

Canada



Indian and Northern
Affairs Canada

DEPARTMENT OF INDIAN AFFAIRS AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT

APPENDICES A.1 TO A.5


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The
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Consulting Group

APPENDIX A.1

BASIC BACKGROUND DATA



INTRODUCTION

This appendix contains socio-demographic data that was used to evaluate the feasibility of organization structures and transition plans. It provided useful insights into the size and dispersion of the communities involved and the structures they use to govern themselves. The material concerning population and education levels was particularly important.


GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

- The population of Nunavut is small, and spread across a wide region. Only six communities (1988) have more than one thousand people, only one is more than two thousand. Most communities have between five hundred and one thousand people.
- The Nunavut population will continue to grow, in particular the age group for whom future employment is a critical issue, those who are currently under 15 years of age.
- After some early rapid gains, the effectiveness of education programming seems to have plateaued. More than half the population does not have secondary school education. High school graduation rates, the key to improving the situation, have at best plateaued, and at worst are in decline.
- Barring dramatic changes in current trends, native unemployment rates will not improve during the nineties, even though there is a clear desire to participate in the work force. The projected number of jobs available to 2016 will not generate employment sufficient to absorb the rapidly expanding native labour force. In 1986 the workforce/employed worker gap was 930 people. By 2016 this will expand to 1,823 but since the workforce will double (6,195 to 12,143) the unemployment rate remains essentially unchanged.
- There is a great deal of "local government" carried out in the Nunavut territory. Regional and Tribal Councils and Municipal or Local Governments currently play a major role in the lives of local residents.


CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS - DEMOGRAPHICS - NUNAVUT

- Natives are not increasing their share of available jobs fast enough to keep pace with population growth. To the extent there has been improvement in the number of natives holding jobs, from 33% in 1971 to 40% in 1989, it occurred mostly before 1981.
- In the Nunavut area, 62% of the jobs are held by natives, but this represents employment for only 36% of natives over the age of 15. Thirty-nine percent of all jobs held by natives were in Iqaluit.
- In Nunavut, 68% of all jobs were found outside the major centres, compared to only 19% in the West. Outside the major centres, native employment rates were higher in Nunavut (35%) than in the West (31%). The overall higher native employment rate in the West is entirely attributable to the major centres. In both areas, native desire for employment is very high.
- Fifty-seven percent of NWT natives aged 15-19 have no secondary schooling, compared to 8% for non-natives. In 1984/85, 10% of natives aged 18 had graduated from grade twelve. By 1990/91 this rate was down to 6%. As a percentage of the population, native high school graduates peaked at 25% in 1967/68. In 1990/91, the rate was down to 14.8%.
- Between 1986 and 2016, the native population of Nunavut is expected to grow 130%. All of this growth will occur among the inuit population. Population aged 15-64 will increase 137% in Nunavut during the 1986-2016 period. In Nunavut, this age group will represent 53% of the total population and 90% of the adult population, the group for whom the availability of employment opportunities is most critical.
- If future job creation rates are presumed to parallel the period 1981 to 1986, and natives in Nunavut assume jobs at the native rate of job creation, natives will become increasingly unemployed. This scenario changes only slightly if it is assumed natives assume jobs at the total rate of job creation. This situation would be eased only if natives in Nunavut chose to take the surplus jobs that will exist in the West by that time.
- Assuming Division does not create a significant net increase in jobs, but only redistributes them, it will not have a significant long run impact on employment rates in the areas involved.


**PROJECTED LABOUR FORCE
1986 - 2016
TOTAL N.W.T.**




**LEVEL OF SCHOOLING IN NWT
PERCENTAGE WITH NO SECONDARY SCHOOLING
1971 TO 1986**



POPULATION AGE DISTRIBUTION - NUNAVUT



OVERALL POPULATION DISTRIBUTION - NUNAVUT



**DIVISION OF NWT
BASED ON PARKER REPORT BOUNDARY**

Population Chart

Towns, Villages or Hamlets in Eastern Territory

Mould Bay - N/A	Eureka - N/A
Coppermine - '88 - 956	Pelly Bay - '88 - 327
Holman - '88 - 316	Repulse Bay - '88 - 454
Bathurst Inlet - '88 - 80	Arctic Bay - '88 - 535
Cambridge Bay - '88 - 1,027	Grise Fiord - '88 - 76
Isacasen - N/A	Pond Inlet - '88 - 885
Ennadai - N/A	Igloodik - '88 - 922
Gjoa Haven - '88 - 706	Hall Beach - '88 - 476
Baker lake - '88 - 1,044	Cape Dorset - '88 - 970
Resolute - '88 - 166	Pangnirtung - '88 - 1,070
Spence Bay - '88 - 540	Iqaluit - '88 - 3,039
Rankin Inlet - '88 - 1,424	Lake Harbour - '88 - 341
Whale Cove - '88 - 225	Clyde - '88 - 474
Arviat - '88 - 1,255	Aleri - N/A
Chesterfield Inlet - '88 - 284	Sanikiluaq - '88 - 457

LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROFILE

REGIONAL AND TRIBAL COUNCILS

Regional and tribal councils developed out of periodic meetings between Territorial government officials and local elected mayors, settlement chairpersons and in the Western NWT, Dene chiefs. Through these meetings, the participants came to realize the value of a common voice in the representation of matters of regional interest to government.

The Baffin Regional Council was the first to be formed, in 1978, with a formal constitution. In 1980, the BRC was legally recognized and funded under its own Act. Prior to this, financial and administrative support had been provided under a joint agreement with the GNWT.

Other councils soon followed, and the Legislative Assembly passed the *Regional and Tribal Councils Act* in September of 1983.

The Councils include, as voting members, mayors of municipalities and chairpersons of settlement councils, chiefs and sub-chiefs of Dene bands and other members appointed by the Council or provided for in the Act, for example, Hunters' and Trappers' Association representatives. While the Councils at present act mainly as advisory bodies to the GNWT, they are legally empowered to act as boards of management for delegated programs and services if they so desire.

The following Regional and Tribal Councils have been formed in the NWT:

THE BAFFIN REGIONAL COUNCIL

Arctic Bay, Broughton Island, Cape Dorset, Clyde River, Grise Fiord, Hall Beach,

Igloolik, Iquluit, Lake Harbour, Pangnirtung, Pond Inlet, Resolute, Sanikiluaq.

KITIKMEOT REGIONAL COUNCIL

Cambridge Bay, Coppermine, Gjoa Haven, Holman, Pelly Bay, Spence Bay.

KEEWATIN REGIONAL COUNCIL

Arviat, Baker Lake, Chesterfield Inlet, Coral Harbour, Rankin Inlet, Repulse Bay, Whale Cove.

DEG CHO REGIONAL COUNCIL

Fort Liard, Fort Providence, Fort Simpson, Jean Marie River, Kakisa, Nahanni Butte, Trout Lake, Wrigley, Hay River Reserve.

DOGRIB TRIBAL COUNCIL

Dettah, Lot 500 (rainbow Valley area of Yellowknife), lac la Martre, Rae Lakes, Snare Lake, Rae-Edzo.

