural settings may be more susceptible to factors such as political turbulence, organizational atrophy and environment or economic impact such as the closing of plants or natural disasters. Noting that the costs of policing rural areas may not be worth the benefits for small stand-alone agencies, he states: “Perhaps it is time to give Sheriff Taylor his gold watch (2015:322).”

Agencies policing First Nations are responsible for patrolling large geographical areas which vary in size and remoteness. Many of the remote communities lack the capacity and infrastructure to support the administrative and operative functions necessary to deliver effective policing services (Jones et al., 2014; Ruddell et al., 2014). Due to the lack of social services in remote communities, the First Nations police either take on additional social related duties which their colleagues in urban environments do not (Lithopoulos & Ruddell, 2011).


There is also a great diversity in First Nations, and the police agencies that serve them range in size from those policing a single village or First Nation to those serving regions with dozens of communities. The largest First Nations policing service is the Nishnawbe Aski Police Service (NAPS), which employs 134 officers, who police 35 Ontario communities. It is the second largest Aboriginal law enforcement agency in North America after the Navajo Tribal Police Service in the U.S. (NAPS, 2010:1). However, the majority of First Nations policing services only employ a few police officers, and this information is presented in Appendix B.

Consequently, changes to First Nation policing should take into account the size of the police services that may want to amalgamate with another force. Based on the data in Appendix B the size of most First nations policing services can be viewed as micro-sized police services (i.e., under 10 police officers). Ostrom and Parks (1973); Ostrom et al., (1973) and Ostrom and Whitaker (1974) found that small to medium sized police services performed more effectively and frequently at lower per capita cost than large police services serving similar neighborhoods. Furthermore, Drake and Simper (2000) and Simpler and Weyman-Jones (2008) suggest that that intermediate-sized police services in England and Wales tended to have higher levels of efficiency than do the largest or smallest services.

In the U.S., unlike Canada, the amalgamation of rural police agencies has been limited and most rural and small-town police services are decentralized, and are undertaken by county sheriff's

offices. These agencies tend to be small and often fragmented. In 2008, there were 6,659 police departments and sheriff's offices employing fewer than ten employees (Reaves, 2011). There has been little consolidation of these agencies. Figure 1 shows that the number of these offices dropped by only 2.3 percent between 1992 and 2007. Reaves (1993) reported that in 1992 there were 3,087 sheriff's offices and that this number had only decreased to 3,012 by 2007 (Burch, 2012). The number of local U.S. police departments, by contrast, dropped from 13,540 in 1997 to 12,575 by 2007, representing a decrease of 7.1 percent. Ruddell and Mays (2006) speculated that the political nature of U.S. county sheriffs—most of whom are elected and operate with considerable discretion and historically little oversight—make it unlikely that many of those operations would willingly disband in favor of amalgamation.

Figure 1 U.S. Sherriff's Office Amalgamation for the Years 1992-2007



There are also implications for the delivery of services in First Nations communities after consolidation occurs. Currently, the objectives of First Nations policing are to provide police services that are effective, professional and tailored to meet the needs of each community. However, amalgamation may push First Nations communities away from local policing. While any amalgamation would result in relatively few individuals with the skills required for top level posts, these individuals require a full understanding of the needs and demands of delivering policing services to a First Nations community. In addition, amalgamation may decrease police responsiveness by distancing the main headquarters from the communities they serve.

Finally, there are also the larger cultural issues when two or more police organizations merge. There may be several distinctive organizational cultures in the merged agency especially when a First Nation and a Non-First Nation police service are involved. Stinchcomb and Ordaz (2007) argue that organizational cultures are important when considering police amalgamations and that these mergers can disrupt organizational effectiveness.

