



NEGATIVE LEADERSHIP: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

**Edited by
Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Watola, PhD &
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EDITED BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL DANIEL WATOLA, PHD &
COMMANDER DAVE WOYCHESHIN, PHD**



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FOREWORD

I am pleased to introduce *Negative Leadership*, the eleventh volume published by the International Military Leadership Association Workshop (IMLAW) of the International Military Testing Association. Established in 2005, the IMLAW has provided a forum for military leadership researchers, academics, and members of military leadership institutes to collaborate on a wide variety of military leadership projects. This publication is one of the tangible outcomes of this long-standing collaboration.

The extensive research conducted on leadership has primarily focused on the positive aspects of leadership and the characteristics of leaders that result in good leadership. Broadening leadership research to include negative aspects will help organizations to more fully address the ability of their leaders to lead effectively. The research on positive leadership allows organizations to select and train leaders and to make good leaders better. The research on negative leadership allows organizations to avoid selecting negative leaders, to identify the negative leaders that they may already have, and to create the conditions for negative leaders to become better leaders. It is important to stress that the impact of negative leadership is especially relevant to military organizations, where poor leadership decisions can, and do, lead to dire consequences.

Negative Leadership has approached the topic from a wide range of perspectives. The chapters provide a thorough review of negative leadership, encompassing concepts such as toxic leadership, destructive leadership, abusive supervision, and unethical leadership, and apply these concepts to the analysis of case studies. Chapters in this volume also discuss the organizational conditions that allow negative leadership to develop and persist in the workplace. Other concepts that are relevant to negative leadership are introduced, such as cynicism and hubris. In addition, ways to measure negative leadership characteristics in individuals and to screen for potential negative leaders in the selection process are presented in this volume. Other chapters highlight issues of negative leadership that arise in particular countries; for example, conflicting leadership styles in the Norwegian Army, addressing leadership incompetence in the South African National Defence Force, and the actions taken following a series of crises in the Australian Defence Force.

FOREWORD

I commend the efforts of the authors, editors, and publishing staff in producing this volume. IMLAW continues to further the understanding of the many facets of military leadership and to provide practical guidance for dealing with leadership issues.

Dr. Bill Bentley
Editor-in-Chief
Canadian Defence Academy Press

CHAPTER 1

TOXIC LEADERSHIP

*Stephen A. Truhon, PhD**

INTRODUCTION

Most of the theory and research on leadership has focused on what makes effective leaders. Ineffective leaders are leaders who lack the traits or fail to display the behaviours associated with effective leadership. Few theories include discussion of the characteristics of ineffective leadership. In his contingency model of leadership, Fiedler proposed that there is no single best leadership style. Instead, the best leadership style depends on the situational variables of task structure and leader-member relations.¹ In his view, to be effective, leaders must be able to adapt to the situation.

In his full-range leadership model, Bass proposed three types of leadership, with subtypes within them. These range from the laissez-faire (least effective) through transactional to transformational (most effective).² But even these approaches focus on the absence of characteristics that make a leader less than effective. Charismatic leadership has usually been regarded as an effective form of leadership. But there are ineffective aspects of charismatic leadership.³ Charismatic leaders can be distractible, insensitive to their effect on others, self-absorbed, and unpredictable. They can exaggerate how they describe themselves and their vision for the organization. They have a tendency to use stereotypes to manipulate subordinates and restrict information to increase subordinates' commitment. As can be seen above, when most theories of leadership have included the concept of ineffective leadership, it has been within the context of effective leadership.

PETTY TYRANNY

Ashforth was one of the first to discuss a specific ineffective leadership style that he called petty tyranny.⁴ In developing the concept of petty tyranny, he identified six major characteristics of petty tyrants: arbitrariness and

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Austin Peay State University or the Tennessee Board of Regents.

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self-aggrandizement, belittlement of subordinates, lack of consideration, a forcing style of conflict resolution, discouragement of initiative, and non-contingent punishment. In a follow-up study, Ashforth found that the effects of petty tyranny on employees included: lower leader endorsement; higher frustration, stress, and reactance; greater helplessness and alienation; and work-unit cohesiveness.⁵ Others have found petty tyranny to be associated with job satisfaction and turnover intentions.⁶

ABUSIVE SUPERVISION

Tepper described a form of leadership called abusive supervision.⁷ He defined abusive supervision as workers' perceptions of their supervisors' "sustained display of verbal and nonverbal hostile behaviours, excluding physical contact."⁸ Hostility is an important component of abusive supervision, while hostility may or may not be present in petty tyranny. Tepper found that abusive supervision lowered subordinates' satisfaction and organizational commitment, and increased work-family conflict and psychological distress. A recent meta-analysis found abusive supervision associated with lower job satisfaction, organizational citizenship behaviour, organizational commitment, perceived organizational support, work performance, and higher counterproductive work behaviour, depression, emotional exhaustion, job tension, and work-family conflict.⁹

DESTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP

While noting its similarity to petty tyranny and abusive supervision, Einarsen, Aasland, and Skogstad¹⁰ proposed the concept of destructive leadership as "the systematic and repeated behaviour by a leader, supervisor or manager that violates the legitimate interest of the organization by undermining and/or sabotaging the organization's goals, tasks, resources and effectiveness and/or motivation, well-being or job satisfaction of subordinates."¹¹ Destructive leadership is a broader concept than petty tyranny or abusive leadership because destructive leaders can affect both subordinates and organizations. In their view, the anti-subordinate behaviour in petty tyranny and abusive supervision can also be pro-organizational. Destructive leadership is not only ineffective leadership but also deliberately harmful leadership.¹² Destructive leadership has been associated with several workplace problems: bullying, job dissatisfaction, job demands, work stressors (e.g., role ambiguity), interpersonal problems and job insecurity.¹³ However, Padilla, Hogan, and Kaiser argued that destructive leadership alone is not the cause of these

problems. A toxic triangle of destructive leadership, susceptible followers, and conducive environments must exist.¹⁴

In contrast to the concept of destructive leadership, Thoroughgood, Tate, Sawyer, and Jacobs have proposed the concept of destructive leader behaviours.¹⁵ They found three components to destructive leader behaviours: subordinate-directed behaviour, organization-directed behaviour and sexual harassment behaviour. In their dual-process model, Wang, Sinclair and Deese proposed two causes for destructive leader behaviour: a self-regulatory process that relies on psychological resources, and a social cognitive process that is based on the theory of planned behaviour.¹⁶ Among the factors that lead to these processes are the integrity cluster (conscientiousness, agreeableness, and neuroticism in the Five Factor Model of Personality), resilience traits (appraisal of stressors, use of resources to stressors, ability to cope, level of adverse outcomes from stressors, hardiness, sense of coherence, and self-efficacy), dark side traits (arrogance, aloofness, betrayal of others' trust, insensitivity, and selfishness).¹⁷

In their meta-analysis of destructive leadership and its outcomes, Schyns and Schilling maintained this distinction between destructive leadership and destructive leader behaviours.¹⁸ They found that destructive leader behaviours were associated with lower job satisfaction, perceived organizational justice, self-evaluation, well-being, and greater turnover intention, counterproductive work behaviour, negative affect, and stress.

NARCISSISTIC LEADERSHIP

At first glance, narcissistic leadership could be regarded as an ineffective form of leadership. But psychodynamic theorists such as Sigmund Freud and Heinz Kohut saw that narcissism was a normal part of development,¹⁹ and it was only a problem when handled improperly. It is possible that there are characteristics of narcissistic leadership associated with effective leadership and other characteristics associative with ineffective leadership. Features of narcissism associated with effective leadership include: a positive self-worth that gives the leaders an air of confidence, a desire for social approval, and a sense of authority. Narcissistic leaders act boldly, aggressively, and even magnanimously in promoting their vision, which inspires followers (much the same way charismatic leaders do). Features of narcissistic leadership associated with ineffective leadership include arrogance, self-absorption, amorality, a lack of sensitivity to others, hypersensitivity and anger, irrationality, inflexibility, feelings of inferiority and hostility, need for recognition and

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superiority, and paranoia.²⁰ Similar to the distinctions between the positive and negative aspects of narcissistic leadership, is the distinction that Lubit made between healthy and destructive narcissism. Although it is possible for a destructive narcissist to rise within an organization, a healthy narcissist will benefit the organization in the long term.

TOXIC LEADERSHIP

As one of the foremost theorists on toxic leadership, Lipman-Blumen has defined toxic leaders as those:

...who engage in numerous destructive behaviours and who exhibit certain dysfunctional personal characteristics. To count as toxic, these behaviours and qualities of character must inflict some reasonably serious and enduring harm on their followers and their organizations. The intent to harm others or to enhance the self at the expense of others distinguishes seriously toxic leaders from the careless or unintentional toxic leaders, who also cause negative effects.²¹

Kellerman²² has suggested that there are seven types of toxic (or bad) leadership: incompetent, rigid, intemperate, callous, corrupt, insular, and evil. In her study on leader toxicity, Pelletier provided a good comparison of the many different types of ineffective leadership that have been discussed.²³ Using Lipman-Blumen's concept of toxic leadership, she developed a Perceived Toxic Leadership Scale. The scale consists of 18 items and has good internal consistency. Pelletier found that out-group members perceived that leaders displayed more toxic behaviour than in-group members.

TOXIC LEADERSHIP IN THE MILITARY

CHARACTERISTICS OF TOXIC LEADERS

Commentators have *noted* the problem of toxic leadership in the military. In their view toxic military leaders are amoral, arrogant, cowardly, deceptive, discontented, greedy, incompetent, insecure, irresponsible, maladjusted, malfasant, malfunctioning, malevolent, malicious, narcissistic, self-absorbed, single-minded, and untrustworthy.²⁴ Toxic leaders also engage in the following: various dysfunctional behaviours (e.g., deception, unfair punishment) to get what they want, self-promotion at the expense of subordinates, penalization of honest mistakes, restriction of communication with subordinates, problem solving at the surface level, and time wasting.²⁵

Rather than listing personality characteristics, behaviours, and attitudes of toxic leaders, some commentators have grouped them into categories or dimensions. In describing the toxic leader syndrome, Reed described three major elements: disinterest in the well-being of subordinates, personality characteristics and behaviours that impede organizational climate, and subordinates' belief that the leader's primary motivation is self-interest.²⁶ Steele proposed four major categories that toxic leaders fall into: micromanaging, mean-spirited/aggressive, rigid/close-minded, and poor attitude/example.²⁷ Several studies have examined the incidence of toxic leadership in the military. Estimates of the presence of toxic leaders range from 5% to 20%.²⁸ More than half of military personnel have experienced a toxic leader. Reed and Bullis found that 57% of military personnel considered leaving the service because of their treatment by a superior officer.²⁹

MEASUREMENT OF TOXIC LEADERSHIP

Schmidt has developed the Toxic Leadership Scale.³⁰ In the initial phase of development he used two focus groups: one of US Navy officer candidates and the other of US Marines. Schmidt and an assistant conducted a semi-structured focus group interview. The guidelines for the interview included members' experience with a destructive leader, their behaviours, personality, and whether the behaviour was context-specific; the effects on subordinates; and the effects on work climate. Content analysis of the transcripts was used to identify themes in the descriptions of destructive leaders.

Six themes emerged from the content analysis: abusive supervision, narcissism, authoritarianism, self-promotion, unpredictability, and unprofessionalism. Using rewritten items from the transcripts and items from scales for abusive supervision, narcissism, and authoritarianism,³¹ Schmidt asked seven doctoral students to do a Q-sort with the items. There was little agreement among these civilian participants about the concept of unprofessionalism. As a result, this dimension was removed. It may be that unprofessional behaviour is readily recognizable in the military, but it is a diffuse concept outside of military life. The Q-sort reduced the number of items from 157 to 109. In the second phase of the study, Schmidt had students complete a survey of these 109 items. He conducted a factor analysis of their responses and forced a five-dimension solution based on the first five themes listed, and found good fit. The factor analysis reduced the Toxic Leadership Scale to 30 items. The internal consistency of the five dimensions ranged from .88 to .93.

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RESEARCH USING THE TOXIC LEADERSHIP SCALE

Schmidt³² examined the relationship between scores on the Toxic Leadership Scale and other measures of leadership. The Toxic Leadership Scale was positively correlated with laissez-faire leadership and contingent reward, and negatively correlated with leader-member exchange, transformation leadership, and leadership by exception. In addition, Schmidt found negative relationships between Toxic Leadership Scale scores and aspects of satisfaction: satisfaction with job, satisfaction with coworkers, satisfaction with supervisor, and satisfaction with pay.

Others have used the Toxic Leadership Scale with military populations. Schmidt³³ found that scores on the Toxic Leadership were negatively correlated with group cohesion, job satisfaction, productivity, organizational trust, and organizational commitment. Gallus and colleagues³⁴ found a negative relationship between toxic leadership and job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and unit civility. Truhon and McDonald³⁵ found toxic leadership to be correlated in the expected direction with several measures of equal opportunity-related outcomes: sexual harassment and discrimination, differential command behaviour toward women and minorities, positive equal opportunity behaviour, racist behaviour, age discrimination, religious discrimination, and disability discrimination. In regression equations which use measures of equal opportunity to predict measures of organization effectiveness (organizational commitment, organizational trust, work group efficacy, work group cohesion, leader cohesion, and job satisfaction), adding toxic leadership to the equation significantly increased the proportion of variability explained (from between 7% and 14%).³⁶

OTHER RESEARCH ON TOXIC LEADERSHIP IN THE MILITARY

Reed and Bullis used the Petty Tyranny in Organizations Scale as a measure of toxic leadership.³⁷ They found toxic leadership to be negatively related to job satisfaction. Using the definition provided by the Center of Army Leadership, Steele³⁸ reported that toxic leadership was strongly associated with subordinates' perception of the leader displaying a lack of ethics, the perception of the leader putting his or her own needs ahead of the unit, a lack of confidence to follow the leader in life-and-death situations, perception of the leader failing to create a positive environment, and perception of the leader failing to demonstrate tact. In addition to short-term effects, there are long-term effects as well. A high percentage of personnel considered leaving the

military because of a toxic leader. If they decide to stay and rise to positions of leadership, they may model themselves on that toxic leader.³⁹

WHY DOES THE MILITARY HAVE A TOXIC LEADERSHIP PROBLEM?

The prevalence of toxic leadership in the military is usually attributed to the leaders. Characteristics of people who become leaders or of positions of leadership contribute to the presence of toxic leadership in the military. One approach to understanding toxic leadership in the military is the attraction, selection, attrition (ASA) theory.⁴⁰ According to ASA theory, there are several paths to toxic leadership in the military. Persons with a tendency toward toxic personalities are attracted to the military. The military environment is appealing to individuals with these characteristics. These persons make it past the military's rigorous selection procedures. Once selected, these persons are less likely to leave and more likely to rise to positions of authority.

Is there evidence to support any of these statements? Characteristics like ambition and the need for power tend to be higher for members of the military academies and reserve officer training corps than they are in the general public.⁴¹ Where leadership in the 21st century requires more cohesion through adaptability, many leaders micromanage and are risk-averse.⁴² Several surveys find that more than half of military leaders are not prepared to lead when they are promoted.⁴³ However, Padilla, Hogan, and Hope's model⁴⁴ suggests that leadership in any form is due to the influences of the leader, followers, and the environment. It is possible that some leaders do not want to be toxic, may not be aware that they are, but are forced into circumstances that make them that way.

DEALING WITH TOXIC LEADERS IN THE MILITARY

DO NOTHING

Because personnel policies lead to movement of troops every two to three years, many military members tend to bide their time. "[I]t is only a matter of time before the suffering soldier or the toxic leader leaves."⁴⁵ The military could do nothing. Leaders with high levels of toxicity can meet short-term goals.⁴⁶ They are likely to be promoted.⁴⁷ But toxic leaders are not the type of high-quality leaders who create trust with their subordinates, which is needed in the 21st century military environment.⁴⁸

SCREEN OUT POTENTIAL TOXIC LEADERS

Many researchers have preferred preventing toxic individuals from entering the military or attaining higher positions once they join the military. They have made use of questionnaires that distinguish good leaders from poor leaders.⁴⁹ Doty and Fenlason have suggested the use of emotional intelligence measures, because empathy, an aspect of emotional intelligence, is an important leadership skill.⁵⁰ Other measures such as the Toxic Leadership Scale could be used.⁵¹ Because toxic leadership is thought to be due largely to personality, many senior leaders believe it cannot be changed. Another option for potential toxic leaders who have not been screened out is to dismiss them.⁵² In fact, there have been several news accounts of military leaders whose toxic behaviour led to their dismissal.⁵³

REGULAR EVALUATION OF LEADERS

Leaders need to be regularly evaluated. Sources of review include leadership by walking around the workplace, organizational climate surveys, upper-level leadership courses that include material on toxic leadership, and 360-degree feedback. However, a recent report found that the 360-degree assessment was not appropriate for evaluation, but was useful for leadership development.⁵⁴

PREVENTING TOXIC LEADERSHIP

There have been several proposals to prevent toxic leadership from occurring. Box suggested establishing an advisory committee of generals. These generals could act as mentors to future leaders.⁵⁵ Part of training a leader includes exercises in constructive leadership.⁵⁶ Schein proposed a model of organizational culture that consists of three layers: artefacts and behaviours, espoused norms and values, and underlying assumptions.⁵⁷ Leadership development includes training in the military's organizational culture. To prevent toxic leadership, there needs to be greater emphasis on the values of the military to prevent a negative organizational culture.⁵⁸ A complementary form of training involves the training provided to followers. Too often military members follow the toxic leader or just accept the situation. Programs like the Global Assessment Tool, which is part of the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness program, could provide followers with the strength to stand up to toxic leaders.⁵⁹

RESPONSES BY FOLLOWERS

There are a variety of toxic leaders including: the narcissist, the bully, the gangster, the turncoat, the backstabber, the accuser, the Casanova, the invertebrate, and the zombie. Followers' responses to these types of toxic leaders include dotting upon the leader, keeping a low profile, confronting the leader directly, reporting sexual harassment, encouraging the leader to take a stand, and encouraging enthusiasm.⁶⁰ Military personnel are trained to be loyal. Reporting toxic leaders to those in command may seem like a betrayal. But those who formalize their complaints provide a great service to their fellow military members.

CONCLUSION

Destructive leadership comes in many forms in the military. The research that has been done, while varying in quality, suggests that it is significant problem. Its effects range from the short-term (subordinate's decisions to re-enlist) to long-term (military readiness). With the availability of assessments such as the Toxic Leadership Scale, and facilities such as the Center for Army Leadership, toxic leadership in the military can be sharply reduced.

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CHAPTER 2

WHY NEGATIVE LEADERSHIP MATTERS: IMPLICATIONS FOR LEADER DEVELOPMENT IN THE MILITARY

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INTRODUCTION

When people think about leadership, the vast majority think about it in a purely positive light. In other words, they ask questions like: “What do good leaders do?,” “What is it about certain leaders that makes them successful?,” and “How do we develop good leaders?” These are certainly important questions to ask, as we need to understand why certain leaders are successful while others are not. However, such a one-sided approach keeps us from asking similar but opposite questions, such as: “What are bad leaders doing?” and “What did that leader do that caused him/her to fail?” This second line of questioning is important because, in order to obtain a complete picture of leadership, we need to not only understand what leaders are doing, but also what they are not doing and what they are doing wrong. This is critical because when leaders fail, their failures affect not only them, but also their followers and ultimately the larger organization. Anyone who has suffered under negative leadership is painfully aware of this fact. In a context like the military, where the decisions that are made can place people’s lives in the balance, it is even more critical for leaders to be effective.

In recent years, leadership researchers have begun to examine negative leadership in an attempt to understand and classify types of leaders. Much like finding out what good leaders do (so we can encourage those types of behaviours), we need to understand what bad leaders do (so we can discourage those types of behaviours). Unfortunately, this effort has gone the way of traditional studies of leadership, where instead of a complete and thorough examination of the topic, we end up with a proliferation of different ways to

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Air Force Academy or the United States Department of Defense.

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conceptualize negative leader behaviours. In order to bring some clarity to this situation, our chapter seeks to accomplish several objectives. First, we will describe several ways that negative leader behaviours have been conceptualized in the literature. Next, we will examine what it is about the military context that makes these types of behaviours prevalent. Finally, we will conclude with some implications for military leader development.

NEGATIVE LEADERSHIP

The goal of leader development is to educate and train leaders on how to be effective. However, we also need to educate them (through self-awareness) on what they are doing that is standing in the way of being an effective leader. The challenge is that these types of leader behaviours have been classified in many different ways. This is not a recent phenomenon, as Stogdill *notes* over 40 years ago that “there are almost as many different definitions of leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept.”¹ The reason this is a challenge is that when someone mentions negative leadership, it is likely that people think about a range of different types of behaviour. Put simply, the category of “negative leadership” extends anywhere from leader error to toxic leader behaviours. For this reason, we think it is important to address the major ways that negative leadership has been framed. While an exhaustive review of the literature is outside the scope of this chapter, we will highlight several of the more common terms that have been used to describe negative leader behaviours (see Table 2.1). In order to avoid referring to specific construct definitions, we will use the general term “negative leadership” throughout the rest of the chapter, except when referring to a specific conceptualization of negative leadership.

Leadership Term	Author(s)
Abusive Supervisors/Supervision	Ashforth, ² Hornstein, ³ Tepper, ⁴ Zhang & Liao ⁵
Aversive Leadership	Bligh, Kohles, Pearce, Justin, & Stovall, ⁶ and Thoroughgood, Hunter & Sawyer ⁷
Bad Leadership	Kellerman ⁸
Bullying	Namie & Namie ⁹
Coercive Power	Elangovan & Xie ¹⁰
Dark Side	Hogan, Curphy & Hogan, ¹¹ Hogan & Hogan ¹²
Derailed Leaders	Bentz, ¹³ McCall & Lombardo, ¹⁴ Schackleton ¹⁵
Despotic Leadership	De Hoogh & Den Hartog ¹⁶
Destructive Leadership	Aasland, Skogstad, Noteslaers, Mielsen & Einarsen, ¹⁷ Einarsen, Aasland & Skogstad ¹⁸ Schyns & Schilling ¹⁹
Harassing Leaders	Broodsky ²⁰
Health Endangering Leaders	Kile ²¹
Intolerable Bosses	Lombardo & McCall ²²
Laissez-Faire	Hinkin & Schriesheim, ²³ Judge and Piccolo, ²⁴ Lewin, Lippitt & White ²⁵
Leader Error	Hunter, Tate, Dzieweczynski & Bedell-Avers ²⁶
Petty Tyrants/Tyrannical	Ashforth ²⁷
Supervisor Undermining	Duffy, Ganster & Pagon ²⁸
Toxic Leadership	Lipman-Blumen, ²⁹ Reed, ³⁰ Ulmer ³¹
Unethical Leadership	Brown, Trevino & Harrison ³²
Unsupportive Managerial Behaviours	Rooney & Gottlieb ³³
Workplace Aggression	Baron & Neuman ³⁴

Table 2.1: Conceptualizations of Negative Leadership³⁵

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TOXIC LEADERSHIP

The term toxic leadership has been around for some time and is one of the more recognizable terms related to negative leadership. In fact, several researchers have offered a definition for this form of leadership. Lipman-Blumen stated that toxic leadership is “a global label for leaders who engage in numerous destructive behaviours and who exhibit certain dysfunctional personal characteristics.”³⁶ Reed, after examining US Army personnel data, determined that toxic leaders have three key characteristics:

1. An apparent lack of concern for the well-being of subordinates.
2. A personality or interpersonal technique that negatively affects organizational climate.
3. A conviction by subordinates that the leader is motivated primarily by self-interest.³⁷

Furthermore, Ulmer, a retired US Army Lieutenant General, said “Toxic leaders are individuals whose behaviour appears driven by self-centered careerism at the expense of their subordinates and unit, and whose style is characterized by abusive and dictatorial behaviour that promotes an unhealthy organizational climate.”³⁸ He goes on to describe some specific characteristics of a toxic leader:

- They rarely take blame or share glory.
- They are not toxic all the time, or to all people.
- They are rarely if ever toxic when in the company of “the boss.”
- They sometimes have good ideas and accomplish things.
- They can be charming when the occasion fits.
- They are frequently described as extremely bright and hard-working.
- They often have a coterie of devoted “fans” who keep appearing on their staffs.
- Most have been seen as toxic by subordinates since early in their career.
- Their boss either does not know or pretends not to know, and almost never records their abuse of subordinates.

While slightly different in their definitions, these descriptions all have some common themes: leader action that is not constructive, a disregard for subordinates, and some form of personality flaw. It is clear that leaders displaying these characteristics would be problematic for any organization, but they are especially dangerous in the military context. Recognizing the impact of such behaviour, the US Army incorporated a description of toxic leadership in their formal doctrine:

Toxic leadership is a combination of self-centered attitudes, motivations, and behaviors that have adverse effects on subordinates, the organization, and mission performance. This leader lacks concern for others and the climate of the organization, which leads to short- and long-term negative effects. The toxic leader operates with an inflated sense of self-worth and from acute self-interest. Toxic leaders consistently use dysfunctional behaviors to deceive, intimidate, coerce, or unfairly punish others to get what they want for themselves. The negative leader completes short-term requirements by operating at the bottom of the continuum of commitment, where followers respond to the positional power of their leader to fulfill requests. This may achieve results in the short term, but ignores the other leader competency categories of leads and develops. Prolonged use of negative leadership to influence followers undermines the followers' will, initiative, and potential and destroys unit morale.³⁹

While toxic leadership is predictably bad for followers, it has some very real implications for the organization as well. First, toxic leadership can spread.⁴⁰ A single toxic leader can have an impact on dozens of subordinates and those subordinates can, in turn, have a negative effect on more personnel.⁴¹ In addition, Steele found that toxic leadership was strongly related to subordinate perceptions of the leader with respect to a lack of ethics, putting own needs ahead of those of their unit, and not creating a positive environment; and through lowered morale, toxic leaders impacted turnover intentions. One point of confusion that goes along with toxic leadership is that often the toxic leader can be very seen as very competent and effective when performing a specific objective or task.⁴² This is because, in the short term, a toxic leader can force their will upon their followers to get short term performance. However, this is short-lived, as the negative implications of such an approach start to appear. Unfortunately, due to the high rotation of leaders through command positions in the US military (typically only 12 to 24 months), the impact of this form of leadership may not truly manifest itself until after the leader is actually gone.

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DESTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP

Destructive leadership is another term that is often used when describing negative leadership. Einarsen and colleagues state that destructive leadership is: “The systematic and repeated behaviour by a leader, supervisor, or manager that violates the legitimate interest of the organization by undermining and/or sabotaging the organization’s goals, tasks, resources, and effectiveness and/or the motivation, well-being or job satisfaction of subordinates.”⁴³ With a slightly different focus, Schyns and Schilling refer to it as “a process in which over a longer period of time the activities, experiences and/or relationships of an individual or the members of a group are repeatedly influenced by their supervisor in a way that is perceived as hostile and/or obstructive.”⁴⁴ In both conceptualizations, the leader is characterized as someone who is standing in the way of accomplishing the goal (i.e., sabotaging, undermining, obstructive). This appears to be a common issue, as it was found in a recent study that one-third of employees reported that they had personally experienced some form of destructive leadership.⁴⁵

In the military context, it is not difficult to see why this would be detrimental. Not only are there implications for the organization, but for followers as well. This appears to be a common theme across the discussion of negative leadership, where there is a disregard for both people and the organization or mission. When examining effective leadership, the leader must at times trade off between the mission and the people. It is not that one is necessarily more important than the other; it is that sometimes both cannot be prioritized equally. For example, when commanders have to put troops in harm’s way, they are not able to make decisions that will result in no harm to the troops. This is because the military has an inherently dangerous mission. However, effective leaders will consider all of the ramifications of what they can do to minimize harm to personnel, while at the same time ensuring mission success. For the destructive leader, this balancing of mission and people does not occur, resulting in less than optimal mission performance and increased risk of harm to personnel. Taken to the extreme, this can lead to needless loss of life and mission failure.

ABUSIVE SUPERVISION

Abusive supervision takes a somewhat different approach to negative leadership. In this case, the leader shows signs of abuse as a means to control subordinates. It has been reported that this form of leadership impacts 13.6% of US workers at a cost of 23.8 billion dollars annually through such issues as lost

productivity, health care costs, and absenteeism.⁴⁶ Abusive supervision has been defined as “Subordinates’ perceptions of the extent to which supervisors engage in the sustained display of hostile verbal and nonverbal behaviours, excluding physical contact.”⁴⁷ Or, put another way, an abusive leader is “One whose primary objective is the control of others, and such control is achieved through methods that create fear and intimidation.”⁴⁸ Not surprisingly, this type of leadership has been shown to affect task cohesion, social cohesion, disciplinary actions, number of reprimands received,⁴⁹ job retention, job satisfaction, life satisfaction, commitment,⁵⁰ actions that benefit the organization,⁵¹ well-being, justice perceptions, performance, and family-related outcomes.⁵² A term that is commonly associated with abusive supervision is petty tyranny. A petty tyrant is “someone who uses their power and authority oppressively, capriciously, and perhaps vindictively.”⁵³

Clearly, this type of leadership is not conducive to the good order and discipline that we expect of our military leaders. It would be a stretch to try and find any instance in the military where such a show of leadership would be warranted, as it is ludicrous for us to envision treating subordinates in the profession of arms this way. That said, there does exist a place in the military where this form of leadership is alive and well: basic military training. The basic training philosophy is that we should first “break soldiers down” so that we can “build them back up” again. In fact, this process has been used for decades. While the authors do not necessarily disagree with this process (all of us were enculturated into the military in this way), it is interesting to *notes* that there is actually very little research on the validity of such an approach to indoctrination.

UNETHICAL LEADERSHIP

Brown, Trevino, and Harrison defined ethical leadership as “the demonstration of normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-way communication, reinforcement, and decision-making.”⁵⁴ In contrast, unethical leadership has been described as “supervisor behaviours that violate moral standards.”⁵⁵ These definitions imply that ethical violations signify breaks from established norms or standards.⁵⁶ This suggests that ethical behaviour is a moving target and not necessarily a rigid definition of right or wrong.⁵⁷ This creates a challenge for leaders, especially when there are shifts in standards over time.

Brown and Trevino subsequently identified some antecedents of ethical leadership: having a leader role model, an ethical climate, and individual

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differences.⁵⁸ Schaubroeck and colleagues conducted a study examining ethical climate antecedents.⁵⁹ Through an investigation of 2,572 soldiers in the US Army, they found that not only do leaders impact their immediate subordinates, they also shape the broader culture that, in turn, has a trickle-down effect on others in the organization.⁶⁰ This means that the impact of the leader is not only felt through their direct actions, but also through the type of climate that they develop (or allow to develop) in their unit. Perhaps, it was characterized best by Doty and Gelineau who wrote, “Walking by or ignoring any violations of a unit’s command climate is setting a new command climate.”⁶¹ In the context of negative leadership, this implies that it is not just what the leader does, but also what they allow to happen.

LEADER ERROR

The previous descriptions of negative leadership constructs infer some sort of intentionality on the part of the leader. However, not all negative leadership is due to willful action; it is possible that the leader made an error. This error could be caused by many factors, such as ignorance, making a bad decision, or lack of preparation. In any case, the followers or organization can suffer the effects of leader error. Hunter and colleagues suggest leader error occurs when a leader takes an action that leads to a result outside the original intent of the leader or the group’s norms.⁶² They go on to state that these errors take one of three forms:

1. Task Errors: planning mistakes; failing to coordinate an activity.
2. Relationship Errors: losing one’s temper; not supporting a subordinate.
3. Ethical Errors: acting outside of acceptable group norms.

What this suggests is that “the causes of such error are simply more than flaws in character and can be caused by situational factors be they contextual pressure, norms, or broader factors such as culture.”⁶³ As an example, when leaders are placed in new situations, they might rely on actions they have taken in the past or mental models of how they think the situations should be handled. As a result, they could apply an inappropriate heuristic that results in an error.⁶⁴ In an environment where there is added time pressure, the use of simplifying heuristics is even more understandable. We do not want to imply that the leader is absolved from the responsibility of the error, but from a developmental standpoint, a different approach should be taken when a leader acts unselfishly verses unethically. This idea of error is not uncommon as it has been reported that estimates of base rates for managerial incompetence

in corporate life is between 30% and 75%.⁶⁵ While we may not experience such high rates in the military, it is not a stretch to imagine that some of the negative leadership that we see in the military could be due to leader error.

LAISSEZ-FAIRE

The majority of negative leadership that we have described thus far concerns problematic leader characteristics or behaviours that run counter to the good order and discipline of the organization. Related to this idea is leader inaction. This inactivity has been referred to as *laissez-faire* leadership.⁶⁶ *Laissez-faire* is a part of the Full Range Leadership Model, which looks at leadership with respect to effectiveness and activity.⁶⁷ This form of leadership is characterized by the leader being absent when needed, avoiding making decisions, and failing to take action.⁶⁸ It is not hard to see how this lack of support by the leader is problematic for not only followers, but the organization as a whole. For example, in a study of 241 hotel employees, Hinkin and Schriesheim found that *laissez-faire* leadership (e.g., omission of rewards) significantly predicted several outcomes, including perceptions of supervisor effectiveness, satisfaction with a supervisor, and role clarity.⁶⁹ Such effects are similar to those seen in other investigations of leader inaction. Judge and Piccolo found that leader inaction was negatively correlated with satisfaction with the leader and leader effectiveness. They went on to state, “the absence of leadership is nearly as important as the presence of other forms of leadership.”⁷⁰ In other words, leadership is about action and presence. If the leader fails to act and show interest, then negative results are predicted to occur.

In summary, there are many different ways that negative leadership has been conceptualized. We have covered just a few of the more popular ones in our review. These conceptualizations are significant in that each one looks at the leader’s behaviours (or lack of behaviours) in slightly different ways. The challenge for leadership researchers and practitioners is to make sense of these sometimes subtle nuances. Kellerman identified why this is significant when she said, “bad leadership has a ripple effect and also a lingering impact. Think of it as having multigenerational consequences. Bad leadership is not an evanescent phenomenon. It does not come and then go. It has a legacy that endures and is pernicious.”⁷¹ When we understand that 65% to 75% of employees in any given organization report that the worst aspect of their job is their immediate boss, there is clearly work that needs to be done.⁷² Next, we discuss what factors in the military context could allow these types of leadership to occur.

THE MILITARY CONTEXT AND THE TOXIC TRIANGLE

Due to the intense focus on leadership, followership, and leader development in the profession of arms, one might speculate that if negative leadership were present, it would not last long. In an attempt to examine if this were true, Reed and Bullis examined a sample of 174 lieutenant-colonels and colonels from all branches of the US military (predominantly the US Army) and found that every study participant had been exposed to the negative behaviours associated with toxic leadership. There was a significant negative relationship between these experiences and multiple measures of satisfaction.⁷³ The Center for Army Leadership recently estimated that the presence of toxic leaders in the US Army may be as high as 20% of the overall leader population.⁷⁴ Others estimate that number to be lower (8% to 12%), but all agree that the presence of toxic leaders in the military is prevalent and particularly troubling given the significant ramifications that a leader's influence can have in the military context.⁷⁵

Toxic leadership can be even more catastrophic in military settings because of the high level of value and meaning that its members find in their work.⁷⁶ The influence of toxic leaders can affect member's well-being, turnover intentions, likelihood of exhibiting deviant behaviours, and performance outcomes like sexual harassment and job satisfaction.⁷⁷ The prevalence and significant impact of toxic leaders in the military begs the question: why is toxic leadership so prevalent in military organizations?

Reed suggested toxic leaders are “poison” to the organization and the military needs to examine not just the leaders themselves, but the culture and policies that exacerbate their influence.⁷⁸ As Kusy and Holloway explain, toxic people thrive in toxic systems.⁷⁹ If this is the case, then it is important to examine both individual leaders and the broader circumstances of the organization if we want to truly understand the emergence and influence of toxic leadership in the military. Padilla and colleagues found that the true impact of toxic leadership does not arise solely from the destructive leader, but from the confluence of destructive leaders, susceptible followers, and a conducive environment, which they collectively refer to as “the toxic triangle.”⁸⁰ This framework is useful to facilitate a discussion of the military's vulnerability to the influence of toxic leadership.

DESTRUCTIVE LEADERS

Toxic leaders are known for exhibiting a variety of behaviours that most people perceive as harmful or deviant toward followers and/or the organization.⁸¹ It is important to emphasize that being a toxic leader is not synonymous with being an incompetent or incapable leader, though both can have a negative influence on organizational outcomes.⁸² As mentioned previously, the problem is that many of the negative behaviours toxic leaders exhibit can result in positive short-term outcomes (e.g., increased motivation or performance).⁸³ Thus, Yukl highlights that toxic leadership is a long-term phenomenon.⁸⁴ While toxic leaders may enjoy certain levels of success, they eventually poison the long-term ability of followers and the organization to maintain successful performance. In fact, it is their leadership strengths that makes them even more dangerous to an organization than an incompetent leader who can be quickly identified and dismissed.

Toxic leaders succeed in short-term situations because they display a variety of positive attributes. For example, toxic leaders tend to demonstrate high levels of charisma, which is widely seen as a positive leadership trait.⁸⁵ While not all charismatic leaders are destructive, toxic leaders are almost always charismatic. Toxic leaders in the military typically demonstrate high levels of charisma through their ability to communicate a clear vision, display a high level of self-presentation skill, and are role models for positive personal energy.⁸⁶ In addition to being charismatic, toxic leaders tend to demonstrate a high level of technical competence that is recognized by others.⁸⁷ As we will expand, these qualities are very attractive to members of the military who desire competent and capable leaders to guide them through extreme circumstances, but these characteristics also make it difficult to recognize the eventual detriment of the leader's influence.⁸⁸

Critical to both the emergence and negative impact of toxic leaders is the fact that their positive qualities are often dangerously paired with other attributes. Reed explained that toxic leaders in the military have a short-term focus that they articulate to superiors through their clear vision and enthusiastic acceptance of the mission.⁸⁹ However, toxic leaders combine this approach with a complete lack of concern for followers, their morale, or the overall organizational climate. Followers eventually perceive toxic leaders as being motivated purely by self-interest.

Unfortunately, the potential for this unique pairing of qualities is ubiquitous in military populations. Thomas found that ambition, extraversion, hedonism, and the need for power were all significantly higher in a sample of

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2,000 Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets than in the general population.⁹⁰ Similarly, Lall and colleagues found that a sample of 500 third-year midshipmen at the US Naval Academy displayed higher means for ambition and extraversion than the general population.⁹¹ Additionally, the midshipmen with the highest class ranks were less likely to be empathetic or to experience guilt. Finally, Bradley and Charbonneau found that extraversion and dominance predicted course performance for a sample of Canadian cadets.⁹²

On the one hand, the military desires steely-eyed killers who can neutralize the enemy. It is easy to understand why being ambitious, exerting dominance, and even needing power, can serve a military leader well in a hierarchical environment focused on extreme circumstances, where dissention cannot be tolerated. In a firefight, you want a leader who takes charge and can confidently execute a plan of action. It is when these qualities go unchecked that they can serve as the building blocks of the mission-focused toxic leader who simply sees subordinates as tools to advance his/her own agendas. To explore these circumstances further, we now examine the follower's role in facilitating toxic leadership in the military.

SUSCEPTIBLE FOLLOWERS

Subordinates play an integral role in the leadership process.⁹³ One reason that toxic leaders are present in an organization is that followers allow them to emerge and exert their influence.⁹⁴ Padilla and colleagues recognized the significance of follower's influence on the leadership process by incorporating susceptible followers into their description of the toxic leadership triangle.⁹⁵ No matter how competent or capable the leaders are, they cannot achieve the destructive outcomes associated with toxic leadership on their own; followers must recognize the authority of their leaders for them to exert their influence.⁹⁶ Only after they gain recognition of that authority are toxic leaders able to gain access to the resources they need to implement their visions.⁹⁷ This is exacerbated in the military context by the explicit positional power associated with the military rank structure.

Follower responses to toxic leaders vary tremendously, with some failing to report toxic behaviours and others embellishing their occurrence.⁹⁸ There are specific traits that make certain followers vulnerable to the influence of toxic leaders: lower levels of maturity, high levels of ambition, a congruent set of values or beliefs, and a strong perception of threat to the environment.⁹⁹ Susceptible followers typically come in two general categories: conformers and colluders.¹⁰⁰ While conformers support toxic leaders based on obedience,

colluders actively support toxic leaders based on shared ideals or based on their own ambitious motives.

Susceptible followers do not question toxic leaders' negative behaviours, which creates a dangerous situation that can severely damage the followers and the organization.¹⁰¹ In a recent study of ethical leadership in the US Army, Hannah and colleagues found that 78% of platoon leaders reported that they would never challenge a direct report, and 79% would not challenge a superior who is participating in ethical misconduct.¹⁰² To avoid toxic leadership, it is absolutely essential for followers to speak up and identify the toxic behaviours of leaders.¹⁰³ In the military, it is often the followers who have the most direct view of a leader's actions. Therefore, they play a critical role in helping the organization recognize toxic leaders. However, in order for this to happen, they require an environment that values and facilitates their input. We now turn our attention to understanding the role of the organizational environment in facilitating both the emergence of destructive leaders and the development of susceptible followers.

CONDUCTIVE ENVIRONMENT

Toxic leadership is enabled by organizations that tolerate, produce, and sustain destructive leaders and their behaviours.¹⁰⁴ Thus, the final element of the toxic triangle is the conducive environment.¹⁰⁵ Certain aspects of organizations and the environmental conditions they face make some organizations more likely to facilitate the influence of toxic leaders.

First, conditions of uncertainty, instability, or significant threat lead followers to seek out leaders who are strong, confident and capable, which are all also qualities of toxic leaders. In fact, the toxic leader's short-term focus on mission accomplishment and ability to clearly articulate a vision make him/her particularly attractive to those who desire a return to more stable conditions. The life and death circumstances that members of the military face may lead supervisors and followers to overlook the toxic behaviours of confident and capable leaders in the pursuit of short-term gains.¹⁰⁶ While there may be short-term benefits to ignoring these behaviours, toxic leaders establish conditions that are detrimental to their unit and increase the potential for negative outcomes, such as increasing ethical violations.¹⁰⁷

Second, the cultural values of the organization can facilitate the emergence of toxic leaders.¹⁰⁸ Toxic leaders are more likely to emerge in organizations that value uncertainty avoidance, collectivism, and high power distance.¹⁰⁹

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Hierarchical organizations, like the military, are especially vulnerable to developing these types of cultural norms.¹¹⁰ It can be particularly difficult to identify toxic leaders in the military because the strong culture values cooperation, encourages loyalty, stresses respect for authority, promotes can-do attitudes, and places an intense focus on mission accomplishment.¹¹¹ While these norms have many positive benefits, they can also create barriers that discourage followers from reporting the destructive behaviours of their leaders.¹¹² For example, the military instills an unquestioned sense of respect for rank and authority that can lead followers to feel it is not their place to question the actions of a leader.¹¹³

Finally, organizations that fail to establish clear checks and balances to identify and systematically deal with toxic leaders open themselves up to their destructive influence.¹¹⁴ The less supervision toxic leaders have, the more likely they are to abuse their power. Reed highlighted that most formal evaluation systems in the military are supervisor-centric.¹¹⁵ Peers and subordinates (i.e., those who are in a position to see leaders on a regular basis) are not typically included in the evaluation process in a formal way. To counter this, the US Army has recently implemented a developmental 360-degree feedback system. However, feedback results are not typically made available to supervisors. This is problematic because toxic leaders are adept at interacting with superiors, making it difficult for superiors to recognize that a subordinate leader is abusing followers.¹¹⁶ Another structural aspect of the military that can allow toxic leaders to persist is the regular rotation of leaders in leadership positions. In response, followers may develop an attitude that it is better to put up with the leader's toxic behaviours and "wait them out" than deal with the consequences of reporting the leader's destructive actions.¹¹⁷ Unfortunately, this creates a "surviving" mentality versus a "thriving" mentality.

The toxic triangle not only allows toxic leaders to emerge, but also sustains their presence in the military. In an examination of the military promotion and selection system, Dorn and colleagues found that the military places a higher value on short-term career accomplishments to the detriment of long-term organizational needs.¹¹⁸ This finding supports the approach of toxic leaders who focus on short-term goal accomplishment regardless of the repercussions on followers or the organization. Further, Keller-Glaze and associates found that a great deal of learning in the workplace takes place through informal mechanisms like on-the-job experience and informal mentoring.¹¹⁹ This is problematic for the military because they also found that subordinate leaders in the Army who observe toxic senior leaders tend to emulate their behaviour. Thus, when toxic leaders are allowed to thrive in an organization,

their influence has the potential to not only decrease various performance outcomes, but also inspire the next generation of leaders to behave in a similarly toxic manner.

IMPLICATIONS FOR MILITARY LEADER DEVELOPMENT

If Padilla, Hogan, and Kaiser's toxic triangle is capable of explaining the production and maintenance of toxic leaders in the military, then its focus on the presence of destructive leaders, susceptible followers, and conducive environments in military organizations provides a starting point for dismantling this toxic system, or at the very least, mitigating its effects.¹²⁰ Fiedler acknowledged the importance of considering the leader, follower, and situation when examining the leadership process, and Hollander incorporated these elements into what Hughes, Ginnett, and Curphy call the Interactional Framework (Figure 2.1).¹²¹ The leader element encompasses what the leader brings to a leadership scenario, and can include the leader's personality, interests, beliefs, values, knowledge, skills, and experiences. The follower element is similar to the leader's, in that each follower also has abilities, beliefs, and motivations. Finally, the situation element describes the context in which leader-follower interactions take place, and can include a range of factors spanning the organization, such as its structure, processes, and culture.




Figure 2.1: The Interactional Framework¹²²

CREATING NON-CONDUCTIVE ENVIRONMENTS

Previously, we noted that military organizations are hierarchical, and create cultures that value mission accomplishment, respect for authority, and loyalty to the extent that followers may not question the actions of their leaders.¹²³ In fact, modern military organizations are highly bureaucratic, featuring most if not all of the characteristic features of Classic Management Theory, such as hierarchical structures, unity of command, span of control, division of labor, and lines of authority and responsibility. Watola, Lindsay and Reimer believe that it is this marriage of organization and bureaucracy that could explain why military organizations are not able to develop, practice, and realize the benefits of transformational leadership.¹²⁴ For example, the US Army is currently struggling with a self-admitted “toxic leadership” problem; such abusive and self-serving behaviours are the antithesis of transformational leadership.¹²⁵

In *Leadership*, James MacGregor Burns defined transformational leadership as a process by which a leader appeals to followers’ values, needs and aspirations to elevate their morality and motivation to achieve their fullest potential.¹²⁶ Bass and colleagues later incorporated this leadership concept in a Model of Transformational and Transactional Leadership, which is now referred to as the Full Range Leadership Model.¹²⁷ Sosik and Jung provide the most detailed and comprehensive explanation of this model by including a thorough explication of the “Four I’s”, or components of transformational leadership: idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation, and individualized consideration.¹²⁸ Transformational leadership is positively related to followers’ satisfaction with their leader, overall job satisfaction, organizational commitment, work motivation, and supervisory ratings of leader effectiveness.¹²⁹ In fact, transformational leadership enjoys tremendous research support for its effective application in a wide variety of environments and contexts, suggesting that militaries should leverage it to realize the twin outcomes of leader effectiveness (and therefore unit performance) and follower development.¹³⁰

Watola and colleagues assert that each of the Four I’s of transformational leadership is compromised by characteristics of the military bureaucracy.¹³¹ Specifically, scarcity compromises the time required by leaders to demonstrate individualized consideration to their followers. Furthermore, competition for promotion and other career opportunities compromise the intellectual stimulation leaders should encourage in followers, lest follower failures reflect poorly on the leader and derail a promotion. In home-stationed military organizations, stasis and the lack of a dynamic enemy can promote

complacency, lessening the need for leaders to demonstrate inspirational motivation. Finally, the military is filled with young men and women who are likely demonstrating moral immaturity. Their only slightly older leaders may not be demonstrating the idealized influence required to encourage behaviours that benefit the organization and nation. In sum, characteristics of the military bureaucracy may be subtly encouraging leaders to engage in transactional, possibly toxic, rather than transformational leader behaviours. A transactional system would in turn engender a transactional response in followers, which would both reward the transactional or toxic behaviours of their leaders while also role-modeling a transactional system or toxic style for followers to emulate when they become leaders.

Gareth Morgan has likened the bureaucratic organization to a machine that seeks efficiency, precision, and predictability, with little regard for the needs, interests, and aspirations of its workers, who are treated like so many replaceable parts.¹³² In such organizations, leaders could be creating a dehumanizing and demotivating environment that excels in stable and predictable environments, but is likely to struggle in volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) operational environments. As Padilla and colleagues *notes*, VUCA conditions are likely to create a conducive environment that enables toxic leaders to thrive.¹³³ Thus, to facilitate the development of effective leaders, organizations must create the kind of structures, cultures, and processes that encourage transformational and effective forms of leadership, while discouraging transactional or toxic forms of leadership.

A problem as complex and difficult as making a bureaucratic organization a non-conducive environment for toxic leadership has an equally complex and difficult solution in the form of an organizational change effort. The theory and methods for organizational change are well established, as evidenced by the work of John Kotter and Donald Anderson.¹³⁴ In contrast to thinking of organizations as machine bureaucracies, Morgan offers an alternative conception in the form of the organization as an organism.¹³⁵ An organic system is prevalent in the way special operations forces (SOF) are organized, trained and equipped to succeed in VUCA environments. SOF teams may be led by *in extremis* leaders who share risk and a common lifestyle with followers, as well as inspire trust and loyalty. These characteristics have more in common with the transformational components of individualized consideration and idealized influence than the self-interested behaviours of toxic leaders.¹³⁶

Once organizational changes take root, it is important to take steps to ensure they are permanently embedded in the culture of the organization. In essence, an organizational change effort goes beyond the visible organizational

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structure and processes to include the mostly invisible artifacts of an organization's culture. Thus, any change effort should also consider the theory and methods for establishing or maintaining an appropriate organizational culture.¹³⁷ In light of the difficulty of conducting successful organizational change (not to mention the long time frame that it often takes), it is also important to address the destructive leader and susceptible follower components of the toxic triangle.