SHIHTA REGIONAL COUNCIL

Norman Wells, Fort Norman, Fort Franklin, Fort Good Hope, Colville Lake.

Communities south of Great Slave Lake have formed the South Slave Lake Regional Council which is not incorporated under the *Regional and Tribal Councils Act*. In the Mackenzie Delta-Beaufort Sea area, funds have been provided to several groups studying the regional council concept.

MUNICIPAL OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE NWT

Legislation was enacted by the Legislative Assembly in June, 1987 to replace the *Municipal Act* and the *Taxation Act* and to make Charter communities and incorporated settlements possible for the first time. The new Acts, which were effective January 1, 1988 are the *Cities, Towns and Villages Act*, the *Charter Communities Act*, the *Settlements Act*, the *Local Authorities Elections Act* and the

Property Assessment and Taxation Act.

Under the new local government legislation, there are many common authorities and responsibilities among cities, towns, villages and hamlets. In order to determine exact differences among local governments it would be necessary to refer to the appropriate Act or Acts under a particular area of responsibility.

The City of Yellowknife, the five towns and the two villages operate under the *Cities, Towns and Villages Act*, and the *Hamlets Act* governs hamlets.

In 1989, there were 44 municipal corporations in the Northwest Territories. This included seven municipal taxing authorities, two villages, five towns, the City of Yellowknife and 36 hamlets. In addition, there were two Settlement Corporations and 12 settlements with locally elected advisory councils. Unorganized communities are administered through GNWT Regional Offices or by Dene Band Councils.

QUALIFICATIONS AND POWERS OF NWT MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS

CITY

Total assessable land of \$200 million.
Council: Mayor and eight Aldermen.
Budget: Sets own budget.
Revenue: Cities, towns and villages get grants and contributions from the NWT Government. Equalization Contribution, Water Delivery Subsidy, Grant in Lieu of Taxes (taxes paid on buildings owned by Government). Capital Grants of 50% of approval on road and sidewalk construction. Repayable loans over lifetime of asset required for capital projects such as fire hall, water/sewer extensions, etc. Also, property taxes, fines, licenses, permits and fees.
Employees: Has its own employees according to local needs.
Capital: It can finance capital projects by selling debentures. Receives matching grants of 50% for road and sidewalk construction.
Area of Responsibility: Cities, towns, villages and hamlets have by-law making authority in many areas.

Towns and cities may borrow up to 20% of their taxable assessment; villages may borrow up to 10%. Hamlets and charter communities require Ministerial approval for by-laws setting rates for water supply or for the use of sewage and drainage system.

TOWN

Has total assessable land of \$50 million.
Council: Mayor and eight Councillors.
Budget: Sets own budget.
Revenue: Same as a city.
Employees: Same as a city.
Capital: Same as a city.

VILLAGE

Has total assessable land of \$10 million.
Council: Mayor and eight Councillors.
Budget: Same as a city.
Revenue: Same as a city.
Employees: Same as a city.
Capital: Same as a city.

HAMLET

Petition of 25 residents and Minister's approval.
Council: Mayor and eight Councillors.
Budget: Set own budget with guidelines from the Territorial Government.
Revenue: Operating contributions, permits, licenses, fines and fees.
Employees: Has its own employees in accordance with budget guidelines.
Capital: In form of projects carried out by Territorial Government Region or Headquarters.

CHARTER COMMUNITY

The *Charter Communities Act of 1987* provides for the incorporation of settlement corporations as charter communities. A charter community is a municipal corporation similar to a hamlet, but the negotiated community charter defines the composition, election procedures, powers and duties of the community council and may determine how the council is to behave towards any band council or other aboriginal organization in the area.

Petition of 25 residents and approval of

community charter by Executive Council and 60 per cent of voters who vote in the community.

Council: Size and make-up of council can be negotiated in community charter.

Budget: Sets own budget with guidelines from the Territorial Government.

Revenue: To be negotiated in community charters. May include permits, licences, fines and fees.

Employees: Has its own employees in accordance with budget guidelines.

Capital: In form of projects carried out with by Territorial Government Region or Headquarters.

SETTLEMENT

Under the *Settlements Act*, the Minister may declare an unincorporated community as a settlement and fix its boundaries. If the Minister and the residents agree, a settlement corporation may be established.

Council: The size of the settlement council is specified in the Minister's Order establishing the settlement corporation. The settlement council may consist of both elected members, and members appointed by the Minister.

Budget: Budget is set by Department of Municipal and Community Affairs based on the needs of the settlement.

Revenue: Per capita grant of \$20 per person with maximum of \$12,000.

Capital: In form of projects carried out by the Territorial Government Region or Headquarters.

Areas of Responsibilities: A settlement council has the power under the *Settlements Act* to contract for municipal purposes and to hire settlement staff. It does not have the power to pass by-laws. On local matters a settlement council states its opinion in the form of a resolution which is then taken into consideration when the Territorial Government acts for the settlement. The council has control over its per capita grant and can conduct community projects with it.

COMMUNITIES ADMINISTERED BY BAND COUNCILS

Ten Northwest Territories communities are run by the local band or sub-band council. Band funding, a federal government responsibility

provides money only for certain administrative functions for the band. Territorial government funding, through the Department of Municipal and Community Affairs, covers municipal services for the community. The communities are Dettah, Fort Good Hope, Jean Marie River, Kakisa, Nahanni Butte, Rae Lakes, Snare Lake, Snowdrift, Trout Lake and Wrigley.

* From Northwest Territories Data Book - 1990/91.



APPENDIX A.2
NUNAVUT POLITICAL ACCORD

NUNAVUT POLITICAL ACCORD

This Nunavut Political Accord has been initialled this 27th day of April, 1992 by the negotiators of the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut, the Government of the Northwest Territories and the Government of Canada, signifying their intent to recommend the Political Accord to their principals.

John Amagoalik
Tungavik Federation of Nunavut

Elizabeth Snider
Government of the Northwest
Territories

Jack Stagg
Government of Canada

1992/04/27

NUNAVUT POLITICAL ACCORD

BETWEEN:

The Tungavik Federation of Nunavut ("TFN"), as represented by the President of the TFN;

AND:

The Government of Canada ("Canada"), as represented by the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development;

AND:

The Government of the Northwest Territories ("GNWT"), as represented by the Government Leader of the Northwest Territories.

WHEREAS the creation of a new Nunavut Territory with its own government is a fundamental objective of the Inuit of Nunavut;

AND WHEREAS achievement of the Inuit objective is supported by Canada and the GNWT;

AND WHEREAS a majority of those voting in a territory-wide plebiscite, held in 1982, favoured division of the N.W.T.;

AND WHEREAS the Legislative Assembly of the N.W.T. has passed resolutions supporting division;

AND WHEREAS the parties have committed themselves to securing the Inuit objective in a manner consistent with the provisions of Article 4 of an Agreement between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement Area and Her Majesty in Right of Canada ("the final agreement");

NOW THEREFORE THE TFN, CANADA AND THE GNWT ("the parties") HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

Part 1: General

1.1 This agreement ("the Accord") is the Nunavut Political Accord referred to in Article 4 of the final agreement.

Part 2: Nunavut Act

2.1 The legislation proposed to establish Nunavut (the "Nunavut Act") shall be similar to the present Northwest Territories Act with such modernization and clarification as may be appropriate.

