Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process

6

Federal Environmental
Assessment Review Office

Report of the Environmental Assessment Panel

Eastern Arctic Offshore Drilling — South Davis Strait Project

Environment Canada

PANEL REPORTS

TO THE MINISTER OF THE ENVIRONMENT

ON PANEL PROJECTS

1. Nuclear Power Station at Point Lepreau, New Brunswick. (May 1975)

2. Hydro Electric Power Project, Wreck Cove, Cape Breton Island, Nova Scotia. (August 1976)

3. Alaska Highway Gas Pipeline Project, Yukon Territory. (Interim report, August 1977)

4. Eldorado Uranium Refinery Proposal, Port Granby, Ontario, (May 1978)

5. Shakwak Highway Project, Yukon Territory - British Columbia. (June 1978)

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November 1, 1978

The Honourable Len Marchand, P.C., M.P.
Minister of Environment
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A OH3

Dear Minister,

In accordance with the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Process, the Eastern Arctic Offshore Drilling Environmental Assessment Panel has completed a review of a proposal by a consortium of oil companies to conduct exploratory offshore drilling programs in southern Davis Strait. We are pleased to submit the Panel report for your consideration.

The Panel, during its deliberations, evaluated the environmental risk associated with the proposed project and considers it to be acceptable. The Panel recommends that the project proceed as proposed under certain conditions outlined in the report.

It must be emphasized that this proposal involves exploratory drilling solely, and the environmental review of any future production system must be considered at subsequent stages in the drilling program development process.

Respectfully yours,

J.S. Klenavic
Chairman
Eastern Arctic Offshore Drilling
Environmental Assessment Panel

ᓄᕕᐱᑎ 1,1978

ᐊᕐᓚᔪᖅᑲᖅ ᔪᐊᓚᑎᒃ, ᓖᓐ ᒫᓵᓐ
ᐊᕙᑎᒧᑦ ᐊᕐᓚᔪᖅᑲᖅ ᔪᐊᓚᑎᒃ
ᐊᑐᕙ, ᐊᓐᑕᐅᑎᐅ
K1A OH3

ᐊᕐᓚᔪᖅᑲᖅ ᔪᐊᓚᑎᑦ ᒧᑦ,

ᒪᓕᓯᑎ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓚᕙᒪᑯᕐᕆᓄ ᐊᕙᑎᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑎᐅᔪ ᓄᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᓕᒫᒥ, ᕿᑭᖅᑖᓗᑉ riu ᑕᑎᐅᕐᓂ ᐃᒍᑕᕈᒪᔪᓄ ᓇᔪᓚᐅᔪᒥ ᐊᕙᑎᒥᒃ ᓇᓚᑎᐅᓯᑎᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᖅ ᑎ ᐱᓴᑎᓯᒪᓕᒪ C ᖄᓄᐃᓕᐅᑕᐅᔪᒪᔪᓂ ᑲᒪᕆ ᓴᐅᔪᒪᔪᓂ ᐱᓴᐅᔪᒪᔪᓂᑦ ᓗ ᐅᖅ ᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯᓄ cda ᐅᖅ ᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯᑦ ᕿᓂᖅ ᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᒍᑕᕈᓇᖁᓗᕆᑦ ᑕᑎᐅᒥ ᐱᕐᓚᑦ ᓇᕐᓂ ᑕᐃᕕᔅ ᓯᑐᕋᐃᑉ. ᖁᕕᐊᓯᑦ ᐳᒍ ᑐᓂᓯᔪᓇᓂᑎᓂ ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ ᑎᑎᕋᓚᐅᑕᕐᕆᓂ AA" ᓇᑦ ᒥᓂᖅ ᐃᓯᒪᑦᓴᖅ ᓯᐅᕕᕆᔪᓇᖅᑕᖅᓂᒃ.

ᑕᑯᐊ ᓈᓚᑦ ᑎᐅᔪᑦ, ᐃᓯᒪᑦ ᓴᖅ ᓯᐅᖅᑎᓗᕆᑦ, ᖃᐅᔨᓴᓚᐅᖅ ᒪᑕ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᔪᒥ ᓯᓂᖅ ᑎᑕᐅᓚᔭᖅ ᓂᕐᓚᓂᒃ ᐃᓚᕆᔭᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᑲᒪᕆᔭᐅᔪᒪᔪᓄ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃᓯᒪᓕᓚᐅᒪᑕ ᓈᒪᑦ ᓴᖅ ᓯᑎᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᔭᐅᔪᒥ. ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪᑦ ᐅᖃᓕᐳᑦ ᐱᔮᐅᔪᒪᔪᖅ ᐃᒍᑕᖅ ᑕᐅᔪᒪᔪᑦ A ᑯᑕᑕᐅᖁᔨᓕᖅᓯᑎᒃ ᑭᓯᐊᓂᓕ ᒪᓕᕆᐊᖄ ᑐᑦ ᑕᑯᑎᒎᓇᖅ ᑎᑎᕋᖅ ᓯᒪᔪᑎᒍᑦ ᐱᖁᔮᐅᔪᑎ ᒍᑦ ᒪᓕᑎᐊᓗᑎᒃ.

ᐅᖃᐅᑎᕆᔭᐅᑲᓂᐱᐊᖃᐳᖅ ᑕᐃᒫᑦ ᓕ ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᐱᖁᔨᓕᖅ LC ᕿᓂᖅ ᓗᑎᒃ ᑭᓯᐊᓂᐅᕆᐊᖃᓂᕐᓂ, ᐊᒪᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᓚᔭᑐᑦ ᐊᕙᑎ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᓚᔭᖅ ᓂᕐᓚᓂᒃ ᓯᕗᓂᑎᓂᐊᑕ ᑎᓂᒃ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᓚᔭᖅ ᑐᑦ ᑲᓚ.ᕆᔭᐅᓚᔭᑐᓘᓃᑦ ᐃᓯᒪᕆᔭᐅᔭᑎ ᐊᖃᓂᕐᕆᓂ ᐃᑦ ᒦᒍᑎᓗᕆ ᐃᒍᑕᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᕆ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᕆᓗ.

ᑎᑎᕋᑐᖅ

ᑭᓕᓇᕕᒃ
ᐃᑦ ᓯᕙᐅᑕᓕᒃ
ᕿᑭᖅᑖᓗᑉ ᒥᑦ ᓴᓂ ᑕᑎᐅᕐᓂ ᐃᒍᑕᕈᒪᔪᓄᑦ
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ᑕᑯᓇᓃᑐᑦ

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the summer of 1976, a consortium of oil companies composed of Imperial Oil Limitedl, Aquitaine Company of Canada Limited, and Canada-Cities Service Limited presented a proposal to the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (DINA) to conduct exploratory offshore drilling programs to test the sedimentary basin of southern Davis Strait for hydrocarbons. DINA stated that drilling in Davis Strait would not be permitted until a comprehensive environmental assessment had been conducted and that studies associated with this assessment be developed in consultation with local communities.

The Proponent has been conducting environmental studies in southern Davis Strait area since 1976. The information collected formed the basis for the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and supporting documentation. In late 1976, the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs initiated a new program that integrated environmental studies for Eastern Arctic offshore drilling proposals into one program known as the Eastern Arctic Marine Environmental Studies (EAMES).

The EIS and supporting documentation were prepared by the oil company consortium and progressively submitted to DINA and FEAR0 in the first half of 1978. DINA identified information deficiencies in the EIS and the 1978 EAMES Program was designed to accommodate these.

The Proponent proposes to drill exploratory wells commencing in 1979, to evaluate the hydrocarbon potential of the prospective area. Drilling would take place during open water seasons in water depths ranging to 6,000 feet, utilizing dynamically-positioned drill ships or semi-submersible platforms. The exploratory drilling program, at this time, is planned to last two to three years.

ᓇᐃᓪᓕᒋᐊᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᓗᑎᒃ ᑎᑎᕋᕐᑕᐅᓯᒪᔭᑦ

ᐊᐅᔭᐅᑎᓗᒍ 1976, ᐅᕐ ᓱᐊᓗᓕᕆᔨᑯᑦ ᐃᒻ ᐱᐅᕆᐅ ᐅᐃᑦ ᓕᒥᑎ, ᐊᒃ ᑯᑕᐃᑦ ᑲᒻ ᐸᓂ ᓕᒥᑎ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕ ᓯᑎᔅ ᓱᕕᓯᔅ ᓕᒥᑎ ᑐᓂᓯᓚᐅᓯ L'LC ᐱᕐᑯᓕᑕᒥᓂ ᐃᓄᓕᕆᔨᑯᓄᑦ ᕿᓂᕈᒪᓗᑎ ᐃᑯᑕᕈᒪᓗᑎᒃ ᑕᑎᐅᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᒪᓗᑎᓗ ᐃᖃᓪᓚᓂ ᖃᓄᐃ ᑲᓗᐊᒪᓪᓚ ᐱᓪᓚᓐᓚᓂ ᑕᐃᕕᔅ ᓯᑐᕋᐃ ᐅᕐ ᓱᐊᓗᓴᒥ ᓪᓚᓯᓴᒥᓗ ᕿᓂᕈᒪᓗᑎ. ᐃᓄᓕᕆᔨᑯ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᓯᒪᓚᓚᑦ cAL ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐊᑎᓗᒋ ᑕᐃᕕᔅ ᓯᑐᕋᐃᒥ ᐊᕐᑕᐅᔫᕐᒋᓂᕋ ᓚᐅᓗᑎ ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑕᐅᑎᐊᓯᒪᔪ ᓇᒪᑎᐊᓗᑎ ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᓪᓚᓂᓪᓚᓂ ᐱᔭᑎᑕᐅᒃᑭᓇᒍ ᐊᒪᓗ cda ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᓂᐊᑐ ᐊᑐᕐᑯᔭᐅᓗᑎ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋ ᐊᐱᓱᖃᑕᕐᑯᔭᐅᓗᑎ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐᓄ ᑕᒪᓂᒥᐅᑕᓄ.

ᐅᕐ ᓱᐊᓗᓕᕆᔨᑯᑦ Cda ᖃᐅᔨᓴᖃᑕᓯᒪᓕᒪᑕ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᔪᒥ ᑲᓇᓐᓚᓂ ᑕᐃᕕᔅ ᓯᑐᕋᐃ ᐱᒋᐊᓯᑎ 1976. ᑲᑎᓯᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᑐᓴᕈᑎ Cda ᐱᒋᐊᕕᐅᓯ ᒪᓕᒪᑕ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᔪᒥ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖁᔭᓂᓪᓚᓂ ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᓗᑎ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᓯᓱᓯᑎ ᑎᑎᕋᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑎᒍ. ᓄᓪᒍᓕᑎᓗᒍ 1976, ᐃᓄᓕᕆᔨᒃ cda ᐱᒋᐊᑎᑎᓚᐅᒪᑕ ᓄᑖᒥ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᐊᑐᒥ ᐊᑕᖃᑕᐅᔪᒥᑕᐅ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᔪᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴ ᑕᐅᓂᐊᑐᒥ ᕿᑭᕐ ᑖᓅᑉ ᒥᕐ ᓴᓂ ᐃᑯᑕᕈᒪᔭᐅᔪᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᓗᓂᓗ ᑕᓇ ᕿᑭᑖᓅᑉ ᒥᕐ ᓴᓂ ᓇᔪᓚᐅᔪᒥ ᑕᑎᐅᓪᓚᓂ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᔪᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᓂᐊᓯᒪᔪᒥ (ᐃᒫᔅ).

ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᖃᓄ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᑕᐅᓚᔭᓂᓪᓚᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᓯᑐᓱᑎ ᑎᑎᕋᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᐊᕿᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᒪᑕ ᐅᕐ ᓱᐊᓗᓕᕆᔨᑯ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᓗᑎ ᐃᓄᓕᕆᔨᑯ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᓗ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᕆᔨᓄ ᐱᒋᐊᓕᕚᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᕙᓪᓚᓂ 1978. ᐃᓄᓕᕆᔨᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᑎᑎᓚᐅᒪᑕ ᑐᓴᕈᑎᓂ ᑕᕙᓂᕐᕿᑐᓂ ᓇᒪᒋᕐᕿᑕᒥᓂ ᑕᑯᑎᒍᓇ ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅ ᓂᓪᓚᑎᒍ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐊᑐᑎᓗᒍ 1978 ᐃᒫᔅ ᑯ ᑎᓕᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯ LLC ᑐᓴᑕᐅᓯᒪᓕᕐᕿᑐᓂ ᓱᓕ ᑲᒪᕐᑯᓗᒋ.

ᐅᕐ ᓱᐊᓗᓕᕆᔨᑯ ᐱᒋᐊᕈᒪᒪᑕ ᐃᑯᑕᕈᒪᓗᑎ ᕿᓂᓗᑎ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᑐᓂ ᐱᒋᐊᓗᑎ 1979, ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᒪᓗᑎ ᐅᕐ ᓱᐊᓗᓴᓂ ᓪᓚᓯᓴᒥᓗ ᕿᓂᕈᒪᓗᑎᒃ ciu. ᐃᑯᑕᕋᔭᑐ ᓯᑯᖃᕐᒋᑎᓗᒍ ᐃᑎᕙᒥ ᐅᕙᒃ ᖃᓂᒋᔭᓐᓚᓂ 6,000 ᐃᑎᓚᐃ, ᐊᑐᕐ ᓗᑎ ᐃᒻ ᒪᒧ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᕐᒋᑐᓂ ᐅᒥᐊᕙᐊᓂ ᐊᑐᓗᑎ ᑭᓴᓯᒪᕙᓂ ᐅᕙᓗᓂ ᐃᒪᐅᑉ ᐊᑕᓄᓪᓚᑲᓴᒍᓇᑐᓂ ᓴᓇᕕᓂ. ᕿᓂᓗᑎ ᐃᑯᑕᕈᒪᕙ, ᒪᓇᐅᕙᒥ, ᐊᕐᕿᑕᐅᓯᒪᒪ ᐊᕋᒍᓄ ᒪᕈᓄ ᐱᓪᓚᓱᓄᓗᓂ.

During the course of its review the Panel requested and received relevant information from a variety of sources. Public hearings were held at various communities on the southern part of Baffin Island for the purpose of familiarizing the Panel with the local biological, physical and social environments. These hearings also provided an oportunity for the residents to express their views about the proposed project to the Panel. A two-day general public hearing followed in Frobisher Bay, where a more structured set of procedures was pursued to hear, written and oral briefs presented to the Panel.

ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐸᓕᐊᑎᒍ ᒥ ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪᑦ Cd ᐊ ᐊᐱᓱᖃᑕ ᓚᐅᒪᑕ ᐱᒍᑎᒍ ᑐᓴᕈᑎᓂ ᐊᐳᕆᕐᕆᑐᓂ ᑭᓇᑯᓕᒫᓂᑦ. ᑭᑯᑐᐃᓇᐃᒍ ᑐᓴᑕᐅᖃᑕᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᐊᐳ ᕆ ᕐᕆᑐᓂ ᖁᓇᖃᑎ ᒦᓂ ᐱᖕᓇᖕᒪᓂ ᕿ ᑭᖅ ᑖᓅᑉ ᐱᔪᑎ ᕆᔭᐅᒍᑎ ᖃᐅᔨᔭᐅᖁ ᒍᕆ ᑕᑯᐊ ᓇᓚᑎᐅᓂᐊᑐ ᖃᖁᓚᑎ ᑕᒪᓂᒥᐅᑕᐃ ᖁᓇᖅ ᑎᕆᑐ ᐅᒪᔪᖃᐅᐸᓂᕐᕆᓂ, ᓇᔪᒪᖕᒪᒍ ᖃᖁ ᑕᐅᑐᖃᒪᖕᒪ ᐊᒪᒍ ᑭᓇᑯᓕᒫ ᐃᓕᖁᓱᖃᒪᖕᒪᑕ ᓇᔪᒪᒥᓂ. ᑕᑯᑎᒧᓇ ᓇᓚᑐᖃᖃᑕᑎᒍ J b ᑎᒪᖃᑕᑎᒍᕆ ᐅᖃᕈᓇᓯᑎᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᒪ ᑕ ᓇᔪᒪᖃᑐ ᑕᒪᓂᒥᐅᑕᐃ ᐅᖅ ᓱᐊᒍᓕᑎᐳᑯ ᒥᖕ ᓴᖁ ᑐᓴᑎᑕᐅᔫᓇᖁᒍᕆ ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ. ᐅᒍᓂ ᒪᕈᓂ ᑲᑎᒪᓚ DLC ᐃᖃᒍᓂ, ᑕᕝᓂᒍ ᐊᖅᑭᑎᐊᓯᒪᓂᓴᐅᒍᑎ ᑲᑎᒪᕖ ᔪᐊᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᓇᓚᔫᒪᒍᑎ, ᑎᑎᕋᕈᒪᒍᑎ ᐊᒪᒍ ᐅᖃᒍᑎ ᑐᓴᑎᑎᓚᐅᓯᒪᒪᒪᑕ ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪᖁ.

Following the public hearings. the Panel developed a recommendation to the Minister of Environment on the project's acceptability. The Panel related the probability associated with a major oil well blowout against the impact it might have as a measure of the environmental risk of the project.

ᑕᕝᓂ ᑲᑎᒪᕖᔪᐊᖃᑎᒍᕆ, ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ ᑕᑯᐊ ᐊᖅᑭᓱᓚᐅᒪᑕ ᖃᖁᐃᓕᐅᑕᐅᖁᓕᑕᒥᓂ ᐊᖕᒪᔪᖃᔪᐊᖕᒪᖁ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᐳᐅᔪᖁ ᒪᕙᒪᑯ ᐅᖅ ᓱᐊᒍᓕᑎᐳᑯ ᑲᒪᕆᓂᐊᑕᕐᕆ ᖁ ᖃᖁᓇᒪ ᑲᒍᐊᒪᖕᒪ ᓇᒪᕐᕆ ᑲᒍᐊᒪᖕᒪᒍᓂ. ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ ᑕᑯᐊ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᓯᒪᒪᒪᑕ ᖃᖁᐃᓕᒪᔭᓂᖕᒪᓂ ᐅᖅ ᓱᐊᒍᒥ b ᒪᑐᖃᖃᓚᓂᐸ ᐃᑯᑕᕖᐅᔪᒥ ᐊᒪᒍ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᒪᔭᓂᖕᒪᓂ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᔪᒥ ᑲᒪᕆᔭᐅᔪ ᒥᓴᖁ.

Thus, the Panel recommends that the project be allowed to proceed as proposed, <u>only</u> if the following conditions meet the satisfaction of the relevant regulatory agencies.

ᑕᐃᒪ ᐱᔪᑎᕆᒍᓂᐅ, ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ Cda ᐅᖃᓕᓚᐅᓯᒪᕗ Ad ᑕᖁᔭᐅᓕᓱᑎ ᑕᐃᒪᓇᐃᓕᐅᕈᒪᓂᕐᕆᑎᑐ ᑭᓱᐊᓂ ᖃᖁᐃᓕᐅᕈᒪᓂᕐᕆ ᓇᒪᑎᐊᐸᑕ ᐊᑐᑎᐊᒍᑎ <u>ᒪᓕᑎᐊᑎᒍᕆ</u> ᑭᓱᐊᓂ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᑐ ᐸᐃᑎᓇᓱᐊᑎᐊᕈᓇᕈᑎᒍ.

i) The Proponent's detailed oil spill contingency plan be developed and in place, six months prior to the commencement of drilling. The effectiveness of the plan in carrying out control and clean-up response action for an oil well blowout should be demonstrated prior to the commencement of the drilling operation.

I.

Cda ᑲᒪᔪᑦ ᐃᒪᖅᑲᑕᐅᑎᓂᒃ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᕆᐊᓕᑦ ᑕᕝ- ᐱᕆᐊᖅ ᕖᐅᓚᐅᕐᕆᓐ ᓂᖕᒪᓂ ᑕᖅᑭᑦ ᐱᖕᓛᔪᖅᑐᑦ ᓱᕗᓂᖕᒪᓂ ᑲᐃᕗᑎᐊᑐᖃᓚᐅᑎᓐ ᓇ J. ᐆᒃ ᑐᑦ ᓱᐊᑎᐊᖃᖅ ᓂᖅ ᐋᖅᑭᒃ- ᑕᐅᒪᔻᑉ ᐊᑐᖅᑕᐅᕆᐊᖃᖅ ᓂᖕᒪᓂ ᐱᓱᒪᑦ ᓱᐊᖅ ᓂᖅ ᒥᒃ ᓴᒍᒻ ᒪᖅᓴᐃᕆᐊᖃᕋᔭᖅᓂᖅᒥᒃ ᒍᐅᖅᓱᐊᔫᑉ ᖃᕈᔭᐅᓂ- ᐸᑦ ᐆᒃ ᑐᖅᑕᐅᒪᕆᐊᓕᒃ ᑲᐃᕗᑕᐅᑲᓚᐅᑎᓇJ ᐅᖅ ᓱᐊ- ᒍᖕ ᒥᒃ ᑕᖅᑭ ᐱᖕᓛᔪᖅᑐᑦ ᓱᕗᖅ ᒪJᑦ ᓈᓚᐅᖅᑎᓐᓇᕆ.

ii) A government contingency plan be developed and in place prior to drilling that would delineate the responsibilities of all government agencies when oil spills occur in the Davis Strait area.

II.

ᒐᕙᒪᒃ ᑯᑦ ᐃᒪᖃᐅᑕᐅᕈᑎᖕᒪᑦ ᐋᖅᑭᒃ CDL ᕆᐊᓕᒃ ᐊ- ᒻ ᒪᒍ ᑖᕝᓂ ᑲᐃᕗᖅᑐᖃᓚᐅᖅᑎᓇ J ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᔪᖃᑎᐊ- ᓕᒃ ᒐᕙᒪᒃ ᑯᑦ ᓵᓯᒪᔭᐅᒐᔭᖅ LC ᑲᒪᒐᔭᖅ LC ᐅ- ᖅᓱᐊᒍᖕ ᒥᒃ d ᕖᔪᖃᖅ ᓂᖅᐸᑦ ᖁᑭᖅᑖᓅᑉ ᐊᑭᐊᓂᒥ- ᐅᑉ ᒍ ᖁᑎᖕᒪᓂ.

iii) the Proponent is able to provide same-season relief well capability.

III.

ᑖᓇ ᑲᒪᔨ ᐊᓱᐊᓂᒃ ᑲᐃᕗᑎᑦ ᓱJᖕ ᓇᕋᔭᖅᑐᖅ ᑕ- ᕝᓂᑦ ᓴᐃᓐ ᓇᖅ ᐊᐅᓴᖅ ᒥ.

iv) liability and compensation provisions under existing regulations be examined by responsible regulatory authorities to ensure their adequacy under current circumstances.

v) the Proponent continue to carry out adequate information programs in order to explain the progress of the drilling program to the residents of south Baffin Island.

IV.

ᐱᒍᕐ ᓇᕈᕐ ᓇᕐ ᓂᖅᑎᑦ ᒪᓕᒐᑎᒍᑦ ᑲᒪᑦᓴᐅᔪᕐ ᓇᖅᑐᑦ ᓱᕐᑯᐃᖅᑕᐅᑦᓱᐊᑦᐊᓛᑦ ᑲᒪᔨᒻ ᒪᑭᕐ ᒧᑦ ᐱᔪᕐ ᓇᕐ ᓂ-ᖅᑎᑦ ᑕᐃᒪᐃᑦᐊᕐᑲᕐ ᓂᖅᐸᑦ ᐊᑭᓕᑕᐅ.

V.

ᑲᒪᔨ ᐳᑭᕐ ᓱᒪᑎᑦ ᓱᑎᐊᓕᒃ ᖃᓄᐃᐸᓕᐊᓂᖕᒐᓂᒃ ᑲᐃᕙ-ᖅᑕᐅᑉ ᑖᑯᓄᖕᒐ ᕿᑭᖅᑖᓗᕐ ᒥᐅᑦ .


70°
65°
60°
55°
BAFFIN ISLAND
BROUGHTON ISLAND
CAPE DYER
PANGNIRTUNG
GREENLAND
65°
FROBISHER BAY
LAKE HARBOUR
BREVOORT ISLAND
(DEW LINE SITE)
* 1978 Met.Buoy
PRELIMINARY LOCATIONS
. IMPERIAL
⊕ AQUITAINE
CITIES SERVICE
AQUITAINE
BPOG
HB0G
IMPERIAL
SIEBENS/(CANADA
CITIES,
61° 18'
PORT BURWELL
60°
50 MILES
80 km
LABRADOR
CANADA
OFFSHORE PERMITS
DIAND REGION
SOUTH OF CAPE DYER
NOVEMBER, 1977

CHAPTER 1

ᓴᑉᑕ 1

SETTING AND PERSPECTIVE

ᓇᓂᒪᓪᓚ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᔭᐅᔪᓗ

In the summer of 1976, a consortium of oil companies composed of Imperial Oil Limited1, Aquitaine Company of Canada Limited, and Canada-Cities Service Limited submitted a proposal to the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (DINA) to conduct exploratory offshore drilling programs to test the sedimentary basin of southern Davis Strait for hydrocarbons. The Department of Indian and Northern Affairs stated that drilling in Davis Strait would not be permitted until a comprehensive environmental assessment had been conducted and that the studies associated with this assessment would be developed in consultation with local communities.

ᐊᐅᔭᐅᑎᓗᒍ 1976, ᐅᕐ ᓱᐊᓗᓕᑎᕗᑯ ᑕᑯᐊ ᐃᒻ ᐱᐅᑎᐅᓪ, ᐊᒃ ᑯᑕᐃ ᑲᒻ ᐸᓂ ᓕᒥᑎ, ᐊᒪᓗ ᓱᑎ ᓵᕕᓱᔅ ᓕᒥᑎ ᑐᓂᓱᓚᐅᒪᑕ ᐱᔨᒪᓕᑕᒥᓂ ᐃᓄᓕᑎᕗᑯᓄ ᕿᓂᕈᒪᓗᑎ ᐃᑯᑕᕈᒪᓗᑎ ᑕᑎᐅᓪᓚᓂ ᕿᓂᕈᒪᓗᑎ ᐅᕐ ᓱᐊᓗᔅ ᖃᕋᓗᐊᒪᓪᓚ ᐃᖃᓪᓚᓂ ᐱᓪᓇᓪᓚᓂ ᑕᐃᕕᔅ ᓱᑐᑕᐃ ᐅᕐ ᓱᐊᓗᔅ ᒥᑉ ᓗ. ᐃᓄᓕᑎᕗᑯᓗ ᑕᑯᐊ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᓱᒪᒪᑕ ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐊᐸᑕ ᑕᐃᕕᔅ ᓱᑐᖁᐃᒥ ᐊᓪᒋᑕᐅᔪᓪᒋᑐ ᑭᓱᐊᓂ ᑐᑭᓱᒪᓇᑎᐊᐸᑕ ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᓪᓚᓪᓚᓗᐊᓂᓪᓚᓂ ᐱᔪᑎᑕᐅᖃᑎᓇᓪᒎ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑕᑯᐊ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᓱᒪᔪ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅ ᐊᕿᑕᐅᖁᓗᒍ ᐊᐱᓱᖃᑕᖁᔭᐅᓗᑎ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐᓂ.

In accordance with the 1973 Cabinet directive establishing the federal Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP), the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs referred the proposal for exploratory drilling in southern Davis Strait to an Environmental Assessment Panel in the summer of 1977.

ᒪᓕᓱᑎ 1973-r ᑲᓇᑕᐅ ᒐᕙᒪᓪᒋᑎᒍ ᐊᕿᑕᐅᓚ ᐅᓯᒪᔪᑎᒍ ᐱᔪᑎᖅᑳᓱᑎ ᑲᓇᑕᓕᒪᒥ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᕗᐅᔪᑯ ᐊᒪᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑎᐅᔪᑯ, ᐃᓄᓕᑎᕗᑯ ᑎᓕᓯᓚᐅᓯᒪᒪᑕ ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐊᑐᓂ ᕿᓂᓗᑎ ᑲᓇᓇᓪᓚᓂ ᑕᐃᕕᔅ ᓱᑐᖁᐃᒥ ᑕᑯᓄᓪᓚ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᕗᐅ ᔪᓄ ᓇᓚᑎᐅᓂᐊᑐᓄ ᐊᐅᔭᐅᑎᓗᒍ 1977.

This Environmental Assessment Panel was established to review the potential environmental consequences of the proposed project and to provide recommendations to the Minister of the Environment on its environmental acceptability. It should be noted that a regional approach encompassing southern Davis Strait (generally between 61o 18'N and Cape Dyer at approximately 66o 20'N) was taken to the proposed drilling program, rather than a site-specific approach.

ᑕᑯᐊ ᐊᕙᑎᒥ ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ ᐊᕿᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᒪᑕ ᖃᐅᔨ ᓴᕐᑯᓗᒋ ᖃᓄᓕᑎ ᐊᕙᑎ ᑕᒪᓇ ᓱᓂᑎᑕᐅᒪᔭᓂᓪᓚᓂ ᐅᕐ ᓱᐊᓗ ᓕᑎᕗᑯᓄ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐅᖃᕐᑯᔭᐅᓗᑎ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᕐᑯ ᔭᐅᓗᑎ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᑕᐅᕐᑯᓕᑕᒥᓂ ᐊᓪᓚᔪᖃᔪᐊᓪ.ᓄ ᑲᓇᑕᐅ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓪᒋᓄ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᕗᐅᔪᓄ ᖃᓄᓕᑎ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐊᕙᑎ ᓱᓂᑎᑕ ᐅᒐᔭᒪᓪᓚ. ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᑎᐊᖃᑐᓯ ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐱᓪᓇᓪᓚᓂ ᑕᐃᕕᔅ ᓱᑐᖁᐃ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑲᐃᑉ ᑕᐃᔪ ᐃᓯᒪᒋᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᒪ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᔪᒪᓗᓂ. ᐃᒪᓇᓪᓚ ᐃᒥᑯᓪᓚ ᑕᒪᐅᓇᑐᐃᓇᐅᓪᒋᑐ.

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1. Effective September 1, 1978, Imperial Oil Limited transfered its interests in this project to Essor Resources Canada Limited.

ᐱᒋᐊᓗᑎ ᓯᑎᐱᑎ 1, 1978 ᐃᒻᐱᐅᑎᐅᓪ Cda ᑐᓂᓯᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᓴᖁᓗᐊᒥᓂ ᑕᑯᐊᓄ ᐃᔅ ᓯ ᑎᓯᐊᓯᔅ brn ᓕᒥᑎ.

The members of this Panel were:

ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪᖅ ᑕᑯᖅᖢ ᐃᓚᐅᕗ:

Mr. J.S. Klenavic
Federal Environmental Assessment
Review Office
Panel Chairman, Ottawa

ᒥᔅ ᑕ ᑭᓚᓇᕖᒃ
ᑲᓇᑕᓕᒫᒥ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᒫᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑎᑦᓯᖅ
ᓇᓚᑎᖅ ᐃᓱᕙᐅᑕᓕ
ᐊᑐᕙ

Mr. J.R. MacDonald
Environmental Protection Service
Fisheries and Environment Canada
Halifax

ᒥᔅ ᑕ ᒪᒃ ᑕᖅ
ᐊᕙᑎᒥ ᐸᐃᑎᕆᐅᔪ ᑲᓇᑕᐅ ᒐᕙᒪᒃᑯᑦᓯᓂᑦᒐᑐ
ᐃᖃᓗᓕᑎᕆᖅ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ ᐊᕙᑕᓕᑎᕆᐅᔪᖅ
Hᐊᓕᕚᒃ ᔅ

Mr. M.J. Morison
Northern Program
Indian and Northern Affairs
Yellowknife

ᒥᔅ ᑕ ᒧᐊᑎᓴ
ᐃᖅᐃᑦ ᒥᓴᖅ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᑎᐅᔪ
ᐃᖅᓕᑎᕆᑯᖅ
ᔭᓗᓇᐃ

Mr. K. Yuen
Ocean and Aquatic Sciences
Fisheries and Environment Canada
Ottawa

ᒥᔅ ᑕ ᔪᐃᓐ
ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑎᐅᔪ ᑕᑎᐅᔪᐊᓂ
ᐃᖃᓗᓕᑎᕆᑯᖅ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓇᔪᒐᓕᑎᕆᑯᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ
ᐊᑐᕙ

Observers: Mr. A. Kooneelusie, Broughton Island
Mr. S. Alainga, Frobisher Bay.

ᓇᓚᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪ ᑕᐅᑐᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪ:
ᒥᔅ ᑕ ᑯᓂᓗᓯ, ᕿᑭᖅ ᑕᔪᐊ
ᒥᔅ ᑕ ᐊᓚᐃᖕᒐ, ᐃᖃᓗᐃ.