DEVELOPING NON-DESTRUCTIVE LEADERS

As previously discussed, toxic leaders can appear competent and highly effective, at least in the short term.¹³⁸ However, this success comes at a cost that is often paid by their followers. Over the long term, unit effectiveness, morale, and the development of future leaders will suffer. Therefore, organizations with a toxic leadership problem should take steps to address it before it becomes pernicious. The fields of industrial-organizational (or work) psychology, human resources management, and organizational behaviour have established personnel processes designed to promote organizational effectiveness via training and development.¹³⁹

Initially, the challenge will be to identify the toxic leaders in need of development. This is no easy task, as formal appraisal systems may be focused on distinguishing high from low performing leaders, and toxic leaders might be found at the high end of the performance spectrum due to their capacity to please superiors. Since formal appraisal systems are also used for promotions and other consequential career decisions, senior leaders are likely to give their subordinate leaders the benefit of the doubt in order to avoid challenges from a toxic leader, particularly when that leader is delivering results. Consequently, personal and professional leadership development programs should provide the best mechanism for addressing toxic leadership.

Reed suggests subordinates are in the ideal position to identify toxic leaders for development. As previously discussed, the leader's supervisors may only be aware of the leader's seemingly effective performance and not the effect their toxic behaviours have on their subordinates.¹⁴⁰ Thus, a comprehensive approach to employee development could involve increasing use of multi-source or 360-degree feedback systems. In such systems, the sources of developmental feedback go beyond the supervising rater to include the ratee's subordinates, peers, and even the ratee him or herself.¹⁴¹ A multi-source system provides a wealth of ratee strength and weakness performance information from unique sources that might otherwise go unnoticed in a traditional,

single-source rater feedback system. When implementing a 360-degree feedback system, Harris recommends rating sources be jointly selected by the supervisor and ratee, that training be provided to the rating sources, and that steps be taken to ensure the anonymity of the rating sources.¹⁴² Once toxic leader behaviours are identified, they can be systematically replaced with more adaptive behaviours through developmental programs. If no toxic leaders or behaviours are identified via the 360-degree feedback system, these efforts are not wasted, as organizations still benefit from a robust developmental feedback system for all leaders.

In sum, by leveraging a 360-degree developmental feedback system, senior leaders can identify the leaders in the organization who demonstrate toxic leadership, provide them with skills training, and reward those who demonstrate skill proficiency with high visibility leadership positions or critical responsibilities. Ultimately, the objective is to develop leaders who are capable of effective performance over the short and long term, while simultaneously modeling and developing effective leadership skills and behaviours for the next generation of leaders.

SELECTING LESS-SUSCEPTIBLE FOLLOWERS

Reed suggests that followers have a critical role to play in identifying toxic leaders, since they are the ones consistently exposed to toxic behaviours.¹⁴³ But how are followers going to perform this function if they are “susceptible followers” who enable toxic leaders via their unquestioning obedience? Recall that, consistent with the US Army’s toxic leadership problem, Hannah and colleagues found that 79% of platoon leaders would never challenge a superior engaging in ethical misconduct.¹⁴⁴ One problem to overcome is follower lack of maturity; as Thoroughgood, Hunter, and Sawyer stated followers are susceptible to toxic leaders’ influence when they lack maturity.¹⁴⁵ Watola and colleagues also argued that moral immaturity is a problem in military organizations; it may be that some military members are operating at a lower stage of moral reasoning.¹⁴⁶

Moral reasoning is the process by which people make ethical decisions, and the quality of moral reasoning reflects the state of an individual’s moral development.¹⁴⁷ Kohlberg theorized that people progress through three levels of moral development: pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional. Each successive level is characterized by increasingly complex ways of analyzing moral situations. People operating at the pre-conventional level (predominately children) make moral decisions based primarily on self-interest.

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Therefore, their decisions often reflect obedience to authority in order to obtain rewards and avoid punishment. Those operating at the conventional level (primarily late adolescents and adults) make moral decisions to obtain the approval of others. As a result, they follow rules or laws and do their duty consistent with their acquired values and beliefs. Finally, a few adults reach the post-conventional level where moral decisions are based on abstract, universal principles that transcend societal or national boundaries.

Most militaries prefer to recruit young people because they are healthy enough to withstand the rigours of military training and combat, are ready to enter the workforce generally unencumbered by spouses and children, and wish to establish an adult identity.¹⁴⁸ Thus, most military organizations are populated by young people who typically reason at the pre-conventional and conventional levels and are predisposed to seek rewards, avoid punishment, and obey authority. This may be one source of the susceptible followers that Padilla and colleagues labeled “conformers.”¹⁴⁹ To reduce the prevalence of conformers, militaries should seek to recruit and select first-term soldiers, sailors, and airpersonnel that demonstrate greater moral development, or they should attempt to develop this over time. Admittedly, this is a challenge and means some changes are required to developmental systems which currently take a more standardized approach to leader (and follower) development.

CONCLUSION

You do not lead by hitting people over the head. That’s assault, not leadership.

Dwight D. Eisenhower

The military is one of the more dynamic professions in the world. As a result, leadership becomes a center of gravity for military organizations.¹⁵⁰ Thus, it is critical that the military gets leadership right. As we have discussed through the various forms of negative leadership, when leaders don’t get it right, there can be drastic consequences for both the followers and the organization. Ironically, the negative leader seems to pay the smallest price, often leaving a wake of destruction when they are promoted/posted out of the position. While a leader bears ultimate responsibility for his/her actions, there are certain aspects of the military environment that allow these types of leaders to exist. Military leaders need to be aware of this dynamic and ensure that their organizations are not enabling these types of negative behaviour. There are

some things, however, that militaries can do to curb these negative leader behaviours by adapting their recruiting, selection and development systems. It is known that there are negative leaders within the ranks and this requires us to be diligent about identifying and eradicating them (or at a minimum developing effective leadership within them), not just for their sake but for their followers and the military as a whole.

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CHAPTER 3

TOXIC, NEGATIVE, AND DESTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOURS IN THE MILITARY CONTEXT: CASE STUDIES

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INTRODUCTION

Leadership has been extensively researched since the middle of the last century. This research has examined several approaches, focusing on background, processes and consequences. Some research covers the leaders' traits in an attempt to predict the personality characteristics that influence the effectiveness of leadership actions. Other research addresses the leaders' behaviour, based on whether those leaders are task- or relations-oriented, dividing the behavioural patterns of leaders into autocratic, democratic and laissez-faire leadership styles. More recently, new approaches have associated different leader orientations with the maturity levels of subordinates, and posit the existence of four leadership styles: directing, coaching, supporting and delegating.¹ Leaders must adapt their leadership style to specific situations. Aside from being able to evaluate a situation correctly, leaders must be flexible in order to adopt any of the four styles, which can then be directed at specific individuals or at the group as a whole. Other approaches focus on the relationships and interactions between leaders and subordinates.

According to Yukl, "leadership is the process of influencing others to understand and agree about what needs to be done and how to do it, and the process of facilitating individual and collective efforts to accomplish shared objectives."² A simpler but equally enlightening definition states that "leadership is a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal."³ In turn, US Army doctrine has adopted the concept of leadership from an organizational perspective, as "the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish the mission and improve the organization."⁴ The key element common

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Portuguese Armed Forces.

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to these three definitions is that the process of leadership involves the act of influencing others, and that this influence tends to be a positive one. This is because there is no better way to promote collective effort, achieve goals, fulfill the mission and improve the organization than effective leadership.

Similarly, the transformational leadership model first proposed by Burns⁵ and later adapted by Bass⁶ is based on a relationship of mutual commitment and trust between leaders and subordinates. It defines four dimensions in which leadership actions are carried out and combined to achieve a performance that exceeds expectations. The first dimension is called Idealized Influence, which results from high ethical and moral standards in leaders, who serve as role models. The second is called Inspirational Motivation and reflects the ability to create a shared vision and to foster team spirit. The third dimension is called Intellectual Stimulation, and it appeals to creativity and thus helps promote new approaches and stimulates the learning process. The fourth and last dimension is called Individualized Consideration, and reflects the leader's concern with supporting and encouraging the development of the individual needs of his/her subordinates, whether personal or professional.

Traditional leadership studies tend to focus on understanding how leaders, followers and context, and their interactions, contribute to achieve the desired results. However, there is a side where the influence exercised in the process of leadership is negative, leading to results that fall short of expectations and eventually to negative consequences. This chapter will analyze several case studies that happened in a military context and will identify the negative behaviours of leaders and their possible consequences. These case studies will be analyzed within the context of negative leadership as a theory, which is also called toxic leadership,⁷ destructive leadership⁸ or bad leadership,⁹ depending on the terminology used by the authors.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Negative, toxic and destructive leadership have only piqued the interest of researchers since the beginning of the twentieth century. Since then, several studies have been undertaken which have built the conceptual framework that serves as a theoretical basis to frame and analyze the less positive behaviours that can emerge in military contexts. Negative consequences translate into inefficiency and sub-optimal results, while relationships, cooperation and cohesion deteriorate in the impacted groups.

As mentioned above, the leadership process incorporates the factors “leader,” “followers” and “context.” Bad leadership not only results from the characteristics of leaders, but from a combination of these three factors. With this in mind, the toxic triangle model was built to represent the negative contributions resulting from the combined action of destructive leaders, susceptible followers and conducive environments.¹⁰

The “leader” factor is at the forefront in almost every theoretical framework. Studies have attempted to identify the potentially destructive behaviours of leaders and their respective impacts. The literature points to several aspects that characterize destructive leaders. The destructiveness of leaders does not stem from an isolated situation, but from systematic and repetitive behaviours in their daily actions.¹¹ These behaviours can be directed towards individuals or towards a group,¹² or may even affect subordinates and organizations by violating their legitimate interests.¹³ In addition to being perceived as toxic by subordinates, the harmful effects increase when there is the perception that the leader intentionally commits these actions.¹⁴

In the conceptual model of destructive leadership¹⁵ proposed by Einarsen, Aasland and Skogstad, both the organization and the subordinates can be positively or negatively affected by the behaviours of leaders. These behaviours are combined into two dimensions producing four types of leadership. Three of these types are destructive and one is constructive. The destructive types are “tyrannical leadership,” which negatively affects subordinates in favour of the organization, “supportive-disloyal leadership,” which negatively affects the organization in favour of subordinates and “derailed leadership,” which adversely affects both the organization and the subordinates. Negative influence in an organization is exercised at the level of goals, tasks, resources and effectiveness, and in subordinates at the level of motivation, well-being and job satisfaction.

The characteristics of destructive leaders include charisma, personalized use of power, narcissism, negative life themes and an ideology of hate.¹⁶ Other authors¹⁷ also analyzed narcissistic attributes in leaders, which translates into individuals with a heightened sense of self-importance, preoccupation with themselves, and who ignore others, and thus display a total lack of empathy in interpersonal relationships. They do not accept suggestions and are convinced that they are naturally accepted and followed by others on the merit of their ideas.¹⁸ Although insecure, they attempt to transmit an image of courage and self-confidence, which may be beneficial in the short term, but over time proves to have a downside, as they do not own up to their mistakes.¹⁹

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Reed describes the three key elements of the toxic leader syndrome:

“an apparent lack of concern for the well-being of subordinates; a personality or interpersonal technique that negatively affects the organizational climate; and a conviction by subordinates that the leader is motivated primarily by self-interest.”²⁰

Eight categories of leader behaviours that are disliked by employees emerged in an article by Rego, Cunha and Gomes.²¹ This study was based on employees from different employment sectors. In order of importance, these are:

- Abusive and impulsive leaders that are arrogant and overbearing and have little power over themselves at the emotional level, which causes them to disrespect subordinates, eliciting fear and making threats.
- Incompetent leaders that are disorganized and lacklustre, have poor time-management skills, are unprofessional, lazy, irresponsible and sloppy.
- Self-centered and controlling leaders that take all decisions upon themselves and keep subordinates under tight control; they do not value their potential and do not foster their development.
- Unfair and/or dishonest leaders that are unfair and partial and/or have character flaws.
- Demobilizing leaders that do not properly value the effort and work of subordinates, or support performance improvement.
- Indecisive, passive and sycophant leaders that have low self-esteem and do not like making decisions nor taking responsibility and/or are susceptible to the influence of others.
- Errant leaders that leave the team adrift, display weak planning and strategic vision skills and do not properly clarify the roles of performers, or their objectives.
- Anti-team leaders that fail to foster cohesion, mutual aid and team spirit.

In her book, “Bad Leadership: What It Is, How It Happens, Why It Matters,”²² Kellerman defines a typology of seven behaviours associated with bad leadership; three behaviours contribute to ineffective leadership and four to unethical leadership. Ineffective leadership results from the action of incompetent

leaders who lack the will or skill to affect positive change, rigid leaders who are unable or unwilling to adapt to new ideas, and intemperate leaders who lack self-control. Unethical leaders are insensitive and inconsiderate to the needs and rights of others. Unethical leadership results from the actions of callous leaders who ignore or disregard the needs of others, of corrupt leaders who put self-interest ahead of the interests of others, of insular leaders who disregard the health and welfare of others, and of evil leaders who use pain as an instrument of power.

Schaubroeck and et al. report two main features associated with destructive leadership: hostility and negative affectivity. Hostility translates into the externalization of frustration and anger, damaging the relationship between leaders and subordinates. Negative affectivity is a negative disposition of leaders towards themselves and others. The focus on a negative outlook prevents them from developing the potential of others based on positive aspects. In short, “both traits are associated with a negative outlook, the lack of interpersonal sensitivity, and a less effective style of interacting with others.”²³

The autocratic and laissez-faire leadership styles fall on opposite ends in terms of the activities of leaders; both have negative effects, fostering discontent, fear and mistrust. The autocratic style characterized by centralized power and directive and controlling leadership actions may prove to be the most appropriate style in emergency situations, as well as when subordinates are inexperienced and/or incompetent,²⁴ and it may even have the benefit of providing team psychological safety.²⁵ The passive and indirect behaviours typical of the laissez-faire style of leadership can also have negative consequences.²⁶ Lack of communication, unwillingness to make decisions, not taking responsibility and lack of concern for providing support are characteristic behaviours of laissez-faire leadership. Passivity, indecision and inaction lead to ambiguity regarding objectives, roles and tasks, to the emergence and escalation of conflicts, to a degraded work environment and to decreased job satisfaction.

A 2010 study conducted in Norway by Aasland and coauthors sought to measure both workers’ exposure to destructive behaviours from their direct superiors and laissez-faire behaviour, based on the destructive leadership model.²⁷ The outcomes obtained indicated that the laissez-faire behaviour was the most prevalent.²⁸ However, in the military context, the laissez-faire style is perceived as undesirable, as it is the responsibility of those in command or leadership roles to exert a positive influence in the leadership process, facilitating the fulfillment of the tasks entrusted to them.

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Returning to the issue of the toxic triangle, in addition to destructive leaders, Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser²⁹ stress the importance of the two remaining elements, susceptible followers and a conducive environment. Susceptible followers, who act as catalysts for the destructive actions of toxic leaders, are divided into conformers, who do nothing out of fear of reprisals, and colluders, who actively collaborate with leaders for personal gain. Sycophants, as well as those adept at managing perceptions in order to be seen by leaders more favourably, also fall within the latter group of followers. It is important to remember that the toxicity of leader's destructive behaviours depends largely on the perception of the leader's intent by followers and on the belief that the leader is primarily pursuing self-interest.

Conducive environments may occur due to instability, perceived threats, cultural values and the absence of checks. Cultural values are important, because when they are not shared, they are a source of constant tension, schisms, instability and uncertainty within the group which in turn generates anxiety and stress. Should a leader lack self-control or be reckless or arrogant, this can amplify the harmful effects of toxic leadership.

CASE STUDIES ON DESTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP IN THE MILITARY CONTEXT

The seven case studies that follow are compiled from research papers. These case studies occurred in a military context and involved officers in command positions. They are examples of negative leadership that allow us to conduct an analysis based on the theoretical framework presented.

CASE STUDY 1

The commander of a support unit accumulated almost all coordination activities. This leader worked with four officers but only assigned work to one of them, perhaps out of a lack of trust in the others. The officer assigned the work was never recognized. During a period of intensive work involving several simultaneous tasks, the officer was called out publicly for problems in the implementation of one of the tasks. When something was not to this leader's liking, perhaps due the pressure and responsibility involved in the missions assigned to his unit, he lost his temper several times and spoke loudly in an aggressive tone to his subordinate officers. The commanding officer was displeased when the tasked officer atypically requested permission to leave early, even though the commanding officer did not care about tardiness and other infringements by his other officers.

The leadership action described in the first case study is an example of unfair leadership, as this leader established a discriminatory relationship with the officers under his command, overwhelming one of them with work. The level of unfairness was aggravated by the leader's unwillingness to praise the officer and by his displeasure when the officer asked to be relieved early, displaying callousness in interpersonal relationships. It is also worth noting that this leader has centralized his authority and is suspicious. The leader in question did not realize that the problem in one of the activities was his or her responsibility, as they did not use all the resources at their disposal. The way this leader addressed the officer showed lack of control and lack of respect. Laissez-faire leadership characteristics are also present, as the leader had a passive attitude regarding successive schedule infringements by certain officers.

CASE STUDY 2

In a regimental unit with five company-level units, the commander focused his attention on the activities developed by the General Staff. This leader did not accept most courses of action proposed by the General Staff and opted for his own solutions, with outcomes that often proved inefficient. As a result of this arrogant attitude, relations with the local civilian authorities increasingly degraded and institutional cooperation was affected. Faced with recurrent manifestations of discontent by the commander of one of the units (a captain) on the impossibility of implementing the internal training plans, the commander, who had other priorities, was visibly angered and answered brusquely by reiterating his position several times in the presence of other officers. The relationship gradually deteriorated until an incident led to the captain's dismissal.

The leader in this case exercised a self-centered, controlling leadership style. This leader showed both narcissistic and demotivating behaviours by not valuing the work of subordinates and by assuming his own ideas were always the best, unaware that they may have actually proven to be less effective. This kind of arrogance was no longer tolerated by the local civilian authorities, who, not being hierarchically dependent, reduced institutional cooperation. The different priorities associated with a narcissistic personality contributed to a failure to appreciate the needs of the captain, and because of their disagreement, the leader took advantage of the situation and removed him from his duties. This is a typical case of imbalance of power between conflicting parties, with the party in a stronger position prevailing.

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CASE STUDY 3

After some time on mission in a theatre of operations, the officer responsible for force protection proposed a change to the schedule and itinerary of troop movements. This proposal aimed to prevent routines from being established, and was based on previous experience and on the training conducted during the pre-deployment phase. Because this measure personally affected the commander of the contingent, (i.e., compelling him to wake up earlier) he disregarded the tactical recommendations, expressed his disagreement with the suggestion and set a fixed time for the start of troop movements. The commander made it clear that the decision was his to make.

This case is an example of derailed leadership, as the commander's decision undermined both the organization, by counteracting the good practices established for tactical movements, and the soldiers, who were exposed to unnecessary risks. The phrase "this is my decision to make" is an example of arrogant and overbearing leadership. The fact that the commander put personal interests ahead of those of the organization and military personnel, ultimately compromised security (including his own), and revealed the narcissistic characteristics of this leader.

CASE STUDY 4

The commander of a regimental unit who had previously exercised the duties of second-in-command was a highly devoted officer, extremely determined and with a strong personality. In order to avoid risks in the conduct of activities, each event was preceded by one or more preparatory meetings, which were planned in detail. The search for perfection was a constant in all his actions and any deviations were immediately quashed. Any failure to comply resulted in an inquiry or in a threat of future consequences for subordinate's career, or even in the threat of a non-renewal of contract. Due to late orders, the work period was extended beyond normal business hours. This leader defended the idea that family life must be secondary to a military career, which his behaviour exemplified. This commander closely monitored activities and often inspected the various service areas. Even though he conveyed an image of concern for the welfare of subordinates, this leader's main goal was to identify failures to comply with his instructions.

This is an example of self-centred and controlling leadership. This leader demonstrated obsessive behaviour in wanting to control every detail in order to eliminate risks. Aside from exercising excessive control over others, this leader did not tolerate mistakes. Threats of future career consequences

aggravated the climate of fear among subordinates. The leader showed no concern for the family lives of subordinates, systematically requiring them, without apparent reason or perhaps due to poor time management, to remain on duty in the unit well beyond normal working hours. As a result of the leader's personal ambitions, the demands were such that they ultimately stifled the most basic needs of subordinates. The persistent imbalance between professional and personal life is a source of stress, with negative consequences for both. In other words, the imposition of a way of life, which is not necessarily a good example, by a leader on his subordinates constitutes a selfish and arrogant act.

CASE STUDY 5

Since the beginning of his command, the commander never bothered with interpersonal relationships or trust relationships with his subordinates. This officer favoured task performance at any cost. On several occasions, after reading the first few lines of the studies presented by his staff, he referred to them as being good "drafts" and immediately stopped reading. New versions of the documents were prepared until they complied with the leader's own ideas. This leader centralized the decision-making process. He preferred incidents to be resolved by the duty officer instead of being recorded in an incident report. When something did not go well or when an action was not in accordance with what the leader had devised, he had no qualms in rebuking subordinates in public and did it without any emotional restraint.

The leadership style described in this case is that of a self-centred leader who takes all decisions upon himself. There are also noticeable narcissistic characteristics, as the courses of action proposed were only accepted by this leader when they were aligned with his own ideas; the leader's authority is seen as absolute and irrefutable. This type of leadership is also demotivating because the effort and work of subordinates is not properly valued and because it does not contribute constructively to improving performance. This leader's clear preference for task performance at the expense of interpersonal relationships contributes to the inability to use a range of leadership styles, which reflects inflexibility and consequently hampers the ability to adapt to different situations. Subordinates are considered mere means to accomplish the tasks. The fact that the leader did not wish any incidents to be recorded in the incident reports may point to the intent of keeping them from the upper echelons. Finally, lack of modesty and lack of concern with reprimanding subordinates in public point to an arrogant leader who does not respect subordinates.

CASE STUDY 6

An officer exercised his duties of second-in-command. In the debriefing of a rescue operation, the duty officer was asked by his commander why a different course of action had not been followed, and the officer replied that they had acted according to the orders given by the second-in-command. Confronted with the duty officer's statement, the second-in-command replied that the order he had issued corresponded to the course of action recommended by the commander, but that the duty officer must have understood it incorrectly. A second problem happens later where errors were found in a military ceremony. When approached by the commander, the second-in-command replied that he had entrusted the head of the support service with those tasks. However, during a preliminary visit to the space where the ceremony would take place, the second-in-command, who was responsible for coordinating the preparations, was asked about various problems and about the work that still had to be carried out. He replied that he would think about it and convey his decisions later. As time went by, the questions remained unanswered and no decisions were taken, and the second-in-command stated that there were other more pressing issues to attend to, and directed questions to the head of the support service without ever having spoken to him. A third episode happens where the second-in-command develops a habit of inviting the officers with whom he has a good relationship for dinner in the duty room he was assigned. On those occasions, he sought to obtain information on other officers who were not in attendance. This strategy was eventually discussed among subordinates with negative impact on the morale of the group.

From the perspective of the destructive leadership model, the first two episodes share that this leader's behaviour simultaneously undermined the organization and the subordinates (i.e., derailed leadership). A bad decision in the first situation and the failures during the ceremony in the second situation may have harmed the image of the organization; and also, in both episodes subordinates were negatively affected. In the first situation, the superior claimed that the action had been taken because the subordinate had not properly understood the order, and in the second situation, he claimed that the subordinate was in charge of organizing the space for the ceremony. In the third situation, it was clear that the leader's actions negatively affected the subordinates. He displayed anti-team behaviour, which, in addition to being discriminatory, fosters intrigue and contributes to undermining the cohesion and morale of the group. In practical terms, it can also indirectly harm the organization due to a possible decrease in productivity resulting from a poor working environment caused by the conflict between the leader and subordinates, as well as among the subordinates.

The leader's actions in these three situations also exemplify the character flaw of not taking responsibility for one's own actions and intentionally promoting whistle-blowing and intrigue. Incompetent leadership was also present in the first two cases, as the leader displayed a lack of professionalism in the orders issued, and was careless and irresponsible by neglecting his subordinates who required his instructions for the military ceremony. It is clear that this leader's behaviour showed him unworthy of the trust of his subordinates; trust being an essential requirement in interpersonal relationships. The last situation also involved colluders who took advantage of the gatherings to exert influence and to take advantage of their position of closeness to the leader.

CASE STUDY 7

The final case study discusses the leadership exercised by an officer responsible for coordinating a department. During his time as head of the department, there were no coordination meetings. Top-down information was not always transmitted in timely manner and the tasks were either assigned to the same subordinates or to those who happened to be near the officer at the time. In addition to being in a state of stress when faced with problems to solve, the officer was averse to preparing proposals for improvement and proved to be a staunch supporter of the status quo. This officer did not show any concern with distributing the work equally among peers or with failures to comply with meeting schedules. This leader was vulnerable to flattery and the officers who consistently showed less commitment and who contributed less to the service were the ones commended, fostering a sense of unfairness among those who were, indeed, committed.

The behaviours of this leader fall within the *laissez-faire* leadership style. This leader had a passive attitude towards the work at hand. Communication was poor and the coordination process was inefficient. Concentrating taskings on the same individuals was a way of mitigating the insecurity shown by the leader, but it also resulted in the creation of an in-group and of an out-group. The assignment of tasks to the officers he came upon first is indicative of some laxness in the exercise of management duties, as well as of a possible lack of firmness in the exercise of authority. By being susceptible to flattery, this leader let himself be influenced by calculating followers who contributed little but who were able to achieve their purpose with the least possible effort. This generated unfairness and contributed to a leveling of effort by the committed and dedicated subordinates, who thereafter reduced their contributions. Another possible consequence is the creation of a sense of impunity, which results from the leader's failure to act when necessary, leading to the

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possibility of maladaptive behaviours being incorporated into the organizational culture. This leader's attitude is also demotivating, as his aversion to new ideas discouraged any initiatives to improve the service.

CONCLUSION

Although the research literature traditionally addresses the positive aspects of leadership, a more recent line of research has sought to understand which leadership behaviours negatively affect organizations and subordinates, and what the consequences of these behaviours are in order to come up with preventive and reactive measures to mitigate the consequences of those behaviours. Several models have been created to help interpret the phenomenon of negative leadership, which can also be called bad, toxic or destructive leadership. In the seven case studies presented, behaviours that were found to be the most common are self-centred leadership and controlling leadership. This is perhaps a reflection of the military culture and its inherent need for a clearly defined hierarchical structure. However, when these behaviours are associated with markedly narcissistic characteristics in leaders, the combination tends to become toxic. Under the aegis of the authority conferred upon them, these leaders fulfill their mission but are not necessarily concerned with how it is implemented. Inordinate ambition in leaders can overshadow self-awareness, while making their real intentions obvious. Furthermore, self-centred and controlling leadership, when exercised without regard to the level of maturity and proficiency of subordinates, contributes to lack of development in subordinates, to mutual distrust and to decreased initiative.

Some case studies also revealed the presence of abusive behaviour and arrogant leadership. This is characterized by lack of emotional control and a generous dose of impulsivity, which promotes a disregard and lack of respect for subordinates. We were also left with the impression that a leader's orientation should integrate both the task at hand and interpersonal relationships. Leaders who are more task-oriented tend to neglect the needs of subordinates and to regard them as mere means to accomplish tasks, while relations-oriented leaders, though affable and friendly, tend to have trouble directing and accomplishing tasks.

Laissez-faire leadership corresponds to a passive attitude towards the exercise of leadership and generates results which are also negative. The absence of behaviours geared towards either people or tasks, such as poor communication, coupled with the lack of feedback, instructions, and recognition, and an inability to make decisions create a highly toxic work environment where

uncertainty, confusion, lack of cooperation and support, conflict and a sense of unfairness prevail. This type of leadership behaviour, which is felt by subordinates, may go unnoticed in the upper echelons and in some cases may even be seen as helpful, because these leaders are more susceptible to being influenced and their passivity does not pose any challenges.

This analysis of case studies underlined the idea that destructive leader behaviours may adversely affect both the organization and the subordinates. The different consequences range from decreased job satisfaction and motivation, leading to increased turnover, an increase in conflicts, the creation of a climate of fear and stress, and decreased performance and productivity. The impact on subordinates is eventually reflected in the organization as a whole.

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CHAPTER 4

NEGATIVE ORGANIZATIONS: ANTECEDENTS OF NEGATIVE LEADERSHIP?

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The following chapter will examine negative organizations as a framing factor for negative leadership in a military context by first reviewing the pertinent literature, and second, by using an empirical case study.¹

LITERATURE ON NEGATIVE ORGANIZATIONS

Theorists in this field write about anorexic, narcissistic and greedy organizations.² The underlying question inferred is whether such negative organizational characteristics serve as antecedent explanatory factors behind individual negative leadership. Modern organizational structures are undergoing a process of transformation. They are exposed to an ever-increasing pace of societal change, a phenomenon known as social acceleration.³ This social acceleration brings with it expectations of ever-increasing productivity within reduced time frames. These accelerated processes impact negatively on the psychosocial environment of leadership because the various areas of operation do not have time to synchronize internal and external processes. As a result, and in tandem with policy proposals, organizations are streamlined and have their resources pared down,⁴ and place greater demands on their employees,⁵ to include, in the case of the military, demands that members be prepared to sacrifice life and limb.⁶

Organizational anorexia, narcissism and greediness tend to be confused with negative leadership and negative teammanship, as it is easier to blame individuals and teams for the negative qualities of the organization. Indeed, organizational anorexia, narcissism and greediness are the very things that can bring out negative qualities in the individual. It is therefore of great importance to study the context underlying negative leadership, with the aim of finding reasons for its development other than those ascribed purely to the

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Swedish Defence University.

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individual. Increased awareness of the negative aspects of an organization should facilitate the understanding of negative leadership.

Key questions are: What comes first, the dark side of organizations or negative leadership? How do they interact? To answer, we first present a literature review of the above mentioned framing factors. The literature review is a fusion of organizational, psychological, economic and sociological scientific approaches. Then, an empirical case study will show how the concepts appear in a military context, and lastly, a theoretical and practical discussion will describe how these concepts influence leadership.

ORGANIZATIONAL NARCISSISM

In psychological terms, narcissism refers to a personality disorder characterized by an exaggerated sense of self, a lack of self-knowledge, a great need to be the centre of attention and a lack of empathy.⁷ Recent research has discussed the concept of narcissism in the work place both, in an organizational and leadership context.⁸ For example, Brown⁹ views the theory of narcissism as an excellent tool for analyzing leadership, organizational citizenship, group dynamics and general organizational behaviour.¹⁰ Researchers are particularly interested in studies of leadership because leadership can impact favourably or unfavourably on organizational productivity. In a positive way, productive narcissists can motivate the organization to identify with them, to think the way they do, and to become the living embodiment of their companies.¹¹

However, research shows that the unfavourable aspects of narcissism have greater impact than the positive ones.¹² Grant¹³ asserts that it is narcissistic leadership, with an emphasis on unethical behaviour, which has contributed to the creation of organizational narcissism (ON), which in turn contributes to a general acceptance of failing standards and ethics within the organization. Behaviours characterized by a lack of morality are generally accepted within the organization, but appear strange to those outside the organization. Once it has been exposed by the media, organizational collapse is common, with the hasty exit of a skilled workforce and a drain on creativity.¹⁴ According to researchers such as Grant, declining organizations of this kind are common, and there are many empirical examples to be found in the industrial and corporate sectors of the western world.¹⁵ In order to tackle this concept in depth, we now pose the question: What characterizes organizational narcissism?

Some researchers¹⁶ apply the following specific aspects to describe organizational narcissism:

1. Denial: organizations deny facts about themselves using spokespersons, propaganda campaigns, annual reports and myths;
2. Rationalization: organizations develop justifications for their actions, inactions, decisions and responsibilities;
3. Self-aggrandizement: organizations self-aggrandize by making claims to their uniqueness, commissioning corporate histories and deploying their office layouts and architecture as signs of status, prestige and vanity;
4. Attributional egotism: organizations attribute failures of their decisions to external factors, while at the same time attributing positive results to the organization itself. Annual reports, publicity campaigns and the manipulation of the media are among the variety of means utilized to achieve this purpose;
5. Sense of entitlement: organizations assume an entitlement to continued successful existence and a consequent entitlement to exploit resources, people and other organizations to achieve this continued success;
6. Anxiety: the narcissistic organization suffers from social instability and alienation.

It is worth pointing out that organizational narcissism is most visible in the context of leadership in that it begins with leaders and is established and propagated by them. According to researchers, leaders and managers are ultimately responsible for raising awareness of and establishing an ethical approach in the organization, with a view to reducing narcissistic tendencies.¹⁷ Subordinates are also accountable for preserving narcissistic behaviour because they imitate the leaders' (or authority's) behaviour¹⁸ and ethical values.¹⁹ This negative behaviour can be spread via boundary spanners, who have a liaison role within and outside of the organization.²⁰ A warning that narcissism has taken hold in an organization is the presence of whistle blowers who bring to light various types of moral scandals.²¹

ORGANIZATIONAL ANOREXIA

Anorexia refers to the pathological condition of self-inflicted starvation, which, if left untreated, can result in death. Organizational anorexia (AO), on the other hand, is a relatively new concept in popular science, recently used to describe dieting organizations and the consequences felt when resources are scarce. One consequence is an imbalance between resources and tasks, resulting in psychological distress among co-workers.²² Economists and workplace scientists have long been interested in resource scarcity, which comes closest to the definition of organizational anorexia. Robbins²³ has even discussed the need to view economics as people's and organizations' attitudes toward scarcity. Resources and scarcity are therefore key words in all organizational activities, but anorexia is the pathological aspect of scarcity.

Anorexic organizations are characterized by a reduction in staff numbers with increasing workloads, lack of training, reduced competence and competence-raising activities for staff, longer hours (including working from home during leisure time), and shorter breaks.²⁴ This organizational starvation process often leads to a culture of "too much to do" among workers, which may be unsustainable in the long term. In an anorexic organization, cuts are associated with different types of resources, such as money, time, materials and staff, which are controlled by managers and leaders. This can, for example, lead to the perception of a leader as good or not as a result of the anorexic behaviour of the organization. Studying anorexic organizations in a leadership context becomes important, not least because several studies highlight a link between lack of resources and increasingly poor health among employees.

ORGANIZATIONAL GREEDINESS

The concept of greedy institutions or organizational greediness (OG) was proposed by Coser²⁵ to describe the characteristics of institutions such as the church, political parties, the armed forces and the family. He *noted* that certain institutions make "total claims on their members"²⁶ through the use of specific techniques. Firstly, these institutions "seek exclusive and undivided loyalty" from their members. They make significant demands on their members' time and rely heavily on compliance by evolving a means of "activating loyalty and commitment," such as by appearing highly desirable to the members.²⁷ Secondly, they are exclusive clubs which "attempt to reduce the claims of competing role and status positions" on their members. This is achieved by creating an aura of exclusivity around the institution and by

putting pressure on individual members to “weaken their ties, or not form any ties, with other institutions or persons that might make claims that conflict with their own [institutional] demands”.²⁸ Thirdly, they forge close links with the social identity of their members through the elements of exclusivity and insulation; members thus find their identity “anchored in the symbolic universe” of the institution.²⁹ The exclusivity of these institutions and the extraordinary demands they make on their members leads Coser to characterize them as greedy: “these might be called greedy institutions insofar as... their demands on the person are omnivorous.”³⁰ The voracious and manipulative qualities of these institutions are their key characteristics.³¹

Greedy institutions exact high demands on their employees, for example, in terms of psychological endurance, competence, long working hours, constant availability, unwavering loyalty and deep commitment, but offer less in return. Military organizations are by far the greediest, as they also require members to be prepared to sacrifice life and limb for the organization, if necessary. Soldiers and officers must be prepared to suffer wounds and kill or be killed in the accomplishment of their tasks, meaning that loyalty unto death also implies abandoning their families in the worst case scenario.

Work intensification is linked to longer working hours, since increased work tasks or effort may be manifested through extended working hours.³² The reported negative effects of work intensification on employees include the decline of workers’ health and well-being, job stress,³³ burnout³⁴ and low staff morale. The literature also suggests that there are negative follow-on effects for the community, including work-family imbalance.³⁵ Despite workplace arrangements such as the provision of family leave designed to support work-family balance, balancing work and family responsibilities is still proving difficult. Australian research into the finance and education sectors³⁶ suggests that, despite relatively good entitlements in these sectors, “employees face continuing difficulties in gaining access to these provisions.”

There is considerable evidence mounting for the work intensification argument, which suggests that more and more is required of workers during work time.³⁷ Greedy institutions should be studied within the framework of the leadership context, which has not been done before.

AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE STUDY

BACKGROUND

This case study provides empirical evidence of the overarching concept of negative organizations, which in turn has been operationalized into three subsidiary concepts:

1. Organizational narcissism – an organizational psychology concept.
2. Organizational anorexia – a business economics concept.
3. Organizational or institutional greediness – a sociological concept.

DATA SELECTION

The data comprised articles from the magazine *Officerstidningen*, which is a publication of the Swedish Officers' Association,³⁸ published eight times per year. It contains editorial pieces, feature articles and reports on visits to units, as well as news from the association and its directors, who give a report of the association's activities and current issues. The association is a professional body and union for soldiers, army, air force and naval officers employed by the Swedish Armed Forces and for those studying in the officer program. The association's main task is to work towards obtaining the best possible terms of employment for military staff in the armed forces. The Swedish Officers' Association comprises 31 local officer associations with approximately 13,500 active members.³⁹ In order to select the right articles, a selection criteria related to the three studied organizational theory concepts (ON, OA and OG) was applied. (See Table 4.1)

Inclusion Criteria		
Organizational Narcissism	Organizational Anorexia	Organizational Greediness
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Denial (failing confidence in the organization and weak anchoring of personnel, cowardly leadership) • Rationalization (restructuring) • Self-aggrandizement • Attributional egotism • Sense of entitlement (the tough stance of the organization towards the union and workers) • Anxiety (discrimination and bullying) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cuts to resources and materials • Reduction, reshuffles and geographic redistribution of staff • Security risks and failings as a result of cuts • Physical and psychosocial damage as a result of resource cuts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Relational demands • Task-related demands, demands on psychological and physical endurance, stress management • Internal organizational demands, sense of belonging and loyalty, demands on availability and commitment, etc.

Table 4.1: Inclusion Criteria for Data Selection

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Articles were chosen from all available editions for the period between 2011-2015. A five-year cut-off point was applied, partly to limit the data to the most recent articles and partly to address of theoretical saturation.⁴⁰ (See Table 4.2)

Year	Number of Issues	Number of Selected Articles for Analysis (per year)	Number of Articles per Concept		
			ON	OA	OG
2015	8	64	9	32	23
2014	8	38	14	17	7
2013	8	56	14	34	8
2012	9	51	18	22	11
2011	9	46	14	28	4

Table 4.2: Data Overview

Data was collected in January 2016 through a process of reading and sorting the articles according to themes and categorization of each of the chosen concepts. The content of each article was read carefully before making an initial extract of units of meaning and assigning them under each concept. Several meaning units were found in the same article. This was considered in the analysis and we could thereby categorize the same text under two concepts. Irrelevant articles were excluded from the data collection – largely reports from overseas, discussion of foreign security policy, the thoughts and reflections of members of the units, advertisements and articles discussing positive aspects, investments in materials or staff.

The following quote illustrates the inclusion criteria of cuts under anorexic organization:

Today, we have an anorexic organization, primarily the organization at ground level... the staff are tying themselves in knots out of loyalty in fulfilling their tasks. The imbalance between tasks and resources, chiefly in regard to staff, has to be rectified.⁴¹

RESULTS

The data analysis highlights how ON, OA and OG manifest in a military context. Together they create framing factors that highlight dark sides of the organization's approach to societal change and the demands of society on the organization. OA, ON and OG affect organizational sensitivity and adaption to external threats, and also influence leadership inside the organization. It

is important to point out that the dark side of the organization is the imbalance between the organization and society's demands on it, which indirectly affects leadership and workers. One consequence may be that leaders are perceived as destructive, when in reality the problem may be a structural one that is not sufficiently transparent.

Organizational Narcissism in a Military Context

Organizational narcissism in the military context revolves around a number of factors that force the organization to focus inwards. The interplay of processes that, in combination, conspire to portray the situation as being much more positive than it is in reality. The factors contributing to narcissism are: restructuring; wavering confidence in the organization and weak anchoring of key personnel; the organization's tough stance towards the union and workers; and discrimination, bullying and cowardly leadership.

Restructuring is the largest category in the analysis of organizational narcissism. Restructuring as a consequence of organizational anorexia, political decisions and incentives is increasing. Social acceleration can be defined as there being less and less time between different reorganizational efforts so the first one cannot take root in the organization before it is time for the next one.⁴² Its effects include, for example, increased administration, bureaucratization and reduced focus on core activities. The articles in the Swedish Officers' Association magazine describe a range of different consequences for both individuals and the organization that stem directly from the process of reorganization.

An example of reorganization is the relocating and decommissioning of units. This process leads to a loss of experience and competence as well as the loss of organizational memory. Narcissism is shown when the reorganization goes ahead despite protests and demonstrable costs, informal staffing is common and there is the risk of ignoring employment requirements. All this is justified by the government's, politicians' and top management's glossy portrayal of the situation, which reduces confidence in the leadership. Psychologists have analyzed reorganizations as failures, inducing stress and anxiety in workers and leading to lack of pride, increased workloads and less motivation to work. Examples of reorganization in the Swedish military include the transformation of conscript service to an all-voluntary force and the creation of temporary employment contracts. Many authors are of the opinion that this weakens the foundations for recruitment and reduces attractiveness of employment in the long term.⁴³

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A failing confidence in the organization and a weak anchoring of personnel are two other factors characterizing narcissism. This was noted in a number of magazine articles about the Swedish Armed Forces which reported that confidence and trust in officers was lower than that of politicians and priests. One example of narcissism in Swedish society affecting the armed forces is on National Day celebrations in 2015 when one local authority forbade the wearing of uniforms. Stigmatization of the officers' uniforms arose out of fear that some minority groups might be alarmed at the sight of people in uniform. An indication of weak anchoring is also highlighted in veterans' complaints that their monument in Stockholm is being disrespected by visitors' litter.⁴⁴

The tough stance of the organization towards the union and workers is expressed in different ways on an individual and organizational level. For individuals, it means a lack of transparency from employers about employment law or opportunities to advance one's career, although it is not apparent whether this is the result of sloppiness or conscious error. The analysis revealed that the employer (i.e., the Swedish Armed Forces) has fought off criticism from the chief ombudsman to the degree that it is becoming a legal issue. Even when the Swedish Armed Forces are in error, for example, by paying more salary than it should have, thousands of affected employees have instead been blamed and told they "should have known better and spoken up about the error." A shift of power is occurring between the Swedish Armed Forces leadership, parliament and the government, favouring a scapegoat-seeking attitude rather than one of taking responsibility. Such a tough attitude is also characterized by unwillingness to see problems and justifying faulty decisions.⁴⁵

Discrimination and bullying. Bullying has been identified as a stressor while serving at home, but appears to increase significantly during international service. Management of such matters is also lacking to a degree. There is discrimination based on age, gender and disability.⁴⁶

Cowardly leadership. The risk of informal leadership occurring is greater under the professional army system. Most reports from the five years of data propose sharp criticism of Headquarters and its leadership. The Supreme Commander has countered such criticism by asserting that none of the governmental authorities are as stable and secure as they once were. There is much talk of soldier dropout; one reason for this is said to be bad leadership. Certain supervisors/managers are accused of not being able to take criticism and for being too touchy and delicate. A number of bad decisions

have also been highlighted that even some decision-makers have described as “nuts.” One such decision was to restructure officer training, another was to allow civilian companies to manage aspects of the Swedish Armed Forces’ activities, and that the units should aim to appear to be elite, even though they are not up to elite tasks. Another issue is advertising aimed at recruiting young people for basic military training. “Welcome to Our Reality” is the Swedish Armed Forces’ advertising slogan, which hints that they see themselves as separate from the rest of the world.⁴⁷

Organizational Anorexia in a Military Context

The following factors were identified within the framework of organizational anorexia: resource cuts; reductions, reshuffles and geographic redistribution of staff; security risks and failings as a result of cuts; and physical and psychosocial damage as a result of resource cuts.

Resource cuts are described as a chronic shortage of resources, with the analysis revealing that this mostly concerns materials. Decommissioned stores and materials that have spoiled in storage cause great cost to the organization. Materials that are old but not replaced become an issue in terms of safety. Also, uniforms and equipment for women are not sufficiently adapted, and are often delayed in their arrival. A further problem affecting the Swedish Armed Forces’ defense capabilities is increased administration and outsourcing. The recalculation of foreign service allowances has resulted in less pay and has affected motivation. Finally, the downsizing caused the minimizing of public display activities, which is seen as a step in erasing traditions and symbolic value; which in turn impacts the defense staff’s sense of work satisfaction and collegial cohesion.⁴⁸

Reduction, reshuffles and geographic redistribution of staff. Soldier dropout during basic military training is estimated at 15%. No attempt is being made to prevent it, as these prevention costs would be even greater than those invested in the actual dropout. Uncertainty in regard to employment and career opportunities is widespread. For example, the introduction of specified time contracts reduces the attractiveness of sticking with the job, as do unfulfilled promises of salary raises on changing positions. Further, there is no clear career pathway for specialists, which impacts the motivation to remain in the forces for the long term. The prevailing shortage of technically qualified staff makes the organization even more difficult to manage.⁴⁹

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Security risks and failings as a result of cuts. The Swedish Armed Forces streamlining measures threaten security in several ways. For example, a shortage of spare parts can increase the risk of serious accidents as does a reduction in training or on the number of allocated flying hours for pilots. Mold in submarines has been discovered, but budget cuts have meant that tests and monitoring are neglected until someone gets ill. Resource downsizing and safety breaches put the lives and health of staff at risk, not only in the course of performing a mission but also in daily activities.⁵⁰

Physical and psychosocial damage as a result of resource cuts. Analysis of the data has identified many consequences of resource cuts. A number of training-related work injuries have been reported, as well as infections, stress and burnout. A lack of psychosocial support makes it difficult to process distressing events and many turn to external, charitable organizations for therapy. There is a view that efforts to improve the working environment are regressing and the union is highly critical of the situation. In regard to health, neglecting to perform checks for diseases such as tuberculosis in connection with an international mission resulted in several individuals getting ill and not receiving timely medical assistance. Another example of neglect is shown when an officer who was seriously wounded at work had to pay his own medical fees.⁵¹

Organizational Greediness in a Military Context

The analysis showed organizational greediness can be expressed by various demands: relational demands, task-related demands and internal organizational demands.

Relational demands mean that relationships with friends and family are affected by work obligations. For example, for a member of the armed forces in a family relationship, it may feel like their family only has him or her “on loan” from the Swedish Armed Forces, as time with the family is limited. Family members often criticize the armed forces for taking their loved ones away on international missions for long periods of time. Military members are required to go on exercises and be away from their families for long periods of time even while they are posted in garrison, which makes things difficult for the spouses who have to take care of children and/or household responsibilities on their own.⁵²

Task-related demands are various. For example, in 2010 the Swedish Armed Forces introduced an obligation for all military personnel to participate in international military operations when necessary. This duty to perform

mission service must be fulfilled or the military member may lose their job.⁵³ This caused a major change of employment conditions for those who were already in the organization.

Internal organizational demands may cause large amounts of overtime hours and leave periods vacations that are not respected because of the requirement for staff to always be available if required. Also, we have already identified organizational anorexia as causing conditions for unmaintained and failing equipment; greediness comes in forcing staff to work with this poor equipment. In addition, increased academization of the profession has led to a requirement for staff to possess double skills sets, which was not the case previously.⁵⁴

SUMMARY

We introduced the chapter with summarizing the literature on negative organizational characteristics, anorexic, narcissistic and greedy organizations in particular examination. This was followed by an empirical content analysis of articles from the last five years of the official journal of the Swedish Officers Association. Our conclusion is that we have found evidence of all three themes; organizational anorexia features predominantly in terms of the number of articles in the data compilation; and organizational greediness and narcissism can actually be seen as a consequence of anorexia. Resource cuts coupled with increased demands and tough attitudes could be seen as a consequence of streamlining. Narcissism cannot only be attributed to the organization or its leaders, as society's relationship with the Swedish Armed Forces is highly narcissistic and greedy, which has consequences for organizational life, leadership and the workforce. Although research on negative leadership exists, one needs to consider framing factors in terms of whether they facilitate the entrenchment of negative leadership or whether they are in fact the cause of negative leadership.

NEGATIVE ORGANIZATIONS' EFFECTS ON LEADERSHIP

This section presents an integration of our three perspectives on negative organizations and how it may affect leadership. Our summary is presented below:

- The Swedish Armed Forces are one of the biggest authorities in Sweden and are subject to the Swedish parliament and the Swedish government. The government also determines the budget and what the Swedish Armed Forces is required to do.

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- The presence of organizational narcissism, anorexic organizations and greediness is not surprising. An organization such as the Swedish Armed Forces is more sensitive to political changes and has less ability to adapt to rapid societal changes. In a bureaucratic, hierarchical and slow organization, it is easier for the “dark sides” to take hold.
- The most important challenge for leaders is to balance the “dark side” of the organization and provide “damage control” for their subordinates. If they are not able to manage this challenge and pressure increases, they risk being perceived as more negative or destructive. The presence of informal processes is a possible way to manage the negative side of the organization.
- Political decisions and increased demands from society make leadership harder to exercise. One of the consequences is a more unhealthy work environment.

There is ample evidence that negative organizational forces exist that may impact on leadership. Watola, Lindsey and Reimer⁵⁵ make a similar observation and claim that resource scarcity and what we have labeled as “anorexic organizations” tend to push leaders away from individual consideration and towards transactional leadership, where followers may feel used and abused as their needs and aspirations are neglected.

Leadership is often seen as a decisive component of making an organization successful. When repeated organizational problems arise, there is a tendency to focus on trying to change the leadership in the hope of solving the problem. The definition of leadership is multifaceted⁵⁶ and polarized,⁵⁷ in that leadership is portrayed as either constructive or destructive. However, our study of organizational aspects shows that leadership should be seen in context. Leadership cannot merely be seen either as a solution for or the reason behind all individual and organizational failures. An exaggerated belief in leadership isolated from the organizational context is considered “leaderism.”⁵⁸ Similarly, an exaggerated belief in contextual factors alone could be labeled as contextual fundamentalism.

