


The High Arctic Relocation

*Summary
of Supporting
Information*

Volume II



Royal Commission
on Aboriginal Peoples



LIBR-00037



*The
High Arctic
Relocation*

*Summary
of Supporting
Information*

Volume II



Royal Commission
on Aboriginal Peoples

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Main entry under title:

The High Arctic relocation: summary of supporting information

Issued also in French under the title: *La réinstallation dans l'Extrême-Arctique, résumé de la documentation.*

ISBN 0-662-22335-7

Cat. no. Z1-1991/1-41-3-1E

1. Inuit — Relocation — Canada, Northern.
2. Native peoples — Canada, Northern — Politics and government.
3. Inuit — Canada, Northern — Government relations.
1. Canada. Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples.

E99.E7H53 1994

346.7104'32'089971

C94-980234-4

© Minister of Supply and Services Canada 1994

Available in Canada through

your local bookseller

or by mail from

Canada Communication Group — Publishing

Ottawa, Canada K1A 0S9

Cat. no. Z1-1991/1-41-3-1E

ISBN 0-662-22335-7



Canada	Groupe
Communication	Communication
Group	Canada
Publishing	Édition



The High Arctic Relocation
Summary of Supporting Information
to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
Report on the High Arctic Relocation

Contents
Volumes I and II

Volume I

General Introduction

Part 1 The Voices of the Relocateses

Part 2 The Voices of Former Officials and Others

Volume II

Part 3 The Administration's View of an Eskimo Problem
and the Relocation Scheme

Part 4 Events After the Relocation

The High Arctic Relocation
Summary of Supporting Information
to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
Report on the High Arctic Relocation

Part 3
The Administration's View of an Eskimo Problem
and the Relocation Scheme

Contents

Introduction	247
Differing Views on the Reasons for the Relocation	249
Eskimo Administration in Canada:	
The Historical Context	253
Introduction	253
Early Impact of Europeans and the Whaling Economy	257
Arrival of the Fur Traders, Arrival of the Missionaries, Government Concerns about Sovereignty	262
Government Neglect in the 1920s and Economic and Health Conditions in the Arctic	266
The Great Depression and the Collapse of Fur Prices	274
The 1934 Relocation to the High Arctic	278
Impact of Wartime Activities	283
The Beginnings of Change after the War	284
Events Leading up to the Relocation Decision	291
The 1949 Collapse of Fur Prices and the Cantley Report	291
Relocations as a Solution	308
Initial Steps	317
Re-Opening the Ellesmere Island RCMP Detachments	321
The 1952 Eskimo Affairs Conference	326
Reports of Conditions in the 1952 Period	338
First Meeting of Committee on Eskimo Affairs	348
The Beginnings of a Plan	352
Sovereignty and the Advisory Committee on Northern Development	361
The Relocation Decision	368
Other Events	383
Implementing the Decision	388
RCAF Concerns	406

Directions to the RCMP	416
Continuing Discussion of Eskimo Policy	422

The High Arctic Relocation
Summary of Supporting Information
to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
Report on the High Arctic Relocation

Part 3
The Administration's View of an Eskimo Problem
and the Relocation Scheme

Introduction

Part 3 tells the story of the relocation which is found in government documents leading up to the relocation and including the 1953 relocation itself. Inuit were called Eskimo by non-Inuit at that time and non-Inuit often referred to themselves as 'white' so that the terms 'Eskimo' and 'white' are found frequently in Part 3. Otherwise, the historical record would have been altered.

Copies of a large number of government documents have been provided to the Commission by Professor Shelagh Grant. Many government documents have been referred to in reports prepared by others, particularly Professor Magnus Gunther whose report contains extracts from numerous documents. Part 3 thus draws on both these primary and secondary sources. Reports on the relocation, for example, that were prepared by Professor Gunther refer to other studies or reports or histories and some of these, such as those by Jenness, Diubaldo, Cantley and Hinds, have been consulted directly. In light of the extensive work done by others, the Commission has not engaged in its own archival research. The written information available to the Commission is extensive and has been carefully reviewed.

Part 3 follows a largely chronological pattern beginning with the historical background to the relocation and focuses closely on the period from 1949 to 1953. Part 4 covers the documentary record of subsequent

years. The documents which are referred to in Part 3 are written at various times by various officials for various reasons. There is no single government document from that period which comprehensively tells the story of the relocation from the government perspective. The reasons for the government's actions and what the government did must be pieced together from a large number of documents. There are indications that documents have been lost and, as a result, the documents which are available must be used with caution. The approach which has been adopted is to point out, as the narrative progresses, some of the significant points which emerge from documents as well as, in some cases, things which do not emerge. In this way it is possible to see — without relying heavily on a single document — whether the documentary record, taken as a whole, reflects any consistent, coherent pattern of attitudes, beliefs, concerns, and actions which explain the reasons for the government's decision to relocate the Inuit to the High Arctic and the approach taken to the relocation.

Part 3 proceeds on the basis that the large number of documents written by different people, at different times, for different purposes, and, in many cases, in confidence on sensitive topics to like-minded officials permits the present-day observer an opportunity to gain a fair insight into the thinking of the day. While this insight must of necessity be obtained from pieces of documentary information, the analysis is not piecemeal. The available information is voluminous. No single piece of information is treated as determinative. Equally, single pieces of information are not examined in isolation from the rest. No attempt has been made to debate or discuss on a point-by-point basis the various interpretations which others have placed upon the events of the period although these interpretations have been kept in mind in working through information which is before the Commission. The whole of the information available is assessed and it is what emerges from this that tells the documentary story of the relocation. The story of the relocatees themselves and the recollections of former officials and others are contained in Parts 1 and 2 respectively.

Differing Views on the Reasons for the Relocation

In its November 20, 1992 response to the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, the government characterized the problem as follows:

The Inukjuak region, at that time, like much of Arctic Quebec, was characterized by markedly severe fluctuating wildlife populations and population pressures on limited game resources. In these circumstances, many Inuit in the vicinity of Inukjuak were on relief and were unable to sustain themselves.

The decision to relocate the Inuit grew from government policy of the day designed to assist the Inuit. The policy was developed with a view to ensuring that those Inuit living in areas in which the natural resources would support them could continue to pursue that way of life, while those who lived in areas where permanent settlements had grown up would be assisted to learn to adapt to this situation and take up such wage employment as became available. The policy further provided that those living in areas which had inadequate resources and insufficient wage employment opportunities would be moved to areas of greater natural resources.

Since the High Arctic was considered to have sufficient game to support a small population of Inuit, it was determined that a number of Inukjuak Inuit should be moved to the High Arctic if they were willing to relocate.³⁶⁶

An earlier report prepared by Hickling Corporation came to the conclusion that the relocation was not motivated by a concern to strengthen Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic Islands although the Inuit who were relocated did contribute to Canadian sovereignty. The main reason for the relocation decision was a concern to improve the living conditions of Inuit in the Hudson Bay region. The Hudson Bay region was

366. "A Response to the Recommendations of the Second Report of the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs on the Relocation of the Inukjuak Inuit to Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay", tabled in the House of Commons November 20, 1992, p. 2.

seen as a depressed area and relocation would break a growing pattern of welfare dependency and provide the Inuit with new and better economic opportunities through improved hunting, trapping and wage employment.³⁶⁷

Professor Grant has expressed the view that the relocation arose from dual concerns: an economic concern related to the well-being of the Inuit and a concern related to Canada's sovereignty in the High Arctic. Related to these dual objectives was the experimental character of the project, to see if southern Inuit could adapt to conditions in the High Arctic, and a rehabilitative aspect to the project, to encourage reliance on the traditional way of life.³⁶⁸

Alan Marcus expresses the view that the relocation was designed to reduce relief payments in the Port Harrison area; to rehabilitate the Inuit

367. Hickling Corporation, "Assessment of the Factual Basis of Certain Allegations made before the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs Concerning the Relocation of Inukjuak Inuit Families in the 1950s", September 1990, pp. 3-4. Mr. Neville elaborated on the Hickling Corporation study in a June 29, 1993 presentation to the Commission, Tr., vol. 2, pp. 635-711.

368. Shelagh D. Grant, "A Case of Compounded Error: The Inuit Resettlement Project 1953 and the Government Response 1990", *Northern Perspectives* 19/1 (Spring 1991), as expanded and elaborated by a substantial amount of additional information and commentary provided to the Commission by Professor Grant, including a presentation to the Commission on June 30, 1993, Tr., vol. 3, pp. 770-865, 1067-1082. Professor Grant also provided copies of official documents now residing in various archives. These have proved invaluable in understanding the chronological development of the relocation project and the background against which this was occurring and, in particular, in placing statements by officials quoted in the studies of the relocation in their full context.

to life off the land without government aid; and to exercise Canadian sovereignty.³⁶⁹

Professor Soberman has expressed the view that the relocation was supported by three closely related ideas: a desire to help Aboriginal peoples to return to the lifestyle and values of an earlier era; to relieve the increasing population in northern Quebec which was exhausting the game resources and thus to alleviate a food supply problem; and to address the demeaning process of increasing dependency on government handouts by returning the relocatees to their former independence. He also concluded that sovereignty was a material, even if not a dominant, concern that may have influenced relocation decisions.³⁷⁰

Professor Gunther is of the opinion that the relocation did not arise from a concern about effective occupation in the High Arctic but rather the concern was the well-being of the Inuit. The Inuit economy had collapsed. The immediate problem was the size and density of the population in northern Quebec in relation to the available resources. The resources were not adequate to sustain the population. Self-sufficiency was being undermined and replaced by dependence on relief. The solution was to distribute the population to other places where a better, self-sufficient, living could be obtained. The relocation was not an attempt to enforce a

369. Alan R. Marcus, "Out in the Cold: The Legacy of Canada's Inuit Relocation Experiment in the High Arctic", Document 71 (Copenhägen: The International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1992), pp. 47-65. Mr. Marcus elaborated on his views in a June 30, 1993 presentation to the Commission, Tr., vol. 3, pp. 866-940.

370. Daniel Soberman, "Report to the Canadian Human Rights Commission on the Complaints of the Inuit People Relocated from Inukjuak and Pond Inlet, to Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay in 1953 and 1955", December 11, 1991, pp. 7-13. Professor Soberman elaborated on his report in a June 29, 1993 presentation to the Commission, Tr., vol. 2, pp. 593-634.

back-to-the-land policy. Gunther situates the planning of the relocation against a background concern about starvation in the following terms:

If one accepts the fact that "starvation had been endemic for decades" and that a relocation was a "major facet of the solution" then the range of information about game conditions at Craig Harbour and Resolute was adequate but far from complete. ...waiting for...more comprehensive/scientific studies would have meant doing nothing. If one accepts the department view that doing *something* was essential then the information base the department acted on was reasonable and acceptable. [emphasis in original]

Gunther concludes that "In general, the preparations, given the truncated resources of the department, the abject poverty of the participants, the parsimonious approach to government spending and the obsession with self-help and individual responsibility of the day, were adequate and acceptable."³⁷¹

There is, not surprisingly, much confusion and controversy as to the motivation for the relocation project. The examination of the relocation from the perspective of the archival record shows the motivations and objectives of the relocation as they appear in the written history. Why the relocation was proposed and what it was intended to achieve is fundamental to any assessment of the basis upon which the Inuit participated in the relocation, of subsequent perceptions within government that the relocation was a success, and of Inuit testimony of the hardship and suffering they endured. The comparison of what emerges from the analysis in this part with the

371. Magnus Gunther, "The 1953 Relocations of the Inukjuak Inuit to the High Arctic—A Documentary Analysis and Evaluation", August 1992, pp. 111-113, 124-125, 245-250. Professor Gunther elaborated his views in a June 30, 1993 presentation to the Commission, Tr., vol. 3, pp. 940-1082, and in a subsequent written response to the Commission's Questions for Discussion. A list of errata in the written report was also received from Professor Gunther.

recollections of former officials and with the Inuit testimony is found in the Commission's report.

Eskimo Administration in Canada: The Historical Context

Introduction

The concerns that gave rise to the relocation have an historical context. Gunther begins his discussion of the government policy context in which the relocation took place by referring to Diamond Jenness's well-known review of Eskimo administration in Canada.³⁷² He also refers to others, such as, Diubaldo.³⁷³

Jenness's review of Eskimo administration characterizes the period in which the relocation took place as a period in which the administration was "steering without a compass" by which he meant to convey that anyone navigating a ship without a compass would inevitably hit a reef. Jenness provides not only an historical review of Eskimo administration and the conditions affecting the Inuit but also a critical evaluation of the policies and practices of the administration. Some of the themes which run through his work emerge in the views expressed by others in the 1950s. Some of Jenness's criticisms were controversial at the time and may be controversial today. The purpose here is not to debate these controversies. It is simply to draw on Jenness's recognized historical knowledge, recognizing he had strong, sometimes controversial, views of his own, and to understand better the times and the difficult problems that confronted government administrators.

372. Diamond Jenness, "Eskimo Administration: II, Canada", Arctic Institute of North America Technical Paper No. 14, May 1964, reprinted in March 1972.

373. Dr. Richard Diubaldo, "The Government of Canada and the Inuit, 1900-1967", prepared for the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1985.

Diubaldo's historical study reflects the detachment of a scholar drawing, with acknowledged temerity, on a vast store of archival material.³⁷⁴ He characterizes the period in which the relocation took place as a period in which administrators "struggled manfully and humanely without any real rudder".³⁷⁵ The study shows that the policies and practices of the early 1950s have roots in practices and attitudes of much earlier years. The early 1950s are seen as a time of great activity, a rush to make up for past neglect, in which sometimes almost anything was put forward in an attitude of "why not" and "let's give it a try".³⁷⁶ The prevailing attitude of that time is seen as paternalistic of a Victorian kind — the just, strict and uncomprehending father who knows best what is good for his charges — with sometimes painful consequences.³⁷⁷ The rush to make up for years of neglect was seen to be "perhaps equally harmful".³⁷⁸

374. Diubaldo prefaces his study with an observation of humility at the apparently unending store of material in the archives and the temerity with which he plunged into the mysteries of government policy toward the Inuit in Canada's first century.

375. Diubaldo, p. 107.

376. Diubaldo, p. 130, referring specifically here to agricultural experiments but in terms that are echoed in the contemporary comments of Mr. Sivertz, discussed later in a May 18, 1993 letter to the Commission. In that letter he refers to the discussions he had with Messrs. Cantley and Stevenson about why the Inuit had not stayed at settlements, the remains of which had been found in the High Arctic. He also speaks of the suggestion that a relocation with modern amenities — coal oil lamps and flashlights — might be more successful. He recalls his reaction at the time: "Why don't we try it?" In passing, the very basic supplies ordered for the little trading stores at the new communities would include only a small number of lamps and flashlights.

377. Diubaldo, pp. 126, 137, 163.

378. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

As will be seen, the traditional Inuit hunting way of life began to be seriously affected in some parts of the Arctic in the late nineteenth century by the introduction of non-Inuit economic influences. These impacts increased in the early decades of the twentieth century with the result that much of the traditional way of life was lost and replaced by dependence on a barter economy based on the fur trade. Inuit congregated near trading posts and were reliant on the goods, including store food, that fur trading could bring. Downturns in the fur trade could cause hardship for the Inuit who had become used to that way of life.

While much changed in the Canadian Arctic during the first six decades of this century, the prevailing attitude of the administration remained paternalistic. Diubaldo's characterization of the harmful effects of this long-standing institutionalized attitude finds support in a 1958 memorandum written by a senior government official discussing the relocation of Inuit from Ennadai Lake to Henik Lake in the Keewatin District to the west of Hudson Bay. Those Inuit suffered starvation in the place they were taken to by the government. The relocation also led to several murders among the Inuit. This was an indisputable disaster with which no one then or now would wish to be associated. The memorandum assesses that relocation in the following terms:

Moves have rarely been successful unless they are done with the full consent of the people concerned. To us, one part of the barrens may appear very much like another, but this is not the case with the Eskimos. The region where they have lived for many years has associations which mean a great deal to them and detailed knowledge of any area is essential for hunters who wish to exploit its potentialities fully. [Given]...that these Eskimos liked the Ennadai region and did not want to leave it, it appeared unlikely that the move was really accepted by them. It is, of course, comparatively easy to get a temporary acquiescence from Eskimos to any suggestion put to them, and especially from this group who go to great lengths to avoid any form of conflict.

...In this case the Eskimos probably felt a real resentment at being moved from an area where they had lived for a long time. They may have thought that the moves from Ennadai were directly connected with the fact that the white man had established a radio station there, and that they implied that the white man wanted to get rid of them from the area.

It seems clear that only two years ago the Eskimos were happy and contented at Ennadai. The deterioration which appears to have set in is certainly owing in part to their being moved to unfamiliar surroundings. Another reason is probably a lack of discipline which has resulted from weakening in the normal tribal procedures. Among the Eskimos in general, and specifically among this tribe, decisions on moving a camp are reached after considerable discussion within the tribe.... The decision to move to Henik Lake, initiated from the outside, cannot have failed to weaken the authority of those who usually decide these things, and may have contributed to the general despondency reported in the new area.

Referring to the decision to move the survivors of the fiasco to Eskimo Point, the memorandum continues:

At present there is a scheme to start a settlement on the coast where possibly thirty or more families might be brought from inland and taught how to live on the resources of the sea. I cannot help feeling myself that this is a little premature until we know how great a population can be supported from the resources of the sea. Certainly Eskimo Point does not sound particularly flourishing at present. At this coastal settlement, if it is ever established, the plan is that the Eskimos would run a co-operative store and they would have boats sufficiently large to allow them to go far afield in their quest for fish, seals and white whales. So far as I can determine the idea is to get these Eskimos and to put them where nobody else can get to them, no company, no missions, only a benevolent administration. In this way they would be protected against everybody — except of course the government. I asked who would protect them against the government, but this was of course assumed to be a joke. If this scheme goes through — and there is a good possibility that something along these lines will be done — we will then have two policies going on at once. One might be described as "integrate and any cost and the

devil take the hindmost" and the other as the ultimate in paternalism, with a just, strict and uncomprehending Victorian father. In pursuing these two extremes, which at any rate appear incompatible, it looks as if the gradual planned adjustment to conditions which are changing will be neglected.³⁷⁹

Apart from the issue of consent,³⁸⁰ this memorandum is interesting for its recognition, based on the knowledge available in the 1950s,³⁸¹ of the attachment of Inuit to the environment with which they are familiar; the tendency of Inuit to avoid conflict by appearing to acquiesce to suggestions put to them; the resentment that can emerge when actions are taken that do not accord with the wishes and desires of the Inuit; and the impact that government-initiated relocation can have on the social fabric of an Inuit community.

Early Impact of Europeans and the Whaling Economy

Before the arrival of Europeans, the Eskimos of eastern Hudson Bay hunted as far south as James Bay. This pattern was upset by the introduction of firearms. Cree Indians supplied with guns by the fur traders drove the Eskimos from the Eastmain River north to about Great Whale

379. Memorandum from Graham Rowley to Geert Vandensteinhoven, as quoted in Diubaldo, pp. 123-126.

380. The author of this memorandum, Graham Rowley, in a June 1993 presentation to the Commission, expressed the view that the 1953 High Arctic relocation was successful and that the relocatees were willing participants, although misunderstandings were possible.

381. Inuit attachment to home is referred to in the report of Alex Stevenson, officer in charge of the 1951 Eastern Arctic Patrol, in the following terms: "Certain schools of thought feel that it is sufficient punishment if a native is moved from his home region and banished permanently to another area of the Arctic. It is true that the average Eskimo does not care to go too far afield, especially if he is told he will never be allowed to return to his home." RG85, vol. 1127, file 201-1-8, Part 3, as quoted by Grant.

River. During this period, Eskimos moved in small bands, within a fixed radius, frequenting favourite haunts, but rarely tying themselves down to definite localities. "All their major settlements today have arisen within the last hundred years, many of them on sites that were seldom or never occupied in pre-European times."³⁸² Prior to European contact, the Eskimos of eastern Hudson Bay, like most other Eskimos, banded together during the winter months wherever seals were plentiful and built temporary buildings of snow in narrow straits and off headlands where tides and currents cracked the sea ice and piled it high in broken ridges. As one locality ceased to yield enough seals for their daily food, they moved to other sealing grounds. When spring came, the families dispersed and in small groups searched out seals in the open sea, fished for char and trout in the lakes and rivers, and in mid-summer roamed over the land in pursuit of the caribou that furnished them not only food but warm furs for winter clothing. "Today the wanderers have uneasily settled down in permanent villages, not one of which is located in a place of their own choosing. It was the white man who chose the sites, most of them for three reasons: because they were readily accessible by sea, possessed safe anchorages, and centred in areas sufficiently well-populated to yield the trade an abundance of furs and the missionary a bountiful harvest of souls. But should fate ever cut off the villages from the civilized world and compel their inhabitants to rely once more on the local resources only, one and all would have to be wholly or partly evacuated, because their immediate

382. Jenness, p. 8. Chimo is described as having been selected by Morovean missionaries extending their activities from the Atlantic coast into the Ungava Region in 1825, with the Hudson's Bay Company building a trading post on their site in 1830. The post was abandoned in 1842 but reopened in 1866 where it remained to the time of writing. The Hudson's Bay Company had operated a trading store in the Hudson Bay region since 1914, and the Frobisher Bay settlement itself began with construction of the air base in 1942. Pond Inlet was frequented by Scottish whalers throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, and in 1903-04 one of their vessels, the *Alvert*, wintered in the Inlet. About 1912 Captain Munn established a trading post, which he sold to the Hudson's Bay Company in 1921.

environments cannot provide enough fish and game to support their populations more than a few days or weeks."³⁸³ In other words, the introduction of the new economic activity upset the balance of population to game resources that had prevailed in the former traditional hunting economy.

In 1756, the Hudson's Bay Company opened a trading post at Great Whale River. The post was closed and re-opened several times during the next 100 years but has operated continuously since 1852.

The search for the Northwest Passage familiarized mariners with the Arctic and the hunt for whales brought large numbers of whalers to both the Western and Eastern Arctic. In the Eastern Arctic, Scottish vessels operating from Pond Inlet controlled the whaling in Baffin Bay while American vessels controlled Foxe Basin and the waters around South Hampton Island. The English captain, Penny, set up the first stationary whaling station in Cumberland Sound in 1840. Others soon followed. These shore-based whaling stations employed, or established intimate relations with, about 500 Eskimos. The American whalers operating in the Eastern Arctic employed sailing vessels which were provisioned for two years so that they could spend the winter in Hudson Bay. Eskimos were hired to man small boats and search out whales. The mother ship was used as a shore station. Eskimos were employed throughout the winter: the men to hunt for fresh meat and the women to make fur clothing. The Eskimo families working around shore-based whaling stations were issued a weekly ration of 4 lbs. of ship biscuit, ¼ lb. of coffee, 2½ lbs. of molasses, and 4 plugs of tobacco. Extra tobacco, ammunition and clothing were distributed as largesse whenever the hunters brought in a whale. The Eskimo families were required to hunt seals and narwhals as before to obtain their daily supply of meat. As a result, the diet of the Eskimos and the Aboriginal economy were never completely undermined. "Nevertheless they did gravely modify that economy by supplying the Eskimos with steel gins, and by

383. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

encouraging them to devote at least part of the winter to trapping foxes, animals that in pre-European times had been virtually worthless. Moreover, they shuttled a large group of natives from the south coast of Baffin Island, first to South Hampton Island, later to Repulse Bay, inaugurating by this action a dangerous policy which found favour later with the Hudson's Bay Company, and, even quite recently, with the Canadian government.³⁸⁴

In the southern half of Baffin Island and on the western coast of Hudson Bay, the impact of whaling was more direct and heavy on the Eskimos than further north on Baffin Island where the Scottish whalers neither wintered in the Arctic nor, as a rule, enlisted Eskimos in their crews. In the heavily affected areas "Metal pots and pans ousted the cooking-pots of stone; garments of cotton and wool overlay and underlay the native garments of fur; and summer tents of canvas replaced the tents made from seal and caribou hides. The Eskimo hunters threw away their self-made bows and arrows to equip themselves with firearms, abandoned their hunting kayaks, their umiaks or travelling boats, and adopted the Klinker-built whale boats that the ship's captains left behind when they

384. *Ibid.*, p. 11. See also Diubaldo, pp. 10-12. Jenness reports that Low (A.P. Low, "Cruise of the Neptune: Report on the Dominion Government expedition to Hudson Bay and the arctic islands on board the DGS Neptune 1903-4" [1906]) states that the Eskimos who moved to South Hampton Island quickly killed or frightened away with their rifles the caribou in the neighbourhood and directly brought about the destruction of the local Eskimo tribe, the Sagdlingmiut, who in 1900 numbered 68 persons, armed only with bows and arrows and spears. Low reports that the entire band died of starvation and disease in 1902. Low reported that the whalers and the Baffin Island Eskimos were now at Repulse Bay and were likely to spread disease and disaster among the Aivilliks and Nechilliks of that region. Low recommended that "Some regulation should be made to prevent this unauthorized movement of the natives or similar wholesale slaughter will again occur." (Low, 1906, p. 138). Jenness reports Mathiassen (Therkel Mathiassen, *Archaeology of the Central Eskimos*, 5th Report, Thule Expedition, 1921-24, Vol. 4, Part 1 [1927]) expressed the belief that the South Hampton Islanders perished, not from starvation, but from a disease, perhaps typhus, that the whalers introduced. Mathiassen records that four children survived.

sailed away. A new generation of Eskimos arose that lacked the ancient skills and hunting lore of its parents, a generation that had lost its 'autarchy' and could hardly survive without contact with the civilized world."³⁸⁵

Jenness reports that the impact of whaling in the Western Arctic was devastating. Whalers wintered in the Arctic in the vicinity of Herschel Island and hired large numbers of Eskimos. Vessel commanders would hire or kidnap Eskimo women to act as their wives. The crews fraternized with the local Eskimo women. Unlike the Eastern Arctic where distribution of alcohol to the Eskimos had been controlled by the whalers, in the Western Arctic alcohol was distributed freely to the Eskimos and the Eskimos were taught how to make it by distilling molasses or potatoes in 5-gallon coal oil cans. "Within a year it converted Herschel Island and indeed most of the Mackenzie Delta into a hive of debauchery, drunkenness and immorality prevailed everywhere, strife and murder became everyday events and diseases previously unknown to the Eskimos began to sweep away old and young like flies."³⁸⁶ By 1930, Canada's Western Arctic population had fallen to about 200 from the 2,000 who had inhabited the region a century earlier.

385. Diubaldo, p. 12, drawing on and quoting Jenness, p. 11-12. Jenness reports Commander Wakehem as stating in 1897 that the Eskimos "who have been brought up about the [whaling] stations would be badly off were these closed and abandoned..." and Low as stating with reference to the Cumberland Sound whaling stations that the Eskimos "have long been dependent upon the whalers for guns, ammunition and other articles of civilization, there is no doubt that many would perish should the whaling stations be closed without other provision being made for the accustomed supplies." (1906, p. 10)

386. Jenness, p. 14.

Diubaldo notes that, in a companion study to his own by William R. Morrison, it is admitted that such things did occur but that initial reports by missionaries may have been exaggerated.³⁸⁷

***Arrival of the Fur Traders, Arrival of the Missionaries,
Government Concerns about Sovereignty***

By 1910, whaling had virtually ceased in the Arctic. "The whalers who had accompanied or followed up the earlier nineteenth-century explorers had killed off most of the whales in Canada's eastern and western Arctic had unconcernedly decimated the Eskimo inhabitants of both regions and had destroyed their independence by replacing with manufactured goods the tools and weapons, the stone-cooking vessels and the skin boats that they could make from local materials with their own hands. Now at the century's end, having shattered the aboriginal economy, the whalers were departing and the Eskimos, no longer possessing their ancient skills or food resources, had to build their economy on a new base or perish."³⁸⁸ However, the Hudson's Bay Company expanded into the vacuum which the whalers left behind. Posts were established at Cape Wolstenholme in 1909, Lake Harbour in 1911, Chesterfield in 1912, Cape Dorset in 1913, Frobisher Bay in 1914, and other places later.³⁸⁹

In this new economy, the missionary played an important role. In addition to Christianizing the Eskimos, "a wise and devoted missionary could...strengthen and restore their spiritual equilibrium, which had been profoundly shaken when the world of their ancestors crumpled under the impact of white civilization and left them drifting, bewildered and without guidance, in an unfamiliar and swiftly changing universe."³⁹⁰ The

387. Diubaldo, p. 13, referring to "Under the Flag", by William R. Morrison.

388. Jenness, p. 14.

389. *Ibid.*, p. 12. See also Diubaldo, p. 12.

390. Jenness, p. 15.

Anglican missionary, E.J. Peck, took over a mission on the east coast of Hudson Bay at Little Whale River in 1876 and transcribed into syllabics parts of the New Testament. Peck moved to Baffin Island in 1894 and opened another mission at a whaling station near the mouth of Cumberland Gulf. Peck's work was carried on by W. G. Walton and, in 1927, an Anglican mission was established at Port Harrison.³⁹¹

In this period, the trader purchased the furs and supplied the economic needs of the Eskimos while the missionary attended to their spiritual wants and provided the first rudiments of an education. The federal government was uninvolved.³⁹² The shock of the Norwegian expedition led by Otto Sverdrup in 1898 led the Canadian government to appoint A.P. Low to lead a counter expedition that would re-affirm Canada's sovereignty over its Arctic. The Low expedition included members of the Northwest Mounted Police who established a post at Fullerton Harbour in 1903, a wintering station for whalers on the west coast of Hudson Bay north of Chesterfield Inlet. In the same year, police posts were set up in the Western Arctic at Fort McPherson, the northern terminus of navigation on the Mackenzie River, and at Herschel Island. In 1904, the Low expedition cruised northward around Baffin Island as far as Cape Herschel on Ellesmere Island. "By establishing these three police posts, Canada for the first time openly served notice on the world that she was accepting the responsibilities of sovereignty over the arctic mainland and the islands beyond it, integrating that region with the rest of the country, and would enforce there her laws."³⁹³

391. William E. Willmott, "The Eskimo Community at Port Harrison, P.Q.", Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources (1961), p. 2.

392. Jenness, p. 16. Diubaldo also describes the government inaction of this period and the role of missionaries in providing for education and health.

393. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

Unlike the United States and Greenland, Canada neglected the welfare of its Eskimos "since otherwise she would have devised some more constructive method of exercising her authority and carrying out her responsibilities than setting up police posts, after the manner of a military occupation.... What brought about this state of affairs in Canada, so unlike the conditions which prevailed at that time in Alaska and Greenland? Without question it was the erroneous policy of the federal government, which accepted the responsibility for law and order in the Arctic, but refused to shoulder the other responsibilities that go with sovereignty. When it passed the *Northwest Territories Act* of 1905, it gave the reins of authority to a Commissioner in distant Ottawa...to uphold Canada's sovereignty in the northland to maintain order, and to enforce the laws of Canada — a negative task which made his administration as static and unprogressive as police-run states generally are."³⁹⁴ Jenness states that at no time was it the function of the Commissioner to originate new policies or to study the resources and plan the development of the vast territory over which the Commissioner was given control.

Diubaldo describes these early decades as years in which government action was preoccupied with the maintenance of sovereignty. The well-being of the Inuit was left to traders and missionaries. It was only after the intense criticism, some of it international, resulting from the great opening of the North in the Second World War and post-war period that the government began significantly to remedy years of neglect in health care, education, and general welfare.³⁹⁵

394. *Ibid.*, pp. 20-21.

395. Diubaldo, pp. 14, 15, 30-35, 54, 89-106. Diubaldo notes that O.S. Finnie, the first Director of the Northwest Territories Branch of the Department of the Interior, considered that at that time (1920 and later) Canada was shamefully neglecting its responsibilities to the Eskimos (p. 30).

Traders expanded over the Arctic with the missionaries and the police following.³⁹⁶ The Hudson's Bay post at Port Harrison was established in 1920. This post competed with the post established by Revillon Frères in 1909 until 1936 when the Hudson's Bay Company bought out Revillon Frères. However, the Baffin Trading Company operated a competing post at Port Harrison from 1939 to 1949. The Inuit name for the Port Harrison area is Inukjuak, which means a place of many people. The area had supported a large number of Inuit for hundreds of years.³⁹⁷

During the early decades of this century, high-powered rifles and boats with motors were replacing ancient hunting equipment and the skills and knowledge that went with them. "In many districts — for example, the east coast of Hudson Bay — they could not have clung [to the ancient ways] even had they wished because rifles had exterminated or driven away nearly all of the caribou which had provided meat for food and skins for bedding and winter clothing. What was past was past and could never return. For good or ill their lot was now cast with the white man's. They could survive perhaps in the denial of the woollen and cotton clothing, the watches and the gramophones that he sold them in his trading store; but they could no longer live without his guns and ammunition, his steel axes and steel knives, his kerosene lamps that lighted and warmed their homes and his flour, baking powder, rice, tea and other foods that sustained them during the long cold months when the trapping of foxes left them little time or opportunity to hunt larger game."³⁹⁸ Hunting and trapping in the Arctic were not always, Jenness and Diubaldo observed, compatible,

396. Jenness, pp. 22-23. Jenness reports that the Hudson's Bay Company opened posts at Wolstenholme in 1909 or 1910, Lake Harbour in 1911, Aklavik and Chesterfield in 1912, Cape Dorset in 1913, Stupart Bay and Frobisher Bay in 1914, Herschel Island in 1915, Bernard Harbour, Baker Lake and Port Burwell in 1916, Coates Island and Repulse Bay in 1919, and Port Harrison in 1920.

397. Willmott, pp. 1-3.

398. Jenness, p. 25. See also Diubaldo, pp. 12, 37, 60, 79.

interrelated activities. The trapper may see the support of a trading store for supplies as essential.

Sovereignty concerns led to the establishment of RCMP posts at Pond Inlet and Craig Harbour in 1922 and further ship patrols of the Canadian Arctic. A Northwest Territories Branch was established within the Department of the Interior to administer the natural resources of the region following the discovery of oil at Norman Wells in 1920. Police posts were also established at Dundas Harbour in 1925, the Bache Peninsula in 1926, and Lake Harbour in 1927. The police post at Port Burwell on the south side of the Hudson Strait had been established in 1920. The RCMP established a post at Port Harrison in 1935, closing it in 1939, and re-opening the post in 1945.

***Government Neglect in the 1920s
and Economic and Health Conditions in the Arctic***

The Director of the Northwest Territories Branch, O. S. Finnie, wished, in the 1920s, to take steps to safeguard the health and welfare of the Eskimos and recognized that the Canadian government was "shamefully evading its responsibilities when it shuffled off these tasks on the traders and the missionaries...".³⁹⁹ Finnie wished to take steps to improve the health of the Eskimos and to educate and train them so that they could work for the development of the Arctic on an equal footing with white men. "But his hands were tied by the shortsightedness of his superiors, who...insisted that as long as the Eskimos lived within the law, they should be encouraged to maintain their own way of life (as far as that was still possible), and should not be deliberately transformed into white men who

399. Jenness, p. 30; Diubaldo, p. 30.

would inevitably demand public schools, medical care, and other services that would entail a considerable expenditure of public funds."⁴⁰⁰

The view that Inuit should remain self-sufficient hunters and trappers prevailed through four decades into the 1950s.⁴⁰¹

The Northwest Territories Branch assumed that Eskimos were wards of the federal government in the same way as Indians. To eliminate any doubt on the subject, the Minister of the Interior introduced a bill in Parliament in 1924 to bring Eskimos under the *Indian Act*. This was opposed by the Opposition who objected "to degrading them into wards of the nation: Canada had signed no treaties with them...and should leave them alone, giving them the benefits of her Civil Law and compelling them to comply with her Criminal Law."⁴⁰² The bill was amended so that it would in no way change the legal status of Eskimos. It did, however, place on the Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs responsibility for Eskimo affairs. As Diubaldo observes, this did nothing for the Inuit since it only further divided and confused authority and responsibility.⁴⁰³ In 1930, the provision which assigned Eskimo affairs to the Department of Indian Affairs was repealed. At this point, no department was responsible for Eskimo affairs. The Northwest Territories Branch was "merely an investigating and clerical agency that could study conditions there, register mining claims, license trading posts, recommend such regulations as, in its judgment, would advance the interest of the territory, and act in general as the public

400. Jenness, p. 32. See also Diubaldo, p. 54. Diubaldo identifies the lack of a mandate to act directly for the benefit of Inuit as a major obstacle for Finnie.

401. Diubaldo, p. 54.

402. Jenness, p. 32. See also Diubaldo, pp. 33-34. The opposition leader was Arthur Meighen.

403. Diubaldo, p. 34.

front for the real rulers, the Northwest Territories Council and its on-the-spot administrators, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police."⁴⁰⁴

In 1920, a Royal Commission had investigated the possibility of establishing a reindeer and musk-ox industry in Arctic Canada along the lines of the reindeer industry in Alaska. This Royal Commission reported in 1922. Finnie, the Director of the Northwest Territories Branch, actively set about implementing the recommendations of the Royal Commission. Finnie recommended to the Northwest Territories Council the establishment of game reserves where only Indians, Eskimos, and half-breeds might hunt and trap. In 1926, the game reserve was extended to cover all Canada's Arctic Islands even though most of the Arctic Islands were uninhabited and remain so. The Council also prohibited the export of caribou hides to protect this vital Eskimo resource.⁴⁰⁵ Diubaldo refers to this development as being part of a conservation program.⁴⁰⁶ The creation of the Arctic Islands Game Preserve also contributed to the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty in the area. Trading companies would, as the Department of External Affairs observed in 1929, require government consent and approval to establish posts in the area and:

The creation of this preserve and its appearance on our maps serves to notify the world that the area between the 60th and 141st meridians right up to the Pole is under Canadian sovereignty."⁴⁰⁷

404. Jenness, p. 33.

405. Diubaldo, p. 57; Jenness, p. 34.

406. Diubaldo, p. 57.

407. Department of External Affairs, "The Question of Ownership of the Sverdrup Islands" (October 28, 1929), p. 10, NAC, RG85, vol. 347, file 200-2; as quoted by Grant, Appendix C-ii.

Trading posts required a licence and transient trading posts were prohibited. As a result, the government controlled both the number and the locations of permanent trading posts.

Efforts by the Northwest Territories Branch to conserve the game and fur-bearing animals of the Arctic were accompanied by studies and reports on the food and mineral resources of the Arctic.

Between 1921 and 1931, the Hudson's Bay Company established in the order of fifteen new trading posts. The number of missions doubled. The RCMP operated out of thirteen posts, including the floating St. Roch detachment. Fur prices increased steadily and at a rate greater than the increase in the costs of staple goods, reaching their maximum level about 1929 when a white fox skin was valued at between \$50 to \$60. In 1914, the price was \$15 and during the 1920s the price never went below \$30.⁴⁰⁸ Some of the Eskimos and half-breeds in the Mackenzie Delta invested in motor-driven schooners and began to exploit the virgin territory of Banks Island where a single family had been known to trap as many as a thousand foxes in a single winter. The Eskimos enjoyed great prosperity. The scourge of alcohol was absent from the scene as a result of a prohibition on the importation of liquor into the territories except for medicinal purposes and then only by holders of government permits. The prosperity in the Mackenzie Delta area was not shared by the Eskimos in the Coronation Gulf area. They had not been affected by the whaling economy and "Fate was driving them to leap at one bound from stone-age autarchy to the bondage of a fur-trade economy.... The caribou that they had hunted every summer for food and clothing had become much scarcer since the strangers suddenly invaded their land and they were too ignorant, too bewildered to realize that it was the indiscriminate slaughter with the new and more deadly weapons that was destroying many of the herds and driving others away.... But the sturdier among them struggled bravely to maintain their dignity and keep up their morale, in spite of the baffling

408. Jenness, p. 36.

universe that now encircled them, the irksomeness of their bondage to the fur traders and the insidious new diseases, influenza and tuberculosis, that swept away about one-third of their number.⁴⁰⁹ It was not only overkilling that was thought to be the problem but also the impact of new posts and hunting with guns on migratory patterns.⁴¹⁰

The Eskimos of the east coast of Hudson Bay were seen as being the worst off. The condition of the Eskimos around Great Whale and Little Whale Rivers, Port Harrison, and beyond, was described as more precarious in this period "because virtually all the caribou in the Labrador Peninsula had disappeared and neither seals nor foxes were as plentiful along its western and northern coasts as in other parts of the Arctic."⁴¹¹ Diubaldo describes them as being on the verge of starvation.⁴¹² Jenness describes a report by Burwash in 1927 that the health of the Eskimos along this coast compared favourably with that of the Indian population of the area but still left plenty of room for improvement with a high death rate among younger children. Burwash contrasted the state of the Eskimos on the mainland to those on the Belcher Islands who were described as showing "no signs of degeneration either physically or mentally. While they are in times of distress dependent upon the trade store, they appear to have lost none of their native arts and under normal conditions are capable of living without more outside assistance than their fur catch will buy. The diet of this group of natives conforms more closely to that of the primitive Eskimo than does that of any other group in the Hudson Bay district."⁴¹³

409. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

410. Diubaldo, pp. 60-61.

411. Jenness, p. 39; Diubaldo, p. 37.

412. Diubaldo, p. 37.

413. Jenness, p. 39, quoting from Burwash.

In other words, by the late 1920s the people in the Port Harrison area were dependent to a significant extent on food from the trading post.

Although the coast of eastern Hudson Bay is within the province of Quebec, the federal government during the 1920s provided relief to destitute Eskimos in nearly every trading post between Fort George and Port Burwell. The relief of \$10,000 to \$12,000 yearly paid in the 1920s in respect of some 2,000 Eskimos grew to over \$22,000 in 1931-32. (This was after white fox fur prices fell from 1929 highs of more than \$50 to \$30 in 1930, hitting \$8 in 1934.)⁴¹⁴ The federal government demanded repayment from the government of Quebec which did refund the amount but advised that it would make no further contribution since it considered that the Eskimos fell into the same category as Indians and were consequently a direct responsibility of the federal government. In 1935, the Supreme Court of Canada was asked to consider the matter and in 1939 ruled that Eskimos were Indians for the purposes of the division of constitutional authority between the federal and provincial governments. Confusion as to where Inuit fit in the administrative scheme and what the government's responsibilities were to the Inuit continued for years.⁴¹⁵

The welfare of the Eskimos was aided by the practices of trading companies to grubstake trappers who were threatened with famine and to grant credit in consideration of furs to be provided at a future date. Jenness agrees with the conclusion of Low at the beginning of the century that, taking into account the risks and the high costs of transport, few traders charged exorbitant prices. "Self-interest, if no other motive, demanded that they keep their trappers healthy, contented and industrious. In the case of the Hudson's Bay Company, indeed, the senior officials never failed to impress on their Arctic post managers that the welfare of the Eskimos was inseparable from the welfare of the company

414. *Ibid.*, p. 51. Note the correlation between the drop in income and the increase in relief payments.

415. Diubaldo, pp. 29, 48-52.

and also of themselves."⁴¹⁶ Diubaldo leaves the question of possible exploitation by traders open and refers to one example of what he considers obvious exploitation.⁴¹⁷ He does also refer to the historical tension between the police and the traders.

Missions were glad to accept the task of educating Eskimos and of supplying medical care providing the government supported their efforts with subsidies. This the government was glad to do "because it hardly dented the federal treasury."⁴¹⁸

Missions provided medical care and the government supported this. For example, the Anglican Church established a small hospital in Pangnirtung in 1928 for which the Department of the Interior provided a medical officer, the salary of a nurse, and a small grant for every person admitted as well as an extra allowance for destitute cases. Similar arrangements were made with the Roman Catholic missions.

Jenness reports that "Year after year, from 1922 to 1932, the Deputy Minister of the Department of the Interior, who was also Commissioner of the Northwest Territories, informed Parliament and the public that all was well in the Arctic..."⁴¹⁹ Jenness quotes from various of these reports. "These official statements lull the enquirer into a sense of security: but the real facts were quite otherwise. Throughout these ten years the infant mortality in every district of the Arctic seems to have been abnormally high, and the population, if not stationary, decreasing rather than increasing. Caribou were becoming scarcer in the Central Arctic; and all round the Labrador coast, where they had disappeared completely (or almost so),

416. Jenness, p. 42.

417. Diubaldo, pp. 66-69.

418. Jenness, p. 42. See also Diubaldo, p. 32, where he refers to the parsimony that prevailed for two decades.

419. Jenness, p. 46.

more and more Eskimos each year had to be issued food and clothing. Costs of all imported goods were rising, and only the high prices paid for fox furs preserved many natives from destitution. Eskimo economy was clamoring for a stable base, but the fur trade in which many people had placed their trust was proving too erratic to supply it."⁴²⁰ The instability of the fur trade emerges again in the 1953 relocation decision.

Diubaldo also reports on the sad state of Inuit health notwithstanding government bulletins which announced to the public that the Eskimos of Canada were in good health.⁴²¹ During the 1920s and '30s "the health care of the Inuit, particularly in the Eastern Arctic, was in a shambles."⁴²² The eastern Arctic Patrol received a false impression of the conditions of the Inuit which "bordered on the theatrical" as the traders directed the Inuit to dress in their best clothes — borrowing clothes from others if necessary — and to paint and clean. The concern of the Patrol was to "save our face".⁴²³ Epidemics would follow the visits of the ships. Over the years, epidemics took a large toll. Single epidemics could claim 25% of a community. Medical care was not given to the dying — they were turned away if they could get to a medical centre or were turned out to die in a snow house or tent if already in one of the few treatment centres. In 1937-1941, the death rates for Inuit were many times those for Canada as a whole. The general death rate was "a staggering 1100 per 100,000."⁴²⁴ Canada was embarrassed by public criticism flowing back from American military personnel entering the Arctic and "if the whole truth had been

420. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

421. Diubaldo, p. 93.

422. *Ibid.*, p. 94

423. *Ibid.*, p. 99, quoting from a contemporary source.

424. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

made public, the Canadian Government, already stinging from embarrassment, would have had much to answer for."⁴²⁵

The Great Depression and the Collapse of Fur Prices

In 1931, the Northwest Territories Branch was disbanded. Jenness describes the period 1931 to 1940 as "bureaucracy in inaction" with "economy" as its watchword. The Department no longer possessed a scientific field staff and did not undertake any further investigations into the natural resources of the Arctic. Other government departments and a few outside agencies continued to make a few studies. The Department relied most importantly for its knowledge of conditions in the far North on the dispatches from the police posts and the reports of the three medical officers attached to the mission hospitals. "Through these and other channels, however, it obtained only fragmentary pictures of the changing Arctic, too sketchy and unrelated to provide the background it needed for any constructive policy applicable to the whole north, if indeed it harboured any intention of framing such a policy."⁴²⁶ The Eastern Arctic patrol lost its semi-scientific character of studying the condition and requirements of the Aboriginal population with a view to formulating measures for their general welfare, investigating the natural resources of the area, securing meteorological and other scientific data, and generally adding to the knowledge of the field. It became a routine operation of supplying and relieving the medical officer at Pangnirtung and the police posts.⁴²⁷ In the judgement of the Department, "The times...called for a rigid hold-the-line policy devoid of any new experiments or adventures that might involve the government in extra expenditures."⁴²⁸

425. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

426. Jenness, p. 49.

427. *Ibid.*, pp. 49-50.

428. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

White fox fur prices fell from a high of about \$50 in 1929 to \$30 in 1930 to \$8 in 1934. While the slump in fur prices gravely affected all Inuit, the effect was greatest on those who were already in a difficult economic situation. In the harsher and more isolated region of King William Island and the Boothia Peninsula, the fall in fur prices aggravated the dislocation brought about by the incomplete change-over from a stone-age economy to an economy based on the trap line which had been initiated by the arrival of fur traders in the 1920s. The Hudson's Bay Company post manager reported considerable hardship in the winter of 1934-35 with some sixteen deaths, eight on account of flu and the others through "natural causes and starvation and murder..." with only four births.⁴²⁹ The police report from Pond Inlet for the same winter also advised that some families in Admiralty Inlet had starved to death. They had been unable to kill enough seals for themselves and their dogs and after the dogs died of starvation, the people starved to death as a result of the loss of their means of communication.⁴³⁰ It appears that the winter of 1934-35 was a particularly hard winter with long periods of extremely cold temperatures and high winds preventing people from hunting or trapping.

In the Eastern Arctic in 1933-34, the Department distributed dried buffalo meat and buffalo hides to the people. The Northwest Territories Council the next year authorized the transfer of surplus caribou skins to people in the Eastern Arctic. In that regard, the traditional suit of clothing, comprising a hooded coat, a pair of breeches, and a pair of long stockings, required six whole caribou hides. Two suits were worn in winter so that twelve caribou hides were required to clothe a man or woman for all seasons. Jenness reports, however, that by 1930, most Eskimo had replaced all these garments, except the inner fur coat, with cloth garments, partly from choice, but mainly as a result of the scarcity of caribou.⁴³¹

429. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

430. *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

431. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

Jenness observes that it was northern Quebec and Labrador which particularly suffered from a lack of caribou.

In 1933, a member of the Northwest Territories Council staff informed the Deputy Commissioner that "the Eskimos of Great Whale River could no longer maintain themselves in their own district but could earn a fair living on the Belcher Islands, only eighty miles away within the Northwest Territories. He questioned, however, whether it was advisable to transfer them to the islands, because the provincial authorities of Quebec might construe that action as an assumption of responsibility for their Eskimos. Once again, therefore, a purely administrative hurdle checked the dictates of humanity, and the Great Whale River Eskimos were left to struggle along as best they could. Fortunately, the hurdle disappeared within a few years, and thereafter the Eskimos could move — and be moved — quite freely between the Belcher Islands and the mainland."⁴³²

Relief was administered, where there was a medical officer, by the medical officer; where there was an RCMP post, by the RCMP; and where there was neither a medical officer nor a police post, by the manager of the trading post. Where a trading company such as the Hudson's Bay Company enjoyed a monopoly of trade, there was no government relief. It was the responsibility of the company to provide relief "since those who are destitute depend upon the hunters whose exertions in securing pelts constitute the basis of the company's trade..."⁴³³ Relief amounted to food and clothing but, wherever possible, it was issued in the form of ammunition "so that the natives will be encouraged to get out and shift for themselves which they are quite willing to do.... The Eskimos are a very fine race of people and care is being exercised in the distribution of relief so that

432. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

433. W. C. Bethune, "Canada's Eastern Arctic, Its History, Resources, Population and Administration" (Ottawa: Department of Interior, 1935), pp. 57-58, as quoted in Jenness, p. 53.

indolence may not be encouraged nor their sense of self-dependence unduly weakened."⁴³⁴ The object was to prevent undue suffering.

Relief, when it was issued as food, was basic — flour, tea, baking powder, sugar, salt, lard — and could include matches, fish hooks, needles, gasoline, and coal oil. Dr. Frederick Banting, on a 1928 tour of the Eastern Arctic, had recommended that the policy be to "keep the native, native". Rations such as milk, butter, bacon and patent medicines were considered luxuries which would not be issued on relief except for infants. The priority was to have the Inuit hunt so, whenever possible, relief food and clothing would not be issued and ammunition for hunting would be issued instead. The Inuit were not to depend on the stores for support and congregating or loitering at trading posts was prohibited. Economy was the watchword. Relief, and related costs, would be kept to the minimum. The Inuit were not to be spoiled. The concern for relief and attendant starvation continued as a concern except in the Western Arctic where there were richer game resources for food.⁴³⁵

A similar concern for minimizing relief and encouraging reliance on game resources for food emerges in the 1953 relocation. It may be noted that while the Inuit would be encouraged to hunt for food rather than to take relief, this policy applied only in bad times. When the trapping was good — plenty of furs or good fur prices or both — the Inuit were free to buy and did buy anything available at a store, including all the luxuries. There was, after all, no point to trapping if one could not trade. Some were critical of the demand for the white man's things that this created.⁴³⁶

Others were critical of the disruptive effect trading had on the traditional hunting way of life. Traders would organize the Inuit in areas

434. Bethune, pp. 57-58, as quoted in Jenness, p. 53.

435. Diubaldo, pp. 70-75.

436. Diubaldo, pp. 57-59, referring to the views of Henry Toke Munn.

where fur-bearing animals were to be found. Inuit would be encouraged to live near posts and then to trap in areas designated by the traders while living, in part at least, on food rations issued by the traders. In some cases people were moved from their traditional hunting areas to areas designated by the traders "without their consent but in the face of as strenuous a protest as an Eskimo, with his fear of the trader, dared to make" and once there, would live in misery.⁴³⁷ This was seen to be "one of the strongest arguments against permitting the establishment of trading posts on any of the uninhabited islands", as it would "mean the deportation of native families from the countries in which they have been born and lived, the separation of close relatives and a new settlement, the site of which will be selected primarily as a fur centre."⁴³⁸ In any policy, the "freedom of the native to follow their own desires should of course be guaranteed."⁴³⁹

The 1934 Relocation to the High Arctic

The placing of responsibility for relief on the Hudson's Bay Company was a factor in the relocation of Inuit from Baffin Island to Dundas Harbour on Devon Island in 1934. Jenness reports that the "growing interest in northern aviation revived the government's apprehension about its sovereign rights in the arctic archipelago, visibly upheld along its eastern margin only by two lonely police posts, and along its western fringe by some Eskimo trappers on Banks and Victoria islands. ...meanwhile the economic condition of the Eskimos in the Eastern Arctic was steadily deteriorating, and the Department of the Interior was facing each year an increasing bill for their relief. What could have seemed more logical to that department, then, than to soften its ban on trading posts within the Arctic Islands Preserve and to move some of the destitute natives...into selected places

437. Diubaldo, p. 63, quoting from an October 30, 1924 memorandum from L.T. Burwash to O.S. Finnie.

438. *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64, quoting from Burwash/Finnie memorandum.

439. *Ibid.*

within the archipelago where they would find abundant game, could turn in their furs at one or more trading posts the government would authorize the Hudson's Bay Company to set up, and in one or two years, perhaps, regain economic solvency. ...such an expansion would show the world that the northern archipelago was indeed Canadian territory, providing in an increasing number of places permanent homes for Canadian nationals. ...the Hudson's Bay Company which would benefit from the expansion of its trade, would take care of the expense."⁴⁴⁰ The application by the Hudson's Bay Company to set up a post in Dundas Harbour was approved March 15, 1934. The approval required the company to assume full responsibility for the welfare of the families which the company proposed to transfer to Devon Island and, in the event the company closed its post, the company was responsible to return the people to their homes at its own expense or to transfer them to such other trapping grounds as the Department might designate. The Northwest Territories Council viewed this as an experiment with a view to a general plan of northern migration and settlement where game was abundant. The Secretary to the Council said "Dundas Harbour is the spearhead of the movement, and upon its success depends the whole future of northern migration and Eskimo independence."⁴⁴¹

A similar sense of an experiment with a view to further High Arctic settlements infused the 1953 relocation decision.

The government press release concluded its description of the relocation as follows:

440. Jenness, p. 56. See also Diubaldo, p. 118, who refers to the objectives in terms of the difficult conditions in the Eastern Arctic and of pushing relief obligations onto the Hudson's Bay Company, although the contribution of such projects to maintaining sovereignty is noted at p. 127.

441. Jenness, p. 57.

In addition to placing the Eskimos in new regions where game is more abundant and work more regular, there is the angle of occupation of the country, now that aerial routes, mineral developments, and other reasons make possible the claims of other countries to part of Canada's Arctic, which now reaches to the North Pole. To forestall any such future claims, the Dominion is occupying the Arctic islands to within nearly 700 miles of the North Pole."⁴⁴²

The work described in the press release were the "chores" of guiding water patrols and foot hunting for men and sewing and cooking for women. "There are no posts in the northland without Eskimo helpers."⁴⁴³

Both Diubaldo and Jenness describe the families who went as having "volunteered"; however, the term "volunteered" is put in quotation marks in the text. Jenness describes the failure of the project. He notes that the trading post could not operate without reliable sea transport and that this factor greatly limited the number of possible locations for colonization. Although Dundas Harbour abounded in sea mammals, the rough ice conditions made it difficult to hunt and equally difficult to travel along the shore to trap. In 1936, the company closed the trading post and moved the Cape Dorset and Pond Inlet families to Arctic Bay. The two families from Pangnirtung were returned to their homes. A year later, the families were moved from Arctic Bay to Fort Ross and then in 1947 they were moved to Spence Bay. He reports that in 1939 arrangements were made for the transportation of several families from Cape Dorset who wished to join relatives at Arctic Bay and Fort Ross.

It is interesting to note that additional families relocated from Cape Dorset to join relatives who remained in the High Arctic following the initial relocation in 1953. As will be seen, a 1942 RCMP report stated that the people who had been relocated to Dundas Harbour and then to Arctic Bay

442. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

443. Press release, quoted in Jenness, p. 58.

and later Fort Ross wanted very much to go home to Cape Dorset. Hudson's Bay Company records for 1943 state that in the spring of 1943 all these people had the "crazy idea" to go home to Cape Dorset. The post manager talked them out of this. He arranged for some of them to talk over the radio with some of the people at Cape Dorset who told them of the hunting and trapping conditions at Cape Dorset. The post manager persuaded the people they were better off where they were because the hunting and trapping were better. He also assured them that the supply ship would get through that year.⁴⁴⁴ It appears that there had been supply problems.

Jenness observes that both the government and the company largely neglected the desires and aspirations of the Inuit themselves. He doubts that a tiny colony established in the High Arctic could remain contented and energetic in such isolation for long.⁴⁴⁵ Jenness observes that, nevertheless, a movement into the Arctic archipelago could have been possible if the Inuit had been trained for it and if close contact were retained with the world to the south. He observes that this would demand "the unswerving cooperation of the white man and his logistic support, neither of which can the white man give save at a heavy price.... And in the 1930s the Department of the Interior was not prepared to pay that price. ...it gave more heed, instead, to those who advocated that the Eskimos should be encouraged to make more use of the wildlife resources available in their homelands and continue to follow the manner of life of their ancestors."⁴⁴⁶

It will be seen that isolation and lack of logistical support are issues which flow from the 1953 relocation and that encouragement to make more use of the wildlife resources available on the land and to continue in the

444. Marjorie Hinds, *High Arctic Venture* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1968), p. 62.

445. Jenness, p. 63.

446. *Ibid.*, p. 63.

"native way of life" are features of the relocation decision. Diubaldo characterizes the administrators of the early 1950s as colonial in their approach and with an attitude of Victorian paternalism, knowing what was good for the people without consulting them.⁴⁴⁷

Jenness characterizes the economic problem with which the administration was confronted as a loss of income caused by the vagaries and the instability of the fur trading economy. The solution should have been directed to finding other sources of income additional to the trap line or in place of it. Otherwise, "they would continue to lean on the government more and more heavily until they became permanent dependents on a dole, victims of all the evils such dependence brings."⁴⁴⁸ Jenness considered that this required education and training.

After this abortive attempt at colonization, the administration relapsed into inactivity. The economic condition of the Inuit failed to improve. White fox fur prices zigzagged up and down but living costs also went up. Efforts were made to diversify the Inuit economy. Various efforts by the Hudson's Bay Company to establish small industries — a white whale fishery and an eider-down industry — failed. Officials had little direct contact with the Inuit and then only on fleeting trips into the North. R. Finnie⁴⁴⁹ has stated that "independent explorers are not encouraged to give unbiased testimony and often feel that it is unwelcome if offered."⁴⁵⁰

447. Diubaldo, pp. 126, 137, 163.

448. Jenness, p. 63.

449. R. Finnie, "Canada Moves North" (1942).

450. Jenness, p.65, quoting from Finnie, pp. 73-74.

Impact of Wartime Activities

Wartime activity had a significant impact on some Eastern Arctic settlements. Airfields were built at Fort Chimo, Coral Harbour and Frobisher Bay. This was done in haste with thousands of men descending on the communities to construct the airfields and large numbers of ships to supply the bases. Only a few Inuit were employed in unskilled or semi-skilled jobs, such as kitchen help and unloading cargo vessels, although around the Fort Chimo base, some found work as carpenters and truck drivers as well as general labourers. Fort Chimo attracted Aboriginal people from as far away as Great Whale River. Those who enjoyed, for a few short years, substantial incomes working at the bases were quickly put in conflict with those who continued with a modest hunting and trapping existence. Jenness describes some Aboriginal people as becoming parasitical, scrounging food and collecting from the dumps. The waste and extravagance around these facilities was enormous. Jenness reports that the discontent brought about by the contrast with the amenities of white society was deepened when the end of the war brought an end to employment. He reports that some adopted a fatalistic spirit that discouraged enterprise, a feeling that there was no need to worry since, if conditions became difficult, the white man possessed an abundance of everything and would provide for them.⁴⁵¹

The war brought about another change. It opened the Arctic to the eyes of a great many airmen and construction workers who brought back first-hand descriptions of the Inuit settlements they visited. This produced foreign newspaper and magazine articles that "reflected little credit" on Canada's administrators.⁴⁵² Questions were asked as to why Canada had done nothing to educate the Eskimos.⁴⁵³ Shock and outrage were

451. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-75.

452. *Ibid.*, p. 76.

