



Commander
CANADIAN ARMY'S
Reading List



CANADIAN
ARMY



ARMÉE
CANADIENNE



Commander **CANADIAN ARMY'S** *Reading List*

Too many people believe that it is old-fashioned to set aside time to study like a student at school. This is wrong, because military leadership without knowledge never has been and never will be truly successful. History is full of examples of how battles and wars can be lost through lack of professional knowledge. ... Do not be under the impression that, as your career progresses, the piece of grey matter in your head will grow in size proportionate to the loftiness of your rank. You may be given more authority by promotion, but you are not by the same act given additional knowledge or ability. ... Formal education alone is not good enough. Self-education is the answer.

—General Jacques A. Dextraze, CDS, 1973





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AN OPEN CHALLENGE TO THE ARMY



J.M.M. Hainse
Lieutenant-General
Army Commander

Surmounting the challenges posed by the constantly emerging threats of the modern world requires the Canadian Army to be intellectually sharp, flexible and agile. Trends in globalization, technological innovation, demographic change, resource scarcity and the physical environment will continue to dramatically shape the future security environment. We have the responsibility and duty to respond to the challenges swiftly and professionally. This speaks directly to our Canadian Army tagline "Strong, Proud, Ready." When we respond, however, we need to do so in the correct way. We must have the intellectual ability to peer through friction, distortion, complexity and a host of old ideas deceptively wrapped in new clothing to discern the most effective means of overcoming challenges.

As the international scene continues to present new challenges, we need to foster excellence in the conventional and non-conventional domains of warfare. Today more than ever, subjects such as persistent engagements, comprehensive approaches, influence activities, IED threats, cyber threats and the space domain are evolving with such momentum that I believe self-development through reading needs to complement foundation training to generate the relevant force for the 21st-century battle space.

We must not take our own intellectual development for granted, and we must not let others do our thinking for us. I strongly support the philosophy behind offering you a reading list like this one because I truly believe that it is a self-development tool to help you deal more effectively with adversity and perform better under the pressures of the future security environment. The reading list reinforces your formal Army education, training and your experience. I cannot stress this enough—*when you read, you increase the problem-solving capability of the Army!*



In closing, I would like to challenge all of you in two ways. First, I challenge you to read as many books, articles and studies as you can, whether in this reading list or not, regardless of the tempo of your military and personal lives. Second, I challenge all of you to write in professional journals, primarily in *The Canadian Army Journal*. In this way, you will give substance to your reading efforts. More importantly, I honestly believe that you will genuinely contribute to the intellectual power of the Army.

J.M.M. Hainse
Lieutenant-General
Army Commander

Strong. Proud. Ready.



USING THIS READING LIST



R.D. Walker
Colonel
Commandant

The aim of this reading list is to provide soldiers with an instructive guide for exploring suitable literature on a broad range of themes. The list is robust, containing some 380 entries. It is a serious list for professional soldiers and students of war, but it does not in any way preclude leaders of any rank from creating their own reading lists for their own purposes; in fact this is strongly encouraged. The list also affords the Army the opportunity to highlight Canadian contributions to military thought. Canadian authors are identified by a small maple leaf next to the entry.

The list is land-centric. It is organized by major theme and not by developmental period. The themes have sub-themes, and there is *no* repetition of entries between

themes. Some entries could clearly fit more than one theme and we have decided where to place them based on the core thesis of the work. Robotics and autonomous systems, for example, could easily fit into "Technology, Science and Innovation" or "The Ethics of War," but we have placed titles under the latter and "Future Warfare." "Cyberwar" has also been placed under "Future Warfare." Thinkers on guerrilla warfare are found in "Modern Military Thought," while the distinct practice of counterinsurgency has been placed under "Specific Operations." "Doctrine" covers the evolution and application of doctrine, including the operational level of war, individual branches and combined arms. "Logistics," "Intelligence" and "Special Operations Forces" have been set as major themes. The "Culture and Conflict" theme covers both the culture of armies and the global conflict of cultures. Although "Aid to the Civil Power" and "Urban Operations" are not considered specific operations in our doctrine, they have been placed under "Specific Operations" for convenience. "Other Resources" consists of atlases, reference works, scholarly journals, Internet sources, and a small section on literature and fiction.

We have not created a critical thinking theme for two specific reasons. First, we believe the list itself expresses the intent. Second, we have produced a special section, **"Why We Should Study Military History and How to Do It."** This section describes a basic methodology for thinking critically about military matters.

The entries have been selected based on several criteria ranging from readability to controversial nature. We have not shied away from weightier books, as we feel that Canadian soldiers are capable of digesting them, if the interest is there. Entries are



listed alphabetically by author and include the title of the work, publication information including the ISBN where applicable, edition, page count and whether or not the work contains maps, charts and tables. The date of original publication is included in brackets. French works available in English and English works available in French are indicated. A brief annotation explains each work's core argument and its relevance.

If you are new to the military or your particular trade or subject of choice, it is recommended that you start with books that cover the breadth of a subject rather than a particular subject in depth. This approach will allow you to not only gain an overall context within which various subjects are discussed, but also to identify a number of subjects that you may wish to explore in greater detail later. You should also read the following section, "**Recommended Reading for the Young Soldier or Officer.**"

Some of the books listed here have been or will be reviewed in *The Canadian Army Journal*. Be sure to look up all of these book reviews either in the hard-copy or electronic edition of the *Journal*. The *Journal* can be found on the Army's homepage.

Maintenance of *Commander Canadian Army's Reading List* is currently vested with the Canadian Army Command and Staff College. Updates and additions to the list will be periodically produced by the Army Professional Military Education section of the Staff College. Suggestions for additional titles, including bibliographic data and ISBN, plus a brief synopsis, are welcome and should be submitted to

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WHY WE SHOULD STUDY MILITARY HISTORY AND HOW TO DO IT

Captain John N. Rickard, CD, PhD

With 2000 years of examples behind us we have no excuse when fighting, for not fighting well.

– T.E. Lawrence

Numerous books have been written on the benefit of studying military history in order to discern emerging trends. All military theorists have constructed their ideas out of historical materials. Napoleon believed that the only way one could acquire the “secret of the art of war” was to read “again and again” the campaigns of the great captains.¹ What follows is not a comprehensive treatment of the subject; rather, it offers some justification for studying the field and some guidance on how to move beyond casual reading to critical investigation of a subject.

Why Study Military History

Philosophically, Army professionals need to study the military past because the military future does not exist. Douglas MacArthur, during his time as Army Chief of Staff in 1935, noted that the military is “forced to depend upon intelligent interpretation of the past for signposts charting the future.”² *Intelligent* interpretation is the goal. Knowledge of military history does not guarantee that solutions to all problems will follow, but knowledge, properly wielded, can provide a *foundation for problem-solving*.³ The broadened perspective, sharpened judgment and increased perceptivity that will follow from a diligent study of military history are powerful tools for tackling our present problems.⁴

Studying the military past will also help boost critical thinking and support the Army's decision-making processes, including the estimate, mission analysis, and the operational planning process. It will also support innovative and improved Army training activities and approaches, enable the analysis and possible use of lessons identified in previous battles and campaigns, and increase understanding of our principles of war.⁵ We study so as to be able to better plan, conduct and lead

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1. David G. Chandler, *The Military Maxims of Napoleon* (London: Greenhill Books, 1994), 82.
 2. Quoted in Colonel Charles A. Willoughby, *Maneuver in War* (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1939), 1.
 3. John E. Jessup, Jr., and Robert W. Coakley, *A Guide to the Study and Use of Military History* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1990), xi.
 4. Department of the Army Ad Hoc Committee, *Report on the Army Need for the Study of Military History, Vol. 1: Report and Recommendations* (West Point, NY: May 1971), 51.
 5. B-GL-300-008/FP-001, *Training for Land Operations*, Annex G – Army War Studies for Land Operations, 2014.



operations. The doctrine we fight under is a reflection of past historical analysis. For example, manoeuvre warfare, officially adopted by the Canadian Army in 1996, was the product of historical analysis.

To my mind, studying military history provides a sort of intellectual inoculation against what I call pseudo-epiphanies, and facilitates rapid comparative recall. In his final year as a cadet at West Point, George Patton wrote in his notebook that in order to become a great soldier it was vital to become

so thoroughly conversant with all sorts of military possibilities that whenever an occasion arises he has at hand without effort on his part a parallel. Therefore, one must study military history. ... To attain this end I think that it is necessary for a man to read military history in its earliest and hence crudest form and to follow it down in natural sequence permitting his mind to grow with his subject until he can grasp without effort the most abstruse question of the science of war because he is permeated with all its elements.⁶

Broad awareness of military history prevents one from being mentally ambushed by buzzwords and sophisticated models. The ability to recognize flawed analogies will set up the Canadian soldier for success when he/she seeks lessons or is presented with “lessons” by others.

There are many types of military “lessons,” and a solid grounding in military history assists in identifying them. We certainly want to avoid, if we can, the “bitter” lesson—the one that is learned with major consequences. Regaining the lost lesson without bitter experience is desirable. The “wrong” lesson is the offspring of flawed deductions flowing from erroneous interpretation of an event. The path to wrong lessons is usually paved with linear projection, hasty, ill-considered adaptations, or even fixation on past success, like the Israeli Defence Force’s all-tank doctrine that disintegrated under a hail of Egyptian ATGMs in 1973.⁷ The transient lesson is one that is highly contextual in terms of time, place and opponent. Major David Petraeus, professor at West Point, wrote in 1986 that the lesson from Vietnam “would indicate that, in general, involvement in a counterinsurgency should be avoided.”⁸ Was he right only in that moment, or did he hit upon a more enduring lesson about these types of wars? The enduring lesson is one that persists through time and context.

6. Roger H. Nye, *The Patton Mind: The Professional Development of an Extraordinary Leader* (Garden City, NY: Avery Publishing, 1993), 18.

7. Joseph J. Collins, “Desert Storm and the Lessons of Learning,” *Parameters* 22, no. 2 (Autumn 1992), 83.

8. Major David H. Petraeus, “Lessons of History and Lessons of Vietnam,” *Parameters* 16, no. 3 (Autumn 1986): 49.

Consider, for example, the currently held belief that the Second World War conventional warfare was rigidly linear, contiguous and almost phalanx-like. The British War Office concluded otherwise in 1943:

A most important lesson—though by no means a new one—that was learned by hard experience is that everyone in a theatre of war, whatever his rank or arm of the service, is a fighting soldier. In a situation where frontages are extended, localities widely separated, and enemy patrols active, there are many opportunities for enemy infiltration ... there were numerous instances of clerks, cooks, batmen, and drivers being compelled to fight.⁹

A careful study of military history will demonstrate that the so-called “contemporary operating environment” reflects many old problems.

We also need to study military history because war, as it currently exists, remains immune to manipulation through scientific means. The Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College's *The Principles of War and the Study of Military History* stated,

If warfare were a science, the past 2,500 years should have produced a body of laws whereby at least some of the relationships are universally governed. At the very least there should be one immutable law, one invariable relationship between cause and effect, one inviolate principle. Yet where is the military equivalent of $E=mc$ [sic], $F=ma$, $E=IR$ or $pV=mRT$? There is none, ... Thus the absence of even one valid casual relationship in the employment of armed force leads to the inescapable conclusion that war is not a science, but is solely an art.¹⁰

Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara attempted to use mathematical formulae to fight the Vietnam War. He described systems analysis as “quantitative common sense.”¹¹ McNamara's quantitative common sense philosophy remains alive and well. As Colonel Timothy R. Reese, Director of the Combat Studies Institute, stated:

A segment of American military historians ... has been and is enamoured with a genre of military history that seeks to quantify war, reduce it to known

9. War Office, *Notes From Theatres of War No. 13: North Africa—Algeria and Tunisia*, November 1942–March 1943 (May 1943), 3.

10. CLFSC, *Realities of Battle: The Principles of War and the Study of Military History*, RB/01/P Part 6, October 1991, Fort Frontenac Library, 3-1.

11. Samuel A. Tucker, ed., *A Modern Design for Defense Decision: A McNamara–Hitch–Enthoven Anthology* (Washington, DC: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 1966), 15.



variables, and posit solutions to future military conflicts based on mathematical formulae. The practice of war contains a strong element of math, science, and social science, but in the end, the practice of war is an art.¹²

Reese's comment surely captures the reality of the Canadian experience as well.

This leads me to the final reason offered here for why the Army needs to study military history. In a world increasingly dominated by technology, the Army cannot lose sight of the timeless and unchanging nature of war and the human dimension dominated by emotion, uncertainty, friction, risk, danger, fear and animosity. As C.P. Stacey noted, "while it might be argued that changing conditions and changing weapons reduce the value of the study of the campaigns of the past, the fact remains that the fundamental problems and principles of military leadership do not change as a result of technological advances."¹³

How to Study

Explaining why we should study is perhaps the easy part. Lawrence's belief that there was no excuse for not fighting well collides with Mao Tse-Tung's: "To learn is no easy matter and to apply what one has learned is even harder."¹⁴ Closing the gap between Lawrence's expectation and Mao's skepticism is dependent upon one's entire mental approach to study and the technique of study. By "mental approach" I really mean possessing sufficient curiosity to sustain the mental effort to learn what can be difficult, and objectively considering ideas that produce a negative reaction in us.

Cause and Effect

Clausewitz's simplistic cause-and-effect methodology is easy to use: establish equivocal facts, trace effects back to their causes, and evaluate the means employed. As Dominick Graham noted, however, "in practice, the tactical picture is rarely so clear, either in real time or in the historical record, that the cause and effect of decisions, plans, actions, and reactions of people can be easily distilled and useful 'lessons' can be extracted."¹⁵ In this case one must admit the gap in knowledge and offer reasonable alternatives and avoid the temptation to extract lessons that are not supportable. The military student must also move beyond the cause and effect of a specific event to test the outcome in different circumstances—against different

12. John J. McGrath, *Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations*. Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 16 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2009), iii.

13. C.P. Stacey, ed., *Introduction to the Study of Military History for Canadian Students*. 6th Edition, 4th Revision (Ottawa: Directorate of Training, n.d.), iii.

14. Mao Tse-Tung, *Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung* (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1966), 84.

15. Dominick Graham, "Stress Lines and Grey Areas: The Utility of the Historical Method to the Military Profession" in David A. Charters, Marc Milner and J. Brent Wilson, eds., *Military History and the Military Profession* (New York: Praeger, 1992), 154.

opponents, at different times in different locations. Mao believed that one should put the conclusions of others "to the test of our own experience, assimilating what is useful, rejecting what is useless, and adding what is specifically our own. The latter is very important, for otherwise we cannot direct a war."¹⁶ Mao's simple process was *assimilation, rejection and addition!* Andrew J. Birtle concluded that "using the comparatively limited and straightforward 'emergency' in Malaya as a lens to interpret Vietnam ... ignores the vast differences between the two conflicts and produces a distorted view."¹⁷ Indeed, the French experience in the same geographical setting against the same enemy, not the British in a different geographical setting against a different enemy, was the logical basis for comparative analysis.¹⁸

Skepticism About Sources and Motives for Writing

A healthy skepticism about sources is important. Understand the problems with war diaries, and the natural tendency to cover up mistakes, especially those that cost lives, and the need for corroboration. As C.P. Stacey once wrote, war diaries range from good to bad to indifferent.¹⁹ Readers will benefit from Larry Robert's Combat Studies Institute report *Evaluating Historical Materials*, a short document that offers specific advice. It is also important to consider the author's motives—they are never entirely neutral. You must understand why the author is writing. Memoirs can be self-serving, and biographers tend to favour their subjects. Consider Lewis Sorley's recent book *Westmoreland: The General Who Lost Vietnam*. Can a single commander unable to achieve unity of command lose a war?

Skepticism About Conclusions

C.P. Stacey stated that officers had to read critically to generate a healthy skepticism about assumptions and conclusions.²⁰ We are essentially concerned with the proposed cause for an outcome. Do you agree with it? Does it seem feasible to you? Does the author have a readily identifiable thesis? Captain E.L.M. Burns was always willing to challenge the greatest military thinkers of his era. In a 1927 review of J.F.C. Fuller's *The Foundations of the Science of War*, Burns declared, "it appears to me that Colonel Fuller has permitted his passion for symmetrical trinities to interfere

16. Mao Tse-Tung, *Selected Military Writings*, 87.

17. Andrew J. Birtle, "PROVN, Westmoreland, and the Historians: A Reappraisal," *The Journal of Military History* 72, no. 4 (October 2008): 1247.

18. George Armstrong Kelly, *Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis, 1947–1962* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965), 47.

19. C.P. Stacey, "War Diaries: Good, Bad and Indifferent," *Canadian Army Journal* 4, no. 3 (Summer 1950): 17–24.

20. C.P. Stacey, "The Study of Military History by Service Officers," *Canadian Army Journal* 11, no. 4 (October 1957): 72–76.



with logical arrangement and clear thought ... he seems to want us to accept the indigestible chop suey which he has concocted from these ingredients as sound pabulum which will nourish our intelligence."²¹

Tackle Discomforting Issues

Williamson Murray was right on the mark when he stated that armies "rarely study what actually happened, but rather what they believe happened" and as a result avoid "discomforting issues."²² Brigadier Nick McCarter, Brigadier General Staff (BGS) of 1 Canadian Corps in Italy, wrote to the official historian, G.W.L. Nicholson, in April 1951 that:

I see no reason for asking that anything I may write for you should be regarded as confidential. Seems to me that if history is to be of real use to future generations to enable them to avoid errors of judgement and action, and even misdemeanors, perpetrated by commanders of all ranks and by staff officers, then very few events indeed, if any, should be suppressed by security grading.²³

I see little evidence that we are yet capable of such self-criticism, but we should read between the lines; readers' personal experiences will no doubt trigger skepticism.

Dealing with Presentism

Presentism, the idea that past events have little to offer in understanding current experience, is an intellectual albatross around the Army's neck. Presentism is the birthplace of buzzwords which can achieve a level of cognitive influence over us that they do not warrant based on historical evidence. So said MacArthur, who rejected the idea that only the most recent wars were applicable to "our present problems" in 1935. Presentism also poses real challenges for *learning*, but those challenges need to be overcome. Colonel Gregory Fontenot, author of *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom*, stated "Interpreting history is difficult; interpreting ongoing events is even more difficult."²⁴ Studying rapidly produced history to glean initial insights entails both risk and reward.

21. Captain E.L.M. Burns, "The Principles of War: A Criticism of Colonel J.F.C. Fuller's Book 'The Foundations of the Science of War,'" *Canadian Defence Quarterly* 4, no. 2 (January 1927): 169–170.

22. Williamson Murray, "Comparative Approaches to Interwar Innovation," *Joint Forces Quarterly* No. 25 (Summer 2000): 84.

23. Brigadier (Ret) G.A. McCarter to G.W.L. Nicholson, 3 April 1951, Record Group 24, Volume 10,799, File 224C1.011(D2) Liri Valley, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa.

24. Colonel Gregory Fontenot (Ret), Lieutenant-Colonel E.J. Degen, and Lieutenant-Colonel David Tohn, *On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), iii.

Identify Issues of Genuine Confusion

Admitting that one has no answer for a problem is essential. Historians try to fill gaps by plausible argumentation; some, unfortunately, engage in mere speculation. Major-General Ira Hunt, Jr. noted in 1974 in *Sharpening the Combat Edge: The Use of Analysis to Reinforce Military Judgement* that the strategy and grand tactics of the Vietnamese war “will probably not be well understood for years. In general, the war and its total environment were so foreign to classical western experience, military and civilian, that one could not grasp it well at the time much less understand it.”²⁵

Identify Distortion—Unintentional and Intentional

Michael Howard believed that one had to proceed from the assumption that history does not teach lessons, since there was “no such thing as ‘history’ because history is what historians write, and historians are part of the process they are writing about.”²⁶ There is also the tendency, argues Jay Luvaas, to compress the past into distinctive patterns and to cite historical examples to prove preconceived notions.²⁷ Milan Vego has argued that historical examples are “sometimes wilfully distorted and even intentionally falsified to prove preconceived notions on the importance of advanced technologies in the conduct of war.”²⁸

Keep Track of Your Thoughts

You will never remember everything you read, so establish a system to assist in recalling important ideas. You can flag your books or annotate the margins like Patton systematically did. You could create a physical file-card system or a computerized program listing the thesis of each work studied.

The Results of Study: “The Pen is Mightier Than the Sword”

Soldiers need to write and share their ideas with the Army at large. By offering something for discussion, the soldier aids the critical thinking of others. The Army may erase the chalkboard many times before it gets a concept right, so do not think that you have to produce a “perfect” argument. Surely, Brigadier-General Wayne Eyre’s comment that “The more leaders we get writing ... I think the better” closes the loop: *read, analyze, write*.

25. Lieutenant-General Julian Ewell and Major-General Ira Hunt, Jr., *Sharpening the Combat Edge: The Use of Analysis to Reinforce Military Judgement* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1974), 7.

26. Michael Howard, *The Lessons of History* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991), 11.

27. Jay Luvaas, “Military History: Is It Still Practicable?” *Parameters* 25, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 82–96.

28. Milan Vego, “Military History and the Study of Operational Art,” *Joint Forces Quarterly* No. 57 (2010): 125.



Conclusion

The above serves as general guidance only. There are many reasons why soldiers must study military history, and the reasons cited above can be summed up in terms of intellectual freedom of manoeuvre. Reading widely and deeply will make the mind supple. Sharpened perception is critical at the moment because so many ideas are put forward as new and revolutionary. Studying military history will ensure that the soldier can peer through complexity to see the simple, elemental aspect of a problem. Remember, the Army studies military history for a very practical reason: to achieve what Lawrence spoke of, *the ability to fight well*.

RECOMMENDED READING FOR THE YOUNG SOLDIER OR OFFICER

Captain John N. Rickard, CD, PhD

Young soldiers or officers just beginning to explore military history may appreciate a little guidance to get them off on the right foot. Developing a basic plan that considers what and how to read will pay long-term dividends. In this regard Colonel Roger Nye's *The Patton Mind: The Professional Development of an Extraordinary Leader* (1993) is a good place to start. Nye explains how George Patton, as a young cadet at West Point, began to systematically study war. Patton made lists of books he needed to read and never limited himself to works considered "over the head" of a lowly cadet. He read critically and argued with the authors by pencilling his thoughts in the margins. He systematically captured his ideas on four-by-six-inch note cards for cross-referencing and later use. *The Patton Mind* is well illustrated, an easy read and, at only 200 pages, digestible for the novice reader.

After developing a personal reading plan for studying military history, the reader should examine a book on ancient warfare. A good grounding in the classics serves to cement an understanding of the timeless aspects of war and is richly rewarding in its own right. Julius Caesar's *Commentaries* on the Gallic War is an excellent place to start. Writing in clear language, Caesar describes many things that echo with us today, including the need to decentralize decision-making, the necessity of, and risks associated with, dispersed operations, the critical requirement for prepositioned supplies and the influence of terrain on decision-making. Caesar's careful attention to tribal politics and his understanding of the importance of cultural intelligence is particularly revealing considering the amount of emphasis the Army places on this subject today.