Collective Bargaining

Another implication relates to the collective bargaining agreements. Some First Nations police services have collective bargaining agreements with their sworn and civilian staff. Other First Nation police officers have not formed an association, or been unionized. Any form of consolidation may need to address these particular issues. The literature suggests that police amalgamation have generally resulted in increased salaries and benefits for the police officers. First Nations police officers who do have their own collective bargaining agreements may be a significant factor given that current agreements' wages and benefits for the First Nations police may not be the same as those off reserve (e.g., health care coverage).

Recruitment and Retention

Another implication for First Nations policing relates to the recruitment and retention of police officers and other staff. There is a tendency for First Nation police services to have a high employee attrition rate (Clairmont, 2006; Lithopoulos, 2007) compared to off reserve police services. Ruddell (2016) observes that some officers in their first posts who are recruited into small stand-alone agencies leave for urban police services after they have gained some experience. As a result, some smaller agencies are trapped in a cycle of recruiting, training, and then losing officers only to repeat the cycle again. This process is expensive in terms of drawing upon the resources and the creativity of the agency staff. However, police services that have amalgamated provide greater opportunities for career development. As a result, amalgamation may provide opportunities for First Nations police services to recruit and retain officers with crucial skills and a comprehensive understanding of Aboriginal culture.

The selection and recruitment process used by First Nations policing services and those used by non-First Nations services tend to differ. While both types of agencies hope to recruit candidates with the best aptitude and education for a career in policing, First Nations police services have the additional challenge of recruiting and retaining individuals who have an understanding of the distinctive cultures and social dynamics of the Aboriginal communities they serve. Retention of officers may be a concern when police officers who are unfamiliar with the culture of the First Nations communities they police are not provided with the necessary training and resources. Similar situations have happened in Finland (Virta, 2002) and in Denmark (Holmberg & Balvig, 2013) where police have had difficulties adapting when called to patrol areas that are culturally different. Furthermore, police officers and staff may not be prepared to travel the extra distance to take up posts in remote First Nations communities where they lack knowledge of the local culture.

Conclusion

Police service amalgamation has been an important issue in policing for the past five decades. For proponents of police amalgamation the main argument in favor of consolidating resources has been the potential for cost savings. For the most part, those who have researched police amalgamation have concluded that while there are potential financial advantages to be had by consolidating police organizations a variety of factors need to be considered in actualizing these advantages. There are a few studies that suggest cost reductions are possible based on economies of scale in merging two or more small police services into one medium sized police service. The average per capita costs of policing as an output decreases with the increase in the scale or size of the police organization policing up to 50,000 inhabitants. The majority of studies focused on economies of scale also suggest, however, that there are limited or no cost efficiencies associated with larger municipal police departments (i.e., those policing more than 50,000 inhabitants). When cost efficiencies exist, they decline at relatively low population levels, where population is frequently used as the proxy in considering scale. Although contracting for services appears to result in lower costs, there is a potential trade-off in terms of service quality. If economies of scale do exist, they can be obscured by bureaucracies capturing and spending cost savings. This was evident in our interviews with those familiar with policing amalgamation in Ottawa. Nellor (1984) refers to this as “bureau monopoly power” whereby public employees are capable of quickly responding to capture any savings after a consolidation occurs.

To understand the impact of police amalgamation on Canadian police services, expenditure and crime data for nine Canadian police services were reviewed. The data collected illustrate that there were no differences between police services that had undergone amalgamation and those that had not.

Case studies were conducted of two amalgamations. The amalgamation of the municipalities of Aylmer, Hull, Gatineau, Buckingham, and Masson-Angers in 2002 was a result of provincial legislation, which re-organized the municipalities and municipal services in the province of Quebec, including policing. Several attempts were made to discuss with individuals that were involved in these aforementioned mergers without success.

In 1995, the OCRPS was established because of the amalgamation of the police departments from Ottawa, Gloucester and Nepean. Interviews were conducted with individuals who were either directly involved or very familiar with the amalgamation process. These interviews revealed that while the argument was put forward that police amalgamation was required to save monies, this was not the case. Additional costs such as new equipment or adjusting the salaries and wages for all the police officers offset any cost savings. Some benefits were also noted including the opportunity to streamline information technology and communications systems and the opportunity to share services in the interest of efficiency and cost-effectiveness.