Brief biographies of the Panel members may be found in Appendix 1.

ᓇᐃᑲᓗᐊᓯᑎ ᑭᓇᑯᓚᑎᐅᒐᓗᐊᒪᒐᑕ ᑕᑯᐊ ᑕᑯᓇᓂᒥᔪᑕᐅ ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᒋᓗᑎ.

Guidelines for the preparation of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) were given to the industry by DINA in July 1976. Upon referral of the project to the Panel in the summer of 1977, these guidelines were modified to reflect the requirements of the Panel and were then re-issued to the Proponent by the initiating department (DINA).

ᒪᓕᑕᐅᔭᑎᐊᖃᑐ ᐊᖁᓯᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᑕᒪᑐᒪ ᖃᕆᑐ ᓯᓂᑎᑕᐅᒐᔭᓂᒐᓂ ᑐᓂᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᒪᑕ ᐅᓯᐊ ᓗᓕᑎᕆᑯᖅ ᐃᖅᓕᑎᕆᑯᓂ ᔪᓚᐃ 1976. ᑐᓂᔭᐅᑎᓗᒋ ᑕᒪᓇ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᐊᑐ ᓇᓚᑎᐅᓂᐊᑐᖅ ᐊᐅᔭᐅᑎᓗᒍ 1977, ᑕᑯᓇ ᒪᓕᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᑐ ᐊᖁᑕᐅᒋᐊᑲᓂᓚᐅᓯᒪᒪᑕ ᐱᖁᔭᒋ ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ ᒪᓕᓯᒋ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑐᓂᔭᐅ ᑲᓂᓚᐅᑎᓗᑎ ᐅᖅ ᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᕆᑯᖅ ᐱᒋᐊᑎᑎᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ (ᐃᖅᓕᑎᕆᑯᖅ).

The Proponent had been conducting environmental studies in southern Davis Strait area since 1976. The information collected formed the basis for the Environmental Impact Statement and supporting documentation. In late 1976, the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs initiated a new program that integrated environmental 'studies for Eastern Arctic offshore drilling proposals

ᐅᖅ ᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᕆᑯᑦ Cd aᖃᐅᔨᓴᖃᑕᓯᒪᓕᓚᑕ ᓇᔪᒐᐅᔪᒥ ᐱᖕᒐᓇᖕᒐᓂ ᑕᐃᕖᔅ ᓯᑐᕋᐃ ᐱᒋᐊᓯᑎ 1976. ᑐᓴᕈᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᑲᑎᓯᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᐱᒋᐊᕈᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᓚᑕ ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᓯᓂᑎᑕᐅᒐᔭᖅᓂᖕᒐᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᓯᑐᓯᑎ ᑎᑎᕋᑕᐅ ᓯᒪᔪᖅᑕᐅ. ᖃᖑᓕᑎᓗᒍ 1976, ᐃᖅᓕᑎᕆᑯ Cda ᐱᒋᐊᑎᑎᓚᐅᓯᒪᓚᑕ ᖅᑕᒥ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᔭᑎᐊᖃᑐᒥᑕᐅ ᐃᓚᒋᔭ ᐅᑎᓗ J CD ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᓂᐊᓂᖕᒐᓂ ᕿᑭᖅ ᑕᓗ ᒥᖅ ᓴᓂ ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐊᑐᓂ ᕿᓂᓂᐊᑐᓂ ᑕᑎᐅᖕᒐᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᓗᑎᓗ ᕿᑭᑕᓗ ᑕᑎᐅᖕᒐᓂ ᒥᓴᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᓂᐊᑐᓂ (ᐃᒻᔅ).





in one program known as the Eastern Arctic Marine Environmental Studies (EAMES). EAMES, became an official government program in November 1977 although the funding and management of the field studies is largely provided by industry. The program included an Advisory Board which consists of one representative from each of the communities in the Baffin Island area and four scientists and two representatives from industry. Two Inuit, the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the EAMES Advisory Board, were appointed as observers to the Environmental Assessment Panel.

The EIS and supporting documentation were prepared by the oil company consortium and progressively submitted to the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs in the first half of 1978. Indian and Northern Affairs identified information deficiencies in the EIS and the 1978 EAMES Program was designed to accommodate these. The EIS for the exploratory drilling program in southern Davis Strait region was submitted to the Panel by the initiating department, DINA, on behalf of the proponent companies Imperial, Aquitaine and Canada-Cities Service for assessment. The Panel secretariat distributed copies of the EIS and its supporting documentation to technical agencies and the identified public interest groups for their comment.

The Proponent proposes to drill exploratory wells commencing in 1979, to evaluate the hydrocarbon potential of the prospective area. Drilling would take place during open water seasons in water depths ranging to 6,000 feet, utilizing dynamically-positioned drill ships or semi-submersible platforms. The exploratory drilling program, at this time, is planned to last two to three years.

In the spring of 1978, the Proponent initiated a public awareness program by conducting pubic meetings in some communities on southern Baffin Island. The

ᐄᒻ ᓴ ᑯᑦ Cda, ᐃᔅ ᒥᑯᓕᖕᒐᓗᑎ ᒐᕙᒪᖕᑰᓚᐅᓯᒪᓪᓚᑕ ᓄᕕᐱᕆ 1977 ᑕᐃᒪᐃᑲᓗᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᑎᕇᑕᖅᒥ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᖅᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕋᐃᑎᓗᒥ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᖃᑎᑕᐅᒐᓗᐊᑎᓗᒥ ᐊᖅᒥᐸᖅᑐᓂ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᕆᔾᔪᑯᓐ. ᑕᑯᑎᒍᓇ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᓯᒪᔫ ᑲᑎᒪᔨᐅᓗᑎ ᐅᖃᑎᐅ ᒍᓇᕋᔭᑐ ᐊᑕᐅᓯ ᒥᓗ ᑲᑎᒪᔨᖃᓯᑎ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐᓕᒪᓂ ᕿᑭᑕᓗᒥ ᐊᒪᓗ f ᑕᒪᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑎᐅᔪᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᒪᕈᓂ ᐅᖅ ᓯᐊᓗᓕᕆᔾᔪᑯᓂᖕᒐᑐᓂ. L? ᐃᓄ ᐃᓯᕙᐅᑕ ᓕ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃᓯᕙᐅᑕᓕᐊ ᑐᓕᖕᒐ ᐄᒻ ᓴ ᑯᓄ ᐊᐱᓯᑕᐅᒍᓇᓗᑎ ᐅᖅᑲᐅᔾᔪᒍᓇᑐ, ᑎᓕᔭᐅᓯᒪᓚᐅᓯ LLC ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑎᐅᒍᓇᖅᑯᓗᒥ ᓇᓚᑎᐅᒍᓇᖅᑯᓗᒥ CD3 J ᓇᖅᑯᓗᒥᓗ Cd ᓄᖕᒐ ᐊᕙᑎᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴ ᑎᓄ.

ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᓂᐊᓂᖕᒐ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃ ᑲᔭᓯ ᑐᓯᑎ ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᔭ ᐊᖅᑭᓯᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᓪᓚᑕ ᐅᖅ ᓯᐊᓗᓕᕆᔾᔪᑯᓄ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑐᓂᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᒋᓗᑎ ᐃᓄᓕᕆᔾᔪᑯᓄ ᐱᒋᐊᓕᓴᑎᓗᒍ 1978. ᐃᓄᓕᕆᔾᔪᑯ Cda ᐅᖃᐅᔾᔪᓚᐅᓯᒪᓪᓚᑕ ᑐᓴᕈᑎᓂᓇᒪᒋᖕᒋᑕᒥᓂ ᐅᖃᑎᐊᓯᒪᖕᒋᓂᓴᐅᔭᓂ Cd ᑎᒍᓇ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔭᓂ ᐊᕙᑎᒥ ᐊᒪᓗ 1978ᖕᒍᑎᓗᒍ ᐄᒻ ᓴ ᑯᑎᒍ ᐊᖅᑭᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔭ ᑕᑯᑎᒍᓇ ᐃᑲᔭᓯᕈᓇᖅᑯᓗᒍ. ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᖃᓄᓚᑎ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᓂ ᐊᓂᖕᒐ ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐊᑎᓗᒥ ᕿᓂᓗᑎ ᐱᖕᒐᓇᖕᒐᓂ ᑕᐃᑦᓴ ᓯᑐᖁᐃ ᑐᓂᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔭ ᓇᓚᑎᓄ ᑕᑯᓄᖕᒐ ᐱᒋᐊᑎᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔭᓄ, ᐃᓄᓕᕆᔾᔪᑯᓄ, ᐱᔭᑎᖃᓯᑎ ᐅᖅ ᓯᐊᓗᓕᕆᔾᔪᑯᓄ ᑕᑯᓄᖕᒐ ᐃᒻᐱᐅᑎᐅᑦ, ᐊᑯᑕᐃ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓯᑎ ᓯᕕᓯᓯ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᒍᓇ ᖅᑯᓗᒥ. Cda ᐊᓚᑎᐅᔭᓇᓚᑎᓄ ᑐᓂᓯᓚᐅᓯᒪᔭ ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᔭᓂ ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔭᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃ ᑲᔭᓯ ᑐᓂᑕᐅ ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᔭᓂ Al-d ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᖅᑲᐅᑐᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑭᓇᑯᓕᒪᓄ ᐱᔭᒪᔭᓄᑕᐅ Cd a ᐅᖅᑲᕈᓇᖅᑯᓗᒥ.

ᐅᖅ ᓯᐊᓗᓕᕆᔾᔪᑯ ᕿᓂᓗᑎ ᐃᑯᑕᕈᒪᓪᓚᑕ ᐱᒋᐊᓗᑎ 1979, ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᒪᓗᑎ ᐅᖅ ᓯᐊᓗᓴᓂ ᓖfᓴᓂᓗ ᐱᑕᖃᕋᓗ ᐊᒪᖕᒐ ᑕᒪᓂ. ᐃᑯᑕᕋᔭᑐ ᓯᑯᖃᖕᒋᑎᓗᒍ ᐃᑎᔭᒥ ᖃᓂᒋᔭ ᖕᒐᓂ 6,000 ᐃᑎᒐᐃ ᐊᑐᓗᑎ ᑭᓴᓯᒪᔭᓂ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᒍᓇᖅᒥ ᑐᓂ ᐃᒪᐅ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖕᒐᓄ ᐅᒥᐊᔭᐊᓂ ᐅᕙᓗᓂ ᐃᒪᐅ ᐊᑕᓄᖕᒐᑲ ᓴᒍᓇᑐᓄ ᓴᓇᕕᐅᔭᓴᓄ. ᕿᓂᓗᑎ ᐃᑯᑕᕈᒪᔭ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒥ ᐊᖅᑭᑕᐅᓯ LL ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᐊᓂᖕᒐ ᐊᕋᒍᓄᒪᕈᓄ ᐱᖕᒐᓯᓄᑐᓂ .

ᐅᐱᖕᒐᓴᖕᒍᑎᓗᒍ 1978, ᐅᖅ ᓯᐊᓗᓕᕆᔾᔪᑯ ᐱᒋᐊᑎᑎ ᓚᐅᓯᒪᓪᓚᑕ ᑭᓇᑯᓕᒪᓂ ᑐᓴᑎᑎᓗᑎ ᑲᑎᒪᑎᑎᖅᑲᑕᓯᑎ p ᑯᓕᒪ ᓂ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐᓂ ᐱᖕᒐᓇᖕᒐᓂ ᕿᑭ ᑕᓗ. ᐊᖅᒥᐸᖅᑐᓂ ᐱᔭᑎ ᒋᐅᓗᐊᓚᐅᓯᒪᔭ ᑕᑯᑎᒍᓇ ᑲᑎᒪᑎᓗᒥ ᑐᓴᕈᒪᓗᑎ ᖃᐅᔨᒍ

main purpose of these meetings was to acquaint the local residents, with the proposed project, delineate its potential benefits and consequences, and provide information on the completed and on-going environmental studies.

In May 1978, the Panel secretariat visited the communities of Pangnirtung, Allen Island, Lake Harbour, Cape Dorset and Frobisher Bay to explain EARP and its procedures. Also, the local residents were encouraged to express their views to the Panel at the community public hearings that would follow in September.

The Environmental Impact Statement and its summary were made available at the Hamlet Office of each of the respective communities. Copies of an Inuktitut translation of the summary were also distributed to each community. In addition, copies of the EIS and its summary were placed in government offices (federal, territorial, and settlement), the C.B.C. and the Nunatsiaq News in Frobisher Bay. Extensive local radio and newspaper announcements provided the public with information on the community hearings and the formal general hearing in Frobisher Bay.

In September 1978, the Panel held community hearings in Pangnirtung (Sept. 8), Allen Island (Sept. 11), Lake Harbour (Sept.11), and Cape Dorset (Sept. 12) to hear the views of the local residents about the project. In particular, Allen Island was visited because of its proximity to the proposed exploratory area and because of the somewhat unique dependence of this outpost community on wildlife for their basic livelihood. A representative of the Proponent was present at all the community hearings to present a brief project description and to answer questions pertaining to the proposed drilling.

Commencing September 13, 1978, the Panel held a two-day public hearing in

ᒪᓗᑎᓗ ᖃᓄᓕᑎ Cda ᓄᓇᖃᑎ ᒋ ᑐ ᐃᓯᒪᖃᒪᖕᒐᑕ ᑕᒪᑐᒥᖕᒐ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᔭᒪᔭᒥ, ᐃᑲᔪᓯᑕᐅ ᒍᒪᓗᑎᓗ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᖃᑕᓂᐊᓂᖕᒋᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓯᓂᕋᔭᓂᖕᒋᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑐᓴᑎᑕᐅᒍᒪᓗᑎ ᑐᓴᑎᑎᒍᒪᓗᑎᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᔭᓂ ᓄᖃᔭᖕᒋᑐᓂ.

ᒪᐃ 1978ᖕᒍᑎᓗᒍ ᓇᓕᑎᐅᔪᓄ ᑎᑎᕋᑎᐅᔪ ᐳᓕᕋᖃᑕᓕᐅᓯᒪᒪᒪᑕ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐᓄ ᐸᓂᑐ, ᐅᑲᓕᐊᓗ, ᑭᒥᕈ ᑭᖕᒐᐃ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᓗᐃ ᑐᓴᑎᑎᒋ ᐊᑐᓯᑎ ᑲᓇᑕᐅ ᒐ ᕙᒪᑯᖕᒋᓂ ᖕᒐᑐ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᔨᐅᔪ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᖃᑕᒪᖕᒐᑕ ᐊᒪᓗ ᖃᓄᓕᑎ bᒪᖃᑕᒪᖕᒐ. ᐊᒪᓯᓕᑕᐅ, ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐ Cda ᐅᖃᕈᔭᐅᓕ ᐅᑎᕗ ᖃᓄᓕᑎ ᐃᓯᒪᖃᒪᖕᒐ ᓇᓕᑎᐅᔪᓄ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᓂ ᑲᑎᒪᑎ ᓗᒋ ᑲᑎᒪᓂᐊᑎᓗᒋᓂ ᐃᓕ ᓯᑎᐱᑎᐅᔪᒥ.

ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᖃᓄᓕᑎ ᓯᓂᑎᑕᐅᓇᔭᓂᖕᒐ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑎᑎᕋᑕᐅᓯ ᒪᔪᕕᓂ ᑐᓂᔭᐅᓕᐅᓯᒪᒪᑕ Hᐊᒻ ᓚᑯᓄ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐᓄ. ᐊᒪᓗᑕᐅ ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᒥᔪ ᓇᐃᓕᒋᐊᓯᒪᓗᑎ ᑐᓂᓴᑕᐅᓕᐅᓯᒪᒋᕗ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐᓄ. ᐊᒪᓯᓕᑕᐅ, ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᔪᑕᐅ ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᖃᓄᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᖃᑕᓂᖕᒐ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑎᑎᕋᑕᕕᓂᖕᒋ ᑐᓂᔭᐅᓕᐅᑎ ᓗᑎᑕᐅ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓄ ᐊᖕ ᓚᕕᖕᒋᓄ, ᑲᓇᑕᐅ ᐊᓚᕕᖕᒋᓄ, ᓄᓇᓯᐊ ᐊᓚᕕᖕᒋᓄ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖕᒋᑕ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐ ᑲᑎᒪᔨᖕᒋᓄ (ᓯᐱᓯᑯ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᓯᐊᑯ ᐃᖃᓗᒥᐅᑕᓄ, ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐᓂᓗ ᓇᓕᐅᑎᑯ ᐊᒪᓗ ,ᐅᖃᓕᒪᒐᖕᒋᑎᒍ ᑐᓴᑎᑕᐅᓕᐅᑎᕗ ᑭᓇᑯᓕᒪ na ᑕᒪᑯᐊ ᑲᑎᒪᓂᐊᑐ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᓂ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᔭᐅᓗᑎ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑲᑎᒪᒪᑎᓕᐅᑎᓗᑎ ᑐᓴᑎᑎᔭᑐᓯᑎ ᐃᖃᓗᓂ.)

ᓯᑎᐱᑎ 1978ᖕᒍᑎᓗᒍ, ᓇᓕᑎᐅᔪ cda ᑲᑎᒪᕕᔪ ᐊᓕᐅᓯᒪᒪᑕ ᐸᓂᑐᒥ (ᓯᑎᐱᑎ 8) ᐅᑲᓕᐊᓗᐃ (ᓯᑎᐱᑎ 11), ᑭᒥᕈ (m m 11), ᐊᒪᓗ ᑭᖕᒐᐃ (ᓯᑎᐱᑎ 12)ᑐᓴᒋᐊᑐᓯᑎ ᓇᓕᒋᐊᑐᓯᑎᓗ ᑕᒪᑯᓂᖕᒐ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᕙᓕᐊ ᒐᓯᐊᑐᓂ. ᐱᓗᐊᑐᒥ ᐅᑲᓕᐊᓗᒥᐅ, ᐳᓕᑕᐅᓕᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅ ᖃᓂᒋᒪᒍ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᒪᔪ ᐅᕐ ᓯᐊᓗᒥ ᕿᓂᕕᐅ ᔪᒪᔪ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅ cda ᑕᒪᓂᒥᐅᑕᐃ ᓯᓕ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋ ᓯᑎ ᐅᒪᔪᑎᖃᓗᐊᒪᑕ ᓂᔪᑎᓄ ᐅᒪᔪᑎᒋ ᓗᐊᓯᓂᔪ. ᐊᒪ ᓯᓕᑕᐅ ᐅᕐ ᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯᓂᖕᒐᓯᒪᔪ c ᕙᓂᓕᐅᑎᕗ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᓂ ᑐᓴᑎᓗᒋ ᑲᑎᒪᑎᓗᒋ ᓇᐃᑐᒐᓗᐊᒥ ᐅᓂᑲᑎᐊᑐ ᓯᓂ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᓂᐊᓂᒥᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑭᐅᔪᓇᖅᑯᓗ J ᐊᐱᖅᑯᑎᒋᔭᐅᔪᓂ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᔭᐅᔪᓂ ᐃᑯᑕᕈᒪᓕᑐᓂ.

ᓯᑎᐱᑎ 13, 1978ᖕᒍᖅᑲᑎᓗᒍ, ᓇᓕᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪ c d a ᑲᑎᒪᑎᑎᓕᐅᒪᑕ ᐅᓗᓂ ᒪᕈᓂ ᑭᑯᓕᒪᑎᐊᓂ ᑐᓴᒋᐊᑐ

Frobisher Bay where a more structured set of procedures was followed. At this hearing, a number of written and oral briefs were presented to the Panel, all of which were read into the record of the hearing.

(Copies of the transcripts may be received by submitting a written request to the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office, Ottawa, KlA 0H3).

ᓱᑎ ᐃᖃᓗᓐ ᑕᕙᓂᓗ ᐊᖏᑎᐊᓯᒪᓂᓴᐅᓱᑎ ᑲᑎᒪᑎᐊᓂᓴᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ. ᑕᕙᓂᓗ ᑲᑎᒪᔭᑐᓯᒪᑎᓗᒥ, ᐊᒥᓱᑲᓴᐃ ᑎᑎᖁᓯᒪᓗᑎ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒥᔭᐅᑐᐃᓇᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᐱᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᓇᓚᒥᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪᓄ, ᑕᒪᕿᑎᐊᓯᒪᓗᑎᓗ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᑎᑎᖃᑕᐅᑎᐊᓯᒪᕙᒥᓕᑐ ᐅᖃᕈᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ.

ᖃᓄᓚᑎ ᐅᖃᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪ ᔪ ᐱᔭᐅᔪᓇᑐ ᑎᑎᖁᑐᖃᑐ ᐊᕈᓂ ᐱᔪᒪᓗᓂ ᑕᑯᓄᕐᒐ ᑲᓇᑕᐅ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᕐᒥᓄ ᓇᔪᒐᓕᑎᐲᐅᔪᓄ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᐲᐅᔪᓄ ᖃᐅᐲᓴᑎᕐᒥᓄ ᐊᓚᕕᕐᒐᓄ ᐊᑐᕙᒥ.

CHAPTER 2

ISSUES AND POTENTIAL IMPACTS

2.1 Introduction

The proposed project under review involves exploratory drilling only and the environmental review of any future production system must be considered at subsequent stages in the program development process.

In arriving at the measure of environmental risk presented by the project, the Panel not only had to examine and determine the probability of a major oil well blowout, but also independently had to assess the nature and magnitude of potential damages that could result should a major oil well blowout occur. This included an evaluation of possible contingency plans and remedial measures that could mitigate these damages.

Throughout the community hearings and the Frobisher Bay general public hearing, many issues and potential impacts associated with the proponent's drilling proposal were presented to the Panel by various individuals and agencies (Appendix I). The Panel heard opinions within the communities that ranged from those who were against drilling to those who supported it given that adequate safeguards were followed. For the most part, the residents were not against the project proceeding but were adamant that the best technology and environmental safeguards be utilized during drilling procedures. The people expressed a desire to retain their traditional pursuits but realized that it was becoming more difficult to do so. Many recognized their increasing dependence upon modern technology for fuel, food, transportation, and communications. To this extent they appreciated the need for oil and oil exploration. They expressed

ᓴᑉᑕ 2

ᐅᖅᑲᕈᑕᐅᔪ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᓚᔭᕕᐅᔪᒧ

2.1 ᓱᕗᓕᐸ

ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᒪᔪ ᑕᒪᓇ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᑕᐅᓂᖕᖓᓂ ᐃᑯᑕᐸᓕᐊᑎᒧᒋ ᕿᓂᕋᓱᐊᑎᒧᒋ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᒧᐊᐳ ᑭᓱᐊᓂ ᐊᒪᒧ ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᖃᓄᑐ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᓂᖕᖓ ᓱᕗᓂᑎᓂᐊᑕᑎᒍ ᐃᑯᑕᐸᓕᐊᑎᒧᒋ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᑎᕗᑕᐅ ᐃᒥᑯᒧᑎ ᐃᑯᑕᐸᓕᐊᑎᒧᒋ.

ᑐᓴᕋᓱᐊᑎᒧᒋ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᖃᓄᓕᑎ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᓚᔭᓂᖕᖓᓂ ᐊᕙᑎᒧ ᑐᓂᔭᐅᓕᐅᓯᒪᔪᓄ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᐊᑐᓄ, ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᕇᐅᔪ ᑕᑯᐊ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑐᐃᓇᑎᐊᖅᑲᑕᓚᐅᓯᒪᕐᒥᒪᑕ ᐃᒥᑯᒧᑎ ᐊᒪᒧ ᓱᓕᑕᐅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑎᐊᖃᓚᐅᑎᕗ ᐊᕐᒥᔪᒥ ᐅᓯᐊᒧᒥ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᔪᒥ ᖃᑐᖅᑲᓚᓕᐸ ᑭᓱᐊᓂ ᐊᒪᓱᓕᑕᐅ ᐃᒥᑯᒧᑎᑕᐅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑎᐊᖅᑲᑕᓚᐅᑎᕗᑕᐅ ᖃᓄᓕᕿ ᐊᕐᒥᓂᖕ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᓚᔭᓂᖕ ᐊᑲᐅᕐᒥᑐᒧ ᐱᑲᓚᑐᖃᓂᐸ ᐊᕐᒥᔪᐊᒧᒥ ᐅᓯᐊᒧᒥ ᑯᕕᔪᖅᑲᓚᓂᐸ ᖃᑐᖅᑲᓚᓂᐸ. ᑕᑯᓄᖕ ᐃᓕᒋᔭᐅᑎᒧᒍ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᓂᖕ ᐸᐃᑎᔭᐅᓚᓯᐊᕋᔭᓂᖕ ᐊᒪᒧ ᓴᒧᒪᓴᐃᒍᓇᕋᔭᓂᕐ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᔪᓄ.

ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐᓂ ᑲᑎᒪᖅᑕᑎᒧᒋ ᐊᒪᒧ ᐃᖃᓗᓂ ᑕᕙᓂ ᑲᑎᒪᕕᔪᐊᑎᒧᒋ, ᐊᒥᓱᐃ ᐅᖄᐅᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᐊᒪᒧ ᖃᓄᑐ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᓚᔭᓂᕐ ᐃᓕᒋᔭᐅᓚᐅᑎᕗᑕᐅ ᐅᓯᐊᒧᓕᑎᕇᑯᓄ ᐃᑯᑕᑎᒧᒋ ᕿᓂᑎᒧᒋ ᑐᓂᔭᐅᓚᐅᑎᕗᑕᐅ ᓇᓕᑎᓄ ᐊᕇᒋᕐᒋᑐᓄ ᑭᑯᓕᒪᑎᐊᓄ ᑲᑐᕇᕇᐅᔪᓄᒧ. ᓇᓕᑎᐅᔪ ᓇᓕᓕᐅᓯᒪᕗ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐᓂᕐᓕᓯᒪᔪᓂ ᐊᕇᒋᕐᒋᑐᓂ ᑕᑯᓂᕐ ᐃᑯ ᑕᖁᕇᕐᒋᑐᓄ ᐊᒪᒧ ᐃᑯᑕᖁᕇᓄᒧ ᐊᑲᐅᔪᒧ ᑭᓱᐊᓂ ᐸᐃᑎᔭᐅᔪᓇᑎᒧᒋ. ᑕᒪᑭᑲᓴᑎᒧᒍ, ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐ cda ᐊᑲᓕᐅᕐᒋᑐ ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐊᑐᓂ ᑭᓱᐊᓂ ᐅᖃᓕᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᐊᑐᑎᐊᖁᕇᒧᑎ ᓴᓇᕈᑎᓂ ᐊᒪᒧ ᐸᐃᑎᔭᐅᑎᐊᖁᕇᒧᑎ ᓇᔪᓚᐅᔪᒥ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᔪᒥ ᐃᑯᑕᑎᒧᒋ. ᑭᑯᓕᒪᒧ ᐅᖃᓕᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᑕᐃᓱᒪᓂᑐᖅ ᐃᓕᖁᓯᒥᓂᑐᖅᑲᒥᓂᑎᒍ ᐃᓄᓯᖅᑲᕈᒪᒧᑎ ᑭᓱᐊᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᓕᓱᑎ a&c-L ᑕᐃᒪᓇᐃᓕᐅᑎᐊᓴ. ᐊᒥᓱᒧ ᐅᕇᑎᓕᐅᑎᕗ ᖃᐅᔨᓕᐅᓱᑎᒧ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒥ ᐅᒧᒥᐅᔪᒥ ᐊᑐᑕᐅᖅᑲᓕᑐᓂ ᓂᕿᓂ ᐅᓱᓂᒧ ᐊᐅᓕᖅᑲᓂᒧ ᐊᒪᒧ ᑐᓴᖅᑕᐅᑎᕙᓂᒧ. ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᒧᓂᐅ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐊᑲᐅᒋᔭᐅᓕᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᐊᒪᒧ ᐅᖅ ᓱᐊᒧᓴᒥ ᕿᓂᓂ. ᐊᕐᒥᔪᒥᒧ ᓴᕐᒥᔪᒥ ᐅᖃᓕᐅᑎᕗᑦ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᓂᕿᕐᒥ ᓱᓂᑕᐅᓚᔭᓂᕐᒥ ᐊᕐᒥᔪᐊᒧᒥ ᖃᑐᖅᑲᓚᓂᐸ ᐅᕙᒧᓂ ᐅᓯᐊᒧᒥ ᑯᕕᔪᖅᑲᓚᓂᐸ ᐊᒪᒧ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᐱᔪᑎᒥᒧᓂᐅ ᐸᐃᑎᔭᐅᖁᕇᓕᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᐅᖅ ᓱᐊᒧᓕᑎᕇᑯᓂ ᐊᓯᓪᓚᓂ ᑐᓂᔭᐅᔪᒪᒧᑎ ᓱᓂᑕᐅᔪᖅᑲᓂᐸ ᐱᑎᐊᕐᒥᑐᖅᑲᓚᓂᐸᒧᓂ.

James Arvaluk (President, Baffin Region Inuit Association)

It takes time for a delicate and harsh environment to be understood and it also takes time for white people to understand the Tnuit.

. ..We Inuit want all the issues to be examined carefully with our active and informed participation.

Akeeshoo (Allen Island Resident)

I feel that the people of Allen Island will help any government agency understand our way of life - today the people will never return to their traditional way with the presence of southerners and their type of food supply.

Leah d'Argencourt ((Inuit Tapirisat of Canada)

. ..talk to them, make them understand exactly what is going to happen, and don't leave anything out of it.

ᓴᐃᒥᓯ ᐊᖅᑰᓗᒃ (ᐊᖕᒐᔪᖅᑳᖕᒐᑦ ᖅᑭᑭᖅᑖᓗᖕ ᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᓄᖕᒋᑕ ᑲᑎᒪᔨᖕᒋᓐ ᓄᑦ)

ᑐᑭᓯᓇᓯᐊᖅ ᓗᒍ ᓄᓇᒋᔭᖅ ᑐᑭᓱᔭᐅᑦ ᓴᐅᑦ ᔭᐅᑎᒋᔪᖕ ᓇᖕᒋᑦ-ᑐᖅ ᐊᒻ ᒪᓗᑉ ᑕᐅᖅ ᖅᑲᑉ ᓗᓈᑦ ᓯᑲᐃᑦ ᑐᒥᒃ ᑐᑭᓯᕚᑦ ᓚᐊᓰᑦ ᐃᓄᖕ ᓂᒃ.

ᐃᓄᓗᒃ ᑖᑦ ᐃᓄᓗᒃ ᑖᑦ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᑦ ᓯᐊᖅᑯᔨᔪᒍᑦ ᖅᑲᓄᓚᒫᖅ ᑖᑯᐊᑎᒍᑦ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᓗᑕ.

ᐊᑲᓱᒃ (D ᑲᓚᐊᓗᒃᒥᐅᖅ)

ᐃᓱᒪᒍᖕᒐᓚ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐅᑲᓚᐊᓗᖕ ᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᑲᔪᑦ ᓯᐊᕋᓱᐊᕈᖕ ᓇᖅᑐᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᒃ ᑯᓐ ᓂᒃ ᑐᑭᓯᑎᑦ ᓯᑦ ᓯᐊᕋᓱᐊᖅ ᓗᑎᒃ ᐃᓅᓯᑦᑎᖕ ᓂᒃ - ᐅᑉ ᓗᒥᓚ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐅᑎᓂᐊᔭᒍᖕ ᓇᐃᖅᑐᑦ ᐱᐅᓯᑐᖅᑲᖅ ᒥᓂᑦ ᑐᑦ ᖅᑲᑉ ᓗᓈᑦ ᓗ ᑕᒫᓃᓚᑦ ᓯᑎᒃ ᓂᖅᑭᖕᒋᓐ ᓂᒃ ᓗ ᐊᑐᖅᓯᑕ.

ᓚᐊ ᑎᐊᔭᓐ ᑯᐊᑦ (ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᑕᐱᑏᒃ ᓴᑦ ᑲᓇᑕᒥ)

ᐅᖅᑲᓚᒫᖅ ᕕᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᑐᑭᓯᑎᑦ ᓯᐊᖅ ᓗᒋᑦ ᖅᑲᓄᐃᓐ ᓂᐊᖅ ᓂᖕᒐᓐ ᓂ ᑕᒪᑐᒪ ᓱᓇᓚᒫᒥᒃ ᐅᖅᑲᐅᓯᖅᑲᑦ ᖕᒋᑦ ᑑᑦ ᑕᐃᓚᓗᓯ.

a strong concern that their food supply could be seriously affected as a result of a major blowout or oil spill and thus requested a guarantee by the Proponent for compensation for damages if such did occur.