453. Diubaldo, p. 90.

expressed over health conditions.⁴⁵⁴ These criticisms were seen by administrators as coming from people who were just passing through, who had no experience with the Eskimo, and who had no idea of the financial constraints imposed by the government.⁴⁵⁵

The Beginnings of Change after the War

In 1945, care of both Inuit and Indian health was transferred to the Department of National Health and Welfare and Eskimos were "for the first time...publicly recognized as citizens by receiving family allowances." Dr. H. L. Keenleyside, of the Department of External Affairs, was appointed Deputy Minister of the Department of Mines and Resources. Keenleyside began to bring about change. Representation from the Mackenzie district was afforded on the Northwest Territories Council. Government schools were built across the Arctic, first at Tuktoyaktuk in 1947, then at Coral Harbour, Lake Harbour, Fort Chimo, and Port Harrison in 1949 and in 1950, his last year of office, at Cape Dorset, Coppermine, and Aklavik.⁴⁵⁶ This program continued and as of 1961 there were thirty-three government schools in the Arctic.

The program for education could not restore the Inuit economy which, in most areas, was gravely deteriorated. "Hardest hit, perhaps, were the Eskimos of the Hudson Bay region, some of whom had prospered from the good wages they had earned during the construction of the Crimson Air Staging Route, but had lost their employment in 1945 when the airfields were completed. They escaped any grave hardship during the three years that followed because trapping still provided a small but significant income, the air bases, meteorological stations, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and the Hudson's Bay Company continued to employ two or three score

454. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

455. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

456. Jenness, p. 79.

families and welfare payments, particularly family allowances sufficed to tip the scale on the side of solvency. But when furs plummeted in 1948-9 to only half their earlier value, the situation of the natives became desperate. Trapping now brought in virtually no return and even the most energetic hunter could rarely avoid dependence on relief. ...in the Central and most of the Western Arctic the majority of the Eskimos lapsed into similar destitution because they possessed no revenue-producing resources except the fur of the white fox...".⁴⁵⁷ In 1948-49 the price of white fox fur averaged \$8.88 and at one period in 1949-50 it fell as low as \$3.50.⁴⁵⁸ "For the second time within the memory of living Eskimos, then, the foundations of Eskimo economy were crumbling. Hardly more than a generation earlier the Eskimos of the Central Arctic had procured their food, their clothing and all the other necessities of life from their own environment, undisturbed by contact with the white man and totally ignorant of the infinite variety and complexity of his possessions. Then the storm had burst over them, as it had burst over other Eskimos a generation or two before. The pressure of the white man's demands and his superior tools and weapons, had shattered their self-contained existence; and his insistence on furs, ever more furs, had forced them to build up their lives on an entirely new foundation. Too weak to resist the aggressive and domineering invaders, they had surrendered their immemorial freedom and resigned themselves to the lot of Helots labouring for foreigners who seldom troubled to learn their language. Now in the 1940s, their new economy too was tottering on its base, and it was by no means clear that the white man who had built the unstable edifice would not quickly abandon it again and leave the Eskimos to their fate."⁴⁵⁹

457. *Ibid.*, p. 79-80

458. Jenness, quoting from the report prepared by James Cantley in 1950 and issued in 1951.

459. *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81. James Cantley, in his 1951 report to the Northwest Territories Council, noted that there was no guarantee that the Hudson's Bay Company, which had been trading in the Arctic for more than 40 years, would continue to do so indefinitely.

James Cantley, an experienced fur trader, was commissioned by the Northwest Territories Council to study the problem. Cantley's report was pessimistic. White fox and, in the Mackenzie Delta, muskrat would be the only important natural products which he foresaw as being capable of exploitation. He believed that any mineral deposits rich enough to develop commercially would affect the lives of only a few local Inuit with the great majority remaining dependent on wildlife. He discouraged subsidizing or setting a floor under fur prices. He could suggest only two ways of raising the living standard of Inuit: by developing small local industries or handicrafts and by larger government grants. He recommended closer cooperation between the government and the Hudson's Bay Company and that the police should cease their welfare activities. Cantley believed that the police handling of welfare undermined efforts to make the Inuit stand on their own feet. As will be seen shortly, Cantley was, among other things, to consider areas which were rich in traditional food supplies but where there was no trading post. Jenness comments that, "One misses in Cantley's report any mention of the 'area surveys' that were already being undertaken to ascertain whether the Eskimos could make fuller use of their local resources: also any reference to the removal of destitute Eskimos to areas where game was more abundant, the 'relocation' schemes which the Northwest Territories Council discussed on more than one occasion during 1949 and 1950..."⁴⁶⁰ However, as will be seen, Cantley played a significant role in the 1953 relocation and his report does speak of the need to redistribute the Inuit population to make better use of the Arctic's resources.

Family allowances were provided in the form of store food and other goods from an approved list. It was not until 1960 that family allowances would be paid in cash. Hudson's Bay Company traders believed that handouts from the government were "making 'bums' out of the majority of these Natives. No person can keep his self-respect when his attitude is: "The more I get for nothing, the better." ...Our concern is for the Natives.

460. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

We would like to see them the strong, upright, hard-working, independent and prideful people they were before the white man brought his "blessings of civilization" to them. To assume that goal, the Native must be made to stand on his own feet, and it is our personal idea that the present policy of too much help is killing him with kindness."⁴⁶¹ The Company's concern was not academic. It was responsible for those who were unable to provide for themselves. In early 1949, the government agreed to accept responsibility for paying the relief costs of "inefficient trappers", those whose average catch was fewer than 10 foxes per year over the past five years.⁴⁶²

The Department of Health and Welfare began a program to improve the health of the Inuit. This led to the opening of the first half of a nursing station at Port Harrison in 1947. The station at Port Harrison was completed in 1949. The year 1947 also saw the opening of a nursing station at Coppermine, with other stations opened in 1949 at Lake Harbour and Fort Chimo. At the time Jenness was writing in 1964, there were nursing stations in twelve Inuit settlements. A program of treating victims of tuberculosis in southern hospitals was also implemented. Diubaldo observes that for decades medical officers, RCMP, missionaries and traders had argued against removing the people from their surroundings and continued to do so. These arguments did not prevail in the face of the cost-effectiveness of using existing hospitals and expertise and the difficulty of persuading medical experts to go north.⁴⁶³ Jenness describes the impact of this program on the morale of the Inuit as follows:

Tuberculosis, diphtheria, influenza and other diseases of the body we can fight with drugs and surgery, but we have yet to learn how to learn how to combat the sickness of the soul

461. Diubaldo, pp. 78-79, quoting from an October 11, 1948 memorandum from the Post Manager at Sugluk to the Manager of the Ungava Section.

462. Diubaldo, p. 79.

463. Diubaldo, p. 105.

which sometimes grips whole tribes or groups of people when crushed by misfortunes from which they see no issue. This was the malady which affected many Eskimos in the late 1940s, after those who had been working at the air bases lost their employment, fur values collapsed, the multitudes of caribou that had once provided both food and clothing shrank in number...and "white medicine men", invading the Eskimos' homes began to carry off young and old, parents and children, to an unknown country from which some of them never returned. Very few tubercular Eskimos at the period left their homes willingly; the great majority went in silence, offering no resistance, and their relatives stood silently by and watched them depart without tears. But there were occasions when the Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer had to use his authority and a number of families deliberately kept away from any settlement when the hospital ship was due to make its annual call.⁴⁶⁴

Jenness observes that the government has been unwavering in its program for Eskimo health. He observes that its educational policy has vacillated partly because of the difficulties in teaching Eskimos and partly because of a policy to maintain reliance on hunting and trapping.

The effect of improved health care was that the mortality rate began to decline and the Inuit population, by the mid- to late 1950s, began gradually to increase. Jenness puts the total Inuit population in 1951 at 8646 increasing by only just over 400 to 9078 in 1957 but then increasing by almost 1700 to 10751 by 1960. This increase in population was a cause for concern particularly in the late 1950s and 1960s since it would "severely tax the local resources in fish and game as well as the opportunities for wage employment".⁴⁶⁵ Willmott reported that mortality rates at Port Harrison in the 1940s and early '50s were so high that they

464. Jenness, pp. 87-88.

465. *Ibid.*, p. 148

cancelled out the birth rate and he estimated that the population in the area was stable at 500 people throughout this period.⁴⁶⁶

Jenness himself believed in integrating Inuit into the Canadian community and proposed a plan for introducing Inuit into southern Canadian society.

Jenness also did not oppose relocations under any and all circumstances. Grant refers to a document prepared by Jenness in 1948 when on special assignment to the Department of Mines and Resources entitled "Future Developments in the Arctic".⁴⁶⁷ Jenness suggests that the Northwest Territories administration might follow the example of Denmark and Greenland and train Canadian Eskimos to

- (a) staff the administrative and scientific stations in the Arctic,
- (b) exploit the local resources of minerals, furs and fish,
- (c) supply all local surface transportation, and
- (d) colonize those areas, now uninhabited, in which it may be advisable to establish permanent settlements in order to assert and vindicate Canadian sovereignty.⁴⁶⁸

He considered that, as a result of the pressure of population growth, the government "will probably be forced to move in this direction in the very near future...".⁴⁶⁹ Jenness observes that the increase in the population in Greenland resulted in Denmark resettling Inuit further north in places that they had abandoned some centuries before. He observes that Inuit

466. Willmott, pp. 10-17, 110-112.

467. Grant, vol. 1, referring to RG18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 51, file T 369-3-2.

468. *Ibid.*

469. *Ibid.*

occupied portions of the Canadian Arctic archipelago many centuries ago and any increase in population could put sufficient pressure on their means of subsistence with the result that some resettlement to the far North might be the result with the government becoming responsible for regular transportation to provide them with necessary supplies.

Jenness goes on in the 1948 document to discuss the educational program he envisaged. He notes that this program would be costly and would not yield immediate results but that the goal would be to train Eskimos to replace most of the white staff in the weather stations. He also saw the Eskimos, with government assistance, acquiring motor vessels which would allow them to take over the sea transport throughout the Canadian Arctic with the government remaining responsible only for carriage of passengers and freight to central locations such as Tuktoyaktuk, Churchill or Pond Inlet.

However, as has been seen, Jenness was, as he expressed in relation to the Dundas Harbour relocation, opposed to those who advocated relocations to the High Arctic as a way of encouraging the Inuit to continue to follow the manner of life of their ancestors. What was needed was to find a stable source of income in place of the instability and decline in the fur trade. His concept involved training the Inuit for new opportunities and to provide close contact with the south and substantial logistical support to the relocated community, all of which would come at a heavy price. He believed that it was not possible for the Inuit to return to the isolation of their forefathers and survive either physically or psychologically.⁴⁷⁰

470. Jenness, p. 63. See also pp. 93-95.

Events Leading up to the Relocation Decision

The 1949 Collapse of Fur Prices and the Cantley Report

The significance of the collapse in fur prices is reflected in the minutes of a special meeting of the Northwest Territories Council of October 27, 1949.⁴⁷¹ It was at this meeting that the decision was made which led to the hiring of James Cantley and the preparation of his report "Survey of Economic Conditions among the Eskimos of the Canadian Arctic". The Council minutes, under an agenda item entitled "Fur Trade in Eskimo Territory", identify the problem as follows:

It was explained that under the present depressed state of the long-haired fur trade the Eskimo receives about \$3.50 for white fox which in 1946 brought him \$20.00. This is having serious effects on both Eskimos and traders. The Eskimo income is reduced by five-sixths and the price of essential goods has about doubled in the past three years. Relief costs for Eskimos will rise, particularly in areas where country food is scarce and the natives depend on store food. A number of independent traders will no doubt be forced out of business and if the low prices on white fox continue indefinitely, the Hudson's Bay Company may have to discontinue the operation of its Arctic posts as it did in Labrador a few years ago.

It was recommended that the Civil Service Commission be asked to provide, on the staff of the Arctic Division, for the employment of a competent businessman experienced in the fur trade in the north and with a sound knowledge of Eskimo conditions to undertake the following investigations:

- (a) The feasibility of opening government-owned or cooperative stores at points rich in native food supplies which are not at present served by traders, owing to the local scarcity of white fox.

471. N.W.T. Archives, G79-042 GC00 1/18; document provided by Grant.

- (b) Methods by which the Eskimo economy might be improved, such as by the introduction of new industries, handicrafts, etc.
- (c) The feasibility of subsidizing fur prices at a level to permit the Eskimo to earn a decent living without reliance upon relief which has a demoralizing effect.
- (d) The advisability of the government taking over all trading in Eskimo territory as in Greenland.
- (e) The possibility of some arrangement whereby the Hudson's Bay Company might continue in the picture with a degree of government supervision and assistance to accomplish desired results.

The minutes, under another agenda item, also addressed the problem of re-establishing Eskimos who had suffered some degree of paralysis as a result of the polio epidemic. Those who would recover sufficiently to be sent home would, in many cases, never earn their living by hunting and trapping again and it was observed they could make a living through handicraft work. It was also noted that the handicraft industry had promising possibilities for Eskimos generally and that the Canadian Handicraft Guild had sent a handicraft expert to Port Harrison the previous summer to teach and organize the industry there with good results. It was recommended that a handicraft specialist be added to the staff of the Arctic Division.

The minutes make clear that the loss of income from the collapse of fur prices is the cause of the increase in relief. Relief increased particularly in areas where country food was scarce. Conversely, as Diubaldo pointed out with respect to the Western Arctic of the 1930s, where game for food was plentiful, relief did not increase to the same degree in areas where country food was plentiful. People could substitute country food for store food or were less dependent in the first place on store food. In areas where country food was less plentiful, the loss of income meant necessary food could neither be purchased nor obtained through hunting and increased relief was required. The measures Cantley was to investigate included, as

one possibility, opening posts in new areas where country food was abundant. Implicit in this is the relocation of people who would use that post. Other possibilities Cantley was to consider involved ways to increase Inuit incomes. In that regard, a memorandum entitled "Eskimo Economy" which is referred to in the Council's minutes is reported by Grant to contain various possibilities for improving the Eskimo economy including handicrafts, boat building, wildlife investigations, employment at remote weather and radio stations, and moving Eskimos to areas with better resources.⁴⁷² In other words, Cantley was to consider the only two ways to provide a long-term solution to the instability of the fur trade with periodic demand for relief in bad years — ways to diversify income sources, leading to increased income, and areas where country food was more plentiful, providing a safety net when income from furs was not sufficient to buy food at the trading store.

Gunther reports that Cantley observed that "if the natives are to live off the resources of the country, they must be distributed in small communities over as wide an area as possible. There are few places where the resources are sufficient to support a large population for any length of time, but there are innumerable places where a few families can hunt and obtain a living indefinitely. They will have seasons of moderate abundance and extreme scarcity, just as their forefathers had, but overall they will obtain not luxury, but at least a higher standard of living than could ever be provided for permanently in larger communities. Taking the Arctic as a whole, it may be said that there are sufficient resources to feed the present population, provided means can be devised to distribute the natives over the available, suitable areas and encourage and assist them to preserve their native skills and independence."⁴⁷³ As Diubaldo has pointed out, it had long been the policy to encourage people to live off the resources of the

⁴⁷². Grant, vol. 1, referring to documents obtained from N.W.T. Archives.

⁴⁷³. Gunther, p. 84, quoting the Cantley report, pp. 27-28.

country. Cantley, an experienced Arctic trader, must be read as identifying what should be done to carry out such a policy.

This passage from Cantley follows immediately on a discussion of the problem caused by the drop in income as a result of the fluctuations in fur prices and the absence of any prospect of increasing income. Lack of income meant that the Eskimos were not able to purchase the imported foodstuffs that were now regarded as necessities but which, less than forty years previously, had been considered luxuries. Cantley goes on to observe as follows:

The fact that the Eskimo race survived for centuries before the white man even came into their country and that even today the most primitive communities, living largely on the resources within the country are still the healthiest and most virile, would indicate that as long as they can obtain sufficient of their native food they are getting everything in the need of nourishment.⁴⁷⁴

Gunther reports that Cantley identified the problem as one of overpopulation in relation to available resources in Quebec. Cantley indicated that the size and density of the Inuit population in Quebec was a problem. The solution was to distribute the population to other available, suitable places where they could obtain a better living.⁴⁷⁵

There is more in the Cantley report as to the problem, the possible solutions, and the factors affecting any solution than appears in the Gunther report.

474. *Ibid.*

475. Gunther, pp. 83, 112.

The Cantley report was, as discussed above, commissioned by the Northwest Territories Council in October 1949. The report,⁴⁷⁶ by its own terms, touches briefly on the principal events of recent years that had influenced the Eskimo economy and brought about changes in the Eskimo way of life and then proceeds to set out in a concise way the present-day economic position of Canadian Eskimos concluding with consideration of the means that may be taken to meet not only the current problems but also the longer-range problems that future developments are likely to raise. The first part of the report describes the situation of Eskimos in Siberia, Alaska, and Greenland and distinguishes their situation from that of Canadian Eskimos. The situation of Eskimos in Newfoundland and Labrador is also described. The report then goes on to describe the situation in "Canada". Newfoundland-Labrador is treated separately as a result of the history of discussions which took place at the time Newfoundland entered Confederation with Newfoundland seeking jurisdiction over its Eskimo population.⁴⁷⁷

The Cantley report shows the regional distribution and density of the Canadian Eskimo population in relation to the land area of the various regions and the approximate miles of coastline of each region. The most densely populated areas were Aklavik, in the far Western Arctic, and Quebec and the Keewatin. Aklavik was not seen as an area of concern, notwithstanding the density of the population, since "the majority of the Natives depend principally on sources other than the sea and white foxes

476. James Cantley, "Survey of Economic Conditions Among the Eskimos of the Canadian Arctic", Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Library. The first 42 pages were submitted to the Department in April 1951 with the remainder, under the heading "Review and Recommendations" following in November 1951.

477. It should be noted, however, that the Constitution Acts were not amended to reflect this understanding and that jurisdiction over "Indians" rests with the government of Canada under section 91 of the *Constitution Act, 1867*.

for their livelihood...".⁴⁷⁸ The Keewatin was not seen as problematic since about 50% of the population were inland caribou hunters and there was an ample land area. When the population was adjusted to distinguish between the inland population and the coast dwellers, the coast dwellers would be left with 5.38 miles of coastline per person which would compare with the 7.82 miles per person of the coastline of Baffin Island, 12.24 miles per person of coastline in the Cambridge Bay area, and 7.64 miles per person of coastline in the Coppermine area. "It is in new Quebec only that there is any immediate cause for concern regarding the size and density of the population. Almost 30 per cent of the Eskimo population of Canada is concentrated in this region which comprises only about 15 per cent of the total land area and 17 per cent of the coastline available to Eskimos."⁴⁷⁹ However, the report qualifies the significance of this information in the following terms:

The amount of land, the length of coastline, or the density of population can only be used in a very general way in comparing the various regions. So much depends on the nature of the land and the coastline and on the natural resources available that any judgment based on geographic considerations and population records only, could be very misleading. There are large areas where Natives could not make a living at all. On the other hand, there are areas of quite limited size where relatively large populations can be maintained without difficulty. It is, therefore, impossible to generalize at this stage: each region must be studied separately, account being taken of all aspects and a regional rather than a general program worked out from that. These considerations will be gone into more fully later in this report."⁴⁸⁰

The qualification is significant because the report makes it clear that no conclusions are being drawn directly from the very general population

478. Cantley, p. 17.

479. *Ibid.*

480. *Ibid.*, p. 17.

density information. Indeed, the discussion of Aklavik makes it clear that it is not population density which is, in itself, of concern. Aklavik is identified as an area with a dense population but it is stated not to be of concern because the economy at Aklavik is not founded solely on sea resources and white foxes. As becomes clear later in the report, what made Quebec an area of concern was Cantley's conclusion that the economy in Quebec was dependent on sea resources and white foxes. The Inuit of Quebec, as a result of the activities of the trading companies, depended on store food and, with the collapse of fur prices, they were no longer able to earn the income necessary to pay for these needs and were, as a result, depending on relief. The prospects for long-term instability in the fur trade meant that this would be a long-term problem in Quebec.

The Cantley report discusses the impact of the fur trade on the Eskimos. It is observed that the traditional Eskimo, who was a hunter by instinct and tradition, was largely indifferent to trapping and regarded trapping as an occupation fit only for women and children. The traditional Eskimo's wants were few and could be satisfied by a fairly minimal level of trapping. To encourage people to trap more, the trading companies had to make them want more. The trading stores stocked more attractive merchandise and the prices of goods and furs were kept at levels which led to an increasing degree of effort on the part of the Eskimos to obtain the furs they needed to satisfy their increasing desires.⁴⁸¹ In some areas of the Arctic, such as on Baffin Island, the people retained their self-reliance, that is, their ability to live in the traditional way by hunting. In other areas, however, such as Quebec, the effect of contact with the trading companies was that the people became largely dependent on the proceeds from furs for their subsistence.⁴⁸²

⁴⁸¹. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁴⁸². *Ibid.*, p. 22.

Cantley's explanation of why the fur trade created a greater dependency on the trade store in some parts of the Arctic than in others is that there was competition between trading companies in some parts of the Arctic but not in others. Competition among trading companies in some parts of the Arctic, such as along the east side of Hudson Bay, meant that fur prices were too high, the prices of goods were too low, and too much credit was extended. As a result, it became easier for the people to live on furs and credit than to hunt to the extent they had previously. This led to greater reliance on the store for food and clothes and a deterioration in self-reliance. Where, however, the Hudson's Bay Company had a monopoly, the people were not spoiled. They still retained the ability to provide their own food from the natural resources of the country. While it was true that the Hudson's Bay Company, as a result, paid less for furs and had higher profits, the result was that the practices of the company obliged people to continue hunting for a living. Cantley's conclusion is that the loss of self-reliance in some parts of the Arctic but not others was not the result of one part of the Arctic having less favourable hunting conditions than another, but was explained by the fact that the people had been spoiled by excessive competition among trading companies.⁴⁸³

Cantley reports that the use of imported foods was increasing steadily from year to year throughout the Arctic and that:

Goods considered as luxuries less than forty years ago are now regarded as necessities in most areas. The areas most noticeably affected are in Quebec where the rather meagre natural resources cannot provide sufficient food for the large population, and the western section of the Western Arctic where high earnings from fox and muskrat trapping in the past years have enabled the natives to relinquish their primitive hunting ways and settle in large communities where they depend on the stores for a large part of their food requirements. Except among the most isolated and primitive natives, some imported foods have, everywhere, come to be

483. *Ibid.*, pp. 22-23.

regarded as a necessary supplement to the native diet and there is every indication that these foods will continue to increase in importance in the native economy.⁴⁸⁴

The report notes the importance which had been given to the nutritive value of foods issued as family allowance and relief and observes that "the effect of such issues must inevitably be to foster a taste for imported foods in the rising generation and the idea in later life that they are important."⁴⁸⁵

Cantley would not see the increasing demand for imported foods to be a cause of any great concern if "there were any prospect that native income could be increased in the foreseeable future to provide for a higher scale of living..."⁴⁸⁶

The report went on to express caution at the prospects for higher income and at the same time to comment on the benefits of country food supplies in the following terms:

When, however, it is remembered that the majority of the natives are dependent on white foxes for their income, the numbers and prices of which fluctuate widely from year to year, and that income is ordinarily no more than just sufficient to provide for bare subsistence, the necessity for exercising great care in encouraging any changes in native food habits is apparent. The fact that the Eskimo race survived for centuries before the white man even came into their country and that even today the most primitive communities, living largely on the resources within the country, are still the healthiest and most virile would indicate that as long as they can obtain

484. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

485. *Ibid.*

486. *Ibid.*

sufficient of their native food they are getting everything they need in the way of nourishment.⁴⁸⁷

Cantley then went on to state the conditions under which the Eskimo could continue to live off the resources of the country in the following terms:

Experience with the primitive races in both Canada and Greenland has shown that if the natives are to live off the resources of the country, they must be distributed in small communities over as wide an area as possible. There are few places where the resources are sufficient to support a large population for any length of time, but there are innumerable cases where a few families can hunt and obtain a living indefinitely. They will have seasons of moderate abundance and extreme scarcity, just as their forefathers had, but overall they will obtain, not luxury, but at least a higher standard of living than could ever be provided for permanently in larger communities.

Taking the Arctic as a whole, it may be said that there are sufficient food resources to feed the present population, provided means can be devised to distribute the natives over the available, suitable areas and encourage and assist them to preserve their native skills and independence.⁴⁸⁸

Cantley identifies several areas, including Fort Chimo, where "there is a growing inclination on the part of the natives to give up their rather nomadic ways and to settle permanently in one location. At places where wood and other materials are available, they build houses and endeavour to set themselves up in the manner of the white man." In such areas, "the natives have advanced out of their aboriginal ways to a great extent..."⁴⁸⁹

The report continues in this vein as follows:

487. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

488. *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

489. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

As long as the Eskimos are to be encouraged to follow their nomadic ways of life, they must live in small communities and remain mobile. Hunting, fishing and trapping conditions change from season to season and it is only by moving from place to place in pursuit of the game that they can hope to get enough to live on.

Substantially built wooden houses in areas where firewood is available are usually over-heated. Flimsily built shacks in other areas cannot be effectively heated by seal-oil lamps. In both cases, the general health of the natives is undermined and they become progressively less able to withstand the rigors of the climate and wrest a living from the country.⁴⁹⁰

The report notes that caribou skins for clothing are in short supply in Quebec and that store clothes are used largely in the summer. It is noted that some skins were being imported but that these had to be bought at the store. The report goes on as follows:

Food and clothing are the two prime essentials to the Eskimos and it is on the means that may be taken to improve the availability of both that the greatest consideration will have to be given.⁴⁹¹

Cantley goes on to provide data on Eskimo income but subject to the qualification that, "It is almost impossible now to obtain reliable information on what Eskimo income has been over a period of years."⁴⁹² Instead, Cantley provides what he considers a reasonably accurate estimate based on data on furs and information obtained from the Hudson's Bay Company. These income figures are discussed later. Cantley goes on to describe the income problem as follows:

The figures in the foregoing statements, although estimated, are sufficiently accurate overall to indicate that income has

490. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

491. *Ibid.*

492. *Ibid.*, p. 36

never been much over bare subsistence level, particularly when the very high cost of goods at Arctic posts is taken into account. It will be noted too that income increased steadily during and since the War when fur prices were at high levels and a considerable amount of local employment was available to the natives at air bases and on other projects. By 1949-50, however, the slump in fur prices had made itself felt, income from other employment had fallen away to practically nothing and the income of the natives at all posts except those in the Mackenzie Delta was reduced to a point where they could not possibly get even their bare essentials without assistance. In the Quebec, Baffin Island and Keewatin areas, the combined family allowances, relief and unpaid debts accounted for about 60% of the goods sold. In other words, the natives were able to earn only 40% of what they needed to subsist....

It was the sudden collapse in white fox prices and the effect on Eskimo economy that made it necessary to evaluate conditions among the Eskimos and reconsider the responsibility of the administration towards them. Since for the majority of the Eskimos white foxes are almost the only source of revenue, lack of a market for these skins could mean not only that they would be deprived of their only means of earning a livelihood, but that the Hudson's Bay Company and other small traders might also be forced to withdraw from the Arctic. The administration would then be left with the whole problem of providing for these people and setting up the facilities for doing so.

While it is possible that prices of white foxes may be maintained at fairly reasonable levels for some time now, the probability is that over a period of years they will not average up to the levels of the past.⁴⁹³

Cantley stated the basic policy questions facing the administration as follows:

The two main questions of policy facing the administration today are (a) what use is to be made of these 1,100,000 square

493. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

miles of Arctic territory, and (b) what provision is to be made for the future of the 8,550 Eskimo inhabitants.⁴⁹⁴

Cantley notes the long history of government inaction with respect to Eskimo affairs and then goes on to make the following strategic observation:

World developments during and since World War II have focused attention on the strategic importance of Canada's Arctic territories, and the rapid decline in white fox prices which took place immediately after the war and continued until 1950 brought a long-delayed realization of the flimsy structure on which the Eskimo economy has been based.

It would seem that the age is past now when any country can continue to hold such a huge territory without occupying it or attempting to develop its resources, however sparse they may be. A territory that, fifteen or twenty years ago, may have been regarded as useless has now become, if not an asset, at least a liability of another kind. Instead of a hinterland it has become a potential frontier and as such it quite evidently interests countries other than our own. Whether we want to or not, it would appear that we shall have to revise our attitude towards the Arctic and take a much greater interest in its affairs than we have done in the past.

Strategic considerations are beyond the scope of this report except in so far as they may ultimately affect the native populations and the natural resources on which they depend. The future care and development of the Eskimos however, are the direct responsibility of this administration and the problems they will raise are more likely to increase than decrease as time goes on. Presuming, therefore, that the administration accepts this responsibility, an endeavour will be made to outline the present position, state the problems that presently exist or are likely to arise, and suggest means by which the difficulties may be overcome and the general economy and well-being of the natives improved.⁴⁹⁵

⁴⁹⁴. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁴⁹⁵. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

Cantley thus situates the economic problem against the backdrop of strategic considerations. In that regard, it had not escaped his attention that the High Arctic islands were unoccupied by Inuit. In the paragraphs of the report leading up to stating the question of what use was to be made of the 1,100,000 square miles of Arctic territory, he observed that his computations of population density "do not include the High Arctic islands which are not presently occupied by Eskimos but which have an additional area of approximately 185,000 square miles. Altogether there are 107 square miles available to each person in the occupied areas or 130 square miles to each person if the Arctic Islands north of 70° N are included."⁴⁹⁶

Cantley states the problem with the present administrative policy as follows:

While it is important that the natives should be protected as far as possible against privation and exploitation, it is more important that this protection should not be carried to a point where they will lose all initiative and become completely dependent. Yet this is the trend under our present administrative policy. The actual needs — as opposed to the desires — of the average Eskimo are small; generally, as long as he can obtain a minimum of food, clothing and shelter without exertion on his part, he will be satisfied. It is therefore very easy for him to adapt himself to a relief economy and to beg rather than work for a bare subsistence. Unless this trait of the Eskimo character is fully understood by all concerned, grave mistakes can easily be made.⁴⁹⁷

Cantley states that this problem emerged when the issuing of relief was taken from the traders and vested in the RCMP and that this became worse when the administration of family and old age allowances was also given to the police. Eskimos were thus given two sources of supply and they used to exploit both effectively. "Previously they had had to look to the trader for everything they needed and as the average trader was not prone to giving

496. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

497. *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

much for nothing, they had to get out and earn their living either by hunting or trapping."⁴⁹⁸ Cantley considered that the solution lay in closer co-operation with the Hudson's Bay Company.⁴⁹⁹ Cantley's concept would not require establishing an elaborate government organization in the North. In that regard, Cantley suggested that the strategic importance of the north needed to be tempered by an understanding of its limited economic value. He stated as follows:

It has to be borne in mind in planning anything for the Arctic that whatever strategic importance or romantic interest it may have, it is economically a poor country with a present native population of little more than 8,500 men, women and children. While there can be no question that the government should occupy and develop these areas and the people in them as far as possible, it is necessary to view the problem objectively and to avoid any exaggeration of the potentialities or requirements.

Economically, the present known resources and the sparse population of the Arctic territories do not warrant the setting up of an elaborate organization, nor any large expenditure of public funds for their development. On the contrary, experience has shown that the simpler the organization can be kept, the better the results are likely to be. The fewer white people that enter the country and concern themselves with native affairs, the less the temptation will be for the Eskimos to relinquish their former independent ways and to become little more than wards living on government charity.⁵⁰⁰

Cantley was convinced that the Hudson's Bay Company would, with policy guidance from the administration, be able to manage the Eskimo economy on a sustainable basis. He stated as follows:

Putting aside all lesser considerations for the moment, the immediate and most important problem is to find means of

498. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

499. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

500. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

ensuring the Eskimo of a reasonable standard of living. This will entail close investigation of all possible sources of supply and income, which will in turn almost certainly lead to positive steps having to be taken to consolidate and conserve income from all sources so that it may be used to the best possible advantage. This is a subject in itself and it need only be said here that the problems that will be involved in attempting to stabilize and spread Eskimo income so that the "boom and busts" of the present economy may be levelled out as far as possible, can only be tackled with the full cooperation of the trading organization and the minimum of interference from others not directly interested.

Informal discussions with responsible officials of the Hudson's Bay Company indicate that their thinking on Arctic problems coincides very closely with what has been expressed in the foregoing and that if a suitable plan for direct cooperative action between the Company and one responsible Department were put forward, they would willingly cooperate to the fullest possible extent.⁵⁰¹

Cantley saw as a further benefit of this scheme the creation of a nucleus of government administrators who would become knowledgeable about the fur trade and thus able to carry on should the fox market deteriorate to the point where the Company could not afford to carry on.

The Cantley report concludes with the following recommendations:

1. That the RCM Police should be relieved of all responsibility for the issues of family allowances, relief, old age allowances, etc.
2. That this responsibility should be assumed by the Hudson's Bay Company, in collaboration with and under the direct supervision of Arctic Services.
3. That provision should be made for the closest cooperation between Arctic Services and the Hudson's Bay

501. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

Company, both at administrative level and in the field, on all Arctic and Eskimo affairs.⁵⁰²

These are the sum total of the Cantley report's recommendations. No recommendation is made with respect to the relocation of Quebec Inuit to other areas. Nonetheless, Cantley clearly expresses his opinion that the Quebec Inuit have become too dependent on the trading store for food having regard to their dependence on the fur trade for income. He clearly contemplates that there must be some reduction in the dependence of the Quebec Inuit on store food with a greater reliance on hunting. This was seen as desirable in terms of increasing self-reliance and independence while decreasing the need to turn to relief during bad fur years with its related decline in Inuit morale. A push toward greater reliance on country food would, however, involve a greater demand on what Cantley considered to be the meagre resources of a relatively densely populated area in relation to the available resources. The Cantley report was clear that, if the Eskimos were to live off the resources of the country, they would have to be distributed in small communities over as wide an area as possible. Thus, putting aside Cantley's advocacy of the interests of his former employer, the Hudson's Bay Company, Cantley's observations provide a concise expression of a set of views and concerns which pointed to relocations as a solution.

Government correspondence of the day reflects all of these issues: prospects for Inuit obtaining income from activities other than fur trading; the demand for relief payments; the concern that traditional food resources were inadequate in relation to the population in some areas; and the consequences of the impact of non-Inuit society in the North on the morale of the Inuit. As discussed previously, Jenness reported that some Inuit adopted a fatalistic spirit that discouraged enterprise and a feeling that there was no need to worry since the white man possessed an abundance

⁵⁰². *Ibid.*, p. 49.

of everything and would provide for the Inuit if conditions became difficult.⁵⁰³ Diubaldo also has referred to the concerns that handouts were adversely affecting morale.⁵⁰⁴ One also sees some mention of the concern for sovereignty which Cantley saw as forming the background to his report and changing attitudes in government to the North. As happens with background concerns on occasion, what is most often seen is the activity on the departmental stage and only occasionally the background against which the activity is taking place. It is an open question whether Cantley saw the sovereignty concern only as related to government inaction in the past with the remedy being increased administrative activity in the North or whether he saw the concern also as related to the unoccupied Arctic Islands with the possible remedy including colonization of the Islands by Canadian Inuit. Nonetheless, while Cantley points a clear arrow at the unoccupied High Arctic Islands as places of potential opportunity for hunting and trapping, he also draws a circle around the area as one involving strategic concerns which might have a bearing on decisions affecting the Inuit and the resources on which the Inuit depended. Cantley's comments predate by several years the reactivation of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development.

Relocations as a Solution

Relocations were seen as a possible solution to these economic and morale concerns. For example, the Director of the Development Services Branch wrote to the Chief of the Arctic Division on October 13, 1950,⁵⁰⁵ suggesting that the area of the Eureka weather station should be considered as a possible location for an Inuit settlement in light of the apparent game in the area. He wrote as follows:

503. Jenness, p. 76.

504. Diubaldo, pp. 78-79.

505. RG85/2085/20096/3; document provided by Grant.

Considering it will be necessary in the very near future to move a number of Eskimos from their presently poor productive hunting grounds to more favourable locations, it is considered that the Eureka area should be considered.

He suggested that the matter may be considered as urgent and proposed moving ahead to obtain sufficient biological and geographical information on the area to determine its suitability for the establishment of an Inuit colony. He proposes transporting the necessary scientific personnel to the area during the spring 1951 airlift to the weather station. The scientific team could remain in the area until late August or early September.

The Chief of the Arctic Division responded in a letter dated October 21, 1950,⁵⁰⁶ observed that the northern administration did not hire specialists but pointed out to other departments of government the need for their specialized services in certain areas. This would require discussing the project with the officials concerned and, if those officials were favourably disposed toward the project, they would proceed with the work and request the necessary funds in their estimates. An immediate requirement for Inuit at Eureka was not seen. In that regard, the letter stated as follows:

In the case in point I do not think we should stress any immediate requirement for Eskimos. In any mass movement of Eskimos we shall use more accessible areas first. However, if these Arctic weather stations prove to be a continuing project we may find it advisable to place one or two Eskimo families at certain stations. In such an event a knowledge of the local wildlife of the land and the sea would be most valuable.

The letter suggests that the project be taken up informally with the other departments concerned. Notations on the October 21, 1950 letter indicate that there was some discussion with other departments. The project appears not to have proceeded.

506. RG85/2085/20090/3; document provided by Grant.

The correspondence of October 13, 1950 is written in an urgent tone and speaks of the necessity to relocate Inuit in the very near future for reasons that have to do with hunting. The reply of October 21, 1950 communicates no great sense of urgency and moving one or two Inuit families to a station such as Eureka seems to have to do more with the continuing nature of the weather stations. The continuing nature of the weather stations would seem to have more to do with providing a stable source of income to Inuit who could be employed at the stations than simply to the hunting prospects. The October 21, 1950 letter underlines the limited capacity of the Department of Resources and Development to obtain the biological and geographical information which would be relevant in any relocation decision. The letter also emphasizes the importance of accessibility. Locations for new Inuit communities would be influenced by transportation access which meant, in practical terms, access by sea.

The morale of the Inuit population was a subject of comment, from time to time, in the reports made by the RCMP detachments in the Arctic. The April 24, 1950⁵⁰⁷ RCMP report from Port Harrison states that the Inuit had suffered some hardship and were congregated close to the post. The report states as follows:

The tendency amongst all the natives in this district to congregate in large camps as close as possible to the various posts. It is suggested that this is due to the ingrained fear of starvation which every Eskimo in the district has. In the past they have seen whole camps die out from starvation and they are still afraid of it recurring. They are afraid that if they get into a camp a long distance from a post they may become stranded sometime and not be able to get in for food. There is a certain amount of good reason to this too as the past winter in Port Harrison demonstrated. When there was a great lack of seals during January and February it was not uncommon for a camp to hunt for two or three days after their last food was

507. RG18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 55, file TA500-8-1-13; referred to in Grant, vol. 1; quoted extensively by Gunther, pp. 116-117. Quotations here are from Gunther.

gone before coming to the post for assistance. For this reason, the writer and the H.B.C. post-manager had to keep close check on the condition of the various camps as if they had got to the end of their food and then were holed up for a few days by bad weather, it is conceivable that starvation could have resulted....

From observations made by the writer in the last two years it is considered that the Eskimo in this district, with a very few exceptions, are not lazy; considering the amount of hunting and travelling they do as compared to the return they receive for it, their effort is very great, and they do it willingly. However, as has been seen in the Port Harrison area in the past winter, despite their efforts, they have not been able to earn enough either to feed or clothe themselves and it is considered that if this situation carries on for any length of time Eskimos are going to become fed up with making the effort and not getting any return for it. At the present time, they have to depend on relief issues to tide them over for times when they haven't enough to eat, etc. Also, they have to depend a lot of the time on relief for the necessary ammunition, nets and walrus hunting outfits which they use to obtain their country food....

It is the desire of the department to have these Eskimos continue to live the Eskimo mode of life and support themselves but I would submit that these people have nothing on which they can depend for their support....

The point is that at present, the Eskimo has nothing that he can definitely depend on and plan with. He is not sure whether he will get any seals during the next week, he is not sure how many fish he can catch at any one time. He knows he will be kept from starving but he is not sure that he will get enough for what he considers his needs. He is not sure that he will get enough foxes this winter, or next winter with which to replace his worn out rifle or buy a new tent etc.

The report notes that two families at Port Harrison in particular tended to hang around the post seeking handouts. In passing, both of these families were among those relocated to the High Arctic in 1953. It may be noted that 1949 was a hard year in which relief was high in the area. By 1952, as discussed below, conditions had improved and no able-bodied people were

on relief. It cannot, therefore, be concluded that these two families were habitually on relief. In fact, the evidence is that the people of the area did work hard and, given reasonable conditions as in 1952, could provide for themselves without relief. Some lack of seals is mentioned in the RCMP report and relief was necessary during the winter months. The report suggests sending the Inuit to the islands in Hudson Bay during the summer to take advantage of better game resources. The report also contains a proposal for stabilizing the Inuit economy by providing all Inuit with a basic minimum income.

During this period a relocation took place of Inuit on the west side of Hudson Bay in the Nueltin lake area. The relocation of the people of the Ennadai, Nueltin and Henik lakes area would continue during the 1950s, ultimately, with disastrous consequences — starvation and murder. Grant reports that the RCMP reported in August 1950 that the Nueltin Lake relocation was "not proving satisfactory" and that "it might be best for them to be returned to their former location if steady employment" was not guaranteed at their new location.⁵⁰⁸

Henry Larsen, the RCMP officer-in-charge of "G" Division, responsible for policing the Northwest Territories and Arctic Quebec, was concerned about the deterioration which idleness and dependence on relief would cause. Larsen was in favour of the education and employment of Inuit but believed that allowing the Inuit to stay idle in communities can be harmful. "Any gravitation toward the town sites which is motivated by curiosity or the expectation of handouts will breed indolence and eventual deterioration. The downfall of many Eskimos has been caused by circumstances which

508. Larsen, 14.08.50; RG 8, acc. 85-86/048, box 13, file G577-14/1; as referred to in Grant, vol. 1. In his unpublished manuscript material, Larsen observes that the idea for these relocations originated with the Northern Administration, which wanted the people to be more self-supporting. Gunther (p. 142) refers to the Ennadai, Nueltin, and Henik Lake relocations as examples where the moves were not voluntary. See also the discussion in Gunther, p. 147.

forced them to abandon the life to which their forbearers and, for that matter, they themselves were accustomed. A few years of lethargy and time-killing will destroy any sense of initiative, previously one of the typical features of the race."⁵⁰⁹ If gainful work was not available in the communities, Larsen proposed establishing new Inuit communities where the natural resources would support hunting, fishing and trapping. Inuit families would be provided with small, comfortable frame houses in which the families would live in comfort and security while the men were out hunting and trapping. This would also permit the children to attend the school which would be established in the community. There would be an Eskimo-run co-operative trading post which would secure the profit of trading to the Eskimos themselves and would allow them to understand the benefits of commerce. "The Eskimo village, the trading post, the school and the development of a respectable livelihood would all contribute to the dignity of the race and offset delinquent and indolent tendencies. The desirability of providing employment is an item which must appear on the Eskimo curriculum."⁵¹⁰ Larsen did not consider that the objective should be "the mere extending of freedom to the Eskimo to choose between honest employment and indolence."⁵¹¹

The concerns which existed in the 1949-50 period have obvious parallels in the concerns for Inuit welfare during the Depression. As is clear from the earlier discussion of the Dundas Harbour relocation, sovereignty was a consideration in the relocation.⁵¹² Sovereignty also reared its head in the discussion of relocating Inuit to the High Arctic. Stevenson, the officer-in-charge of the 1950 Eastern Arctic patrol, recommended that Inuit be moved from north Baffin Island to Devon Island and that, in addition to re-opening the Craig Harbour RCMP detachment, Inuit settlements be

509. Unpublished manuscript provided by the Larsen family.

510. *Ibid.*

511. *Ibid.*

512. Jenness, p. 58.

established on Ellesmere Island extending northward along the coast from Craig Harbour as far north as the Bache Peninsula. The report went on as follows:

There is no doubt that country produce is plentiful in the aforementioned regions and the Baffin Island Eskimos could easily live off the country. In this regard I understand that there is evidence that the Greenland Eskimos are hunting on Ellesmere Island and the vicinity. Why not give our natives a chance to cover this country and also if it is considered necessary help improve the position regarding sovereignty rights.⁵¹³

Grant reports that the copy of this report found in the Northwest Territories Archives included an additional report entitled "The Annual Eastern Arctic Patrol" which refers to the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty in Canada's Arctic sector as one of the purposes of the patrol and describes relocation as one of its functions in the following terms:

When deemed advisable, Eskimo families may, with their consent, be moved from over-hunted and unproductive areas to areas where native food resources are more plentiful.⁵¹⁴

Given that north Baffin Island would later be identified as an area which could support an increased population, the question arises as to whether sovereignty concerns may have been the principal motivation for Stevenson's proposal. As will be discussed shortly, Greenlanders had in the 1920s and 1930s been employed at police posts north of Lancaster Sound because of the difficulty of finding Canadian Inuit who would live there. These Greenlanders would in the 1940s and 1950s continue to hunt on Ellesmere Island, a part of the Arctic Islands Game Preserve, which raised questions about Canada's ability to enforce its game regulations and, as a result, concern over the exercise of Canadian sovereignty in these areas.

513. RG85, vol. 1127, file 201-1-8 [2A], as quoted in Grant, vol. 1; also referred to in Gunther, pp. 22-23.

514. N.W.T. Archives, Stevenson Papers; as quoted in Grant, vol. 1.

The re-establishment of police posts on Ellesmere Island would create a need for Canadian Inuit to work as special constables for the police. The settlement of additional Canadian Inuit may have been seen as supporting the Inuit working for the police or as further evidence of Canadian occupation of the area or both. What is clear is that Stevenson, like Cantley, had a sense of the strategic importance of decisions involving the High Arctic islands.

Relocations were not merely a subject of discussion by individual officials in 1950. The Annual Report of the Department of Resources and Development for the year ending March 31, 1951 states as follows:

A recent improvement in fox prices has relieved the immediate problem to some extent but the development and difficulties of the past few years have served to emphasize the need for a flexible, long-term social and economic policy in respect to the Arctic.

Continued consideration is being given to the possibility of opening up new areas for Eskimo habitation and providing for a greater utilization of known resources in other areas. Some progress has already been made in this direction and encouraging results have been obtained.⁵¹⁵

The progress referred to may be a reference to the locally-initiated efforts made in some areas to disperse the Inuit away from trading posts to make better use of the available traditional food resources of those areas or to the relocation to Nueltin Lake which, as noted, was reported in August 1950 not to be going well. This short statement captures the income-related aspect of the problem by referring to the increase in fur prices. The report also suggests that ups and downs of the past years had emphasized longer-term issues which required a long-term policy.

⁵¹⁵. Report of the Department of Resources and Development for the Fiscal Year Ending March 31, 1951, p. 80, as quoted in Grant, vol. 1.

What was missing was a policy. On November 22, 1951 the Director of the Northern administration and Lands Branch wrote to the Deputy Minister in the Deputy Minister's capacity as Commissioner of the Northwest Territories.⁵¹⁶ The memorandum describes the remainder of the Cantley report. The first portion of the report had been submitted in April 1951. The memorandum highlights differences between Cantley's recommendations and those made by Larsen of the RCMP. Cantley recommended that the RCMP be relieved of responsibility for Inuit welfare and that the responsibility be delegated to the Hudson's Bay Company. Cantley considered that, under the present system, Inuit were losing their initiative to provide for themselves and were rapidly becoming dependent on government assistance for a livelihood. Cantley opposed Larsen's recommendation to establish a Crown trading company. The Director was concerned with the ability of Inuit to sustain themselves. He expressed this as follows:

The tendency of the natives to remain at post centres for extended periods instead of continuing their former mode of life and the gaining of a livelihood from the sea and land is undoubtedly attributable to the encroachment of whites, projects which give them employment, social legislation [family allowances, old age security], and the availability of relief. While the increasing cost of relief is of real concern to us, the serious aspect is that the natives, with very limited opportunities of gaining a livelihood, are giving up their former mode of life and depending upon handouts of one kind or another to sustain themselves.

The "former mode of life" appears to be a reference to hunting. The Director expressed the view that the situation warranted a round table discussion by as many as possible of those who have an intimate knowledge of the Inuit problem and then the establishment of a committee to assist in determining policy. This recommendation gave birth to the 1952 Conference on Eskimo Affairs and the Eskimo Affairs Committee.

516. RG22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/2; document provided by Grant; also referred to in Gunther, p. 89.

The relocation to the High Arctic would not, however, await the development, with the assistance of the Eskimo Affairs Committee, of long-term policy. The problem identified by the Northwest Territories Council in 1949, and the possible solution which they had identified of opening up new areas, were confirmed in substance by Cantley in his April and November 1951 report. In the meantime, the Department had been comfortable enough with the idea of relocation to refer to it in its 1950-51 annual report. The 1952 Conference would, however, provide a sounding board for the Department's concerns and possible solutions.

Initial Steps

Gunther reports that the following instructions were provided to the Eastern Arctic Patrol in 1951:

As you are aware, Northern Quebec is the area where Eskimo problems are most acute and it will be necessary for you to enquire closely into what can be done to alleviate conditions there. Consideration should be given to the feasibility of breaking up the present concentrations of population around Fort Chimo, Ivuyvik, and Port Harrison and to the possibility of finding other areas along that coast where food is available and where these people, with some assistance, may gradually be made self-supporting again. Enquiries might also be made with a view to finding out whether any Eskimo families in this area would be prepared to be transferred to eastern Baffinland or other suitable places where they would have a better chance of making a living.⁵¹⁷

The officer-in-charge of the southern leg of the 1951 Eastern Arctic Patrol, Cantley, reported as follows:

Although conditions among the Eskimos all along the Quebec coast have not been good since the price of white fox declined so drastically two years ago, there are indications now that these people are trying to adjust themselves to the changed

⁵¹⁷. Gunther, p. 118, citing RG85, vol. 80, file 201-1(26).

conditions.... At Port Harrison more families are taking interest in going to the outlying islands for the winter.... I do not think there has been any appreciable decline in the food resources of this area. Conditions do not appear to be any worse than they were thirty or forty years ago; the only difference is that the people themselves are less spread out and have reached a stage where they are inclined to rely less on their own efforts and more on the government for the fulfilment of their wants. The remedies lie in encouraging a wider distribution — possibly including the transfer of family groups to other areas and in seeing that these people are given leadership and the equipment to make greater use of the resources that are available to them.⁵¹⁸

Cantley reported that the average income per capita at Port Harrison was \$115.00 of which roughly 30% was earned, 30% came from programs such as family allowances, 30% came from government relief, and about 9% was advanced from traders.⁵¹⁹ In other words, about \$35.00 per person on average was attributable to relief. Since incomes were small, 30% of a small amount is also a small amount on a per person basis.

Programs such as family allowance and the old age pension became available only after the Second World War and filled the gap which would have been filled by relief at that time.⁵²⁰ The Cantley report shows the contribution to income made by family allowances and relief in the years following the war and the decline in earned income with a corresponding increase in relief payments as a result of the collapse in white fox prices in 1949.⁵²¹

518. Gunther, p. 118, referring to RG85, vol. 1127, file 201-1-8, Pt. 2A.

519. Gunther, p. 119.

520. Jenness, p. 79-80.

521. Gunther, pp. 85-86. One must be careful in interpreting the post-war and post-1949 income data. Some increase in payments by the government may be related to the gradual extension of family allowance and old age security to the population. That is, not all people would have been registered on the first date these programs were available. Also in the post-

Cantley's 1951 patrol report makes clear that the conditions in Quebec declined when fur prices declined and that decline in game food or increase in population were not the concern although population density at the posts meant people were more dependent on relief in bad fur years and less able to hunt for food. Reducing the population density near posts would make it possible for the people to hunt more for their food needs when they would otherwise have turned to relief in a bad fur year.

The officer-in-charge of the northern leg of the 1951 Eastern Arctic Patrol, Stevenson, reported as follows:

Relating to employment of natives and the general economy, the suggestion has been made that the transfer of natives from overpopulated areas to areas where they would be able to make a better living might be advisable. There are points on Baffin Island, Devon Island, Ellesmere Island and other islands of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago where a good number of natives could be re-established. There is no doubt that country produce are plentiful in the fore-mentioned regions and providing the natives are willing to move, I can see no reason why it should not be a success. Incidentally when I was in Pond Inlet, Eskimo Idlout who is one of the top natives in that district, approached me on this very subject. He said that his camp which comprised about four families would be extremely

war period, people were sent to southern hospitals. When the head of the family was in the south, the family might turn to relief. In addition, the figures as presented in Gunther do not make clear the possible effect of the government's 1949 agreement to accept responsibility for paying relief costs previously borne by the Hudson's Bay Company. Nor is it clear that all the figures were calculated on the same basis. For example, the total of \$75 on account of relief and family allowances per family for 1933-1949 (\$5 per year) is contrasted with \$213 per family on account of relief, family allowance, and unpaid debt. Unpaid debt relates to advances from the trading company, which are not identified specifically in the 1933-49 figures. The earned income figures suggest that the average annual earned income per family in the 1933-1949 period was cut in half in 1949-50, to \$121 in Quebec. Jenness, for example, states that fur trapping in the period 1949-1959 would provide a trapper \$200 to \$400 a year on average (p. 101).

interested in moving north to Ellesmere Island.... Any venture of moving Eskimos to the islands might well take advantage of this voluntary interest by Idlout and his group. He would make an excellent leader and could be put in charge of a group of natives from Pond Inlet or further south where the hunting conditions are not so good.... The employment of Eskimos is another problem which should be given consideration as to the long-term policy to be followed in providing for the steadily increasing Eskimo population. The question is what is to be our stand in this matter. Are we to encourage the Eskimos to seek employment, or should they remain close to the land, living as hunters and trappers? As you know, most Eskimos are presently nomadic, comparatively primitive people, and conditions of settled living and employment are a drastic change for them. There is a tendency on the part of organizations where Eskimos are employed to look at the matter from the standpoint of securing labour, without taking into account the fact that a profound change in the life of the native takes place when he accepts employment, and that interest and help are required if he is to adjust to this change."⁵²²

The report asks a critical question: is the goal to be the pursuit of employment opportunities or are the people to remain as hunters and trappers. It suggests that Inuit are still nomadic peoples. The possibility that life anchored on a trading post had long ago changed the nomadism of many hunters is not mentioned in the report.

Relief was not provided in cash but in the form of supplies such as ammunition and food. Relief rations did not, however, provide a completely balanced diet and hunting was required for a balanced diet. Relief food rations consisted of flour, sugar, lard and baking powder. Ammunition was the favoured relief issue so as to encourage hunting.⁵²³ RCMP detachments were, as a result, advised to encourage the use of country food. Gunther refers to a report in this regard to the officer-in-charge of "G"

522. Gunther, p. 95, quoting without the reference to Idlout from report dated 24.1.52; RG85, vol. 1207, file 201-1-8, Pt. 3.

523. Diubaldo, pp. 70-73.

Division of the RCMP on the observations made by Dr. Harper. The report is as follows:

I have to report that I have noted several forms of malnutrition is [sic] numerous among Indian Eskimo natives at Great Whale and Richmond Gulf. This may be due to lack of vitamins and the use of more so-called "white man's food" than they are accustomed to.

I find that in most areas the Indians and Eskimos who live on their own country food are far healthier and less prone to disease, especially pulmonary and other forms of tuberculosis, than those who live around the posts on a diet of flour, sugar and tea. Since we, in our department are most anxious to cut down on sickness among natives, we from time to time recommend to the Department of Indian Affairs and the RCMP that particular attention be given to aiding the natives to hunt and seek their own food.⁵²⁴

This was a period when people were relying more heavily on relief rations which were, as noted, very basic and did not provide a balanced diet.

Re-Opening the Ellesmere Island RCMP Detachments

In August 1951, the RCMP detachment at Craig Harbour on Ellesmere Island was re-opened to assert Canadian sovereignty in the High Arctic. In addition to the two regular RCMP members assigned to the detachment, two Inuit special constables and their families from the Pond Inlet area were assigned to the detachment. In February 1952, the officer-in-charge of "G" Division recommended to the Commissioner the re-opening of an RCMP detachment further north on Ellesmere Island in the vicinity of Cape Sabine. An RCMP detachment had been located on the Bache Peninsula from 1926 to 1933 primarily for the maintenance of sovereignty. It was recommended that, in addition to the two Inuit families employed by the

⁵²⁴ Gunther, pp. 117-118, quoting from a memorandum dated 18.9.51; RG85, vol. 107, file 253-2-304.

RCMP, the RCMP should "endeavour to recruit three or four good Eskimo families from the Pond Inlet area to be transported up there for the purpose of trapping, hunting, etc., and thereby in a general way improve their economic circumstances."⁵²⁵ Larsen considered that it had been a mistake in the past to hire Greenland Inuit and their families to work at the police detachments in that part of the Arctic. An earlier, November 7, 1951 memorandum from Larsen to the Commissioner of the RCMP refers to the problem of Greenlanders crossing to Ellesmere Island for hunting and indicates that most of those who were crossing over had worked for the RCMP poses on Ellesmere Island in earlier years.⁵²⁶ The memorandum goes on to describe how family allowances could be handled and the need to provide a stock of necessities for the benefit of the Inuit families. It was proposed that the furs could be traded for the stores administered by the RCMP detachment or could be traded at the time the supply ship arrived each year. The Department could attend to the auctioning of the furs and "the respective hunters credited with the proceeds."⁵²⁷ The recommendation did not contemplate any mark-up on the goods and equipment ordered for the Inuit families. The RCMP detachment would be responsible for helping the people and for their general welfare. Larsen had in mind moving the RCMP detachment from Craig Harbour to the Bache Peninsula.

In some ways, this recommendation contained elements of the 1953 relocation except that, as discussed below, the arrangements for the 1953 relocation would not permit individual hunters to be credited with the proceeds from the sale of furs, there would be a mark-up on goods, and most of the people would not come from the High Arctic community of Pond

525. February 8, 1952; RG18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 42, file D 1512-2-4-Q-27; document provided by Grant.

526. November 7, 1951; RG85, vol. 294, file 1005-7[5]; document provided by Grant.

527. February 8, 1952, cited above.

Inlet where Idlout had, in 1951, indicated a willingness to go further north and did, in fact, in 1955, go to Resolute Bay from where he communicated a general sense of satisfaction at his new surroundings.⁵²⁸

As noted above, in the past the RCMP and others operating on Ellesmere Island had used Greenlanders instead of Canadian Inuit. Grant refers to the December 18, 1933 minutes of the Northwest Territories Council for an explanation of why expeditions to the Canadian High Arctic as well as RCMP detachments at Dundas Harbour, Craig Harbour and the Bache Peninsula had employed Greenland Inuit. The minutes state that "for years considerable difficulty arose in getting natives to go even to Dundas Harbour. The Baffin Islanders do not mind travelling so long as they can visit friends."⁵²⁹ Even Inuit from north Baffin Island had been reluctant to move to these posts. Grant also refers to Stevenson's observation in the report of the 1951 Eastern Arctic Patrol about the attachment of the Inuit to their homes. The report is as follows:

Certain schools of thought feel that it is sufficient punishment if a native is moved from his home region and banished permanently to another area of the Arctic. It is true that the average Eskimo does not care to go too far afield, especially if he is told he will never be allowed to return to his home.⁵³⁰

A study by W.E. Willmott, based on research done at Port Harrison in 1958, found that the most important form of recreation among the Inuit at Port

⁵²⁸. Information provided by Mr. Doug Wilkinson, June 28, 1993, Tr., vol. 1, and by Mr. Gerard Kenney, June 29, 1993, Tr., vol. 2, and the letters referred to in Mr. Kenney's presentation, as well as the transcript of an interview with Idlout supplied by Mr. Wilkinson.

⁵²⁹. RG18, acc. 85-86/046, vol. 32, file G-804-1A/1; document provided by Grant.

⁵³⁰. RG85, vol. 1127, file 201-1-8, Pt. 3; as quoted by Grant, vol. 1.

Harrison was visiting, of which there were five different forms, each with an appropriate behaviour for the host and guests.⁵³¹

The Commissioner of the RCMP in a February 11, 1952 letter advised the Deputy Minister of Resources and Development of Larsen's recommendations respecting the opening of an RCMP detachment in the vicinity of Cape Sabine. The letter concluded with the observation that the Commissioner thought the Deputy Minister "should have information on this matter now, as you may wish to have some thought given to its implications, particularly in so far as it may touch on the movement and welfare of the natives."⁵³²

The Deputy Minister replied to the Commissioner's February 11, 1952 letter on February 22, 1952. The Deputy Minister said the following:

We have been considering, for some time, the feasibility of transferring Eskimos to Arctic islands from other overpopulated areas. There is no doubt that they could quickly adapt themselves to the changed conditions and could make a better living there than they are doing in their present locations. However, I would prefer to wait until we see what comes out of the meeting on Eskimo affairs in May before taking any definite steps in this direction. This slight delay will, I presume, make no difference to your arrangements as I understand you are not contemplating moving Craig Harbour until 1953.⁵³³

It is not clear what was expected to come out of the May conference that would affect a decision on a relocation. The conference was not to be a

531. Gunther, p. 132, citing W.E. Willmott, "The Eskimo Community at Port Harrison, P.Q." (Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1961 [mimeo]).