The purpose of literature review on police amalgamation, and the analysis on police services in Canada was to identify the implications of police amalgamation on FNPP. One of the main implications for the FNPP is that this policy operates under its own legal framework. The FNPP is based only on government policy and does not have a statutory basis for its existence. To this end, it is implemented through a tripartite agreement involving First Nations and the federal and

provincial governments. Furthermore, the police officers are appointed as peace officers under provincial policing legislation. This exceptional framework needs to be addressed as part of any amalgamation of police services. Moving personnel and resources between First Nations communities may be complex as it would require buy-in from every participating First Nation. In conclusion, a realistic approach for First Nation policing would be to focus on other options such as: shared service agreements, full amalgamation, municipal agreements (one-way or two-way), or where a First Nations policing services is providing services to another community (see Figure 2 below).

Figure 2: FNPP Implications for Police Amalgamation

Further implications for First Nations also include developing budgets in instances where First Nations policing is funded by a tripartite policing agreement and off-reserve policing is generally paid for via a community's tax base and by provincial grants. Finally, other implications for the FNPP would include the characteristics of First Nations policing in terms of location (rural and remote areas), the size of the services, and the collective bargaining process, non-union police officers, attrition rates, and the recruitment and retention of First Nation police officers.

Acronyms

AANDC	Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada
BC	British Columbia
CBC	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
CSI	Crime Severity Index
CTA	Community Tripartite Agreement
FNSA	First Nation Self-Administered police service
FNCPS	First Nation Community Policing Service
FNPP	First Nations Policing Program
LBPS	Louis Bull Police Service
NAPS	Nishnawbe Aski Police Service
OCRPS	Ottawa-Carleton Regional Police Service
OPP	Ontario Provincial Police
PS	Public Safety Canada
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police
SA	Self-administered police service
SQ	Sûreté du Québec
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics Team
UK	United Kingdom
U.S.	United States
VCSI	Violent Crime Severity Index

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Appendix A: Survey Instrument

Police Service Amalgamation in Canada: Questionnaire

Introduction

As you may be aware, Public Safety Canada is working in partnership with provincial, territorial, First Nation, and Inuit governments to improve public safety in Aboriginal communities in Canada. To this end, the Department is undertaking a study of police amalgamation to determine how the First Nations Policing Program (FNPP), which funds police services in Aboriginal communities, can provide more effective and efficient policing services to these communities.

Aboriginal police services in Canada have a distinct mandate and structure, and play a complex role in policing Aboriginal communities. They are also part of a larger Canadian policing environment – one that is evolving in ways that may have strong implications for them. Of special interest is the challenge for provinces and territories of providing 24/7 coverage and ensuring adequate response times for remote and isolated Aboriginal communities which, on average, have approximately 3,000 residents and are policed by micro-sized police detachments of about nine officers.

Research on police service life-cycles has shown that small police services, usually deploying fewer than 10 officers, are more apt to fail due to their inability to maintain or meet ever-increasing policing standards.

To support this priority, Public Safety Canada has contracted with Compliance Strategy Group (CSG), which has expertise in quantitative and qualitative research methodologies and an extensive publication record in the areas of policing and Aboriginal social policy, to undertake the following work:

1. To study the amalgamation of police services by analyzing national and international policing literature and to conduct a comparative analysis of selected amalgamated and non-amalgamated police services in Canada; and
2. To assess the implications of police amalgamation or the lack of such amalgamation on policing services provided to Aboriginal communities under the FNPP.

We would greatly appreciate if you would facilitate your police service's participation in this important research and respond to the attached questionnaire. Please review the questions listed in the interview guide and respond in the space under each question or in a separate document. Please refer to the question number if you need to use a separate document.