Studying the evolution of war from a technological perspective will prepare the young soldier or officer to stare down the pervasive revolution in military affairs (RMA) arguments. Martin van Creveld's *Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present* (1989) offers a long overview. Those seeking a shorter timeframe will benefit from Max Boot's *War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today* (2006).

It is important that soldiers and officers also begin an exploration of the influence of culture on warfare as early as possible. As a generic category, however, the subject of "culture" can be overwhelming, even for the well-read. Some initial focus on Islamic culture and its interactions with Judaism and Christianity is recommended. Ian Barnes's *Crossroads of War: A Historical Atlas of the Middle East* (2014) covers the intense conflicts between the three groups from the rise of Islam to the Crusades to the rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Arab Revolt sparked by T.E. Lawrence on through the Arab-Israeli Wars to the Arab Spring beginning in 2010. Each era is covered by a short commentary supported by a full-colour map that greatly assists in understanding the text. At a little over 200 pages, *Crossroads of War* will hold the attention of the novice reader.



Aspiring soldiers and officers should certainly explore works on their selected profession. General Sir John Hackett's *The Profession of Arms* (1983) is a classic. It traces the evolution of the profession, is easy to read and is not excessive in length. In terms of the human dimension, readers cannot start their study of combat psychology soon enough. Richard Holmes's *Acts of War: The Behaviour of Men in Battle* (1985) is a valuable historical overview of the subject. Ethics is directly related to battlefield behaviour, and Richard Gabriel's *The Warrior's Way: A Treatise on Military Ethics* (2007) is a small book that will ground the soldier and officer in the subject. After that, Jim Frederick's *Blackhearts: One Platoon's Descent into Madness in Iraq's Triangle of Death* (2011) will reveal what happens when ethical discipline disintegrates from senior leadership to the troops at the sharp end.

Finally, in terms of small unit leadership, Erwin Rommel's *Infantry Attacks* is another classic. It explores his development from green lieutenant to seasoned combat commander in the cauldron of the First World War. The text is well supported by maps and three-dimensional sketches that allow the reader to understand Rommel's solutions to tactical problems.

All the books mentioned above are found in the *Commander Canadian Army's Reading List* with full bibliographic information.



CANADIAN PERSPECTIVES ON WAR

Consistent with Canada's participation in homeland defence or international security has been an identifiable Canadian way of war. We, as a nation, have evolved certain cultural and philosophical approaches to warfare that form a common thread throughout our colourful and dramatic history.

—Major-General (Retired) Lewis MacKenzie

Bercuson, David J. ***The Fighting Canadians: Our Regimental History from New France to Afghanistan***. Toronto: HarperCollins, 2008, 400 pages.
ISBN: 978-0002007344.

Bercuson argues that the regiment does what no other organization in a military structure can do in terms of creating the means necessary to transform ordinary citizens into soldiers. He suggests that regiments are constructed clans, impenetrable by outsiders but essential to the resilience of those in their ranks.

Burns, Major-General E.L.M. ***Manpower in the Canadian Army, 1939–1945***. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company, 1956, 184 pages. Chart, tables.

Burns, commander of 1st Canadian Corps in Italy during the Second World War, provides a damning assessment of the Canadian Army's force generation. He calculated our divisional slice at a staggering 93,150 and concluded that we were sadly overstaffed and had too many higher formations and administrative headquarters.

Burns, Major-General E.L.M. ***Megamurder***. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company, 1966, 288 pages.

Burns posited that the *raison d'être* of military strategy is the preservation of one's population, not the complete annihilation of it. Writing while serving as Canada's representative on the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, Burns argued that the best way to protect western democracy was to prevent both limited and unlimited nuclear war.

Granatstein, J.L. ***Canada's Army: Waging War and Keeping the Peace***. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002, 688 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-1442611788.

Granatstein argues for the preservation of military professionalism, given the inevitable continuation of armed conflict around the world. To ensure sovereignty now and into the future, Canada must have a properly led, educated, well-trained, and well-equipped armed forces.



Horn, Colonel Bernd, ed. ***The Canadian Way of War: Serving the National Interest***. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2006, 408 pages. ISBN: 978-1-55002-612-2.

This collection of essays examines the Canadian way of war from the 18th century to the present. The general theme is that, contrary to popular opinion, Canada has always consciously and consistently utilized military force to further its security, as well as its economic and political well-being.

Richter, Andrew. ***Avoiding Armageddon: Canadian Military Strategy and Nuclear Weapons, 1950–1963***. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2002, 214 pages. ISBN: 978-0870136573.

Argues that Canadian officials came to an independent strategic understanding of the most critical issues of the nuclear age. Given the ongoing proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Army should not lose sight of what some may consider a “dated” issue.

Stanley, George F. ***Canada’s Soldiers: The Military History of an Unmilitary People***. Revised edition. Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1960, 449 pages. Maps.

Stanley argues that Canadians are essentially an unmilitary people routinely compelled to war by circumstance rather than desire. His thesis is useful when discussing modern wars of discretion.

Woods, James. ***Militia Myths: Ideas of the Canadian Citizen Soldier, 1896–1921***. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010, 384 pages. ISBN: 978-077481-7660.

Woods concluded that by the end of the First World War the untrained civilian who had answered the call to arms in 1914 replaced the long-serving volunteer militiaman of the past as the archetypal Canadian citizen soldier.



FUTURE WARFARE

[T]he Army must work towards a fuller understanding of the character of the future security environment and its implications for future armed conflict. Moreover, it must foster operational concepts and doctrine that are clear, relevant and always forward-looking.

—Lieutenant-General Andrew B. Leslie

Eilam, Ehud. ***The Next War Between Israel and Egypt: Examining a High-Intensity War Between Two of the Strongest Militaries in the Middle East***. Portland, OR: Vallantine Mitchell, 2014, 276 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0853038382.

Eilam examines how the battle for air superiority, air-ground bombardment, armour, and infantry collisions would shape the outcome of the conflict. The analysis draws on previous (mainly Arab–Israeli) conflicts and the author's twenty years of studying Israel's national strategy and military doctrine.

Gray, Colin S. ***Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare***. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2005, 431 pages. ISBN: 0-297-84627-2.

Gray argues that although war is ever-changing its nature always remains the same regardless of time, technology, belligerents, or motives for combat.

Hammes, Colonel Thomas X. ***The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century***. St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004, 321 pages. ISBN: 0760320594.

Hammes argues that 4th-generation warfare (4GW) is insurgency rooted in the fundamental precept that superior political will can defeat greater economic and military power and uses all available networks.

Kilcullen, David. ***Out of the Mountains: The Coming of the Urban Guerrilla***. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 369 pages. ISBN: 978-0199737-505.

Kilcullen does not predict the future but offers a straight-line projection of current trends. He considers nine domains that will influence manoeuvre in littoral areas and stresses that to fight effectively in mega-cities armies will require amphibious capability, expeditionary logistics, different organizations and protection measures.

Kuntsman, Adi, and Rebecca L. Stein. ***Digital Militarism: Israel's Occupation in the Social Media Age***. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015, 192 pages. ISBN: 978-0804785679.

Kuntsman and Stein trace the rise of Israeli digital militarism in a global context and discuss the reach of social media into Israeli military theatres and the occupation's impact on everyday Israeli social media culture.



Mandel, Mark D. ***The Future of War: Organizations as Weapons***. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005, 212 pages. ISBN: 1-57488-631-2.

Mandel argues that the key to future combat effectiveness is not technology but the extent to which institutional and organizational structures incentivize invention and innovation.

Murray, Williamson, and Peter R. Mansoor. ***Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from the Ancient World to the Present***. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 334 pages. ISBN: 978-1107643338.

Argues that recent analysts have incorrectly categorized past conflicts characterized by regular and irregular forces as unique. Hybrid wars are the most likely conflicts of the 21st century, as competitors use hybrid forces to wear down America's military capabilities in extended campaigns of exhaustion.

Rid, Thomas. ***Cyber War Will Not Take Place***. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 288 pages. ISBN: 978-0199330638.

Rid argues that the focus on war and winning distracts from the real challenge of cyberspace: non-violent confrontation that may rival or even replace violence in surprising ways. The threat consists of three different vectors: espionage, sabotage and subversion.

Simpson, Emile. ***War From the Ground Up: Twenty-First Century Combat as Politics***. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, 256 pages. ISBN: 978-0199327881.

The author, a British infantry officer in the Royal Gurkha Rifles, argues that in the Afghan conflict, and in contemporary conflicts more generally, liberal powers and their armed forces have blurred the line between military and political activity, and contends that this loss of clarity is more a response to the conditions of combat in the early 21st century, particularly that of globalization, than a deliberate choice.

Singer, P.W. ***Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century***. New York: Penguin Books, 2009, 512 pages. ISBN: 978-0143116844.

Blending historical evidence with interviews, Singer shows how technology is changing not just how wars are fought, but also the politics, economics, laws and ethics that surround war itself.

Singer, P.W., and Allan Friedman. ***Cyber Security and Cyber War***. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 320 pages. ISBN: 978-0199918119.

Singer and Friedman explore the important issues and characters of cybersecurity, from the "Anonymous" hacker group and the Stuxnet computer virus to the new cyber units of the Chinese and U.S. militaries.



CLASSICAL MILITARY THOUGHT

It is ... from the sound study of former battles, from the study of the evolution of military thought, that one can refine one's judgment, develop one's skills, and have a basis for developing the new tactical concepts necessary to the modern battlefield.

—Lieutenant-General J.J. Paradis

Bonaparte, Napoleon. ***The Military Maxims of Napoleon***. Translated by Lieutenant-General Sir George C. D'Aguilar. Introduction and Commentary by David G. Chandler. London: Greenhill Books, 1994 (1831), 252 pages.

Napoleon never formulated a definite system of war on paper and did not select the 78 maxims contained in this collection to express a unified body of thought. Instead, he tailored his orders to his marshals to address specific situations. Napoleon was one of the great captains of war, and his intuitive disregard for a "system" of war in favour of principles of war is worthy of consideration by any army overly attracted to systems theory.

Clausewitz, Carl von. ***On War***. Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984 (1832), 732 pages. ISBN: 0-691-05657-9. Available in French.

Although many observers focus excessively on Clausewitz's dictum that war is the continuation of politics by other means, he offered many other key insights, including that the aim is to break the will to resist of a living force, that war is never an isolated act, and that war does not consist of a single, short blow. Most importantly, he stressed that in war the result is never final. Despite attempts to marginalize his thought, Clausewitz's comprehensive analysis of war still merits close attention by the Army.

Du Picq, Ardant. ***Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle***. Gloucester, England: Dodo Press, 2004, 231 pages. ISBN: 978-1409975076. Available in French.

"[M]an is the fundamental instrument in battle." Ardant du Picq's famous assertion is truer than ever today. Although high technology may take the lead in the first phases of a high-intensity conflict, humans will once again be at the heart of the new crises, which are fought on a psychological level.

Frederick the Great. ***Frederick the Great on the Art of War***. Edited and translated by Jay Luvaas. New York: The Free Press, 1966, 391 pages. Maps.

This book brings together selections from Frederick's *The Art of War* and other works written specifically for his generals and successors. Frederick preached the idea that war's aim was not simply to win battles but to destroy the enemy's capacity to fight.



Hughes, Daniel J., ed. ***Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings***. Translated by Daniel J. Hughes and Harry Bell. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993, 275 pages. ISBN: 0-89141-484-3.

Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke served as the Prussian Army Chief of Staff and led the army to spectacular victories against the Austrians in 1866 and the French in 1870–1871. Moltke had an aversion to systems, but he did follow a few principles. The selections are only a small portion of his writings but provide a fair representation of his views.

Jomini, Antoine Henri de. ***Précis de l'art de la guerre***. Paris: Tempus Perrin, 2008 (1830), 303 pages. ISBN : 978-2262027674. Available in English.

Jomini and Clausewitz were the two greatest military strategists of the 19th century. In this book, Jomini, who was Marshal Ney's chief of staff and a remarkably keen observer of Napoleon's campaigns, explains the factors that lead to war and how to conduct a war.

Machiavelli, Nicollò. ***The Prince***. New York: Everyman Library, 1992 (1513), 190 pages. ISBN: 0-679-41044-9. Available in French.

This work argues that theological and moral imperatives have no place in the political arena or within foreign relations. Machiavelli, a public servant immersed in the scheming atmosphere of the 16th-century city-states of northern Italy, stressed the important role the citizens of a state have in its defence, and the folly of employing *condottieri* and mercenaries.

Machiavelli, Nicollò. ***The Art of War***. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005 (1520–1521), 312 pages. ISBN: 978-0226500461. Available in French.

This is a humanistic treatise on war, written under the form of dialogues and divided into seven books. It argued for an army based in many ways on the Roman legionary system.

Sawyer, Ralph D. ***The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China.***

Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993, 568 pages. ISBN: 0-8133-1228-0.

Sawyer explores an Eastern tradition of strategic thought that emphasized outwitting one's opponent through speed, stealth, flexibility and a minimum of force. Even in modern times these writings have been known to only a handful of Western specialists. Seven separate essays, written between 500 B.C. and A.D. 700, preserve the essential tenets of strategy distilled from the experience of the most brilliant warriors of ancient China.

Saxe, Maurice, Comte de. ***Reveries on the Art of War.*** Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1944, 122 pages. ISBN-13: 978-0486461502.

Available in French.

This is a very personal reflection on war, based both on the teachings of the Chevalier de Folard and on Maurice de Saxe's own first-hand knowledge of the situations and the generals of his time. His thinking is too often reduced to a few formulas, but in reality it is an in-depth analysis of the basic tactics and grand tactics of the modern age of warfare.

Vegetius Rhenanus, Flavius. ***Epitoma Rei Militaris (The Military Institutions of the Romans)***, Translated by Lieutenant John Clark. Edited by

Brigadier-General Thomas R. Phillips. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1965 (430–435 A.D.?), 114 pages. Diagrams.

This work, dedicated to the Emperor (perhaps Theodosius or Valentinian III), urges a return to former Roman discipline and courage to arrest the decay of the legions in the Late Roman Empire. Though it contains several inconsistencies, it was perhaps the most influential military treatise up to the 19th century. Its true value lies in the recognition of the need for reform to face new challenges.



COMMENTARY ON THE MILITARY CLASSICS

Colson, Bruno. *L'art de la guerre de Machiavel à Clausewitz*. Namur: Presses universitaires de Namur, 1999, 285 pages. ISBN: 978-2870373699.

This book takes us back to the history of the fortifications, tactics and strategies of the European armies, from Marignan to Waterloo. The Industrial Revolution had not yet been applied to warfare. It was the era of the great captains: Maurice de Nassau, Turenne, Eugène de Savoie, Frederick II and Napoleon.

Creveld, Martin van. *The Art of War: War and Military Thought*. London: Cassell, 2000, 224 pages. Maps, diagrams, ISBN: 0-304-35264-0.

A wide survey of the systematic attempts to understand the nature of war. Creveld focuses heavily on classical military thinkers and less on post-1945 thinkers, and argues that a continuity of thought in the art of war is clearly discernible.

Handel, Michael I. *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought*. 3rd revised edition. London: Routledge, 2001, 482 pages. ISBN: 071468132-6.

This is a comprehensive, comparative analysis of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-Tung. Handel argues that there is much greater symmetry in their thought than previously believed.

Paret, Peter, ed. *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, 941 pages. ISBN: 0691027641.

This collection of essays examines war, its strategic characteristics and its political and social functioning over the last 500 years. A chronological approach facilitates the understanding of this evolution. Major theorists, political and military figures and the strategy of particular conflicts are emphasized.

Phillips, Brigadier General Thomas R., ed. ***Roots of Strategy: The 5 Great Military Classics of All Time***. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1985, 485 pages.
ISBN: 0811721949.

This is a concise summary of the writings of Sun Tzu, Vegetius, de Saxe, Frederick and Napoleon. The book includes a summary of how their writings waxed and waned in popularity as time and technology progressed, which in turn provides a greater appreciation of the impact these writers had upon military development and events.

Viroli, Maurizio. ***Redeeming the Prince: The Meaning of Machiavelli's Masterpiece***. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013, 208 pages.
ISBN: 978-0691160016.

Argues that *The Prince* is not about unscrupulous politics but rather political redemption. This book, written in the form of an oration following the rules of classical rhetoric, argues that Machiavelli was motivated by patriotic desire, not personal gain, and rejects the cliché that Machiavelli was "Machiavellian."

Walach, Colonel Jehuda L. ***The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation: The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars***. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986, 334 pages.
ISBN: 0-313-24438-3.

Walach concludes that Schlieffen's view of war as a purely military affair contributed to failure in the First World War. Ignoring Clausewitz's philosophy that politics and war were interdependent led to disaster in the Second World War.

Willmott, H.P., and Michael B. Barrett. ***Clausewitz Reconsidered***. Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2010, 236 pages. ISBN: 978-0-313-36286-6.

Willmott and Barrett argue that warfare is far more brutal today than when Clausewitz developed his philosophy. They consider *On War* dated and attempt to bring Clausewitz's thinking up to date for a new generation.



J.F.C FULLER

MODERN MILITARY THOUGHT

Obviously, ... while there is an optimum level of technological capability below which no modern army can afford to fall—especially in the area of battlefield observation—it would be a mistake to pin all hope on fighting neat and tidy technological “cyber” or information wars in a “battlespace” reminiscent of the television program “Star Trek.”

—John A. English

EVOLUTION OF LAND WARFARE

Angstrom, Jan, and J.J. Widen. *Contemporary Military Theory: The Dynamics of War*. London: Routledge, 2014, 214 pages. ISBN: 978-0415643030.

Angstrom and Widen introduce contrasting perspectives and constantly criticize various theories. They draw upon and illustrate military thought through a wide-ranging number of examples from the Napoleonic Wars to the current war in Afghanistan.

Bellamy, Christopher. *The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare: Theory and Practice*. London: Routledge, 1990, 314 pages. Maps, diagrams, ISBN: 0-415-02073-5.

Bellamy argues that military history can be of immense practical help to the modern military analyst and professional. He stresses the need for acquiring greater knowledge of Russian and Oriental military history.

Burne, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred H. *The Art of War on Land*. London: Methuen, 1950, 227 pages.

Burne attempts to answer the question "What wins battles?" He identifies four "strands of war"—quality and capability of commanders, quality and capability of troops, morale, and resources—and analyzes them through eight principles of war.

Crevelld, Martin van. *The Transformation of War*. New York: The Free Press, 1991, 254 pages. ISBN: 0-02-933155-2. Available in French.

Crevelld argues that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world was entering a period of ethnic and religious conflict and that conventional military power was no longer relevant. Both East and West must adapt to the new realities or risk reaching a point of not being capable of employing organized violence. He employs a non-Clausewitzian analytical framework.



De Bloch, Jean. ***The Future of War in Its Technical, Economic, and Political Relations***. Boston: The World Peace Foundation, 1914 (1899), 400 pages. Maps, diagrams.

De Bloch was a Polish economist who argued that, as a result of its sheer destructive power, war would become impossible to wage. His chapter on how war would be fought on land is important in terms of both what he got right and what he got wrong.

De Gaulle, Charles. ***The Army of the Future***. Translated by Walter Millis. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1941 (1934), 179 pages. Available in French.

De Gaulle argued that the quality of a small professional armoured force was superior to the fixation on quantity inherent in the “nation in arms” idea.

🍁 Denison, Colonel George T. ***A History of Cavalry: From the Earliest Times With Lessons for the Future***. 2nd Edition. London: Macmillan, 1913 (1877), 448 pages. Maps.

Denison accurately predicted that whichever nation employed mounted rifles extensively in the next war would be victorious. The book demonstrates that it is possible to accurately predict changes in the techniques of war.

Dupuy, Colonel Trevor N. ***Numbers, Predictions and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles***. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1979, 244 pages. Charts, ISBN: 0-672-52131-8.

Dupuy presents a method for making confusing and contradictory facts and numbers consistently meaningful, and argues that German ground troops possessed a 20 percent superiority over their Western counterparts in the Second World War.

🍁 English, Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) John A. ***Marching Through Chaos: The Descent of Armies in Theory and Practice***. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996, 220 pages. ISBN: 0-275-94657-6.

English argues that war is ultimately characterized by primeval chaos and therefore the course it may take cannot be predicted with any accuracy. Despite this, armies still have to find a way to adapt.

Foch, Maréchal Ferdinand. ***The Principles of War***. London: Chapman & Hall, 1920, 351 pages. ISBN-13: 978-8185047973. Available in French.

Foch's principles of war, which he began writing in 1903, have gone through more than 10 editions. The book contains the essence of Foch's military thinking, centred on his key idea: "Learn to think." This work is one of the classics of military thought, in the same league as Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*, Clausewitz's *On War*, Jomini's *The Art of War* and Liddell Hart's *Strategy*.

Fuller, J.F.C. ***The Conduct of War, 1789–1961: A Study of the Impact of French, Industrial, and Russian Revolutions on War and Its Conduct***. London: Routledge, 2015 (1961), 358 pages. Maps.

Fuller concludes that a war which is not fought in pursuit of a clear and feasible policy will always end in disaster.

Grange, David L., et al. ***Air-Mech-Strike: Asymmetric Maneuver Warfare for the 21st Century***. 2nd Edition. Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing Company, 2002, 344 pages. Charts, diagrams, ISBN: 978-1563116162.

This work merges the lessons of 3-D fire and manoeuvre history with current and likely events to enhance the U.S. Army's transformation to reach out across oceans, continents and populations to strike enemies hiding behind a harbouring nation-state or in remote areas. The authors recommend the creation of light, air-mobile forces to complement heavy forces.

Hooker, Richard, ed. ***Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology***. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993, 416 pages. ISBN: 978-0891415183.

Several essayists suggest that a smaller army could actually be a stronger one if it is trained and equipped to fight in the manoeuvre-warfare mode.



Simpkin, Brigadier Richard. ***Race to the Swift: Thoughts on Twenty-First Century Warfare***. London: Brassey's, 1985, 345 pages. Diagrams, ISBN: 0-08-031170-9.

Simpkin explores war on three levels, the physical, the statistical and the psychological, and argues that in the future military principles must be adjusted to consider the decline in bellicosity of Western nations.

Smith, General Rupert. ***The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World***. London: Allen Lane, 2005, 428 pages. ISBN: 0-713-99836-9. Available in French.

Smith argues for a shift in our thinking from 19th-century industrialized warfare to warfare among the people. Morality of cause does not ensure the utility of force.

Tucker, Lieutenant-General Sir Francis. ***The Pattern of War***. London: Cassell and Co, 1948, 159 pages.