2.2 The Nunavut Act shall provide that those territorial laws made under the Northwest Territories Act that are in force immediately prior to the coming into force and effect of the provisions of the Nunavut Act creating the Nunavut Territory will continue to apply to Nunavut, except to the extent that they are inconsistent with the Nunavut Act, or until such laws are revoked or amended by the Nunavut Legislative Assembly.

2.3 Canada shall consult with the TFN and the GNWT on all matters to be provided for in the Nunavut Act prior to recommending the said legislation to Parliament.

Part 3: Recommendation and Timing of Nunavut Act

3.1 The Nunavut Act shall be recommended to Parliament, as a Government measure, on the date on which legislation to ratify the final agreement is tabled in Parliament, unless TFN agrees to another date.

3.2 Canada shall seek Royal Assent for the Nunavut Act coincidental to seeking Royal Assent for the legislation to ratify the final agreement unless TFN agrees otherwise.

3.3 All sections of the Nunavut Act shall come into force and effect no later than April 1, 1999. It is anticipated that appropriate sections of the Nunavut Act will be brought into force prior to April 1, 1999 where those sections support the transition process for the creation of Nunavut.

Part 4: Powers of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly and Government

4.1 The types of powers of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly and Nunavut Government shall be generally consistent with those in the present Northwest Territories Act.

4.2 The Nunavut Government shall have sufficient authority to fulfil its lawful obligations under the final agreement.

4.3 The Nunavut Act shall include provisions regarding the authority to transfer administration and control over public lands to the Nunavut Government.

Part 5: Boundaries of the Nunavut Territory

5.1 The Nunavut Territory shall comprise that area which forms that part of the Northwest Territories, pursuant to the Northwest Territories Act, situated east of the line described in Annex A attached hereto.

Part 6: Transition Process

- 6.1 The Nunavut Act shall provide for a Nunavut Implementation Commission (NIC) in accordance with this Accord.
- 6.2 The Nunavut Implementation Commission (NIC) shall be established as soon as practicable after the Nunavut Act receives Royal Assent and in any event no later than six months beyond that date, and shall terminate no later than three months following the coming into force and effect of the provisions of the Nunavut Act creating the Nunavut Territory.
- 6.3 The NIC shall comprise nine Commissioners appointed by the Governor in Council, three of whom shall be chosen from a list of names submitted by the GNWT and three of whom shall be chosen from a list of names submitted by the TFN. Not less than six of the Commissioners shall be ordinarily resident in the Nunavut Settlement Area.
- 6.4 In addition to the nine Commissioners, a Chief Commissioner, who shall be acceptable to the parties hereto, shall be appointed by the Government of Council.
- 6.5 An Executive Director shall be hired by the Commission, and shall manage the Commission's staff and budget. The Executive Director shall report to the Chief Commissioner, and shall act as Secretary to the Commission.
- 6.6. The NIC shall provide advice to the parties hereto on the creation of Nunavut.
- 6.6.1 Consistent with its general mandate, the NIC shall provide advice on:
- (i) a timetable for the assumption of service delivery responsibilities from the GNWT, federal government or other authority, by the Government of Nunavut;
 - (ii) the process for the first election of the Government of Nunavut and for the determination of electoral districts for Nunavut;
 - (iii) the design of and funding for training plans;
 - (iv) the process for the identification of a capital city of Nunavut;
 - (v) the principals and criteria for an equitable division of assets and liabilities between the GNWT and the Government of Nunavut;
 - (vi) capital infrastructure needs of Nunavut resulting from division and the creation of a new territory, and scheduling for construction;
 - (vii) the appropriate administrative design for the first Government of Nunavut which may include personnel to administer the functions described in 7.1 with due regard for efficiencies and effectiveness; and
 - (viii) such other matters consistent with the Commission's mandate as may be referred to it.

The determination of the administrative design of the first Nunavut government organization is separate from the determination of ongoing federal financing arrangements for the two territories.

The responsibility for accepting and implementing the recommendations of the NIC will depend on the jurisdiction to which recommendations individually apply.

6.6.2 The NIC shall:

- (i) propose an annual budget for its own operations;
- (ii) hire or engage appropriate NIC support staff;
- (iii) recommend arrangements for the continuing provision of programs and services where the assumption by the Government of Nunavut of service delivery responsibilities is to be phased;
- (iv) establish public information programs, which may include public meetings, to keep residents of Nunavut apprised of the Commission's work; and
- (v) undertake such other tasks within its mandate as may be required.

6.7 The Commission shall prepare an annual report, and a copy of the annual report shall be tabled by the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development in Parliament, and immediately thereafter provided to the Government Leader for tabling in the Legislative Assembly. A copy shall also be provided to the TFN.

Part 7: Administrative Capacity of the Nunavut Government

7.1 The arrangements made regarding the administrative design of the first Nunavut Government (as recommended by the NIC pursuant to 6.6.1 (vii)) shall provide the Nunavut Government with the administrative capacity to:

- (i) establish and maintain a Legislative Assembly and Executive Council;
- (ii) manage the financial affairs of Nunavut;
- (iii) secure independent legal advice for the Government;
- (iv) undertake personnel recruitment, administration and training for and of government employees;
- (v) maintain certain aspects of public works and government services; and
- (vi) support municipal affairs; and
- (vii) provide adult education programming as part of a comprehensive human resource development plan.

7.2 It is anticipated that other areas of administrative responsibility at present administered by the GNWT which are not part of the core administrative capacity of the Nunavut Government, referred to in 7.1, shall be discharged through intergovernmental agreements or contracts with appropriate governments, public institutions or non-governmental bodies.

7.3 In discharging its duties with regard to the design and implementation of the structures of the first Nunavut Government (see 6.6.1 (vii) and 6.6.2 (iii)) the NIC shall work toward the following goals:

- (i) an equitable distribution of government activities among Nunavut communities;
- (ii) appropriate utilization of information management systems and supporting technology to support a decentralized and efficient government delivery system; and
- (iii) employment of local residents in new government positions through strong emphasis on training and work support programs.

Part 8: Financing the Nunavut Territory

- 8.1 Prior to the coming into force and effect of the provisions of the Nunavut Act creating the Nunavut Territory, Canada, following consultation with the other parties hereto, shall establish the financial arrangements for the Government of Nunavut. Recognizing the desirability of formula based financing, such financial arrangements may be analogous to those which currently exist for the GNWT with such modifications as may be necessary.
- 8.2 Prior to the coming into force and effect of the provisions of the Nunavut Act creating the Nunavut Territory, Canada, following consultation with the GNWT, shall establish formula based financial arrangements for the GNWT for the period following such coming into force and effect of the provisions of the Nunavut Act. Such financial arrangements shall be analogous to those which currently exist with the GNWT with such modifications as may be necessary.
- 8.3 Prior to the coming into force and effect of the provisions of the Nunavut Act creating the Nunavut Territory a process shall be established by the parties to consult on the matters referred to in 8.1 and 8.2 herein and to clarify, as necessary, the financial arrangements referred to in 8.1 and 8.2.
- 8.4 In establishing the financial arrangements referred to in 8.1, and following consultation with the other parties hereto, Canada shall determine and fund reasonable incremental costs arising from the creation and operation of the Government of Nunavut.
- 8.5 The financial arrangements referred to in 8.1 and 8.2 shall support the need for financial stability for the territories and provide both territorial governments the opportunity to continue to provide public services for residents, recognizing the existing scope and quality of such services.
- 8.6 The GNWT will continue to provide an equitable allocation of its capital, maintenance, and operating expenditures in the Nunavut area and the western part of the Northwest Territories until the coming into force and effect of the provisions of the Nunavut Act creating the Nunavut Territory.