Others felt that only "the good side of the story of the drilling" was presented by the Proponent. Some opposed drilling because the oil, if discovered, would be transported to the southern part of the country and thus would not be available to the southern Baffin Island residents. Others considered the submission of the Environmental Impact Statement as premature, and the hearings to be premature, and called for additional studies which would provide for a wider analysis of the environmental risks that could be associated with the proposed project. Some intervenors questioned the EAR Process itself and requested an independant inquiry directed towards all Eastern Arctic drilling proposals and the whole issue of northern energy development.

2.2 Probability of Oil Well Blowout

The main concern of both the intervenors and the local people was the question of a major oil well blowout. The hypothetical cases presented by the Proponent failed to destroy the image of total decimation of animal populations due to the possible widespread effects of an oil spill occurring. The Proponent mentioned the eastern Canada experience where approximately 125 offshore wells have been drilled with no oil well blowouts. In addition, some icebergs have been successfully deflected away from drilling platforms off Labrador by towing. The Department of Energy, Mines and Resources elaborated upon the considerable geological differences between the Beaufort Sea where water blowouts have occurred as compared to southern Davis Strait. Deep water drilling practices were discussed and it

ᐊᓱᕐᕆᑕᐅ ᐃᓱᒪᓚᐅᖏᑦ "ᐊᑲᐅᓂᓴᖓ ᑭᓱᐊᓂ Dub ᑎᔭᐅᓚᐅᓂᖓᓂ ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐅ ᒥᓴᓄ" ᑐᓂᔭᐅᓚᐅᓂᖓᓂ ᐅᓱᐊᓗ ᓕᑎᕗᑯᓄ. ᐊᓱᕐᕆᑕᐅ ᐃᑯᑦᒃᕗᓚᐅᕐᕆᑐ ᐱᔪᑎᒥᓗᓂᐅ ᐅᓱᐊᓗ ᑕᒪᓇ ᓇᕙᑕᐅᓂᕈᓂ, ᐊᔭᑕᐅᖅᑕᕋᔭᒪ ᖃᓗᓇ ᓄᓇᖓ ᓄ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᐱᔪᑎᒥᓗᓂᐅ ᐱᑕᖅᑲᔭᕐᕆᓱᓂ ᐱᖓᓇᖓᓂ ᕿᑭᑕᓗᒥᐅᑕᓄ. ᐊᓱᕐᕆᑕᐅ ᐃᓱᒪᓚᐅᖏᑦ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᓚᐅᓂᖓ ᐊᕿᑎᐊᓯᒪᕐᕆᓇᓱᒥᔭᐅᓗᓂ r ᑭᓗᐊᓂᕋᑕᐅ ᓱᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑐᓴᖅᑕᑐ ᑲᑎᒪᖅᑕᑐ ᒥᑭᓗᐊᓂᖓᓂ ᓇᐃᓗᐊᓂᖓ ᓂ, ᐊᒪᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑲᓂᖁᔨᓚᐅᓱᑎ ᐊᓱᕐᕆᓂᑕᐅ ᐊᕐᕆᓂᓴᒥ ᓯᓚᑐᓂᓴᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᖁᔨᓗᑎ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᔪ ᒥᓴᓄᖓᔪᒥ ᐱᔪᑎ ᖃᓱᑎ ᐃᑯᑦᑕᐅᔪᓕᒪᔪ ᒥᓴᓄ. ᐃᓚᕐᕆ ᐃᑯᑦᒃᕗᕐᕆᑐ ᐊᐱᕆᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᑕᑯᓂᖓ ᑲᓇᑕᐅ ᓚᕙᒪᑯᕐᕆᓂᖓᑐᓄ ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑎᕐᕆᓂ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᖅᑕᓂᕐᕆᓂ ᓇᒥᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐊᐱᕆᓚᐅᕆᓗ ᑎ ᑲᑎᒪᖅᑕᖅᑯᕗᓗᑎ Aru ᕿᑭᑕᓗᒥᐅᖓᔪᒥ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᔪ ᒪᔪ ᒥᓴᓄ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑕᒪᑭᑎᐊᓱᒍ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐃᓄᐃ ᒥᓴᓄᖓᔪ ᓄᑭᓴᐅᔪ ᐱᕈᑎᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᖅᑕᓂᖓ ᐱᔪᑎᒥᓗᒍ.

2.2 ᐅᖅ ᓱᐊᓗᒧ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᔪ ᖃᑲᓚᑐᐃᓇᑎᐊᖅᑲᓂᖓ

ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪᑕᒪᑭᓄ ᐃᑯᑦᒃᕗᕐᕆᑐᓄ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᖅᑲᑎᒋᑐᓄ ᐱᔪᑎᖅᑲᓗᐊᓚᐅᑐ ᐊᕐᕆᔪᐊᓗᒥ ᖃᑐᖅ b ᓚᒋ ᐊᖅᑲᓂᖓ ᓱᕗᓂᐊᒍ ᓇᓚᐅᑕᑕᐅᒪᓱᐊᓱᓂ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᐅᖅ ᓱᐊ ᓗᓕᑎᕗᑯᓄ ᓯᖅᑯᒥᑎᑎᓚᐅᕐᕆᒪ ᓄᕐᒍᑕᐅᒪᔭᓂᖓᓂ ᓂᔪᑎ ᐱᔪᑎ ᒥᓗᓂᐅ ᐅᓱᐊᓗ ᓱᐊᒥᒪᔭᓂᖓᓄ ᐊᕐᕆᔪᐊᓗᒧ ᑯᕕᔪᖅᑲᓚᒪᔭ ᓂᐸ ᐅᓱᐊᓗᒥ. ᐅᓱᐊᓗᓕᑎᕗᑯᓗ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᑎᓗᑎᓗ ᓂᕐᕆᐅ ᒥᓴᓂ ᐅᕙᖅ ᖃᓂᒥᔭᓂ 125 ᑕᑎᐅᒥ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᓚᐅᑐᓂ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᔪᒥᒍ ᖃᒪᑐᖃᓚᐅᕐᕆᓂᖓᓂ. ᐊᒪᓗᓱᓕᑕᐅ, ᐱᖃᓗᔭᐃ ᐱᑕᐅᖅᑕᓚᐅᓱᑎ Do-QC ᐅᖃᑕᓚᐅᓂᕐᕆᓄ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅ ᔪᒥ ᓚᐸᑐᐊᒥ ᐅᓂᐊᑕᐅᓗᑎ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅ ᒪᕙᒪᑯᕐᕆᓂᖓᓯᒪᔪ ᓄᑭᓕᑎᕗᐅᔪ, ᐅᔭᕋᓂᐊᑎᕈᔪᐃ CL ᑯᐊ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᑎᓗᑎ ᐊᕗᒥ ᕐᕆᒪᑎᓂᕐᕆᓂ ᑕᐅᑐᖓ ᓄᓇᐅ ᐅᐊᓕᓂᐅ ᑕᑎᐅᖓᓂ ᑕᒪᓂ ᖃᒪᑐᖅᑲᖅᑲᑕᓚᐅᓂᖓᓂ ᓱᖅ ᓗ ᐊᕗᒥᕐᕆᒪᒍᓄᓇᐅ ᑕᐅᑐᖓ ᑕᐃᕕᔅ ᓱᑐᕋᐃ. ᐃᑯᑕᖅᑲᓂᕐᕆ ᐃᑎᔪᒥ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᖅᑲᓂᕐᕆ ᐅᖄᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᒥᔪ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᒋᓗᓂᓴᓇᕈᑎ ᑕᒪᑯᐊ ᐊᕿᑕᐅᓯᒪᓕᓂᕐᕆᓂ, ᐱᔪᑎᒥᓗᓂᐅ ᐃᑯᑕᖅᑲᓚᐅᓂᕐᕆᓂ ᐃᑎᓂᓴᓂ ᓯᓚᔪᐊ ᐊᓱᖓᓂ.

was pointed out that the technology was established, due to experience from drilling in deeper water in other parts of the world.

The Panel was presented with estimates of the probability of blowouts ranging from 3 in 10 for water blowouts in the Beaufort Sea to 1 in 3,000,000 (Proponent's estimate) for oil blowouts based upon world industry experience.

ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ **Cda** ᑐᓴᑎᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᖃᒡᑐᖃ ᑲᓚᒐᔭᓂᖓᓂ ᖃᓂᒋᔭᓂ ᐅᕙᖃ ᐱᖓᓯᓂ ᖁᓪᓂ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᔪᓂ ᐃᒪᓂ ᐅᐊᓪᓂᐅᒥᓴᓂ ᐅᕙᖃ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᒥ ᖃᒡᑐᖃᖁᔭᓂᖓᓂ 3-ᒥᓪᓕᐊᒥ (ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓪᓕᑎᕐᑯᓄ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᓇᓚᐅᑕᑕᐅᓗ) ᖃᒡᑐᖃᖁᔭᓂᖓᓂ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᖃᕖᐅᔪᒥ ᒪᓪᓯᑎ ᓯᓚᔪᐊᓪᓚᒪᒥ ᐃᑯᑕᖃᑕᓚᐅᓂᕆᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᓂᕆᓄ.

Bercha, in his report (reference - Appendix III) states that a blowout which releases a volume of oil greater than 50,000 barrels is a 1 in 1,000,000 probability.

ᔫᓴ **Do-** ᑲᑎᓚᐅᓯᒪᔭᕆᑎᒍ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᑕᕙᓪᓕ ᖃᑐᖃᖁᔭᑎᓗᒍ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᒥ ᐊᕐᓂᓴᐅᔪ 50,000, ᖃᑕᐅᔭᓂ ᐅᕙᖃ ᖃᓂᒋᒪᒍ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᒥ 1-ᒥᓪᓕᐊᒥᑦ ᖃᑐᖃᖁᔭᕆᓂᖓᓂ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᒥ ᓱᓗ ᐱᓗᒍ 1-ᒥᓪᓕᐊᒥᑦ .

The Proponent evaluated the probability of a major oil blowout and determined it to be minimal. The Panel concluded that in view of a high degree of technology that had been developed by the oil industry and its historical performance elsewhere that the probability of oil blowout is low.

ᐅᕐ ᓯᐊᓗᓪᓕᑎᕐᑯᓗ ᓇᓚᐅᑕᓯᑎ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᐊᕆᔪᐊᓗᒥ ᖃᑐᖃᖁᔭᓂᖓ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᒥ ᒥᑭᔪᑲᔭᓂᐊ ᐃᓚ ᖃᑐᖃᖁᔭᖁᕆᓂᐊ. ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪᓗ ᑕᑯᐊ ᐃᓯᒪᓪᓚᐅᓯᑎ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᓴᓇᕈᑎᕆ ᐊᕿᑎᐊᓯᒪᓂᕆᓄ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓪᓕᑎᕐᑯᓄ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍ ᐱᖃᑕᓪᓚ ᐅᓯᒪᓂᕆᓄ ᐊᑐᕌᓚᐅᓯᒪᔭᕆᓂ ᖃᑐᖃᓂᐊᖁᓯᕆᓇᒍ ᖃᑐᖃ ᔭᓂᖓ ᒥᑭᑐᑯᓗᓇᓯᒥᔭᐅᓗᓂ.

2.3 Fate of Oil

2.3 ᖃᓄᐃᓕᔭᓂᖓ ᐅᕐ ᓯᐊᕋᑦ

The EIS describes the plume behaviour and subsequent slick path trajectory for both calm and rough sea conditions. In each case the oil rises in diffuse droplets to the surface where some will agglomorate into a thin slick. Lighter fractions will be vaporized and some oil will be mixed in the upper 25 feet of the water column.

ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᕐᐅᔪᓗ ᑕᑯᐊ ᐅᓂᑲᐅᑎᓗᑎ ᐅᕐᓯᐊᓗ ᑕᒪᑐᒪ ᑯᕕᓯᒪᔪ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᖃᑕᖁᔭᓂᖓᓂᐅ ᑯᖃᑕᖁᔭᓂᖓᓂᓗ ᑕᒪᕿᓂ ᐊᖁᓇᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᖁᓇᕆᑎᓗᒍᓗ. ᑕᒪᕿᑎᒍᓗ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐅᕐ ᓯᐊᓗ ᖃᖅᑲᖅᑲᓯᓂ **r P** ᑐᑭᓗᓕᓯᓂ **ALD** ᖃᖅᑲᖅᑲᓯᓂ ᑲᑎᓯᓂᓗ ᓴᑐᑯᓗᓇᓯᓂ. ᒥᑭᓂᓴᖅᑲᓗ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐃᓚ ᐃᓕᒥᔭᐅᓕ ᑐᐃᓇᖁᔭᓯᓂ ᓯᓚᒧ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃᓚᖅᑲ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐅᕐ ᓯᐊᓗ ᐃᓕᒥᔭᐅ ᓕᖁᔭᓯᓂ ᐅᕙᖃ ᖁᓪᓂ 25ᓂ ᐃᑎᓚᓂ ᐃᒪᒥ ᖃᖅᑲᓂ.

In order to predict the subsequent condition and movement of oil the Proponent employed the Sliktrak computer model. The Proponent chose this model for the Davis Strait study because it incorporated most factors affecting the movement of oil, those fractions lost to evaporation and that portion which is dispersed into the water column.

ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅᓯᕗᓂᓴᖅᑲ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᔭᒪᖅᑲ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᔭᓂᖅᑲ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᕙᔭᓂᖅᑲ ᐅᓯᐊᓗ **Cda** ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓪᓕᑎᕐᑯ ᐊᕿᓯᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕈᑎᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐅᑎᒥ . ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓪᓕᑎᕐᑯ ᑕᑯᐊ ᓂᕈᐊᓚᐅᓯᒪᓪᓚᑕ ᑕᐃᒪᐃᓕᐅᑐᒥ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᓯᑎ ᑕᐃᕕᔅ ᓯᑐᕋᐃᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᓂᐊᕐᑕᒥᓂ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᐊᑐᓇᒪᑎᒪᑕᒪᑭᓂ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖅᑲᐅᕐᓯᐊᓗ,ᓇᓕᐊᖅ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐃᓕᒥᔭᐅᓕᕙᕆᐊᓴᖅᓯᓚᑐᐃᓇᒧ ᐊᒪᓗᓇᓕᐊ ᐃᓕᒥᔭᐅᖃᑕ ᓕᕙᒪᖅ ᐃᒻᒥᖃᖅᑲ.

A total of 955 cases were simulated from six potential sites in Davis Strait

ᑲᑎᓯᑎ ᑕᒪᕿᓂ 9 5 5ᖑᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪᐅᑐᕋᑕᐅᖑᐊᓯᑎ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᔪᑎᒋᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ 6-ᓂ ᐊᕐᕌᒍᑐᓂ ᑕᐃᕕᔅ

based on a well flow rate of 3,000 barrels per day under varying environmental conditions and duration of flow up to a maximum of 250 days. The Proponent reported that out of the 955 simulations, oil reached the shoreline in 37 cases. These originated from four of he six test source sites selected for the exercise.

ᓱᑐᕋᐃᒥ ᐱᖑᐊᓱᑎ ᐅᑐᕋᓱᑎ ᐃᓚ ᖃᓂᒋᔭᓂ 3,000 ᖃᑕᐅᔭᓂ ᐅᓗᒥ ᐅᓗᒥ ᐊᕆᒋᖏᑎᓗᒍ ᓇᕙᒪᖕ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᑎᒋᐅᒥ ᐅᓗᒥ 250. ᐅᕐ ᓱᐊᓗᓕᑎᕆᑯᓗ ᐅᖃᓚᐅ ᑎᓗᑎ ᑕᑯᐊ 955ᓂ ᐅᑐᕋᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᐅᑎᒍ, ᐅᕐ ᓱᐊᓗ ᑕᒪᓇ ᓱᔭᒧᐊᓚᐅᓂᖕᒐᓂ 37ᐅᑐᓱᓂ. ᑕᑯᐊ ᐱᒋᐊᑕᐅᓚᐅ ᓯᒪᒪᑕ ᓯᑕᒪᓂ ᖃᐅᕆᓴᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᐅᓂ 6ᓂ ᐊᕆᒋᖏᑐᓂ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ
ᐅᑐᕋᐅᑕᐅᓗᑎ.

The primary criticism voiced by the Department of Fisheries and Environment (DFE) regarding the model was the use of average weather data as opposed to the inclusion of weather extremes. The Panel was satisfied that the calculations provided an adequate basis for the Proponent's oil spill contingency planning.

ᐊᑲᐅᖏᑐᒥᔭᐅᓗᓂ ᐅᖃᕈᑎᒥᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᑕᑯᓄᖕ ᑲᓇᑕ ᒪᑭᒪᑯᖏᓂᖕᒐᓯᒪᔪ ᐃᖃᓗᓕᑎᕆᐅᔪᓄ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᕆᐅᔪ ᓄᓗ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᔭᐅᓱᓂ ᓱᓚᖕ ᑕᒪᓇ ᑕᐃᒪᓇᐃᑎᓗᒍ ᐅᑐᕋᐅᑎ ᒋᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᒪ ᑕᒪᓂᓕ ᓱᓚᖕᓕ ᐃᑭᓇᑐᐊᓗᖃᑎᓗᒍ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᑎᓇᒍ. ᓇᓕᑎ ᑕᑯᐊ ᐊᑲᐅᓴᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᑐᓴᑕᒥᓂ ᐅᓱᐊᓗᓕᑎᕆᑯᓄ ᐅᑐᕋᐅᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪᓄ ᑯᕖᔪᖃᑲᓚᑎᓗᒍ ᐸᐃᖁᓇᓱᐊᕈᒪᔪᑎᒋᔭᖏᓄ.

The Panel recommends that an operational slick tracking model which incorporates real time data should be a requirement for the Proponent's oil spill contingency plan.

ᓇᓕᑎᓗ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕈᑎᖏ ᑕᒪᑯᓂᖕ ᖃᐅᕆᓴᐅᑎᓂ ᐊᑭᓱᖁᕆᓗᑎ ᐅᓱᐊᓗᓕᑎᕆᑯᓄ ᑯᕖᔪᖃᑲᓚᑎᓗᒍ ᐸᐃᖁᓇᓱᐊᓂᐊᓂᖏᓂ.

Some residents in Pangnirtung and Allen Island ***were*** concerned that oil contamination could occur in their regions. A Pangnirtung resident felt that currents in Cumberland Sound should be studied since he had witnessed, in the past, pieces of trees and other objects floating in the sea that must have originated elswhere. The residents of Lake Harbour and Frobisher Bay had seen similar evidence in Hudson Strait and Frobisher Bay respectively.

ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐᓗ ᐃᓚᖏ ᐸᓂᑐᒥ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐅᑲᓂᐊᓗᒥ ᐃᓱᒪᓚᐅᑎᕗᑕᐅ ᐅᓱᐊᓗ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐊᑲᐅᖏᑎᑎᓕᕋᔭᓂᖕ ᓇᐅᒪ ᖏᓂ. ᐸᓂᑐᒥᐅᑕᓗ ᐃᓱᒪᓚᐅᑎᕗ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖕᓄ ᑕᑎᐅ ᑲᒻ ᐹᓚᑦ ᓴᐅᑦᒥ ᖃᐅᕆᓴᑕᐅᖁᓗᒍ ᐱᐅᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅ ᑕᓇ ᐊᖑ ᐅᖃᓱᓂ ᑕᑯᕙᓚᐅᓯᒪᓂᒥᓂ, ᓱᕗᓂᑎᓚᐅᑕᒥᓂ, ᓇᐸᑐᕕᓂ ᐊᒪᓗᑕᐅ ᐊᓯᖏ ᐳᑕᓚᓯᒪᔪ ᑕᑎᐅᒥ ᐊᓯᖕᖏᓂᖕᓚᐅᓯᒪᓂᖏᓂ. ᑕᑯᐊᓗ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐᒥᐅᑕ ᑭᒥᕈᒥᐅ ᐃᖃᓗᒥᐅᓗ ᑕᑯᕙᓚᐅᓯ ᒪᒋᓗᑎᑕᐅ ᐊᕆᑲᓴᖏᓂ Hᐊᑦ ᓴᑦ ᓱᑐᕋᐃᒥ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᓗᓂ

The Proponent noted that data on currents is presently being acquired in the nearshore areas of Cumberland Sound. However, it was noted that the exploratory wells will be drilled at a considerable distance from these identified nearshore areas and the likelihood of oil moving into these areas, especially Hudson Strait and Frobisher Bay is remote. The oil spill contingency plan must be designed accordingly.

ᐅᕐ ᓱᐊᓗᓕᑎᕆᑯᑕᐅ ᐅᖃᖢᓗᑎ ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᔪ ᐃᒪᐅ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖕᓂ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒥ ᐱᔭᐅᕚᓂᖕᓂ ᓱᔭᐅ ᖃᓂᒋᔭᖕᓂ ᑲᒻ ᐹᓚᓐ ᓴᐅ. ᑭᓱᐊᓂ, ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᓚᐅᑎᓗᓂ ᕿᓂᕖᐅᔪ ᐃᑯᑕᕖᐅᔪ ᐃᑯᑕᕖᐅᒪᔭᒪᑕ ᐅᖕᒐᓯᒋᔭᓗᖕᒐᓂ ᓱᓴᐅ ᖃᓂᒋᔭᖕᒐᓂᐅᖏᑐ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᖃᑕᕋᔭᕐᑯᖏᓇᓱᒋᔭᐅᓗᓂ ᐅᓱᐊᓗ CLD'L, ᐱᓗᖕᒐᑐᒥ Hᐊᓴᓐ ᓱᑐᕋᐃ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᓗᓄ ᑕᒪᐅᖕᒐᖃᑕᕋᔭᓂᖕ ᐅᖕᒐᓱᑐ. ᑕᕘᓕ ᖃᐅᕆᓴᑕᐅ ᓚᐅᓯᒪᓂᖕᒐᑎᒍ ᐃᒪᐅ ᐊᐅᓚᖃᑕᓂᖕᒐᑎᒍ ᑲᒻ ᐸᓚᑦ ᓴᐅ ᐊᐅᓚᖃᑕᕋᔭᐸ, ᐅᓱᐊᓗ ᑕᒪᓇ d ᕖᓯᒪᔪ ᐸᐃᑎᔭᐅᒪᓱᐊᕋ ᔭᓂᖕ ᐊᕿᑕᐅ ᒪ ᓱᐊᑎᐊᖃᕋᔭᐳ.

There is little known about the movements of ice bound oil that could occur from a blowout which continues into the winter season. The main concerns were for the time, manner and location in which the oil would be re- released and the possible resulting impacts.

ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᑎᐊᕐᒥᒪ ᐊᐅᓚᖃᑕᕋᔭᓂᖓ fd ᒧᖕᒪᐅᕙᓚᖕᒐᕙ ᐅᓯᐊᓗ ᑕᒪᓇ ᖃᑐᖅᑲᕋᔭᑎᓗᒍ DPD ᑎᑭᓗᒍ. ᐱᓗᐊᑐᒥ ᐃᓯᒪᕆᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᕙ ᒪᓇᐅᕙᒥ ᓇᐅᑯᖃᑕᕋᔭᓂᖓ ᐅᓯᐊᓗ ᑕᒪᓇ ᑯᐱᔭᐅᓯᒪᕙ ᖃᓄᓚᑎᓗ ᓯᓂᑎᑎᖃᑕᕋᔭᓂᖓ.

It is recognized that further knowledge is required to determine the fate of oil under ice. Movement and potential effects of oil or oil fouled ice moving into more southerly waters is yet poorly defined. Information obtained from such existing government programs OLABS (Offshore Labrador Biological Studies) and AMOP (Arctic Marine Oilspill Program) may prove useful in the derivation of the contingency plan. Although the Panel was not convinced that the Proponent's scenario that oil moving into southerly water was minimal, it was satisfied that resulting impacts would be low.

ᐅᔨᑎᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᕙ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᖃᐅᔨᓴ ᑲᓂᖁᓗᕆ ᐅᓯᐊᓗ ᑕᒪᓇ fd ᐊᑕᓂ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᑎᑎᒐᔭᓂᖓ. ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖓ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓯᓂᑎᑎᒐᔭᓂᖓ ᐅᓯᐊᓗ ᐅᕙᓗᓂ ᐅᓯᐊᓗ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᖅᑐ ᓯᑯᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᕙᓕᐊᓂᖓ ᐱᖕᒐᓇᐅ ᒥᔅᓄ Dub ᑎᔭᐅᑎᐊᓯᒪᕐᒥᒪ ᓯᓕ. ᑐᓴᕈᑕᐅᕙ ᐱᔭᐅᓯᒪᕙ ᒪᓇᐅᕙᒥ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓄ ᑲᒪᕆᔭᐅᕙᓂ (ᑕᑎᐅᒥ ᓚᐸᑐᐊᑎᒥ ᐅᒪᕙᕐᕆ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᖃᑕᑎᓗᕆ) ᐊᒪᓗ (ᐃᓄᐃ ᓄᓇᕐᕆᓂ ᐅᓯᐊᓗ ᑲᒪᕆᔭᐅᒐᓯᐊᑐ) ᐊᑐᑕᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᒪ c ᐱᕆᐊᕕᐅᓗᑎ ᐸᐃᑎᓇᓯᐊᑎᐅᓂᐊᑐᓄ. ᑕᐃᒪᐃᑲᓗᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᓇᓕᑎᐅᕙ cda ᐊᑲᐅᓴᑎᐊᕐᕆᑲᓗᐊᑎᓗᕆ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯ ᓇᓚᐅᑕᑕᕐᕆᑎᒍ ᐅᓯᐊᓗ ᑕᒪᑐᒪ ᐊᐅᓚᒐᔭᓂᖓ ᓇᒎᓚᑎ ᐅᐊᓇᐅ ᒥᔅᓄ ᒥᑭᑲᓗᐊᑎᓗᒍ, ᐊᑲᐅᓴᓚᐅᑐᓕ ᓯᓂᑎᑎᓗᐊ ᕋᔭᕐᕆᓂᖕᒐᓂ r ᑭ ᒐᔭᓂᖕᒐᓂ ᓯᓂᑎᑎᑕᐅᒐᔭᑐ.

2.4 Marine Birds

2.4 ᑕᑎᐅᒥᐅᑕ ᑎᖕᒥᐊ

The potential impact of a major oil spill upon birds was not raised as a major concern by local residents. However, this was raised by DFE and Denmark, and the Proponent acknowledged that oil "blowout" could have a major impact on thick-billed murres, as well as moderate and minor impacts on other bird species at various times of the year.

ᓯᓂᕕᖕᒐ ᐊᕐᕆᕙᑎᓗ J d ᕕᕙᖅᑲᖅᑲᓚᓂᑎᓗ J ᐅᓯᐊᓗᒥ ᑕᒪᑯᓄᖕᒐ ᑎᒥᐊᓄ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᕆ ᔭᐅᓗᐊᓚᐅᕐᕆᑐ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᕆᑐᓄ. ᑭᓯᐊᓂ, ᐅᖃᐅᑎᕆᔭᐅᓗᐊᓚᐅᓯᒪᕙ ᐃᖃᓗᓕᑎᔨᐅᕙᓄ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑎᓐᒫᒃ ᒥᐅᑕᓄ, ᐊᒪᓗ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᑎᓗᑎ ᐊᕐᕆᕙᒥ ᖃᑐᖅᑲᑲᓚᓂᐸ ᐊᕐᕆᕙᐊᓗᒥ ᓯᓂᑎᑎᒐᔭᓂᐊᓂ ᐊᒃ ᐸᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓯᓕᑕᐅ ᐊᕐᕆᓗᐊᕐᕆᑲᓗᐊᑐᒥ ᐊᒪᓗ ᒥᑭᕙᒐᓗᐊᒥ ᓯᓂᑎᑎᒐᔭᑎᓗᑎ ᐊᓯᕐᕆᓂᑕᐅ ᑎᒥᐊᓂ ᐊᖁᒍᑎᓗᒍ ᑎᒥᐊᓂ.

The main concern was the potential impact upon flightless murres during their swimming migration period in late August. Some two to four million birds were estimated to be swimming, along a number of routes, the details of which are not known and more information is required to locate them. Data could be enhanced by reporting sitings of birds from drilling platforms, support vessels,

ᐃᓯᒪᕆᔭᐅᓗᐊᓚᐅᓯᒪᕙ ᓯᓂᑎᑎᓗᐊᖁᔭᓂᖕᒐᓂ ᖃᖕᒐᑕᕈᓇᕐᕆᑐᓂ ᐊᒃ ᐸᓂ ᐳᐃᕙᖁᓯᑎ ᐊᐅᓚᐸᓚᐊᕙᓂᕐᕆᓂ ᓄᖕᒎᓚᑎᓗᒍ ᐅᒍᑎ ᖃᓂᕆᔭᖕᒐᓂ 2 ᐅᕙᓗᓂ 4-ᒥᓕᐊ nra ᑕᒪᑯᐊ nra ᐳᐃᕙᖁᖃᑕᖁᓯᕆᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᕙ, ᐊᔨᕆᕐᕆ ᑐᑯᓯᑎ ᐊᖁᑎᒥᑎᒍ, ᑎᑎᖁᑎᐊᓯᒪᕙᓗ ᑐᓴᕈᑎᑎᐊᕙᐃᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᓇᑎ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑐᓴᑲᓂᑎᐊᖃᓯᑎ ᓇᒥᓚᑎᑲᓗᐊᓂᕐᕆᓂ. ᑐᓴᕈᑎᓴᑲᓂ ᐱᔭᐅᑲᓂᕈᓇᖁᔭᑐ ᑎᑎᖁᑎᐊᓯᒪᓗᑎ ᑎᒥᐊ ᓇᓂᓚᑎᑲᓗᐊᒪᖕᒐᑕ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᕙᓕᐊᕙᓂ, ᐃᑲᕙᓯᑐᓂᓗ ᐅᒥᐊᕙᐊᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᖃᖕᒐᑐᓯᑯ. ᐸᐃᑎᓯᖁᓯᐊᓂᐊᓂᕐᕆᑦ

Dick Brown (Canadian Wildlife Service)

. ..probably two million birds are involved in each migration route. The vulnerability hardly needs to be overemphasized. At the wrong place at the wrong time you could wipe out a whole year's class.

ᑎᒃ ᓴᖅᑐᓵ (ᑲᓇᑕᐅᔨ ᐅᒪᔪᖏᖅᓂᒃ ᑲᒪᒋᐊ)

ᐃᒡᒪᖅᑲᒃ ?-ᒥᓕᐊᓵ ᑎᖅ ᒥᐊᑦ ᐊᖅ ᖃᔪᑕᒪᑦ ᐅᑦ ᓕᑎᐊᖅᑐᒃ - ᓴᑐᑦ . ᐱᑐᐃᓵ ᓇᐅᓂᖓ ᐅᖅᑲᓕᑎᒥᐊᖅᖏᑦ ᑐᑦ ᑐᓵ ᓂᑦ . ᑕᒪᓐᓂᐅᖏᑦ ᑐᖅ ᓱᒡᒪ ᒪᒃ ᓇᔪᓗ ᐊᑲᐅᓇᖅᓴᒪᓵ ᓇᔪ ᐃᑐᓵ - ᓇᓴᐊᖏᓵ ᓂᒃ ᑐᓴᕆᐃᔪᓵ ᓇᖅᑐᑎᒃ ᐊᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᖏᓵ - ᓂᒃ .

Tom Beck ((Aquitaine Company of Canada Limited)

If a spill occurs, the company will be responsible for damages without question.

We want residents to participate and need their inputs as well as the scientists.

ᒎᒡ ᕆᒃ_ (ᐊᑯᐊᑎᓵᒥᒃ ᑕᐃᔨᐅᔪᖅ ᐅᖅᓴᐊᓗᓕᑎᐅᑦ ᑲᓇᑕ ᓕᒪᑕᒃ)

ᑯᕆᖏᖅᖅᓴᑦ ᒎᑯᐊ ᑲᒪᒍᔨᖅᑐᑦ ᓴᒃ ᑯᖅᑕᒥᓂᔪᓂᒃ ᐊᐱᑎ-ᒪᑎᒃ ᑐᓵ ᓂᑦ ᑕᒪᓂᔪᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᒃᓴᔪᑯᓂᑦ ᓴᓇᑐᐃᓵ ᓇᓂᒃ ᓗ ᑐᑭᓴᒪᔨᖏᑦ .


CBC

and aircraft. The contingency plans must recognize the vulnerability of this species during the migration period, and consideration must be given to the use of mitigating measures including the judicious use of dispersants.

Further information on migratory patterns to develop adequate counter measures is essential. The Panel considers this issue of major importance and thus recommends that the responsible regulatory agency ensures that the Proponent's contingency plan be designed to give these birds the best possible protection; even to the extent of temporary suspension of drilling operations during the migratory period, should this be judged appropriate.