532. RG85, vol. 1070, file 251-4-2; document provided by Grant; also cited in Gunther, p. 24.

533. RG22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/2; document provided by Grant; passage also cited in Gunther, p. 96.

policy-making forum but was, rather, to be a first step in the development of long-term policy. It would appear that the Deputy Minister was being cautious. The May conference would provide an opportunity to take a reading on other people's views and concerns and act as a sounding board for various of the Department's ideas.

The Deputy Minister's letter conveys a clear conviction that the Inuit could adapt themselves to life on Ellesmere Island. The only indication as to where the people might come from is found in the reference to "overpopulated areas" of which northern Quebec had been identified as one. The reference to making a "better living" is broad enough to capture any objective — greater reliance on a traditional hunting economy, improved opportunities to obtain gainful income, increased self-reliance generally through elimination of dependence on relief. In that regard, Larsen's and Stevenson's reports also do not communicate a completely clear sense of objectives. To the extent that Larsen speaks of improving the economic circumstances of the families that would be moved, his comments may apply generally to the state of the Inuit economy since he is speaking of moving Inuit from the Pond Inlet area. Stevenson, in his earlier report suggesting moving people to Ellesmere Island, had referred to the willingness of Idlout and other members of Idlout's camp to move further north. Idlout was one of the best hunters in that area. When the time came to recruit Pond Inlet Inuit for the 1953 relocation, Idlout's name was the first suggested as a possible recruit.⁵³⁴ Stevenson refers, in his report, to the possibility of relocated Inuit making a "better living" and appears to relate this to his belief in the abundance of country produce in the Arctic Archipelago but is unclear as to whether the long-term policy is to encourage Inuit to seek employment or for them to remain close to the land, living as hunters and trappers. Stevenson also refers to moving people from overpopulated areas yet goes on to refer to Idlout's expression of desire to move further north and Stevenson then goes on to comment favourably on that possibility. North Baffin Island was, however, not an area of great

534. RG85, vol. 1072, file 252-3, Pt. 1; document provided by Grant.

concern as regards overpopulation. Grant reports that Hudson's Bay Company officials in late 1951 discussed the desirability of having more trappers in the north Baffin area if there was consideration of moving Inuit from overpopulated areas.⁵³⁵ Gunther in his report identifies Arctic Quebec as the area of greatest concern with respect to overpopulation.⁵³⁶ The 1951 Eastern Arctic Patrol Report had mentioned that there were places on Baffin Island which could support people relocated from overpopulated areas. In 1952, as discussed below, sites on north Baffin Island were identified as locations for relocated Inuit. However, Stevenson the previous year, had identified sovereignty as a consideration in moving people to Ellesmere Island and Larsen, in his 1952 memorandum, was concerned that Canadian Inuit rather than Greenland Inuit have the opportunity to exploit the resources of Ellesmere Island and be employed at government posts in the area. Those posts were intended to demonstrate that Canada could enforce its laws in the area including game laws designed to preserve game resources for the benefit of Canadian Inuit (although Canadian Inuit did not inhabit Ellesmere Island). The game preserve itself had a sovereignty as well as a conservation purpose.

The 1952 Eskimo Affairs Conference

The issue of transferring groups of Inuit to underpopulated areas was on the agenda of the May 1952 Eskimo Affairs Conference. It appeared under the heading of "Policy on Employment of Eskimos". The agenda shows the concerns of the Department:

1. Recent Changes in Eskimo Economy
 - (a) Decline of availability of country food in some areas.
 - (b) Employment at bases.
 - (c) Low price of white foxes and reduced income.

535. RG85/1129/252-3, Pt. 2A; correspondence of December 3, 1951, Nichols to Chesshire; document cited in Grant, vol. 1.

536. Gunther, p. 83.

- (d) Increased prices of store commodities.
- (e) Increasing relief costs.
- (f) Advent of Family Allowances, Old Age Assistance, and Old Age and Blind Pensions.

2. Cumulative Effects of Government Aid

- (a) Native awareness of two sources of supply.
- (b) Native morale and independence reported on decline.
- (c) Encouraging congregation around posts rather than dispersal to their former hunting grounds.

3. Functions of R.C.M. Police in Respect of Eskimos

- (a) Patrols for the maintenance of law and order and enforcement of game regulations, etc.
- (b) Registrars for Vital Statistics — Family Allowances, Old Age Assistance, and Old Age and Blind Pensions.
- (c) General supervision of native welfare.
- (d) Eskimos and Liquor.

4. Suggestions Received for Improving the Situation

- (a) The formation of a government trading organization.
- (b) The appointment of Eskimo agents.
- (c) Better utilization of existing facilities and closer co-operation with the Hudson's Bay Company.
- (d) Desirability of consolidating and controlling native income so that it may be used to the best advantage and reduce the necessity for issuing relief.
- (e) Establishing a Trust Fund to improve Eskimo economy.
- (f) Placing of a "floor" under fur prices paid in the country.

5. Policy on Employment of Eskimos

- (a) Consideration of long-term policy to be followed in providing for a steadily increasing Eskimo population.
- (b) Are Eskimos generally to be encouraged to live in the Arctic as hunters and trappers?
- (c) Are they to be encouraged to take other employment, temporary or permanent, that later may have the effect of unsuited them or their families for resuming the native way of life?

- (d) Exploration of the possibilities of finding permanent employment in the Arctic for the average Eskimo or for those who could be trained in any particular field, viz.,
 - (i) as Canadian citizens or as a branch of Armed Services to occupy and patrol the Arctic - for the purposes of sovereignty and security;
 - (ii) as labourers and mechanics at Arctic settlements, radio and meteorological stations, airfields, etc.
 - (iii) as specialists in trades such as carpentering, boat-building, the designing and making of suitable clothing, repairing rifles and guns, clocks and watches, cooking, practical nursing, midwifery, etc.;
 - (iv) development of a wider range of vocations, e.g. handicrafts, eiderdown industry, etc.;
 - (v) greater development of fisheries and the use of fish, particularly in the Eastern Arctic;
 - (vi) consideration of improvements that could be made in methods of hunting and fishing;
 - (vii) reindeer herding;
 - (viii) transfer of groups to under-populated areas.

6. Policy on Eskimo Education

- (a) Consideration of the problems of bringing education to a nomadic people without disturbing their native way of life -
 - (i) Federal and Mission day schools in the settlements;
 - (ii) Residential schools or hostels;
 - (iii) Itinerant teachers;
 - (iv) Summer schools;
 - (v) Manual and technical training in the country;
 - (vi) Advanced educational facilities and, or, technical training in outside institutions.
- (b) Periodicals or pamphlets in the Eskimo language - problem of translating into various dialects.
- (c) The possibility of teaching Eskimos in the Eastern Arctic the use of Roman script for their own language instead of syllabics.
- (d) Teaching of English.

7. Health and Welfare

- (a) General medical, dental and eye care;
- (b) Incidence of tuberculosis;

- (c) The problems raised by the prolonged treatment of natives at outside hospitals, including care of families during hospitalization, and of convalescence and rehabilitation after their return home.

Larsen provided his views on the agenda items to the Commissioner in a memorandum dated May 2, 1952.⁵³⁷ Larsen considered that it would be desirable, for the purpose of the conference, to define what was meant by "the native way of life". In his opinion, this was the way of life which the Inuit followed before the arrival of white men and traders. Since that time, he considered that the Inuit had not followed altogether their traditional way of life because their lives had been controlled by the traders who had given priority to trapping fur instead of hunting. He recommended that the legal authority of the department to control Eskimo affairs should be clarified and that it was desirable that legislation be passed in this regard. Absent special legislation dealing with Eskimos, the *Indian Act* should be amended to provide for administration of Eskimos having regard to the 1939 judgement of the Supreme Court of Canada.

With respect to the agenda items, Larsen doubted that there had been any increase in the Inuit population in light of the high mortality from disease. He was of the view that the decline of available country food appeared to be more pronounced in the seas off Arctic Quebec although he cautioned that seals and walrus are difficult to obtain anywhere in the wintertime. He also expressed the view that caribou had disappeared almost entirely from northern Quebec but again expressed a cautionary note that "the natives have, to some extent, in recent years, lost their skill and/or patience in hunting". He believed that the employment of Inuit at air bases had been very beneficial and expressed the view that those employed should receive the same pay that is paid for comparable work by white people. He noted that Inuit have been adversely affected not only by the low price of fur but also by the increase in the prices of goods at trading

⁵³⁷. Document provided by Grant; RG18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 42, file D1512-2-4-Q-27.

posts. He doubted whether there was any more expenditure on relief at that time than there had been over the past twenty years having regard to the higher current prices of goods but that, even if relief costs were higher after taking this into account, it probably meant that in previous years Inuit who needed relief didn't get it. He also observed that the income obtained in good times had led to Inuit becoming used to white man's food and now looking upon that food as a necessity when in years past they did without it. He was of the view that the decline in morale and independence was not a recent happening but had begun with the arrival of the white man. He believed that one of the reasons Inuit congregated around trading posts was the desire for "a more civilized way of life and more of the amenities of the white man's way of life, for themselves and their children." He noted that, if their children are to get any schooling, it is almost necessary that the families congregate around the trading posts. He believed that, to a lesser extent, the Inuit had a fear of starving to death if they went too far away from the posts. He considered a further reason to be the actions of traders in the past. When furs were plentiful close to the trading posts, the traders welcomed the Inuit to the post.

He believed that the RCMP should continue to do the welfare work as there were "no other persons in the country more competent.... The Eskimos prefer to do business with and bring their trouble to the police rather than to others." He favoured the establishment of a government trading organization or, in the alternative, the establishment of Native co-operative stores. "With these measures and encouragements the natives could regain their confidence in themselves which they have lost to some extent through being continually told, by other persons, what they should and should not do." He observed that, if the Hudson's Bay Company were to withdraw from the Arctic, their posts could be taken over as co-operative stores by the Inuit themselves. He did not favour the establishment of a floor-price for furs. He did not consider that this got to the root of the trouble with the Inuit economy. He considered that "If the living standards of the Eskimos are ever to be raised they will require education, and education will interfere with their so-called nomadic life, but their nomadic

life has, to a large extent, already been eliminated by changing them from hunters of meat to fur trappers. Fur trapping keeps them comparatively close to the Trading Posts to which they go often with their fur, and of course, the traders encourage them to do as much trapping as possible. If the Eskimos were living their true nomadic way of life, they would, to a large extent, be living hundreds of miles away from Trading Posts, following caribou herds or fishing some good lakes or streams or camping at good sealing and walrus grounds." He observed that, "There is really no valid reason why the Eskimos should be made or encouraged to continue as hunters or trappers in the Arctic, especially if they don't want to." He considered that, "the more employment that is found for Eskimos other than as hunters and trappers, the better. I think it is useless to talk of them resuming the native way of life. They should be brought to a white man's standard as quickly as possible in those localities, such as Aklavik and Fort Chimo, where they have been in contact with white men for a considerable number of years and where they have already partially taken to the white man's way of life. ...wherever the Eskimos continue to remain as hunters and trappers permanent wooden buildings should be built for them or by themselves under competent direction at the various settlements, which dwellings they would keep clean and sanitary."

Larsen's comments go directly to the issues raised by Stevenson in the Eastern Arctic Patrol Report of 1951 and challenge Stevenson's view of the people as fundamentally nomadic. Larsen's memorandum clearly has the tone of an argument, not only in favour of a particular view, but also against the views of others. Cantley, for example, had recommended in 1951 that the RCMP be relieved of the welfare function and that the Hudson's Bay Company should handle all relief matters. The Northwest Territories Council had for some years been considering that the Inuit should not be encouraged to give up the "native way of life" and Stevenson's comments in 1951 are a reflection of that approach. Larsen's challenge to define what was meant by the "native way of life" strikes at the heart of the perceptions and misperceptions of the administration. Larsen's perceptions were based on 30 years of Arctic experience. He was no less an Arctic hand

than Cantley or Stevenson, the former Arctic traders. The existence of tension between police and traders was not, however, new.

Gunther refers to the comments on the conference agenda prepared by the general manager of the Hudson's Bay Company, Chesshire.⁵³⁸ Chesshire provided income figures which suggested that average income per family in all districts except Baffin Island had improved considerably by 1951. These figures differed from those provided by Cantley for the prior 1949-50 year and Gunther suggests that they be treated with caution.⁵³⁹ Chesshire identified northern Quebec as a priority area in the following terms:

Turning to the poorer income returns of the Central Arctic, Baffinland, and Northern Quebec, it might at first be supposed that trapping and other conditions were almost identical. That this is very definitely not the case is clearly evident from the sharply higher relief costs relating to Northern Quebec.

In most cases, the natives of Baffinland have adequate supplies of sea food. Again, in the Central Arctic, in most years, there is a sufficient supply of deer meat. Furthermore, at certain settlements within each of these groups, additional income can be earned from miscellaneous activities, which helps towards providing for items other than the bare necessities.

On the other hand, the Eskimo in Northern Quebec, as a result of their habit of concentrating their activities in restricted areas, have only limited country food available and

538. Gunther, pp. 101-102 and 120-121.

539. One may ask why, if income calculation could vary so greatly, all calculations by everyone should not be suspect until any underlying methodological or information base problems are identified and resolved. This is particularly so since the Cantley report points to the impossibility of making anything but reasonable estimates of Inuit income using Hudson's Bay Company information. Note, however, that Cantley's figures were for 1949-50 and Chesshire's were for 1951, which raises questions about an increase in quantities of furs and fur prices from 1950 to 1951.

are almost entirely dependent on the result of their trapping and local labouring for the bare necessities of existence.

It is this area, therefore, that demands priority of consideration. ...but these facts do suggest that something constructive, involving among other things perhaps the transfer of families to other more productive regions — should be undertaken as soon as practicable in Northern Quebec.⁵⁴⁰

Cheshire discussed relocation in the following terms:

A transfer of Eskimos from one area to another is often highly desirable but the Eskimos themselves are reluctant to move from their familiar homes. They would sooner congregate in large communities than go to distant places where they might secure a better livelihood. Experiments in moving them have been tried — always under government supervision — but, generally speaking, the results have not been encouraging.

However, the advisability of moving people to areas which are more productive either in terms of foxes or country food — or both — is something which obviously should be carefully and thoroughly explored. The main thing is to make sure that the potentials of the areas, to which such transfers are to be made, are sufficient to provide the newcomers with a reasonable livelihood without at the same time reducing the living standards of the present inhabitants.

Another important point is that such transfers shall be made in camp groups, which often consist of three or four families, as only in this way are they likely to establish themselves satisfactorily.⁵⁴¹

Cheshire's comments, like the earlier Cantley Report, make a clear connection between income, concentration of population, and relief. Poor

40. Quoted in Gunther, p. 121, from Cheshire's "Brief Comments on Government Agenda of Arctic Affairs", RG18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 42, file D-1512-2-4-Q-27.

41. Quoted in Gunther, pp. 101-102, apparently from the same document commenting on the agenda for the May 1952 conference.

income was not perceived as a problem where the people could turn to the available country food. However, where people were dependent on store food because the population exceeded the available country food resources, substantial relief was required when income levels from fur trading were low and other sources of income were not available. This memorandum also makes it clear that, while transferring people from one area to another might be highly desirable from the perspective of the administration, it was contrary to the inclination of the Inuit.

The Conference on Eskimo Affairs was held May 19 and 20, 1952. It was chaired by the Deputy Minister of Resources and Development and attended by representatives of that Department, the Northwest Territories Council, the RCMP led by the Commissioner, the Department of National Health and Welfare led by the Deputy Minister, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, the Defence Research Board, the Department of National Defence, the Department of Transport, the Department of Fisheries, the Hudson's Bay Company, the Roman Catholic Mission, the Anglican Mission, the United States Embassy, and the National Film Board in the presence of Mr. D. Wilkinson who had made known his views on the subject. Although the Conference is referred to in the Gunther report, much of the detail of what was discussed, as it appears in the Conference summary apparently prepared by departmental staff, is not set out in that report. The summary of the proceedings⁵⁴² stated that:

It was recognized that conditions vary greatly in different parts of the Arctic and can also vary within the same area and from year to year. ...the Mackenzie Delta group is considered to be the farthest advanced culturally and the best off economically. Northern Quebec and Newfoundland-Labrador are the most densely populated and the poorest economically.

542. Summary of the proceedings of a meeting on Eskimo affairs held May 19 and 20, 1952 in the boardroom of the Confederation Building, Ottawa RG85, vol. 294, file 1005-7[5]; document provided by Grant.

Although there are reported declines in some food resources in some certain areas, most Eskimo groups can still obtain a large part of their living within their own country. All, however, have now passed the primitive stage when they were wholly self-sufficient and they could not survive without much of the supplies and equipment they obtain from the trade stores. The drastic decline in white fox prices during recent years, accompanied by greatly increased prices of store goods, has therefore had a very adverse affect on the economy of most groups. The least affected have been the more remote settlements where hunting has remained the principal occupation. While this situation may be temporary and results cannot be gauged on a short-term basis, the fact remains that such occurrences create serious difficulties and make it necessary to consider what remedial action can be taken.

Natives employed at military bases during the war who became accustomed to living in heated accommodation and to receiving regular wages and rations, have also posed a problem during recent years. Families, particularly, which grew up at these bases, have found it very difficult to adjust themselves to the life of the hunter, fisherman and trapper now that employment has ceased. This raises the question as to whether Eskimos should accept such employment if it is to be only temporary or if it does not offer prospects for their families as they grow up.

The decline in fur revenue has been off-set in part since 1945 by issues of family allowances and direct relief amounting in all to some \$1,687,000.00. While these issues have done much to assist the Eskimos over this difficult period, the effect on morale has not been all that could be desired. It has now become apparent that in many instances the natives are coming to depend on such issues rather than on their own efforts for a living. There has been a decided tendency, particularly among the poorer groups, to forsake their former hunting way of life and to congregate in larger groups near the settlements where they can obtain this assistance more regularly. This trend raises the question as to whether present policy and arrangements for issuing family allowances and relief should not be carefully revised.

The summary states that "Canadian Eskimos were not legally wards of the government", so that "it was not considered desirable to attempt at

this late date to segregate the Eskimos or to retard native progress in any way."

The summary went on as follows:

Ways by which the Eskimos could be assisted, not only in meeting the present crises, but in adapting themselves to the changes that can be anticipated in the Arctic in the future, were discussed. Education along practical lines was regarded as being the prime requirement but it was recognized that until such time as these people can be brought to a stage where they can intelligently handle their own affairs, they will have to be given assistance and above all, some form of leadership and direction. Attention was drawn to the equal dangers of doing too much for them as of doing too little, thus breaking down native incentive and morale. Assistance, where it is to be given, should be extended in a way that would encourage the Eskimos to feel that they were expected to remain self-supporting.

On the issue of employment of Inuit, the summary observed that:

Although it was agreed that the bulk of the Eskimo population must and would prefer to continue to live in the Arctic, it was suggested that provision would ultimately have to be made to assist those capable and willing to do so to move outside and find other employment. Hitherto, the growth of the Eskimo population has been limited by the hazards of its environment; disease, starvation and a declining birthrate kept it at a level where it could subsist on the resources available. It was pointed out, however, that with an effective medical and welfare program the population could increase so rapidly that the natural food resources would become quite inadequate to supply its needs. Relief would therefore have to be sought either by enabling the people to earn sufficient in the country to purchase imported foods and other goods or to take up employment in other areas.

At present, there are less than 250 whites employed in various capacities in Eskimo territories, so that unless there are very extensive future developments, the opportunities open to

Eskimos in their own country, even when they become capable of taking up such work, are definitely limited.

It was agreed, however, that the educational program should be directed to fitting Eskimos to take over as many of the jobs as possible that may become available in the north country.

It was felt, however, that the immediate need was to assist the natives to continue to follow their traditional way of life as hunters. This assistance could be extended by seeing that they were properly equipped and placed in the most suitable areas for hunting. Movements could be initiated from overpopulated or depleted districts to areas not presently occupied or where the natural resources could support a greater number of people. Steps should be taken to assist the Eskimos in improving their hunting techniques and in interesting them in making fuller use of all of the resources available.

This did not mean that the Eskimos should be discouraged from accepting any suitable employment that may be offered so long as they could be assured that it would be reasonably permanent or that by following it they would not become wholly incapable of returning to their native way of life if it should fail.

It was agreed that there should be a permanent committee established to initiate future policy on Inuit affairs.

It seems clear that population growth was not an immediate concern. Mortality rates had kept the Inuit population from growing. However, it was said that this *could* become a problem with improvements in health. The emphasis on the "traditional way of life as hunters" and the desirability of encouraging the continuation of this life is telling. It suggests that the Inuit are essentially hunters who have suffered as a result of abandoning their traditions. At the same time, it is a view of the Inuit which is inconsistent with the view expressed earlier in the conference summary of people who have become dependent on store supplies. Plainly some Inuit were more like, and others less like, their hunting ancestors. Which were which would be very important in any scheme to "assist the natives to continue to follow their traditional way of life as hunters". The summary does not articulate

these issues in a clear and unambiguous way. What does come through consistently is an emphasis on economic self-reliance. Starvation is not mentioned. The major economic problem is not a decline in game food resources but is clearly identified as the instability of the income economy, primarily trapping. Hunting is frequently referred to in a context which points to it as the general way to economic self-sufficiency. However, pursuing an objective of self-reliance through increased reliance on hunting could only mean a significant change for those Inuit who had become dependent on the trading post and store-bought supplies. What would be involved in an economic program which emphasized increased reliance on hunting would be a return to earlier ways of living with a perceived improvement in morale and personal dignity. In short, it would involve a restoration to what was perceived to be the proper state of the people; that is rehabilitation. The 1953 relocation to the High Arctic would be referred to by some of those involved as a rehabilitation project.

Reports of Conditions in the 1952 Period

In June 1952, Constable McRae, in charge of the Port Harrison RCMP detachment, reported that things had been good during the past winter. Gunther reports that "this, in part, was because he had provided the 'inefficient' trappers with equipment to make a living and told them that if they did not use it to procure a sufficient amount of country food and fur it would be taken away and given to someone who was 'willing to work for a living'".⁵⁴³ McRae stated that:

The real reason for the present living conditions of the natives in this area is not the scarcity of food, but the overpopulation of the area, and if some of the natives could be made interested to move to the outlying islands or to another district

543. Gunther, p. 120, quoting from "General Conditions—Eskimo" 29.6.52; RG18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 42, file D 1512-2-4-Q-27.

entirely, conditions would be much better for the remaining natives.⁵⁴⁴

The report noted that people who had gone to the Ottawa, Sleeper and King George Islands had, with the exception of the group on the King George Islands, fared well. The report is significant in identifying population *distribution* as the concern, not scarcity of country food as such.

Gunther reports that the term "inefficient trapper" was "the name given to the able-bodied few who, due to lack of ability, ambition, or just plain laziness, are unable to trap sufficient furs to maintain themselves or their families — their catch of furs every year being exceedingly low. Natives falling into this category are...the responsibility of the government".⁵⁴⁵ Pushing so-called inefficient trappers to be more self-reliant was the accepted practice.

In a September 22, 1952 report to the Commissioner, Inspector Larsen once again set out his views on Eskimo administration urging that legislation be enacted to clarify the legal relationship of Eskimos to the government; that the RCMP assume greater responsibility for the welfare of the Inuit; that the government become involved in the trading of furs for supplies; that local Native councils be set up in order that the views of the Eskimos might be obtained with respect to their own welfare. Larsen also observed that a number of Northwest Territories officials are ex-traders and still think and act as such. In commenting on Larsen's report, Superintendent Peacock commented that "I think the view generally held now is that Eskimos are not wards of the government but have complete citizenship rights. There was a Supreme Court decision holding that Eskimos and Indians were in the same category but I do not think that is the opinion held by Northern administration officials. The problem could be

544. *Ibid.*

545. Gunther, p. 120, quoting from Chesshire, "Eskimo Relief Policy (1944)", RG18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 42, file D-1512-2-4-Q-27.

decided by legislation as Inspector Larsen suggests and to follow his other suggestions the Eskimos must be made wards to make them subject to control by the federal Department."⁵⁴⁶ Larsen's proposal for greater involvement by the RCMP in the welfare of the Inuit was not embraced. The suggestion of establishing local Native councils was considered to be a good idea. Larsen's comments about ex-traders bring into sharp focus the differences in his views from those reflected in Stevenson's and Cantley's reports, both ex-Hudson's Bay Company traders, and also from those evident in the conference summary prepared by the Department.

In April 1952, a report was received on a successful operation on Banks Island. The Hudson's Bay Company had in 1951 outfitted a group of Inuit to permit them to return to Banks Island for a year of hunting and trapping. They would return to Tuktoyaktuk the following year with their catch of furs. As discussed above, Inuit had acquired their own schooners in years past to exploit the resources of Banks Island but low fur prices prevented the maintenance and outfitting of the boats for this purpose. It was hoped that this activity would be continued so as to reduce relief payments and to contribute to the "rehabilitation" of the Inuit.⁵⁴⁷ The use of a loan fund for such projects was proposed. As discussed below, the continuation of this project would proceed under the Eskimo Loan Fund with Fred Carpenter asking for the loan. By contrast, the relocated Inukjuak Inuit would not ask to be relocated and would not ask for a loan for that purpose. The loan fund provided the funds necessary for the stores in the new communities and putting a name on the loan appears to have been largely a matter of form.

546. RG18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 42, file D-1412-2-4-Q-27; document provided by Grant.

547. Hunt, 9.4.52; RG22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1, Pt. 2; referred to in Gunther, p. 103; part of document provided by Grant.

The report of the 1952 Eastern Arctic Patrol, northern leg, of which Cantley was the officer-in-charge, indicates that the patrol was aware that Mr. D. Wilkinson proposed to live at Idlout's camp near Pond Inlet the next year. The report indicated that caribou were plentiful on the northern part of Baffin Island and, if patrols the winter of 1952-53 by the RCMP and the Hudson's Bay Company post manager showed that caribou continued to be plentiful, consideration should be given to relaxing the present ban on Inuit hunting caribou on the island.

The report addresses the situation at Craig Harbour. The complement of two regular members of the RCMP at the Craig Harbour detachment is referred to, as is the presence of two Inuit special constables from Pond Inlet and their families. The report goes on as follows:

Walrus, seals and other country food are quite plentiful in the area and there is no reason why more Eskimos should not be moved over to Ellesmere Island to live permanently. This was suggested to Inspector Larsen and he expressed his willingness to have the Police detachment cooperate with the Department provided arrangements could be made to have the necessary supplies made available. This could probably be arranged next year through the "loan fund" that has been applied for. A similar arrangement could also be made if a further detachment is established in the Cape Sabine area next year. Six or eight families could be placed there also and could probably be drawn from one or other of the overpopulated northern Quebec areas. A few families at Port Harrison have already expressed their willingness to go further north and others could also probably be found in other areas if they were to be canvassed.

Musk-ox and caribou were reported to be fairly numerous on Ellesmere Island although no estimate of the actual numbers could be obtained. The Craig Harbour natives shot a few caribou during the winter but otherwise land animals were left unmolested. The most disturbing news is, however, that Greenlanders are crossing over to the island and apparently hunting there. Six of them visited Craig Harbour last spring by dog team and Eureka has since reported that twelve Eskimos had arrived from around Bache Peninsula, where they had

apparently spent the winter. Mr. Christensen wrote to the Greenland authorities at Thule last spring, asking them to discourage Greenlanders from crossing to Canadian territories but he admitted that it was unlikely that this would have any effect. The only way that any control could be exercised would be to have a RCM Police detachment in the Cape Sabine area where these people are entering.

If Police detachments could be maintained at both Craig Harbour and Cape Sabine and arrangements could be made to have them supplied through the "loan fund" ten or twelve Canadian Eskimo families could be transferred to Ellesmere Island and use made of the natural resources that are undoubtedly available there. The occupation of the island by Canadian Eskimos will remove any excuse Greenlanders may presently have for crossing over and hunting there. Using Craig Harbour and Cape Sabine as starting points consideration might then be given to the possibility of finding employment for natives at Eureka and Alert, under the supervision of the Police, during the summer months. Such an arrangement would probably be welcomed by the Meteorological Division and also have the support of the RCM Police.⁵⁴⁸

The reference in the patrol report to Inuit being "moved over to Ellesmere Island" appears to be a reference to more people coming over from Pond Inlet in addition to the special constables and their families. It might be noted that the report refers to the special constables and their families living in wooden houses during the winter and in tents during the summer. There is no indication in the patrol report as to how additional Inuit families would be expected to live. Nor is there a clear indication as to what purpose is to be served by a relocation of north Baffin Island Inuit other than that game appeared to be plentiful. By contrast, the relocation

548. RG85, vol. 1207, file 201-1-8, Pt. 3, Report on the Eastern Arctic Patrol, September 1952; document provided by Grant; also referred to in Gunther, pp. 22-23 and 103-104. Gunther, p. 22, indicates that Stevenson was the officer in charge, but indicates, p. 104, that Cantley was the officer in charge. Gunther attributes the quotation on p. 104 to the report of the southern leg of the patrol, which was headed by Johnston rather than Cantley, to whom the quotation is attributed.

of people from northern Quebec is linked to overpopulation which, as Cantley's earlier reports and those of others made clear, related to population distribution and not the availability of game for food as such. The comment that the occupation of Ellesmere Island by Canadian Inuit would "remove any excuse Greenlanders may presently have for crossing over and hunting there" appears to recognize that the presence of Canadian Inuit hunting in a game preserve created for their benefit would contribute to enforcing the exclusion of foreign hunters from the preserve. As such, it touches on the issue of the maintenance of sovereignty. Cantley was, as we have seen, aware of the strategic significance of decisions involving the unoccupied High Arctic islands.

The patrol report also discusses the situation at Resolute Bay. No difficulty was experienced that year in getting through to Resolute but it was observed that ice conditions were unusually favourable and it was doubtful if the *C.D. Howe* would be able to get there in a normal year when heavy ice would be found in Barrow Strait. The weather had been bad when the ship arrived at the end of August with snow, sleet and a gale with temperatures around 20° F.

The report notes that the RCMP had a detachment at Resolute Bay up to the previous year but it was closed on the basis that there was not sufficient work to justify keeping a man there. The report suggested that there was a need for some one person to be charged with general administrative authority for that area to ensure that game regulations, the protection of archaeological sites, and other ordinances affecting the Northwest Territories were enforced. "At places such as this, where there are large permanent staffs the year round and a large transient population during the spring and summer, it seems desirable to have a capable Police officer or someone else who could be independent of the various stations and who would act as general government representative."⁵⁴⁹

549. *Ibid.*

No recommendation is made with respect to relocating Inuit to Rolute Bay. There is a suggestion that Arctic Bay would afford a suitable location for more Inuit. It is observed that game is plentiful and the settlement was located around meteorological and radio stations and the Hudson's Bay Company store.

A catch of 1,225 foxes was made last year and the natives had no difficulty in getting all the country food they wanted. ...there are, at present, only about 40 families attached to Arctic Bay and there will be no difficulty in accommodating as many more if natives could be persuaded to transfer from other areas and to settle north of Arctic Bay along the Brodeur Peninsula. There is no lack of country food and trapping opportunities would be as great there as anywhere else in the Eastern Arctic.⁵⁵⁰

A similar observation is made with respect to Clyde River where the settlement was centred on meteorological and radio stations and the Hudson's Bay Company post. The catch of fox furs was not particularly good the previous winter but the Inuit were reported as "fairly well off as country food had been quite plentiful". Plans for development in the area and possible employment opportunities for Inuit were reviewed. Thirty families were reported living in the area and the report observed that "if there is demand for more natives than there are at Clyde River, other families could be transferred from other places and encouraged to settle there permanently. All reports indicate that a larger population could be supported from the natural resources of this area and if summer employment were also available, this would provide an income in addition to that from trapping."⁵⁵¹ It may be noted here that the report focuses not only on the availability of country food but also explicitly on the potential for income not only from trapping but from temporary employment. The comment with respect to relocating other Inuit to Arctic Bay also refers to trapping opportunities in addition to the availability of country food. The

550. *Ibid.*

551. *Ibid.*

trapping economy was the same across the Arctic. The fact that relocatees would be able to trap was important because it would provide them with some income but not necessarily more than they had at home given that fur prices were the same for everyone. Only an increase in furs would increase income at any given level of fur prices. One does not, however, find any discussion of relocatees having increased fur trapping opportunities. The references are consistently to increased game food opportunities. It was the availability of country food which appears to have been particularly important in making sites attractive for receiving relocatees with seasonal employment an additional factor.

The report of the southern leg of the 1952 Eastern Arctic Patrol with R. G. Johnston in charge, describes the situation at Port Harrison. The report described the movement of Inuit in the area as follows:

Mr. Ploughman reported that the Hudson's Bay Company are planning this year on putting a group of Eskimo families on the Ottawa Islands, Mr. Ploughman and Constable McRae have investigated the islands and state that game appeared to be fairly plentiful.

Constable McRae reported that the native camp at Nestapoka had been moved to the Sleeper Islands where they will be in a better position to look after themselves.

With reference to the transfer of natives from Port Harrison to Richmond Gulf, this project got under way April 23. Due to adverse weather conditions the families got held up at Nestapoka and were unable to proceed until the RCMP patrol in early July when they brought a whale boat from Port Harrison. Constable McRae did not know how this experiment was progressing, however a report will be submitted this Fall when the natives return to Port Harrison.

If it is desired to move any native families off the Quebec coast and north to Baffin Island Inukpuk E9-904, Pellyushie E9-720 and eight other families of the Port Harrison area have signified their willingness to move. In order that we might encourage natives to move from Quebec to better hunting grounds it is

suggested that these people be moved next summer on the "Howe".⁵⁵²

The report does not indicate what was said to the people who indicated their willingness to go to Baffin Island. It will be recalled that beginning in 1951 the Patrol was instructed to identify people who would be prepared to be relocated. In other words the issue of relocation would be raised by the government officials. government officials cannot be taken as reporting on a spontaneous expression of desire by the Inuit.

The report refers to the problem of mail to people who were at the hospital in Moose Factory. Apparently there were no stamps on the letters and the mail was not delivered. To correct this problem, a suggestion had been made to Constable Gibson, who was on the *C.D. Howe* to begin his posting at Port Harrison, that the police forward all letters in a government envelope and send them direct to the hospital for distribution.

The handicraft industry at Port Harrison was reported as operating at a high standard of efficiency although "very few of the relief recipients are benefiting from this industry as the majority of the work is being done by efficient hunters".

It is reported that "the relief in Port Harrison is still quite high although Constable McRae has reduced it considerably due to efficient handling of the recipients and placing them in better hunting grounds".⁵⁵³ In other words, country food provided a substitute for store food and, hence, for relief rations.

552. RG85, vol. 1207, file 201-1-8/3, Eastern Arctic Patrol Report, 1952.

553. *Ibid.*

The patrol reports that "the country produce around Port Harrison is fairly plentiful particularly seal and fish. There are a number of excellent fishing spots within a very short distance from the post."⁵⁵⁴

The school at Port Harrison is reported as having approximately thirty children with an additional sixty camp children "who come in at all times".⁵⁵⁵

Gunther refers to a general observation of the patrol through the southern areas. The report is as follows:

It is the long-term outlook, however, that causes the greatest concern. If fox prices continue their low level, the earnings of most of these people will be greatly reduced in poor fur years. During the past year, they were able to get by but they were quite unable to put anything aside for replacement of major equipment, such as boats, rifles, tents, etc. Most of which after a succession of years of low earnings are now coming to the state where renewal will be necessary.... It would appear, however, that the time is now past where the economy could be based almost entirely on white fox and that other means will have to be found to permit Eskimos in all sections of the Arctic to earn sufficient by their own efforts to be assured of a reasonable standard of living. Family Allowances and relief have assisted greatly in the past few years but they can only be regarded as temporary expedients, the continued use of which can only result in the complete demoralization of the people.⁵⁵⁶

In other words, the focus of administrators was on the underlying instability in the fur economy and the perceived solution was not affected by reports of better years.

554. *Ibid.*

555. *Ibid.*

556. Report on the Eastern Arctic Patrol, as quoted in Gunther, p. 104.

First Meeting of Committee on Eskimo Affairs

On October 16, 1952, the first meeting of the Special Committee on Eskimo Affairs was held in Ottawa. It was chaired by the Deputy Minister. The committee, in addition to representation from the Department, included the Commissioner of the RCMP, representatives of both the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches, the general manager of the Hudson's Bay Company, the Director, Indian Health Services, Department of National Health and Welfare, and the Chief of the Department's Northern Administration Division. The minutes of the meeting noted that the committee had been appointed at the Conference on Eskimo Affairs held in Ottawa May 19 and 20, 1952 and, at the conference, a number of matters had been suggested for further study. In opening the meeting, the minutes indicate that the chairman stated as follows:

It was felt that greatly improved educational facilities must be made available to the Eskimos to enable them to meet the changing conditions brought about by the encroachment of white civilization upon their territory. Careful planning must also be undertaken to improve the general level of the Eskimo economy.⁵⁵⁷

The committee approved a number of items proposed by the subcommittee on Eskimo education. With respect to health issues, it was considered not to be practicable at the time to establish more hospitals in the Arctic. The need to provide some rehabilitation of patients discharged from hospitals was recognized. The issue was that long stays in hospitals had rendered the patients totally or partially unfit to return to their way of life. The committee agreed to establish two rehabilitation centres, one at Driftpile, Alberta and the other at Frobisher Bay.

557. Minutes of the first meeting of Special Committee on Eskimo Affairs, Thursday, October 16, 1952, RG22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1/3; document provided by Grant; also cited briefly in Gunther, p. 105.

The committee agreed "that arrangements should be made to set up a fund of \$50,000.00 from which returnable advances could be made to Eskimo groups or individuals to assist them to purchase necessary supplies and equipment with which to increase their earning power or to embark upon any approved project which local traders or others may not be prepared to finance".⁵⁵⁸

The committee noted that encouraging progress had been made in the development of a handicraft industry and that the grant to the Canadian Handicrafts Guild should be continued and the effort extended. In addition, approval was given to "special projects such as boat building, fishing, eiderdown collecting, etc., designed to widen the native economy".⁵⁵⁹

On the subject of the transfer of Inuit, the minutes state the following:

Consideration was given to the possibility of assisting natives to move from overpopulated areas to places where they could more readily obtain a living. It was agreed that Craig Harbour and Cape Sabine on Ellesmere Island should be investigated as possible localities where Eskimos could be placed under the care of the RCM Police detachments and arrangements made to enable them to obtain necessary supplies through the loan fund.⁵⁶⁰

With respect to the employment of Eskimos, the minutes state as follows:

Eskimos should be encouraged to take employment at northern centres provided that they and their families do not

⁵⁵⁸. *Ibid.*

⁵⁵⁹. *Ibid.*

⁵⁶⁰. *Ibid.*

lose their ability to return to the native way of life if employment should cease. Rotation of employment and time off for hunting are good precautions.

Eskimos should receive the same wages as white employees for the same class of work.⁵⁶¹

The minutes report that consideration was given "to a suggestion that a Royal Commission should be asked to enquire into Eskimo Affairs. It was agreed that the present committee should continue its investigations during the next two or three years and put forward solutions to the problems involved. If, at the end of that time the problems are such that a Royal Commission seems called for, the matter will be considered again then."⁵⁶² The proposal for a Royal Commission had been made by the Commissioner of the RCMP on the recommendation of Inspector Larsen.

The minutes note that "reference was made to the changes that had taken place in the Arctic during the past fifteen years, and the opinion was expressed that although development must necessarily be slow, a great deal of progress had been made by government during that period in providing for the care and development of the Eskimo population".⁵⁶³

The meeting concluded with the chairman explaining "that in view of the importance attached to the development of an overall educational program, this subject had been given priority at this meeting. He suggested that at the next meeting of the committee, which might be held during the first week in May, 1953, first consideration might be given to problems affecting Eskimo administration. He also referred to the great interest now being taken in the Arctic and the Eskimos by both the public and the government and the importance of the work of this committee in dealing

561. *Ibid.*

562. *Ibid.*

563. *Ibid.*

with the difficult problems presented and thanked the members for the time and thought they had given to the committee's work."⁵⁶⁴

It might be noted that the minutes indicate only that the committee considered relocations from "overpopulated areas" to locations where the people could "more readily obtain a living". Since there were no employers at Craig Harbour and Cape Sabine other than the RCMP posts that might be established there, a "living" would mean a living by hunting and trapping. Since the prospects for the trapping economy were the same throughout the Arctic, as indicated by the general observations in the Eastern Arctic Patrol Report quoted by Gunther, this would mean a greater reliance on hunting, that is, a greater reliance on the traditional way of life.

No mention is made of starvation. Much of the minutes is occupied by the discussion of issues related to education and health. The "transfer of Eskimos" is only one of many items and it is not described in terms which suggest any extreme urgency. In that regard, the minutes conclude with observations about the substantial progress which had been made in providing care for the Inuit.

It is noteworthy that the relocation of Inuit was given consideration as distinct from other items which resulted in agreement or decisions. The only decision which appears to have been made was to investigate Craig Harbour and Cape Sabine as possible locations for relocated people. In this regard, the minutes are ambiguous in that the committee may have accepted relocation in principle with the remaining decision to be made only as to location. Given the general theme in the correspondence of all of those involved in Eskimo administration at the time favouring relocations, this would seem to be the interpretation to be placed on the minutes. The correspondence of the day reflects the general consensus on the appropriateness of relocations with differences confined to the objectives to be achieved and the manner in which relocations should be executed — not

⁵⁶⁴. *Ibid.*

that these are necessarily small differences. In that regard, the decision by the Deputy Minister to relocate northern Quebec Inuit to the High Arctic would be made before the committee would meet again. The chairman's concluding remarks about the great interest which was being taken in the Arctic and the Eskimos by both the public and the government may be seen as prescient in light of subsequent developments leading to the reactivation of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development although Cantley had a year earlier commented on the strategic importance of the Arctic.

The Beginnings of a Plan

As of October 1952, it cannot be said that there was a plan to relocate northern Quebec Inuit to the High Arctic. There was at most an idea, a concept, of relocating northern Quebec Inuit, possibly to the High Arctic. The Eastern Arctic Patrol Report had talked about some northern Quebec Inuit indicating a willingness to move to Baffin Island. The patrol had identified various localities on Baffin Island which could support additional population through hunting, trapping and, in some cases, employment. The possibility of moving Pond Inlet Inuit over to Craig Harbour was referred to and mention was made of the Cape Sabine area as a possible location for Inuit relocated from northern Quebec. The committee appears to have focused on the possibility of relocating Inuit from overpopulated areas, by which we might take it that northern Quebec was included, to Ellesmere Island. Why the committee did not consider locations on Baffin Island where Hudson's Bay Company posts were established and communities already existed is not evident. Nor is there any indication as to why the focus was on an uninhabited part of the Arctic in which the RCMP had just recently re-established a detachment at Craig Harbour and might establish a detachment at Cape Sabine.

What was the idea that was forming? To begin with, one does not see starvation as a significant consideration. There is no sense of extreme urgency such as might exist were there a threat of imminent starvation. What one sees is a long-term economic concern. As has been seen, the

"overpopulation" in Quebec was a cause of concern as a result of the decline in the fur economy. The people of northern Quebec had become used to purchasing food and goods at the trading post but, with the decline in incomes caused most recently by the drop in fur prices, had turned to relief to obtain the food and goods which they could no longer buy. Earned income had, in fact, declined at the end of the war with the loss of employment in war-related activities but this had been offset to some extent by the arrival of family allowances and old age pensions. In areas where the population around the trading post had access to sufficient country food, the decline in income was seen to be offset by an increased reliance on country food. However, where the population around the trading post was greater than could be supported by the available country food resources, the reliance on relief was seen to be heavier. The idea was to move people away from these "overpopulated" posts to areas where they could rely on country food. It was recognized that the inclination of the people was to have access to the food and goods from the trading post and to stay relatively close to the post.

The idea of moving people away from "overpopulated" posts was reinforced by the perception of moral decline in people who had become reliant on unearned income from relief in addition to family allowance and old age pensions. Relief supplies were also seen as not providing an adequate diet, with resulting concerns about health. A push toward self-reliance was thus seen to achieve economic, moral and health objectives. Where the relocation was to an area where the opportunities would be limited primarily, if not entirely, to hunting and trapping and, given that the trapping economy was the same throughout the Arctic, self-reliance would mean greater reliance on country food. Hence, the push would be in the direction of increased reliance on country food in a relocation of that type. There would, in any event, be a limit on what would be available by way of store food since supplies for the store would come in only once a year to the extent funded through the loan fund.

If the idea were to come to fruition, success would be seen in terms of the extent to which people were in fact relying on hunting and trapping. What of the reaction of the people who were the object of this push toward self-reliance? Perhaps some complaining or resentment might be expected but overall they might see that this was a necessary, if not entirely desirable, development. Perhaps they might be entirely happy to be hunters and trappers who were primarily reliant on their own resources rather than things supplied by the white man; perhaps they might be completely unhappy and demand to be returned. However, severe unhappiness and a desire to return would not remove the necessity to hunt and trap. The force of circumstances would require continued self-reliance even in the face of serious unhappiness. Hence, the overt signs of success, namely self-reliance, would be similar regardless of the state of mind of any of the people. This would be different, of course, if the means of getting home were readily available. If people could simply pick up their things and head off a few hundred miles to their homes then they could vote on the success of the project with their feet. Indeed, this did happen in the case of relocations to places not too far distant from people's homes.

If the idea were to ensure that those who participated in the project were entirely happy then the means would have to be readily available for them to vote with their feet. However, these documents reflect little consideration of the desires of the people themselves or of social and cultural issues. The people were plainly not represented in the decision making and there is some explicit reference in the documents to the inclination of the people to stay near trading posts. Various steps were being taken around Port Harrison, for example, to push people to become self-reliant. The push did not take the form of overt force. It rather appeared in the guise of leadership, guidance and encouragement to a people who were seen to be unable to make the right choices for themselves. It appears clear that, in the locally initiated relocations of

Quebec Inuit to other parts of the Quebec coast or to offshore islands, people were told where to go and they went where they were told.⁵⁶⁵

The idea began to take the form of a plan in December 1952. On December 18, 1952 Cantley sent up a memorandum outlining programs that might be undertaken over the next year or two to improve conditions among Inuit generally. In the cover note, he observed that "if anything is to be attempted this year it will be necessary to start making preliminary arrangements immediately. There will have to be close liaison with the RCM Police, the Hudson's Bay Company and possibly others on most of the projects both in the field and at executive level. Communication with the field organizations takes time and they in turn must have sufficient notice to make the necessary local arrangements with natives and others. It would be desirable, therefore, to have an early decision on what we should attempt to do during the coming year."⁵⁶⁶ The recipient, Mr. Meikle, wrote on the cover memorandum on December 22, 1952 a comment to Mr. Cunningham, the Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch, that "there are many problems in these two memos that require careful study. You may wish to ask Mr. Wright for his comments before deciding on what items need immediate further attention." Mr. Cunningham, on the same date, wrote a note to Mr. Meikle saying "I agree that we should ask Mr. Wright to comment."⁵⁶⁷ Mr. Wright was the Chief of the Northern Administration Division. There is nothing further to indicate the nature of the problems referred to by Mr. Meikle or how they were ultimately addressed.

65. In his June 30, 1993 presentation to the Commission, Professor Gunther acknowledged that local moves could involve pressure but argued the Inuit were not pressured in the 1953 relocation to the High Arctic, Tr., vol. 3, p. 971.

566. Cantley to Meikle, December 18, 1952, RG85/1234/251-1, Pt. 2; document provided by Grant; also cited in Gunther, pp. 106-107.

567. *Ibid.*

Cantley's memorandum on improving conditions among Inuit generally (the other memo sent to Mr. Meikle dealt with a situation at Aklavik specifically) contained four proposals for the transfer of Inuit from overpopulated areas to places where they could more readily make a living and be made self-supporting; three proposals with respect to "organization and improvement of hunting techniques"; two proposals with respect to "whale hunting"; and thirteen items under the heading "augmenting and conserving Eskimo earnings".⁵⁶⁸

Under the heading "transfers of natives from overpopulated areas to places where they can more readily make a living and be made self-supporting", it was proposed that ten families be transferred from the Port Harrison area to Ellesmere Island where they could be looked after by the existing RCMP detachment at Craig Harbour and the proposed detachment near Cape Herschel. The transfer of dogs, boats and other equipment could be arranged on the *C.D. Howe* and the *d'Iberville* in the 1953 season. Trade supplies would be purchased through the Eskimo Loan Fund and shipped from either Montreal or Churchill on these vessels. Furs and other produce traded would be brought out to Montreal for disposal and credited to the loan fund. A second transfer proposed involved ten families from northern Quebec and/or Cape Dorset to Resolute Bay if arrangements could be made with the RCMP to station a man there to look after them and enforce observance of Northwest Territories ordinances and regulations. It was suggested that the RCMP officer could "probably" obtain accommodation and board at the RCAF station or the meteorological station and a small building could "probably" be made available as a store. The same arrangements for transferring dogs, etc. providing supplies, and disposing of furs were proposed as with the first project. In addition, it was suggested that arrangements could "probably" be made with the Department of Transport or the RCAF to employ "some on a year-round basis as maintenance crew".

568. *Ibid.*

A third proposed transfer involved ten families from northern Quebec and/or Cape Dorset to Clyde River on Baffin Island. It was suggested that most of the Inuit men in the area could "probably" find employment on construction during the summer months if the proposed U.S. radar station were erected at Cape Christian. It was proposed that the Hudson's Bay Company post manager could look after the Inuit at Clyde River. The presence of the Hudson's Bay Company post alleviated the need to provide supplies or to make arrangements for trading furs.

A fourth involved using the loan fund to assist Inuit who were already living and hunting on the islands in Hudson Bay off the Quebec coast and to encourage others to go there. The arrangements for the transfers would be made locally using the RCMP, the Hudson's Bay Company and the Inuit's own boats. The Hudson's Bay Company posts would be responsible for outfitting the Inuit for winter and would take care of supplies and trading. It was possible that one or two whale boats would have to be provided for hunting.

The proposals for organizing and improving hunting techniques involved organizing hunting and fishing in Ungava Bay to make fuller use of the sea mammals and fish. Leadership was seen as the prime requisite. The Hudson's Bay Company posts were seen as capable of supplying whatever additional supplies the people might need. A second proposal involved supervision by the RCMP of walrus hunting at various places in the Eastern Arctic where there was a danger of the herds being seriously depleted by uncontrolled hunting. A third proposal involved encouraging Inuit to make greater use of nets for taking seals and white whales to save the cost of rifles and ammunition and the loss of animals shot and not recovered.

The proposals in connection with whale hunting involved outfitting Fred Carpenter's boat to kill large whales in the Beaufort Sea and Amundsen Gulf and chartering a small whale hunting steamer for whaling and research in Hudson Strait and Bay. It was observed that the proposal

or whale hunting could require the provision of cold storage facilities for the preservation of meat.

Under the heading of "augmenting and conserving Eskimo earnings" thirteen items were listed involving wider distribution of the population during the winter months for trapping and hunting; distributing meat and fish caches to attract wild foxes; providing suitable box traps for taking ermine; investigating present methods of marketing white foxes and the role the Department might play in promoting their use and obtaining a greater return for the Inuit; encouraging Inuit to save and better prepare hair seal skins to make them saleable; improving the dressing and tanning processes for foxes, white bears, and seal skins to make them saleable; exploring markets for walrus and white whale hides; organizing small fisheries for supplying local settlements and the bases; wider development of Inuit handicrafts; developing other local industries for sale outside; developing local industries to meet local needs; employing Inuit by various agencies in the smaller settlements at isolated radio stations, at High Arctic joint U.S. Canadian weather stations, at U.S. and Canadian military bases, and making arrangements in that connection to standardize wages and rations and to make provision for deductions from wages for savings as well as the usual deductions, e.g., income tax; and considering means that could be taken to consolidate Inuit income from all sources and to regulate its use to the best of advantage. This shopping list of ideas reflects ideas that had been circulating for several years.

Much of the memorandum takes the form of ideas. The transfers however, take the form of relatively concrete proposals. It is clear, with respect to the transfers, that "make a living and be made self-supporting" refers to a living by hunting and trapping and being made to depend on that living. Employment might be an additional feature at some locations but it is clear that the prospects of employment were tentative. The impression is that at some locations there were organizations that employed people, so that, if people were transferred there, they could "probably" get some work. It should be noted that the entire memorandum is three and

a half pages long and the discussion of the four proposed transfer projects occupies one and a quarter pages.

The December 18, 1952 memorandum does not refer to the transfer of Pond Inlet Inuit. Gunther reports that in a memorandum dated December 8, 1952, Stevenson advised Cantley that the transfer of Port Harrison Inuit to Ellesmere Island would require the assistance of Pond Inlet Inuit to help them "contend with the dark period which they are not familiar with and that although the terrain is similar to the Quebec coast, I know that from past experience with the Dorset natives that the dark period causes some discontentment".⁵⁶⁹

In December 1952, an RCMP staff sergeant went to Resolute Bay. Gunther states that the purpose was to check on the possibility of housing and jobs for Inuit who might be moved there.⁵⁷⁰ Gunther does not elaborate on the contents of the staff sergeant's report. As will be seen shortly, the staff sergeant apparently identified the need to construct housing or to convert a Quonset hut into living units.

It appears that the Director considered, with respect to the relocation of families from northern Quebec to the High Arctic, that the project should involve a smaller number of families. This was communicated in a letter dated January 12, 1953 to the general manager of the Hudson's Bay Company fur trade department. The letter, as reported by Gunther, is as follows:

Consideration is being given...to the possibility of transferring about five families each to Craig Harbour and Cape Herschel on Ellesmere Island and possibly to Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island. These natives would be transferred from presently overpopulated areas where they have difficulty in

569. Gunther, p. 106, quoting from Stevenson to Cantley, 8.12.52; RG85, vol. 1234, file 251-1, Pt. 2.

570. Gunther, p. 162.

obtaining their living by hunting and trapping. These small groups would in the absence of a trading post be put under direct supervision of the RCMP detachments at those places and these detachments would carry supplies necessary for looking after these people during the year. Although we are only considering a few families this year, it is possible that if the experiment proves successful, these communities might enlarge later on. This might apply more particularly to Resolute Bay where there is every prospect that the base will be a permanent one and that there will be employment beside hunting and trapping for quite a large number of men...

As northern Quebec is the area which is causing us the most concern at the present, we shall endeavour to draw the families for Ellesmere Island and Cornwallis Island from there, but since there is a big difference between living conditions in the High Arctic and those in Quebec, we think it would be advisable to make a limited experiment only, until we can be sure that the people taken from the Quebec area can accustom themselves to living in the High Arctic. It may be necessary to send one or two families from north Baffin Island with these people in getting them used to hunting conditions, particularly during the long winter. It may then be possible to transfer families from northern Quebec to north Baffin Island to replace the families moved to gradually build a larger population in this area.⁵⁷¹

It appears that the relocation to north Baffin Island had been dropped. There is nothing in the letter to explain why.

Grant reports that on December 29, 1952, Privy Council Office staff recommended to the Clerk of the Privy Council that the Privy Council Office should support the RCMP proposal to re-open the detachment at Resolute Bay. This recommendation was made in the context of a discussion about the importance of maintaining Canadian sovereignty in the Canadian Arctic. The memo states that "About a year ago Mr. Pearson [the Secretary of State for External Affairs] remarked in private that he wondered how

571. Gunther, pp. 107-108, quoting from Cunningham to Chesshire 12.01.53, RG85, vol. 1513, file 1012-Pt. 1.

good our claim was to some areas of the Arctic. ...probably of much greater concern is the sort of de facto U.S. sovereignty which has caused so much trouble in the last war and which might be exercised again." With a view to preserving Canadian sovereignty, it is recommended, among other things, that "the RCMP might open new posts in the Arctic. There is a proposal that the post at Resolute should be re-opened and I recommend that we support this idea. The Department of Transport is in favour."⁵⁷² As a result, like the re-opening of the posts on Ellesmere Island, the police post at Resolute was seen to contribute to the maintenance of sovereignty.

On December 30, 1952, the Department of Transport acknowledged the inquiry of the Director of northern Administration about the possibility and the requirements involved in transferring Inuit to Ellesmere Island.⁵⁷³

Sovereignty and the Advisory Committee on Northern Development

On December 31, 1952, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs sent a memorandum drawing the Minister's attention to some of the prospective developments in the Arctic primarily involving U.S. military activities. The memorandum went on as follows:

As you know the Canadian Government at the end of the last war embarked on a vigorous program intended to "re-Canadianize the Arctic". It was carried out under the aegis of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development... This program was well on the way to completion by 1949 and the Advisory Committee has not met to review progress since December of that year.

These prospective new developments in the Arctic suggest to me that there is every likelihood in the course of the next three or four years of a new influx of US citizens to the Arctic. One

572. Phillips to Pickersgill, December 29, 1952, DCER vol. 1952, pp. 1996-1200; referred to in Grant, vol. 1.

573. RG22, Box 176, file 40-2-20; referred to in Grant, vol. 1.

probable consequence is that the number of U.S. citizens in the district of Franklin will probably be substantially greater than the number of white Canadians. Furthermore, if Canadian transportation and communications facilities cannot meet the load that these developments are bound to create, there will be a demand from the United States that it be permitted to do so, thus involving additional U.S. commitments.

If this analysis of the situation is correct, then it would seem that now is the time to give serious consideration to the adoption at the highest level of a vigorous policy in all Canadian Arctic services including communications, transportation, aides to navigation, meteorology, and police. I am of the opinion that it should be considered as a matter of some urgency since past experience has shown that a lengthy period is required when dealing with Arctic activities to convert decisions into realities.

If you agree, I propose to write to General Young both in his capacity as Deputy Minister of Resources and Development and as Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development and suggest to him that this matter might be an appropriate subject for consideration by the Advisory Committee.⁵⁷⁴

It is significant that the Under-Secretary was concerned that Americans would out-number *white* Canadians. He appears not to have considered Inuit to be first-class citizens for the purpose of asserting Canadian sovereignty. This contrasts with the view expressed by the departmental press release of the Dundas Harbour relocation in 1934 which linked the relocation of the Inuit to Dundas Harbour to the assertion of sovereignty. It also contrasts with Stevenson's comments in the 1950 Eastern Arctic Patrol report that the movement of Canadian Inuit to Ellesmere Island could contribute to the assertion of Canadian sovereignty. It is not clear how wide spread the Under-Secretary's views may have been in the Canadian government at that time. One expert on sovereignty wh

574. RG25, acc. 90-91/109, vol. 58, file 50197-40/1; document provided by Grant; also referred to in Gunther, p. 52.

appeared before the Commission had considered that the reason there had been no discussion at the higher levels of government of relocation of Inuit as a means of asserting sovereignty was the belief that Inuit were not first-class citizens for that purpose although he was also considering whether it might be that the higher levels of government were simply unaware of the relocation.⁵⁷⁵ In that regard, it might be noted that a May 8, 1953 memorandum and map of the Arctic prepared by the Privy Council Office to show the number and distribution of Canadian and U.S. government personnel includes the RCMP detachments. However, the personnel identified at RCMP detachments at existing and proposed posts such as Craig Harbour and Cape Herschel included only the two regular members of the Force and not the two Inuit special constables.⁵⁷⁶

The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Pearson, brought the concern to the Cabinet at its meeting of January 22, 1953. He reviewed the present situation and the potential developments. The minutes record that he went on as follows:

If Canadian claims to territory in the Arctic rested on discovery and continuous occupation, Canadian claims to some relatively unexplored areas might be questioned in the future. He was concerned about the de facto exercise of U.S. sovereignty, examples of which were numerous during the last year in other parts of Canada, and it seemed clear that an increase in U.S. activity in the Arctic would present risks of misunderstandings, incidents and infringements on the exercise of Canadian sovereignty.

In the circumstances, he urged strongly that the Advisory Committee on Northern Development, which had not recently been active, be directed to consider all phases of development of the Canadian Arctic and to report on the present situation and on the means which might be employed to preserve or

575. Gordon W. Smith, June 28, 1993, Tr., vol. 1, pp. 363-364.

576. MG30, E133, vol. 294, file ACND, 2.19.53, vol. 1; document provided by Grant.

develop the political, administrative, scientific and defence interests of Canada in that area.⁵⁷⁷

The Prime Minister stated that "it was within the realm of the possible that in years to come U.S. developments might be just about the only form of human activity in the vast wastelands of the Canadian Arctic".⁵⁷⁸ The Cabinet "directed the secretary to request the chairman of the Advisory Committee of Northern Development to have that Committee consider and report periodically on all phases of development in the Canadian Arctic and on the means which might be employed to preserve or develop the political, administrative, scientific and defence interests of Canada in that area".⁵⁷⁹

The Secretary to the Cabinet, J.W. Pickersgill, communicated the "urgent priority" to study the Arctic to the Deputy Minister of the Department in a letter dated January 26, 1953.⁵⁸⁰

The Advisory Committee had been established in early 1948 because of concerns about Canada's sovereignty in the North. The concern was not that the United States would overtly challenge Canada's sovereignty. As Gordon W. Smith put it in 1966, "The danger is that even with completely satisfactory arrangements to preserve Canada's rights, and with unqualified agreement and the best intentions on both sides, a massive and quasi-permanent American presence in the Canadian North such as we have seen during and since World War II could in due course lead, gradually and almost imperceptibly, to such an erosion or disintegration of Canadian sovereignty that the real authority in the region, in fact if not in law, would

577. RG2, series A5a, vol. 2652, file January 1953-April 1953; document provided by Grant; also referred to in Gunther, pp. 52-53.

