



Canadian International  
Development Agency

Agence canadienne de  
développement international

# Corporate Evaluation of the Canadian Cooperation Program in Haiti (1994-2002)

## Summary Report

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The cover page shows the sculpture of an unknown slave [called the *marron inconnu*] in front of the Presidential Palace in Port au Prince. The sculpture may be representative of Haitian history and, to some extent, symbolic of our evaluation process.

It depicts a slave breaking free from the chains of oppression, and blowing into the lambi shell to call others in the same condition to do the same. The evaluation is also a call to a new way of thinking and of implementing international development cooperation in countries in crisis.

Dr. Rémy Beaulieu

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## **Foreword**

The Haiti country program is in many respects one of a kind within CIDA development cooperation experience. The existing program is the result of three decades of Canadian commitment in the country supported by a sustained political will from Canadian authorities to try to contribute to the well being of the Haitian population. The participation of a large number of Canadian institutions, NGOs and private sector organisations has contributed to this effort. The Haitian Diaspora was, and remains, very effective in advocating for a larger and more diversified presence of Canada.

The evaluation of such a program is a very challenging exercise. First, the period (1994 – 2002) covered by the evaluation was particularly volatile. Emerging from three years of “de facto” military government during which the bilateral program was suspended, the return to constitutionality was celebrated as the opening of a new era of opportunities for the reconstruction of the country. The international donor community was mobilized and a kick off program was put together. The goal was to show quick benefits to the population while the planning and programming process was launched to design a more development-oriented program. But the optimistic perspective faded rapidly and the dialogue between the international community and the Haitian government became more and more difficult. Other political events, outbursts of violence, increase of conditionality resulted in a major disengagement of most donors and, to a certain extent, fuelled a syndrome of “Haiti fatigue” among the international community.

Second, Canadian assistance during this period was not an integrated program. Projects and programs originated from very different sources. Some came from NGOs activities put in place during the interruption of bilateral cooperation with the support of the Partnership Branch; some addressed the needs of rehabilitation – reconstruction phases; others were Canadian contributions to the effort to re-establish the security within the country. Finally, some pertaining to the usual planning process were at the early stages of the implementation phase,

too early to be conclusive about developmental results.

And while one may speculate as to whether conditions in Haiti would have been better or worse without CIDA’s continued involvement, the evaluation nevertheless provides a well-documented image of the current Canadian involvement in Haiti, raises relevant questions to be addressed and provides useful insights and milestones that will feed into the development of the new programming strategy for Haiti currently in progress.

The close collaboration between the Evaluation Division, Performance Review Branch, the Haiti desk and field representatives has lead to a constructive approach and illustrates the added value of a corporate perspective.

## Management Response

First, we would like to congratulate the evaluation team, led by Rémy Beaulieu, on the quality of the work done and the participatory approach that allowed all partners to express their views. Throughout the evaluation process, the Haiti, Cuba and Dominican Republic Division was able to exchange and provide clarifications and comments on the information, analysis and arguments in the evaluation. We also had the chance to provide a series of specific comments on a draft of the summary document. Most of these comments were reflected in the final document. We now wish to respond to the more general aspects of the evaluation, not to each conclusion, lesson and recommendation.

Like the evaluators, we recognize that the cooperation program is at a crossroads. For this reason, with CIDA's other branches, BMH has embarked on an in-depth review to develop implementation strategies and mechanisms suited to a difficult and ineffective partnership. The corporate evaluation's conclusions support and enhance the strategic approach that we plan to adopt for future programming in Haiti. Moreover, a concept paper, outlining the strategic approach, will soon be submitted to Policy Committee for consideration.

We believe that the evaluators' diagnosis is accurate, given the current situation in Haiti. The BMH team has already voiced its reservations about certain aspects of the evaluation and its limitations. Among other things, the analysis does not reflect the program's political dimension. This dimension has been a determining factor in decision-making since 1994.

The evaluation recognizes the complexity of working in Haiti. It recognizes the impact of the structural crisis on the program's resources, implementation and results. It also highlights the importance of developing a corporate approach to programming. This approach will optimize the use of all CIDA mechanisms. We are developing such an approach.

The evaluation highlights the importance of striking an ideal balance between country and/or sectoral concentration in future programming. It also emphasizes the

possibility of seizing opportunities without scattering our efforts. In this regard, we must be sure to harmonize larger-scale or longer-term activities with the small-scale, short-term approach in future programming. The suggested sub-sector approach might be valuable.

We agree with the evaluators that the criteria for Bilateral and Canadian Partnership responsive mechanisms should at least be harmonized. The structure of the program should allow better synergy among the various mechanisms available at CIDA.

The evaluation amply showed the importance of policy dialogue, consultation and coordination among all partner involved in Haiti. We plan to make this a full-fledged line of business in future programming. This will allow Canadian cooperation to continue its leading role in international cooperation.

Risk management will be examined in depth. Managing and dealing with risk constitutes a key challenge in difficult partnerships, especially if phasing out assistance is no longer the best possible option.

It is worth focusing on the finding that the results chain is broken in a country in crisis. We would have liked the evaluation to touch on the consequences of non-intervention. This means the concept of results aimed at preserving and/or halting the deterioration of achievements, rather than improving a given status. We will cooperate with Performance Review Branch to adapt these concepts to the Haiti program.

Operationally, key questions were raised about streamlining the program, reviewing resources required for program delivery, transaction costs, increasing the program's effectiveness, and delivering the program in a country in crisis. The complexity of the environment, institutional weakness, and internal/external risks require stronger ongoing support of projects and programs. These aspects must be properly addressed in a future policy paper.

## Abbreviations and acronyms

AFD - Agence française de développement

BHN - Basic human needs

BRH - Banque de la République d'Haïti  
[Bank of the Republic of Haiti]

CCPSU - Canadian Cooperation Program  
Support Unit

CEA - Canadian Executing Agency

CECI - Canadian Centre for International Studies  
and Cooperation

CHCF - Canada-Haiti Counterpart Fund

CIDA - Canadian International Development  
Agency

DID - Développement international Desjardins

ED/PSD - Economic development / public sector  
development

EEDCRF - Environment, Economic Development  
and Civil Reconstruction Fund

EFHE - Emergency Fund in Health and  
Education

ESF - Environment Support Fund

EU - European Union

EUI - Economic Intelligence Unit

FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization

FR - Field representative

G - Gourde [basic monetary unit in Haiti]

GAD/GE - Gender and development, and gender  
equality

GD/HR - Governance, democracy and human  
rights

GH - Government of Haiti

HAF - Humanitarian Alliance Fund

HIPC - Heavily indebted poor country

IB - Institution building

ID - Institutional development

IDB - Inter-American Development Bank

ILO - International Labour Office

IMF - International Monetary Fund

JHRF - Justice and Human Rights Fund

KFF - Kore Fanm Fund

MARNDR - Ministère de l'agriculture, des  
ressources naturelles et du développement rural

MEDA - Mennonite Economic Development  
Association

MICAH-OAS Mission to Haiti

MPCE - Ministère de la planification et de la  
coopération externe

n/a - not applicable

n.d. – no data

NGO - Non-governmental organization

NPH - National Police of Haiti

OAS - Organization of American States

ODA - Official Development Assistance

PRSF - Poverty Reduction Strategy Formulation

RBM - Results-based management

RCMP - Royal Canadian Mounted Police

SME - Small and medium-sized enterprise

SOCODEVI - Société de coopération pour le  
développement international

UNCDF - United Nations Capital Development  
Fund

UNDP - United Nations Development Program

UNICEF: United Nations Fund for Children

WB - World Bank

## 1.0 Introduction

### 1.1 Background of the Evaluation

The multiple aspects of the economic, social, political and institutional crisis in Haiti poses major challenges in implementing and evaluating Canada's cooperation in that country.