Tucker argues that there is, and always has been, a pattern of war and that, by carefully studying military science one can forecast the nature of the next war and determine whether it will be one of manoeuvre or linear stagnation. He discusses the decline of manoeuvre warfare and its resurgence in the Second World War.

GUERRILLA WARFARE

Callwell, C.E. ***Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice***. 3rd Edition. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1996 (1899), 580 pages. ISBN: 978-1438513881.

Callwell concludes that technological superiority is important, but not the most important ingredient in low-intensity warfare. An army must adapt to climate, terrain and an enemy's mobility, and take what an enemy values most.

🍁 Cohen, Major A.A. ***Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer Who Defined the Art of Counterinsurgency***. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2012, 347 pages. ISBN: 978-1-4408-0049-8.

Cohen traces the influence of the Chinese Revolution, the Algerian War, mentors and French military schools of thought on Galula's thinking and argues for the contemporary and future validity of his work.

Desmaretz, Gérard. ***Des guerres révolutionnaires au terrorisme: les stratégies de la subversion***. Paris: Chiron, 2006, 238 pages. ISBN: 2702711480.

Robespierre, Napoleon, Blanqui, Bakunin, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, Mao—they all promoted their doctrines and ideologies, and, by applying them to coups d'état and other revolutions, they disrupted and changed the world order.

Galula, David. ***Contre-insurrection : théorie et pratique***. Paris: Economica, 2008 (1964), 215 pages. ISBN : 978-2717855098. Available in English.

Lieutenant-Colonel David Galula offers the lessons he learned during his long practice of counter-insurgency, from the fall of Chiang Kai-shek to the Algerian war. He believed that victory of the insurgents was not inevitable: by adapting to the situation, a counter-insurgent government can win the support of the people, which is the key to success.

Giap, Vo Nguyen. ***The Military Art of People's War: Selected Writings of General Vo Nguyen Giap***. Edited by Russell Stetler. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970, 342 pages. ISBN: 978-0853451938.

Giap explored the tactical, operational, and strategic aspects of war, but his most important statements concern the political, strategic and psychological framework of conflict. Giap devotes considerable effort to laying out the arguments used to motivate the North Vietnamese Army, the guerrillas and the peasants.

🍁 Godefroy, Major Andrew B., ed. ***Bush Warfare: The Early Writings of General Sir William C.G. Heneker, KCMG, DSO***. Kingston: Directorate of Land Concepts and Design, 2009, 162 pages. Diagrams.

Canadian-born soldier William Heneker fought several campaigns in West Africa as an officer with the British Army at the end of the 19th century and developed strategic and tactical thoughts about fighting across the full spectrum of conflict from complex counterinsurgencies to stability operations.



Ho Chi Minh. ***The Selected Works of Ho Chi Minh***. New York: Prism Key Press, 2011 (1961), 146 pages. ISBN: 978-1466482768.

Ho led the Viet Minh independence movement from 1941 onward, establishing the communist-governed Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1945 and defeating the French Union in 1954 at Diên Biên Phu.

Kitson, General Sir Frank. ***Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping***. London: Faber and Faber, 2011 (1971), 220 pages. ISBN: 978-0571271023.

Kitson stressed that the British Army should be prepared to deal with future insurgency and peacekeeping operations and that the qualities required to fight insurgencies were different than those required to fight conventional war.

Laqueur, Walter. ***Guerrilla: A Historical and Critical Study***. Boston: Little, Brown, 1976, 462 pages. ISBN: 0-316-51469-1.

Argues that no theory can predict the course of a guerrilla war and there is little evidence that there ever will be.

Lawrence, T.E. ***Seven Pillars of Wisdom***. London: Vintage Classics, 2008 (1935), 704 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0099511786. Available in French.

This is a sophisticated exploration of war aims and the metaphysical aspects of the Arab Revolt against the Turks during the First World War. Lawrence discarded Foch's concept of absolute war and destruction of the enemy army through battle in favour of the concept of influence, ideas, intangibility and invulnerability.

Taber, Robert. ***War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare***. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2002 (1965), 214 pages. ISBN: 978-1574885552.

Taber argues that all guerrilla insurgencies use similar tactics to advance their cause, whether it is ideological, national or religion-based.

Trinquier, Colonel Roger. ***La Guerre moderne***. Paris: Economica, 2008 (1961), 109 pages. ISBN : 978-2717854787. Available in English.

In 1961, Roger Trinquier—better known as Colonel Trinquier—published his major work of theory, *Modern Warfare*, based on his operational experience in Indochina and Algeria. The circumstances and political objectives are certainly very different today, but the tactics remain, and Trinquier's major principles fit today's engagements so well that his work, which has been widely translated, is now a reference for many Western armies.

Tse-Tung, Mao. ***Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung***. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1966, 4 volumes. Approximately 1600 pages.

Mao turned away from Marxist proletarian and urban concepts of revolution and waged a peasant-based guerrilla war against the Japanese. He stressed the primacy of political over military action and developed a sophisticated concept of protracted war which contradicted Western concepts of time and space. Mao's thoughts on studying war are of considerable value.

STRATEGY

🍁 Appleton, Colonel Stephen B. ***The U.S. and Canadian Army Strategies: Failures in Understanding***. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute Press, 2003, 60 pages. ISBN: 1-58487-140-7.

Appleton argues that the two nations' armies' penchant for internalizing business concepts and strategies has left them both in a perilous situation pertaining to strategy formulation and direction.

Barnett, Roger W. ***Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power***. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 2003, 182 pages. ISBN: 1574885634.

Barnett defines asymmetrical warfare as taking the calculated risk to exploit an adversary's inability or unwillingness to prevent, or defend against, certain actions. He concludes that the U.S. must create a formal system of selectively eliminating the constraints that dictate responses to certain situations or scenarios.



Beaufre, General André. ***Introduction à la stratégie***. Third Edition. Fayard/Pluriel, 2012 (1963), 192 pages. ISBN : 978-2818502990. Available in English.

General Beaufre defined strategy as “the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute.” In his view, “the decision is obtained by creating and then exploiting a situation resulting in sufficient moral disintegration of the enemy to cause him to accept the conditions it is desired to impose on him.”

Collins, John M. ***Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives***. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2001, 350 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-1574884302.

Collins illuminates practices that worked well or poorly in the past, together with reasons why. He discusses national security interests, strategic building blocks, military strategies across the conflict spectrum, methods for developing talent and strategic acumen, and recent case studies that put principles into practice.

Gray, Colin S. ***Perspectives on Strategy***. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, 256 pages. ISBN: 978-0199674275.

Strategic thought and behaviour are explored and explained from the perspectives of intellect, morality, culture, geography, and technology.

Liddell Hart, B.H. ***Strategy***. Second Revised Edition. London: Plume Books, 1991, (1954), 430 pages. ISBN: 0452010713. Available in French.

Liddell Hart emphasizes how most successful military operations have been the result of the skilful use of surprise, movement and flexibility. He explains how the dislocation of an enemy’s psychological and physical balance is usually a vital prelude to victory and makes a strong argument for the indirect approach in terms of military strategy.

Luttwak, Edward N. ***Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace***. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002, 283 pages. ISBN: 0-674-83995-1. Available in French.


Luttwak explores the differences between the strategic, operational, tactical and technical levels of war and shows how capabilities combine across mission areas and between levels to create a coherent matrix of mobility, weapons and communications capabilities. He illustrates the inherent difficulties of melding together the complexities of state objectives, foreign relations and military power.

Nance, Malcom W. ***The Terrorists of Iraq: Inside the Strategy and Tactics of the Iraq Insurgency 2003–2014***. 2nd Edition. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2014, 404 pages. ISBN: 978-1498706896.

Nance thoroughly analyzes how Iraq became the centre of the ISIS strategy to create an Islamic caliphate in the heart of the Middle East. This book illustrates the political, military, and religious strategies as well as the street-level tactics of the insurgents.

Summers, Jr., Colonel Harry G. ***On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War***. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982, 224 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0-89141-156-9.

Summers seeks to answer the question of how the United States could dominate the battlefield tactically yet lose the war strategically. He evaluates American strategy through Clausewitz's principles of war and concludes that military men failed to produce a strategic perspective due to neglect of strategic thinking in the nuclear era and an overreliance on systems analysis.



DOCTRINE

Doctrine is the unifying force of the military. It is more than just principles of war: it also involves application, which includes method, structures, procedures and even rules.

—Major Ian Hope

Armée de Terre. **Manœuvre interarmes – Fondamentaux**. Paris: Economica, 2013, 128 pages. ISBN: 978-2717866452.

Combined arms manoeuvre, a subtle alchemy that blends fire, speed, movement and achieving synergy among a wide range of operational capabilities down to the lowest level of command, is at the heart of tactical success in land combat in Afghanistan and Mali, among other places. Combined arms manoeuvre is not new, but today it requires tactical leaders to have a great deal of know-how and the ability to adapt.

Bailey, Major-General J.B.A. **Field Artillery and Firepower**. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004, 633 pages. ISBN: 1-59114-029-3.

Bailey argues that artillery evolved into the primary source of combat power in the 20th century, and that a new phenomenon is emerging that will reshape battlespace geometry and styles of war: precision delivery irrespective of range.

Beaumont, Roger A. **Joint Military Operations: A Short History**. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993, 254 pages. ISBN: 0313267448.

Beaumont provides a broad and selective survey of “jointness”—the combined operations of land and naval forces until the 20th century and especially of land, sea and air forces since the Second World War. Wide-ranging case studies illustrate trends and patterns of jointness and define the central problem of friction.

Biddle, Stephen. **Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle**. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004, 337 pages. Tables, charts, ISBN: 0-691-11645-8.

Biddle argues that force employment (doctrine and tactics) determine outcomes and that current policy debate systematically exaggerates the concept of change, or RMAs, and slights the concept of continuity. Major warfare since 1900 has seen much less real change than now supposed, and the future will most likely witness more continuity.



Carver, Field Marshal Lord. ***The Apostles of Mobility: The Theory and Practice of Armoured Warfare***. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1979, 108 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0-297-77681-9.

Carver concludes that the practical influence of theorists has often been overestimated. Fuller and Martel erred in conceiving land warfare too much in naval terms. Liddell Hart corrected that flaw, but his error lay in advocating excessive dispersion, which in Carver's opinion led to serious setbacks for the British Army in North Africa.

Citino, Robert M. ***Blitzkrieg to Desert Storm: The Evolution of Operational Warfare***. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004, 424 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0700613005.

Citino demonstrates the difficulty of achieving decisive results at the operational level and shows why technical superiority is no guarantee of victory. A thorough grounding in the history of past campaigns is essential for anyone who wishes to understand modern warfare. This book addresses the future of operational-level warfare in the post-9/11 era.

Doubler, Michael D. ***Closing with the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944–45***. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994, 354 pages. Diagrams, ISBN: 0-70006-0675-0.

Doubler portrays a far more capable and successful American fighting force than have previous historians, notably Russell Weigley, Martin van Creveld, and S.L.A. Marshall.

Doughty, Robert A. ***The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919–1939***. Hamden, CT: Archon, 1985, 243 pages. ISBN: 978-0208020963.

Doughty demonstrates that in the inter-war years, the French Army formulated doctrine, devised a strategy, organized and equipped its units and trained its personnel for the wrong war. This is a cautionary tale of the consequences of overconfidence and narrow-mindedness.

🍁 English, Major John A. ***A Perspective on Infantry***. New York: Praeger, 1981, 345 pages. Diagrams, ISBN: 0-03-059699-8.

English argues that infantry remains among the most powerful influences in battle and that its effectiveness rests on the performance of the smallest units and their leaders. For infantry to maximize its inherent mobility, it should not be tied rigidly to either tanks or artillery fire plans.

Fuller, Major-General J.F.C. ***Armoured Warfare: An Annotated Edition of Lectures on F.S.R. III (Operations Between Mechanized Forces)***. Harrisburg, PA: Military Service, 1943 (1932), 189 pages. Maps, diagrams.

This book was intended to “jog the mind of the thinking soldier.” It contains fourteen lectures covering command, information and protection, as well as an interesting discussion of warfare in underdeveloped countries.

Gable, Christopher R. ***Seek, Strike and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II***. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1985, 90 pages. Charts.

Gable argues that the doctrine was fundamentally flawed, and that its creators formulated it with an imperfect understanding of combined arms mechanized warfare, thus creating a doctrinal solution for a problem that did not exist as perceived.

Glantz, Colonel David M. ***Soviet Military Operational Art: In Pursuit of Deep Battle***. London: Frank Cass, 1991, 295 pages. Diagrams, ISBN: 0-7146-3362-3.

Glantz examines the Soviet study of war, the re-emergence of the operation level and its connection with deep battle, the evolution of the Soviet theory of operations in depth before 1941, and its refinement and application in the European theatre and the Far East between 1941 and 1945.



Grau, Lester W. ***The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan***. London: Frank Cass, 2003, 220 pages. Maps, diagrams, ISBN: 9780714648576.

The Frunze Military Academy in Russia compiled this book for their command and general staff combat arms officers. It deals with the starkest features of the unforgiving landscape of tactical combat: casualties and death, adaptation and survival. It provides an intimate look at the brutal business of counterinsurgency operations.

Griffith, Paddy. ***Forward Into Battle: Fighting Tactics from Waterloo to the Near Future***. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1997 (1990), 228 pages. Diagrams, ISBN: 978-0891414711.

Griffith concluded that a future high-technology conflict might produce an empty battlefield.

Guderian, Major-General Heinz. ***Achtung-Panzer! The Development of Armoured Forces, Their Tactics and Operational Potential***. London: Arms and Armour, 1993 (1937), 220 pages. Diagrams, ISBN: 1-85409-138-7.

Guderian concluded that Germany could only win swiftly and decisively in a future war and avoid the attrition of the First World War through the intelligent use of armoured forces. He stressed that it was an incontrovertible truth that, as a general rule, new weapons call for new ways of fighting and for the appropriate tactical and organizational forms.

House, Jonathan M. ***Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century***. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001, 372 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0700610983.

House focuses on a key aspect of military change: the development of combined arms doctrine, tactics and organization at the division level and below. He traces the parallel development of the command and control mechanisms and procedures necessary to orchestrate the employment of combined arms on the modern battlefield.

Jalali, Ali Ahmad, and Lester W. Grau. ***The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet–Afghan War***. Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps Studies/Analysis Division, 1995, 419 pages.

Jalali and Grau provide accounts by Afghan commanders—the vast majority of them civilians—who took up arms against the Soviets and developed the skills necessary to command guerrilla units. The accounts are supported by maps that show the topography, the locations of the attackers and defenders, movements, and fields of fire.

🍁 Jarymowycz, Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Roman J. ***Tank Tactics: From Normandy to Lorraine***. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001, 361 pages. Maps, charts, ISBN: 1-55587-950-0.

Jarymowycz examines the evolution of armour as the essence of manoeuvre and creativity and the doctrinal evolution of North American armour, and concludes that Canadian armour doctrine was unsound and senior armour leadership was poor during the Second World War.

Kretchik, Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Walter E. ***U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror***. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011, 392 pages. ISBN: 978-0-7006-1806-4.

Kretchik argues that the Army's leadership has been more forward-thinking and adaptive than has been generally believed.

Leonhard, Robert. ***The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and AirLand Battle***. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1991, 315 pages. Diagrams, ISBN: 0-89141-403-7.

Leonhard argues that the U.S. Army does not understand the importance of manoeuvre as the classical writers did because the army is culturally conditioned to see war as an attritional phenomenon. He concludes that the growing importance of manoeuvre in low-intensity conflicts will render attrition approaches obsolete.



Luper, Timothy T. ***The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War.*** Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1981, 73 pages.

Luper argues that the Germans made profound changes to their defensive doctrine, replacing an arbitrary defence of terrain with timely counterattack which avoided strongpoints and plunged deeply into enemy territory aided by effective artillery.

Macgregor, Colonel (Retired) Douglas. ***Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights.*** Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003, 320 pages.
ISBN: 978-0313361579.

The author extends the argument made in his 1998 work, *Breaking the Phalanx*, to include ISR, strike, manoeuvre and sustainment frameworks. He argues that interservice cooperation in assembling small, mobile units and a dramatically simplified command structure is essential to reduce timelines for deployment, enhance responsiveness to crises, and permit rapid decision-making and planning. Without a conceptual redefinition of warfare as a joint operation, a new military culture that can execute joint expeditionary warfare will not emerge.

🍁 Marteinson, John, and Major Michael R. McNorgan. ***The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps: An Illustrated History.*** Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2000, 446 pages. Maps, ISBN: 1-896941-17-6. Available in French.

Marteinson and McNorgan examine the history of Canada's armoured forces from their humble beginnings during the First World War to the pre-Afghanistan era. They seek to make a case for an armoured role at a time when the capability is being questioned.

Miksche, Major F.O. ***Blitzkrieg.*** London: Faber & Faber 1941, 249 pages.
Maps, diagrams. Available in French.

Miksche served on the General Staff of the Spanish Republican Army during the Civil War. The principles of Blitzkrieg, he argued, were identifiable by 1939 and execution was made possible by applying rules that were completely simple and logical.

🍁 Rostek, Lieutenant-Colonel Michael, and Peter Gizewski, eds. ***Security Operations in the 21st Century: Canadian Perspectives on the Comprehensive Approach***. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011, 258 pages. ISBN: 978-1-55339-351-1.

This collection consolidates numerous research efforts and experiences from academics and practitioners as Canada attempts to define and employ a new collective approach to security operations, known as the Comprehensive Approach.

🍁 Sattler, Major V., and Captain M. O'Leary. "Organizing Modern Infantry: An Analysis of Section Fighting Power." ***The Canadian Army Journal*** 13, no. 3 (Autumn 2010): 23–52.

Sattler and O'Leary argue that the current doctrinal ten-person infantry section is a proven compromise of troops to tasks, weaponry and equipment, and the requirement to operate effectively with or without the intimate support of section vehicles. They caution that, if smaller sections become specialized to the point that they are no longer able to conduct the role, mission and tasks of the infantry, then they are no longer infantry.

Smith, Ray L. ***Tactics of the Crescent Moon: Militant Muslim Combat Methods***. Chevy Chase, MD: Posterity Press, 2005, 360 pages. Illustrations, ISBN: 0963869574.

Smith provides detailed tactical descriptions of exactly how militant Muslim insurgents fight and shows how these tactical examples relate to the larger cultural and political issues. He offers insight on how to win what might be the most important battle of all: the battle for the moral high ground.

Willoughby, Colonel Andrew. ***Maneuver in War***. Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Company, 1939, 286 pages. Maps, tables.

Willoughby argued that the tempo of war had changed and a premium was now placed on fast-thinking staffs and a military machine capable of high-speed operations. He concluded that German operations in Poland reflected classic Napoleonic manoeuvre: "once more history has pointed the finger, for those who care to see!"



LOGISTICS

With few exceptions Canadian Military History has ignored the combat logistics side of the battle—the nine-tenths activity and effort that lie below the surface of all military operations.

—Lieutenant-Colonel John Conrad

Aubin, Nicolas. ***Les routes de la liberté : La logistique américaine en France et en Allemagne, 1944–1945***. Paris: Histoire & Collection, 2014, 220 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-2352503200. Available in English.

The Red Ball Express Highway was the nickname given to a road opened in August 1944 to deliver supplies from the beaches of Normandy to the American soldiers who were engaged in an epic pursuit across France. In the end, by means of field expedients and remarkable innovations, in spring 1945 the U.S. Army became the only war machine capable of sustaining millions of soldiers and thousands of tanks throughout the enemy's depth.

Brown, Ian M. ***British Logistics on the Western Front, 1914–1919***. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998, 280 pages. ISBN: 978-0275958947.

While the BEF may be found wanting in some areas, administration was not one of them. British generals proved to be thoroughly modern professional officers in the manner in which they solved the ongoing crises that attended the explosive growth of the BEF and its artillery-intensive style of warfare.

🍁 Conrad, Lieutenant-Colonel John. ***What the Thunder Said: Reflections of a Canadian Officer in Kandahar***. Toronto: Dundurn, 2011, 239 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-1-55488-408-7.

Conrad commanded 1 Service Battalion in Kandahar in mid-2006 and explores the near-collapse of logistical support for Task Force Orion. He argues that the era of brute-force logistics has passed.

Crevel, Martin van. ***Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton***. 2nd Edition. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004 (1977), 328 pages. ISBN: 978-0521546577.

Crevel argues that modern armies do not move much faster than 18th-century ones, and that characterizing the 1944-type army as obsolete demonstrates a misunderstanding of the development of logistics in the 20th century. He predicts that the speed of mobile operations cannot be expected to increase much in the foreseeable future.



Lynn, John A., ed. ***Feeding Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present***. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993, 344 pages. ISBN: 0813318653.

Essays by eleven leading scholars revise the history of logistics and its important role in the development of military operations.

Peltz, Eric, et al. ***Sustainment of Army Forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom: Battlefield Logistics and Effects on Operations***. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005, 145 pages. ISBN: 0833038060.

The authors describe how US Army forces were sustained in the face of severe logistics problems, examine how well this support performed, and discuss the effects on operations with an emphasis on the period from the start of ground combat to the fall of Baghdad.

Prados, John. ***The Blood Road: The Ho Chi Minh Trail and the Vietnam War***. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1999, 431 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0-471-25465-7.

Prados suggests that the Vietnam War might have ended differently if the United States had somehow managed to shut down the Trail.

Roth, Jonathan P. ***The Logistics of the Roman Imperial Army at War 264 BC–AD 235***. Leiden: Brill, 2012 (1999), 398 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-9004225473.

Roth explores the Roman military supply system from the Punic Wars to the end of the Principate. Each chapter is devoted to a different aspect of logistics: supply needs and rations; packs, trains and military servants; foraging and requisition; supply lines; sources of supply; administration; and the impact of logistics on Roman warfare.

Shrader, Charles R. ***The Withered Vine: Logistics and the Communist Insurgency in Greece, 1945–1949***. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999, 352 pages. ISBN: 0275965449.

Shrader provides a striking lesson in what happens to an armed revolutionary movement when it lacks adequate manpower and logistical resources.

Thompson, Julian. *Lifeblood of War: Logistics in Armed Conflict*. London: Brassey's, 1994, 360 pages. ISBN: 978-0080417769.

Thompson uses a number of campaigns to illustrate how the problem of supplying forces has been tackled over the centuries.

🍁 Warren, Arnold. *Wait for the Wagon: The Story of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps*. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1961, 413 pages. Maps.

Warren documents the vital but unrecognized contribution of the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps to operations in the Second World War, through Korea and into the peacekeeping era.



INTELLIGENCE

The problem is that despite all of the technology and Humint we had ... we were never 100% certain of what the Taliban had in any specific location at any time. We were going to have to “feel” our way through the fight, to some degree.