578. *Ibid.*

579. *Ibid.*

580. Soberman, p. 41, fn. 10.

be American."⁵⁸¹ Diubaldo believes that the Inuit were not mentioned in the five meetings held from February 1948 to December 1949.⁵⁸² Grant observes that the question of employing the Inuit at Arctic stations was discussed at the first meeting and the Transportation Sub-Committee also discussed the training and employment of Inuit. Jenness had, as noted above, made proposals along these lines in 1948. The RCAF in 1950 is reported by Grant to have considered employing the Inuit at all levels of Arctic defence. Grant also observes that the concern about Greenlanders hunting was a concern that this was evidence that Canada could not enforce its laws and this evidence was visible to the Americans who had never declared that they accepted Canada's claims to the uninhabited North. In that regard, Grant points to a 1946 USAAF Intelligence report which was "leaked" to Canada and which spoke of the possibility of the United States taking over uninhabited Arctic Islands should Canada be unwilling to co-operate with U.S. defence plans.⁵⁸³

The Advisory Committee met on February 16, 1953. The minutes of the meeting indicate that the secretary to the Cabinet reviewed the background to the concern about the Canadian North and the apprehension of seeming encroachment on Canadian sovereignty. He advised that the Cabinet "wished to be informed of all activities in this area, to have periodic reports of proposed developments, to receive recommendations of what could be done to promote Canadian initiative, and to have Canada take the lead rather than be paced by the United

581. Gordon W. Smith, "Sovereignty of the North: The Canadian Aspect of an International Problem", in *The Arctic Frontier*, ed. R. St. J. MacDonald (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966).

582. Diubaldo, p. 108.

583. Grant, Appendix C-ii; the January 7, 1950 memorandum by S/L Alexander was located in the Stevenson Papers at the Northwest Territories Archives.

States in areas of joint participation."⁵⁸⁴ The secretary to the Cabinet "emphasized the need to ensure that the civilian activities in the North were predominantly Canadian. He noted that there was a disproportionate amount of funds spent by the United States and Canada on certain activities."⁵⁸⁵ The Commissioner of the RCMP "asked if any thought had been given to the potential of the inhabitants of the North — training, development, adaptabilities, and so forth."⁵⁸⁶ The Committee noted a number of reports on departmental activities which became the basis for a report to the Cabinet on activities in northern Canada which was considered at the March 16, 1953 meeting of the Advisory Committee. The report on the work of the RCMP in the North, under the heading "future plans", reads as follows:

The Force expects to continue the service we presently give in the north and to open new detachments when Canadian interests seem to call for such action. For instance — it is planned to open a detachment at Cape Herschel on the east coast of Ellesmere Island and another one at Clyde River on the east coast of Baffinland this year. The Cape Herschel detachment will, it is hoped, encourage the move of some Canadian Eskimos into that part of Ellesmere Island and will also tend to prevent Greenland natives from making hunting excursions into Canadian territory. The projected detachment at Clyde River will be set up in order to provide a better policing service in that area, having regard to projected new developments.⁵⁸⁷

This report appears to have been prepared before the decision was made to re-open the detachment at Resolute Bay. A handwritten note o

584. MG30, E133, series V, file ACND to December 1953, vol. 1; document provided by Grant; also referred to in Gunther, pp. 54-55.

585. *Ibid.*

586. *Ibid.*

587. MG30, E133, vol. 294, file "First Report 1953"; document provided by Grant; also referred to in Gunther, pp. 56-59.

the report observes that additional projected detachments are to be opened that year at Sachs Harbour on Banks Island and at Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island.

The report of the Department of Resources and Development, among other things, states that one of the functions of the Eskimo Research Section of the Northern Administration Division of the Northern Administration and Lands Branch "plans transfers of Eskimos from overpopulated, depleted areas to areas where game is more plentiful, or where employment may be found. Recommends loans to Eskimos or investments in their projects."⁵⁸⁸

The reports of the departments covered all of their activities in the North and were before the Advisory Committee at its February 16 and March 16, 1953 meetings. This was consistent with the direction communicated by the secretary to the Cabinet that the Cabinet wished to be informed of all activities in the North.

Gunther reports that the revised version of the RCMP report added reference to the two additional detachments in the following terms:

It is planned to open four new detachments in the Arctic Islands this year: one at Sachs Harbour...one at Resolute Bay...one at Cape Herschel...and one at Clyde River. The detachments at Sachs Harbour and Cape Herschel will have to do almost solely with the administration of Eskimo affairs, and in respect of the latter point, it is hoped by setting up a detachment at Cape Herschel to not only encourage the move of Canadian Eskimos into that part of Ellesmere Island, but to prevent or control the movement of Greenland natives on hunting excursions into Canadian territory. The projected detachments at Resolute Bay and Clyde River will be set up to

588. *Ibid.*

provide for the administration of Eskimo families working in and about these bases.⁵⁸⁹

It will be recalled that the Privy Council Office saw the re-opening of the Resolute Bay detachment as contributing to the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty. The Commissioner's description is, of course, consistent with the maintenance of sovereignty.

It is interesting that the Commissioner of the RCMP at the February 16, 1953 Advisory Committee meeting considered it important to refer to the potential movement of the inhabitants of the North, that is, the Inuit, in the context of a discussion about ensuring that the civilian activities in the North were predominantly Canadian. Plainly, the Commissioner considered that the Aboriginal population had a contribution to make as Canadians in the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty. It cannot therefore, be concluded that there was a consensus at the senior levels of the bureaucracy that only white Canadians could make a contribution in this regard.

The Relocation Decision

On February 20, 1953, the Deputy Minister of Natural Resources and Development wrote to the Commissioner of the RCMP. The Deputy Minister had received a copy of the staff sergeant's report on his trip to Resolute Bay and the purpose of the letter was to confirm that an RCMP detachment at Resolute Bay was essential for the plans of the Department. The letter stated as follows:

As you are aware, we have been giving consideration to the possibility of transferring a few Eskimo families from overpopulated areas to places in the High Arctic, including Craig Harbour, the proposed detachment site at Cape Herschel, and Resolute Bay. It would be possible to establish

589. Gunther, pp. 58-59, quoting from RG85, acc. 89-90/233, vol. 3, file report to Cabinet, "Activities in Northern Canada", 31.3.53.

these small settlements only with your cooperation as there is no one else at these places who could assist these people in adjusting themselves to new conditions.... We could not consider placing Eskimos at Resolute Bay unless we had someone to look after them and direct their activities.... I would be interested to hear, therefore, if you propose to open a detachment at that point this year.⁵⁹⁰

The Commissioner is reported by Gunther to have replied on February 24 as follows:

We did have a man stationed at Resolute for a time but moved him a year ago because there was no work for him to do except arbitrate disputes...

It is, however, an entirely different matter if some native families are to be moved to Resolute. In that case I would be quite willing to select a good man and have him stationed there with the specific job of taking care of the natives. He might even be able to encourage some hunting and trapping on their part and handle their furs for them.⁵⁹¹

On March 16, 1953, a number of projects, including the relocation to the High Arctic, were submitted by the Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch, to the Deputy Minister for approval. Approval was apparently given by early April, which is when action began to be taken on the relocation. The memorandum was entitled "Assisted Eskimo Projects"; the full text is as follows:

It is proposed, with your approval, to initiate certain new projects and continue certain existing projects in the interest of improving the Eskimo economy. These projects are listed beneath the headings under which they will be financed.

⁵⁹⁰. RG22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1, Pt. 3, Young to Nicholson, February 20, 1953; document provided by Grant; also referred to by Gunther, p. 162.

⁵⁹¹. Gunther, p. 163.

Eskimo Loan Fund

Loan Project No. 1 Cape Herschel

The R.C.M. Police will establish a detachment at Cape Herschel on the east coast of Ellesmere Island to police a region where Greenland natives have from time to time been hunting on Canadian territory. Native food supplies are reported to be plentiful. There are no Canadian Eskimos in the region and it is planned to move in five Eskimo families from overpopulated depressed areas and establish them in the native way of life under the direction of the R.C.M. Police. It is estimated that the cost of moving these Eskimos and equipping them to live at Cape Herschel will not exceed \$200 per family or \$1,000 in all, which will be charged to the item in the estimates — Transportation of Eskimos — and to Relief.

As there is no trading post at Cape Herschel a year's stock of supplies for the natives will have to be provided in care of the R.C.M. Police. It is proposed to finance the purchase of these supplies under a loan issued to a leading Eskimo in the group. These goods will be held by the R.C.M. Police as security for the loan and will be dispensed by the Police on behalf of the loanee in return for payment in money or in kind and the proceeds will be credited to the loan. When goods for relief or Family Allowances are to be issued, the R.C.M. Police will make out the vouchers to show the order as being filled by the loanee who for this purpose will be acting as a trade. When the vouchers are approved for payment the amounts will be credited to the loan.

The exact cost of supplies will not be known until the families are selected and the purchases made. It is estimated that the cost should not exceed \$1,000 per family. The loan to the leader of the group should, therefore, be for an amount up to \$5,000.

Loan Project No. 2 Craig Harbour

This project is similar to Project 1. Five Eskimo families would be established under the R.C.M. Police to live off the country

where native food supplies are reported to be good. The amount of the loan would be up to \$5,000.

*Loan Project No. 3
Resolute Bay*

It has been tentatively agreed with the R.C.M. Police that if we will move five Eskimo families to Resolute Bay they will re-open their detachment there to supervise the Eskimos and maintain law and order in a settlement where there are four different organizations, each with its own senior officer, and many transient visitors.

The Meteorological Service could offer permanent employment to at least one Eskimo to learn to replace one of their mechanics and might employ one or two others on semi-skilled jobs. All could be employed on menial jobs but, except in summer, we prefer at least part of the group to hunt and trap after the native way so that the children of employed Eskimos can learn the native way of life with them. The details as to terms of employment and rotation of labour will be carefully worked out for the guidance of the R.C.M. Police.

As there is no trading post at Resolute Bay this project would operate on the same principle as Project 1. The amount of the loan would be up to \$5,000.

The above three projects have as their object:

- (a) Relief of population pressure in distressed areas.
- (b) A pioneer experiment to determine if Eskimos can be induced to live on the northern islands which, relics indicate, once supported a native population.
- (c) An experiment to work out a method by which Eskimos may be trained to replace white employees in the north without the Eskimo children losing touch with the native way of life.
- (d) If these projects warrant it, more natives can be moved north both to these pioneer points and to other points to be selected later.

Project No. 4
Banks Island

During the prosperous years of the white fox trade many Eskimos from the Aklavik and Tuktoyaktuk areas made a lot of money from trapping on Banks Island during the winter and trading their catch on the mainland each summer. When fox prices dropped below \$5.00 these people no longer found it economically possible to outfit themselves for Banks Island and some of them became relief cases.

In the fall of 1951 nine Eskimo families comprising twenty-seven people, under the leadership of Fred Carpenter, were outfitted for Banks Island at a cost of \$10,059 with the backing of two traders and northern Administration. The group lived well on Banks Island, were free from the influenza epidemic which attacked natives on the mainland and returned in August 1952 with sufficient furs to pay off all their debts and partially equip themselves for another winter on Banks Island. Thirty-one people went to Banks Island last fall and about \$1,000 was advanced to five new members of the group.

Fred Carpenter reported that bowhead whales were plentiful in summer off the west coast of Banks Island and he asked for a loan to outfit his schooner to take one whale to provide dog feed and oil for his group, to relieve hunting pressure on caribou. Oil could be brought back to the mainland for native use but could not be exported under the treaty convention in regard to bowhead whales.

A poor fox year can be expected either this winter or next, in which case it is unlikely that traders will be able to advance credit for another winter on Banks Island. In view of the population pressure around Tuktoyaktuk it is most important that Carpenter and his group return to Banks Island next fall. It is, therefore, recommended that, if Carpenter applies for a loan to outfit his natives for Banks Island and equip his schooner to catch a whale, he be given a loan up to \$10,000.

*Loan Project No. 5
Herschel Island*

There are at present about forty-three Eskimos in the Herschel Island region who do not find it worth while to travel 150 miles to the nearest trading post (Aklavik) with the small amount of fur they catch. For the past two years the R.C.M. Police detachment at Herschel Island has stocked relief supplies for these people and accepted in return what furs the natives had to offer. In this way relief costs have practically disappeared for this group.

It is now recommended that this project be financed under the Loan Fund. A loan of \$3,000 would be made to the group leader and the goods would be purchased, held and dispensed on his behalf by the R.C.M. Police in the same manner as outlined in Project 1.

Possible Combined Loan and Relief

It is reported that Eskimo employment and income would be increased if natives were assisted to trap fine fur in inland areas. It has been suggested that one party of trappers be organized from Aklavik and Tuktoyaktuk to go into the marten area on the lower Anderson River and another party from Stanton should go into the marten area in the upper Anderson River. Both parties would need food supplies and air transportation at a cost of perhaps \$3,000 for each party. If carefully supervised by a game warden, perhaps 50% of the cost could be recovered and, therefore, would justify a loan. The balance of the cost would have to be provided from relief. The two projects will have to be further studied in the field before details can be worked out. If the general principle is approved of supporting such projects partly by loans and partly by relief, we will have Mr. Hunt arrange for the necessary investigations.

Projects Provided for in Estimates

Lake Harbour Boat Building

This is a co-operative project with the Hudson's Bay Company upon which agreement was reached in the fall of 1951 but which was not carried out in 1952 owing to an epidemic of measles at Lake Harbour in the spring of that year. The company has supplied the materials for five whale boats and will pay all normal costs of building the boats. We are to pay the wages, travelling and living expenses of an expert boat-builder, Mr. Jos. Thorpe, who has been engaged by the Hudson's Bay Company to instruct the Eskimos. We would also pay the transportation costs of two Eskimos from Cape Dorset to go to Lake Harbour and learn with the local group. The company agreed to take over the five boats, when completed, and sell them at what they cost the company plus 25%. We have an item of \$5,000 in the 1953-54 estimates to cover our share of this project.

Ungava Bay Hunting and Fishing

We have an item of \$3,000 to encourage hunting and fishing in Ungava Bay where relief costs have been high. This will entail the repair and outfitting of native boats and rations for organized hunts to Akpatok Island for walrus and to Port Burwell for codfish and seals to relieve the food situation at Fort Chimo, George River and Payne Bay. The Hudson's Bay Company will co-operate with the R.C.M. Police in organizing and supervising this project and will arrange for the storage and distribution of meat and seal skins brought back by the expeditions. Financial assistance will also be given for the repair or replacement of fish nets for the taking of fish by the natives for their own use and for sale locally. These operations will be supervised by the R.C.M. Police.

*Aklavik
Workshop*

An item of \$3,000 was provided in the 1953-54 estimates to provide materials for the construction of a workshop for community use in which to promote local industries such as boat building and repairs, making sleds, toboggans, snowshoes, etc. Mr. Carmichael was of the opinion that this building could be erected by voluntary local labour. Now that it is planned to convert the present government school into a vocational training school, the two projects will have to be closely integrated. The matter is being discussed with Mr. Hunt.

Projects Under Relief

*Tuktoyaktuk
Boat Repairs*

The Eskimos of the Tuktoyaktuk region are not making the best use of the resources of the area, particularly in regard to taking white whales and fish which would augment the local food supplies both for men and dogs. Their power boats are said to be in disrepair because of low fur prices and they have no money to buy gasoline. It is proposed to assist these people to outfit for whaling and fishing to the extent of about \$1,000. Fuller details will be obtained through Mr. Hunt.

*Port Harrison
Sleeper Islands*

The region around Port Harrison is overpopulated in relation to the available country resources. Food supplies from the sea are scarce but white foxes are usually plentiful in good years. Many of the natives depend on food supplies purchased from the trading post from the proceeds of their white fox catch. Relief costs are high in poor fur years and with low fox prices some unsuccessful trappers are unable to support their families even in good fur years.

For several years it has been the policy to assist indigent Eskimo to earn part of their living on the chains of outer islands 100 miles or so out in Hudson Bay where seals are plentiful. In 1951-52 fifty-five Eskimos were outfitted at a cost

of \$2,506 to winter on the Sleeper Islands. In 1952-53 \$1,027 of relief funds were spent to re-outfit thirty-five Eskimos to go to the Sleeper Islands. A good part of the supplies consisted of ammunition to enable these people to obtain seals for food and fuel. Issues of tea and tobacco were reduced to encourage these people to produce furs and oil for barter. It is proposed to follow the same procedure next fall.

*Port Harrison
King George Islands*

Twenty-five natives wintered successfully on King George Island and were re-outfitted last fall at a cost of \$919.00 from relief, most of which was for ammunition, fish nets and traps. It is proposed to continue this project next fall.

*Port Harrison
Richmond Gulf*

Four Eskimo families from Port Harrison were assisted last summer to move south to Richmond Gulf where sea food is plentiful, at a cost of \$406 from relief. While there is little prospect that these people will be able to produce much in the way of trade goods, they are able to secure country food supplies which reduces the cost of relief and benefits their morale. It is proposed to continue this project if it works out well this winter.

**Other Projects Being Investigated
Some of Which May Be Later Submitted for Action
in 1953 and Others in 1954**

Shell Re-loading Industry

Eskimos pay about 20¢ per shell for rifle ammunition which includes a 15% sportsman's excise tax and a 10% sales tax. In Quebec there is a further 2% provincial sales tax. Investigations are under way as to the feasibility of developing a small shell re-loading industry at certain points under the supervision of the R.C.M. Police. The reloaded shells would be marketed by the Hudson's Bay Company and suitable places to start would be Port Harrison, Fort Chimo, Aklavik and possibly the proposed rehabilitation centres at Driftpile and Frobisher Bay.

Manufacture of Clothing

Eskimos purchase certain types of ready-made clothing manufactured outside. It is believed that such items as trousers, shirts, parkas, mittens and socks would be manufactured in the country by small groups of indigent women who are presently living on relief. Sewing machines, knitting machines, and materials and patterns would have to be supplied and the work done under supervision, possibly in schools and nursing stations. It also seems probable that such small industries could be carried on by some disabled persons at rehabilitation centres. The Hudson's Bay Company has offered its co-operation in marketing these products.

Major Projects Under Study

Eiderdown Industry

A large amount of information from existing records has been assembled on previous efforts along this line in Canada. No eiderdown is presently produced in Canada, and Iceland and Norway are understood to be the principal sources of supply. Information from both these countries has been promised through diplomatic channels. Preliminary inquiries indicate that the feather-using trade in Canada is most anxious to obtain eiderdown.

Reindeer Industry in Ungava

The information already available on this subject will be assembled in close co-operation with the Wildlife Division. It has been pretty well agreed that further field studies on range conditions will have to be made to determine their suitability. A careful study will also have to be made of climatic data and local index plants to determine the possibility of this region being visited by icing storms which would freeze over the food supply of the deer. This has been given as a possible cause of the disappearance of the caribou except for a few small inland herds. The possible effect of these few caribou and the probable development of an iron ore industry in the region on imported reindeer will have to be carefully considered.

Handicraft Industry

A separate report will be submitted on this subject.⁵⁹²

Loan projects nos. 1, 2 and 3 were, as is clear from the earlier December 18, 1952 memorandum from Cantley and the January 12, 1953 letter from the Director to the Hudson's Bay Company, intended to involve Inuit from northern Quebec, although the memorandum for the Deputy Minister does not say this. Nor does the memorandum set out the concern about the "big difference between living conditions in the High Arctic and those in Quebec" referred to in the Director's January 12, 1953 letter and the advisability of having people from north Baffin Island join the relocatees "to assist them in getting them used to hunting conditions, particularly during the long winter", again as discussed in the January 12, 1953 letter. The memorandum for the Deputy Minister does not set out the manner in which the Inuit would be approached about the relocation, what would be said to them, or what representations, assurances, or promises would be given. Indeed, that subject is not discussed in any of the documents to this point.

The memorandum does refer to these three projects as a "pioneer experiment to determine if Eskimos can be induced to live on the northern islands which, relics indicate once supported a native population." This phrase captures the uncertainty reflected in the Director's January 12, 1953 letter without stating the reason for the uncertainty. Perhaps it can be taken that the Deputy Minister would have been aware of the issue being discussed by his officials but there can be no certainty in this. It might be noted that the period from January to March 1953 was particularly busy for the Deputy Minister, with the Cabinet concern about affairs in the North and the re-activation of the Advisory Committee of which the Deputy Minister was the chairman. There can be no assurance

592. RG22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1, Pt. 3; document provided by Grant; also referred to in Gunther, pp. 163-165.

that the Deputy Minister addressed his mind to the issue of how the Inuit were to be approached and what was to be said to them since this topic does not figure in the documentation leading up to the Deputy Minister's decision to approve these projects. Staff, however, produce the analysis that the decision maker calls for, and this was not the first time the issue of relocations had come before the Deputy Minister.

It can be safely concluded that the Deputy Minister would have understood that the reference to "overpopulated" areas and establishing the people "in the native way of life" captured the economic problem which had led to the decision on these relocations, namely, the decline in Inuit income as a result of the collapse of fur prices. In other words, the concern was not about increasing population outstripping declining game resources. Rather, as discussed earlier, the concern was that the Inuit who were living close to posts such as Port Harrison had become dependent on store food which they no longer had the earned income to purchase and the game resources in the immediate area were insufficient to make up the difference with the result that relief in the area increased in bad fur years. To say that the people would be "established in the native way of life" was an entirely accurate description of what was involved since the object was plainly not to move them to another place where relief would constitute an important aspect of their livelihood but rather to move them to a place where they could increase their reliance on country food (and thus decrease their reliance on store food which they would not have the income to pay for in a depressed fur trading economy). The encouragement, guidance and direction provided by the local official (who would by necessity, be an RCMP member) would ensure that the people would do what it was perceived they could do, namely, increase their reliance on country food and become less dependent on relief. This approach, as discussed earlier, reflected a broad consensus among all those involved in northern affairs, both inside and outside government and including secular and non-secular concerns (although there were significant differences of view as to how things should be done).

The three projects were proposed to be funded through the Eskimo Loan Fund. Since the people involved were not known, the identity of the borrower could not be included in the memorandum for the Deputy Minister. This is in contrast to Loan Project No. 4 involving the financing of another trip to Banks Island by Fred Carpenter. Banks Island had been an area frequented by Inuit of the Western Arctic over a long period. As Jenness has pointed out, in the prosperous years before the Depression Inuit of the Western Arctic owned their own schooners and would go to Banks Island with them. The Hudson's Bay Company, in the early 1950s had provided the financing to re-outfit a group of Inuit under Fred Carpenter and had permitted this activity to continue. It is of interest to note that the loan project for Banks Island would be triggered by Fred Carpenter asking for a loan to outfit his people for Banks Island. No Inuit asked for a loan to be relocated from northern Quebec to the High Arctic. The High Arctic was an area unknown to the people of northern Quebec. Ellesmere Island was also an area where Inuit from north Baffin Island had limited experience (given the history of Greenlanders hunting in the area of Ellesmere Island and the employment of Greenlanders at RCMP posts in that area).

The relocation to Resolute Bay, in contrast to the other two projects involves some emphasis on employment. It is said that "The Meteorological Service could offer permanent employment to at least one Eskimo to learn to replace one of their mechanics and might employ one or two others on semi-skilled jobs." The implication is that there is a definite prospect of permanent employment for one person and the possibility of permanent employment for one or two others. It is also said that "all could be employed in menial jobs" which again implies some certainty of that prospect. The preference is expressed, however, that the people take such menial employment only in summer so that at least part of the group would hunt and trap "after the native way so that the children of employed Eskimos can learn the native way of life with them". In other words, all were expected to have employment but only some would have permanent employment so that hunting and trapping skills would not be entirely lost. The

Meteorological Service is identified as the employer, not the air base. This is described as "an experiment to work out a method by which Eskimos may be trained to replace white employees in the north without the Eskimo children losing touch with the native way of life". In other words, the focus was on improving the Inuit economy through employment and the development of the necessary skills to secure skilled and semi-skilled employment while preserving the safety net of hunting and trapping.

Various of the projects approved by the Deputy Minister appear in one form or another in Cantley's December 18, 1952 memorandum. Cantley had proposed continuing, through the use of the loan fund, hunting and trapping on the islands in Hudson Bay by people from Port Harrison. Three projects of this nature were approved by the Deputy Minister as "projects under relief". The description of these projects is interesting in that it identifies clearly the nature of the "overpopulation" problem. It is said that "The region around Port Harrison is overpopulated in relation to the available country resources. Food supplies from the sea are scarce but white foxes are usually plentiful in good years. Many of the natives depend on food supplies purchased from the trading post from the proceeds of their white fox catch. Relief costs are high in poor fur years and with low fox prices some unsuccessful trappers are unable to support their families even in good fur years." The history of moving Inuit from the Port Harrison area to outlying areas in the preceding years is reviewed. These movements involved an expenditure of relief funds and the Deputy Minister approved the continuation of relief expenditures for this purpose. However, the relief did not go to the provision of food. The object was for the people to rely on country food. Hence, "A good part of the supplies consisted of ammunition to enable these people to obtain seals for food and fuel. Issues of tea and tobacco were reduced to encourage these people to produce furs and oil for barter. It is proposed to follow the same procedure next fall."

This passage also provides an insight into the manner in which encouragement could be provided. The government controlled the issue of relief supplies, and the nature and the amount of the supplies could be

adjusted to provide the necessary encouragement to hunt for food; basic economics and the imperative of survival achieved the desired objective. With respect to the movement of people to the Sleeper Islands, the objective included encouraging them to earn income through the production of furs and oil so that they could obtain, through barter, the store goods they desired. With respect to the Richmond Gulf Project, it was recognized that "While there is little prospect that these people will be able to produce much in the way of trade goods, they are able to secure country food supplies which reduces the cost of relief and benefits their morale." The link between increasing reliance on country food and decreasing the cost of relief is explicit, as is the link between self-reliance and improved morale. At the same time, the Department was prepared to incur costs for relief when it contributed to self-reliance.

There is nothing in the documentary material to explain why locations on north Baffin Island were dropped from the relocation proposals.

The cost of supplies for the stores in the new communities would be funded through the loan fund. This would operate as a revolving account with the proceeds, including any profits, from each store being credited to the loan fund. Subsequent years' purchases would be debited to the fund and so on. While technically one Inuk would be named as the debtor for each loan, in practice all the members of each community were the debtors.⁵⁹³

593. Gunther, p. 326.

Other Events

The RCMP report on conditions at Port Harrison for the year ending December 31, 1952 is dated March 9, 1953. It cannot have had an influence on the plans for the relocation which were already crystallizing in December 1952 and culminated in a decision by the Deputy Minister by early April 1953. The report is as follows:

During the present winter, white foxes are building up to a peak which is expected to be reached next year. The HBC have forecast a fur return of 1,500 white fox and to date the return is up to expectations. Some other fur is brought in but not enough to influence the economy of the natives. In addition to the income from fur, the natives brought in handicraft (soapstone and ivory carvings, baskets) to the approximate value of \$5,000. Construction work under way at Port Harrison last summer also contributed to their income.

During the fall of 1952, the HBC outfitted seven walrus and whale hunts for the natives. These hunts resulted in thirty-five walrus, forty white whale and fifteen square flippers, besides a few smaller seals. The winter has been mild and for the most part suitable for seal hunting. This, and the nearness of the flow edge, has enabled the natives to procure a higher than average amount of seal meat throughout most of the winter. These factors have resulted in a marked decrease in relief issues, both by the HBC and this office. HBC relief approximated \$2,300 all of which went to cover the above-mentioned hunts. Very little government relief is being issued other than to sick people, cripples, aged, and families with the head out in hospital.

The majority of the Port Harrison natives are spread out in camps along about one hundred miles of the adjacent coast. In cleanliness these camp vary from the very clean to very dirty. On the whole, however, when the general conditions are considered, they are not unsatisfactory to any extent. It has been noted that the majority of the natives are easily influenced toward personal cleanliness. Any of them who have come in close contact with white establishments retain markedly clean habits even after returning to the nomadic life. Very few natives live in the settlement other than servants for

various establishments. This is due, however, to continuous efforts by various detachment members to discourage them in this regard.⁵⁹⁴

The report is interesting in several respects. It shows that even in a good year there were people who needed government relief because they were unable to provide for themselves as a result of sickness, disability, age or the head of the family being out of the area in hospital. It also shows that hunting conditions could be significantly affected by weather and ice conditions and that, with favourable hunting conditions, able-bodied hunters fended for themselves and their families. This report dealing with conditions in northern Quebec, and Port Harrison specifically, provides a view behind the gross relief figures to show the factors which could influence relief payments. So far as the impact of weather and ice conditions on the ability to hunt is concerned, these are factors which would apply anywhere in the Arctic and are not factors affected by relocation.

Gunther reports that Stevenson visited Port Harrison in July 1953 and reported on the improved conditions in similar terms to that of the RCMP report and also indicated that 1953-54 promised to be a bumper fur year. He advised that one of the projects to move people to the Belcher Islands had not worked well but he considered that this was a case of poor organizing and lack of leadership although he recognized that "of course, when one is living a precarious existence of the hunt, no two years are the same and weather and ice conditions often play a part in preventing the natives from getting a good supply of fish, walrus, seal..."⁵⁹⁵ Plainly, Stevenson's report of a July trip played no part in the decision on the relocation to the High Arctic but is of interest in confirming both the conditions in the 1952-53 period at Port Harrison and the impact of

594. RG18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 55, file TA500-8-1-13; document provided by Grant.

595. Gunther, p. 122, quoting from "Inspection Tour...July 1953, etc.", RG85, vol. 207, file 201-1-8, Pt. 3.

weather and ice conditions on those who live the "precarious existence of the hunt".

It should be noted that the RCMP detachment at Port Harrison did not consider the prevailing favourable conditions to affect the general perception of an unsound economy. In its general observations, the March, 1953 report stated as follows:

Throughout most of the detachment area the natives are enjoying a good fur year. The prospects are for an even better one next year. This temporary increase in their income, however, has done nothing to solve any of the problems which beset the Eskimo. Much of the fur return has so far gone to paying off HBC debt, and while most of the trappers are clearing off their debt, some even building up credits, their economy is still unsound and will continue to be so as long as it is based on a fluctuating fur market and fox cycle. \$7 and later \$8 has been the price received for white fox, and although this is apparently an increase over last year, it is still not enough to compensate for the general rise in the cost of trade goods.

As has been reported on many occasions, the population of this area appears to be too great for the available resources. To alleviate this efforts have been made to settle natives on the various islands of Hudson Bay, namely the King George and Sleeper Islands. There is no doubt that these undertakings have been of great benefit to the natives involved. It is doubtful however that it can be maintained without being regularly subsidized, as the resources of these islands are restricted mostly to country food. The subsidization is not excessive when the benefits are considered but the dependency of the native on government handouts is an undesirable feature which should be considered. It is felt too, that with better direction and leadership the people on these islands could do much more to support themselves.

During the coming summer the writer intends to fully investigate the practicability of outfitting other groups to winter in other island groups.

While the resources of the country might be inadequate it is quite probable that the natives could make much greater advantage of them if they had the proper leadership and direction. Many of them, even some of the poorest of the inefficient trappers, showed marked abilities and initiative when given the opportunity. There is however, a strong general tendency to expect, even demand, free handouts in any form, and to do nothing as long as there is an even remote possibility of getting by on some form of relief. This is probably due to the fierce competition which once prevailed along this coast between two rival trading concerns.

The clothing of the entire native population is poor and in many cases consists of cast-offs and the contents of mission bundles. They are strongly dependent on store bought clothes for they have almost no opportunity to kill caribou during the summer when the skins are suitable for clothing. In fact, very little caribou is taken at any time. Some caribou clothing is in existence but it is of skins bought at H.B.C.⁵⁹⁶

The report makes clear that, to avoid issuing relief rations to those who were considered to be able to fend for themselves, a firm hand was employed.

In that regard, Gunther reports that the Director of the Northern Administration and Lands Branch wrote to the RCMP officer in charge of "G" Division on May 8, 1953 in response to the RCMP reports which had been received on conditions in the Port Harrison area and stated that:

After making due allowance for all other factors, there is no doubt that some groups have come to depend too much on issues of relief and family allowance rather than on their own efforts. We fully concur, however, with the steps that Constable Webster is taking to combat this tendency and to emphasize to the natives that they are expected to provide for their own needs whenever it is possible for them to do so.⁵⁹⁷

596. March 9, 1953, RCMP Report from Port Harrison, cited above.

597. Gunther, p. 122, fn. 16, quoting from Cunningham to Larsen, 8.5.57 RG18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 55, file TA 500-8-1-13.

The actions taken by the RCMP at Port Harrison were, therefore, fully in accord with the Department's wishes. Those actions included limiting access to food on government relief to those who could be expected to provide for their own needs and dispersing people away from the post where they would hunt for their food. Ammunition would be provided on account of relief and some amount of food on relief might be required to subsidize those who had little income from trapping but the thrust was on self-reliance. It is also evident that this policy is one which was imposed on the people affected.

Gunther reports that in March 1953, the welfare teacher at Port Harrison wrote to the Director to advise that, while one of the camp leaders mentioned in the report of the Eastern Arctic Patrol would not likely go north, she understood that Fatty's camp wanted to go and that he had "two excellent sons and I think it would be good to have them in the party."⁵⁹⁸ The extract of this March 16, 1953 letter provided by Grant reads as follows:

(1) It is now doubtful whether Inukpuk will go north as he is considered to be a good leader of his people and the H.B.C. post manager feels that the district cannot afford to part with good leaders. But I understand that Fatty wants to go. He is a dirty old rascal, but has two excellent sons and I think it would be good to have them in the party. However, as soon as arrangements are definite we can go ahead with the selection of people.

Apparently Ms. Hinds had a low opinion of Fatty who was one of the best carvers in the region and a leader of his camp. Fatty's camp would go to Craig Harbour in 1953 and it would be observed soon after that he was

598. As reported by Gunther, pp. 146 and 169; Hinds to Cunningham, "extract", 16.3.53; RG85, vol. 1072, file 252-3(4). Gunther notes that it is not known when Hinds' letter to Cunningham arrived.

unhappy shortly after arrival.⁵⁹⁹ However, Fatty, who is also referred to elsewhere as Paddy, died in July 1954. The March 16, 1953 letter from Mr. Hinds is interesting as well in that it reflects the concern of the Hudson's Bay trader that the good leaders remain at Inukjuak.

Grant reports that at the April 13, 1953 meeting of the Advisory Committee the terms of reference for a new Administration Sub-Committee were discussed which would have the mandate "to recommend measures which would contribute to the maintenance of sovereignty" and "to study questions arising from the employment of natives, both Eskimo and Indians, and to examine the desirability of recommending arranged movements with a view to bettering their conditions".⁶⁰⁰ It would appear that relocations were a matter of interest to the Advisory Committee although the Department was proceeding with the relocation to the High Arctic without bringing the matter forward to the Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee would be informed of this relocation later in the year, at its October meeting.

Implementing the Decision

On April 8, 1953, the Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch, advised the commissioner of the Deputy Minister's decision. The documents available to the Commission do not show the date of the decision. It appears, however, that the decision was made shortly before this April 8, 1953 memorandum. On the same day, Gunther reports that the Director sent a message to the Port Harrison RCMP detachment as follows:

599. Constable A.C. Fryer, "Rehabilitation Program of Eskimo at Cranberry Harbour", *RCMP Quarterly* (February 1954), referring to the "old fogey" who would not say that he wanted to stay. The "old fogey" was Paddy (referred to as "Fatty").

600. As quoted in Grant, vol. 1.

Officers of Resources and Development Department discussed with Constable McRae last spring and also with Miss Hinds in Ottawa recently suggestions to move out ten families from Port Harrison to Ellesmere and Cornwallis Island by *C.D. Howe* this summer. Understand several families expressed willingness to go. If they are still interested, please wire names and disk numbers of hunters, number of dependents and relationships of families involved, also give particulars of boats, calibres of rifles and other major equipment owned and also number of dogs to be transferred. Conditions in High Arctic should be carefully explained to natives. Some may find temporary or permanent employment but majority will have to hunt and trap for a living.⁶⁰¹

It will be noted that there is little in this passage, as taken from Gunther, by way of representations, assurances or promises to be given to the people. There is a suggestion that employment will be available without excluding Ellesmere Island from that suggestion. There is also no suggestion as to the number of communities which will be established except that there will be communities on Ellesmere and Cornwallis Island. It is stated that the majority of the people will have to hunt and trap for a living but there is no indication as to what post facilities would be available to support that activity. In that regard, the people had become accustomed to the support of a post through long acquaintance with the activities of the Hudson's Bay Company at Port Harrison. It is also not known what representations might have been made when these families first expressed willingness to go or, indeed, if any representations were made. The people may simply have had some expectation as to the benefit of a move and, if so, there is nothing in the documents to indicate what those expectations might have been and how what was being proposed might have met, or otherwise, those expectations. The memorandum is interesting as well in that the Director is communicating directly to the RCMP detachments on the same matter that the officer-in-charge of "G" Division would be communicating in a few days. There was, as a result, cross-talk to the

601. Gunther, p. 169, quoting Cunningham to constable in charge, 8.4.53; G85, vol. 1072, file 252-3(4).

detachments and the contents of the messages are not, as will be seen identical.

Also on April 8, 1953, Gunther reports that the Director sent a message to the Pond Inlet RCMP detachment as follows:

In connection with plans being made to transfer Eskimos from northern Quebec and southern Baffin Island to Ellesmere and Cornwallis Islands this season I understand Idlout previously expressed desire to go to Ellesmere. If he still wishes to go there to hunt and trap please wire names of hunters who would accompany him.... If Idlout is not interested can you suggest one or two other men who would be qualified to assist newcomers in adjusting themselves to conditions in High Arctic.⁶⁰²

Again, there is little in this passage, as taken from Gunther, which would indicate anything by way of representations, assurances or promises. It is indicated that the people at Pond Inlet are being recruited to assist others in adjusting themselves to conditions in the High Arctic. There is thus, a service aspect to the activity but no indication as to compensation and no indication as to what is to be held out to the people to induce them to undertake this activity.

There is some question as to whether the April 8, 1953 memorandum to the RCMP detachments was actually sent. Grant has provided a copy of the April 8, 1953 letter to the Commissioner of the RCMP to which are attached draft messages dated April 8, 1953 addressed to the Port Harrison and Pond Inlet (but not the Fort Chimo) detachments over the Director's name. The letter suggests that these be sent to the two detachments. The draft messages contain the text quoted by Gunther. In this regard, the normal channels of communication were Department to RCMP Headquarters to detachments and vice versa. It would have been unusual

602. Gunther, pp. 169-170, quoting from Cunningham to constable in charge, 8.4.53; RG85, vol. 1072, file 252-3(4).

for the Department to have communicated directly with the detachments although the draft messages imply that a reply should be made by the detachments directly to the Department. Nothing is said in the April 8 letter to the Commission or in the draft messages to the two detachments about Fort Chimo.

On April 14, 1953, the officer in command of "G" Division communicated with the Pond Inlet, Port Harrison, and Fort Chimo detachments and also reported these communications to the Director, northern Administration and Lands Branch. It is not clear why a message was sent to the Fort Chimo detachment. Perhaps there were intervening, possibly oral, communications with the Department. In any event, the Department did nothing to countermand the instructions to the Fort Chimo detachment. The message to the Port Harrison detachment is as follows:

It is suggested by Director northern Administration to move this summer on the *C.D. Howe* from Port Harrison detachment four Eskimo families to Craig Harbour on Ellesmere Island and three families to Cape Herschel on Ellesmere Island to hunt and trap for a living under supervision of RCM Police detachments. Please ascertain whether any families are willing to go and if so wire names and identification numbers and numbers of dependents and relationships of families involved. Also give particulars of boats, calibres of rifles and other major equipment owned and number of dogs. Conditions on Ellesmere Island should be carefully explained particularly complete dark period of two months and other short days and only annual visits by supply ship. It would be preferable if one or two members of families are qualified and named to act as traders under supervision of RCMP. Trade supplies will be shipped in. Pond Inlet detachment being asked to name three families and Fort Chimo detachment five families. Final distribution of all fifteen families will be five each at Craig Harbour, Cape Herschel and Resolute Bay. The heads of families should be good energetic hunters. Families will be brought home at end of one year if they so desire.⁶⁰³

603. RG85, vol. 1072, file 252-3, Pt. 1; document provided by Grant; also referred to in Gunther, p. 170.

The message to the Fort Chimo detachment, as quoted by Gunther is as follows:

It is suggested by Director, Northern Administration to move five Eskimo families this summer on *C.D. Howe* from Fort Chimo detachment area to live at Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island, NWT where they can possibly get permanent employment at air base and weather station as drivers of trucks, caterpillars and bulldozers and hunt and trap in spare time and be under supervision of RCM Police detachment. Please ascertain whether any families having members previously qualified as drivers of above-mentioned equipment are willing to go and if so wire names. Living conditions at Resolute Bay are favourable.... The heads of families should be good energetic hunters. Families will be brought back at end of one year if they so desire.⁶⁰⁴

It will be recalled that the Deputy Minister's approval was given to a project to relocate people to Resolute Bay for purposes including employment, as part of an experiment to work out a means of replacing non-Inuit workers with Inuit workers in skilled and semi-skilled jobs, with hunting and trapping to be preserved by some in the group. This is not quite captured by the reference to hunting and trapping "in spare time" although it is close and the message does indicate that the heads of families should be good energetic hunters. The reference to favourable living conditions at Resolute Bay reflects an apparent belief that housing would be available at the base although there is nothing in the March memorandum, which the Deputy Minister approved, which addresses the issue of the provision of housing. This is only one aspect where what was intended was not being clearly communicated even around Ottawa. In a few months, the Department would disavow any intent of sending people to Resolute for the purpose of employment.

The message to the Pond Inlet detachment is as follows:

604. Gunther, pp. 170-171.

It is suggested by Director northern Administration to move this summer on the *C.D. Howe* from Pond Inlet detachment area a total of three Eskimo families one of the families to Craig Harbour on Ellesmere Island the other two families to Cape Herschel on Ellesmere Island to hunt and trap for a living under supervision of RCM Police detachments. Please ascertain whether any families are willing to go and if so wire names and identification numbers of dependents and relationships or families involved. Also give particulars of boats, calibres of rifles and other major equipment owned and numbers of dogs. Conditions on Ellesmere Island should be carefully explained particularly longer dark period and only annual visits by supply ship. It would be preferable if one or two members of families are qualified and named to act as traders under supervision of RCM Police. Trade supplies will be shipped in. Port Harrison detachment being asked to name seven families and Fort Chimo detachment being asked to name five families. Final distribution of all fifteen families will be five each at Craig Harbour, Cape Herschel and Resolute Bay. The heads of families should be good energetic hunters. I understand that Idlout E5-766 expressed desire to go to Ellesmere if so he could possibly help you name others. Families will be brought back home at end of one year if they so desire.⁶⁰⁵

It will be noted that there is nothing in this message to indicate that the Pond Inlet people are to assist the Inuit from Port Harrison. The thrust of the message is much the same as the thrust of the message sent to the Port Harrison detachment. The reference to explaining the longer dark period may simply have been the result of using one message as a template for the other.

These messages were sent to the Director on April 14, 1953. The covering memorandum from Inspector Larsen refers to the most significant aspect of the messages, namely, the promise to return. It may be noted that the Director, rather than the Deputy Minister, had sent the April 8, 1953 letter to the Commissioner notwithstanding the difference in rank. The April 14, 1953 memorandum to the Director is as follows:

605. RG85, vol. 1072, file 252-3, Pt. 1; document provided by Grant.

By direction of the Commissioner of the RCM Police, and having reference to your letter to him, dated the 8th inst. I enclose one copy of each of the wireless messages which we have today sent to our Port Harrison, Fort Chimo and Pond Inlet detachments.

Please note the reference in the messages to the Eskimo families being brought back to their homes. I considered it advisable to make that promise. I have in mind the sad experience of those families of Eskimos (I believe eleven families) who were taken from Cape Dorset to Dundas Harbour in 1934 by the then northern Administration and after being there with the Hudson's Bay Company for two years were taken to Arctic Bay and Fort Ross. They suffered hardships and asked, from time to time to be taken back to Cape Dorset. They never were taken back and the survivors and their descendants are still in the Fort Ross-Spence Bay district, under the supervision of our Spence Bay Detachment.⁶⁰⁶

The memorandum makes it clear that the Force is acting under the direction of the Commissioner (a not insignificant subtlety considering either the Director's direct communication with the detachments a few days earlier or his proposal to communicate in his own capacity directly with the detachments). It is also clear that, even though carrying out a direction from the Commissioner, the promise was made by the officer in command of "G" Division on his own initiative. There is nothing in the documentation before this date to indicate that the plan included a promise to return. The decision to make the promise was based on the hardships experienced by another group of Inuit who had been relocated a long distance from home and who had asked to be taken back to Cape Dorset but never were.⁶⁰⁷

606. *Ibid.*

607. Curiously, when preparing manuscript material for a book yet to be published, Larsen characterized the Dundas Harbour relocation as having beneficial results and refers specifically to his visit in the winter of 1940-41. He writes, "The results of that move were highly satisfactory, as the families were accommodated in a country where good hunting and trapping prevailed having come from a region which was poorly favoured from standpoint of local economics. The natives themselves were delighted with

in that regard, Larsen, when stationed with the St. Roch detachment on duty in the Arctic in 1942, reported on the condition of the relocated Cape Dorset Inuit who were then near Fort Ross. Grant reports that he advised as follows:

Everyone I spoke to expressed ardent desire to be taken back to Cape Dorset, Baffin Island as their present location did not agree with them.⁶⁰⁸

Grant also states that Larsen reported that conditions seen in the vicinity of trading posts by summer visitors "in no way reflects the true facts as to prosperity and clothing".⁶⁰⁹ This observation is of interest since the interim report of the 1940 Eastern Arctic Patrol stated as follows:

The migration northwards of Eskimo families inaugurated in 1934 has been a success and continues to be popular. Twenty-nine men, women and children migrated from Frobisher Bay to River Clyde, fifteen from Cape Dorset to Arctic Bay, while thirty-eight were transported on the "Nascopie" to hospitals or to join relatives in more favourable hunting areas.

While some of the adult natives of the Dorset Culture who migrated northward in 1934 would probably avail themselves of an opportunity to return to their birthplaces, the majority are happy, contented and prosperous in their new surroundings, more than six hundred miles north.... Officials

the scheme." (Unpublished material provided by the Larsen family.) This suggests that either Larsen had forgotten what he had reported in 1942 and again referred to in official correspondence in 1953, which seems doubtful, or that he did not consider it his place to express public criticism of officially-sanctioned and upheld events, a more likely explanation given the mood of an RCMP officer of that day. Larsen's son has said that he did not voice publicly all of his criticisms of what was being done. (June 28 1993, Tr., vol. 1, p. 263)

608. Report from Pasley Bay, 8 May 1942, RG18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 2, file D1412-2-4-Q27; quoted in Grant, vol. 1.

609. *Ibid.*

of the Hudson's Bay Company familiar with Arctic conditions believe that the Eskimos will continue the northern migration and in a few years camps will be established on the Parry Islands by the rising generation descended from the Notchilik-Dorset-Thule Cultures.⁶¹⁰

The contrast between this upbeat description of that relocation and the unhappiness reported by Larsen in 1942 and remembered in 1953 when implementing a similar relocation brings to mind Jenness's comment about the unwelcomeness of criticism and Diubaldo's reference to the contrast between reports on conditions and the reality. The record demonstrates that Larsen's concerns in 1942 led to no more action by the administration than did criticisms and concerns expressed as officer-in-command of "G" Division. His criticisms of the Hudson's Bay Company were not well received by the former Hudson's Bay Company traders at the Department.

It will be recalled that the Hudson's Bay Company was authorized to relocate the Cape Dorset Inuit to Dundas Harbour on condition that they be brought back to Cape Dorset if the project were unsuccessful or be taken to such other place as the Department might designate. One can only assume that the Department authorized the Hudson's Bay Company to relocate the Inuit from Dundas Harbour to locations other than Cape Dorset when the Dundas Harbour settlement proved a failure because adverse ice conditions precluded hunting and trapping activities. The wishes of the people to return, even those that were acknowledged in the 1940 Eastern Arctic Patrol interim report, appear not to have been a factor although there was conflicting evidence as to the happiness of the people with their new situation and administrators might have taken comfort in the positive report of the 1940 Eastern Arctic Patrol. In 1943, the Hudson's Bay trader talked these Inuit out of their "crazy idea" of returning home.

610. RG85, vol. 64; document provided by Grant and in turn obtained by her from M.A. Van Meehen.

The April 14, 1953 memorandum to the Director from Larsen bears the initials of Stevenson and a handwritten indication that it was passed to Cantley.

There is nothing in the documentary material to indicate that Larsen's instructions with respect to the promise were countermanded. In fact, Stevenson later reported, after speaking with two of the hunters who would go north, that the "Eskimo agreed that they would go north for a period of two years at least. Then if they were dissatisfied or unhappy in their new environment, they could return to Port Harrison."⁶¹¹ The promise was, however, to return in two years rather than one.

Nowhere in the plan as written is there any indication as to how people would be returned if they asked to be returned. Nor is it clear what would count as a request that would cause the government to make good on the promise. In that regard, it has been said that the entire group at one of the new settlements would have to ask to be returned permanently before the government would take action.⁶¹² In other words, individuals who were unhappy and wished to return permanently might not be considered as being covered by the promise. One might also ask whether the content of the promise would cover someone who became homesick and wished to return home for a period of time but then go back to the North to rejoin friends and family there. As will be seen, there is no dispute that people did make requests of this sort. It will also be seen that, given what was known about the Inuit attachment to home and social nature, it was predictable that people would wish to return home at least for visits.

It should also be noted that the plan at this point is general in its description of what is to be done and for what purpose. The documentary material which provides the background and support to the relocation is

⁶¹¹. Inspection Report, 1953, RG22, vol. 176, File 40-2-20; as quoted in Grant, vol. 1; also referred to in Gunther, p. 180.

⁶¹². Sivertz, June 29, 1993, Tr., vol. 2, pp. 446, 458-459.

also general. The detail would be worked out as the plan was implemented. A large amount of discretion would be left to those whose job it was to implement the decision.

On April 28, 1953, Cantley sent the orders for the trading stores to be established at Resolute Bay, Craig Harbour and Cape Herschel to the person in the Department responsible for equipment and supplies. The following day, April 29, the orders were sent to the RCMP officer-in-charge of "G" Division with the request that he comment on their adequacy. On May 15 the lists were revised, primarily in an editorial manner, by Cantley.⁶¹³ The supplies were the same for each location and were very basic and also limited to \$5,000.00 for each store. Food stuffs were primarily flour, sugar, tea, and lard.⁶¹⁴ A comparison of the amount of flour ordered by Cantley with the amount of flour reported by Willmott to have been consumed at Inukjuak in 1957-58 indicates that the amount of flour ordered by Cantley on a per person basis compares favourably with the amount of flour consumed per person at Inukjuak.⁶¹⁵ There does not

613. Gunther, p. 167.

614. Gunther, pp. 203-209.

615. The details of Willmott's report are contained in Annex IV for the year 1958. Willmott's study shows that, in 1957-58, 57,000 lbs. of flour were sold at the Inukjuak trading store. The "settlement" Inuit received part of their payment in the form of food rations from the employers. As a result, they tended to purchase luxuries from the trade store. Willmott estimated the population at Inukjuak in 1957 to be 350 people and in 1958 to be 330 people. Of those, 75 were "settlement" Inuit. That would give a "camp" Inuit population of 275 to 265. Assuming that the 57,000 lbs. of flour went to feed approximately 275 Inuit, that would work out to approximately 207 lbs. of flour per person. Using a larger population figure results in less flour per person. Using a smaller population of say 250 Inuit results in 228 lbs. of flour per person. The 1953 relocation was to involve 15 families. If each family had four members, that would involve 60 people, split between three communities. In fact, fewer than 60 people were relocated in 1953. Cantley's flour order for each of the three stores was 60 bales with each bale containing four 24 lb. bags. This is 5,760 lbs. of flour which is equal to 288 lbs. per person. As such, Cantley's order of flour compared

appear to have been any deliberate attempt to restrict the basic food ordered for the stores in the new communities. In that regard, Willmott reported that flour, sugar, tea and lard were the food items generally purchased by the Inukjuak hunter/trappers in 1957-58. It should be noted that the amount of the loan, \$5,000.00 for each store, was intended to provide one year's supplies. There does not appear to have been provision for the purchase of a supply to be held in reserve in case supply problems

avourably with the per capita flour consumption at Inukjuak in 1958. It should be observed that in 1958, Willmott estimated that camp Inuit obtained 50% of their food from the store and obtained the other 50% from hunting. This was in a poor fur year but with no able-bodied people on relief. In the summer of 1957, a number of Inuit had gathered in the settlement but had been sent back out onto the land by the RCMP. In addition, the population at Inukjuak had been reduced substantially from the 500 people that Willmott estimated were there in 1953. Willmott was of the view that, as a result of the reduction in population, people were more able to obtain country food. It may be, therefore, that use of store food was greater in 1953 than it was in 1958. In that regard, Chesshire of the Hudson's Bay Company had reported that the Inukjuak Inuit were very heavily dependent on the store for food. The division of people would in fact involve 22 people going to Resolute Bay and 34 people going to Craig Harbour. Gunther states that the Craig Harbour group received the supplies for two stores when the decision was made not to land the Inuit settlers on the Bache Peninsula and instead to bring them back to Craig Harbour. Finally, it should be observed that both communities grew in size. The loan arrangement remained in place until 1960 and operated like a revolving fund. The capacity of the store to acquire more than the basic supplies that were initially funded through the loan would depend on the working capital that would be built up as the proceeds from furs and other revenues were credited to the loan account. At Resolute Bay, by 1960, there was a substantial amount credited to the Loan Fund — on the order of \$10,000 to \$35,000. At Craig Harbour/Grise Fiord, the amount of the Fund available to purchase supplies for the store would remain in the \$10,000 to \$12,000 range through the 1950s. The Loan Fund provided for one year's supply. There was no provision for a reserve supply in case there was a supply failure in any year. In 1956, supplies did fail to reach Resolute Bay, and in the end only one ton of supplies would be airlifted in February 1957. Those supplies consisted mostly of ammunition. At Grise Fiord, the administration documented complaints that the supplies had been inadequate from the very beginning.

arose, as sometimes happened in the Arctic. There is no indication in the plan to this point as to what was to happen with the amount of the loan if the communities increased in size. In other words, the answer to the question: Would funds be available to purchase an increased quantity of supplies if the population increased? is not found in the plan.

On May 6, 1953, the Commissioner of the RCMP advised the Deputy Minister that a reply had been received from the Fort Chimo detachment in response to the April 14 message. The Fort Chimo detachment reported that "There are Eskimos who are willing to go however they wish to know if they will have houses to live in as none of these people have ever lived in snow houses." The Commissioner also referred to the January 22, 1953 report of the staff sergeant who had visited Resolute Bay which stated that "quarters would have to be built for any Eskimo families who might be sent to Resolute Bay air base, or that possibly a Quonset hut now at the RCA detachment at Resolute Bay could be converted into four suites." The letter advised that replies had not yet been received from Port Harrison or Pond Inlet.⁶¹⁶ The Deputy Minister responded by letter of May 13, 1953, expressing doubt that the Fort Chimo Eskimos would be able to adapt themselves to conditions at Resolute Bay. "Few, if any of them, can build snow houses and they would certainly have to be housed and be guaranteed full time employment at the base. We have been exploring this angle with the Air Force and are awaiting their reply as to what number, if any, they could give full time employment to. When we have received replies from the detachments at Port Harrison and Pond Inlet, we can then go more fully into the whole matter and decide from which areas we should draw for the initial experiment."⁶¹⁷ This letter indicates that the issue of employment at Resolute Bay was, even following the decision to proceed with the project, still up in the air and the issue of housing, although

616. RG22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1, Pt. 3; document provided by Grant.

617. RG22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1, Pt. 3; document provided by Grant.

addressed in the staff sergeant's report, had not been addressed when the decision to proceed with the project had been made.

Gunther reports that the issue of the Fort Chimo Inuit was discussed between the Acting Director and the officer-in-charge of "G" Division and it was agreed that the Fort Chimo group should not be relocated to Resolute Bay.⁶¹⁸ This meeting is referred to in a letter from the Acting Director to the officer-in-command of "G" Division dated June 8, 1953 as follows:

As explained to you when you were in the office recently, we think that it would not be advisable to include any Fort Chimo Eskimos this year. These people have been accustomed to living in the bush and we are afraid that they would not adapt themselves very well even at Resolute Bay where they could probably find employment and be housed. It would be advisable, we feel, to defer any action with regard to this group until we have had an opportunity of discussing the matter more fully with them and of obtaining some first-hand experience at Resolute Bay during the coming year.

The Port Harrison group consisting of seven families, includes eleven grown males and these, with the four families which are to be transferred from Pond Inlet, should be sufficient for the initial experiment.

We should be glad, therefore, if you would ask your Port Harrison detachment to have their natives ready when the *C.D. Howe* calls there next month, and also ask Pond Inlet to have the four families from there ready to take passage on the *d'Iberville* when she arrives there in September...

If, as suggested, Mr. Stevenson accompanies you on your coming inspection trip, there will be an opportunity then for you to jointly discuss with your detachment at Port Harrison the arrangements to be made for transferring these people...⁶¹⁹

⁶¹⁸. Gunther, p. 172.

⁶¹⁹. Le Capelain to Larsen, 8.6.53; RG85, vol. 1070, file 251-4, Pt. 1; document provided by Grant; also referred to in Gunther, p. 172.

The reference to the Fort Chimo Inuit probably finding employment and being housed at Resolute is puzzling since the Deputy Minister's correspondence indicates that the issue of employment is still up in the air and the issue of housing was unresolved. In that regard, Grant refers to a May 7 memorandum from the Director to the RCMP stating that it had not been the intention of the Department to build accommodation and suggesting that the people from Fort Chimo were not suitable candidates for relocation because they were no longer living in snow houses.⁶²⁰ It had also been Larsen's belief, as expressed by the Commissioner in the May 6, 1953 letter to the Deputy Minister, that the Fort Chimo people who had indicated a willingness to go were those who had previously worked at the Fort Chimo air base when the base was in operation and had lived in houses on the base. The June 8, 1953 letter for some unknown reason suggests that the unsuitability of the Fort Chimo group relates to their having lived in the "bush" and not to the real reason, namely, the absence of housing at Resolute Bay and, ultimately, as will be seen, the failure to make proper arrangements for employment at Resolute Bay. In other words, the letter suggests that the reason they will not be relocated has to do with a characteristic of the people and not the bad planning of the Department which failed to accommodate the objective to the characteristics of the people.

The order for each of the three trading stores placed by the Department included an order for 150 caribou skins suitable for making clothing and 50 additional caribou skins for use as bedding.⁶²¹ It will be recalled that the Port Harrison Inuit were reported as having little access to caribou and were using either white man's clothing or clothing made from caribou skins purchased at the Hudson's Bay Company post. By letter of May 26, 1953, the Hudson's Bay Company acknowledged a May 22, 1953 letter from the Department placing the order for the caribou skins.

620. RG22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1, Pt. 3; as referred to in Grant, vol. 1.

621. Gunther, p. 208.

The letter advised, with regret, that the Company would be unable to supply any skins. It could only supply 150 sinew (used for sewing).⁶²² This was late in the implementation process to learn that the bedding and clothing materials needed in the High Arctic could not be supplied. The project, however, continued.

On June 3, 1953, the 150 sinews were ordered, 50 each for the three stores to be set up at Resolute Bay, Craig Harbour and Cape Herschel.⁶²³ When Stevenson was at Port Harrison on his inspection tour later in June, he was able to purchase 60 skins from the Hudson's Bay Company and made arrangements to have the cost of these charged to relief and delivered to the Inuit aboard ship.⁶²⁴ There were thus 60 instead of 600 skins available to the Inuit for clothing and bedding for the coming year. Clothing and bedding are not small items in a project which calls for people to live in the land in the High Arctic. In recognition of the inadequate provisions for bedding, the people were, on disembarking, given the mattresses which they had been using on the ship.⁶²⁵

The Pond Inlet detachment had reported the names of three families who would go north on May 20, 1953. The Port Harrison detachment reported the names of seven families who would go north on May 23,

622. Nichols to Cantley, May 26, 1953; document provided by Grant.

623. Document provided by Grant.

624. Grant, vol. 1; Gunther, p. 211, although Gunther incorrectly interprets the order for 150 sinews as an order for 150 skins.

625. Cantley to Doyle, 21.12.53, RG85, Vol. 316, File 201-1, Part 29, referred to in William D. Kemp, "The Relocation of Inuit from the Port Harrison Region of Hudson Bay to the High Arctic Communities of Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord: A background document" (Makivik Research Department, September 2, 1982).

1953.⁶²⁶ These seven families were in three camps, five miles, fifteen miles and fifty miles from Port Harrison. They lived in tents during the summer and snow houses in the winter, making a living from hunting, trapping and handicrafts.