In this context, Performance Review Branch received the mandate from CIDA's senior management to undertake a corporate evaluation of CIDA's cooperation in Haiti for the period 1994 to 2002 including the bilateral, multilateral and partnership programs.

### 1.2 Evaluation Objectives

The Canadian cooperation in Haiti is one of the oldest and largest that CIDA has implemented. In the 1990s, the program sought to respond to emergencies before focusing on strengthening public institutions and finally, emphasizing reducing poverty via civil-society organizations.

Today, the program is at a crossroads. There is a need to closely examine the assumptions, approaches, funding mechanisms, areas of support and types of partnership that have formed the basis of Canadian cooperation in an unstable country.

The evaluation has two specific objectives:

- ❑ to assess CIDA's activities in order to determine the relevance, coherence and results of Canadian cooperation in Haiti;
- ❑ to draw lessons from CIDA's experience that can serve as a basis for making decisions about future activities in this country and similar situation elsewhere.

### 1.3 Evaluation Components

Apart from this executive report, the program evaluation has six components:

- ❑ a profile of Canadian cooperation in Haiti from 1994 to 2002;
- ❑ an analysis of social development and basic human needs (SD/BHN);
- ❑ an analysis of economic development and private sector development (ED/PSD);
- ❑ an analysis of governance, democracy and human rights (GD/HR);
- ❑ an analysis of institution building (IB), which cuts across all intervention priorities; and
- ❑ a synthesis report presenting the overall findings and conclusions of the thematic and sectoral studies.

This Summary Report aims to summarize the synthesis report.

### 1.4 Evaluation Themes

For all components of the evaluation, the main question was as follows:

Did Canadian cooperation in Haiti (1994-2002) allow the achievement of sustainable development results in reducing poverty, addressing basic human needs, and building public institutions and civil society? What lessons can be drawn from this experience about cooperation in a country in crisis?

To answer this question, five key evaluation themes were identified:

- ❑ **Relevance:** How well do CIDA's activities meet Haiti's development objectives and Canadian cooperation objectives and international commitments?
- ❑ **Coherence:** Is there any coherence in the different components of Canada's cooperation program and in CIDA's relations with Canadian departments (including DFAIT) and agencies active in Haiti, the Government of Haiti and other donors?
- ❑ **Efficiency and effectiveness:** What conditions have favoured the smooth operation of Canadian cooperation projects? What conditions have caused difficulties?
- ❑ **Results achieved and sustainability,** distinguishing clearly between support to government and civil-society institutions, and monitoring mechanisms for short- and medium-term program results.
- ❑ **Risk management:** How are risks managed in a country such as Haiti? What care is taken to analyze and monitor Canadian cooperation's risks and choices?

### 1.5 Methodology

The evaluation sought to build on a variety of traditional approaches including documentation review, interviews and field visits. We also wanted to use participatory approaches such as round tables, focus groups and feedback sessions to involve as much as possible the variety of stakeholders involved in the Canadian cooperation in Haiti. Approaches included the following:

- ❑ The evaluation team reviewed the literature on Haiti. The team focused special attention on all matters related to CIDA interventions.
- ❑ The team undertook a deeper analysis of a selection of projects through meetings held in Canada and Haiti to discuss these



projects and visits of some projects on site in Haiti.

- ❑ The team reviewed project literature. This included management plans, logical frameworks analysis, narrative reports, evaluation studies and so on. The team interviewed executing agencies, monitoring officers, and CIDA managers involved in these projects.
- ❑ The team widely consulted CIDA's Canadian and Haitian partners on all aspects of the program through round tables and focus groups in Canada and Haiti.
- ❑ The team held information feedback sessions with program managers and with Canadian, local and international partners.

In all, more than 400 people were involved. They included program managers, Canadian partners, stakeholders in the field, local partners and representatives of international agencies.

The evaluation of the different channels of Canadian cooperation was a challenge considering the fact that CIDA's interventions in Haiti for that period were not the result of an integrated programming effort. However, we have included in the sample of projects for review, projects from the different channels and have analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of each cooperation channel.

Note that the corporate evaluation team did not conduct any project impact studies. The team felt that this would prove impractical considering the fact that activities are divided among many sectors and focus areas for action and that there are no valid, comparable databases. Such a task would have meant or incurred implementation costs clearly beyond the resources and time allocated for this process.

## 2.0 Program Context and Environment

### 2.1 Ongoing Structural Crisis

The evaluation considered the nature of the crisis that Haitian society is currently facing. The thematic and sectoral studies analyzed the historical, political, social, cultural and institutional aspects of the crisis. Some of the characteristics of that crisis include:

- ❑ A society profoundly divided between a traditional culture and an elite;
- ❑ An unstable government and a weak public institutional capacity;
- ❑ Economic and social infrastructures that are seriously deteriorated;

- ❑ An absence of capacity to have law and order being respected allowing violent insurgences;

- ❑ An uncontrollable flux of migrants from rural areas to Port au Prince;

- ❑ The concentration of wealth in the hands of a few traditional families and new mafia-like groups;

- ❑ An inadequate and constantly deteriorating environmental base;

In such context, we consider that for the period 1994-2002, Canadian cooperation has had to work in an extremely difficult environment. In such structural crisis, the necessary critical conditions were often not present to allow projects to be successful. In such a context, the development results chain is often broken. And we consider that these conditions of crisis will remain in a short and medium term.

#### The broken result chain

**Modern management theory suggests that the result chain should include the following logic:  
Inputs→Outputs→Outcomes- Impacts**

**The proper implementation of such chain implies the existence of a number of critical conditions, which if they do not exist may affect the success of the project. In a country in crisis, these conditions are not only non-existent, they often work against the intent of development initiatives (absence or inadequacy of the legal framework, absence of institutional capacity, social and political conflicts, inexistent minimum logistical requirements, brain drain, predatory behaviours, etc.)**

**What to do in such context? The answer to this question would probably require deeper analysis and research. However we hope that this evaluation will provide some food for thought in this regard.**

### 2.2 Summary of Political Issues

Haiti ranks among the countries that have experienced the most dramatic situations in the past 15 years characterized by a series of breakdowns in the social and political environment.

For the past eight years, despite the move toward democratization, government instability has characterized the environment of the Canadian cooperation program in Haiti. Governance problems have led many international stakeholders to withdraw. These include the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Others, such as the American, French, European and Canadian cooperation, have considerably reduced their support to Haiti. Canadian cooperation currently ranks second after American cooperation.

## 2.3 Summary of Socio-economic Issues

Haiti is the only country in the Americas that ranks among the world's poorest countries.

There are about eight million Haitians. It is estimated that 66% live below the poverty line. In rural areas, the rate is 80%. In Port-au-Prince, 66% of people live on less than US\$25 per month. Conditions are increasingly violent and unsanitary. This makes the Haitian capital one of the world's poorest cities. Also, the international community established a global fund to support activities to fight the HIV/AIDS pandemic which is the most important of the Americas.