Part 9: Training and Human Resources Planning

- 9.1 The parties recognize the central importance of training in enabling Nunavut residents to access jobs resulting from division of the Northwest Territories, and that investing in people is of greater value than investing in infrastructure.
- 9.2 Training plans shall be incorporated into all planning, design and implementation activities of the NIC as reflected in the general mandate provided through 6.6.1. Planning shall identify existing training programs and associated funding programs, as well as new program requirements. Planning efforts shall consider all aspects of training activities including skills surveys, pre-employment education, skills upgrading, co-operative education and on-the-job-training opportunities.
- 9.3 The parties shall begin preparation of a preliminary human resources plan within six weeks of the signing of this Accord.
- 9.4 Coordination may occur between the training effort for implementation of the final agreement and that to establish Nunavut.

Part 10: Other

- 10.1 This Accord may be amended with the consent of the parties.
- 10.2 This Accord shall be revised by the parties in the event of any amendments to Article 4 of the final agreement in order to reflect that amendment.
- 10.3 Where there is any inconsistency or conflict between the provisions of this Accord and the final agreement, the final agreement shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency or conflict.
- 10.4 This Accord shall come into effect upon signing by the parties, and, subject to 10.6, shall continue in effect until three months after the date of the coming into force and effect of the provisions of the Nunavut Act creating the Nunavut Territory.
- 10.5 This Accord is subject to the appropriation of funds by Parliament.
- 10.6 In the event that the final agreement is not ratified by the Inuit in the ratification vote, this Accord shall have no force and effect.
- 10.7 Any reference in this Accord to the GNWT in relation to that period after the coming into force and effect of the provisions of the Nunavut Act creating the Nunavut Territory shall be construed as a reference to the government responsible for the western part of the Northwest Territories.

ANNEX A

The following legal description is the western boundary of the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut (TFN) Land Claim Settlement Area:

60th Parallel Commencing at the intersection of 60°00'N latitude with 102°00'W longitude, being the intersection of the Manitoba, Northwest Territories and Saskatchewan borders;

Thelon River Thence due north to the intersection of 64°14'N latitude and 102°00'W longitude, near the south shore of the Thelon River.

Gloworm Lake Thence west northwesterly in a straight line to the intersection of 64°51'N latitude and 109°20'W longitude, north of Gloworm Lake;

Contwoyto Lake Thence northwesterly a straight line to the intersection of 65°30'N latitude and 110°40'W longitude, west of Contwoyto Lake;

Itchen Lake Thence due west to the intersection of 65°30'N latitude and 112°30'W longitude, east of Itchen lake;

**Inuvialuit
Settlement
Region**

Thence northwesterly in a straight line to a point on the southeastern boundary of the Inuvialuit Settlement Region, being the intersection of 68°00'N latitude and 120°40'51'W longitude;

Thence following the adjusted boundary of the Inuvialuit Settlement Region, as set out in the TFN/COPE Agreement of May 19, 1984, to the intersection of 70°00'N latitude and 110°00'W longitude; and finally

Thence due north along said meridian of longitude, along the eastern boundary of the inuvialuit Settlement Region, to its intersection with the Territorial Sea Boundary north of Borden Island, being the termination of this boundary.



APPENDIX A.3

NEW APPROACHES TO SERVICE DELIVERY

NEW APPROACHES TO SERVICES DELIVERY

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A. NEW APPROACHES TO SERVICE DELIVERY

The opportunities and challenges that will arise during transition to a distinct public government in Nunavut, and the continuing realities of governing its new leadership will have to face after April 1 1999, raise questions about the most effective institutional arrangements for initial and ongoing delivery of services.

In combination the principles governing the design of an administrative structure, and the realities of maintaining service, indicate a creative and flexible approach to the institutional arrangements supporting service delivery is needed. More traditional approaches to management of service delivery by government do not address the needs that will arise in Nunavut during the next decade and beyond. There are a number of specific influences that limit the utility of traditional approaches.

1. Immigration

The challenge to reduce immigration to the lowest level compatible with other objectives means the structure of government can only develop in concert with the skills and capacities of the regional labour force. This means a lengthy transition period, since the process of developing local skills is limited by the realities of education and job training processes. During this transition the leadership of Nunavut will need to access, on a temporary basis, the skills needed to undertake the broad range of government functions that will arise from normal citizen expectations. Since this challenge is linked to transition, the solution must also be transitory. Partnerships, strategic alliances and contracting arrangements linked to identified time frames and specified goals are ideally suited to such circumstances, and can be used as very effective transition management tools.

2. Transition Management

The requirement for a "seamless" transition during which services continue uninterrupted creates a difficult inconsistency. On one hand the emerging public government will have to ensure little or nothing about service delivery changes, while on the other hand it must cope with the uncertainties surrounding emergence of a new organization that must reflect the new circumstances of a distinct government in Nunavut. To maintain services throughout the region during transition there must be a degree of centralized control and accountability, yet for many of these services the management and administrative structure for ensuring them will not be fully in place in the East for some time. As well, there is a stated preference for local decision making and control of service delivery, which itself implies less control and accountability.

Again, partnership and contracting concepts could be a very effective mechanism for managing this process. Properly structured arrangements could provide the framework for a "seamless" transition in identified programs, thereby allowing government to choose the order and magnitude of program transfer and development issues it wishes to manage at any single point, while also being assured that service is delivered across the board. This approach would also allow leaders to focus attention on priority items, such as human resource issues, by focusing specialized resources without affecting ongoing service delivery. The flexibility of partnership and contracting arrangements would also permit recognition of local differences, and create opportunities to pilot different approaches to service delivery.

Partnership and contracting arrangements could also support the transition process for the western government, as it evolves in response to the emergence of public government in

Nunavut. It may also wish to manage the scope and timing of change by carrying out some functions through arrangements with third parties.

3. Cost and Technology


The increasing capacity and declining costs now associated with information technology create opportunities for alternate delivery mechanisms, especially where standardized or processing environments exist, or where the cost of "on-site" service delivery is prohibitive. The rapidly changing environment, however, suggests pursuing a strategy which minimizes risks associated with technological change, while optimizing benefits to the Nunavut Government. Effectively structured partnership and contracting arrangements accomplish this, since it is the service provider that will have to cope with technological change and accompanying risk.

Transition management is also a consideration. Information systems currently supporting program delivery in the east are now resident in the GNWT. The process of migrating or replacing these systems will be long and complex. Again, this process can be best managed by handling some elements through partnership and sharing arrangements.