When it was agreed that Stevenson would go to Port Harrison on the RCMP inspection tour, Cantley gave the following instructions:

If you visit Port Harrison by the RCM Police plane, you should discuss with Constable Webster, the arrangements to be made for the transfer of natives from that point to places in the High Arctic. Please arrange with Constable Webster to see that all these families have good tents and that they have sufficient clothing and other equipment to take care of their needs until such time as the supplies at their destinations can be opened up. Any supplies issued at Port Harrison can be charged as relief and we can allocate it here against the appropriation of \$5,000 which we have for expenses in connection with the transfer of natives.

It will be necessary for you when you arrive at Craig Harbour, Cape Herschel, and Resolute Bay, to check the rifles and shotguns owned by the families that are landed at each place and see that they have the right ammunition for these rifles and guns. Where ammunition has been ordered and may not be required in one place, it can be transferred to one of the other places where the natives have rifles and guns of these calibres.⁶²⁷

The intent was, therefore, that people be properly outfitted before going north and that the costs of this relief would come from a special \$5,000.00 appropriation. These costs and the costs of transportation were not charged to the Loan Fund. The people would be provided with duffel

626. Gunther, p. 172; Grant, vol. 1, RG85, vol. 1070, file 251-4, Pt. Grant states that the list of equipment of the Port Harrison group shows them to be short of dogs and traps.

627. Gunther, pp. 177-178, quoting Cantley to Stevenson, 8.6.53; RG85, vol. 80, file 201-1-(28).

make clothing and the welfare teacher, Ms. Hinds, provided some assistance in getting the people ready for the move. Hinds considered some of the people who were moved to be poorly clothed and not living under good conditions, although she reports that people were happy and had sufficient food. Ms. Hinds appears to have seen many of the relocatees as lacking industriousness and self-reliance. She emphasized the need for "proper guidance and supervision" if the project was to succeed. She considered the relocation to be a good plan.⁶²⁸

Stevenson later reported on his trip as follows:

Arrangements were completed for the transfer of these families and instructions were given to Corporal Webster to see that all these families had good tents and that they had sufficient clothing and other equipment to take care of their needs until such time as the supplies at their destination can be opened up.... With the exception of clothing material, I suggested that any other items issued should be put on board the *C.D. Howe* in care of the officer-in-charge of the Eastern Arctic Patrol for distribution to the natives in question while enroute to their final destination. I thought that this might be a better procedure than making a general handout to the natives of Port Harrison in the presence of the other Eskimos at the settlement...

As the majority of the natives to be moved were camped some distance from Port Harrison, I only had the opportunity to interview two of the men who happened to be at the Post trading some handicrafts. I discussed the whole project with them and they fully understood the plan for their movement. They were well pleased and I was able to answer all of their questions to their satisfaction.

As a number of natives to be moved are excellent stone carvers, I advised them to take a quantity of stone with them until they could locate some similar material for carving at the points where they would be disembarking.

⁶²⁸. Gunther, pp. 173-177.

One final item regarding this movement is that the Eskimos agreed that they would go north for a period of two years at least. Then if they were dissatisfied or unhappy in their new environment, they could return to Port Harrison.⁶²⁹

Gunther reports that on June 22, 1953, the Deputy Minister of Transport issued instructions to the master of the *C.D. Howe* advising that there would be some special features to the voyage that year and that the ship would be carrying a considerable number of passengers. The Deputy Minister stated that "it is particularly desired that they should be courteously treated by the ship's officers and crew and made as comfortable as possible while on board".⁶³⁰

On July 24, 1953, the *C.D. Howe* arrived at Port Harrison to, among other things, pick up the relocatees.⁶³¹

RCAF Concerns

In the meantime, the RCAF had concerns about the proposed Inuit settlement at Resolute Bay. On June 15, 1953 the Deputy Minister of Resources and Development had written to the Deputy Minister of Transport, to the Controller, Air Services, Meteorological Division of the Department of Transport, and to the Deputy Minister of National Defence to make inquiries about job opportunities at Resolute Bay.⁶³² A reply was sent on behalf of the Deputy Minister of Transport by letter dated July 27, 1953 advising that the Department had, in the past, been able to offer

629. Gunther, pp. 179-180; Inspection Trip, etc. June-July 1953, A Stevenson; RG85, vol. 1207, file 201-1-8, Pt. 3.

630. As quoted in Gunther, p. 178; Lessard to Master, C.D. Howe, 22.6.53; RG85, vol. 80, file 201-1-(28).

631. Gunther, p. 182.

632. Young to Lessard, Thompson, and Drury, RG22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1 Pt. 4; referred to in Grant, vol. 1.

employment to a limited number of Inuit generally as unskilled labour. The idea of employing Inuit in more skilled capacities was being explored although it was "not possible to be very specific", officials of the Department would keep in touch with the Northern Administration and Lands Branch to co-operate in this regard. It was noted that there was a good prospect that the joint weather station at Resolute would be relocated within the RCAF base with the result that "it would seem that any employment opportunities in the next few months would be provided by the RCAF rather than our Meteorological Division."⁶³³

On July 30, 1953, the Deputy Minister of National Defence replied by bringing to the attention of the Deputy Minister of Resources and Development concerns that the "experiment will result in hardship on the Eskimo families concerned and that the RCAF will likely be faced with the problem of tendering care for which they are unprepared. Possibly the concern...might have been avoided if this department had been represented at some of your preliminary discussions on this experiment." It was recognized that the families were enroute but that it might not be too late for a meeting. The concerns referred to were voiced by the Air Officer Commanding, Air Transport Command at Lachine. A copy of the AOC's letter of July 6, 1953 to the Chief of the Air Staff was enclosed. The AOC viewed the relocation "with considerable misgivings". He said the following:

The general principle of establishing Eskimos under proper surroundings where their standard of living can be improved and where they can be usefully employed cannot be argued against. However, casual information picked up by myself through various channels would indicate that the present proposal has not been discussed at the proper levels nor has the plan been formalized in a way that would guarantee some success.

We now have considerable experience with Eskimos at Frobisher. Over a period of years, some of these people have

633. *Ibid.*

become very useful but the majority have not, because their living and health standards make them unpredictable, unreliable, and unemployable. Your letter indicates that an RCMP constable will be established at Resolute and that the RCAF or DOT will give the Eskimos useful jobs. At a recent conference with DOT...I raised this subject and DOT claimed that their department were not involved as yet. As the majority of the DOT staff will be moving into the RCAF site this year, it would appear that the onus for training and employment will fall on the shoulders of the RCAF.

No mention is made of housing or support of the Eskimos. Because of the necessity of holding all present buildings for overflow of personnel during operations, no accommodation has been allocated for either the RCMP or Eskimo families. Similarly, the question of food arises. Cornwallis Island cannot be expected to support Eskimos on a scale that would make them suitable for manual or other labour. They must have a properly balanced diet, clean healthy living accommodation and proper clothing, which will have to be supplied to them. Medical attention is not possible on Cornwallis other than the simplest first aid.⁶³⁴

The Acting Deputy Minister of Resources and Development replied by letter of August 6, 1953 to the Deputy Minister of National Defence as follows:

The experiment we are making this year is to transfer a few families from Port Harrison and Pond Inlet to Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island and Craig Harbour and Cape Herschel on Ellesmere Island. The primary object is to find out how Eskimos from overpopulated southern areas can adapt themselves to conditions in the High Arctic where there is at present no Eskimo population and where natural food resources are reported to be much more readily available than they now are in southern areas. Each group will be in charge of a NCO of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. While we had not overlooked the possibility of the Eskimos at Resolute Bay finding some employment at the station there, it was not our intention to ask either the RCAF or the Department of

634. *Ibid.*

Transport to make any special arrangements until such time as we could ascertain how well these people could adapt themselves to their new environment.⁶³⁵

A meeting for August 10, 1953 is proposed. The meeting is to be chaired by the Director of northern Administration and Lands Branch and will be attended, in addition to members of the Department of National Defence, by the Secretary of the Advisory Committee, the Commissioner of the RCMP, the Director of Indian Health Services, the Department of National Health and Welfare and the Controller of Telecommunications, Department of Transport.

The reply of August 6, 1953 is worth a moment of reflection. The project approved for Resolute Bay as set out in the memorandum for the Deputy Minister prepared by the Director was described in the following terms:

The Meteorological Service could offer permanent employment to at least one Eskimo to learn to replace one of their mechanics and might employ one or two others on semi-skilled jobs. All could be employed on menial jobs but, except in summer, we prefer at least part of the group to hunt and trap after the native way so that the children of employed Eskimos can learn the native way of life with them. The details as to terms of employment and rotation of labour will be carefully worked out for the guidance of the RCM Police.⁶³⁶

The other two projects did not identify employment as a possibility. At Cape Herschel it was said that the plan was to "establish them in the native way of life", and at Craig Harbour it was said that the plan was for the people "to live off the country where native food supplies are reported to be good". The objects of these three projects were relief of population pressure in distressed areas, a pioneer experiment to determine whether suit could be induced to live on the northern islands and if it was

635. *Ibid.*

636. March 15, 1953, memorandum for the Deputy Minister, cited above.

warranted, to move more Inuit north. The list of objects included the following:

An experiment to work out a method by which Eskimos may be trained to replace white employees in the north without the Eskimo children losing touch with the native way of life.

This objective could only relate to Resolute Bay because it was the only project which speaks about employment. Cantley's memorandum of December 18, 1952 had also stated in relation to the proposed relocation to Resolute that "Eskimos could find at least seasonable employment at the base. Arrangements could probably be made with the Department of Transport or the RCAF to employ some on a year-round basis as a maintenance crew."⁶³⁷

It is more than a little difficult to understand how the proposed relocation to Resolute could achieve the objective of an experiment to work out a method by which Inuit could be trained to replace white employees in the North if it were not intended to enlist the employers at Resolute Bay in the scheme. This is particularly so in the context of a project description which speaks in terms of some of the people being permanently employed with the balance being seasonally employed so that there will always be some people making some of their living from hunting and trapping. To be sure, the language of the memorandum to the Deputy Minister spoke in terms of "could" which is an ambiguous term. It has the appearance of conveying a sense of something reasonably certain. At the same time, it is capable of an interpretation no more certain than that employed in Cantley's December memorandum. The reality is that the possibility of employment of Inuit at Resolute was just as much an unexplored possibility when the Deputy Minister approved the project as it was when the idea was raised in the December 1952 memorandum.

637. Cantley to Meikle, December 18, 1952, cited above.

There is no doubt that a key feature of the project was to see whether the people could adapt to conditions in the High Arctic. However, to imply, as the August 6, 1953 letter to the Deputy Minister of National Defence does imply, that, in respect of Resolute Bay, employment was simply a "possibility" which had not been "overlooked" is disingenuous. It turns the lack of planning around to make the project appear to be something which it clearly was not when it was approved by the Deputy Minister in March. What is particularly noteworthy about the way in which the August 6, 1953 letter communicates this shift in focus is that no single statement in it is patently untrue. It is rather the way in which the statements are framed and the fact that the recipient, the Deputy Minister of National Defence, would not have been in possession of the March 1953 memorandum, which creates the desired impression that employment, and hence any significant involvement by employers at the base, was not a significant component of the project. It will be recalled as well that it had been intended that the Fort Chimo Inuit who had acquired some skills from working at the air base were the ones who had been intended to go to Resolute Bay but they were required to be housed and the Department had not planned for this. As a result, it was decided in June that only the Port Harrison Inuit would go to the North although the letter confirming this decision is misleading as to the real reason.

The meeting of August 10, 1953 was chaired by the Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch who was joined by Messrs. Cantley, Fraser and Sivertz from the Department, as well as Mr. Marshall of the Secretariat of the Advisory Committee. The Director advised that there were three aspects to the Department's policy as follows:

1. In areas where the natural resources will support the Eskimo inhabitants it has been decided that their basic way of life is to be maintained as far as possible.
2. In areas where permanent white settlements have grown up, the Eskimos will be educated to adapt them to this new situation.

3. In areas of the north which cannot continue to support the present Eskimo population, attempts will be made to move the Eskimo to areas with greater natural resources.⁶³⁸

It was said that, "The administration has found that the eastern coast of Hudson Bay cannot continue to supply the Eskimo there with a reasonable standard of living and, therefore, efforts will be made to re-settle some of the inhabitants to more prosperous areas. This year the administration is carrying out an experiment in which it will transplant a small number of Eskimo families from the eastern shore of Hudson Bay to certain settlements in the high north to see if they can find a better living there."

Mr. Cantley said that "All of the people involved were volunteers and each had been told of the type of environment and conditions which would be found where he was going. ...of the three points where the families will be settled, Resolute Bay is the only one where they may be the possibility of the Eskimos finding employment. However, the possibility of securing employment was not an important factor in deciding where the Eskimos should be settled. The men of the group are primarily hunters and the main purpose of the experiment is to see if it is possible for people to adapt themselves to the conditions of the High Arctic and secure a living from the land."

Squadron Leader O'Neil confirmed that the concern of the RCAF was that the Inuit would become dependent on the RCAF for food and clothing if the experiment was not successful and he advised that the RCAF did not expect to be able to offer any employment at Resolute except if the Inuit had some type of technical training. He wished to know how many families would be going to each of the three settlements and Mr. Cantley "stated

638. Minutes of meeting held August 10, 1953, RG22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1 Pt. 4; document provided by Grant; also referred to in Gunther, pp. 10 and 235-236.

that this would be decided on the boat taking the Eskimo to their destination. It was not desirable to break up family groups if possible."

The representative of the Department of Transport said that the Department had found the Inuit to be good as general handymen and kitchen help and would like to hire at least one Inuk as a general handyman for the ionosphere station at Resolute. Mr. Cantley explained that an Inuk employed by the Department of Transport would receive credit for the work done at the trading store and the bill for the work would be sent to the Department of Resources and Development which would then forward it to the Department of Transport. Squadron Leader O'Neil expressed concern that there was not sufficient wildlife in the Resolute area to support the proposed Inuit population. Mr. Cantley replied that "he had reason to believe that there was sufficient marine life to support the Eskimo families concerned. No one could say for sure that this was the case and, consequently, the experiment was being staged."

The minutes indicate that "Mr. Sivertz pointed out that the Canadian government is anxious to have Canadians occupying as much of the North as possible and it appeared that in many cases the Eskimo were the only people capable of doing this."

Mr. Sivertz referred to the "prime purpose" of the project in terms similar to those used by Cantley earlier in the meeting and said that "every effort will be made to see that the RCAF is not inconvenienced." Mr. Cantley stated that "Those taking part in the experiment were not seeking employment but that the administration would not stand in their way if employment became available."

While by August, with the abandonment of the plans to move the people from Fort Chimo to Resolute Bay, the Department may have lost interest in pursuing the employment objective of the relocation, it would seem, contrary to what was said at the meeting, that the prospects for employment at Resolute Bay were a significant consideration in deciding on

Resolute Bay as a place where the Inuit should be settled. Resolute emerged as a possible site for relocatees in December 1952 with employment identified as a feature of the project. In addition, considering that the Director's memorandum to the Port Harrison detachment on April 8, 1953 had referred to the possibilities of employment, it could not be said with certainty that the relocatees "were not seeking employment". Even though a later communication on April 14, 1953 indicated that the Fort Chimo people would be going to Resolute Bay, which was the only place where there was a prospect of employment, it is not clear how one could say without having spoken to the people involved that they had not formed any expectation of employment.

It might be noted that, in Stevenson's report of the 1953 patrol to northern Quebec, he observed that the Fort Chimo "Eskimos are past the hunting and trapping stage."⁶³⁹ This was made in the context of a discussion of prospective mining activity in the area. He was expressing the view that employment at the mines would be the answer to the problem at the Fort Chimo area. The Fort Chimo Inuit were well-suited to relocation to Resolute if there had been jobs, as originally planned, and houses.

The minutes are also significant in that they indicate that the question of which families would go where had not been resolved before people left Port Harrison. It would only be settled on the ship once they were on their way.

It is also interesting that Mr. Sivertz refers to the objective of the government to Canadianize the North. This was very much the concern of the Cabinet and had led to the reactivation of the Advisory Committee. In August 1953, Mr. Sivertz worked in the office of the Deputy Minister and his attendance at the meeting was in that capacity. In that regard, Mr. Sivertz in June 1953 had attended a meeting between the Air Officer Commanding RCAF Transport Command and the U.S. Commanding

639. RG22, vol. 176, file 40-2-20; document provided by Grant.

General of the Northeast Air Command as the representative of the Deputy Minister.⁶⁴⁰ As has been noted, there appear to have been some at the senior levels of government in 1952-53 who did not see activities by Inuit to support the exercise of Canadian sovereignty. There were, however, others who appear to have considered that such activities did support the assertion of Canadian sovereignty. The Department had been of that view with the relocation to Dundas Harbour in 1934. In that Mr. Sivertz was expressing a similar view in 1953, he must be taken as speaking for the Department. At the very least, his statement would be seen by the intended audience, the Department of National Defence, as stating one of the benefits of the project. To the extent that this additional benefit served to resolve the concerns of the Department of National Defence, it would become a feature of the project just as the assurance that the RCAF would not be inconvenienced by the relocation would become a feature of the project.

The statement of the three policy principles of the Department by the Director is particularly interesting. This is the first time that these three principles appear in the documentary record. The statement of these principles should be viewed with some considerable caution given the context of the meeting, namely, an effort by the Department to assuage an annoyed Department of National Defence. The concerns of the Department of National Defence about lack of planning would hardly have been removed if the relocation to Resolute Bay had been characterized as the ad hoc, poorly planned exercise that it was in reality. The project appears far more credible when set against a background of a clear policy with three distinct principles, one of which conveniently captures the very project which is the subject of discussion. When examined with a critical eye, the three principles bear little resemblance to the policy principles which had been emerging in previous years. The documents indicate a general consensus that education should be given priority but with some caution because of

640. Memorandum for the Deputy Minister, June 22, 1953, RG85, vol. 993, file 1009-10-69; document provided by Grant.

the uncertainties of future employment. It cannot be said that there had been a policy decision to limit education to those areas where permanent white settlements had grown up. In fact, the Department would continue to expand educational facilities throughout the Arctic in the coming years including in communities that could not be characterized as "permanent white settlements". Port Harrison had a school. Would that mean that, by definition, Port Harrison had a "permanent white settlement" and, if so, why was the emphasis for the Port Harrison people not on education? In addition, the third principle focuses on the inability of an area to continue to support the Eskimo population. This implies a rather serious state of affairs. Yet it cannot be said that northern Quebec was unable to continue to support the Eskimo population. There was a problem in northern Quebec but the problem was economic and involved a concern about continued instability in the fur economy. There was no pressing concern about starvation in northern Quebec. To the extent that the principles enunciated at the meeting did reflect the Department's policies, they lack clarity and coherence. As Diubaldo has put it, the Department may have had many policies but it did not have a coherent long-term policy. "In many ways, government Inuit policy in the 1950s could be likened to Stephen Leacock's medieval knight, who jumped on his charger and rode off in all directions. There were policies, but no policy. And once southerners shed the assumption that they knew best and began to listen to both Inuit and other northerners, the painful process of trial and error could be eased."⁶⁴¹

Directions to the RCMP

The RCMP would act as the general representative of the government in the new communities in addition to doing police work. A memorandum was therefore prepared by the Department for the RCMP detachments to give guidance on operations at the proposed settlements at Craig Harbour, Cape Herschel and Resolute Bay. An early version of this memorandum, which

641. Diubaldo, p. 163

Further states may have dated from April 1953,⁶⁴² contained a section on employment at Resolute Bay. Gunther notes that the section on employment at Resolute Bay was excluded from the final draft "because of RCAF objections to the project which emerged in June and July 1953."⁶⁴³ The copy of the draft memorandum provided by Grant, which apparently like other drafts is undated, contains the statement that "It is quite probable that all those going to Resolute Bay will find permanent employment. Both the RCAF and the Department of Transport have expressed interest in employing Eskimos at this base and every assistance should be given to them in employing suitable men. Arrangements between the Eskimos and the personnel at the stations will have to be made by the police detachments. Wages should be fixed on the basis of the prevailing rates paid to white personnel for similar work, due consideration being given to the comparative ability of the Eskimos to perform the duties assigned to them. The people who are not employed should, of course, be assisted and encouraged to set up their camps away from the settlement at places where hunting conditions are favourable and where they will have the best chance of at least procuring their own food. Care will have to be exercised, however, that they do not take more than they actually need and that in particular they do not deplete the land resources. Musk ox, of course, must be fully protected."

Apart from the reference to the prospects of permanent employment, the memorandum makes clear that the Inuit settlement is to be placed at a distance from non-Inuit facilities with a view to the Inuit procuring their own food from the land. At the same time, there is the expression of concern for conservation particularly with respect to land animals. The possibilities for hunting were not, therefore, unlimited. In this regard, the concern for conservation also existed in northern Quebec where the report of the 1953 patrol expresses concern that the movement of Inuit to the

⁶⁴². Gunther, p. 166, fn. 3.

⁶⁴³. *Ibid.*; RG 85, vol. 1070, file 251-4, Pt. 1.

islands in Hudson Bay not result in over-hunting of the sea mammal around the islands.⁶⁴⁴ The draft memorandum explains the purpose of the relocation in the following terms:

The purpose of these operations is primarily to determine how well Eskimos transferring from over-populated areas in northern Quebec can adapt themselves to conditions in presently unpopulated high Arctic areas where there is reason to expect they can make a satisfactory native living by hunting and trapping.

The families being transferred from Port Harrison this year are essentially hunters and trappers and it is thought that with assistance and guidance, they can make a better living for themselves in the high Arctic than they can ever hope to do around Port Harrison now. To assist them in adapting themselves to high Arctic conditions and in particular to the period of darkness, it is being arranged to have at least one family from Pond Inlet placed at each station. It is hoped that with the experienced guidance of the Pond Inlet natives and the encouragement and supervision of the men in charge of the detachment, these Quebec natives will quickly become accustomed to their new environment and adapt themselves to the difference in hunting and living conditions there. If this initial experiment turns out satisfactorily, and it is felt that the resources in these areas are sufficient to support a greater population, arrangements will be made to transfer other families from northern Quebec and/or southern Baffin Island next year.

The draft memorandum then goes on to state that "We are not overlooking the possibility that some at least of these natives will be ab

644. The report suggests that, with the prospect of a bumper year for fur the following year, "it may be that during a good fur year they should come in from the islands and trap on the mainland and return to the islands during a poor fur year. This might be considered not only an advantage as a source of income but might also be a conservation measure. The islands would not become depleted of game. Geese would be allowed to breed and sea life would not be scared away from the islands as is often the case with continual hunting."

to find permanent or temporary employment at one or other of the weather stations in these areas. It is quite probable that all those going to Resolute Bay will find permanent employment."

The memorandum refers to the supplies which are being purchased through the loan fund and mentions that the documents concerning the operation of the fund are attached. The memorandum goes on to state that "You will note that we are arranging for the appointment of one Eskimo at each place as borrower and trader and it will be necessary for him to sign the attached documents as such. Since few, if any, of the Eskimos being transferred are qualified yet to act independently as traders, or to keep the necessary records and accounts, it will be necessary for the Police at each detachment to closely supervise the business on behalf of the native trader and keep the records." This passage raises the question of whether the arrangements for the loan had been discussed with the Inuit prior to their departure. It seems clear that it is intended that the police will deal with the matter once the people have landed and that the signature of one of the Inuit as the borrower and trader is a formality since the substantive work will be handled by the police at each of the new settlements. The memorandum indicates that the Department will provide lists indicating the prices at which goods are to be sold. The prices include a mark-up on the cost to take care of handling and other charges and "to allow for a reasonable profit on the operations." It is not clear why there should be a profit on goods purchased under a loan which, notwithstanding the formality of an individual borrower's signature, was in effect a debt which the entire new community would be repaying.

The memorandum observes that the people may have revenue from other sources such as wages from employment, family allowance, old age assistance, old age security or pensions for the blind.

The memorandum states that "There may also be times when it will be necessary to issue direct relief to certain individuals when they may be temporarily unable to provide for themselves. Every effort should be made,

however, to keep the Eskimos self-supporting and independent." In other words, relief may be issued to those unable to provide for themselves but otherwise the direction to the police is to keep the people self-supporting and independent. The memorandum directs that "All transactions will be on a barter basis, i.e., no credit will be issued. If anyone needs supplies that he cannot pay for, these will be issued on Relief Account." In other words, the common practice at trading posts of grubstaking a trapper by providing supplies on credit in anticipation of future receipt of furs is not to apply. The trading post at Port Harrison did have a practice of grubstaking trappers. The draft memorandum observes that the supplies being sent in comprise only "the staple goods which we have considered necessary for the first year's operations. In the event of Eskimo earnings being fairly high, care will have to be taken to ensure that these supplies are equitably distributed to the various families over the year. In other words, each family should be allowed to purchase only what they may reasonably require for their current needs." Earnings would not, therefore, result in any increased capacity to purchase goods on a current basis. Rather, any excess over what the person would be permitted to buy at the store would be "set aside as savings or for making special purchases in the following year." It is then suggested that "After the first year's experience you will be in a position to judge more accurately what the requirements will be and to send in requisitions accordingly." As will be seen, the operation of the loan fund and the purchase of supplies through the loan fund became a source of considerable difficulty.

The operation of the store would require the police to maintain separate account for each customer; a separate account for amounts charged against the stock to cover wages from employers paid in kind; separate account for each family receiving family allowance and the goods issued against the family allowance payment; a separate account for relief payments; and the use of counter slips to record all transactions. These accounting procedures would become a source of confusion over time. In that regard, it might be noted that there would not be a direct relationship between wages payable and goods issued from the store in light of the

limited stock of the store which requires the maintenance of an account to keep track of any credit on account of wages. No such account was identified in the instruction.

The memorandum refers to the "possibility that some at least of these natives will be able to find permanent or temporary employment at one or other of the weather stations in these areas". In this regard, the Department received an August 20, 1953 letter from the Controller, Air Services, Meteorological Division of the Department of Transport expressing agreement with an enclosed letter from the U.S. Weather Bureau that "a useful function could be served by Eskimos at Eureka and Alert as well as Mould Bay and Isachsen. However, in view of the problems involved with regard to accommodation, messing, supervision, etc. it is felt that it would be desirable to have this matter discussed thoroughly at the annual meeting in Ottawa in January when representatives of all departments concerned will be present."⁶⁴⁵ The Meteorological Service, like the RCAF, supported the employment of Inuit in principle but there were significant practical matters to be taken into account, including accommodation. The letter from the U.S. Weather Bureau is reported by Grant as stating that "having observed the use of Eskimo families at other Arctic stations, we believe that they could be a great deal of use in carrying out arduous chores such as hauling ice, pumping water, assisting with cargo and supply, assisting in lighting temporary runway flares for landing aircraft and any other duties about the station which absorb an appreciable amount of time of the technical employees."⁶⁴⁶ In other words, the "useful function" would be in the performance of unskilled labour. In this regard, the prospects for employment would be similar to those which were anticipated with the 1934 relocation of the Cape Dorset Inuit to Dundas Harbour.

645. RG85, vol. 1070, file 251-4/1; document provided by Grant.

646. *Ibid.*

Continuing Discussion of Eskimo Policy

On August 24, 1953 the Administration Sub-Committee of the Advisory Committee met to discuss, among other things, "general policy governing Eskimo". The Commissioner of the RCMP stated "that he considered it very important to have a long-range policy aimed at helping the Eskimo through the difficult transition period they are now experiencing due to their rapidly increasing contacts with modern civilization and the resulting effects on their primitive way of life. It might be possible to present the general outline of such a policy to the main committee but the sub-committee should first consider whether such a matter was its responsibility."⁶⁴⁷ Discussion on the matter then followed with particular reference to the work of the Advisory Committee and the work of the Eskimo Affairs Committee. The issue was what role the Advisory Committee should take in formulating government policy in light of the existence of the Eskimo Affairs Committee and, hence, what role the Administration Sub-Committee of the Advisory Committee should take in this area. Mr. Sivertz is reported as stating "that a government policy was required and that the main features should be clearly expressed in a written statement. He suggested that effective fusion be established between the ACND and the Committee on Eskimo Affairs. The minutes indicate that the sub-committee agreed "that there was a need for a clearly stated government policy towards the Eskimo and that the Advisory Committee on Northern Development should be asked where the responsibility for formulating this policy lies."

During the discussion of the formulation of policy, Mr. Fraser, Chief of the Northern Administration Division, is reported as having mentioned "a number of the measures being taken by the government to assist the Eskimo and the difficulty of following a general policy where conditions varied so greatly that each individual case frequently required consideration on its own merits. He doubted therefore whether the sub-committee would

647. MG30E133, Series V, Box 294, File ACND 2 1953 vol. 1; document provided by Grant.

be able to assist by defining a broad policy." This statement, perhaps, provides some insight into the approach of the Department as reflected in the discussion of August 10, 1953 with the RCAF.

The sub-committee also discussed controlling the contact between Inuit and non-Inuit. The Commissioner of the RCMP suggested that existing administrative processes and the co-operation of interested groups would serve for the time being to control such contact. He suggested that it would be unwise for the sub-committee to recommend any new legislation in this regard until the general policy question had been settled. It might be observed that the administrative arrangements involved agreement with those operating facilities in the North that instructions would be issued to personnel restricting their contact with the Inuit. The issue of controlling contact between Inuit and non-Inuit had been referred to the Advisory Committee by the Council of the Northwest Territories.

From September 8 to 12, 1953, Mr. Stead of the Department of Finance, who also participated in the Advisory Committee's activities, made a tour of the Arctic Islands visiting various places including Resolute Bay. He was accompanied by Mr. Sivertz of the Deputy Minister's staff. Mr. Stead was making the trip, as stated in his subsequent report, "to obtain a background knowledge of the Eastern Arctic with special reference to the business of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development and the Estimates and policy problems of the Department of Resources and Development."⁶⁴⁸

Stead concludes his report with a number of observations on Inuit policy. He had earlier in his report referred to the "ad hoc approach that presently passes for policy". That comment was made in the context of comments questioning moving Eskimos to an area such as Resolute Bay

⁶⁴⁸. Report on Tour of the Arctic Islands September 8-12, 1953, RD22, Vol. 176, file 40-2-20, Pt. 3; document provided by Grant; also referred to in Gunther, p. 242.

where there was a large white base when the reason for the move was an attempt to keep them in the "native state" and to preserve their culture as "primitive as it is". The Resolute Bay location appeared to conflict with this objective "while leaving them untrained to cope with the problems presented by...contact" with non-Inuit. In Stead's view,

thought should be given to the continuing growth of contacts between Eskimo culture and White civilization in the Arctic. ...this question is not only a problem in itself but also has a bearing on the sovereignty issue. Our lack of suitable action on behalf of our Eskimos has already been raised on more than one occasion in the United Nations. It seems to me that our sovereignty can certainly be regarded as in jeopardy if we do not carry out the somewhat basic function of adequately training the aboriginal population so as to fit them for participation in the life of a modern state. Our efforts so far apparently suffer seriously by comparison with Alaska and Greenland. ...certainly the problems involved are complex and I feel sure no one in the government service has studied the problem from all the angles, sociological, political and economic. ...my opinion at the moment is that we should gradually drop the assumption that the Eskimo culture should be maintained. The process can be gradual, starting with the present points of contact between the cultures and extending it as further contacts demand or opportunity offers. Whether we like it or not these contacts are occurring and I think we should endeavour to fit the Eskimos for them. Beginning with the present younger generation training should be provided so that Eskimos can be made welcome in the present Military Establishments as truck drivers, junior technicians and the like. Hand in hand with this village development along the lines of Happy Valley should take place so that the living standards of the Eskimos will be raised. This must be done so as to permit the older generation to continue to live as they have done for I see no chance of their making a clean break with their culture.... For the time being I feel such Eskimo communities should be developed at a respectable distance from the Military bases so that contact is reduced to that required by the employment until the passage of time removes those Eskimos which are not trained to meet the White culture. In the development of an Eskimo policy the experience of Alaska and Greenland should be studied.... Greenland has

been working at this problem for centuries and by this time considerable capital investment is in the place.... Greenland makes annual reports to the United Nations and I now have a copy on loan from Graham Rowley.... We must face the possibility that if we train Eskimos to live in contact with and be participants in White society, any retreat of the frontier, Military or economic, must be met by arrangements for moving the Eskimo population to conform at least in respect of those Eskimos which have been in contact. A general development along the lines suggested above may well denude certain Islands of their civilian population. This is most likely to occur only if the major military bases are closed down in the future and, of course, if this happens the pressure of the sovereignty question will be relaxed.⁶⁴⁹

Gunther disposes of these comments by Stead with the observation that he did not seem to realize that his recommendations were "more or less the direction the Department was in fact taking."⁶⁵⁰ This dismissive comment does not appear to be well-founded when the history of the Department's approach to the employment of the relocatees at Resolute Bay is considered. What was brought forward to the Deputy Minister as "an experiment to work out a method by which Eskimos may be trained to replace white employees in the North without the Eskimo children losing touch with the native way of life" had not been preceded by any serious discussion with the affected employers and, when problems emerged, the employment aspect was quickly abandoned as a significant feature of the relocation. Yet it is clear that Resolute Bay was selected for its employment opportunities, and the Fort Chimo Inuit who could no longer be regarded as hunters and trappers because of prior contact with and employment at the air base were to be recruited to go there. It was the mistaken belief that the Fort Chimo Inuit would be able to live in snow houses which led to the abandonment of plans to relocate Fort Chimo Inuit. None of this reflects a serious commitment to the policy objectives enunciated by Mr. Stead or, for that matter, to a serious planning process aimed at implementing such a

649. *Ibid.*

650. Gunther, p. 242, fn. 139.

policy. This does indeed reflect an ad hoc approach to the relocations which is not founded on any long-term coherent policy. To the extent that the comments made at the August 10, 1953 meeting with the RCAF pass for an already established policy, they lack clarity and coherence. They are, in any event, suspect given the context of the meeting, namely to deal with and deflect criticism arising through the failure to consult with affected organizations. It was not long after, at the Administration Sub-Committee that the Department's representative was saying a general policy was not practical. What emerges as the unifying feature of the relocations is a desire to meet the loss of income from the collapse of fur prices and the continuing ups and downs in the fur economy with increased reliance by the people on country food rather than through relief. That bears no resemblance to the policy discussed by Stead.

It is interesting to observe that the continual reference in 1952 documents to the relocations being driven by "overpopulation" at Port Harrison is reflected in Stead's perception of the relocation as having been caused by an "increasing Eskimo population" at Port Harrison which has "been outrunning the food supply". In other words, his perception — which has been carried through to the present day — is of a population which was dependent on game but which was outstripping the available game resources. In fact, as has been discussed above, the problem was an economic problem caused by a drop in fur prices. There was no urgency to these relocations as might have been the case had there been a population dependent on game which was suffering as a result of a lack of game. By 1952 and 1953 the conditions at Port Harrison were good. The Port Harrison Inuit were not suffering and they had long ceased to be entirely dependent on game. In fact, the driving force behind the relocations was to put them into a situation where they would become more dependent on game than they previously had been. There is no evidence that this aspect of the relocation was communicated to the relocatees when they were recruited for the project and every reason to believe that the relocatees had very different expectations about the relocations.

Gunther observes that Stead's specific comments with respect to the Resolute relocation were ignored by the Department "(for good reason in my view) since his was a one-paragraph criticism of a very general sort by someone who had no experience of the North, spent a few hours at Resolute, did not visit the camp, and made his definitive judgments only a week after the group had arrived there."⁶⁵¹ Yet, experience or no experience, Stead's comments on policy later in the report are perceptive and one does not find the policy underpinnings to the Department's actions on the relocation which would permit an answer to be given.

The question which arises from a careful review of the departmental action leading up to the relocation is whether the Department was feeling pressure to be seen to be doing something. Mr. Fraser's comments in response to the RCMP Commissioner's concerns about the development of long-term policy are insightful in that regard. Mr. Fraser answered by, in essence, saying the Department was doing something and, if it did not have comprehensive long-term policy, that was because such a policy was impractical. In short, the question which arises is whether the immediate need for action was a political need to address growing concern both by the public and by the political leadership in the administration of northern affairs. As discussed, there was no immediate need for action based on an Aboriginal society dependent on hunting suffering hardship as a result of inadequate game resources. Yet as early as Stead's report of his September 1953 tour, this was how the relocation was beginning to be perceived. This was undoubtedly the result of the ambiguity with which the project had come to be characterized during the 1953 period. To the knowledgeable, "overpopulation in relation to available resources" described the inability of the population to increase its reliance on country food when bad fur years resulted in insufficient income to purchase the usual store food, with the result that periodically relief had to be issued. To the less well-informed, "overpopulation in relation to available resources" could describe a situation of an Aboriginal society dependent on hunting outstripping the

651. *Ibid.*, p. 243.

country food resources, with a resulting crisis of famine and possible starvation. There is little doubt that this ambiguity became a source of confusion about the purpose of the relocation and the justification for the relocation which continues to the present day. This ambiguity lies at the heart of the unresolved complaint of the relocatees.

Stead's comments concerning sovereignty are also of interest. His comments reflect two aspects of the exercise of sovereignty. One relates to the occupation of islands by Canadian civilians, in this case, Inuit. In that regard, his comments are similar to the comments made by Sivertz at the August 10, 1953 meeting with the RCAF. However, he introduces another aspect of the exercise of sovereignty which relates to carrying out the government's responsibilities in relation to the Aboriginal population. He appears to relate the relocation to contributing to sovereignty in both aspects. In that regard, Stead was making the tour "with reference to the business of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development" which was reactivated precisely because of sovereignty concerns. Stead's comments in relation to sovereignty reflect a then contemporary view about the value of the project to the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty by someone outside the Department. As we have seen, Sivertz and Stevenson saw that such a relocation would contribute to the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty. Stead also links the need for an Inuit population in the High Arctic to the build-up of military bases in the North. As has been seen, it was United States military activity in the Arctic that had led to concern about maintaining Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. If the military bases were closed, the "pressure of the sovereignty question will be relaxed" and there would be no concern with later movements of Inuit to pursue opportunities in other parts of the country. That is, while the closure of the military bases would result in loss of employment and the need for the Inuit to move from the High Arctic, this would not affect the sovereignty concern since it was the presence of the military bases which gave rise to that concern.

Sivertz's memorandum to the Deputy Minister on the September 10, 1953 tour suggests that the possibilities for employment and training of the Inuit at

Resolute Bay "should be examined afresh and at an early date."⁶⁵² The air officer commanding Transport Command had been with Stead and Sivertz on the tour and Sivertz reports that he expressed the view that the Inuit men now at Resolute "could all be employed as unskilled workers by the RCAF, and, if Eskimo can be found who have any experience in any of the common trades he feels sure that employment could be found next summer for fifteen or twenty more. He considers that it would be advantageous to Canada in many ways to replace with Eskimos as many as possible of the white men who have to be sent there at great expense and who are generally dissatisfied themselves and render indifferent service." Sivertz notes that such a program would require the building of an Inuit married quarters. He suggests that the materials for a simple house could be bought from the loan fund and erected by the Inuit who were to live in it under supervision of a carpenter supplied by the administration. He suggests that arrangements might be made for the Inuit to purchase heating oil, food and other necessities at prices which did not include the full cost of transportation. He also proposed opening a school for the children. He recognized that this would be expensive "but I think it would have a better chance of real success in the long-term objectives than any other Eskimo school. Pupils would attend full time. They would be motivated in studies by the fact of their parents and neighbours being salaried employees in jobs which they, the children, can qualify for and improve on. In ten years such a school at Resolute could be producing Eskimo boys and girls ready for vocational and technical training at Aklavik and return to the high Arctic. In due course, I would hope to see establishments such as Mould, Isachsen, Eureka and Alert substantially, if not entirely, manned by Eskimos with their families in residence." Sivertz was proposing full-time employment as part of a longer-term goal to take advantage of the opportunity which employment at the base would provide. He believed this aspect of the project should be considered afresh at an early date. His memorandum indicates that the RCAF was supportive of

652. Sivertz to Deputy Minister September 23, 1953; RG22, vol. 176, file 49-2-20, Pt. 3; document provided by Grant.

employing Inuit which appears to underline the employment opportunities which were lost at Resolute Bay. Gunther, however, suggests that in 1950 RCAF senior officers were unwilling to employ Inuit.⁶⁵³

The discussion on the need for long-term policy at the Administration Sub-Committee in August 1953 came before the Advisory Committee at its meeting of September 14, 1953. The minutes of that meeting state that "General Young reviewed the various steps that his Department was taking to meet the problems of the Eskimo, and a long-term policy emphasis was being placed on the provision of adequate education but in the mean time there were many short-term problems. He had set up a Committee on Eskimo Affairs which included representatives of the churches and the Hudson's Bay Company and which had made valuable proposals for the solution of some of these problems. He suggested that the recommendations of the Committee on Eskimo Affairs should be referred to the Administration Sub-Committee for consideration.... The Committee agreed that the matter of a general Eskimo policy should be studied further by the Department and referred to the Administration Sub-Committee for suggestions." It might be noted in passing that the economic problem of the northern Quebec Inuit was consistently viewed as a long-term problem. Relocating families permanently to the High Arctic was also anything but a short-term solution. Moving families to winter on the islands off the Quebec coast or down to the Richmond Gulf area, by contrast, could be viewed as short-term solutions. Indeed, Gunther points to the long-term nature of the problem in answering the objection that the conditions at Port Harrison in the 1952-53-54 period were reasonably good.⁶⁵⁴

It was at the Advisory Committee meeting of October 19, 1953 that the Advisory Committee was advised of the relocation of Inuit to the High Arctic. The minutes of the meeting record the following:

653. Gunther, p. 311.

654. *Ibid.*, pp. 122 and 124.

An experiment is being made in moving Eskimo from areas where conditions are difficult to places where they can find employment or good hunting. Seven families from Port Harrison have been moved to Ellesmere Island and Cornwallis Island while five young men have gone to Fort Churchill where they are employed by the services.⁶⁵⁵

The reference to five young men going to Fort Churchill is a reference to the change in the relocation of the Fort Chimo Inuit. Instead of sending families to the High Arctic with a view to employment at Resolute Bay, young men would be sent to Fort Churchill with a view to employment. The description of the reason for the relocation in terms of "difficult" conditions is vague. The reference to "places where they can find employment or good hunting" is also vague as it may only refer to the movement to Fort Churchill but could also apply to the movement to the High Arctic. One should not too easily dismiss the ambiguities in the minutes to the inevitable summarizing which takes place in the preparation of minutes since these ambiguities are evident in the planning documentation itself.

Grant reports on a related document in the files entitled "Policy Towards the Eskimo" which appears to have been prepared in support of the proposal to the Advisory Committee that the Administration Sub-Committee have a role in the consideration of Eskimo policy. The paper states as follows:

The long-term policy is presumably to make the Eskimos full citizens of Canada with rights, responsibilities, and a standard of living comparable to those of the white population. In the past few years a number of measures have been taken in order to assist the Eskimo. They have however, been done piecemeal, and at times they have appeared to be mutually inconsistent. Our first need is the preparation of a written policy outlining the objectives of the government and the methods it is proposed to adopt to achieve them. Such a policy should be considered by the Committee on Eskimo Affairs, and passed

655. MG30E133, Series V, vol. 294, file ACND 1953, Pt. 1; document provided by Grant.

through the Administration Sub-Committee to the Advisory Committee on Northern Development.⁶⁵⁶

It would appear that the characterization of action as piecemeal is an accurate reflection of internal departmental thinking since Gunther reports that "A few years later Cantley was much more cautious about a 'piecemeal' approach calling instead for 'an attempt to look at the whole picture before making any more piecemeal arrangements'."⁶⁵⁷

656. RG22, vol. 544, ACND 1953/1; as quoted in Grant, vol. 1.

657. Gunther, p. 244, fn. 142, referring to Cantley to Sivertz 28.3.56; RG85, vol. 1070, file 251-4, Pt. 2. These comments were made in the course of a discussion about establishing further new communities in the high North.

The High Arctic Relocation

Summary of Supporting Information to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples Report on the High Arctic Relocation

Part 4 Events After the Relocation

Contents

Introduction	437
Differing Views on the Success or Lack of Success of the Relocation	438
The First Year	443
The Different Conditions from those at Inukjuak	443
Some Supplies Not Delivered to Resolute Bay	445
First Winter at Resolute Bay	445
Marshall's November 1953 Report on Conditions at Resolute Bay	448
First Winter at Craig Harbour	450
Reports of Inuit Satisfaction	451
Conditions at Craig Harbour at the End of 1954	453
Use of Carving Material	454
Reports of Requests for Relatives to Come to the New Communities	455
Income Level	456
Freeman's View of the Significance of Paddy's Death	459
Questions About the Eskimo Loan Fund	460
Plans to Move Additional Families in 1954	461
Memorandum of Guidance on Release of Information on Northern Activities	462
Cantley's Comments on the Promise to Return	463
Subsequent Years	464
1955	464
Conditions at Craig Harbour	464
Conditions at Resolute Bay	466
Requests for Additional Families to Come to the New Communities	466
Relations between the Inukjuak and Pond Inlet Inuit	467
Problems Finding Spouses	467

1956	Conditions at Craig Harbour/Grise Fiord	468
	Conditions at Resolute Bay and Requests to Return Home	469
	Eastern Arctic Patrol Report of Requests to Return Home	470
	Requests for Additional Families to Come North	471
	Failure to Deliver Supplies to Resolute Bay	472
	Complaints About Handling of Supplies	473
	Disappointment of Inuit and Questions about Accounts	473
	Report that Inuit Were Doing Well	474
	Employment at Resolute Bay, Expressions of Satisfaction, Improvements	474
	Expressions of Caution about Further Relocations and a Mention of the Promise to Return	475
	Operation of the Trading Stores, the Loan Fund, and a Mention of the Promise to Return	478
	Sovereignty and the New Settlements	480
1957	Conditions at Grise Fiord	480
	Conditions at Resolute Bay, the Measles Epidemic, Problems with the Accounts at the Store	481
1958	Conditions at Grise Fiord and Complaints about Inadequate Supplies	482
	Operation of the Trading Stores	483
	Conditions at Grise Fiord, Problems Finding Spouses, Housing	490
	Relations between the Inukjuak and Pond Inlet Inuit	491
	Conditions at Resolute Bay	494
	Concerns about Moving More People to the High Arctic	495
	Willmott's 1958 Study at Inukjuak	496
	Concerns about Increasing the Size of the New Communities	502
	Concerns about People Wishing to Move from Grise Fiord to Resolute Bay	503
	Discussions about Paying Transportation Costs and Requests to Move	504
1959	Bolger's Report on the New Communities	506
	Conditions at Grise Fiord, Requests to Move to Resolute Bay	507
	Conditions at Resolute Bay, Concerns About Increasing the Size of the Community	508
1960	Requests to Move, Concern about Increasing the Size of Resolute Bay Community	512
	Conditions at Grise Fiord	513

Conditions at Resolute Bay	516
Questions about the Operation of the Stores and the Loan Fund	517
Relations between the Inukjuak and Pond Inlet Groups at Resolute Bay	518
Bolger's Memorandum on the Object of the Relocation and the Possibility of Establishing Additional Communities	519
1961	526
Conditions at Grise Fiord	526
Questions about Payment for Travel	527
Conditions at Resolute Bay	529
Requests to Move	529
1962	530
Conditions at Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord	530
1963	531
Conditions at Grise Fiord	531
Conditions at Resolute Bay	532
1964	533
Conditions at Grise Fiord	533
Conditions at Resolute Bay	534
1965	534
Conditions at Grise Fiord	534
Conditions at Resolute Bay	535
1966	535
Conditions at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay	535
Bissett's Study of Resolute Bay	536
Bockstoce's Study of Resolute Bay	538
1967	538
Conditions at Grise Fiord, Requests to Move, Freeman's Observations at Grise Fiord	538
1968	542
Conditions at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay	542
1969 and Following	543
Returning to Inukjuak	543
Government Assessments of Other Relocations	545
Stevenson's 1977 Report on the Relocation	546
Chronology of Events Leading up to the Commission's Hearings	552

The High Arctic Relocation
Summary of Supporting Information
to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples
Report on the High Arctic Relocation

Part 4
Events After the Relocation

Introduction

Part 4 describes, on the basis of government records and other documents, events at the new communities after the initial relocation. The focus is on information relating to the perceived happiness or unhappiness of the relocatees, the adjustment of the relocatees to the new areas and the perceived success of the project, the growth of the communities, the economic activity in the new communities, the management of the trading stores and the Loan Fund, the adequacy of supplies, housing and improvements in housing, services and improvements in services, the interaction of the Pond Inlet and Inukjuak groups, the ability of single people to find spouses, requests to return and the response to such requests, and generally anything which relates to the well-being of the relocatees and the continuation of the new communities. The information presented on a year-by-year basis, since this captures the evolution of the relocation project and shows the different aspects of community life over time as reflected in government reports.

The documents covering the events after the relocation are extensive. The government's November 20, 1992 response to the parliamentary committee's recommendations is based to a considerable extent on the documentary record, especially Professor Gunther's study of the documentary record. Part 4 includes references to documents which are not found in earlier studies of the relocation. The comments or observations which are made in various places in Part 4 are designed to highlight

particular matters. The assessment of all the information before the Commission is found in the Commission's report.

Differing Views on the Success or Lack of Success of the Relocation

The government, in its November 20, 1992 response to the parliamentary committee, acknowledged that, in some respects, it failed to live up to its obligations after the relocation took place. It said the following:

It appears that, beginning in the late 1950s some of the Inukjuak families began asking to return home, based on their understanding that the government had promised them they could return to Inukjuak, at government expense, if after one or two years in the High Arctic they no longer wished to remain there. For reasons that are not entirely clear, these requests were not expeditiously dealt with, and it was not until the 1970s that the government of the Northwest Territories began moving people back to Inukjuak in response to their requests to return. Some, however, had managed to move back on their own in the 1960s.⁶⁵⁸

The government acknowledged that it behaved inappropriately in this regard and that, since 1987, the government has endeavoured to remedy this failing by relocating Inuit to Inukjuak, along with their possessions, reimbursing those Inuit who had already returned at their own expense and providing funds for the construction of additional housing in Inukjuak. The government stated that it would continue to fund, for a further five years, the relocation of any Inuit, with their possessions, who still wished to return to Inukjuak. The government would also fund periodic visits between those who have chosen to remain in the High Arctic and their immediate family members in Inukjuak. The government acknowledged that "There were shortcomings in the planning and implementation of the

658. "A Response to the Recommendations of the Second Report of the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs on the Relocation of the Inukjuak Inuit to Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay", tabled in the House of Commons November 20, 1992, p. 2.

project, causing unintended emotional and physical hardship" in the following terms:

The Soberman Report, however, has identified deficiencies in the manner in which the relocation was prepared and implemented. The government thus acknowledges that the Inuit suffered both emotional and physical stress through having been moved so far from their home community and relatives, and by being separated from their peers and companions, upon the split of the groups between Resolute Bay and Craig Harbour/Grise Fiord. It is also acknowledged that, due to difficulties encountered through the sea lift, the Inuit arrived without all the supplies and equipment they should have had, particularly in regard to housing, making their first year in the High Arctic a very difficult one. It is to their credit that those relocated were able to persevere and create prosperous communities for themselves and their descendants. Nevertheless, the government acknowledges these deficiencies and the distress caused thereby.⁶⁵⁹

Professor Gunther is of the opinion that the supplies that would be available through the trading store reflected planning which was "neither perfect nor incompetent." He considers the lack of sufficient caribou skins to be among the "few serious errors" which were made. The stores were "to provide basic staples for a project which might not succeed and should be judged in that light. The assumption was that these would be improved in subsequent years as the needs of the families changed." Some supplies failed to arrive at Resolute Bay and this "undoubtedly added to the stress of the first year.... The Department took reasonable steps to replace the essential missing items (rifles, tent material and blue denim) by flying in replacements." Hunting and trapping in the first year at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay were good even though there had been some shortage of equipment (traps and dogs) which were compensated to some extent at Craig Harbour by the RCMP supplying additional traps. The separation of the groups on the ship "was handled inadequately, caused unnecessary hardship and showed an unacceptable level of insensitivity towards the

59. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

Inuit settlers and was high-handed." At both of the new communities, and in particular at Resolute Bay, the RCMP gave "active and adequate assistance in setting up camp and obtaining the winter cache, as well as establishing traps for the trapping season." The decision to locate the Inuit settlement forty miles from Craig Harbour "must have added to the stress and loneliness of the first year, for the three Inukjuak families that had been used to living 3 hours' rather than a day's travel from a RCMP post. He believes that the first year at Grise Fiord was very difficult. "The lack of snow houses in the first part of the winter, the absence of skin-clothing for the children, the darkness, the distance from the police detachment, and must have put people under a tremendous psychological and social strain." He believes that things at Resolute Bay were also difficult "particularly getting used to the greater cold, but there the isolation was far less extreme."⁶⁶⁰

Gunther's overall conclusion takes as a starting point "the harsh, poverty-stricken, disease-prone world of the Eastern Arctic in the early 1950s where government services were few, hunger a constant threat, and resources to deal with the modern world, few." He then concludes that, given the starting point, "the poorest of the poor who went to the High Arctic did very well in a short time in income, housing, employment (at least at Resolute), and, above all, in food resources. As government services expanded after 1954, the settlements, especially Resolute Bay, were well served. Grise Fiord was healthier than many other northern communities but more limited in government services offered for the first eight years. Despite the mistakes, the penny-pinching, the discontent expressed from time to time, the benevolent boarding school atmosphere at Resolute in the early years, the delays and the frustrations of living in small communities far from original kith and kin, these projects must be seen (at least as portrayed in the archival documents) as a limited but not insignificant

660. Gunther, pp. 245-250.

success story. The real test of this was the large number of people who either wanted to or did join the growing settlements in those years."⁶⁶¹

The Hickling Corporation found that the evidence did not support the allegation that the government committed any wrongdoing in the planning and conduct of the project. Their conclusion was that the project was conscientiously planned, was carried out in a reasonably effective manner, and that the Inuit participated voluntarily out of a desire for a better life. The Hickling Corporation also concluded that the Inuit benefited from the experience. They concluded that the project had been reasonably successful. They found that the understanding was that the Inuit would be returned to their original communities after one, two or three years if this was requested but that there was no evidence to suggest that the Department intended this undertaking to remain in force indefinitely. However, a commitment was made in 1982 to reimburse the transportation costs incurred by families who had moved back at their own expense and there was a delay in carrying through on this commitment.⁶⁶²

Professor Soberman found that the families arrived at their destinations in the High Arctic poorly informed about conditions. Some were poorly equipped for winter conditions and some important supplies were not available. They found the first winter very hard. He found that it was unnecessary for the relocatees to have suffered this hardship, particularly the hardship suffered in the first year but also to a lesser extent the hardship suffered by the relocatees who came in 1955. He found that the unnecessary hardship was caused by inadequate planning and implementation of the project. He found that the government failed to

⁶⁶¹. *Ibid.*, pp. 377-378.

⁶⁶². Hickling Corporation, "Assessment of the Factual Basis of Certain Allegations Made Before the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs Concerning the Relocation of Inukjuak Inuit Families in the 1950s", submitted to Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, September 1990, pp. 55-57.

honour its promise to return the relocatees. The hardship suffered by the relocatees was aggravated by the long delays and difficulties many of the first-generation relocatees encountered in finding their way back to Inukjuak. The delays resulted in separation of different generations of the same family.⁶⁶³ Soberman found the operation of the Eskimo Loan Fund, including the handling of accounts for individual Inuit, to have been confusing.

Alan Marcus has pointed to a number of elements of the project which led to hardship for the Inuit: the location of the settlement on the Lindstrom Peninsula with few provisions and distant from the RCMP post; the small size of the new communities and the separation from extended families and friends in Port Harrison; the difficulties of searching for spouses which were encountered later; the requirement that the people become more dependent for their survival on hunting and trapping with limited opportunities to make an income from carving and without enough store food to supplement their existence; the absence of the health care, school and other services which existed at Inukjuak; the adjustment to the dark period, changes in diet, and new hunting patterns; the lack of equipment; and the failure to credit individuals with profits from fur traded or wages earned.⁶⁶⁴

Professor Grant considers that the planning and implementation failed adequately to take into account the needs of the Inuit. Supply problems and food and fuel shortages contributed to the hardship of the relocatees. The project was underfunded and it was a serious mistake to relocate Inuit at a great distance from friends and relatives without

663. Daniel Soberman, "Report to the Canadian Human Rights Commission on the Complaints of the Inuit People Relocated from Inukjuak and Pond Inlet, to Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay in 1953 and 1955" (December 11, 1991), pp. 26 and 48.

664. Alan R. Marcus, "Out in the Cold, The Legacy of Canada's Inuit Relocation Experiment in the High Arctic", Document 71 (Copenhagen: The International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1992).

financial assistance to return home for visits. The arrangements for funding the trading store through the Eskimo Loan Fund were not appropriate and resulted in individuals failing to receive credit for their endeavours.⁶⁶⁵

The First Year

The Different Conditions from those at Inukjuak

The environment at the new communities is, in addition to the dark period, different from Inukjuak. The annual mean average temperatures at Craig Harbour during this period were 12° F below those at Inukjuak and at Resolute Bay they were 16° F below those at Inukjuak. For example, average day/night temperatures in February were as follows:

Resolute	Craig Harbour	Inukjuak
-25/-35°F	-16/-30°F	-5/-20°F

average day/night temperatures in August were as follows:

Resolute	Craig Harbour	Inukjuak
42/33° F	42/34° F	53/40° F

Craig Harbour, which is about 40 miles east of Grise Fiord, is an area with a rugged terrain with steep-walled valleys and heights of land to 4000 feet with many glaciers. It is a treeless area with grass, small willows and Arctic flowers in some of the valleys. Freeze-up is in mid-September to late July or early August. Temperatures go below -40° F in March. Snowfall is light with infrequent blizzards. In summer, water is obtained from streams and, in winter, from grounded icebergs. Game is of various sorts: caribou, musk ox, polar bear, fox, white whale, seals, ptarmigan, gulls, terns, loons, and occasionally lake trout and Arctic char.

65. Shelagh D. Grant, "Submission to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples", June 1993, revised August 1993, vol. 1.

Resolute Bay is an area which is hilly on the coast with a flat tableland interior of shale. There are numerous lakes with moss around them. There are no trees. Freeze-up is from mid-September to late July. There is light snowfall with frequent blizzards. Rain and fog are common in the navigation season. Game is of various sorts: caribou, musk ox, polar bear, fox, white whale, seals, ptarmigan, ducks, geese and Arctic char.⁶⁶⁶

At Inukjuak there are many varieties of plants including three kinds of berries that are eaten. Moss and willow twigs are burned for heat and willow twigs are used for matting under the skins used for bedding. There is wood from driftwood and scrap lumber. In summer wildlife is plentiful. There are three types of seals — jar seals are the most common, there are some square flippers (bearded seals), and occasional harp seals. There are many Canada and blue geese, three varieties of ducks, some sea pigeons, gulls and terns, and an occasional great loon. The three main fish are whitefish, char, and trout (mainly lake or grey). There are also other varieties of fish including sculpin which are used as dog food in the summer. White whales are taken in the summer and the Hudson's Bay Company and the RCMP organize walrus hunts to the Sleeper, King George and Ottawa Islands. During the winter the men run trap lines primarily catching white fox but also other fur-bearing animals such as wolverine, otter, mink, muskrat. Caribou were hunted in the interior with approximately 100 a year take until 1956 on trips into the Ungava. In 1955 and subsequent years, the hunting of caribou was prohibited. Parasites were not a problem. Trichinosis was not a problem since few walrus and polar bears were taken and the walrus were used as dog food.

The population around Inukjuak until 1953 was stable at around 500 people, although population estimates were unreliable. This was reduced by relocations to the High Arctic (seven families in 1953 and three in 1955) and south along the Hudson Bay coast (fourteen families in 1955) to about 337 in 1958. The population was increasing in the middle to later part of

666. Gunther, pp. 251-253.

the decade as a result of a decline in the rate of mortality through improved health care. A number of large boats were owned by Inuit and were an important part of the economic, including hunting, activity of the community. Store food represented 50% of the food of camp Inuit in 1958.⁶⁶⁷

Some Supplies Not Delivered to Resolute Bay

Some of the supplies intended for the trading store at Resolute Bay were not delivered. These included 6 rifles, 60 yards of blue denim and 120 yards of white cotton duck tent material and 1000 board feet of spruce lumber. Some items which were in fact delivered, such as 60 yards of cotton drill and 40 yards of white duffel, were reported as not having been delivered because these were not found immediately on arrival and would only be found later. Efforts were made to trace the missing supplies and replacements for the rifles, tent material and blue denim were flown in by the RCAF.⁶⁶⁸ The replacement supplies would be flown in by the RCAF sometime after January of 1954.⁶⁶⁹

First Winter at Resolute Bay

Gunther reports that Constable Gibson assisted the Inuit in setting up camp at Resolute Bay and obtained the use of a boat from the RCAF to assist in hunting food. In October 1953, it was reported that enough food

667. William E. Willmott, "The Eskimo Community at Port Harrison, P.Q." (Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1961), pp. 7-17, 32, 44, 166.