### Economic and Social Indicators: Haiti (2000)

Population (million)	8.0
Per capita GDP (US\$)	480
Life expectancy	53
Infant mortality (per 1000 births)	70
Infant malnutrition (% of under fives)	28
Access to drinking water (% of population)	46
Illiteracy (% of those 15 and over)	52
HIV/AIDS Prevalence (15-49)	6,1

In 2000, Haiti ranked 146th out of 173 countries on the Human Development Index. The gross domestic product diminished in the past two years. As a result, poverty has increased even further, since the population is fast growing.

## 3.0 Profile of the Canadian Cooperation in Haiti (1994-2002)

### 3.1 CIDA's Disbursements by Branch and Priority

Starting in 1994, Canadian cooperation rose sharply from \$35M a year in 1994-95 to nearly \$45M in 1997-98. It then rapidly declined to \$18.6M for 2001/2002. (note that the data for 2001-2002 are preliminary) There have been three key programming phases:

- ❑ Phase I (1994-1995): Projects basically focused on BHN (in this case, emergency assistance and reconstruction).
- ❑ Phase II (1996-1999): Massive investments were made to support government mechanisms for better governance.
- ❑ Phase III (2000-2002): An increasing commitment was made to civil society. This included creating several decentralized funds.

Disbursements totalled about \$273M from 1994/95 to 2001/2002. Americas Branch contributed the most (64.3% of disbursements).

Multilateral Programs Branch followed with 20.3%, and Canadian Partnership with 15.4%.

Canadian Partnership disbursements rose during the first three years. They then remained relatively stable. Proportionally speaking, however, they rose from 9.4% to 29%, while bilateral and multilateral disbursements dropped.

With regard to disbursements by priority, disbursements focused particularly on social development and basic human needs (SD/BHN) with 28.4% of the total. They also focused on governance and human rights (GD/HR) with 24.4% of disbursements, most of which to support government institutions. Uncoded disbursements (13.8%) include mainly administrative expenses.

### Disbursements by Priority (1994-2002)\*

Priority	\$ Million	%
SD/BHN	77.6	28.5
GD/HR	66.7	24.4
ED/PSD	18.4	6.7
Other <sup>(1)</sup>	72.6	26.6
Uncoded	37.8	13.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>273.1</b>	<b>100</b>

\* Data for 2001-2002 fiscal year are preliminary

1 This includes Canadian Funds for Local Initiatives, infrastructure services, the environment and gender equality.

### 3.2 Programming Structure

It appears that, the Canadian cooperation in Haiti was fairly dispersed during the period reviewed, despite recent efforts to achieve greater sector-based and geographic concentration.

The evaluation identified 450 projects or sub-projects based on available information. These data exclude initiatives funded by CFLIs. They also exclude projects funded by Canadian Partnership at the start of the period. No reliable data are available for these projects and initiatives.

Considering the resources invested, scattered Canadian projects do not seem to provide a critical mass of results, do not foster efficiency and effectiveness of the action taken, and make it difficult to achieve sustainable results in view of the surrounding high-risk environment.

**Partial Estimate - Number of Projects Funded by CIDA (1994-2002)**

Branch or Mechanism	Projects
Bilateral (non fund projects)	55
HAF, ESF, Kore Fanm, JHRF, CHCF and EFHE (sub-projects of funds)	173
Partnership (recent and current)	188
Multilateral (including bilateral fund projects)	34
<b>Total</b>	<b>450</b>

## 4.0 Canadian Cooperation Results

### 4.1 Overview

To answer the evaluation's main question, we may conclude as follows:

- Canadian cooperation over the three key phases (emergency assistance and reconstruction, support focusing on government mechanisms, and development of civil society) has helped to reduce poverty in Haiti. It has also helped to meet the basic needs of many target groups. It has supported several projects that have achieved good, even excellent, performance. It has succeeded in strengthening a substantial number of local organizations, mostly in civil society. One might be tempted to say that, considering the very difficult circumstances under which the program has been delivered, its performance has been quite remarkable.
- But this contribution can generally be described as marginal, given the scope and depth of the problems in relation to the resources invested. This reality is even more evident since many donors have withdrawn.
- Canadian cooperation has been characterized by a project-based (in many cases, a micro-project) approach. Synergy, complementarity and multiplier effects were consequently limited. This prevented investments from achieving maximum efficiency and effectiveness.

Examples of Results in the Education Sector	
<b>PAENA</b>	• 40 school committees organized
	• 3 resources centres built
	• 4 cooperation tables organized
	• Directors and inspectors trained
<b>FDCHC (CECI Project)</b>	• 2 schools built
	• 1 schools rehabilitated
	• 3 schools equipped
	• 3 school committees organized
<b>Club 2/3 (Ile de la Tortue: 2 projects)</b>	• 12 primary schools supported
	• 7 class-rooms repaired
	• 184 teachers trained
	• Educational material printed
	• 8847 students reached

- Moreover, the environment of a multidimensional and structural crisis is a major obstacle to attain sustainable results, especially in support to public institutions where political interferences and institutional weaknesses sometimes cause setbacks that are more rapid than the painstaking progress made. This difficulty in achieving sustainable results is not unique to Canadian cooperation. It affects all cooperation agencies evidenced by other program evaluations, including evaluations by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank.

- Finally, the situation of crisis that the country has been facing during the period reviewed, raised the level of interest and scrutiny of the Canadian authorities in regard to the development assistance program. This has raised the importance of political considerations in the decision making process related to the cooperation activities. As a matter of examples, we can mention the embargo imposed on Haiti during the period 1990 to 1994, or the importance of the governance component within the Canadian interventions.

### 4.2 Results by Phases of Canadian Cooperation

#### 4.2.1 Emergency Assistance/Reconstruction

In 1994, there appeared to be strong agreement among donors to provide humanitarian assistance. It was imperative to invest funds to create jobs and income quickly by massively rebuilding economic and social infrastructures. Therefore, in 1994 and 1995, CIDA programming basically involved food aid programs and labour-intensive infrastructure activities.

This set of activities generated a large share of expected short-term results in job creation, and helped to provide rapid relief for many Haitians living in poverty.

#### 4.2.2 Strengthening of the Public-Sector

During the period 1996 to 1999 CIDA, as did most donors, gave priority to supporting democracy and good governance in Haiti, mainly through institution building of government mechanisms.

These large-scale initiatives included the payment of debt arrears, justice, policing, and public corporation reform with a view to equipping Haiti with institutions that would be able to play their social, economic and political role.

This type of project has admittedly been the one to yield the most disappointing results for Canada and other donors. The main reasons for this being the Haitian Government's lack of political will to reform the public sector as a whole and improve all forms of governance and the Government's flagrant lack of cooperation. Canada has had to terminate most of its support to public institutions, especially in the area of security and justice.

#### 4.2.3 Support for Civil Society

The third phase (2000/2002) was characterized by a shift in support toward civil society. This included establishing decentralized or local funds, mainly to strengthen the non-governmental sector. This approach did not exclude cooperating closely with government institutions at the local level when and where possible and necessary (education, health, cooperatives and so on).

It is very hard to measure the results of the third phase because many projects were still on-going or recently renewed. A very large number of initiatives were launched in a wide variety of sub sectors. Bases of comparisons are risky, but the following observations were made:

- ☐ The output achievement rate is generally satisfactory. This is especially true if we consider the situational factors that make it difficult to achieve project effectiveness in an efficient way.
- ☐ Projects do not necessarily generate substantial and significant outcomes for the issues they address. There are few exceptions in the area of immunization, savings and credit unions and energy for example.