—Lieutenant-Colonel Shane Schreiber on Operation MEDUSA

Allen, George W. ***None So Blind: A Personal Account of the Intelligence Failure in Vietnam***. New York: Ivan D. Ree, 2001, 320 pages. ISBN: 1-5666-3387-8.

Allen, a chief official with the CIA and Army Intelligence, argues that American leaders were consistently unwilling to face up to “bad news” from intelligence sources.

Bennett, Ralph. ***Ultra in the West: The Normandy Campaign 1944–45***. London: Hutchinson, 1979, 305 pages. ISBN: 0-09-139330-2.

Bennett investigates the relation between military intelligence and military action and concludes that there was a striking difference in the heed paid to Ultra before and after the closing of the Falaise Gap.

🍁 Charters, David A. “Canadian Military Intelligence in Afghanistan.” ***International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*** 25, no. 3 (Fall 2012): 470–507.

The Canadian intelligence presence in Afghanistan was a major undertaking for a small power. At its peak it represented the largest overseas deployment of Canadian intelligence personnel and resources since the Second World War.

🍁 Elliot, Major R.S. ***Scarlet to Green: A History of the Canadian Intelligence Corps, 1903–1963***. Toronto: Canadian Security and Intelligence Association, 1981, 769 pages, Maps, ISBN: 978-0969054702.

Elliot traces the evolution of Canadian Army intelligence from the creation of the Corps of Guides in 1903 to the beginning of Unification.

Handel, Michel I., ed. ***Intelligence and Military Operations***. London: Routledge, 1990, 464 pages. ISBN: 978-0714633312.

Handel examines the ways in which the intelligence profession has grown in esteem and argues that co-operation between the intelligence adviser and the military decision maker is vital.



Hughes-Wilson, John. ***Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-ups***. New York: Da Capo Press, 2004 (1999), 384 pages. ISBN: 978-0786713738.

A long-serving professional military intelligence officer explores and exposes the often disastrous misunderstanding and mishandling of crucial intelligence by politicians and seasoned generals in recent times.

🍁 Jenkins, Dan R. ***“Winning Trench Warfare: Battlefield Intelligence in the Canadian Corps, 1914–1918.”*** PhD Dissertation, Carleton University, 1999. Available through the Army Professional Military Education section, CACSC.

From 1915 onward the Canadians became aggressive intelligence gatherers, collecting and analyzing every possible scrap of information before launching assaults. Operational plans became so detailed and complex that battlefield confusion, luck and chance were reduced, as prior calculation and mathematical precision helped commanders regain some control over events.

Koch, Oscar W. ***G-2: Intelligence for Patton***. Philadelphia: Whitmore, 1971, 167 pages.

Koch describes how intelligence was valued and exploited in Third Army, how Patton expressed his Essential Elements of Information, and how enemy intent was constantly checked against enemy capability. He also discusses the characteristics of a good G-2.

Schwieen, Colonel Edwin E. ***Combat Intelligence: Its Acquisition and Transmission***. Washington, DC: The Infantry Journal Press, 1936, 121 pages. Maps.

Schwieen, an instructor at the Command and General Staff School and a graduate of the Ecole Supérieure de Guerre, argued that intelligence was a practical study in psychology and logic, but lamented that “we attribute an almost unbelievable immobility and stupidity to our adversary.”

Strong, Major-General Sir Kenneth. *Men of Intelligence: A Study of the Roles and Decisions of Chiefs of Intelligence from World War I to the Present Day*. London: Cassell, 1970, 208 pages. ISBN: 978-0304936526.

Strong surveys the work of a dozen men from four major intelligence powers who were responsible for the establishment, development or implementation of modern intelligence processes. He examines the evolution of fulfilling the basic need to see what was "on the other side of the hill."

West, Nigel. *The Secret War for the Falklands*. London: Sphere, 1998, 277 pages. ISBN: 978-0751520712.

West focuses on the clandestine efforts to deny General Galtieri the one weapon that could have turned Operation Corporate into a humiliating defeat for Britain: the French-manufactured Exocet missile.

Willoughby, Major-General Charles A. *MacArthur, 1941–1951*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954, 441 pages. Maps. Available in French.

Willoughby served as MacArthur's G-2 for a decade. He provides a detailed analysis of the influence of intelligence on MacArthur's decision making in the Second World War and Korea.



SPECIFIC OPERATIONS

Certain environments pose specific challenges to the successful conduct of military operations. They normally stem from the physical nature of the surroundings and require careful consideration.

—Land Operations

AID TO THE CIVIL POWER

🍁 Charters, David A. "From October to Oka: Peacekeeping in Canada, 1970–1990," pp. 368–393 in Marc Milner, ed., ***Canadian Military History: Selected Readings***. Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993. ISBN: 0773052577.

Charters provides a useful examination of this issue and the legal and political complexities involved.

AIRBORNE AND AIRMOBILE

🍁 Horn, Colonel Bernd. ***Bastard Sons: An Examination of Canada's Airborne Experience, 1942–1995***. St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell, 2001, 287 pages. ISBN: 1551250780.

Horn argues that the Army's key problem was its inability to find a viable, long-term role that made airborne forces indispensable.

🍁 Rickard, Captain John N. "The Employment of Airborne (Parachute) Forces in Modern Asymmetrical Warfare." ***The Canadian Army Journal*** 7, no. 3 (Fall/Winter 2004): 111–123.

Rickard argues that the Army's disregard for parachute forces is unwarranted and present doctrine is unimaginative. He suggests that company-level parachute operations would be the most effective in the asymmetrical environment.

Shrader, Charles R. ***The First Helicopter War: Logistics and Mobility in Algeria, 1954–1962***. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999, 296 pages. ISBN: 978-0275963880.

Shrader explains how the French Army, recently defeated by the Viet Minh insurgents in Indochina, was able to successfully defeat the Algerian nationalist rebels on the battlefield by exploiting a superior logistical system and the use of the helicopter to enhance operational mobility.



Tolson, Lieutenant-General John J. ***Airmobility in Vietnam: Helicopter Warfare in Southeast Asia***. New York: Arno Press, 1981, 304 pages. Maps.

Tolson traces the evolution of airmobility and discusses the pros and cons of the capability. He argues that airmobility worked in Vietnam despite the tremendous problems of operating in the jungles and mountains of an undeveloped country.

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

Lovering, Tristan, ed. ***Amphibious Assault: Maneuver From the Sea***. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Sheridan House, 2007, 520 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0955024351.

Leading international military and academic experts analyze 37 amphibious operations from the “how not to do it” catastrophe of Gallipoli in 1915, through the Second World War, Vietnam and the Falklands, to the Al Faw landings in Iraq in 2003. German, Japanese and Soviet operations are included.

COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS

🍁 MacDonald, Brian, ed. ***Defence Requirements for Canada’s Arctic***. Vimy Paper. Toronto: Canadian Defence Associations Institute, 2007, 140 pages. Available in French.

Chapter 7 addresses requirements in terms of land forces.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Catignani, Sergio. ***Israeli Counter-Insurgency and the Intifadas: Dilemmas of a Conventional Army***. London: Routledge, 2008, 256 pages. ISBN: 0415433886.

Catignani analyzes how the Israeli Defence Force attempted to adapt its conventional military forces to the difficulties of carrying out counterinsurgency operations during the two major Palestinian uprisings of 1987–1993 and 2000–2005 in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Egnell, Robert, and David Ucko. ***Counterinsurgency in Crisis: Britain and the Challenge of Modern Warfare***. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013, 221 pages. ISBN: 978-0-231-16426-9.

This is a critical assessment of British Army performance in Basra and Helmand which exposes a disconcerting gap between ambitions and resources, intent and commitment.

Gentile, Colonel Gian. ***Wrong Turn: America's Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency***. New York: The New Press, 2013, 208 pages. ISBN: 978-1595588746.

Gentile argues that history does not support the idea of counterinsurgency as a viable method of resolving conflict. The concept has been elevated almost to the religious level and lulls people into believing that war is about soft power.

Jeannerod, Thibaud. ***La contre-insurrection en Afghanistan, leçon d'un échec***. Paris: Nuvis, 2012, 130 pages. ISBN: 978-2363670168.

After achieving mythic status and being promoted as a way out of the conflict in Afghanistan, counter-insurgency strategy collided with reality. After being applied for six years in the Afghan theatre of operations, it had limited results at best: despite the withdrawal of NATO troops, the country's fate is still in question and the current government still lacks legitimacy.

Lyautey, Hubert. "Du rôle colonial de l'Armée." ***Revue des deux mondes*** 157 (15 January 1900): 1–41.

Lyautey argued that war in the colonies was a constructive force, employing economic, political and diplomatic weapons to minimize the violence of conquest. Stability could be achieved by close association with the native elites in a flexible protectorate that guided, but did not dominate, the traditional hierarchy.

Nagl, Lieutenant-Colonel John A. ***Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam***. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005 (2002), 249 pages. ISBN: 0226567702.

Nagl argues that organizational culture is the key to the ability to learn from unanticipated conditions. British Army organizational culture supported successful counterinsurgency in Malaya, but U.S. Army culture undermined the prosecution of counterinsurgency in Vietnam.



Porch, Douglas. ***Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War.*** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 445 pages. ISBN: 978-1107699847.

Porch challenges the contemporary mythologizing of counterinsurgency as a humane way of war. The reality is that “hearts and minds” has never been a recipe for lasting stability and that past counterinsurgency campaigns have succeeded not through state-building but by shattering and dividing societies while unsettling civil–military relations.

🍁 Rankin, Lieutenant-Colonel Chris. ***“The Canadian North West Rebellion 1885: A Case Study in Counterinsurgency.”*** Master’s Thesis, University of New Brunswick, 2013, 139 pages. Available from the Army Professional Military Education section, CACSC.

Rankin argues that the North-West Rebellion meets the criteria for definition as an insurgency and that the government’s response contained many of the complexities currently associated with contemporary counterinsurgency operations as generally defined in historical and contemporary western academic and military thought.

🍁 Rickard, Captain John N., and Michael Hennessy. ***War Without Fronts: A Primer on Counterinsurgency.*** Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2012, 132 pages. Maps, tables, ISBN: 978-1894673518. Available in French.

Rickard and Hennessy seek to inform the reader that while each campaign is unique, the history of insurgencies provides a rich source of comparative analysis and ample lessons learned by others that may help lift the fog of war which will surround any future counterinsurgency campaign.

Wayne, Martin I. ***China’s War on Terrorism: Counter-Insurgency, Politics and Internal Security.*** London: Routledge, 2007, 218 pages. ISBN: 978-0415545181.

Wayne explores China’s ruthless but effective counter-insurgency and internal security operations in the western Xinjiang province and highlights the success achieved based upon reshaping local society and government institutions.

URBAN WARFARE

Antal, John. *City Fights: Selected Histories of Urban Combat from World War II to Vietnam*. New York: Presidio Press, 2003, 464 pages. ISBN: 978-0891417811.

This book is a collection of thirteen case studies: Tai-Erh-Chuang (1938), Stalingrad (1942), Warsaw (1944), Arnhem (1944), Troyes (1944), Budapest (1944–1945), Aschaffenburg (1945), Manila (1945), Berlin (1945), Jaffa (1948), Seoul (1950), Hue City (1968), and Da Nang–Hoi An (1968). A discussion of the evolution of urban tactical doctrine and lessons to be learned is also included.

Camp, Colonel (Retired) Dick. *Operation Phantom Fury: The Assault and Capture of Fallujah, Iraq*. New York: Zenith Press, 2009, 320 pages. ISBN: 978-0760336984.

The Second Battle for Fallujah took place over an almost two-month period, from 7 November to 23 December 2004. Camp's book is a firsthand account of the brutal reality of the war in Iraq, how this battle for a key city was fought, and how such a crucial battle looks from positions of command and from the thick of the fight.

🍁 Eyre, Lieutenant-Colonel Wayne D. "The Urban Web: An Operational Concept for Offensive Operations in the Urban Sprawl of the 21st Century." *The Canadian Army Journal* 7, no. 1 (2004): 49–65.

Eyre argues that the concept of the urban web, isolating the centres of the enemy's strength through intelligence, and thereby saving large portions of a city from combat, is a viable option. If properly employed it will facilitate rapid domination of selected urban areas with smaller forces than would ordinarily be required to dominate an entire city.

Joes, Anthony James. *Urban Guerrilla Warfare*. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2007, 232 pages. ISBN: 978-0813124377.

Joes examines eight urban guerrilla actions from Warsaw to Grozny. He demonstrates that urban insurgents violate certain fundamental principles of guerrilla warfare as set forth by Clausewitz and Mao Tse-Tung. Urban guerrillas operate in finite areas, leaving themselves vulnerable to encirclement and ultimate defeat.



Oliker, Olga. ***Russia's Chechen Wars 1994–2000: Lessons from the Urban Combat***. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001, 102 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0833029980.

Oliker concludes that whatever else the Russian army proved capable of in Chechnya and Grozny, it could not, and cannot, bloodlessly capture a large urban area from an insurgent force. One reason for this limitation is that in 1999, as in 1994, the Russians were fundamentally unprepared for urban combat. Forces practised for mountain combat, for small-scale counter-terrorist actions, even for urban defence, but not for capturing a populated area by force.

🍁 Zuehlke, Mark. ***Ortona: Canada's Epic World War II Battle***. Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 2003, 480 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-1550545579.

In one blood-soaked, furious week of fighting, from 20 to 27 December 1943, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division took Ortona, Italy, from the 1st Parachute Division at the cost of 2,339 Canadians killed or wounded. This is an instructive narrative of urban combat based on participants' recollections.



SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

I think Canadians need to hear about what their special forces are doing to the extent we can get that message out, because they would be very proud.

—Brigadier-General Mike Rouleau

Foot, Michael R.D. ***SOE in France: An Account of the Work of the British Special Operations Executive in France, 1940–1944***. London: Routledge, 2004 (1966), 584 pages. ISBN: 978-0415408004.

Foot explains the six sections of SOE, where SOE fitted into the Allied war machine, and how it worked in France. He concentrates on the work of the 400 hand-picked men and women of the “independent French” section, although the book also covers SOE’s five other sections that operated mainly in France.

Gillespie, Robert M. ***Black Ops Vietnam: The Operational History of MACVSOG***. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011, 304 pages. ISBN: 978-1-59114-321-5.

Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group was a highly classified, U.S. joint-service organization committed to action in Southeast Asia even before the major build-up of U.S. forces in 1965. It fielded South Vietnamese military personnel, indigenous Montagnards, ethnic Chinese Nungs, and Taiwanese pilots in its varied reconnaissance, naval, air and agent operations.

Hernault, Thomas. ***L'évolution de la doctrine d'utilisation des Forces spéciales françaises***. Paris: L'Harmattan. 2015, 188 pages. ISBN: 978-2343048833.

This book describes the development and evolution of the French special forces through France’s political–military strategy. They arose from a new concept that came to maturity in the early years of this century and have proven their usefulness to government and the military. The French special forces are indispensable for France and for the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. They symbolize the power of a nation with international ambitions and a 21st-century vision of warfare.

🍁 Horn, Colonel Bernd, and Major Tony Balasevicius, eds. ***Casting Light on the Shadows: Canadian Perspectives on Special Operations Forces***. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007, 307 pages. ISBN: 1-55002-694-1. Available in French.

The essays in this book, written by individuals with specialized knowledge and expertise in the field, cover a series of SOF-related issues and topics. As well as providing a solid foundation for SOF theory, historical background and evolution, the book also highlights ongoing developments in SOF.



🍁 Horn, Colonel Bernd. ***No Ordinary Men: Special Operations Forces Missions in Afghanistan***. Toronto: Dundurn, 2015, 288 pages. Maps, ISBN: forthcoming.

Horn peels back the cloak of secrecy and reveals four untold special operations that JTF 2 operators conducted in 2005–2006 in which their courage, tenacity and impressive capabilities meant the difference between life and death. The book takes the reader to the Taliban sanctuaries deep in the Afghan hinterlands and provides a glimpse of Canada's remarkable legacy in special operations.

🍁 Joyce, Kenneth H. ***Snow Plough and the Jupiter Deception: The True Story of the 1st Special Service Force and the 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion, 1942–1945***. St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell, 2006, 320 pages. ISBN: 1551250942.

Utilizing first-hand accounts from veterans and official documents, Joyce's book describes the formation, training and operational deployment of this unit to the northern Pacific, Italy and southern France. The genesis of the unit, the reasons why its initial mission did not come to fruition and its eventual disbandment are also examined.

Naval Post Graduate School. ***Conventional and Special Operations Forces Integration at the Operational Level***. Damascus, MD: Pennyhill Press, 2014, 72 pages. ISBN: 978-1503208629.

This work argues that in the future, conventional and Special Operations Force (SOF) integration should be determined by the task, not the unit, and proposes a methodology that enables the identification of task interdependencies between conventional forces and SOF.



COMMAND AND LEADERSHIP

I inspire them [soldiers] by being with them, by being out on the ground, understanding their capabilities, which enables me to be decisive and give them orders [so that] I can get the full potential out of them.

—Brigadier-General Dean Milner

Bailey, Major-General Jonathan, Richard Iron and Hew Strachan. ***British Generals in Blair's Wars***. London: Ashgate, 2013, 404 pages. ISBN: 978-1409437369.

This book is based on a series of high-profile seminars held at Oxford in which senior British officers, predominantly from the army, reflected on their experiences of campaigning. The chapters embrace all the UK's major operations since the end of the Cold War, but they focus particularly on Iraq and Afghanistan.

Blumenson, Martin, and James L. Stokesbury. ***Masters of the Art of Command***. New York: Da Capo, 1990 (1975), 412 pages. ISBN: 978-0306804038.

Blumenson and Stokesbury explore the interplay of time, circumstance, and individual character and ability that makes for success or failure. They argue that there is no formula, and therefore no "science" of command.

Burne, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred H. ***Lee, Grant and Sherman: A Study in Leadership in the 1864–65 Campaign***. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000 (1938), 216 pages. Maps, tables, ISBN: 978-0700610730.

Burne contradicted the prevailing perceptions of the generals and even proposed that Grant's military capabilities were inferior to Lee's. Burne challenged the orthodox views of historians—J.F.C. Fuller on Grant and Basil Liddell Hart on Sherman.

Crevelld, Martin van. ***Command in War***. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985, 33 pages. ISBN: 0-674-14440-6.

Although vast changes have occurred in military thinking and technology, the one constant has been an endless search for certainty by commanders about the manifold factors that together constitute the environment of war. The author concludes that progress in command has usually been achieved less by employing more advanced technologies than by finding ways to transcend the limitations of existing ones.



🍁 Davis, Karen B., ed. ***Women and Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Perspectives and Experience***. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007, 196 pages. ISBN: 978-0662462972. Available in French.

A series of essays discusses the role of women in leadership positions in the Canadian Forces.

🍁 Dextraze, General Jacques A. "L'art du Commandement." ***Le Bulletin de doctrine et d'instruction de l'Armée de terre*** 1, no. 2 (Novembre 1998): 23–27. Available in English.

Dextraze argued that the essence of leadership does not change.

Dixon, Norman F. ***On the Psychology of Military Incompetence***. New York: TimeWarner Books, 1981 (1976), 448 pages. Diagrams, ISBN: 978-0708814826. Available in French.

Dixon argues that military incompetence is a largely preventable phenomenon because that phenomenon follows certain laws. Identified patterns of behaviour suggest that prediction of performance is possible. Available in French.

Elliott, Major-General (Retired) Christopher L. ***High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars***. London: C. Hurst & Co Publishers, 2015, 288 pages. ISBN: 978-1849044608.

Elliott reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. Often the opinion of a junior tactical commander led the entire strategy of the Ministry of Defence, not the other way around, as it should have been.

Fuller, J.F.C. ***Generalship, Its Diseases and Their Cure: A Study of the Personality Factor in Command***. London: Faber & Faber, 1933, 106 pages.

Fuller investigates First World War generalship and concludes that it was impersonal and more a product of staff decisions than true command.

Glover, Michael. ***Wellington as Military Commander***. New York: Penguin Books, 2001 (1968), 304 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0141390512.

Argues that Wellington, one of the greatest commanders in history, achieved his victories despite impossible obstacles—including George III's own army, which was chaotic, undisciplined and recruited mainly from, in Wellington's famous words, "the scum of the earth." Ultimately, Wellington made the best of every situation and left no room for surprise.

🍁 Godfrey, Major Andrew B., ed. ***Great War Commands: Historical Perspectives on Canadian Army Leadership 1914–1918***. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2010, 238 pages. Maps, diagrams, ISBN: 978-1-100-15601-9. Available in French.

This book is a valuable exploration of the minds of Canadian commanders charged with waging total war at a terrible cost.

Godfrey, Simon. ***British Army Communications in the Second World War: Lifting the Fog of Battle***. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013, 304 pages. ISBN: 978-1441190390.

Godfrey argues that failures in front-line communications contributed to several of the setbacks suffered by the Army and that ultimate victory was only achieved after a successful communications system was in place.

Graham, Dominick, and Shelford Bidwell. ***Coalitions, Politicians and Generals: Some Aspects of Command in Two World Wars***. London: Brassey's, 1993, 323 pages. ISBN: 1-85753-007-1.

Graham and Bidwell identify the stresses between levels of command and staff responsible for policy and strategy, strategy and operations, and operations and tactics, and enhances the understanding of the issues with a careful consideration of logistics.



Hart, Stephen A. ***Montgomery and 'Colossal Cracks': The 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944–1945***. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000, 214 pages. ISBN: 0-275-96162-1.

Hart argues that maintenance of morale and casualty conservation were key elements in Montgomery's operational technique.

🍁 Hope, Lieutenant-Colonel Ian. ***Dancing with the Dushman: Command Imperatives for the Counter-Insurgency Fight in Afghanistan***. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2008, 162 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0-662-47818-8. Available in French.

This is a personal account by the commander of Task Force Orion in Kandahar Province in 2006. Hope stresses that a commander must (1) comprehend the nature of the war that he finds himself in, (2) must recognize that the human personality is everything, and (3) must cultivate a sense of moral purpose.

🍁 Horn, Colonel Bernd, and Stephen Harris, eds. ***Warrior Chiefs: Perspectives on Senior Canadian Military Leaders***. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2000, 365 pages. ISBN: 1550023519. Available in French.

The chapters in this book chronicle the personalities and experiences of 17 senior Canadian military commanders stretching from Confederation to the post–Cold War era. Several post-1945 army officers are covered, including Foulkes, Mackenzie and Dallaire.

🍁 Horn, Colonel Bernd, ed. ***In Harm's Way: On the Front Lines of Leadership: Sub-Unit Command on Operations***. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2006, 195 pages. ISBN: 0-662-42446-8. Available in French.

This is a collection of war stories based on personal experiences and interpretations, reflections and lessons the authors have drawn from them. Offers a useful, virtual experience for those who have not deployed on operations, and a broader repertoire of knowledge even for those who have.