668. Gunther, pp. 215 -216. Gunther does not indicate when the replacement supplies were flown in by the RCAF.

669. Director to Deputy Minister, January 25, 1954, providing a status report on the goods purchased for Resolute Bay and stating in Item 3 as follows: "We are still endeavouring to trace the other articles reported missing, but in the meantime we have arranged to replace the rifles, cotton duck and blue denim by the RCAF on a regular flight out of Churchill"; document provided by Grant; RG22, vol. 254, file 40-8-1, Part 4.

had been obtained to last for some time and that Gibson had taken the hunters on several long patrols and assisted in their hunting parties. He had, with the help of the Inuit, constructed a 30-foot by 16-foot shed from scrap lumber to use as a workshop, a place for drying pelts, a church, and a place where he could provide some simple schooling. Gibson had arranged for ivory and soapstone to be flown in for use in the dark period. By December, the Inuit were living in snow houses.⁶⁷⁰

During the winter of 1953-54, the RCAF Headquarters in Ottawa expressed concerns to the Department that the Inuit at Resolute Bay were becoming wards of the RCAF. There was an exchange of correspondence, including a report from Constable Gibson on the subject. In a March 1954 report, Gibson stated that the Inuit had had "very little contact with the air base" and that "strict instructions were given that they were not to carry away any articles found in the dump". He reported that scrap wood had been salvaged from the dump. He also reported that the women and children had not left the campsite since their arrival at Resolute Bay. He believed that there were no serious problems with clothing and the people were making caribou skins into clothing. Gunther reports that ten bales of caribou hides for clothing and sleeping purposes were flown into Resolute Bay in March 1954. The morale of the group was said in Gibson's report to be "very good and the natives have stated that they are happy with their new home". It is reported that he had made arrangements for some of the Inuit to speak over the radio to relatives at Inukjuak because "It is felt this will keep the people more settled at this point." He goes on as follows:

The writer has conversed with the natives since receiving this correspondence [asking him to comment on DND allegations that the camp had become wards of the RCAF] and inquired of them if at any time they were hungry and received food from any establishment at Resolute Bay. They stated they had not been hungry since they arrived at Resolute Bay and that they wished to remain here if possible. They stated, however, that

670. Gunther, pp. 186-187.

if they had been here earlier last summer they would not have had to work so hard for dog food during the past winter. ...the natives that are presently living on Cornwallis Island say that they are content and wish to remain here for longer [sic] period of time. They are, however, very keen on having other natives join them here. The writer is in favour of this as it is felt that the area could support at least four more families of average size.⁶⁷¹

In June 1954, the officer commanding "G" Division requested an explanation of reports that he had been "allowing white men to go out hunting with the local natives". In a July 1954 memorandum, Gibson reported that, when the Inuit first arrived in September 1953 the Air Force boat had been used, with two airmen assigned to run the boat, to assist in obtaining food. During the winter months, Gibson reported that he had accompanied the Inuit on patrols that lasted two or three days and that he invited from time to time a white man to accompany the party". "On two occasions when a polar bear was cornered after considerable difficulty...the visiting person shot the animal with the natives getting full benefit of the hunt. White persons cannot and do not hunt in the Resolute Bay area..."⁶⁷²

Gunther reports that there was a heavy emphasis in Gibson's reports on reassuring superiors that the welfare of the Inuit was not becoming the responsibility of the RCAF. His reports in the first year stated that there was plenty of country food as well as that purchased from their own store. A need for boats for hunting during the summer months was identified. He recommended that more Inuit should be sent to Resolute Bay where there was "plenty of game about". He suggested, however, that Resolute Bay was not a good site for the camp and that the camp should be moved to Intrepid

671. March 26, 1954 report to officer commanding "G" Division, as referred and quoted in Gunther, pp. 187-188.

672. July 7, 1954 response by Gibson to June 22, 1954 inquiry from officer commanding "G" Division; documents provided by Grant, RG18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 55, file TA 500-8-1-14.

Bay or Assistance Bay. There had been some part-time work during the summer of 1954 with the Geological Survey of Canada with one family earning \$1,700.⁶⁷³ There had also been some part-time employment with the RCAF.⁶⁷⁴

Marshall's November 1953 Report on Conditions at Resolute Bay

C.J. Marshall, of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development Secretariat, reported in a November 9, 1953 memorandum to Mr. Rowley following a visit to Resolute Bay as follows:

The people are well fed and happy and seem to be satisfied with their new environment. ...from what I could gather the settlement is a happy one because hunting has been very good. ...with what the men are able to secure from hunting and purchase from their store they and their families have plenty to eat. Health is very good and there is no reason why this should not continue to be the case since the Eskimos' contact with the white residents of the area is very limited. The women of the settlement have never been to the air force base and the men go there only once a month to pick up their family allowances. No white person goes to the settlement unless he is accompanied by Constable Gibson and these visits are kept to the minimum. The officer commanding the RCAF detachment at Resolute reports that the Eskimo have caused him absolutely no trouble and he is quite content to have them in the area. Constable Gibson has made extensive plans to help the Eskimos over the long dark period. He is securing a supply of soapstone which they will use for carving and there is a large amount of whale bone in the area which also can be used. Constable Gibson has school supplies and will attempt some elementary teaching of the children during the winter. He plans to live for several days at a time in the wooden building at the Eskimo settlement during the dark period. He is very

673. Gunther, p. 352.

674. *Ibid.*, p. 311.

well liked by the Eskimo and they appear to trust him implicitly.⁶⁷⁵

Marshall's memorandum goes on to identify the missing supplies and makes various other critical comments about the project, including comments about some supplies which he considered inappropriate such as butter, pants in too big sizes, braid, wool mitts, and gasoline, although he does consider that the project will be "an unqualified success...primarily to good luck and to the resourcefulness of Constable Gibson". Apart from the concern about the missing and the inappropriate supplies, Marshall is critical of some elements of hasty planning which resulted in the people arriving late in the season on September 7 with no stockpile of meat for the winter which meant that they had had to hunt every day since they arrived. The letter indicates that Constable Gibson had received instructions about the relocation only in April and had had "some difficulty" in being able to contact a number of the families to ask for volunteers for the relocation. The letter also reports that Gibson had no quarters on his arrival and there was no storage space for the supplies for the trading store. Had the people arrived in early August they would have been able to hunt walrus which were believed to be plentiful at Resolute Bay. These observations coincide to a large degree with Ross Gibson's presentation to the Commission on June 17 and 28, 1993, which is summarized in Part 3.

Gunther reports that Inspector Larsen, the officer commanding "G" Division, had obtained the agreement of the base at Resolute Bay for chartering an RCMP constable and storing necessary supplies. Gunther notes that there appears to be a contradiction between Marshall's account and Larsen's reports of the arrangements that were made and that "We do not, of course, know for sure which account is correct."⁶⁷⁶ It would appear, however, that the two reports can be reconciled as the difference

675. Marshall to Rowley, November 9, 1953, RG22, vol. 544, ACND 1953, Part 1; document provided by Grant, portions of memorandum also referred to by Gunther.

676. Gunther, p. 220.

between making arrangements, in the sense of obtaining agreement, and something being done to make those arrangements effective. Marshall's report indicates that, while Gibson obtained considerable assistance from the base, he had to use a good deal of initiative. That is not inconsistent with Larsen's reports.

First Winter at Craig Harbour

After arrival at Craig Harbour, the Inuit were moved forty miles to the Lindstrom Peninsula. Corporal Sergeant reported that "This location was chosen because of the known abundance of seal game, especially the Harp seal in Grise Fiord and the fact that it would be a good distance away from the caribou and musk-ox feeding grounds." This location would also prevent a "tendency to look for handouts". The RCMP had provided a small boat to the Inuit since the Inuit, on arrival, stated that they had been promised a boat although the local RCMP had not been advised of this and no special arrangements had been made. The Lindstrom Peninsula site was not in a good location for operating a boat. It was also reported that there was unhappiness with the site because of a high cliff immediately behind it and the fact that the people had been accustomed to living in a valley where one could see a long way. It was reported that the Inuit were going to look for an alternative site in the spring.

The RCMP had taken the Inuit on two caribou hunts in September and twenty caribou were shot but that it had been suggested that the people not take any more caribou in the area between the Lindstrom Peninsula and Craig Harbour but instead should hunt for caribou to the west of the Lindstrom Peninsula. The Inukjuak and Pond Inlet Inuit were reported as "Getting along very well together, much better than first expected. There is no sign of friction whatsoever." The people were living in tents with buffalo skins for outside covering. The Inukjuak Inuit were adjusting to the fact that they could not use the small wood stoves that they had previously used at Inukjuak.

In early December, Corporal Sergeant had requested that two hundred skins be sent in as soon as possible and the response was that the RCAF would drop these, if possible, "sometime during the winter". These skins were required for clothing, particularly for the children. There was a need for more carving material. Traps had been loaned out by the RCMP but were still not sufficient. The Inukjuak Inuit did not have sufficient dogs but the one hunter most in need of dogs was working with another hunter who had dogs. The sleds of the Inukjuak people were not suitable for the area and old police sleds had been provided to them. As soon as ice conditions permitted, the police power boat would be used for hunting to provide more dog food.

Reports of Inuit Satisfaction

It was reported that both the Pond Inlet and Inukjuak Inuit had been successful at hunting seals through holes in the ice.

By the end of December 1953, \$2,000 had been traded at the store. It was reported that "all natives with the exception of one, state being happy and content in the Craig Harbour area". The person who had indicated unhappiness was Paddy, although it is reported that he "has stated that this is a good native country and since their arrival they have not gone in want as they have done at Port Harrison". It is stated that "there have been no rumors of natives wanting to leave the area in the very near future".⁶⁷⁷

Sergeant's comments with respect to Paddy, who was unhappy, are as follows:

All natives, with the exception of one, state being happy and content in the Craig Harbour area. The one native being not wholly content is [Paddy]. ...he complains of not being able to

⁶⁷⁷. Gunther, pp. 188-190, quoting from [Constable] A.C. Fryer, "Eskimo conditions, Craig Harbour" and "Rehabilitation Program of Eskimo at Craig Harbour", *RCMP Quarterly* (December 31, 1953 and February 1954).

see a long way in all directions from his tent, but this will probably be corrected in the spring or summer. However, he has stated that this is a good native country and since [their] arrival [they] have not gone in want as they have done at Port Harrison. There have been no rumors of natives wanting to leave the area in the very near future.⁶⁷⁸

Gunther advises that Gibson's reports from Resolute Bay in 1953 say nothing about whether people had indicated a desire to stay or leave.

The report from Craig Harbour for 1954 stated as follows:

To date no natives have requested a move back to their own countries, i.e. Port Harrison and Pond Inlet. The Port Harrison natives advise that they have never been hungry or in need or want since their arrival at Craig Harbour and state they are very happy to remain in this area. They also advise that if sometime in the future they had to leave Craig Harbour due to the detachment closing down, they would like to go elsewhere in the area such as Dundas Harbour or Resolute Bay rather than return to Port Harrison. Craig Harbour and surrounding countries is their "Garden of Eden". The Pond Inlet families have advised that they like Craig Harbour and that they do better here than at Pond Inlet. However, both families have mentioned that although they have no immediate desire to return, they would like to go back possibly in a few years to help their aging parents and relatives. It is understood that both the Port Harrison families and Pond Inlet families requested the departmental officials last year to have some of their relations to this navigation [sic] to join them here. It is felt by the writer that this would be a good move and that the surrounding country could support more families than at present and now that the first migration has become climatized and established they would be of assistance to new families coming into the area.⁶⁷⁹

678. Gunther, p. 270, quoting from report dated 31.12.53.

679. Gunther, p. 270, quoting from report dated 31.12.54.

Conditions at Craig Harbour at the End of 1954

The 1954 report from Craig Harbour indicated \$6,200 had been traded consisting of six hundred fox and sixty-six carvings. Most of the fresh meat for food had consisted of seals, hares and fox. Whale, walrus, polar bear and caribou represented a smaller portion of the fresh meat supply.⁶⁸⁰ The clothing of the women and children was reported as being much better and the dwellings at the Inuit settlement were reported as being greatly improved. Lumber had been distributed to the families for use as floors and to create frames which could be covered with tenting material. The dwellings were banked with snow, the tenting would be doubled in places, and buffalo skins would be used for insulation. "All houses are warm and clean and averaging larger than last." It was reported that there was increased "self-respect, ambition and initiation" and that there had not been "one request for aid" in the form of food. "Anytime these natives have assisted members of this detachment such as boat time, they have not made a request for payment for services rendered but told the member in charge they did not want and were not looking for payment as they were being helped and treated fairly all the time. They advised that they would rather return favour for favour rather than receive payment for small jobs done." It was reported that Corporal Sergeant had suggested that, during the trapping season "while some of the men were away, some would always be at the camp to hunt seals and to assist those families whose men were away and to watch for bear coming into the campsite" so that the hunters who were away would not have to worry about their families running out of fresh meat and seal oil before their return. The Inuit were reported as

⁶⁸⁰. Gunther, pp. 379-382, provides game and trapping returns for Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay. The 1954 return at Grise Fiord shows that there were 3 walrus, 7 whales, 27 polar bear, 15 caribou and 365 foxes taken, compared with 23, 11, 18, 28 and 409 respectively for 1955. The Resolute Bay returns show 43 polar bear in 1952-53, no available record for 1953-54 and 36 for 1954-55. Fox returns are shown as 725 for 1952-53 and 602 for 1954-55. Gunther states, p. 339, that there were more whale, walrus, polar bear and caribou at Resolute Bay than at Grise Fiord in 1954 but it is not clear on what that is based.

being in good health although Paddy, the camp leader, had died of a heart attack. There had been considerable purchases at the trade store and there were also sufficient savings for orders to be placed for new sleds and sewing machines.⁶⁸¹

Two aspects of the discussion of families not being left alone while the men went out trapping are worthy of note. First, in the new communities, trappers could not rely on a grubstake from the trading post to keep them going until they had furs to trade since credit was not to be extended at the government-run stores in the new communities. Second, it would emerge in 1958 that shortages of food and fuel at the Grise Fiord store had been a problem since the very beginning and had been a source of hardship. The hunters did not like leaving their families alone because the shortage of supplies would leave them hungry and cold. Little of this emerges in RCMP reports from Grise Fiord, and the 1958 report of the Eastern Arctic Patrol, which does discuss the Inuit concerns is exceptional among government reports of the period. Some caution is, therefore, required when reading reports of the unqualified happiness of the relocatees.

Use of Carving Material

The Inuit at Craig Harbour had used up the carving material they had brought with them by the end of 1953 but were attempting to carve using local bone material. Constable Gibson, in his 1954 report from Resolute Bay, stated that he "had not encouraged the making of handicraft at this point as it is thought that the natives would be inclined to depend on this". Apparently no one gave Gibson instructions to the contrary since Jackson in 1956 would comment that Gibson continued with this approach notwithstanding the large market for handicrafts. Gibson's successors from 1957 on did not carry on with this approach. In 1959, Constable Jenks would report that he was encouraging this activity. The provision of

681. Gunther, pp. 339-340, quoting from report dated 31.12.54.

soapstone for carving would be a source of problems, particularly at Craig Harbour, for several years. Soapstone was sent in but for a few years the quality was not good. The Inuit at Craig Harbour included some of the best carvers from Inukjuak.⁶⁸²

Reports of Requests for Relatives to Come to the New Communities

Following the 1954 Eastern Arctic Patrol visits to Craig Harbour and Resolute Bay, Stevenson reported as follows:

I might say briefly at this time that both the projects at Resolute Bay and Craig Harbour have been a huge success during the past year. The Eskimos are all happy and contented, and were eager to advise us that they had never fared so well in their lives, particularly the Eskimos from Port Harrison, Quebec. In fact, they are so enthused with their new environment that they gave us some of the names of their immediate relatives whom they would like to have come north to join them next year. If this meets with your approval, I will write to the RCMP at Port Harrison and Pond Inlet regarding the Eskimos in question that they be interviewed and if they so desire, be prepared to move north next summer.⁶⁸³

The annual report from the RCMP detachment at Port Harrison for 1954 stated that:

Several native families have received correspondence from the natives who left here on the *C.D. Howe* in 1953 that were placed at Resolute Bay and Craig Harbour, the conditions to them seemed very favourable and several families have asked for their names to be placed on the list should any further native families be moved north. It is felt that if this additional group could be moved, it certainly would clear some of the congested areas. At the present time suitable camp localities

682. Gunther, pp. 314-317.

683. Gunther, p. 271, quoting from Stevenson to Sivertz and Cantley, 17.9.54.

are slightly over-crowded and in order to maintain a better standard of living from country feed, it would be necessary to minimize the size of the camps.⁶⁸⁴

In the course of responding to the concerns of the RCAF expressed early in 1954, Deputy Minister Robertson writing to the Deputy Minister of National Defence stated that Constable Gibson had recently visited the Department and informed them that the Inuit families "had been able to obtain all the food they needed and had obtained sufficient fur and other produce to purchase their other requirements from the native store. In brief, they have been living their native life, have had little or no contact with the base, and were so happy in their new surroundings that they were already talking of having some of their relatives from Port Harrison join them."⁶⁸⁵

Income Level

Gunther converts the \$6,200 worth of furs and carvings traded at Craig Harbour in 1954 into an average family income of \$1,083. He relies on work by Riewe about the value of hunting to the Grise Fiord economy in 1971-72 to calculate the income equivalent value of hunting to the community in 1954. Riewe calculated that hunting for game food and dog food, in 1971-72, was more important to the community than cash income and, when an income-equivalent value was assigned to hunting, the contribution was equivalent to 60% of total settlement income. Riewe calculated this by estimating the retail cost of store-bought substitutes for meat hunted for food and dog food.⁶⁸⁶ If the average family income in 1954 at Craig

684. Gunther, p. 271, quoting from report dated 27.12.54.

685. Robertson to Drury, February 18, 1954; document provided by Grant; also referred to in Gunther, p. 237.

686. R.R. Riewe, "The Utilization of Wildlife Resources in the Jones Sound Region by the Grise Fiord Inuit", in *Truelove Lowland, Devon Island, Canada*, ed., L.C. Bliss (Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1977); referred to in Gunther, pp. 374-375 and 341.

Harbour was \$1,083 and if this represented only 40% of real total family income, taking into account the value of hunting, then the average family income in dollars and in kind would have been \$2,708 which would compare more favourably with the average family income in Canada in 1951 of \$3,185. Gunther concludes that even if one were to use a lower percentage of equivalent value from hunting, there was a dramatic improvement in the standard of living of the Inuit.⁶⁸⁷

Care is required in comparing income levels, although \$1,000 of income for an Inuit family surviving by hunting and trapping in 1953-54 does compare favourably with the situation of Inuit hunter/trappers elsewhere in the Eastern Arctic. Jenness reports that on average from 1949 to 1959 a trapper in the Arctic could earn about \$200 to \$400 a year from furs.⁶⁸⁸ Gunther's conclusion appears to be based on a comparison with the estimated annual income per family shown in the Cantley report which, for 1949-50, was estimated in the Quebec area to be \$121 of earned income and \$213 on account of family allowances, relief and unpaid debts for a total of \$334 per family on average.⁶⁸⁹ Gunther also reports that the 1951 Eastern Arctic Patrol estimated the average family income for four centres in Quebec (Sugluk, Cape Smith, Povungnituk, and Port Harrison) to be \$590.⁶⁹⁰ Port Harrison was below the average at \$510 per family.⁶⁹¹

687. Gunther, pp. 340-341.

688. Jenness, p. 101.

689. Gunther, p. 85.

690. Of the \$590.00, \$106 came from furs, \$22 from handicrafts, \$37 from labour, \$182 from family allowance, \$165 from government relief, \$69 from traders, \$5 from unpaid debts, \$2 from old age security, and \$2 from other sources (Gunther, p. 119).

691. Of the \$510, \$65 came from furs and \$43 from handicrafts, with \$43 coming from labour, \$159 from family allowance, \$156 from government relief, and \$44 from traders (Gunther, p. 119).

Chesshire, of the Hudson's Bay Company, had estimated the 1951 average income in northern Quebec from all sources to be \$454.⁶⁹²

If one were to use 1958 at Grise Fiord as a comparison, one would find a very good fur year and average family income of \$1,212 with lower incomes (about \$1,100) in the next two years with furs in decline.⁶⁹³ The average income for 'camp' Inuit at Inukjuak in 1957-58 was \$985. Interestingly, by 1957, income from handicrafts was a more significant proportion of camp family income than fur trapping although it must be remembered it was also a poor fur year.⁶⁹⁴ In that regard, Gunther acknowledges that, because of difficulties in getting adequate soapstone in the early years, the Grise Fiord Inuit earned "probably about half of what they would have earned from carvings at Inukjuak, for example, around \$28 in 1961 versus \$58 per capita in 1958, in Inukjuak."⁶⁹⁵

Some care, therefore, is required in making income comparisons to ensure that comparable years are being used and that the data are adequate for the purpose. Gunther is, however, undoubtedly correct in his

692. It will be recalled, however, that 1949 was the worst year in the fur cycle, with subsequent years getting better. 1953-54 had been a peak year, with foxes at Port Harrison amounting to 4,920. This was reflected in a decline in relief as the cycle built to a peak. In 1950, 20% of the population at Port Harrison was receiving relief, declining to 15% in 1951, 5% in 1952, and 3.2% in 1953. Following the 4,920 peak in 1953-54, the fox catch declined until 1957-58, when only 415 furs were traded. In 1956-57, 18% of average family income was coming from relief. Only 600 fox were traded that year (Gunther, pp. 128 and 131, referring to W.E. Willmott, "The Eskimo Community at Port Harrison, P.Q." [Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1961]).

693. *Ibid.*, pp. 344-345.

694. Handicrafts represented 34% of average camp income, compared to 24% from furs. Wage income at Port Harrison represented a small 4% of camp family income (Willmott).

695. Gunther, p. 317.

Conclusion that income from employment at Resolute Bay was from the very beginning much greater than at either Inukjuak or Craig Harbour. By 1966, at Resolute Bay, there were few full-time hunters. By that time, income from hunting and trapping had become unsatisfactory. However, there was a relative abundance of game and this, combined with ready access to wage labour, was considered to provide a sound basis for the community.⁶⁹⁶ At Grise Fiord, handicrafts became a more important source of income than furs during the 1960s, with wage earnings becoming the largest portion by the end of the decade. By 1972, all the men had wage employment although hunting continued to make a significant contribution to the community.⁶⁹⁷

Freeman's View of the Significance of Paddy's Death

Milton Freeman reports that, after Paddy died in 1954, "his brother was assigned the leadership, but as he also lacked leadership qualities the camp increasingly failed to function as a social, political or productive unit, though as need arose it did function as a single unit of distribution. In view of the small size of each of the two social and productive units, both groups [Hudson Bay and Baffin Island groups] continued to urge kinsmen in their former communities to follow them north."⁶⁹⁸ Paddy was the one who made his unhappiness known and Freeman's assessment of the significance of his death to the functioning of the group raises a question about the ability of the group to take action on any unhappiness about their circumstances. How unhappiness may have been understood raises further questions. It is not without significance that the complaints in 1958 about inadequate supplies would be made to the officer commanding the

696. *Ibid.*, pp. 375-376.

697. *Ibid.*, pp. 374-375.

698. Milton M.R. Freeman, "The Grise Fiord Project", in *Handbook of North American Indians*, ed. D. Damas, vol. 1.5, 1984, p. 678. Professor Freeman is an anthropologist with extensive Arctic experience; he has lived among the Inuit and speaks fluent Inuktitut.

Eastern Arctic Patrol that year and would appear in his report even though this concern had been voiced to the RCMP members at Grise Fiord. Their response was to try to explain why the supply situation was the way it was. As will also be seen, a man from Grise Fiord apparently would not leave for Resolute Bay until told in 1967 by non-RCMP non-Inuit that he was free to go whenever he wished. Willmott observed of the Inukjuak Inuit in 1959 that domination by non-Inuit often replaced any sense of a right of independent action in many areas of life and that suggestions could be taken to be directions.

Questions About the Eskimo Loan Fund

Questions about how the Eskimo Loan Fund operated arose in 1954. Superintendent Larsen, in June 1954, wrote to the Department inquiring about the treatment of wages earned by the Resolute Bay Inuit. He referred specifically to the wages earned by Amagoalik and his wife, \$5 per day each, for their work with the Geological Survey party and states "I get the impression that AMAGOALIK and his wife do not actually receive the wages either in cash or in goods from the Eskimo trading store but that the whole of their wages goes to your department to help pay off the Eskimo traders' loan account. If I have the wrong impression, may I please be advised accordingly. I would say that the individual Eskimo who earns such wages should receive them in the form of goods out of the Eskimo trading store or if such goods are not available, that the Eskimo concerned be credited with the appropriate amount, to be drawn by him as and when he so desires."⁶⁹⁹ In that regard, the instructions issued to the RCMP had referred to the fact that some of the Inuit might have income from sources such as employment and that a separate account was to be maintained for amounts charged against the stock to cover wages from employers paid in kind. However, there was no instruction given to maintain an individual

699. Officer commanding "G" Division to Director, Northern Administration and Lands Branch, June 2, 1956; document provided by Grant.

account to keep track of any credit on account of wages.⁷⁰⁰ Constable Gibson, in the same period, had been asking "to whom stock would belong when the Eskimo Loan has been paid off".⁷⁰¹ The handling of accounts would remain a source of confusion at Resolute Bay for years.

Plans to Move Additional Families in 1954

There was some discussion of moving additional families from Port Harrison to Resolute Bay in 1954 although, in fact, such a movement did not take place until 1955. A letter dated May 31, 1954 from the Deputy Minister of Transport to the Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources refers to the arrangements for freight and transportation of personnel to the Arctic that year. The letter includes the following statement:

I note the movement of four families of Eskimos, and their equipment, including approximately 30 dogs from Port Harrison to Resolute Bay. The *C.D. Howe* is expected at Port Harrison July 15th and these natives should be made ready to embark onboard ship by this date.⁷⁰²

It would seem that any movement that had been planned for 1954 would involve a carry-over of the people who had been identified as wishing to go north in 1953 or in earlier years and was not a response to requests by people in the new communities for relatives to join them. The desire of such families to go north would thus be a carry-over of whatever

⁷⁰⁰. RG85, vol. 1070, File 251-4/1; document provided by Grant.

⁷⁰¹. Referred to in June 14, 1954 correspondence from the Director to the officer commanding "G" Division. The letter suggests that the response is to be found in earlier letters sent in May from the Director to the officer commanding "G" Division. Larsen's letter of June 2, 1954 refers to that earlier correspondence and is still asking questions about how the Loan Fund works.

⁷⁰². Document provided by Grant.

representations were made by government officials in 1953 or earlier years about the advantages of the new communities.

Plans for the movement of Quebec Inuit in 1954 are reflected in a memorandum to the Advisory Committee on Northern Development from its secretary in April 1954 on activities during the past calendar year. Outlining plans for the current 1954 year, under the heading "Transfers of Eskimos to More Favourable Hunting Grounds", the memorandum stated as follows:

Additional families will be transferred at an approximate cost of \$1,000 from Port Harrison to Resolute Bay to meet the demand for casual labour for handling supplies during air lifts and during the summer re-supply. Possible employment also includes assistance to the geological survey and the meteorological division.

A few families may be moved from northern Quebec to Pond Inlet and Arctic Bay where hunting and trapping are better.⁷⁰³

The Department's plans for a movement of people in 1954 were reported to the ACND May 1954 meeting in terms of possible employment opportunities.⁷⁰⁴

***Memorandum of Guidance on
Release of Information on Northern Activities***

The Secretary to the Advisory Committee also prepared a memorandum giving guidance for the release of information on activities in the North which Grant reports states, in part, as follows:

703. Memorandum for the Advisory Committee on Northern Development, "Government Activities in the North", from the Secretary ACND, April 26, 1954 (classified "Secret"); extract of document provided by Grant.

704. Gunther, p. 310.

The first object of public information on the north is to emphasize that the northern regions are as much a part of Canada as any other area in the country.

It is also important that the rest of the world should be aware that the Canadian Arctic is not an "ultima Thule" but is being effectively occupied, administered and developed by the Canadian government and people.

In part, also, Canada is developing the north merely because it is Canada and because we have a responsibility to ensure that conditions are established to permit residents of the north, Eskimos, Indians and others to share in the benefits of and to contribute to Canadian national life.⁷⁰⁵

The memorandum advises that "reference to U.S. activities in the Canadian north in isolation should be avoided, if they can be coupled with reference to Canadian work". In addition, it is suggested that "no emphasis should be placed on Canadian claims in the north lest we seem to be on the defensive. ...we do recognize, however, that the maintenance of sovereignty in any part of Canada requires, effective administration which there now is and will continue to be."

Cantley's Comments on the Promise to Return

Shortly after the relocation Cantley referred to the possibility that the people could be returned home. He said that "if they did not like the country they would be returned to their homes.... If the first group is successful and satisfied, other will follow. If not, then we shall have to bring them back."⁷⁰⁶ This statement is interesting because it identifies the fact that a desire to return would mark the failure of the project and would require the return of the group to Inukjuak. It also identifies others

705. Memorandum: Policy Guidance Paper for Release of Information on the North, Secretary, ACND, May 28, 1954; RG85, vol. 376, File 1009-3, Pt. 6, as quoted in Grant, vol. 1, pp. 93-94.

706. Cantley to Director, Oct. 13, 1953; referred to in Soberman, p. 16.

following the first group to the new locations as a sign of the success of the project. One does not see consideration of other possible explanations as to why relatives might follow the relocatees to the High Arctic. As was discussed in Part 2, the Cape Dorset Inuit who were relocated to the High Arctic in 1934 were reported in 1942 and in 1943 as being unhappy and wishing to go home. Yet relatives had joined the group and other reports about the same time spoke of some discontent but otherwise general happiness. In 1943, the Hudson's Bay trader had talked the Inuit out of what he considered the "crazy idea" of going home and assured them that the supply ship would get through that year.

Subsequent Years

1955

Conditions at Craig Harbour

The 1955 report for Craig Harbour reported that there had been "no definite word" from any of the Inuit families about returning to their homelands. It was expected that possibly one Pond Inlet family would wish to return to Pond Inlet in 1957. The head of that family had requested that his brother and family come to Craig Harbour and they did not arrive. He had advised that if his brother and family did arrive then he would have "no present or near future desire to return". Another Pond Inlet family had asked that his father come to Craig Harbour but the father did not arrive. He had not spoken of returning. Both men would be approached in the near future on these matters. A "tentative" request had been put forward by an Inukjuak family to have the mother of the wife come to Craig Harbour provided she was still a widow and had not acquired a new husband. "When it is definitely known what these natives want, a further report will be submitted. It is felt that the area could support more families."⁷⁰⁷

707. As referred to in Gunther, pp. 271-272.

The food situation at Craig Harbour was reported as "quite adequate". Income was \$5,068 for the community since the number of fox had decreased. Three young men had saved \$600 and were planning to purchase a whale boat. Clothing was reported as being "very good". One additional family from Inukjuak joined the community bringing the total population, including Inuit special constables, to nine families and forty-three people. The new family "had no money, no dogs, no sleighs, no traps, an old torn dirty tent and very little accessories and clothing". They were helped by their relatives and given "transportation and pups" by the Pond Inuit. "It is expected that by the next year this native will have his own dog team and sled and will be quite independent." Houses consisted for the most part of wooden frames with two linings of canvas filled with moss for insulation. Expected shipments of buffalo or reindeer skins for use as floor coverings had not been received. The homes were said to be "quite warm and comfortable". Three outboard motors and one canoe that had been ordered failed to arrive during the sea lift as did sewing machines ordered in the previous year. The opinion was expressed that the camp was in "very good condition, and although not improved financially over the last, they have more native food, articles, better clothing and a [sic] increase in equipment."⁷⁰⁸

Grant reports that between January and March 1955, correspondence was exchanged between the RCMP and the Department regarding the possibility of simply giving the Inuit at Craig Harbour the old RCMP trap boat that had been loaned to them in 1953. Sivertz expressed preference for the people paying for the boat out of their own funds and proposed that a whale boat from Lake Harbour be provided at a cost of \$1,500. The officer commanding "G" Division advised in March that the RCMP would sell the old trap boat for \$75 and proposed that the RCMP whale boat from Alexandra Fiord be provided as a more economical

8. Gunther, pp. 341-342.

alternative to spending money on a new whale boat.⁷⁰⁹ This discussion gives a sense of what "self-reliance" could mean, although the people concerned had understood they would be provided with a boat. As will be seen, the same view of what people should pay for emerges later in 1955 when the question of returning to Inukjuak for visits was discussed.

Conditions at Resolute Bay

In a March 1955 report, the Resolute Bay detachment stated that the Inuit were "content and wished to remain here for a longer period of time. They are, however, very keen on having other natives join them here. The writer is in favour of this as it's felt that the area could support at least four more families of average size."⁷¹⁰

Five families, three from Inukjuak and two from Pond Inlet, joined the Resolute Bay community, adding thirty-two people to the population. The Pond Inlet families brought with them a whale boat and a large transport boat.⁷¹¹

Requests for Additional Families to Come to the New Communities

In 1954, the Craig Harbour people had, it was reported, asked Stevenson if three families, including one from Inukjuak and two single women from Inukjuak could move to the North. The Resolute Bay people had also asked for two families to come from Inukjuak. Three Pond Inlet families had indicated their desire to move to Resolute Bay. By May 1955, thirteen

709. Grant, vol. 1, p. 95, referring to RG18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 55, File TA500-8-1-5; correspondence among officer commanding "G" Division, Chief of the Arctic Division, and the Director, Northern Administration.

710. Gunther, p. 272.

711. *Ibid.*, p. 353. Gunther states that four families came, two from Inukjuak, and on p. 272 he says that five came, three from Pond Inlet. However, the list of families (p. 399) shows three from Inukjuak.

families comprising seventy people from Pond Inlet and Inukjuak, had expressed their desire" to move to the High Arctic with all but one family wishing to go to Resolute Bay. Some concerns were expressed that such a large number could cause a problem with transportation and supplies and also that the Pond Inlet population might become too small.⁷¹² In the end, three Inukjuak families moved to Resolute Bay, one Inukjuak family moved to Grise Fiord, and two Pond Inlet families moved to Resolute Bay. The single women did not move.

Relations between the Inukjuak and Pond Inlet Inuit

The Craig Harbour report noted that the two groups, from Pond Inlet and Inukjuak, appeared to be getting on well and "helping each other out when necessary". "The writer has not heard of any serious dispute and has not had to act as a mediator to date. If they are having any disputes, same are being taken care of by themselves."⁷¹³ Reports in later years would refer to poor relations between the two groups. The two groups spoke different dialects, had different ways of living and hunting and different equipment for living and hunting.

Problems Finding Spouses

The Craig Harbour report for 1955 stated that three young men had approached the RCMP "in regard to wives". One had "no equipment and is not considered a good provider yet, he has been discouraged". The report expressed the opinion that "the other two be assisted in obtaining wives before they cause trouble. They are both good hunters and are well able to provide for a wife. They have advised they will be writing letters on their own with regard to two young Eskimo women at Resolute Bay. If the families come to agreement it is requested that if the women are not

712. *Ibid.*, p. 272.

713. *Ibid.*, p. 256.

transported by dog sled coming spring, that they be transported by boat coming navigation season."⁷¹⁴ Gunther reports that one of the men married during 1957; that the second went to Pond Inlet in 1957 where he found a wife; and that the man who had been discouraged went to Resolute Bay in 1959 still in search of a wife. As will be seen, he was still having difficulty in 1959 since the prospective spouse's family were said not to be happy at the prospect of the young woman going to Grise Fiord because economic conditions at Resolute Bay were better. The young man's family would try to move to Resolute Bay from Grise Fiord but would be discouraged.

1956

Conditions at Craig Harbour/Grise Fiord

The 1956 RCMP report from Grise Fiord stated that none of the people had "definitely stated that they wish to return to their former homes". It is reported that one single Inuk wished to return to Pond Inlet but as a result of rushed conditions prevailing at boat time this was not possible. It was reported that this person had not said anything "definite" about the coming summer. Another family "appears always to be in half a mind to return to Pond Inlet to help his aged parents, but has not said anything definite. If definite requests come in, notification will go forward as soon as possible."⁷¹⁵ It was also reported that a family had asked for a widowed mother and two sisters at Inukjuak to move to Craig Harbour. A letter had been written to the welfare teacher at Inukjuak inquiring about this and the reply was that they did wish to come to Craig Harbour. Arrangements were to be made for this to occur.⁷¹⁶

714. As quoted in Gunther, pp. 261-262.

715. As quoted in Gunther, p. 273.

716. Gunther, p. 273.

Average family income at Grise Fiord in 1956 from the sale of furs and carvings and from family allowances was \$1,160. Clothing was reported to be good. The sewing machines, canoe and outboard motors which were to have arrived in 1955 finally arrived. The Pond Inlet families maintained "permanent" winter dwellings. The Inukjuak families enlarged the floor space and height of their tent-frame houses and the hope was expressed that these would now be "permanent". The RCMP removed several teeth and set a broken leg with no complications with advice received by radio from a medical officer. The detachment post was moved from Craig Harbour to Grise Fiord which was seven miles across the fiord from the Lindstrom Peninsula. The detachment buildings were then used occasionally for movies, parties and dances.⁷¹⁷

The RCMP report for Grise Fiord advised that a young man from Alexandra Fiord en route to Pond Inlet to seek a wife stopped over at Grise Fiord and married a young Inukjuak woman. The young man who had been discouraged from marrying in 1955 had indicated an intention to go to Resolute Bay in the spring of 1958, although as it turned out, he did not go until 1959. As noted above, one young man married during 1957 and a second went to Pond Inlet where he found a wife.⁷¹⁸ Grant advises that a shortage of caribou skins was reported, as few had been obtained locally, and store supplies had been depleted.⁷¹⁹

Conditions at Resolute Bay and Requests to Return Home

The 1956 RCMP report from Resolute Bay stated that the Inuit "do, however, from time to time express the desire to return to friends and relations at Port Harrison. They wish only to return to Harrison for one year. The writer believes they were promised by the department they could

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 342-343.

718. Gunther, p. 262.

719. Grant, vol. 1, p. 102.

return at the end of a given time. Rather than increase the population for the time being a rotation program could be brought into effect by letting those who wish to remain at Port Harrison and having them replaced at Resolute Bay by other keen and interested settlers."⁷²⁰ Constable Gibson thus put forward a proposal, which he would repeat later when posted again in Inukjuak, which would have permitted people to rejoin their relatives at Inukjuak, maintained the new communities, and resolved the concern which emerged about the new communities becoming too large. It would, of course, have involved some expense.

Eastern Arctic Patrol Report of Requests to Return Home

The 1956 Eastern Arctic Patrol report refers to a meeting which was held with most of the heads of families at Resolute Bay. The report states as follows:

The question of returning to Port Harrison for a visit was raised although it was not of immediate urgency. There seems to be some thought that this was in the original agreement. I pointed out that transportation difficulties might require that visits be for a year and that it would be expensive to transport a family there and back. This was left in abeyance but Constable Gibson should be given a policy on this. I do not know what the agreement may have been when the move was first made, but aside from any definite promises, if there were any, I would be inclined to suggest that if any family goes back for a visit, the family should pay part or all of the transportation costs and be able to guarantee to be self-supporting during the visit. With substantial credits [five of the eight family heads attending the meeting had credits of over \$1,000], which a number of them will have this fall, they should be financially capable of doing this and, like anyone else, if they have the means to travel and visit and wish to utilize their money in this way, they would probably have a good claim to the right to exercise the privilege.

720. As quoted in Gunther, p. 274.

The Eskimos at the meeting also raised the question of bringing their relatives and friends to Resolute. They pointed out there were Port Harrison people who want to come. I reminded them that they were now well off for game, seal and walrus, and that too many in one area could result in a less happy situation. They assured me there was plenty of game and there would be no danger in some increase in population. With expanding opportunities for employment at Resolute, plus the fact that hunting by reason of lack of boats has been kept to a restricted area, it does seem that 2 - 5 more families could quite safely be added to the settlement. Resolute has the advantage that a great deal of salvage lumber and other materials does become available so the population needs to hunt only for meat and dog food.⁷²¹

It is clear from this report that the idea of returning did not meet with an encouraging response — there were transportation difficulties and there was the expense. The idea of bringing relations north also did not meet with an encouraging response — perhaps the game would not support more people. With regard to more people coming north, the message seems to have been clear, this would be done only if the administration was persuaded there was sufficient game. The concern about the adequacy of the game population supporting a larger human population would be repeated over the years in government reports. The statement in the report that, if people had the money to pay for their return, then "they would probably have a good claim to the right to exercise the privilege" is an unusual way to describe what for other Canadians would be a free decision. The statement suggests that the government would "probably" agree to grant a passage home.

Requests for Additional Families to Come North

The 1956 Eastern Arctic Patrol report also mentions, in connection with Grise Fiord, that the families at Grise Fiord wanted to bring relatives in. The Pond Inlet family wanted to bring his father from Pond Inlet and would

1. As quoted in Gunther, p. 274.

not stay unless the father could join him. Another wanted to bring his brother from Pond Inlet. It was recommended by Corporal Sergeant that both of these families be brought in and possibly two Port Harrison families. "If one leaves, he suggests bringing in three or four younger families from Port Harrison."⁷²²

Failure to Deliver Supplies to Resolute Bay

Gunther reports that a major transportation error occurred in 1956 with the failure to deliver supplies for the Resolute Bay trading store. Supplies were to be flown in but none had arrived by November 15, 1956 and "there is no record of when they arrived". Grant reviews this situation extensively. There was considerable correspondence directed to remedying the situation. In total some 18 tons of annual supplies were not delivered to Resolute Bay because they "were not ordered in time for shipment by the annual supply vessel". These supplies were recognized as being "vital to the welfare of the Eskimo". The RCAF agreed to assist, provided an agreement could be made on cost recovery. The Department did not have money in its estimates to cover such a cost. In October 1956, Constable Gibson passed through Ottawa and expressed concern about "the welfare of the Eskimo at Resolute Bay if these supplies are not forwarded". A December memorandum stated that only four tons was "most urgently needed" and should be sufficient until next summer. A small carrier would take eight and one-half tons but the cost would be \$6,130. A request was made to the Deputy Minister for approval of a charter. This was followed by a letter from the Deputy Minister to the Deputy Minister of National Defence stating that "the whole quantity is not in the category of being essential and urgent" with just over one ton of "bare minimum, such as ammunition, so that the Eskimos can continue hunting, special foods for the children to ensure good health and several items of clothing". A request is made for assistance. The RCAF agreed in January 1957 to airlift one ton of supplies at \$194. At the end of January 1957, the Deputy Minister thanked the Deputy Minister of

722. As quoted in Gunther, pp. 274-275.

ational Defence for his assistance. The bare minimum supplies were then presumably delivered after January 1957, more than six months after they should have arrived.⁷²³ With respect to the significance of the trade store, Willmott would report in his 1958 study of Inukjuak that Inuit supporting themselves by hunting and trapping, without relief, and were dependent on the store for 50% by weight of their food as well as many other goods. Inuit employed at the settlement full-time received rations from their employers and were even more reliant on store food. The decision to send in only a bare minimum of supplies so late in the season raises a question of how well the decision makers understood the role of the store in the life of the Inuit.

Complaints About Handling of Supplies

Superintendent Larsen made an inspection patrol of the RCMP detachments along with the Eastern Arctic Patrol. He complained about the handling of supplies at both Pond Inlet and Craig Harbour. At Pond Inlet he referred to "all cargo getting soaked as it is only piled on the beach in a heap" in a pouring rain. "[The] various establishments can locate their own supplies only after vessel leaves. A very deplorable way of handling supplies, nothing can be checked during the unloading either by our men or any other establishment." With respect to Craig Harbour, he referred to the supplies being unloaded "in a most haphazard manner, all messed up and piled everywhere on the beach" with a heavy sleet soaking everything. Some of the materials for pre-fabricated buildings were damaged.

Disappointment of Inuit and Questions about Accounts

With respect to Resolute Bay, Larsen refers to the fact that no supplies arrived on the ship. Boats which had been ordered also did not arrive. "It could plainly be seen that the Natives, especially the good hunters, were

23. Grant, vol. 1, pp. 99-100, referring to correspondence located in the Northwest Territories Archives, Stevenson Papers.

very disappointed." The report notes, with respect to the accounts at the trading store, that "most of them demanded to know how their accounts stood and stated that they wished to purchase suitable boats etc. as had been promised them by the department". Mr. Jackson of the Department promised he would look into the matter.⁷²⁴

Report that Inuit Were Doing Well

The RCMP inspection report also refers to the apparent improvement in the condition of the people from the time that the officer commanding "G" Division had seen them on the ship in 1953. Then they were "destitute and in rags" and in 1956 they were "self-supporting and happy" and "looked healthy and well fed with good dogs". The report praises Corporal Sergeant, Constable Pilot, and Constable Gibson for their efforts.

Employment at Resolute Bay, Expressions of Satisfaction, Improvements

In 1956 at Resolute Bay, two Inuit men went to Eureka to work with the Department of Mines and Technical Surveys and one man was employed by a geographical project. The RCAF raised the possibility of a "great deal of employment on construction during the summer. A meeting was held with the RCAF, Constable Gibson and the Inuit and an agreement was reached that everyone would be offered employment but everyone would also have time off to continue to hunt "to keep the camp in fresh meat". At this meeting, Constable Gibson reported that the people expressed approval at having come to Resolute Bay and he felt that the reason they were doing "so well is due to their keenness to improve their way of living".⁷²⁵ The RCMP inspection patrol report referred to above also mentioned that the

724. October 15, 1956, Eastern Arctic Inspection Patrol 1956, RG18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 13, File G-577-14/C; portion of document provided by Grant.

725. As referred to in Gunther, p. 353.

people had pointed to Constable Gibson and had said, "Good man, good man." Three houses had been sent to Resolute Bay in 1955 but it was not possible to set up the houses until 1956. Constable Gibson considered that the houses were unnecessary since "there was satisfactory material for native dwellings that were obtainable at Resolute free of cost and that these buildings seem unnecessarily expensive". He discussed the matter with the Inuit and got their agreement, and later that of the Department, to use the buildings as a school house, store, and a warehouse instead of as homes. He reported that the Inuit had agreed to provide the labour on a voluntary basis. An eighteen year old Inuit woman began to hold school daily in 1956.⁷²⁶ Constable Gibson had helped organize the construction of houses after the first winter using scrap wood and other materials, including the provision of electricity, scrounged by Gibson.

Expressions of Caution about Further Relocations and a Mention of the Promise to Return

In 1956, the Department was considering moving Inuit to Dundas Harbour. Cantley suggested that this be postponed for a year. In a March 1956 memorandum to Sivertz he stated as follows:

With all the changes that are taking place in the Arctic now, we should perhaps be cautious in our approach to setting up new communities in the far north. At least, I think we should make a careful survey of the present distribution of the population with a view to determining which areas are over-populated and which groups would benefit most by being transferred, provided they are willing to move. We should also decide on the areas to which such groups should be transferred, keeping in mind the resources available and other advantages that might accrue. ...we must also keep in mind possible development in the areas from which such groups may be drawn from. Apart from the Mid-Canada Line operations at Great Whale River, I am thinking of possible mining developments on the Belcher Islands and Ungava Bay

726. As referred to in Gunther, pp. 353-354.

in northern Quebec and also Rankin Inlet in Keewatin. If these developments come about, as they very well may, there is a possibility that quite a few Eskimos may find wage employment which might appeal to them more than going north to hunt and trap.

North Baffin Island, Dundas Harbour and Resolute Bay, and possibly other places in this general area, could I think support larger populations than they are now, but before we decide on any large scale moves, I think it would be desirable to carefully consider what the general pattern for Eskimo development is to be. Are we to encourage and to assist Eskimos to remain scattered in smaller groups, or to congregate into larger settlements where they will have access to educational facilities for their children at least, and where they themselves may be better taken care of and trained in skills other than those of the hunter and trapper. I think we should attempt to look at the whole picture before making any temporary piecemeal arrangements.⁷²⁷

There was, however, nothing temporary about the High Arctic relocation although, perhaps by "temporary", Cantley would have included actions which would have only a temporary or short-term effect in the area from which people were moved. The centripetal effect of people gravitating to settlements was continuing in the Arctic. The longer-term issues involved the policies that should be adopted in relation to an Inuit population that was beginning to increase gradually and steadily as a result of improved health care, with a corresponding decline in the mortality rate, and that was also being affected more and more by developments in the North. Interestingly, Cantley's question about what the long-term policy is to be mirrors Stevenson's comments to the same effect in the 1951 Eastern Arctic Patrol report.

The Deputy Minister, writing to the Commissioner of the RCMP with regard to the possibility of further relocations, also expressed some caution as follows:

727. As quoted in Gunther, p. 92, with assistance from the extract quoted in Grant, vol. 1, p. 97.

We are thinking over the possibility of establishing other Eskimo communities in the High Arctic. The two establishments at Craig Harbour and Resolute Bay seem to be doing well...but we are not sure that a definite conclusion, based on the experience of only two years, would be justified. The Canadian Wildlife Service feels that the question as to whether the animal populations can stand the present amount of killing cannot be answered in such a short time. In addition, the sociological problems have not yet been worked out. We do not know what proportion of the Craig Harbour Eskimos and those at Resolute Bay may wish to return to their former homes after a stay of say three or four years in the High Arctic. We have been hoping that the majority of them would regard their new locations as permanent. If, on the other hand, they are not content to stay and demand to be sent back, this would be a disappointment to us and a factor to be considered in connection with establishing other groups.⁷²⁸

This statement is interesting in that the reference to a "proportion" of the Inuit wishing to return suggests that the promise to return applied to individual Inuit and was not limited to a request by the whole group to return. The statement is also interesting in that the "demand to be sent back" would be seen as a blow to the success of the project.

The construction of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line had produced a heavy demand for labour, including Inuit labour. The Department wished the Inuit to have employment in connection with the DEW Line but the Eskimo Affairs Committee was against it. This led to some compromises which were said to have "hampered the work" although the "employment program had gone well" and this was later recognized by the Committee.⁷²⁹ Cantley's caution in 1956 about further relocations should be seen in the light of the significant changes, with related employment opportunities, brought about by this increased activity which began shortly after the 1953 relocation to the High Arctic. The increase in

728. Robertson to Nicholson, 8.5.56, as quoted in Gunther, p. 145.

729. October 22, 1956, Chief, Arctic Division to Director, Northwest Territories Archives, Stevenson Papers; document provided by Grant.

employment opportunities at Resolute Bay in this period must also be seen in this context. A study of Resolute Bay in 1966 found that Resolute Bay, with its sufficient availability of game as well as employment opportunities, had not suffered the problems of other communities where large numbers of people had been attracted to the communities as a result of employment opportunities, such as the construction of the DEW Line, which led to a greater dependence on wage labour which was often temporary, or after projects were completed, not available and leaving them without an adequate economic base and without sufficient availability of game in the areas to which they had moved.⁷³⁰

Operation of the Trading Stores, the Loan Fund, and a Mention of the Promise to Return

In October 1956, the Department was discussing a suggestion by Bishop Marsh concerning the trading arrangements and handling of the income of the Inuit at the new communities. In a memorandum for the Director from the Chief, Arctic Division, it is observed that:

It should be remembered that we are feeling our way into these projects. So far things have gone well — better than we could properly have hoped. After two years the people seem content to stay on, whereas they only agreed to go in the first place on condition that we promise to return them to their former homes after "two or three years".⁷³¹

It is observed that the trading stores were financed through the Eskimo Loan Fund and that "freedom of action under loan fund regulation is circumscribed". The memorandum agrees that the arrangements "should be reviewed and set up on a better basis" but disagreement with some

730. Study by J.R. Bockstoe, referred to in Gunther, p. 375.

731. October 22, 1956, Chief, Arctic Division to Director, Northwest Territories Archives, Stevenson Papers; document provided by Grant Sivertz's comments concerning the promise to return also referred to in Gunther.

Bishop Marsh's suggestions is expressed. Apparently Bishop Marsh suggested that the Inuit should order their own annual supply of goods and learn from this the hard way. This is rejected as "rubbish", "unsound", and also unkind". Instead, it was stated that the Inuit should continue to be given guidance by their mentor the RCMP member". The memorandum goes on to discuss various problems encountered in dealing with the Eskimo Affairs Committee on which there was "much weight of special interest" (including Bishop Marsh). Reference is made to preparing a report on the two resettlement projects at Resolute Bay and Craig Harbour "setting out our objectives, our methods and appraising the results to date...the report would then make specific recommendations for the next few years' handling of economic and social problems in these two settlements". It is proposed that this report be tabled with the Eskimo Affairs Committee for advice but not for the Committee's approval. It is recommended that the Department continue to reserve its position and its "right and duty to act independently" where the public interest and special interests do not coincide.⁷³²

It would be four more years before the problems with the operation of the trade stores would be resolved through the creation, in 1960, of co-operatives. The reference to the Inuit continuing to receive "guidance" from "their mentor the RCMP" captures the dependence of the people on direction from the RCMP in many aspects of their lives and the duty imposed on the RCMP to give those directions.

732. It is not known whether the report evaluating the relocation project and discussing economic and social problems in the two communities was prepared. This would appear to be one of many gaps in the documentary record that have been the subject of comment by Grant. Grant has, for example, found documents in the Northwest Territories Archives, Stevenson papers, that are apparently not in the records available at the National Archives of Canada.

Sovereignty and the New Settlements

In a January 1956 memorandum to Robertson, Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources, Rowley addressed the issue of Canadian sovereignty on Ellesmere Island and listed all the activities that had taken place in relation to the island, including the colonization of the island by Canadian Inuit.⁷³³

1957

Conditions at Grise Fiord

The 1957 RCMP report for Grise Fiord stated that one family and one single man had gone to Pond Inlet. The single man went to seek a wife. The family returned to help aged parents. A young man arrived from Alexandra Fiord en route to Pond Inlet looking for a spouse and, during the stopover, married a young Inuk girl and took up residence in the area. An Inuk widow and her daughter arrived from Arctic Bay. Two other families from Inukjuak were detained at Resolute Bay as a result of contact with measles. "The natives always appear in good spirits, have plenty to eat and to drink there have been no requests for transfer to other areas."⁷³⁴ It appears that, while the ship was at Inukjuak, an Inuk man had come on board and asked to be taken to Grise Fiord and that he also had a friend who wished to go. After some inquiries were made, the two men were taken aboard with their dogs and equipment and taken to the High Arctic.⁷³⁵ It appears they were the families who were detained at Resolute Bay and would not reach Grise Fiord until 1958.

733. RG22, vol. 545, file ACND 1956; document provided by Grant.

734. As referred to in Gunther, p. 275.

735. Gunther, p. 275.

**Conditions at Resolute Bay, the Measles Epidemic,
Problems with the Accounts at the Store**

Gunther was unable to find an RCMP report for Resolute Bay for 1957 and provides no information on the state of affairs at Resolute Bay in 1957. Grant has provided some information in this regard.

The 1957 RCMP inspection report of Eastern Arctic detachments reported that an epidemic of measles had broken out on the ship. All the Inuit on the ship were taken off at Resolute Bay and accommodated in huts at the Department of Transport facilities. Those Inuit who were not ill were accommodated in the winter quarters of the Inuit settlement at Resolute Bay. The measles would spread to the Inuit settlement. One doctor and a nurse were left at Resolute Bay and arrangements were made for another doctor to be flown in from Ottawa. New cases were breaking out at the rate of three or four per week and it was anticipated that at least a month following the last occurrence of measles would have to expire before the Inuit could be transported to their destinations. The Inuit settlement at Resolute Bay was reported as being well located and cleanly kept. "The hunting has been excellent and the natives were enjoying good health prior to the arrival of the natives on the *C.D. Howe* who were infected with measles."

The operation of the trading store was raised. There were problems with the accounts and Corporal Moodie, who had replaced Constable Gibson, with the assistance of Corporal Sergeant was making an effort to straighten out the accounts. The importance of keeping proper records of transactions was impressed on Corporal Moodie. The inspection report also reported on conditions at Grise Fiord. The camp was reported as being clean and "evidenced good supervision by our members". The natives

generally were enjoying good health. Hunting had been excellent and had provided the natives with abundant food...".⁷³⁶

The RCMP report for Resolute Bay for 1957 reports that the Inuit settlement is approximately five miles from the air base. There are eleven wooden houses which are used as winter quarters and are heated with a stove fuelled by scrap lumber from the dump. The stove is also used for cooking. The houses are equipped with one light fixture with power supplied from the Department of Transport and one house has a telephone connected to the air base for emergency use. Houses consist of two rooms with double wall construction with vapour barriers and fibreglass or rock wool insulation. Three new houses which had been sent in from the south were found to be quite cold and, during the summer, were partially torn apart and re-constructed with better insulation which Constable Moodie had been able to obtain. It is reported that the Inuit take great pride in their houses.⁷³⁷ The houses built from scrap lumber were erected after the first winter with Constable Gibson's help.

A June 14, 1957 memorandum from the Department to the RCMP responds to a request for information concerning fox pelts during 1956 and 1957 because accounts at Resolute Bay had not been credited and records of the information were not on file at Resolute Bay. The Department observed that Constable Gibson had recently been in Ottawa and assured that a complete record of accounts, credit and debit standing, stock on hand, bank accounts, etc. for the trading store had been left with Corporal Moodie. The letter went on to explain that the procedure was for the detachment to record the number of furs traded by each individual trapper at the price fixed by the Department, namely \$15. The Department then sold the furs but, at that point, was concerned only with the total amount,

736. Inspector La Pointe to officer commanding "G" Division, September 20, 1957, RG18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 13, File G-577-14C.

737. Moodie to officer commanding "G" Division, September 29, 1957, document provided by Grant.

any profits or losses were applied to the loan fund and not to the individual rapper. The information which the Department had, therefore, would not assist in identifying individual transactions.⁷³⁸ Corporal Moodie was left to work with the books of account he inherited from Constable Gibson.⁷³⁹

An August 28, 1957 confidential departmental report on the measles epidemic reported that 52 Inuit had been taken off the ship at Resolute Bay with the RCAF and Department of Transport supplying emergency food, water and clothing. The epidemic spread to the Inuit settlement at Resolute Bay. The report observes that Corporal Moodie did not consider that the trading store could "spare any supplies and certainly not in the quantities needed to wholly support [the temporary camp] for any appreciable time." The RCAF and the Department of Transport were not, however, committing themselves publicly to providing the temporary camp with a food supply since they did not consider that they had any authority to do so. The confidential memorandum requested that the necessary authority be obtained to avoid embarrassing the local RCAF and DOT people. Various options were discussed for when the outbreak would be over. The options were to leave the people to winter there until ship-time, leave them until the spring when they could be flown to their destinations, remove them to Churchill to winter there, or remove them to their destinations as soon as conditions permit by chartered aircraft. The last option was proposed as being the most humane and the least expensive in the long run. All the other options were considered to be inhumane and more expensive in the long run.⁷⁴⁰

38. Philips to Fitzsimmons, June 14, 1957, Northwest Territories Archives, Stevenson Papers; document provided by Grant.

39. In his memoirs, Larsen considered the criticism of Constable Gibson over the accounts to have been unfair and praised Gibson's work and initiative in making the new settlement a success.

40. Neville to Philips, August 28, 1957, Northwest Territories Archives, Stevenson Papers, N92-023; document provided by Grant.

Grant reports that, as can be determined from 1958 RCMP reports and the 1958 Eastern Arctic Patrol reports, it was the first option which was adopted and Inuit were moved to their destinations by ship the following year.

1958

Conditions at Grise Fiord and Complaints about Inadequate Supplies

Gunther reports that in 1958 the Grise Fiord RCMP reported that "several men stated they wish to move 'from the area'." Low morale had been caused by the sudden death of two children who drowned. In addition "staple food articles such as flour, rolled oats, sugar, milk and tobacco were depleted in the trading store, so that the natives were not too happy to start with. However, with the arrival of the *C.D. Howe* and the trading store supplies and especially the arrival of...new families to the area...the men who had mentioned they wish to move from this area had now changed their minds."⁷⁴¹ Three families had arrived — two from Inukjuak, comprising seven people and one from Arctic Bay comprising eight people. One of the Inukjuak families and the family from Arctic Bay were reported as arriving with "no money, no tents, and very little accessories and clothing" and generally were very poorly equipped. It is reported that both families refused relief from the local trading store and by the end of the year "we now doing quite well because they were good carvers and aggressive hunters". The Inuk woman and her daughter who had arrived from Arctic Bay in 1957 were going to be taken to Resolute Bay during the spring by dog team and it was reported that a man had come over from Resolute Bay to visit and wanted his mother to return with him to live in Resolute Bay. Average family income in 1958 was reported to be \$1,212 with 1958 being another peak year for fox. All the families were reported as having substantial credits with the store and game for food was reported to be adequate. One person had a serious case of pneumonia which was treated

741. As quoted in Gunther, p. 276.

under instruction received by radio from medical officers. The same patient was reported as having a very difficult eye condition which was not treated successfully either with advice received by radio or by the doctor on the *C.D. Howe*. It was reported that if the "present hunting styles and practices" were continued, the community could be increased without depleting game resources.⁷⁴² Among RCMP concerns was conservation so that encouragement to people to go hunting was not without some limitations. The RCMP would give directions as to hunting methods, places to hunt, frequency of hunting in any area, and, with some species, numbers to be taken.