### 4.3 Results by Key Area for Action

#### 4.3.1 Social Development and Basic Human Needs (SD/BHN)

Three key sub sectors were evaluated: food aid, health and education. A total of \$77.6M was

invested in these three areas. They represent 28.5% of Canadian cooperation in Haiti from 1994 to 2002.

Compared with other donors, from 1995 to 1998 (the period for which we have data), Canadian cooperation played a substantial role in food aid, making 11.3% of all contributions. In health, this contribution averaged less than 5%. In education, it varied between 15% and 30%, depending on the year.

#### Canadian SD/BHN Contributions

Donors	1995	1996	1997	1998
<b>1. Food aid: Thousands of metric tonnes</b>				
Donors	134.2	129.0	118.8	126.7
Canada	2	3.5	32.0	30.6
Canada as a %	5.8	2.7	26.9	24.2
<b>2. Health (\$M)</b>				
Donors	59.3	39.0	57.4	n.d.
Canada	1.3	2.3	1.6	4.02
Canada as a %	2.2	5.9	2.8	n/a
<b>3. Education (\$M)</b>				
Donors	12.3	14.0	22.0	24.8
Canada	1.8	3.6	3.5	7.4
Canada as a %	14.6	25.7	15.9	29.8

The study on basic human needs carried out as part of this evaluation yielded the following findings on results achieved:

- Food aid activities generally aimed to meet emergencies. Despite delays and some damage in transit, the bulk of outputs were delivered. Food aid provided immediate relief for target communities.
- A portion of Canadian food aid was monetized. Monetization served to finance community development projects. However, projects did not last long enough to shift from an emergency-oriented approach to a development-oriented approach, and thus produce sustainable results.

In some ways, the health and education sectors share a similar profile, characterized by the following findings:

- On the one hand, Canadian cooperation relieved human misery. It also addressed the basic needs of many target groups. It did this through various charitable activities by several Canadian religious and civil society organizations. This visible, human face has been and remains a trait of Canadian cooperation in Haiti.

• On the other hand, these activities were dispersed and fragmented into many subprojects and partners. They have produced substantial outputs, but not results that would make them replicable in space and sustainable over time.

Examples of Results in the Health Sector	
<b>FDCHC</b> (Centre GHESKIO)	• 600 women tested HIV -AIDS
	• 45 women received AZT
	• 12205 persons received IEC
	• 2109 accepted family planning
<b>Kore Fam</b> (Profamil)	• 6 persons trained
	• 12 organizations informed
	• 1 mobile clinic functional
	• 1400 adopted family planning
	• 2658 women received gynaecological care

CIDA intended to improve this situation by establishing health and education policy frameworks but these have not created any major synergy among the various channels of cooperation active in these sectors. This is partly because of the lack of coordination among CIDA's various response mechanisms. Significant efforts of coordination have been undertaken in the field. Such after the fact coordination of approved projects, does not seem to provide major synergy effects on the program per se.

CIDA has recently sought to remedy dispersion by concentrating on specific sectors (education and health) and a specific region (Artibonite). Finally, it should be noted that Canadian cooperation has played an important role within bilateral and multilateral discussions that have permitted the design of development plans and strategies in these social sectors.

#### 4.3.2 Governance, Democracy and Human Rights (GD/HR)

Activities in the GD/HR sector have addressed critical problems. These activities, totalling \$62.7M, have been in six sub-sectors: peacekeeping, public security, justice, prisons, elections and human rights.

##### CIDA Contributions: GD/HR (\$M)

Sub-sectors	\$
Peacekeeping (bilateral)	21.9
Public security (bilateral)	14.3
Justice (bilateral)	10.4
Elections/democracy (bilateral & multilateral)	5.8
Human rights (bilateral, incl. decentr. funds)	6.2
NGOs (recent and current projects)	4.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>62.7</b>

The study on governance and human rights carried out as part of this corporate evaluation

summarizes the results achieved in this sector as follows:

- **Peacekeeping:** Expected results were achieved during the transition period.
- **Public security:** Results began to emerge, but were negated when the Government politicized the police force. Canada therefore withdrew. The existence of non-favourable conditions impeded the project to produce the expected results.
- **Justice:** Political will was lacking. Activities were viewed as a threat. Inconsiderate demands were made. All of this led Canada to withdraw. Courthouses were built, judges were trained, but justice is no better served.
- **Prisons:** Canada was and is still involved in a UNDP program to improve all aspects of the penal system. The project generated valuable and sustainable results. However, the cost was very high.
- **Election:** Corrupt post-election practices nullified the results of Canada's upstream efforts (organization and provision of materials) to the electoral process.
- **Human rights:** Support for civil society (especially through JADJ and FKF) seems to have produced good qualitative results. However, these results are fragmented into several small initiatives. It is thus difficult to measure the actual impact.

Canada remains a credible partner among international organizations present in Haiti thanks to its management of the risks to which Canadian cooperation has been confronted. The Canadian response to the existing international agreement should be based on this experience.

The study generally concludes that, under present conditions, Canadian cooperation is justified in supporting civil-society initiatives. The approach here aims to strengthen demand within civil society. In so doing, these initiatives create pressure to provide government services relating to justice and public security.

##### The case of support to the Haitian Police

In 1994, the Haitian Government established a new Police to ensure security and the respect of the law and order.

The Canadian cooperation provided important support to this new institution by training new policemen and providing technical assistance through the Canadian RCMP. After a few years of effort, CIDA decided to step back based on a risk analysis demonstrating the increasing politicization of the institution.

#### 4.3.3 Economic Development and Private Sector Development (ED/PSD)

Canadian cooperation in the ED/PSD sector sought to favour the beginnings of economic development in a variety of sub-sectors. These sub-sectors include energy, cooperatives, rural development and environment.

In 1994-2002, Canadian cooperation invested \$58M to support economic development and private sector development, including environmental issues.

##### CIDA Contributions: ED/PSD (\$M)

Sub-sectors	\$
Bilateral among which:	
COOPEC (bilateral)	8.0
Agricultural cooperatives (bilateral)	3.0
Rural-local development (bilateral)	10.7
Electric power (bilateral)	24.0
Other (bilateral)	0.3
ESF and KFF (bilateral)	1.4
Partnership (recent and current projects)	11.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>58.7</b>

The study on economic development and private sector development carried out as part of this evaluation reported the following results for the 10 projects examined:

- ☐ Four projects, focussing on energy, micro finance, food production and cooperative farming, were or are highly successful in terms of outputs and outcomes offering potential for sustainability if certain conditions are met.
- ☐ Two projects generated mixed results. These were rural development projects that took a local development direction.
- ☐ Four projects did not meet expectations. They involved cooperative farming, small-business support and two decentralized funds.

Activities achieved critical mass in two sectors: energy, and savings and credit unions.

##### The cases of Energy

In the energy sector, CIDA focused its support to the Jacmel subsystem. The project outputs allowed to produce electricity, distribute it to more than 6,000 clients, and increase the recovery of costs. The local semi-autonomous centre was able to provide electricity 24 hours a day. However, the rising petroleum costs, the devaluation of the Gourde, and unpunished frauds could jeopardize sustainability. Canada's ongoing technical and financial presence seems necessary to safeguard what has been achieved through these investments.

##### The case of credit unions

In the savings and credit unions project 48 financial institutions provided services to 142,000 beneficiaries. The project permitted to strengthen the institutional and financial autonomy of local partners. However, the environment has been extremely weakened by the bankruptcy of many financial cooperatives (the credit unions providing 10% interest rate) operating outside the network supported by Canada. Added support, especially for administrative and financial controls, seems necessary to ensure a degree of sustainability.