Keegan, John. ***The Mask of Command***. New York: Penguin Books, 1988, 400 pages. ISBN: 978-0140114065. Available in French.

Keegan examines Alexander the Great, the Duke of Wellington, Ulysses S. Grant and Adolph Hitler. He rejects the social science "trait" and "behaviour" models in favour of the idea that generalship differs through the ages due to differences in purpose and function.

Lemos, Le capitaine Nicolas de. ***De l'art du commandement : Réflexions d'un officier de réserve***. Quinçay, France: L'Esprit du Livre, 2011, 154 pages. ISBN: 978-2915960952.

The author not only shares his experience as a company commander but also reflects on training and motivating soldiers to enable them to push past their limits and be the best they can be in the service of their country.

McGrath, John J. ***Crossing the Line of Departure: Battle Command on the Move: A Historical Perspective***. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006, 282 pages. Maps.

This is a wide-ranging study from Alexander the Great to the Information Age. The key to successful battle command on the move was the interplay between technology and personal technique. It is not inevitable that the Information Age will shift the balance in favour of technology.

Nye, Colonel Roger H. ***The Challenge of Command***. New York: Perigee Books, 2002 (1986), 208 pages. ISBN: 0-399-5280-4.

A handbook for mentors as well as junior officers, this work guides the reader through the major aspects of command: developing a professional vision and being a tactician, warrior, moral arbiter, strategist and mentor.



🍁 Rickard, Captain John N. ***The Politics of Command: Lieutenant-General A.G.L. McNaughton and the Canadian Army, 1939–1943***. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010, 416 pages. Maps, tables, ISBN: 978-1442640023.

Rickard argues that McNaughton was not opposed to getting Canadian formations operational experience, was a better commander than generally believed and was ultimately relieved of command of First Canadian Army in November 1943 because of personality clashes with British and Canadian peers.

🍁 Rickard, Captain John N. ***Advance and Destroy: Patton as Commander in the Bulge***. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011, 472 pages. Maps, diagrams, tables, ISBN: 978-0813134550.

This is a critical assessment of Patton's decision making through the lens of the estimate process. Rickard argues that Patton was willing to take greater risks based on his ongoing assessment of intelligence but was forced by Bradley and Eisenhower to pursue more conservative courses of action. *Advance and Destroy* was the winner of the 2011 U.S. Army Historical Foundation award for best work in the Operational/Battle History category.

Slim, Field Marshal Sir William. ***Defeat into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942–1945***. London: Cooper Square Press, 2000 (1956), 616 pages. ISBN: 978-0815410225.

Slim, who commanded 14th Army, does not hesitate to elaborate on his command mistakes and miscalculations or his own deficiencies as a military commander.

THE MILITARY STAFF

Crosswell, D.K.R. ***The Chief of Staff: The Military Career of General Walter Bedell Smith***. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1991, 464 pages. ISBN-10: 0313274800.

Smith, who served as the Chief of Staff of Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force under Eisenhower, played a major role in planning and orchestrating the major Allied operations of the Second World War in Europe.

De Guingand, Major-General Francis. ***Operation Victory***. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1947, 382 pages. Maps, ISBN-10 81811580699.

De Guingand served as Montgomery's Chief of Staff in both Eighth Army and 21 Army Group. De Guingand believed that commanders should make the plans and decide on their amendments. Youth and brains were the most important things a staff officer needed to be effective in the field. Non-regulars could fill most staff appointments with a small amount of training and experience. De Guingand provides a detailed inside look at Montgomery's operational and command techniques.

Hittle, Lieutenant-Colonel James D. ***The Military Staff: Its History and Development***. 3rd Revised Edition. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975 (1944), 286 pages. ISBN: 0837179521.

Hittle focuses primarily on the evolution and development of the military staffs of Germany, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and the United States. He concludes that the American system of having co-equal staff sections is a major advantage over staff systems in which the operational function is dominant, and that it enables staff sections to conduct their estimates objectively.

Jones, R. Steven. ***The Right Hand of Command: Use and Disuse of Personal Staffs in the American Civil War***. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000, 256 pages. ISBN: 0-8117-1451-9.

Jones examines the staffs of Lee, Grant, Sherman and McClelland. Only Grant developed the staff to perform extended duties. Concludes that the unsophisticated nature of Civil War staffs warrants caution in describing the conflict as modern.

Zabecki, Major-General David T., ed. ***Chiefs of Staff: The Principal Officers Behind History's Great Commanders***. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008. Volume 1, ***Napoleonic Wars to World War I***, 241 pages. ISBN: 978-1-59114-990-3. Volume 2, ***World War II to Korea and Vietnam***, 248 pages. ISBN: 978-1-59114-991-0.

This book examines the history, development, and role of the chief of staff. Looking at both process and personalities, the contributors provide very useful and unique insights into the complex relationships between commanders and their principal staff officers, while at the same time giving the reader an appreciation for how military staffs and planning have evolved over time.



THE NCO AND NCM

🍁 Bland, Douglas L., ed. ***Backbone of the Army: Non-Commissioned Officers in the Future Army***. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003, 128 pages. ISBN: 0889118892.

This collection examines the subtle changes that have occurred in the officer/NCM relationship, including the expectations of NCMs and the way they view the authority of officers. It discusses the implications for education, training, doctrine and organization, offering comparative assessments from other military establishments.



THE HUMAN DIMENSION

There are few that focus on the “dirty” business of killing and the effects killing has on those that have conducted the act. It was surprising to me when starting my research how difficult it was to find a [Canadian] military members’ staff paper, article or book on the subject.

—Major David Quick

🍁 Brennan, Patrick. "'Completely Worn Out by Service in France': Combat Stress and Breakdown Among Senior Officers in the Canadian Corps." *Canadian Military History* 18, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 1–10.

Brennan describes the long command tenure of senior Canadian officers in the First World War and argues that psychological attrition needs to be factored into any assessment of command effectiveness in the Canadian Corps.

🍁 Copp, Terry, and Bill McAndrew. *Battle Exhaustion: Soldiers and Psychiatrists in the Canadian Army, 1939–1945*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990, 249 pages. ISBN: 0773507744.

Copp and McAndrew examine how Canadian military and medical authorities dealt with battle exhaustion, or what had previously been referred to as shell-shock. Reveals the diametrically opposed views of military and medical practitioners on the true nature of battle exhaustion, and the arguments that erupted within the medical community.

🍁 Copp, Terry, and Mark O. Humphries. *Combat Stress in the 20th Century: The Commonwealth Perspective*. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2010, 595 pages. ISBN: 978-1-100-12725-5.

This book is an introduction to the history of the ways in which combat stress reaction and its aftermath have been interpreted by soldiers and psychologists in the British Empire and Commonwealth.

Crevel, Martin van. *Fighting Power: German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939–1945*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982, 198 pages. Charts, tables, ISBN: 0-313-23333-0.

Crevel argues that the German Army's internal organization was superior to the U.S. Army's and the secret of the former's tremendous fighting power.



🍁 Engen, Robert. ***Canadians Under Fire: Infantry Effectiveness in the Second World War***. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009, 245 pages. ISBN: 978-0-7735-3626-5.

Engen utilizes battle experience questionnaires filled out by Canadian officers to address S.L.A. Marshall's ratio-of-fire thesis, and concludes that the thesis has no validity in the Canadian context.

Francis, Allan. ***Saving Normal: An Insider's Revolt Against Out-of-Control Psychiatric Diagnosis, DSM-5, Big Pharma, and the Medicalization of Ordinary Life***. New York: William Morrow, 2013, 304 pages. ISBN: 978-0062229250. Available in French.

This book is a devastating indictment of diagnostic inflation by the Chair of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-IV* Task Force. Mislabelling everyday problems as mental illness shifts responsibility for our mental well-being away from our own naturally resilient and self-healing brains to pharmaceutical companies reaping huge profits.

Glenn, Russell W. ***Reading Athena's Dance Card: Men Against Fire in Vietnam***. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000, 214 pages. ISBN: 1-55750-316-8.

Glenn argues that nearly all American combatants used their personal weapons to actively engage the enemy, and refutes Marshall's ratio-of-fire thesis. This is an important study which in many ways contradicts Grossman's thesis that soldiers find it difficult to kill.

Grossman, Lieutenant-Colonel Dave. ***On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society***. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995, 367 pages. ISBN: 0-316-33000-0.

Grossman stresses that human beings have a powerful, innate resistance to the taking of life and examines the techniques developed by the military to overcome that resistance.

Grossman, Lieutenant-Colonel Dave. ***On Combat: The Psychology and Physiology of Deadly Conflict in War and Peace***. 2nd Edition. PPCT Research Publications, 2007, 402 pages. ISBN: 978-0964-920521.

Grossman examines the impact of combat on the nervous system, the heart, the act of breathing, visual acuity, auditory perception, and memory. He discusses new research findings on what measures warriors can take to prevent such debilitations so they can stay in the fight, survive and win.

Henderson, William D. ***Cohesion: The Human Element in Combat***. Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific, 2002 (1985), 224 pages. ISBN: 978-1410202734.

Henderson argues that human abilities, character and mindsets will influence modern combat to a degree at least as important as technology. Within an all-volunteer military force environment, the kind of citizen attracted to military service, the qualities people carry from society and what qualities the military organization is able to impart must be matters for serious thought and planning.

Holmes, Richard. ***Acts of War: The Behaviour of Men in Battle***. New York: The Free Press, 1985, 436 pages. Diagrams, ISBN: 0-02-915020-5.

Holmes explores the soldier's experience in its entirety, including basic training, the intense comradeship of army life, terror, isolation, exhaustion of battle, the experience of killing, and man's basic instincts, including the tension between courage and fear and between self-preservation and self-sacrifice.

Karpov, Anatoli, and Jean-François Phelizon. ***Psychologie de la bataille***. Paris: Economica, 2004, 204 pages. ISBN: 2717847472. Available in English.

How is a game of chess like a negotiation? How is a negotiation like a game of chess? The dialogue between the authors on the theme of the psychology of battle has much to teach us. They agree that, to maximize the chances of winning a battle, it is not enough to be well prepared, well informed or even experienced in the tactical aspects of combat; the action taken must be tailored to the psychological profile of the adversary.



Keegan, John. ***The Face of Battle***. New York: Penguin Books, 1983 (1976), 368 pages. ISBN: 978-0140048971. Available in French.

This is a ground-breaking, bottom-up study of Agincourt, Waterloo and the Somme, but Keegan's comments on future combat are also important. He argues that the impersonality, coercion, and deliberate cruelty present on a rising scale make the fitness of modern man to sustain the stress of battle increasingly doubtful. He also presents a critically important contradiction. Since the beginning of the 20th century, Western armies have been "taught to accept" that they had no free will in deciding to be courageous or cowardly. Yet he also suggests that war ultimately is to the strong, and the percentage of psychiatric disorder reflects the inevitable differentiation of will.

🍁 Kellett, Anthony. ***Combat Motivation: The Behavior of Soldiers in Battle***. Boston: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing, 1982, 362 pages. ISBN: 0-89838-102-9.

This study was prepared by the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment (ORAE) under the auspices of Mobile Command Headquarters. Kellett concluded that despite attempts at prediction, and even quantification, the soldier's willingness to fight remains an unstable and unpredictable factor in military planning.

Kindsvatter, Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Peter S. ***American Soldiers: Ground Combat in the World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam***. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003, 432 pages. ISBN: 0-7006-1229-7.

Drawing on histories, memoirs, oral histories, psychological and sociological studies and fiction, Kindsvatter concludes that the experiences of American soldiers remained fundamentally the same, regardless of the enemy, terrain, training or weaponry.

🍁 Linford, Lieutenant-Colonel Chris. ***Warrior Rising: A Soldier's Journey to PTSD and Back***. Victoria: Friesen Press, 2013, 344 pages. ISBN: 978-1460219935.

This is the story of Linford's road to a diagnosis of PTSD after three operational deployments to the Gulf War, Rwanda, and Kandahar, Afghanistan. He recounts the traumas that impacted him so dramatically, leading him to what he describes as the very edge of his personal and professional competence. Years later, and after months of effective treatment, he discovered new ways to improve his health further.

🍁 Mantle, Craig, et al., eds. ***In Their Own Words: Canadian Stories of Valour and Bravery From Afghanistan, 2001–2007***. Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2013, 419 pages. ISBN: 978-1-100-21528-0. Available in French.

Mantle presents the personal accounts of 23 Canadian soldiers who have been recognized with some of the nation's highest honours. The book offers profound insight into the daily challenges of combat, the trials and rewards of military service and the mind of the Canadian soldier.

Marshall, S.L.A. ***Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command in Future War***. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000 (1947), 224 pages. ISBN: 0806132809.

Although his argument that only a small percentage of American infantry actually fired their weapons has been challenged, Marshall nevertheless offered many compelling insights on the human dimension. He argued that in spite of the proliferation of weapon systems that allow targets to be destroyed from great distances, future wars will still fundamentally revolve around the infantry.

Moran, Lord. ***The Anatomy of Courage: The Classic WWI Study of the Psychological Effects of War***. New York: Basic Books, 2007 (1945), 256 pages. ISBN: 978-0786718993.

Moran sought to find out why a man could be like a lion in battle one day and cower in battle the next day.

🍁 Quick, Major David N. ***"Killing in Combat: Implications for Military Leaders, Trainers and Scholars."*** Master's thesis, Royal Military College of Canada, 2008, 65 pages. Available from the Army Professional Military Education section at CACSC.

This is a thoughtful analysis by an RCR company commander who served in Afghanistan in 2007. He argues that the Canadian Army was ineffective in psychologically preparing soldiers to kill.



Shay, Dr. Jonathan. ***Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character***. New York: Atheneum, 1994, 246 pages. ISBN: 0-689-12182-2.

Shay examines the psychological devastation of war by comparing the soldiers of Homer's *Iliad* with Vietnam veterans suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. Although the *Iliad* was written 27 centuries ago, Shay believes it has much to teach about combat trauma, as do the more recent, compelling voices and experiences of Vietnam veterans.

Steenkamp, M.M., et al. "Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: Review of the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program." ***American Journal of Preventive Medicine*** 44, no. 5 (2013): 507–512.

Steenkamp argues that despite buy-in by the chain of command on a program that is extremely costly, and the credentials of the originators of the program, a high risk of specious reasoning exists despite the best intentions of everyone involved. The emotions attached to this subject, and a desperate effort to find that panacea of improving resiliency, undermine objectivity.

Watson, Peter. ***War on the Mind: The Military Uses and Abuses of Psychology***. New York: Basic Books, 1979, 534 pages. ISBN: 0465090656.

This book contains detailed accounts of experiments and studies by military psychologists during the post-1945 period which show that the psychological effects of chemical and biological warfare are far worse than the physical, that atrocities in war are invariably committed by "mild-mannered" soldiers, and that the most feared weapons in combat are those that do the least damage.

Young, Allan. ***Harmony of Illusions: Inventing Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder***. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995, 327 pages. ISBN: 0-691-03352-8.

Young, a professor of Anthropology in the Department of Social Studies of Medicine, Anthropology and Psychiatry at McGill, argues that PTSD is not a timeless or universal phenomenon or a discovery. It is a cultural product, a reality glued together by diagnostic technologies, styles of scientific and clinical reasoning, and modes of self-narration and confession. PTSD is not simply a psychiatric phenomenon, but also a moral development.



THE ETHICS OF WAR

The universal and natural determination of Canadian soldiers to avenge the death of our comrades must NOT under any circumstances take the form of retaliation in kind. ... Instead, Canadian anger must be converted into a steel-hard determination to destroy the enemy in battle.

—Lieutenant-General Harry Crerar, 1 August 1944

Aussaresses, General Paul. ***Services Speciaux, Algérie 1955-1957***, Paris: Perrin: 2001, 204 pages. ISBN : 978-2262017613. Available in English.

Aussaresses tackles a difficult subject: torture and summary executions. Based on his first-hand experience, he offers revelations and confirmations to shed light on the problems an army faces when the State assigns it the mission of fighting, by any means necessary, a rebellion that uses terrorism to force the population to support it and provokes repressive measures which bring international attention.

🍁 Bercuson, David. ***Significant Incident: Canada's Army, the Airborne, and the Murder in Somalia***. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1996, 272 pages. ISBN: 978-0771011139.

Argues that the process of bureaucratization initiated by passage of the *Unification Act* of 1968, and reinforced by later structural changes, undermined the command authority, leadership and morale of the Army to the point where the Somalia incident was possible.

Burleigh, Michael. ***Moral Combat: Good and Evil in World War II***. New York: HarperCollins, 2011, 650 pages. ISBN: 978-0-06-058097-1.

Explores how entire nations change under the shock of total war and establishes a practical basis for situational ethics. Adds emphasis to J.F.C. Fuller's belief that the Second World War was a moral debacle on both sides.

🍁 Dallaire, Lieutenant-General (Retired) Roméo. ***Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda***. New York: Carroll and Graf, 2005, 592 pages. ISBN: 0786715103. Available in French.

Dallaire vividly reveals the total failure of the international community to stop the genocide. He argues that Rwanda-like situations are fires that can be put out with a small force if caught early enough.



🍁 Dallaire, Lieutenant-General (Retired) Roméo. ***They Fight Like Soldiers, They Die Like Children: The Global Quest to Eradicate the Use of Child Soldiers.*** Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2011, 320 pages. ISBN: 978-0307355782. Available in French.

In conflicts around the world, there is an increasingly popular weapon system that requires negligible technology, is simple to sustain, has unlimited versatility and incredible capacity for both loyalty and barbarism. In fact, there is no more complete end-to-end weapon system in the inventory of war-machines than children.

Doaré, Ronan, and Henri Hude. ***Les robots au cœur du champ de bataille.*** Paris: Economica, 2011, 214 pages, ISBN: 9782717861099.

The main advantage of robots is, of course, to keep soldiers alive while gaining power in combat. However, their use raises some thorny issues beyond those that arise in traditional warfare. These new weapons oblige us to revisit all the fundamental ethical problems of war and its relationship to politics.

Frederick, Jim. ***Black Hearts: One Platoon's Descent into Madness in Iraq's Triangle of Death.*** New York: Broadway Books, 2011, 464 pages. ISBN: 978-0307450760.

Hit by near-daily mortars, gunfire, and roadside bomb attacks, suffering from a particularly heavy death toll, and enduring a chronic breakdown in leadership, members of 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion descended into a tailspin of poor discipline, substance abuse and brutality.

Gabriel, Richard A. ***The Warrior's Way: A Treatise on Military Ethics.*** Kingston: Canadian Defence Academy Press, 2007, 225 pages. ISBN: 978-0-662-46114-2. Available in French.

Gabriel attempts to identify the precepts, values and obligations that the soldier must understand and observe to be ethical. He posits several questions, including "When should the soldier disobey?"

Krishnan, Armin. ***Killer Robots: Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons.*** Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2009, 203 pages. ISBN: 978-0-7546-7726-0.

Krishnan argues that growing automation could represent a major discontinuity in the history of warfare by removing many psychological aspects of combat. A military ethos based on chivalry is still the best argument against increasing automation of warfare.

Montroussier, Laurence. ***Éthique et commandement.*** Paris: Economica, 2005, 246 pages. ISBN: 2717850007.

Where do a military leader's loyalties lie? What are the keys to moral strength in combat? What values will lead to operational success for soldiers and their leaders when they are plunged into the suffering and pride of action in wartime? The answers to these fundamental questions lie in leader training and command styles.

Royal, General Benoit. ***Éthique du soldat français,*** 3rd Edition. Paris: Economica, 2014, 304 pages. ISBN : 978-2717866957. Available in English.

This book reveals the heart of situations of extreme violence that soldiers must face. The author accomplishes this through the extraordinary first-person accounts of men and women whose strength in combat is a product of their fortitude.

Walzer, Michael. ***Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations.*** 4th Edition. New York: Basic Books, 2006 (1977), 400 pages. ISBN: 978-0465037070. Available in French.

Walzer, a political activist during the Vietnam War, stresses that the work concerns practical morality dominated by a doctrine of human rights. Ultimately, he argues that restraint in warfare is the beginning of peace.



Whitman, James Q. ***The Verdict of Battle: The Law of Victory and the Making of Modern War***. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012, 323 pages.
ISBN: 978-0-674-06714-1.

Whitman argues that pitched battle was a trial with a lawful verdict. The disappearance of this contained form of battle gave way to the rule of unbridled force. The ritualized violence of the past was more effective than modern war in bringing carnage to an end. Humanitarian laws that hold war to be evil have produced longer, more barbaric conflicts.



THE PROFESSION OF ARMS

The officer corps of the Canadian Army needs to revitalize its profession and seize the legacy of academic excellence that it was left by its predecessors. ... Over time, however, this seems to have been forgotten, with relatively few officers now contributing to the ongoing evolution of their profession.

—Major Todd Strickland

🍁 Bentley, Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Bill. ***Professional Ideology and the Profession of Arms in Canada***. Toronto: The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 2005, 146 pages. ISBN: 1894736079. Available in French.

Bentley argues that the classic attributes of unique specialized knowledge, applied in accordance with an inviolate value system, have been undermined. Only strict adherence to the tenets of a distinct professional ideology enables healthy, collaborative, and therefore effective, civil–military relations.

Coker, Christopher. ***The Warrior Ethos: Military Culture and the War on Terror***. New York: Routledge, 2007, 184 pages. ISBN: 978-0415424523.

Coker argues that warriors' actions, and indeed thoughts, are increasingly patrolled and that the modern battlefield is an unforgiving environment in which to discharge their vocation. As war becomes ever more instrumentalized, its existential dimension is fast being hollowed out. Technology is threatening the agency of the warrior, and in early 21st-century warfare, many aspiring warriors are becoming disenchanted with their profession.

🍁 English, Allan. ***Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective***. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004, 232 pages. ISBN: 077352715X.

English concludes that, while the culture of the Canadian Forces has been "Americanized" to a certain extent, the culture of the U.S. armed forces, due to changes in their personnel and roles, has experienced a certain degree of "Canadianization" in the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

🍁 English, Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) John A. ***Lament for an Army: The Decline of Military Professionalism***. Toronto: Irwin Publishing, 1998, 110 pages. ISBN: 0-7725-2520-X.

English argues that the Army clearly lost its way in the years leading up to the Somalia incident. He offers a provocative analysis of the type of army the country needs and the nature of the military professionalism required to achieve it.



Hackett, General Sir John. ***The Profession of Arms***. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1983, 239 pages. ISBN: 0-283-98951-3.

Hackett traces the forces that have shaped the military profession and argues that the profession of arms is an essential social institution offering an orderly way of life. It gives much and takes more, enriching freely anyone prepared to give more than he gets.

Huntington, Samuel. ***The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations***. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1981 (1957), 560 pages. ISBN: 978-0674817364.