CSG researchers are experienced and trusted researchers who have worked with numerous police services. Should your organization be willing to participate in the research, we ask that you encourage your personnel to provide the criminal incident data requested, participate in interviews, and provide any necessary information to ensure the success of this project. CSG

personnel hold the security clearances required to handle information provided by your organization. They are required to store protected information in accordance with the policies of the Canadian Industrial Security Directorate, Public Works and Government Services Canada. The final products created as part of this study will not include comments attributable to individuals or your organization overall, and interview notes will be destroyed once the research study is finalized.

Please feel free to contact the Project Coordinator, Mr. John Kiedrowski if you have any questions, the President and chief researcher of CSG at [redacted], or [redacted]. If you require further information that cannot be provided by Mr. Kiedrowski or his team, please contact [redacted], Research Advisor, Research Division, Community Safety and Countering Crime Branch, at [redacted], or [redacted].

Sincerely yours,

Attachment: Questionnaire

Background Information

The first question focuses on some background information.

1. The following information focuses on some background information:

Name of Individual Completing Interview:	
Position:	
Address:	Contact Telephone Number:
Email address:	
What was the name of the police services that you were involved?	

Costs Associated with Police Amalgamation

The following questions focus on some general information on the costs associated with police amalgamation.

2. Do you believe that there was any cost savings in police services associated with amalgamation? If us, can you describe these cost savings in terms of which areas?
3. Can you describe what changes in policing resources occurred during the process of amalgamation and after it was completed?

Impact on the Police Administration

The following questions focus on the impact that police amalgamation on the administration of the department.

4. Can you describe what changes in service levels were associated with amalgamation? If there were no changes in service levels can you provide an explanation?
5. In your view, did the front-line officer workload change with amalgamation? If yes, please explain how the workload changed?
6. As part of the implementation of police amalgamation was there any re-organization to front-line police services? If yes, can you provide any insights?

Public Perception of Police Amalgamation

This question focuses on the public's perception of police amalgamation.

7. In your view, how did the residents of the municipalities affected by amalgamation perceive the quality of police services? Can you please provide any insights?
8. In your view, was there any opposition to police amalgamation? If yes, can you please explain?

Crime Rates in the Communities

There is one question that focuses on the impact of police amalgamation on crime rates.

9. In your view, did the crime rates change with police amalgamation? If yes, please explain what crime rates changed?

General Questions

Finally, two general questions give you an opportunity to provide further information.

10. Are there any other comments you want to make regarding police amalgamation?
11. Can you provide any supporting documents to substantiate your comments?

Thank you for taking time to participate in this project. Your input is very much appreciated.

Appendix B: Overview of FNPP Agreements and Location

Overview of the FNPP Agreements (January 2015)

Agreements	Province	Agreement Type	Officers Negotiated	Communities	Population
Alexis Creek, Xeni Gwet'in, Stone, Anaham CTA	BC	CTA	3	4	1469
Blueberry River, Doig River and Halfway River CTA	BC	CTA	2	3	515
British Columbia FNCPS Framework Agreement	BC	Framework	107.5	131	50145
Canim Lake RCMP CTA	BC	CTA	1	1	438
Canoe Creek and Esketemc CTA	BC	CTA	2	2	752
Chemainus CTA	BC	CTA	1	1	777
Cowichan CTA	BC	CTA	4	1	2767
Ditidaht CTA	BC	CTA	1	1	248
Fort Nelson and Prophet River RCMP CTA	BC	CTA	2	2	568
Haisla (Kitamaat) CTA	BC	CTA	1	1	673
Hupacasath, Tseshaht CTA	BC	CTA	2	2	593
Huu-ay-aht, Uchucklesaht CTA	BC	CTA	2	2	167
KA:'YU:'K'T'H' CTA	BC	CTA	1	1	186