Canadian Partnership Branch funded about 60 projects in this sector. These projects seem to be producing adequate results at the output level. However, they are generally limited in scope.

The study concludes that, in the areas of economic development and private-sector support, there may previously have been too much emphasis on community approaches and integrated development, with over-ambitious technical assistance and technology transfers. In the future, it might be more appropriate to focus on supporting entrepreneurship in specific production and technology sectors.

#### 4.3.4 Institution Building (IB)

The crosscutting study on institution building found that there were very limited results in this area concerning government institutions. The evaluations undertaken by other international cooperation agencies (namely WB and IDB) have reached the same conclusion.

The lack of IB results stems from three obstacles. The first is the structural crisis that has prevailed in Haiti for nearly half a century. This is the most difficult obstacle to overcome.

The second is the too-piecemeal approach usually taken in regard to IB. This approach focuses on one aspect of a problem. It uses limited means, very often training. To build institutions, it is necessary to act on several fronts at once. These include the partner's legal, economic, organizational and cultural aspects.

The third obstacle is that Canada's approach lacks consistency. Projects have been funded on a very short-term basis. This has not allowed the continuity needed to effect significant change. However, we found that the existence of long term partnerships between organizations of the Canadian and Haitian civil society may provide a base for long term sustainable development strategies.

#### 4.3.5 Cross-cutting themes

Gender equity and environment remained constant preoccupations of Canadian cooperation in Haiti during the period reviewed. However, the cross-cutting nature of these themes make it very difficult to measure performance.

The establishment of the Fonds Kore Fanm in 1997 and the one in support of the environment in 1998 intended to increase the level of effort. More recently, some studies have been undertaken to increase our contributions in these areas.

### 5.0 Review of Key Issues: Findings and Recommendations

In this section, we review the Canadian cooperation in Haiti for the period 1994 to 2002 in general. When possible we will make some recommendations for the future.

#### 5.1 Relevance

Most projects selected for review in this evaluation responded to real need at the time of their implementation and many addressed basic needs. We analyzed their relevance to the Haitian Government's objectives, Canadian cooperation priorities and international commitments.

The Government of Haiti lacked a comprehensive strategy that would have permitted the Canadian cooperation and other international organizations to establish a real division of labour based on clear targets in a comprehensive context.

Where possible, Canadian cooperation sought linkages with Haiti's national objectives, especially those defined in plans for the health and education sectors. However, these plans did not generate the dynamic they might have produced because the Government did not officially endorse or implement the plans.

Internationally, CIDA and other cooperation institutions established a number of common objectives among which we can mention the Millennium Development Goals. The United Nations family produced a common development framework (UNDAF). Also OAS produced a number of resolutions on governance issues. These objectives were relatively clear, but their practical applicability was less obvious.

Projects were consistent with Canada's poverty reduction objectives and ODA priorities, especially the social development priorities outlined in the framework for action in this regard.

At the same time, DFAIT strongly emphasized action to be taken in the area of governance and democracy. Major consultation efforts were made in the GD/HR sector to harmonize Canadian objectives among various departments and agencies (CIDA, DFAIT, Immigration, the RCMP and so on).

**Recommendation:** CIDA should take advantage of the current programming process to engage in consultations with Canadian and international partners with a view to developing clear strategic directions to concentrate the program in specific sectors or sub-sectors. It should pay special attention to the social sector in order to address basic human needs of the most vulnerable Haitian population.

We would suggest that the program would progressively evolve from a dispersed approach toward a more concentrated approach building on the successful projects with strategic potential. Annex II contains an analytical table setting out the advantages and disadvantages of two different approaches: concentration and dispersion.

#### 5.2 Coherence, Consultation, Coordination

##### - Coordination with the Government of Haiti

Canadian cooperation has invested time and energies in developing good partnerships with representatives of government and civil-society organizations in Haiti, and with international organizations. This strong point of Canadian cooperation has allowed us to play a catalytic role in terms of consultation and policy coordination.

However, many obstacles have been and continue to be faced in coordination with the Government of Haiti. The Government's objectives are often hazy and subject to change. Plans and policies are not approved or implemented. Its actions are often diametrically opposed to the projects carried out. Government spending is largely discretionary. Based on the consultations done as part of this evaluation, technical coordination (at least) must be maintained with authorities of the Government of Haiti. This will promote the efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of our activities.

**Recommendation:** We deem that the current approach of supporting civil-society organizations while cooperating with the appropriate government authorities to ensure service to the poorest is entirely justified. CIDA could also use its influence more strategically in certain key sectors.

#### - International Coordination

Important efforts have been made by headquarter and field based Canadian representatives to undertake coordination that would lead to concrete results. It was the case in the area of HIV/AIDS and MICAH. However, it must be noted that coordination of development cooperation very often comes up against political considerations, especially in the area of governance where very different visions and priorities among donors have led them to make unilateral decisions without any further consultation.

Since 2000, several donors have suspended aid (WB, EU, AFD, IDB, the Netherlands among others), while others have considerably reduced it (USAID, CIDA and so on). Under the circumstances, we can hardly speak of coordination among donors, or even between donors and government mechanisms.

**Recommendation:** On the one hand, Canadian cooperation should encourage UNDP to assume a leadership role in coordinating international cooperation efforts in Haiti. This would complement the OAS's role in governance. On the other hand, CIDA could identify opportunities for coordination in areas of concentration of its activities. CIDA could consider playing a leadership role in areas of concentration of its activities.

#### A Success Story of Donor Coordination?

The fact that Canadian cooperation was able to carry out projects that yielded some significant results despite the extremely difficult conditions in Haiti could be described as quite remarkable.

This was the case, for example, with the national immunization program, carried out in cooperation with the international community, including United Nations institutions. This program succeeded in covering 95% of the country's needs. Yet our investment was relatively limited when compared with the overall investment (\$1.5 million of a total of \$6).

What can we learn from this experience?

- First, international coordination is possible and works particularly when there are specific objectives to be met.
- Second, the government and local authorities can play a constructive role when pressure is brought to bear by various bodies.
- Third, the question of national glory and who gets credit is secondary when the focus is truly on solutions to be found to real problems.
- Fourth, Canadian cooperation can have a significant impact despite its limited resources.

#### - Coordination with Canadian Cooperation Partners

Canadian cooperation partners unanimously agree that CIDA needs to increase consultation and consistency within the program. No clear programming strategy was in place at the time of the evaluation. This certainly has not helped the consistency of Canada's activities. A variety of mechanisms operate according to different types of logic and criteria. This adds to the feeling of ambiguity among Canadian partners.

CIDA recently adopted sector frameworks to make its programming more consistent. However, these frameworks proved to have over-ambitious objectives. They targeted too many sub-sectors in relation to available resources. This prevented any real concentration of effort.

**Recommendation:** CIDA should take the appropriate means to facilitate exchanges of information and coordination among Canadian stakeholders, both in Canada and in Haiti, especially in areas where activities are concentrated.

#### 5.3 Efficiency & Results-based Management

##### - Delivery and Monitoring Costs

The number and diversity of Canadian interventions in Haiti have had direct effects on our capacity to manage these interventions effectively and efficiently and has a direct impact on the cost of implementation and monitoring.