Huntington compared the German and Japanese pre-Second World War experiences with the American experience and developed his own theory as to what the ideal form of civil-military relations should be. He argued that the officer corps was a professional body characterized by expertise, a responsibility to society, and a sense of corporateness. These characteristics gave the military a distinctive outlook and role which in turn formed the basis of the problem of civil-military relations.

Luvaas, Jay. ***The Education of an Army: British Military Thought, 1815–1940***. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970 (1964), 454 pages.

Luvaas examines the British Army over the course of 125 years and describes the transformation of a conservative military establishment into one of the world's most progressive armies. He presents the biographies of eleven of the most eminent British military writers and reformers, including Napier, Henderson, Wilkinson, Fuller and Liddell Hart.

Moskos, Charles C., John A. Williams and David R. Segal, eds. ***The Post-Modern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War***. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, 304 pages. ISBN: 0195133293.

The post-modern military loosens the ties with the nation-state, becomes multi-purpose in mission and moves toward a smaller volunteer force. It is increasingly androgynous in makeup and ethos and has greater permeability with civilian society.

Nye, Colonel Roger H. ***The Patton Mind: The Professional Development of an Extraordinary Leader.*** Garden City, New York: Avery Publishing, 1993, 212 pages. ISBN: 0-89529-428-1.

This book explains how Patton built up and used a personal military library for almost daily study and how he utilized a system of marginal notes and file cards to develop his thoughts on tactics, strategy, leadership and organization. It is based on several hundred of Patton's books donated to the West Point Library by his son.



TECHNOLOGY, SCIENCE AND INNOVATION

To remain an effective instrument of national power the Canadian Army must continue to innovate and adapt.

—Lieutenant-General Peter J. Devlin, 2011

Bidwell, Shelford, and Dominick Graham. ***Fire-Power: British Army Weapons and Theories of War 1904–1945***. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982, 327 pages. Diagrams, ISBN: 0-04-942176-X.

The authors, both former artillery officers who saw action in the Second World War, describe the development of their neglected, inadequate and class-ridden arm through the battles of the First World War and the eventual war-winning role that artillery played in the Second World War.

Boot, Max. ***War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today***. New York: Gotham Books, 2006, 624 pages. Maps, ISBN: 1-592-40222-4.

Boot argues that the last five centuries have been marked not by gradual change but by four major revolutions in military technology: the gunpowder revolution, the steam-engine revolution, the combustion engine/combat aviation revolution and the ongoing information revolution.

🍁 Copp, Terry, ed. ***Montgomery's Scientists: Operational Research in Northwest Europe, The Work of No. 2 Operational Research Section with 21 Army Group June 1944 to July 1945***. Waterloo: Laurier Centre for Military Strategic Disarmament Studies, 2000, 478 pages. Diagrams, charts, ISBN: 0-9697955-9-9.

Details the technological and scientific research behind the victory campaign. Dozens of documents empirically examine the effectiveness and employment of the various weapons and tools of war.

Crevelld, Martin van. ***Technology and War: From 2000 BC to the Present***. New York: The Free Press, 1989, 242 pages. ISBN: 0-02-933151-X.

Crevelld argues that technological progress does not necessarily translate into operational or tactical benefits, that it is difficult to discern long-term trends because technology is interacting and interchangeable, and that the nature, function and logic of war are impervious to technology.



Finkel, Meir. ***On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield***. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011 (2007), 300 pages. ISBN: 978-0-8047-7488-8.

Finkel contends that the current paradigm, with its over-dependence on intelligence and an all-out effort to predict the nature of the future battlefield, generally doesn't work. Therefore, surprise is inevitable.

Fortmann, Michel. ***Les cycles de mars: Révolutions militaires et édification étatique de la Renaissance à nos jours***. Paris: Economica, 2010, 654 pages. ISBN: 978-2717856866.

This book evaluates Tilly's theory by examining the processes through which war built the state, focusing on five periods marked by military revolutions: the Renaissance (15th and 16th centuries), the revolutionary and Napoleonic period (1792–1815); the Industrial Revolution (1815–1914), the two world wars (1914–1945), and the nuclear era (1945–2007).

🍁 Godefroy, Major Andrew B. ***In Peace Prepared: Innovation and Adaption in Canada's Cold War Army***. Vancouver: UBC Press, 2014, 275 pages. Diagrams, ISBN: 978-0-7748-2702-7.

Explains how and why the Army prepared for a possible future war against the Warsaw Pact and what the outcome of these preparations were. It argues that, contrary to popular myth, the Army was far more innovative and adaptive to the emerging security environment than previous assessments have given it credit for.

Kurzweil, Ray. ***The Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology***. New York: Penguin Books, 2006, 672 pages. ISBN: 978-0143037880.

Kurzweil argues that a "technological singularity," defined as a period in the future where the rate of technological change will be so high that human life will be irreversibly transformed, is rapidly approaching. Though fascinating from a pure science perspective, this book also raises human dimension and ethical issues.

Murray, Williamson. ***Military Adaptation in War: With Fear of Change.*** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, 352 pages. ISBN: 978-1107006591.

Murray examines the problem of how to adapt under the trying, terrifying conditions of war. The fact that the enemy is adapting at the same time presents military organizations with an ever-changing set of conundrums that offer up no easy solutions.

Parker, Geoffrey. ***The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800.*** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996 (1988), 282 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0521479585. Available in French.

Parker argues that the advent of firearms and ocean-going warships amounted to a “military revolution” which gave Westerners a decided advantage over the people of other continents: over the Amerindians in the 16th century, over most Indonesians in the 17th, and over many Indians and Africans in the 18th. A new chapter addresses the controversies engendered by the previous edition.

Roberts, Michael. ***The Military Revolution 1560–1660: An Inaugural Lecture Delivered Before the Queen's University at Belfast.*** Belfast, UK: Marjory Boyd, 1956, 32 pages.

Roberts argues that four major revolutions occurred during the period, including tactics, the growth in the size of armies, adoption of more complex strategies to bring larger armies into action, and the greater cost to society of waging war based on the first three.

Rubright, Richard. ***The Role and Limitations of Technology in U.S. Counterinsurgency Warfare.*** Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2015, 296 pages. ISBN: 978-1612346755.

Rubright argues that the U.S. military continues to find itself struggling against low-technology foes that conduct warfare on a different scale. Emerging technology is constantly in flux, and strategies for its use must continually evolve to ensure that available resources are put to best use against disparate enemies.



Winton, Harold R., and David R. Mets, eds. ***The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941***. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000, 246 pages. ISBN: 0-8032-4793-1.

This book traces how France, Germany, Russia, the United States and Great Britain dealt with the tension between continuity and change and synthesizes valid historical generalizations and insights that could have contemporary relevance.

Wong, Wilson W.S. ***Emerging Military Technologies: A Guide to the Issues***. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2013, 232 pages. ISBN: 978-0313396137.

Wong examines the potential of the United States to deploy new technologies and thoroughly explores three general categories of emerging technologies: autonomous computers, nanotechnology and biotechnology. The interrelated topics of directed energy weapons and ubiquitous space access are also given significant attention.



CULTURE AND CONFLICT

I underestimated one factor ... culture. I was looking at the wrong map—needed to look at the tribal map not the geographic map.

—Brigadier-General David Fraser
ISAF Multinational Brigade Commander, Kandahar

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. ***Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty***. New York: Crown Business, 2012, 529 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0-307-71921-8.

Acemoglu and Robinson argue that it is man-made political and economic institutions that underlie economic success or lack of it, not culture, the weather, geography or ignorance of what the right policies are.

🍁 Burns, Major-General E.L.M. ***Between Arab and Israeli***. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Company, 1962, 336 pages. Maps.

This book is Burns's recollection of events while serving as Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and commander of the United Nations Emergency Force between August 1954 and the spring of 1957. He concludes that both sides restricted the movement of observers and that the use of world public opinion had little impact on the Israelis because they were so convinced of the righteousness of their cause.

Creveld, Martin van. ***The Culture of War***. New York: Ballantine, 2008, 485 pages. ISBN: 978-0-345-50540-8.

Creveld argues that, because of free will, war has an inherent tendency to degenerate and that the culture of war, rooted in psychology, is largely impervious to change.

Giustozzi, Antonio, ed. ***Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field***. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009, 420 pages. ISBN: 978-0231701129.

This book explores the strengths and weaknesses of the organization, the nature of its networks, its success at maintaining unity, even when faced with attrition in the field, and the extent to which Taliban leaders have imposed strategy among the rank and file despite immense geographical challenges and poorly functioning communication systems.



Hanson, Victor David. ***Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power***. New York: Doubleday, 2001, 492 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0-385-50052-1. Available in French.

Looking beyond popular explanations such as geography or superior technology, Hanson argues that it is in fact Western culture and values—the tradition of dissent, the value placed on inventiveness and adaptation, and the concept of citizenship—which have consistently produced superior arms and soldiers.

Huntington, Samuel P. ***The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order***. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, 367 pages. ISBN: 978-1-4516-2716-9. Available in French.

Huntington argues that civilizational clashes are the greatest threat to world peace, but an international order based on civilizations is the best safeguard against war. Cultural differences have replaced ideological differences. He offers a strategy for the West to preserve its unique culture.

Lai, Benjamin. ***The Chinese People's Liberation Army: Its History, Traditions, and Air, Sea, and Land Capabilities in the 21st Century***. London: Casemate, 2015, 320 pages. ISBN: 978-1612002361.

Lai describes some of the lesser-known battles and wars the Chinese have been involved in, the development of their key weapon systems, and recruiting and training.

Lynn, John A. ***Battle: A History of Combat and Culture***. Revised Edition. New York: Basic Books, 2008 (2003), 464 pages. ISBN: 978-0813333724.

Lynn argues that ideas can be more important than bullets or bombs, but rejects Victor David Hanson's "Western way of warfare" thesis and replaces it with more nuanced concepts of varied and evolving cultural patterns of combat.

Motadel, David. *Islam and Nazi Germany's War*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2014, 500 pages. ISBN: 978-0-674-72460-0.

This is the first comprehensive account of Berlin's attempt to build an alliance with the Islamic world to address a deteriorating military situation. Berlin failed to achieve greater political returns from Islam because of fundamental issues of authenticity.

Pollack, Kenneth M. *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002, 698 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0-8032-3733-2.

Pollack argues that the Arab armies consistently suffered from deficiencies in four key areas: tactical leadership, information management, weapons handling and maintenance. He concludes that cohesion was generally good and that no pattern of competence or incompetence is readily apparent in Arab generalship.

Porter, Patrick. *Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009, 263 pages. ISBN: 978-0-231-15414-7.

Porter argues against the idea that culture dictates the strategy of war. Culture is powerful but it encompasses an ambiguous repertoire of ideas rather than a clear code of action. Dividing the world into Western, Asiatic or Islamic ways of war is a misconception that profoundly impacts our approach to present and future conflicts, especially the "War on Terror."

Stern, Jessica, and J.M. Berger. *ISIS: The State of Terror*. London: William Collins, 2015, 416 pages. ISBN: 978-0008120931.

The authors discuss the startling effectiveness of the Islamic State's use of social media as a means of luring and recruiting citizens from countries such as the United States, Great Britain and France. They emphasize that we must alter our present conceptions of terrorism and react to the rapidly changing jihadi landscape, both online and off, as quickly as the terrorists do.

STUDYING MILITARY HISTORY

🍁 Canadian Land Forces Command and Staff College. ***Realities of Battle: The Principles of War and the Study of Military History***. RB/01/P Part 6, October 1991, Fort Frontenac Library, 100 pages. Available from the Army Professional Military Education section, CACSC. Available in French.

This is an internal look at the relationship between the principles of war and history. It asserts that war is an art, not a science.

🍁 Charters, David A., Marc Milner and J. Brent Wilson, eds. ***Military History and the Military Profession***. Westport: Praeger, 1992, 242 pages. ISBN: 0-275-94072-1.

This collection examines the state of the art in modern military history, and the utility of the subject for professional armed forces. Part 1 explores the state of military historical writing in Britain and the United States. Part 2 illustrates the utility of the historical method in analyzing command decisions.

🍁 English, Allan D. ***The Changing Face of War: Learning from History***. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998, 299 pages. ISBN: 0773517235.

This is a collection of seventeen essays written by officers in the War Studies program at the Royal Military College of Canada. The editor's overarching purpose for the collection is to provide a source for post-Cold War military professionals who lack combat experience to learn vicariously.

Murray, Williamson, and Richard Hart Sinnreich. ***What's Past is Prologue: The Importance of History to the Military Profession***. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 298 pages. ISBN: 978- 0521619639.

Murray and Sinnreich illustrate the great importance of military history while simultaneously revealing the challenges of applying the past to the present. Essays present a convincing argument that today's military leaders need to study the past in spite of these challenges.



ANCIENT WARFARE

Caesar, Julius. ***Commentaries on the Gallic War***. Translated by H.J. Edwards. Miniolo, NY: Dover Publications, 2006, 224 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0486451077. Available in French.

One of the greatest works of military literature, Caesar's account of his conquest of Gaul deals with the psychology of his troops and the enemy, dispersed operations over a massive area, the impact of terrain on his tactical dispositions, the importance of cultural intelligence, logistics and the ever-present need to calculate risk.

Goldsworthy, Adrian. ***Roman Warfare***. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2007 (1999), 240 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0753822586. Available in French.

Goldsworthy reveals why Rome developed the most professional fighting force of the ancient world and what it was like to be a soldier in the legions. The Roman Army was clearly distinguishable from its opponents because it waged relentless, uncompromising warfare aimed at the total destruction of its enemies.

Hanson, Victor David. ***The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece***. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000, 244 pages. ISBN: 0520219112. Available in French.

Hanson explores the actual mechanics of hoplite battle in detail and argues that the ferocious, brutal, brief and destructive head-on clash shaped the Western way of warfare to the present.

Luttwak, Edward N. ***The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third***. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976, 255 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0-8018-1863-x. Available in French.

Luttwak argues that the Romans consciously developed three distinct strategic systems: hegemonic expansion, territorial security and sheer survival. Each system was based on a different combination of diplomacy, force and fixed infrastructures, different operational methods and different Roman world views and self-image.

Strassler, Robert S., ed. *The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War*. New York: The Free Press, 1998, 758 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0684827905.

The Peloponnesian War is a mine of military, moral, political and philosophical wisdom. As Thucydides stated 2400 years ago, he wrote about it for “those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the past, and which (human nature being what it is) will, at some time or other and in much the same ways, be repeated in the future.”

MEDIEVAL WARFARE

Keen, Maurice, ed. *Medieval Warfare: A History*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, 353 pages. ISBN: 978-0198206392.

Keen explores the experience of war chronologically and thematically, identifying the principal developments in the art of war, including fortification and siegecraft, the role of armoured cavalymen, the employment of mercenary forces, the advent of gunpowder artillery, and new skills in navigation and shipbuilding.

Luttwak, Edward N. *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2009, 498 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0-674-03519-5. Available in French.

The Byzantine empire so greatly outlasted its western counterpart because its rulers were able to adapt strategically to diminished circumstances, relying less on military strength and more on persuasion and manipulation of allies and potential enemies.

Verbruggen, J.F. *The Art of Warfare in Western Europe During the Middle Ages*. Revised Edition. Suffolk, UK: Boydell Press, 2002 (1954), 410 pages. ISBN: 978-0851155708.

Verbruggen assesses the reliability of the sources for our knowledge of the military history of the period, and examines the constituent parts of the medieval army, knights and footsoldiers, equipment and terms of service, behaviour on the field, and psychology. The problematic question of medieval tactics is addressed through analysis of accounts of a series of major battles.



16TH CENTURY

Oman, Sir Charles. *A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century*. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999 (1937), 800 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-1853673849.

This is a classic study covering the great wars of 1494–1559, Henry VIII's continental wars, the French Wars of Religion, the Dutch war of independence, and the Ottoman offensive against Christendom. Contemporary maps illustrate many of the actions.

17TH CENTURY

Childs, John. *Warfare in the Seventeenth Century*. London: Cassell & Co, 2001, 224 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0-304-35289-6. Available in French.

Childs rejects the thesis that a military revolution occurred during the century. Changes in the conduct and techniques of war were evolutionary because revolutions are “sharp, sudden events” and do not occur over centuries.

Parker, Geoffrey. *The Thirty Years' War*. 2nd Edition. London: Routledge, 1997 (1984), 340 pages. ISBN: 0-978-0415128834. Available in French.

Covers the horrors of the war, the contorted politics of the period, and all the major figures, including Wallenstein and Richelieu, Gustavus Adolphus and Tilly, the Winter King and the Habsburg emperors.

18TH CENTURY

Anderson, Fred. *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empires in British North America, 1754–1766*. New York: Vintage Books, 2000, 746 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0375706363.

Anderson's book is a comprehensive analysis of land and naval engagements on three continents, the political situation in Europe and the Americas, and the mentalities of European, American and native societies.

Black, Jeremy. ***Warfare in the Eighteenth Century***. London: Cassell & Co, 1999, 224 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0-304-352-454. Available in French.

This is a non-Eurocentric examination that stresses three major points. First, different military practices were appropriate in different parts of the world. Second, one cannot point to a hierarchy of military achievement based on the adoption of particular weapons. Third, no single model adequately captures both land and naval systems across the globe.

19TH CENTURY

🍁 Beal, Bob, and Rod Macleod. ***Prairie Fire: The 1885 Northwest Rebellion***. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1994, 384 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0771011091.

Beal and Macleod thoroughly describe how Indians and white settlers, in addition to the Métis, had serious grievances that were ignored by a distant federal government.

Epstein, Robert M. ***Napoleon's Last Victory and the Emergence of Modern Warfare***. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994, 220 pages. ISBN: 978-0700607518.

Epstein contends that the 1809 war, with its massive and evenly matched armies, multiple theatres of operation, new command-and-control schemes, increased firepower, frequent stalemates, and large-scale slaughter, had more in common with the American Civil War and subsequent conflicts than with the decisive Napoleonic campaigns that preceded it.

🍁 Grodzinski, Major John R. ***Defender of Canada: Sir George Prevost and the War of 1812***. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013, 400 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0806143873.

This, the first book-length examination of Prevost's career, offers a reinterpretation of the general's military leadership in the War of 1812. Grodzinski argues that Prevost deserves far greater credit for the successful defence of Canada than he has heretofore received.



Howard, Michael. ***The Franco-Prussian War: The German Invasion of France, 1870–1871***. 2nd Edition. London: Routledge, 2001 (1961) 536 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-04152667.

Howard's book is acknowledged as the definitive history of one of the most dramatic and decisive conflicts in the history of Europe. In 1870 Bismarck ordered the Prussian Army to invade France, inciting one of the most dramatic conflicts in European history. It transformed not only the states-system of the Continent but the whole climate of European moral and political thought. The overwhelming triumph of German military might, evoking general admiration and imitation, introduced an era of power politics, which was to reach its disastrous climax in 1914.

Royle, Trevor. ***Crimea: The Great Crimean War 1854–1856***. London: Abacus Books, 2000, 576 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0349112848.

Royle traces the gross incompetence of the British Army leadership that resulted in carnage. The loss of a good portion of the Light Brigade in the most famous, but not the most inept, incident of the war, and the destruction of whole regiments left to blunder about in the fog and smoke, could have been mitigated had commanders aggressively pursued adequate intelligence-gathering efforts.

Scales, Brigadier-General (Retired) John R. ***Sherman Invades Georgia***. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006, 213 pages. Maps, charts, ISBN: 1-59114-815-4.

Scales assesses Sherman's conduct of the Atlanta Campaign through the modern estimate methodology, based on information he had at the time, not his after-action reports. He concludes that Sherman's decision-making followed a logical process.

The United States Military Academy. ***The West Point History of the Civil War***. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014, 448 pages. Maps, charts, ISBN: 978-1476782621.

This book combines the expertise of preeminent historians commissioned by West Point and hundreds of maps uniquely created by cartographers under West Point's direction. It covers the generals and officer corps of both Union and Confederacy and the tactics, decisions and consequences of individual battles and the ebb and flow of the war in great detail.

Wavro, Geoffrey. *The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War with Prussia and Italy in 1866*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, 330 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0521629515.

Blending military and social history, Wavro describes the panic that overtook Austria's regiments in each clash with the Prussians. He reveals the blundering of the Austrian commandant, who fumbled away key strategic advantages and ultimately lost a war that most European pundits had predicted Austria would win.

20TH CENTURY

Aït-El-Djoudi, Dalila. *La guerre d'Algérie vue par l'ALN 1954–1962: l'armée française sous le regard des combattants algériens*. Paris: Autrement, 2007, 241 pages. ISBN: 978-2746709195.

The Algerian war has often been characterized as a "war of images," and indeed the combatants also had to confront stereotypes in newspaper articles, pamphlets and other propaganda. By portraying their adversary, by redefining "the other," "the enemy," in relation to themselves, the Algerian combatants were constructing their own identity in order to build strength and credibility.

🍁 Bercuson, David J. *Blood on the Hills: The Canadian Army in the Korean War*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002, 269 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0802085164.

Focuses on the many consequences of the army's un-readiness for combat in Korea and on the army's lack of success in learning lessons from its experience in an active theatre of war.

Bergerud, Eric. *Touched by Fire: The Land War in the South Pacific*. New York: Viking Penguin, 1996, 608 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0140246964.

Explores the brutal and no-quarter ground combat in New Guinea and the Solomon Islands from mid-1942 until early 1944. An important study on how the ferocious fighting power of one side was matched by the other.



Cadeau, Ivan. ***La guerre d'Indochine – De l'Indochine française aux adieux à Saigon 1940-1956***. Paris: J. Tallandier, 2015, 624 pages. Maps, ISBN: 979-1021010192.

In the face of the Việt Minh's guerrilla tactics, the French army's modern equipment proved less than effective. The soldiers were demoralized by ambushes and booby-traps, and the high command was gradually losing the initiative in combat. In May 1954, the defeat at Diên Biên Phu delivered the final blow to the expeditionary corps and hastened the end of the hostilities. The French officers were profoundly marked by this conflict and devastated by what they saw as the nation's indifference, contempt and stigmatization.

Clark, Alan. ***Barbarossa: The Russian–German Conflict, 1941–45***. New York: William Morrow, 1985 (1965), 560 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0688042684.

Clark explores one of the most brutal campaigns in the history of warfare and explains how a fighting force that in a two-month period lost two million men was nevertheless able to rally to defeat the Wehrmacht. The Barbarossa campaign included some of the greatest episodes in military history: the futile attack on Moscow in the winter of 1941–1942, the siege of Stalingrad, and the great Russian offensive beginning in 1944 that would lead the Red Army to the historic meeting with the Americans at the Elbe and on to victory in Berlin.

Connaughton, Colonel Richard M. ***Rising Sun and the Tumbling Bear: Russia's War with Japan***. London: Cassell, 2004 (1988), 383 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0304366576.