Following is a discussion of the influences causing public sector organizations to re-examine the arrangements they use for service delivery, strategic factors to be assessed when considering partnership or similar kinds of arrangements, and specific elements of implementation.

This discussion is designed to support initial discussions concerning how these kinds of arrangements might best be used to manage service delivery in Nunavut. An overall approach to this issue is a **major strategic decision** that will be faced early in the transition period. The results of this approach will affect virtually all aspects of service delivery for many years.

Change Pattern



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Driving Forces

- Fiscal



- Debt
- Risk Dilution

- Economic/Competitive



- Adjustment & Training
- Time-Based Competition

- Socio-Demographic



- Protection

- Institutions



- New Meanings

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B. PARTNERSHIPS AND ALLIANCES

1. CHANGE PATTERNS

Partnerships are emerging as one approach to dealing with some very significant changes. These changes are part of an overall process that has several consistent characteristics (Exhibit 1).

(i) Steady State

This state of affairs exists when there is no fundamental change underway. This does not imply that nothing is happening, only that the changes occurring are not affecting the foundations of the "system", but rather are part of administrative or short term operational policy.

(ii) Instability

Something begins to change in a more fundamental way and views about how to cope begin to polarize, usually first around whether there is a need to change, and then over what the response should be. Because the new situation is often poorly understood, or hard to define, ideas about what the response should be can be widely dispersed and based as much on emotion and value systems as fact. Clearly the creation of a new public government in Nunavut is such a circumstance.

(iii) New Idea

Specific responses begin to emerge as relevant hard data and continued debate begin to bring some clarity to the situation that existed at the polarization stage. This is the point at which specific solutions like partnerships begin to emerge. The important thing at this stage is to avoid over-commitment to particular solutions. They are just ideas at this point, and further experimentation is usually needed before solutions workable in the long run can be established.

(iv) Conflict

At some point the experimentation stage must end and some specific actions undertaken. This usually involves prioritizing allocation of scarce resource. Some conflict is part of this process. The nature and length of time for the conflict vary depending on the issue and the skill with which the situation is managed. It is likely the transaction to a new government in Nunavut will contain elements of states (iii) and (iv).

(v) Emergence

At some point, hopefully without debilitating conflict, one or more acceptable long term solutions emerge, and are generally applied and accepted. The length of time before the cycle begins again depends on the speed of change in the relevant environments.

2. DRIVING FORCES

There are four general forces driving change in the relationships between major institutions in Canada, and in particular recognition of the interdependence that now exists (Exhibit 2). These forces give rise to challenges that can no longer be thought of as "public policy" issues in the sense that government takes action to deal with them. They are "integrated challenges" in the sense that virtually all levels of society must now get involved in meeting the challenge. Business and government both have a huge stake in the process and its results.

Fiscal

The amount debt of being carried by all levels of government is limiting the kind of responses that can be given to new challenges, and the extent to which existing services can be maintained. We are living in a world that can

no longer support the programs designed in the 60's. Governments are retreating to "core" services like health care and education, and reconsidering fundamental assumptions and service delivery mechanisms in other policy areas. There is also a high level of cynicism about the capacity of government to deliver in some areas. People now think government has neither the resources (people and money) or the political will. These forces are causing people to look to other institutions and new combinations of institutional arrangements to address problems.

Economic\Competitive

The challenge is to manage the adjustment to a new competitive environment, especially since the basis on which the new competitive era will evolve is knowledge based, not geography or resource based. The technological and economic forces driving change in the Canadian economy cannot be held back or even slowed down, the only question is how best to cope with change. There are two major challenges here, keeping the infrastructure up to date (tax system for example) so that Canadian business can compete, and facilitating adjustment at the individual level as workers cope with changes in the workforce. The scope and speed of the changes mean that designing and implementing adjustment strategies cannot be left with a single sector or group of organizations - a coordinated and cooperative effort of some kind is needed. The total quality movement and the recognition of the need to bring the customer, however defined, back into the picture, and the recognition of the predominant role the "system" and "process" play in the behaviour of people is a current response to the competitive forces that are now at work.

Socio-demographic

The challenge is protection of the those who cannot cope with the consequences of change. How far can society go, and in what ways, to shelter those who do not have the education and other tools to compete, or are either too young or too old to participate, yet are affected

by what is going on?

Last two factors in particular have driven training and retraining to the top of the concern list. Documents like Reichs "The Work of Nations" have heightened awareness of the long term importance of skill development and maintenance. This is a complex and difficult area involving reassessment of the roles played by the home, workplace, and educational institutions, and a rethink of the concept of learning to address teams and organizations. Given the importance of education and training to the long term aspirations of the people of Nunavut, it is critical effective institutional arrangements be developed very early on.

Institutional Changes

Traditional distinctions between types of institutions may no longer be relevant. There are now three key functions that must be effectively undertaken by an organization, regardless of sector or market.

- 1 - Responsiveness to demand.
- 2 - Capacity to support and inform users.
- 3 - Capacity to share information and consult.

There is no particular kind of organization best suited to these functions. Different configurations will work in different arenas at different times. This need to remain flexible is what raises the possibility that partnerships may be a way of dealing with this uncertainty.

3. TRADE-OFFS

These driving forces produce a number of difficult trade-offs (Exhibit 3). Although there is some middle ground in all these cases, it is really not possible to have it both ways: there are not enough resources to take dual approaches and see which one works best.

Selective vs Universal

Should benefits, or services, be distributed universally to all those who fit broadly based categories (family allowance) or must there be some criteria used for selection (means tests).

Trade-Off Challenges

- **Selective** vs **Universal**
- **Private** vs **Public**
- **Centralization** vs **Decentralization**
- **Doing** vs **Thinking**
- **Short Term** vs **Long Term**

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What about universal programs in the private sector, especially things like pension plans? Will these continue to be provided "across the board" or tailored more to individuals? The universality question has been answered, especially with the tax-back of selected universal benefits in recent years and the rapid evolution of more tailored programs in the private sector. The problem now is mechanisms for service delivery, and supporting institutional arrangements.

Private vs Public

Whether a service is delivered selectively or universally, there is still the issue of what mechanisms and resources to use. New kinds of partnerships are one way of taking the predominantly private sector route, though the nature and type of privatization depends on the kind of partnership used.

Centralization vs Decentralization

Regardless of service delivery mechanism, and especially for very broadly based services there remains the question of central or local control. This has major implications for the kind of partnerships that might be feasible, and the number and nature of potential partners. Clearly the stated preference for local decision making in the North will impact upon the kind of alliances and partnerships that may be feasible.

Doing vs Thinking

There is a public sector bias toward extensive and detailed review of decisions and extensive planning before action is taken. Speed of change and the kinds of decisions being made in the other trade-offs identified are undermining the viability of this long "run-up" to action. One consideration now operative is just doing something, called a "pilot" if you wish, seeing how it works, and then going from there. The thinking of people like Peters and Waterman is evident in this new approach, as is the TQM movement and its Plan\Do\Check\Act cycle, in particular the short time frames involved. These kinds of things are

hard to do in traditional public sector organizations, but can be carried out through effective use of partnerships.