We now conclude by contrasting these two perspectives on negative leadership. The first is in line with the purposefully selective content of this chapter and states that negative leadership has its roots in negative organizational framing factors. The other perspective is related to the individual and proposes that negative leadership can be explained by negative leader traits, such

as a narcissistic and over-controlling personality. Who is right? We propose that both are wrong! Negative leadership can best be understood as a product of an interaction between individual and contextual characteristics. This means that we argue in favour of an interactional, person-by-situation perspective⁵⁹ on leadership.⁶⁰ To clarify: in extreme cases, each of the two above-mentioned perspectives may be right. In an extremely anorexic, narcissistic and greedy organization, it is quite probable that most, if not all, leaders will display similar negative leadership behaviours. On the other hand, leaders who have an extremely narcissistic personality, for instance, are likely to exhibit negative leadership even if all organizational factors are favourable.

In reality, most organizations and leaders probably fall somewhere between these two extremes. Consequently, we argue that even if the organization is fairly anorexic, narcissistic and greedy, there will be variation between different leaders because of varying individual leader characteristics. Similarly, among leaders who have a fairly narcissistic personality, there will be differences in leadership behaviours because organizational characteristics can, to a varying degree, counterbalance the impact of the leader as a person.

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CHAPTER 5

MEASURING DESTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOURS

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INTRODUCTION

Until recently, there has been a one-sided focus on the positive aspects of leadership. Leadership was seen as equivalent to “doing the right thing”. However, in the last decade, an increasing number of scholars and practitioners have started to recognize the “dark side of leadership”. The hypothesis “bad is stronger than good” has been an important mainstay in this line of research. This hypothesis proposes that negative events will tend to have a greater impact on an individual than positive events of the same type, and good can only prevail over bad by superior force of numbers.¹ For leadership, this implies that a leader can have both positive and negative qualities but the latter tend to prevail.

It is therefore important to recognize both the positive and negative aspects of leadership. The negative consequences of destructive leadership are well known. This type of leadership behaviour has been shown to be related to, for example, stress, illness, performance, and turnover, all of which can be costly for the organization.² A Norwegian study showed that over 80% of participants had been subjected to destructive leadership. Researchers have concluded that this is a widespread phenomenon that most employees will very likely experience during their working lives.³ It is therefore important that organizations have knowledge and relevant tools for discovering and measuring destructive leadership behaviours.

The aim of this chapter is to contribute a summary of the current definitions of destructive leadership, provide a description of the measurement instrument Destrudo-L and explain how it can be used, and discuss practical implications of measuring destructive leadership behaviours.

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of Swedish Defence University.

THE DEFINITION OF DESTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOURS

Scholars have proposed several definitions for destructive leadership. The definitions differ depending on their view of whether destructive leadership is volitional behaviour or not. Einarsen, Aasland and Skogstad define destructive leadership as “the systematic and repeated behaviour by a leader, supervisor or manager that violates the legitimate interest of the organization by undermining and/or sabotaging the organization’s goals, tasks, resources, and effectiveness and/or the motivation, well-being or job satisfaction of subordinates.”⁴ Their definition includes destructive leadership behaviour from two dimensions: behaviour directed towards subordinates and towards the organization. Their emphasis is on the results of the leader’s behaviour regardless if the destructive behaviour is intentional or not. If the behaviour is systematic and repeated, and the consequences are destructive for subordinates, the organization, or both, it is considered to be destructive leadership.

Schyns and Schilling’s definition of destructive leadership also stresses the results of leadership behaviour, but includes the subordinates’ perceptions of their leader’s behaviour.⁵ They define destructive leadership as “a process in which over a longer period of time the activities, experiences and/or relationships of an individual or the members of a group are repeatedly influenced by their supervisor in a way that is perceived as hostile and/or obstructive.”⁶ Similar to Einarsen et al., this definition also stresses that the behaviour is repeated over time, meaning that occasional use of destructive leadership behaviours is not considered destructive leadership.⁷ Krasikova et al.⁸ modified the definition by Einarsen et al. They look upon destructive leadership as harmful and volitional behaviour imbedded in the process of leading (thus excluding counterproductive work behaviours). They also distinguish between encouraging subordinates to pursue destructive goals and using destructive methods of influence with subordinates.

Our view of the definition of destructive leadership is in line with the definitions of Einarsen et al. and Schyns and Schilling. We find it difficult to determine if a leader’s behaviour is intentional or not. Therefore, we argue that it is better to focus on the consequences from the subordinates’ (or organization’s) perspective. It is the result of the (repeated) behaviour that counts, not the intention.⁹ This is also in line with the work of Richard Lazarus who emphasizes that “the truth lies in the eyes of the beholder.”¹⁰

Destructive leadership behaviours can be divided into active and passive forms. Active forms represent more deliberate and volitional behaviours while passive forms are regarded as behaviours leaders use when they have more or less abdicated supervisor responsibilities and duties.¹¹ One of the most vital discussions within the field of destructive leadership research concerns whether or not *laissez-faire* leadership (a form of inactive, non-leadership) should be regarded as a form of destructive leadership. Those of the opinion that it should not argue that a concept should not be defined by its consequences and that *laissez-faire* leadership is related more to ineffective behaviours than to destructive ones.¹² Others point out the severe negative consequences of passive, indirect leader behaviours, concluding that behaviours resulting in these consequences must be considered a form of destructive leadership.¹³ For example, research shows that passive destructive leadership behaviours (compared to active behaviours) have a stronger correlation with employee job satisfaction, efficiency, workplace stressors, emotional exhaustion and bullying in workplaces.¹⁴ One hypothesis is that stress and a heavy workload can be conducive to leaders using passive destructive leadership behaviours since they do not have time to be clear and structured or to take an active part in subordinates' work.¹⁵

Laissez-faire leadership has previously been regarded mostly as non-leadership but recently Skogstad, Hetland, Glaø, and Einarsen stated that *laissez-faire* leadership can be defined as a follower-centred form of avoidance-based leadership. Hence it can be perceived as a volitional and active avoidance of subordinates when they are in need of leadership and support.¹⁶ The Norwegian study mentioned above showed that the most common destructive leadership behaviour was *laissez-faire*, which was experienced by more than 20 per cent of the participants.¹⁷ We view *laissez-faire* as a destructive leadership behaviour, in line with the definition of Skogstad et al.

DESTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOURS

There are several different leadership models that describe negative leadership. The most known are probably destructive leadership,¹⁸ petty tyranny¹⁹ and abusive supervision.²⁰ In the Destructive Leadership Model developed by Einarsen, Aasland and Skogstad, both active and passive forms are included. Their model describes four destructive leadership types:²¹

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1. **Tyrannical leadership** (active). This behaviour is mostly directed towards subordinates and not towards the organization's goals. A tyrannical leader may behave favourably towards higher leaders and colleagues but typical behaviours directed towards subordinates include humiliation, belittling, and manipulation in order to "get the job done."
2. **Derailed leadership** (active). The derailed leader's behaviours are directed both toward subordinates and the organization. The behaviours are characterized by, for example, bullying, humiliation, deception, absenteeism, and fraud.
3. **Supportive-disloyal leadership** (active). This destructive leader type shows consideration for the subordinates but in a way that violates the legitimate interest of the organization. This includes behaviours such as stealing resources, allowing unreasonable benefits or encouraging loafing or misconduct.
4. **Laissez-faire leadership** (passive). The authors use the well-established term *laissez-faire* for the passive destructive leadership type. This implies that the leader has abdicated leadership assignments and duties. This leadership type includes behaviours such as avoiding decision-making and not engaging with subordinates even when it is necessary.

In Tepper's²² Abusive Supervision and Ashford's²³ Petty Tyranny, all of the behaviours are considered active forms of destructive leadership. Tepper defines Abusive Supervision as "subordinates' perceptions of the extent to which supervisors engage in the sustained display of hostile verbal and non-verbal behaviours, excluding physical contact." Abusive Supervision includes behaviours such as ridiculing subordinates, rudeness, and expressing anger at subordinates even if the anger is caused by someone/something else. Petty Tyranny is defined as "an individual who lords his/her power over others."²⁴ This includes behaviours like arbitrariness, self-aggrandizement, belittling, and non-contingent punishment.

THE DESTRUDO-L: A MEASUREMENT INSTRUMENT

Discussing one's own destructive leadership behaviours during leadership courses or leadership development activities can sometimes be difficult. To be able to have a genuine discussion, a leader who is open to change and recognizes his or her own shortcomings is required. In our first

attempts to educate military personnel within the Swedish armed forces on destructive leadership, we sometimes met resistance, denial and excuses explaining why their leader behaviours were necessary, and even anticipated by the subordinates. The idea of developing a measurement instrument was born. The aim was to develop an instrument that would be easy to use and psychometrically sound. It would be used in leader development courses as a means of making leaders' destructive leadership behaviour more salient and accessible to discussion.

Destrudo-L (the L stands for Leadership) is an instrument designed to measure destructive leadership behaviours in a military context. The instrument was developed in the following manner. First, a literature review on negative leadership was conducted. Behaviours that were suggested as being destructive/negative were selected. Complementary to this, about 500 Swedish conscripts serving at a logistics regiment were asked to write down some examples of bad military leadership that they had experienced. The behaviours were compared to the ones found in the literature review and a qualitative clustering procedure identified 43 behaviours.

Next, a pilot study with conscript soldiers was conducted and exploratory factor analyses reduced the 43 items to 20.²⁵ Questionnaire responses were obtained from three Swedish military groups (conscripts, non-commissioned officers, majors) and a dimensional analysis of the 20 items was performed using structural equation modelling (SEM). A nested hierarchical model with a general factor and five specific factors emerged. The final instrument consists of five different factors each consisting of four items (see Table 5.1). The first three factors are considered active forms of destructive leadership and the last two are considered passive ones. All scales had significant *t*-values and exhibited satisfactory internal consistency, and all items but four had acceptable reliability. Overall, the factors of the Destrudo-L instrument also correspond well with existing models on negative leadership, suggesting good face validity. The only exception is that none of the factors in Destrudo-L corresponds to supportive-disloyal leadership.²⁶ This may be related to the military context from which our sample was obtained. Officers may have no need or wish to be "pals" with the conscripts.²⁷

Personality traits are assumed to underlie some destructive leadership behaviours (e.g., psychopathy, narcissism and Machiavellianism.)²⁸ However, the Destrudo-L instrument does not measure or account for these types of traits. The instrument measures leadership behaviours regardless of their antecedents.

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Factor	Items
Arrogant, unfair	Makes subordinates feel stupid Behaves arrogantly Treats people differently Is unpleasant
Threats, Punishments, Overdemands	Shows violent tendencies Punishes subordinates who make mistakes and/or do not reach goals Uses threats to get his/her way Makes unreasonable demands
Ego-oriented, False	Takes the credit for subordinates' work Puts own goals ahead of the group's Does not trust his/her subordinates Does not keep promises
Passive, Cowardly	Does not dare to confront others Does not show up among subordinates Does not show an active interest Does not take a grip on things
Uncertain, Unclear, Messy	Shows insecurity in his/her role Is bad at structuring and planning Gives unclear instructions Behaves confused

Table 5.1: Factors and Items of the Measurement Instrument Destrudo-L

USAGE OF THE DESTRUDO-L

Each item in the Destrudo-L questionnaire begins with “I experience that my superior/commander...” The scale ranges from 1 (never or almost never) to 6 (very often or always). Subordinates estimate the frequency of their leader’s behaviours in the questionnaire. It is recommended that at least six subordinates participate so that none of the subordinates feel identified which could lead to more flattering ratings (response set tendencies) which in turn affects reliability. The mean value for each of the factors is then calculated.

When using the instrument for leader development, we recommend that the Destrudo-L be used simultaneously with an instrument measuring constructive leadership behaviours. We usually use the Developmental Leadership Questionnaire (DLQ).²⁹ The DLQ measures the developmental leadership model,³⁰ which is a Scandinavian adaptation of the transformational leadership model. It is important to measure both constructive and destructive leadership behaviours because the relationship between a leader and his/her subordinates is characterized by both positive and negative influences. Therefore, both need to be taken into account in order to gain as complete a picture as possible of the leader's behaviours. For example, using both the Destrudo-L and DLQ, we were able to explain 69% of the variance regarding trust in the immediate supervisor.³¹

In our experience, the mean values for the different Destrudo-L factors are usually fairly low. For example, in a group of all-volunteer soldiers ($N = 300$), estimating their immediate supervisors' destructive leadership behaviours, soldiers rated their supervisors highest on the Arrogant, Unfair factor ($M = 2.04$, $SD = 0.85$) and lowest on the Threats, Punishments, Overdemands factor ($M = 1.59$, $SD = 0.69$). Studying if destructive or constructive leadership behaviours are the best predictors of follower work outcomes, data was gathered from military personnel in Estonia, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland. This multinational sample consisted of soldiers, Non-Commissioned Officers, cadets and officers ranging in rank from lieutenant to colonel, who rated their supervisors' destructive leadership behaviours.

Raters once again reserved their highest ratings for the Arrogant, Unfair factor ($M = 2.31$, $SD = 1.02$) and their lowest for the Threats, Punishments, Overdemands factor ($M = 1.99$, $SD = 0.86$). These results are in line with other studies that show that the mean value for the five different Destrudo-L factors is generally approximately 2. We would like to point out that low ratings were expected. If the ratings were much higher, it would indicate the Swedish Armed Forces had failed in their selection and recruitment procedures. Considering the hypothesis "Bad is stronger than good," a mean value around 2 should still be considered when using the measurement instrument in leadership development. The behaviours in the Destrudo-L are regarded as destructive in all types of situations and should not occur at all, as compared with transactional leadership that can be functional in some situations but not in others. Even an estimated value of 2 indicates that this is a behaviour that needs to be taken into consideration so it does not take over the subordinates' appraisal of the leader.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF MEASURING DESTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP BEHAVIOURS

INTERPRETING THE RESULTS

As described above, the destructive leadership analysis results should be interpreted in relation to results from an instrument measuring constructive leadership behaviours. If only the negative aspects are evaluated, the leader's perceptions of his/her abilities and confidence could be damaged. By comparing positive and negative results, leaders can gain new insights of their strengths and weaknesses and realize that they have both positive and negative qualities in their leadership style. For example, the leader can have high ratings on transformational leadership and be viewed as inspirational and motivational by his/her subordinates. However, the leader may simultaneously score highly on passive forms of destructive leadership.

The Destrudo-L is not intended to be used for self-rating but it can be used as a tool for self-reflection. For example, questions that can be used as a basis for self-reflection could include:

- Are some behaviours more prominent during particular situations, for example under stress? A leader can behave aggressively or passively due to lack of stress management ability. The behaviour becomes more pronounced under stress and in contrast to calmer situations.
- Do I have any “blind spots” (i.e., leadership behaviours that the leader perceives differently from how their subordinates perceive them)? For example, an individual can regard himself/herself as a trustful leader who delegates responsibilities. However, the subordinates may not perceive the leader as actively delegating responsibilities, but as a passive leader who does not show an active interest or who has a grip on things.

BENEFITS

The goal of using the Destrudo-L is for the leader to gain greater self-insight and to provide the leader with an opportunity to reduce destructive behaviours that he/she may not have been aware. However, using the Destrudo-L to measure destructive leadership behaviours can be a delicate subject for some leaders. A certain amount of self-awareness and maturity is required if a leader is to gain insights from Destrudo-L results. We propose that the

leader interpret the results together with an individual (such as a coach) with knowledge of the instrument and of destructive leadership theory. If the leader receives high ratings on the Destrudo-L, it is important to help the leader see the whole picture and help him/her to find appropriate tools for minimizing these behaviours. By interpreting the results together with someone else, the individual has a sounding board who can redirect the leader into discussing proper strategies if he/she tends to go into denial or make excuses. It is important to point out that the leader should consider the benefits of receiving feedback on his/her behaviour and embrace the opportunity to change these behaviours. Again, we propose it is crucial that the Destrudo-L is used simultaneously with an instrument measuring constructive leadership behaviours so the leader might be able to see that he/she has other qualities that their subordinates consider positive.

It is important that organizations have a respectful and humble view of destructive leadership. “Bad” leaders do not lack good qualities and they may therefore develop into constructive leaders given the opportunity. For best results, the term Destructive Leadership should be played down and talked about in terms of development and self-awareness and be part of a continuous leader development plan.

CONCLUSION

Destructive leaders cause negative consequences for subordinates in terms of impaired health, job satisfaction and willingness to continue their employment. By identifying which leaders use destructive leadership behaviours, the organization can support them by helping them develop more constructive behaviours. If the leader is not responsive to change, the leader can be transferred to another post or released from the organization. Research shows that subordinates of destructive leaders generally have a more negative view of the organization as a whole. The destructive behaviours can be perceived as sanctioned by upper management which influences the subordinates’ view of the whole organization. If the organization fails to manage destructive leaders, other leaders in the organization may imitate their behaviour.³² In conclusion, organizations have a lot to gain by developing systems for identifying leaders with destructive leadership behaviours and planning actions for changing these behaviours into more constructive ones.

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CHAPTER 6

PERSONALITY AND DESTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP: POTENTIAL FOR SELECTION

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INTRODUCTION

It is well-established that leadership is determined by person and situational factors.¹ Studies aimed at identifying person factors have examined personality or ability correlates,² whereas those focused on situational factors have looked at job demands or leader-member exchange.³ This chapter, focuses on identifying personality predictors or correlates of destructive leadership. Determining these predictors is especially important in a military context. The requirement for effective leadership has often been seen as critical in the military,⁴ given the nature of the work and the potential consequences of error. While this has long spurred researchers to investigate the personality attributes that make up the *ideal* leader, in the past these examinations often centred on positive personality traits with an eye to determining how one might select for, or develop, good leaders. However, there has been a growing recognition that a more holistic approach must be taken when designing or evaluating leader selection and development programs.⁵ Specifically, the dark or destructive aspects of leadership must also be considered, as a leader's disposition can influence destructive leadership behaviours.

Military leadership has historically relied on an authoritarian leadership style: the leader ordered and the follower obeyed or suffered the consequences of sanctions.⁶ Indeed, this type of leadership style was seen as a necessary component of military life, due to the hierarchical structure of the military which demanded unquestioning obedience from followers.⁷ While this type of obedience was once perceived as necessary due to the minimal training provided to soldiers (i.e., it was seen as necessary for their safety), this is no longer the case in many militaries. The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), for example, no longer supports the use of an authoritarian leadership style. While the CAF recognizes that directive behaviours (e.g., telling

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Canadian Armed Forces or the Department of National Defence.

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subordinates what to do, and possibly when, how, and to what standard) may be required in particular situations, such as during basic military training or in dangerous combat situations, there has been a concerted effort to move from authoritarian leadership behaviours, which can be perceived as abusive⁸ and are generally less accepted by subordinates,⁹ to a more transformational approach of influencing followers, with the understanding that supportive, facilitative, and participative influence behaviours are the hallmarks of effective leaders.¹⁰ This move away from negative leadership behaviours toward more positive influence behaviours is likewise echoed in other militaries. For example, the United States (US) Army is currently interested in weeding out toxic leaders from command positions within their units,¹¹ as they recognize the important role that leaders play in building a workplace free from abuse, harassment, and incivility.

This understanding of the importance of the leader's role in shaping climate and morale within a unit, and the desire to prevent abusive behaviour in all its forms, can be seen in the programs and policies that impact the socialization programs of many modern militaries. In the CAF, for example, one such program is the Defence Ethics Program (DEP). This comprehensive, values-based program views the military ethos, which "acts as the centre of gravity for the military profession, and establishes an ethical framework for the professional conduct of military operations,"¹² as the core of the effective leader. The military ethos is the foundation upon which the reputation and honour of the CAF rests, and is made up of three fundamental components: beliefs and expectations about military service,¹³ Canadian values, and CAF military values.¹⁴ As destructive leadership would be seen to be in direct contradiction to fundamental CAF military values, the identification of personality predictors or correlates of negative leadership would be especially important in the context of screening and selection, and have numerous implications for the socialization of new members.

Examinations of personality and leadership date back to the early 1900s.¹⁵ Focused initially on identifying traits associated with leaders and non-leaders, studies have since explored personality in relation to numerous criteria such as leadership emergence and effectiveness,¹⁶ and various types of leadership styles, such as transformational¹⁷ and ethical leadership.¹⁸ The importance of personality to an understanding of leadership is reflected in Chen and Zaccaro's literature review, in which they concluded that personality has significant influences on leadership even after controlling for non-personality factors.¹⁹

In another review of the leadership literature, Avolio, Sosik, and Berson *noted* a rising interest in personality traits associated with "bad leadership."²⁰

They briefly reviewed a few studies exploring the bright (i.e., positive traits such as self-confidence) and dark (i.e., maladaptive traits such as narcissism) sides of personality in relation to leadership, adding that there have been few attempts to organize these various traits in a meaningful or coherent manner. Judge, Piccolo, and Kosalka's review may represent one of these few attempts; however, their goal was to highlight the paradoxical effects of bright and dark traits in relation to general leadership effectiveness.²¹ They also drew attention to the fact that there have been relatively few empirical examinations of dark personality traits in relation to leadership. In this chapter, we hope to address these gaps by proposing the elements of moral character as the basis for understanding destructive leadership, and organizing our review of bright and dark personality predictors or correlates of destructive leadership around these elements.

BRIGHT AND DARK PERSONALITY FACETS

Accumulated evidence shows that personality facets or narrower traits have higher criterion-related validity compared to broader personality factors.²² In this section, we focus on the identification of personality facets or traits because it facilitates a better articulation of the conceptual links we make in this chapter between personality, elements of moral character, and destructive leadership.²³ We refer to bright personality facets as those that have typically been examined within the Five Factor Model (FFM) of personality, comprising Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Openness to Experience, and Emotional Stability. Also referred to as normal personality traits, a recent review of evidence for the construct and criterion-related validity of facets within the FFM suggests that there are approximately 15 such facets.²⁴ Dark personality facets, on the other hand, have typically been examined within the abnormal personality arena. However, Paulhus and Williams' work on the Dark Triad (DT), comprising Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathology, facilitated the measurement and examination of sub-clinical dark traits in relation to work behaviour.²⁵

Recent revisions to the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)* have further facilitated an understanding of a range of dark traits and their possible influence in the workplace.²⁶ Briefly, there are five main maladaptive personality factors or constructs in the DSM: Negative Emotionality (negative emotions such as anxiety, guilt, worry), Detachment (withdrawal from interpersonal relationships, restricted affective expression), Antagonism (exaggerated self-importance, hostility towards others), Disinhibition (lack of consideration for learning from the past or future

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consequences of one's behaviour), and Psychoticism (unusual perceptions and beliefs). Each maladaptive factor has between three and seven facets or traits as measured by the Personality Inventory for the DSM-5 (PID).²⁷ These maladaptive facets will be introduced and defined, whenever pertinent, in later sections of this chapter. Paulhus and Williams' DT maps onto facets represented within two maladaptive personality factors: Antagonism and Disinhibition.²⁸ Dilchert, Ones, and Krueger mapped the maladaptive factors onto the FFM, explaining that they reflected the extreme poles of the FFM construct range.²⁹ For example, they illustrated Negative Emotionality as the extreme low end of Emotional Stability, Detachment as the extreme low of Extraversion, Antagonism as the extreme low of Agreeableness, Disinhibition as the extreme low of Conscientiousness, and Psychoticism as the extreme high of Openness to Experience. Wille and De Fruyt also reviewed evidence suggesting that normal and maladaptive personality traits can be viewed within the same FFM umbrella.³⁰

DESTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP

The dark side of leadership is often referred to by terms such as toxic leadership, petty tyranny, abusive supervision, despotic leadership, or destructive leadership. Although some reviews of the literature have attempted to set one term apart from the others,³¹ other reviews have suggested that it might be limiting to do so. For example, Krasikova, Green, and LeBreton's review concluded that each of these terms reflect only aspects of the dark side of leadership, and fail to provide a complete picture of this construct.³² In their attempt to integrate the varied terminology, they adopted the term "destructive leadership," rationalizing their choice by its increasing use in published literature and at professional conferences. Krasikova et al. further clarified destructive leadership as having three defining features:³³ leading or influencing behaviours that are harmful to the organization and/or subordinates; behaviours or actions that go against organizational norms or interests; and behaviours or actions that are volitional in nature (i.e., they result from a leader's choice to act in a certain way, and not due to lack of ability). These features certainly help distinguish destructive leadership from other related constructs such as counterproductive work behaviour (CWB) or workplace aggression, which are also destructive but do not necessarily involve leading or influencing behaviours. Krasikova et al. deliberately excluded unethical leadership from their review,³⁴ based on the argument that unethical leadership is judged through a moral lens, whereas the assessment of destructive leadership uses the organization and organizational members as key points of reference. They added, however, that drawing connections between these

fields would offer interesting directions for future research. In this chapter, we do exactly that.

DESTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP AND MORALITY

Morality is often discussed in relation to ethical leadership; ethical leaders are described as moral people or moral managers.³⁵ Although the literature has not explicitly described destructive leadership in these terms, the moral implications of such behaviours are clear.³⁶ Based on the definition of *moral* as concerned “with the distinction between right and wrong,”³⁷ it is easy to make this connection. In other words, it would be rather difficult not to regard leaders who choose to lead and influence in a manner that is harmful and against the legitimate interests of the organization, by definition destructive,³⁸ as having done something wrong. Indeed, Detert, Treviño, Burris, and Andiappan explained subordinates’ counterproductivity as reflecting *moral outrage* against abusive supervision.³⁹ Deficient moral reasoning has also been consistently implicated and empirically linked as an antecedent to delinquent or deviant behaviour in general. For example, Dilchert, Ones, Davis, and Rostow proposed moral reasoning as a mediator between general intelligence and CWB.⁴⁰ In a multi-level model of CWB, O’Boyle, Forsyth, and O’Boyle also proposed moral judgement and moral reasoning as antecedents that influence one’s affective and cognitive processes, which in turn influence CWB.⁴¹ In an examination of workplace aggression, Spector, Fox, and Domagalski suggested that anger interferes with moral reasoning, a higher-level cognitive process.⁴²

We propose that morality is as important to an understanding of destructive leadership as it is to (un)ethical leadership. Indirect evidence for this link comes from strong negative associations between various forms of destructive leadership and ethical leadership. For example, De Hoogh and Hartog reported a correlation of $-.54$ between despotic leadership and ethical leadership, referred to as morality or fairness leadership in their study.⁴³ The correlation between ethical leadership and abusive supervision was also high in Detert et al.’s examination ($r = -.51$)⁴⁴ and in Brown, Treviño and Harrison’s study ($r = -.61$).⁴⁵ Ng and Feldman’s meta-analysis also reported a corrected correlation of $-.49$ between ethical leadership and destructive leadership.⁴⁶ These strong associations suggest overlapping or shared variance between (un)ethical leadership and destructive leadership which could stem from a number of measurement or substantive factors. We propose morality to be an important substantive base underlying destructive leadership. Consequently, we believe that a consideration of the elements of moral character can inform the identification of the traits or characteristics of a destructive leader.

LINKING MORALITY, PERSONALITY, AND DESTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP

In the remainder of this chapter, we introduce Hogan's elements of moral character, integrating his descriptions with a more recent discussion on the topic, to identify bright and dark personality correlates relevant to each element.⁴⁷ We also review the literature for evidence to support the relevance of these personality traits to destructive leadership. Our objective is to identify personality correlates of the destructive leader. However, given the limited number of empirical examinations on predictors of this leadership form (Tepper, 2007; Kant, Skogstad, Torsheim, & Einarsen, 2013),⁴⁸ we draw upon findings of related constructs as they pertain to the element of moral character under consideration. The key outcome of interest in our review is destructive leadership forms (whether labelled abusive, tyrannical, despotic, toxic, etc.). Our review is limited by the operationalization of destructive leadership in empirical examinations, the majority of which have assessed employee ratings or perceptions of a particular form of destructive leadership. Finally, we deliberately exclude findings pertaining to (un)ethical leadership, because of the conceptual link we are trying to establish between morality and destructive leadership.

ELEMENTS OF MORAL CHARACTER

In identifying personality correlates of maladaptive behaviour, Harms, Spain, and Wood called for an understanding of the psychological underpinnings (i.e., motives, perceptions, abilities) of such behaviour.⁴⁹ Jonason, Wee, and Li similarly emphasized the need to adopt an evolutionary perspective, one that draws upon theoretical concepts in an effort to understand the motivation behind a particular behaviour.⁵⁰ Consequently, in identifying personality correlates of destructive behaviour, we draw upon Hogan's (1973) paper on moral character in which morality is assumed to be an "adaptive response to evolutionary pressures."⁵¹ Hogan described moral behaviour as actions that are carried out in accordance with a certain set of rules of conduct in a given social context. Whether or not a person adheres to these rules depends to some degree on their underlying motives and disposition, which Hogan referred to as moral character.⁵² By extension, we regard the elements of moral character as the basis for leadership behaviours that are harmful and defy organizational norms or interests (i.e., rules).

Hogan identified five elements (knowledge of rules, socialization, empathy, ethics of conscience and responsibility, autonomy) thought to be "abstract

dimensions of individual differences” that help explain moral behaviour.⁵³ In a more recent effort to understand the concept of moral character, Cohen and Morse, and Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse, and Kim described moral character as a set of individual differences that prompt an individual to feel, think, or act in an unethical or ethical manner.⁵⁴ They developed a tripartite model of moral character comprising the elements of motivation (i.e., consideration of others), ability (i.e., self-regulation), and identity (i.e., moral identity) thought to guide moral conduct. In describing each of Hogan’s elements, we also consider the relevance of the tripartite model to each element.

KNOWLEDGE OF RULES

Hogan explained the first element, knowledge of rules of moral conduct, as being absolutely essential to moral behaviour because individuals can only follow rules if they are aware of them. He further suggested that such knowledge pertains to whether a person can accurately describe the number or nature of such rules. Hence, this element reflects cognition, suggesting that cognitive ability rather than personality correlates might be more directly relevant to this element. Not surprisingly, general cognitive ability has been linked to CWBs; Dilchert et al. found that those with higher intelligence scores were less likely to engage in CWBs ($r = -.33$).⁵⁵ None of the three dispositional elements in the tripartite model of moral character are pertinent to this element, thus given that our focus is on personality, we move on to the next element.

SOCIALIZATION/INTERNALIZATION OF RULES

Hogan’s second element, socialization, is concerned with an internalization of the rules of moral conduct. In other words, individuals are not only aware of the rules, but accept and use them to guide their behaviour. He also includes the willingness to follow rules in his discussion of socialization; someone who is unwilling to follow rules will likely not internalize them. Of the three dispositional elements in the tripartite model of moral character, moral identity is most relevant to Hogan’s concept of socialization, because it refers to viewing morality as central to one’s sense of self. Individuals with a strong moral identity are deeply concerned with being moral, suggesting that they would be most likely to internalize rules of moral conduct.

In reviewing developmental antecedents of socialization, Hogan identified warmth as being especially important. As described in Cohen et al., Aquino and Reed’s measure of moral identity also refers to characteristics such as

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“caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, and kind.”⁵⁶ In linking these to the FFM, it appears that facets of compassion (Agreeableness) and dependability (Conscientiousness) might be most relevant. Compassion, which is described by adjectives such as trusting, soft-hearted, generous, kind, warm, friendly, and sympathetic,⁵⁷ maps well onto that of warmth identified by Hogan,⁵⁸ and onto the characteristics contained in Aquino and Reed’s measure of moral identity.⁵⁹ In addition, dependability, which refers to being respectful of laws, authority and regulations, and compliant with rules, customs, and expectations, is especially relevant to one’s willingness to follow rules,⁶⁰ and is identified by Hogan as an important determinant of the element of moral conduct. Given Aquino and Reed’s inclusion of “hardworking” in their measure of moral identity,⁶¹ the conscientiousness facet of achievement might also be relevant as it pertains to working hard, being efficient, and adopting high standards in goal accomplishment.⁶² As for the dark or maladaptive traits, irresponsibility (a facet of Disinhibition) might be most relevant because it concerns a lack of respect for agreements and a failure to follow obligations.⁶³

Relevance to destructive leadership. Although there is plenty of empirical evidence for negative associations between CWBs and the personality facets of compassion, dependability, and achievement,⁶⁴ there is little or no published empirical research examining these facets in relation to destructive leadership. Nevertheless, such links are plausible through other related constructs. For example, Collins and Schmidt examined several personality dimensions from the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) in relation to white collar crime.⁶⁵ White collar crime could possibly fit Krasikova et al.’s definition of destructive leadership if the perpetrator used influence or leadership behaviours in committing the crime (e.g., directing subordinates to change bookkeeping numbers).⁶⁶ Of the CPI dimensions, socialization is most relevant to Hogan’s socialization/internalization of rules, because it pertains to the ready acceptance of rules and conformance to authority.⁶⁷ Collins and Schmidt found socialization to most strongly discriminate between white collar offenders and non-offenders ($r = .45$).⁶⁸

In discussing the hierarchical abuse of managerial power (e.g., imposing demands for illegal cooperation or exacting personal service from subordinates), Vrendenburgh and Brender identified low levels of caring for people as an antecedent.⁶⁹ Empirically, Brown et al. reported strong negative associations between abusive supervision and affective trust ($r = -.66$) which reflects the extent to which genuine care and concern are expressed in interpersonal relationships.⁷⁰ Abusive leaders were also found to be low in consideration

($r = -.72$), suggesting that such leaders are less likely to be friendly, approachable, or to treat members of their group fairly.⁷¹ Taylor found abusive supervision to be negatively related ($r = -.26$) to a personality facet labelled prudence measured by the Hogan Personality Inventory;⁷² prudence is thought to be similar to dependability (Conscientiousness) in that it refers to individuals who are conforming and dependable.⁷³ Together, these findings suggest that it is not unreasonable to expect that leaders who score high on compassion, dependability, and achievement, and low on irresponsibility to be more likely to internalize and accept the rules and interests of their organization as their own, and therefore have a lower likelihood of engaging in destructive leadership behaviour.

EMPATHY

Hogan's third element of moral character, empathy, refers to a consideration of the implications of one's actions on the welfare of others. Hence, one may refrain from going against organizational norms or interests because one is sensitive to others' expectations. This element is represented as motivation in Cohen and Morse's tripartite model of moral character. Specifically, it is explained as a "consideration of others' wants and needs, and how one's actions affect other people."⁷⁴ These authors further *notes* that it is this consideration that motivates individuals to respect certain rules (e.g., treat others fairly). In identifying developmental antecedents of empathy, Hogan used the term "role taking" to describe someone who can adopt different perspectives with respect to an issue. Interestingly, he reported that scores on empathy scales were quite strongly correlated with intelligence scores, which he attributed largely to the spatial reasoning component of intelligence tests (which requires shifting perspectives).

In an empirical examination of moral character, the motivation element was operationalized as empathic concern and perspective taking.⁷⁵ With respect to maladaptive personality correlates of these elements, manipulativeness (defined by influence or control of others to achieve one's ends), deceitfulness (defined by fraudulence, dishonesty, or fabrication), and callousness (defined by a lack of guilt or remorse for the effect of one's actions on others)⁷⁶ are most relevant because their definitions suggest that individuals high on these traits are less likely to consider how other people might be affected by their actions. These traits are represented under Antagonism in the DSM factor structure, but are also reflected in Paulhus and William's DT trait, Machiavellianism.⁷⁷ Machiavellians are more likely to manipulate others, lack empathy, and take pleasure in deceiving others.⁷⁸ In other words, they are less likely to

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take into consideration the perspective of others. Of the FFM facets, compassion (Agreeableness) is relevant to this element as well, because it captures one's social responsiveness or tendency to behave in a way that is intended to benefit others.⁷⁹

Relevance to destructive leadership. In discussing the socialization element, we already established a link between compassion and destructive behaviour. In this section, we review evidence linking destructive leadership to the maladaptive personality facets of manipulateness, deceitfulness, and callousness (i.e., facets proposed as relevant to the element of empathy). Of these, manipulateness, an aspect of Machiavellianism, has received the most attention. For example, Kiazad, Restubog, Zagenczyk, Kiewitz, and Tang examined the relationship between supervisor Machiavellianism and subordinate perceptions of abusive supervision and found a positive relationship between the two ($r = .34$ and $r = .16$, across two samples).⁸⁰ Machiavellianism was also related to authoritarian leadership ($r = .36$ and $r = .18$ across two samples), a form of leadership that exerts control over subordinates and demands absolute obedience.⁸¹ Authoritarian leadership has also been shown to be associated with abusive supervision ($r = .38$).⁸²

Krasikova explained destructive leadership as a reaction to goal blockage.⁸³ She explained that leaders who are unable to achieve certain goals will resort to the use of harmful actions to attain them. She further hypothesized that manipulateness, an aspect of Machiavellianism, can perpetuate a destructive leader's reactions to goal blockage. She found manipulateness to be related to the pursuit of a destructive leader's goals and actions ($.39 \leq r \leq .58$). Other evidence comes from Adams' examination of a leader's need for power and a set of dark traits reflecting *mov(ing) against people*⁸⁴ as assessed by the Hogan Development Survey (HDS). He found that a trait labelled *mischievous* was one of two traits in that set that was most strongly related to the need for power. Mischievous is relevant to manipulateness because those scoring high on mischievous tend to use charm to manipulate others and feel little remorse in doing so.⁸⁵ A high need for power has been theorized to be related to the hierarchical abuse of power.⁸⁶ Overall, it is not unreasonable to expect the proposed maladaptive traits of manipulateness, deceitfulness, and callousness to be relevant to destructive leadership, because they render such individuals as having little concern for others' interests.

ETHICS OF CONSCIENCE AND OF RESPONSIBILITY

Ethics of conscience and of responsibility is the fourth element identified in Hogan's description of moral character. At the heart of this element is the extent to which individuals endorse laws and procedures as having instrumental value. Hogan explained that those with an ethic of conscience tend to believe that humans are naturally good and that institutional laws or procedures are unjust. On the other hand, those with an ethic of responsibility are skeptical about the motives of others, and believe that laws or procedures are instrumental in ensuring that people behave well. He further suggested that morally mature individuals would likely cluster in the centre of this dimension (i.e., endorse the instrumental value of laws and procedures).

In relation to Cohen and Morse's model, this element is argued to be relevant to ability (i.e., self-regulation).⁸⁷ As its name suggests, self-regulation comprises traits related to the regulation of one's behaviour, particularly the tendency to consider the consequences of one's actions before acting. In other words, this element is concerned with behaviour control. Even if one endorses laws or procedures as having instrumental value, applying these laws to control one's behaviour is dependent on self-regulation or self-control.

Of the FFM traits, the Conscientiousness facets of dependability and cautiousness are most relevant. The former is concerned with respecting and complying with laws or regulations, whereas the latter is concerned with considering the consequences or risks of one's actions before acting.⁸⁸ In addition, the compliance facet of Agreeableness (i.e., being compliant and withholding the urge to speak or act in response to negative emotions), which reflects the underlying motivational base concerned with effortful regulation of emotions,⁸⁹ might also be relevant to this element of moral character. Among the maladaptive traits, risk taking and impulsivity (represented under Disinhibition) are most relevant because they are concerned with acting "on the spur of the moment" or "without regard to consequences."⁹⁰

Relevance to destructive leadership. The personality facets that are relevant to the element of ethics of conscience or responsibility have to do with self-regulation. In an examination of abusive supervision from a self-control perspective, Yam, Fehr, Keng-Highberger, Klotz, and Reynolds used ego-depletion theory to explain abusive supervision; the depletion of leaders' self-control resources prompt them to lead in a destructive manner.⁹¹ In this examination, trait self-control, which was defined as one's ability to override inner impulses or interrupt certain undesired tendencies, was hypothesized to be a moderating influence that mitigated the depletion of leader

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self-control resources resulting from demanding aspects of a job or role, which in turn lowered leader engagement in abusive behaviour. Trait self-control also had a moderate negative association with abusive supervision ($r = -.28$), further supporting its relevance to destructive leader behaviour.

The personality facet of compliance (Agreeableness) has not been examined in relation destructive leadership, but is likely influential because it can curb a destructive leader's urge to respond to negative emotions. For example, in a student sample, Reid found moderate-to-strong correlations between the Agreeableness compliance facet and trait anger ($r = -.57$), propensity to react angrily ($r = -.35$), and an individual's attempt to control the expression of anger ($r = .42$).⁹² Kant et al. hypothesized trait anger to be predictive of petty tyranny, another label used to refer to destructive leaders.⁹³ They explained that trait anger predisposes a leader to perceive varying situations as frustrating and annoying, elevating state anger levels, which prompts destructive leader behaviours. However, low associations have been found between trait anger and both petty tyranny ($r = .15$)⁹⁴ and abusive supervision ($r = .10$),⁹⁵ providing tentative support for Reid's view that some people who are predisposed to be angry can act or behave with minimal dysfunction.⁹⁶ Perhaps, such individuals are also predisposed to intentionally control their urge to act out in destructive ways because of the Agreeableness facet compliance.

With respect to the other proposed facets (i.e., cautiousness, impulsivity, and risk taking), indirect evidence for their link to destructive leadership comes from Vrendenburgh and Brender's model of leaders' abusive exercise of power in which risk taking propensity is identified as an influential attribute of the powerholder.⁹⁷ The lack of deliberation (reflecting impulsivity) was also found to be moderately positively related to danger seeking in a sample of Swedish soldiers.⁹⁸ In another military sample, recruits with high levels of impulsivity were found to be at an increased risk of suspension from military training.⁹⁹ Although risk taking and its correlates have been examined in relation to occupational safety,¹⁰⁰ there are little or no direct examinations of these in relation to destructive leadership behaviour.

One early examination by Mulder compared the personality characteristics of a group of violators (which could have possibly included supervisors or leaders) of formal company rules or policies against a group of non-violators.¹⁰¹ Violators were found to score significantly lower on the personality attribute labelled cautiousness compared to non-violators. Kaiser, LeBreton, and Hogan found the HDS' cautious scale, which measures reluctance in taking risks, had a small but significant negative correlation with the forceful dimension of their measure of ineffective leadership ($r = -.15$);¹⁰²

although the forceful dimension is not regarded as destructive leadership, in its extreme form (e.g., emotional eruptions, yelling),¹⁰³ it could be regarded as such.

AUTONOMY

Hogan described the last element of moral character, autonomy, as reflecting an individual with an autonomous will and personal sense of duty to be moral. He further described an autonomous person as having what it takes to refuse to comply with rules or standards that are immoral or unethical. Drawing upon the limited empirical work on autonomy at the time, Hogan further suggested that autonomous people are strong, forceful, and not easily affected by others in the choice or achievement of their goals. Interestingly, Hogan regarded autonomy as problematic, explaining that a person who scores high on autonomy but does not possess the other elements (i.e., has not internalized the rules of moral conduct, or is not empathic) can be domineering and anti-conforming. Hence, he suggested that autonomy must be considered in conjunction with the other elements when understanding moral character.

Cohen and Morse's moral identity element, which was identified earlier as being relevant to socialization or the internalization of rules, is also pertinent to the element of autonomy because it characterizes individuals who are deeply concerned with being moral. The link to Hogan's autonomy is primarily via the tendency or the will to stand up for what is moral even in the face of objecting viewpoints. Such a person would likely require both a strong positive sense of self and a willingness to take charge. Of the FFM traits, the most relevant are Extraversion's dominance facet (characterized by descriptors such as determined, forceful, confident) and Emotional Stability's self-concept facet (characterized by descriptors such as positive sense of self, strong self-esteem, secure, sees one as capable).¹⁰⁴

Among the maladaptive traits, grandiosity is relevant. Grandiosity is represented under Antagonism and defined as being self-centred and as having an inflated sense of self-worth.¹⁰⁵ Grandiosity is also reflected in narcissism because it is most likely responsible for narcissists' unusual self-confidence.¹⁰⁶ Grandiosity or narcissism could function as a double-edged sword in that such individuals are forceful enough to stand up for morality if it earns them recognition.¹⁰⁷ On the other hand, these same individuals' need for recognition or success could drive them to disregard norms or regulations because they see themselves as unique and above everyone else.¹⁰⁸ Another maladaptive trait, submissiveness (Negative Affect), described as adapting to the

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interests of others even when it goes against one's desires or needs,¹⁰⁹ could also be relevant here, particularly when one's own interests or desires are misaligned with being moral or when one is being influenced (e.g., dominated) by someone whose interests or desires are misaligned. Consistent with Hogan's assessment that autonomy is dependent to some degree on the other elements of moral character, it is possible that dominance and submissiveness can also function counter to the depiction above.¹¹⁰

Relevance to destructive leadership. The negative aspects of narcissistic leadership are well described. Narrative reviews on the topic cover a range of possibly destructive behaviours and styles of the narcissistic leader.¹¹¹ Of relevance are arrogance, hypersensitivity, and anger, all of which can disrupt interpersonal relationships, and result in vengeful or strong-willed actions. As an example, Rosenthal and Pittinsky describe Steinberg's psychoanalytic evaluation of the Cuban missile crisis as resulting partially from the hypersensitivity of the Cuban and American presidents in power at the time.¹¹² Narcissistic leaders are described as having an insatiable need for recognition and superiority which, in extreme form, can result in destructiveness and sadism, as in the case of Sadaam Hussein's reign.¹¹³ These examples are, perhaps, extreme in depicting the destructive potential of narcissistic leaders. However, McFarlin and Sweeney reviewed a number of studies in which narcissism has been found to be positively related to CWBs.¹¹⁴ O'Reilly, Doerr, Caldwell, and Chatman suggested that although there has been interesting theorizing about narcissism and destructive leadership, there is little empirical research that directly examines leader narcissism and destructive leadership.¹¹⁵ We uncovered one study by Park who found supervisor narcissism to be unrelated to perceived abusive supervision ($r = .06$) in a Korean sample.¹¹⁶

Narcissism has been described as a double-edged sword,¹¹⁷ suggesting that narcissistic tendencies can be beneficial if they are directed at standing up for some wrongdoing or rallying efforts that benefit others, as well as oneself. Rosenthal and Pittinsky discussed the upside of narcissistic leaders as having supreme confidence and visionary perspectives that can be transformative. As an example, they attributed Turkey's independent status as a nation to the narcissistic attributes of its founding leader.¹¹⁸ Maccoby described narcissistic leaders as willing to get the job done and as having an ability to convert the masses.¹¹⁹ O'Reilly et al. theorized and found support for an association between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) narcissism and executive compensation ($r = .40$), explained to be a result of such CEOs' extreme confidence and ability to influence board compensation decisions.¹²⁰ McFarlin and Sweeney also described a study by Wallace and Baumeister in which narcissists "rose to

the challenge” when tasks were difficult or when presented with opportunities for recognition.¹²¹ Hence, it is not unreasonable to expect narcissistic leaders to have the autonomous will to stand up to rules or standards that go against organizational norms or interests, particularly if it benefits them in some way.

Narcissism is also associated with and often operationalized in terms of high self-esteem, optimism, and self-confidence.¹²² Indeed, Milad found leader narcissism to be associated with leader core self-evaluations ($r = .32$),¹²³ a construct comprising positive traits such as self-esteem, internal locus of control, and self-efficacy.¹²⁴ Hiller and Hambrick discussed how high core self-evaluations equip managers with the self-confidence required to overcome obstacles and to create and seize opportunities.¹²⁵ In the context of strategic decision-making, they proposed that executives with high core self-evaluations would be more likely to undertake strategies that deviate from the norm. Core self-evaluation traits have also been linked to voice behaviour and whistleblowing, which are actions taken by employees to correct some organizational wrongdoing or to change an unacceptable state of affairs.¹²⁶ Hence, we propose that leaders with traits linked to core self-evaluation (also relevant to the self-concept facet of Emotional Stability)¹²⁷ have what it takes to stand up to wrongdoing.

Leaders with high self-efficacy have been found to be more likely to be perceived as transformational ($r = .22$) rather than abusive ($r = .01$).¹²⁸ With respect to some of the other proposed personality correlates such as dominance, a facet of Extraversion, Bjørkelo et al. hypothesized and found that Extraversion and a related facet, domineering, had positive associations with whistleblowing, which were explained in terms of confidence, persuasiveness, and domineering interpersonal interactions, which are characteristics associated with Extraversion’s dominance facet.¹²⁹ There is no empirical evidence linking leader submissiveness to destructive leadership or to whistleblowing or voice, but it is not unreasonable to expect highly submissive leaders to either internalize organizational rules of conduct or to cave into misconduct requests from higher or other sources, depending on their standing on the other elements of moral character.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT PERSONALITY FACETS

Table 6.1 presents a summary of our review of personality facets that are likely to be relevant to destructive leadership. Arguing morality to be at the basis of destructive leadership, we focused our review around Hogan’s five elements of moral character.¹³⁰ In the table, each element is mapped onto the

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elements in Cohen and Morse's tripartite model.¹³¹ The elements are then linked to relevant FFM and DSM traits reviewed in this chapter. A total of 15 traits (from within the FFM and maladaptive factor structure) are identified as being relevant to destructive leadership. The expected relationship between each of these facets and destructive leadership is depicted in the last column. For example, the facet of compassion is anticipated to have a negative relationship with destructive leadership (i.e., those scoring high on compassion are less likely to engage in destructive leader behaviours). For some facets (see last row of table), their relationships with destructive leadership could be either positive or negative, depending on the leader's standing on the other elements of moral character or, in the case of grandiosity, on the double-edged nature of this particular facet.

Elements of moral character ¹³²	Tripartite model of moral character ¹³³	Relevant bright and dark personality facets	Expected relationship between personality and destructive leadership
Knowledge of Rules	n/a	n/a	n/a
Socialization/Internalization of Rules	Moral Identity	compassion (A) dependability (C) achievement (C) irresponsibility (D)	- - - +
Empathy	Motivation (consideration of others)	compassion (A) manipulativeness (An) deceitfulness (An) callousness (An)	- + + +
Ethics of Conscience and of Responsibility	Ability (self-regulation)	dependability (C) cautiousness (C) compliance (A) risk taking (D) impulsivity (D)	- - - + +
Autonomy	Moral Identity	dominance (E) self-concept (ES) grandiosity (An) submissiveness (NA)	+/- - +/- +/-

A = Agreeableness; An = Antagonism; C = Conscientiousness; D = Disinhibition; E = Extraversion; ES = Emotional Stability; NA = Negative Affect; n/a = Not Applicable

Table 6.1: A Summary of Relevant Personality Facets

CONSIDERATIONS FOR LEADER SCREENING AND SELECTION

The objective of this chapter was to identify personality facets that could be used in personnel selection practices to screen out leaders with a predisposition to be destructive. Although we identified a number of personality facets with potential relevance to destructive leadership behaviour, a determination of the utility or value of these in the selection or screening of leaders is premature. Below, we discuss several areas in which progress can be made to better inform the use of personality in destructive leadership screening and selection.