Connaughton argues that Russian war planning was deeply flawed from the start. The Russians fought in Manchuria at the end of a 5,000-mile single-track railway, while the Japanese were a week or so from their bases. The Russian command structure was hopelessly confused, their generals old and incompetent, the Tsar cautious and uncertain. The lessons for the West were there for all to see, had they cared to.

🍁 Cook, Tim. ***No Place to Run: The Canadian Corps and Gas Warfare in the First World War***. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000, 304 pages. ISBN: 0774807407.

Cook explores how the Canadian Corps reacted to this form of warfare, how its effects were more psychological than physical, and how the use of gas shaped operations and strategy.

🍁 Copp, Terry. ***Fields of Fire: The Canadians in Normandy, 1944***. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004, 334 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0802037801.

Copp argues that the army performed much better than many historians have previously allowed, but stresses the continual fluctuations of combat effectiveness. None of the three Canadian division commanders passed the test of battle, but it did not matter because the major responsibility of the division commander and his staff was to ensure that the formation was prepared for battle. Copp also argues that high Canadian casualties were exclusively the result of the number of days in combat rather than tactical shortcomings.

Daddis, Colonel Gregory A. ***Westmoreland's War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam***. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 250 pages. ISBN: 978-0-19-931650-2.

Argues that Westmoreland developed a comprehensive approach that encompassed far more than attrition. He attempted to implement a sweeping strategic vision in the complex political and military environment of the war.

🍁 English, Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) John A. ***The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command***. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991, 341 pages. Maps, ISBN: 027593019X.

English concludes that it was a failure on the part of the army institutions, and specifically the division commanders, that led to the lacklustre performance in Normandy. He discusses the influences of the British military model upon the Canadian Army, and of attempts to turn the Canadians around prior to their being committed to combat.



Fall, Bernard. ***Street Without Joy***. Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania: Stackpole Books, 2009 (1961), 416 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0811717007. Available in French.

Published before the United States escalated its involvement in South Vietnam. Offered a clear warning about what American forces would face in the jungles of Southeast Asia: a costly and protracted revolutionary war fought without fronts against a mobile enemy.

Fehrenbach, T.R. ***This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness***. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2001 (1963), 540 pages. Maps, charts, chronology, ISBN: 978-1574883343.

In this seminal work on the Korean War, Fehrenbach argues that a great power like the United States must maintain a highly professional army organized along lines different from the society it protects.

Frieser, Colonel Karl-Heinz. ***The Blitzkrieg Legend: The 1940 Campaign in the West***. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005 (1995), 507 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-1-59114-294-6. Available in French.

Frieser argues that German victory was not inevitable. French and German military systems were solid and their campaign plans were sound. The key to victory was the execution of operational plans, preplanned and ad hoc, amid friction.

Graham, Dominick, and Shelford Bidwell. ***Tug of War: The Battle for Italy, 1943–1945***. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1986, 445 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0-340-34347-8.

Graham and Bidwell trace the factors which caused a war to race out of control and attract vast numbers of men, tanks, guns and aircraft. The book analyzes the main battles of Salerno, Cassino, Anzio and the march on Rome.

🍁 Hennessy, Michael. ***Strategy in Vietnam: Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1967***. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997, 232 pages. ISBN: 978-0275956677.

Drawing from two schools of thought that diverge over the appropriate strategy America should have pursued in South Vietnam, Hennessy argues that both the number of troops and their tactical employment proved inadequate for redressing the threat within the parameters America set for itself. Demonstrates that the counterrevolutionary warfare strategy postulated for Vietnam was largely ignored in some quarters, and sowed the seeds of defeat in others.

Herzog, Major-General Chaim. ***The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East***. 3rd Edition. New York: Vintage Books, 2005 (1984), 558 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-1400079636.

Herzog, former President of Israel, was involved in every conflict involving Israel and its Arab neighbours from the 1948 War of Independence to the invasion of Lebanon. This new edition covers the events of the past twenty years, including the pullout from Lebanon, both *intifadas*, the first Gulf War, the Oslo Process, and beyond.

Hiro, Dilip. ***The Longest War: The Iran-Iraq War Military Conflict***. London: Grafton Books, 1989, 312 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0-246-13376-7.

The longest conventional war of the 20th century was a violent manifestation of the struggle between the secular Arab nationalism of Iraq and the universalist, religious ideology of Iran's revolutionary Islamic regime. Hiro concludes that the war was a draw.

Horne, Alistair. ***The Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954–1962***. London: Macmillan, 1977, 604 pages. ISBN: 0-333-15515-7. Available in French.

The Algerian War lasted from 1954 to 1962. It brought down six French governments, led to the collapse of the Fourth Republic, returned de Gaulle to power, and came close to provoking a civil war on French soil. More than a million Muslim Algerians died in the conflict and as many European settlers were driven into exile. Above all, the war was marked by an unholy marriage of revolutionary terror and repressive torture.



🍁 Johnston, William. ***A War of Patrols: Canadian Army Operations in Korea.*** Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2003, 448 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0774810084.

Johnston examines the uneven performance of the various Canadian units and argues that the soldiers of the “Special Force” initially sent to Korea were more thorough and professional in their operations than were the army’s regular battalions that eventually replaced them at the front.

Knezys, Stasys, and Romanas Sedlickas. ***The War in Chechnya.*** College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1999, 383 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0-89096-856-7.

Knezys and Sedlickas present comprehensive, objective, impartial information about the military strategy, nature and conduct of operations on both sides. They seek to answer the question “Is military terrorism . . . a new tactical element, ensuring the success of a small country’s resistance to a powerful army?”

Krepinevich, Jr., Major Andrew F. ***The Army and Vietnam.*** Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, 318 pages. ISBN: 0-8018-2863-5.

Krepinevich argues that the firepower-dominated operational methods pursued in Vietnam doomed the Army to failure. Light infantry, firepower restraint and the resolving of political and social issues were the keys to success. Leaders recognized the need for a change early on but were ignored.

Macgregor, Colonel (Retired) Douglas. ***Warrior’s Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting.*** Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009, 244 pages. Diagrams, ISBN: 978-1-59114-505-9.

Macgregor describes the victory of “Cougar Squadron,” the 2nd Squadron of the 2nd Armoured Cavalry Regiment, over Iraq’s Republican Guard Corps in the open desert along the North–South grid line of a military map referred to as the “73 Easting.” Also discusses the failed generalship that allowed the Republican Guard to escape.

🍁 McLaren, Roy. ***Canadians in Russia, 1918–1919***. Toronto: Macmillan, 1976, 301 pages. ISBN: 0770513395.

McLaren examines the political motivations that led Canada to contribute troops, and the military operations in northern Russia and in Siberia where Canadian troops were deployed.

McMaster, H.R. ***Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam***. New York: HarperCollins, 1997, 446 pages. ISBN: 0-06-018795-6.

McMaster describes how and why the United States became involved in an all-out and disastrous war in Southeast Asia and pinpoints the policies and decisions that got the United States into the morass, and reveals who made these decisions and the motives behind them, disproving the published theories of other historians and the excuses of the participants.

🍁 Miller, Carman. ***Painting the Map Red: Canada and the South African War, 1899–1902***. Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993, 541 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0773-509139.

More than 7,000 Canadian soldiers participated in the Anglo–Boer War, and for almost three years the Canadian public was mesmerized by events in South Africa. This book examines Canada's involvement in the Anglo–Boer War and the effect on the country, from the rancorous pre-war debate on the wisdom of Canadian participation through the soldiers' experiences in the field to the public's perception of the war and how it altered Canadian opinion, politics and military development.

🍁 Milner, Marc. ***Stopping the Panzers: The Untold Story of D-Day***. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2014, 375 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0-7006-2003-6.

Milner argues that 3rd Canadian Infantry Division did precisely what was asked of it during the first days ashore: stop the major German panzer counterattack expected to come northwest of Caen. Asserts that the Canadian official history did not accurately describe the division's performance during this crucial period.



Pakenham, Thomas. ***The Boer War***. New York: Random House, 1979, 659 pages. ISBN: 0-297-77395-X.

This is the most comprehensive work on the Boer War, utilizing a massive array of documentary evidence and personal papers. Pakenham explores all facets of the war in detail and reveals a personal feud between Sir Redver Bullers and Lord Roberts that undermined British effectiveness. Concludes that the Boers won the final political victory, despite losing the war.

Palit, Major-General D.K. ***The Lightning Campaign: Indo-Pakistan War 1971***. Salisbury, UK: Compton Press, 1972, 168 pages. Maps.

Describes the 12 day campaign waged by the Indian Army to liberate Bangladesh from Pakistan in some of the most difficult terrain in the world while cooperating with a massive organized resistance movement. Argues that the speed of the campaign was achievable because Eastern Command outwitted the Pakistanis by bypassing strongpoints and moving over ground considered to be impassable.

🍁 Radley, Kenneth. ***We Lead, Others Follow: First Canadian Division, 1914–1918***. St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell, 2006, 415 pages. ISBN: 1551251000.

An analysis of the 1st Division and its effectiveness, focusing upon training methods, unit organization, equipment, staff duties and procedures, and personnel problems. It also examines the substantial British contribution to Canadian skill at arms, since many of the divisional staff officers were British.

🍁 Reid, Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Brian A. ***Our Little Army in the Field: Canadians in South Africa, 1899–1902***. St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell, 1996, 206 pages. Maps. ISBN: 1551250241.

In 1899, for the first time in its short history, Canada dispatched sizeable expeditionary forces to conduct combat operations in a foreign war. Although considered ill-disciplined and nearly useless by the British when they first arrived in South Africa, the Canadian contingent soon earned a reputation for skill, courage and daring.

🍁 Reid, Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Brian A. ***No Holding Back: Operation Totalize, Normandy, August 1944.*** Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, 2005, 491 pages. Maps, diagrams, ISBN: 1-896941-40-1.

Reid asserts that Totalize was a successful operation of war but that it could and should have achieved more, more quickly. He argues that Canadian generalship and high-level staff work were not up to the standards of the Americans and the British. Canadian generals failed to allot enough troops to tasks and failed to grip operations at the divisional level at critical moments.

Russian General Staff. ***The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost.*** Translated and edited by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002, 392 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0-7006-1186-7.

This book reveals a story of poor intelligence compounded by inappropriate force structures, inadequate operational doctrine and no strategy to speak of, whereby Soviet forces did not understand their opposition, especially the mujahedeen's ability and willingness to sustain the fighting far beyond what seemed rational.

🍁 Schreiber, Major Shane B. ***Shock Army of the British Empire: The Canadian Corps in the Last 100 Days of the Great War.*** St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell, 2005 (1997), 200 pages. ISBN: 0275955133.

The author argues that the Canadian Corps transcended limited-objective, set-piece battles to "a nearly continuous cycle of rapid pace, coordination, intensive attacks" with tanks, indirect artillery, tactical air support, chemical munitions, electronic deception and command and control and intelligence.

Shazly, General Saad. ***The Crossing of the Suez. Revised Edition.*** San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 2003 (1980), 368 pages. ISBN-13: 978-0960456222.

Shazly, who was Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Armed forces during the Yom Kippur War in 1973, provides a day-to-day account of the war, the capture of the Bar Lev Line, the subsequent split between the political and military leadership and the aftermath of the Israeli penetration through Egyptian lines.



Thomas, Hugh. ***The Spanish Civil War***. London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1961, 719 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0375755152. Available in French.

Revised and updated with significant new material, including new revelations about atrocities perpetrated against civilians by both sides in this epic conflict. With its massive, well-researched detail, this book remains the best and most comprehensive account of the war available.

Travers, Tim. ***The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900–1918***. London: Allen and Unwin, 1987, 309 pages. ISBN: 9780049422056.

Travers's book explains why the British Army fought the way it did in the First World War. It integrates social and military history and the impact of ideas to tell the story of how the army, especially the senior officers, adapted to the new technological warfare.

Windrow, Martin. ***The Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam***. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2004, 734 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0-306-81443-3.

Windrow argues that the ideas behind the French strategy at *Diên Biên Phu* were taken from a prior victorious battle. The generals believed that establishing a ground base deep in Communist-controlled territory and supplying it by air would regain them the initiative against the Viet Minh insurgency.

Zaffri, Samuel. ***Hamburger Hill: The Brutal Battle for Dong Ap Bia, May 11–20, 1969***. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 2000, 328 pages. ISBN: 0891417060.

The narrative is full of the horror felt by the ordinary soldiers and junior leaders, down to the platoon and section level, as well as the frustration for the tactical decisions made by the top leadership of the 101st Airborne Division during those hectic days.

Zaloga, Steven J., and Victor Madej. ***The Polish Campaign***. New York: Hippocrene, 1991 (1985), 198 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0870520136.

Zaloga and Madej examine the campaign from the Polish perspective and argue that the Polish Army fought more effectively than generally realized. The book includes an excellent discussion of strategic and operational doctrine of the Polish Army in 1939.

21ST CENTURY

🍁 Cadieu, Major Trevor. "Canadian Armour in Afghanistan." ***The Canadian Army Journal*** 10, no. 4 (Winter 2008): 5–21.

Cadieu argues that armour can be deployed rapidly, that the tank will remain an invaluable tool in the Army's arsenal, and that the squadron is no longer the smallest tactical grouping.

Farquhar, Lieutenant-Colonel Scott C., ed. ***Back to the Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD***. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, 146 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0-9823283-0.

Farquhar distills insights from the two conflicts for the education of U.S. Army leaders. He emphasizes the successful prosecution of information operations in ways that highlight the importance of the so-called "new media" and traces the IDF's learning curve in terms of information operations between 2006 and 2009.

Flichy, Thomas. ***Opération Serval au Mali – L'intervention française décryptée***. Panazol: Lavauzelle, 2013, 124 pages. ISBN: 978-2702515679.

At a time when some of its equipment is aging and its pre-positioned forces are dangerously reduced, the French army has proven to be an exceptionally responsive tool. Through its military operations, France was suddenly reminded of the strategic issues in Mali.



Fontenot, Colonel (Retired) Gregory, et al. ***On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom***. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005, 538 pages. Maps, diagrams, ISBN: 1-59114-279-2.

This book reflects the analysis of the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Study Group that sought to interpret the events of 2003 in terms of what they reveal about the conduct of warfare in the 21st century. The final chapter discusses a wide range of implications. The authors understand the risks of a rapidly produced history but believe they are worth taking to glean initial insights.

🍁 Horn, Colonel Bernd. ***No Lack of Courage: Operation MEDUSA, Afghanistan***. Toronto: Dundurn, 2010, 203 pages. Maps, ISBN: 9781554887668.

Horn describes the bitterly fought, two-week battle in early September 2006 to dislodge a heavily entrenched Taliban force in the Pashmul district of Kandahar Province.

Menon, Rajan, and Eugene B. Rumer. ***Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order***. Boston: MIT Press, 2015, 248 pages. ISBN: 978-0262029049.

Menon and Rumer put the conflict in historical perspective by examining the evolution of the crisis and assessing its implications both for the Crimean peninsula and for Russia's relations with the West more generally. Describes what is at stake in Ukraine and explains the key economic, political and security challenges and prospects for overcoming them.

Sahner, Christian. ***Among the Ruins: Syria Past and Present***. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 256 pages. ISBN: 978-0199396702.

Focuses on five themes of interest to anyone intrigued and dismayed by Syria's fragmentation since 2011: the role of Christianity in society, the arrival of Islam, the rise of sectarianism and competing minorities, the emergence of the Ba'ath Party, and the current pitiless civil war.

🍁 Windsor, Lee, David Charters and Brent Wilson. ***Kandahar Tour: The Turning Point in Canada's Afghan Mission***. Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 2008, 264 pages. ISBN: 978-0-470-15761-9.

The authors describe Task Force 1-07's mission and stress that it was much more than warfighting. During the first half of 2007, following Operation MEDUSA, Task Force 1-07 began delivering at fuller capacity a wholistic approach consisting of diplomacy, aid, reconstruction, mentoring and combat.

Wright, Dr. Donald P., and Colonel Timothy R. Reese. ***On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign***. Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2014, 714 pages.

Wright and Reese provide a contemporary historical account of the United States Army in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from May 2003 through the Iraqi elections of January 2005. They depict the transition of the Army from conventional combat to full-spectrum operations.



MEMOIR AND BIOGRAPHY

In reading biographies and memoirs, the soldier discovers that not only has each generation faced their own unique challenges, but that many of today's vexing problems have been faced in the past. One learns how the soldier arrived at his or her most significant decisions—the thinking and the factors that were taken into account that led to making critical decisions.

—Colonel Robert Walker

MEMOIR

Adan, Avraham. ***On the Banks of the Suez: An Israeli General's Personal Account of the Yom Kippur War.*** Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1991 (1980), 480 pages. ISBN: 978-0891410430.

By 1973 Adan was GOC of the armoured forces and was preparing to retire. When the Yom Kippur War broke out, he fought as a divisional commander on both banks of the Suez from Romani in the north to the Gulf of Suez in the south.

Alexander, E. Porter. ***Military Memoirs of a Confederate: A Critical Narrative.*** Dayton, OH: Press of Morningside Bookshop, 1977 (1907), 635 pages. Maps, diagrams, charts, ISBN: 0-89029-038-X.

Alexander served as Longstreet's Chief of Artillery and critically examines each campaign of the war "as one would criticise a game of chess" for the benefit of military students and staff officers.

🍁 Allard, Jean V. ***Mémoires du général Jean V. Allard.*** Ottawa: Editions de Mortagne, 1998 (1985), ISBN : 2-89074-190-7. Available in English.

General Allard's military career flourished during the Second World War when he distinguished himself on the battlefields of Europe. In the Korean War, he was able to put his talents as a tactician to good use. However, Allard was more than a superb combatant, and he had plenty of opportunities to demonstrate that in the various staff and command positions he held.

Bellavia, David. ***House to House: An Epic of Urban Warfare.*** London: Simon & Schuster, 2007, 320 pages. ISBN: 978-1-84737-089-1. Available in French.

This is Staff Sergeant Bellavia's account of the close combat, including hand-to-hand, in Fallujah in November 2004 against an enemy who had weeks to prepare booby-trapped houses, ambushes and a myriad of other traps.



🍁 Bird, Will R. ***Ghosts Have Warm Hands***. Nepean, ON: CEF Books, 1997 (1930), 192 pages. ISBN: 978-1896979007.

Bird served in the 42nd Canadian Battalion, The Black Watch of Canada, and provides a stirring portrait of the power of camaraderie and the special pride of enduring the trenches. A compelling examination of the psychological side of combat in the First World War.

🍁 Blackburn, George G. ***The Guns of Normandy: A Soldier's Eye View, France 1944***. Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1995, 511 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0-7710-1500-3.

Provides genuine insights into the experience of Canadian gunners in action against a peer opponent. Describes the horrific conditions of the Normandy bridgehead and stresses the fact that men were still expected to act heroically despite the constant threat of German artillery, lack of sleep, and the sudden and gruesome loss of friends.

Bolger, Lieutenant-General (Retired) Daniel P. ***Why We Lost: A General's Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars***. New York: Eamon Dolan/Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014, 540 pages. ISBN: 978-0544370487.

Bolger offers a unique assessment of these wars and asserts that the United States lost but didn't have to. Intelligence was garbled, key decision makers were blinded by spreadsheets or theories, and, at the root of the failure, the US never really understood the enemy.

🍁 Burns, Major-General E.L.M. ***General Mud: Memoirs of Two World Wars***. Toronto: Clarke, Irwin, 1970, 254 pages.

Burns reflects on his experiences as a signals officer on the Somme, Vimy Ridge and Passchendaele, his interwar education and his experiences as a divisional and corps commander in the Second World War. He explains his operational and command technique and deals honestly with his eventual relief from command of 1st Canadian Corps in Italy as a result of personality conflicts with successive commanders of Eighth Army.

🍁 Cederberg, Fred. ***The Long Road Home: The Autobiography of a Canadian Soldier in Italy in World War II***. Toronto: General Publishing, 1984, 257 pages. ISBN: 0-7736-0122-8.

This is a gritty memoir by a sergeant in the Cape Breton Highlanders and Lanark and Renfrew Scottish Regiments. He details the heroism and brutality of infantry combat against a first-rate opponent.

Dayan, Major-General Moshe. ***Diary of the Sinai Campaign***. New York: Da Capo, 1991 (1966), 236 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0306804519.

This book provides a detailed account of events leading up to and including the invasion by Dayan, who served as the mastermind and commanded Israeli troops in the field. Dayan does not avoid criticism of the tragic blunders of Israeli forces in the heat of battle.

De Gaulle, Charles. ***Mémoires***, Paris: Gallimard, 2000 (1954), 1505 pages. ISBN: 978-2070115839. Available in English.

Charles de Gaulle used words to transfigure his actions, thereby creating his own legend. The historical interest of his *Memoirs* is incontestable: devoted exclusively to the public man and his actions, they are an irreplaceable source, rich in anecdotes, for anyone who wants to know more about the leader of free France and founder of the Fifth Republic and the events on which he left his mark.

🍁 Gasparotto, Lieutenant-Colonel Mark. ***Clearing the Way: Combat Engineers in Kandahar, 23rd Field Squadron***. London, ON: Ardith Publishing, 2010, 346 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-1926582597.

This is an insightful collection of personal accounts of Canadian engineers at war in 2006. Accounts by officers and non-commissioned members provide balance in the discussion of resources, equipment, missions and battles. Important descriptions of the engineer role in Operation MEDUSA add to our understanding of this key battle.



Grant, Ulysses S. ***Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant***. New York: Library of America, 1990 (1876), 1199 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0940-450585.

Grant, the Commander-in-Chief of Union Forces during the Civil War, wrote one of the best memoirs in all of military literature. He pays great attention to operational detail and explains the factors that led him to a multiplicity of critical decisions. From this, one can appreciate his relentless, uncompromising approach to war.

Guderian, Heinz. ***Panzer Leader***. London: Penguin, 2009 (1952), 560 pages. ISBN: 978-0141042855. Available in French.

This book is a detailed reflection on Germany's warfighting philosophy in the Second World War by the man who helped create the panzer force. Guderian commanded the XIXth Panzer Corps in Poland and France and a panzer group during Operation BARBAROSSA in 1941. Guderian fully explains his command technique, which, contrary to our interpretation of *Auftragstaktik*, was based on a forward command philosophy which clashed with the independence of subordinates.

🍁 Humphries, Mark, ed. ***The Selected Papers of Sir Arthur Currie: Diaries, Letters and Report to the Ministry, 1917–1933***. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008, 408 pages. ISBN: 978-0-97834-412-2.

This collection covers Currie's tenure as commander of the Canadian Corps from the battle of Hill 70 to the victorious Hundred Days campaign. Readers will gain an appreciation for Currie's operational and command techniques and the lengths to which he was willing to go to ensure success.

🍁 Jourdain, Lieutenant-Colonel Steve. ***Mon Afghanistan***. Balma, France: Athéna Editions, 2013, 283 pages. ISBN: 978-2-294142-05-9.