Numerous projects have set very ambitious objectives, especially when we consider the unstable and complex environment, making difficult or impossible to monitor the results..

Moreover, sector studies have shown weaknesses in databases, indicators and monitoring mechanisms for various projects. These weaknesses in turn raise the monitoring costs absorbed by CIDA, especially through the Canadian program support unit [called UAPC]. In some cases, the Canadian program support unit must wholly or partially replace executing agencies.

Haiti's lack of economic and social statistics makes the task of Canadian cooperation even harder. In a high-risk country, CIDA must very strictly insist on the quality and effectiveness of its partners' monitoring systems. This includes setting up initial databases.

**Recommendation:** CIDA should analyze different options for reducing the number of projects and activities in order to simplify program management, including raising the minimum value of the different interventions it supports. It



should clearly state its cooperation objectives in Haiti, and should define sector frameworks for action, proposing choices in regard to which results can be measured. Projects should have realistic objectives to create reasonable expectations. Projects must consider specific situational and structural difficulties in their execution. CIDA should attach greater importance to measuring the outputs and outcomes of its projects.

#### - Funding Channels and Mechanisms

Sector studies also analysed the efficiency and effectiveness of the various funding channels and mechanisms and found that in general there exist important relations between the various mechanisms. As a matter of example, we can mention the fact that the bilateral channel supported a number of unsolicited proposals from non-governmental organizations, which also can access the local and decentralized funds. Also, the bilateral channel has supported many multi-bilateral initiatives. There are also cases of multilateral organizations calling upon the expertise of Canadian non-governmental organizations.

The analysis shows that the various cooperation channels have advantages and disadvantages that must be built upon or offset.

Thus, the Partnership Program allowed the establishment of close and sometimes innovative cooperation ties between Canadian stakeholders and their local counterparts. This was especially true in health and education.

The bilateral program carried out more substantial activities, including some projects related to energy, support for the public sector, and savings and credit unions, etc. They mobilized considerable resources. At the same time, they allowed better integration of activities and closer monitoring of CIDA projects in a high-risk country.

Local funds gave CIDA the necessary flexibility to deliver its projects independently of government and to reach grassroots communities. However, funds were not as effective in sectors requiring specialized skills (micro credit, reforestation and so on). These skills are not necessarily found on teams managing local funds. Funds were more effective in supporting local organizations, especially in GD/HR and social services, where projects are not technical-resource intensive.

The evaluation suggests that special attention should be paid to harmonizing the various mechanisms, especially with regard to local funds and Canadian Partnership projects.

**Recommendation:** Synergy between the different mechanisms should be reinforced and strengthened. CIDA should clarify decentralized-fund management mechanisms. This will ensure that funds are consistent with the conditions of partnership programs. It will also ensure that funds better complement bilateral projects. Decentralized funds should focus their activities on supporting civil society in the social sector and in human rights advocacy. CIDA should promote better complementarities of the various mechanisms (CFLI, Partnership, decentralized funds, bilateral projects) in such a way that there could be a progression in the level of support for successful initiatives.

#### - Is the Multilateral Channel Underutilized?

Evaluations suggest that the multilateral channel may not be utilized to its full capacity.

The multilateral channel offers many advantages. CIDA could perhaps better build on these advantages in meeting basic human needs, and in governance and democracy in the public sector (an area of high risk and high visibility for activities carried out in the absence of political will).

The same is true of major projects requiring large-scale mobilization of local and foreign organizations and close integration of operations within a coherent framework in areas where Canada's value-added as an individual donor is not apparent. This channel also improves risk management by allowing it to be shared with other donors.

Sector studies also noted the high cost of activities through the multilateral channel. This mechanism sometimes involves different bureaucratic complications.

**Recommendation:** CIDA should consider strengthening the use of the multi-bilateral cooperation mechanism. This is especially true in areas related to governance and addressing basic human needs.

#### 5.4 Effectiveness

A variety of factors hinder the effectiveness of projects in Haiti. These factors are largely explained by the crisis situation. Key factors are:

- An excessive number of projects, which increase operating costs.
- Timetables tailored to administrative requirements, not local realities.
- Brain drain of qualified resources from Haiti.
- Weakness of local partners involved in projects.
- Bad press and difficulty recruiting in Canada.

- Difficulty in executing projects, owing to the weakness of local government institutions.

**Recommendation:** CIDA could support initiatives of a larger scale that offers better economies of scale including focusing more attention on the cost-effectiveness of activities. It should promote those that seem most effective and are most likely to be replicable and give priority to projects that are not technical-resource intensive. CIDA should take the means to ensure greater retention of human resources mobilized in managing programs working under difficult circumstances.

The following key factors generally relate to project management:

- Targeted, community-based projects based on local ownership.
- Projects executed by Canadian executing agencies that have the necessary local knowledge and skills.
- Projects have realistic objectives that allow control of several variables (sectors) that are key to success.
- Projects are based on local ownership, and recipients make a substantial contribution.
- Projects have informative databases that promote timely and sound decisions.

**Recommendation:** CIDA should put in place mechanisms to identify success stories in terms of project management and results. Success factors (including small-scale partnership projects) should lead the list of CIDA's decision-making criteria in approving projects to benefit from increased support (the champions).

## 5.5 Risk Management

All activities may be deemed risky in a country like Haiti. This is especially true if they threaten the political powers. This was the case in activities involving the Haitian National Police and the Ministry of Justice. The evaluation's key risk management findings may be summarized as follows:

- It is agreed that risks are many and varied in a country in crisis.
- Recognized management methods must be adapted to the context of a country in crisis.
- More attention must be paid to endogenous risks. Managers have more direct control over them.
- Exogenous risks may have a major impact in deciding whether or not to intervene in a sector.
- It would be beneficial to share and apply existing methodologies more systematically.
- Risks must be identified before and during the project.

- Risks must not only be analyzed, but also managed. Here, official representatives of Canadian cooperation could use their influence in strategic areas by allocating the necessary resources.

It seems that, when risks are not systematically analyzed, risk management is even more problematic. Based on the various studies done as part of this evaluation, there is a significant need to share concerns, approaches and tools available for managing a cooperation program in a country in crisis.

**Recommendation:** CIDA acquired during the period under review an experience in risk management that should be systematized at the program or project level. Risks must be analyzed upstream (before selecting activities) and downstream (while implementing them). CIDA must promote the exchange of information, tools and experience in this area. CIDA should use its influence to manage risks strategically in its areas of concentration.

### - Policy Dialogue and Risk Management

Because instability is a constant in Haiti, CIDA plays an even more crucial supporting role than in other countries in the areas of communications and policy dialogue with the government and other cooperation agencies. This ensures, ideally in a preventive manner, the removal of major obstacles that make CIDA-funded activities less likely to achieve expected results.

In-depth knowledge of the project environment is required, upstream and downstream. On-line channels of communication must be established with project managers. These two variables are essential for development projects to yield satisfactory results, and to protect Canadian investments.

**Recommendation:** Policy dialogue and other advocacy activities must be included as lines of business in CIDA programming. Action plans must be developed to this end. Human resources and related budgets must be allocated. CIDA should invest time and energy for this purpose, especially in priority areas for Canadian cooperation.

## 5.6 Results and Sustainability

### - Sustainability in a Country in Crisis?

Given the issues faced by a country in crisis, structural factors break the results chain at all stages. Links between outputs and outcomes are very tenuous. Outcomes, if any, are even more rarely reflected in self-sustaining impacts.