LEADER PERSONALITY AS AN ANTECEDENT

In this chapter, personality was considered to be an antecedent of destructive leadership, because it predisposes the leader to act destructively. As evident through our review, there is very little empirical evidence directly examining leader personality and destructive leadership. The field has focused largely on the consequences of such leadership styles.¹³⁴ Examinations into personality antecedents of destructive leadership are on the rise, but they do not always focus on the leader's personality. For example, Brees, Mackey, Martinko, and Harvey examined the influence of subordinate personality and their perceptions of abusive supervision.¹³⁵ Similarly, Burton and Hoobler examined subordinate narcissism and reactions to abusive supervision.¹³⁶ Of the few studies that have examined leader personality in relation to destructive leadership, the focus has been on only a handful of traits such as trait anger,¹³⁷ Machiavellianism or its dimension manipulativeness,¹³⁸ and narcissism.¹³⁹

By grounding our review in the elements of moral character, we have elucidated possible motivational influences underlying such behaviour which allows for the incorporation of theory in building a priori hypotheses. For example, self-regulation is described as the basis for the link between Hogan's ethics of conscience/responsibility and the proposed personality facets (e.g., cautiousness, compliance).¹⁴⁰ Consequently, related theories such as conservation of resources theory¹⁴¹ or ego-depletion theory¹⁴² could be used in formulating and testing hypotheses concerning these facets and their relation to destructive leadership. Evidence from such examinations will not only improve our understanding of the role of personality in destructive leadership, but will furnish much-needed evidence, from a selection perspective, for the validity of these traits in predicting destructive leadership.

DARK VERSUS BRIGHT PERSONALITY FACETS

Research on the incremental validity of dark or maladaptive personality facets over normal ones (i.e., FFM) is scant at present.¹⁴³ Hence, research comparing the incremental contribution of the proposed dark personality facets over the bright ones is required. This is especially true given Dilchert et al.'s mapping of the maladaptive factors onto the FFM with an explanation that the former reflected the extreme poles of the FFM construct range.¹⁴⁴ Even if there is sufficient incremental validity evidence for maladaptive traits, Christiansen et al. highlighted certain legal or ethical issues that require consideration before their use in selection.¹⁴⁵ For example, these authors discussed the possibility that such measures could be considered to be assessments of mental health or impairment, which could have implications for the legal defensibility of their use in selection decision-making. These issues could be addressed through measurement or operationalization of the construct at the sub-clinical rather than clinical levels.¹⁴⁶ Regardless, further investigation into the incremental validity of maladaptive personality facets in predicting destructive leadership, and the potential consequences associated with their use in selection, is warranted.

DOUBLE-EDGED INFLUENCE OF SOME PERSONALITY FACETS

Judge et al. discussed the “paradoxical utility”¹⁴⁷ of personality facets, which pertains to the positive and negative aspects of some personality facets. They examined several personality factors and facets in this regard. For example, although Conscientiousness is considered to be desirable because conscientious individuals tend to be hard working, dependable, and less likely to engage in CWBs, such individuals may also be more resistant to change, less willing to take risks, and experience stress when faced with challenges. The same paradox applies to some of the facets of destructive leadership proposed above. The positive and negative aspects of narcissism, for example, have already been alluded to in this chapter.¹⁴⁸ Machiavellianism, proposed in this chapter to be maladaptive because it predisposes leaders to be destructive, is also beneficial when Machiavellian leaders use their influence tactics to navigate through the politics of complex bureaucracies in achieving some organizational objective.¹⁴⁹ From a selection perspective, in addition to establishing the validity of a facet in relation to destructive leadership, careful risk-benefit analyses must also be carried out to determine if the selection of leaders on some bright or dark facet yields benefits (and/or minimizes the risk of some negative consequence) to a greater extent than it increases the risk of negative consequences.

In their review of personality and leadership effectiveness and emergent leadership, Chen and Zaccaro called for more examinations utilizing multivariate and pattern models of personality and leadership.¹⁵⁰ They described multivariate models as comprising a set of various personality variables most strongly associated with some leadership criterion. Similarly, pattern models examine various multiplicative combinations of personality variables in predicting leadership. Our chapter can certainly facilitate such examinations by exploring all 15 facets or sets of them to determine those most predictive of destructive leadership. In addition, hypotheses may be formulated and tested around joint combinations of facets (e.g., destructive leadership perceptions will be low when leaders are high on Machiavellianism but also high on compassion and/or compliance). From a selection perspective, such analyses can contribute to the development of compound personality measures for predicting destructive leadership. Compound personality measures are on the rise, and comprise a number of personality facets that are aggregated to form a composite that optimally predicts some criterion.¹⁵¹ They also tend to have higher validities than any single personality facet measure, especially when they are developed to focus on the prediction of a particular criterion.¹⁵²

PERSONALITY AND SITUATIONAL INFLUENCES

Consistent with the long-accepted definition of leadership as an influence process,¹⁵³ personality is regarded as a distal antecedent that influences and is influenced by more proximal factors and processes in the leadership continuum.¹⁵⁴ In other words, the influence of personality on leadership behaviour is mediated and/or moderated by subordinate, team, and/or organizational processes. Within the destructive leadership literature, for example, Henle and Gross found support for their hypothesis that subordinates with certain behavioural tendencies or personalities can contribute to or elicit abuse from a supervisor.¹⁵⁵ In addition, Mawritz, Mayer, Hoobler, Wayne, and Marinova examined a multi-level model of abusive supervision to demonstrate the trickle down effects of abusive leadership at higher (i.e., managerial) levels on abusive supervision.¹⁵⁶ Krasikova also examined how demanding aspects of leaders' roles can also prompt them to act destructively.¹⁵⁷ All these studies illustrate that the influence of personality on destructive leadership does not occur in a vacuum, but rather in the presence of varying contextual elements at different levels of analysis. And, depending on the situation, the influence of personality on destructive leadership can possibly be constrained or exacerbated. How then, can the use of personality measures be justified in the selection of leaders?

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In reviewing the literature on personality and leadership, Chen and Zaccaro concluded that personality does explain a significant amount of variance beyond non-personality factors.¹⁵⁸ They view personality as the foundational basis that can promote leadership effectiveness across situations. Further, according to the contingency model of leadership, leader effectiveness is most likely when leader qualities are matched to situational requirements.¹⁵⁹ For selection purposes, it may be possible to design selection measures or tools that capture key situational elements, supported by research, to be triggers for destructive leadership (e.g., misaligned leader-organizational goals,¹⁶⁰ subordinates with certain characteristics¹⁶¹) to assess how potential leader applicants might respond in such situations. For example, Krasikova et al. suggested the use of interviews or situational judgement tests (SJTs) in addition to personality measures in leader selection.¹⁶² Such tools could be designed to capture the situational elements of relevance to destructive leadership.

Another relatively new approach, the measurement of implicit personality through conditional reasoning (CR), is thought to capture the interaction of personality with situational elements.¹⁶³ Such measures comprise CR problems, similar to SJTs in that they contain a problem stem and several response options. The response options are designed to assess implicit motives of the responder. Such measures are designed with some specific domain in mind (e.g., creativity¹⁶⁴). Smith explored the usefulness of one such measure, for the US Army Ranger School, in identifying leader effectiveness in stressful combat.¹⁶⁵ Implicit personality measures using CR are worth exploring in relation to destructive leadership. Our review around the elements of moral character provides some insight into possible implicit motives that could form the basis of such a measure.

MEASUREMENT OF PERSONALITY AND DESTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP

As research on destructive leadership continues to develop, more attention must be given to the operationalization of this construct. Multiple labels, varied constructs, and different measures can hinder the development of knowledge in this area.¹⁶⁶ In some cases, measures claiming to assess destructive leadership include behaviours that Krasikova et al. would regard as measuring leadership ineffectiveness or incompetence.¹⁶⁷ For example, a large part of the Destructive Leadership Questionnaire captures behaviours that are not destructive in nature (e.g., ineffective at negotiation, unclear about expectations, unable to develop or motivate subordinates).¹⁶⁸ Such measures are clearly contaminated by constructs that are irrelevant to the definition of

destructive leadership, and limit the extent to which resulting findings can be used to progress an understanding of destructive leadership.

What must also be avoided are measures that confound destructive leadership and personality. An example of such a measure is the Business-Scan 360 (B-Scan)¹⁶⁹ which claims to assess corporate psychopathy. The measure is based on the clinical Psychopathy Checklist-Revised, and comprises four dimensions (manipulative/unethical, callous/insensitive, unreliable/unfocused, and intimidating/aggressive), but is completed by subordinates who rate their supervisors. Inherent in this measure is a presumption that destructive leaders exhibit high levels of psychopathy. Hence, personality and destructive leadership cannot be easily teased apart in such a measure, limiting its use in predictive validity examinations of personality and destructive leadership. In moving forward, we strongly encourage researchers to consult the defining descriptions of destructive leadership provided in Krasikova et al. to guide their operationalization of this construct in future examinations.¹⁷⁰

The concerns described above apply to the measurement of personality as well. Given the large constellation of normal and maladaptive personality traits and measures, it can be a challenge to tease out differences between them and to assess the adequacy of their measurement. These issues can hinder the comparison of findings from one study to another. For example, Rosenthal and Pittinsky attributed conflicting findings about narcissism and leadership partly to the different conceptualizations used by researchers.¹⁷¹ They explained that some studies focus on confidence and self-esteem in their measurement of narcissism, whereas others have focused on grandiosity which is the hallmark of this construct. Yet self-esteem and confidence are also typically reflected in another facet, positive self-concept.¹⁷² To facilitate the systematic synthesis of accumulated research in estimating the validity of the facets proposed in this chapter, future examinations must be attentive to the operationalization of personality facets. Krueger et al.'s PID measuring maladaptive facets based on the DSM-5 together with discussions provided in Guenole and Dilchert et al. are useful in guiding the measurement of maladaptive facets.¹⁷³ The FFM facets proposed in this chapter are based on Darr and Kelloway's synthesis of evidence around the construct validities of personality facets within the FFM, another useful resource in determining the measurement of these facets.¹⁷⁴

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we focused on identifying personality predictors or correlates of destructive leadership. Determining these predictors was presented as important for military selection, as the nature of military work and the potential ramifications of error may have far-reaching impact beyond the immediate workplace. Indeed, the consequences of scandals such as Tailhook (US Navy and Marine Corps, 1991), the Somalia Affair (CAF, 1993), Abu Ghraib (US Army and Central Intelligence Agency, early 2000s), to name but a few, affected both the reputations of the individuals involved and the reputations of the leaders and organizations they served. Damage to the reputation of any organization can impede that organization's ability to operate in the future. This impact is often exacerbated in a military organization, as members are expected to represent the best of their society. Further, when working in a peacekeeping or peacemaking role, both of which require members to build trust with the locals, or when in an asymmetric war, where one of the main goals is to "win the hearts and minds" of the local populace,¹⁷⁵ it is difficult to be effective when the public's trust in the organization is low.

While the scandals mentioned above have not been explicitly linked to destructive leader behaviours, it would be reasonable to infer that the behaviours observed during these scandals showed evidence of a lack of moral character. In this chapter, moral character has been presented as a cornerstone of destructive leader behaviours. To date, attempts to deal with the behaviours that are typical of destructive leaders have largely been aimed at reducing such behaviours through awareness campaigns, training programs, and policies. For example, in the CAF, mandatory harassment prevention training, Operation Honour,¹⁷⁶ and the DEP, all illustrate the CAF's desire to promote positive leader behaviours, and curb negative or destructive behaviours. Programs such as these rely on socialization. However, in conjunction with these socialization efforts and any leader development activities designed to take into account negative leader behaviours,¹⁷⁷ we contend there is a need to have a better understanding of the personality predictors or correlates of destructive leader behaviours in order to better screen for them during selection. This chapter is a first step in laying the foundation for such efforts.

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CHAPTER 7

TOXIC LEADERSHIP AND CYNICISM

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No man is born cynical, nor – contrary to popular belief – can cynicism be thrust upon one: it must be achieved by experience.

Ernest Augustus Boyd¹

Writer Ernest Augustus Boyd suggested that cynicism is a learned behaviour. His assertion raises a number of questions. If cynicism is in fact learned, who is the teacher and how is it taught? Can cynicism be mitigated, and if so, how and by whom? Also, can opposite traits, like trust and belief, also be inculcated? These are not mere philosophical questions. The answers have practical ramifications that are worthy of study, particularly in the realm of leadership. A deeper understanding of the relationship between leader behaviour and cynicism would be useful to those who are concerned with leader development and organizational effectiveness.

The impacts of poor leadership and of cynicism are increasingly recognized as problems throughout organizations. Research suggests that an organization's human capital may be an important, sustainable, competitive advantage. Employees represent the organization's source of courage, innovation, future leadership, and creativity.² In addition, employees are the link between the organization and its stakeholders. However, research also indicates that cynical employees are more likely to challenge or speak negatively about their employer.³ There is evidence that employee's negative comments adversely affect the customer's experience, and the organization's bottom line.⁴ Therefore, how an employee feels about his or her institution is of importance. The extent of the problem of worker cynicism appears to be pervasive. Polls report that over 50% of survey respondents describe themselves as cynical at work.⁵ These broad-based feelings of cynicism show little sign of decreasing.

The problem of cynicism is not limited to the workplace, but rather is endemic throughout the world across a broad spectrum of organizations.

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Air Force Academy or the United States Department of Defense.

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Mistrust of institutions across multiple and diverse sectors such as academia, government, banks, big business, and the military is more pervasive now than at any time since the era of the Great Depression as companies continue to lay off workers, outsource operations, and cut entire branches of organizations to increase revenue.⁶ According to the National Leadership Index, which surveys Americans' attitudes toward their leaders in 13 major sectors, confidence in leaders fell to the lowest point since the index was established in 2005.⁷ Cynicism appears to be widespread, and it negatively impacts the organizations tainted by it. The complex relationship between perceived poor leadership and cynicism, and its effects, is worthy of additional attention and exploration.

The modern United States military has been an all-volunteer force since 1973; its members are not compelled to serve. It is also an organization that is without a profit motivation, and representative of an important segment of the public sector. In recent years, the US military has begun to recognize the profound negative effect that cynicism and toxic leadership can have on the maintenance of good order and discipline, and it has sought to increase understanding of these phenomena.⁸ Yet little, if any, work has been conducted concerning efforts to curtail these issues within military organizations.

This chapter defines organizational cynicism, distinguishes it from other constructs, and explains the theoretical frameworks that have been used to explicate the nature of cynicism. Next, a review of the seminal works on toxic leadership will be presented. Finally, the chapter concludes with the examination of toxic leadership and cynicism in a military context, and how further research in this topic could assist leaders in government and military organizations to militate against the negative impact of cynicism on those institutions.

CYNICISM LITERATURE

The term cynicism originated from ancient Greek philosophers called Cynics. Cynics rejected all conventions designed to control men, such as religion, manners, or rules of decency, advocating instead the pursuit of virtue in a simple and non-materialistic lifestyle. Early research defined cynicism as an attitude distinguished by a "dislike for and distrust of others."⁹ More recent work has equated cynicism as an attitude characterized by scornful or jaded negativity, suspicion, and a general distrust of the integrity or professed motives of others.¹⁰ Defined concisely, cynicism is the condition of lost belief. Lost to cynicism is belief in the possibility of a change, improvement, or betterment of current or future circumstances along with the ability to aspire to

a different state. The hurt, disillusionment, disappointment, and anger that follow unmet expectations and unfulfilled goals give rise to a perspective that is overwhelmingly negative. As such, cynics “agree that lying, putting on a false face, and taking advantage of others are fundamental to human character” and conclude that people are “just out for themselves” and that “such cynical attitudes about life are paralleled in attitudes about work.”¹¹ Cynicism in the workplace is emerging as a new paradigm resulting from a critical appraisal of the motives, actions, and values of an employer.

DEFINING ORGANIZATIONAL CYNICISM

Cynicism’s influence upon an organization has not been extensively examined by scholars. Most studies define organizational cynicism as a negative work attitude that has the potential to affect numerous organizational and individual outcomes.¹² Scholars differ in defining the origin, and therefore, the complete nature or definition of organizational cynicism. James defined organizational cynicism as “attitudes related to one’s employing organization, characterized by negative beliefs, feelings, and related behaviors in response to a history of personal and/or social experiences susceptible to change by environmental influences.”¹³ Thus, an individual’s prior history is key to understanding cynicism. Dean, Brandes, and Dharwadkar described organizational cynicism as a negative attitude toward one’s employing organization, comprised of the belief that the individual’s organization lacks integrity, fairness, sincerity, and honesty.¹⁴ These definitions are not entirely at odds. In fact, they could be said to have similarities to Abraham’s suggestion that cynicism toward the organization could result from workers’ perceptions of a lack of congruence between their own personal values and those of the organization.¹⁵ This idea of value congruence between individuals and organizations is particularly appealing for the study of cynicism and leadership because values play a central role in leading followers, and influencing organizational culture.¹⁶

There is ample literature supporting the importance of value congruence between leaders and followers. For example, Lord and Brown theorized that values influence follower affect, cognition, and behaviour by interacting with follower self-concepts.¹⁷ While Argris’ seminal work on shared values and goal congruence theory emphasized the importance of promoting the integration of individual and organizational goals, and suggested that incongruence between the two may cause unintended consequences such as passivity and aggression.¹⁸ Such results may interfere with system (organizational) effectiveness and individual growth and satisfaction. This is consistent with Dean and colleagues’ conceptualization of cynicism as a multidimensional

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construct made up of three components: beliefs, affects, and behavioural tendencies. Specifically, the cognitive dimension of organizational cynicism is the belief that organizations lack such principles as “fairness, honesty, and sincerity.”¹⁹ The affective dimension refers to the positive and negative emotional reactions individuals may feel toward an organization, and the behavioural dimension of organizational cynicism refers to the negative tendencies in the expression of strong criticisms toward the organization.

In the simplest of terms, cynicism is the feeling that develops when expectations do not match reality. Table 7.1 shows the definitions of organizational cynicism in five frequently cited publications on this topic.

Author	Definition
Andersson (1996)	A general and specific attitude characterized by frustration, hopelessness, and disillusionment, as well as contempt toward and distrust of a person, group, ideology, social convention, or institution.
Dean, Brandes, and Dharwadkar (1998)	A negative attitude toward one’s employing organization, comprising three dimensions: (1) a belief that the organization lacks integrity; (2) negative affect toward the organization; and (3) tendencies to disparaging and critical behaviours toward the organization that are consistent with these beliefs and affect.
Brockway, Carlson, Jones, and Bryant (2002)	An attitude, characterized by frustration and negatively valenced beliefs, resulting primarily from unmet expectations, which is capable of being directed toward the college experience in general and/or more specific facets of the college environment.
Stanley, Meyer, and Topolnysky (2005)	A belief of another’s stated or implied motives for a decision or action.
James (2005)	Attitudes related to one’s employing organization, characterized by negative beliefs, feelings, and related behaviours. Additionally, it is a response to a history of personal and/or societal experiences that are susceptible to change by environmental influences.

Table 7.1: Various Definitions of Organizational Cynicism in the Literature²⁰

CONSEQUENCES OF CYNICISM

With regard to consequences of cynicism, research has shown that cynicism has important *negative* ramifications. The negative effects of cynicism contribute to substantial costs for both organizations and individuals which result from increases in stress, emotional exhaustion, burnout, job tension, job satisfaction, and turnover.²¹ It also reduces citizenship behaviour, productivity, commitment, and organizational identity. In essence, cynicism can undermine leaders, institutions, and the practices they support.

Given the pernicious impact of organizational cynicism, it is surprising that the literature in this area reveals little empirical research or rigorous inquiry on organizational cynicism and its relationship to leadership styles or behaviours. This is especially notable, given that as Bass stated, “leadership is often regarded as the single most critical factor in the success or failure of institutions.”²² The majority of studies have focused on the consequences and effects of cynical employees in business models conducted in the private sector, and typically presented very specific antecedents for study (e.g., workforce reduction, layoffs, organizational performance, and executive compensation). These studies are largely silent on the role a leader’s behaviour might have in influencing the organizational cynicism of their followers.

TOXIC LEADERSHIP

Research in the area of leadership traditionally tends to take an overly positive approach. Every week, commentaries feature tables, posters, or quotes exhorting all the good things associated with leadership and the bad attributes associated with being a manager, boss, and the like. The leadership publishing, recruiting, and development industries have all promoted the notion that leadership is a good thing. All it takes to be a leader is to be authentic, leverage one’s strengths, demonstrate executive presence, serve others, or adopt a given set of habits. However, recent abuses of authority in a range of organizations – business, politics, and the military – have revived interest in the dark side of leadership.

In recent years, scholarly publications have used a variety of constructs to describe these dark or destructive forms of leadership: abusive,²³ tyrannical,²⁴ unethical or bad,²⁵ and toxic.²⁶ Although these terms are used differently by different authors, they are often used to describe the same phenomenon: interpersonal influences and downward hostility by those in positions of authority that negatively affect followers and ultimately undermine the best interest of the organization. For example, Lipman-Blumen maintained that

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leaders are considered toxic when they “engage in numerous *destructive behaviors* and exhibit certain dysfunctional personal characteristics”,²⁷ whereas Reed stated that a single specific behaviour does not necessarily cause toxic leadership, rather it is the “cumulative effect of demotivational behavior on unit morale and climate over time that tells the tale.”²⁸

DEFINING TOXIC LEADERSHIP

Attempts to define toxic leadership are numerous, and vary from study to study. For example, Einarsen, Aaslad, and Skogstad propose that destructive leadership should account for destructive behaviour aimed at both subordinates and at the organization. With that in mind, they suggested the following all-inclusive definition of destructive leadership: “the systematic and repeated behavior by a leader, supervisor or manager that violates the legitimate interest of the organization by undermining and/or sabotaging the organization’s goals, tasks, resources, and effectiveness and/or the motivation, well-being or job satisfaction of subordinates.”²⁹ Thus, Einarsen and colleagues focused their definition on the receivers or victims of the toxicity.

Taking a slightly different vantage point, Schmidt’s research systematically brought a comprehensive understanding to the topic of toxic leadership by defining what toxic leadership is and is not, while developing and evaluating a new measure he called the Toxic Leadership Scale. His research concluded that toxic leadership is a much broader construct than abusive supervision. Toxic leadership is a multidimensional construct that includes elements of abusive supervision along with narcissism, authoritarianism, self-promotion, and unpredictability.³⁰ Whicker stated “toxic leaders may be of one of several types, but all toxic leaders share three defining characteristics: deep-seated inadequacy, selfish values, and deceptiveness.”³¹ Kusy and Holloway summed up the literature aptly, addressing both the leader and follower and cause and effect, saying that toxic personality is “anyone who demonstrates a pattern of counterproductive work behaviors that debilitate individuals, teams, and even organizations over the long term.”³² The underlying tenet to toxic leadership is that it is “viewed as a detractor from motivation, alignment, and commitment to organizational goals that serve as the hallmark of good leadership.”³³

Although there are obvious similarities among these concepts, researchers have yet to adopt a common definition or conceptual framework of toxic leadership. Thus, Reed’s claim that “toxic leadership, like leadership in general, is more easily described than defined, but terms like self-aggrandizing,

petty, abusive, indifferent to unit climate, and interpersonally malicious seem to capture the concept.³⁴ Table 7.2 shows the definitions of toxic leadership in frequently cited publications on this topic.

Author	Definition
Whicker (1996)	Maladjusted, malcontent, and often malevolent, even malicious. They succeed by tearing others down.... With a deep-seated but well disguised sense of personal inadequacy, a focus on selfish values, and a cleverness at deception, these leaders are very toxic, indeed.
Lipman-Blumen (2005)	Leaders who engage in numerous destructive behaviour and who exhibit certain dysfunctional personal characteristics. To count as toxic, these behaviours and qualities of character must inflict some reasonably serious and enduring harm on their followers and their organizations. The intent to harm others or to enhance the self at the expense of others distinguishes seriously toxic leaders from the careless or unintentional toxic leaders, who also cause negative effects.
Reed (2004)	Three key elements of the toxic leader syndrome are: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. An apparent lack of concern for the wellbeing of subordinates 2. A personality or interpersonal technique that negatively affects organizational climate 3. A conviction by subordinates that the leader is motivated primarily by self-interest
Schmidt (2008)	Narcissistic, self-promoters who engage in an unpredictable pattern of abusive and authoritarian supervision.
Tepper (2000)	Subordinates' perceptions of the extent to which supervisors engage in the sustained display of hostile verbal and nonverbal behaviours, excluding physical contact.

Table 7.2: Various Definitions of Toxic Leadership in the Literature³⁵

PREVALENCE OF TOXIC LEADERSHIP

Although many issues of definition and terminology have yet to be resolved, several sources suggest that toxic leadership is a common occurrence in organizations. A recent study found that 94% of survey respondents

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($N = 404$) reported having worked with someone toxic in their career, with 64% reported currently working with someone they would describe as having a toxic personality.³⁶ More to the point, as many as three-quarters of employed adults ($N = 5,266$) reported that their bosses are the most stressful parts of their jobs.³⁷ Similarly, research conducted in the military has found that more than 80% of army officers and sergeants “had directly observed a toxic leader in the last year and that about 20 percent of the respondents said that they had worked directly for one.”³⁸ Another survey found that 61% of mid-grade officers ($n = 167$) in the Army considered leaving their profession because of the way they were treated by their supervisor.³⁹ Correspondingly, according to Light, the US Navy has a systemic problem in the ranks and “needs to make adjustments in priority, policy, training, and personnel processes in order to stem the tide of personal misconduct by leaders.”⁴⁰

MILITARY FACTORS FACILITATING TOXIC LEADERSHIP

Two US Army War College professors recently published a study that pointed to an uncomfortable level of lying by military personnel, driven by an environment where requirements and expectations exceed available resources. The resulting “ethical fading and rationalizing allow individuals to convince themselves that their honor and integrity are intact despite ethical compromise.” Ethical fading and numbness can facilitate toxic leadership since they lead to a lower likelihood that harm will be recognized. This is especially so when organizational members are able to maintain the delusion that they hold moral high ground even while engaging in unethical or toxic activities. Words like integrity and character abound in military culture yet, as the Army War College study confirmed, high standards, insufficient resources, and an unwillingness to recognize inherent limitations can be a formula for significant moral hazard. One of the most morally hazardous statements from a person in authority has to be, “I don’t care how you do it, just get it done.” “Pleasing the boss” becomes an imperative, and moral inversions where bad activities become perceived as good are a predictable outcome.⁴¹

Organizations frequently espouse values that do not coincide with the lived experience of their members. Shared value systems characterized by homogeneity of values can lead to a number of positive organizational outcomes, including a common vision, retention and social cohesion. However, too much distance between espoused and enacted values can be problematic. “Talking the talk” without “walking the walk” can lead to perceptions of hypocrisy, cynicism and quite possibly a sense of betrayal.⁴² A litmus test

for dissonance between espoused and enacted values can be observed when values statements are turned into sarcastic jokes that spread through the organization. Values statements that are meant to inspire and motivate can become the brunt of cynical forms of humor if they are not part of the lived experience of organizational members.

TOXIC LEADERSHIP OUTCOMES

The appeal of destructive behaviours as a research target lies in its potential to influence numerous individual and organizational outcomes. Specifically, harmful leadership behaviours have been found to negatively affect subordinates' job satisfaction levels, organizational commitment and create an erosion of trust.⁴³ Additionally, abusive supervision has been positively related to subordinates' intentions to leave their jobs.⁴⁴ Furthermore, subordinates of abusive supervisors show higher levels of anxiety, burnout, depression, and work-family conflict, as well as diminished self-efficacy and more frequent health complaints that could lead to deteriorations in performance and morale.⁴⁵ In a military context, studies have shown that abused subordinates perform fewer organizational citizenship behaviours (activities conducted by workers that were beyond the scope of the job that provided an additive benefit to the organization) compared to their non-abused counterparts.⁴⁶

Independent but related studies by James Dobbs and James Do recently focused on cadets at the United States Air Force Academy. Analyzing quantitative attitudinal data, Dobbs found evidence that a relationship exists between perceived toxic leadership and increased levels of organizational cynicism, and that followers of toxic leaders are likely to have more negative attitudes toward their organizations as a whole. Specifically, there is evidence to suggest that cadets who perceive their commanders to display high levels of the toxic leadership dimensions of abusive supervision, authoritarian leadership, narcissism, self-promotion, and unpredictability, tend to be more cynical about their organization.⁴⁷ Do conducted in-depth interviews with cadets, corroborating Dobbs' work, reflecting a cynical reaction to their organization's destructive leadership behaviour.⁴⁸ In almost all of the interviews, cadets' negative feelings toward leadership carried over to negative feelings about the organization. These findings are consistent with a study by Burris, Detert, and Chiaburu that found that negative feelings towards the supervisor carried over to negative feelings towards organizations.⁴⁹ This could be due not only to the toxic leader being perceived as representative of the organization, but also due to the perception that the organization does not intervene to protect its personnel. These findings reflect Reed's research among

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military members that toxic leaders are anathema to the health of units, undermine confidence levels, and erode unit cohesion and esprit de corps.

TOXIC LEADERSHIP AND CYNICISM

A 2013 study by Hannah and colleagues *noted* that leader behaviour has both positive and negative impact on the prosocial and antisocial behaviour of followers. Their study included a sample of 2,572 soldiers serving in Iraq in 2009. It found that those who experienced abusive supervision identified less with the organization's core values and demonstrated lower levels of moral courage. Abusive supervision was found to undermine moral agency and negatively impacted ethical behaviour. Furthermore, those in organizations with higher levels of abusive supervision were less likely to report ethical transgressions of others. This study was of particular interest because it is one of the few that examined military personnel in a combat zone and it focused on the mistreatment of non-combatants as a measure of unethical conduct.⁵⁰

Applying findings from this study to the notion of cynicism suggests that abusive/toxic leaders may be perceived by subordinates as representative of the entire organization, and that the organization does not intervene to protect its personnel. This lack of faith in the leadership of the unit could translate to a lack of attachment to the larger organization with might result in feelings of frustration, hopelessness, disillusionment, and possibly even content of individuals or an entire organization. Organizational cynicism is related to unmet expectations and pessimistic predictions about how the leader of the organization will act in the future. Cynicism predicts a lack of organizational citizenship, which is defined as activity that extends beyond that which is required: behaviour that tends to serve organizations well. Organizational citizenship behaviour takes place when unit members are committed rather than merely compliant. It is a military maxim that leadership matters, but we are still learning the myriad ways leadership style impacts the behaviour of followers as well as the culture and climate of military organizations.

ADDRESSING TOXIC LEADERSHIP

Given the relationship between perceived toxic leadership and cynicism, leader development programs would be well served to include the concept of toxic leadership as a fundamental component. Three hundred and sixty-degree assessment of leader perceptions, including a comparison with self-ratings, would be particularly insightful. The more awareness leaders have regarding their harmful leadership behaviours and tendencies, the sooner

they can correct their deficiencies and positively affect the organization and their followers. This recommendation aligns with Reed and Olsen who highlighted the need to discuss destructive leadership practices in the military. Specifically, they recommended that “the system of professional military education examine the use of negative examples of leadership in addition to stories of exemplary leadership that abound” as “negative case studies, and stories of failure can be powerful influencers of organizational culture.”⁵¹

The implementation of formal mentoring programs could be especially useful. Considering that Kusy and Holloway explicated, “toxic people thrive only in a toxic system,”⁵² a proactive approach by top-level leaders would be to volunteer their time to create opportunities for more supervisor-employee interactions. These interactions could foster important relationships and generate an organizational culture within which senior leaders ensure that intermediate-level leaders and managers engage in appropriate, healthy behaviours.

Administrators, supervisors, and others in leadership roles should spend some focused time learning about toxic leadership and cynicism. The prevalence of cynicism in the workforce could be significantly reduced by the introduction of leadership education programs for personnel in positions of authority. Applying an understanding of the relationship between toxic leadership and organizational cynicism to the training and education of leaders in corporate, government, and military organizations might ultimately serve to mitigate the negative impact of cynicism on those institutions.

CONCLUSION

This exploration has made the case for inclusion of toxic leadership and cynicism in the lexicon of military ethics. A cynical military led by toxic leaders can lead to outbreaks of ethical fading and disillusionment. Cynicism might be widespread among personnel in military organizations but as a construct it is inadequately understood. The purpose of this chapter is to gain a better understanding of the complex relationship between how a follower’s perception of a supervisor affects organizational cynicism, and understanding how behaviours of toxic leaders may predict cynicism.

Drawing on the belief that leader behaviour has both positive and negative impacts on the prosocial and antisocial behaviour of followers, we suggest that the study of the relationship between toxic leadership and cynicism has implications for the development of both leaders and organizations.

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Findings from this research could assist administrators, supervisors, and others in leadership roles to better understand the impact of perceptions of toxic leadership on cynicism. Cynicism can be mitigated but cannot be attacked directly. However, by identifying its origins, measures can be taken to engage the conditions that allow cynicism to propagate in an organization.

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CHAPTER 8

A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR LEADERSHIP HUBRIS IN THE MILITARY CONTEXT

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INTRODUCTION

The topic of leadership and leader characteristics has been extensively studied in the literature. Leadership is of particular interest to researchers in the military.¹ The general difference in context between the military and non-military organizations could be characterized by the impact of failure that is attributable to leadership. In highly hierarchical structures and relatively strict chains of command, both military leaders and followers acknowledge that they may be requested to make the ultimate sacrifice in the exercise of their duty to their country. This requires the military leaders to have individual characteristics for motivating followers to willingly take on the unique responsibilities that society places on military personnel. Therefore, identifying the qualities that are essential for effective military leadership and the characteristics of destructive leadership that have negative consequences for the military may have enormous implications for mission accomplishment.

Our primary focus in this chapter will be a destructive leadership characteristic that has been called hubris. There is an extensive literature on hubris in business research;² however, in the military context, scholars have just begun to examine the harmful effects hubris may have on leadership.³ In the business context, managerial hubris can be so catastrophic that the failures of some well-known corporations such as Parmalat, Swissair, Vivendi, Enron and WorldCom have been attributed to managerial hubris.⁴ Because of its importance, there has been an increasing interest in the hubris concept among researchers.⁵ Much of the previous research has investigated the antecedents and outcomes of leadership hubris from a non-military organizational perspective.

* The views presented in this chapter are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the Turkish Armed Forces or any other institutions.

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In the military context, since the failures of the military leaders can be very costly (e.g., casualties, losing a war, or even losing independence), every factor that has an effect on leadership effectiveness should be scrutinized. To our knowledge, however, little or no research has been devoted to the antecedents and outcomes of hubris in the military context. Because hubris is thought to have dysfunctional effects and to be costly to both the leaders and the organization, identifying antecedents and outcomes of military leadership hubris has obvious utility for military leaders and military organizations. By better understanding the hubris concept, under what circumstances it develops, how it affects military leaders, which contextual factors affect its emergence, what consequences it produces, and finally what steps should be taken to guard against it, military leaders and organizations could be less vulnerable to hubris.

With these concerns in mind, we aim to develop a conceptual model for hubris in military contexts based on the prior empirical and theoretical work as well as military-specific factors, and to make some recommendations for overcoming the hubristic behaviours of military leaders. Accordingly, this chapter will address the concept of hubris, antecedents of hubris, contingencies affecting the relationship between the antecedents of hubris and hubris itself, consequences of hubris and practical recommendations for overcoming hubris.

THE CONCEPT OF HUBRIS

Hubris is one of the “dark side” leadership traits and is characterized as overwhelming self-confidence, exaggerated pride, inflated self-belief and feelings of humiliation from the recommendations and criticisms of others.⁶ The concept of hubris was first introduced to the business world by Roll under the name of the hubris hypothesis in his financial study on corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A).⁷ Roll proposed that the managers of the bidding firms overestimated the value of the target firms and paid too much for these target firms as acquisition premiums under the assumption that their predictions about the worth of the target firm were correct.⁸ Hubris appears as a trait when an individual has an extreme pride and excessive levels of self-confidence, and when they make overly positive self-assessments that would not be an output of any reasonable and objective evaluation by oneself or by others.⁹ Hubristic leaders may easily wrap themselves in a world of their own, may be quite myopic in their opinions, may not need or accept any advice from others, may mostly create their own realities, and therefore, be blind to the potentially negative outcomes.¹⁰

A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR HUBRIS

We propose a broader nomological network for understanding the role of leadership hubris in the military context. Figure 8.1 depicts major relationships based on the military and non-military literature reviewed. In the nomological network, demographic factors (i.e., status, tenure and gender), power, intuition, self-importance, core self-evaluations (CSE), narcissism, exemption from rules, a series of recent successes, and uncritical acceptance of accolades are included as the antecedents of military leader's hubris. The operational failure, poor unit performance, poor decision-making processes (i.e., intuitive decision-making, relying on simplistic formulas for success, failure to face changing realities, excessive risk taking), self-serving bias and arrogance are the outcomes of hubris. Societal culture (e.g., power distance) and military culture (e.g., hierarchy) are the contingencies in the model.

We propose that antecedents of hubris relate indirectly to leadership outcomes through individual differences in hubris. Moreover, the nomological network recognizes the importance of the military context, which could affect the relationship between individual differences and hubris. We posit that the contingencies serve as important moderators of the relationship between individual differences and hubris. In the following sections, we introduce these relationships based on antecedents of hubris, contingencies affecting the relationship between the antecedents of hubris and hubris itself, and the consequences of hubris.

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


Figure 8.1: A Conceptual Model for Hubris in the Military Context

ANTECEDENTS OF HUBRIS

As depicted in Figure 8.1, demographic factors (i.e., gender, tenure and status), power, intuition, self-importance, CSE, narcissism, exemption from the rules, a series of recent successes and uncritical acceptance of accolades are the antecedents of our proposed theoretical model for hubris.

Demographic Factors

Gender. Although not especially focusing on hubris, the studies of gender differences in overconfidence may shed light on whether there is any effect of gender on hubris. Some researchers have referred to hubris as the dark side of overconfidence¹¹ or a cognitive bias in the form of overconfidence.¹² Barber and Odean found that men are more overconfident than women and that men trade stocks more excessively than do women, resulting in lower performance levels, thus punishing men for their overconfidence.¹³ Bengts-

son and colleagues also showed that the men are more overconfident than the women by testing students' inclination to aim for a higher grade.¹⁴ Higher levels of overconfidence in men than in women have been empirically demonstrated in several other studies.¹⁵ Furthermore, for masculine tasks, gender differences were found to be even greater.¹⁶ As a result, we expect that male military leaders are more prone to hubris than are female military leaders.

Tenure. The length of time leaders stay in power is one of the key external factors that leads to hubris.¹⁷ The hubris syndrome develops only after power has been held for a period of time.¹⁸ Owen and Davidson argued that the hubris syndrome is likely to abate once power fades. Rather than being related to only power itself, hubris also seems to be related to the length of the time during which the power is held.¹⁹ In an empirical study of bank Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), it was found that there is a positive relationship between tenure and hubris such that the longer the tenure the more likely hubris will be observed.²⁰ For military members who have served as leaders for long periods, their tenure may serve as an antecedent of hubris.

Status. Status in the upper levels of the hierarchy can be a fertile ground for hubris to develop and proliferate.²¹ Hierarchical status serves as a basis for power (i.e., legitimate power).²² In the military, where the hierarchical culture is more salient,²³ it is mostly the hierarchical status that gives the military leaders their power. It can be stated that the higher the status, the more likely military leaders will fall into the trap of hubris.

Power

Power is the capacity of one party (i.e., the agent) to influence another party (i.e., the target).²⁴ Power can be interpreted as one's available resources to influence others to do what those people would not do otherwise.²⁵ Although there are different taxonomies for the bases of power,²⁶ French and Raven's five bases of power (i.e., coercive power, reward power, legitimate power, expert power and referent power)²⁷ can be said to be the most popular and more commonly used one.²⁸ The five bases of power can be categorized into two main dimensions as positional power (i.e., coercive power, reward power, and legitimate power) and personal power (i.e., expert power and referent power).²⁹ The individuals' positional power originates from the position they hold in their organizations, whereas their personal power is the result of their personal characteristics, qualifications, experiences, and training.³⁰

The power leaders have may lead to hubristic behaviours.³¹ Holding substantial power is one of the key external factors that leads to hubris.³² Hubris is

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argued to be related to one being intoxicated by power.³³ Since holding power means that the power holders have fewer social checks on their own lack of self-knowledge, they are particularly vulnerable to the pitfalls of hubris.³⁴ Accordingly, power is a prerequisite for the hubris syndrome to develop.³⁵ The hubris syndrome is an acquired personality disorder and its emergence post-dates the acquisition of power.³⁶ Owen and Davidson argued that extreme hubristic behaviour is a syndrome comprised of a series of symptoms which are triggered by power and that it usually remits when the power diminishes.³⁷ They also associated the hubris syndrome with the possession of power, especially power held for a period of years, and experienced together with tremendous successes and with little constraint on the power holder.³⁸ If we think of the military context and the power military leaders hold, it is more likely that military leaders are more vulnerable to hubris.

Intuition

Intuition is defined as an affectively reached judgment that is made rapidly, sub-consciously and holistically.³⁹ Intuitions are the thoughts and preferences that come to mind fast, automatically, effortlessly, and without much elaborative thinking.⁴⁰ Although intuition is viewed as a positive asset for managers,⁴¹ it may also have negative effects. In their study on why it is too difficult to change minds in the US Army, Gerras and Wong argued that intuition loses its power in decision-making at strategic levels where there are not any common patterns and consistencies.⁴² Senior military leaders have a tendency to rely on their intuitions than the empirical evidence submitted to them, since their confidence in their own judgments has been formed, exercised and rewarded while becoming senior leaders.⁴³ These tendencies of senior leaders are akin to hubristic characteristics, such as having too much self-confidence, having inflated self-belief, and the tendency toward humiliation from the recommendations and criticisms of others.⁴⁴

Claxton and his colleagues offered a model for hubris in terms of a degree of balance between intuitive systems and analytical systems.⁴⁵ They suggested when intuitive systems and analytical systems are in balance (i.e., reflective analytical mode), the feeling of one's rightness is analyzed and evaluated by conscious deliberation, reflection, and discussion as well as public testing. But when these systems are imbalanced (i.e., reflexive intuitive mode), intuitions dominate rational analysis, the self-checking process stops functioning, the feeling of being right becomes unchecked by analytical systems and, therefore, are strengthened. As a result, the leader becomes stuck in the intuitive mode in which the facts generated by the means other than intuition are overlooked and naysayers are dismissed. It is when intuition

decouples from rational analysis and gets unbridled and dominant that hubristic behaviours become more evident. As a result, and in line with Claxton and his colleagues, we propose that intuition is one of the antecedents of hubris and that military leaders who rely mostly on their intuition are more prone to hubris.

Self-Importance

Self-importance is caused by a delusion of superiority accompanied by a strong desire for admiration.⁴⁶ Hayward and Hambrick pointed out self-importance as another antecedent of hubris.⁴⁷ They argued that some top managers possess excessive views of their abilities, possibly due to their sense of self-importance. These individuals tend to manifest hubristic behaviours when they gain authority over others, earn much more than others, and accumulate titles and awards.⁴⁸ Among the manifestations of the self-importance, the most overt one is their pay relative to others, especially when they have influence on the amount of it.⁴⁹ In the military context, there may not be big differences in terms of pay, but self-importance may be fed by the authority given to them by hierarchical organizational structures. As a result, we propose that military leaders' perceived self-importance may lead them to manifest hubristic behaviours.

Core Self-Evaluations

The CSE construct was first introduced by Judge and his colleagues as an aspect of self-concept. It is described as a fundamental self-evaluation that one makes regarding their worth, competence and capability.⁵⁰ Individuals having a positive self-evaluation think of themselves as worthy, competent and capable, and therefore are influenced by external forces to a lesser extent.⁵¹ More broadly, CSE is defined as a fundamental self-evaluation or basic conclusion regarding one's self-worth derived from self-appraisals (i.e., self-esteem), one's capacity to control one's life events (i.e., locus of control), one's general self-potency (i.e., general self-efficacy), and one's overall feeling that one's life is going well (i.e., emotional stability).⁵² As derived from the definition, CSE is conceptualized as a broad latent concept and indicated by four traits: self-esteem, generalized self-efficacy, locus of control, and neuroticism (or emotional stability).⁵³ People who have positive CSE believe that they have the capacity to overcome problems (high self-efficacy), are worthy of respect and regard (high self-esteem), have control of their life events and have responsibility for the happenings in their lives (internal locus of control), and finally are free from doubts and worries and prone not to be pessimistic (low neuroticism or high emotional stability).⁵⁴ CSE is the overlapping and

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therefore a core part of these four traits; it does not entirely encompass the aforementioned traits and some parts of them may fall outside of CSE.⁵⁵

Perceptions of high CSE have a positive effect on job satisfaction. This is partly because high CSE individuals tend to choose more challenging jobs and also perceive these jobs as intrinsically motivating.⁵⁶ In addition to its effect on job satisfaction, individuals with high CSE are more motivated to perform their jobs. CSE has positive relationships with job satisfaction,⁵⁷ job performance,⁵⁸ and life satisfaction.⁵⁹ Although it has positive effects on satisfaction and performance, CSE or its components (i.e., self-esteem, generalized self-efficacy, locus of control and neuroticism) in part may also lead to some undesirable results. Individuals with high self-efficacy set challenging goals, persist in reaching these goals, and, therefore, perform their tasks better than individuals with low self-efficacy perceptions.⁶⁰ But the role of self-efficacy may, under some conditions, be dysfunctional. In a study of conflict management, it was found that there is an inverted-U shaped relationship between the disputants' self-efficacy and relational outcomes (e.g., relationship between the disputants, satisfaction with the results or with the process). This means that incremental increases in self-efficacy have positive effects on subjective outcomes, but there are certain levels at which self-efficacy turns out to be dysfunctional and decreases the subjective outcomes.⁶¹

In a laboratory study,⁶² it was found that the disputants with high levels of self-efficacy perceptions tend to be anchored to their positions and show escalation of commitment to them even though their positions represented losing courses of action or failing projects. Participants in the high self-efficacy condition were more likely to believe that they had the capacity to pursue the project (i.e., to resolve the dispute for their own benefit), even though the probability of the project's success was not high. Additionally, instead of resolving the conflict at hand, the high self-efficacious disputants exhibited inconvenient behaviours in terms of managing conflict, such as causing the conflict to be escalated and precluding a decrease in conflict intensity. In another study by Vancouver and his colleagues, it was found that self-efficacy leads to overconfidence and therefore increased the possibility of committing logic errors when participants are performing an analytical game.⁶³ There are also other studies showing the dysfunctional side of higher levels of self-efficacy perceptions.⁶⁴

In their recent study, Hiller and Hambrick argued that higher levels of CSE, and especially hyper-CSE, may not be as functional as previously anticipated and may also lead to dysfunctional results.⁶⁵ They proposed that hyper-CSE is aligned closely with the hubris concept and that executives with hyper-CSE

would be more prone to exhibiting hubris in their behaviours, such as making decisions in a non-participative and centralized manner and applying these decisions with perseverance even though they would lead to failures. We suggest that the higher the levels of CSE military leaders have, the more likely they will be prone to hubris.

Narcissism

One of the Dark Triad of personality,⁶⁶ narcissism is a personality trait which encompasses grandiosity, arrogance, self-absorption, entitlement, fragile self-esteem, and hostility.⁶⁷ Narcissism is defined as an inflated sense of self and an ongoing preoccupation with having that self-view constantly strengthened.⁶⁸ Campbell and colleagues argued that it is useful to conceive of narcissism as having three components: the self, interpersonal relationships, and self-regulatory strategies.⁶⁹ They suggest the narcissistic self has the characteristics of pessimism, specialness, uniqueness, vanity, and a desire for power and esteem; narcissistic relationships tend to be shallow and can range from exciting and engaging to manipulative and exploitative. In order to maintain inflated self-images, the narcissists practice some strategies such as seeking out opportunities for attracting the attention and admiration of others. They are motivated to be admired by others and affirmed as a superior.⁷⁰

Narcissists exhibit too high a level of self-love, have a belief of being uniquely special, and deserving constant praise, attention, and admiration from others, and tend to see themselves as superior to others.⁷¹ For narcissistic top managers, the performance of the organization is second to their own power and prestige.⁷² In their study of narcissistic leadership, Rosenthal and Pittinsky provide a long list of the highly interrelated psychological underpinnings of narcissistic leaders, including arrogance, feelings of inferiority, an insatiable need for recognition and superiority, hypersensitivity and anger, lack of empathy, amorality, irrationality, inflexibility, and paranoia.⁷³ Accordingly, in an empirical study on narcissism, it was found that high-narcissistic individuals react to the negative feedback about the tasks they complete with more anxiety, aggression, and anger than low-narcissistic individuals.⁷⁴

Kroll and his colleagues hypothesized that hubris derives from an overbearing sense of grandiosity, a strong need for admiration by others, and self-absorption, all of which comprise narcissism.⁷⁵ There are also other studies which advocate that narcissism plays a significant role in the development of hubris.⁷⁶ With the negative characteristics of narcissism in mind, we conclude that narcissism may lead to hubristic behaviours.

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Exemption from Rules

Idiosyncrasy credit is defined as the degree to which a group member can run afoul of the norms of his or her group without being sanctioned.⁷⁷ Due to their high idiosyncrasy credit, group leaders can be exempt from rules. To some degree, group members with higher status may feel free to not comply with group norms because of the high idiosyncrasy credit given to them by other group members. The low level of constraints on the leaders who exercise authority is one of the key external factors that leads to hubris.⁷⁸ Exemption from the rules may also come from the characteristics of the focal person. Some people, especially those having narcissistic personalities, have a natural tendency to break the rules because they have a sense of exemption from the rules, which they think are only valid for people other than themselves.⁷⁹ Whether the right to be exempt from rules is given to them by their subordinates or taken by themselves as result of their narcissistic personality, exemption from the rules may lead to hubris.