Short vs Long Term

Most of the adjustments we are going to make will create short term "pain" (restructuring of manufacturing in Ontario) for perhaps a long term gain. The training and TQM challenges are just not overnight remedies - they involved making changes in mind set and then in how institutions are run and relate to each other.

4. STRATEGIC ISSUES

As partnerships are considered as possible responses to service needs in a changing environment some specific questions start to arise.

(a) Is this the Right Problem for a Partnership Solution? (Exhibit 4)

Three general questions come up at this stage. Although there are no clear cut answers they must still be carefully considered.

1. The Issue

There are different kinds of issues to be addressed. Some may be more amenable to solutions with partners than others. There are moral, institutional, legal, measurement and technical issues. It is likely the closer you get to the end of this list the more likely partnership is a viable solution.

2. The Partners Agenda

Some arenas are closer to the "core" interests of partners than others. Those that are fundamental may not be best handled through involvement of third parties, or may require very specific kinds of arrangements.

3. Other Available Approaches

A partnership can be considered one form of instrument available to address the issue at hand, but its relevance can be considered in

Strategic Issues



relation to the other choices available, (exhortation, expenditure, regulation, and ownership by government, or joint venture, mergers and other alternatives with the private sector) and the fit between these approaches and the issue being addressed. For example, potential partners may be able to show that one of these other approaches is much more likely to achieve the desired result.

(b) What Kind of Partnership?

The partnership alternative can be effectively evaluated in the context of a value chain. Activities are strung together to provide a product or service desired by the customer. To be effective a potential partnership must add something to the chain, otherwise there is no point in starting the relationship. The other question is what kind of partnership will add the most to the chain? (Exhibit 5).

Although issues are often thought of as public there is often no overpowering reason to involve government in the solution at all, and in many other cases only to the extent of its capacity to set the framework that will support the relationship. There are a number of relationship possibilities, flowing from the presence of five major groups - government - business - community - labour and issue specific players such as education institutions and specific associations like professional groups.

There are three general categories of partnership arrangements. Their relevance varies with the situation, and none is "pure"; elements of each can be found in most arrangements.

1. Consultative

The partner is an agent of persuasion, education, and information distribution and gathering. The partner is not directly involved in the decision making process, though the information it collects may be extremely important. The partner may also be consulted on the development of new strategies or changes. Fiscal arrangements are fairly

straightforward and linked to delivery of a clearly identified service.

2. Joint Delivery with Delegated Authority\Accountability

The partners each deliver pre-determined parts of the service. Each partner has specific authority to take action in identified areas on its own. Both partners are actively involved in the decision making process, though possibly at different levels. There is joint planning, delivery and evaluation. Fiscal arrangements between the parties reflect their relative roles, and require ongoing or regular periodic contact between the partners.

3. Self - Determination

After the initial framework is set up the "partner" runs the show and as long as performance is within the original framework there is no further involvement from the other partner. Separate revenue streams make the activity self sustaining, and eliminate the need for ongoing fiscal contact between the parties.

Each type of partnership requires a very different development cycle ranging from something that looks much like a normal tendering process to detailed involvement of both parties early on to ensure arrangements meet mutual needs, and virtual shared decision making from the beginning.

(c) Which Partners?

Though it may be possible to address a given situation using partnerships there must still be interest and capacity for this to occur. Three initial questions need attention (Exhibit 6).


1. Representativeness

Who represents stakeholders and participants, or has a good relationship with them? Can this be tested or measured in some way?

2. Readiness


If there is a potential partner that meets test #1,

Strategic Issues



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can the organization assume the role the defined partnership would require of it? conflict of interest? stability of leadership and membership? fiscal health? mandate and constitution? Is the potential partner clear enough about wants and needs to go into the relationship fully aware of the implications?

3. Motivation

What is the motivation of those who seek to or could become involved? Is this compatible with the overall objectives of the partnership? Even if the potential partners are "ready", what incentive is there to ensure this will continue? will the incentive have to change over time? how will this be done? who will decide?

(d) When do we Succeed?

Nothing lasts forever. How will the partners decide how and when the partnership has to change through renewal, or termination? What tools and procedures will be used. The major problem is the many "agendas" that will be brought to the table. There are at least five distinct points of view from which success or failure might be assessed (Exhibit 7).

1. **Direct** - What happened to whom, and what did it cost? What do clients think?
2. **Economic** - What was the broader economic impact of the process, beyond the immediate scope of those most affected or involved?
3. **Social** - What was the social impact of the partnership, again beyond the immediate scope of those directly involved?
4. **Political** - How is the partnership viewed within political circles - has the Minister\party\government gained or lost as a result of this partnership?
5. **Partner** - Regardless of the other four perspectives, how does each partner view the partnership?

Obviously these perspectives can vary widely. It is important to identify in advance which

perspective will prevail when the partnership is up for renewal.

5. VALUES

There are a number of overall organization values held by potential partners that affect the nature of the partnership that can be developed, and the level of interest in getting into this kind of arrangement. These will change over time, and in some cases this process has already begun. For example, the general values held by governments in Canada include the following, which would clearly affect the nature of the partnership relationship they would choose to enter. This is also very important for the concept of the value chain, since it will determine whether there is a common chain from which to work (Exhibit 8).

1. Equity\Fairness

There is an overall bias toward doing things such that there is equality of treatment, without a great deal of concern over quality or individuality of treatment.

2. Accountability

In government services the administrative and decision-making structure must operate to make someone responsible - team or collective responsibility is not considered effective.


3. Procedural Management

Equity flows from the process, therefore the process must be managed - usually at the expense of strategic concerns. Government is also driven by the need to be able to withstand external scrutiny, both legal and political.

4. Consultative Decision Making


There is a slowing of the decision-making process as more and more people are brought into the process. Time and complexity increase, but it is likely the results will be more long lasting.

Strategic Issues



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Strategic Issues



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5. Custodians

Most government decision-makers see themselves as the keepers of the public interest. This creates a bias against risk taking and experimentation, and affects responses to changes in the environment. This creates a "mushy" focus because of the vague meaning of "public interest". It also produces incrementalism, an approach to change governed by a perceived need to proceed one small step at a time.

6. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES (Exhibit 9)

Authority - Who gets to Decide?

At the administrative or implementation stage there are a host of decisions to be made as part of the transition to the new relationship, and during its tenure. There needs to be a clear understanding about who will make what decisions. This cannot be determined in isolation, but must reflect the realities of the framework within which the partnership will operate. (If current policy will not allow anyone but a particular partner to make certain kinds of decisions, then do not create a situation that allows others to get involved) Clearly the financing arrangements and the legal framework are key parts of the control system.

Accountability - Who goes on TV?

Regardless of the partnership arrangements consideration must be given to where "blame" is likely to rest if something goes wrong. Given this reality, the partners must carefully consider the roles they will play in relation to enquiries and responses to those outside the partnership, especially if the issue is controversial or the program experimental or precedent setting. Where government is involved the non-government partner in particular needs to ensure arrangements limit its involvement to reflect its role, and that it does not become embroiled in matters much broader and deeper than the scope of the partnership.