Agreements	Province	Agreement Type	Officers Negotiated	Communities	Population
Kamloops, Whispering Pines/Clinton and Skeetchestn RCMP CTA	BC	CTA	4	3	952
Kitasoo Indian Band CTA	BC	CTA	2	1	320
Kitsumkalum and Kitselas CTA	BC	CTA	1	2	530
Lax Kw'alaams CTA	BC	CTA	3	1	736
Lytton, Skuppah, Kanaka Bar, Cooks Ferry, Nicomen and Siska CTA	BC	CTA	2	6	1338
McLeod Lake Indian Band CTA	BC	CTA	1	1	136
Nanoose CTA	BC	CTA	0.5	1	174
Neskonlith and Little Shuswap Lake CTA	BC	CTA	1	2	557
Nisga'a RCMP CTA	BC	CTA	3	4	2246
Nuxalk Indian Band CTA	BC	CTA	1	1	929
Okanagan CTA	BC	CTA	1	1	919
Old Masset Village Council CTA	BC	CTA	2	1	751
Penticton CTA	BC	CTA	2	1	612
Red Bluff, Nazko, Alexandria and Kluskus CTA	BC	CTA	1	4	375
Saik'uz CTA	BC	CTA	1	1	456
Saulteau CTA	BC	CTA	0.5	1	383

Agreements	Province	Agreement Type	Officers Negotiated	Communities	Population
Sechelt Indian Band CTA	BC	CTA	2	1	661
Semiahmoo CTA	BC	CTA	0.5	1	56
Skidegate CTA	BC	CTA	2	1	740
Sliammon CTA	BC	CTA	1	1	588
Snuneymuxw CTA	BC	CTA	1.5	1	699
Songhees FN and Esquimalt CTA	BC	CTA	1	2	566
Stl'atl'imx Tribal Police Service Agreement	BC	SA	10	10	3376
Sto:lo and Sts'ailes	BC	CTA	7	9	2307
Takla Lake CTA	BC	CTA	2	1	422
Tl'azt'en and Nak'azdli CTA	BC	CTA	4	2	1339
Tsartlip, Tseycum, Tsawout and Pauquachin First Nations	BC	CTA	2	4	1630
Tsawwassen Enhanced Municipal Agreement	BC	Municipal	1	1	185
Tsay Keh Dene and Kwadacha RCMP CTA	BC	CTA	2	2	550
Ulkatcho Indian Band CTA	BC	CTA	1	1	684
Upper Nicola, Lower Nicola, Coldwater, Shackan and Nooaitch CTA	BC	CTA	4	5	1583
West Moberly CTA	BC	CTA	0.5	1	116
Westbank CTA	BC	CTA	3	1	441

Agreements	Province	Agreement Type	Officers Negotiated	Communities	Population
Williams Lake & Soda Creek CTA	BC	CTA	2	2	437
Yuuluath and Toquaht First Nations CTA	BC	CTA	1	2	235
Alberta FNCPS Framework	AB	Framework	7	20	42089
Alexis RCMP CTA	AB	CTA	3	1	1142
Bigstone Cree CTA	AB	CTA	3	1	3181
Blood Tribe Police Service Agreement	AB	SA	31	1	8217
Duncan's CTA	AB	CTA	1	1	143
Enoch Cree Nation CTA	AB	CTA	4	1	1638
Lakeshore Regional Police Service Agreement	AB	SA	11	5	2284
North Peace Tribal Police Service Agreement	AB	SA	7	2	5049
O'Chiese First Nation CTA	AB	CTA	1	1	894
Piikani Nation CTA	AB	CTA	3	1	2392
Saddle Lake Cree Nation Community Tripartite Agreement	AB	CTA	3	1	6350
Siksika Nation CTA	AB	CTA	4	1	4029
Stoney Nakoda First Nation RCMP CTA (Eden Valley)	AB	CTA	2	3	4896