Series of Recent Success

Success cultivates hubris.⁸⁰ If an executive experiences a stream of successes, the inclination for exhibiting hubristic behaviours tends to increase.⁸¹ When managers associate the firm's successes entirely to themselves, it is likely that they are suffering from hubris.⁸² Additionally, a series of recent successes has the tendency to create a fertile breeding ground for hubris, especially when the organizational successes are caused mainly by external factors but attributed to the manager. Not surprisingly, it is more likely that top managers are associated with recent organizational successes.⁸³ Kroll and his colleagues⁸⁴ argued that Napoleon was given the full credit for all the victories of the Grand Army of France. Until he started his campaign for Moscow, Napoleon had accumulated a record of accomplishments by defeating Austrians, Russians and Prussians. Leaders also tend to link the successes of their organizations to their behaviours by visualizing how their own actions lead to successes, and how failures would come if they had not initiated certain actions.⁸⁵ Hayward and Hambrick hypothesized that the greater the series of successes of an organization, the more likely the managers are to behave in a hubristic manner.⁸⁶

Uncritical Acceptance of Accolades

The acceptance of the accolades of other people without asking oneself whether they are accurate is another factor enhancing hubris. Praise from others is likely to breed hubris, since any praise from others confirms and legitimizes the receivers' narcissism, meets their high need for praise and

admiration from others, and contributes to their sense of grandiosity.⁸⁷ Kroll and colleagues argued that Napoleon did not have a self-image as the master of Europe, but the media helped to create that self-image by excessive praise.⁸⁸

CONTINGENCIES AFFECTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ANTECEDENTS AND HUBRIS

In our proposed model, societal culture (e.g., power distance) and military culture (e.g., hierarchy) are the contingencies affecting the relationships between the antecedents of hubris and the hubris itself.

Societal Culture

Hofstede defines culture as the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others.⁸⁹ Power distance and uncertainty avoidance, as sub-dimensions of societal culture,⁹⁰ are the main cultural dimensions serving a moderator role in the proposed model.

Power Distance. Power distance is defined as the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally.⁹¹ In low power distance cultures, individuals see themselves relative to others as equals rather than superiors and subordinates; in high power distance cultures, subordinates accept power relationships that are more absolute and autocratic.⁹² How a leader encourages, reacts to, and rewards dissent or disagreement determines the power distance relationship of an organization's culture.⁹³

Power distance is implicit in hierarchical organizations, especially in the military.⁹⁴ Superiors in high power distance cultures have power based on their legal status in the organizational hierarchy.⁹⁵ While high power distance cultures provide a stable distribution of power that brings order in uncertain and chaotic environments, they also tend to suppress subordinates from questioning, disagreeing, or raising alternative points of view.⁹⁶ Thus, although the high power distance culture common in the military contributes to combat effectiveness in adverse and complex situations, it also has the potential to quash conflict and disallow dissenting opinions to cultivate.⁹⁷ We propose that the higher the power distance, the higher the possibility the antecedents would lead to hubris in military leaders.

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Uncertainty Avoidance. Uncertainty avoidance is defined as the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations.⁹⁸ If subordinates have a tendency toward uncertainty avoidance, this might pave the way for the leaders' hubris. The leaders' exaggerated pride and overconfidence would meet the desires of the subordinates for a leader to provide order and stability.⁹⁹ Therefore, we expect that uncertainty avoidance as a contextual factor may have a moderating effect on the relationships between the antecedents of hubris and hubris itself.

Military Culture

Schein defines culture as the set of assumptions that are shared, taken-for-granted and implicit, by a group that determines how that group perceives, thinks about, and reacts to its various environments.¹⁰⁰ Organizational culture communicates a sense of identity, provides unwritten and often unspoken guidelines for how to get along in the organization, and ensures the stability of the social system that the employees experience.¹⁰¹ We have included hierarchy-adhocracy and clan-market cultures from the taxonomy of the competing values framework¹⁰² to the proposed model as moderators under the name of military culture variables.

Hierarchy versus Adhocracy Culture. Hierarchy culture is mostly seen in large organizations such as the military. It is characterized by multiple standardized procedures, large numbers of hierarchical levels and an emphasis on rule reinforcement, by which internal control is maintained.¹⁰³ If an organization is dominated by a hierarchy culture, the most effective managers tend to be in the roles of organizing, controlling, monitoring, administering, coordinating, and maintaining efficiency.¹⁰⁴ Contrary to hierarchy, adhocracy cultures do not have centralized power or relationships based on authority. In adhocracy, the power flows from individual to individual or from task team to task team, depending on the characteristics of a specific problem to be solved at a specific time.¹⁰⁵ The hierarchy culture represents the centralization of authority as well as the prominence of levels of hierarchy and may create an environment that may facilitate the antecedents of hubris to lead to managerial hubris.

Market versus Clan Culture. Market culture is another type of organizational culture which is characterized by stability and control. In the market culture, leaders are characterized as tough, demanding, hard-driving producers and competitors.¹⁰⁶ A strong emphasis on winning is the glue that holds the organization together.¹⁰⁷ Contrary to market culture, clan culture assumes that teamwork and employee development are the best options to manage the

environment, and that empowerment, participation commitment and loyalty are the major tasks of management.¹⁰⁸ The market culture increases the likelihood of an organizational environment to facilitate the antecedents of hubris to lead to managerial hubris.

CONSEQUENCES OF HUBRIS

Hambrick¹⁰⁹ stated that “the experiences, values, and personalities of top executives have prevalent influences on their fields of vision (the directions they look and listen), selective perceptions (what they actually see and hear) and interpretations (how they attach meaning to what they see and hear).” Accordingly, upper echelons theory suggests that the organization is a reflection of its top managers, such that the characteristics of top management influence the organization’s strategic decision-making and organizational performance.¹¹⁰ Therefore, hubris as a characteristic of the managers is thought to have organizational-level consequences. Additionally, as in the Greek mythology from which the concept of hubris comes,¹¹¹ managerial hubris is punished by corporate failures¹¹² in the same manner hubris is punished by Nemesis.¹¹³ In line with the extant literature, the consequences of hubris are the subtopics in the proposed model: operational failure, poor unit performance, poor decision-making processes (i.e., intuitive decision-making, relying on simplistic formulas for success, failure to face changing realities, excessive risk-taking), self-serving bias and arrogance.

Operational Failure

The hubristic leaders tend to create weak strategy formulations and set overambitious goals, both of which can result in bad performance and failure. When faced with failures stemming from overambitious and weak strategies, rather than giving attention to the factors that led to the bad performance, the hubristic leaders are inclined to create new, but still unreasonable and unsuccessful strategies.¹¹⁴ The vicious cycle of failures and new grandiose strategies is referred to as “hubris trap” and it leads to repeated organizational failures.¹¹⁵

Hayward and colleagues, the developers of the hubris theory of entrepreneurship, argue that the overconfident actors (i.e., the actors who are under the influence of their overconfidence, also referred to as hubris) are more inclined to start business ventures but, in the end, their overconfidence affects their decisions about allocation, usage and attainment of resources.¹¹⁶ As a result, the overconfident behaviours of these entrepreneurs lead to an increase in the likelihood of failure in their ventures. It can be stated that

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the hubris of entrepreneurs at the individual level has a negative effect on the success of business ventures at the organizational level. In line with the negative results caused by hubris, Malmendier and Tate argued that overconfident CEOs overestimate their abilities in generating returns from M&As, and therefore, tend to overpay for their M&A acts, which were empirically demonstrated to be value-destroying.¹¹⁷ Moreover, the value-destroying effect would be stronger if overconfident CEOs have access to internal financing or if the merger is a diversification that can be made without external financing.¹¹⁸

Integrating the hubris theory of entrepreneurship into the military context, hubristic military leaders would be expected to take more risky actions. The effect of hubris on their decisions could lead to the unsuccessful allocation of resources and finally lead to a series of operational failures (as in the case of Napoleon).¹¹⁹ Like the CEOs' M&A activities that do not require external financing,¹²⁰ military leaders have enough power to do what they envision,¹²¹ which can lead to operational failures as a result of their hubris.

Poor Unit Performance

Unit, group, and team performance is affected by many variables, but leadership and the characteristics of the leaders play an important role in performance levels.¹²² In addition to positive effects, leaders may have negative effects on performance if they have specific characteristics, such as the Dark Triad (i.e., narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy),¹²³ toxic leadership characteristics¹²⁴ or hubris. Examining Chinese publicly traded firms from 2002 to 2005, Jiang and colleagues found that managerial overconfidence decreased firm performance in terms of profitability due to a rapid rate of expansion and overinvestment.¹²⁵ In another study on managerial overconfidence, it was empirically shown that the overconfidence of entrepreneurs caused poor firm performance.¹²⁶

Narcissistic CEOs were found to develop highly dynamic and grandiose strategic ventures, causing the organizational performance to fluctuate widely or to impair the long-term performance of their firms.¹²⁷ In a similar vein, Haynes and colleagues showed that managerial hubris has negative effects on organizational performance.¹²⁸ In addition to the excessive risk-taking behaviours or mistakes in decision-making processes, hubristic managers may also not be able to behave in a manner that motivates subordinates to perform better, as in the case of toxic leadership.¹²⁹ As a result, we suggest that the hubristic behaviours of leaders may lead to poor unit performance.

Poor Decision-making Processes

Hubris leads individuals to lose contact with reality.¹³⁰ Excessive self-confidence may result in overly ambitious strategies, habitual risk taking and inflated decisiveness, the consequences of which may be catastrophic.¹³¹ Hubristic individuals tend to conceive that the information, knowledge, and insights that they have are more accurate than they really are.¹³² Their degree of certainty about the accuracy of their judgments exceeds the actual accuracy of their predictions.¹³³

As an important psychological bias, executive hubris has some effects on the strategic decision-making process and implementation of decisions.¹³⁴ By empirically testing Roll's hubris hypothesis,¹³⁵ Hayward and Hambrick found that hubris is a significant predictor in explaining irrational and excessively high acquisition premiums paid by the CEOs of the acquiring firms.¹³⁶ They showed that hubristic CEOs are inclined to pay higher than reasonable acquisition premiums since they are so strongly convinced about their abilities to increase performance levels and achieve overwhelming success in the newly acquired companies. Corporate executives affected by hubris tend to see themselves as having abilities and insights that others do not possess, and belittle the contributions of others.¹³⁷ They believe that they will be able to achieve better than the acquired firms' CEOs, who they see as less skilled.¹³⁸ The hubristic attitudes of the acquiring firms' CEOs cloud their rational decision-making processes and often, contrary to their expectations, result in reduced shareholder wealth for the acquiring firm.¹³⁹ Poor decision-making by hubristic leaders may be seen in the form of intuitive decision-making,¹⁴⁰ relying on simplistic formulas for success,¹⁴¹ failure to face changing realities¹⁴² and excessive risk-taking,¹⁴³ or it may involve a combination of these processes.

Intuitive decision-making. Intuition is argued to be one of the main constructs explaining the cognitive and affective processes that may contribute to hubristic leadership.¹⁴⁴ In their study on the perils of unbridled intuition, Claxton and colleagues proposed that when leaders overestimate the characteristics of their intuitions and relinquish the control processes on their intuition, their decision-making processes are more likely to rely on intuitions rather than rational thinking.¹⁴⁵ They argued that when intuition becomes uncontrolled and decoupled from rational analysis, the hubristic leaders' sense of being righteous will not be related to any particular decision-making process or judgment. Unfortunately, the judgments based on intuitive decision-making are associative, quick, unconscious, effortless, heuristic, and error-prone.¹⁴⁶ Although intuition is critical to leaders, decision makers at senior levels should be aware of the limitations of relying

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on intuitions because they will frequently result in close-mindedness and ignorance of dissenting information.¹⁴⁷

Relying on simplistic formulas for success. Hubris leads managers to rely on overly simplistic formulas when trying to achieve success.¹⁴⁸ In order to pursue repeated achievements, hubristic leaders are predisposed to rely on and reapply their unique or ingenious formulas which had brought success to them in the past.¹⁴⁹ Strategic-level processes which are controlled by hubristic leaders may suffer from crystallization and foolishness, both of which are characteristics of decision-making processes affected by hubris.¹⁵⁰ Hubristic leaders tend to believe that they possess the recipe for overwhelming success.¹⁵¹ This reliance on what had worked well in the past is so likely that these formulas become the standard operating procedures (SOPs) for hubristic leaders.¹⁵² But these fixed procedures enhance the predictability of the intended courses of action of their enemies, and decrease the chances of success (as in the case of Napoleon's Russian campaign).¹⁵³ Knowing what had brought Napoleon success in his previous battles, the Russians prevented the same tactics and strategies from working in Russia.¹⁵⁴

Failure to face changing realities. Individuals affected by hubris frequently fail to properly adjust themselves to changing realities and uncertain settings.¹⁵⁵ Hubristic leaders are inclined to have selective screening processes for external environmental factors and include only those factors that are critical to implementation of their formulas.¹⁵⁶ The exclusion of new realities could cause the decision-making processes to be flawed and to produce poor decisions.

Excessive risk-taking. Hubris may lead to an overestimation of an individual's capabilities, their self-performance, the possibility of success and a willingness to take higher risks when making strategic decisions.¹⁵⁷ Simon and Houghton found that overconfident managers are more prone to make pioneering (and risky) product introductions and express extreme, but misleading, certainty for achieving success.¹⁵⁸ In their study of the relationship between hubris and firm risk-taking, Li and Tang¹⁵⁹ proposed three operative mechanisms linking CEOs' hubris to firm risk-taking: CEOs' overestimation of their own problem-solving abilities,¹⁶⁰ CEOs' underestimation of the required resources and overestimation of the focal firm's resources¹⁶¹ and CEOs' underestimation of the level of uncertainty in their operating environment.¹⁶² They argued that these operative mechanisms suggest why hubris causes CEOs to overestimate their probability of achieving their strategic initiatives despite the excessive risks associated with them, and showed that CEO hubris is positively related to firm risk-taking.

Self-serving Bias

Hubristic individuals tend to believe that they perform better and more efficiently than others.¹⁶³ Self-serving bias is a kind of attribution error whereby individuals are more inclined to attribute their achievements to internal factors (e.g., their own abilities, efforts), but tend to attribute the failures they face to the external factors (e.g., the working conditions, the subordinates).¹⁶⁴ In a study on managerial myopia, it was found that corporate executives are inclined to behave in a self-serving biased manner.¹⁶⁵ Contrary to a largely held belief that entrepreneurs are only cautiously optimistic, it was found that entrepreneurs with self-serving bias perceive their prospects as very favourable, such that 81% of the entrepreneurs see odds of 7 out of 10 or better and 33% of them see odds of success of 10 out of 10.¹⁶⁶ But, when considering the prospects for other businesses like their own, these entrepreneurs who are overly optimistic about their own ventures perceive odds which are significantly lower.

With the high emphasis by hubristic personalities on arrogance, vanity, excessive self-importance, exaggerated confidence, and self-aggrandized perception of one's own self in mind,¹⁶⁷ we suggest that self-serving bias would be more likely to be exhibited by the ones infected by hubris and that it would be one of the consequences of hubris.

Arrogance

Arrogance is one of the dominant characteristics of hubris and it distorts the apprehension of the limits of human abilities.¹⁶⁸ Arrogance, together with excessive pride, is likely to be the result of the power that leaders possess.¹⁶⁹ After a series of successes, leaders' self-confidence increases and they may to feel like they can handle anything they encounter.¹⁷⁰ As a result, they find themselves in a rush of activities, facing every challenge, and their confidence rises to a level that is called arrogance.¹⁷¹ Kroll and colleagues argue that hubristic leaders have confidence to the point of arrogance, which is a consequence of their hubris.¹⁷² Contrary to external evidences, hubristic individuals are so overconfident that they see all the problems they face as trivial and easily tackled, and they feel that they are capable of making all events conform to their will.¹⁷³ Some leaders may have an excessive sense of potency verging on arrogance, which can be reflected in the strategic decisions they make (for example, paying high prices for corporate acquisitions).¹⁷⁴

In the case of Napoleon and his Russian campaign, Kroll and colleagues¹⁷⁵ pointed out how the hubristic behaviours of Napoleon brought him

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complete failure. Rather than focusing on the rational strategic needs to overcome Russia, Napoleon's campaign was more about satisfying his hubristic personality and arrogance. Napoleon was so under the influence of hubris that he called his officers timid and weak when they warned him about the perils of the Russian campaign. By the time of the campaign, his arrogance was reflected in his reference to the problems of a war with Russia as only minor details, which was the main cause of his failure. In line with the aforementioned arguments and cases, military leaders affected by hubris, may be prone to cultivate arrogance.

DISCUSSION

The purpose of this chapter was to develop a conceptual model for hubris in the military context based on prior theoretical and empirical research as well as military specific factors, and to make some recommendations for overcoming the hubristic behaviours of military leaders. We tried to integrate the studies that have been conducted to create a nomological network of the hubris construct. We now make some recommendations for overcoming hubris and its implications for practitioners.

IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCHERS

Our model contributes to the hubris literature by integrating variables from different theoretical and empirical studies. It focuses on the antecedents and the consequences of hubris as well as contextual variables. The proposed conceptual model needs to be empirically tested in various military contexts to determine its generalizability. Empirical testing will contribute to the extant knowledge of hubris as well as have implications for the development and revision of selection procedures and training programs for military leaders.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS

Successful leaders frequently turn out to be their own worst enemies by yielding to hubris.¹⁷⁶ According to the upper echelons theory, leaders' characteristics are reflected in their organizations.¹⁷⁷ As a result, both organizations and managers suffer from hubris. Instead of succumbing to hubris, there are a series of measures that can be taken to overcome it. Institutionalization of checks and balances on leaders¹⁷⁸ and monitoring leaders for signs of hubris¹⁷⁹ may impede the development of hubris. If leader intuition goes unchecked and leaders are not given any feedback about the consequences of their

actions, the leaders' intuition tends to thrive, which is a breeding ground for hubris.¹⁸⁰ Maintenance of learning environments may have utility in preventing hubris. In their suggestions for preventing intuitions from overcoming analytical thinking, Claxton and colleagues argued that learning environments cultivate good judgment.¹⁸¹ Development of authentic leadership, which has the opposite characteristics of hubris, may counter the fabrication of a false self-concept by creating trust-based relationships with others.¹⁸² Developing a strong organizational information base to present changing realities to leaders and promoting a heterogeneous and decentralized corporate culture could prevent leaders from tending towards simplistic formulas for achieving success.¹⁸³ Additionally, an organizational culture of diversity and openness to new insights should be cultivated and promoted in order to create an environment that is open to different, and even conflicting, points of view.¹⁸⁴

Executives may fall into the trap of building teams of individuals who always support what they suggest and of only listening to team members who always say what they want to hear.¹⁸⁵ Hubristic leaders are more prone to overestimating the value of their own performance relative to others and, therefore, are likely to ignore diverse opinions, even when these opinions belong to experts in a particular field.¹⁸⁶ In order to avoid these kinds of traps, cultivating the virtue of reverence,¹⁸⁷ dialogue, listening to naysayers, and appointing an alter ego¹⁸⁸ or devil's advocate may help. Not only must executives allow open dialogue and discussion, but they should encourage them.¹⁸⁹ The alter ego role should serve as a mediator and sounding board, and it may facilitate criticism of the leader.¹⁹⁰ Kets de Vries argues for appointing a "sage-fool" as a safety device against the hubristic behaviours of leaders. He argues that when the boundaries between reality and wishful thinking disappears and gives way to devastating consequences, the sage-fool can play a preventive role.¹⁹¹ High power distance and the lack of a culture of trust may have a negative impact on the ability to tell the truth to leaders, discourage critiquing or criticizing leaders' decision-making processes, and also prevent challenges to leaders.¹⁹² In a group decision-making process, leaders should share their own opinions, proposals and evaluations only after the others in the decision-making team share theirs in a roundtable fashion.¹⁹³

Managers should respect institutional checks and balances and not make any attempts to get rid of them.¹⁹⁴ In addition to external checks and balances to overcome managerial hubris, leaders should have self-assessment and self-control systems as well. These internal factors, such as humour, cynicism, self-criticism and humility, might help overcome hubris.¹⁹⁵ Leaders who remain modest while holding power, who do not abandon their previous

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lifestyle and avoid the traps of power are most likely to be successful in overcoming hubris.¹⁹⁶ Kroll and colleagues argued that being introspective enough to perceive the capabilities of the self and the importance of counseling by others is the most useful way for a leader to fight against hubris.¹⁹⁷ Although it is difficult,¹⁹⁸ reflecting on one's own performance may be another precaution to prevent hubris from affecting leaders. Leaders should confront their own failures by critically evaluating their actions.

Kroll and colleagues submitted the case of Daimler-Benz's CEO Jurgen Schrempp as an example of how being reflective is helpful to overcoming hubris.¹⁹⁹ Rather than falling into the trap of self-serving bias, Schrempp was reflective enough to accept that the decline in his company's fortunes was due to internal problems, especially with himself; he led Daimler to a 45 percent increase in corporate share price.²⁰⁰ Additionally, leaders should bear in mind that formulas which brought successes in the past may not subsequently yield similar results and, therefore, they should stay away from past-oriented approaches in order to prevent their mental maps from crystalizing.²⁰¹

Hayward argues that applying the ego check framework to business leadership would be helpful in the fight against hubris.²⁰² The ego check framework could also be applied by military leaders. According to the ego check framework, leaders must not get too full of themselves, which means their locus of pride must come from their appreciation of doing good work rather than the approval from others; get in their own way by having a trusted advisor and listening to them; kid themselves about their situation by seeking, using and sharing salient feedback about what is going on around themselves; manage with false bravado; and test the waters rather than plunging in it with both feet.²⁰³

LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE STUDIES

In the proposed model, we only included contingencies about culture (i.e., societal and organizational culture) but there could be other contingencies as well as mediators. In order to fully understand the antecedents and outcomes of hubris in military leaders, moderating variables in addition to culture could be added to the model and empirically tested in future studies. We did not add distal variables to our model, and it is suggested that in future studies, distal variables be added in order to make the nomological map of hubris clearer. Additionally, while examining the extant literature, it was seen that the operationalization of hubris varies among the studies and there is a need to have a psychometrically-sound instrument to measure the hubris construct.

In our proposed model, we suggested that military organizational cultures, which have the characteristics of hierarchy and market cultures, would be likely places for the cultivation of hubris. The findings of an empirical study of the military culture of US Army showed that it presented the characteristics of both hierarchy and market cultures.²⁰⁴ By using the Organizational Culture Assessment Instrument, Pierce found that the US Army had the “an overarching desire for stability and control, formal rules and policies, coordination and efficiency, goal and results oriented, and hard-driving competitiveness.”²⁰⁵ According to our proposed model, these findings show that culture in military organizations make military leaders more vulnerable to hubris. When considering that hubris has negative consequences and is referred to as the dark side of leadership, it is highly recommended that hubris in military leaders deserve the attention of researchers.

CONCLUSION

Our work adds to the growing literature on hubris by providing an integrated assessment of the relationships among antecedents of hubris, contingencies affecting the relationship between the antecedents of hubris and hubris itself, and consequences of hubris. The proposed model, however, needs to be tested empirically. Clearly, given the significance of hubris in the military context, both scholars and military practitioners should continue to understand the underlying mechanisms of leadership hubris.

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CHAPTER 9

ADDRESSING THE DARK SIDE OF GOOD LEADERS: THE NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE FORCE APPROACH TO LEADER DEVELOPMENT

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INTRODUCTION

The impact of negative leadership is often significant. In business, this can mean a reduction in productivity, profit, and a poor experience for workers and consumers alike.¹ Hogan and Kaiserp² argue that there is a moral imperative to limiting negative leadership because it causes incalculable suffering for subordinates. Negative leadership should also be managed because of its strong link to health issues including mental health issues for subordinates.³ As a result, negative leadership is linked to a reduction in organizational effectiveness particularly in terms of financial cost. For example, the cost of replacing a manager is immense, and there is the collateral cost of turnover of subordinates, lost intellectual and social resources, and lower productivity.⁴

In sectors like the military, that require safe practices to be upheld, leadership can be the difference between life and death.⁵ Previously, negative leadership has been very broadly defined and attributed to multiple causes such as trait-related factors, context-related factors, or a combination of the two.⁶ Consequently, the topic of negative leadership is as complex as the wider topic of leadership itself. This chapter aims to provide some clarity by differentiating popular terms like negative leadership from the more extreme toxic leadership through identifying the mechanisms of inadvertent failure and malicious intent.

We then examine the New Zealand Defence Force's (NZDF) perspective on how to mitigate the potential for leadership failure through a leader development system that enhances self-awareness, which is a necessary but not

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the New Zealand Defence Force.

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sufficient foundation for successful leadership. Specifically, we explore the process of developing leaders who are sufficiently self-aware to know their own vulnerabilities and can put in place mitigation tactics to keep themselves on track. We demonstrate how leaders can become more self-aware through an approach combining experiential learning with psychometric data. We then discuss how this contributes to a broader agenda for talent management and culture change, with the goal of enhancing leadership within the NZDF and therefore increasing operational effectiveness.

DEFINING NEGATIVE LEADERSHIP

When discussing negative leadership, it is typical to start by defining “leadership” in order to assist in determining when “leadership” is drifting into negative territory. However, this is challenging because the topic of leadership has been looked at through a variety of lenses across many decades, leading to very little theoretical consensus of its exact definition.⁷ The concept of leadership consequently requires a broad and flexible definition to be useful. Military definitions of leadership vary somewhat across nations but also have many commonalities. Specifically, military doctrinal definitions include characteristics such as influencing and inspiring others in order to achieve mission success and many also include an ethical dimension such as a focus on a greater organizational or societal good.⁸

A useful model to consider the classification and development of leaders is the Domain model. This model contains competencies that distinguish effective from ineffective managers. The Domain model divides these competencies into four key areas: intrapersonal skills, interpersonal skills, leadership skills and business skills.⁹ Together these four domains form a developmental sequence around which an educational program can be based. In doing so, it is important to appreciate that the skills developed earlier (i.e., intrapersonal and interpersonal) are harder to train than the skills developed later (i.e., leadership skills and business skills). The utility of this model is that all leadership competencies typically identified by organizations as being important for effective performance are able to be subsumed by one of the four key domains. Hence, developing leaders across these domains should lead to more competent performance.

FAILED LEADERSHIP

The Domain model also provides a useful framework with which to analyze the determinants of negative leadership. According to the Domain model,

deficiencies in any one of the four domains may lead to instances of negative leadership. Poor interpersonal skills, failure to achieve results, inability to build a team, and failing to transition effectively once promoted are central determinants of leadership failure.¹⁰ All of these failures fit under one or more areas of the Domain model.¹¹ In fact, *failure* is the word that most characterizes negative leadership.

A clear challenge, particularly in the selection of leaders, is that the likelihood that a leader will fail appears difficult to predict. The Centre for Creative Leadership defines a leader who has failed as one who, despite being predicted to perform well, is fired, demoted or involuntarily reaches a career plateau. In contrast, a successful leader is one who reaches a senior level and is still being considered for further promotion. This success appears to arise from their ability to establish good relationships, build and lead good teams, perform well in terms of achieving outcomes and adapt to the changes required for promotion (i.e., performing effectively across all domains).¹² The unpredictability of success may stem from the observation that career success in terms of potential for promotion is not always aligned with equally positive organizational outcomes. For example, a leader may not be equally committed to the success of their organization or team as they are to the success of their career.¹³

TOXIC LEADERSHIP

Throughout history there has been a popular view of leaders as being either inherently good or bad. The bad ones in particular have captured our imagination and have been subject to a vast amount of biographical analysis. Personality research has also followed this path in examining some of the traits associated with “badness”; however, it has tended to focus more frequently on routinely observed aspects of personality as captured by the five factor model.¹⁴ While this chapter focuses largely on negative leadership, as captured by failures across the domain model, it is worth briefly addressing the extreme examples of negative leadership which fall within the popular concept of toxic or destructive leadership.

Toxic leadership, like most aspects of leadership, does not lend itself well to a concise definition; rather it is easier to describe how it looks or how it is experienced as opposed to what it “is.”¹⁵ This is somewhat complicated by the fact that some of the attributes that make someone a toxic leader may also be what has made them successful.¹⁶ There are, however, some recurring topics in the toxic leadership literature that provide some descriptive utility.

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Toxic leaders are characterized by their ability to inflict significant harm to both subordinates and the wider organization. This is due to behaviours that are destructive and dysfunctional and are seen in negative outcomes over the longer term.¹⁷ However, rather than being aligned with themes of failure and unawareness, toxic leadership also appears driven by an element of *conscious* self-interest that concerns control and coercion rather than influence and inspiration.¹⁸ This is, to a certain degree, captured by the “Dark Triad” of personality which includes Machiavellianism, sub-clinical narcissism and sub-clinical psychopathy. Machiavellianism is characterised by manipulative behaviour; sub-clinical narcissism by grandiosity, entitlement, dominance and superiority; and sub-clinical psychopathy by high impulsivity, thrill seeking, low empathy and low levels of anxiety.¹⁹

While extreme or clinical forms of these attributes would typically be seen in the criminal justice system, the sub-clinical forms are relevant to how people operate in organizations, particularly in leaders. It is argued that some of these traits have assisted leaders in rising above their peers because they do not impede performance as they would in the presence of a clinical disorder and they may also have some short-term benefits. For example, narcissistic entitlement has been found to be associated with ratings of charismatic leadership and executive performance and Machiavellian leaders have been found to engage in effective strategic behaviour in complex environments.²⁰

The challenges associated with mitigating toxic leaders are that toxic leader behaviours are at times enabled by followers and environments that for some reasons support, tolerate, and at times promote, toxic leaders.²¹ Additionally, toxic leaders are unlikely to be toxic all of the time and may not be perceived as toxic by all people (particularly their superiors). As a result, the ability to isolate and suppress toxic leadership is challenging.²²

OVERPLAYED STRENGTHS

While it is perhaps simpler to think of leaders as being either good or as possessing some character flaw that makes them inherently toxic, there is significant risk that this overly black and white approach would disguise one of the more likely threats to successful leadership. Good leaders can head “off-track”, make mistakes, or slide into undesirable behaviour that has a negative impact on the success of the organization and the experience of their subordinates and coworkers. The reason this threat is more likely is because it has been established that what makes a leader successful can also be the very attributes that place them at risk of failing. Examples of behavioural

strengths that can become vulnerabilities include visionary leadership, communication and impression management skills, and general management practices.²³

Visionary leadership is effective when it is accurate, takes into account the realities of the environment and is aligned with the needs of the organization and its stakeholders. It goes wrong when leaders make an incorrect assessment of their environments and pursue their own agendas at the expense of the needs of the organization. This single-minded pursuit of their own goals makes them vulnerable to ignoring information that conflicts with their goals and also makes them vulnerable to ignoring alternative courses of action.²⁴ Successful leaders are often able to self-promote. However, when this self-promotion comes at the expense of others and their high need for recognition and visibility leads to a distortion of reality, they may begin to deceive not only their followers but themselves. Again, this leads to an inability to make good data-driven decisions and leaves them vulnerable to bias. They may also tell people what they want to hear, which increases the vulnerability to bias of their followers.²⁵

Finally, leaders' management practices that may once have been helpful can later become their downfall as they rise in the organizational hierarchy and the context in which they operate changes.²⁶ The overuse of certain behaviours may result from the erroneous assumption of linearity in assessing the impact of traits on outcomes.²⁷ To illustrate, it has been found that conscientiousness (which is widely agreed to be a positive predictor of performance) will predict that an individual is able to plan carefully, is motivated to do a good job and will persist to complete work. However, past a certain point, high levels of conscientiousness will also result in an individual who will be somewhat rigid and inflexible and may be hamstrung by perfectionism.²⁸ When tested, this trait was found to have a curvilinear relationship with performance: conscientiousness led to better performance up to a point, after which this relationship diminishes.²⁹

A further implication of overusing strengths is that it can result in too much of some leader behaviours and also too little of complementary (or opposing) behaviours.³⁰ For example, it has been found that very high levels of ambition (as measured by the Hogan Personality Inventory) resulted in overuse of forceful and driving types of leader behaviours and too little of the complementary enabling and supportive behaviours. Specifically, it was found that personality only had to increase one standard deviation above the mean to produce an effect where behaviours were over and under used. Interestingly, it was also found that too little of a personality trait had an even lower

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threshold for producing excessive behaviour.³¹ The implication of this research is that very few leaders are truly versatile and hence, the vast majority are predisposed to overdo or underdo behaviours.

One reason that leaders may overdo or underdo behaviours is that they lack self-awareness. It has been argued that self-awareness, and self-regulation, determines whether negative leadership will be manifested. That is, when an individual is experiencing stress or, alternatively, is feeling complacent, they will be more likely to display negative behaviours because they are failing to effectively monitor and manage their own behaviour.³² If this happens repetitively, it can create a gap between an individual's identity versus their reputation, suggesting a need for greater self-awareness.³³ Theories of self-regulation and self-awareness also support the premise that it is relatively easy for anyone to display negative leadership behaviours, which needs to be actively mitigated in a leader development program.

THE MILITARY CONTEXT

While militaries, like most other organizations, require ethical and effective leadership to limit costs and increase performance, they also present unique factors and environments that may make the outcomes of negative leadership more significant or likely to occur. A key organizational difference is the concept of command. Military leadership (as distinct from command) is no different than leadership performed in most other contexts. Command, however, is relatively unique to the military in that it is a legal form of authority in which control is used as a tool that can only be applied down the chain of command (it is never applied upwards) and requires compliance from subordinates.³⁴

Another key difference is the operational environment. Due to the nature of the work being undertaken by the military, leaders will be faced with increased levels of exposure to morally ambiguous situations or choices in which a potentially toxic focus on self-interest will likely be at odds with an outcome that serves the greater good. Ethical leadership requires that leaders operate in a way that transcends their own self-interests and this may be difficult for truly toxic leaders.³⁵ The nature of command is that the commander may be the last "sanity check" prior to taking significant action which could lead to a range of potential outcomes, some of which may be particularly serious. If poor ethical decisions are made or sanctioned by a commander, then this gives the enemy an opportunity to exploit these instances to further its own agenda.³⁶ This is an undesirable situation in which the enemy does

not need to expend a great deal of energy to reduce the effectiveness of its opposition. Both ethical and effective leadership are critically important in the deployed environment, where leadership has also been shown to have a relationship to the mental health of subordinates.³⁷ Subordinates in the deployed environment are more vulnerable to the impact of negative leadership because of their inability to avoid the leader as they live and work in close proximity.

Another key variable that makes negative leadership a concern for the military is that the military is a closed system that must develop its leaders from the bottom up. This means that it is not possible to swiftly replace an underperforming leader with someone from another organization; a new leader must be grown and developed through the military training system.³⁸ Therefore, there must be appropriate systems in place to address negative leadership when it occurs and develop leaders in such a way as to minimize the occurrence of negative leadership altogether.

There are a number of unique aspects of the military culture that enable negative leadership. Dixon suggests that there is some commonality with negative leadership and what the military values in a leader. Examples include a focus on short-term output and technical skill over the softer interpersonal skills that are crucial to true successful leadership over the long term.³⁹ The nature of the followers may also enable negative leadership due to a propensity for subordinates to sustain a respect for rank regardless of whether the leadership is positive or negative. Additionally, subordinates may have an inclination to know that a poor leader can be simply tolerated until the next posting or deployment cycle transfers either the subordinate or leader into a new position.⁴⁰

Like other organizations, the military is a human organization and is vulnerable to typical and well established human failings. Some aspects of the military operating environment make these vulnerabilities more likely to occur. These vulnerabilities include a predisposition for group-thinking, moral disengagement due to extreme conditions and fatigue, and the transfer of responsibility.⁴¹ While some of the behaviours that result from these vulnerabilities may appear particularly negative or toxic, it is apparent that all humans are vulnerable to these failings and that the best way to mitigate them is to develop the meta-cognitive skill of self-awareness.⁴² This means that it is important to consider the idea that all leaders may be vulnerable, under the right circumstances, to behaviour that others would experience as negative. This also means that we need to consider ways in which this human vulnerability can be mitigated.

HOW TO DEVELOP ETHICAL AND EFFECTIVE LEADERS

Many leader development programs focus on identifying problematic behaviours and developing skills to adapt these inappropriate behaviours into more effective behaviours. Such an approach is referred to as “surface learning”, which is of dubious lasting impact.⁴³ To be truly effective, “deep learning”, in which there is “an impact of one’s implicit understanding of leadership, one’s self-concept, and one’s role as a leader” must also occur.⁴⁴ In addition, a leader’s development should be clearly linked with the organization’s learning and development culture to ensure that both the goals of the organization and the leader are aligned.⁴⁵ How should a broad range of leaders with various learning styles and learning orientations be engaged in development? Maurer and Lippstreu argue that leader development programmes “are far more likely to have an enduring impact if they offer new learning and opportunities for growth in self-awareness, reflection, multisource feedback, goal setting, and guided practice of new behaviours, combined with follow-on assistance from coaches”.⁴⁶ This requires a more innovative approach than the traditional development methods used to train military personnel.

THE NZDF PERSPECTIVE

The NZDF, like many other militaries, has historically focused on the more readily trainable aspects of the Domain model, specifically leadership skills and technical skills as delivered during typical career courses. It is only more recently that this imbalance has begun to be addressed through a systematic approach that actively tackles the intra- and interpersonal domains of leader development. The Leadership Development System (LDS) seeks to create new learning opportunities for leaders at all levels of the organization to engage in deep learning about their self-concepts and their impacts on others.

A fundamental focus of interventions within the LDS is to bring an individual’s view of themselves, including their goals and aspirations, and their self-evaluation of their performance and skills, into greater alignment with the views that others hold of them.⁴⁷ In doing so, there are some important learning outcomes that are being targeted: modelling self-awareness and self-control, modelling the NZDF ethos and values at all times, building trust and relationships, and influencing the performance of others under pressure. These are all contained in the NZDF’s Leader Development Framework which sets the organization’s expectations of leaders. These learning outcomes do not lend themselves naturally to classroom training. More

specifically, while there may be a theory component taught in the classroom, there is also a practical element inherent in the topic. Bringing about deep and sustained behavioural change is not likely to be achieved through traditional methods of teaching. Hence, a more innovative and deeply engaging form of learning is required to achieve the potential gains in leader behaviour that come from increased self-awareness.

EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING

Many of the influential theorists in learning and development have emphasized that at the heart of learning is how individuals process experience. It is particularly important in learning for individuals to reflect on their experiences and draw meaning from them.⁴⁸ To achieve this learning, the LDS needs to create opportunities for individuals to be conscious and deliberate about learning from their experiences. Experiential learning stems from a four-part process of concrete experience, observation and reflection, the formation of abstract concepts, and testing them in new situations.⁴⁹ The learning process begins with a person carrying out an action and observing its effects. Individuals then reflect on their actions to understand them better. They can proceed to active experimentation by modifying the action to apply in a new situation.⁵⁰

This model of experiential learning underlies much of the teaching approach utilized in the residential courses that exist within the LDS. However, one of the key tenets of experiential learning is that it does not need to be conducted in a classroom or even as part of a leader development program. There is a specific subcategory within experiential learning referred to as outdoor experiential training (OET) that capitalizes on this wider experience. The aim of OET is generally to develop reflective skills and encourage individuals to take stock of their leadership capabilities.⁵¹

THE IMPACT OF THE OUTDOORS

Since the 1960s, outdoor experiential training has grown markedly in popularity as a form of leader development. In a typical OET program, physical activities are used as a means for individuals to learn about their strengths and weaknesses. Rather than providing information, participants reflect, derive meaning and learn from OET experiences, which they can then apply to their performance back in the workplace.⁵² Being taken outside of a familiar environment and comfort zone can lead individuals to reassess their long-held assumptions, which in turn can lead to learning and new behaviour.

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Despite OET's popularity, the body of research supporting its efficacy is more recent. In evaluating a wilderness training program for senior leaders, Watson and Vasilieva found evidence that "wilderness training is a catalyst for sustained leadership development" that lasted for up to three years following the program.⁵³ The majority of participants reported greater levels of self-belief and confidence and this translated into changes both at home and at work. They identified that a key benefit of outdoor training is that "unfamiliar surroundings were used to liberate leaders from organizational norms and cultures."⁵⁴ They concluded that the retreat experience accelerates a process of self-awareness that brings about sustainable personal change. That change results in increased confidence back in the workplace to challenge poor performance and practice, and to influence key stakeholders. They found that coaching was a necessary ingredient to enable leaders to reflect on their retreat experience and translate their learning into practical outcomes.

In reviewing five meta-analytic studies of the outcomes of outdoor programs, Neill found evidence that "self-concept" showed larger improvement at the follow-up mark than immediately after the program, suggesting "a sleeper effect whereby self-concept changes in particular are begun during a programme and then continue to unfold afterwards."⁵⁵ He observed that such programs "seem capable of triggering an ongoing cycle of positive change within participants."⁵⁶

UTILIZING THE OUTDOORS

The New Zealand Army has been evolving outdoor experiential leader development training for many years. With the introduction of the LDF, these courses have been aligned with LDF learning goals. In addition to the experiential activity (examples of which include whitewater kayaking, caving, rock climbing and alpine touring), participants receive feedback from three independent sources through the use of a 360-degree tool, personality profiling tools and peer feedback. Together these three sources of information show common themes that can be a powerful force for change that carries over to the workplace. A key component of the feedback is the concept of an individual's behaviour when they let their guard down and reveal dark side behaviours. Placing an individual under pressure through exposure to an OET creates an environment where dark side behaviours are likely to be displayed.

The cycle of learning follows Kolb's experiential learning theory, with an activity followed by a review of the behaviour, then trying new strategies. At the end of the course, emphasis is placed on developing behavioural

strategies for transfer to the workplace. An internal evaluation concluded that this focus was working effectively, as 96% of participants claimed to have changed their behaviour as a result of their OET experience, most commonly in relation to dealing with challenging situations more effectively.⁵⁷

THE LEAD INTEGRATED CAPABILITY PROGRAM

Since the introduction of the LDS in 2012, experiential opportunities have been developed further. The most finely tuned program exists at the Lead Integrated Capability level. This program is designed for those transitioning to a senior management role, either military or civilian. It is a two-week program that incorporates an experiential component in the first week and classroom-based instruction in the second week. The first week involves a thorough exploration of the individual's reputation through the review of their personality profiles and 360-degree information provided by the Leadership Versatility Index (LVI). The personality profiles are used as the basis for a group discussion, looking at each scale in turn and discussing the strengths and weaknesses associated with either end of the scale. Through this deliberate separation of behaviours, participants gain a much greater appreciation of the full spectrum of behaviour in relation to each dimension of personality and its impact on others. While individuals at this stage in their career typically have a good understanding of their personality, this process deepens their understanding of the impact of their behaviour on others, as well as the extent to which they differ from others.

In addition to these discussions, participants review their LVI reports to gain insight into the perceptions of their superiors, peers and subordinates and how that compares with their views of themselves. They are also introduced to the concept of overplaying their strengths and underplaying complementary behaviours. Syndicate facilitators are available for individual coaching and ensuring that the leaders comprehend the full extent of their behaviour and its impact on others, including their potential dark side and how/when it typically manifests. Participants then use this new knowledge of their behaviour to develop strategies to address their less effective behaviours. These strategies are disclosed to the group to stimulate peer feedback and then new strategies are offered to help manage potentially derailing behaviour. These exercises constitute the first steps in Kolb's experiential learning cycle and bring the individual to the point of active experimentation with new behavioural strategies.

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Over the first few days of the course, as participants are exploring their reputations and behaviours through the eyes of others, they are also practicing the skills needed for their experiential activity. For instance, if they are going caving, they practice the rope skills required to abseil safely into the cave. Once they have mastered these skills and broadened their self-awareness, they conduct the experience as a team that must transit collectively through the caving system, which is an exercise in endurance, perseverance and teamwork. Individuals are placed under pressure in a real environment with real interactions that are unfamiliar and challenging, with the presence of real risk and associated potential consequences.

Following the activity, while in a group setting, course members then give each other feedback on their behaviours during the exercise, focusing on both a key strength and a key weakness. This feedback highlights observed behaviours of each individual's dark side tendencies and the extent to which they either kept them effectively in check or not, and the impact on others. Individuals continue to reflect on their behaviours over the course of the weekend, when they return to their families and then the following week in the classroom. The course culminates in each member writing a leader development plan, which is shared with the course.

At the conclusion of the program, participants' managers are invited to attend the final afternoon to discuss the developmental plan with their subordinate. Parts of the plan can then be directly transferred to the individual's performance appraisal plan as behavioural skills to be focused on during the next reporting period. Managers are then expected to provide ongoing support, opportunities and feedback in the coming months to assist the individual in achieving their development goals, and be a more effective leader. Initial research at the three month mark indicated that most students had made deliberate, planned changes to the way they operate as a result of their development plans.⁵⁸

LASTING POSITIVE CHANGE

While these experiential learning interventions are achieving positive results, learning in an environment other than the workplace does create challenges in the transfer of the learning.⁵⁹ Learning that occurs either in the classroom or outdoors does not always result in lasting behaviour change in the workplace as individuals slip back into their previous patterns under the weight of a heavy workload.⁶⁰ This places greater emphasis on the importance of viewing leader development as an ongoing process where people learn most

effectively in the context of their work environment and with the assistance of a coach.⁶¹

Salas et al. have highlighted the importance of recognizing that learning is shaped by factors that occur both before and after a course, in addition to the actual course.⁶² There is evidence that individuals perform best in a course when they come with appropriate expectations and mind-set. To achieve this objective, the NZDF expects all managers to have constructive conversations with participants prior to course attendance. These conversations should provide a realistic assessment of the individual's current leadership ability including any negative leader behaviours. Post-course factors have also been identified to enhance the transfer of learning. These factors include environments that provide formal and informal reinforcement, post-training goal-setting interventions, guided reflection, mentoring and opportunities to perform new behaviours on the job.⁶³ The more supervisors communicate the value of the training to the organization and encourage new behaviours, the more effective the learning transfer is likely to be.⁶⁴

Burke and Hutchins⁶⁵ further identified the role of coaching, practicing new skills immediately post-training in addition to supervisor feedback. Support from peers was recognized as even more important than support from supervisors in influencing learning transfer.⁶⁶ Proactive networking also affords leaders greater access to information, resources and sponsorship, which can advance their career development.⁶⁷ For the NZDF, initial findings from the Lead Integrated Capability program highlighted the value of the cohort and follow-up at the three month mark. The cohort remained in contact and held one-another to account, with participants feeling they were "stakeholders in each other's success."⁶⁸

To complement and extend the pre-course discussion, all NZDF managers are expected to have further conversations post-course with participants to discuss their learning development plans to help embed them in their workplaces. The other significant system enabler will be the building of a follow-up process with the cohort to reinforce learning so that leaders continue to make behavioural adjustments. It is envisaged that post-learning action groups conducted on a regular basis will assist leaders to maintain focus on their goals and gain the benefits of a tight cohort, maintaining ongoing leader development.

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EMBEDDING THE CULTURE

The development of the LDS over the last five years has been part of a broader NZDF process of transitioning its philosophical approach to the development of people. A component of this involves understanding that learning and development should not be course-centric, as it has traditionally been viewed in the NZDF. In fact, much learning (estimated to be up to 70%) occurs in the workplace in an ongoing manner as leaders are exposed to challenging job assignments and adverse situations that stretch them.⁶⁹ Riggio asserts that leaders, no matter the level of their technical expertise, should always be engaged in a continuous learning process. He argues that leaders can “always find ways to improve and learn how to lead better,” given the complexity of leadership and its application to the local context.⁷⁰ This places further emphasis on the importance of managers understanding their role as coaches and mentors to help individuals draw out the learning from their experiences.

A further element of the cultural change is that leadership is considered a malleable skill. It includes a capacity and set of behaviours that can be developed and enhanced through training and experience.⁷¹ Drawing on Dweck’s research into fixed and growth mind-sets, the underlying philosophy of the framework is that any leader can develop their leadership skills and ability. This moves away from the traditional view of leadership being determined by genetics and not amenable to development.⁷² When individuals are provided with feedback about negative leader behaviours they are more amenable to addressing this information if they believe the skills are within their control to change.⁷³

LINKING THE SYSTEM

The NZDF has constructed a systematic approach to leadership development by creating a performance appraisal system with behavioural competencies contained in the Leader Development Framework. Since 2015, most NZDF personnel, military and civilian, have had their performance appraised using this framework. When managers discuss performance goals with their team members, they can now look for development opportunities to address leadership issues or provide growth opportunities. The process is such that while development and appraisal are now linked, the independence of these areas maintains the privacy of individual goals.

As people become familiar with the appraisal tool, it is intended to become a system enabler for meaningful conversations about performance, both good

and bad. The LDF clearly sets out the expectations for leaders. Part of this cultural shift requires that managers understand that to be effective, active coaching is a key function of their role. In turn, this will encourage them to develop their coaching skills and competence in providing feedback. As performance discussions become less task-focused and more coaching-focused, individuals should receive the valuable feedback they need to be ethical and effective leaders.

CONCLUSION

Even the most well-respected and highly effective leaders can and do derail, displaying behaviours that will impact negatively on those around them. Organizations wanting to safeguard their people from the impact of negative, even toxic, leadership need to actively develop mitigations for the dark side of leader behaviour. While leaders learn organically from their experience and through watching other leaders, organizations can accelerate this learning through the deliberate, planned use of developmental experiences set within a culture that encourages honest feedback and ongoing learning. The NZDF is taking a systematic approach to developing leader behaviour by using a range of tools and opportunities targeted at increasing an individual's self-awareness. Experiential outdoors training offers the opportunity to create experiences which demonstrate some of an individual's key personality traits and flaws in action. Overall, the interventions and culture that support the LDS focus on deepening a leader's understanding of their role in the NZDF and on enhancing their understanding and management of behaviours while under stress. This approach to leader development is intended to ensure leaders are thoroughly skilled in ethical and effective leadership prior to demonstrating it during operations.

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CHAPTER 10

DEALING WITH MILITARY LEADERSHIP INCOMPETENCE IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL DEFENCE FORCE

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Soldiers can be led to their death (in battle) only if the leader first earned their trust.

Sun Tzu¹

INTRODUCTION

The four main responsibilities of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) are to defend and protect South Africa, to safeguard its borders and infrastructure, to promote peace and security in Africa, and to perform developmental tasks assigned to it.² This is clearly a difficult task and it is not unrealistic to expect that soldiers will die. Furthermore, the context in which these four responsibilities will be addressed is clear from Krulak's³ description of the typical battlefield of the 21st century. He postulates the future battlefields as complex endeavors where military operations other than war are combined with disparate challenges of mid-intensity conflict. This is a battlefield arising from growing global instability, and characterized by the widespread availability of sophisticated weapons and equipment, blurred boundaries distinguishing combatants from non-combatants, and asymmetrical warfare used as a means to redress the imbalances of force strength and technological superiority. Constant media coverage and social media also mean that all military actions will be transparent to an international audience. Krulak refers to this modern-day warfare as the "three-block war" and defines it in the United States Marine Corps context as "contingencies in which Marines may be confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks."⁴ SANDF elements and their leaders can expect the same when deployed in Africa to fulfill their responsibilities.

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the South African National Defence Force.