Mon Afghanistan is the personal account of a Francophone infantry company commander's experiences in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan. Steve Jourdain describes the day-to-day life of the members of C Company of the 2 Battalion Royal 22^e Régiment Battle Group, which he led for seven months in 2009 in the Kandahar region. The book was featured at the Festival International du Livre Militaire at Saint-Cyr.

🍁 Kitching, Major-General George. ***Mud and Green Fields: The Memoirs of Major-General George Kitching***. St. Catharines, On: Vanwell, 2003 (1985), 292 pages. ISBN: 978-0920277737.

Discusses his relief from command of 4th Canadian Armoured Division by Simonds in August 1944.

🍁 MacKenzie, Major-General (Retired) Lewis. ***Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo***. Toronto: Douglas and McIntyre, 1993, 345 pages. Maps, ISBN: 1-55054-098-X.

MacKenzie describes how he created Sector-Sarajevo and with a 30-nation UN force set out to liberate the airport to receive desperately needed food and medical supplies. Discusses how he used the media—"the only weapon I had"—to maximum advantage.

Manstein, Eric von. ***Lost Victories***. New York: Zenith Press, 2004 (1955), 592 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0760320549. Available in French.

This is a detailed account of operations on the Russian front by perhaps the greatest German commander of the Second World War. His finest moment was perhaps the operation to retake Kharkov in early 1943 following the long retreat from Stalingrad. He argued for unity of command in the East.

🍁 Martin, Charlie. ***Battle Diary: From D Day and Normandy to the Zuider Zee and VE***. Toronto: Dundurn, 1994, 192 pages. ISBN: 1-55002-214-8.

One of the youngest company sergeants-major in the history of the Queen's Own, Martin took part in some 75 patrols in Normandy and deals honestly with the impact of stress, hand-to-hand combat, the skill of silent killing, and the sickening odour of the dead animals and human corpses. Despite what he witnessed, Martin returned home and led a happy, productive life.



Moore, Lieutenant-General (Retired) Harold G. ***We Were Soldiers Once ... and Young***. London: Airlife Books, 1995, 412 pages. Maps, ISBN: 1-85310-502-3.

Describes how the soldiers of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry persevered and sacrificed themselves for their comrades and never gave up after being surrounded by 2,000 North Vietnamese soldiers in Landing Zone X-Ray in the Ia Drang Valley in November 1965.

🍁 Mowat, Farley. ***And No Birds Sang***. Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 2012 (1979), 256 pages. ISBN: 978-1771000307.

Mowat, a young lieutenant in the Hastings and Prince Edward Regiment, relates his experiences of close combat with the Germans in Sicily and Italy. His account deals honestly with fear, cohesion, fatigue, the brutality of war and the images, initiation into combat, the temptation to mercy kill, the inability to locate the Germans, rage, hatred, the fear of certain types of enemy weapons, and frustration with rear-echelon personnel.

Nagl, Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) John A. ***Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice***. New York: The Penguin Press, 2014, 269 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-1-59420-498-2.

Nagl, an early convert to the view that asymmetric warfare would become America's biggest challenge, explains how this made him an outsider in the U.S. Army. He nevertheless convinced his superiors to send him to Oxford to study counterinsurgency in depth. Nagl claims that the result of his studies, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, became the bible of the counterinsurgency movement. He describes the process by which he helped write the Army's new counterinsurgency doctrine and defends his ideas against mounting criticism of the entire counterinsurgency mind-set.

Patton, Jr., George S. ***War As I Knew It***. New York: Bantam, 1983 (1947), 400 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0553259919.

Patton reveals his operational and command techniques, which produced a relentless, rapid and calculated type of warfare that was difficult for both the enemy and his own superiors to handle.

Reitz, Deneys. ***Boer Commando: An Afrikaner Journal of the Boer War***. New York: Sarpedon, 1993 (1929), 286 pages. ISBN: 978-096276133-1.

Reitz was present at nearly every one of the major battles of the war and vividly describes mobile guerrilla warfare.

Richards, General David. ***Taking Command***. London: Headline, 2014, 384 pages. ISBN: 978-1472220844.

As commander of NATO forces, Richards became the first British general to command U.S. forces in combat since the Second World War. Reflects the changing reality of life for the modern soldier over the last forty years and offers unprecedented insight into the readiness of the military to tackle the threats and challenges of today.

Rommel, Erwin. ***Infantry Attacks***. London: Greenhill Books, 1990 (1937), 265 pages. Maps, ISBN: 1-85367-064-2. Available in French.

Provides great insight into his mind and character as he developed as a combat commander. Rommel firmly believed that men with will, spirit and skill were the key to success, and that high morale was built on the accomplishment of difficult tasks.

Rommel, Erwin. ***The Rommel Papers***. Edited by B.H. Liddell Hart. New York: Da Capo Press, 1982 (1953), 592 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0306801570. Available in French.

Rommel's papers capture the intimate thoughts of the Desert Fox, the hard, uncompromising, practical combat leader whose exploits in France and North Africa during the Second World War have become legendary. Contains an excellent section entitled "Modern Military Leadership" where Rommel expressed his distaste for academic theorizing about war and concluded that, to win in the future, leaders would need great flexibility of mind, eager acceptance of responsibility, a sound mixture of caution and audacity, and greater control over the fighting troops.



Sajer, Guy. ***Le Soldat oublié***. Paris: Robert Laffont, 1976, 548 pages.
ISBN : 978-2221037393. Available in English.

In July 1942, when Sajer put on the uniform of the Wehrmacht, he was not yet 17. He was the son of a French father and a German mother and was living in Alsace at the time. Because of his youth, he was assigned not to a combat unit, but to transportation and logistics. He discovered the real war—the war of front-line soldiers—when he was transferred to the “Grossdeutschland,” an elite division with which, beginning in the summer of 1943, he would find himself engaged in the biggest battles on the Ukrainian front.

Sledge, Eugene. ***With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa***. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981, 326 pages. Maps, ISBN: 9780195067149.

Even after intense training, Sledge was shocked to be thrown into the battle of Peleliu as part of 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division, where “the world was a nightmare of flashes, explosions, and snapping bullets.” By the time Sledge hit the hell of Okinawa, he was a combat vet, still filled with fear but no longer with panic.

Slim, Field Marshal Sir William. ***Unofficial History***. London: Cassell, 1959, 242 pages. Maps.

Slim reminisces about his time as a subaltern in Mesopotamia, a captain in India and a brigadier in the Middle East.

Thompson, Julian. ***No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigade in the South Atlantic 1982***. London: Leo Cooper/Secker & Warburg, 1985, 210 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0-436-52052-4.

Thompson recalls the short but intense battle for the Falklands. He asserts that the requirement to close with and destroy the enemy was no different than in the First World War.

Zaeef, Abdul Salam. ***My Life with the Taliban***. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010, 331 pages. ISBN: 978-0231701488.

A senior former member of the Taliban, Zaeef describes his participation in the jihad in 1983. After the war Zaeef returned to a quiet life in a small village in Kandahar, but chaos soon overwhelmed Afghanistan as factional fighting erupted after the Russians pulled out. Disgusted by the lawlessness that ensued, Zaeef was one among the former mujahedeen who were closely involved in the discussions that led to the emergence of the Taliban in 1994.

BIOGRAPHY

Benoist-Mechin, Jacques. ***Lyautey l'africain ou le rêve immolé (1854-1934)***. Paris: Perrin, 2007, 486 pages. ISBN: 978-2262026882.

Lyautey, a cavalryman born in Lorraine in 1854, embodied the dream of a self-styled "civilizing" colonization, and he had no doubts about its rightness. He attracted the notice of Gallieni while serving in Algeria and southern Morocco and became the first Resident General of Morocco in 1912. His knowledge of North African traditions and the diplomatic skills he exercised with the Sultan enabled him to bring peace to the country, resist German intrigues and lay the foundation for economic development.

Currey, Cecil B. ***Victory at Any Cost: The Genius of Vietnam's General Vo Nguyen Giap***. Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005 (1997), 424 pages. ISBN: 978-1574887426. Available in French.

Currey relates Giap's life and actions from his early membership in the Communist Party, to his defeat of the French at Diên Biên Phu, through to his later struggle against the Americans. He identifies Giap's shortcomings and presents an interesting look at a general who was arguably one of history's greatest.

🍁 Delaney, Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Douglas E. ***The Soldiers' General: Bert Hoffmeister at War***. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2005, 299 pages. ISBN: 077481148X.

Delaney reveals how Hoffmeister overcame his own self-doubt, how he led from the front and inspired his subordinates and how, through his ability to manage the forces under his command, eventually became one of Canada's foremost combat officers.



D'Este, Carlo. ***Patton: A Genius for War***. New York: HarperCollins, 1995, 977 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0-06-016455-7.

The definitive biography of “Old Blood n’ Guts” reveals the complex and contradictory personality that lay behind the swashbuckling and brash facade.

🍁 Dickson, Paul Douglas. ***A Thoroughly Canadian General: A Biography of General H.D.G. Crerar***. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007, 571 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0802008022.

Crerar served as commandant of RMC, Chief of the General Staff and commander of the 1st Canadian Corps overseas, and finally replaced General McNaughton as commander of First Canadian Army in 1944 just prior to the invasion of Northwest Europe. Dickson asserts that Crerar was the primary architect of First Canadian Army and was a nationalist who saw the army as an instrument to promote Canadian identity and civic responsibility.

Eddé, Anne-Marie. ***Saladin***. Paris: Le Grand Livre du Mois, 2008, 761 pages. ISBN : 978-2286048884. Available in English.

Eddé describes the rise of a man with a fine political instinct who came to dominate a territory stretching from the Nile to the Euphrates and from Yemen to northern Mesopotamia. Saladin was genuinely interested in religious life, conscientious about applying Muslim law, and uncompromising but not excessive, particularly regarding the Jewish and Christian communities within his empire. He was a tireless warrior, but those close to him despaired of his extravagance as an administrator.

🍁 Granatstein, J.L. ***The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War***. Toronto: Stoddart, 1993, 370 pages. ISBN: 0-7737-2730-2.

Granatstein demonstrates where the quest for leadership failed and succeeded. This is an insightful look at the personalities of Canadian military commanders and the inherent difficulties of having to rapidly expand an officer corps from a small cadre.

Henderson, Colonel G.F.R. ***Stonewall Jackson and the American Civil War.*** New York: Da Capo Press, 1988 (1936), 772 pages. Maps, ISBN: 978-0306803185.

Henderson argued that Jackson was the most renowned and skilful commander of Confederate troops in the Civil War. Not even Lee or Stuart matched his purely military intelligence, his intransigence at Bull Run (which earned him the name "Stonewall"), his knack for knowing when to attack and retreat, which he showed throughout the Shenandoah campaign, or his tactical brilliance at Chancellorsville. He was stern, a strict Calvinist, and a single-minded officer for whom religion and the army were everything. Yet he had the undivided loyalty of the men he commanded.

🍁 Hyatt, A.M.J. ***General Sir Arthur Currie: A Military Biography.*** Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987, 178 pages. Maps, ISBN: 0802026036.

Hyatt traces Currie's rise from brigade commander to command of the Canadian Corps and explains his operational and command technique, which proved so effective in combat. The author stresses Currie's patience in planning, his ability to identify attainable objectives, and the strength of character that enabled him to challenge his higher and superior commanders when he felt that they were wrong.

Siry, Steven E. ***Greene: Revolutionary General.*** Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006, 116 pages. ISBN: 978-1-57488-912-3.

Greene was one of George Washington's most trusted advisers and eventually ranked second in the command structure of the Continental Army. As commander of the Southern Department, Greene combined regulars, militia and guerrillas into a force that used rapid movement and continuous pressure against the British, outmanoeuvring and outguessing them.



OTHER RESOURCES

It would be of tremendous benefit if a dedicated website ... could provide 'one-stop shopping' for soldiers, scientists, students and scholars to take advantage of new studies and works-in-progress as well as attract new academic research that would serve to benefit the Army.

—Major Andrew B. Godefroy

ATLASES

Banks, Arthur, and Allan W. Palmer. ***A Military Atlas of the First World War.*** London: Leo Cooper, 2003, 337 pages. 250 maps, ISBN: 978-0850527919.

This work presents both broad general surveys of political and military strategy and closely detailed treatments of individual campaigns and engagements.

Barnes, Ian. ***Crossroads of War: A Historical Atlas of the Middle East.*** Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 2014, 223 pages. ISBN: 978-0-674-59849-2.

From the Bronze Age to the 21st century, vying armies have clashed over the territory stretching from the Upper Nile to modern-day Iraq and Iran. This atlas captures five millennia of conflict and conquest in detailed full-colour maps, accompanied by incisive commentary.

Cattaruzza, Amaël. ***Atlas des guerres et conflits: Un tour du monde géopolitique.*** Paris: Autrement, 2011, 96 pages. ISBN: 978-2746735583.

This atlas contains almost 100 maps and graphics that shed light on the complexity of past, current and future conflicts and wars.

Davis, Major George B., et al. ***The Official Military Atlas of the Civil War.*** New York: Arno Press, 1978. ISBN: 0-405-11198-3.

This is a reproduction of *The Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*. It contains 821 maps, 106 engravings and 209 drawings.

Eposito, Brigadier-General Vincent J. ***West Point Atlas of American Wars, Volume II: 1900–1918.*** New York: Henry Holt, 1997, 160 pages. 84 maps, ISBN: 978-0805053050.

This updated edition of the classic military atlas of World War I is available again for the first time in 10 years. It analyzes the development of military theory and practice from the prewar period of Bismarck's Prussia to the creation of the League of Nations. This new edition incorporates research undertaken since the book's initial publication.



Gilbert, Martin. ***The Routledge Atlas of the Arab–Israeli Conflict***. 10th Edition. London: Routledge, 2012, 240 pages. 227 maps, ISBN: 978-0-415-69975-4.

The complete history of the conflict is revealed, including the prelude and background to the conflict, the Jewish national home, the intensification of the conflict, the state of Israel, the moves to find peace, and the ongoing Palestinian search for statehood.

Holmes, Richard. ***The World Atlas of Warfare: Military Innovations that Changed the Course of History***. New York: Viking, 1988, 303 pages. 150 maps, drawings, ISBN: 0-670-81967-0.

Asserts that major turning points in military history very frequently stem from the first effective use of new techniques. An excellent source to assist the soldier in the study of revolutions in military affairs.

Hooper, Nicholas, and Matthew Bennett. ***Cambridge Illustrated Atlas, Warfare: The Middle Ages, 768–1487***. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 192 pages. ISBN: 0-521-44049-1.

Argues that the military culture of the era was as sophisticated as our modern one, with well-organized armies and a high degree of tactical intelligence. High-quality maps, battle plans, and pictorial essays explore the legacy of the Middle Ages in modern warfare.

Keegan, John, ed. ***The Times Atlas of the Second World War***. New York: Harper & Row, 1989, 254 pages. Maps, charts, ISBN: 0-06-0161-78-7.

Provides a comprehensive graphic survey of the war's major and minor fronts and theatres with complex, but clear, maps. Complemented by sophisticated presentations on less-obvious subjects like resistance, intelligence, and special operations. The accompanying texts, sparse but not simplistic, reflect state-of-the-art scholarship.

Summers, Jr., Colonel (Retired) Harry G. *Historical Atlas of the Vietnam War*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1995, 224 pages. ISBN: 0-395-72223-3.

Covers all aspects of the war and provides in-depth historical background, charting the social and economic aspects and examining Vietnamese military and political strategy.

REFERENCE WORKS

🍁 Cooke, Owen. *The Canadian Military Experience, 1867–1995: A Bibliography*. 3rd Edition. Ottawa: Directorate of History and Heritage, 1997, 520 pages.

Ganguly, Rajat. *A Dictionary of Ethnic Conflict*. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2015 (2006), 400 pages. ISBN: 978-1857430592.

Containing approximately 500 entries, this work covers current ethnic hotspots, irredentist claims, secessionist movements and major peace accords, with clear and concise definitions given for each specific conflict. Current concepts, theories and policies related to ethnic conflict are also discussed in detail.

Messenger, Charles. *Reader's Guide to Military History*. London: Routledge, 2001, 986 pages. ISBN: 978-1579582418.

This guide contains some 600 entries on a range of topics from ancient Chinese warfare to late 20th-century intervention operations. It encompasses general reviews of aspects of military organization and science, as well as specific wars and conflicts.

The Timechart of Military History: 3000 B.C. to the Present. Foreword by David Chandler. Rickmansworth, UK: Prospero Books, 1999, 152 pages. ISBN: 155267268-9.

An A–Z compendium of the 2,000 most important battles, dates of engagement and the generals, victors and the vanquished; maps of the great battles with information on the commanders, casualties and consequences; double-page spreads offering snapshot narratives of wars, their generals, and principal battles; a chronology of wars from 3000 B.C. to present; and an up-to-date bibliography.



JOURNALS

Armed Forces and Society

International in scope with a focus on historical, comparative and interdisciplinary discourse. The editors and contributors include political scientists, sociologists, historians, psychologists, scholars, and economists, as well as specialists in military organization and strategy, arms control and peacekeeping.

Canadian Military History

Focuses exclusively on Canadian military history, with particular emphasis on the world wars.

Journal of Military Ethics

Devoted to normative aspects of military force. The journal publishes articles discussing justifications for the resort to military force (*jus ad bellum*) and/or what may justifiably be done in the use of such force (*jus in bello*).

Journal of Military and Strategic Studies:

This site provides access to a large number of previous issues of this journal, together with its most recent. The journal itself focuses upon military and foreign policy issues, many of which are devoted to the Canadian perspective.

Journal of Slavic Military Studies (Until 1993 The Journal of Soviet Military Studies)

Investigates all aspects of military affairs in the Slavic nations of central and eastern Europe in historical and geopolitical context and offers a vehicle for central and eastern European security and military analysts to air their views.

Journal of Strategic Studies

Committed to multi-disciplinary approaches to the study of war. Encourages the challenging of our historical understanding of humanity's efforts to achieve political ends through the application of military and diplomatic means.

Military and Strategic Affairs

Stimulates and enriches the public debate on military issues relating to Israel's national security.

Military Review

The U.S. Army's primary forum for critical thinking on controversial subjects, new ideas, concepts, doctrine and warfighting principles.

Parameters: U.S. Army War College Quarterly

The U.S. Army professional journal, published quarterly. Its articles address military and maritime strategy, comments on current and past U.S. Army policies and examines past operations and their implications for the present.

Small Wars and Insurgencies

Facilitates discussion by historians, political scientists and students of international relations and security studies of theoretical and practical issues related to the past, present and future of small wars and insurgencies.

Special Operations Journal

The first professional journal dedicated to promoting research across academia, the military and the SOF community, both in the US and abroad, on the nature, conduct and sources of success of special operations. Promotes rigorous historical and social science research as a means to better understand special operations forces.

The Canadian Army Journal

The official journal of the Canadian Army is published three times a year and is dedicated to the dissemination and discussion of doctrinal and training concepts, ideas and opinions by all army personnel.

The Journal of Military History

Contains a variety of articles covering all periods of military history. With extensive use of illustrations and maps, the production values are excellent and the articles are of high quality.

INTERNET SOURCES AND WEBSITES

Canadian Institute for Military and Veteran Health Research:

<https://cimvhr.ca/>

The health and well-being of Canadian military personnel, veterans and their families is maximized through world-class research resulting in evidence-informed practices, policies and programs.

Canadian Forces College, CFC Papers:

<http://wps.cfc.forces.gc.ca/en/cfcpapers/index.php>

Available for download online are all of the papers written by Canadian officers enrolled in several CFC programs, including the Master of Defence Studies, Exercise Final Horizons and other advanced military studies courses. The papers are searchable by year, program or paper title and author name.

Canadian Forces Directorate of History and Heritage (DHH), Reports Online:

<http://www.cmp-cpm.forces.gc.ca/dhh-dhp/index-eng.asp>

The Directorate of History and Heritage maintains a semi-complete collection of historical reports filed by the historical sections of Canadian Military Headquarters (1940–1948), Army Headquarters (1948–1959) and Canadian Forces Headquarters (1965–1980).



Defense Technical Information Centre: <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/>

Serves the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) community as the largest central resource for DoD and government-funded scientific, technical, engineering and business-related information available today.

École de Guerre – France: <http://www.dems.defense.gouv.fr/ecole-de-guerre/>

The École de Guerre publishes a monthly list of new French-authored books received. Descriptions are not provided, but the list does offer a quick way for French soldiers in the Canadian Army to see what is new in various fields.

RAND Corporation: <http://www.rand.org/>

Provides free access to a very large number of online articles devoted to the field of warfare. Its other important aspect is its link to its publishing department, from which a wide range of hard-to-find books covering contemporary military and foreign policies can be purchased.

The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies: <http://www.ciss.ca/>

Established in 1976, the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS) is widely recognized as the nation's foremost source of independent and balanced information and research on a broad range of military, foreign policy and security issues affecting Canada. Its website includes access to a large number of freely available articles related to these issues.

The Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society:

<http://www.unb.ca/fredericton/arts/centres/gregg/>

Pursues the goal of increasing understanding of the cause, course and consequence of armed conflict.

LITERATURE AND FICTION

Lartéguy, Jean. *The Centurions*. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1962, 487 pages.
Available in French.

In a prisoner of war camp in the Asian jungle after the defeat at Diên Biên Phu, a group of French prisoners are “re-educated” in the Communist doctrine of the Việt Minh. Officers Raspéguy, Boisfeuras, Merle and Esclavier will never be the same. The men witness the cruel, sudden deaths of friends, sometimes find love, and fall under the charm of Asia. When they return home, how can they resume normal family life, surrounded by a wife and children? Then come the first events in Algeria. Experienced, battle-ready men are needed, so they enlist in the 10th colonial parachute regiment. They are caught up in the events in North Africa, but it is completely unlike Asia. Only one thing is the same: war. With the bombs, the terrorists, the colonists, the Djebel and white Algeria, this is a different war, even though the motivation is the same as in Indochina: independence. A new edition of a classic of “war literature.”

Marlantes, Karl. ***Matterhorn: A Novel of the Vietnam War***. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2011, 640 pages. ISBN: 978-0802145314. Available in French.

This is a visceral and spellbinding novel by a Marine veteran of Vietnam about what it is like to be a young man at war. It transforms the tragedy of Vietnam into a powerful and universal story of courage, camaraderie and sacrifice.

Remarque, Erich Maria. ***All Quiet on the Western Front***. New York: Ballantine Books, 1987 (1928), 304 pages. ISBN: 9780449213940. Available in French.

Paul Baumer enlists with his classmates in the German army of the First World War. Despite what they have learned, they go to pieces under the first bombardment in the trenches. Paul holds fast to a single vow: to fight against the principles of hate that meaninglessly pit young men against each other.



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