Agreements	Province	Agreement Type	Officers Negotiated	Communities	Population
Stoney Nakoda First Nation RCMP CTA (Morley)	AB	CTA	1	3	4896
Sturgeon Lake CTA	AB	CTA	3	1	1468
Sunchild First Nation CTA	AB	CTA	1	1	876
Tsuu T'ina Police Service	AB	SA	7	1	1639
Whitefish Lake (Goodfish Lake) CTA	AB	CTA	3	1	6350
Woodland CTA	AB	CTA	3	1	804
Ahtahkakoop CTA	SK	CTA	3.5	1	1791
Beardy's and Okemasis CTA	SK	CTA	2	1	1162
Big Island Lake Cree Nation CTA	SK	CTA	3	1	918
Big River First Nation CTA	SK	CTA	3	1	2485
Birch Narrows CTA	SK	CTA	2	1	418
Black Lake CTA	SK	CTA	6	1	1590
Buffalo River CTA	SK	CTA	3.5	1	712
Canoe Lake RCMP CTA	SK	CTA	1.5	1	1002
Cote, Key and Keeseekoose CTA	SK	CTA	5	3	1970
English River CTA	SK	CTA	3	1	776
File Hills Policing Agreement	SK	SA	14	5	2380
Flying Dust CTA	SK	CTA	1	1	529
Fond du Lac CTA	SK	CTA	4	1	1071

Agreements	Province	Agreement Type	Officers Negotiated	Communities	Population
Four Nations CTA	SK	CTA	6	4	10829
Hatchet Lake CTA	SK	CTA	4	1	1350
Kahkewistahaw CTA	SK	CTA	2	1	606
Lac La Ronge - Kitsakie CTA	SK	CTA	7	1	6283
Little Pine and Poundmaker CTA	SK	CTA	3	2	1785
Makwa Sahgaieghan CTA	SK	CTA	2	1	1096
Montreal Lake CTA	SK	CTA	3	1	2316
Moosomin and Saulteaux RCMP CTA	SK	CTA	3	2	1853
Muskeg Lake RCMP CTA	SK	CTA	1	1	365
Muskoday CTA	SK	CTA	1	1	620
Pelican Lake and Witchehan Lake RCMP CTA	SK	CTA	3	2	1693
Peter Ballantyne CTA	SK	CTA	20	1	6407
Qu'Appelle First Nations CTA	SK	CTA	3	2	1100
Red Earth CTA	SK	CTA	2	1	1422
Saskatchewan FNCPS Framework Agreement	SK	Framework	126.5	47	59370
Sweetgrass CTA	SK	CTA	2	1	715
Touchwood Agency CTA	SK	CTA	4	4	3096
Waterhen Lake CTA	SK	CTA	2	1	976

Agreements	Province	Agreement Type	Officers Negotiated	Communities	Population
Whitecap CTA	SK	CTA	2	1	298
Yellow Quill CTA	SK	CTA	2	1	986
Bloodvein First Nations CTA	MB	CTA	4	1	1054
Buffalo Point CTA (Sprague)	MB	CTA	1	1	43
Chemawawin CTA	MB	CTA	3.5	1	1454
Dakota Ojibway Police Service Agreement	MB	SA	36	6	8773
Manitoba RCMP FNCPS/ACCP Framework Agreement 2014-18	MB	Framework	60.5	45	69503
Nisichawayasihk CTA	MB	CTA	8	1	3005
Opaskwayak CTA	MB	CTA	7	1	3132
Peguis CTA	MB	CTA	7	1	3681
Poplar River First Nations CTA	MB	CTA	4	1	1263
Swan Lake CTA	MB	CTA	2	1	618
Waywayseecappo CTA	MB	CTA	5	1	1501
Akwesasne Policing Agreement	ON	SA	24	1	9515
Anishinabek Police Service Agreement	ON	SA	61	16	9853
Lac Seul Police Service Agreement	ON	SA	7	1	895
Nishnawbe-Aski Police Service Agreement	ON	SA	130	34	23408