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It has become apparent from operations in the last two decades that the outcome of such operations may hinge on the decisions made by small unit leaders on a tactical level. This implies that junior leaders will have to deal with a complex array of challenges without direct supervision from senior leadership. They will be required to make well-reasoned and independent decisions based on good judgement, maturity and strength of character. It is therefore of paramount importance that military leaders in current and future warfare be skilled, competent and prepared to lead.

Consequently, it can be postulated that leadership is important for militaries in general, or as the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst puts it, “leadership is the lifeblood of an army.”⁵ This view is further emphasized by the South African Minister of Defence, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, when she states that future layers of leadership need to be prepared to deal with the issues facing the SANDF as an organization.⁶ Krulak⁷ recommends the selection of bold, capable and intelligent men and women of character; training methods that emphasize honour, courage, and commitment; institutional commitment to lifelong professional development; sustaining the growth of technical and tactical proficiency and mental and physical toughness; and growth of integrity, courage, initiative, decisiveness, mental agility and personal accountability as some of the fundamental qualities and attributes.

The South African Defence Review of 2014 states that South Africa’s military capability must be commensurate with the country’s international status, strategic posture and continental and regional leadership role. It is no surprise that great emphasis is placed on the leadership required from members who are skilled, healthy, fit, highly disciplined professionals with a high level of morale and sense of duty.⁸ When a military leader lacks the necessary knowledge, skills and attributes required by the current and future battlespace, it will lead to a phenomenon that will be described as military leadership incompetence (MLI).

It is thus clear that there is, and rightfully should be, significant organizational concern about the negative aspects of military leadership in the SANDF. Kellerman states that there is a tendency to focus more on the “good” of leadership and not the “bad”, but poor leadership is still leadership.⁹ If one does not focus on studying the bad part of leadership, one will never truly become a subject matter expert on leadership. With respect to the SANDF, Firsing recently commented that leadership is a grave concern, thus suggesting the prevalence of MLI.¹⁰ In order to highlight this concern, the focus of this chapter will thus be to conceptualize MLI and to place its possible manifestation within a conceptual framework. This will be done by first defining

what military leadership is, followed by a description of MLI. The causes of MLI will then be discussed, and recommendations will be offered on how the SANDF can deal with this challenge. It is important to *notes* that in this chapter, the term leader applies to anyone in the SANDF appointed in a leadership, supervisory or managerial position.

MILITARY LEADERSHIP

In general, leadership can be defined as the thoughtful and conscious taking on of a role in which someone deliberately persuades, mobilizes and guides other parties to pursue shared future goals in order to reach a desired end state within a specific environment.¹¹ Rauch and Behling define leadership as “the process of influencing the activities of an organized group toward goal achievement.”¹² Military leadership can be defined as “the process of influencing others to accomplish the mission by providing purpose, direction, and motivation.”¹³ Similarly, the South African Army Leadership, Command and Management Manual defines leadership as a “process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization.”¹⁴

From these definitions, it is clear that there are certain commonalities between military leadership and leadership in a civilian context. Leadership is, in essence, a process of influencing others with the aim of achieving set objectives. Military leadership is therefore a specific or contextual kind of leadership. All the principles for leadership in general therefore also hold true for military leadership. However, the complexity of the context or environment where military leadership needs to be applied, as well as the required ability to influence others, implies that there is a smaller margin of error for military leaders. It is therefore necessary to echo what has been stated above “Leadership is the life blood of an army.” For this reason, military colleges, academies and training institutions pay particular attention to developing leadership skills. In terms of the context, it is also worth noting that one might be a good leader in a specific context, for example as a staff officer responsible for mainly managerial tasks, but might not do well in a different context, for example, as a unit commander. A detailed discussion of these contexts is, however, beyond the scope of this chapter.

Based on case studies of the great (and not so great) military leaders in history, General Maxwell Taylor¹⁵ identified four important aspects that form part of the profile of a good military leader. First, professional competence includes knowledge of the job and the ability to transfer such knowledge to

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others, as well as to supervise and evaluate the application of job knowledge. It also includes good judgement as well as physical fitness. Second, intellectual abilities are very important, as military leaders need to make sound decisions on very serious matters. Such abilities include clear oral and written communication and problem-solving skills and competencies. A military leader should continuously strive towards personal development and widening their horizons; in other words, the military leader should constantly be a student and a teacher. Third, military leaders need to have certain virtues and strength of character. These virtues include reliability, courage, dedication, determination and self-discipline. Strength of character is something that cannot be exactly defined, but involves the ability to influence others. It is a spark or charisma or imagination that causes others to be drawn to them and willingly follow them. The aspects of competence, intellectual abilities and some aspects of virtue can be taught or developed in potential leaders, but this strength of character cannot be taught without combining it with experience.

An overview of the literature on leadership in its negative and destructive form often highlights personality traits hidden in the so-called dark side of the leader. It uses concepts such as determinants of antisocial behaviour, psychopathological risk factors, authoritarian personality, narcissistic leaders, destructive leaders, derailed leaders, health-endangering leaders, dysfunctional leaders, abusive supervision or supervisors, toxic leaders, crazy bosses, intolerable bosses, bad bosses, harassing leaders, and petty tyrants. Other perspectives describe negative leadership practices, and negative aspects of leadership.¹⁶ These concepts describe leaders who demonstrate behaviours that have an adverse impact on individual subordinates, groups and the organization.

If the competence of leaders is of such great importance in the military environment, and if leaders should demonstrate elements such as strength of character, intellectual abilities, professional competence and the ability to influence others, it can be argued that failure to demonstrate these elements constitutes leadership incompetence. In the military environment specifically, it will be referred to as MLI; for the purpose of this discussion, MLI will be used as an umbrella term for the various forms of incompetence demonstrated by military leaders.

CONCEPTUALIZING MILITARY LEADERSHIP INCOMPETENCE

A review of South African news articles indicates that the South African military's leadership is in crisis, with specific reference to lack of leadership, greed and corruption.¹⁷ This confirms that leadership incompetence manifests itself in various ways in the South African military. Previously, MLI was described as an umbrella term for the various forms of incompetence demonstrated by military leaders. In order to more fully conceptualize MLI, the following definition is proposed:

That behaviour repetitively demonstrated (or not demonstrated when required) by a person in a military leadership position that intentionally or unintentionally has a negative impact on his or her subordinates and/or the effective functioning of the organization in achieving its objectives.

According to this definition, MLI refers to behaviour that has occurred and does not refer to intent or potential to do something. It is thus behaviour that can be observed or of which the consequences can be physically experienced. It also refers to repetitive behaviour, thus excluding single or isolated incidents of what can in general be described as bad leadership behaviour. Both active and passive behaviours are included in the concept of MLI. It therefore includes both what the person does and what the person neglects to do when they are expected to do it. Thus, the absence of certain behaviours or constructive qualities is included in this concept.

Another important aspect of MLI is the context in which the behaviour manifests itself. A position of military leadership implies that a person is appointed to a position of authority and has responsibilities to achieve organizational goals. Einarsen, Skogstad and Aasland emphasize the importance of context when they observe that if a leader exposes their subordinates to the risk of dying during war, it would not constitute a destructive form of leadership, but doing so in times of peace probably would.¹⁸

In terms of the outcomes of MLI, incompetent leadership behaviour may affect subordinates, the organization or both. It may adversely affect the effectiveness and/or motivation, well-being or job satisfaction of subordinates and may include behaviours that undermine the organization's goals, tasks, resources and effectiveness.¹⁹ Sometimes behaviours that undermine the organization and/or subordinates are more a matter of lack of skills or competencies than purposefully evil intent. It is furthermore important to *notes* that

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MLI behaviour might sometimes even have a positive intention, but result in a negative outcome (e.g., poor judgment and decision-making). In some cases, the leader may even be unaware of the negative impact of their behaviour. It is for this reason that the aspect of intentional or unintentional negative consequences is included in the definition. There are, however, instances where organizations or superiors expect leaders to act illegally (or carry out an illegal act) under the notion that it is in the legitimate interest of the organization. Leaders who refuse to carry out such illegal or unethical acts cannot be viewed as displaying a destructive form of leadership, but are rather demonstrating a constructive form of leadership.²⁰ Thus, in such situations disobedience cannot be viewed as a manifestation of MLI.

Einarsen, Skogstad, and Aasland observe that only a behavioural approach can be used to enlighten and train new leaders in the full range of possible behaviours that they may show and experience in the role of leader.²¹ Consequently, this chapter will address MLI from a behavioural perspective, thus excluding intent or motive and instead focusing on the manifested behaviour. Leadership incompetence in the military setting will be described through a conceptual framework of MLI based on behavioural descriptions. Such a framework should increase our understanding of these behaviours that manifest in the military environment and provides guidance for future research.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR MILITARY LEADERSHIP INCOMPETENCE

An overview of the leadership literature dealing with the negative side of leadership produced various themes and concepts that were subsequently placed in a conceptual framework (see Figure 10.1). This framework serves more of a heuristic function in that it provides a useful frame of reference for further observation and data collection and may eventually lead to formulating and testing a theory. This conceptual framework was based on the four clusters of competencies of good military leaders described by Taylor.²² MLI will, however, focus on the manifestation of the negative or opposite of these required competencies or the absence of such competence. The framework serves to summarize MLI behaviours logically. It should be noted that some of the concepts in the framework are interrelated. In the section below, the MLI framework is discussed including, where possible, reference to its manifestation in South Africa in general and more specifically in the SANDF context.




Figure 10.1: Conceptual Framework for Military Leadership Incompetence

MANIFESTATION OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP INCOMPETENCE

Poor Virtues and Character

This cluster of MLI involves inherent traits of the individual in the military leadership position. Yukl states that traits refer to “individual attributes,

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including aspects of personality, temperament, needs, motives and values.”²³ The MLI behaviour resulting from this cluster, with its origins in the personality traits of the leader, may range from severely antisocial and destructive to a mere lack of qualities and virtues required of an effective leader.

Unethical Behaviour. Atan refers to a number of destructive leadership behaviours included under the MLI umbrella that are aimed at the degrading of subordinates.²⁴ These may include bullying behaviour such as personal insults, threats and intimidation, humiliation, public shaming or status degradation rituals, giving frequent or continuously negative feedback, micromanagement, withholding recognition, taking credit for work done by others and treating people as if they are invisible.

Unethical behaviour may also manifest itself as callousness²⁵ and disrespect towards others. This can include sarcasm, uninvited physical contact, swearing, slamming doors, being excessively angry, arrogance, withholding information, using inappropriate humor, impolite interruptions, and unnecessary micromanagement (out of spite) of subordinates. This form of MLI may also include an attitude that the person in the position of authority is “above the law” (rules do not apply to them), and frequently reminding subordinates of who is in control. Hence this is an approach where the leader is mean and disrespectful and disregards the needs of other people.

Kellerman²⁶ identified corruptness as one of the items in her typology to describe bad leadership. Corrupt leaders lie, cheat or steal from the organization. A review of South African news articles confirms its manifestation. The reports suggest the presence of greed and corruption among some SANDF leaders.²⁷

Another form of unethical behaviour is known as insularity. In its severest form, insularity includes failure or refusal to acknowledge the adverse impact of one’s actions or group activities on those outside the group.²⁸ The Rwandan genocide is an example of such severe insularity. Firsing²⁹ suggests that the term also refers to narrow-mindedness of a less evil nature, such as when military leaders think that only they are right and refuse to listen to the advice and ideas of subject matter experts, colleagues or subordinates.

The worst form of unethical leadership behaviour is that of evil leaders that can be referred to as wickedness. Wickedness describes those who use evil means to cause atrocious physical or mental harm to others. Hitler is an example of such a leader; he led his Nazi followers to stage the Holocaust, a genocide that killed six million Jews. Joseph Kony of Uganda is another such leader; his forces were responsible for the deaths of more than 100,000

people, the kidnapping of at least 60,000 children and atrocities such as raping young girls and abducting them as sex slaves.³⁰ In this regard, Charlton³¹ advocates that people are more productive and societies stable when everyone is treated with respect and dignity.

Toxic Behaviour. Toxic behaviour is the manifestation of the toxic leadership approach. Toxic leaders harm individuals and the organization by the poisoning of enthusiasm, creativity, autonomy, and innovative expression.³² Toxic leaders further demonstrate a sense of over-control and may exhibit behaviours such as unfair rewards and punishment (i.e., rewards for those who agree with the boss and punishment for those who disagree or challenge him).³³ The toxic leader's combination of self-centred attitudes, motivations and behaviours for personal gain has a systematically destructive effect on subordinates, which eventually affects the organization, and ultimately affects mission achievement (see the work of Daniel and Metcalf for an extensive review of toxic leadership from a military perspective³⁴).

Yukl³⁵ describes the insensitive type of leader who exhibits abrasive and intimidating behaviour towards others. He adds that such persons can appear charming and concerned about others when it suits them, but are inherently selfish, inconsiderate and manipulative. He explains that such people advance to higher levels of leadership because their insensitivity is tolerated at lower levels because of their technical skills, but in leadership positions, their behaviour has a seriously adverse impact.

Unpredictability and Unreliability. Some authors relate unpredictability to toxic behaviour.³⁶ When the expectations of subordinates are not met in terms of the functioning of the leader, it may result in disappointment. With this comes an aspect that Charlton³⁷ refers to as unreliability. He mentions that implementation of ideas and decisions requires 90% of the leadership effort. Leaders who fail to implement decisions are perceived as unreliable. Leaders with high credibility grow followers with high commitment to the organization. The unreliability of the leader may cascade down to subordinates and even eventually result in a "who cares?" culture in the organization.

Uncommitted Behaviour. Leaders who lack commitment and dedication may choose to avoid accountability and rather complain frequently without doing anything about the situation. This type of behaviour demonstrates lack of courage (cowardice) and commands little respect from followers.³⁸ Subordinates may become despondent because of frequent complaints from the leader and also lose commitment and dedication themselves. The observations of the authors reveal that there seems to be a "passing the buck"

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approach among many leaders in the SANDF when it comes to taking responsibility and accepting accountability. Furthermore, many people join the SANDF to have an income, rather than being motivated by a calling or need to serve their country.

Dishonesty. Dishonesty refers to lack of integrity and has a demoralizing effect on subordinates. It may also encourage subordinates to act dishonestly in imitation of the example set by those in leadership positions.

Self-indulgence. Yukl³⁹ states that good leaders apply self-management strategies such as self-goal setting, self-monitoring, self-reward or criticism and rehearsal of planned action. MLI demonstrated as a consequence of insufficient self-discipline includes decadent and pleasure-seeking behaviour, such as misuse of or disregard for working hours, lack of gainful employment (being unproductive), failure to set or achieve goals and inability to evaluate one's own actions and/or think ahead in terms of what needs to be done and the best way of tackling it. Disregard for personal development is also associated with lack of self-discipline.

Inconsistency. Military members expect their leaders to apply norms and values equally to all members of the organization. Failure by leaders to do this leads to disparate behaviour among subordinates. Inconsistency in standards and procedures also leads to confusion and distrust among members of the organization. Inconsistent leaders are not trusted and this leads to demoralized subordinates.

Lack of Intellectual or Cognitive Abilities

Cognitive capacities or abilities consist predominantly of analytical and creative attributes that include capacities such as problem-solving, critical thinking, analytical thinking, creative thinking and the development of mental models.⁴⁰ Military leaders who lack cognitive abilities (sometimes also referred to as intellectual abilities) will find it very difficult to deal with complex environments, especially during military operations. Intellect and cognitive abilities are thus important from the perspective of MLI, as military leaders are required to analyze and solve problems and make decisions, and as they progress in the organization, to think of the future implications of what is happening in the present. The way in which they deal with this has an effect on their subordinates and the organization as a whole.

Inadequate Decision-Making Ability. To a large extent decision-making is about solving problems. An individual's ability to solve complex problems is

dependent on a few basic criteria, one of which is cognitive ability.⁴¹ The inability to make proper decisions can manifest itself in many ways, from poor and impulsive decisions to not making a decision at all. With regard to the latter, Piet Mouton, a South African business leader, observes that it is easy not to make a decision, to be a temporizer and then criticize easily if things do not work out. He says many people are good decision-makers with the advantage of hindsight, implying that they concur with the successful decisions of others after the fact. Poor decisions may lead to individual trauma or failure in achieving the military mission. The authors observed that there seems to be a trend in the SANDF of favouring collaborative rather than individual decision-making (and problem-solving). This results in hours of discussions and meetings with very little decision-making, and consequently a delay in implementation and lower productivity. It is, in fact, the opposite of the autocratic leadership style.

Poor Problem-Solving Abilities. Closely linked to decision-making is the ability to solve problems, which requires critical and creative thinking. Cummings and Worley define the problem-solving process as “a systematic and disciplined approach to identifying and solving work-related problems.”⁴² MLI is demonstrated when leaders fail to identify problems or challenges and fail to follow a logical process in generating options to solve the problem. Some leaders in the SANDF seem to follow a process of facilitating solutions from their subordinates rather than applying individual creative or critical thinking themselves.

Poor Oral and Written Communication. The ability to convey a message properly through oral or written communication is a result of practice and is dependent on pre-existing grammatical and language abilities. Leaders are required to demonstrate the ability to get an argument across with clarity, accuracy and logic, yet the literacy level in South Africa is decreasing⁴³ in response to the low standards of schooling in the country.⁴⁴ This situation can therefore be expected to have a negative impact, especially on the written communication abilities of SANDF members. Poor communication by a leader has a myriad of negative effects on the organization. The cognitive aspects of MLI are, moreover, not only linked to the present (here and now) situation, but also to the impact leaders will have on the future of the SANDF and their subordinates.

Lack of Strategic Thinking. Military leaders must be able to think strategically; they must be able to see the bigger picture. Tichy and Cohen⁴⁵ add that leaders need to be long-term generators of value. Krulak’s article describing the challenges for military leadership in the current context of operations

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argues that even junior leaders must have the ability to think strategically and not just demonstrate tactical leadership skills. The complexity of current operational scenarios requires making complex decisions that may have far-reaching effects.⁴⁶ Firsing⁴⁷ emphasizes that military leaders need to have a long-term perspective. In support of this idea, Dr. Johan van Zyl, a well-known South African businessman, states that one of the main causes of what he refers to as “weak leadership” is that people are unable to identify the correct strategic issues.⁴⁸ He says that the importance of this ability usually comes to the fore during times of crisis, when leaders with vision emerge through their ability to see the bigger picture. Erasmus and Uys refer to the findings of van Dyk’s research that concluded that only two percent of students at the SANDF’s Military Academy show the qualities of an inspiring leader and only eight percent do long-term planning.⁴⁹

Closed-Mindedness. People (including military leaders) may be narrow-minded or exhibit closed-mindedness. Close-mindedness is linked to stereotypes, suggesting a schema of attitudes toward or impressions about people that fits a mental picture that can be referred to as bigotry or prejudice.⁵⁰ Jordaan⁵¹ observes that this precludes the serious investigation of alternative possibilities or alternative perceptual hypotheses. People displaying this characteristic are thus likely to find it very difficult to change their perceptions about something and to change their attitudes.

Lack of Professional Competence

Professional competence includes behaviour derived from knowledge and skills that can be taught or developed through formal or informal training. It is also the personal responsibility of the leader. For the military leader, professional competence starts with military professionalism. Therefore, one of the first indications of lack of professional competence is lack of military professionalism.

Lack of Military Professionalism. Firsing states that over the past 15 years, except for some pockets of excellence at the unit level, there has been a constant and rapid dilution of professionalism in all spheres of the SANDF.⁵² The issue of lack of military professionalism in the SANDF context is further affected by what Greeff refers to as military leadership going to great lengths to provide political cover for government’s ineptness.

Low Professional Standards and Orientation to Excellence. Standards refer to adherence to set criteria. Kolenda advocates orientation to excellence for leaders, which will inspire those around them to follow suit.⁵³ A leader must

strive to be the best in his or her unit and a professional, moral and ethical example to others. Charlton states that future competitive advantage is dependent on the way people are led and the quality of human competence.⁵⁴ In order to achieve this, the development of human resources is critical. He mentions studies conducted by the United Nations that identified two essential criteria for successful nations: first, the development and proper management of human resources, and second, allowing international competition in order to raise the quality of human resources and products. The South African Minister of Public Service and Administration, Ngoako Ramathlodi, stated that it was important for the government to employ competent people who are able to perform their jobs with professionalism. He made this statement after expressing concern about the loss of competence and professionalism when leaders change posts often and then fail to work effectively with subordinates in their new environment.⁵⁵

Lack of Job Knowledge. A qualitative study focusing on leadership challenges and their impact on the SANDF identified the theme of leaders being placed in positions for which they are not qualified in terms of knowledge, experience or skills.⁵⁶ Participants added that the baggage of the South African apartheid era is weighing down the quality of leadership because affirmative action policies result in a practice called fast-tracking, through which members proceed through the ranks quickly based on their ethnicity, rather than on their competency. Such placements have the potential to affect everyone negatively. First, the leaders themselves experience being set up for failure, as they are unable to perform the tasks of the position effectively because of lack of experience and job knowledge. This may lead to high levels of stress, embarrassment and lack of trust and respect from subordinates. Second, subordinates may become frustrated by a lack of clear direction, as well as having to hold back on innovation and taking the initiative from fear of being perceived as delegating upwards. Third, the organization suffers from demoralized employees, resulting in lack of productivity. A second theme from the study indicated career advancement should not be based on who one knows, but instead on one's competence and job knowledge.

Failure to Transfer Job Knowledge. Kolenda advocates for leaders to “pay it forward” by being mentors and empowering others to become good leaders.⁵⁷ This can be done by counselling subordinates. Leaders who fail to empower others can be seen as undermining the sustainability of the organization. Some leaders appear to keep their job knowledge to themselves. This may be out of selfish motives, such as not wanting others to get ahead of them. It may also be due to not wanting to make the effort. Regardless of the motivation

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for failure to transfer knowledge, it has a serious long-term adverse impact on the organization and can thus be viewed as a manifestation of MLI.

Failure to Maintain Continuous Professional Development. Military leaders need to keep abreast of global trends in the security environment as well as activities and developments within their own force. The dynamic nature of the South African security environment requires military leaders to develop themselves continuously and attend formal courses to stay abreast of new developments. If military leaders are not up to date on the latest developments and trends, they may have to lead subordinates who are more informed than they are, which, in turn, could have a negative effect on trust and confidence in the leader. There is a close link between failure to maintain continuous professional development and the next topic, a limited understanding or awareness of the military context.

Limited Understanding or Awareness of the Military Context. Leadership is embedded in a specific environment representative of a certain time and space.⁵⁸ If the military leader does not have insight into the dynamics and nature of the military environment, they will fail to translate leadership principles and practices successfully into the military environment. An example is wanting to use democratic processes to select a platoon commander during a war. This leads to what is referred to as “misrepresented leadership”. Because of the SANDF’s transformation process, some military leaders progress quickly through the junior ranks, especially in a training environment, and are staffed in strategic level posts with little or no exposure or experience in the operational environment. This results in lack of understanding of the military context and inability to add value on the strategic level of the SANDF.

Contextual Incompetence. Sometimes a person may be eager to lead, but their leadership style is not suitable for the context. It may also happen that a person has too few skills or competencies required for a specific context. An example may include having the skills to be good in a command post but not knowing how to function when appointed as a staff officer.

Lack of Managerial Skills. In general, it can be said that management involves the continuing actions of planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling and evaluating the use of people, money, materials and facilities to accomplish an activity or task.⁵⁹ When a military leader lacks managerial skills they find it difficult, for example, to supervise and evaluate subordinates.

Poor Physical Attributes. Kott⁶⁰ states that the physical appearance and skills of a leader, in addition to technical and interpersonal skills, should be of a very high standard. Soldiers want to follow someone they respect. Therefore, leaders who do not look after their weight, health, fitness and appearance are viewed as lacking self-discipline, as these problems may be the result of self-indulgence, as mentioned above.

Misdirection

When a military leader does not have the influence to motivate and direct subordinates, it can be referred to as misdirection. As is evident from the definition of military leadership, the military leader is required to take command and to influence others to achieve goals. Failure to motivate others to achieve specific goals can be viewed as the manifestation of MLI. Misdirection starts when leaders lack the will to lead, are unable to motivate subordinates, do not know how to appreciate and utilize the uniqueness of human beings, cannot manage cultural diversity, cannot set proper goals for themselves or their subordinates and disregard the morale of subordinates.

Lacking the Will to Lead. In the military, one can find a person who is appointed to a leadership position without having a say in the appointment. One can also find a person who accepts a leadership position merely for the increase in status, salary or additional benefits. In these cases, the person may not be motivated to accept the responsibility or to satisfy the requirements of the specific position to achieve organizational goals. The appointed leader may choose not to provide any direction to their subordinates and might even delegate all responsibility to a subordinate. Behaviour like this has a direct influence on the motivation of subordinates. If there is no will to lead, it can be viewed as the deathblow for the team, organization or entity to which the person is appointed as leader.⁶¹

Failure to Motivate Subordinates. Although members of an organization are not to be viewed as passive pawns and should be interested and motivated to perform well or to carry out their duties, a leader must be skilled in combining extrinsic and intrinsic motivational techniques to ensure positive performance. In many cases, providing extrinsic rewards results in increased intrinsic motivation.⁶² Herzberg's two-factor theory of motivation describes organizational satisfiers as motivators, and factors that prevent dissatisfaction as hygiene factors. Hygiene factors include policies and administration, supervision, technical support, salary, interpersonal relations, supervision and satisfactory working conditions; these elements serve

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only to prevent dissatisfaction and do not motivate. Motivators include achievement, recognition, the work itself, responsibility and advancement; Herzberg asserts that these factors motivate people in their jobs.⁶³

In terms of failure to motivate others, MLI can include failures to provide subordinates with recognition, a sense of achievement, tasks that will interest them or be seen as significant, as well as failure to empower subordinates and provide opportunities for advancement. Closely linked to this, the leader might be more task-oriented than people-oriented.⁶⁴ This may, for example, manifest in behaviour such as a leader taking credit for the initiative or work of an unsung subordinate or acknowledging the achievement of some subordinates and not others. Such behaviour may be interpreted as favouritism and may cause dissonance among subordinates or distrust between the leader and subordinates, negatively influencing morale and motivation.

Failure to Appreciate the Uniqueness of Human Beings. Failure to appreciate the uniqueness of human beings can be viewed as one of the symptoms of MLI.⁶⁵ Research has concluded that managers who rise to positions of power but only possess task-specific skills and are unable to recognize the work of subordinates, can result in destructive tendencies.⁶⁶ Kolenda maintains that recognizing the value and unique contribution of every individual in the organization is an important requirement for professional and mutual respect.⁶⁷ Furthermore, van der Merwe observes that intelligent leaders realize that they do not have subordinates exactly like them, but they need to appreciate the different talents and orientations of those around them.⁶⁸

Lack of Understanding and Poor Management of Cultural Diversity. Within the culturally diverse SANDEF, MLI may also include poor management of cultural diversity. The costs of poorly managed diversity includes not only increased legal fees associated with discrimination cases, but also negative implications for creativity, problem-solving and retaining good employees, as well as poor cohesion and consequent low morale.⁶⁹ This is particularly relevant in the South African context where, citizens include members of 15 ethnic groups falling within five categories: “African” people, “white” people, “coloured” people of mixed lineage of European settlers and other ethnic groups, “Asian” people, including mostly people from India, but also Chinese and other Asian immigrants; and a more recently recognized Khoi-San, light-skinned indigenous people that lived in the Western Cape coastal areas (Khoi) and the Kalahari Desert (San).⁷⁰ South Africa also accommodates large numbers of refugees and migrant workers from the rest of Africa, especially Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo. There are also increasing numbers of Chinese immigrants. Each

of these groups has unique cultures and different languages and can make unique contributions in the workplace.

Improper Goal Setting. Setting goals is an integral part of leadership. Military leaders must provide direction and purpose to their subordinates by formulating goals that are aligned with organizational strategic objectives. Sometimes military leaders may fail to provide a purpose or goal or they may redefine organizational goals to suit their personal objectives. Thus, MLI may include the inability to translate organizational objectives into goals and tasks for the specific unit or section. Aubrey refers specifically to the role of toxic leaders who tend to redefine organizational goals and then assign importance to them in order to undermine the organizational values.⁷¹ It is a clear manifestation of MLI when goals are not set, wrongly set or redefined for the leader's own purpose.

Disregard for the Morale of Subordinates. Morale is defined by van't Wout and van Dyk⁷² as:

a confident and positive state of mind of an individual and the persistent motivation (a willingness) to engage in the shared purpose of the group, especially when faced with challenging conditions (such as military operations).

Leaders who disregard the morale of subordinates may find that when the time comes for followers to act, their subordinates have no will to pursue the achievement of goals. MLI behaviours may occur in the form of leaders who are task-oriented only and have little regard for people.

EFFECT OF LEADERSHIP INCOMPETENCE

Leadership failures in the SANDF costs resources and, at worst, can cost lives. The following is a brief discussion of the effect of MLI on the various levels of the SANDF.

IMPACT ON INDIVIDUAL LEVEL

Individuals on the receiving end of MLI will experience negative consequences that may have far-reaching consequences on the psychological and organizational levels.⁷³ Woestman and Wasonga⁷⁴ found that destructive behaviours directed at subordinates were the most common and significant predictors of workplace attitudes among professional educators. It can be

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expected that MLI will have the same effect in the SANDF military population. MLI can be expected to have the following outcomes:

- Decreases in performance
- Grievances, complaints to higher management, dwindling professional credibility
- Work slowdowns, deliberate sabotage of equipment and facilities, mutiny
- Low levels of job-satisfaction, avoidance behaviour, absenteeism
- Deterioration in physical and emotional well-being, death
- Requests for transfers, voluntary turnover
- Impact on Organizational Level

Leaders may also act destructively in a way that primarily affects the organization. This has potentially negative consequences for the execution of tasks, quality of work, efficiency and relationships with customers and clients.⁷⁵ With respect to the SANDF, post-deployment feedback continuously indicated distrust in leadership and frustration with incompetent leaders as the most prominent operational stressors affecting the SANDF. As Wilson-Starks⁷⁶ has stated, incompetent leaders have the same effect on an organization that termites have on a wooden house: on the outside, things look normal, but there is serious trouble just under the surface.⁷⁷ Aubrey⁷⁸ emphasizes the importance of dealing with the negative aspects of leadership when he refers to Wilson-Stark's statement that some members may start to perceive MLI as normal and then conform to it. Typical effects of MLI on the organization are:

- Lack of productivity
- Lack of sustainability
- Poisoned morale
- Lowered unit cohesion
- Exploitation of organizational norms to cause dysfunction and chaos
- Development of dysfunctional organizational or leadership culture⁷⁹

CAUSES OF LEADERSHIP INCOMPETENCE

In order to be able to deal with leadership incompetence, one must first gain an understanding of what could be the possible causes of the behaviour that is symptomatic of leadership incompetence.

PERSONALITY TRAITS OF THE LEADER

There are certain personality traits that predict a leader's tendency to engage in destructive MLI. The characteristics of these leaders are likely to include hostility and negative affectivity, personal power demands, a pessimistic view of the world, personal charisma, and what is referred to as the dark triad of personalities: narcississism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy.⁸⁰

POOR ROLE MODELS

The development of MLI starts before the person is appointed to a leadership position. For example, people who are mentored by toxic leaders have a tendency to have a faulty concept of leadership.⁸¹ They tend to advocate "strong leadership" that manifests in over-controlling behaviour, and may contribute to the development of certain belief-based constructs⁸² that can lead to destructive behaviour.

BELIEF-BASED CONSTRUCTS

A person's beliefs influence the way in which they interpret the world and react to it. Mumford and others⁸³ confirmed in their research in the early 1990s that destructive individuals scored high on a composite measure consisting of the three elements:

- *Myth viability.* Myth viability refers to having a destructive image of the world.
- *Power motives.* Generally non-conscious motives that let the leader act for their own self-aggrandizement or in a socialized manner, ostensibly for the greater good of society.
- *Object belief.* The belief that one can use others for personal gain.

It was clear that individuals who scored high on this composite made more destructive organizational decisions. The long-term effects tended to harm other individuals in the organization. This was especially true of individuals who had the support of an authority figure or who had low self-esteem.

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ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Aubrey⁸⁴ suggests that certain characteristics and traits may be helpful in identifying incompetent or toxic leaders. He states that research often falls short of a holistic view by failing to identify and discuss how an organization's culture may contribute to toxic leadership. Organizational culture can be broadly defined as the various ideologies, beliefs and practices of an organization that make it different from others.⁸⁵ In his observations of the Australian Defence Force, Jans observed the influence of organizational culture when he stated that the environment and defence bureaucracy turned "men into mice."⁸⁶ An organization's culture can create a favourable environment and have a direct impact on the way leaders make decisions, set standards and treat people. However, if the organizational culture allows incompetent leadership or fails to develop good leadership, what may have started with a few incompetent leaders can become more widespread.

Research has indicated that in some organizations, destructive leaders were not reprimanded for their behaviour and some were even rewarded with promotions for their achievements because they managed processes and produced results.⁸⁷ Aubrey's view that organizational culture is a key strategic factor in predicting behaviours and outcomes is supported. Ron Kaufman summarizes this view very clearly:

The culture of an organization is like a river. It can be fluid, strong and consistent, serving as lubricant while guiding its members in the right direction. In contrast a river can become stale and toxic, silently killing those who drink at its shore.⁸⁸

COERCIVE ISOMORPHISM

Coercive isomorphism occurs when superior military leaders coerce subordinate leaders to adopt destructive behaviour models. Because of the coercive nature of the environment, lower-level leaders consciously or unconsciously imitate and copy higher-level leaders' destructive behaviour patterns. They are forced into faulty leadership molds and stereotypes. It can become normative when these patterns become the organization's culture, and provide social guidance for subordinate leaders.⁸⁹ Although the situation has not yet reached crisis proportions in the SANDF, media attention has already been focused on some of the objectionable behaviours of senior SANDF leaders.

ADDRESSING MILITARY LEADERSHIP INCOMPETENCE IN THE SANDF

If the SANDF is serious about addressing MLI, it must first look at its existing leadership cadre. Second, it must prevent people with the wrong leadership profile from entering the SANDE, or at least prevent them from being appointed to leadership positions. It will also have to address MLI at the organizational level.

The MLI framework presented suggests four clusters of incompetent behaviour. It is clear that the elements that form part of poor virtues and character are mainly inherent in the person, such as elements ingrained in stable personality traits, and will therefore be very difficult to change. Similarly, lack of intellectual or cognitive abilities is mainly inherent in the person, but some elements, such as problem-solving and communication, can be developed. Lack of professional competence can be clearly addressed through training to give the person the necessary knowledge, skills and attitudes to do his or her job effectively. The inability to influence others might be partially inherent in the person but can also be partially developed through, for example, modeling behaviour.

EXISTING LEADER GROUP

Personal transformation is required to change people currently in leadership positions. This will not be easy. It is also possible that incompetent leaders may refuse to change. For those who persevere and do change, the rewards will be significant for both the individual and the SANDE. As Wilson-Starks states:

Not only will the leader's employees and company benefit, but the leader will acquire a new set of leadership techniques and methods, enjoy new (and healthier) sources of ego gratification, and become a healthier role model for the next generation of leaders.⁹⁰

With the above mentioned observation in mind, one should start addressing MLI through the existing leader group. Breaking the denial and recognizing the existence of MLI is the first step.

Breaking the denial: recognizing the existence of MLI. There is a likelihood that senior leadership tends to tolerate MLI in the SANDE. For the SANDE to either prevent it or develop remedies, it is necessary to be able to first recognize MLI. One has to acknowledge the destructive effect it has on the

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organization and its human resources. It is necessary to understand MLI's social dynamics in general, and more specifically, the situations and contexts that enable these destructive behaviours. In this way one can prevent people from voluntarily adopting them. Horn and MacIntyre observed that military personnel, and particularly those in the combat arms, often have a very arrogant perspective on leadership. They tend to deny that there is a leadership problem and they believe they have nothing to learn, since they practice leadership on a daily basis.⁹¹ The existing leaders in the SANDF, with specific reference to the senior leadership cadre, will have to go through a process of "conscientization."

Creating a need for change. Conscientization is only part of the solution; change from the existing leadership style to an improved leadership style needs to be created. This is especially necessary for those incompetent leaders who have been in the SANDF for a very long time. An option may be to create a crisis to motivate them to change, whether an organizational crisis or pressure exerted by their leaders higher in the hierarchy. Alternatively, a system can be developed to reward those demonstrating the required leadership style. A typical process through which this can be addressed is the performance assessment process.

Individual commitment to change. A leader must commit to the process of change.⁹² A reward system might contribute to creating this commitment. Without individual commitment, personal transformation will not take place and one would not change the habits of a lifetime.

Encourage self-knowledge and feedback. A self-aware leader understands their strengths and weaknesses and uses feedback from subordinates and superiors to improve their performance and leadership style.⁹³ It is therefore important that a system of feedback be developed and implemented for the SANDF. A 360-degree feedback process is suggested, in which the leader gets feedback from peers, subordinates and supervisors. It can provide appropriate checks and balances on the behaviour of the leader, as well as an avenue for subordinates to provide feedback to senior leaders.

INCOMING AND FUTURE MILITARY LEADERS

It is recommended to start with the recruitment, selection and appointment of people with the most suitable leadership profile. The current Minister of Defence and Military Veterans, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula, emphasized that the SANDF should pay close attention to the people they should be

recruiting in order to equip the SANDF with the necessary capabilities to ensure its operational effectiveness.⁹⁴ South Africa does have a process for leadership selection prior to and after appointment, but it is not consistently applied over all services. It is suggested that South Africa follow a more rigorous officer selection system, like that used in the United Kingdom.⁹⁵ The South African Defence Review 2014 clearly states that appropriate selection criteria and instruments should be used that focus on applicants' leadership abilities.⁹⁶

During the selection and vetting process, predictors of MLI should be identified in order to be able to exclude applicants who show traits related to MLI. This is in particular applicable to the cluster of poor virtues and character and can also address a lack of intellectual and cognitive abilities. The South African Security Forces Union suggested that the Commander in Chief should play an active role and closely supervise military leadership, and that he should discontinue appointing incompetent leaders to positions of military leadership.⁹⁷

ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL INTERVENTIONS

Leadership development through a professional military leadership development framework. The SANDF has procedures in place for leadership development.⁹⁸ However, a study conducted in 2009 showed that senior SANDF officers are not aware of the official SANDF leadership approach.⁹⁹ In comparing South Africa, the United Kingdom and Germany, it was concluded that the British Army spent much more time on developing its officers.¹⁰⁰ Minister Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula also stated that the SANDF should position its military training to produce more competent officers and non-commissioned officers. It was suggested, for example, that transformational leadership should be infused into the SANDF's leadership training and development programs, from basic training to joint command and staff training.

Transformational leadership approach. Leadership literature suggests a relationship between transformational leadership and the effectiveness of institutions, as well as a link between transformational leadership of superiors and the performance of their subordinates.¹⁰¹ A transformational approach encourages employees to anticipate and adapt to change and also strengthens the institution's competitiveness and effectiveness in the market. Individual consideration, one of the characteristics of the Transformational Leadership Model, will address the appreciation of the uniqueness of human beings as socially complex beings who have intrinsic value that goes far beyond the salary they receive or the position they hold.¹⁰² There is, however, no consensus

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that transformational leadership is the best leadership approach and there seems to be a need to redefine successful leadership. Therefore, a Professional Military Leadership Development Framework needs to be conceptualized to act as a pathway, model or roadmap for expanding the depth and breadth of leadership development from entry-level to the highest level in the SANDF. It should also address MLI at the opposite pole.

Continuous Professional Development (CPD) for military leaders. The demands on the SANDF require that military leaders be developed on a continuous basis to be able to deal with new challenges and not fall back on old habits. Leadership education is thus a lifelong journey.¹⁰³ Consequently, it would be viable to implement a system of CPD for military leaders to develop them from tactical to strategic level in a dynamically changing environment. One way of ensuring optimal leadership development is to follow an integrated framework or model of leadership for all levels of command and coordinate leadership development through a single military leadership development institution.

Single military leadership development institution. Erasmus and Uys¹⁰⁴ observe that South Africa does not spend as much time on leadership development as the United Kingdom. A military leadership development institution can facilitate research and training and can play a role in continuous learning in the SANDF.¹⁰⁵ It is suggested that the SANDF establish a military leadership development institute as a centre of excellence, with the aim to generate research, concept development, and doctrine regarding military leadership and professionalism. One of the fundamental aspects to be addressed is the concept of MLI. Such an entity can address the following:

- *Governance guiding leadership development.* Very often great emphasis is placed on programs and institutions, but nothing is done to implement, monitor and evaluate policies and other guidance.¹⁰⁶ Appropriate governance will contribute to providing an environment suitable for the learning and growth of military leaders. Countering the effects of MLI is more likely to succeed in organizations where the appropriate policy and doctrine exist.
- *Research on military leadership incompetence.* It is necessary to focus on MLI and its impact on the SANDF. Such research will enhance the general understanding of this phenomenon and will contribute to developing practices to address MLI for optimizing leadership behaviour. It will also contribute to the “conscientization” referred to above.

- *Mentoring and coaching programs.* Wilson-Starks observed that creative coaching is required to support a leader through the transformation process.¹⁰⁷ One-on-one meetings with the leader to analyze their specific needs will help the development of a custom-designed plan for the leader's unique situation. Erasmus and Uys emphasize that the challenge is to find a way to influence an individual human being into becoming a person with the appropriate qualities and character needed to lead soldiers, especially in a diverse society of South Africa.¹⁰⁸
- *Focusing on the social aspects of leadership.* From the MLI conceptual framework above it is also clear that military leaders should focus on the social aspects of leadership and as such should focus on the well-being of their subordinates and the development of a favourable organizational climate. The military leader's conduct must be a reflection of the moral values of society contextualized to the military environment.
- *Opportunities to experience real life situations in a simulated environment.* There is no substitute for experience. By giving developing leaders opportunities to experience the demands of leadership situations in a safe and secure environment, they can gain experience to be used as a resource for future real-life situations that make similar demands.

Selection of instructors. Erasmus and Uys¹⁰⁹ emphasize that the United Kingdom places a lot of value on the selection of its colour sergeants* (i.e., instructors). In order to become a colour sergeant, an individual must first apply. After an intense four-week selection exercise, only the best are selected. In training institutions, trainees tend to model the behaviour of their instructors, which also applies to leadership behaviour. It can be assumed that this approach ensures high standards of training, which will subsequently deliver better developed leaders.

Performance evaluations. In order to act as an incentive and to provide a reward for displaying the correct behaviour, it is suggested that the identification of specific leadership behaviour should form part of the annual performance reviews of military leaders. The assessment of MLI should be included in this review. This will contribute to "conscientization"; that is, the development of a critical consciousness through which military leaders can recognize negative behaviours and can reliably take action against them.

* This is a similar level as the SANDF's staff sergeants.

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Establish an enabling leadership culture. The culture in which military officers function has a substantial influence on what they do.¹¹⁰ The culture may have many enabling factors that can assist the leader to lead and optimize performance. Jans uses an interesting analogy, stating that leadership has the same effect on organizational performance as a backswing has on golfing performance: both provide the kind of sound structure from which good performance springs. He concludes this analogy by stating that without a consistent golf swing, it is difficult to consistently score well; similarly, without a sound leadership culture, it is difficult for leaders to lead.¹¹¹

Reinforce the current governance structure. The development of new governance was discussed above, but the SANDF has a governance structure that directly or indirectly addresses processes and procedures. However, this structure is not always implemented. The SANDF's Human Resources Strategy 2010 (HR 2010) focused on getting the composition of the SANDF's human resources to the correct level in terms of quality, quantity, and composition.¹¹² It would be safe to say that HR 2010 was a good policy with good intent, but the outcome was a failure due to the appointment of unqualified staff to senior positions, which, in turn, compromised effective recruiting and training consistent with that strategy.

CONCLUSION

Leaders have a major impact on both the people and organization they lead. Based on South Africa's international status, strategic posture, continental and regional leadership role, the SANDF requires leaders with effective leadership styles, mind-sets, attitudes and behaviour. MLI refers both to what military leaders do and what they do not do to meet expectations. MLI can damage the SANDF, which will have an effect not only locally, but also internationally. MLI produces such negative effects that it requires much closer attention and research. The conceptual framework developed in this chapter is by no means complete, but it provides a point of departure for a more in-depth investigation into the phenomenon of MLI. This chapter emphasizes the need to focus not only on obtaining an understanding of the positive aspects of leadership, but also on the negative aspects to gain insight into what is required of effective military leaders.

It is clear that MLI should be addressed either by preventing or by changing the existing ways of leading. If South Africa wants to fulfill its defense commitments, it must be prepared to make a bigger effort to optimize its military leaders by creating an awareness of MLI, emphasizing a need for change,

obtaining individual commitment to change, and encouraging leaders to gain self-knowledge and feedback on their leadership style. Incoming and future military leaders need to be targeted through the right recruitment, selection and vetting processes. New leaders and current leaders need to be developed throughout their career paths. At the organizational level, leadership development should be based on a professional military leadership development framework, using a single military development institution to deliver various leadership development approaches and interventions. Emphasis should be placed on a system of continuous military leadership development, on the selection of instructors for leadership development in particular, and on including the assessment of MLI in the performance evaluation system of military leaders. An enabling leadership culture needs to be developed and governance for addressing MLI must be properly executed.

It is clear that competent leadership is a necessary element for the sustained success of the SANDF in fulfilling its obligations. It is worth applying the warning of General Jean V. Allard of the Canadian Forces to the SANDF: if MLI is not addressed through properly educated, effectively trained, professional military leaders, the SANDF will, in the future, be doomed to at best mediocrity, at worst disaster.¹¹³

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CHAPTER 11

LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT AND SELECTION IN THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES: A DEFENCE AGAINST NEGATIVE LEADERSHIP

*Kenneth Lim and Clara Chua**

INTRODUCTION

Leadership is a core tenet of most, if not all, organizations. Peter Drucker said, “Only three things happen naturally in organizations: friction, confusion and underperformance. Everything else requires leadership.” Leadership is a key driver of organizational performance and success across all types of organizations. At the recent Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) Leadership Development Seminar, the distinguished guest speaker – a senior leader in the public sector – defined leadership as making things happen which would not have happened without the leader. We can expect, then, that good leaders would make good things happen, while bad leaders would make bad things happen. That would be the essence of negative leadership: leaders who lead to bad outcomes.

Leadership is especially critical in the military¹ because of the authority vested in military leaders. While business leaders have the power to reward, military leaders literally have the power of life and death over the men and women under their command. At best, bad leaders can lead to outcomes such as stress in their followers² and decreased troop morale.³ At worst, bad military leaders can lead their followers to their deaths. Leadership has always been a key area of interest for military psychology. The military is one place where good leaders are essential, and bad leaders are potentially catastrophic.

Leadership research has traditionally focused on what makes good leaders and on the positive impact good leadership has on followers, teams, units and organizations. While research on the positive aspects of leadership is vast

* The views expressed in the chapter are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the positions of the Singapore Armed Forces.

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and well established, there is less research in the negative aspects of leadership, likely given its late start. However, research in this area has been increasing and interest in negative leadership in militaries, in particular, has augmented over the past decade.

This chapter outlines a working definition and conceptualization of negative leadership in the military context, and explains how the leadership development and selection systems in the SAF have mitigated the potential effects of negative leadership. It concludes with a way ahead, addressing the research the SAF is undertaking to better understand, assess and manage negative leadership across all ranks.

WHAT IS NEGATIVE LEADERSHIP?

Stogdill wrote “there are almost as many definitions of leadership as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept.”⁴ Negative leadership has received many names from researchers over the years. Toxic leadership, management derailers, and destructive leadership are all labels that have been applied to bad leaders and bad leadership behaviours. These definitions also imply that negative leadership is not simply the absence or lack of positive leadership. Negative leadership is not merely incompetence (although it includes that), but leadership behaviours that have harmful effects on subordinates and even the organization.

From the body of research available, negative leadership can be conceptualized as a larger term to encapsulate different types or manifestations of leadership that would be considered negative. For example, incompetence, derailment and toxic leadership can be considered different facets of negative leadership. A working set of definitions is needed to guide the current discussion, and it can be refined as research uncovers new insights into this large and complex area of leadership research. Here we attempt to broadly categorize these terms as a way to define negative leadership with the help of a few categories.




Figure 11.1: Working Definition of Negative Leadership

Negative leadership can broadly be applied to all forms of leadership and leadership behaviours that are negative, undesirable, or destructive, and lead to negative outcomes and consequences. We can then consider two main areas of negative leadership – incompetence/derailers and toxic leadership. Incompetence refers to leaders who lack the necessary competencies and skills to lead effectively. They are unable to meet business objectives (or in the military context, achieve mission success), or unable to influence their subordinates.

Derailment refers a more specific situation where leaders become incompetent due to an inability to adjust to a new environment. A new environment could be a promotion to a higher level of leadership, a transfer to a job with a different scope, or simply encountering a new type of problem. Most definitions of derailment assume that the leader is on track to success, but stumbles (i.e., derails) along the way. Incompetence and derailment point to a failure of leadership. This failure can usually be attributed to errors in selection, assignment of the leader to the wrong job, or a failure to develop the leader adequately.

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Toxic leadership refers to negative behaviours that are destructive to followers, teams, units and the organization. Researchers refer to toxic leadership in terms of the process (i.e., behaviours of the leader) or the outcomes (i.e., impact of the leader's behaviour). The current discussion defines toxic leadership as both, but with an emphasis on the outcome. Some researchers have argued that what is considered toxic behaviour to one follower may be considered effective or even inspirational to another.⁵

Besides the two main categories of negative leadership, we propose a third category: red flag behaviours. Red flag behaviours refer to leadership behaviours that are potentially negative or toxic. Having a separate category for red flag behaviours achieves two purposes. First, it allows the distinction between negative leaders and negative leadership behaviours. A leader might be negative (i.e., incompetent or toxic) without demonstrating negative behaviours. A competent and non-toxic leader, on the other hand, may occasionally exhibit negative behaviours. It is therefore important to distinguish between the leader and his/her outward behaviour. Second, a red flag behaviour category allows the distinction between clearly toxic leader behaviours, and behaviour that is potentially toxic. Some "negative" or "toxic" behaviours, when viewed in isolation, may not actually be negative or toxic, at least not to every individual who observes or even experiences it.