Grant reports that the officer in charge of the Eastern Arctic Patrol provided a detailed report on conditions at Grise Fiord for 1958. Under the heading "Trading Store", there is a subheading "Food Shortages" which reads as follows:

Shortly after the "HOWE" arrived at Grise Fiord, Thomassie, [identification number illegible] who was ostensibly the operator of the trading store came to see me regarding this problem. He said that the Eskimos had come to Craig Harbour five years before and although the hunting had been good there and at Grise Fiord, there had never been enough tea, coal oil, tobacco, flour, sugar, milk, 30.30 ammunition and duck for their tents at the store. He said that when the store ran out of food, heating and hunting supplies, the Eskimos did not like leaving the camp to go on hunts, because of the hardship caused to their wives and children by the food shortages, and because of the cold in their houses. He said that although the game was good their children still needed white man's food and he pointed out that the Eskimos were obeying the white man's game laws as they had been asked, but because there was not enough white man's food at the store they were going hungry as a result. He said that if the police did not give them more food this winter that they would all wish to leave Grise Fiord next year.

2. As referred to in Gunther, pp. 343-344.

I tried to explain to Thomassie that it was not the police who were at fault but that there was only a limited amount of money available in Ottawa to buy food and when this was used up no more food could be bought. I said that the police had tried to get them more food for this year and I believed there was more and that the situation should be better. I said I would discuss the problem in Ottawa to see whether something could be done for next year so that there would be no danger whatsoever of food shortages.

This problem is a serious one because it not only affects the Eskimos at Grise Fiord but also the reputation of the Mounted Police. When I was in Resolute Bay I talked with two Eskimos who had been at Grise Fiord and who were going back there on the "HOWE". They did not wish to return but as there was no space for them at Resolute and they had been transported on the "HOWE" last year from Port Harrison specifically at their request to go to Grise, we told them that they would have to go. They were most unhappy about this, not because they disliked the situation as far as the community, or the game resources were concerned, but because they could not buy the things they needed at the store. They had told the Resolute Eskimos about this and the blame was directed at the police. If we are going to operate trading stores in the north for the benefit of the Eskimos these should not be set up, if as in the case of Grise Fiord, they cause hardship to the Eskimos and blacken the reputation of the police in the eyes of the Eskimo people.

I discussed the interview with Thomassie with Constable Pilot and Corporal Sergeant. Corporal Sergeant said that when boat time had come around this year all of the Eskimos had talked to him about leaving Grise Fiord because of food shortages. He said he had tried to explain the intricacies of the Loan but this was most difficult to explain to a fairly primitive people such as the Eskimos.

One of the factors which complicated the Loan was that individual Eskimos ordered large items and this depleted the amount available for purchasing necessities from the Loan Fund.

Corporal Sergeant felt the problem of shortage of supplies could not be rectified unless a second loan was taken out for

the store. He suggested that the establishment of a co-operative might also provide a solution to this problem.

Corporal Sergeant suggested that if a second loan should be taken out, the two most qualified Eskimos would be: [names and identification numbers then provided].⁷⁴³

This report is interesting for its detail on the importance of the trading store to the well-being of the Inuit and particularly the importance of store food. Although, Thomassie spoke of the needs of the children, it is clear that he was also speaking of the needs of the entire community. The inadequate supplies for the trading store were caused by the small amount available in the Loan Fund for this purpose. This was not something within the control of the RCMP but was simply a fact of life that the RCMP in the new communities would deal with in accordance with the general direction to encourage the relocatees to be self-reliant. This may, in part, explain why this issue does not surface in earlier RCMP reports and is only, apparently, mentioned in a passing way in the 1958 RCMP report for Grise Fiord. The patrol report also shows that, whatever the number of game in the area, conservation rules would limit what the Inuit could hunt and this too could be a source of complaint.

The patrol report also gives rise to a question. Various reports supported bringing in more people because of the belief that the game food resources could support a larger population. Yet there is no indication of a concern that the trade stores might be having difficulty supporting the existing population and that, given the constraints of the Loan Fund, such a difficulty would not be lessened with an increased population. Finally, there is a question as to whether the inadequate provisioning of the store at Grise Fiord would have had a parallel at Resolute Bay at least in 1956-57 when supplies failed to arrive and in the earlier years of the community at Resolute Bay before a large working capital for the store was built up. This may put the stories of taking food from the Resolute Bay dump in a

743. R.A. Gould, Officer in Charge, Eastern Arctic Patrol, RG18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 55, File TA500-8-1-5; document provided by Grant.

different perspective. It may not be a question of "lack of money to buy extra food at the stores",⁷⁴⁴ there may not have been enough supplies at times to meet the demand.

Interestingly, the 1958 inspection of Eastern Arctic detachments by the officer commanding "G" Division refers to the Inuit special constables and their families at Alexandra Fiord and then goes on as follows:

It was explained to me that not sufficient supply in the line of food such as flour, sugar, milk, etc. is shipped in so that our natives can purchase same on re-payment. This will have to be changed so that our employed natives can purchase these food items from our supplies. These men have large families and the double native ration is not sufficient to feed them and there are no trading stores except the little native store at Grise Fiord. This store does not carry sufficient for the little group of natives taken in there in 1953. The only food obtainable at Alexandra is walrus and seals and the natives especially the children tire of this diet, besides they need other food which they have become accustomed to. It is therefore our duty to see to it that food is shipped in and sold on re-payment to our natives if we wish to keep them in such isolated places. We must also have an emergency supply here because it could happen that some year the ship would be unable to get in. As previously mentioned, I think the children looked a bit under nourished.⁷⁴⁵

The comments on the inspection of the Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord detachments is brief and contains comments indicating that all is well and that the communities are successful. The RCMP members at both locations are praised for their work.

744. Gunther, p. 320.

745. Officer commanding "G" Division Report on Inspection of Eastern Arctic Detachments, Summer of 1958, RG18, acc. 85-86/048, vol. 13/577-14/C1; portion of document provided by Grant.

The comments about the adequacy of supplies at Alexandra Fiord, the need for more than just seal and walrus, and the importance of a reserve supply were no less applicable to Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord. The difference perhaps was that Alexandra Fiord supplies were under Larsen's control and budget.

Operation of the Trading Stores

The instructions to the Eastern Arctic Patrol for 1958 refer to the difficulty which had been encountered at Resolute Bay in following accounting procedures at the trading store. It is noted that essential items such as ammunition, traps, boats, etc. should have a small mark-up of 10% to cover freight costs by rail and vessel as these goods are not shipped free on government supply vessels any more. The prices to be paid at the trading stores for furs which are traded are set out with \$12 being the price for white fox. It is observed that when furs are sold locally this has an impact on the market price of the furs which go to auction since the choice skins are usually the ones sold. It is suggested that there should be a 50% mark-up from the tariff for any furs sold locally. Some problems with carvings are discussed. It is observed that no suitable stone for carving has been found near the High Arctic communities and that stone has to be shipped in and that there have been problems with the quality of the stone. A quantity of stone was to be shipped in that year and instructions were given to see that it actually be put ashore. It is noted that some of the Inuit at Grise Fiord have built up a large credit on account of family allowances and it is suggested that these credits should be transferred to a bank by cheque.

With respect to selling prices at the Grise Fiord store, it was reported that the RCMP members had said that, since 1953, they had never had a complete list of selling prices from the Department and had been using a combination of the 1953 list together with invoices which came with some of the articles delivered. Those articles were marked up to cover freight costs. For the most part, the 1953 prices were the basis of current pricing with essential goods sold at cost and luxuries sold at a 10% mark-up. The

problem with the family allowance credits, referred to in the instructions to the Eastern Arctic Patrol, was that, if goods were ordered against the family allowance credit then, because of the way the Loan Fund operated, "it would mean that the amount of essential supplies which the store could order would be reduced and other Eskimos in the community would suffer". The amount of the loan was not sufficient to meet the demand for goods at the store. Family allowances and old age pensions were received by the Inuit in the form of goods, but there were not enough goods to give the Inuit family allowance and old age pension benefits. As was seen in Part 3, the directions from the Department to the RCMP contemplated that there might not be sufficient goods in the store for family allowances and old age pensions, and the RCMP were instructed to record these amounts as 'savings' in the name of the person entitled to those benefits. In other words, people would get a credit for family allowances and not receive anything from the store. These book-entry credits were building up at Grise Fiord. This appears to explain Inuit testimony that their family allowances stopped after the relocation.

The problems with running the stores led, in 1960, to a proposal to establish co-operative stores in the new communities. A discussion at the time of the problems associated with the Eskimo Loan Fund provides some insight as to the problem of adequately stocking the store at Grise Fiord. The Loan Fund was treated as a revolving fund to which profits or losses from the sale of furs or handicrafts were credited. As has been discussed above, it would also seem that wage earnings could be applied to the Loan Fund. As a result, by 1960, "one of the stores", presumably the one at Resolute Bay, had working capital in the order of \$30,000 to \$35,000.⁷⁴⁶ This permitted a substantial inventory of stock and a corresponding large

746. The revolving fund reflected the income of the entire community, but not all individuals had the same purchasing ability. Jenness reports that of \$33,574.40 of employment income at Resolute Bay in 1961, \$24,000 represented the earnings of the five men who had full-time employment (114).

volume of business.⁷⁴⁷ The working capital at only one store is referred to, namely, the one which was operating with notable success. This raises a question as to what was happening at Grise Fiord where people had substantially less income from all sources than at Resolute Bay where employment was, in this period, generally available to all Inuit for large parts of the year. Even at Resolute Bay, however, the large build-up of operating capital over the original \$5,000 loan was being accumulated in the Loan Fund and was not being credited to individual Inuit.

Conditions at Grise Fiord, Problems Finding Spouses, Housing

The report of the patrol with respect to Grise Fiord contains detailed information on the community. It is reported that Corporal Sergeant had been taking a number of steps to encourage conservation practices in hunting. Walrus hunts had been conducted by the RCMP in one or two hunts only so as not to affect the migration of the walrus to the area and sufficient dog meat had been obtained for the year. The previous year, the Inuit had run short of seal oil as a result of a surplus amount of fat being left on the shore unused and allowed to rot. Corporal Sergeant had made arrangements to store surplus fat in 45-gallon drums and believed that this, along with the new fat which would be obtained later, would supply sufficient fuel for the winter. He was encouraging the Inuit to make pants out of polar bear skins as these had a longer life (approximately three years) and would aid in caribou conservation. He was also attempting to encourage the Inuit to use seal skin as material for parkas instead of caribou. Fifty reindeer skins were left by the patrol at Grise Fiord. One man, Samulie, was reported as seeking a wife. He had gone to Resolute Bay with Constable Pilot and wished to marry a woman named Rynee who was staying with Johnny Ekalook's wife. Johnny Ekalook was in hospital but had apparently sent a letter authorizing the marriage. Samulie had asked

747. Eskimo Loan Fund Trading Stores — Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay, 1960, RG18, vol. 55, acc. 85-86/048, File TA500-8-1-5; portion of document provided by Grant.

Corporal Moodie at Resolute Bay to arrange the marriage but Corporal Moodie would not do so as he felt he could not interfere in Inuit personal relationships. Constable Pilot was reported as advising that the family was not enthusiastic about the marriage "because of the better economic and community situation at Resolute and the fact that Samulie wished to bring Rynee back to Grise Fiord". Samulie was asking "whether if he went to Resolute again this Spring, he could marry Rynee at that time as there were no eligible women at Grise Fiord". The Patrol report suggested that the welfare section contact Johnny Ekaloos at the sanatorium and discuss with him what he would like done, following which, advice might be provided to Corporal Moodie and Constable Pilot suggesting the next course of action. This aspect of the report is interesting for the fact that, notwithstanding the desire of Corporal Moodie not to become involved in Inuit personal relations, the man in question was apparently looking for RCMP permission to go to Resolute Bay the following spring so that he could marry the woman. The situation is, however, somewhat ambiguous since the head of that family was out of the community and this may have made it difficult for the man to come to an arrangement with the members of the family who were in Resolute Bay. It would appear that this was the man who was discouraged from marrying in 1955. The comment about the better economic and community situation at Resolute Bay is also interesting.

The Patrol report advises that Corporal Sergeant and Constable Pilot had proposed a plan for building housing for the Inuit at Grise Fiord. They had designed a wooden house which cost \$700, not including freight. This price was based on retail values and it was expected that the actual cost of materials could be reduced through a bulk purchase. It appears that these were to be constructed by the RCMP members with the assistance of the community. They would replace the present winter houses which were described as being of a wooden frame construction with a sod covering which became very damp in the spring and resulted in an epidemic of colds each year. The design, by the RCMP members themselves, would make maximum use of stock sizes of lumber and other materials so as to minimize cutting, minimize waste, and speed the construction process.

will be recalled that Corporal Sergeant and Constable Pilot handled the movement of the detachment from Craig Harbour to Grise Fiord and were personally involved in the construction of the detachment buildings at Grise Fiord, for which they received much praise from the officer commanding "G" Division. It would appear that the proposal to proceed with houses in this fashion was not approved. The government provided housing at Grise Fiord for the first time in 1959. Five houses were built that year. Two more houses were built in 1960 and three in 1961 under the Low Cost Housing Program.⁷⁴⁸

Relations between the Inukjuak and Pond Inlet Inuit

Freeman reports that in 1958 the Inukjuak Inuit and the Baffin Island Inuit separated and established two camps. This had first been considered in 1955 with the Inukjuak Inuit identifying a site two miles to the east. The physical separation of the two groups was maintained following the establishment of a federal day school in 1962 at Grise Fiord when the Inuit moved their camps closer to Grise Fiord. It was in 1964, when row housing was established at Grise Fiord, that the two groups all lived in the same area again. Freeman reports the Inukjuak Inuit speaking of "the unhelpful attitude of the Baffin Islanders: indifference, ridicule, and even hostility". An example of lack of co-operation was found in the difficulty the Inukjuak Inuit had in identifying fresh water in sea ice. They had been used to obtaining fresh water from streams, rivers and lakes. In the far north, water is obtained from sea ice. Many promising pieces of sea ice turn out to be salty when melted even if they taste fresh when frozen.⁷⁴⁹ Corporal Moodie, at Resolute Bay, reported that when he arrived in 1957 there were

748. Gunther, pp. 370, 344-45.

749. Milton M.R. Freeman, "The Grise Fiord Project", p. 678.

"hard feelings" between the Quebec and Baffin Island groups and that they lived like "two separate communities".⁷⁵⁰

Conditions at Resolute Bay

Constable Gibson provided a tape recording in 1958 of the early experiences at Resolute Bay which spoke of "the many difficulties experienced during the first winter owing to a lack of supplies and inadequate equipment".⁷⁵¹

The 1958 RCMP report for Resolute Bay, from Corporal Moodie, reported as follows:

The morale of the Resolute Bay Eskimo has been very high in the majority of cases during the past year. There are a few male Eskimo who have been discontent...this being due to the fact that their wives have been hospitalized for the past three years.

All of the Eskimos have advised the writer at one time or another that they are very happy at Resolute Bay and under no circumstances would they consider returning to their original home. They further state that since moving to this area they have never been hungry, they have good homes and most of them have considerable savings.⁷⁵²

The teaching done by the young Inuk woman continued with classes being held from time to time in an irregular manner. The RCMP report provided a more systematic and complete report of game than has previously been the case. It was reported that forty-seven caribou had been shot, forty-eight polar bear, thirty-four white whales, forty-two walrus, three

750. As referred to in Gunther, p. 257, referring to communication from Moodie to Chief, Arctic Division, 3.5.58.

751. Larsen to Director, July 11, 1958; referred to in Soberman, p. 65

752. As quoted in Gunther, p. 276.

hundred and seventy-five seals and twenty-two bearded seal. White foxes traded amounted to eight hundred and twenty-five.⁷⁵³

Resolute Bay received a school and a full-time teacher in 1958. The school had been destined for another community but the ship could not get through and it was unloaded at Resolute Bay with a view to moving it the following year. Gunther reports, however, that the community petitioned the minister to erect the school and begin education at Resolute Bay. A second teacher arrived in 1965-66 with a second classroom being added in 1966-67. Grise Fiord received a school in 1962.⁷⁵⁴

The Department reported that one man asked that his brother and family join him from Inukjuak. The brother had a defective eye and the brother at Resolute Bay believed he could live better at Resolute because "more favourable hunting conditions".⁷⁵⁵

Concerns about Moving More People to the High Arctic

Constable Gibson had been posted in 1957 to Inukjuak again. In the spring of 1958 he expressed concern about the depletion of Inukjuak's good hunters through the effects of relocation. Gunther reports that Gibson proposed that, rather than increasing the population at Resolute Bay, a rotation program could be implemented, letting people who wished to return to Inukjuak do so and be replaced by other settlers. Gibson is reported as referring to one family who had arrived from Inukjuak with poor equipment, three poor dogs and living entirely from family allowances and asking from time to time for assistance. His equipment was now good and it was suggested that he could return to Inukjuak and continue to live reasonably well and "in so doing give some other native a chance to improve

753. As referred to in Gunther, pp. 354-355.

754. Gunther, p. 365.

755. As referred to in Gunther, p. 276.

his luck".⁷⁵⁶ Sivertz writing to the officer commanding "G" Division in regard to Gibson's concerns acknowledged that the relocation project "should never at any point jeopardize the well-being of the remaining population" at Inukjuak. It was observed that the Department did "not plan a large scale movement of Eskimos to the high arctic, but we would like to move this summer three families from Port Harrison, who wish to join their relatives at Grise Fiord. ...those best informed advise that Grise Fiord could stand this additional population. This is, of course, provided the Eskimos are willing to move."⁷⁵⁷ The letter acknowledges that "care should be taken in sending marriageable young people". The letter stated as well that

You will recall that part of the history of this migration scheme was one of a greatly increased population over-burdening a depleted game population. Withdrawal of some of the hunters from the area not only benefited them but relieved Port Harrison of some of its large human population. However, this population adjustment should not proceed as you point out, to the degree that there might be an imbalance in the opposite direction.

It is interesting that Sivertz characterizes the initial problem as one of a greatly increasing population over-burdening the game in the Inukjuak area. As has been seen in detail in Part 3, the problem at Inukjuak as perceived by the administration was one of population density and distribution with what was considered to be too many Inuit living in close proximity to the trading post at Inukjuak with an unstable source of income from the fur trade to support their demand for goods and food from the trade store with the result that, in bad years, they would turn to relief. It was not a problem of an increasing population of hunters exceeding declining game food resources as Sivertz's 1958 letter suggests. The ambiguity of the phrase "overpopulation in relation to available resources"

756. As referred to in Gunther, p. 354.

757. Director to officer commanding "G" Division, May 7, 1958, Northwest Territories Archives, Stevenson Papers; document provided by Grant; also referred to in Gunther, p. 280.

seems to have caused misunderstandings very soon after the relocation even among those involved in the decision making.

Willmott's 1958 Study at Inukjuak

It was in 1958 that Willmott spent a summer at Inukjuak and this became the basis for his study, referred to earlier.⁷⁵⁸ Willmott was a graduate student who was going to the Arctic for the first time and did not speak Inuktitut. His observations about the people must be treated accordingly. Willmott's report is the only available detailed study of the area in the period and does contain much useful information. Portions of Willmott are referred to by Gunther although there are other portions which are interesting. For example, Gunther emphasizes the concern about the population in relation to available resources and notes the reduction in population at Inukjuak as a result of relocations. It is interesting to note, however, Willmott's estimate that the post-war population in the period preceding the relocations had been stable at about 500 people. The numbers were acknowledged by Willmott to be difficult to estimate. However, whatever the absolute number, Willmott's conclusion appears to be based on a comparison of birth rates and mortality rates which until about 1954, when improvements in medical care began to have an effect, tended to cancel each other out. Only from 1954 on was there a significant decline in mortality rates and hence the prospects for an increase in population. This underscores the importance of putting the early 1950s issue of "overpopulation in relation to available resources" into the correct perspective as one related to population density, not population growth. In regard to population density, Willmott also reports that, in addition to the ten families who were relocated to the High Arctic in 1953 and 1955, fourteen families were relocated to Great Whale River, further south on

758. W.E. Willmott, "The Eskimo Community at Port Harrison, P.Q." (Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1961); portions of Willmott are referred to in Gunther, pp. 127-135.

Hudson Bay.⁷⁵⁹ Growth of the total Inuit population did become a concern as the effects of improved medical care began to reduce mortality rates. Jenness reports the Inuit population as having increased by just over 600 from 1951 to 1957 (8,464 to 9,078) and by almost 1,700 from 1957 to 1960 (9,078 to 10,751). He noted that, while a 3% increase per year might seem modest, it would "severely tax the local resources in fish and game as well as the opportunities for wage-employment."⁷⁶⁰

Willmott's study shows that foxes had been at a peak in 1953-54, with 4,920 traded, and declined to 1957-58 when 415 were traded. Relief, which in 1950 was being made available to 20% of the population, had declined by 1953 — the peak fox year — to only 3.2% of the population and then rose again so that by 1957, 18% of average annual camp family income came from relief. Thus, although the population had declined from Willmott's estimate of 500 to 337, the cycle of increasing demand for relief as a function of declining income from the fur trade was still in evidence.⁷⁶¹ What one sees is that even with a substantially reduced population and a better balance of population to available game resources, loss of income in a bad fur year led to increased demand for relief to provide the goods from the store which fur income could not purchase. However, the level of the demand for relief in poor fur years appears to have declined.⁷⁶² It would appear that the simple availability of the food at the

759. Willmott, pp. 10-17, 110-112.

760. Jenness, p. 148.

761. This is so, even though income from handicrafts had increased as a proportion of family income, representing 34% of average family income in 1957, as compared to 24.4% from furs. There was little wage employment for camp Inuit, with wages from employment representing 4.2% of average income. These proportions are, of course, difficult to interpret given that in a good fur year, there would be a much greater income from furs.

762. In 1951, relief represented about 30% of average income at Inukjuak. By contrast, in 1957, also a poor fur year, 18% of annual camp family income came from relief, a reduction of 12 percentage points.

trading post, coupled with the dependency on the trading post which the trading economy had created, led to a demand for relief even when country food was said to be more plentiful relative to the population in the area.

It appears, however, that the policy of pushing Inuit away from the community had not been applied in the 1953 to 1957 period. The settlement population increased until 1957 but this was reversed in 1957. Inuit were ordered out of the settlement with a consequent reduction in relief payments even though 1957-58 was also a poor fur year. Relief in the early part of 1958 was only 1/3 of the 1957 level when 18% of average camp income was from relief.⁷⁶³

Willmott concludes that the apparent declining trend in relief was the result of the introduction of family allowances in 1948, the "phenomenal rise of the soapstone industry over the past decade", and the "policy of reducing the population at Port Harrison through migration to the high Arctic has increased the land resources available to each household, allowing them to depend more on country food." Willmott's conclusions are perhaps accurate about the level of relief, but not necessarily accurate about the pattern of relief. Putting aside the small point that many people were moved, not to the High Arctic, but to other parts of Quebec, Willmott misses the fact that these three conditions prevailed in 1956-57 when relief payments began to increase with the cyclical drop in the fur trade and represented 18.3% of camp Inuit income. What changed in 1957 was a new order by the RCMP that the Inuit, unless fully employed at a settlement

763. Willmott reports that, in the summer of 1957, the RCMP constable at Inukjuak ordered all Inuit who were not employed by establishments to leave the settlement. There had been a gradual migration into the settlement, so that from 1953 the settlement population increased from about 55 to about 135 (27 households). With the RCMP order, the settlement population was reduced to 75 (13 households), with 60 people (14 households) setting up camp between a mile and 20 miles away. Although 1957-58 was a poor fur year, relief levels in the spring of 1958 were only one-third of 1956-57 levels, when relief accounted for 18.3% of camp Inuit income.

establishment, were to live on the land and, presumably consistent with practices followed for many years in the Arctic, were to hunt for food if they could not buy it. In short, the RCMP order in 1957 reversed the reason for migration into the settlement which Willmott correctly identifies in these terms:

The Eskimos moved closer to the trading centre as they became more dependent on trade, less on subsistence hunting off the land.

The natural thing for people who depend on trade to do, in a bad year, is to take some relief. It required coercion to change this dependence.⁷⁶⁴ At the same time, the combination of the three factors may have been responsible for the fact that average reliance on relief was at the 18.3% level rather than the 30% level experienced in 1951.

Willmott is interesting as well because he found that in 1958, 50% by weight of camp Inuit food was from the store.⁷⁶⁵ The exact accuracy of the percentage is less interesting than the fact that the store played an important role in the life of camp Inuit as a source of food. It is also interesting that 1958 was a poor fur year where people were depending more on country food since Willmott had noted that country food substituted for relief rations in poor fur years. In good fur years, such as 1953-54, one might ask if the proportion of store food would have been higher.

Consumption of store food at Inukjuak would appear to be greater in winter than summer with one-third of camp Inuit food in summer coming from the store.⁷⁶⁶ In that regard, summer was the period of greatest abundance and variety of game. The main store food of camp Inuit was

764. Willmott, pp. 17-18, 34-35.

765. *Ibid.*, p. 32.

766. *Ibid.*, p. 113.

our, sugar, tea, lard and baking powder with tobacco also representing a significant proportion of purchases. Settlement Inuit, who received rations from the employer, spent more on luxuries of all kinds, including food items — bacon, tinned meat, tinned fruit, jam — as well as clothing.⁷⁶⁷ Willmott observes that "savings are meagre, and appear to be the result of suggestions from the HBC store staff that...[the Inuit]...may interpret as commands."⁷⁶⁸

Willmott observed that the changes brought about by non-Inuit have not been overtly opposed by the Inuit but had been seen, like the environment generally, as something the Inuit could do nothing about. The unfortunate consequence of this was that the Inuit accepted "as an environmental axiom much that in democratic society is considered an individual's prerogative and duty." He noted that "The right to choice of religion, the right to movement, the duty to work, the right to bargain as a free agent, and the right and duty of education for children...do not usually involve individual choice among Eskimos in this area."⁷⁶⁹ In short, the Inukjuak Inuit at that time expected to be told what to do by non-Inuit including on questions of movement.

Apart from mentioning the depopulation of the area through relocations, Willmott does not discuss the possible effects of the relocations on relationships with people remaining at Inukjuak or the possible desire of people to join or be reunited with relatives. He does, however, discuss the importance of kinship and visiting friends and relations.⁷⁷⁰

767. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

768. *Ibid.*, p. 118.

769. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

770. Willmott, it should be noted, did not speak Inuktitut before going to the Arctic and left, after a summer, speaking "pidgin Eskimo".

The discussion of the importance of store food for camp Inuit raises a question about the effect on demand for store food of moving people to the High Arctic where climatic conditions were more severe, hunting conditions initially unfamiliar and, in any event, more difficult, and the variety and summer-time abundance of game was different. The effect of income on demand for store food also raises questions as to what Inuit expectations would be about access to store food when they had the money to purchase these items. Finally, non-Inuit had access to foods which were not sold to camp Inuit through the trade store at Inukjuak such as canned foods. Those Inuit who were employed at the settlement did receive such foods and apparently enjoyed them. The question of what foods people could buy, may have desired, and did get is complex.

Concerns about Increasing the Size of the New Communities

At this point the Department was limiting the numbers of people joining the new communities because of lack of knowledge of the wildlife resources. Sivertz's letter of May 7, 1958 to the officer commanding "G" Division has referred to the fact that the Department had been endeavouring for some time to have a survey made of the wildlife of the Lancaster Sound area. In a June 1958 memorandum to the Deputy Minister, Sivertz refers to "growing pressure from Eskimos of the east coast of Hudson Bay to move to the high Arctic. Most of them wish to join relatives at Resolute or Grise Fiord, who have given them enthusiastic reports of the life there. At the same time, they are discouraged by the economic possibilities of the Port Harrison and Povungnetuk [sic] areas." He went on as follows:

We think that the success of the two new communities in the high Arctic more than justifies a continuation of such movement. We have continued to postpone it, however, because we think it unwise to engage in any further relocation plans without a thorough knowledge of the remaining resources in the new areas. As a temporary measure, we are letting three families go from Port Harrison to Grise Fiord this year, since they are close relatives of people already there. We

have told the RCMP representative at Port Harrison that all other applications must still be refused.⁷⁷¹

The memorandum notes that the wildlife service had agreed to do a study of the food resources of Lancaster Sound but had still been unable to undertake it. Proceeding with the study was considered to be an urgent matter in light of the then-present instability of the fur market and the situation which existed in the Keewatin. It is interesting that the Department was willing to take a risk on the success of the initial relocation without having done a thorough wildlife survey but would not risk any large increase in the population in the High Arctic even though economic conditions in northern Quebec were similar to those earlier in the decade. It is also interesting that the effect of the absence of such a survey for the relocatees would be to constrain the growth of the new communities.

Constable Gibson, now at Inukjuak, had visited Povungnituk where three hundred and fifty people were reported as living within one mile of the post and hunting was poor. He reported that a camp of thirty-two people indicated they wished to move to Resolute Bay. The Department did not authorize the movement of these people but only the movement of some eighteen people. In the end, Gunther reports that no moves were made from northern Quebec in 1958. The families changed their minds and decided not to move. One family from Arctic Bay did move to Grise Fiord.⁷⁷²

***Concerns about People Wishing to Move
from Grise Fiord to Resolute Bay***

Of the two families who had gone north in 1957 but had not been able to proceed past Resolute Bay, one family wished to remain at Resolute Bay rather than proceed on to Grise Fiord. Constable Pilot complained that such a trend might deplete the Grise Fiord population. The family which

771. Sivertz to Deputy Minister, 6.6.58, as quoted in Gunther, pp. 280-281.

772. Gunther, p. 282.

did not wish to go on to Grise Fiord felt that Resolute Bay was a better place with good hunting and trapping, access to medical and air transport and the opportunity to build a house.⁷⁷³

Discussions about Paying Transportation Costs and Requests to Move

One man had travelled from Resolute Bay to Churchill for a medical examination and had decided to move there with his family. Corporal Moodie reported that this man advised him of his desire upon his return to Resolute Bay. It was reported that "he advised that he liked the living conditions better and also that his children would be able to attend school" but as the man "had a habit of talking about big things", Corporal Moodie did not know "whether he really meant it or not, therefore the matter was not discussed any further. Since that time he has brought this matter up on several occasions, therefore, just recently the writer had a good talk with him. He was advised of all the disadvantages in moving to Churchill as regards to having to pay rent for his house, buy practically all his food, etc." Corporal Moodie pointed out that one of his children was presently at Frobisher Bay and another was married and did not wish to go to Churchill which would leave him with a wife and five young children to support. It was suggested that he was not a young man any more and that he would have a difficult time finding suitable employment and, even if he did, it was doubtful whether he would earn enough to support his family. Corporal Moodie advised him that the RCAF would be employing people to work at Resolute Bay during the summer and expressed the opinion that the man would be much more content and financially better off than he would be if he went to Churchill. The man was reported, after careful consideration, as agreeing with Corporal Moodie and stating that, although he felt Churchill would have been a good place for his family to go, since he would have no one to help him support his family and considering the high cost of living, he would remain at Resolute Bay. He would consider moving to Churchill

773. *Ibid.*

gain later.⁷⁴ This memorandum is interesting in that it suggests that the views of the Inuit might simply be ignored until the person became persistent. Persistence might then be met with strongly expressed discouragement. The memorandum is perhaps indicative of the role of the RCMP as what Sivertz had described as the "mentor" of the Inuit in a relationship where the Inuit were not seen as capable of making wise choices.

Departmental correspondence in 1958 expressed the view that people leaving the High Arctic communities to visit other places should pay their own costs. A February 6, 1958 Treasury Board minute specified the circumstances in which the Department could pay for travel and related expenses. These included the following:

- (a) Eskimos who may be on relief but who, by removal to another area may become employed and self-sustaining...;
- (b) An Eskimo who is employed but whose income from his employment is less than the subsistence level of income and who, by removal to another place of residence, can become more permanently self-supporting at a higher economic level...;
- (c) Those Eskimos who for various reasons may require placement in a boarding home, foster home...or some other special consideration;
- (d) Eskimo children being moved to permanent adoption homes;
- (e) Eskimos for whom employment in southern Canada is planned following hospitalization...;
- (f) Those Eskimos for whom a rehabilitation program has been planned but, because of inability to conform to the needs of the program, have to be returned permanently to their homes;

74. As referred to in Gunther, quoting from Moodie to Chief, Arctic Division, 3.5.58.

(g) The next of kin of an Eskimo who was a patient in the hospital and for whom the attending physician has recommended a visit by a close relative for the purpose of improving the morale of the patient...⁷⁷⁵

Gunther reports that there was uncertainty about the interpretation of this directive. Gunther suggests that (f) and (g) would apply to the issue of returning to Inukjuak. It may be noted that (g) relates to patients in hospital and there was no hospital at Inukjuak. Item (f) involves the failure to conform to a rehabilitation project. This implies that the project was for rehabilitation purposes. Of course, if nothing in the Treasury Board minutes could be said to apply to returning people to Inukjuak then the promise to return might be said to be worthless.

1959

Bolger's Report on the New Communities

In March 1959, C.M. Bolger, of the Department, prepared a brief report on the new communities. The report begins as follows:

During the past few years the Department of Northern Affairs has encouraged and assisted various groups to move from areas where they were finding difficulty in making a satisfactory living from the available resources to areas where hunting and trapping conditions were more favourable, or where there were opportunities for other steady employment.⁷⁷⁶

The reference to "opportunities for other steady employment" is interesting in light of the August 1953 meeting between the Department and the RCAF in which the Department downplayed the importance of employment in its original plan for the relocation in the face of RCAF

775. As referred to in Gunther, pp. 277-278.

776. C.M. Bolger, March 16, 1959, "Movement of Eskimos"; document provided by Grant.

concerns about lack of planning for the implementation of an employment scheme.

Bolger states that the group at Resolute Bay "have been very successful. They have had no difficulty in obtaining sufficient food from the natural resources available and have had good earnings from sales of furs and other produce and from occasional employment at the Base and with geological survey parties. ...supplies for this community have been made available through the Eskimo Loan Fund and trade with the Eskimos is supervised by the local RCMP detachment." The Inuit population is said to total seventy-two. The group at Grise Fiord are said to "have been very successful in adapting themselves to their new environment. They have had no difficulty in getting all the country food they have required. Supplies for this community have been made available through the Eskimo Loan Fund and trade with the Eskimos is supervised by the local RCM Police detachment." The Inuit population, including two families of special constables, is put at sixty-one. It is interesting to note that the report makes no mention of the complaint recorded in the 1958 Eastern Arctic Patrol report of inadequate supplies at the trading store through the entire life of the project at Grise Fiord with resulting hardship from hunger and cold. Nor is there any mention of the desire of the Inuit to leave the community if this problem is not corrected.

Conditions at Grise Fiord, Requests to Move to Resolute Bay

The 1959 RCMP report for Grise Fiord expresses concern about the desire of one family to move from Grise Fiord to Resolute Bay. The report goes on to state that "the writer is against such a move as it is known that others from this area would like to live at Resolute also and that if one moves it is felt that more will follow. The writer requested Constable Jenkin [of the Resolute Bay detachment] to report this to headquarters and request the

Department write direct to the natives concerned, explaining to them the situation regarding movements between Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay."⁷⁷

This family had given as a reason the desire to join a brother who had gone to Resolute Bay in 1959 in search of a wife and who was still there although his marriage plans had not materialized. It would appear that this was the young man who was discouraged in 1955 from pursuing a desire to get married.

The report goes on to identify two other families, both from Inukjuak who also wished to move to Resolute Bay from Grise Fiord.

It was reported that the Inuit settlement had divided into two camps, with the four Pond Inlet families living in one camp and the eight Inukjuak families living two or three miles away. Average family income was \$1,107. It was a poor year for foxes. The RCMP complained about the operation of the Eskimo Loan Fund. Five families were granted loans under the Low Cost Housing Program. Those homes were completed in 1959. Two people were evacuated to hospital, one by RCAF aircraft within two days of reporting the illness. The other was the boy who was reported the previous year as having an eye infection which had not responded to treatment. The report stated that the area "abounds in game of all descriptions and it is considered that more families could be supported off the land...". It was reported that constant hunting was a necessity in that "very little white man's food may be purchased in the local store, certainly no staple food other than flour and sugar. And from this it may be realized that there is no time for the local Eskimo to take a holiday and he must constantly be on the hunt. There is absolutely no tendency by the local people to loiter at their camps or in the settlement of Grise Fiord. They are very capable and ambitious people." The reference to an absence of food, other than flour and sugar, in the trading store is of interest in light of the complaints the previous year about the inadequate supplies, including food, at the store.

777. As referred to in Gunther, p. 283.

Given that the supplies continued to be purchased under the constraints of the Loan Fund, it would appear that nothing was done to address that complaint.

The five houses sent to Grise Fiord were funded through loans under the Eskimo Loan Fund and were all completed by September 1959. This left three families without new homes. The older dwellings were referred to as becoming quite damp in early spring as a result of a lack of proper insulation and ventilation giving rise to an accumulation of frost and ice making them musty and "a germ breeder".⁷⁷⁸

It was reported that clothing at Grise Fiord was good but that there was a shortage of caribou skins for winter clothing. All hunters had two sleds each and good dog teams. There was a small power boat with a ten-horsepower motor and the families were well-equipped with rifles, pots, pans and sewing machines.⁷⁷⁹

Conditions at Resolute Bay, Concerns About Increasing the Size of the Community

The 1959 RCMP report for Resolute Bay stated as follows:

At this time it seems to be the idea of practically all residents from Port Harrison to encourage their relatives to move here. This includes not only ones who are living at Port Harrison but families from Grise Fiord too...this matter could develop into a serious situation in regards to over-population.⁷⁸⁰

It is interesting to note that the concern is with over-population and not with the apparent desire of the Inuit to be reunited with relatives.

78. Gunther, p. 370.

779. As referred to in Gunther, pp. 344-345.

780. As referred to in Gunther, p. 283.

Gunther reports that the Department was not willing to pay the transportation costs for new groups, such as the people from Povungnituk who had expressed a desire to go north, until wildlife studies of the Lancaster Sound area could be done. An exception was made for one family with relatives at Grise Fiord who were transported at government expense. It may be noted that at Grise Fiord, the RCMP had expressed the opinion that the game resources would support additional people, but Corporal Moodie, at Resolute Bay, was concerned about depleting the game resources and was also concerned that no more free electricity could be expected for any new houses that would be built and that this could create hard feelings. Sivertz wrote to the officer commanding "G" Division in this regard as follows:

We agree with you that the influx of too great a number of Eskimo families to Resolute Bay will create the risk of an economic problem through over-taxing of local resources. In view of this, no Eskimos will be encouraged to transfer to Resolute Bay. If, however, they wish to move and are willing to do so at their expense, we are not in a position to stop them. They should fully understand that we are unable to provide them with housing or electricity.⁷⁸¹

In the spring of 1960, the Department would write to the Inuit at Resolute Bay to advise them of the view of the Department that it would not be wise to bring any more Inuit into the area.

The RCMP report for 1959 notes that medical problems could be resolved through consultation with the RCAF medic at Resolute Bay, by way of radio advice from the military hospital at Churchill, or by air evacuation. It was reported that there were fourteen houses built from lumber obtained from scrap which were described as being comfortable and warm. Seal-oil lamps were not being used and all homes had electricity provided by the Department of Transport powering one light and one electrical appliance. Families lived in tents in the summer. Morale was

781. As referred to in Gunther, p. 284.

described as "fairly good" although two members of the settlement had wives in hospital and were described as being "extremely discontented" and the wife of another man had died. Regular movies and dances were held in the community. The RCAF did not hire any Inuit for casual labour in the summer of 1959 and instead brought students in from the south. This led to a protest and the RCAF agreed to hire Inuit workers the following year. Four Inuit men were permanently employed — one as a school caretaker and three by the RCAF survival school. Hunting and trapping remained the main activity with carvings and handicrafts also contributing to cash income. The RCMP continued to enforce a restriction on loitering at the RCAF base or the Department of Transport station. The school children were described as enthusiastic. The returns from trapping and casual labour permitted the purchase of items such as radios, tape recorders, record players, irons, and electric sewing machines. The Inuit were reported as having told the RCMP that their health was improving each year.⁷⁸²

Corporal Moodie reported that the relationship between the Inukjuak group and the Pond Inlet group was his only concern with respect to the morale of the community. He reported as follows:

There is only one factor of morale that could develop to a serious situation at Resolute Bay. That is the jealousy between the group from Port Harrison and the smaller number from Pond Inlet. Openly these people get along together well, but as a person such as the writer visits with individuals of both groups, dislike, jealousy, or whatever it might be called, is plainly present.⁷⁸³

⁷⁸². As referred to in Gunther, pp. 355-356.

⁷⁸³. As referred to in Gunther, p. 257.

1960

***Requests to Move, Concern about Increasing
the Size of Resolute Bay Community***

The 1960 RCMP report for Grise Fiord advised that a Pond Inlet man and his wife wished to move to Pond Inlet to look after his father-in-law who was old and not well. It was reported that the wife of one man had been in hospital for almost five years but that, in 1960, he had been out to visit her twice during the year and had been told that she might be well enough to return in the summer of 1961.

Concern continued to be expressed about the family which indicated that they wished to move to Resolute Bay from Grise Fiord to join the brother who had gone there to look for a wife. It was stated that "even though Constable Pilot and the writer strongly discouraged both parties, these people plan to take up residence here in the spring". Constable Jenkin at Resolute Bay advised that two other families had been corresponding with relatives at Port Harrison to have them settle at Resolute Bay and expressed concern that the area "would soon be overpopulated and the Eskimo would lose many of their present advantages such as free electricity, a fair amount of employment, and good hunting and trapping. But for some reason the writer has not been able to make the local people realize this." The Department was requested to write to the Inuit concerning the problems and disadvantages which would result from over-population.

Bolger, of the Department, wrote in February 1960 to the Regional Administrator at Churchill, as follows:

There were no conditions laid down when the department agreed to the voluntary transfer of the Eskimo group from Port Harrison to Grise Fiord. While we realize it would possibly impair the economic condition at Resolute Bay if several more families moved from Grise Fiord, we cannot dictate to them

where they will live. It is only by discouraging them and explaining the situation that we can hope to deter them. This is I know not a positive approach but we can hardly say with one voice "Let the Eskimo have the same rights as any other Canadian citizen" and with the other, "You must live in Grise Fiord, it is better for you". What we can do is to decline to pay for transportation from, say Port Harrison, but they can fairly easily make their own way to Resolute Bay from Grise Fiord.

Bolger wrote to the Inuit at Resolute Bay in March 1960 as follows:

...you and your families...have had plenty of food [but] there is a lot we do not know about migration, and the reproduction of sea mammals and animals and the number that can be taken for food and still be enough for many years. Until we study this and have more information, we do not think it wise to bring any more Eskimos into the region because the additional hunting might deplete the game and there would not be enough for everyone.

We hope it will be possible next year to have a team of scientists who, with your help, will do research and decide the number of Eskimos your area can support...

For the reasons we have given you and because we want you to remain successful and have plenty of food, we prefer that you do not encourage your relatives and friends to come to Resolute Bay at this time. If you wish to have someone join you for a special reason, would you bring it to the attention of the RCM Police or write to me.

Gunther reports that requests from two families to have people from Inukjuak join them and from one family from Pond Inlet to move to Resolute Bay were refused government-assisted transportation until more employment became available.⁷⁸⁴

The Resolute Bay RCMP report referred to one family from Inukjuak having difficulty with the elders of the village resulting in an agreement by the family to leave Resolute and go to Churchill.

⁷⁸⁴. All as referred to in Gunther, pp. 284-286.

Conditions at Grise Fiord

Gunther reports that there was discussion within the Department concerning people who wished to travel via Churchill on a proposed trip to Inukjuak. Two of the people concerned could pay for the trip but one could not. The correspondence states that "in practice it has sometimes proven possible to effect local arrangements. It has always seemed a relatively simple matter, however, for the RCMP Detachment at Resolute to obtain transportation for Eskimos as far as Churchill. This has been done many times as recently as last month." The Regional Administrator then comments that he does not think there should be any problem and will discuss the matter with Constable Jenkin at Resolute Bay and, if necessary, with the officer commanding the RCAF base at Resolute Bay.⁷⁸⁵

Gunther reports that the trade store at Grise Fiord did \$13,000 worth of business. Two families and one widower joined the community in 1960 increasing the number of families from 14 to 16 and the number of people from 58 to 81, as compared with the original 7 families or 36 people.⁷⁸⁶

Two more houses were built at Grise Fiord in 1960. Four houses had been arranged for but two of the houses were delivered elsewhere in the Arctic. Up to 1960, no monthly payments toward ownership of the homes had been collected because the RCMP felt that the Inuit "cannot afford it".⁷⁸⁷

785. As referred to in Gunther, pp. 285-287.

786. Gunther states, p. 345, that the average income was the same as in the previous year, which had been reported to be \$1,107 per family. However, \$13,000 worth of trading divided among an annual average of fifteen families (14 families in 1959, increasing in August 1960 to 15 families, yields an average of 15 families for the year) results averaged annual trading per family of less than \$900.

787. Gunther, p. 370.

Gunther reports that the items traded included \$2,050 from carvings and handicrafts and that "the community grossed \$2,360 in wage employment from the Geological Survey of Canada".⁷⁸⁸ The reference to the wage earnings being shown as gross to the community reflects the operation of the Eskimo Loan Fund which, while a separate account at the Grise Fiord store should show the credit for individuals, the total amounts were included in the Loan Fund. In passing, Gunther translates the \$2,050 from carvings and handicrafts into \$170 per family which is the equivalent of twelve families. Using an average of fifteen families for the year,⁷⁸⁹ the per family income from carvings and handicrafts would be \$137. No effort has been made by the Commission to check all of the various figures and statistics provided in the Gunther report. The figures for 1960 have been examined for internal consistency simply because the presentation for the 1960 year is different from the presentation of figures in other years. Willmott reports that the average camp Inuit household at Inukjuak in 1957 earned \$342 from crafts.⁷⁹⁰

A jolly boat had been added to the community.

The year 1960 was reported to be a poor one for fur, with other game generally good.

In November 1960, there was an epidemic of whooping cough, complicated by secondary infections, with the result that one child died. The RCMP constables had radioed to Resolute Bay for instructions but a radio black-out prevented the message from reaching Resolute Bay although the U.S. Air Force base at Thule, Greenland, picked up the

788. *Ibid.*, p. 345.

789. The community had 14 families at the beginning of the year, with two more joining in August, bringing the total to 16 families, which results in an average of 15 families for the year.

790. Willmott, p. 31.

message and relayed it on. The U.S. Air Force attempted to air drop medical supplies from Thule into Grise Fiord but were unsuccessful. Radio communication problems resulted in garbled messages and a tentative diagnosis of diphtheria was made. Arrangements were made for a doctor to go to Grise Fiord when, on November 4, the Indian and Northern Affairs Health Services received a report of the epidemic at Grise Fiord. The doctor left Ottawa November 5 for Resolute Bay via RCAF aircraft. The following day, November 6, a report was received suggesting that the aircraft carrying the doctor was down. On November 7 a detailed message from Grise Fiord was received by the Health Services and whooping cough was diagnosed. On November 9 the Health Services received confirmation that the doctor had arrived at Resolute Bay, was to depart for Grise Fiord and had in fact arrived at Grise Fiord. The doctor departed from Grise Fiord on November 12. Upon the doctor's arrival, it was found that six children were seriously ill and that one child had died.⁷⁹¹

Conditions at Resolute Bay

The Resolute Bay community had one whale boat, one Peterhead boat, two trap boats, three canoes and four outboard motors. It was reported that there were eighteen hunters of whom fifteen were "very active". There were twelve dog teams for hunting and equipment was reported to be "in good repair". There was a reported heavy increase in respiratory illnesses during the summer. It was thought that this was the result of more contact with people from the South who were in the community during the summer, and the RCMP considered it necessary to resume the restrictions on contact between the Inuit community and the base. It was observed that this resulted in "an immediate drop in this type of illness". Morale was reported as "very high" with the exception of the family who were having difficulty with the elders of the village and who were moved to Churchill at government expense.

791. As referred to in Gunther, pp. 345-346.

Four men were still permanently employed and others obtained occasional employment with the RCAF, the Department of Transport, and with oil exploration crews. The material wealth of the community was commented on in the following terms:

Compared with other settlements in the Arctic, the Resolute Bay Eskimo is fairly well off and continues to possess articles that are not owned by a good many other Eskimos in the north. These are washing machines, tape recorders, record players, irons, sewing machines, transistor radios and 35 mm cameras.

The RCMP reported that there was a problem with the persistence of U.S. Weather Bureau and Department of Transport personnel wanting to attend Inuit dances and to fraternize in general. Assistance to prevent this was requested. Dances were held one night a week in the school and films were shown two nights a week.⁷⁹²

Questions about the Operation of the Stores and the Loan Fund

In April 1960, Constable Warner, at Grise Fiord, questioned why the profits from furs sold at auction for the 1958-59 trapping season had not been credited to the trappers. He noted that the trading store paid \$6,140 for furs in accordance with the tariff established by the Department but that the furs were sold at auction for \$17,953.65, leaving a difference of \$11,813.65. Gunther reports that the officer commanding "G" Division, W.G. Fraser, explained to Constable Warner that this was as a result of "the unusual circumstances whereby the trading stores were established". These circumstances had been set out in a memorandum from the Director, Cunningham, to the officer commanding "G" Division, Larsen, in 1954. Any income earned by an individual was to be entered as a credit at the trading store. This included family allowances, old age security, proceeds from the sale of furs, and any other income. Ultimately, the Department would take

92. As referred to in Gunther, pp. 356-357.

the money and apply it to the account maintained for the trading store under the Eskimo Loan Fund. Cunningham's memorandum states that "When the loan is re-paid in full, it is expected that a surplus will accumulate. We are tentatively planning that any such surplus will be distributed among the Eskimos who trade in the store in proportion to the amounts of their purchases from the store or their sales of fur to the store." However, as it turned out, the surpluses were retained in the Loan Fund account which operated as a revolving fund. Where individuals had an amount standing to their credit at the store, that amount could be drawn in kind against goods supplied by the store or could be taken out in money to pay for other things. This would involve issuing a cheque which would be drawn against the Loan Fund account with a corresponding debit to the individual's account. Sivertz, among others, objected to the operation of the Loan Fund and, in 1960, co-operatives were established.⁷⁹³

There were, as has been discussed above, problems with keeping proper accounts, particularly at Resolute Bay in the early years. There were also problems when individuals with large credits wished to make special purchases which would have drawn down the amount in the Loan Fund account available for purchasing other supplies for the store. There were also complaints at Resolute Bay in 1956 that people did not know how their accounts stood at the store. Even when co-operatives were put into place in 1960, the surplus in the Loan Fund was applied to the co-op and, hence, to the entire community, not to specific individuals.

Relations between the Inukjuak and Pond Inlet Groups at Resolute Bay

The Chief of the Department's Welfare Division, Rudnicki, reported that there was an "extraordinary amount of animosity and bickering" between the Inukjuak group and the Pond Inlet group at Resolute Bay. He observed that the two groups hunted together and "stayed out of each other's way"

793. Gunther, pp. 325-335.

He is reported as believing that the mixing of the two groups had been an error. The Chief of the Department's Industrial Division, Snowden, while acknowledging that "mutual hostility, suspicion and bickering occur in many communities where there are people drawn from different locations in the Arctic", people could work these things out themselves and a positive community program leading to better harvests, housing, the development of co-operatives, together with adult education, would help to overcome these rifts.⁷⁹⁴

***Bolger's Memorandum on the Object of the Relocation
and the Possibility of Establishing Additional Communities***

In 1960, the Director, Sivertz, requested C.M. Bolger, Administrator of the Arctic, to give thought to the possible relocation of small groups of Inuit to the High Arctic. This is referred to in a memorandum from Bolger to Stevenson dated October 4, 1960. The Director requested that the advisability of this be considered in light of the fact that oil companies were seeking to obtain the use from the RCAF of some of their Inuit employees for oil exploration work in 1961. In his memorandum to Stevenson, Bolger states as follows:

I pointed out to the Director some of the problems we have had with Grise Fiord in respect of supply and of medical services, and his own feeling is that while Grise Fiord should be continued for sovereignty purposes, it should not be duplicated at other isolated locations. He considers, rather, that any new colonies to be established should be in the vicinity of established weather stations such as Mould Bay, Isachsen, and Eureka. He also thinks that a logical development would be to start these colonies as satellites of the Resolute Bay community since the Resolute Bay people now know the country and many of them have been to these points on labouring jobs.

94. As referred to in Gunther, pp. 257 to 258, citing Rudnicki, 13.12.60, and Snowden to Director, 9.02.61.

The Director would like us to give this matter some thought and then send a paper to him outlining the history of the Resolute and Grise Fiord communities and defining the advantages and the problems of establishing additional colonies in the high Arctic. Our paper should ask if it is the wish of the government to fortify our claims to sovereignty of these islands by establishing Eskimo groups on them and it should contain our best recommendation on what, if anything, should be done along this line. We should also point out that the Resolute Bay people are becoming an important factor in the economic development taking place on Cornwallis Island and the adjacent island and suggest that other groups at the locations mentioned might develop a similar importance.

The memorandum requests Mr. Stevenson to take this on or to have someone else undertake it.⁷⁹⁵

The memorandum which was prepared was sent by Bolger to the Director, November 15, 1960. The memorandum outlines the history of the Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord communities. The memorandum refers to the object of the relocation in the following terms:

In the early 1950s this Department instituted several projects whereby encouragement and assistance was given to various groups of Eskimos to move from areas where they were finding difficulty in making a satisfactory living from the available resources to areas where hunting and trapping conditions were more favourable or where there were opportunities for other steady employment. One of these projects started in the summer of 1953 when four families, three from Port Harrison, Quebec, and one from Pond Inlet, N.W.T., voluntarily transferred, with tents, dogs and other equipment, via the CMS *C.D. Howe* to the vicinity of the air base at Resolute Bay. Another small group also from Port Harrison and Pond Inlet were established at Craig Harbour. Later they were moved to Grise Fiord with the opening of a new RCM Police detachment at that point.

795. Bolger to Stevenson, 4.10.60, RG85, vol. 1962, File A1012-13, Pt. 1, also Northwest Territories Archives, Stevenson Papers; document provided by Grant; also referred to in Gunther, pp. 65-70.

This movement of Eskimos was regarded more or less as an experiment to determine how well Eskimos from southern areas would adapt to conditions and the environment of the High Arctic, together with filling all the requirements of making a good living for themselves. It was thought at the time of the move that the Harrison group would not only find the environment strange, but, as they had never experienced the dark period, the assumption was that travelling and trapping would be most difficult. This is one of the reasons why Pond Inlet people were involved, so as to help the southern group adjust to their new terrain and related situations.

The project was entirely self-contained and the groups were the responsibility of the RCM Police detachments. Financial assistance was obtained through the Eskimo Loan Fund. A small trading store was set up at each place in the name of a leading Eskimo. These stores were equipped with essential supplies to provide the groups with the necessary subsistence.

The outcome of these ventures has been more successful and satisfactory than had ever been anticipated. The Eskimos have been able to obtain all the country food they need and sufficient fur and additional produce to purchase their own other requirements from the store. They have adapted themselves quickly to the changed conditions and have been, on the whole, happy in their new environment. So much so, they requested that arrangements be made to have some of their relatives transferred north. This was done — in 1955 and subsequent years when small numbers of Eskimos were moved north. There are now some eighty-two people at Resolute and around sixty-one at Grise Fiord.⁷⁹⁶

The memorandum goes on to discuss the initial concerns of the RCAF as expressed in August 1953 and that these concerns were soon dispelled with the RCAF providing considerable employment to the Inuit at Resolute Bay. The memorandum notes that the RCAF have recently proposed that more Inuit could be permanently employed "if given both training outside courses of skilled trades which would fit them into the general

796. Bolger to Director, 15.11.60, RG85, vol. 1962, File A1012-13, Pt. 1; also Northwest Territories Archives, Stevenson Papers; document provided by Grant; also referred to in Gunther, pp. 66-70.

employment possibilities of Resolute Bay and also on-the-job training in other fields". Bolger comments that he wrote to the Director on this subject on July 21 requesting comments and a decision on a proposed training program but notes that no reply had yet been received, perhaps as a result of changes in some staff. The memorandum then goes on as follows

Although the Eskimos at Grise Fiord have not had the opportunities of employment, they have, however, obtained a good livelihood from the country and this community also serves a distinctly useful purpose in confirming, in a tangible manner, Canada's sovereignty over this vast region of the Arctic.

You will recall that part of the history of the migration scheme was one of a greatly increased population over-burdening a depleted game population. Withdrawal of some hunters from the area not only benefited them but relieved Port Harrison of some of its large human population. However, the Canadian Wildlife Service have always showed great concern that this adjustment should not proceed to the point where the population would exceed the known available game resources. At the present time, the number of people hunting seems to be able to obtain enough country food, but an increased population living off the country entirely would swing the pendulum in the other direction.

Therefore no further large scale moves have been made awaiting surveys which would determine whether the animal population could stand the present amount of killing or whether other resources were available. Because of staff limitations it has never been possible to make the survey required. In 1956 the Deputy Minister requested that action be taken to select two places as possible locations for the settlement of Eskimos in the High Arctic, and that surveys be carried out to determine their suitability from the standpoint of the abundance of wildlife. The Department of Fisheries were also brought into the picture and although some investigations have been made, we have not seen any reports indicating that the project was tackled or completed as originally planned.

Some years ago the DOT gave tentative approval to considering employment of Eskimos at weather stations all over the Arctic,

provided of course they had certain qualifications. No further action has been taken in this regard. No doubt the employment of Eskimos, particularly in the High Arctic, within the range of their capabilities would be a distinct advantage to DOT and render a service to weather stations, and again the matter of sovereignty would be another aspect of such employment.

The memorandum then goes on to comment that it is believed that wage earning opportunities will continue at Resolute Bay particularly in light of oil companies now operating in the High Arctic. The memorandum goes on as follows:

In considering any moves north to meet changing conditions in the Arctic, is our policy still along the lines as follows:

1. To ensure to Eskimos the means of obtaining a reasonable standard of living according to their stage of development.
2. To assist those of the more primitive groups to continue their hunting and trapping way of life by seeing that they are adequately equipped and encouraging them to make fuller use of the resources that are available. Assistance is also to be given to members of these groups to transfer, when necessary, to areas where hunting conditions are more favourable. They are also to be encouraged to take up other occupations besides trapping, where feasible, such as handicrafts and small home industries.
3. To assist more advanced groups to combine other occupations with trapping and also take up employment, temporary or permanent, that will enable them to augment their income without, however, unfitting themselves for the life of a hunter should employment cease and they be thrown back on their own resources. Seasonal employees will spend part of the year working and part trapping. Year round employees should be allowed reasonable time off for hunting throughout the year. In this way they will retain certain ethnic skills and be more content in their work.
4. The more advanced, younger men of any group will be given opportunities and encouraged to take employment or

training for employment in order that they may fill positions available at the weather stations, other military and civilian centres, and with oil companies.

I raised the above policy statements because we have had some problems at Grise Fiord in respect of supply and medical services and I believe we should not duplicate such communities at other isolated locations. My understanding is that you would prefer that any new colonies be established in the vicinity of existing weather stations such as Mould Bay, Isachsen and Eureka. I am in general agreement with this principle. However, I think that many Eskimos will want to make a livelihood from the country for sometime to come, provided of course the resources are available. Therefore, I do not think we should eliminate entirely in any study the setting up of communities away from established stations. What would be a more progressive step, during this transition period, is to take advantage of modern technology and improved communications. It might be that by regular inspection flights and using ECUs we could well supervise any isolated community. This is certainly done in Alaska.

The memorandum goes on to agree that the logical starting point would be to establish satellites of the Resolute Bay community since that community could provide support to the new communities. It is observed that the stock of goods at the trading store at Resolute Bay would have to be increased and that, "As a matter of fact, even today it is doubtful if the stock on hand will meet the requirements of non-hunting Eskimos with whom, like us to the south, as money increases, demands and tastes also increase." The memorandum goes on as follows:

Therefore, taking all the foregoing facts into consideration, I would suggest that the time has come for the reconvening of meetings involving the DOT, the RCAF, oil companies and this Department to assess the employment potentialities of Eskimos in the High Arctic. If adequate assurances are received that employment opportunities exist for Eskimos, and as to whether they are permanent or temporary, then we should consider the relocation of further groups in the High Arctic and the most advantageous bases from which they could operate.

One important factor to always keep in mind is that the Eskimos at Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord are an invaluable human resource in the northern economic development taking place on Cornwallis Island and the adjacent islands, and other groups at several other points in the vast region might develop a similar importance. Then again, as already mentioned, the occupation of these northern islands by Canada's first Arctic citizens only enhances our claims to sovereignty in these regions.

In summary, it is recommended for your consideration and approval that we do the following:

1. Canvas or hold meeting [sic] individually or collectively, with organizations concerned to discuss employment opportunities.
2. Revive the suggestion that proper surveys be carried out to ascertain the wildlife or other resources of the region. We consider this important in the interests of the Eskimo people and the economy of the country. More adequate knowledge of all the resources would be invaluable in planning for the future.
3. We should make a careful survey of the present distribution of population with a view to determining which areas are over-populated and which groups would benefit most by being transferred, provided they are willing to move! Presumably, as a result of any surveys as suggested in Recommendation No. 2, we would decide on the area to which such groups should be transferred, keeping in mind the resources available and other advantages that may accrue.
4. Pursue, immediately and vigorously, with the RCAF their desire to employ more Eskimos, provided they have training as outlined in my memorandum to you of July 21.
5. Related considerations which will have to be made in any move are numbers, educational facilities, housing, supplies, medical treatment and supervision. There are also other features which will be brought out if we have your approval and direction of the scheme in principle.