Money

Several issues emerge once the arrangements get specific enough to begin talking about money.

1. Not a Tender

Many arrangements look like the partners, in particular the government, thought of the arrangement as another kind of tender. This is acceptable in some cases, but the more authority and independence being granted, the less relevant the tendering process is.

2. Consistency

The process often starts with money the major concern. Fiscal considerations drive the whole exercise. This can produce inconsistent results, the most common being much rhetoric about independence and shared accountability, within a financial control straightjacket for one or both partners. Government in particular must be aware that it cannot work with external partners and treat them like an internal unit of government.

3. Flexibility

The partnership will evolve as the needs change. The financial arrangements need to have this capacity as well. There is no single best way to handle the money, just the approach that works best under the current circumstances. The difficulty here is the need to comply with the needs of some central control agencies where the partners are large organizations.

There is a tendency to transfer the processes of one partner into the partnership arena. There is no need for this, other than the comfort levels of that partner. This tendency only creates confusion and raises the likelihood of misunderstandings later on.

Information

This becomes an issue because of the control and accountability needs mentioned earlier, and

Implementation Issues

AUTHORITY

ACCOUNTABILITY

MONEY


INFORMATION

DISPUTES

TRANSITION

SHARING

C&L



because of the time and cost involved in producing information. As well, there are issues surrounding confidentiality and the compatibility of the information systems involved. Partners need to get specific about what will be provided, **in what format**, as part of the relationship. There is no overall prescription; each situation needs specific attention.

Disputes and Contract Monitoring

There is no reason to assume that a relationship will work perfectly well for the duration of an agreement. Partners need to know how disputes will be settled, and how the partnership arrangement can be altered, renewed or terminated. This is well understood in the private sector, and is becoming better understood where public services are involved, especially if they are thought to be high profile or quasi-essential.

Transition

Except where there is a tradition of partnership arrangements there will be a need to move from the current situation (which may be no service or program at all) to the desired state. The costs of getting there, the process and the timing, need to be addressed as a separate consideration. This is almost a separate "deal" that may require skills not relevant to long run service delivery, but critical to transition management. There may also be discreet fiscal and legislative arrangements involved.

Transition is most often thought of as a "logistics" kind of exercise in which the challenge is to make sure nothing gets lost, and budgets are not exceeded. Experience is indicating that the cultural dimension to the change is extremely important. Taking a group of "big organization" people, public or private sector, for example, and putting them in a more entrepreneurial environment means a fundamental change in culture. This takes time and must be carefully managed, including things like altered compensation schemes, reorganized internal priorities, and changes in institutional arrangements and structures.



APPENDIX A.4
FUNCTIONS MODEL
AND
ORIGINAL DESIGN

THE FUNCTIONS MODEL AND ORIGINAL DESIGN

A. CLASSIFYING PROGRAMS

One of the fundamental challenges faced in designing the organization was meeting the directives to maximize local participation, which would limit immigration and the size of the labour pool, while also ensuring a low risk and "uneventful" transition.

To meet these directives it was necessary to set priorities on activities and programs. Not everything could be undertaken at once. As well, there was a significant sequencing issue: some things had to be in place before others could be considered. The chart outlined in Exhibit One was used to sort out existing programs. The numbered boxes represent the classifications used.

Box 1: These are activities for which there is very little discretion. They are essential, and can only be delivered in a specific manner. The legislature and its attendant activities are an example.

Box 2: These are activities that were thought to be necessary to start-up of government, but for which alternative delivery mechanisms might exist. For example the capacity to draft legislation is essential, but it is feasible to use a qualified third party to provide service.

Box 3: For these activities there is little discretion concerning delivery mechanism, but some kind of transition is possible or necessary. For example there are often standards of practice or competence associated with delivery of a professional service. These standards limit discretion concerning delivery. In such cases it is necessary to manage the transition process to ensure appropriate capacity exists before direct delivery of the program is undertaken.

Box 4: For these activities transition arrangements are possible, and there is discretion regarding mechanisms and standards of delivery. In these cases the transition period could involve not only developing capacity, but also redesigning service delivery. Activities in the safety area, for example, require technical competence that is often controlled, but there are also alternate delivery mechanisms.

Box 5: Some activities are such that there is no need to consider altering the mechanism or overall framework for delivery. They are often driven by factors beyond the control of a single jurisdiction, such as national or intergovernmental arrangements, or underlying technical realities. The actuarial realities of running a workers compensation system for example, may require that there be no change as a consequence of division. To keep the system viable it may have to continue to cover the whole of the NWT.

Box 6: There are some functions, such a electrical power, for which there is discretion in that new physical plant could be built, but there is no clear reason to change the physical arrangements of current delivery. The legal or contractual arrangements could be altered to provide service continually.

			MECHANISM DISCRETIONARY
			B
6	4	2	
			NO DELIVERY DISCRETION
			A
5	3	1	
NO FORSEABLE CHANGE IN STATUS OR DELIVERY	TRANSITION ARRANGEMENTS NEEDED	IN PLACE AT START-UP	PROGRAM TYPE
			TIMING

**START-UP STRUCTURE
PROGRAM CLASSIFICATION GRID**

This framework produced the arrangement of programs found in Exhibit Two. As stakeholders worked with the analysis they found that the most meaningful distinction was between start-up, transition arrangements needed, and no foreseeable change. Although the distinction concerning mechanism will likely prove useful with more detailed analysis, the kind of detailed review needed to make these distinctions was not part of the current undertaking. The summary in Exhibit Two sets out the general results of the analysis. The overall conclusion was that there were a number of major programs that had to be built into the transition process, some that were either start-up, or no change, and a few that could fit in either of the first two categories. The latter, including programs like government services, were initially placed in the "start-up" category at the request of stakeholders. **(Note: the long transition process ultimately costed in Chapter 7 contains only essential core functions at start-up).**

The programs contained in the first two columns were grouped to form the organization chart found at Exhibit Three and detailed later in this Appendix. Those functions thought to be essential to start-up, and not amenable to fundamental change in delivery mechanism, were identified as "core", and treated as a separate group thereafter. Regardless of which transition scenario was considered these activities were always in place at start-up.

B. FUNCTIONS MODEL

A program functions model was used to establish the activity content of programs as documented in Phase One. This permitted consideration of alternative organization designs while keeping function groupings and their related costs intact. It also permitted more efficient identification of opportunities for streamlining or combining functions. The documentation in this appendix is arranged according to the program groupings initially proposed to stakeholders, and reflects the organization structure found at Exhibit Three, (and Exhibit 6 in the body of the report). Material in this Appendix is arranged in the following order.


1. Functions for which person years were identified in the baseline data are set out. Each box represents a function. These are **not** organization charts. They do **not** represent the institutional relationships between the functions. As well, activities or functions for which no person years were allocated **do not** appear on the charts. They do appear, however, in the Charts of Appendix B - Point of Departure. Only Government program departments are included in this analysis, with the exception of Arctic College. Boards and agencies are **not** included.
2. At the end of each section dealing with a program group (Chart 1) there is a summary chart showing the whole program group on a single page. Following this is an identical chart with shaded boxes indicating the points of change, as documented in the charts of Appendix B (Chart 2). After this is a summary chart indicating the distribution of functions after reallocations and refinements (Chart 3).