The usual logic behind development models does not apply, unless major changes are made. Such

changes must consider factors in the crisis. Better yet, such changes must aim to control the internal and even external parameters of activities.

From this perspective, the philosophy and concept of sustainable results and results-based management must be researched and further analyzed. Approaches must be developed that can help managers adapt development strategies to the conditions existing in a country in structural crisis.

Programming should not assume a definite and visible improvement in the political environment. Rather, programming should fully take into account the inevitable stalemates and interruptions (uprisings, instability, conflict) as working assumptions in a country so deeply mired in a structural crisis.

In other words, in a crisis environment, activities must form part of a long-range vision. This vision must go beyond the project life cycle as such. From the outset, rather, the project should be viewed as a phase that, if it yields results, leads to another. Moreover, sector-based studies have shown that a weak institutional environment and numerous risk factors may often lead to the failure of very well intentioned projects.

**Recommendation:** CIDA should promote the development of realistic projects with clear short-term objectives within a long-range horizon. CIDA should avoid launching or supporting projects that promise substantial results, with complex, over-ambitious technological packages. Results are fragile in a country in crisis. CIDA should encourage partnerships that can ensure long-term support, offer good institutional potential and meet practical needs. Ownership and local capacities can then be strengthened.

## 6.0 Key Lessons for Countries in Crisis

This evaluation had a second objective, which was to draw lessons from the experience in Haiti that could be applied to other countries in crisis. To this end, we consulted with other donors and referred to broader literature pertaining to other countries in order to derive some ideas on improving the effectiveness of development in countries in crisis, torn by conflict, or contending with post-war situations, where the conditions for delivering a cooperation program are especially difficult.

These lessons also apply to the Canadian cooperation program in Haiti. However, they have been presented separately because they are more general in nature.

## 6.1 Millennium Development Goals

One of the key principles of development effectiveness involves implementing a long-range strategy to help achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. These goals seem out of reach for countries in crisis, at least in Haiti's case.

**Lesson 1:** In countries in crisis, CIDA needs to cooperate with the international community (especially the United Nations system) to establish more realistic targets for achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

### Principles of Development Effectiveness and Success Factors in Countries in Crisis

- **Millennium development goals** are often out of reach for countries in crisis.
  - **Local ownership** is problematic, given the lack of legitimacy of governments in power.
  - **International coordination** is often subject to the political imperatives of donor countries and international organizations.
  - **Close partnerships** are difficult because local capacity is weak and foreign governments are reluctant to legitimize the local government.
  - **A results-based approach** is difficult to implement, as the results chain is broken and there are weaknesses in information management.
- **Greater coherence** among foreign, cooperation and other policies is compromised by political instability and local social crisis.
- **Good governance** is often the basic problem of public and private institutions of countries in crisis.
- **Capacity building** is especially needed, given the weakness of the institutional environment.
  - **Mobilizing civil society** may be a way to reach and engage the poorest, while supporting human solidarity.
- **The program-based approach** presents serious challenges, given institutional weaknesses and the lack of local and international strategies.

## 6.2 What Local Ownership?

The principles of effective development cooperation attach special importance to government and community ownership of the development process. For countries in crisis, this concern is even more problematic, since governments do not have the necessary legitimacy. How can one avoid taking the government's place? How can one ensure local ownership? Supporting the various institutions that represent civil society can constitute a viable alternative in such an environment.

However, it is still necessary to coordinate and cooperate with government mechanisms. Multilateral institutions can play a key role here. They have a comparative advantage for building government mechanisms in terms of governance and their regulatory and normative role. Multilateral institutions can thus bring the Government to shoulder its responsibilities.

**Lesson 2:** Canadian cooperation could aim to support institutions that represent civil society in countries in crisis, while cooperating with the public sector through various mechanisms in order to meet basic human needs.

### 6.3 Donor Coordination

Experience in Haiti shows how hard it is to reap the benefits of consultation and joint action, no matter how intensive. Coordination is harder in countries in crisis, since it is mostly subject to political imperatives. It is necessary to contend with an ineffective government on the one hand, and cooperation agencies with sometimes unpredictable priorities and responses on the other.

Despite these obstacles, Canadian cooperation must continue to promote consultation and joint action among cooperation stakeholders at the various levels of intervention. Different objectives may be pursued. These objectives must be consistent politically and in terms of development cooperation.

Support by cooperation agencies is volatile, however, and projects are most likely to achieve good results if their design and scope reflects the financial resources that Canada is prepared to allocate. It cannot be assumed that other cooperation agencies will become involved.

The policy framework for CIDA's future programming in Haiti must further consider this issue of consultation and joint action and determine the preferred thrusts of coordination.

**Lesson 3: International organizations could be more proactive in fostering donor coordination in countries in crisis.** Such coordination might involve policy, cooperation or sector-based activities. CIDA needs to foster coordination among the various Canadian departments and partners.

### 6.4 Results-based Approaches in a Country in Crisis?

Sector-based and thematic studies have widely shown difficulties in shifting from an emergency-oriented approach to a more long term developmental approach. This particularly applies to the very mixed results of public-sector institution-building initiatives in Canada's Haiti

program. These difficulties largely stem from trying to administer a tonic to boost overall strength to a patient that is still in very critical condition.

Moreover, the results chain is often broken in countries in crisis. All development strategies are implemented to achieve higher goals. Teachers or police officers, for example, are trained to improve education or the public security system. In countries in crisis, however, it is very rare for assumptions about the results chain (inputs-outputs-outcomes-impacts) to prove correct. Our activities should thus target more realistic goals and be managed in light of them.

**Lesson 4:** In countries in crisis, it is urgent to address the basic needs of the people, who are most often living in conditions of extreme poverty and want. Yet the results chain is systematically broken. Clear, precise, reasonable goals must be set to meet the most urgent needs of the poorest. CIDA could consider re-examining the theoretical background of the result chain it currently utilizes to adjust it to international standards and lower the level of expectation of our projects and programs especially at the impact level.

### 6.5 Coherence

In countries in crisis, decision-making may involve various incompatible interests. These interests may relate to foreign policy, cooperation policy, trade, national security, immigration policy (the boat people, for example), and so on.

Donor-imposed embargos, fluctuations and suspensions of support have adverse consequences in this environment. They compound the severity of the crisis, leaving the country increasingly ravaged and disorganized. International reprisals and drifting by the various cooperation agencies exact a very heavy toll, not only economically but also socially (violence, mistrust, erosion of values). These outcomes may have regional and international impacts (on migration, for instance).

**Lesson 5:** In a structural crisis such as the one in Haiti, various cooperation mechanisms can be used to tailor support. Bilateral, partnership and multilateral mechanisms may assume varying degrees of importance and may be used in turn, depending on needs and circumstances. This approach is a preferable solution to imposing embargos, if only to keep hope alive and to avoid a human tragedy or civil war.

### 6.6 Governance and Capacity Building

Lack of good governance is a crucial issue in countries in crisis. It could be tempting to make good governance a condition. The experience of Canadian cooperation in Haiti shows that it is

difficult but possible to intervene in a country in crisis, "despite" predatory behaviour and lack of institutional capacity.

In the case of our program in Haiti, support for civil society seems to constitute a valid option. This is all the more true since, traditionally, religious and civil-society organizations have assumed special responsibility for areas such as education and health. This is a historical reality.

**Lesson 6:** Whether through the bilateral or partnership program, CIDA could increase the component that relates to building the capacities of Haitian organizations. Canadian partners could share their experience in this regard. Such an approach should not be separate but, rather, integrated into the programming strategy. It should be based on providing solutions to people's practical needs.