It is clear from this memorandum that economic considerations related to the well-being of the Inuit are primary considerations. At the same time, sovereignty is clearly identified as an additional consideration. In that regard, Stevenson, working for Bolger in the preparation of this memorandum, in 1960 is responding to a request from Sivertz, who, in Bolger's October 4, 1960 memorandum to Stevenson is reported to have said that the Grise Fiord community should be continued for sovereignty purposes and requested that the memorandum which was to be prepared by Stevenson address the contribution to sovereignty of establishing Eskimo communities on the High Arctic islands.

The memorandum speaks of "part of the history" of the relocation as "a greatly increased population over-burdening a depleted game population". As has been seen in detail in Part 3, this is not an accurate characterization of the "population problem" at Inukjuak but it is a characterization which, by 1960, appears to have become part of the institutional memory. This error might flow from the ambiguity of the phrase "overpopulation in relation to available resources" which could easily come to be seen in terms of population *growth* rather than the more subtle issue of population *density*.

One possible consequence of the shift in characterizing the reason for the relocation is the fact that it reinforced the need to continue the new communities. It could hardly be seen to be sensible to think of returning people to an area which could not support them. It is perhaps hardly surprising that Inuit complaints and desires to return would not be heard in the way they were intended or would be met with discouragement.

1961

Conditions at Grise Fiord

At Grise Fiord, the materials for building a school arrived and Gunther reports that the community decided that the school would be set up

Grise Fiord with the families moving there from the Lindstrom Peninsula. The families were reported as living in new houses with the exception of two families, one of whom was newly arrived. Health was described as excellent and the people were reported as enjoying a good financial year. Movies were shown two or three times a month and people listened to the radio, receiving the CBC Northern Service and broadcasts from Greenland. It was reported that "These are very happy and hardworking people and their progress over the years since the establishment of this community has been truly remarkable."⁷⁹⁷

Questions about Payment for Travel

In 1961, three additional homes were built at Grise Fiord bringing the total of new houses built at Grise Fiord to ten since 1959 with one house also being built out of scrap material.⁷⁹⁸

The family which had left Resolute Bay to go to Churchill in 1960 because of a problem with the elders in the community wished to return. This family had been transported at government expense, either on a flight arranged by the Department or through use of the RCMP aircraft. Gunther reports that until 1961 the Department shared the cost of the RCMP aircraft so that arrangements of this type required no disbursement of specific funds. However, in 1961 this arrangement changed and the Department was not in a position to facilitate free flights out of the community. The Department had funds for the movement of Inuit for welfare reasons, for example, to cover the costs of visits of relatives to patients in hospital where the visit is recommended by the physician to be of benefit to the patient or to cover transportation and related costs involved in moving or relocating Inuit and their families from one place to another for the economic betterment of the family or for purposes of

797. As referred to in Gunther, p. 347.

798. Gunther, p. 370.

rehabilitation. Departmental correspondence reflects the fact that Inuit from time to time, would ask for air transportation to visit relatives or persons in other communities whom they had not seen for a long time. This was not a problem when the Department had the use of the police aircraft but it became a problem in 1961 when the Department lost the use of the aircraft.⁷⁹⁹

There was some discussion within the Department about other circumstances in which the Department would be authorized, in accordance with Treasury Board directives, to cover travel and related costs. Four additional examples were discussed as follows:

1. The movement of an applicant to the Chesterfield Home for the Aged and Infirm where that person's admission has already been authorized by the appropriate departmental representative.
2. The movement of an aged person from a northern community to Churchill for the winter months and back to the home settlement for the summer because of inadequate accommodation in the home settlement and the advanced age of the person.
3. The movement of members of a family from the home settlement to Churchill so that they may rejoin an ill member whose medical condition does not permit him to be repatriated beyond Churchill after discharge from hospital.
4. The movement of a person, with a serious social problem such as alcoholism, from one community to another where a change of environment is regarded as being a necessary step in treatment of his problem.

799. As referred to in Gunther, pp. 287-288.

It was subsequently confirmed by the Director that the Treasury Board directive would apply to these four examples. The Director did not consider it "wise at this time" to request an extension of the Treasury Board directive to establish a general policy with respect to visiting, preferring to deal with specific cases as they might arise, such as the payment of transportation for an aged mother, who was not medically ill, to visit an indigent son whom she had not seen for many years.

The family which had gone to Churchill in 1960 did return, presumably either at their own expense or with the help of the RCAF.

Gunther suggests that such a movement out of the community and then back into it is not evidence of a great desire to return to Inukjuak.⁸⁰⁰ Gunther does not comment on whether there might be close relatives, for example a married daughter, at Resolute Bay.

Conditions at Resolute Bay

Three families arrived at Resolute Bay in 1961: two from Churchill and one from Spence Bay. As a result, the two families who had gone to Churchill in 1960 had returned by 1961.

Requests to Move

A family which had been reported as desiring to return to Inukjuak from Grise Fiord had "withdrawn" this request. A request was made from Grise Fiord that the mother of a family be sent north from the area near Ivungnituk. It was reported that one man had "reluctantly" returned to Inukjuak because his stepfather and father-in-law asked him to return although he expressed the desire to return to Resolute Bay in the future.

800. Gunther response to RCAP Questions for Discussion. Gunther identifies this family as the Amagoalik family from Inukjuak.

At Grise Fiord, one family returned to Pond Inlet and another family came from Pond Inlet.

Gunther reports the Department responding to a request from a man at Resolute Bay who was "longing" to see his relatives that the Department "cannot pay for a trip if you only want to visit" and asking if "maybe there is another reason for wanting to go to Inukjuak".⁸⁰¹ This letter and the Department's response are quoted in full in Part 1.

1962

Conditions at Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord

The RCMP report from Resolute Bay stated that "all families are happy to remain in Resolute Bay" although a Pond Inlet man wished to go to Frobisher Bay because of his wife's epilepsy but had indicated he would remain at Resolute Bay if more regular visits by a doctor resumed.⁸⁰²

Eight people were in hospital: two for tuberculosis and others for respiratory infections, epilepsy, a dislocated shoulder, and one for "mental sickness". The people were reported to be well clothed and enjoying continued increases in income which permitted them to purchase household furnishings at the co-op.⁸⁰³

At Resolute Bay, an additional person was employed full-time and three people were to be trained as mechanics and mobile equipment drivers. All the homes had electricity and were heated with fuel oil. Adult education classes were reported as being successful. The RCAF was loaning films every week to the Inuit settlement. The RCAF had decided to deny

801. As referred to in Gunther, pp. 287-291.

802. As referred to in Gunther, pp. 291-292.

803. As referred to in Gunther, p. 357.

privileges to the full-time Inuit employees of the RCAF to drink in the RCAF canteen because it was causing "heated domestic squabbles on returning home from the canteen". Gunther reports that this was only a temporary ban. Generally, the morale of the community was reported as being high with many people having full employment, the children enjoying a good school, the co-op store and efficient mail service permitting people to purchase goods at low prices, and generally good living conditions.⁸⁰⁴

Jenness reports that of the \$33,574.40 in employment income at Resolute Bay in 1961, \$24,000 was earned by the five men who were employed full-time.⁸⁰⁵

In 1962, a school was established at Grise Fiord.⁸⁰⁶

1963

Conditions at Grise Fiord

At Grise Fiord, a man who had been employed by the RCMP for four years as a special constable and who had originally come from Inukjuak, wanted to move to Frobisher Bay or Churchill to obtain employment to allow him and his family to maintain the economic level to which they had become accustomed.⁸⁰⁷

It was reported that there was a reluctance between the Inukjuak and Lind Inlet groups to inter-marry and it was suggested that an effort be made to ensure that, when new people moved into the settlement, they have no relatives within the settlement. It was said that "At present no

⁸⁰⁴. As referred to in Gunther, p. 358.

⁸⁰⁵. Jenness, p. 114.

⁸⁰⁶. Gunther, p. 365.

⁸⁰⁷. As referred to in Gunther, p. 292.

problem is presenting itself with inter-marriage but it is felt that within the next fifteen years one could arise."⁸⁰⁸ Gunther suggests that the reference to the possibility of a problem of inter-marriage arising in fifteen years refers to marriage between people with too close a degree of consanguinity.⁸⁰⁹

Morale at Grise Fiord was reported as "at an all time high". The school provided weekly dances, movies, classes in sewing, cooking, art, music, adult academic education; Girl Guides and Wolf Cubs. There was an increase in construction of additional government buildings which was providing most of the men with part-time employment. Game was reported as abundant and equipment was reported as being good. In addition to the government-employed teacher, there was a government-employed maintenance mechanic in the community.⁸¹⁰

Conditions at Resolute Bay

At Resolute Bay it was reported that three wives and one husband were in hospitals in the south and that the families involved were "naturally unhappy". Arrangements were made for free trips to Edmonton via the RCAF and oil company charters to visit relatives in hospital. It was reported that the remaining families were "content with their way of life at Resolute Bay".⁸¹¹

It was reported that friendship between the Inukjuak and Pond Inuit groups had improved as a result of marriages between the groups.⁸¹²

808. As referred to in Gunther, p. 256.

809. Gunther, p. 263.

810. As referred to in Gunther, p. 348.

811. As referred to in Gunther, p. 292.

812. As referred to in Gunther, p. 359.

The RCMP report expressed concern because the RCAF would be leaving the area and there would have to be a greater reliance on hunting. It was observed that the Inuit had good access to a large hunting area which had previously been generally under-hunted and had good equipment for doing so. Gunther observes that the snow mobile was beginning to make its appearance and that by 1965 there were ten snowmobiles in Resolute Bay and nine dog teams.⁸¹³

1964

Conditions at Grise Fiord

Grise Fiord reported that two families, originally from Inukjuak, moved to Resolute Bay for reasons that were stated to be "personal and have no reflection on the resources available at this point".⁸¹⁴

A "slight tendency" for the Inukjuak and Pond Inlet groups to keep to themselves was reported although it was noted that these groups had not been "resident together" for a good length of time so that it was possible that the "current division may eventually disappear".⁸¹⁵

Morale at Grise Fiord was reported as being good. Anglican church services were being conducted by lay preachers. The school continued to be a focal point for many activities. The co-op and mail order catalogues were making more goods available and, while life could "at times [be] quite tiring", it was reported that there was "no lack of the necessities of life". Home brew was reported to be a problem. This was the first reference to this problem.⁸¹⁶

813. As referred to in Gunther, p. 358.

814. As referred to in Gunther, p. 292.

815. As referred to in Gunther, p. 256.

816. As referred to in Gunther, p. 349.

Conditions at Resolute Bay

Resolute Bay reported that morale was generally good although there were a few exceptions in the case of people who had lost employment. Many of the people who had been in hospital returned to the community and the improved family conditions. It was reported that "The Eskimos are content with their way of life at Resolute Bay, however, a few wish they could visit their friends at their original homes at Port Harrison, or Pond Inlet."⁸¹⁷

1965

Conditions at Grise Fiord

One family was reported as leaving Grise Fiord for Frobisher Bay because of health and "community problems". The men of the community were reported as wishing to have work as casual labourers. One of the Pond Inlet men was expressing the desire to obtain work at Milne Inlet where he believed he could have permanent employment.⁸¹⁸

There had been a marriage at Grise Fiord in 1964 and in 1965 it was reported that another local marriage was likely. It was reported that within three or four years, there would be another six or seven people who would be of marrying age and "it is possible that a problem will exist". The report noted that the Pond Inlet and Inukjuak groups were closely knit but expressed the hope that, as a result of good associations among the children, the barriers between the groups might be broken down in the future. The report went on to note that "At any rate, even if no barrier existent [sic] in the community, there are not really sufficient of either sex in the same age group to allow much, if any, choice of a partner."⁸¹⁹

817. As referred to in Gunther, pp. 292 and 359.

818. As referred to in Gunther, p. 293.

819. As referred to in Gunther, p. 263.

Housing at Grise Fiord was reported as adequate but over-crowded and the Department was asked to provide assistance in expanding the size of some of the homes. Morale was said to be adequate, assisted by "much visiting", and CBC programs which provided information concerning relatives or friends in hospital or attending school. Families were also using tape recorders to exchange tapes with relatives or friends in other settlements. The families were reported as enjoying "quite a number of the luxuries and up-to-date items commonly observed in an outside home". Only three men were employed full-time: two as special constables and one as the school janitor.

Conditions at Resolute Bay

Gunther observes that the reports from Resolute Bay did not deal with questions related to marriage. He believes that this is partly a function of the age of the children and partly a function of the growth in the population at Resolute Bay.⁸²⁰

The population at Resolute Bay grew from one hundred and nineteen in 1964 to one hundred and twenty-four in 1965.

1966

Conditions at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay

Grise Fiord reported that the couple that had been planning to marry the previous year had not yet done so. It was reported that there were only two other single persons of normal marrying age and they had recently arrived with a new family at Grise Fiord. It was reported that there were several young people who would be of marrying age within the next four years and

⁸²⁰ Gunther, p. 260.

that some of them would no doubt have to look elsewhere to find companion.⁸²¹

A family of eleven people from Pangnirtung joined the Grise Fiord community.

Resolute Bay reported that morale had been good throughout the year and that this was contributed to by the co-op store as well as the general high standard of living.⁸²²

Bissett's Study of Resolute Bay

In 1965-66 Bissett conducted an area study of Resolute Bay.⁸²³ Bissett found that "little distinction could be observed between Eskimo groups at Resolute". The community seemed, from early on, to have been a "unit production", and help across group lines occurred, for example, with an Inukjuak woman caring for the children of a Pond Inlet mother sent to hospital in 1955. Sharing of country food was almost universal. There had been considerable inter-marriage, with seven out of nineteen married couples by 1966 constituting inter-group marriages. Three of those involved marriages between Pond Inlet and Inukjuak people. One involved an Inukjuak person and an Arctic Bay person. One involved an Inukjuak person and a Spence Bay person. One involved a Pond Inlet person and a Cape Dorset person.⁸²⁴

821. As referred to in Gunther, p. 263.

822. As referred to Gunther, p. 359.

823. D. Bissett, "Resolute, an Area Economic Survey" (Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1967).

824. As referred to in Gunther, pp. 259-261. Gunther does not indicate the origin of the spouse in the seventh marriage.

Bissett's findings concerning the two groups at Resolute Bay contrast with Freeman's findings concerning Grise Fiord discussed previously.

Bissett noted the depressing effect that the dark period had on the people and the decline in morale which accompanied it. He observed that this was particularly true for the Inukjuak Inuit but the Pond Inlet and Arctic Bay people also complained about the dark period to a lesser degree. During the dark period, there would be heavier drinking and increased fighting.⁸²⁵

Using information contained in Bissett's study, Gunther reports that, in 1964, twenty families earned \$35,600 from wages, \$8,404 from trapping and received \$4,091 in family allowances and \$1,117 from social assistance for a total of \$49,212 or an annual average per family of \$2,734. He notes that he has excluded two families in the sense of individuals with no dependants and another with one dependant; neither of the families appeared to be part of the money economy, with one receiving \$800 in social assistance and the other \$215 in family allowance. Gunther suggests that, taking into account the value of country food and subsidized rents for housing, an average family income in the order of \$2,734 per family would compare favourably with the median Canadian family income of \$4,262 in 1961 or \$5,859 in 1967, recognizing that any such comparison can only be made with caution.⁸²⁶

Bissett surveyed the hunting and trapping economy at Resolute Bay, reviewing statistical information back to 1949-50. His conclusion is that there is "a relative abundance of game" in the area. The number of full-time

⁸²⁵. As referred to in Gunther, p. 367.

⁸²⁶. Gunther, pp. 372-373.

hunters at Resolute Bay in 1966 was small. By 1966, income from hunting and trapping had become unsatisfactory.⁸²⁷

Bockstoce's Study of Resolute Bay

It was in 1966 that J.R. Bockstoce, a Yale University anthropologist, studied Resolute Bay. He found that Resolute Bay, with its sufficient availability of game as well as employment opportunities, had not suffered the problems of other communities where people had been attracted to communities to seek employment but were left without an adequate economic base and without sufficient availability of game in the areas to which they had moved. He found a successful community with an adequate and stable economic base where the Inuit had regained their confidence in their ability to control their own future. He contrasted the community favourably with other communities in the Arctic.⁸²⁸

1967

Conditions at Grise Fiord, Requests to Move, Freeman's Observations at Grise Fiord

The Inukjuak family which had, in 1963, indicated a desire to move from Grise Fiord to Frobisher Bay or Churchill, moved to Resolute Bay in 1967. Gunther reports that Freeman discusses the case of a Grise Fiord hunter who, in 1963, wanted to leave for either Frobisher Bay or Resolute Bay. He had a positive work reference but by 1967 had received no reply to his

827. Jenness, p. 101, estimated that a trapper's income from trapping in the period 1949-1959 averaged \$200- 400 a year. The 1966 Resolute Bay income from trapping was \$8,404; with 20 families living there, this is an average of \$420 per family. Presumably income from hunting and trapping had become unsatisfactory in the sense that people's wants or needs could be met only with higher levels of earned income than trapping was able to provide.

828. As referred to in Gunther, pp. 375-376.

request to leave. Apparently there had been two unsuccessful attempts to meet with the RCMP inspector on his annual visits in 1965 and 1967 and a letter had been sent in February 1967. However, when he was told by "non-RCMP Euro-Canadians" that the "decision and responsibility to leave were entirely his own" he left for Resolute Bay in 1967. Gunther comments that, if this is the same person, "then it is not clear why this person did not leave in 1963 since the RCMP report of that year expected this to occur in 1964".⁸²⁹ The answer would, however, appear to lie in what Willmott observed in 1958 at Inukjuak, namely, that what a non-Inuit understood to be a right to movement did not usually involve individual choice among the Inuit he observed as a result of domination by non-Inuit.⁸³⁰

There was one marriage in Grise Fiord in 1967 between members of two Pond Inlet families. It was reported that there were eligible females and two eligible males but no indication of marriage on anyone's part. The observation was made that "it appears that mates will have to be found elsewhere. In 1968, two men left Grise Fiord for Arctic Bay to seek spouses and another eligible male had indicated a possible cross-group marriage with a woman attending school at Fort Churchill."⁸³¹

Seven new prefabricated houses were erected at Grise Fiord in 1967 with all families now living in 3-bedroom houses. Seven snow mobiles were purchased by members of the community. The division between the Pond Inlet and Inukjuak groups was commented on. Neither group was willing to "take decisions" for the community which created difficulties in community decision making.⁸³²

829. Gunther, p. 293.

830. Willmott, pp. 125-126.

831. Gunther, p. 264.

832. As referred to in Gunther, p. 251.

In 1967, the average monthly rent for a house in Grise Fiord, including electricity, heating fuel, garbage removal and ice for water, was \$16.⁸³³

Grant reports that Freeman, in a 1967 paper, refers to some Inuit feeling they were coerced into relocating.⁸³⁴ In his more recent 1984 paper, Freeman states that "it should be stressed that some pressure had to be exerted to 'persuade' at least one of the original families to journey north from Hudson Bay...and that subsequent efforts by members of both groups to leave Grise Fiord were officially opposed."⁸³⁵ Freeman observes that, viewed in the government's terms and viewed purely objectively, "there can be no doubt that hunting returns, more especially as they ensured the necessities of meat for human and dog food and skins for clothing and other essential needs, were improved over both groups' former situations, with the Hudson Bay group experiencing the far greater improvement." However, he went on as follows:

In subjective terms, both improvements incurred costs. The Hudson Bay group, having a longer period of dependency on store foods and coming from a very different part of the Arctic, regarded the resources of Grise Fiord as seriously lacking variety. The scarcity of Arctic char, ducks and geese, eggs, berries (several varieties), shellfish, caribou, and (for Baffin Islanders) the highly prized skin of the narwhal — all constituted missing items in the seasonal diet of the immigrants.

Both groups came to Grise Fiord from camps situated at a distance from the administrative-trading centres of their respective regions; therefore, following the move to Grise Fiord where a single settlement was constituted in 1962, they

833. Gunther, p. 371.

834. Grant, vol. 1, Chronology. This observation does not seem to have been picked up by Gunther.

835. Freeman, p. 681.

experienced certain amenities otherwise lacking in camp life. The proximity to a store (albeit of very limited capability to satisfy consumer demand), to medical aid, to communication facilities (radio, post office, periodic aircraft arrivals) — all represented increased security and access to amenities. There were certain additional benefits to be derived from the administrative presence, such as occasional film showings, dances, parties, the use of certain facilities, and additional visiting potential. The small number of households in the community allowed significant physical improvements to be made to each, utilizing surplus materials within the community.

Despite the benefits of small size, there are certain disadvantages too, more especially when the compactness encapsulates powerfully divisive forces. It should be apparent from the foregoing material that there remained in fact quite discrete social groupings within the small confines of the settlement. Temporary alignments might cross these group lines, but sometimes disputes within a group caused further factionalism...

Another serious problem of small size was the shortage of potential spouses for the young people approaching marriageable age.⁸³⁶

In 1966, the administration of Inuit housing was put into the hands of local committees. This led to a growing awareness, according to Freeman, of not only the need to exert meaningful influence over local affairs but also the knowledge of how this was being achieved elsewhere. He gives various examples of the exertion of influence, including two complaints in 1966 about the conduct of a local RCMP officer and various successful petitions of government in 1966 and succeeding years.⁸³⁷

⁸³⁶. Freeman, pp. 681-682. Note that Freeman is referring to amenities in place after 1962 and not to the earlier Inuit community on the Lindstrom Peninsula. Note, as well, that in 1953 the Inukjuak families lived 5, 15 and 50 miles from the post at Inukjuak (Gunther, p. 173)

⁸³⁷. Freeman, p. 682.

1968

Conditions at Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay

In 1968, Grise Fiord got its first nurse. It was reported that division between the two communities, Inukjuak and Pond Inlet, continued "as strong as always and remains the greatest obstacle to the community morale". Four more snow mobiles were bought that year by members of the community bringing the total to sixteen. It was suggested that there was sufficient game in the area to support another five families. Three of the eligible males were going to Fort Churchill and Arctic Bay to seek spouses. A second classroom was added to the school with a second teacher. The co-op moved into its own building but for the second year in a row was operating at a loss as a result of retail prices set by Ottawa which did not take into account the costs of shipping and handling. Goods were, as a result, being sold at a loss and there was disappointment about this in the community.⁸³⁸

At Resolute Bay there was a serious drop in morale with the co-op running up a large debt amounting, on a per family basis, to between \$500 and \$1,500. The co-op was owed between \$19,000 and \$33,000 for fuel that had not been paid for in the previous two or three years. The RCMP report referred to a "lack of community spirit". Hunting during the dark period had declined and in mid-December 1968 the village was short of meat. People said that they had been existing on "tea and bannock". The local construction company sold some food and more food was flown in in January 1969. Alcohol consumption was on the increase and there was a death in an alcohol-related accident. The shift away from hunting as a major source of subsistence was now complete. It was reported that "all the

838. As referred to in Gunther, pp. 351-352.

Eskimos that do wish to work have no trouble finding employment on this base either part or full-time".⁸³⁹

Hunting continued to be a major activity at Grise Fiord in the late 1960s. In 1968, the population at Grise Fiord was eighty-nine consisting of seventeen families. At Resolute Bay, in 1968, the population was one hundred and sixty-one consisting of twenty-three families.⁸⁴⁰

1969 and Following

Returning to Inukjuak

Marcus states that over the sixteen years after 1969, six families from Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay moved back to Inukjuak on their own initiative.⁸⁴¹

The report prepared by Hickling Corporation states as follows:

The records indicate that early in the 1970s Inuit families living at both Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay approached the government of the Northwest Territories requesting assistance to travel to Inukjuak to visit relatives and assess whether they wished to be relocated to that community on a permanent basis. The territorial government, which had by that time assumed responsibility for the administration of Inuit Affairs from the Federal government, acceded to this request and paid the costs of both the exploratory visits and the permanent relocation. These costs were later recovered from the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. The RCMP used their own aircraft on at least one occasion for this purpose during the same period and appear to have absorbed the costs involved. During the 1980s, additional families from both Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay returned to Inukjuak,

839. As referred to in Gunther, pp. 359-360.

840. Gunther, pp. 295-296.

841. Alan R. Marcus, "Out in the Cold: The Legacy of Canada's Inuit Relocation Experiment in the High Arctic" (Copenhagen: The International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, 1992), p. 86.

initially at their own expense or with help from Makivik Corporation. These transportation costs were also reimbursed by the department in 1988-89. In the same year, the department also contributed approximately \$700,000 to the government of Quebec to offset the impact of this influx of people on the province's housing plan for Inukjuak.⁸⁴²

Marcus reports that twenty-two people moved back to Inukjuak in July to September 1988 in response to the government-finance scheme.⁸⁴³

Soberman was unable to find an accurate record of all those who returned to Inukjuak. He determined that in the 1960s, several individuals returned to Inukjuak. Between 1970 and 1980, over twenty people returned to Inukjuak, some as individuals or couples, some as families. In the 1980s, and especially in 1988, when the government offered to pay for the return of families, at least five more families returned. He estimated that between forty and fifty inhabitants of Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay, including a number of young children and a few in their teens or twenties returned to Inukjuak in the three decades following the relocation.⁸⁴⁴

The government's November 20, 1992 response to the parliamentary committee acknowledges that some people "managed to move back on their own in the 1960s". The government response states as follows:

842. Hickling Corporation, "Assessment of the Factual Basis of Certain Allegations made before the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs concerning the relocation of Inukjuak Inuit families in the 1950s" September 1990, p. 42.

843. Marcus, p. 87.

844. Daniel Soberman, "Report to the Canadian Human Rights Commission on the Complaints of the Inuit People Relocated from Inukjuak and Pond Inlet, to Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay in 1953 and 1955" December 11, 1991, p. 7.

It appears that, beginning in the late 1950s, some of the Inukjuak families began asking to return home, based on their understanding that the government had promised them they could return to Inukjuak, at government expense, if after one or two years in the high Arctic they no longer wished to remain there. For reasons that are not entirely clear, these requests were not expeditiously dealt with, and it was not until the 1970s that the government of the Northwest Territories began moving people back to Inukjuak in response to their requests to return. Some, however, had managed to move back on their own in the 1960s.⁸⁴⁵

Government Assessments of Other Relocations

There were a number of movements of Inuit in the 1960s and 1970s for the purpose of pursuing employment opportunities, including employment opportunities in southern Canada. There was a good deal of discussion with a view to ensuring the success of such projects. In August 1969, one member of the Department, commenting on papers that had been prepared in this regard, commented on the social aspects of relocation and stated as follows:

In particular, I suggest that relocation is more apt to succeed where there is easy communication and transportation to the home settlement and where a strongly cohesive Eskimo group exists, provided such a group is able to establish some link with the new community. There is a need, first of all, then, for financial assistance to make possible frequent visits home. Secondly, there is the need for a skillful group worker who can both support existing group cohesion while at the same time assisting the Eskimo group to establish ties with the new community.⁸⁴⁶

845. "A Response to the Recommendations of the Second Report of the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs in the Relocation of the Inukjuak Inuit to Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay", tabled in the House of Commons November 20, 1992, p. 2.

846. Supervisor, Social Development Section, to Acting Chief, Social and Cultural Development Division, August 29, 1969, Northwest Territories

Earlier discussions had identified the need to integrate the experience from previous relocation projects; to provide full information with counselling of prospective families before initial acceptance into a relocation program; the recognition of the importance of relocating groups with good kinship ties and speaking the same dialect, the need to ensure that the conditions of acceptance were well understood; and the need to provide some amount of counselling support to the relocatees and assistance if they wished to move from the southern location into other accommodation and occupations.⁸⁴⁷

These forward-looking observations undoubtedly reflect the lessons of experience. One does not see, however, a reappraisal of the Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord settlements as ongoing projects, in light of the experience gained since 1953, which takes account of the need to maintain links to the home community, to provide for frequent visits, to take groups which share a common dialect and linked by kinship, to establish clearly the conditions of participation, and to ensure these are understood.

Stevenson's 1977 Report on the Relocation

In 1977, the Department requested Alex Stevenson to prepare a report of the High Arctic relocation. His report is dated November 1977.

His report reviewed the early history of the involvement of Europeans with the Inuit through the whaling period and the early fur trade with some of the changes that this brought about. He refers to some of the relocation

Archives, Stevenson Papers; document provided by Grant.

847. As reflected in the results of a meeting held September 4-5, 1968 document entitled "Relocation of Eskimo Families Conclusions Reached in Discussion September 4-5, 1968", chaired by the Assistant Deputy Minister, Northern Development; Northwest Territories Archives, Stevenson Papers; document provided by Grant.

influenced by the activities of fur traders including the 1934 relocation to Dundas Harbour which he refers to as having a dual purpose as follows:

This would serve the dual purpose of sovereign rights in the Arctic Archipelago by greater occupation than one or two RCMP detachments but also Inuit from selected poor hunting and trapping areas might reap the benefit of the available wildlife.

He refers to the fact that the Inuit involved were told that after two years, if they wished, they could return to their respective home settlements. He refers to this attempt at colonization as being a limited success. The difficulty was that travelling in the area was very difficult as a result of ice conditions in the summer and rough ice along the coast in the winter. The trading post was closed in 1936 with the Pangnirtung families being returned home and the Pond Inlet people, who were on familiar terrain, being landed at Arctic Bay. The Cape Dorset people "who were an adventurous group under the leadership of an outstanding hunter...agreed to remain at Arctic Bay." He states that in 1937, they agreed to move to Fort Ross and, in 1947, to Spence Bay. He refers to the fact that this initial relocation and the subsequent relocations have been criticized on the basis that the Inuit were "pawns of government and commerce"; who "although nomadic, take a great deal of time to get used to unknown country"; with the breaking of ties with distant relatives causing stress"; with problems of mingling or marriage between the Inuit of different regions; and without research surveys and planning which included full consideration of the desires and needs of the Inuit. He disposes of these criticisms as follows:

All hindsight juggling attitudes and actions of the past by known experience and the social conscience of today.

In a companion report dealing specifically with the High Arctic relocations, Stevenson refers to the economic concerns giving rise to the relocation as follows:

Encouragement and assistance were given to various groups of Inuit to move voluntarily from areas where they were finding difficulty in making a satisfactory living from the available resources to areas where hunting and trapping were more favourable or where there were opportunities for steady employment. Economic conditions were poor in the Port Harrison area of Arctic Quebec at this time. The local people were experiencing a declining fur take and other resources such as Caribou.

Referring to the August 1953 meeting between the Department and the RCAF and the statement which was made at that time that "the Canadian government is anxious to have Canadians occupying as much of the Arctic as possible and it appears that in many areas the Eskimos are the only people capable of doing this", Stevenson observes that "no doubt sovereignty was of concern to some...".

He states that "Arctic Quebec was experiencing an increasing population placing a strain on the rather limited country food resources available". He refers to the RCMP being requested to seek out volunteers and also about the arrangements that were made to have Pond Inlet people join the relocation to assist in the adaptation. He comments, with respect to the concern that the Port Harrison people would have difficulty in adjusting as follows:

I do not believe this was ever proved as a necessary precondition for the Harrison people adapted rapidly and extremely well to the High Arctic.

Stevenson states that one of the key officers involved in the project was "Mr. J. Cantley, a veteran fur trader and former assistant HBC Fur Trade Commissioner. He organized the trade supplies required, purchasing them from funds made available from the Eskimo loan fund to a leading Eskimo in the two groups to be moved. He subsequently handled the fur returns when they were sent to the auction house in Montreal. The two projects were designed to be entirely self-contained." He states that "The philosophy of the time was that the Eskimos selected were essential

hunters and trappers and with assistance and guidance they could make a better living for themselves in the unpopulated High Arctic areas. The possibility of employment was not overlooked for at least some of these people might find even temporary employment at one time or another at the Resolute Weather Station or other Weather Stations in the High Arctic. However, the main purpose of the experiment was to enable the people to live the traditional life of hunters and trappers obtaining all the country food they needed and sufficient fur and other produce to purchase other requirements from the native store."

He refers to the fact that the RCMP at Fort Chimo reported on a number of Inuit who would like to move and suggests that this was because they had heard about the proposed relocation and had made inquiries about the possibility of joining it. (Stevenson's research and memory failed to recall the fact that the Fort Chimo detachment was asked specifically to recruit Inuit for the relocation.)

He states that within two years the people had adapted to their new environment and appeared extremely happy, getting plenty of country food and furs. "They had no desire to return home and asked that arrangements be made to have some of their relatives from Harrison and Pond Inlet join them." He refers to the employment opportunities that presented themselves at Resolute Bay and goes on as follows:

Although the Craig Harbour later Grise Fiord group did not have the opportunities of employment they continued to obtain a good livelihood from the country and this community also served a distinct purpose in confirming in a tangible manner Canada's sovereignty over this vast region of the Arctic.

He refers to the discussions about 1960 of extending the relocation projects. He states that "The files do not reflect whether any ever moved back to Port Harrison. In the early years as this was an experiment, the understanding was, should it fail or the Harrison people wish to return to their original homes, they could do so. There were rumors from time to time

in the first seven years that there were some dissatisfied or were homesick but this was never confirmed or were there any approaches on record having been made to officials of the Federal or Territorial governments. In this regard, there was also from a sociological point of view some expressions being made that the Baffin Islanders were not interested or avoided interrelation with the Port Harrison people. Here again, there is nothing on file to confirm this." He goes on as follows:

Since 1970 the Territorial government has had full responsibility for the two High Arctic communities in question. It might require an update report from them to round out the record. I understand that recently there was some question on the background of the initial moves indicating there was coercion or force. This is not so. Also, apparently one or two of the originals or their descendants wish to now go back to Port Harrison. This might have been expected in the first few years of the projects but I do not think anyone could have suspected that some twenty-five years later people would want to go back to their original homes holding the government to a promise made so long ago.

On the original moves people in the Department and the RCMP responsible for organizing these were experienced and knowledgeable officers with a northern background. There were also good interpreters who assisted in order to avoid any misunderstandings. This is not to say misunderstandings were not possible regardless of the precautions and plans. Furthermore, in light of the conditions of the day and the communications, the efforts of relocation were definitely in the interests of the people who moved. They were certainly successful projects and they benefited these Inuit, who indicated to many associated with them their happiness and satisfaction in their new location. Some could say yes, they benefited only materially, for often such moves cause trauma for people in transition. However, many events and factors such as urbanization in a rapidly changing North over the past twenty-five years since the initial move, have contributed to changes and attitudes in all Canadians both North and South. Looking at the past in today's so-called more enlightened society and with hindsight always suggest approaches which might have been better made at any point in time. In 1953 even the most visionary could not see the Arctic of today and

the Inuit people with more material possessions, education, increased life expectancy, better health, more help in adversity. ...the efforts of the government in 1953 to ease the transition and ameliorate the impacts of the South were thought to be the best possible at that time. The future of the Canadian Inuit is one which has no easy panacea and the value in human terms cannot be simply expressed.⁸⁴⁸

Stevenson defends the action taken in 1953 in 1953's terms but he does not address the contemporary needs of relocatees on the basis of contemporary knowledge about the consequences of the relocations. His comments appear to be heavily influenced by his belief that the Inuit had been happy with their new surroundings.

In December 1981, Stevenson received a letter indicating that the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories wished to interview him on the move of the Inuit to the High Arctic in 1953. He responded in January 1982 by enclosing a copy of his 1977 report and reiterating that the claim of coercion was "absolutely untrue". He refers to a trip that he made in 1967 with Stuart Hodgson, who was Deputy Commissioner, later to become Commissioner of the Northwest Territories, to Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord. "Here we had public meetings and Stu asked the people many questions about their living conditions and settlements in the High Arctic. Well, the well-known Pond Inlet hunter was still living then as were a number of the leading Port Harrison people. They all spoke in glowing and satisfactory terms of the High Arctic giving them a better way of life."⁸⁴⁹

In March 1983, the Commissioner of the Northwest Territories wrote to the Deputy Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs in response to a letter

848. A. Stevenson, "Inuit Relocation — High Arctic" (November 1977), Northwest Territories Archives, Stevenson Papers; document provided by Grant.

849. Stevenson to Director General, Ottawa Liaison Bureau, Government of the Northwest Territories, January 13, 1982, Northwest Territories Archives, Stevenson Papers; document provided by Grant.

of December 1982 from the Deputy Minister and an earlier letter of August 16, 1982 concerning the relocation. He encloses a copy of Stevenson's November 1977 report and makes the observation, "It seems there is no doubt that the people moved entirely of their own free will, but it also seems likely that promises were made to return them should the scheme not work out. I am sure that no one in government expected that the promise of relocation would be called on more than twenty-five years after the original move. The people have done reasonably well and I think have received a high level of attention from both the Federal and Territorial governments."⁸⁵⁰

Chronology of Events Leading up to the Commission's Hearings

On February 1, 1993, at the request of the Commission, Mary Simon and Roger Tassé presented a report to the Royal Commission on the relocation and recommending possible courses of action for the consideration of the Royal Commission. That report sets out a chronology of events in the 1980s and early 1990s leading up to the Commission's hearings. The chronology is as follows:

John Amagoalik, then President of Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC), in his appearance before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs in March 1990, testified that they had been dealing with the relocation issue for more than thirty years. Since the late 1970s, the Makivik Corporation (Makivik) as well as the ITC made repeated representations to various DIAND ministers and deputy ministers concerning the relocation. Renewed efforts began in 1982. The following represents only what appear to be the most salient events.

850. Commissioner, Northwest Territories, to Deputy Minister of Northern Affairs and Northern Development, March 29, 1983, Northwest Territories Archives, Stevenson Papers.

1982

- On August 16, the deputy minister of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) wrote to the Inuit Committee on National Issues stating that on several occasions in previous years families from Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay had asked for assistance in moving back to Inukjuak, insisting that they had been promised that, if they did not like the High Arctic, the government would move them back. The Deputy Minister's letter stated that "*we have nothing on file to indicate that such a promise was ever made. Even if it had been, I suspect that it was for a limited number of years following their location...*".
- The Makivik Research Department published a paper by W.B Kemp, "The relocation of Inuit from the Port Harrison region of Hudson Bay to the High Arctic communities of Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord". The paper stated that "certain aspects of relocation imply that sovereignty was considered but not as a central issue".

1983

- The minister of DIAND (Munro) presented a discussion paper prepared by Environment Canada entitled "*Environment Canada and the North*" at the Third General Assembly of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference held in Frobisher Bay in July which stated that "*to further entrench the sovereignty claim the government relocated Inuit people from northern Quebec to the Arctic islands in the mid-1950s*".

1984

- Mark M. Hammond, an independent consultant, is commissioned by DIAND to determine whether there had in fact been a promise by the government of Canada to the relocated Inuit to finance their return to their original homes in Inukjuak and Pond Inlet. The report of August 3, 1984 (Hammond) indicated that Inuit who were moved to the High Arctic in 1950s quite likely received a promise from the government that they could return after two years if they so desired.

1985

- In February, the minister of DIAND (Crombie) met with Inuit relocatees at Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord. The relocatees claimed that they had been promised that if they wanted to return after two years they could do so, but that their requests were turned down. They discussed the relocation issue with the minister and the re-settlement back to Inukjuak for those who might wish to return.
- The December report of the Task Force to review comprehensive claims policy, *Living Treaties: Lasting Agreements*, stated that "thirty years ago the federal government strengthened Canadian sovereignty by moving several hundred Inuit from northern Quebec to Ellesmere and Cornwallis islands in the High Arctic, where they established the communities of Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay".

1987

- Makivik, ITC and the Kativik regional government issue a "Position Paper regarding Grise Fiord/Resolute Bay relocation issue" (January 20th) which deals with such matters as the building of thirteen new housing units in Inukjuak, moving expenses for those individuals and families who had already returned to Inukjuak as well as those who still intended to return, in addition to other compensatory and remedial measures. All demands that were presented again to the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs on March 19, 1990.
- On September 30th, the minister of DIAND (McKnight) agreed to fund the construction of ten new housing units in Inukjuak and to pay for the transportation of those who may wish to move in 1988-1989. The minister also offered to provide some recognition for the contribution of the Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay communities towards asserting Canadian Arctic sovereignty. Alternatively, the minister raised the possibility that the relocation of Inuit from northern Quebec to Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay be recognized specifically as an event of national historic significance.

1988

- The government proceeds to reimburse those families who had returned previously to Inukjuak at their own expense and to defray the moving cost of those families who wished to return to Inukjuak.
- The government undertakes the construction of 10 new housing units in Inukjuak, after the Inuit had requested 13 units.
- In July-September, twenty-two Inuit moved back to Inukjuak.
- The minister declined, however, to continue discussions on the other items which were included in the Makivik/ITC Position Paper.

1989

- On March 23rd, Makivik wrote the minister of DIAND (Cadieux) requesting action on their demands for compensatory and remedial measures still outstanding. These demands included:
 1. Compensation for personal property losses incurred by those Inuit from Grise Fiord/Resolute Bay who relocated back to Inukjuak at their own expense since 1970;
 2. A Heritage Trust Fund of \$10 million as compensation to the original nineteen relocated families, their children and descendants;
 3. Housing and transportation costs for those wishing to return to Inukjuak in future;
 4. Travel costs for yearly visits of separated families;
 5. Official recognition of Grise Fiord/Resolute Bay Inuit in assisting in establishing Canadian sovereignty in the High Arctic;
 6. Economic and social assistance to support adjustment of Inuit relocatees returning to Inukjuak;

7. Municipal and educational infrastructure support for Inukjuak;
 8. Funding of Makivik for future discussions, consultations and negotiations relating to relocation issue;
 9. Reimbursement of negotiation costs incurred by Makivik.
- On May 12, the minister replied that the federal government had fulfilled all its commitments in relation to the relocation of the Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay Inuit and therefore he did *"not believe that a meeting is necessary to discuss this situation"*.

1990

- On March 19, ITC and Makivik representatives as well as Inuit relocatees appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, tabled a Position Paper and testified on the relocation issue. Retired RCMP officer, Bob Pilot, was also heard by the Committee on June 18. Documents were tabled by Makivik and ITC representatives including the 1984 Hammond Report, the 1987 Makivik/ITC Position Paper as well as copies of correspondence and other documents.
- The deputy minister of DIAND submitted a 10-page Response to the Standing Committee on May 15, 1990 providing the federal government's view point on the relocation issue and arguing that the *"records indicate, quite simply, that there was no malice or wrongdoing by departmental officers in the relocation project. The basic motivation — the assurance of country food supplies and somewhat enhanced employment opportunities — was honorable, and there seems to have been some effort to anticipate and avoid the inevitable problems of relocation"*.

In the words of the deputy minister, *"It is 37 years since the first people moved from Inukjuak to Resolute Bay and Grise Fiord. With the passage of time, the facts surrounding the project have become altered in the memories of the people concerned. It is important to examine the beliefs of the present"*

which are undoubtedly sincere, in the light of observations made at the time."

The letter also stated that *"feelings are not facts, no matter how fervently held. They should not be allowed to obscure the historical record"*.

- In its June 19 unanimous report to the House of Commons, the Standing Committee made five recommendations requiring the government to:
 1. Acknowledge the role played by the Inuit relocated to the High Arctic in the protection of Canadian sovereignty in the North;
 2. Issue an apology for the wrongdoings carried out against the people of Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay;
 3. Carry out such an apology with due solemnity and respect;
 4. Accompany the apology with some form of recognition of the contribution of the Inuit of Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay to Canadian sovereignty; and,
 5. Consider compensation to the Inuit of these two communities for their service to Canada and for the wrongdoings that have been inflicted upon them.
- Following the tabling of the Standing Committee Report in the House of Commons, DIAND commissioned the Hickling Corporation, which provided Bud Neville, an independent outside consultant mutually acceptable to both Makivik and DIAND, to assess the factual basis of the allegations that led to the Standing Committee Report, as they relate to the department. The Hickling Report, *"Assessment of the factual basis of certain allegations made before the Standing Committee on aboriginal affairs concerning the relocation of Inukjuak Inuit families in the 1950s"*, was completed in September. The report was primarily based on a documentary survey although the researchers *"also interviewed a number of key informants, including some members of the Inuit groups that were involved in the relocations that are the subject of our study"*. (p. 3)

- The main findings and conclusions of the Hickling Report may be summarized as follows:
 - (i) The government's decision to relocate the Inuit to the High Arctic in the 1950s was not "*motivated primarily by a concern to strengthen Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic Islands*", but by "*a concern to improve the living conditions of the Inuit, particularly in the Hudson Bay region...*" and to provide them "*with new and better economic opportunities to improve hunting, trapping and possible wage employment*". (p. 44)
 - (ii) Reasonable steps were taken by the government to establish and apply suitable criteria for the selection of Inuit to be relocated. (p. 44)
 - (iii) There was no deliberate attempt by government officials to deceive or mislead the Inuit participants and reasonable efforts seem to have been made to explain the project to the Inuit involved before their leaving and explain that their participation was voluntary. (p. 45)
 - (iv) It is more than likely that some of the Inuit could not completely envisage what conditions in the Arctic would be like because these things were outside the range of personal experience at the time. (p. 45)
 - (v) There was a promise made to the Inuit that they could return to their original communities after one, two, or three years, if that was their wish, but there was no evidence to suggest that the government intended this undertaking to remain in force indefinitely. (p. 45)
 - (vi) DIAND is justified in rejecting all allegations to the effect that it was guilty of willfully perpetrating wrongdoings of one kind or another in the conduct of the relocation. (p. 51)
 - (vii) There are no grounds for an apology by the government for the manner in which the relocation of the 1950s was conceived, planned and carried out. To apologize for a wrongdoing it did not commit would constitute deception on the part of government and would imply that the

project was a failure, when, in fact, it was a reasonably successful endeavor. (p. 57)

- On November 19th, the minister of DIAND (Siddon) tabled the government's response to the recommendations of the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs, rejecting each of the five recommendations of the Committee:
 - (i) The Inuit were not relocated in order to protect or affirm Canadian sovereignty in the North but to assist them in their traditional livelihood. The government indicated its appreciation for the assistance of the Inuit who moved to Grise Fiord in the proper management of Canada's Northern Territories.
 - (ii) The government cannot acknowledge that it acted improperly in the design and implementation of the project. It acknowledged, however, a "*moral obligation*" to fulfill the promises that were made to the Inuit that they could be returned to their original community.
 - (iii) No apology is required since the government's investigations did not indicate any wrongdoing.
 - (iv) The government's response indicated that all those who have served or lived in the Canadian Arctic deserved to be recognized for the contribution they have made to Canadian sovereignty but that it would not be appropriate for only one small group of Canadians to be singled out particularly for recognition.
 - (v) The government's response indicated that there was only one area where compensation was appropriate and that had to do with the funding of the relocation of Inuit wanting to return to Inukjuak.

1991

- In January, the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC), at the urging of the Inuit, decided to review the complaints made by the Inuit before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and made an informal arrangement with ITC and DIAND to conduct a review of the complaints and their surrounding circumstances. The CHRC

review was carried out by Dr. Daniel Soberman, a former dean of Queen's University Law School. In the course of his review of the complaints, Soberman visited Grise Fiord, Resolute Bay, Pond Inlet and Inukjuak and interviewed many of the original Inuit relocatees as well as former and current civil servants including RCMP officers. All relevant documents were also made available to Soberman by interested parties. Dr. Soberman reported (December) that the substance of the Inuit claims was generally agreed to be as follows:

- (i) *The primary reason for relocating Inuit families from northern Quebec to the High Arctic in 1953 and 1954 was to strengthen Canada's claim to territorial sovereignty over the Eastern Arctic archipelago.*
- (ii) *This purpose was not disclosed to them but rather they were told they were being moved solely for the altruistic reason of improving their quality of life, and especially with respect to the availability of "country-food" (game).*
- (iii) *They were promised they would be returned to their original home without expense if, within "two or three years they stated they were not happy with the new location and wished to return.*
- (iv) *The relocation itself in terms of both planning and implementation was seriously flawed and inadequate, resulting in unnecessary hardship to the relocated families.*
- (v) *A large proportion of the Inuit families asked to be returned but the promise to return them was not kept.*
- (vi) *The result has been long-term hardship for many of the families, caused primarily by separation from other members of their family in the south.*
- (vii) *The relocation did in fact strengthen Canada's claim to territorial sovereignty. (pp. 3-4)*

• Dr. Soberman's conclusions may be summarized as follows.

- (i) *In the early 1950s, the government of Canada had concerns about effective occupation of the Canadian*

Arctic, primarily because of increasing activity and numbers of United States armed services personnel in the region, but also because of long-term hunting visits of Greenland Inuit to Ellesmere Island. The combination of these elements was likely to have influenced the planned location of two settlements on Ellesmere Island. (p. 55)

- (ii) Soberman found no direct evidence "that either immediately before or at the time of the relocations of the Inuit, the government in Ottawa expressly decided to use them as a significant factor in reinforcing the Canadian claim to Arctic sovereignty. No document that I have examined coming from the highest levels of government, directly states that the reason — or a primary reason — for relocating Inuit...was to enhance Canadian claims to territorial sovereignty in the High Arctic". (p. 11)

He concluded, however, on a review of all the evidence available, that "on the balance of probabilities, it is reasonable to conclude that sovereignty was a material, even if not a dominant, concern of the Canadian government and may well have influenced relocation decisions". (p. 12)

In addition, he found that the establishment of two permanent Inuit settlements was viewed by the government of Canada as reinforcing and contributing in a material way to Canada's claims of sovereignty over its Arctic territories. (pp. 55-56)

- (iii) The government had promised the Inuit that if they so wished, they would be returned to Inukjuak, at most within three years after the relocation in 1953. The government failed to meet its fiduciary duties of care and diligence in not taking steps in the first few years to honour its promise of return. The government also failed to meet its fiduciary duties of care and diligence in planning and carrying out the relocation. (p. 56)
- (iv) The relocatees of 1953 suffered unnecessary hardship, particularly in the first year — as did to a lesser extent the relocatees in 1955 — caused by inadequate planning and implementation of the project. (p. 56)

(v) The hardship of the Inuit was aggravated by the long delays and difficulties that many of the first generation relocatees encountered in finding their way back to Inukjuak. The delays resulted in long-distance separation of different generations of the same family (p. 56)

- Soberman recommended that the government formally acknowledge the contribution of the Inuit relocatees to Canadian sovereignty in the High Arctic and publicly thank them; that the federal government apologize for the shortcomings in planning the relocation, particularly with respect to providing adequate equipment and housing for the first winter, and in failing to provide schools and nursing facilities in the early years.

Soberman further recommended that the federal government should recognize its responsibility for its failure to honour its promise to return Inuit to Inukjuak and for the unhappy consequences for many Inuit families. It was also recommended that the federal government relocate any other Inuit desiring to return to Inukjuak and to provide them with housing as well as fund regular visits between families and the communities of Grise Fiord/Resolute Bay and Inukjuak. Soberman did not specifically discuss the question of compensation. (p. 57) In his June 29, 1993 presentation to the Commission, he advised that he left the question of compensation open in the expectation that his report would lead to further mediation between the relocatees and the government.

1992

- On January 15, the minister of DIAND in commenting on Dr. Soberman's Report, noted with satisfaction that the Report recognized "*that the primary motivations for the project were humane*" and that "*this is the second independent study to reject the claim that the project was primarily an effort by Canada to assert sovereignty in the Arctic*". The minister also noted that Soberman pointed out hardships created by supply problems in the first winter, by the separation resulting from relocation, by the difficulties of communications between Inuit and non-Inuit and by slowness in returning those who eventually wanted to go back to Inukjuak. The minister noted

that all of these concerns had been acknowledged by the government of Canada.

- The minister also indicated that the government had already provided support in the form of transportation and housing for the Inuit who wanted to return to Inukjuak and that approximately \$1 million had already been provided for this purpose. He also indicated that the moving expenses of any other Inuit who wanted to return to Inukjuak would be paid for by the government.
- Finally, the minister indicated that the other recommendations of the Soberman Report were generally acceptable to the government and that he would want to discuss them with the Inuit to determine how and when they could be implemented.
- On the same day, (January 15) the representatives of ITC expressed satisfaction with the Soberman Report indicating that it validated many of the complaints of the Inuit relocatees. The ITC underlined Soberman's finding that the government of Canada had failed in its fiduciary duties of care and diligence toward the relocatees. The ITC requested the government to honour their request for the establishment of a Heritage Trust Fund and for compensation.
- On February 11, the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs presented a second Report to the House of Commons. Noting that new evidence reaffirmed and reinforced the earlier views of the Committee, it recommended that the government implement, through consultation with the Inuit people, the recommendations contained in its Report to the House of Commons of June 19, 1990.
- On June 4, Makivik and ITC issued a press release indicating that the minister of DIAND had refused to meet with Inuit relocatees to resolve their outstanding claims.
- On June 8th, four relocatees who had moved back to Inukjuak testified before a panel of the RACP (Dussault, Sillett and Wilson) in Inukjuak. The Co-Chair informed the witnesses that the RCAP would look into the matter and get back to them.
- Nine months earlier (August 1991), and while the Soberman's review was under way, DIAND commissioned Professor Magnus

Gunther of the Department of Political Studies at Trent University, to conduct further documentary research into all the allegations made concerning the relocation, including those of the Inuit witnesses appearing before the Standing Committee in 1990 and those contained in the studies published after the completion of the Hickling Report.

- The Gunther Report which was completed in August 1992 is basically a review of three other reports dealing with the relocation. One of these is the Hickling Report. The other two were prepared by S.D. Grant *"A case of compounded error: The Inuit re-settlement project 1953, and the government's response 1990"*, (Spring 1991) and A.R. Marcus, *"Out in the Cold: The legacy of Canada's Inuit relocation experiment in the High Arctic, 1953-1990"*. (1992). Gunther also referred to the Soberman Report in his report.

The Gunther Report made a number of findings and reached conclusions that may be summarized as follows:

- (i) *"There was no de facto or de jure threat to Canadian sovereignty on Ellesmere Island"*.(p. 376) In his view *"evidence in support of the sovereignty claim is flimsy and flawed. This evidence against this claim is overwhelming"*. (p. 75)
- (ii) On the question whether the Inuit relocatees fully understood the proposal to relocate, Gunther found that *"the fact that their understanding of the project was far from complete does not mean that it was non-voluntary nor that it was an unreasonable decision to make"*. The relocatees *"were among the poorest of the poor in the district"*. They were promised that they could return home after a few years if they wished, as well as the constant presence of RCMP detachment. Gunther concluded that, *"in these terms they understood and were interested in participating in the project"*. (pp. 151-152)
- (iii) After noting that *"the main purpose of the projects was to deal with what was perceived to be a problem of over population in relation to resources in northern Quebec"*, Gunther found that, *"the planning for what supplies the*

trading post would carry was neither perfect nor incompetent. A few serious errors were made". (p. 245)

- (iv) *After noting that there are "repeated statements in the documents guaranteeing the Inuit they could return after one or two years if the re-settlement did not suit them", he found that officials in the field conveyed "to volunteers some of the changes they would face in the High Arctic, the two-month long dark period, short days and one annual supply visit". (p. 246)*
- (v) *Gunther acknowledged that "the separation of the groups was handled inadequately, caused unnecessary hardship and showed an unacceptable level of insensitivity towards the Inuit settlers and was high-handed". (p. 247)*
- (vi) *Gunther also found that "the arrangements for employment at Resolute were not inadequate given the objectives of the project and the time of year the settlers arrived". He noted as well that the "missing supplies" at Resolute undoubtedly added to the stress of the first year, but expressed the view that DIAND "should not be blamed for the failings of the department of Transport". (p. 248)*
- (vii) *In the end, Gunther concluded that "in general, the **preparations**, given the truncated resources of the Department, the abject poverty of the participants, the parsimonious approach to government spending and the obsession with self-help and individual responsibility of the day, were adequate and acceptable". (p. 250, emphasis in the original)*

Later on in his Report, Gunther commented that "The notion of an adequate level of fiduciary responsibility must be measured in terms of what could reasonably be expected at that time, as various court decisions have shown. There is no concept in law of a universal standard of care irrespective of time, place and circumstance". (p. 77)

- (viii) *Gunther agreed in his report with previous findings that the government had made promises to the Inuit that*

they could return to Inukjuak if they were not happy in the High Arctic and that the government did not honour this promise.

- On November 20th, the minister of DIAND (Siddon) tabled a response in the House of Commons to the recommendations of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs on the relocation of the Inukjuak Inuit to Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay.

In its response, the government indicated that it had taken account of research completed following the Hickling Report and relied upon the findings of the CHRC (Soberman) and, on points of historical details, the research conducted by Professor Gunther.

The specific government responses to each of the recommendations of the Standing Committee may be summarized as follows:

- (i) The Inuit were relocated from Inukjuak to Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay to assist them to continue to pursue their traditional way of life based on hunting and trapping. The response noted that the economic circumstances of most of those relocated did improve in comparison to their former situation. The response emphasized that the relocation was not made in order to affirm or protect Canadian sovereignty in the High Arctic. It acknowledged, however, that Inuit presence had made a valuable contribution to building the Canadian presence in the region.
- (ii) The relocation having been initiated with human intentions and based upon the consent of those moved, it would be inappropriate for the government to apologize for having initiated and carried out the relocation.

In referring to the Soberman Report, the government acknowledged, however, that there were deficiencies in the manner in which the relocation was prepared and implemented and that the Inuit suffered both emotional and physical stress by having been moved so far from their own community and relatives, and by being

separated from their peers and companions. The government also acknowledged that their first year in the Arctic was a very difficult one.

The government acknowledged that it behaved inappropriately in the failure to honour the promise made to the Inuit at the time of the relocation to return them to Inukjuak if they were not happy in the High Arctic. The government indicated that it was prepared to implement the recommendations of the Soberman report in that regard.

- (iii) While the government was not prepared to apologize for having undertaken the relocation, it was ready to acknowledge that there were shortcomings in the planning and implementation of the project, causing unintended emotional and physical hardship.
- (iv) The government was prepared to recognize the contribution of the relocated Inuit to the building of Canada's presence in the far north and to discuss with the Inuit a suitable memorial to commemorate the establishment of Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay in the 1950s.
- (v) The government was finally prepared to take further corrective actions including the expenditures for further relocations to Inukjuak, for additional housing if required, and for visits between family members, but indicated that payment of additional compensation was not contemplated.

- On November 26th, the ITC, on behalf of the Inuit relocatees, rejected the minister's response to the Standing Committee recommendations, taking serious objection to the findings of the Gunther report and labelling both the government response and the Gunther report as "*an insult*".

The ITC repeated that the relocation was imposed upon Inuit without their free and informed consent, and in addition, that it was executed poorly and in a manner that was inexcusably insensitive to the most basic needs of Inuit as human beings.

Specifically, the ITC argued that the federal government had breached its fiduciary duty to Inuit, first, in failing to obtain the free and informed consent of the Inuit to relocate; second, in its failure to provide properly for the basic food, shelter and other necessities of life; third, in its failure to fulfil its promise not to separate the families upon arrival in the High Arctic and to provide for the return of the Inuit at their option. The ITC called upon the Standing Committee "to study the federal government's inadequate and insulting response".

- On December 14th, the ITC wrote to the Co-chairs of the RCAP indicating that more extensive testimony was required by the relocatees themselves, as their testimony before the House of Commons Standing Committee in 1990 needed elaboration and collaboration. A formal request was made for hearings to be held.

The December 14, 1992 request for hearings led the Commission on January 15, 1993 to ask Mary Simon and Roger Tassé for a review and technical and strategic evaluation of a number of documents concerning the relocation. The purpose of the evaluation was to assist the Commission to determine future courses of action. The Simon/Tassé report of February 1, 1993, from which the chronology set out above was taken, concluded that the relocatees' allegations had not, overall, been addressed in an entirely fair and just manner by the government. First, the relocatees had not been given a meaningful opportunity to tell their full story. Second, the serious discrepancies in findings and conclusions found in reports and studies on many critical matters created a great deal of confusion and uncertainty about exactly what happened in the early 1950s.

The Commission accepted the conclusions of the Simon/Tassé report and held hearings on April 5-8, 1993 that gave the relocatees their first opportunity to tell their full story. The presentations made in April 1993 were summarized in Part 1 of this summary of supporting information. The Commission also held hearings on June 28-30 and July 5, 1993 to receive presentations from those who had already studied or reported on the relocation to assist the Commission in understanding better the different conclusions in their reports or studies. The Commission also heard in June

1993 from former officials and RCMP members as well as others with an interest in the relocation. Their presentations were summarized in Part 2 of this summary of supporting information. The Commission also invited a panel of experts to the June 1993 hearing to understand better the issue of Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. Their presentations are also referred to in Part 2 as well as in the sovereignty chapter of the Commission's report.

For further information:

Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples

P.O. Box 1993, Station B

Ottawa, Ontario


K1P 1B2

Telephone: (613) 943-2075

Facsimile: (613) 943-0304

Toll-free: 1-800-363-8235 (English, French, Chipewyan)
1-800-387-2148 (Cree, Inuktitut, Ojibwa)

ISBN 0-662-22335-7



9 780662 223351