**START-UP STRUCTURE
PROGRAM CLASSIFICATION GRID**


PRELIMINARY PRIORITY LISTING		
IN PLACE AT START-UP	TRANSITION ARRANGEMENTS NEEDED	NO FORESEEABLE CHANGE IN STATUS OR DELIVERY
Justice Finance Executive Legislative Assembly Municipal Affairs Public Works Human Resources/Training Government Services	Renewable Resources Social Services/Housing Culture and Communications Education/Arctic College Health Economic Development and Tourism Public and Safety Services Transportation Energy, Mines and Resources	NWT Power/Petroleum Products Workers' Compensation Board Liquor Commission

The shaded functions in these charts were not subjected to a detailed review, such as would occur under a program evaluation. Such scrutiny was not part of the mandate of this study, nor would it be practical across the broad scope of activity encompassed in this work. As each area was examined several simple tests were applied.


1. In many cases the activity units allocated were simply too small to be viable as a discreet administrative unit. Partial py's, for example, were allocated in many cases. These activities were combined with appropriate others.
2. In some cases there was a clear duplication of service or a shared interest between activity groups. This happened in respect of many engineering and building technology areas, for example. Since human resource availability will be a major challenge for the new government similar functions were combined wherever the result would produce better utilization of scarce human resources.
3. Some functions were simply not required in the Eastern territory. In some cases the capital infrastructure that had given rise to the activity was no longer part of the long run expenditure plan, or it was simply thought more efficient to have services delivered through a third party.




CORE FUNCTIONS




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
CORE FUNCTIONS




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
CORE FUNCTIONS




LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY




CORE FUNCTIONS




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
CORE FUNCTIONS




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

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



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


CORE FUNCTIONS (Chart 3)













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



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



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


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






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
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



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
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








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


ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND TOURISM





RENEWABLE RESOURCES



**EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR -
LAND BASED
SERVICES**


**Municipal and
Community
Affairs**

**Economic
Development and
Tourism**


**Renewable
Resources**

**Energy, Mines and
Petroleum
Resources**


ENERGY MINES AND PETROLEUM RESOURCES




LAND BASED SERVICES (Chart 1)





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
LAND BASED SERVICES (Chart 3)










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



PUBLIC WORKS






GOVERNMENT SERVICES







SAFETY




ENGINEERING SERVICES (Chart 1)



ENGINEERING SERVICES (Chart 2)



ENGINEERING SERVICES (Chart 3)



v



APPENDIX A.5
FINAL ORGANIZATION DESIGN



FINAL ORGANIZATION DESIGN

In response to the feedback from stakeholders concerning the initial organization design, (Appendix A - 3) a new design was proposed. The fundamental reasons for the change in design are set out in Chapter 5 of the body of this report. This appendix sets out the major elements of this new structure in more detail. It is this organization structure that is costed in Chapter seven of this report.

Exhibit One sets out the revised overall structure. (This is the same as Exhibit Seven in the body of the report). Exhibit Two shows the structure of the core functions. Exhibit Three outlines the program departments, and Exhibit Four addresses the uniform regional service component for the program departments.

Exhibit One - Overall Structure

As indicated in Chapter Five the revised model is designed to meet concerns raised about regionalization and appropriate groupings of functions. This structure still represents significant streamlining and simplification, and groups functions such that the transition process can be managed in accordance with the directions from stakeholders. A streamlined approach, delegation of program delivery to strong regional structures, and simplification of lines of reporting and accountability are major features of the structure.

Exhibit Two - Core Functions

These are the functions deemed essential to start-up for the government. They come into full effect in 1999. They are the activities through which government-wide law making, service delivery and administrative strategies, and control mechanisms, are established.


Exhibit Three - Direct Program Delivery

The program delivery departments are divided into very clear components. The policy development and overall monitoring responsibility lies in the Deputy Ministers office. Responsibility for delivering service in a manner consistent with regional needs rests with each regional director. (The tables in Appendices C and D show the specific activities included in each of these program groupings). These are activities that are best carried out within the specific framework of the Deputy Ministers office. This does **not** mean that those doing this work must reside in any particular location. Policy analysis work, for example, can be undertaken almost anywhere current technology permits access to the necessary information. The Boards associated with the Final Agreement have been included. Detailed administrative structures have not been outlined since implementation of the agreement has not progressed to the point where this kind of detail can be set out.

Exhibit Four - Regional Service Delivery

This exhibit sets out the basic or "generic" structure that could be implemented in the regions. It is put forward in this form because of the differences between regions that already exist, and in recognition of the differences that will continue to emerge as service is regionalized further. The authorities contemplated for the regional structure, and the differences it will give rise to, are consistent with the instructions given by stakeholders, and more recently the recommendations of the GNWT Commission for Constitutional Development, in its report entitled "Working Toward a Common Future".

**REVISED DESIGN
A FUNCTIONAL MODEL**



(i) Regional Director

There will be a regional director for each program group, in each region. Capital works, for example, would have three regional directors. Each would be the senior accountable manager for that group of programs in that region. Each would report directly to the Deputy Minister and have full delegation of the authority needed to ensure delivery of services sensitive to local needs, within the overall framework of department or government-wide policies and practises. For example, the Regional Director would be given a budget within which to deliver a specific service. Decisions about how best to utilize the budget would be made in the region. Expenditures would occur in accordance with the established budget and associated guidelines and procedures.

(ii) Boards and Agencies

This approach acknowledges the necessary interface between this structure and local boards and agencies that may already be active in a particular service delivery field, such as education or health care. The nature of this interface will have to be worked out in each region.

(iii) Existing Structure

This approach also acknowledges there is an existing regional service delivery structure upon which the new structure will have to be built. Again, the details will have to be sorted out in accordance with the nature of current structures and the kinds of services desired in the region.

(iv) Customer Services


We also suggest a regional customer services function. There should be a service whereby there is a single point of contact in the region for services by all program areas. This will provide easy access and redirection to the service most aligned with the identified need. This will permit greater professionalization of initial customer contact activity, and a more "user friendly" environment for customers.


(v) Devolution

Devolution to other levels of government active in the region is specifically accounted for. Virtually any function set out in the regional structure could be devolved to a regional government with proper preparation and appropriate fiscal arrangements. This structure does not prejudice how this might occur, or when, but it does permit it to happen rather easily if the parties so desire.

(vi) Support Services

Each region would have its own support services function, including human resources, information technology, finance, and communications. A functional Deputy Minister would be responsible for all support services in a region. With three regions this leaves one program Deputy without responsibilities for a regional support service. The Deputy Minister of Social Services and Health is relieved of this responsibility in recognition of the scope of his responsibilities.





REGIONAL SERVICES

PROGRAM DESCRIPTION			
REGIONAL SUPPORT SERVICES	REGIONAL DIRECTOR A	REGIONAL DIRECTOR B	REGIONAL DIRECTOR C
REGIONAL CUSTOMER SERVICES	BOARDS AND AGENCIES		
	EXISTING STRUCTURE		



DEVOLUTION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT AS AGREED