### 6.7 Program-based Approach

It is difficult to consider a program-based approach in a country in crisis. National leadership and capacity are often seriously lacking.

Diversifying and even dispersing activities has often been used as a way to manage risks. However, such an approach entails its own risks in terms of achieving sustainable results at reasonable costs.

Choices must be made in the interest of program effectiveness. A more modest approach could perhaps be adopted to maximize the impact of the resources we wish to invest. We can then better control the parameters involved.

Our experience in Haiti would seem to indicate that, by investing more resources in one or more specific sub-sectors, we would be better able to strengthen the impact of our action while cutting operating costs and minimizing the risk involved.

**Lesson 7:** Implementing a program-based approach poses enormous challenges in a country in crisis. The various mechanisms and stakeholders must be closely coordinated to allow synergy in achieving shared goals. More focused approaches targeting a particular area or sub-area should be the approaches of choice. A program-based approach may also be implemented by building on institutional support for organizations that have demonstrated excellence and possess a significant capacity for intervention.

### 6.8 Mobilizing Civil Society

Canada's cooperation program in Haiti has one characteristic that should continue to be valued. It has a human face. Again and again, in round

tables and feedback sessions in Haiti, we heard the heartfelt cry, "Please don't abandon us!" This spirit of solidarity may be of more importance than the amount of resources we allocate. For over 30 years, Canada's presence has embodied this human solidarity, kept alive the hope of pulling through, and sometimes maintained achievements that would otherwise have been crushed by a predatory attitude or by *laissez-faire*.

**Lesson 8:** Human solidarity must constitute a recognized component of our cooperation program, especially in countries in crisis. How and by what means? CIDA might consider reviewing some criteria of Canadian Partnership programs to strengthen this component of Canadian cooperation with these countries.

### 6.9 A Country-in-crisis Category?

Should CIDA create a country-in-crisis category, to which specific criteria for resource allocation and program management might apply?

The international community is currently debating this issue. The OECD Development Assistance Committee has published a paper on "difficult partnerships". The World Bank has just published a study on LICUS countries (Low Income Countries Under Stress). Both studies conclude that specific conditions exist in countries in crisis or in conflict. These specific conditions require specific cooperation mechanisms.

The option of creating a specific category for such countries may encounter various difficulties. First, it is difficult to identify criteria on which such country would be classified. Also a country can get in crisis (ie. Ivory Coast) at any moment. As a matter of example, when we asked Canadian partners to identify other countries in crisis the list was very scattered. We can give the matter more thought. In that context we can share information, develop tools to ensure more effective management in this type of environment, also we can develop different approaches and behaviours. Defining such approaches does not fall within the limited purview of this study.

**Recommendation:** That CIDA create a working group on countries in crisis, torn by conflict, or contending with post-war situations, where cooperation conditions are especially difficult, to develop management tools. These tools would especially relate to the principles of development effectiveness and would make things easier for CIDA officers dealing with these countries. This working group could include representatives of Canadian voluntary organizations involved in cooperation with these countries.

## 7. References

This executive summary report was developed from the various sector-wide and thematic studies produced as part of this evaluation:

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Please note that the ideas expressed in these various studies remain the responsibility of their authors.

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<b>Annex: Disbursements by Priority (1994-2002) – All Branches</b>										
<b>Priority</b>		<b>1994/95</b>	<b>1995/96</b>	<b>1996/97</b>	<b>1997/98</b>	<b>1998/99</b>	<b>1999/00</b>	<b>2000/01</b>	<b>2001/02</b>	<b>Period Total</b>
SD/RHM	\$	10 231 06	4 509 225	8 011 531	7 824 372	13 286 29	12 055 94	14 177 97	7 512 368	77 608 762
	%	28.3%	13.6%	20.4%	17.4%	37.7%	30.9%	52.1%	40.3%	28.4%
GD/HR	\$	2 535 379	5 816 257	12 859 10	13 852 89	10 855 81	12 726 53	5 225 185	2 842 969	66 714 145
	%	7.1%	17.6%	32.6%	30.8%	30.8%	32.6%	19.2%	15.3%	24.4%
ED/PSD	\$	999 083	2 203 080	3 295 955	2 652 214	2 405 519	2 851 098	1 619 656	2 391 265	18 417 870
	%	2.8%	6.7%	8.4%	5.9%	6.8%	7.3%	5.6%	12.8%	6.7%
Environment	\$	28 385	136 098	660 370	398 058	980 349	1 649 466	1 462 968	1 504 010	6 819 704
	%	0.1%	0.4%	1.7%	0.9%	2.8%	4.2%	5.4%	8.1%	2.5%
Infrastructure serv.	\$	5 004 602	5 475 832	1 701 367	2 679 532	3 520 759	5 727 769	2 054 604	1 362 318	27 526 783
	%	14.0%	16.6%	4.3%	6.0%	10.0%	14.7%	7.6%	7.3%	10.1%
GAD/GE	\$	111 008	368 748	45 230	330 366	1 356 604	2 004 782	1 113 273	1 599 593	6 929 604
	%	0.3%	1.1%	0.1%	0.7%	3.9%	5.1%	4.1%	8.6%	2.5%
Uncoded	\$	11 172 10	13 383 09	8 736 601	3 578 557	926 989	0	0	0	37 797 341
	%	31.3%	40.5%	22.2%	8.0%	2.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	13.8%
Other programming	\$	5 648 521	1 171 896	4 057 369	13 608 47	1 893 758	2 010 647	1 553 928	1 417 364	31 361 961
	%	15.9%	3.5%	10.3%	30.3%	5.4%	5.2%	5.7%	7.6%	11.5%
Total	\$	35 730 14	33 064 22	39 367 52	44 924 47	35 226 08	39 026 24	27 207 58	18 629 88	273 176 174
	%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Comparing Approaches: Concentration Versus Dispersion		
Criteria	Concentration	Dispersion
<b>Relevance</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strategic approach: directive or participatory</li> <li>• Difficult to make strategic choices</li> <li>• Potential to build on successes</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Responsive approach</li> <li>• Every player decides on its priorities</li> <li>• Leaves more leeway for innovation</li> </ul>
<b>Coherence</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fewer players involved</li> <li>• Key coordination work is easier</li> <li>• Potential division of work among players</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Many players involved</li> <li>• Wide variety of approaches and modes of action</li> <li>• Potential for duplication and contradiction</li> </ul>
<b>Results</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Potential for achieving critical mass in terms of actions in a given sector or sub-sector</li> <li>• Easier to measure results</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limited effects and reduced potential for replicating winning formulas</li> <li>• Scattered results</li> </ul>
<b>Efficiency and effectiveness</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Potential economies of scale</li> <li>• Reduced transaction costs</li> <li>• Mechanisms: bilateral and multi-bi</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Smaller projects easier to manage</li> <li>• High transaction costs</li> <li>• Mechanisms: partnership and local funds</li> </ul>
<b>Risk Management</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Tighter risk management</li> <li>• Potential use of leverage and pressure</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Diversity can provide a kind of risk management</li> </ul>
<b>Sustainability</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Synergy resulting from complementary action reinforces sustainability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Isolated actions</li> <li>• Long-term support required</li> </ul>
<p>Note: The new programming strategy could consider gradually moving from a dispersion approach to an approach of concentration by building on the success stories that show strategic potential.</p>		