It is the context, including the response from the affected individuals, that determines if the behaviour is simply that of an authoritative leader or an abusive one. For example, the use of vulgarities and expletives is not necessarily toxic. Some leaders use expletives when frustrated or angry and co-workers may accept such language. This was especially true for the SAF in the past, where the use of vulgarities was more common and socially acceptable. But if vulgarities and expletives were used in a demeaning and abusive manner, such behaviour could be considered toxic. It is important then for a separate category of red flag behaviours to highlight the importance of context in considering negative leadership, and for us to capture negative leadership behaviours that are not clearly negative or toxic.

NEGATIVE LEADERSHIP IN THE MILITARY

The military context differs from that of other industries and large organizations. Leadership in the military context also differs from leadership in other industries due to these contextual differences.⁶ The military is typically one of the largest organizations in any nation. Military leaders at all levels command a large number of subordinates and therefore are capable of exerting

significant influence. The military is also a very diverse organization. Most militaries have some variation of the three services: Army, Navy and Air Force. In the SAF, there is even more diversity. The SAF comprises fulltime National Servicemen serving two-year mandatory conscript service, Operationally Ready National Servicemen required to report for annual currency training, and Regulars who are career soldiers. There are also four different service schemes for the Regulars: officers, warrant officers, military experts, and non-uniformed Defence Executive Officers. The size, diversity and hierarchical nature of the military set it apart from other organizations.

The US Army's doctrinal definition of toxic leadership highlights some key features of the phenomenon:

Toxic leadership is a combination of self-centered attitudes, motivations, and behaviors that have adverse effects on subordinates, the organization, and mission performance. This leader lacks concern for others and the climate of the organization, which leads to short- and long-term negative effects. The toxic leader operates with an inflated sense of self-worth and from acute self-interest. Toxic leaders consistently use dysfunctional behaviours to deceive, intimidate, coerce, or unfairly punish others to get what they want for themselves. The negative leader completes short-term requirements by operating at the bottom of the continuum of commitment, where followers respond to the positional power of their leader to fulfill requests. This may achieve results in the short term, but ignores the other leader competency categories of leads and develops. Prolonged use of negative leadership to influence followers undermines the followers' will, initiative, and potential and destroys unit morale.⁷

The theme of toxic leadership being closely related to leaders' self-centredness is a recurring one. The US Army's Center for Army Leadership released a technical report on toxic leadership in 2011, and posits "Toxic leaders work to promote themselves at the expense of their subordinates, and usually do so without considering long-term ramifications to their subordinates, their unit, and the Army profession."⁸ The other theme that emerges in many definitions of toxic leadership is the focus on short-term results, usually at the cost of long-term sustainability. In the face of prolonged exhibition of toxic leadership, outcomes could be positive in the short term, but are almost always negative in the long term. While publically available publications on toxic leadership are largely from the US Army, the issue of toxic leaders is certainly common and widespread.⁹

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Negative leadership, in particular toxic leadership, may be underreported in the military.¹⁰ Followers do not complain about toxic leaders because they do not want to be seen as whiners; there is a certain expectation that they deal with bad leaders and still do their job. Militaries are hierarchical, and there is a strong, implicit respect for rank. Followers may hate the person, but they will respect the rank. Toxic leaders who possess technical competence may be valued for their competence, with their superiors dismissing or tolerating their toxic behaviours. Most systems also rewards or incentivize leaders for short-term effectiveness without holding them accountable for the long-term impact of their behaviours. Leaders often move after two to three years and leave behind the pieces for others to pick up.

PARADOX OF TOXIC LEADERSHIP

Research into toxic leadership has revealed an outcome: the paradox of toxic leadership. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that toxic leaders are tolerated, if not accepted by followers,¹¹ and can also lead to what appears to be positive outcomes.

TOXIC LEADERS PRODUCE AMAZING RESULTS

A unit commander rules his battalion with an iron fist. He demands effort and performance from his subordinates, and drives the unit to produce results. He volunteers for multiple taskings from higher headquarters, and loads his unit with ever-increasing amounts of work. He ignores their feedback of workload and threatens punitive action for any perceived lack of effort. The staff works long hours to avoid the commander's wrath. To be fair, the commander is able to get resources for this unit, albeit through bullying other departments. At the end of the year, the unit delivers the various taskings and the commander's superiors are impressed by his ability to produce results.

Toxic leaders, using coercion, fear or threats, can “motivate” their units to extremely high levels of performance, at least in the short term. In the longer term, subordinates become disengaged and the unit is sapped of its morale. This is a recurring theme with destructive/toxic leaders: whatever short-term performance they deliver is counterbalanced by the long-term cost to the unit and organization. Lowered engagement and increased burnout/turnover are the common longer term effects of destructive/toxic leaders. The cost of the longer term impact (to the unit an organization) is greater than the short-term success achieved by toxic leaders. The paradox of toxic/destructive

leaders producing positive results is explained by taking into account the long term costs.

TOXIC LEADERS GET PROMOTED

The same unit commander leaves his unit exhausted and demoralized. They have been working long hours on multiple projects and in the end, the credit goes to the unit commander. The next year, they find out, to their shock, that the commander has been promoted.

Toxic leaders can rise in the organization, because, as discussed, they often deliver results. They are often mission-focused and can be seen as highly effective by their superiors in delivering mission success. However, their subordinates are often incredulous when the toxic leaders are promoted. This causes staff to lose trust in the integrity of the system, and worse, to think that it is an easier method to success, tried and tested by successful toxic leaders. The single action of an individual toxic leader that goes unchecked by the system has a ripple effect on the organizational culture, influencing the development of future leaders. This is similar to the Broken Window effect:¹² if one broken window (or toxic leader) goes unchecked, this can be seen as a signal that breaking windows (or being toxic) is perfectly acceptable. It is the duty of leaders to maintain the integrity of the system.

TOXIC LEADERS “CREATE” STRONG, COHESIVE TEAMS

During the tenure of the toxic unit commander, his subordinate commanders came together to support each other. They helped each other, coordinated closely to deal with the multiple demands, covered for each other when necessary, and in the end, formed a bond through their shared, difficult experience of working under the unit commander.

Another paradox of toxic leadership is how it can actually enhance cohesion. A bad leader can serve as a “galvanizing force” for the subordinates and lower levels of leadership.¹³ Faced with a toxic unit commander, the junior leaders under him may have to band together. As the relationships among the junior leaders grow as they continue to cope with a toxic leader, the unit can engender a strong level of cohesion and morale, in spite of their unit commander’s toxic behaviour. The phenomenon of a group banding together against a common enemy occurs often;¹⁴ in this case the toxic leader serves as that common enemy.

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PEOPLE ARE ATTRACTED TO TOXIC LEADERS

The unit commander is later posted to a newly set up unit where they face a great deal of uncertainty. The commander is able to confidently espouse an ambitious vision for the unit. The unit is impressed by their new, confident leader.

Toxic leaders often seem to display behaviours and attributes that most organizations and subordinates like their leaders to have.¹⁵ On the surface, successful toxic leaders are often deemed to be charismatic, bold, confident, or even visionary. Such leaders are attractive to followers, especially in times of crisis when a confident, decisive leader is preferred.¹⁶ In the short term at least (a recurring theme with toxic leaders), followers could prefer a narcissistic leader's confidence and decisiveness. However, toxic leaders are typically egocentric and serve nobody but themselves. They often attempt to build a personal legacy instead of establishing systems and processes for organizational success.

LEADERSHIP IN THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES

Like all other militaries, leadership is an important pillar in the SAF. A great deal of effort has gone into selecting and developing SAF leaders. While the SAF has not been targeting negative leadership specifically, it is our view that our existing leadership development and selection systems have successfully mitigated the emergence and flourishing of negative leadership. We will outline some of our development and selection efforts, and discuss how they may have been able to mitigate negative leadership. Doctrines and frameworks were developed to guide the development of our leadership development and selection processes. The key leadership-related framework is the SAF 24/7 Leadership Framework.

SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES 24/7 LEADERSHIP FRAMEWORK

The SAF set up the Centre for Leadership Development ten years ago and since then has put in place a robust and comprehensive leadership development system. Underpinning it is the 24/7 Leadership Framework.¹⁷ The SAF 24/7 Leadership Framework comprises a triangle and a circle. The triangle's four parts outline the important components of a leader in the SAF, while the circle's three parts outline the context of the leader. Taken together, the framework articulates leadership in the SAF.




Figure 11.2: SAF 24-7 Leadership Framework

Values

SAF leaders are defined by their values. There is a systematic values inculcation process in which SAF leaders internalize the seven SAF Core Values, use them to guide their decisions and actions, and are clear on how their personal values are aligned with the Core Values. A values-based leader with the correct values is less likely to be toxic (i.e., demonstrate the wrong behaviours).

Competencies

The SAF's Leadership Competency Model maps the five competencies and 14 skills a SAF leader must develop in order to lead effectively. The SAF has a variety of programs, practices and processes to ensure SAF leaders are developed appropriately on these competencies. A Leadership Development Road Map outlines these developments. A competent leader is less likely to fail through incompetence or derailment.

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Styles

The SAF is currently developing a doctrine on leadership styles. The SAF uses the Full Range Leadership Model and encourages flexibility of styles in its leaders.

Self

Ultimately, the SAF leader is expected to be a leader and to lead by example. The leader must have a high degree of self-awareness (knowing their own strengths and weaknesses), self-management (knowing how to manage their own actions and emotions) and personal mastery (having clarity of their life purpose, personal vision and values). Only when leaders are able to lead themselves, can they lead a team, a unit, and the organization.

Guided by the SAF 24/7 Leadership Framework, SAF leadership development is focused on leaders who are values-based, competent, flexible, and possess a high degree of self-awareness and personal mastery. Together, these mitigate several of the antecedents and factors that could lead to negative leadership. Our leadership development and selection systems develop these in our leaders, and therefore help to prevent the emergence and flourishing of negative leadership.

SELECTION AND LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT IN THE SINGAPORE ARMED FORCES

The SAF has a comprehensive leader selection and development process, with interventions at various stages. This has likely allowed the SAF to mitigate the development of negative leadership.

SELECTION OF LEADERS

Selection of leaders is one way an organization can mitigate negative leadership.¹⁸ The processes by which the SAF selects its commanders initially (and later for key command appointments) helps to screen out potentially toxic leaders. Selection (and development) in the SAF is comprehensive and goes beyond competencies and cognitive abilities, to assess other factors such as values and beliefs, personality, and motivation.

The SAF's selection of junior commanders comprises multiple assessments, among which is a short interview by an officer assessor. The main focus of

that interview is to ascertain the motivation of the candidate. Why do they want to be a commander? The interview does not take place in a comfortable office, it is conducted during a field exercise that is part of basic military training. The officer interviewing the candidate wants to understand if they want to be a commander for the right reasons (e.g., to serve the nation) or the wrong ones (e.g., the prestige). While susceptible to social desirability, the interview offers an early opportunity to sieve out those who may not be motivated to command for the appropriate reasons.

Before officers are selected for battalion command, they are subject to an interview board. The board members assess not just competence as a commander, but also track record and reputation. Senior commanders have access to various sources of information, through both formal and informal channels, to amass a comprehensive assessment of potential battalion commanders. The selection of battalion commanders is holistic and comprehensive, ensuring that commanders with potentially toxic tendencies (or actual demonstrations of such behaviours) are screened out and not placed in critical command positions.

The SAF's comprehensive and robust commander selection system helps to screen out individuals with potential toxic leadership tendencies from becoming commanders in the SAF and from rising to key command positions. However, the system is not perfect. Some behaviours associated with toxic leaders can be beneficial and sought after in leaders. For example, narcissistic leaders are usually self-confident, which is a trait associated with leadership. Selection is not a panacea. In the SAF, the development of leaders is the other key process by which we ensure good leadership, and therefore mitigate bad leadership. The SAF 24/7 Leadership Development Framework guides leadership development in the SAF via the four blocks of values, competencies, styles and self.

DEVELOPMENT: VALUES INCULCATION

The SAF, like most other militaries, is a values-based organization. The SAF Core Values of loyalty to country, leadership, professionalism, discipline, fighting spirit, care of soldiers, ethics, and safety guide every commander and soldier. Values are the bedrock on which leadership competencies are built. We also have the Code of Conduct, Officers' Creed, Warrant Officers' Creed, and many other codified guidelines to educate and remind commanders and soldiers how they should act and behave. The SAF formally and informally reminds its people when they step out of line. While there exists clear disci-

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plinary measures to deal with infractions, SAF personnel also actively speak up to remind their followers, peers and leaders when they observe behaviour and conduct unbecoming of the SAF.

Values inculcation is a deliberate and structured process to ensure SAF leaders are values-based commanders¹⁹ who know and internalize the SAF Core Values. Values inculcation modules are embedded throughout training in key milestone courses. These modules allow SAF leaders attending these courses to periodically reconnect with their purpose and personal values, and to revisit the alignment of these values to the larger organizational mission and values. The Three-Level Values Inculcation Model (see Figure 11.3) was developed to articulate the stages of values inculcation. This ensures that SAF leaders are clear about the SAF Core Values and on how to use them to guide their decisions and actions. The three stages comprise alignment, adherence, and internalization. Over time, the SAF has constantly evolved its approach and strategies to ensure internalization of the SAF Core Values in a largely conscript force.²⁰

Alignment

The first stage of the process involves clarification of the individual SAF leader's personal values, and aligning them with the SAF Core Values. Junior leadership school starts this process by guiding junior leaders through a personal values clarification exercise, followed by a values alignment exercise. At the end of the exercises, the leaders will have mapped out the alignment between their own values, the SAF Core Values, and the mission of the SAF. This allows a personal reflection of individual values in the context of SAF values. In terms of negative leadership, this stage allows SAF leaders to examine if any of their personal values are significantly misaligned to them.

Adherence

The second stage of the process will demonstrate if SAF leaders are doing the right thing to avoid punishment or for the sake of conformity. Leadership development at this stage focuses on letting SAF leaders recognize the threats that prevent them from doing the right thing, through the use of case studies, for example. In the context of negative leadership, this stage sees SAF leaders "catching" values from senior leaders and their peers. The strong values system of the SAF keeps deviant behaviours in check.




Figure 11.3: SAF Values Inculcation

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Internalization

The third stage of the process is to ensure SAF leaders internalize the SAF Core Values, and use them to guide their decision making and actions. Over time, SAF leaders will internalize the SAF Core Values as they observe them role-modeled by other leaders, take action consciously while being guided by the values, and revisit the Core Values in the various leadership modules of their milestone courses. Over time, SAF leaders will more naturally use the SAF Core Values in their decision making and actions. At this stage, the SAF Core Values become a part of who a SAF leader is.

As part of the process of values inculcation, SAF leaders are also exposed to ethical reasoning. Using scenarios and actual case studies, SAF leaders are guided through reflection exercises to clarify their decision making with respect to the SAF Core Values. They are regularly reminded of their roles and responsibilities as leaders in the SAF, and the importance of making decisions and taking actions that are aligned to the SAF Core Values. The SAF has developed various resources and learning pedagogies to enhance values inculcation. Recent developments include leveraging gamification and sports. A “Decisive Combat” Serious Game was developed to complement values inculcation in junior leadership schools. Character Development Through Sports was developed to provide an experiential platform aimed at socializing and reinforcing the SAF Core Values in a competitive environment.

Recent research suggests that one way to mitigate the manifestation of toxic leadership behaviours, especially those of a more unethical nature, is the presence of clear moral boundaries in an organization. These moral boundaries also need to be backed up by the organization’s willingness to enforce those boundaries. The enforcement can be formal, through regimentation and disciplinary actions, or informal, through leaders’ willingness to speak up when they observe such behaviours in their peers, subordinates, and even superiors.

DEVELOPMENT: COMPETENCIES TRAINING

The SAF developed the Leadership Competence Model (see Figure 11.4) and Leadership Development Road Map to guide the development of SAF leaders’ leadership competencies. Together with values, leadership competencies form a significant part of SAF leaders’ development during their milestone courses.

COMPETENCIES	"CORE COMPETENCIES"				"META-COMPETENCY" (FOR GROWTH / ADAPTABILITY)
		Conceptual Thinking	Social	Mission	Development
SKILLS	Critical Thinking	Communicating to Influence	Planning	Developing People	Self Awareness
	Creative Thinking	Interpersonal Effectiveness	Decision Making	Development Team	Self Management
	Ethical Reasoning		Execution	Improving Organization	Personal Mastery

Figure 11.4: SAF Leadership Competency Model

As SAF leaders progress in their careers, they attend milestone courses to prepare them for their next key appointment or rank. Leadership development is an integral part of these milestone courses, and they equip leaders with the key leadership competencies necessary for the next phase of their career. A leadership development roadmap ensures a holistic, career-long view of leadership development.

DEVELOPMENT: FEEDBACK

Feedback is one of the SAF key leadership development practices to develop effective SAF leaders. As articulated in the SAF Leadership Framework (24/7) and SAF Leadership Competency Model, SAF leaders must possess a dynamic capacity for the Self, which consists of Self-Awareness, Self-Management and Personal Mastery (see Figure 11.5). Self is a meta-competency that drives the growth and adaptability in the other core competencies, such as social and conceptual thinking, for enhanced performance. As self-awareness is central to the development of the Self, feedback contributes to the development of effective SAF leaders by increasing their self-awareness. With higher self-awareness of their leadership competencies, SAF leaders will be able to better manage their strengths and developmental opportunities consciously, leading to personal mastery over time.




Figure 11.5: Feedback for Leadership Development in the SAF

Since 2007, SAF leaders have been provided with robust feedback and executive coaching on their leadership behaviours, using customized multi-source leadership feedback (MSLF) instruments for developmental purpose.²¹ While the SAF MSLF is not designed to manage negative leadership behaviours specifically, MSLF enables SAF leaders to develop higher self-awareness of their leadership behaviours so that they are able to identify blind spots, leverage their strengths, as well as manage developmental areas. In addition, MSLF allows SAF leaders to receive feedback from their superiors, peers and subordinates, offering SAF leaders an opportunity to analyze, review and reflect on their leadership behaviours from multiple perspectives.

Besides providing feedback on desirable leadership behaviours, MSLF instruments also provide SAF leaders with feedback on red flag leadership behaviours. Red flag leadership behaviours are indicators of negative leadership that are inconsistent with effective leadership, and which are likely to slow down or prevent leaders from advancing in their careers in the SAF. Red flag leadership behaviours might also potentially undermine the leaders' strengths. Red flag leadership behaviours are identified based on focus groups and in-depth interviews with SAF leaders, as well as their superiors, peers and subordinates. While individuals can do little about the toxic leadership behaviours inflicted upon them by their superiors, they can focus on their own behaviours to make sure they are not toxic to their own subordinates.²² This is why feedback is an important intervention to mitigate the emergence of potentially toxic behaviours in leaders.

Leaders who consistently display red flag leadership behaviours affect the well-being of their subordinates and would be unable to build mutual trust, respect and confidence with them, much less establish esprit de corps within the team to achieve mission success and organizational development. There are three categories of red flag leadership behaviours in the MSLF instruments: values, people and task.

Red Flag Leadership Behaviours: Values

This set of red flag leadership behaviours refers to morally questionable leadership behaviours that call into question the integrity of a leader's character or cause. For example, the leader takes credit when things go well, but blames others when things go wrong.

Red Flag Leadership Behaviours: People

This set of red flag leadership behaviours refers to disrespectful or demeaning leadership behaviours that fail to take into consideration individual needs

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and well-being in the workplace. For example, the leader closely monitors subordinates in a way that implies lack of trust (e.g., micromanages).

Red Flag Leadership Behaviours: Task

This set of red flag leadership behaviours refers to inconsiderate or disorganized leadership behaviours that downplay the team members' contributions or adversely affect the team's operating procedures. For example, the leader dominates discussions, giving little chance for subordinates to provide input.

By providing SAF leaders with feedback on their red flag behaviours, SAF leaders have increased self-awareness of their leadership blind spots and tendencies towards negative leadership behaviours. To support SAF leaders' leadership development, SAF leaders are provided with coaching sessions with an executive coach. The executive coaches will help leaders understand their leadership behaviours, both effective and ineffective, in a holistic manner, and their impact on their people. As part of the executive coaching process, the executive coaches support the SAF leaders to articulate an action plan to manage their leadership behaviours, including negative leadership behaviours, to cultivate positive leadership behaviours.

THE WAY AHEAD

There is an ongoing effort to measure the State of Leadership (SoL) and the State of Leadership Development (SoLD) in the SAF. SoL refers to the effectiveness of SAF Leaders, and will be measured through organizational surveys. SoL helps the organization identify strengths and gaps of leadership abilities, so that the SAF can identify areas where leadership development interventions are required. SoLD refers to the effectiveness of our various leadership development initiatives. SoLD helps the organization to identify ways to enhance our leadership development initiatives, and to ensure that they are equipping our leaders with the appropriate leadership competencies and values. Such assessments may not be the most effective way of detecting negative leadership²³, but they can be effective if utilized by the chain of command. The SAF's leadership development measurement effort will help the SAF assess the effectiveness of leadership development, and ensure continual improvement of our leaders. This will mitigate the emergence of negative leadership, especially incompetence and derailment.

CONCLUSION

Leadership is paramount in the military. Negative leadership in the military can have serious impact on followers, teams and the entire organization. The SAF's leadership selection and development systems, coupled with a strong values-based culture, has mitigated the emergence and flourishing of negative leadership. However, the SAF needs to ensure its selection and development systems are continuously reviewed and improved. At the same time, the SAF needs to deepen its understanding of negative leadership in the unique SAF context.

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CHAPTER 12

BREAKING POINT: ANTECEDENTS TO CHANGE IN THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE

*Anne Goyne, Warrant Officer Dave Ashley, Lieutenant Guy Forsyth, PhD, Wing Commander Lisa Macnaughtan and Warrant Officer Kevin Woods**

INTRODUCTION

Between 1998¹ and 2013, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) faced a number of public scandals that largely focused on the mistreatment of service-women. While women were not the only targets of negative organizational behaviour, over time the effect of successive scandals created the impression that women were not safe in the ADF. Although these incidents involved only a small minority of ADF personnel, the unremitting media focus on the issue resulted in increasing public and political pressure on ADF leaders to do something about it.

The ADF has a proud history and a positive reputation, both within Australia and throughout the world. Despite the scandals *noted* above, the ADF continues to be rated as one of the most trusted Australian institutions by the general public.² Nevertheless, when the “Skype Scandal” involving the sexual exploitation of a young female cadet at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) was broadcast by the media in 2011, it hit a nerve in the general community and among former and serving ADF members. Soon after the story became public, the Defence Minister received numerous personal accounts detailing allegations of abuse. In response to this apparent watershed of allegations, a special inquiry into the issue was launched, which became known as the DLA Piper review named after the global law firm that conducted the inquiry. The DLA Piper inquiry subsequently recommended the establishment of the Defence Abuse Response Taskforce (DART).

During the course of the DLA Piper and DART investigations from 2011 to 2013, in excess of 2,000 allegations of physical, verbal and sexual abuse

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Australian Defence Force.

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from the preceding five decades were reported.³ On the available evidence, a substantial number of cases have been assessed as plausible and complainants have received financial compensation of up to \$45,000 from the Commonwealth.⁴ The worst cases have been referred to the police and are currently being investigated for criminal prosecution. However, the DART also uncovered a previously ignored fact about abuse in the ADF: the majority of victims were male and many were minors (under 16) when the victimization occurred. More disturbingly, the majority of these reports involved physical violence, sexual abuse or both.

While the preponderance of males amongst the reported cases is unsurprising given the larger number of men in the ADF,⁵ the finding still seems to be shocking. Defence personnel, like the general community, have become accustomed to hearing about harassment and abuse directed at women and, to a lesser extent, minority groups. By contrast, there was almost no public outcry about the abuse of men in the ADF over the past half century. The results of the DART investigations revealed that 58% of the over 1,600 male cases reported to the inquiry alleged physical violence, one third reported sexual abuse and 68% reported bullying and harassment. Of the 570 plus female cases investigated, 59% reported bullying and harassment, half reported sexual abuse and 20% reported physical violence. Almost four times as many women (42% compared to 9%) reported experiencing sexual harassment compared to men.⁶ The majority of abuse allegations occurred while individuals were undergoing their initial training or early in their careers.

After the release of the three DART reports, the ADF commenced a process of restorative engagement⁷ to help address the psychological injuries experienced by those who had revealed their stories, sometimes after decades of silence. Even prior to the release of the reports, Defence leaders had promulgated large-scale programs to address the cultural issues that led to the abuses. These programs, such as “New Generation Navy” and “Pathway to Change”, placed particular emphasis on the treatment of women and other minority groups. They especially emphasized the need for a more inclusive culture within the broader, mostly male, ADF community. However, almost nothing was said about the way men had been treated at the hands of their more violent peers and/or superiors. Raising awareness about the experience of institutional violence against men, in addition to women, has been a particular focus for Defence Leadership and Ethics (DLE), as the gender, sexual orientation or race of the victims of abuse should not distract attention from the wrongness of the abusive behaviour itself.

The vast majority of ADF leaders use their power wisely and with consideration and respect. Unfortunately, the history of abuse outlined in the reports of the DART and other investigations suggests abuse of power is a subtle problem that has evolved over time⁸ and is heavily influenced by institutional cultural norms and deeply held attitudes. To this day, the mistreatment of women and other minorities within the ADF is represented as the rationale for cultural change, despite the unacknowledged reality that men from all backgrounds have also been frequent victims of abuse during their military service. While the over arching problem of institutional violence and abuse of power is a cultural artefact that is still not well understood in the ADF, the role of leadership in allowing this culture to continue is a particular blind-spot. This chapter aims to provide some insight into this issue.

DEFINING NEGATIVE LEADERSHIP

There is an endless fascination with how leaders exert influence to achieve results, with hundreds of articles and books produced every year on the positive aspects of leadership. However, research into positive leadership only reflects half the picture. There is now a growing interest in the “dark side” of leadership, where leaders use their influence for reasons other than the greater good. Interestingly, this area of research has been slow to develop into a field of academic study. Presumably, this is because the very idea of destructive leadership appears counter intuitive when considering the role of a leader in an organization. Of course, such a view ignores the substantial historical and contemporary evidence of capable and otherwise competent individuals in positions of authority using their influence destructively, either against individuals, organizations or nations. For an organization as reliant on a hierarchical and, at times, authoritarian leadership model, the military has much to gain from a clearer understanding of negative organizational leadership.

In their seminal article on destructive leadership behaviour (DLB)⁹, Einarsen, Schanke, and Skogstad¹⁰ provided the first comprehensive definition and conceptual model of negative leadership:

The systematic and repeated behaviour by a leader, supervisor or manager that violates the legitimate interest of the organisation by undermining and/or sabotaging the organisation's goals, tasks, resources, and effectiveness and/or the motivation, well-being or job satisfaction of subordinates.¹¹

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According to Einarsen et al., destructive leadership can negatively affect organizations, subordinates or both. It can be passive or aggressive, but it must involve repeated behaviour, i.e., not just a leader having a bad day. To qualify as DLB, the behaviour has to violate the legitimate interests of the organization, even though this may not necessarily be the intention. As Einarsen et al. point out, while negative leadership/DLB itself is undoubtedly volitional (i.e., the individual has made a decision to act in this way), inflicting harm to one's own organization does not have to be the leader's goal, although, as they acknowledge, it could be.

By focusing on two intersecting continua, pro- and anti-organizational behaviour and pro- and anti-subordinate behaviour, Einarsen et al. proposed a model of DLB with four measurably different leadership styles. These styles are: Supportive-Disloyal: pro-subordinate, anti-organizational; Tyrannical: pro-organizational and anti-subordinate; Derailed: neither pro-organizational nor pro-subordinate; and Constructive: both pro-organizational and pro-subordinate. While laissez-faire leadership (e.g., where a leader opts to avoid their responsibilities, leaving their subordinates to make leadership decisions) appears to fall outside this model as it is not clearly anti-organizational or anti-subordinate, Einarsen et al. argued that this style of leadership still remains within the destructive leadership framework (perhaps as a form of derailed leadership), rather than comprising a less damaging style of leadership behaviour, ineffective leadership.¹²

Schilling¹³ found that negative leadership had a direct effect on the work environment, and especially on the attitudes, behaviour and feelings of followers. However, respondents perceived such behaviour also negatively affected the well-being of leaders, and undermined the relationship between leaders and their subordinates. While a negative leadership style led to employee demotivation and lack of commitment, changes in employee behaviour also changed the relationship with the leader, altering the leader's behaviour. This double effect created a "vicious cycle", where destructive/negative leadership and its effects on employees continued to escalate until they risked "organizational ruin."

NEGATIVE LEADERSHIP IN THE MILITARY

Given the potential for interpersonal and/or organizational damage caused by negative leadership, it is not surprising this issue has begun to be considered in the military context. In a strongly worded paper focusing on the effect of toxic leadership in the United States Army, Colonel John E. Box¹⁴ discussed

the unique harm done to units by leaders who displayed the characteristics of the toxic leader. He argued that military toxic leaders tend to be micromanagers, pretenders or “egomaniacs”¹⁵ with each pattern of behaviour reflective of specific aspects of the character of the individual. Contrary to Einarsen et al.’s more corporate definition of DLB, Box argued that military toxic leadership is distinguished by the direct harm done to individuals within units, with a decline in unit effectiveness occurring as a consequence. According to Box, toxic leaders are driven primarily by self-interest, steal credit for the achievements of their subordinates, and lack empathy for subordinates and their families. As they “rise to their stations in life over the carcasses of those who work for them,”¹⁶ Box argued toxic leaders pose a particularly serious threat to military personnel and unit performance.

While Box refers to a particularly negative style of leader, negative leadership does not have to involve the kind of tyrannical, self-serving behaviour described in his paper to have dangerous consequences for operational effectiveness. Some ADF commanders have been expressed concerns about the ability of junior leaders to maintain military standards during overseas deployments. Instead of decisively addressing an increasing drive for individuality and non-conformity among junior troops, there seems to be a desire among some junior leaders to avoid confrontation and simply to ignore the issue. Not only does such an approach have potentially negative consequences for the overall effectiveness of the mission, it also risks leaders losing their authority to manage their troops.

The impact of inconsistent, laissez-faire and/or arbitrary leadership can obviously affect soldier behaviour in many ways. Recent examples include the experiences of Canadian troops in Somalia and Bosnia and the abuse of prisoners by American and British personnel in Iraq. Leaving aside these extreme cases, failing to enforce rules consistently erodes soldier confidence, military standards and unit morale and Australia is not immune to this problem.

To provide a means of investigating this type of issue, Australia introduced the Profile of Unit Leadership, Satisfaction and Effectiveness (PULSE) as a command climate survey tool in 2004. By 2007, ADF researchers were concerned by the percentage of junior Army personnel reporting witnessing the abuse of power frequently or always in their units.¹⁷ The finding was so pervasive that researchers developed the view the PULSE was tapping a cultural factor and not behaviour specific to an individual unit. The research was hampered by the absence of a clear definition of witnessing abuse of power, making it difficult for commanders to target specific issues. Nevertheless, a review of the comments provided suggested most of the incidents related to unfairness

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and/or double standards in the application of rules and punishments, and the perception of favouritism operating in the chain of command.¹⁸

While these results were troubling, of greater concern was the effect that witnessing the abuse of power had on the morale of soldiers who reported it. Although no significant differences were found between soldiers on most PULSE variables, those who reported witnessing abuse of power frequently or always also reported significantly higher scores for “amotivation” (i.e., feeling detached and unmotivated toward their work) and lower scores for feeling valued by their unit than those who did not. Moreover, reporting witnessing frequent abuse of power was significantly correlated with future discharge intentions. While leadership did not form a central part of this research, it is reasonable to assume that leadership was a factor in individual perceptions of fairness amongst these troops. These results would align with Tepper’s¹⁹ research showing the damaging effect of negative leadership on individual well-being, and especially on those without the resources or opportunity to leave.

THE INFLUENCE OF NEGATIVE LEADERSHIP ON ADF CULTURE

The vast majority of leaders in the ADF are good people who lead with compassion and professionalism. However, there are simply too many reported examples of negative organizational behaviour in the ADF²⁰ to suggest the organization does not also have its fair share of negative leadership. The examples discussed below reflect a culture in the ADF that, it is hoped, is relegated to the past. However, the lessons to be learned about the insidious nature of negative leadership, in particular the negative effect such leadership has on individual well-being and morale, remain one of the most important leadership lessons for the ADF.

ABUSE OF POWER AND INSTITUTIONAL VIOLENCE IN THE ADF

When someone wants you to do the right thing they appeal to your sense of integrity, but when someone wants you to do the wrong thing they appeal to your sense of loyalty.²¹

Negative leadership in the ADF generally comes in two forms, acts of commission and acts of omission. In other words, a negative leader can actively do things that undermine the integrity of their organization or the well-being of their people (as per Einarsen et al.’s definition) or they can fail to prevent

such behaviour. In the PULSE findings *noted* above, fairness was a significant issue for many young respondents. Where rules or privileges are managed in ways that appear to undermine the integrity of the system, this has a deleterious effect on the motivation of those experiencing it. However, if the people with the power to right this wrong stand by and do nothing, the affect can be considerably worse. The ADF has a depth of policy and rules to function effectively as an institution. Nevertheless, if there is a perception rules do not apply equally and fairly, then the system that upholds these rules loses the confidence of its people and the social contract underlying military service begins to fail.

It is the values of individuals and groups that determine when and where people will do the right thing. One of the strongest of Australia's (and the ADF's) cultural norms is "mateship." Included in the code of mateship is the requirement to demonstrate loyalty towards one's mates, and this can include when a mate is at risk of getting into trouble with the authorities. To "dob"²² on a mate is a cultural taboo that had its genesis in Australia's early history²³ and remains to this day a deeply ingrained aspect of our nation's culture. Mateship is, on the whole, a wonderful cultural norm, especially amongst soldiers. Australian troops will fight to save their mates over political ideals, religious dogma or jingoistic platitudes. However, from a leadership perspective, mateship can be a problem.

To prevent the secondary consequences of acts of omission, Australian leaders should make wrongdoers accountable for their actions. But if the wrongdoer is a 'mate', then it is a cultural anathema for an Australian male to inform a higher authority of their behaviour. The taboo against "dobbing" also makes it difficult for individuals to complain and/or identify their persecutors, resulting in an organization that has tolerated considerable unfairness rather than critically addresses the cultural ideal of mateship.²⁴

The evidence of this unfairness has been playing out in the Australian media over the past two decades, capped off by the accounts of abuse and institutional violence reported to DLA Piper and DART. Most of the accounts of extreme abuse occurred in training institutions where young men and women became easy prey for perpetrators from among both their more senior peers and staff. The fact that institutional violence and abuse of power can occur in military training is hardly surprising, as the cultural norms of these environments create a strong delineation between those with power and those without. However, when a cultural taboo against making complaints, or even investigating complaints, is also in place, it is not hard to see why it took years before these problems were addressed.

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It is testament to the professionalism of Australian military instructors that the abuse of trainees has become a rarity in the ADF.²⁵ However, the belief that obedience to legitimate authority is both necessary for military success and also necessary for survival in combat has long provided the justification for maintaining the status quo in military training institutions. So despite the fact the ADF is an all-volunteer force that attracts a more educated and worldly population of young Australians, military discipline has not changed a great deal over the generations. This, in itself, is not a problem, as the training system is generally very sound. However, negative cultures evolve because people on the inside fail to see their behaviour has drifted away from the norm and become a source of harm. Once again, under the rules of mateship, it is actually quite difficult to point out this problem because it means stepping outside the confines of mateship and enforcing accountability. It is therefore no surprise that Defence has generally responded to public demands for accountability rather than taken the initiative to address these problems proactively.

HMAS *Leeuwin*

While the results of DLA Piper and DART identified evidence of abuse of power throughout the ADF, two institutions featured repeatedly amongst the complaints, HMAS *Leeuwin*²⁶ and ADFA.²⁷ Both institutions were similar in a variety of ways and these similarities provide an insight into the underlying cultural drivers for what subsequently occurred. In the case of *Leeuwin*, the institution was responsible for training Junior Recruits (JR) for the Navy between January 1960 and December 1984. All JRs were male and most were minors, with the youngest aged under 16 at the commencement of their training. In the early years of the institution, around 300 boys were housed at *Leeuwin* to complete their school education before entering the broader Navy.²⁸

Most of the accounts of abuse at *Leeuwin* were perpetrated by more senior recruits against the younger and smaller new recruits. It would appear staff either did not know the abuse was occurring, or regarded the behaviour as largely benign and possibly a rite of passage. However, according to the DART report on abuse at *Leeuwin*,²⁹ many complaints involved sexual abuse, extreme violence and episodes of ritualized violence, and some of it was perpetrated by staff. These accounts are chilling, especially when one considers the isolation from family and youth of the boys involved.

In the late 1960s, possibly at the height of this abusive culture, stories about abuse of boys at *Leeuwin* were leaked to the media, resulting in one of the

first public scandals for the Navy. To address community concerns, the government commissioned Justice Trevor Rapke to investigate allegations of abuse at *Leeuwin*. The Rapke Report was released in 1971, but was not made public at the time. Nevertheless, the conclusions reported by the government of the day suggested there were no examples of systematic abuse at *Leeuwin* and certainly no evidence the staff colluded in any way with the few incidents reported to Rapke. Indeed, the review cleared the commanding officer and staff of *Leeuwin* of any failure of leadership.³⁰ While this may have been an understandable result given the culture of the day, it seems fair to conclude the Rapke Report did not address the harm done to the men who experienced brutality in their time at *Leeuwin*.

Australian Defence Force Academy

While many of the details of the case were similar at ADFA, the outcome was very different. This was an institution tasked with providing a university education for future officers in all three services of the ADF. Both men and women could be selected, but from the day ADFA opened in January 1986, the number of female cadets comprised less than a quarter of the male population. Officer cadets and midshipmen³¹ commenced training straight from school, generally aged 18 years, but sometimes as young as 16 years. While the staff of the Academy could be from any service, the military training model largely reflected the training conducted at the neighbouring (Army) Royal Military College (RMC): Duntroon. Duntroon provided the first wave of cadets from first to third year and this group largely comprised the ADFA cadet hierarchy, perhaps instilling an RMC culture at ADFA. The Navy and Air Force provided a few senior cadets and midshipmen, but nowhere near enough to address the imbalance of male army cadets. Army women at the Academy were almost exclusively in their first year in the ADF.

Looking at this arrangement it is unsurprising that ADFA fairly quickly ran into problems with the integration of women into co-educational officer training. The ongoing abuse of women at the Academy by more senior male cadets eventually became one of the longest running public scandals to ever occur within the ADF. To address the public demand for something to be done, the government commissioned Bronwyn Grey³² to conduct an investigation into allegations of abuse at ADFA. Unlike the approach that followed the Rapke Review, the Grey Review reported numerous accounts of violence and sexual abuse directed at women at ADFA. The government accepted the recommendations of the report almost in their entirety and ADFA was suddenly changed beyond recognition. Indeed, the evidence was clear that it was acts by cadets with rank, combined with acts of omission by some ADFA staff

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that enabled the toxic culture to continue, to the detriment of generations of young women and men. Perhaps of even greater concern, support agencies within the Academy that knew about some of the abuses also did very little to alert the hierarchy to the extent of the problem. While not specifically recommended by Grey, ADFA cadets lost their internal cadet hierarchy, making the institution unique among similar officer training institutions in other countries.

Australian cultural norms changed markedly between 1971, the year of the Rapke investigation, and 1983 when ADFA opened. However, the cultural climate at the Academy in its early years reflected earlier Australian society's blindness to abuse. It took 12 years before the Grey Review into ADFA revealed the extent of the problem within the Academy. The Grey Review highlighted that abuse was directed at women and involved sexual exploitation. Fortunately, the women were becoming increasingly prepared to speak up about it. However, the DART report into ADFA had revealed that victimization was not confined to female cadets. Male cadets were also the victims of an abusive culture (including severe physical and sexual abuse). Even so, there has never been a specific focus on male cadets in any investigation into ADFA and, unsurprisingly, this group has had no voice. Indeed, one could argue that Australian concepts of masculinity, manhood, mateship and even values such as loyalty and honour make it difficult for men to demand this kind of justice. For them there is just stoic silence for whatever injustice has been directed at them, whether their abusers are male or female. Such a mindset can only be changed by empowered and inspirational leaders stating that violence and sexual abuse are wrong regardless of the gender of the victim or the perpetrator. But it would not be until the 2012 adoption of a cultural change policy in Defence (Pathway to Change³³) before these voices began to be heard in the ADF.

In 2011, ADFA faced another public scandal about the abuse of a young woman at the Academy. However, on this occasion a male midshipman, a graduate of the Navy's New Officer Year One Scheme, informed ADFA staff that a serious incident of abuse had occurred. ADFA staff immediately informed the Commandant. The Commandant informed the Chief of the Defence Force, the local police and ADF Investigative Service (ADFIS). The police, and subsequently ADFIS, failed to treat the incident as an offence because in law³⁴ no such offence existed. The young woman, believing her concerns were not being met, told her story to the media. A media storm broke out, the Commandant of ADFA was stood down,³⁵ the police changed their minds and decided a crime had been committed and eventually the main

perpetrators were convicted. The Commandant of ADFA was then reinstated having been cleared of wrongdoing. So while a young female cadet had been abused, no one in the chain of command, including a peer of all those involved, committed a further act of omission by hiding what had taken place. The ADFA scandal is actually a testament to just how far ADFA (and the ADF) has advanced from the days of the Grey Review.

The F-111 Deseal/Reseal Program

The Royal Australian Air Force introduced the F-111 aircraft into service in 1973. The nation was coming to the end of its involvement in Vietnam. It was an era when societal attitudes toward the military were at an all-time low, including concerns about the welfare and well-being of military personnel. Across industry, employer obligations to protect the health and well-being of employees were lower than they are today. The culture of the military was largely can-do at any cost. The profoundly unpleasant task of climbing into the F-111's extensive fuel tank to identify and repair leaks simply had to be done. This maintenance activity became known as the F-111 deseal/reseal program. Against this backdrop, the cultural norms that enabled the F-111 reseal/deseal program to injure the lives of many young Air Force personnel were established. In an Air Force review of the work in 1979, it was acknowledged that:

(I)n winter this is cold, cheerless, obnoxious and very demanding work...[but importantly] there should be no need to reiterate the importance the nation places on this work... [nor] to doubt the motivation of those employed on it.³⁶

A phenomenon observed in human psychology is the attribution of failure in another to innate factors of the person, but to extrinsic circumstances when it is attributed to oneself.³⁷ This is not necessarily well-recognized in the day-to-day interactions within organizations, but there is evidence in the F-111 deseal/reseal Board of Inquiry (BOI) that it affected the perceptions of leaders when issues about this maintenance activity were raised. Given leaders recognized that deseal/reseal was unpleasant work, it is unsurprising workers felt their complaints were dismissed with the attribution they were just being troublemakers or whingers. However, this attribution was real and not merely an erroneous perception. One maintenance supervisor stated, "these fellows had to be watched to keep them on the go."³⁸ Moreover, punishment ensued for those who refused to comply with the direction to enter the tanks: for one member it resulted in seven days detention.³⁹ It is therefore incongruous that in such a climate a leader would argue that "At no time was there

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anything preventing [squadron] members from passing up this information through the Chain of Command^{39,40} and “I feel confident that should a serious safety concern be identified, it would have been raised through the management chain rapidly.”⁴¹

Other indicators of the potential for harm caused by the deseal/reseal program were apparent. Members working on the program and who lived on base were prevented from going to the Mess, the bar or the cinema⁴² because the smell of fuel was so abhorrent to other people. Yet no one seemed to consider the long-term effects of this severe level of exposure to fuel on the young men. Not even the unfairness of denying them access to social activities available to everyone else raised concerns. Medical personnel, who were aware of a range of physical ailments attributable to the deseal/reseal program, also failed to alert the hierarchy of concerns about the damage being done. In the end, the personnel completing deseal/reseal duties were treated as second-class by all those with control over their lives, and this largely justified ignoring their personal and physical well-being to achieve a difficult but necessary outcome.

There is no suggestion the problems of the deseal/reseal program were the consequence of toxic leadership. None of the leaders involved were unusually self-interested, careerist or tyrannical. Nevertheless, the choice to apply a double standard of leadership meets the criteria of destructive leadership as defined by Einarsen et al., even though the behaviour itself does not fit neatly into one of their categories. In the case of deseal/reseal program, leaders showed an undue loyalty to the F-111 platform over the care and welfare of their personnel, which is an odd reversal of the supportive-disloyal category described by Einarsen et al. These leaders were blind to the effect of a toxic culture on themselves and their subordinates, and even when the young men being damaged pointed out to them what was happening, they labelled, blamed and even punished them. This is beyond an act of omission. By continuing a program that both reduced the quality of life and physically damaged the young men involved, these leaders were complicit in the act of harm itself.

The 2001 F-111 deseal/reseal BOI into the program concluded the “responsibility for safety lies ultimately with the chain of command” and as such, the outcomes were acknowledged as a failure of leadership. However, given that the program lasted over 20 years, it was also recognized that it was a “deep seated failure for which no individual or group of individuals can be reasonably held accountable” instead “if anybody is to be held accountable ... it is the Air Force itself.”⁴³

Managing the Army “Jedi Council” Incident

In 2011, around the same time the Skype Scandal was causing a media furore for ADFA, rumours within the Army began to surface about something similar involving a large number of ranking Army members. While the scandal was never actually leaked to the press, it was fairly clear that the then-Chief of Army was facing another set of problems. An unknown number of male Army personnel, self-described as the “Jedi Council,” had been producing electronic images of consensual sex with female partners, who had no knowledge they were being filmed, and sending these images to their friends using the Defence email system. These emails were sent to over 100 recipients.

The Army conducted an inquiry to discover the truth of the allegations. At the end of this investigation, a group of people faced charges and six individuals were discharged from the ADF.⁴⁴ Some of those discharged did not commit an act of commission, in that they did not produce illegal images of themselves having sex. However, they appeared to know the images had been produced and had been promulgated, and instead of taking action, which one might have expected given their more senior rank, they did nothing. This is the act of omission that causes a crisis of conscience in too many Australian leaders. To do something means becoming the person in authority. Despite all the training and preparation for the role, some people still avoided this level of accountability when there was a choice between doing the right thing and protecting a mate, resulting in negative leadership in the Australian context.

CONCLUSION

The military is unique in society. It is the only institution authorized to take human lives as part of its role and it is one of very few organizations where members are expected to ignore a safer alternative to deliberately and energetically risk injury and death to achieve mission success. It is one of the few institutions where the difference between life and death can be measured by a young person making a split second decision under extreme stress. Because the military is populated by young people, there is a heavy reliance on older more experienced leaders to show young people the right way. This is the paradox of the Australian military: while able to make the decisions necessary to conduct a war, it often struggles with the seemingly more mundane decisions about what is right and what is wrong in interpersonal relations.

While institutional violence and abuse of power are acts of commission, it is acts of omission by leaders and peers that enable them to continue. The ADF

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has changed because leaders were no longer prepared to tolerate or turn a blind eye to abuse, or naïve enough to believe it could not be happening. Moreover, ADF personnel across the organization are now fully aware they have a responsibility to take action to identify the causes of inappropriate workplace behaviour and do something about it. This is the primary message of single service cultural change programs, and especially the broader ADF Pathway to Change. The task for the organization now is to learn how to retain everything good about the culture of mateship, while at the same time encouraging all ADF members to feel comfortable with taking responsibility and, when necessary, assuming authority.

ENDNOTES

1. This was the year the Grey Review (see notes 24 below) into inappropriate behaviour at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) was published.
2. A 2004 study found that 91 per cent of Australians surveyed reported a high level of confidence in the ADF: C. Bean, "Is There a Crisis of Trust in Australia?", in Shaun Wilson et al. (eds.), *Australian Social Attitudes: The First Report* (University of NSW Press: Sydney, 2005), 122-140, available at <<http://eprints.qut.edu.au/5624/1/5624.pdf>>, (accessed 6 October 2015).
3. Len Roberts-Smith, "Defence Abuse Response Taskforce: Report of Abuse in Defence," (Commonwealth of Australia, November 2014).
4. Defence Abuse Response Taskforce: Reparations Scheme Fact Sheet. <<https://www.defenceabuseresponssetaskforce.gov.au/Outcomes/Pages/DefenceAbuseReparationsScheme.aspx>>, (accessed 15 March 2016).
5. The number of female cases appearing in the DART investigation comprised around one third of all cases, which is substantially higher than the representation of women in each of the Services over the past 50 years.
6. Len Roberts-Smith, "Defence Abuse Response Taskforce: Report of Abuse in Defence," 94.
7. Defence Abuse Taskforce: Restorative Engagement Program Frequently Asked Questions, <<https://www.defenceabuseresponssetaskforce.gov.au/Outcomes/Pages/RestorativeEngagementProgramFAQs.aspx>>, (accessed 15 March 2016).
8. Evolution in this context refers to how the intensity of violence can escalate step by step, taking what might have started as relatively benign behaviour to extreme levels over time.
9. Destructive leader behaviour is one of many terms for leadership from the dark side. In this case the authors are quite specific about the behaviour, and its consequences – which makes this a useful definition for the purposes of this paper. It is acknowledged by the authors that there are other definitions of negative leadership – including toxic leadership. Given the obvious overlap between these constructs, the terms negative and destructive leadership are used interchangeably in this paper.
10. Ståle Einarsen, Merethe Schanke Aasland and Anders Skogstad, "Destructive Leadership Behaviour: A Definition and Conceptual Model," *The Leadership Quarterly*, no. 18 (2007): 207-216.