2.5 Marine Mammals

The major issue associated with the effect of an oil spill on marine mammals was the potential impact on the residents' food supply. The possible loss of revenue due to a decrease in animals or damage to furs and skins was also mentioned. At one community a concern was directed towards the possibility of contaminated mammals migrating to an area outside the spill and being eaten by other animals or residents. Also, some residents mentioned that the exploration operation activity might change the migration patterns of certain types of sea mammals.

Although no numerical estimates of sea mammals were available in the area of the proposed drilling, it was stated that the ringed seal was abundant in the Allen Island area and was the most important marine mammal for the Inuit. The importance of the harvest of beluga whales and walrus was also stated.

The Panel noted the available information on the abundance of marine mammals in the Davis Strait region. Many

ᐅᐹᑎᔭᐅᔭᑎᐊᖃᒪᑎᑐ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᒐᔭᓂᕐᒥ ᑕᑯᓂᖓ nl-a, ᐊᐅᓚᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒥ, ᐊᒪᓗ ᐊᕐᒥᔦᐊᓗᒥᑕᐅ ᐸᐃᑎᓇᓱᐊᓗᑎ ᐊᑭᓯᒥᐊᖃᖁᔭᑐ ᐃᓚᒥᔭᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᓯᓚᑐᒐᓱᐊᑐᒥ ᐅᐊᓴᐅᑎᐅ ᒐᔭᑐᒥ ᐊᑭᓯᒪᓱᐊᑎᐊᖃᓂᕐᒥ.

ᑐᓴᑲᓂᕈᑎᓴᐃᑕᐅ ᖃᓄᑐ ᐸᐃᑎᓇᓱᐊᑎᐊᖃᓂᕐᒥᓂ ᐊᑭᑕᐅᑲᓂᑎᐊᖃᑐ ᐱᑎᐊᕐᒥᑐᖃᑲᓚᑐᐃᓇᑎᐊᖃᑎᓗᒍ. ᑕᑯᐊ ᐃᓱᒪᓕᓕᓚᐅᓯᒪᔦ ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔦ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᐊᕐᒥᔦᐊᓗᒥ ᐊᑐᓇᓂᖓᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐅᖃᓕᓱᑎ ᐱᖁᔭᓕᑎᐹᐅᔦ ᐊᑭᓯᖁᓗᒥ ᐅᓱᐊᓗᓕᑎᐹᑯ ᐸᐃᑎᓯᓇᓱᐊᕈᓇᖁᓗᒥ ᐊᑭᓯᒪᕙᒥᑐᓂ ᐸᐃᑎᔭᐅᒍᓇᖁᓗᒥ ᑕᑯᐊ ᑎᒥᐊ "ᓄᖃᑲᐃᓇᕈᓇᑐᓗᓂ ᑕᑯᐊ ᐃᑯᑕᑐ ᑎᒥᐊ ᑕᒪᑯᐊ ᐃᕐᒥᖁᕙᓕᐊᓕᑎᓗᒥ, ᑕᐃᒪᐃᓕᐅᑎ ᐊᖃᕈᑎ".

2.5 ᑕᑎᐅᒥᐅᑕ ᓂᔦᑎ

ᐱᔦᑎᒥᔭᐅᓗᐊᓱᓂ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᒐᔭᓂᐊ ᐅᓱᐊᓗᒥ ᑯᕕᔦᖃᑲᓚᑎᓗᒍ ᑕᑎᐅᒥᐅᑕᓄ ᓂᔦᑎᓄ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᓗᐊᖁᔭᒪ ᑭᓇᑯᓕᒪᓄ ᓂᑭᒥᔭᐅᓗᐊᐸᑐᓄ. ᐅᖃᕈᑕᐅᓚᐅᑎᓗᓂᑕᐅ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᕐᒥ ᒥᑭᓕᒥᐊᖁᔭᓂᕐᒥᓄ ᓂᔦᑎᓄ ᐊᑕᒪᑕ ᐅᕙᓗᓂ ᓱᓂᑕᐅᐸ ᒥᖁᕐᒥ AD ᒍᓂᑕᐅᐸᑕ ᑭᓯ ᓗᓂ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒥᔭᐅᓚ ᐅᑎᓗᓂ. ᐊᑕᐅᓯᒥ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒥᑐᓂ ᐱᔦᑎᒥᔭᐅᓗᐊᓱᓂ ᑲᒪᒥᔭᐅᓗᐊᓚᐅᐳ ᐱᔦᑎᖃᓗᐊᓱᓂ ᐱᐅᒍᓂᓯᒪᔦ ᓂᔦᑎ ᐃᕐᒥᖁᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒥ d ᕕᓯ ᒪᔦᒥᕐᒐᓱᑎ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓂᑭᒥᔭᐅᕙᓱᑎ ᐊᓯᕐᒥᓄ ᓂᔦᑎᓄ ᐅᕙᓗᓂ ᐃᓄᓄ. ᐊᒪᓱᓕᑕᐅ, ᐃᓚᕐᒥ ᓄᓇᖃᑎ ᒥ ᑐ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᑎᓗᑎ ᑭᓂᓗᑎ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᑭᓂᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗ ᒥ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᒐᔭᓂᕐᒥ ᐊᐅᓚᖃᑕᓂᕐᒥ ᐊᖁᑎᒥᔭᐅᕙᓂᕐᒥᓗ ᑕᑎᐅᒥᐅ ᑕᓄ ᓂᔦᑎᓄ.

ᓇᓴᐅᑎᓄ ᑎᑎᖁᑕᐅᒪᑎᓯ ᒪᕐᒥᑲᓗᐊᑎᓗᒥ ᑕᑎᐅᒥᐅ ᑕᐃ ᑎᑎᖁᓯᒪᔦ ᐱᑕᖃᕐᒥᑲᓗᐊᑎᓗᒥ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᔦᒪᔦᑎᒍ, pf ᐊᓂᓕ ᑕᑯᐊ ᖃᐃᕈᓕ ᐊᒥᓱᐊᓗᓂᖁᑕᐅᓗᑎ ᐅᑲᓕᐊᓗᒥ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐊᑐᓇᓂᐸᕐᒎᓂᖁᑕᐅᓗᑎ ᑕᑎᐅᒥᐅᑕᓂ ᓂᑭᒥᔭᐅᕙᑐᓄ ᐃᓄᓄ. ᐊᑐᓇᑎᔭᐅᓗᓂᑕᐅ ᑭᓚᓗᒐᐃ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐊᐃᕕ ᐅᖃᐅᑕᐅᓚᐅᒥᔦᑕᐅ.

ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔦ Cda ᖃᐅᐹᓚᐅᓯᒪᔦ ᑐᓴᑎᑕᐅᓚᐅᑐ ᐊᒥᓱᓂᕐᒥᓂ ᑐᓴᕈᑎᓴᐅᓂᕐᒥᓂ ᐊᒥᓱᐊᓗᓂᕐᒥᓂᓗ ᑕᑎᐅᒥᐅᑕᐃ ᓂᔦᑎ ᑕᐃᕕᓴ ᓯᑐᖁᐃᒥ. ᐊᒥᓱᓗ ᓂᔦᑎ cda

species provide a key food source to the local Inuit and therefore it is essential to maintain these regional populations. On the basis of interventions made by DFE, Canadian Nature Federation and individuals, the Panel agrees that the information in the EIS is lacking comprehensive baseline data on distributions, behaviour, migration and life stages of numerous species, e.g. polar bear, seals, belugas, and this makes it difficult to predict impacts with precision. While the EIS does include a good survey of the available literature, the state of scientific knowledge on impacts of oil upon marine mammals is limited and is concerned mostly with large doses of oil and lethal or near lethal effects. Little of the scientific literature addresses the subject of the effects of low concentrations of oil, sub lethal or long term effects.

Despite these difficulties, the Proponent did conduct an impact analysis, based upon worst case scenarios. The Panel heard no serious criticisms of the method of analysis except for the problem of limited data and knowledge being available. The "major" impacts identified related to polar bears and hooded seals at the ice edge in late. winter and walrus near shore in late summer. The Panel also heard evidence of experimentation with sea mammals e.g. seals, when fed large doses of oil, eventually recovered. On the other hand, opinions were heard that some whale species could be more sensitive to oil than are seals. Additionally, it was expressed that some mammals such as polar bears and seals would avoid oiled areas.

The Panel is generally satisfied that the impacts identified in the EIS represent a probable upper limit. It is also believed that significant improvements in knowledge on specific impacts are not likely to emerge in the

ᓂᕿᒥᔭᐅᕙᒪᑕ ᐃᓅᓄ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᐱᔪᑎᒥᓗᓂᐅ ᐊᒥᓱᓂᕐᒥ ᑕᒪᓂᕐᒥᓇᐅᔭ ᑎᐊᖃᓂᕐᒥ ᐊᑐᓇ ᑎᔭᐅᓂᕐᒥ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒥᔭ ᐅᓚᐅᑎᕗ. ᒪᓕᓯᑎ Ad ᑕᖁᕕᓚᐅᕐᒥᑐᓄ Cd ᓄᕐᒐ ᐃᖃᓗᓂᑎ ᕗᐅᔪᓄ ᑲᓇᑕᐅ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᕐᒥᓂᕐᒐᓯᒪᔪᓄ, ᑲᓇᑕᒥᓗ ᓂᔪᑎᓕᑎ ᕗᐅᔪᓄ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑭᑯᓕᒪᑎᐊᓄᓗ ᐃᒥᑯᓯᑎ, ᓇᓚᒥᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪ ᐊᕐᒥᖃᑎᖃᓚᐅᕗ ᑕᑯᐊ ᑐᓴᕆᑎᓴᐃ ᓇᔪᒐᐅᔪᒥ ᐊᕙᑎᒥ ᖃᐅᕗᓴᑎᐅᔪ ᑎᑎᕋᑎᐊᓯᒪᓚᐅᕐᒥᒪᑕ ᑐᑭ ᓯᓇᑎᐊᑐᒥ ᓇᒥᖃᑕ ᓂᕐᒥᓂ, ᐃᓕᖁᓯᕐᒥᓂ ᐊᐅᓚᐸᓕᐊᖃᑕᑎᓗᒥ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓂᔪᑎ ᐊᕕᒥᕐᒥᑐ ᐊᒥᓱᕙᓂᕐᒥ ᓱᓗ, ᓇᓄᐃ, ᓇᑎ, ᕿᓚᓗᒐᐃ ᐊᒪᓗ CAL ᐱᔪᑎᒥᓗᓂᐅ ᐊᔪᓇᕈᑎᒥᕙᐅ ᖃᓄᓕᑎ ᓱᓂᑎᑕᐅᖃᑕᕋᔭᓂᕐᒥᓂ ᓇᒪᑎᐊᑐᒧ a ᑲᐅᔪᒧ ᖃᓄᓕᑎ. ᑕᐃᒪᐃᑲᓗᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᕙᑎᒥ ᑕᑯᐊ ᖃᐅᕗᓴᑎᐅᔪ ᐃᓚᒥᔭᐅᑎ ᓗᒍ ᖃᐅᕗᓴᑎᐊᖃᑕᕋᓗᐊᑎᓗᒥ ᐅᖃᓕᒪᒐᑎᒍᑎᓗᒍ, ᖃᐅᕗᓴᑎᒪᑎᑎᒍ ᖃ ᐅᕗᒪᔭᐅᔪ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᒐᔭᓂᕐᒐ ᐅᓯᐊᓗ ᑕᒪᑐᒪ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᒐᔭᓂᕐᒐ ᑕᑎᐅᒥᐅᑕᓂ ᓂᔪᑎᓂ ᒥᑭᓗᐊᑎ ᔭᐅᓗᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᓗᐊᓯᒪᒪ ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᐊᕐᒥᔪᐊᓗᒥ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᒥ ᑯᕕᔪᖃᑲᓚᒐᔭᓂᐸ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑐᖁᓇᕋᔭᐸ ᐅᕙᓗᓂ ᑐᖁᓇ b ᓴᓂᐸᓗᓂ ᑭᓯᐊᓂ. ᒥᑭᑐᑯᓗᒥ ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᑎᑎᕋᑕᐅᓯ ᒪᔪᖃᒪ ᖃᐅᕗᓴᑎᐅᔪᑎᒍ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᓯᑎ ᒥᑭᑐᕈᓗᒥ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᒥ d ᕕᔪᖃᑎᓗ J ᓱᓂᑎᑎᒐᔭᓂᐊ,ᑐᖁᓇᑲᓴᓂᕐᒐᐅᕙᓗᓂ ᐊᑯᓂᐊᓗ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᒐᔭᓂᕐᒐ ᑎᑎᕋᑕᐅᑎᐊᓯᒪᕐᒥᒪᑕ.

ᑕᒪᑯᐊᓕᒪ ᐊᔪᓇᕋᓗᐊᑎᓗᒥ, ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᕗᑯ ᖃᐅᕗᓴᖃᑕᓯᒪᓕᒪᑕ ᖃᓄᓕᑎ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᒐᔭᓂᕐᒐᓂ, ᐊᕐᒥᔪᐊᓗᒥ ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᑯᕕᔪᖃᑲᓚᒐᔭᓂᑎᓗᒍ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᓯᑎ. ᓇᓚᒥᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪ ᓇᓚᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᓯᑎ ᖃᐅᕗᓴᖃᑕᓂᕐᒐᓂ ᐊᑲᐅᒥᔭᐅᕐᒥᑐᒥ r ᑭ ᒥᔭᐅᓗᐊᓯᑎ ᑎᑎᕋᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᐊᒪᓗ ᖃᐅᕗᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᐱᔭᐅᔪᓇᓂᕐᒥᓂ. ᐊᕐᒥᔪᐊᓗᒥ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᒐᔭᓂᕐᒐ ᖃᐅᕗᒪᔭᐅᓕᐸ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᓯᑎ ᓇᓄᓂ ᐊᒪᓗᐊᐸᓂ ᐊᔪᖃᓂ ᐅᑭᐅᕐᒍᑎᓗ J ᐊᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᕕᓂ ᓯᔭᐅ ᖃᓂᒥᔭᕐᒐᓂ ᐊᐅᔭᐅᓕᑎᓗᒍ. ᑐᓴᓚᐅᑎᕗ Cda ᓇᓚᒥᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪ ᐅᑐᖃᑕᐅᓯᑎ ᖃᐅᕗᓴᑕᐅᕙ ᓚᐅᓯᒪᓂᕐᒥᓂ ᑕᑎᐅᒥᐅᑕᓂ ᓂᔪᑎᓂ ᓱᓗ ᓇᑎᓂ, ᐊᕐᒥᔪᐊᓗᒥ ᓂᑎᑎᑕᐅᕙᓂᓯᑎ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᒥ, ᑕᑯᐊᓕ ᐅᕙᑎᐊᕈᕐᒍᖃᑎᓗᒍ ᓇᒪᓯᓚᐅᓯᒪᒥᔪ. ᑭᓯᐊᓂᑕᐅ ᐊᓯᐊᒍᑕᐅ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᑎᓗᓂᑕᐅ ᐃᓚᕐᒥ ᑕᒪᑯᐊ ᐊᕐ ᕕ ᓱᓂᑎᑕᐅᒐᔭᓂᕐᒥ ᕿᓚᒥᐅᓂᓴᒧ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᒧ ᓇᑎᓂᐅᕐᒐᓂ. ᐊᒪᓱᓕᑕᐅ, ᐅᖃᑐᖃᓚᐅᑎᓗᓂ ᐃᓚᕐᒥ ᓂᔪᑎ ᓱᓗ ᓇᓄᐃ ᐊᒪᓗᓇᑎ ᐃᓚᕐᒥ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᖃᑐᒧᐊ ᑕᐃᓕᔪᓇᓂᕐᒥᓂ.

ᓇᓚᒥᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪᓗ ᑕᑯᐊ ᐊᑲᐅᓴᓚᐅᓯᒪᕗ ᓱᓂᑎᑕᐅ ᒐᔭᓂᕐᒐᓂ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒥᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᖃᐅᕗᓴᑎᐅᔪᓄ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᕗ ᐅᔪᓄ ᓇᒪᒐᓯᒥᔭᐅᓗᓂ. ᐅᐱᕈᓯᒐᓯᒥᔭᐅᓗᓂᑕᐅ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᑕᑯᓴᐅᔪᒥ ᐊᕿᑕᐅᒥᐊᑲᓂᕕᐅᒐᔭᑐᒥ ᖃᐅᕗᒪᔭᐅᔪᓂ ᐃᒥᑯᓯᓂ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᕕᐅᒐᔭᑐᒥ ᑕᑯᓴᐅᓕᖁᔭᕐᒥᓂᕐᒐᓂ ᓇᐃᑐᕈᓗ ᑎᓗᒍ ᑭᑕᕈᓗ. ᑕᐃᒪ ᐱᔪᑎᒥᓗᓂᐅ ᓇᓚᒥᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪ

short term. The Panel therefore concludes that the risk for impacts to marine mammals is acceptable because affected populations are likely to recover.

Cda ᐃᓱᒪᓕᓚᐅᓯᒪᕗ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᒐᔭᓂᖓᓂ ᑕᑎᐅᒥᐅᑕᓂ ᓂᐊᑎᓂ ᓇᒪᒋᔭᐅᓱᓂ ᐱᐊᑎᒋᓱᓂᐅ ᑕᒪᑯᐊ ᓱᓂᑕᐅᓯᒪᐊ ᐱᐅᓯᒍᓇᕋᔭᒪᑕ ᐊᕿᒍᓇᕋᔭᕐ LC ᐅᕙᑎᐊᕈᑦᒎᑎᒍᒍ.

The Panel feels some additional data gathering by the Proponent is necessary, to ensure that an adequate data base is in place for contingency response in the event a blowout occurred. It is noted that DFE and some residents felt that this work could be conducted concurrent with drilling. At the same time, the Panel accepts the Proponent's argument that not all outstanding information on marine mammals is critical to a decision on drilling, (Proponent's responsibility) but rather is a prerequisite to resource management (a Government responsibility). The Panel therefore recommends that the existing consultative mechanisms between government and industry be utilized to determine precisely the extent of further work required for contingency planning purposes.

ᓇᓕᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᐊ ᐃᓱᒪᕗ ᓯᓕᑲᓂ ᑎᑎᕋᑲᓂᓯᒪᐊᓂ ᐊᕿᓯᒋᐊᑲᓂᒃᑰᕈᑎ ᑲᑎᓱᐃᑲᓂᒃᑰᕈᑎ ᐅᕐ ᓱᐊᒍᓕᑎᕈᑯᓂ, ᐱᐊᑎᒋᒍᒍ ᓇᒪᑐᒥ ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᐊ ᐱᒋᐊᕈᓇᒃᑯᒋ ᓴᒍᒪᓴᐃᒋ ᐊᖄᓂᐸᑕ ᐸᐃᑎᓯᒋᐊᖄᑲᓚᐸᑕᒍᓂ ᑲᒪᑐᖅᑲᓚᑎᒍᒍ. ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᓚᐅᓱᓂᒍ ᑕᑯᓐᓚ ᐃᖃᒍᓕᑎᕈᐅᐊᑯᓐ ᐊᒪᒍ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐᓐ ᐃᓚᕆᓐ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕈᓇᓂᕆᓂ ᐃᑯᑕᐸᓕᐊᑎᒍᒋ. ᐊᑕᐅᑎᑯᑎᒍᒍᑕᐅ, ᓇᓕᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᐊ ᐊᑲᐅᓴᓚᐅᓯᒪᒋᕗ ᐅᓱᐊᒍᓕᑎᕈᑯ ᐊᐅᕚᐊᑎᒋᓚᐅᑕᕆᓂ ᑕᓇ ᑐᓴᕈᑎᓴᐅᓂᐊᑐ ᐅᕙᑎᐊᕈᑦᒍᑎᒍᒍ ᐱᐊᑎᖅᑲᓱᑎ ᑕᑎᐅᒥᐅ ᑕᓐ ᓂᐊᑎᓐ ᑐᐊᕕᓇᑎᔭᐅᕆᓂᕋᓱᓂ ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐊᑐ ᒥᓴᓐ ᓄᖅᑲᑎᑎᕈᐅᑯᓇᒍ, (ᐅᓱᐊᒍᓕᑎᕈᑯᓐ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᔭᑎᐊᖅ) ᑭᓱᐊᓂ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᔭᑎᐊᖅᑐ ᐊᑐᐸᓕᐊᓕᑎᕈᐅᐊᓐ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᕈᐅᐊ ᓐ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓐ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᔭᑎᐊᖅᑐ. ᓇᓚᑎᐅᐊ ᑕᑯᐊ ᐱᐊᑎᒋᒍᓂᐅ ᐅᖃᓕᓚᐅᓯᒪᕗ ᒪᓇᐅᐊ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓂᖓᓂ ᐊᐱᓱᕈᒍᔭᖅᑕᕋᔭᖅᑕᕋᔭᓂᕆᓂ ᐃᑦ ᒥᓐ ᐊᑯᓂᕆᓐ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓐ ᐅᓱᐊᒍᓕᑎᕈᑯᓐᒍ ᐊᕿᑕᐅᒃᑰᒍᒍ ᖃᓄᓚᑎ ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᓂᐊᒪᖅᑕ ᐱᐊᑎᒋᒍᓂᐅ ᐸᐃᑎᓇᓱᐊᓂᐊᑎᒍ ᒋ ᒥᓴᓐ.

2.6 Fish

With one exception, potential impacts of an oil blowout on fish were not identified as a major concern during the hearings. A concern was voiced over scarcity of knowledge over the effects of oil on under ice biota which in turn related to arctic cod populations. The EIS indicates potential impacts of a minor to moderate nature on five fish species. The Panel considers, based on present day knowledge, that should a blowout occur, the effects on fish are expected to be limited.

2.6 ᐃᖃᓗᐃ

ᐊᑕᐅᓯᐅᑎᒍᒍ, ᓯᕗᓂᐊ J ᓱᓂᑎᑎᒐᔭᑐᖅᑐᖅᑲᔭᓂ ᐸ ᐅᕐ ᓱᐊᒍᒥ ᐃᖃᓗᓐ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᒍᐊᓚᐅᕆᑐ ᐱᐊᑎᖅᑲᓱᓂ ᐊᕆᐊᐊᒍᒥ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᖓᓂ ᑕᑯᑎᒍᓇᑎᒍᒋ ᑐᓴᑎᒍᒋ ᑲᑎᒪ [illegible]. ᐱᐊᑎᒋᔭᐅᒍᐊᓱᓂ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᒍᐊᓯᒪᐊ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᑎᐊᒍᐊᕆᓂᕆᓐ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᒐᔭᒪᖓᑕ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐅᓱᐊᒍ ᓯᑯ ᐊᑕᓐ ᐱᕈᑐᓐ ᐅᒪᔪᓐᒍ ᑭᓱᓕᒪᓐ ᓂᐊᑎᕈᔪᓐᒍ ᑕᒪᑭᓐᒍ ᐃᒥᓐ ᐊᑕᓱᑎ ᐃᓄᐃ ᓄᓇᕆᓂᒥᐅᑕᓐ ᐅᒐᓐ. ᑕᑯᑎᒍᓇ ᓇᐊᒐᐅᐊ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᓚᐅᓂᕆᑎᒍ ᑐᓴᑎᑎᓚᐅᕗ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᒐᔭᑐᓂ ᑕᑯᓂᖓ r ᑭᒍᐊᕆᑐᒥ ᐊᕆᒍᐊᕆᑐᒥ ᐃᖃᓗᐃ ᑕᓕᒪᐃ ᐊᕈᒋᕆᑐ ᐱᐊᑎᒋᒍᒋ. ᓇᓚᑎᐅᒪᐅᑐ Cda ᐃᓱᒪᓚᐅᕗ ᐱᐊᑎᖅᑲᓱᑎ ᒪᓇᐅᐊ ᐅᒍᒥᐅᐊᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᕆᓂ ᕆᓐ ᖃᑐᖅᑲᔭᓂᐸ ᑕᕙ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᑕᐅᒐᔭᑐ ᐃᖃᓗᐃ ᒥᑭᑐᒐᔭ Lc ᓱᓂᑎᑕᐅᒐᔭᓂᕆ.

2.7 Lower Part of Food Chain

Considerable discussion took place at the Frobisher Bay hearing on the potential impact of an oil spill on the food chain with specific reference to the under ice communities. In general, the consensus was that a spill would have a moderate effect on the under ice biota but additional studies would be required

2.7 ᒥᑭᓂᓴᐃ ᓂᕆᔭᐅᕙᑐ ᓂᐊᑎᓐ

ᐊᕆᐊᐊᒍᒥ ᐅᖃᒪᖃᑎᒋᕙᓚᐅᓯᒪᒪᒪᑕ ᑕᐃᓱᒪᓂ ᑲᑎᒪᑎᒍᒋ ᐃᖃᓗᓂ ᑲᑎᒪᕕᐊᐊᑎᒍᒋ ᖃᓄᓚᑎ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᒐᔭᒪ ᓪᑕᐅᓱᐊᒍᑯᕕᐊᖅᑲᑲᓚᓂᐸᐃᒥᓄᓂᑎᖅᑕᐅᑎᖅᑕᑐᓐ ᓂᐊᑎᓐ ᐱᒍᐊᑐᒥ ᐱᐊᑎᖅᑐ ᓯᑯ ᐊᑕᓂᒥᐅᑕᐅᐊᓐ. ᑭᓱᓕᒪᑎᐊ ᓇᓚᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᐊ ᓱᒍ, ᑕᒪᑭᑎᐊᑲᓴᓱᑎ ᐃᓱᒪᓚᐅᓯᒪᒪᒪᑕ ᑯᕕᐊᖅᑲᑲᓚᓂᐸ ᒥᑭᑐᒥᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᓱᓂᑕᐅᒐᔭᒪᓯᑯᐊᑕᓂᒥᐅᑕᐃᐱᕈᑐᐅᒪᐊᒍᑭᓯᐊᓂ

to determine the extent of the impact.

The EIS has predicted that in the event of a serious blowout the lower levels of biota could be affected but not in a major way. The EIS further suggests that effects would most likely be greater in selected areas such as the near-ice edge or at the nearshore area. The inference is drawn that recovery to pre-spill levels would be expected to occur over a relatively short period of time. The criticisms voiced over the adequacy of the information is understandable given the magnitude of the task of studying the lower level biota and their contributions to the food chain. Such criticisms are not restricted to arctic environment studies but are rather universal. The low probability of a single spill which could affect the lower trophic levels as described is believed to be an acceptable risk but the chances for additional oil spills, particularly should oil production become feasible, will dictate the need and allows time for future work in this field.

2.8 Operational Practices and Waste Management

The Panel felt that adequate regulatory mechanisms are currently in effect to ensure that safe and environmentally sound operating procedures will be followed throughout the drilling program. The Panel noted with concern the additional complexity of drilling from a moveable platform in the deepest arctic waters that the industry has encountered to date. It was recognized that the industry had previously drilled from moveable (dynamically positioned) platforms, and had also drilled in deeper waters as well as having faced the iceberg menace before; but not in the same combination of hazards that the southern Davis Strait presented.

ᑕᐃᒪ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅ ᑲᓂᕿᐊᖃᓚᐅᓯᒪᔭ ᖃᓄᓚᕿ ᓱᓂᑕᐅᓚᔭᕋ ᓗᐊᓂᕐᕕᓂ.

ᑕᑯᐊᓗ ᓇᔭᓚᓕᕿᔩᐅᔭ ᓚᕙᒪᑯᓂᖓᓯᒪᔭ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑎᐅᔭ ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍ ᓱᓗ ᓇᓚᐅᑕᐃᓚᐅᓯᒪᒪᑕ ᐊᕐᕕᔭᐊᓗᒥ ᖁᑦᖃᓚᓂᐸ ᐃᒪᐅ ᐊᑕᓂᒥᐅᑕᐃ ᐱᕈᑐ ᓂᔭᑎᓗ ᓱᓂᑎᑕᐅᓚᔪᒪᑕ ᕿᓯᐊᓂ ᐊᕐᕕᓗᐊᑐᐊᓗᒥ ᐱᓚᔪᕐᕕᑐ. ᑕᑯᐊᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑎᐅᔭ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᕿᔩᐅᔭ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᓯᒪᒥᔭ ᓱᓂᑕᐅᓚᔪᑐ ᑕᕙᓕ ᐱᓗᐊᓂᓴᐅᓚᔪᒪᑕ ᐃᒥᑯᓕᓪᓚᔪ f d ᖃᓂᕆᔪᓪᓚᓂᑐᓄ ᐅᕙᓗᓂ ᓯᔪᐅ ᖃᓂᕆᔪᓪᓚᓂᑐᓄ. ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᔭᑎ J ᖃᐅᕆᒪᔪᐅᕙᓕᐊᔭᑎ J ᓱᓗ ᖃᐅᕆᒪᓕᓚᐅᒪᑕ ᐃᒥᓄ ᓇᔭᑕᕕᓂᒥᑎᑐ ᐅᓄᑎᕆᔪᒥᓂᑎᑐ ᐅᑎᕋᔪᒥᔭ ᑯᕕᔭᖃᓂᐊᓴᑎᓗᒍ ᑕᐃᒪ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᕐᕆᓚᔪᒪ ᕿᓯᐊᓂ. ᐊᑲᐅᕆᔪᐅᕐᕆᓗᐊᓱᓂ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᕆᔪᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔭ ᐱᔭᑎᖃᓗᐊᓱᓂ ᑐᓴᕈᑎᓴᓂ ᓇᓗᓇᕐᕆᑎᐊᒪ ᐱᔭᑎᖃᓱᓂ ᐊᕐᕆᓗᐊᑐᐊᓗᒥ ᑕᐃᒪ ᓱᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᓚᔪᑐ ᑕᐃᒪ ᐊᕐᕆᔭᕕᔭᐊᕋᓗᓚᔪᒪ ᐃᒪᐅ ᐊᑕᓂᓂᓴ ᐱᕈᑐᓗ ᓂᔭᑎᕈᔭᐃᓗ ᐊᒪᓗ ᖃᓄᓚᑎ ᐃᒥᓄ ᓂᑎᖃᑕᐅᑎᖃᑕᕋᔪᓂᕐᕆᓂ ᐱᔭᑎᖃᓱᑎ. ᑕᐃᒪ ᐊᑲᐅᕆᔪᐅᕐᕆᔭᑎᕆᔪᓪᓚ ᐱᓗᐊᑐᐃᓇᐅᕐᕆᒪ ᐃᓄᐃ ᓄᓇᓪᓚᓄ ᐱᓗᐊᕐ ᑐᐃᓇᐅᕐᕆᒪ ᐃᓄᐃ ᓄᓇᓪᓚᓄ ᕿᓯᐊᓂ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᔭᒍ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᓂᕐᕆᓄ ᕿᓯᐊᓂᓕ ᑕᕙ ᓯᓚᔭᐊᒥᐅᑕᓕᒪᑎᐊᓄ. ᑕᕙᓕ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᒥᓗᓂ ᑯᕕᔭᖃᖁᔭᓂᐸ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᓚᔪᑐ ᐃᑎᓂᓴᐅᔭᒥ ᑕᑯᑎᒍᓇ Du b ᑎᔪᐅᓚᐅᑐᑎ J ᐅᐱᑎᔪᐅᕗ ᓇᒪᕐᕆᓂᐊᑐᐃᓇᑎᐊᖃᑐ ᕿᓯᐊᓂ ᑕᕙᓕ ᐊᓯᐊᒍᑕᐅ ᑯᕕᔭᖃᑲᓚᓚᔪᓂᐸ, ᐱᓗᐊᑐᒥ ᐅᓯᐊᓗ ᑕᒪ ᓴᓇᔪᐅᕙᓕᐊ ᓕᑎᓗᒍ, ᖃᐅᕆᑎᑎᓚᔪᒪ ᐱᔪᐅᑲᓂᕿᐊᖃᑲᔪᑐᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᓴᒥ ᐅᕙᑎᐊᕈᑦᒍᑎᓗᒍ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕕᓴᐅᒍᓇᑲᔪᒪ ᑕᒪ.