Agreements	Province	Agreement Type	Officers Negotiated	Communities	Population
Ontario First Nations Policing Agreement	ON	SA	71	19	16669
Rama Police Service Agreement	ON	SA	2	1	719
Six Nations Regional Policing Agreement	ON	SA	25	1	10814
Treaty Three Police Service Agreement	ON	SA	75	23	8454
United Chiefs and Councils of Manitoulin (UCCM) Anishnaabe Police Service Agreement	ON	SA	16	6	2123
Wapekeka First Nation Community Tripartite Agreement	ON	CTA	2	1	418
Wikwemikong Police Service Agreement	ON	SA	16	1	3175
Abitibiwinni, Entente de services policiers de	QC	SA	3	1	572
Eagle Village Police Force Agreement	QC	SA	2	1	274
Eeyou-Eenou Police Force	QC	SA	79	8	15131
Essipit, Entente de services policiers de la Première nation des Innus	QC	SA	3	1	202
Gesgapegiag, Agreement on the Provision of Police Services of the Micmacs of	QC	SA	4	1	691

Agreements	Province	Agreement Type	Officers Negotiated	Communities	Population
Huronne-Wendat, Entente de services policiers de la Nation	QC	SA	9	1	1503
Kahnawake Police Services	QC	SA	33	1	7809
Kativik Regional Police Service Agreement	QC	SA	58	11	6870
Kitigan Zibi Anishinabeg Police Services Agreement	QC	SA	9	1	1603
Lac Saint-Jean, Entente de services policiers des Montagnais du	QC	SA	11	1	2053
Lac Simon, Entente de services policiers de la Nation Anishnabe du	QC	SA	12	1	1639
Listuguj Mi'gmaq, Agreement on the Provision of Police Services of	QC	SA	12	1	2054
Manawan, Entente de services policiers des Atikamekw de	QC	SA	9	1	2283
Naskapi Village of Kawawachikamach Police Services Agreement	QC	SA	4	1	672
Odanak et Wolinak	QC	SA	6	2	420
Opitciwan, Entente de services policiers des Atikamekw d'	QC	SA	14	1	2291
Pakua Shipi, Entente de services policiers des Montagnais de	QC	SA	3	1	5

Agreements	Province	Agreement Type	Officers Negotiated	Communities	Population
Timiskaming, Agreement on the Provision of Police Services of	QC	SA	4	1	588
Wemotaci, Entente de services policiers des Atikamekw de	QC	SA	6	1	1427
New Brunswick FNCPS Framework Agreement	NB	Framework	19	2	3973
Chapel Island CTA	NS	CTA	2	1	574
Eskasoni RCMP CTA	NS	CTA	16	1	3635
Membertou Municipal Agreement	NS	Municipal	7	1	894
Millbrook CTA	NS	CTA	5	1	871
Nova Scotia FNCPS Framework Agreement	NS	Framework	40	7	8377
Pictou Landing CTA	NS	CTA	1	1	489
Shubenacadie CTA	NS	CTA	10	1	1296
Wagmatcook CTA	NS	CTA	4	1	621
Waycobah CTA	NS	CTA	2	1	891
Abegweit CTA	PE	CTA	1	1	222
Lennox Island CTA	PE	CTA	1	1	399
P.E.I. FNCPS Framework Agreement	PE	Framework	2	2	621
Hopedale Inuit Regional CTA	NL	CTA	5	1	620

Agreements	Province	Agreement Type	Officers Negotiated	Communities	Population
Makkovik Inuit Regional CTA	NL	CTA	2	1	380
Nain Inuit Regional CTA	NL	CTA	7	1	1050
Newfoundland and Labrador FNCPS Framework Agreement	NL	Framework	16	4	2365
Rigolet Inuit Regional CTA	NL	CTA	2	1	315
Liard CTA	YT	CTA	4	1	507
Yukon FNCPS Framework Agreement	YT	Framework	12	12	3665
162 agreements			1,560.50	441	402,491

Provinces: All

Agreement Type: Framework, CTA, SA, Municipal