2.8 ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᖃᑕᑲᔪᓂᕐᕆ ᐅᕐ ᓱᐊᓗᓕᕿᕐ d ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃᖁᐃ ᑲᒪᕆᔪᐅᕙᓕᐊᓚᔪᓂᕐᕆ

ᓇᓕᑎᐅᔭ ᑕᑯᐊ ᐃᓱᒪᓚᐅᒪᑕ ᓇᒪᑎᐊᑐᒥ ᐱᖁᔭᐃ ᒥᓴᓄ ᑲᒪᕆᔪᐅᕙᑐ ᐊᑐᑕᐅᑎᐊᖃᑕᓂᕐᕆ ᐸᐃᑎᓯᓚᓯᐊᓯᑎ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓇᔭᓚᓕᕿᔩᐅᔭ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᑲᔪᓂᕐᕆ ᓇᒪᑎᐊᑲᓯᕆᔪᐅᓗᑎ ᐃᑯᑕᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᕆ. ᓇᓕᑎᐅᔭᓗ ᐱᕆᓚᓕᐅᑎᖌ ᐃᓕᕆᔪᐅᑎᓗ J ᐊᔭᓇᓂᓴᐅᓂᐊᑐ ᐃᑯᑕᑎᓗᕆ ᐊᐅᓚᔪᐅᒍᓇᑐᒥ ᐃᑎᓂᐸᖑ ᔭᒥ ᐃᓄᐃ ᓄᓇᕐᕆᓂ ᐃᒪᕐᕆ C d a ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᕿᕐd ᐊᑐᖃᑕᓚ ᐅᓯᒪᔪᕐᕆ ᐅᓗᒥᐅᔭᒥ ᑎᑭᓗᒍ. ᐅᕐᕿᔪᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᓗᓂ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᕿᕐ d ᓯᕗᓕᒥ ᑕᐃᓯᒪᓂ A d ᑕᖃᑕᓚᐅᓯᒪᒪᑕ ᐊᐅᓚᒍᓇᑐᓂ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᔭᓂ (ᕿᓴᓯᒪᓗᑎ) ᓴᓇᕕᐅᔭᓂ, ᐊᒪᓗ A d ᑕᖃᑕᓯᒪᓕᕿᓗᑎ ᐃᑎᓂᓴᐅᔭᓂ ᐃᒪᓂ ᐱᖃᓗᔪᖃᐅ ᐸᑐᓂ ᑕᐃᓯᒪᓂ ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍ; ᕿᓯᐊᓂ ᑕᐃᒪᓇᐃᕐᕆᑐ ᐊᑕᐅᑎ ᑯᕐᕆᑐ ᑰᓴᓚᓇᓂᓪᓚᓂ ᐱᓪᓚᓇᓪᓚᓂ ᑕᐃᕕᓴ f ᑐᖃᐃ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᓪᓚᓂᓪᓚᓂ.

30-787

DYNAMIC POSITIONING



Compensatory factors to the above noted hazards were the improved drilling technology available, the Proponent's use of improved geophysical (seismic) data to design their drilling program, and the comprehensive environmental data that can serve as an operational planning tool as well as a protective baseline measure.

Finally, it was noted that seemingly complex technical problems are often precipitated by the more mundane questions of comunications between crews and general housekeeping procedures, such that some two thirds of all blowouts have been attributed to human error. The Panel recommends that well-trained crews, communicating in a common language should minimize this occurrence and that the chain of command as well as the respective authorities must be delineated for both routine and emergency procedures.

The Proponent's waste management programs which encompass both domestic and industrial effluents as well as the disposal of solid wastes, were viewed by the Panel as adequately covered by government regulations and codes of good practice.

The ice alert system, which was described in the proponent's supplementary submission of September 22, 1978 details the actions to be taken for each of three levels of alarm (i.e. proximity of approaching icebergs). The Panel recommended that this procedure be reassessed as both the iceberg tracking techniques and offshore drilling programs are modified to reflect the experiences of actual Eastern Arctic offshore drill sites as well as those of the Beaufort Sea and offshore Labrador locations.

ᑕᑯᑎᒍᓇ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒥᖃᐅᔭᑎᒍ ᓱᓗ ᖁᓴᓚᓇᑕᐅᕖᐅᒍᓇ ᑐ ᐊᕿᑕᐅᑎᐊᓯᒪᕚᓕᐊᓕᒪᑕ ᐃᑯᑕᕖᐅᒐᔭᑐᓂ ᒪᓇᐅᔪ, ᐅᓱᐊᓗᓕᕆᔨᑯ ᐊᕿᓯᒪᓕᒪᑕ ᐃᑯᑕᕈᑎᒥᒐᔭᑕᕐᒥᓂ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᑭᓯᓇᑎᐊᑐᒥ ᓇᔪᒐᐅᔪ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᔪ ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᓂᕐᓂ ᐃᑲᔪᓯᑎᐅᒐᔭᒪ ᐱᕚᓕᐊᑎᓗᒥ ᐊᕿᓱᐃᕚᓕᐊᑎᓗᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐸᐃᕆᓇᓱᐊᕈᓇᕋᔭᓂᕐᒥᓂ.

ᑭᖑᓕᐸᖑᑎᓗᒍ, ᖃᐅᔨᔭᐅᓚᐅᑎᕗ ᑐᓴᑕᐅᓚᐅᑎᕗ ᐊᔪᓇᖁᔨᔪᐊᓗᖃᑕᑎᓗ J ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᐃᒥᑯ ᓱᑎ ᖃᐅᑕᒪ ᑭ f au ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᖃᑐᓗ ᑐᓴᕈᑕᐅᕚᑐᓗ CL Pɪ) ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᑎᐅᔪᓗ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᖃᐅᑕᒪ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᑎᐅᔪᓗ, ᓱᓗ ᐅᕚᖅ 2/3 ᖃᒐ ᑎᑕᐅᖃᑐ ᓴᓇᔨᐅᔪᓗ ᐱᑎᑕᐅᕚᑐ . ᑕᑯᐊᓗ ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ ᐅᖃᐅᔨᓚᐅᓱᑎ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᑎᐅᔪ Cd a ᐃᓕᓂᐊᑎᑕᐅᑎᐊᓯᒪᖁᓗ ᒥ, ᐊᑕᐅᓯᒥᓗ ᐅᖃᐅᓯᖃᕆᓇᖁᓗᒥ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᑕᒪᓗᐊᖃᑕᕆᓂᖁᔭᐳ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᖓᔪᖃᑎᐊᖃᖃᑕᖁᓗ ᒥ ᐃᒥᑯᐸᓕᐊᓗᑎ ᓱᓗ ᑕᒪᑭᓗ ᖃᐅᑕᒪ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᑎᕚᑕᕐᒥᓗ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᔭᑎᐊᖃᓕ ᑲᓚᓕᐸ ᑐᐊᕖᓇᑐᖃᑲᓚᓂᐸ ᑕᐃᒪᓇᐃᓕᐅᕈᓇ ᖁᓗᒥᑕᐅ.

ᐅᓱᐊᓗᓕᕆᔨ d ᐃᖃᑕᐃᖃᑕᓂᕐᒥ ᐃᖃᑯᓂ CL ᑭᓂ ᖃᐅᑕᒪ ᐊᑐᖃᑕᑕᕐᒥᓂ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕈᑎᕐᒥᓗ ᐊᑐᖃᑕᑕᕐᒥᓗ ᐃᖃᑯᓂ ᐃᓚᒥᔭᐅᑎᓗ J ᐃᖃᑯᓕᒪᑎᐊᖁᓗᐃ, ᖃᐅᔨᔭᐅᓯ ᒪᓕ L c ᑕᑯᓗᕐᒐ ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪᓗ ᓇᒪᓂᖁᑕᐅᓗᑎ ᓱᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅ ᒐᕚᒪᑯᕐᒥᓗ ᐱᖁᔭᕐᒥᑎᒍ ᒪᓕᐊᓱᑎ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᑎᐊᖁᓱᐊᖁᓗ ᒥ.

ᖃᓗᐃᓕᐅᖃᑕᓂᐊᓂᕐᒥ f d ᒥᓴᓗ, ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪᓗ ᓇᒪᓂᖁᑕᐅᓱᑎ ᓱᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅ ᒐᕚᒪᑯᕐᒥᓗ ᐱᖁᔭᕐᒥᑎᒍ ᒪᓕᑎᐊᓱᑎ ᐱᑎᐊᖁᓱᐊᖁᓗ ᒥᓗ.

ᖃᓗᐃᓕᐅᖃᑕᓂᐊᓂᕐᒥ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᓱᑎ f d ᒥᓴᓗ, ᐅᓂᑲᑏᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᐅᓱᐊᓗᓕᕆᔨᑯᓗ ᑐᓂᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᑎᑎᖁᓯᒪᓗᑎ ᓯᑎᐱᑏ 22, 1977 ᐅᓂᑲᑎᐊᓯᒪᒪᑕ ᖃᓗᐃᓕᐅᖃᑕᖁᔭᓂᕐᒥ ᖁᓴᓚᓇᑐᖃᑲᓚᓂᐸ (ᓱᓗ ᐱᖃᓗᔭᖅ ᑲᓚ ᓂᐸ). ᑕᑯᐊ ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ ᐅᖃᓯᒪᓕᐳ ᑕᐃᒪᐃᓕᐅᖃᑕᓂᐊᓂᕐᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᑎᐊᑲᓂᖁᓗ J CLP ᓗ ᐱᖃᓗᔭᖅ b ᓚᓂᐸ ᖃᓗᐃᓕᐅᖃᑕᓂᐊᓂᕐᒥᓗ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᑎᐅᒥ ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐊᑎᓗᒥ ᐃᓱᒪᓇᓱᐊᖁᓗᒥ ᖃᓗᐃᓕᐅᖃᑕᓂᐊᓂᕐᒥᓗ ᑕᐃᓱᒪᓂ Ad Cc ᐸᑕ ᕿᑭᑕᓗ ᒥᓴᓂ ᐃᓗᐃ ᓗᓇᐃᓂ ᐃᑯᑕᓕᑎᓗᒥ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓱᓕᑕᐅ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᑕᐃᒪᓴᐃᓇᑕᐅ ᐱᕚᓚᐅᓯᒪᒥᒪᑕ ᐅᐊᓕᓂᐅ ᒥᓴᓂ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᑎᐅᕐᒐᓂ ᓚᐸᑐᐊ.

2.9 Monitoring & Prediction - Physical Environment

a) Weather

The need for sound weather prediction systems was recognized by both the Proponent and the technical agencies for the management of day to day operations. It was noted that the Proponent has already installed automatic weather stations at Brevoort and Resolution Island and that a meteorological/oceanographic discus buoy will be deployed this year. The Proponent has indicated that work is underway to develop a weather prediction system for the operating region.

Data derived from the Proponent's stations will be fed into the Weather Prediction Model. Consultations are underway between the Proponent and the Atmospheric Environment Service on the design of the system including the establishment of appropriate regional standards. AES agreed that a system could technically be put into place in advance of the 1979 drilling season.

b) Waves

The Proponent has acknowledged that sea state is a necessary parameter in selecting safe drilling conditions. Therefore, the Panel recommends that sea state systems including real-time monitoring accompany drilling operations. The Proponent stated that more measurements will in fact be incorporated into the discus buoy program. These measurements should permit the Proponent to develop a more accurate wave forecasting system in conjunction with weather predictions.

c) Currents

Since both winds and currents will affect iceberg movement and in view of

2.9 ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐸᓚᔭᓂᕐᒥ ᐊᒻᒪ ᓇᓚᐅᑕᐃᕙᓚᔭᓂᕐᒥ ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᓂᖓ

ᐃ) ᓯᓚ

ᖃᓄᓕᑎ ᓯᓚ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᓂᐊᕋᓗᐊᒪᖕᒐ ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍ ᑕᒪᑭᓄ ᐅᐃᑎᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᐃᑯᓄ ᐊᒻᒪ ᐃᒥᑯᓯᑎ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᖃᐅᑐᓄ ᐊᐅᓚᔭᐅᓇᓯᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᖃᐅᑕᒪ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᑎᓗᒋ. ᐅᖃᐅᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᓂᓗ ᑕᑯᐊ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᐃᑯ ᐊᕿᓯᒪᓕᓂᕋᑕᐅᓯᑎ Ard ᐊᐅᓚᒍᓇᑐᒥ ᐳᑎᕗᐊᒥ ᐊᒻᒪ ᕋᔅ ᓴᓗᓴ ᕿᑭᑕᖓᓂ ᐊᒻᒪ ᐃᒪᐅ ᖃᓄᑐ ᐊᐅᓚᖅᑕᓂᖓᓂ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᓯᑎ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑎᐅᓂᐊᑐ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᑐ ᐊᐅᓚᑎᑕᐅᓂᐊᓯᑎ ᐊᕋᒎᔪᒥ ᑕᒪᑐᒪᓂ. ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᐃᑯᓗ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᑎᓗᑎ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᓂᕋᓕᓯᑎ ᖃᓄᓕᑎ ᓯᓚ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖅᑕᓂᐊᒪᖔ ᓇᓚᐅᑕᕋᓯᐊᓂᐊᑐᒥ ᑕᒪᓂᒥᐅᑕᓄ.

ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᓗᑎ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᑐ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᐃᑯᓄ ᐊᕿᑕᐅᓯᒪᔫᓄ ᓯᓚᒧ ᖃᓄᓕᑎ ᐱᓂᐊᕋᓗᐊᒪᖔ ᐊᕿᑕᐅᓯᒪᓂᐊᓕᑐ. ᐊᐱᓯᖅᑎᕆᐸᕆᓯᒪᓕᑐ ᐃᒥᓄ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᐃᑯ ᐊᒻᒪ ᓯᓚᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑎᐅᔪ ᓇᔪᓚᓕᑎᐃᐅᔪ ᓚᕙᒪᑯᓂᖔᓯᒪᔪ ᖃᓄᓕᑎ ᐱᕙᓂᐊᕋᓗᐊᒪᖔᑕ ᐊᕿᑕᐅᕙ ᕆ ᓯᒪᔪ. ᑕᑯᐊ ᓯᓚᓯᐅᑎᓕᑎᐃᐅᔪ ᐊᖏᖅᑎᕆᓯᒪᓕᑐ ᓇᒥᓂ ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍ ᐊᕿᓯᒪᕙᕆᓂᐊᓕᓂᕋᓯᑎ 1979-r ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐊᓴᑎᓗᒋ.

D) ᒪᓕ

ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᐃᑯ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᓯᒪᕆᓗᑎᑕᐅ ᑕᑎᐅ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᓪᓚᓂᓪᓚᓂ ᓇᓚᐅᑕᑎᐊᖃᖅᑕᓯᑎ ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍ ᐃᑯᑕᕈᓇᖅᑯᒥ ᓯᕗᓂᐊᖕᒍ. CAL ᐱᔪᑎᕆᓗᒍ, ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᓯᒪᕆᕗ ᑕᑎᐅ ᖃᓄᐃᓪᓚᓂᓪᓚᓂ ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑎᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᑐᓂ ᐊᕿᓯᖅᑯᒥ ᐃᑯᑕᓕᑎᓗᒥᓗᓂ. ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᐃᑯ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᓯᒪᕗ ᖃᓄᓕᑎ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᖃᑕᓂᐊᓂᕐᒥᓂ ᑎᑎᕋᑎᐊᓯᒪᔫᓂ ᐊᕿᓯᓂᐊᑐᒍ ᐳᑕᓚᑐᑎᒍ ᐊᑐᓗᑎ. ᑕᐃᒪᓇᐃᓕᐅᓂᐊᑎᓗᒥ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᐃᑯ ᐊᕿᑎᐊᓯᒍᓇᓯᓂᐊᑐ ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍ ᓇᒪᓂᓴᐅᔪᒥ ᒪᓕ ᖃᓄᓕᑎ ᐱᖃᑕᓂᐊᕋᓗᐊᒪᓪᓚᑕ ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍ ᒪᓕᓗᑎᓗ ᓯᓚᐅ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖅᑕᓂᐊᓂᓪᓚᓂ ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍ.

ᐊ) ALD ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖓ

ᐱᔪᑎᒥᓗᓂᐅ ᑕᒪᑭᓗᒥ ᑕᒪᑯᐊ ᐊᓄᑎᐅ ᐃᒪᐅ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖓᓄ ᔪᓂᑎᑎᓂᐊᒪᑕ ᐱᖃᓗᔭᐃ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖓᓄ ᐊᒻᒪ ᐱᔪᑎᒥᓗᓂᐅᑕᐅ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒥ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖓᓄ ALD,

the variability of currents, the Panel recommends that the monitoring of surface and subsurface currents in the vicinity of the drill ships should also be undertaken on a real-time basis. Both wind-wave, and current data will also be needed for operational prediction of slick movements in the event of a blowout and to improve predictive capabilities for ice movement.

d) Icebergs

The statistical studies of iceberg occurrence, general tracks, size, and type, were described. Local residents had difficulty believing that icebergs could be towed. Nevertheless, based upon towing experience, the Proponent was confident that 50% of all icebergs in the Davis Strait could be towed or deflected away from a drill site. As a result the average frequency with which iceberg incursion is likely to delay drilling is one incident in 40 days in inshore Davis Strait. The frequency would be less for sites further offshore.

The Panel recommends that the Proponent give consideration to an iceberg prediction system in Davis Strait that will provide more reliable information on iceberg movement utilizing local real-time wind, current and sea state data.

e) Iceberg Scour

The Proponent indicated that the probability of iceberg scour is in the order of a scour within 200 feet of any given point every 30 years. The well head, including the BOP Stack, rises above the sea floor about 40 feet while drilling is under way, but after the well has been abandoned and the BOP stack removed the remaining stucture would be just under the sea floor. Studies to

C ᑯᐊᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᓯᒪᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᒐᓱᐊᓂᖏᓂ ᐃᒪᐅ ᖃᖏᓂᑐ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃᒪᐅ ᐊᑕᓂᑐ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖓ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᓂᐊᑐ ᑕᕙᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᒐᓱᐊᖃᑕᓂᐊᐳ ᑕᐃᒪᖏᓂ. ᑕᒪᑭᓂ ᐊᓄᑎᐅ, ᐃᒪᐅ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖏᓄ ᒪᓂᓄ, ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃᒪᐅ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖏᓂ ᑎᑎᕋᑎᐊᓯᒪᔪ ᑕᑯᐊᑕᐅ ᐊᑐᑕᐅᑎᐊᑎᐊ ᖃᓂᐊᒥᔪ ᐃᑯᑕᐸᓂᐊᑎᓗᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕋᓯᐊᑎᓗᒥᓗ ᐃᒪᐃ ᐅᓯᐊᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᕙᓂᐊᓂᖏᓂ ᖃᒪᑐᖄᓚᓂᐸ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐅᕙᑎᐊᕈ ᓯᕗᓂᓴᖏᒍ ᐊᖁᑎᐊᓯᒪᓂᓴᐅᒪᔭᑐ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕋᓯᐊᓂᐊ ᑎᓗᒥ ᐊᑐᑕᐅᒪᔭᑐᓂ fd ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖏᓂ.

ᐱ) ᐱᖃᓗᔭᐃ

ᑐᓴᑕᐅᓯᒪᒪᑕᑕᐅ ᐱᖃᓗᔭᐃ ᖄᖏ ᑕᒪᓂᖃᑕ ᑎᐊᖏᓂ, ᖃᓄᓗᓇᓂ ᑲᓗᐊᒪᖏᑕ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᒐᓱᐊᖃᑕᓂᖏ, ᐊᖏᑎᒥᓂᖏ ᐊᒪᓗ ᖃᓄᐃᑐᒪᑎᓂᖏ, ᐅᓂᑲᑎᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᒥᔪᑕᐅ. ᑕᒪᓂᒥᐅᑕᐃᓗ ᐅᐱᕈᓯᑎᐊᓚᐅᓯᒪᖏᒪᑕ ᐱᖃᓗᔭᐃ ᐅᓂᐊᑕᐅᒍᓇᑎᐊᖏᓂ. ᑕᐃᒪᐃᑲᓗᐊᑎᓗ J ᑕᐃᒪᐃᖃᑕᓚᐅᓂᖏ ᐅᓂᐊᖃᑕᓚᐅᓂᖏ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᕗᑯ ᑕᕙᓂ ᐅᓂᐊᕈᓇᓂᒥᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᑎᐊᓕᑐ 50% ᐅᓂᐊᑕᐅᔪᓇᑎᐊᖏᓂ ᑕᐃᕕᓪ ᓯᑐᖏᐃᒥ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐅᓂᐊᑕᐅ ᒍᓇᑎᓗᑎᐅᕙᓗᓂ ᐊᓯᐊᓄᖕᑎᑕᐅᒍᓇᓯᑎ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᔪᒥ. CAL ᐱᔪᑎᒥᓗᓂᐅ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᐅᓕᒪ CL ᑯᐊᐱᖃᓗᔭᐃᓄᖄᖑᑎᑎᑲᐃᓇᕈᓇᖏᔭᑐ ᐃᑯᑕᑐᒥ ᓱᓗ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᖏᔭᒪᑕ ᐅᕙᒃ 40ᓂ ᐅᓗᓂ ᑕᒪᓂ ᑕᐃᕕᓪ ᓯᑐᖏᐃᒥ ᐃᑯᑕᑎᓗᒥ. ᐱᖃᓗᔭᖃᖏᔭᓂᖑᓗ ᒥᑭᓂᓴᐅᒪᔭᓱᓂ ᓯᔭᐅ ᐅᖓᓯᒥᔭᖑᓂ.

ᑕᑯᐊᓗᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᑎᓗᑎ ᑕᑯᐊ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᕗᑯ ᐃᓯᒪᒪᓱᐊᖁᓗᒥᓗ ᑕᑯᐊ ᖃᓄᓚᑎ ᐱᖃᓗᔭᐃ ᖃᐃᓂᐊᖏᓗᐊᒪᖑᑕ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑎᐅᒪᔭᑐᒥ ᑕᐃᕕᓪ ᓯᑐᖏᐃᒥ ᐅᖃᑎᐊᓂᓴᐅᔪᓇᖁᓗᒥᓗ ᓇᒪᓂᓴᒥ ᐊᑲᐅᓂᓴᒥᓗ ᑐᓴᕈᑎᓴᐅᔪᓇᖏᔭᑐᒥ ᐊᐅᓚᖃᑕᓂᖏᓄ ᐱᖃᓗᔭᐃ ᑕᒪᓂ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᒪᔭᑐᒥ, ᐃᒪᐅᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖏᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ fd ᑕᑎᐅ ᐃᓚ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖏᓂᖏᓂ ᑎᑎᕋᑎᐊᓯᒪᔪᓂ.

ᐳ) ᐱᖃᓗᔭᐃ ᐃᖄᖏᓂ ᑭᓕᐅᑐᐸᓂᖏ

ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᕗᑯ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᑭᓕᐅᑐᖏᔭᑐ ᐱᖃᓗᔭᐃ ᐃᖄᖏᓂ ᐅᕙᒃ ᖃᓂᒥᒐᔭᒪᒍ 200 ᐃᑎᒐᐃ ᓇᒥᑐᐃᓇᓗᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᖁᒍᓂ ᐅᕙᒃ 30ᓂ. ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᔪ, ᐃᓚᒥᔭᐅᑎᓗ.! ᖁ ᑕᐃᓕᔪᑎ ᓴᓇᕕᐅ ᔪᓱᓗ ᐃᒪᐅᒧ ᖄᖏᓂ ᐃᒪᐅ ᐅᖓᓯᓂᖏᓂ fd ᐃᓚ ᐃᖄᖏᓂᐅᕙᒃ 40 ᐃᑎᒐᓂ ᐱᖃᖏᔭᒪ ᐃᑯᑕᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗᒥ ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᕿᒪᑕᐅᖃᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᒪᓗ ᖃᒐᑕᐃᓕᔪᑎ ᐱᑕᐅᖃᑎᓗᒥ ᑕᕙᓂ Ca ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖏᓂᖏ ᑕᐅᑐᒥᑎᑐ ᐅᑎᖏᔭᒪ ᐃᖄᖏᓂᓗ. ᖃᐅᔨᓴᖃᑕᓚᐅᓯLLC ᓯᕗᓂᖏᑎ J

date have indicated that sea floor scours have been found in water depths ranging to 1200 feet. With the majority of proposed well locations in deep water, the Proponent does not propose to take any steps to place the cap deeper beneath the sea floor. Abandonment of drilling operation will be conducted in accordance with the oil and gas regulations.

The Panel agrees that the probability of damage by ice is remote and therefore agrees that steps to lower the well head below the sea floor are presently not required. This matter should be left to the judgement of the regulatory agencies involved. However, it should be recognized that the probability of ice scour will increase in shallower waters and that each drilling site will require an evaluation based upon thorough knowledge of the historical ice scour in the area to determine what protective action need be taken.

f) <u>Ice Prediction Systems</u>

The Panel endorses the Proponent's intentions to introduce pack-ice prediction system to ensure same season relief capability.

g) <u>Earthquakes and Sediment s Slumping</u>

The seismic loading (earthquake potential) in the proposed area has been estimated to be 3 to 4 percent of gravity. The Proponent stated that the well head equipment is designed to withstand forces in excess of this figure. It was indicated by Energy Mines and Resources that sedimentation rates in the Davis Strait region are low and therefore there is little potential for slumping (sea-bed mud slides). Nevertheless, the Proponent noted that site-specific sea bed studies are conducted to ensure that the well head is not placed in a location having a

ᖃᐅᔨᒪᓕᓯᑎᓗ ᑕᕙᓂ ᐃᖃᖓᒍ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᑭᓕᐅᑐᐸᓂᖏ ᐅᕙᖓ ᐃᑎᓂᖃᕋᔭᒪ 1200 Anbu ᐃᖃᖓᓄ. ᑕᒪᑭᑲᓴᓗᒥ ᓱᓗ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᒍᒪᔪ ᐃᑎᔪᒥ, ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯ ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐊᖏᓂᕋᑐ ᐃᑎᓂᓴᖓᓂ ᐃᖃᐅ ᐊᑕᓂ ᐃᒪᔪᐊ. ᖏᒪᑕᐅᓕᐸᑕᓗ Cda ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᔪ ᒪᓕᒐᔭᑐ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓯᐅᑎ ᖏᓴ ᓯᓯᐅᑐᓗ ᐱᖁᔭᖏᑎ J ᒪᓕᓗᑎ.

ᓇᓕᑎᐅᔪᓗ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒥ ᓚᐅᑐ ᑕᕙᓂ a ᑲᐅᖏᑐᒧ ᐱᔭᐅᒐᔭᑐ ᓯᑯᒧ ᐱᔭᐅᒐᔭᑐ ᒥᑭᑐᕈᓗᒪ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐊᖏᖃᑎᒥᓂᖓ ᐱᔪᑎᒥᓯᓂᐅ ᑕᐅᓄᖓ ᐃᑎᓂᓴᑲᓂᒧ ᒪᑐᒐᔭᑕᖓ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᔪ ᐃᖃᖓᑕ ᐊᑕᓄ ᒪᓇ ᐃᓯᒪᒋᔭᐅᖏᒪ. ᑕᒪᓇ ᐱᔪᑎᒥᓗᓂᐅ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᓴᐅᔪ ᐱᖁᔭᓕᑎᔨᐅᔪᓄ ᑲᒪᔨᐅᔪᓄ. ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᑕᕙ, ᐅᔨᑎᔭᐅᔭᑎᐊᖃᐳ ᑕᕙᓂ ᓯᑯ ᐊᑕᓄ ᑭᓕᐅᑐᕋᔭᑐ ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᐃᑲᓂᓴᒥᑲᔭᒪ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃᒥᑯᓯᑎ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᒐᔭᑐ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑎᐊᑎᐊᖃᕋᔭᒪᑕ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑕᒪᓇ ᓇᔪᒐ ᐅᔪ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᒐᓯᐊᑐ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᑎᐊᑕᐅᔭᑎᐊᖃᕋᔭᒪ ᐸᐃᑎᔭᐅᓇᓯᐊᓗᓂᓗ ᖃᓄᓕᑎᓗ ᐱᖃᓗᔭᖃᖃᑕᓚᐅᓂᖓ Lc-CD ᒥᐊᖃᕋᔭᒪ.

<) <u>ᓇᓚᐅᑕᐃᕙᓂᖏ ᖃᓄ ᓯᑯ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᕙᒐᔭᓂᖓᓂ</u>

ᐃᑲᔪᓯᐳ Cda ᓇᓚᓚᐅᑐ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓯᐅᑎ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕈᒪᓂᖏᓅ ᐃᒪᓇ ᒪᑯᐊ ᓯᑯᐃ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖃᑕᓂᐊᖁᔭ ᒪᖓᑕ ᑕᓯᒥᖓᓴᐃᓇᑕᐅ ᐊᕋ ᒍᔪᒥ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᖃᑕᓚᐅᓂᖏᓂ A ᑲᔪᓯᕈᓇᑐᒥ Ad ᑕᕈᓇᖁᓗᒥ ᐊᓯᖓᓂᑕᐅ.

ᑎ) <u>ᓄᓇᐅᑉ ᐊᐅᓚᑲᓚᕙᓂᖓ ᖁᐊᓴᓇᑐᓄᓗ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᖓᓂᑐ ᒪᓗ</u>

ᓄᓇᐅ ᐊᐅᓚᑲᓚᒐᔭᓂᖓ ᑕᑯᑎᒍᓇ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅ J ᒪᔪᒧᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᓯᒪᓕᒥᔪᑕᐅ. ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪᑎ J ᓗ ᐅᐱᕈᓯᐳ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯ '-_; a ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᓂᐊᑐ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕈᑎᒥᓂᐊᑕᖏ ᓴᓇᔪᑎᒥᓂᐊᑕᖏ ᐊᖏᓂᓴᐅᒥᐊᖓᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪᑎ J ᐱᔪᓇᓂᖏᑎ J. ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒥᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯ ᓂᓗ ᑕᑯᓄᖓᑲᓇᑕᐅ ᒐᕙᒪᑯᖏᓂᖏᖓᓯᒪᓯᔪᓄ ᓄᕿᓕᑎᔨᐅᔪᓄ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓴᓇᕙᓕᐊᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᓄ ᐃᒪᐅ ᐃᖃᖓᓂᑐ ᑕᐃᕕᓴ ᓯᑐᕋ AI- ᐅᓇᓂᐊᓗᒪᑕ ᐊᒪᓗ r ᕿᑐᕈᓗᓯᓂ ᐃᖃᖓᓂᑐ ᒪᓗᐃ ᐊᐅᓚᕙᓕᐊᓯᒪᔪᕕᓂ. ᑕᐃᒪᐃᑲᓗᐊᑎᓗ J, ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᑎᕗ ᐃᒥᑯᓯᑎ Cda ᐃᖃᖓᓂᑐ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᖃᑕᓯᒪᓕᓂᖏᓂ ᒪᓗ ᒧ ᓴᐅᔭᐅᖁᓇᖏ.

potential for slumping.

2.10 Contingency Plan

In considering containment and physical recovery of oil with existing equipment, the Proponent stated four foot significant wave heights represented the present day limit for effective operations with no break through in technology envisaged. With present day equipment it was indicated that up to 20% of any spilled oil might be recovered from calm waters, with a further 50% dissipated by evaporation. In rougher water conditions mechanical containment and recovery could be impossible but the increased wave energy would cause the slick to break up and disperse into the water column. To supplement the capacity and availability of equipment, the need for inter-industry mutual aid programs was noted.

The Proponent has indicated that the contingency plan will be in place by the end of 1978 or six months prior to the commencement of drilling in accordance with the drilling program approval requirements. This plan will have the benefit of the results of the additional 1978 studies and must meet the standards of the responsible regulatory agency.

Clearly identified at the Frobisher Bay hearing was the need for a Government Contingency Plan similar in nature to the Beaufort Sea Government Contingency Plan which would delineate the response of all government agencies when oil spills occur in the Davis Strait area. In the Davis Strait Government Contingency Plan there is a need to clarify authorities on such matters as approval for use of dispersants, authorities south of 60º, and authorities necessary for entrance into Greenland waters. The Government Plan must be completed before the drilling program commences and should be co-ordinated with the Proponent's

2.10 ᐸᐃᑎᓇᓯᐊᕈᓇᕋᔭᓂᖏ

ᐃᓯᒪᒋᔭᐅᓇᓯᐊᑎᓗᒋ ᑕᒪᑯᐊ ᐸᐃᑎᔭᐅᓇᓯᐊᑎ ᓗᒍᓗ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐅᓯᐊᓗ ᑯᕕᓯᒪᔪ ᐱᑕᐅᓇᓯᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᑐᓗᑎ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒥ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕈᑎᒋᔭᒥᓄ, ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᕘᑯ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᑐ ᓯᑕᒪᓂ ᐃᑎᒐᓂ ᒪᓕᓂ ᐳᑐᓂᖅᑲᑐᓂ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒥ ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᓴᓗᒪᓴᑕᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᒪᑕ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕈᑎᒋᔭᑎ ᐅᓗᒥᐅᔪᒥ ᐊᑐᑎᓗᒍ. ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒥ ᐅᓗᒥᐅᔪᒥ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕈᑎᒋᖅᑕᑕᖏ ᐊᑐᑎᓗᒋ ᐅᕝᕙ 20%.ᒥᒃ ᑯᕕᓯᒪᔪ ᐅᓯᐊᓗ ᐱᔭᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᑐ ᐊᖁᓇᑎᓇᒍ, ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᐅᕝᕙ 50%. ᓯᓚᐃᓇᓘ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᓕᑐᐃᓇᕋᔭᒪ ᐅᓯᐊᓗ ᑕᒪᓇ. ᐊᖁᓇᑎᓗᒍᓕ ᑕᕝᕙ ᓴᓗᒪᓴᑕᐅᓚᓯᐊᕋᔭᓂᓪᓚ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᔭᐅᓚᓯᐊᕋᔭᓂᓪᓚ ᐅᓯᐊᓗ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐊᔪᓇᑲᓴᒪ ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᐳᑐᓯᕚᓕᑎᓗᒋ ᒪᓕ ᓯᖁᑎᑎᓯᓚᔭᒪᑕ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᒥ ᑯᕕᓯᒪᔪᒥ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᓕᓗᓂᓗ ᒪᒧ. ᐱᔪᓇᓂᖏ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖅᑎᐊᕈᓇᓂᖏ, ᑕᑯᐊ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓯᐅᑎ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖅᑎᖅᑎᐊᖏ ᐅᖅᑐᑎᒋᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪ ᕗ.

ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᕘᑯᓗ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᓯᑎ ᐸᐃᑎᓇᓯᐊᕈᓇᓂᐊᓂᒥᓂ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᓪᓚᓗᑎ ᑐᓂᔭᐅᓂᐊᑐᒍ ᓄᓪᓕᑎᓗᒍ 1978 ᐅᕝᕙᓗᓂ ᑕᕿᓯᐅᑎᓂ 6-ᓂ ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍ ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐊᓴᑎᓗᒋ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍ ᑕᐃᒪᐃᓕᓯᒪᒪ ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐊᓴᑎᓗᒋ. ᑕᐃᒪᐃᓕᐅᓂᐊᓂᖏ ᐃᑲᔪᓯᒪᑎᒪᑕ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᓂᐊᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ 1978-ᒧ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᒋ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᖁᔭᓕᐅᑎᓄ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᓕᕋᔭᓯᓂ.

ᑐᓴᑕᐅᑎᐊᓚᐅᓯᒪᒪ ᐃᖃᓗᓂ ᑲᑎᒪᕕᔪᐊᑎᓗᒋ ᑕᑯᐊ ᓚᕝᕙᒪᑯ ᐃᒥᑯᑐᒥᑕᐅ ᐸᐃᑎᕗᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᑐᒥ ᐱᖁᔭᓕᐅᖁᔭᐅᓗᑎ ᐊᕗᑲᓴᑎᔭᓪᓚᓂ ᐅᐊᓕᓂᐅ ᑕᑎᐅᓪᓚᓂ ᓚᕝᕙᒪᑯ ᐸᐃᑎᓇᓯᐊᓯᑎ ᐊᕿᓯᒫᕝᕙᒋᑕᓪᓚᓂ ᑕᑯᐊ ᓚᕝᕙᒪᑯ ᑲᒪᓪᓚᓕᖁᓇᒋ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᒥ ᑯᕕᔪᖅᑲᑲᓚᓂᐸ ᑕᐃᕖᔅ ᓯᑐᕋᐃᒥ. ᑕᕝᕙᓂᓗ ᑕᐃᕖᔅ ᓯᑐᕋᐃ ᐸᐃᑎᕗᐅᓚᓯᐊᓂᐊᑐ ᐅᖅᑎᐊᒪᑎᓯᒪᒋᐊᖅᑲᒪᑕ ᑲᒪᕗᐅᓚᔭᑐ ᐊᕐᒋᕋᔭᑐᓗᓂ ᐅᐊᓴᐅᑎᓂ ᐊᑐᕈᓇᖁᓗᒋ, ᐊᓪᓚᔪᖅᑲᕐᒍᔪᓗ ᖃᓗᓇ ᓄᓇᓪᓚᓂᒥᐅᑕᐃ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᓪᓚᔪᖅᑲᕐᒍᓂᓴᐃ ᒥᓴᓄᓪᓚᔪ ᐊᑯᑭᑐ ᐃᒪᔪᐊᓪᓚᓄ. ᓚᕝᕙᒪᑯᓄ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪ ᐱᔭᑎᑕᐅᔭᑎᐊᖅᑲᓂᐊᒪᑕ ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐊᓴᑎᓗᒋ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᓪᓚᔪᖅᑲᕐᒍᓂᓴᐃ ᒥᓴᓄᓪᓚᔪ ᐊᑯᑭᑐ ᐃᒪᔪᐊᓪᓚᓂ. ᓚᕝᕙᒪᑯ ᒥᓴᓄᓪᓚᔪ ᐱᔭᑎᑕᐅᔭᑎᐊᖅᑲᓂᐊᒪᑕ ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐊᓴᑎᓗᒋ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᔭᑎᐊᖅᑲᓂᐊᓯᓂ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᕘᑯ ᐸᐃᑎᔪᓇᑕᕐᒥᑎᒍᒋᐊᖅᑲᓂᐊᓯᓂ.

contingency plan.

Recognizing that the Davis Strait region is ice covered for a large part of the year, the Panel stresses the need for same season relief well capability. Dynamically positioned vessels have the capability to move off site in the event of a blowout and can return to drill the relief well. The Proponent therefore stated that a standby drilling vessel was not required. The Proponent indicated some questions require resolution with respect to location of a substitute marine riser and a blowout preventer (BOP) to allow for relief well drilling. The Panel recommends that identification of a back up drilling vesel and the ready availability of substitute relief well equipment should be included in the Proponent's contingency plans. Further biological information required for contingency planning purposes is addressed in other sections of the report.

ᐅᔨᕆᔭᐅᓂᖓ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅ ᑕᐃᕕᔅ ᓯᑐᕋᐃ ᒥᔅᓂ ᐊᕋᒍᑕᔅᑲᔅᑎᐊ, ᓇᓕᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᕗ A b ᔪᓯᕈᓇᕋᔭᑐᒥᑕᐅ ᐊᓯᐊᒍᒡᒐᑕᐅ ᖃᒐᑐᖅᑲᖅᑲᓚᓂᐸ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᒡᒐᓕᕈᓇᕋᔭᑐᒥ. ᑭᔅᓯᒪᓗᑎ ᐅᒥᐊᔪᐊ ᓄᑐᓇᒪᑕ ᖃᑐᖅᑲᓚᓂᐸ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐅᑎᑲᓂᕈᓇᕋᔭᓯᑎ ᐊᓯᒡᒐᒡᒐᓂᑕᐅ ᐃᑲᔪᕈᓇᕋᔭᑐᒥ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᑐᒥ. ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯᓗ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᓯᒪᒥᔪ ᑕᓇ ᐱᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅ ᐊᓯᒡᒐᒡᒐᑕᐅ ᐃᑲᔪᕈᓇᕋᔭᒥᔪ ᐅᒥᐊᔪᐊ ᑕᒪᓂᒋᐊᖅᑲᔭᕐᒋᑐ. ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯᓗ ᐊᐱᕆᓚᐅᕆᕗ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᓯᑎᓗ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᓯᓂ ᓇᒥᒐᔭᓂᒡᒐ ᐅᒥᐊᔪ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᒥᔪᑕᐅ ᐊᒪᓗᑕᐅ ᖃᒐᑕᐃᓕᔪᑕᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᒥᔪ ᐊᓯᒡᒐᒡᒐᓂ ᐃᑲᔪᓯᕈᓇᑐᒥ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᖅᑲᓕᕈᓇᖅᑯᓗᒍ. ᓇᓕᑎᐅᔪᓗ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᓯᒪᒥᔪ ᐅᖃᐅᔨᖅᑯᓗᒋ ᑕᐃᓯᖅᑯᓗᒋᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᓯᕈᓇᕋᔭᑐᒥ ᐅᒥᐊᔪᐊᒥᑕᐅ ᐃᑯᑕᕈᓇᕋᔭᑐᒥ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐱᔭᐅᑲᐅᑎᒋᔪᓇᕋᔭᑐᒥ ᐊᓯᒡᒐᒡᒐᓂᑕᐅ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᑐᒥ ᐃᑯᑕᕈᑕᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᑐᒥᓗ ᐃᑯᑕᕈᑕᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᑐᒥᓗ ᐃᓕᒋᔭᐅᖅᑯᓗᒍ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓯᐅᑎ ᐸᐃᕆᓇᓯᐊᓂᐊᑎᓗᒋ ᓴᓗᒪᓴᐃᑲᐅᑐᕋᓯᐊᓂᐊᑎᓗᒋᓗᓂ ᓯᕗᓂᓴᒡᒐᒍ. ᐊᒪᓯᓕᑕᐅ ᐅᒪᔪᐃ ᒥᓴᓄ ᐱᔭᐅᒋᐊᖅᑲᑲᓂᒪᑕᑕᐅ ᐸᐃᕆᓇᓯᐊᓂᐊᑎᓗᒋ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᒪᑎᓂᐊᑎᓗᒋ ᑕᑯᑎᒍᓇᑕᐅ ᐊᓯᒡᒐᒡᒐᑎᒍ ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᒋᓗᑎ.

2.11 Compensation & Liability

2.11 ᐊᑭᓕᒐᔭᓂᕐᒋ ᐱᓗᐊᖁᑲᓚᓂᐸᑕ

Concern for the loss of food and livelihood as a result of an oil spill was expressed in every community in which the Panel held hearings. The Proponent assured the residents that they would be compensated in full should they incur losses. The Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act provides liability for damages and clean-up costs (in that order) in an amount up to $10 million per well. This liability becomes effective at the time the authorities are issued.

ᐱᒋᒐᓂᕐᒋ ᓂᖃᐃᕈᑎᓂᐊᓂᒥᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐅᒪᒍᓂᕋᔭᓂᒥᓂ ᑯᕕᔪᖅᑲᓚᓂᐸ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᒥ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᓚᐅᒪ ᑕᒪᑭᑎᐊᓂ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐᓕᒪᓂ ᓇᓚᕕᐅᔪᓕᒪᓂᓇᓕᑎᐅᔪᓄ C ᑯᓄᒐ. ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨ ᑯᓗ ᐅᖃᐅᔨᓚᐅᓯᑎ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐᓂ ᐊᓯᒡᒐᒡᒐᓂᒍ ᑐᓂᔭᐅ ᒍᓇᕋᔭᒪᑕ ᑭᓯᓕᒪᓂ ᐊᓯᐅᔨᔭᕐᒋᓂ. ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑕᐅ ᐱᖁᔭᕐᒋᑎᒍᑐ ᐃᓄᐃ ᓄᓇᕐᒋᓂ ᑕᑎᐅᒡᒐᓂ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᓯᑎ ᓯᕈᔪᑎᑎᔪᖃᓂᐸ ᑲᒪᔨᐅᒐᔭᒪᑕ ᓴᓗᒪᓴᐃᑭᐊᖅᑲᕋᔭᓯᑎᓗ ᐅᕙᖅ ᑎᑭᓯᒍ 10-ᒥᓕᐊ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᔪᒥ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᒥ. ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᐃᑲᔪᓯᑎᐊᕈᓇᕋᔭᕗ ᐃᑯᑕᕈᓇᓯᑐᐊᐸᑕ.

The Panel in recognition of the requests of the residents asks that the responsible regulatory agency specifically ensure that the matter of liability is properly addressed with the Proponent at the time of acceptance of the drilling program. Consideration should also be given to increasing the amount of liability, if upon examination,

ᓇᓕᑎᓗ ᑭᐅᔪᑎᒋᓗᓂᔪ ᐊᐱᖁᑎᒋᔭᐅᓚᐅᑐᓄ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐᓄ cda ᓇᓕᑎ ᐊᐱᑎᒪᐅᕗ ᑲᒪᔨᐅᓂᐊᑐ ᐱᖁᔭᐃ ᒥᔅᓄᒡᒐᔪᓂ ᐊᖏᓯᑎᐊᖁᓗᕆ ᐊᑭᓕᕋᒐᔭᓂᕐᒋᓂ ᐱᓗᐊᖏᔪᖅᑲᑲᓚᓂᐸ ᑐᔅᑎᑕᐅᑎᐊᖁᓗᒋᓗ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯᓄ cda ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯ ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐊᔅᑎᓗᕆ ᐃᑯᑕᕈᓇᓯᑎᑕᐅᔅᑎᓗᕆ. ᐃᓯᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᔅᐅᒋᕗᑕᐅ ᐊᓯᒡᒐᒡᒐ ᑕᑯᐊ ᐊᕐᒋᓂᔅᒥᑕᐅ ᐊᑭᓕᕋᒐᔭᓂᕐᒋ ᐱᓗᐊᖏᔪᖅᑲᑲᓚᓂᐸ, ᒪᓇᐅᔪᑎᒍ ᐱᖁᔭᕐᒋᑎᒍ ᒥᑭᓗᐊᖁᔨᒐᔭᐸ ᐃᑲᔪᓯᕕᐅᒡᒐᕋᔭᑐ ᐊᕐᒋᓗᐊᑐᐊᓗᐸᓗᓂ

the present regulatory level for compensation is not commensurate with the present day values of potential losses. In addition the Panel recommends that a mechanism is required to compensate affected people south of 60° as well as residents of Greenland.

ᐊᓯᐅᕈᒪᔭᑕᕐᕆ ᐊᑭᓕᕙᒐᔭᓂᕐᕆ ᐱᓗᐊᖅᑭᔪᖅᑲᑲᓚᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᕐᕆᓗᐊᑐᐊᓗᒥ ᐱᓗᐊᖅᑭᔪᖅᑲᑲᓚᓂᐸ. ᐊᒪᓯᓕᑕᐅ ᑕᑯᐊ ᓇᓕᑎᐅᔪ ᐅᖃᓕᐅᑎᓗᑎ ᐊᖅᑭᓯᔪᖅᑲᑎᐊᖅᑲᑐᑕᐅᕈ ᐊᓯᕐᓚᕐᓚᓂ ᐃᑲᔪᓯᕈᓇᖁᔭᑐᒥ ᐊᑭᓕᕙᒐᔭᑐᓂ ᐱᓗᐊᖅᑭᔪᖅᑲᑲᓚᓂᐸ ᖃᓗᓇ ᖁᓇᕐᓚᓂᒥᐅᑕᓂ ᐊᒪᓯᓕᑕᐅ ᐊᑯᑭᑐᒥᐅᑕᐅᔪᓂ.

2.12 Energy Policy, Tax Incentives, and Exnloration Permits

2.12 ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍ ᖁᑭᐅ ᒥᓴᖁ, ᑖᒃᓴ ᐊᑭᓕᑕᐅᕙᒐᔭᓂᕐᕆ ᐊᒪᓗ ᕿᓂᕈᓇᕈᑎᐅᔪ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᕈᑯᖁ ᒪᕙᒪᑯᓂᕐᓚᓯᒪᔪ

The Panel has noted the national energy policy, respecting "need to know" of Canada's frontier energy resources. The Panel has also noted the special investment tax credit incentives under the Canada Income Tax Act which apply up to July, 1980. The proposed drilling program is in direct response to these government policies. Furthermore, the exploration permit arrangements for the acreage in question (secured by performance deposit) are due to expire variously in the period 1981-1983. As a result, the Proponent is pursuing the aquisition of environmental approvals with considerable urgency.

ᓇᓕᑎᓗ ᐅᕈᑎᓯᒪᓗᑎ ᑲᓇᑕᓕᒪᒥ ᖁᑭᓂ ᐊᑐᒐᓴᐅᒐᔭᑐᓂ, ᐱᔪᑎᖅᑲᓯᑎ ᖃᐅᕈᒪᔭᑎᐊᖅᑲᓂ ᖃᖁᓕᑎ ᑲᓇᑕᐅ ᐃᖁᖅᑲᓗᐊᕐᕆᓂᕐᓚ ᖁᑭᒧ ᐊᑐᑕᐅᑲᓂᕋᔭᑐᖁ. ᓇᓕᒥᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪ CdaCD ᐅᕈᑎᓕᐅᑎᓗᑎ CdaCD ᐃᒥᑯᓯᑎ ᑖᒃᓴ ᑯᑦ ᖃᖁᓕᑎ ᐊᑭᓕᒥᐊᖅᑲᖅᑲᑕᕋᔭᓂᕐᕆ ᒪᓕᓯᑎ ᑲᓇᑕᓕᒪᒥᐅ ᐱᖁᔭᕐᕆᑎᒍ ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᔪ ᐊᑐᑕᐅᒍᓇᓯᓂᓗ ᑎᑭᓯᒍ ᔪᓚᐃ 1980. ᐃᑯᑕᕈᑕᐅᔪᒪᔪᓗ ᒪᓕᑎᐊᒪ ᑭᐅᑎᐊᓯᓂᓗ ᒪᕙᒪᑎᒍ ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᓯᒪᔪ. ᐊᒪᓯᓕᑲᓂᑕᐅ, ᕿᓂᕈᓇᕈᑎ ᖃᖁᐃᓕᕐᓚᓂᕐᕆ ᑕᑯᖁᕐᓚ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᔪᒪᔪᒍ (ᓇᓗᓇᕈᓇᐃᑎᑕᐅᓯᕐᒍᒪ ᐃᑯᑕᓚᑎᓕᕋᕐᓚᑕ) ᐃᓯᓕᓂᐅᔭᓕᒪᑕ Cda 1981-1983. ᑕᓇ ᐱᔪᑎᒥᓗᓂᐅ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᕈᑯ ᑐᐊᕕᕈᑎᒥᒪᔪ ᐊᕐᕆᑕᐅᔪᒪᓂᒥᓂ.

Taxation incentives in particular have encouraged the Proponent to perform within a time frame that is inconsistent with the comprehensive environmental studies and impact analysis being done. As a result, information deficiencies have had to be rectified subsequent to the preparation of the EIS in order to obtain a timely environmental clearance. In this case the new information has not altered the Proponent's assessment but it does place the public, the intervener, and the Panel in the disadvantageous position of not having the completed report for review.

ᐃᒥᑯᓕᕐᓚᔪᓂᑕᐅ ᑖᒃ ᓴ ᓂ ᐊᑭᓕᒥᐊᖅᑲᖅᑲᑕᕋᒥ ᑕᑯᐊ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᕈᑯ ᖃᖁᓕᑎᓗ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᐊᓂᕐᓚᓂ ᒪᓕᒥᐊᖅᑲᓯᑎ ᒪᓕᓯᑎᓗ ᐊᑐᓯᑎᓗ ᓇᔪᒪᐅᔪᒥ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᔪᒥ ᖃᐅᕈᓴᑕᐅᓂᕐᓚᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓯᓂᑎᑎᒪᔭᑐᒥ ᐱᕙᓕᐊᓂᕐᓚᓂ. CAL ᐱᔪᑎᒥᓗᓂᐅ, ᑐᓴᕈᑎ ᑕᒪᑯᐊ ᖃᐅᕈᒪᔭᐅᑎᐊᕐᕆᑐ ᓯᓕ ᑲᑎᓯᑕᐅ ᒥ ᐊᖅᑲᒪᑕ ᐊᖅᑭᓯᑕᐅᔭᑎᐊᖅᑲᓯᑎᓗ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᕈᐅᔪ ᑲᓇᑕᐅ ᒪᕙᒪᑯᕐᕆᓂᕐᓚᓯᒪᔪ ᑐᓴᕈᓇᖅᑯᓗᒥ ᐱᔪᓇᖅᑯᓗᒥᓗ ᐊᕐᕆᕈᓇᖅᑯᓗᒥᓗ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᔪ ᑕᓯᒪ ᒥᓴᖁ ᐱᓗᒍ. ᑕᐃᒪᐃᑎᓗᒍ ᖁᑕ ᑐᓴᕈᑎᓴᐅᒪᔭᑐ ᓯᓂᑎᑎᕐᕆᒪ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᕈᑯ ᖃᐅᕈᓴᓂᐊᑕᕐᕆᖁ ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᑭᓇᑯᓕᒪᑎᐊᖁ, ᐃᑯᑕᖅᑯᕈᕐᕆᑐᖁ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓇᓕᑎᐅᔪᖁ ᐅᐸᓗᐃᓗᐊᑎᑎᒪ ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍ ᑕᑯᖁᕐᓚ ᑎᑎᕋᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᓂ ᐃᓕᓂᐊᕈᓇᕐᕆᒪᑕ ᖃᐅᕈᓴᕈᓇᕋᑎᓗ.

2.13 Employment

2.13 ᖃᓇᐃᔭᒐᓴᐃ ᓯᓴᖁ

The Proponent mentioned that of the 150 jobs necessary to operate a drilling platform, 20 to 40 would be available to the local residents. As personnel acquire additional skills through

ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᕈᑯᓗ ᐅᖃᓕᐅᓯᑎ ᑕᑯᑎᒍᓇ 15 0ᓂ ᐃᖅᑲᓇᐃᔭᑎᖅᑲᑎᐊᖅᑲᕋᔭᒪᑕ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᕐᓚᖁ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᔪᑕᓇ 20 ᑎᑭᓯᒍ 40 ᐃᖅᑲᓇᐃᔭᑎᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᑐ ᑕᒪᓂᒥᐅᑕ ᖁᓇᖅᑲᑎᒥᑐ. ᐃᖅᑲᓇᐃᔭᑎᓴᑕᑎᐊᖅᑲᖅᑲᑕᒪᑕᑕᐅ

on-the-job training, more jobs would become available. Employment of local residents had been done in the past to assist the proponents with their environmental studies.

At the community hearings, the residents expressed a desire for meaningful, long-term positions with on-the-job training. Some also expressed concern over language needs as many of the jobs demanded a good working ability in a common language. As indicated earlier by the Proponent, such needs would be based on factors such as ship and crew safety. The Proponent also pointed out that failure on their part to discover oil or gas would lead to curtailment of the drilling program in as little as two years. This would of course affect the viability of any long term or permanent employment for local residents.

2.14 Public Information bv Proponents

Although most of the residents in the communities were happy with the Proponent's visits to the settlements in order to explain the proposed project, many felt that a continued public information should be pursued.

The Proponent indicated that this would be done and mentioned that some workers employed for the drilling operation would be hired from the communities. These workers could keep communities informed of drilling operations.

The Panel appreciated the concern expressed by the communities for more in-depth project information and public participation by the Proponent and thus encourages the Proponent to continue its communication with the related communities. Special attention should be given to advising the communities of oil spill contingency plans in an effort to

ᐅᕙᑎᐊᕈᕐᒍᖅᑲᑎᓗᒍ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᖅᑲᐅᑎᐊᑐᓂ ᐃᓕᓂᐊᑕᐅᕙᓕᐊᓗᑎ ᐱᔭᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᑐ, ᑕᕙᓕ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᒐᓴᐃ ᐊᒥᑐᓂᓴᐅᒐᔭᒪᑕ. ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖅᑎᑕᐅᖅᑕᓯᒪᓕᒪᑕ ᑕᒪᓂᒥᐅᑕᐃ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᕆᔩᑯ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕙᓕᐊᑎᓗᒋ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᕗᒥ.

ᓄᓇᖅᑎᒋᑐᓂᓗ ᑲᑎᒪᑎᓗᒋ, ᐅᖃᓚᐅᓯᒪᒪᑕ ᓄᓇᖅᑎ ᒋᑐ ᐊᑐᓇᓂᓴᒥ, ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓂᓴᒥᓗ ᑭ ᑕᕈᓗᕐᒋᑐ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕙᓕᐊᓗᑎ ᐃᓕᓂᐊᕙᓕᐊᓗᑎᓗ ᐱᕗᒪᓗᑎ. ᐃᓚᕐᒋᓗ ᐅᖅᑲᓂᓚᐅᑏᓗᑎᑕᐅ ᐅᖃᐅᓯᐅ ᒥᓴᓄ ᐊᒥᓯᐃᓗ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᐅᓂᐊᑐ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᒥ P ᓯᐊᓂ ᐅᖃᐅᓯᖅᑏᐊᖃᓂᐊᒪᑕ. ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᑎᐊᕈᓇᖁᓗᒋ. ᓯᓗ ᑕᑯᑎᒍᓇ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᖅᑲᐅᔭᑎᒍ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᏂᕗᑯ, ᑕᐃᒪᓇᐃᒋᐊᖅᑲᕋᔭᒪᑕ ᐱᓗᐊᕿᕙᖅᑯᓇᒍ ᐅᒥᐊᕙᐊᒥ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᑎᐅᕙᓄ ᐱᓗᐊᕿᕙᖅᑕᐃᓕᓇᓯᐊᓂᒎ. ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᏂᕗ d CD ᐅᖅᖃᓂᓚ ᐅᏂᓗᑎ ᓇᓂᓯᕐᒋᓂᕈᑎ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᒥ ᐅᕙᓗᓂ ᓖᓯᓴᒥ ᓄᖅᑲᕋᔭᒪᑕ Ad ᑕᕈᓂᓗᑎ ᐅᕙᒃ ᐊᕋ Ju ᒪᕈᓂ . ᑕᒪᓇᓗ ᐱᕙᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅ ᓯᖃᐃᒪ ᐊᑯᓂᓗᐊᕋᓗ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᑐᖅᑲᕈᓇᕋᔭᕐᒋᒪ ᐅᕙᓗᓂ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᐃᓇᑐᖅᑲᕈᓇᕋᔭᕐᒋᒪ ᑕᒪᓂᒥᐅᑕᓄ.

2.14. ᑐᓴᑎᑕᐅᕙᒐᔭᓂᕐᒋ ᑭᑯᐃᓇᐃ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᏂᕗᑯᓄ

ᑕᐃᒪᐃᑲᓗᐊᑎᓗᒍ ᑕᒪᑭᑲᓴᑎᐊᑐ ᑕᒪᓂᒥᐅᑕᐃ ᓄᓇᖅᑎᒥ ᑐᓂ ᖁᐱᐊᓯᓚᐅᕋᓗᐊᓂᕐᒋᓂ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᏂᕗᑯᓄ ᐳᓚᏂᐊᕐᒋᓂ ᐅᓂᑲᏂᐊᑐᓯᒪᕗᓂ ᓄᓇᖅᑎᒥ ᓄ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕈᒪᓂᒥᓂ ᐊᒥᓱᓗ ᐃᓯᒪᓚᐅᐳ ᓄᖅᑲᔪᕐᒋᑐᒥ ᑐᓴᒐ ᓴᓂ ᐊᖏᓯᖁᕗᓗᑎ.

ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᏂᕗᑯ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᑐ ᑕᐃᒪᐃᓂᐊᓂᕋᓯᑎ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐅᖃᑲᓂᓯᑎ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᑎ ᐃᓚᕐᒋ ᑕᕙᓂ ᐃᑯᑕᑎᐅᕗ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᑎᑕᑕᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᒪᑕ ᓄᓇᖅᑎᒋᓛᑐᓂ. ᑕᑯᐊᓗ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᑎᐅᕗ ᓄᓇᖅᑎᒥᑐᓂᓛᓯᒪᕗ ᑐᓴᑎᑎᖅᑕᕈᓇᕋᔭᒪᑕ ᖃᓄᓚᑎ ᐃᑯᑕᖅᑕᓂᒥᓂ.

ᓇᓚᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᕗᓗ ᖁᔭᓇᒥᓚᐅᑐ ᑕᑯᐊ ᐅᖅᑲᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᕗᓂ ᓄᓇᖅᑎᒥᒥᐅᑕᓄ ᑐᓴᑲᓂᕈᑎᓴᓂᓗ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑭᑯᓕᒪᑎᐊᓂ ᐃᓚᐅᖁᔨᓕᓯᑎ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᏂᕗᑯᓄ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑕᓇ ᐱᕙᑎᒋᓗᓂᐅ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᏂᕗᑯ ᓄᖅᑯᔭᐅᓇᑎ ᑐᓴᑎᑎᖅᑕᓂᕐᒋ ᓄᓇᖅᑎᒋᑐᓂ. ᐃᒥᑯᓕᓛᓗᓂᑕᐅ ᑐᓴᑎᑕᐅᒋᐊᖅᑲᒪᑎᑐ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᔭᐅᖅᑕᓂᕐᒋ ᓄᓇᖅᑎᒋᑐ ᖃᓄᓚᕿ

improve their understanding of potential impacts.

2.15 Land Claims

This issue was not directly raised at the community hearings but was addressed specifically at Frobisher Bay by representatives from the Baffin Region Inuit Association and the Eastern Arctic Bar. Their interventions included a call for a moratorium on any type of drilling operation in the Eastern Arctic until the broader issue of land claims was settled.

Matters related to land claims were mentioned at the community hearings. One of the community residents felt that the southerners had once contributed to the demise of the whales in the immediate area and now a similar situation could develop with possible oil reserves. Another resident asked whether the Eastern Arctic would be guaranteed an adequate future oil supply if large quantities were taken to southern Canada.

The Panel considers comments pertaining to the issue of Land Claims are not part of its mandate.

2.16 Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP)

Other than a few requests for the Panel to return, the Environmental Assessment and Review Process was not questioned at the community hearings. At Frobisher Bay various groups addressed the fundamentals of the process. Lack of public funding for intervenors was an issue in addition to the EARP's narrow terms of reference. Consultation methods, timing, and procedures were also expressed as being "not enough". Need was expressed for an independent (Government free) mechanism to examine he whole question of drilling in the

ᐅᓯᐊᓗᒥ d ᕕᔪᒃᑲᓚᓂ ᐸᐃᑎᓇᓯᐊᕈᓇᕋᔭᓂᖏᓂ Ab ᔪᓯᑕᐅᔪᓇᖅᑯᓗᒥ ᑐᑭᓯᑎᑕᐅᑎᐊᕈᓇᖅᑯᓗᒥᓗ ᖃᓄᓪᓕ ᓴᓗᒪᓴᐃᓚᔭᓂᖏᓂ ᑯᕕᔪᒃᑲᓚᓂᐸ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᒥ.

2.15 ᓄᓇᒥ ᓇᒥᓂᕐ ᑕᕋᓯᐊᓂ

ᑕᒪᑐᒪ ᒥᓴ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᒪᑎᓪᓗᐅᖏᑐᓚᓗᐊ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐᓂ ᑲᑎᒪᕕᔪᐊᑎᓗᒥ ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᒪᑎᓪᓗᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᐃᖃᓗᓂ ᑕᑯᓅᓚ ᕿᑭᑕᓗ ᐃᓄᐃ ᑲᑐᐹᐸᖅᑯᑎᖏᓅ ᐊᒪᓗ ᕿᑭᑕᓗᒥᓴᓂ ᐱᖅᑯᔭᓕᑎᐹᐅᔪᓅ. ᐃᑯᑕᖅᑯᐹᓪᓗᐅᖏᓂᖏ ᐱᔪᑎᖅᑲᓪᓗᐳ ᓄᖅᑯᐹᓗᑎ ᑭᓯᓕᒪᑎᐊᓂ ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐊᑐᓂ ᕿᑭᑕᓗ ᒥᓴᓂ ᐱᔭᑎᑕᐅᓂᐊᓴᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᖏᓂᓴᐅᔪ ᓄᓇᒥ ᓇᒥᓂᑕᕋᓯᐊᓂ ᐊᖏᖅᑲᑎᒋᓂᒎ.

ᐱᔪᑎᖃᑐᓂ ᓄᓇᒥ ᓇᒥᓂᑕᕋᓯᐊᑐᓂ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᓪᓗᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐᓂ ᑲᑎᒪᑎᓗᒥ. ᐊᑕᐅᓯᓗᓄᓇᖃᑎᒥᐅᑕ ᐃᓯᒪᓪᓗᑐ ᖃᓗᓇᓕ ᓄᕐᔪᑎᑎᓪᓗᐅᓂᖏᓂ ᐊᐃᕕᓂ ᑕᒪᓂᒥᐅᑕᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᒪᓇᐅᔪ ᑕᐃᒪᓇᑕᐅ ᐱᓚᔭᒥᒪ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᐃ ᒥᓴᓄ. ᐊᓯᐊᑕᐅ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᑐᒥᐅᑕ ᐅᖃᓪᓗᑎᓗᓂ ᕿᑭᑕᓗ ᒥᓴᓂ ᐅᕙᑎᐊᕈᕐᔪᖃᑎᓗᒍ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᑕᕈᓇᓂᐊᕋᓗᐊᒪᓪᓚ ᐊᖏᔪᐊᓗᒥ ᖃᓗᓇᓄᓪᓚᑕᐅᐸᑕ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᒃᑲᓇᑕᒥ.

ᓇᓚᕆᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪ ᐃᓯᒪᓪᓗᑐ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᓯᑎ ᓄᓇᐅ ᒥᓴᓄ ᓇᒥᓂᑕᕋᓯᐊᑐᓂ ᐊᑐᓇᖏᓂᕋᓯᓂᔪ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᓚᓴᑎᖏᓂᕋᓯᓂᔪᓗ.

2.16 ᓚᕙᒪᑯᓂᓪᓗ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᐹᐅᔪ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᐸᓂᖏ

ᑭᓯᐊᓂᓕ ᐊᒥᓱᓇᑎ ᐊᐱᓯᑕᐅᓪᓗᒪᑕ ᐅᑎᖁᔭᐅᓗᑎ C d a ᓇᓚᕆᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪ ᑕᑯᐊᓕ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᐹᐅᔪ ᑲᓇᑕᐅ ᓚᕙᒪᑯᖏᓂᓪᓗᓯᒪᔪ ᐊᐱᑎᔭᐅᓪᓗᐅᖏᑐ ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒥᓂ ᑲᑎᒪᑎᓗᒥ. ᐃᖃᓗᓂ ᐊᕈᒥᖏᑐ ᑲᑐᐹᖃᑎᒥᑐ ᐅᖃᐅᐹᓪᓗᐅᑐ ᖃᓄᓪᓕ Cda ᐱᖃᑕᕋᓗᐊᒪᓪᓚ. ᕿᓇᐅᔭᖃᖏᓗᐊᓂᒥᓄ ᑭᑯᓕᒪᑐᐃᓇᐃ ᓄᖃᑎᑎᒎᓇᓪᓗᐅᖏᒪᑕ ᐃᑯᑕᖅᑯᐹᖏᑐᓚᓗᐊ ᐊᒪᓯᓕᑕᐅ ᓯᓪᓗᐃᑐᒎᓗᔭᑐᒥ ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᓇᔪᓚᓕᑎᐹᐅᔪ Cda ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᓪᓗᐅᑐ. ᐊᐱᓱᖃᑕᓂᖏ, ᖃᓄ ᖃᓪᓚᐅᖃᑕᓂᓪᓗ ᐊᒪᓗ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᓪᓗᑎᖃᑕᓂᖏᓂ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᓪᓗᐅᒥᔪᑕᐅ ᓯᓗ ᐅᖃᐅᑎᒋᔭᐅᓗᑎ

Eastern Arctic.

At the Frobisher Bay hearings, some intervenors stated that insufficient time was allowed for the Inuit in the communities to adequately prepare for the hearings as many of them had just returned from a summer of living off the land. The Panel recognized the problems associated with little time being made available for persons to review the Environmental Impact Statement and to prepare comments for presentation at the hearings.

"ᓇᒪᕐᕆᑐ".
ᐅᖃᐅᑎᕆᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᓂᓗ ᐃᒥᑯᓗᓂ
"ᒐᕙᑎᒍᕐᕆᓗᓂ"
ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᖁᓗ ᒍ **CL P** ᑎᐅᓗᓂ
ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐅ ᒥᓴᓄᕐᒐᔪᒥ
ᖁᑭᑕᓗ ᒥᓴᓂ ᐃᓄᐃ
ᓄᓇᕐᕆᓂ.

ᐃᖃᓗᓂ ᑲᑎᒪᕕᔪᐊᑎᓗᒋ ,
ᐃᓚᕐᕆ ᑕᑯᐊ ᓄᖃᖁᔨᔪ ᐃᑯᑕᖁᔨᕐᕆᑐ
ᐅᖃᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᑐᐊᕕᓗᐊᑎᑕᐅᓂᕋᓯᑎ
ᐅᐸᓗᑎᑕᐅᓂᕋᓯᑎ ᐃᓄᐃ
ᓄᓇᖃᑎᒋᕐᕆᑐ ᐸᓇᑎᐊᓯᒪᕐᕆᑎᑕᐅᓗᐊᓂᕐᕆᓗ
ᐅᖃᐅᑎᕆᔭᐅᓚᐅᑎᓗᑎ ᑲᑎᒪᑎᓗᒋ
ᓯᖃᐃᒪ ᐱᔪᑎ ᒋ ᓗᓂᐅ
ᐊᒥᓯ ᐅᑎᓕᓴᓚᐅᒪᑕ ᐊᐅᔭᓕᒪ
ᓄᓇᒋᓚᐅᑕᒥᓂ ᓄᓇᐃᓇᒥ.
ᓇᓚ ᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪ ᐊᕐᕆᖃᑎᖃᓚᐅᐳ
ᐊᑲ ᐅᕐᕆᓂᕐᒐᓂ ᐊᑯᓂᐅᓗᐊᕐᕆᑐ ᑭᑕᒐᓗ
ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᑭᓇᓕᒪᑎᐊ
ᐅᖃᓕᒪᒐᓇᓚᐅᒪ
ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᖃᓄᓚᑎ ᓯᓂᑎᑕᐅᒐᔭᓂᕐᒐᓂ
ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᔪᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐸᓇᑎᑕᐅᓯᒪᕐᕆᓂᕐᕆᓂ
ᐅᖃᐅᓯᓴᑎᔪᓇᑕᓴᑎᔭᕐᕆᓂ ᑲᑎᒪᕕᔪᐊᑎᓗᒋ .

CHAPTER 3

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Probability of Major Oil Well Blowout

The Panel concluded that the potential impact of an oil well blowout was the most important factor to consider in evaluating the environmental acceptability of the proposed project.

The Panel further concluded however that the probability of a major oil well blowout is low.

2. Fate of Oil in the Event of Major Oil Well Blowout

The Panel concluded that the calculations presented by the Proponent provided a reasonable basis for impact analysis.

The Panel further concluded that oil from a major well blowout will generally move in a southerly direction. Under adverse winds oil could impact upon shorelines or ice edges but likely in low concentrations. Should a blowout continue over the winter, oil could be entrained under ice.

3. Effects of Oil in the Event of a Major Oil Well Blowout

The Panel concluded that the most serious impact could be on swimming birds.

The Panel concluded that there could be an impact on sea mammals and polar bears. Such impact could adversely affect the food source and livelihood of some residents of southern Baffin Island. The Panel concluded that, based upon the limited scientific evidence, populations would recover from adverse effects within

ᓴᑉᑕ 3

ᐃᓱᒪᕆᔭᐅᓕᑐ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᖅᑯᔭᐅᓕᑐᓗ

1. ᖃᖓ ᑐᖃᑐᐃᓇᑎᐊᖃᓂᖓ ᐊᕐᒋᔪᐊᓗᒥ ᐅᓱᐊᓗᒥ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᔪᒥ

ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪᓗ ᐃᓱᒪᓕᓚᐅᐳ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᑐᐃᓇᑎᐊᖃᓂᖓ ᐅᓱᐊᓗᒥ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᔪᒥ ᐊᕐᒋᔪᐊᓗᒥ ᖃᑐᖃᑐᐃᓇᑎᐊᖃᓂᖓ ᐊᑐᓇᓂᐸᕐᒍᓂᖕᒐᓄ ᐃᓱᒪᓴᓯᐅᐸᓕᐊᑎᓗ ᒋ ᓇᒪᑲᔭᕋᓗᐊᒪᖕ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᔪᒍ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᓱᓂ ᐃᖁᑕᑕᐅᔪᒪᔪ.

ᓇᓚᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪᓗ ᓱᓕᑲᓂᑕᐅ ᐃᓱᒪᓕᓚᐅᑎᕗ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᖃᒪ ᑐᖃᕋᔭᓂᖓ ᐊᕐᒋᔪᐊᓗᒥ ᐅᓱᐊᓗᒥ ᐃᑯ CAD ᔪᒥ ᒥᑭᑐᓂᖕᒪᓂ.

2. ᖃᓄᐃᓕᑲᔭᓂᖓ ᐅᓱᐊᓗ ᖃᑐᖃ b co-< ᐊᕐᒋᔪᒥ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᔪᒥ

ᓇᓚᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪ ᐃᓱᒪᓕᓚᐅᐳ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕈᒪᓂᕐᒋ ᑐᓂᔭᐅᓯᒪᓕᑐ ᑕᑯᓄᖕ ᐅᓱᐊᓗᓕᑎᕓᑯᓄ ᓇᒪᓂᕋᑕᐅᓱᑎ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᑐᓂ ᓱᓂᑎᑕᐅᓂᐊᑐᓂ.

ᓇᓚᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪᓗ ᑕᑯᐊ ᓱᓕᑲᓂ ᐃᓱᒪᓕᓚᐅᑎᕗ ᐅᓱᐊᓗ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐊᕐᒋᔪᐊᓗᒧ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᔪᒧ ᖃᑐᖃᑲᓚᓂᐸ ᐃᕐᖁᐸᓕᐊᑲᔭᒪ ᖃᓗᓇ ᓄᓇᖕᑕ ᒥᓴᓄ. ᐃᑯᑕᖁᓗᐊ ᑎᓗᒋ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐅᓱᐊᓗ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᑲᔭᒪ ᓯᔭᒥ ᐅᐸᓗᓂ ᓯᑯ ᓯᓇᓂ ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᒥᑭᑐᐳᓗᑲᔭᒪ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᑲᔭᓂᖓ ᑕᒪᑐᒪ. ᑕᐸᓕ ᑕᒪᓇ ᖃᑲᓯᒪᔪ ᓄᖄᕐᒋᑎᓗᒍ ᐅᑭᐅᓕᒪᑎᐊᒥ ᐅᓱᐊᓗᓕ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐱᔭᐅᓯᒪᑲᔭᒪ ᓯᑯ ᐊᑕᓄ.

3. ᖃᓄᓚᑎ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᑲᔭᓂᖓ ᐅᓱᐊᓗ ᑕᒪᑐᒪ ᐊᕐᒋᔪᐊᓗᒥ ᖃᒪ ᑐᖃ ᑲᓚᓂᐸ ᐊᕐᒋᔪᐊᓗᒥ

ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ ᑕᑯᐊ ᐃᓱᒪᖃᓕᓚᐅᓯᒪᒐ ᐊᑐᓇᓂᐸ ᖑᓱᓂ ᑕᒪᑐᒪ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᑲᔭᓂᖓ ᑕᒪᑯᓄᖕ ᑎᒥᐊᓄ ᐳᐃᔪᕋᐸᑐᓄ.

ᓇᓚᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪᓗ ᐃᓱᒪᓕᓚᐅᑎᓗᑎ ᓱᓂᑎᑕᐅᑲᔭ ᓂᕐᒋ ᑕᑎᐅᒥᐅᑕᐃ ᓂᔪᑎ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓇᓄᐃ. ᑕᐃᒪᓇᑕᐅ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᑲᔭᒪᑕᐅ ᓂᔪᑎ ᓂᖏᕆᔭᐅᐸᑐᓂ ᐅᒪᔪᑎᕆᔭᐅᔪᓄ ᓗ ᑕᒪᓂᒥᐅᑕᓄ ᖏᑭᑕᓗᒥᐅᑕᓄ. ᓇᓚᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪᓗ ᐃᓱᒪᓕᓚᐅᑎᓗᑎ, ᒪᓕᓱᑎ ᒥᑭᑐᑲᓗᐊᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑎᓄ ᖃᐅᔨᔭᐅᓯᒪᓕᑐᓄ, ᐊᒥᓱᓂᕐᒋ ᐅᑎᖁᔭᒪᑕ ᐃᑉ ᒥᓄ ᐅᐸᑎᐊᕈᕐᒎᖕᑎᓗᒍ PC?_>.

a relatively short period of time.

The Panel concluded that the effects upon the lower part of the food chain from a single oil spill would not be major and would likely be localized near the ice edge and in near shore areas. The use of oil dispersing chemicals may increase this impact to some extent although dispersants may provide a degree of protection to birds.

4. Operational Practices and Waste Management

The Panel concluded that existing regulatory mechanisms and codes of good practices are adequate to ensure safe and environmentally sound operating procedures including waste management, at both sea-borne and land-based facilities.

5. Iceberg Scour

The Panel concluded that the probability of a blowout caused by iceberg scour is remote. The Panel noted that additional data on scouring may be necessary prior to approvals to drill in shallower waters in the region (nearer to shore).

6. Land Claims

The Panel concluded that comments pertaining to land claims by the Inuit were not related to the Panel's mandate to advise the Minister of the Environment on the environmental acceptability of the proposed project.

7. Maior Conclusion

THE PANEL CONCLUDED THAT THE ENVIRONMENTAL RISK OF THE PROJECT IS ACCEPTABLE PROVIDED THE CONDITIONS OUTLINED BELOW ARE FOLLOWED.

ᓇᓚᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪᓗ ᐃᓱᒪᒃᑲᓚᐅᓯᒪᒋᕗ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᒐᔭᓂᓪᓚ ᐃᖃᓪᓗᓂᒥᐅᑕᓂ ᓂᕿᒋᔭᐅᕙᑐᓂ ᐊᑕᐅᓯᒥ ᖃᑐᖃᑎᒍ J ᐅᓯᐊᓗᒥ ᑯᕕᔭᖃᑎᒍᒍ ᒥᑭᑐᕈᓗᒐᔭᒪ ᑭᓯᐊᓂᓕ ᓯᐊᒥᒐᔭᕋᓂᓗ ᓯᔭᐅ ᓯᓇᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓯᔭᐅ ᖃᓂᒋᔭᓪᓚᓂ. ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕ ᑕᒪᓇ ᓴᓗᒪᓴᑕᐅᒐᔭᒪ ᐅᐊᓴᐅᑎᓂ ᐊᑐᓗᑎ ᑕᐃᒪᐃᑲᓗᐊᑎᓗᒍᑕᐅ ᐅᐊᓴᐅᑎᑕᐅ ᐊᑐᑕᐅᒍᓇᕋᓗᐊᑎᓗᑎ C D ᐸᐃᑎᔭᐅᓇᓯᐊᑎᓗᒋ nra.

4. ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᐸᓕᐊᕙᓂᖏ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᑯᐃ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᖏ

ᓇᓚᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪ ᐃᓱᒪᒃᑲᓚᐅᓯᒪᒍ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒥ ᐱᖁᔭᐃ ᐱᔪᑎ ᒋᓗᓂᖏ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᖃᑕᕋᔭᓂᖏ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᑎᐊᖃᑕᕋᔭᓂᖏ A ᑲᔪᓯᕋᔭᒪᑕ ᐸᐃᑎᑎᐊᕋᔭᓱᑎᓗ ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᓪᓚᓂᓪᓚ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᑎᓗᒍ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᕙᓂᖏ ᑕᒪᑯᐊ ᐃᖃᑯᕈᔪᐃ, ᑕᒪᑭᓂ ᑕᑎᐅᒥ ᓄᓇᒥᓗ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕕᐅᔪᓂ.

5. ᐱᖃᓗᔭᐃ ᐃᖃᓪᓚᓂ ᑭᓕᐅᑐᐃᓚᔭᓂᖏ

ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ Cd ᐊ ᐃᓱᒪᒃᑲᓚᐅᓯ ᒪᔪ ᖃᓚᑎᑎᓚᔭᓂᖏ ᑕᒪᑯᐊ ᐱᖃᓗᔭᐃ ᑭᓕᐅᑐᕋᔭᓂᖏ ᖃᑎᑎᓚᔭᖁᖏᒪ. ᑖᑯᐊᓗᑕᐅ ᓇᓚᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᑎᓗᑎ ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪ ᑲᓂᑐᓂᑕᐅ ᐊᓯᖏᓂᑕᐅ ᐱᖃᓗᔭᐃ ᐊᑕᓂ ᐃᖃᓪᓚᓂ ᑭᓕᐅᑐᐃᑐᐃᓇᑎᐊᖃᓂᖏᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᑎᐊᑲᓂᑎᐊᖃᒪᑕ ᐊᖏᑕᐅᓂᐊᓴᑎᓗᒋ ᐃᑯᑕᑎᑕᐅᓂᐊᓴᑎᓗᒋ ᐃᑲᓂᓴᐅᔪᓂ ᐃᒪᓂ.

6. ᓄᓇᒥ ᓇᒥᓂᑕᕋᓯᐊᓂ

ᓇᓚᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪ ᐃᓱᒪᒃᑲᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᐅᖃᒪᔪᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᓯᑎ ᓄᓇᒥ ᓇᒥᓂᑕᕋᓯᐊᓂᒥ ᐃᓄᓄ ᐊᑐᓇᖏᓂᕋᑕᐅᓯᓂ ᐃᓚᐅᖏᓂᕋᑕᐅᓯᓂ ᓇᓚᒋᐊᑐᑐ ᐱᔭᑎᐊᖃᑕᖏᓄ ᐅᖃᓂᐊᑎᓗᒋᓗ ᐊᓪᓚᔪᖃᔪᐊᖏᓄ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᕙᐅᔪᓄ ᑲᓇᑕᐅ ᓚᕙᒪᑯᖏᓄ ᐱᔪᑎᖃᓯᑎ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐊᕙᑎ ᓇᒪᒋᔭᐅᓚᓗᐊᒪᓪᓚ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᒍᒪᓂᓪᓚᓄ.

7. ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᓕᑐ

ᓇᓚᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪ ᐃᓱᒪᒃᑲᓚᐅᓯᒪᔪ ᑕᑯᐊ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᓚᔭᓂᓪᓚ ᓱᓂᑎᑎᓚᔭᓂᓪᓚᓗ ᐊᕙᑎᐅᔪᒥ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᒍᒪᔪᒥ ᐃᑯᑕᕈᒪᔪᓄᓗ ᓇᒪᒋᔭᐅᓂᕋᑕᐅᓯᓂ ᑭᓯᐊᓂ ᒪᓕᑯᑎ ᑕᑯᐊ ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᔪᑎᒍ ᑕᑯᑎᒍᓇ.

8. CONDITIONS FOR ACCEPTABILITY OF THE PROJECT

a. Monitoring and Prediction – Physical Environment

There is an identified need for real-time monitoring and prediction systems for safe operations under normal procedures and to provide essential information for countermeasure activity in the event of a blowout. This system must include information on weather, seastate and currents.

b. Industry Contingency Plans

A detailed industry contingency plan must be submitted to the responsible regulatory agency six months prior to drilling and approved before drilling. There is a need to demonstrate the effectiveness of the plan (i.e. "dry run") to the satisfaction of the responsible regulatory agency.

The industry plan must give highest priority to the protection of flightless birds.

The results of information acquired fromt he 1978 environmental studies must be incorporated into the contingency plan. (e.g. strategies for protection of exposed sea mammals).

The contingency plan must clearly indicate the methods to be used to ensure same-season relief well capability.

The contingency plan should also include the use of an operational slick tracking model for real time prediction of slick movement.

8. ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓗᑎ ᐊᖏᑕᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᓂᖏ ᐃᑯᑕᕈᒪᔪ

A. ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐸᓂᖏ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓇᓚᐅᑕᐃᓂ-ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᑕᐅᑐᖓ.

ᐱᔭᑎᐊᖃᓚᑎᒪ ᑕᐃᒪᓇ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᒥ ᐊᖃᔨᑎ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐅᕙᑎᐊᕈᖑᑎᓗ J f ᕗᓂᓴᖕᒍ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᓂᐊᕋᓗᐊᒪᖕ ᐊᑲᐅᔪᒧ ᐃᑯᑕᑎᐊᕈᓇᖁᓗᒥ ᖃᐅᑕᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖃᑕᑕᖏᒻ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑐᓴᑎᑎᔪᓇᖁᓗᒥ ᓴᓗᒪᓴᐃᔨᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᑐᓂ ᖃᒐᑐᖅᑲᑲᓚᐊ. ᑕᑯᑎᒍᓇ ᑐᓴᑕᐅᒥᐊᖃᑐᑎᒍ ᐃᓚᒥᔭᐅᒥᐊᖃᕋᔭᕗ fc, ᑕᑎᐅᓗ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᖓᓂᖕ ᐊᒪᓗ ALD ᐊᐅᓚᓂᖕ.

D. ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯ ᐸᐃᑎᕕᒥᓇᓯᐊᕈᓇᕋᔭᑕᖏ

ᐅᓂᑲᑎᐊᓯᒪᓗᓂ ᐅᖃᑎᐊᓯᒪᓗᓂ ᑐᓂᔭᐅᒥᐊᖃᑐ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯᓐ ᑲᒪᔨᐅᓂᐊᑐᓐ ᐱᖁᔭᓕᑎᔨᐅᕙᓐ ᐃᑯ ᑕᓂᐊᓴᑎᓗ ᒥ ᑕᕿᓯ ᐅᑎᓂ 6ᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃᑯᑕᕈᓇᓯᑎᑕᐅᓂᐊᓴᑎᓗᒥ. ᑐᑭᓯᑎᑎᐊᑎᐊᖃᓯᑎᓗ ᑕᒪᓇ ᑲᒥᔭᐅᓂᐊᑐ ᓇᒪᑎᐊᕋᓗᐊᒪᖕ ᓱᓗ ᐅᑐᕋᖃᑕᓗᑎ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᓂᐊᒪᑎᓂᒥᓂ ᑕᑯᓐᖕ ᐱᖁᔭᓕᑎᔨᐅᓂᐊᑐᓐ.

ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯᓗ ᓯᕗᓕᐸᖑᑎᓗᒍ ᑲᒥᔭᑎᐊᖃᒪᑎᑕᖕ ᐸᐃᑎᓇᓯᐊᓗᑎ ᖄᖕᑕᕈᓇᖏᑐᓂ ᑎᒥᐊᓂ.

ᐱᔭᐅᓯᒪᕙᓗ ᑐᓴᕈᑎᓐ ᐱᔭᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᕙ ᑕᐃᓯᒪᓂ 1978ᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᓚᐅᓯᒪᓂᖕᓐ ᐊᕙᑎᐅ ᐊᑐᑕᐅᔭᑎᐊᖃᑐ ᐸᐃᑎᓇᓯᐊᓂᐊᑎᓗᑎ ᐊᕿᓯᓂᐊᓴᑎᓗᒥ (ᓱᓗ ᐸᐃᑎᓇᓯᐊᕈᓇᕐᒥ ᑕᑎᐅᒥᐅᑕᓂ ᓂᕙᑎᓂ).

ᐸᐃᑎᓇᓯᐊᓂᐊᓂᒥᓗ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᓂᐊᓂᖏ ᑎᑎᕋᑎᐊᓯᒪᔭᑎᐊᖃᑐ ᐅᖃᑎᐊᓯᒪᔭᑎᐊᖃᓯᑎᓗ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᓚᑎᓂᐊᕋᓗᐊᒪᖕᑕ ᐊᕿᑎᐊᓯᒪᖁᓗᒍ ᐃᑯᑕᕕᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᑐᒥ ᐊᓯᐊᒍᑕᐅ ᖃᒐᑐᖅᑲᑲᓚᓂᐸ.

ᐊᕿᓯᓂᐊᑎᓗᒥᓗ ᐸᐃᑎᕙᑎᒥᓂᐊᑕᒥᓐ ᐃᓚᖅᑐᓴᐅᒥᕗ ᐊᑐᑕᐅᕙᓴᒥ ᑯᕕᓯᒪᕙ ᑕᒪᓇ ᐳᑕᓚᑐ ᒪᓕᑕᐅᕙᑎᒥᕙᓇᕋᔭᑕᖏᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐅᑎᐅᕙᓇᕋᔭᑐᓂᓗ ᓇᒧᖕᓚᐅᒐᔭᕋᓗᐊᒪᖕ ᑯᕕᓯᒪᕙ ᑕᒪᓇ.

c. Government Contingency Plan

A government contingency plan must be in effect prior to drilling. This plan must delineate the response of government agencies when oil spills occur in the southern Davis Strait region. This plan must include, among other matters, the necessary authority for the use of dispersants, the responsibility and authority for government oil spill response south of 60o Latitude, and the authority and procedures for response activities that may be necessary in Greenland waters.

d. Compensation and Liability

The responsible regulatory agency must give consideration to increasing the limits of liability of a proponent for damages and cleanup costs, where existing levels for compensation may not be commensurate with present day values.

9. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Continuing: Environmental Studies

The Panel recommends that the existing consultative mechanisms between government agencies and the Proponent be utilized to determine the extent of further environmental studies. Some possible study areas are identified in Chapter II. As a matter of principle, the Panel recommends that industry accept as its responsibility those studies necessary to improve and enhance contingency plans, while government agencies accept as their responsibility those studies related to resource management.

ᐊ. ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓄ ᓱᕗᓂᐊᒍ ᐸᐃᑎᕕᐅᒍᑎᒋᔭᐅᓇᓱᐊᕈᓇ ᖃᔭᑐ

ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓄ ᐸᐃᑎᕕᐅᒍᑕᐅᒐᓱᐊᕈᓇᖃᔭᑐ ᓱᕗᓂᐊᒍ ᐊᑦᑭᑕᐅᓯᒪᔭᑎᐊᓕ ᓱᕗᓂᐊᒍ ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐊᓴᑎᓗᒋ. ᑕᑯᑎᒍᓇᓗ ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᔭᑎᐊᖅᑲᓯᓂ ᐅᖃᓯᒪᔭᑎᐊᖅᑲᓯᓂ ᒐᕙᒪᑯ ᑕᑯᐊ ᑲᒪᔾᒋᒪᑕ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᒥ ᑯᕕᔮᖅᑲᑎᓗᒍ ᐱᓪᓚᓪᓚᓂ ᑕᐃᕕᒃ ᓯᑐᕋᐃ. ᑕᑯᑎᒍᓇᓗ ᐊᑦᑭᑕᐅᓂᐊᑐᑎᒍ ᐃᓕᒋᔭᐅᒋᐊᖅᑲᓯᓂᑕᐅ ᐊᓯᐊᒍᑕᐅ, ᐊᔾᒋᕕᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᒪᑕ ᐅᖃᑎᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᓯᑎᓗ ᐊᑐᑕᐅᒋᐊᔾᒋᓂ ᐅᐊᓴᐅᑎᕈᐋᐃ, ᑲᒪᒋᐊᖅᑲᕋᔭᓯᑎᓗ ᑕᑯᐊ ᑭᐅᒋᐊᖅᑲᕋᔭᓯᑎᓗ ᑕᑯᐊ ᒐᕙᒪᑯ ᑯᕕᔮᖅᑲᑲᓚᓂᐸ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓂᒥ ᖃᓗᓇ ᓄᓇᓪᓚᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐅᖃᑎᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᑐᓂ ᑭᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᑐᓂᓗ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᕈᓇᕋᔭᑐᓂᓗ ᐱᔭᑎᐊᖅᑐᐊᑎᐊᖅᑲᓕᓂᐸ ᐊᑯᑭᑐ ᒥᓴᓂ.

ᐱ. ᑐᓂᔭᐅᓪᓚᕈᓇᕋᔭᑐ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐃᑲᔪᓯᐅᕕᐅᔪᓇᑐ

ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓗ ᐱᖁᔭᓕᐅᑎᕈᔾᒋ ᐃᓯᒪᓴᓯᐅᑎᐊᖅᑲᓚᑕᑕ ᐅ ᐊᔾᒋᓕᒋᐊᕈᓇᖁᓗᒍ ᑭᓇᐅᔭᐃ ᒥᓴᓄ ᐃᑲᔪᓯᕕᐅ ᒍᓇᕋᔭᑐᓗ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯᓄ ᓯᕋᐃᐸᑕ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓴᓗᒪᓴᐃᓂᐅ ᐊᑭᐊᓄ, ᑕᑯᑎᒍᓇ ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᔾᒋᐸᑕ ᐊᔾᒋᓗᐊᑐᐊᓗᐸᓗᓂ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒥ ᐊᑦᑭᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᑎᔾᒋᑎᒍ ᑎᑎᕋᓯᒪᓂᔾᒋᑎᒍ.

9. ᐊᓯᔾᒋᑕᐅ ᐱᖁᔭᐅᓕᑐ

ᐃ. ᓄᖃᓚᐅᕋᑎ aenr ᖃᐅᔨᓴᐸᓕᐊᒐᓯᐊᓂ

ᑕᑯᐊ ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ ᐅᖃᓚᐅᑐ ᒪᓇᐅᔪᒥ ᐊᐱᓯᕈᓗᔭᖅᑲᑕᓂᔾᒋ ᑭᐅᕈᓗᔭᖅᑲᑕᓂᔾᒋᓗ ᐃᒥᓄ ᒐᕙᒪᑯ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓯᐅᑎᓗ ᐊᑐᑕᐅᖁᓗᒍ ᖃᐅᔨᒐᓯᐊᑎᓗᒋ ᐅᕙᑎᐊᕈᔾᒍᖅᑲᑎᓗᒍ ᑕᒪᑯ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᒐᓯᐊᓂᐊᓂᔾᒋᓄ ᐊᕙᑎᕈᔪᑕᐅ. ᐊᓯᔾᒋᑎᒍᑕᐅ ᐃᓕᓂᐊᑕᐅᒍᓇᕋᔭᒥᔪ ᐅᓂᑲᑕᐅᓯᒪᒥᒪᑕ ᓴᑉ ᑐ 2-ᒥ. ᐅᖃᓚᐅᑎᓗᑎᓗ ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᐹᑯ ᑲᒪᐹᐅᖁᓗᒋ ᐊᑭᓯᑕᐅᑎᐊᕋᓯᐊᑐᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐸᐃᑎᓇᓯᐊᓂᒥᓗ, ᒐᕙᒪᑯᓗ ᑲᒪᐹᐅᖁᓗᒋ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑕᐅᓂᐊᑐᓂ ᐱᔪᑎᖅᑐᓂ ᐊᑐᑕᐅᖅᑲᓂᕈᓇᑐᓂ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᔾᒋᓄ.

b. Compensation and Liability

The Panel recommends that the responsible regulatory agency develop a mechanism to ensure that compensation for damages and cleanup costs is available for potentially affected people south of 60º as well as for residents of Greenland.

c. Iceberg Prediction System

The Panel recommends that the Proponent give consideration to the development of an operational prediction system for iceberg movement in the vicinity of the drillship.

d. Energy Policy Tax Incentives and Exploratory permits.

The Panel recommends that future national energy policies and tax regulations take into account the time requirements for adequate environmental studies and assessment.

e. Employment

The Panel recommends that the Proponent employ as many of the southern Baffin Island residents as is feasible for positions associated with the drilling program.

f. Public Information by Proponent

The Panel recommends that the Proponent continue its communications program with the southern Baffin Island residents. Special attention should be given to explaining the contingency plans that would come into effect in the event of a major oil well blowout.

D. ᐊᑭᓕᒍᓇᓂᕐᒥ ᐱᓗᐊᕿᔪᖃᓂᐸ

ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ ᐱᖁᔨᓕᓚᐅᐳ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᖃᐅᑐ ᐱᖁᔭᓕᑎᔨᐅᕙᓗ ᑕᒪᑯᓂᖕᒐ ᐊᕿᓯᖁᓗᒋ ᐱᓗᐊᕿᔪᖃᑲᓚᓂᐸ ᐊᑭᓂᒍᓇᕈᓇᖁᓗᒋ ᐊᒪᓗ ᓴᓗᒪᓴᐃᓂᐅ ᐊᑭᖕᒐᓄ ᐱᔪᓇᖁᓗᒋ ᑭᑯᓕᒪᓄ ᓯᓂᓯᑕᐅᒐᔭᑐ ᖃᓗᓇ ᓄᓇᖕᒐᓂᒥᐅᑕᓄᓗ ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᑎᓗᒋᑕᐅ ᐊᑯᑭᑐᒥᐅᑕ.

Δ. ᐱᖃᓗᔭᐃ ᓇᓚᐅᑕᑕᐅᓂᕐᒥ ᖃᐃᓕᓂᕐᒥᑕ

ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪᓗ ᐱᖁᔨᓕᓚᐅᐳ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯᓂ ᐃᓯᒪᓴᓯᐅᖁᓗᒋ ᐊᕿᓯᖁᓗᒋᓗ ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍ ᓇᓚᐅᑕᐃᒍᓇᓯ ᒐᔭᑐᒥ ᐱᖃᓗᔭᐃ ᐊᐅᓚᓂᕐᒥᓂ ᐃᑯᑕᑉᐅ ᓇᔭᑐᒥ ᐅᒥᐊᔪᐊᒥ.

A. ᐱᖁᔭᑎᒍᑐ ᓄᑭ ᒥᓴᓄ ᐊᒪᓗ ᕿᓂᕈᓇᕈᑎ

ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ ᐱᖁᔨᓕᓚᐅᓯ ᒪᕗ ᐅᐸᑎᐊᕈᖕᒍᑎᓗᒍ ᐱᖁᔭᐅᓂᐊᑐ ᑲᓇᑕᓕᒪᒥ ᐊᒪᓗ ᑖᒃᓴ ᐱᖁᔭᕐᒥ ᐃᓯᒪ ᒋᔭᐅᓇᓯᐊᖁᓗᒋ ᓇᒪᑐᒥ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᓇᖁᓗ ᒋ ᐊᐸᑎᐅᔪᒥ ᐊᒪᓗ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑎᐊᕈᓇᖁᓗᒋ.

>. ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᓂᐅ ᒥᓴᓄ

ᓇᓚᑎᐅᔪ ᐱᖁᔨᓚᐅᐳ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᑎᖃᖁᓗᒋ ᐱᔪᓇᑕᓕᒪᒥᓂ ᐱᖕᒐᓇᓕᒪᖕᒐᓂ ᕿᑭᑕᓗ ᐱᔪᓇᑐᐊᐸᑕ ᐊᑐᑎᓗᒍ ᐃᑯᑕᓂᐊᓂᕐᒥᓄ.

<. ᑐᓴᖃᑕᓂᕐᒥ ᕿᑯᓕᒪᑎᐊᓂ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯ

ᓇᓚᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᔪ ᐱᖁᔨᓕᓚᐅᑐ ᑕᑯᐊ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯ ᓄᖃᖁᔨᓇᑎ ᑐᓴᖃᑕᓂᒥᓂ ᐱᖕᒐᓇᖕᒐᓂ ᕿᑭᑕᓗᒥᐅᑕᓄ. ᐃᒥᑯᓕᖕᒐᓗᑎᑕᐅ ᑲᒪᒋᔭᐅᒪᑎᒋᐊᖃᑐ ᑐᑭᓯᑎᑎᒐᓯᐊᓂᕐᒥ ᖃᓄᐃᓕᐅᓗᑎ ᐸᐃᑎᓇᓯᐊᓂᐊᓂᕐᒥᓂ ᐊᑐᑕᐅᒐᔭᑐᒥᓗ ᐊᕐᒥᔪᐊᓗᒥ ᑯᐱᔪᖃᑲᓚᑎᓗᒍ ᐅᓯᐊᓗᒥ ᐃᑯᑕᐱᐅᔪᒥ ᖃᑐᖃᑲᓚᓂᐸ.

10. SUPPLEMENTARY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a. The Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office should institute a follow-up mechanism to evaluate and report on the degree to which the Panel's conclusions and recommendations have been accepted and acted upon.

b. The Panel endorses the Proponent's efforts to inform the residents of southern Baffin Island about the proposed project. The Panel concludes that such initiatives by a proponent are fully compatible with the EAR Process.

c. The Panel recommends that the Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office actively pursue the use of federal funding and other assistance for the public participation as intervenors in future Panel projects.

d. The Panel recognizes the difficulties in carrying out meaningful communications with groups whose mother tongue is not an official language of Canada. The Panel recommends that proponents, initiators, and future Panels recognize the need for additional time (for such matters as translation of documents) and make special efforts to ensure that timely information is available in the language of the people who may be affected by a project.

10. ᐃᓚᒋᔭᐅᑲᓂᒥᔪᑕᐅ ᐃᓱᐊᓄ ᐱᖁᔭᐅᓕᑐᓄ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᓕᑐᓄᑦ

ᐃ. ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑕᐃ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᔨᐅᔪ ᐊᓚᕖᖕᓚ ᐊᕿᓯᒋᐊᖃᑐ ᒪᓕᑕᐅᑲᓂᕈᓇᓂᐊᑐᒥ ᐅᕙᑎᐊᕈᖕᒍᐸ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕖᐅᑲᓂᕈᓇᓂᐊᑐᒥ ᑎᑎᕋᕈᓇᓂᐊᓱᑎᓗ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᔭᐅᓕᑐᓄ ᑕᒍᓄᖕᓚ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᑎᐅᓚᓄ ᐱᖁᔭᐅᓕᑐᓄ ᐃᓱᒪᒋᓕᑖᖕᒋᓄᑦ ᒪᓕᓗᑎᓗ ᑳᒥᔭᐅᖁᔭᐅ ᓕᑐᓄ.

D. ᐃᑲᔪᓯᑎᕚᑕᐅ ᓇᓚᒋᐊᑐᓯᒪᓚᐅᑐ ᐅᓱᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯᓕ ᑐᓴᑎᑎᓚᓱᐊᖅᑕᓚᐅᓂᖕᒋᓂ ᕿᑭᑕᓗᒥᐅᑕᓂ ᑳᒥᔭᐅᔪᒪᓕᑐ ᐅᓱᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯᓄ. ᖃᐅᔨᓚᐅᑎᓗᑎᓗ ᑕᐃᒪᐃᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᓂᖕᒋ ᐊᓱᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᑯ ᒪᓕᑎᐊᓂᕋᓱᓂᔪ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᔨᐅᔪ ᒪᓕᖁᔭᖕᒋᑎ J.

ᐊ. ᐱᖁᔨᓕᓱᑎᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅ ᓚᕙᒪᑯᖕᒋᓂᖕᓚᓯᒪᔪ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᔨᐅᔪ ᐊᓚᕖᖕᓚᓂ ᐃᓚᐅᖁᔨᓗᑎ ᐱᖁᔨᓗᑎᓗ ᐊᑐᑎᑎᖁᔨᓗᑎ ᑲᓇᑕᐅ ᓚᕙᒪᑯᖕᒋᓂᖕᓚᑐᓂ ᐊᒪᓗ ᐊᓯᖕᒋᑎᔪᑕᐅ ᐃᑲᔪᕋᓱᐊᖁᓗᒋ ᑭᑯᓕᒪᑎᐊ ᐃᓚᐅᔪᓇ ᓯᖁᓗ ᓄᖅᑎᑎᓕᓱᐊᓂᐊᑎᓗᒋ ᐅᕙᑎᐊᕈ ᓯᕗᓂᑎᓂᐊᑕᑎᓄ ᓇᓚᑎᖅᑲᓕᑎᐊᖅᑲᐸᑐᓄ.

ᐱ. ᓇᓚᑎᓗ ᐅᔨᑎᓕᓗᐊᓱᑎ ᐊᔭᓇᓯᕙᓂᖕᓚᓂ ᑐᓴᖅᑕᐅᑎᑎᐊᕈᓇᖅᑕᓂᒧ ᑯᑐᔨᖅᑎᒋᑐᓄ ᐅᖅᑲᐅᓯᓗ ᑕᓇ ᐃᓕᑕᑎᔭᐅᓯᒪᖕᒋᑎᓗᒍ ᐅᖅᑲᐅᓯᒪᑎᒋᔭᐅᖕᒋᑎᓗᒍ ᑕᐃᒪᐃᓄ ᑲᓇᑕᒥᐅᑕᓄ. ᐱᖁᔨᓕᓱᑎᓗ ᐅᓱᐊᓗᓕᑎ ᔨᑯᓂ, ᐱᒋᐊᑎᑎᔨᐅᔪ, ᐊᒪᓗ ᓯᕗᓂᓴᒥ ᓇᓚᑎᐅᓂᐊᑐ ᐅᔨᑎᖁᔨᓗᑎ ᑐᐊᕖᓗᐊᓇᑎ ᑎᑎᕋᖁᔨᓇᑎ ᓱᓗ ᐃᓄᑎᑐᓕᑎᑎ ᕋᓂᒍ ᐅᐸᓗᐃᓗᐊᖁᕋᓇᒋ.

ᐊᕙᑎᒥᒃ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕐᑎᓄᑦ ᓈᓚᑎᐅᔪᓄ

ᕿᑭᕐ ᑖᔫᑉ ᒥᖅᓵᓂ ᑕᑎᐅᖅᒐᓂ ᐃᑰᑕᕆᒪᔪᓄᑦ

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT PANEL

EASTERN ARCTIC OFFSHORE DRILLING

- SOUTH DAVIS STRAIT PROJECT



ᒃ ᑭᓚᓇᕕᒃ
(ᐃᒃ ᓯᕙᐅᑕᓕᒃ)

J.S. Klenavic
(Chairman)

ᒪᒃ ᑖᓅᑦ



J.R. MacDonald

ᒧᐊᑎᓴᓐ

M.J. Morison



ᔫᐃᓐ

K.B. Yuen

APPENDIX I ᐃᓱᐊᓃᑐᑦ I

PRESENTATION TO THE PANEL
ᓇᓚᑎᑐᑦ ᑐᓴᕐᑎᑕᐅᔪᑦ

ABELSON, Emil
Greenland

ALAINGA, Simonie
Vice-Chairman, EAMES Advisory Board

ARVALUK, J.
President, Baffin Regional Inuit Association

BALDWIN, D.D.
Imperial 011 Limited

BARRET, Jim
Department of Indian and Northern Affairs

BECK, T.
Aquitaine Company of Canada Limited

BERRY, M.
Atmospheric Environment Service, Toronto
Fisheries and Environment Canada

BIRCHARD, E.C.
Imperial Oil Limited

BRINKER, Jim
Aquitaine Company of Canada Limited

BROWN, R.G.
Canadian Wildlife Service
Fisheries and Environment Canada

BURCH, J.
Fisheries and Marine Service, Arctic Biological Station
Ste. Anne de Bellevue

CONOVER, S.A.M.
MacLaren-Marex

DAFOE, T.
Environmental Protection Service, Yellowknife
Fisheries and Environment Canada

D'ARGENCOURT, Leah
Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, Ottawa

EETOOLOOKANAINGA, Frank
Hunters and Trappers Association

GRAINGER, E.
Fisheries & Marine Service, Arctic Biological Station
Ste. Anne de Bellevue

GREENE, G.
Imperial Oil Limited

HUNTER, J.G.
Fisheries & Marine Service, Arctic Biological Station
Ste.Anne de Bellevue

KOONEELUSIE, Mr.
Hunters and Trappers Association

LAWRENCE, M.J.
Fisheries and Marine Service, Winnipeg

MACKAY, S.
Imperial Oil Limited

MCCART, P.
Aquatic Environment Limited

MELNYK, T.
Imperial Oil Limited

OOKPIK, Abe
EAMES Advisory Board

PARSON, J.
MacLaren-Marex

PATERSON, R.J.
Fisheries and Marine Service, Winnipeg

PATTERSON, D.
Eastern Arctic Bar, Frobisher Bay

SANDSTROM, H.
Imperial Oil Limited

SKINNER, R.G.
Department of Energy, Mines and Resources

SMITH, T.
Canadian Wildlife Service

SNOW, N.B.
Department of Indian and Northern Affairs

STIRLING, I.
Canadian Wildlife Service, Edmonton

TELFORD, A.
Imperial Oil Limited

TOD, J.
Imperial Oil Limited

UNDERHILL, J.C.
Imperial Oil Limited

WALLACE, Ron
Ecologist

WATMORE, T.
Imperial Oil Limited

APPENDIX II

PANEL MEMBERS

CHAIRMAN

JOHN KLENAVIC, (Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office, Department of Fisheries and the Environment).

Mr. Klenavic was born in St. Catharines, Ontario and attended schools in Ontario, British Columbia and Manitoba. He graduated from the Royal Military College, Kingston, and Queen's University with a degree in Chemical Engineering (B.Sc.).

He served in the Canadian and British Armies from 1960 to 1968 and subsequently worked as an industrial engineer and quality control chemist in the food processing industry in Toronto. In 1973 he was appointed Acting Director of the Environmental Emergency Branch, Environmental Protection Service of the Federal Department of the Environment. This Branch is concerned with the prevention of, and response to, spills of pollutants into the environment.

Mr. Klenavic was appointed to his present position of Director, Operations, Federal Environmental Assessment Review Office in mid-1977 and is currently chairman of fifteen Environmental Assessment panels.

Mr. Klenavic is a member of the Association of Professional Engineers of Ontario.

MEMBERS

J.R. MacDONALD, Department of Fisheries and the Environment.

Born in Baddeck, Nova Scotia, Mr. MacDonald received his early education there and in Ottawa. He received his B.Sc. (Biology) from St. Francis Xavier University in Antigonish, Nova Scotia. Mr. MacDonald joined the Department of Fisheries in 1960 and after the formation of the Department of Fisheries and the Environment, joined the Environmental Protection Service in 1972. Mr. MacDonald is currently Acting Director of the Environmental Services Branch, Atlantic Region.

M.J. MORISON, Department of Indian and Northern Affairs

Mr. Morison was born in Fredericton, New Brunswick. He graduated from the University of Toronto with a degree in Forestry in 1959. Upon graduation he was employed with the Ontario Department of Lands and Forestry where he held various positions related to land use and resource management in Northern Ontario.

He joined the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs in 1973 being positioned in both Fort Smith and Yellowknife. In these capacities he was attached to the Land Use Committee, North West Territories Water Board and Arctic Water Advisory Committee. As part of his duties in the Department of Fisheries and Environment in Vancouver in 1975-77 he was responsible for coordinating the studies and presentation to be made by the Department in preparation of the Panel hearings related to the Alaska Highway Gas Pipeline proposal. In 1977 he returned to Yellowknife to assume the position of Assistant Director, Non-Renewable Resources where he is responsible for the N.W.T. mines, mineral and oil and gas interests of DINA.

KENNETH B. YUEN, Department of Fisheries and Environment.

Mr. Yuen was born in Victoria and received is education at the University of British Columbia and at Waterloo University. Currently, Mr. Yuen is Chief, Ocean Science Affairs Division, Fisheries and Environment Canada. In 1970, he was assistant to the Scientific Coordinator for "Operation Oil" - the government response to the Arrow oil spill. Subsequently he was appointed Secretary of the Departmental Coordinating Committee of the development of deep water oil ports study and has served as Assistant to the Chairman, NATO Colloquium on Oil Spills. He worked with Transport Canada in developing the Termpol Code for the prevention of pollution at Marine Terminals. Mr. Yuen has had substantial involvement on a number of working groups involving the Maritime Code and Anti-Pollution Sections of the Canada Shipping Act within the 200 mile limit.

ᐃᓯᐊᓃᑦ II

ᑲᑎᒪᔨᕐᓕᑦ

ᔫᓐ ᕿᒡ ᓚᓇᕖᒃ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᔨᑦ ᑲᒪᔨᖁᑦ ᐊᒃ ᓚᒃ ᕖᑦ ᒥ (ᐃᖃᓗᓕᑎᔾᒃ ᑯᓐ ᓂ ᐊᒻ ᒪᓗ ᐊᕙᓗᓕᑎᔾᒃ ᑯᓐ ᓂ)

ᒥᓯᑕ ᕿᓕᓇᕖᒃ ᐃᓅᓕᓚᐅᖅᑐᖅ ᑖᕙᓂ ᑕᐃᔭᐅᔦᒥ ᐃᒪᒃ ᓯᓐ ᑳᑐᕋᓐ St. Catherine's ᐋᓐ ᑎᐅᑎᐅᒥᐃᓕᓐ ᓂᐊᖅᑐ-
ᖅᓂᐅᑉ ᓗᓂ ᐋᑎᐅᑎᐅᒥ ᐳᕿᑎᔅ ᑲᓚᒻ ᐱᐊᒥ ᐊᒻ ᒪᓗ ᒫᓂᑑᑉᒥ. ᐃᓕᓐ ᓂᐊᕐᖅᒃ ᔦᐊᕐ r ᐱᔪᓐᑎᓚᐅᖅᑐᖅ ᑕᐃᔭᐅᓯᕐ ᒥᒃ ᕈᐅᑦ
ᒥᓕᑎᐅᑎᑲᓕᔨᑭᖁᓯᑕᕐᒥᒃ ᐊᒻ ᒪᓗ ᐃᓕᓐ ᓂᐊᕐ ᖅᒃ ᔦᐊᑦ ᓴᐃᓐ ᓇᕐ r ᑯᐃᑉ ᐃᓕᓐ ᓂᐊᕐ ᖅᒃ ᔦᐊᖁᓂ ᑕᐃᔭᐅᔦᒥ ᐱᔪᓐᑎᖅᓯᒪᓪ -
ᔪᓂ ᐃᓕᓐ ᓂᐊᕈᑎᒌᒌᖅᓯᒪᔾᖄᖅᑐᖅ Chemical Engineering ᑕᐃᒫᒃ ᑕᐃᔭᐅᔦᓂᒃ.

ᐱᓇᓱᓚᐅᖅᑐᖅ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᑯᐃᑯᒥᐅᓪᓗ ᐅᓇᓕᕌᑦ ᑯᑎᕐᓐ ᓂ ᑖᕙᖁᑦ 1960-ᒥᑦ 1968-ᒨᑦ ᐊᒻ ᒪᓗ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᓚᐅᕐ ᒥᔦᖅ
ᐊᐅᓪ ᓚᐅᓯᑎᔨᒻ ᒪᑎᐅᑉ ᓗᓂ ᐱᒻ ᒪᑎᑦ ᓂᒃ ᓗ ᓂᕿᓕᐅᕈᑎᓂᒃ ᐊᐅᓪ ᓚᐅᑎᑎᒍᑦ – ᑐᕌᓐ ᑐᒥ 1973-r ᐊᖁᔦᖄᕈᑎᐅᓚᐅᕐ r-
+ ᐃᒪᖁᐃᓕᔨᕈᑦ ᓱᓂ ᑖᑯᓃᖁ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᔾᒃ ᑯᑦ ᐅᐸᓗᖃᓇᑐᓕᑎᔾᒃ ᑯᓐ ᓂ, ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᔾᒃ ᑯᑦ ᐊᐱᑎᒥᐊᓕᑦ ᓂᒃ (ᐸᐃᑎᔭᐅᒥᐊ-
ᓕᑦ ᓂᒃ) ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᔾᒃ ᑯᑦ. ᑖᑉ ᑯᐊ ᑲᒪᕙᒃ ᑐᑦ ᓱᒃ ᑯᖅᑕᐅᑎᐃᓕᔨᑎᒃ ᑯᑦ ᑖᑉ ᑯᐊ ᐱᑉ ᓗᒥᑦ ᒪᐅᖁᑐᐃᓐ ᓇᖅ ᑯᕖᔦᖄᕐ ᓂᖅ-
ᐸᑦ CLD'L.

ᒥᓯᑕ ᕿᓕᓇᕖᒃ ᒫᓐ ᓇ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᕐ ᒥᔦᖅ ᐱᒥᐊᖅᑎᑕᐅᓚᐅᖅᑐᖅ ᐃᒪᒪᐃᓕᔨᐅᑉ ᓗᓂ ᐊᐅᓪ ᓚᖅᑕᐅᓂᕐ ᓂᒃ ᒪᕙᒪᒃ ᑯᑦ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎ-
ᔨᕐᓐ ᓂ ᑕᒪᓐ ᓇ ᕿᑎᒪᓕᖁᓂ 1977 ᐊᒻ ᒪᓗ ᐊᖁᔦᖄᑎᔭᐅᑉ ᓗᓂ 15 ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᔾᒃ ᑯᕐᓐ ᓄᑦ ᑲᑎᒪᔨᕐᓐ ᓄᑦ.

ᒥᓯᑕ ᖃᓕᓂ ᖅᒃ ᐃᓕᒥᔭᐅᔦᖅ ᑲᑐᑦ ᔨᖃᑎᒌᕐᓐ ᓄᑦ ᐱᒻ ᒪᑎᒃ ᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓪ ᓚᐅᑎᓕᑎᔨᓄᑦ ᐋᓐ ᑎᐅᑎᐅᒥ.

ᑲᑎᒪᔨᑦ

ᔨ. ᕌ. ᒪᒃ ᑖᓄᓪ ᑦ ᐃᖃᓗᓕᑎᔨᑦ ᐊᕙᑖᓕᑎᔨᐅᔦᑦ

ᐃᓅᓕᓚᐅᖅᑐᖅ ᑖᕙᓂ ᕗᑎᖅ Baddock ᓅᕙ ᓯᑰᓴᒥ, ᒥᓯᑕᒪᒃ ᑖᓄᓪ ᑦ ᐃᓕᓴᑎᐊᖃᓚᐅᖅᑐᖅ ᐃᓅᓕᕐ ᖂᓂᕐ ᒥᓂ ᐊᒻ ᒪᓗ
ᐋᑐᕚᒥ. ᐃᓕᓐ ᓂᐊᓐᑎᕈᑎᑕᐅᑦ ᓱᓂ ᓱᓇᓕᒫᒨᑦ ᐃᓅᓂᕐ ᒥᒃ ᑖᕙᖁᑦ St. Francis Xavier ᐃᓕᓐ ᓂᐊᕐ ᖅᒃ ● SCᒥC-
ᐸ, Antigonish ᓅᕙ ᓯᑰᓴᒥ.ᒥᓯᑕᒪᒃ ᑖᓄᓪ ᑦ ᐃᖃᓗᓕᑎᔾᒃ ᑯᓐ ᓂ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᓯᓚᐅᖅᑐᖅ 1960-r ᐊᒻ ᒪᓗ ᑭᖁᒍᓂ-
ᖁᒍᑦ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᔾᒃ ᑯᓐ ᓂ ᐸᐃᑎᔾᒃ ᑯᕐᓐ ᓂ ᐃᒃ ᐱᒥᔨᓕᑎᔾᒃ ᑯᕐᓐ ᓂ 1972-r. ᒥᓯᑕᒪᒃ ᑖᓄᓪ ᑦ ᒫᓐ ᓇ ᐃᒪᒐᐃᓕᑎᔨᐅᔦᖅ
ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᔾᒃ ᑯᓐ ᓂ ᑕᑎᐅᕌᓗᑦ r.

ᐃᒻ. ᔨ. ᔫᐊᑎᓴᓐ ᐃᓄᓕᑎᔾᒃ ᑯᓐ ᓂ

ᒥᓯᑕᔫᐊᑎᓴᓐ ᐃᓅᓕᓚᐅᖅᑐᖅ Fredericton, New Brunswick-L ᐃᓕᓐ ᓂᐊᓐᑎᓚᐅᖅᑐᖅ ᑐᕌᓐ ᑐ ᐃᓕᓐ ᓂᐊᕐ -
ᖅᒃ ᔦᐊᖁᓂ ᓇᕚᖅᑐᐃᑦ ᒥᒃ ᓵᓄᑦ 1959-r. ᐃᓕᓐ ᓂᐊᑎᐊᕋᒥ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᓯᓚᐅᖅᑐᖅ ᐋᓐ ᑎᐅᑎᐆᑉ ᓄᓇᓕᑎᔾᒃ ᑯᕐᓐ ᓂᓇᕚᖅᑐ-
ᓕᑎᔾᒃ ᑯᕐᓐ ᓂᓗ ᑕᐃᒪᐃᑦ ᑐᓕᑎᔨᐅᑉ ᓗᓂ ᓄᓇᐅᑉ ᒥᒃ ᓵᓄᑦ ᑲᒪᓂᔨᐅᑉ ᓗᓂ ᑕᒪᑯᓂᖁ ᐋᓐ ᑎᐅᑎᐆᑉ ᐱᖁᕐ ᓇᖁᓂ.

ᑖᒃ ᑯᓇᓂ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᓯᓚᐅᖅᑐᖅ ᐃᓄᓕᑎᔾᒃ ᑯᓐ ᓂ 1973-r ᑖᑉ ᑯᓇᓂ ᕗᐊᑦ ᓯᒪᑦ ᒥ ᔪᓗᓇᐃᒥᓗ. ᑕᒪᒃ ᑯᓃᖁ ᐃᓕᒥᔭᐅᑉ ᓗᓂ
ᓄᓇᐅᑉ ᐊᑐᕐ ᓂᖁᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᑦ ᓯᐊᕐ ᒥᐅᑦ ᐃᒥᕐ ᓂᐊᖅᑎᕐᓐ ᓄᑦ ᐅᑭᐅᖅᑖᖅᑑᑉ ᓗ ᐃᒥᕐ ᓂᐊᖅᑏᑦ ᑲᑎᒫᔨᕐᓐ ᓄᑦ. ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖁᑕ
ᐃᓕᖁᑦ ᑖᑯᓇᓂ ᐃᖃᓗᑦ ᓂᐊᖅᑎᒃ ᑯᓐ ᓂ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᑎᔾᒃ ᑯᓂᓗ ᕙᓐ ᑰᕙᒥ ᑕᒫᓂ 1975-1977 ᑲᒪᔨᐅᓚᐅᖅᑐᖅ ᐃᓕᓐ ᓂᐊᖅᑕᓂᒃ
ᐱᔭᐅᒥᐊᓕᑦ ᓂᒃ ᓗ ᑖᑯᓃᖁ ᑲᒪᒥᐊᓕᑦ ᓄᑦ ᑲᑎᒪᔦᓂᒃ ᓗ ᑐᕌᔭᐅᒥᐊᓕᑦ ᓂᒃ c d a ᐱᓗᒥᑦ ᐊᓖᔅ ᑲᐅᑉ ᐊᑐᑎᐊᖁᑕ ᓯᑉ ᓗᐊᓗ-
ᒃ ᑯᑦ ᐅᖅᓯᐊᓗᓕ ᑎᔨᕐᓐ ᓄᑦ ᐱᔭᐅᕙᓕᐊᑎᓪ ᓗᒍ. 1977-r ᐅᑎᓚᐅᖅᑐᖅ ᔭᓗᓇᐃᒨᑦ CL" ᓇᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᑎᑉ ᓗᒍᑐᖁᓕᑎᔭᐅ-
ᑉ ᓗᓂ ᐃᒪᒐᐃᓕᔨᖁᓄᑦ ᐱᒃ ᑲᓐ ᓂᖅᑕᐅᒍᑦ ᓇᕐᒋᑦ ᑐᓄᑦ ᐱᑦ ● a' ᑖᑯᐊᓗ ᑲᒪᒥᑉ ᓗᒥᑦ ᓄᓇᑦ ᓯᐊᕐ ᒥᐅᑦ ᐅᔭᕋᑦ ᓂᐊᖅᑎᕐᓐ ᓄᑦ
ᐅᖅᓯᐊᓗᓕᑎᔨᕐᓐ ᓄᑦ ᓗ ᑖᑉ ᑯᐊ ᑕᐃᒪᐃᑦ ᔦᑎᒥᑉ ᓗᒥᑦ ᐃᓄᓕᑎᔾᒃ ᑯᑦ.

ᑭᓐ ᔦᐊᓐ ᐃᖃᓗᓕᑎᔾᔪᑦ ᑯᑦ ᐊᕙᑎᖅ ᓂᐊᖅᑎᓪ ᓗ

ᒥᓯᑕ ᔦᐊᓐ ᐃᓅᓕᓚᐅᖅᑐᖅ ᕕᒃ ᑑᑎᐊᒥ ᐃᓕᓐ ᓂᐊᖅᑐᕕᓂᐅᑉ ᓗᓂ ᐃᓕᓐ ᓂᐊᕐ ᕕᒃ ᔭᐊᖅᓯᓂ ᐳᖁᑎᔅ ᑲᓚᒻ ᐱᐊᒥ ᐊᒻ ᒪᓗ ᐃᓕᓐ ᓂ-
ᐊᕐ ᕕᒃ ᔭᐊᖅᓯᓂ ᕗᐊᑕᓗᑉ. ᒫᓐ ᓇᓕ ᒥᓯᑕ ᔦᐊᓐ ᐊᖅᓚᔭᖄᖅᔪᔭᖅ ᐃᒪᖅᔭᐊᑉ ᐃᓕᒪᕆᐊᖄᕐ ᓂᖅᓚᓂᒃ ᐱᓇᓯᐊᖅᑕᐅᔭᒥᒃ ᑕᒪᑐᒥᖅᓚ
ᐃᖃᓗᓕᑎᔾᔪᒃ ᑯᓐ ᓂᓗ ᐊᒻ ᒪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᕚᓗᓕᑎᔾᔪᖅᕆᓐ ᓂ. 1970-ᒥ ᑐᖅᓚᑎᔮᐅᓚᐅᖅᑐᖅ ᐃᓕᓐ ᓂᐊᕐ ᓂᕐ ᒥᒃ ᑕᒪᑯᓂᖅᓚ ᐊᐅ-
ᓚᖅᑕᐅᓂᖅᓚᓂ ᐅᖅᓯᐊᓘᑉ - ᒐᕙᒪᒃ ᑯᑦ ᑲᒪᓂᖅᓚᓂᒃ ᑖᕗᖅᓚ ᐅᖅᓯᐊᓘᑉ d ᕕᒍᖅ ᓇᕐ ᓂᖅᓚᓂᒃ . ᒫᓐ ᓇᓕ ᐊᒃ ᓚᒃ ᑎᒻ ᒪᑎᕆᔦᖅ
ᑖᑉ ᑯᓄᖅᓚ ᐃᒪᒐᐃᓚᕗᑦ ᑲᑎᒪᕗᖅᕆᓐ ᓄᑦ ᐱᕚᓪ ᓚᐊᒍᑎᖅᕆᓐ ᓄᑦ ᐃᒡ ᕙᒡ ᕕᐅᑉ ᐃᑉ ᑎᔭᑦ ᐅᖅᓯᐊᓗᖅᕆᑦ ᐃᓚᑕᐅᕙᓪ ᓚᐊᓂᖅᓚᓂᒃ
ᐊᒻ ᒪᓗᑉ ᑕᐅᖅ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖄᓯᒪᖅ ᒥᔭᖅ ᑐᖅᕆᓚ ᑎᔭᐅᑉ ᓗᓂ ᐊᖅᓚᔭᖄᖅᓚᓄᑦ Nato Colloquim ᐅᖅᓯᐊᓗᑉ ᑯᕕᓂᖅᓚᓄᑦ ᐃᖃᓇ-
ᐃᔭᖅᓯᒪᑉ ᓗᓂᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐊᐅᑦ ᓚᑦ ᔭᑎᖅᕆᓐ ᓂᒃ ᐱᕚᓪ ᓚᐊᓂᕐ ᒥᒃ ᑖᑉ da ᐃᒃ ᐱᕆᑦ ᓯᐊᑎᐊᖄᕐ ᓂᖅᓐ ᓂᒃ ᓯᑯᑎᑦ ᓯᒍᖅ ᓇᖅᑑᑉ
ᐃᖃᓗᓕᖅ ᓂᒃ . ᒥᓯᑕ ᔦᐊᓐ ᐃᓕᕆᔭᐅᓯᒪᔭᖅ ᐊᒥᓯᓄᑦ ᐃᖃᓇᐃᔭᖅᐸᒃ ᑐᓄᑦ ᑖᑉ ᑯᐊ ᐱᑉ ᓗᕆᑦ ᑕᐃᔭᐅᔭᑦ Maritime
Code ᓇᓗᓇᐃᒃ ᑯᑕᕐ ᒥᒃ ᓱᒃ ᑯᐃᖅᑕᐃᓕᓂᕐ ᒥᒃ ᓗᑕᒪᑐᒥᖅᓚᑲᒪᔭᓂᒃ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᐅᒥᐊᕐ ᔭᐊᓕᑎᔾᔪᖅᕆᓐ ᓂᒃ 200 ᒪᐃᐅᑦ
ᐅᖅᓚᓯᖅ ᓂᖅᓚ ᑎᑭᑦ ᓗᒍ .

APPENDIX III

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APPENDIX IV

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ᑲᑎᒪᔨᑦ ᖁᔭᓐᓇᒦᕈᒪᕗᑦ ᑖᒃᑯᓄᖓᓕᒫᖅ ᓄᓇᓕᒻ ᓄᑦ ᑲᑎᒪᕗᖕ ᓅᖅᑐᕕᓂᕐ ᓄᑦ ᐃᑲᕗᖅᑐᒥᓂᐅᓗᑎᒃ ᓗ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑭᒃ ᑯᓕᒫᑦ ᑲᑎᒪᕗᒥᓂᐅᑎᑦ ᓗᒋᑦ ᐸᖕ ᓅᖅᑐᒥ ᐅᑲᓕᐊᓗᖕ ᒥᓗ ᖃᒻ ᒥᕈᕐ-ᒥᓗ ᑭᖕᒐᕐ ᓂᓗ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑲᑎᒪᑦ ᕗᑎᒥᓂᕐ ᒥᒃ ᐃᓘᓐ ᓇᐃᓐ ᓄᑦ ᐃᖅᑲᓗᓂ. ᖁᔭᓐ ᓇᒦᕐ ᒥᕗᒍᑦ ᑕᑯᓄᖕᒐ ᑲᒪᓚᐅᖅᑐᓄᑦ ᐊᒃ ᓚᒃ ᑎᓄᑦ ᐃᑲᕗᓚᐅᖅᑐᓄᑦ ᓗ ᐃᖕ ᒥᒃ ᑯᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᖕ ᓂ ᑖᑯᐊ ᐊᑲᐅᓇᖅᑎᑦ ᓯᓯᒪᓚᐅᖅᑐᑦ ᑐᓵᔨᐅᓂᕐ ᒥᒃ.

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