11. Einarsen et al, "Destructive Leadership Behaviour: A Definition and Conceptual Model," 208.
12. The ineffective leader can also be a negative leader but their behaviour falls short of being destructive. Such leaders may behave in petty, self-serving ways, but their leadership is not so problematic that it risks the goals of the organization or subordinate welfare.
13. Jan Schilling, "From Ineffectiveness to Destruction: A Qualitative Study on the Meaning of Negative Leadership," *Leadership*, no. 5 (2009): 102-128.
14. Colonel John E. Box, "Toxic Leadership in the Military Profession," (United States Army War College: Unpublished Manuscript 2012).
15. *Ibid.*, it seems clear from his description Box is referring to narcissistic leaders.
16. *Ibid.*, 3.
17. Anne Goyne, "Perceptions of Abuse of Power in the Australian Regular Army: A Preliminary Review of PULSE Data," (PRTG, Internal Working Paper. 2007).
18. Anne Goyne, "The Impact of Military Culture on Unit Climate: For Better or for Worse," (Presentation to a special meeting of the Army Capability and Modernisation Committee (ACMC) and the Army Element of the Australian Command and Staff College, Australian Defence College, 2007).
19. Bennett Tepper, "Consequences of Abusive Supervision," *Academy Management Journal*, no.43/2 (Apr 2000): 178-190.
20. Prevalence of Defence Unacceptable Behaviour Survey Results – 1013-2014 data (personal communication, 2015).
21. WO1 Kevin Woods, *Moral Courage*, unpublished CDLE Ethics Presentation, Australian Defence Force Academy Positive Performance Workshop, 2009.
22. Dobbing is to inform on another – generally a peer, potentially a friend. To 'dob' on a mate is generally considered the lowest thing an Australian male can do to one of their friends. Australian women also have a taboo on 'dobbing' but it is applied less stringently on behaviour committed between the genders. In other words, it is quite acceptable for a woman to tell someone when a man has committed a crime (especially sexual) against her.
23. Robert Hughes, *The Fatal Shore: The Epic of Australia's Founding* (Random House, USA, 1988).
24. It should be noted, the military is not the only institution in Australia where mateship is a strong cultural value – it would be fair to argue the social demands of mateship affect Australians across the spectrum, but especially in workplaces heavily dominated by men raised in Australia. This may explain why Australian men can be suspicious of perceived outsiders.
25. Bronwen Grey, "Australian Defence Force: Report of the Review into Policies to Deal with Sexual Harassment and Sexual Offences at the Australian Defence Force Academy," (Canberra: Director Publishing and Visual Communications, 1998).
26. Len Roberts-Smith, "Defence Abuse Taskforce: Report on Abuse at HMAS Leeuwin," (Commonwealth of Australia, June 2014).
27. Len Roberts-Smith, "Defence Abuse Taskforce: Report on Abuse at the Australian Defence Force Academy," (Commonwealth of Australia, November, 2014).
28. Brian Adams, "HMAS *Leeuwin*: The Story of the RAN's Junior Recruits," (Commonwealth of Australia, 2009).

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29. Len Roberts-Smith, "Defence Abuse Taskforce: Report on Abuse at HMAS *Leeuwin*," 19-32.
30. Adams, "HMAS *Leeuwin*: The Story of the RAN's Junior Recruits," 91-94.
31. The Navy introduced the Navy Officer Year One (NOYO) Scheme in 2000 in response to a higher than expected drop out rate of Maritime Warfare Officer trainees post completion a degree at ADFA. Under the NOYO scheme, Midshipmen complete a year in the Navy prior to commencing their training at the Academy. During this time they also complete an officer training course at HMAS *Creswell*.
32. Grey, "Australian Defence Force: Report of the Review into Policies to Deal with Sexual Harassment and Sexual Offences at the Australian Defence Force Academy."
33. The Defence Committee, *Pathway to Change* (Department of Defence, 2012), <<http://www.defence.gov.au/pathwaytochange/docs/120410%20Pathway%20to%20Change%20-%20Evolving%20Defence%20Culture%20-%20web%20version.pdf>>.
34. The view reported at the time was there was no offence in the ACT relating to the behaviour being reported.
35. The decision to stand down the Commandant related to the perception he had undertaken actions against the young woman's welfare by allowing a charge process against her to be completed. It was subsequently revealed this decision was made with the young woman's willing consent as she wanted to rebut any accusations she had gone to the media to avoid punishment.
36. F-111 deseal/reseal BOI Vol 1 Ch 9, p9-1 -9-2.
37. Vincent Yserbt, Steve Rocher and Georges Schadron, "Stereotypes as Explanations: A Subjective Essentialistic View of Group Perception." *The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life*, eds. R. Spears, J. Oakes, N. Ellemers, & A. Haslam, (Blackwell, UK, 1997).
38. F-111 deseal/reseal BOI Vol 1 Ch 4 p4-4.
39. F-111 deseal/reseal BOI Vol 1 Ch 9 p9-1 – it should be noted however, that the BOI did highlight that there was no evidence that this punitive approach existed in the latter years of the program.
40. F-111 deseal/reseal BOI Vol 1, Ch3 p3-2.
41. F-111 deseal/reseal BOI Vol 1 Ch3 p3-1.
42. F-111 deseal/reseal BOI Vol 1 Ch3 p9-2.
43. F-111 deseal/reseal BOI Vol 1 Ch3 p2-4.
44. <<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-14/army-personnel-sacked-over-explicit-emails/5092966>>, (accessed 16 Mar 2016).

CHAPTER 13

TRUST IS GOOD, CONTROL IS BETTER? LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES DURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AN OFFICER AND OTHER RANKS CORPS IN THE NORWEGIAN ARMY

*Ole Boe, PhD, and Torill Holth**

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will discuss the leadership changes that are taking place in the Norwegian Armed Forces (NAF) in relation to the Norwegian Army's (NA) new implementation of an officer corps and an other ranks (OR) corps. The purpose of this implementation is to provide a foundation for a more balanced personnel structure that will contribute to the NAF's operational capacity. A flexible and complete implementation of this new system will give the NAF more possibilities for the management of competence. The goal is to ensure necessary conditions to develop qualified professional practitioners to meet the NAF's needs.¹ It is in line with NATO standards, but it may have implications for the leadership of the NA. Officers and ORs have different leadership roles, with different leadership styles. Getting these two approaches to work together may create some challenges.

Historically, the NAF have gone through a transformation in how it views leadership. The starting point for this transformation was the aftermath of an accident in 1986 where a company of engineering soldiers was caught in an avalanche. At this time, the NAF used a strict authoritarian style of leadership (restrictive command), which paved the way for the accident. This philosophy was based on the principle that higher ranked officers at all times had command and the sole authority to make decisions about what the unit should do and how it should act. Soldiers and subordinate officers were to just follow orders. This distinct restrictive command-based leadership philosophy was thus the norm in the NAF.² The search for causes

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Norwegian Armed Forces.

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of the accident resulted in the Norwegian state demanding that the NAF change its leadership style.³ Consequently, the leadership philosophy had to be modernized significantly. During the year 2000, the NAF published its first joint operational doctrine, where the leadership philosophy emphasized the commander's intention for the mission; it was up to the individual to adapt his or her actions so that the intention could be fulfilled.⁴

In recent years, the leadership philosophy has been replaced by a new concept referred to as mission command or mission-based leadership.⁵ The mission is still the focus, and the commander's intention is still implicit in this approach. The need to communicate effectively and accurately has simply been made clearer. The main point in the new leadership philosophy that should be emphasized is the officer's ability to communicate well, have a good overview, and the ability to ask good questions that provide the desired information.

The leadership pendulum, especially for Norwegian officers, has swung even further. Today, educating and developing young leaders for the NA takes place at the Norwegian Military Academy (NMA). The NMA's main role is to educate future leaders of the NA. This includes creating a common direction, alignment and commitment for the officer, so that they will be able to function well in three officer roles: platoon leader, education planner and asset manager.⁶ The NMA accomplishes this by using a Norwegian version of mission-based leadership.⁷ In 2012, the NAF Chief of Defense stated that the successful execution of mission-based command comes as a result of the subordinate leaders taking directed initiative based on the commander's intention.⁸ In all ranks "directed initiative is expected by a subordinate through followership based on the properties of autonomy, academic excellence, and implementation capacity."⁹

NORWEGIAN SOCIETY AND ITS EFFECT ON THE NORWEGIAN ARMY

Changes in the education of Norwegian citizens will have an effect on the attitudes and values that they will have when they join the NAF. The 2006 revised Norwegian Act on Daycare Institutions stated that children have the right to participate and to express their view. Children in daycares are given the opportunity to actively participate in planning and evaluating the daycare's daily activities on a regular basis. The children's opinions are emphasized according to their age and maturity.¹⁰ Likewise, the curriculum for elementary schools and high schools states that schools shall prepare

the pupils to participate in democratic decision-making and stimulate national and international community engagement.¹¹ In the Norwegian curriculum, there are apparently opposing goals, which demands that education emphasizes a balance between the pupils' values and attitudes. One example is that schools fight against the cultivation of the self on the one hand and on the other help each pupil to grow a strong sense of self-esteem and independence.

In a democracy, the people both need to be able to cooperate, and to retain strong individual morals and be able to act independently. This duality is one of the issues that schools prepare students to confront. Pupils should be allowed to develop their own personality and strengthen their ability to work together.¹² Young adults have been raised in this society with these values and attitudes, at home, in daycares and in schools. At the same time, there also exists the opinion that the bureaucracy ensures equal rights and distribution of benefits and obligations among all citizens.

The NAF has developed its leadership strategies in line with the civil society. Authority is questioned in new ways. Young adults are used to being heard and participating both in their families, in institutions and among friends. The NAF has an even more difficult challenge in balancing the demand for loyalty to decisions and execution on the one hand and to take personal responsibility for the situation at hand. Involvement and participation are two core attitudes both in the civilian and the military community. Trust is additionally a key attribute in the human dimension of combat leadership. Soldiers must trust and have confidence in their leaders. Once trust is violated, a leader becomes ineffective.¹³

THE ESSENCE OF A TRUST-BASED CULTURE IN THE NORWEGIAN ARMY

Developing a leadership culture based on trust is important, but at the same time it is quite problematic. The main problem seems to be adapting mutual trust into the civilian management rules of the military bureaucracy. Trust among the members of a military unit is fundamental for functioning on military missions. Therefore, trust also underlies the arrangement of internal control routines to secure responsible management.¹⁴ Trust is an essential element of the Norwegian version of mission-based command.¹⁵ A commander has to trust his subordinates, and vice versa. Trust is thus a prerequisite for effective decentralization, unplanned interaction, utilization of expertise and targeted initiative and vigour.¹⁶ Parrington and Findlay

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state that building and maintaining trust is possibly a commander's most important action to establish and exercise mission command and to achieve cross-domain synergy.¹⁷

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The *art of command* is the creative and skillful use of authority, instincts, intuition, and experience in decision-making and leadership. The *science of control* is about the systems and procedures that improve a commander's understanding and support the execution of missions. Effective commanders leverage both art and science.¹⁸ The use of authority is also central to Weber's term "legitimate domination". Fantuzzo explains that there are three "subjectively adequate" types of legitimate domination: legal domination, traditional domination, and charismatic domination.¹⁹ According to Fantuzzo, Weber's three explanations account for why people obey and internalize commands as legitimate. Traditional domination is probably the most powerful, because it is somewhat unconscious. It can be situated between legal domination (the 'rule of law') of the bureaucracy, and charismatic domination (the 'rule of man') of the charismatic leader. People accept traditional domination somewhat unthinkingly based on tradition and culture.²⁰ Blindly following traditions without reflection may hinder desired changes and development. Unthinkingly following the rule of law may reduce the influence of values and personal responsibility, but following the rule of man may lead to the unwanted effects of charismatic leaders. The leader must master their leadership and influence in a balanced way in order to create the desired personal involvement among employees.

BASIC NORWEGIAN ARMY CULTURE

Loyalty is an NA value. Complaints about their leader's leadership style does not fit with being a soldier. It is possible to say that the organization itself sustains the old culture of authoritarian leaders, even though we know that this kind of leadership does not activate the soldiers' full competence potential. What is it about this kind of leadership, that uses the transactions between leader and led as the best way of accomplishing missions? In earlier times, it was commonly the leader who was the expert and who had the longest experience, best professional knowledge and the highest rank. Today, the situation is more complex. The leader still has the highest rank, but they are not necessarily the one with the expert competence. The new key competence of the military leader is communication. The officers need to get to know their

personnel to get a picture of their professional and personal competence. This allows them to put the right person on the right task. However, there is still a myth surrounding the strong successful military leader, the idea that everyone obeys them without doubt.

A study from 2014 found that young leaders under 30 years of age in the NAF preferred a structural style of leadership.²¹ Within this leadership framework, discipline is required and expected. In order to become a good structural leader, the leader has to know his/her field of work. He/she has to be certain of what he/she is doing, so that he/she can contribute his/her expertise. The down side of this is that the leader may also function as a tyrant, with total control. This may also be called management by exception according to the theory of transformational and transactional leadership.²² Transactional leadership as contingent reward may function in organizations under stable circumstances, but will not engage the subordinates' initiative and personal commitment to the unit's tasks.²³ A strong control regime will probably kill the subordinates' motivation and creativity.

This is the duality in the NA's culture. On the one hand, the leader is expected to be self-confident and action-oriented. On the other hand, the leader receives and shows trust in others and creates awareness and acceptance of the subordinates' perception of the purpose of the unit's mission. This serves to enhance the individuals' and the team's competence and willingness to perform more than what is expected.²⁴ The two different career paths of the ORs and the officers may provide different domination sources. On the one hand, one will find the charismatic as the safe and strong. On the other hand, one will find the bureaucratic that ensures that things are done correctly but that is detached from the relationship and the personal involvement. One core issue when a culture is in shape may be said to be the awareness of the sources of dominance. In the NA culture the charismatic person may have been perceived to be the secure base and easy to trust and the bureaucratic person more distant and impersonal.

The NAF Chief of Defense's statement on leadership from 2012 aimed to raise the awareness of all employees in the NAF regarding the military principles and values that underlie the governance of the military organization.²⁵ The purpose of the statement was to help create a common understanding and thus a common language and thinking on what can be characterized as good leadership in the military. Among the principles and values that are highlighted are respect, responsibility, and courage: these values serve as the NAF core values. Furthermore, emphasis is on professional expertise, ethical judgment, collectivity and solidarity, social responsibility and joint liability,

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the organization's ability to learn in order to enhance action, commitment, flexibility and situational awareness. It is emphasized that good leadership is based on mutual respect and trust between leaders and subordinates and that leadership is about relationships.²⁶

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE OFFICER CORPS AND THE OTHER RANKS CORPS

The Chief of the NA stated that the specialist corps is going to be a new and strong backbone to the NA²⁷, with the sergeant majors as the spearhead. However, the officers will still lead, command and be responsible. The plan for the implementation of the specialist corps produced by the Norwegian Defence Staff states that the principal differences between roles of the officer corps and the OR corps lies in their different leadership roles.²⁸ The ORs are meant to practice what has been called executive leadership. The officers are meant to have the leadership responsibility, command and control. These two roles then will complement each other and give units structure, competence and motivation, thereby increasing the possibility of effectiveness. It is intended that the officers will continue to be visible leaders and role models. They will also have more focus on leadership, tactics, intentions and system understanding. The OR will focus on detail, following-up and control.²⁹ This indicates that the executive leader (the OR) is meant to be the one to execute the science of control, while the officer shall be the role model and thus to be responsible for executing the art of command. In order for this to be successful, the NA needs to create a system based upon complementary roles and authority between the ORs and the officers. The glue holding this together will be the respect and understanding of each other's roles.

Kotter divides leadership and administration in two separate categories with complementary tasks (Table 13.1).³⁰ His point is that it is possible to learn to manage both roles, which also is important for the organization's effectiveness and achievement of objectives. However the situation in today's complex organizations is that they are over-administered and under-led, which means they lack the capacity to handle change, determining direction and aligning and motivating the employees. These are tasks that are valued in the NA. Kotter states that an army in peacetime needs administrative routines, but you can never administer soldiers into battle, they need to be led.³¹ The NA soldiers must have confidence in both the officer and the OR, but only one of them can be the leader.

Administration	Leadership
Handle complexity Plan and budget Organization and resource allocation Control and problem-solving (discrepancies)	Handle change Determine the direction Aligning the employees Motivation and inspiration

Table 13.1: Division of Tasks Between Administration and Leadership

Table 13-1 shows the division of tasks between administration and leadership according to Kotter.³² It clearly shows that the administrative manager is more prone to use leadership by exception. The executive leader has the possibility to influence people directly and apply transformational leadership. This creates relationships between the executive leader and the people they lead. The plan for the implementation of the OR corps in the NAF visualizes the division of tasks between the two roles in the model presented in Figure 13-1.³³




Figure 13.1: Functional Differences Between the Two Roles of Officers and ORs

The overlapping part of the two circles represents common tasks shared by both the officers and the ORs. The officer will deal with what should be done based on seeing the bigger picture and on proficiency in tactics, whereas the

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OR will deal with how things should be done, and have a strong focus on details and techniques to be used. Looking in more detail at the principal differences between the officer and OR, what they have in common is where and when missions are to be accomplished. Table 13-2 gives a brief overview of these differences. There are several areas of overlaps between the two roles. Some examples include communications and the values of respect, responsibility and courage. There are also areas where problems may arise if they are not sorted out. Examples are command and control for the officer and executive leadership for the OR. What will be important is that the officers will be able to remain operational, but without reverting to a transactional leadership style.

Officer	OR
Leadership, command and control Broad proficiency and holistic overview Military academic education, and also additional civilian extra education	Executive leadership Depth proficiency within defined areas Experienced-based proficiency, specific subject vocational training, and also non-military academic education

Table 13.2: Principal Differences Between the Roles of Officers and ORs

Experiences from Norwegian troops in contact in Afghanistan have revealed that the officers tend to look at the larger picture, while the enlisted personnel and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) tend look at the tactical picture. An experience related to using a Joint Terminal Attack Controller to ask for air support in order to bomb a village is a good illustration of the differences in leadership style. The NCOs may consider this to be a good decision because they win the conflict at hand. The officer understands that while they may win this specific conflict, loss of civilian lives may result in later increased hostility towards one's own unit and perhaps more possible enemies. This may represent two different perspectives, because the NCOs and the officers are trained and educated to process different types of information, and to conduct different types of missions and tasks.

The officer can be seen by the NCOs and the enlisted personnel as making unpopular decisions, or is seen as a weak or soft leader. What the NCOs might be missing is that it is not always about winning every battle, but about winning the war. If the officers are not able to communicate this to their personnel, trust may be eroded. When the enlisted personnel and the NCOs are not given the opportunity to take the fight to the enemy and to engage them,

they might start questioning whether the officer understands the business of being a soldier. The key to solve this will be for both officers and ORs to have a clear understanding of each other's roles and responsibilities. It will also be important for the ORs to understand the overarching intention of the mission.

POSSIBLE CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING THE NEW OFFICER AND OTHER RANKS CORPS IN THE NORWEGIAN ARMY

It has been observed that the NA officers seem to have a fear of being perceived as authoritative leaders. A reason could be that they are too consensus-oriented in their leadership. Norwegian society has also shifted dramatically towards viewing leadership as transformational leadership. Soldiers and officers in army units expect leaders to be more authoritative, firm and decisive, and to use more of the authoritarian style of leadership. This may pose a challenge to the new officers, as they have to deal with ORs used to executing a different type of leadership. As a consequence, this may have a severe negative impact upon the NA's ability to conduct missions. Having the ability to practice authoritarian leadership does not need to be the same as being a tyrant as a leader. As Key-Roberts puts it, stern or harsh leadership may have to be used to get the job done, but should be "reserved for drastic times, when stakes are especially high (such as combat situations), and leaders should use it in such a way that soldiers do not take it personally".³⁴

Perhaps the leadership style taught at the NMA has developed a bias towards involvement and individualized consideration as leadership tools without sufficient balancing against command and control mechanisms and having the power to make decisions and take responsibility for consequences.

CONCLUSION

What should be the common denominator of leadership for both the officers and the ORs? The basic values of the NAF, respect, responsibility, and courage, will be a good starting point. We need to ensure that there is a mutual respect, trust and understanding between the officers and the ORs. As mentioned, they will execute both common tasks and tasks allocated to each of their roles. The OR is the specialist on the subject matter and the officer must be exceptional on the tasks he or she will handle alone, while maintaining an overall or holistic perspective. In addition, the officer must master command

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and control and exhibit enough dominance to ensure that their leadership is followed. There is the need to clarify responsibility between the two roles in order to create a common ground for cooperation. For the implementation of these two new roles to succeed, a new common NA culture has to emerge.

The officer must learn to have an impact even when they lead through others. Indirect leadership will be important to learn. Likewise, they must learn to build and maintain relationships. They must also learn to understand and assemble information. They need to exercise influence and domination and thus secure the basis for building trust. How much subject matter expertise do they need to have? Much authority rests in the realm of subject matter expertise.

What do the ORs need to learn? They need to learn more about operational planning, so that they understand more of the aims of an ongoing operation than just the isolated tactical aspects of a single part of the operation. They also need to learn more about tactics in order to be able to have a common understanding and language they can use with the officers. Furthermore, they need to learn more about general concepts of leadership and to develop the ability to see things from different perspectives. The common denominator in all this will be to learn more about different ways of communication.

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CHAPTER 14

OVERCOMING NEGATIVE LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES THROUGH WE-LEADERSHIP: BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL IDENTIFICATION AND COMMITMENT, WITH INSPIRATION FROM THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS¹

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INTRODUCTION

Organizations face myriad challenges that stem from changing environments as well as organizational pressures. The fundamental non-predictability of the future means that organizations need to be adaptive not just to current challenges, but also to those that might arise in the future. Leadership and leaders have central roles in helping organizations navigate changing environments. But if the future is uncertain, how do leaders help prepare their organizations to be more adaptive? How do they encourage, cultivate, and build organizational capabilities that are critical for overcoming challenges that they do not know?

Traditional leadership approaches emphasize the role of the individual leader in motivating followers. Leaders inspire their followers to perform well on tasks and to unlock their potential. However, when leaders are concerned about their individual relationships with followers in the absence of the organizational context, they may be vulnerable to negative leadership behaviours and outcomes. “I”-leadership, where the emphasis on the leader, can lead to rigidity, toxic leadership behaviours, egotism, and myopia. This is due to the I-leader’s focus on their individual relationships with followers at the expense of the organization.

We propose an alternative way of thinking of leadership that brings the organizational context to the fore. This chapter will discuss the concept and

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Navy or the Department of Defense.

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practice of “we”-leadership, its importance for leadership in organizations, provide examples of we-leadership in action, and outline some steps leaders can take towards building a culture of we in organizations. Some of the mechanisms of we-leadership include:

- *We-leadership builds organizational identification.* Organizational members are more likely to identify with the organization’s goals (even through hard times) when they are psychologically connected to the organization.² Cultivating a we mentality can help people feel like a part of the organization, not just in it.
- *We-leadership versus careerism.* We-leadership is in opposition to careerism. Leaders who are pursuing their own career and goals can be very destructive to themselves and to their organizations. We-leadership can help overcome negative effects of such of toxic leadership.
- *We-leadership is about people.* We-leaders place the people in the organization ahead of themselves. We-leaders can inspire and motivate people and, through the effects of social and psychological contagion, contribute to their organization becoming more resilient. We-leaders know the strengths and weaknesses of their organization and of themselves.
- *We-leadership and innovation.* We-leadership is also beneficial for attracting and nurturing innovative and strategic thinkers, among other things, because we-leaders are less hierarchical in their thinking. Ideas matter, not the hierarchy.

The potential benefits from we-leadership are not just from those elements, but from we-leadership synergies (i.e., positive effects built into the organization as a whole). A key message of this chapter is that we-leadership can help educate and train leaders who are committed to the long-term goals of the organizations, rather than to their own careers. We contribute a framework demonstrating that leadership behaviours can actively build organizational commitment, and illustrate some examples of we-leadership by examining some key practices in the US Marine Corps.

The structure of the chapter is as follows: after a brief overview, we will introduce the concept of we-leadership and why it matters, on several (often interrelated) levels. For example, we-leadership can cultivate motivation in followers by instilling a greater sense of belonging, as well as identification

with the organization's goals (vis-à-vis individual goals). The following section will provide examples to illustrate the dynamics of we-leadership. We focus on examples from the United States Marine Corps, which has evolved as one of the most adaptive organizations, combining seemingly opposite organizational dynamics, such as the simultaneous pursuit of rigidity and innovation, strong hierarchy yet decentralized and innovative thinking at all levels, and the key role of visionary-maverick leaders who put the organization and its people ahead of themselves (we-leaders). The final section will discuss the possible lessons from these examples to the strategic leadership of other organizations, from businesses to non-profit organizations.

FROM ME-LEADERSHIP TO WE-LEADERSHIP

TRADITIONAL LEADERSHIP

Traditional leadership perspectives often emphasize the role of the individual leader in motivating a team. Leaders are thought to exhibit certain behaviours that can lead to positive or negative consequences for team and individual outcomes. There is an emphasis on the relationship a leader develops with their followers.³ An example of traditional leadership work involves trait leadership. In this literature, leadership is thought to be a function of individual traits or attributes which predict leadership and leader success.⁴ Trait-based perspectives were popular in early leadership theory, and some trait-based techniques are related to other theories of leadership. For example, Bono and Judge⁵ examined how Big Five personality variables are related to dimensions of transformational-charismatic leadership. Adorno's work on authoritarian leadership⁶ and Jerrold Post's work in political psychology⁷ are examples from a political science tradition.

Another approach is servant leadership. Servant leaders are motivated not just to lead, but also to serve their followers. Servant leaders empower their followers and exhibit humility and authenticity.⁸ Servant leadership scale validation suggests it is a multidimensional construct and explains different aspects of leadership behaviour relative to leader-member exchange and other leadership ideas.⁹ Servant leadership is virtuous, ethical, and leaders are stewards rather than individual heroes.¹⁰

Charismatic-transformation leadership has gained significant attention in recent research. Some suggest that this leadership style is the most effective in motivating followers.¹¹ Charismatic-transformational leaders focus less on management and more on change, innovation, and transforming

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systems. Bass' model suggests there are four dimensions of charismatic-transformational leadership: charisma, intellectual stimulation, inspirational motivation, and individualized consideration. Leaders engaging in these behaviours are said to be able to motivate employees far better than leaders not. Recently, charismatic-transformational leadership has been criticized for poor construct definition, poor causal ordering, poor operationalization, and invalid measurement tools.¹² Charismatic-transformation leadership is in contrast to transactional leadership, where leaders motivate followers in a transactional manner by offering rewards for performance. Studies have directly compared the relative of efficacy of both.¹³

Traditional leadership research emphasizes the ability of an individual leader to motivate and inspire followers. The emphasis is to examine different behaviours or styles that may lead to positive outcomes for both organizations and for leaders and followers. They explain how leaders affect followers by increasing (or decreasing) motivation and by providing (or failing to provide) the necessary support and mentorship for their followers to succeed.

We argue that the dyadic emphasis of traditional leadership theory, where leaders interact in a one-to-one fashion with followers, ignores much of the organizational context in which leadership is embedded by focusing on individual leaders. Much leadership is conducted within organizations, where leaders work with followers in accomplishing the tasks the organization has set. By building the organizational dimension back into the leader-follower relationship, and emphasizing leadership as putting ones' organization and its people ahead of oneself, we see that leadership strategies need to not only focus on the motivational aspects of leader behaviour, but also on how leaders work to build a culture where organizational members identify with the organization and its goals. Such identification has several advantages with regards to organizational innovation, adaptation, and resilience.

WE-LEADERSHIP

The words we use matter a great deal. Rather than a leadership concept focused on the "I" or "me" (the individual leader), we suggest that a more fruitful dynamic may result from a leadership concept focusing on the "we". Broadly construed, this includes the leader, the followers, and the organization. According to Gray and Otte¹⁴ and Otte,¹⁵ we-leadership is selfless leadership. It is an obligation to serve people in the organization (and not to be served by them) by putting oneself last. This is manifested by the "officers eat last" phrase used by the US Marines, which serves to break down traditional conceptions of hierarchy.

We-leadership is principally focused on how leaders instill a feeling of collectivity into their followers and build a we-culture in their organizations. We-leaders take actions that help their followers identify with the organization and its goals. Rather than focusing on individual rewards, either for leaders or followers, we-leaders focus on recognizing people and forge a psychological connection between the follower and the organization, such that the follower takes actions to benefit the organization. Our concept of we-leadership draws on ideas about organizational commitment and loyalty. Members of an organization can be committed to an organization by forming a psychological attachment. They tie their identity to the organization, they feel involved in their role, and they feel loyalty and attachment to the organization.¹⁶ Organizational members who are committed to their organizations identify with the organization's goals and desire maintaining membership to achieve those goals.¹⁷

One aspect that separates we-leadership from traditional leadership approaches is an explicit focus on leadership behaviours designed to increase the follower's commitment to the organization and an emphasis on selflessness. By encouraging the follower to identify with the goals of the organization, the leader builds a culture that is beneficial for the group and organization. Such positive leadership behaviours can help counter negative leadership forms and create positive contagion effects.¹⁸ In the Marine Corps, boot camp, which breaks down individual identity and remakes it in the context of the overall culture and tradition of the Marine Corps, is the first step in building organizational commitment.

Leadership behaviours can build organizational commitment in at least two ways. First, leadership behaviours can activate and strengthen existing commitment. Marine Corps personnel learn to be committed to Marine Corps goals through much of their professional development. Leadership rhetoric that draws on Marine Corps traditions and that reminds followers of how their actions will serve the broader goals of the organization help to remind followers of their existing commitment, and in doing so, strengthen follower feelings. Second, leadership can actively build commitment through their actions on behalf of their followers. Leaders are a physical representation of the organization in the eyes of their followers: they serve as avatars of the organizational identity. If leaders take actions that show their own commitment to their followers, their followers would be likely to reciprocate that commitment, but the target of that commitment would be the organization. When reciprocating commitment, the followers would have the organization as a whole in mind, as they may view the leader as acting on behalf of the organization.

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We-leadership is different from leadership behaviours that try to motivate or cajole followers into certain actions through individual rewards, or from inspiring followers to unlock their potential. Traditional leadership behaviours focus on building esteem within groups or in stressing motivation. We-leadership takes commitment to the organization as the superseding precondition that builds a “we-culture” and leads to these behaviours. Rather than targeting the behaviours themselves (e.g., leaders motivating followers through charismatic rhetoric), we-leaders build follower commitment to the organization over time, which leads followers to perform better and be more willing to take risks and make sacrifices for the organization. Table 14.1 shows some key aspects of we-leadership as compared to traditional leadership.

	We-Leadership	Traditional Leadership
Objective	Building organizational commitment, identification and loyalty	Motivating or inspiring followers
Goal orientation	Goals of the organization (internalized to be own)	Personal goals
Target of behaviours	Targeting followers in relationship to organization, building a ‘we’ culture through encouragement, ideas, initiative and recognition	Targeting followers individually or specifically; individual rewards
Behaviours	Surrogacy, semantic, symbolic, service, physical	Charismatic-transformational, transactional
Outcomes	Followers with strong commitment to organization; possible adaptability/resiliency	Strongly motivated followers, followers inspired to accomplish their own goals

Table 14.1: Key Aspects of We-Leadership and Traditional Leadership

How does we-leadership manifest? Leaders can take many classes of action to build commitment.

SURROGACY

Central to any leadership behaviour is for the leader to act on behalf of the organization. The leader must become a physical avatar of the organization in the minds of followers. Any actions the leader takes that might build follower loyalty to themselves would affect the follower's commitment to the organization as a whole, rather than to the individual leader. In this way, surrogacy is the precondition for we-leadership behaviours to be successful. For the leader to really build commitment to the organization, they need to de-emphasize their own role and motivations and emphasize how the beneficial actions that they perform for the followers come from the organization itself.

SEMANTIC ACTIONS

Semantic actions involve the use of rhetorical strategies to make individuals feel as if they are psychologically connected to the organization. The objective of the semantic action is to merge the individual's identity with that of the organization.¹⁹ This can involve breaking down individual identity or making the organization's identity salient. This fusion of the individual identity with the organization's is an important component in developing commitment, as it necessitates a psychological bond with the organization (i.e., the organization's goals becomes one's own). Leaders can employ specific rhetorical strategies to achieve this (e.g., team names).

SYMBOLIC ACTIONS

Symbolic actions involve the use of rituals and symbols that all personnel share. Leaders can explicitly tie their actions or projects to traditions, to common themes, to mascots, to former leaders (i.e., to symbols that represent the organization). By highlighting these symbols and encouraging personnel to engage with them, leaders build identification with the organization.

SERVICE

Leaders can make use of servant leadership behaviours to build commitment.²⁰ They act as advocates for their followers, mentor them, and generally undertake actions that focus on their followers' success (not their own career or success). However, what is essential for this to be a successful strategy is for followers to see their service as an extension of a service done for them by the organization. When followers view favours and support as coming from the organization, through its agent, the leader, they will be more committed to the organization, as it has used resources on their behalf.

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PHYSICAL ACTIONS

The use of routines can guide physical action. Followers engage in the same tasks repeatedly, which helps to create conditions that engender commitment. Working together and thinking of one's immediate group as a team can create shared social identity²¹ or a transactive memory system²² that can tie the team to each other and to the organization.

We-leadership is different from collective leadership. Collectivistic leadership de-emphasizes the role of the individual leader in explaining group outcomes.²³ Rather, it emphasizes a shared leadership concept where multiple members of a given team share leadership responsibilities. Although that may sometimes be the case in our concept of we-leadership, we would argue that the desired outcome is of an individual cultivating a we-leadership mentality among their followers and building a we-mentality in their organizations.²⁴

A CAUTION

Although we have argued that we-leadership is essential for organizations to be adaptable, there are possible pitfalls. Organizations suffering from groupthink also emphasize a devotion to the organization, but one that may lead to a flawed decision-making process.²⁵ By using we-leadership to build organizational commitment, the leader simultaneously builds a strong group identity.²⁶ A strong identity may lead members of the organization to all think similarly and may suffer groupthink as a result by suppressing any opposing viewpoints. We-leaders can counter this by also emphasizing critical thinking and disruptive/innovative initiatives in their organizations.

Additionally, it is important to be open to learning from both inside and outside the organization. Often, organizations are presented with solutions from the external environment, particularly public organizations with broad constituencies (e.g., the Marine Corps). Individuals with very strong commitment to their organization may feel that they are the only ones who can contribute ideas. They might view anyone from outside of the organization as not knowledgeable, committed, or justified enough to propose ideas for the organization. They could be less receptive to any ideas from those outside the organization. Although we-leadership may strengthen acceptance of disruptive ideas generated by organizational members, it may make it more difficult for the organization to accept disruptive ideas coming from outside the organization unless they are sponsored by a member viewed to be committed.

These potential challenges are small in comparison to the possible dangers of I-leadership. We-leadership is not just beneficial for organizational outcomes, but essential for organizational strategy and ability to change under conditions of uncertainty or ambiguity. With real uncertainty and limited rationality, new alternatives for leaders are created through the role of imagination. Individuals who are more committed to their organizations may be more willing to take extra steps to search for innovative solutions. Individuals think differently when their leaders use we-leadership (by focusing more on the overall goals of the organization and sublimating their own goals) than traditional leadership (by focusing more on how their goals can serve themselves and perhaps their immediate teams).

HOW DOES THE US MARINE CORPS BUILD A WE-LEADERSHIP MENTALITY?

[T]he destiny of our Corps depends on each of you. Our Forces, brigades, regiments, battalions, companies, and other detachments are what you make of them. ... Harmonious cooperation and teamwork, together with an intelligent and energetic performance of duty, are essential to success, and these attributes can be attained only by cultivating in your character the quality of loyalty, unselfishness, devotion to duty, and the highest sense of honor.

General John Lejeune

The we-mentality uses the mechanism of organizational commitment, which is a powerful altruistic force. It can minimize transaction costs, as well as key biases in organizations, and overcome negative leadership forms such as toxic and aggressive leadership (i.e., leaders who are insensitive, self-serving and/or micromanagers). When thinking about their organization, if people think “we”, it reduces perceptions of differences and distances (for example, in terms of power and hierarchy) and increases the feeling of belonging to something beyond oneself.²⁷ At the individual level, it helps build the psychological and social mechanisms of identification, and a shared organizational culture and philosophy. A we-mentality can also help make the organization more adaptive and resilient as individuals and organizations are less resistant to change to the organization that they are a part of (as opposed to change imposed on or dictated to them).

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How can organizations encourage organizational identification and commitment? How can leaders help shape human motivation in organizations? The Marine Corps cultivates, in part through the design of the organizational and psychological architecture of their organizations, a devotion to the organization. They socialize its members into the ethos, values and tradition of the organization from their first day (or even before, as many recruits commit to the Corps before joining through deferred enlistment). The Marines have an exceptional sense of organizational commitment to the organization's goal. Part of that may be explained by the mission of the Marine Corps (as it might attract people dedicated to higher causes). There is also an element of strategic organizational design, including design of the psycho-cultural-organizational mechanisms to build and cultivate team spirit, organizational identity and loyalty.

In the previous section, we introduced several classes of action leaders can use to build organizational commitment and therefore engage in we-leadership. The Marine Corps has an institutional focus that enables its leaders to engage in all of these classes of actions and build commitment among its personnel. They also build leadership at several levels, starting with leadership in small groups (squads or platoons).

SURROGACY

Marine Corps leaders act on behalf of the organization. At a high level, followers view leaders as acting on behalf of the Marine Corps. In their decisions to assign personnel to tasks, develop training routines, and mentor their followers, followers ascribe leader behaviours to the Marine Corps itself. This allows certain leader behaviours to build organizational commitment (mentoring, for example). When leaders perform promotion ceremonies or give awards, they give them on behalf of the organization. When they give counseling statements to mentor their personnel, they give them on behalf of the Marine Corps. When they deliver orders to their personnel, those orders are couched in terms of serving the Marine Corps' broader mission.²⁸

SEMANTIC ACTIONS

Upon entering boot camp, Marines are no longer identified by their individual name but are referred to as a recruit. The loss of self relative to the identification with the organization is embedded in the language used. A former Marine recalled his days in boot camp: "There were no 'I's in the Marine Corps, only 'eyes'. If we ever said 'I this' or 'I that', [the instructors] would

make us point at our eye and ask, 'is this the eye you're referring to'?... It was meant to free us from our individualistic nature and the importance of the collective."²⁹ Every member is a Marine first, and every Marine is a rifleman, which also helps breaking down hierarchical or specialty barriers and create a commonality to being a Marine.

SYMBOLIC ACTIONS

A first symbol of losing one's identity and giving up self is the yellow footprints at the entrance to boot camp. This symbolizes a new path for the young Marines, stepping towards the disappearance of the individual and into a tradition and culture of selflessness and sense of duty.³⁰ Stripping away individual characteristics also includes haircuts, sometimes making the recruits unrecognizable even to themselves. This further serves to build an identity centred around the Marine Corps. Another common symbol is the eagle, globe, and anchor originating from the founding of the Marine Corps, which Marine Corps personnel wear on their uniforms. This symbol unites personnel, tying them to the marines who served before them and instilling in them a sense of shared responsibility for the future. Even if they leave the service, the Marine identity stays with them, reflected in the saying "once a Marine, always a Marine."

SERVICE

Leaders serve their followers through mentorship, recognition, and sacrifice, often substituting their followers' well-being for their own. This action can be as mundane as nominating a Marine for a quarterly award and filling out the necessary paperwork.³¹ But the ultimate example of service is in sacrificing one's own safety. The example of Lance Corporal Kyle Carpenter is one example of this. In 2010 in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, Lance Corporal Carpenter shielded a fellow Marine from a grenade blast, saving the life of his fellow Marine. Lance Corporal Carpenter received the Medal of Honor for his actions.

PHYSICAL ACTIONS

Marine boot camp is well known for its grueling exercise and tough physical standards. This helps build team identity. For instance, punishing recruits as a group for individual misbehaviour helps instill the sense that any organization or team is only as strong as its weakest link. Several exercises are also designed to only be successfully finished as a team; for example, the Crucible, a 54-hour

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exercise where recruits carry each other's gear (and sometimes each other) in order for the team to finish.³² Recruits also are taught to embrace uncertainty and fear, and to run towards the sound of the gun, not away from it.

The combination of these factors builds greater commitment than simply the sum of their individual effects. Such values help encourage an organizational identity and loyalty and a pursuit of a logic of identity.³³ The building of team identity, organizational identification, and loyalty in the Marines Corps has several levels. This includes aspects of strategic organizational design, as well as design of the psychological architecture and mental characteristics of Marine training and education. This involves knowledge of what motivates humans, along with knowledge of how to change human behaviour. It also includes characteristics of how individuals interact with others. The facilitation of organizational commitment can reduce possible conflicts of interest as well as ambiguities and misperceptions about goals and interests. It also helps Marines to be highly adaptive on the battlefield.

With an ingrained sense of organizational loyalty and identification already in place, as Marines evolve as leaders, a focus beyond oneself naturally become part of one's leadership style. Marines often begin leading small groups within their organization at a young age. Learning to lead in small groups helps reinforce the connection between leaders and the people they lead not as one of distance, but rather in terms of a bond, a relationship. This has been central to the Marine Corps spirit since its founding, as emphasized in the statement by General John Lejeune in 1921: "The relationship between an officer and enlisted men should in no sense be that of superior and inferior, not that of master and servant, but rather that of teacher and scholar."

MARINE-IZING LEADERSHIP: WE-LEADERSHIP, DISRUPTIVE THINKERS AND ADAPTIVE ORGANIZATIONS

A self-less leader recognizes that everything that is accomplished is done through people.³⁴

WE-LEADERSHIP AND GENERATING CREATIVE AND INNOVATIVE THINKING

We-leadership is central for adaptive organizations on several levels. Adaptation involves both exploration and exploitation. Most organizations struggle

with too little creative and disruptive thinking. We-leadership facilitates disruptive thinking by members of the organization and unleashes initiative through trust, transcending notions of hierarchy and rank through delegation and shared sense of vision.³⁵ Moreover, it aids in implementing innovation into organizational practices and thinking.

An essential element to we-leadership is breaking down notions of hierarchy. For example, when General James Mattis commanded Task Force 58, a Marine unit, during the initial invasion of Afghanistan in 2002, he made sure to build relationships with members in the task force regardless of any formal position: “He created an atmosphere where barriers between commanders and staff and officers and enlisted were broken down. Members of the division were valued for the contribution of their talents rather than the rank on their collar.”³⁶ Likewise, when General Gray led exercises at Fort Pickett in the early days of manoeuvre warfare, the debriefs and learning discussions took place with no ranks visible, so that seniors were more open to learn from juniors, and juniors felt more free to speak up.

The creation of an open and collaborative environment can help generate innovative ideas. Early work on small team communication networks showed that highly centralized communication networks, where there is a great deal of hierarchy, outperform decentralized networks, but only in tasks involving information aggregation. In tasks requiring collaboration and coordination, it was the decentralized teams without much hierarchy that performed better.³⁷ This is analogous to modern attempts to break-down hierarchy in organizations, such as Zappo’s experiment with holocracy, the elimination of all managers.³⁸

Related to the issue of decentralization, we-leadership is likely to foster a culture that encourages people to think outside the box.³⁹ Organizations with a we-culture are more likely to be more willing to try new things and fail. This is due to we-leaders building a collective commitment to the organization that motivates personnel to take risks in developing new solutions. Moreover, people realize the risks of failure are not as high under we-leadership, making them more likely to take extra steps to solve problems that may result in failure, but can also yield success. We-leadership is therefore central to building a balance between exploitation of existing knowledge and exploration of new knowledge.⁴⁰

WE-LEADERSHIP AND THE ADOPTION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF DISRUPTIVE AND INNOVATIVE THINKING

We-leadership can also be central to the adoption and implementation of innovative ideas. A disruptive change that is embedded in the collective mind-set of the organization and not attributed to single individual might be less likely to encounter resistance.

An example is General Gray's leadership of the Marine Corp's development of the manoeuvre warfare doctrine. Although quite disruptive and innovative in nature, Gray embedded it in the Marine Corp's organizational routines and let the organization claim it; for example, a core document (*Warfighting*) was not authored by individuals, but by the organization. Quite often, Gray did not frame his leadership initiatives as new ideas he came up with, rather, he framed them as building on the history and tradition of the organization. A true we-leader, he still credits others and the organization for his ideas, claiming that he unleashed the people with the ideas, turning them loose.⁴¹

Adoption of innovative ideas does not guarantee success, even with we-leadership. However, we argue that we-leadership can help organizations to learn from their mistakes. Individual followers are less concerned with individual reputations, and leaders are less concerned with their own careers. Failures can be opportunities for learning that can inform better implementation. As Gray and Otte suggest: "In the Marines, initiative is a duty, but it can only be a duty in an environment where it is encouraged in spite of the mistakes...that can result. Creating that environment is both a requirement for, and a result of, [we] leadership."⁴²

We-leadership can exist at all levels of the organization. It is not necessarily related to a leader's structural position in the organizational chart. This is in line with thinking on the "strategic corporal," where great responsibility can devolve down to the lowest rungs of the organization.⁴³ In the Marines, privates and recruits can act as we-leaders for their fellow Marines. Fundamentally, we-leadership is the opposite of careerism. Leaders build commitment to the organization and to the people, not to themselves. Leaders are committed not to their careers, but to their organizations, and in committing to their organizations, they seek to serve their followers. Thus, we leaders in a sense "become subordinate to the people, placing their needs ahead of their own."⁴⁴

WE-LEADERSHIP AND THE IMPORTANCE OF READING

“If you want a new idea, read an old book”

General Alfred Gray

We leadership is about leading through ideas, trust, inspiration, recognition, and engagement, not through intimidation, power and control. Generals such as Gray and Mattis emphasize the importance of reading and the study of history as essential to leadership and adaptability. When Gray created the Commandant’s reading list in 1989, he wanted to broaden the minds of young marines. Reading does not eliminate the inherent uncertainty and ambiguity of battle, but it helps battle leaders create a mental preparedness and understanding of past situations. General Mattis *notes*: “Thanks to my reading, I have never been caught flat-footed by any situation, never at a loss for how any problem has been address (successfully or unsuccessfully) before. It doesn’t give me all the answers, but it lights what is often a dark path ahead.”⁴⁵

CONCLUSION

Knowing yourself is perhaps the most difficult idea to master but is of the utmost importance in developing leadership ability. Leaders must be fully aware of their strengths and weaknesses. Know what you do not know, and focus on those areas that will expand your base of knowledge. You can learn much from junior officers and from enlisted men, who often have a startling grasp of topics and are often specialists in their own right. You will find them eager to share what they know, and they will respect you all the more for it⁴⁶

There is a growing body of theory resting on assumptions such as opportunism and self-interest. Meanwhile, the leadership area has focused on individual leaders and the power of heroes. Our contribution does not aim to contradict, as much as complement these traditions. We emphasize the importance of developing organizational commitment⁴⁷ through mechanisms of we-leadership. We argue that we-leadership can help build more resilient and adaptive organizations, linking the behavioural motivational assumptions in leadership and organizational studies with ideas about organizational capabilities. We-leadership can help build more adaptive and resilient organizations, curb greed, counter decision-making biases, and help instill values for the longer term benefit of the organizations in which leaders are embedded.

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ENDNOTES

1. We would like to dedicate this paper to the memory of Dr. Paul Otte. We are grateful to General Alfred Gray, Andrew Marshall and Jim March for inspiring conversations on the topic of this paper, and the importance of 'selflessness' in organizations in general. Any remaining errors were produced without help.
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29. Jeffrey Sands, *Letting Go: A Marine's Journey Through War and His Search for Meaning* (Amazon Digital Services, 2014), 48.
30. Tom Rick's book about the Marine Corps captures this symbolic aspect well: "They charge off the bus onto rows of yellow footprints painted on the asphalt: in their first moment on the ground of Parris Island, they have also stepped into the Marine Corps' powerful and distinctive culture. The footprints, four to a row, eighteen rows, are so closely packed that newcomers can't be seen as individuals. Standing nearly heel to tow in the dark night their faces are hardly visible, and their bodies become one mass. The effect is intentional: Marine Corps culture is the culture of the group, made up by members who are anonymous" See Thomas E. Ricks, *Making the Corps* (Scribner, 2007).
31. Other example: Mattis taking duties so other marine could go be with his family during Christmas (see, "A General Mattis Christmas Story", US Naval Institute Blog.

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32. Otte *notess*: "Watching as the recruits drag themselves, their equipment, and each other to morning colors and the ceremony is inspiring. It truly personifies their belief in 'one more for the Corps', as you have to imagine the entire 54 hours has been a series of 'one mores'" (Otte, *We Leadership*, 43).
33. James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, *The Logic of Appropriateness*, Working Paper, ARENA, Center for European Studies, Oslo, 2004.
34. Gray and Otte, *The Conflicted Leader and Vantage Leadership*, 74.
35. E.g. Mattis *notesd*: "Most Marine units and most Marines can do more than they are asked to do. It is how you unleash that, delegate the decision making to the lowest capable level so that units can maneuver swiftly and aggressively based on exercising initiative. A sense of co-equal ownership of the mission between Generals and 18 year olds." (cited in "The Mattis Way of War", p. 56).
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39. In March 2016, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Robert Neller, put out a call for disruptive thinkers to shape the future of the Corps: "It will start raining goofy ideas, and goofy ideas are OK because they are well-intended and there is a pony in there somewhere," he said. "We just have to find the ponies and let them run." See <<http://bit.ly/21gVji6>>.
40. It is no coincidence that the examples we have used are from some of the Marine Corps' 'mavericks' – General Al Gray and General James Mattis; both examples of visionary leaders in the Marine Corps. Although beyond the scope of this paper, an interesting aspect of the Marine Corp is its ability to attract strong and perhaps disruptive individuals. The Marine Corps officer's guide even states: "The Marine Corps cherishes the individuality of its members and, although sternly consecrated to discipline, has cheerfully sheltered a legion of non-conformist, flamboyant individuals and irradiant personalities. It is a perennial prediction that colorful characters are about to vanish from the Corps. They never have and never will. No Marine need to fear that the mass will ever absorb the individual" [*The Marine Officer's Guide*, 17th edition (Naval Institute Press), 4].
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45. Quoted here: <<http://read.bi/1gAhNYN>>.
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CHAPTER 15

TOXIC LEADERSHIP GOES TO THE MOVIES

*Michael Jager**

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will focus on depictions of toxic leadership in military and war movies and the lessons that can be learned from watching them. This chapter will also discuss how the phenomenon of toxic leadership can be explored through a visual narrative. Finally, it will discuss whether subordinates can analyze movies to find solutions to cope with toxic leaders.

THEORIES OF TOXIC LEADERSHIP

The problem of toxic leadership has been addressed in different ways. Kellerman defined it as “bad leadership”¹ resulting from negative personality traits. Her typology of toxic leaders consists of seven character attributes: incompetence, rigidity, intemperance, callosity, corruption, insularity and evil. Price explains toxic leadership as a self-justifying mechanism where leaders see themselves in an exceptional situation in which moral limitations can be put on hold.² Lipman-Blumen describes toxic leadership as the result of certain leaders’ dysfunctional personality traits leading to destructive behaviour.³ With these definitions in mind, we can divide the source of toxic leadership in different ways. While some of them are inherent in leaders’ personalities, others seem to arise from extraordinary situations and circumstances where an individuals’ code of morality can be adjusted to suit the moment, resulting in unethical behaviour and bad outcomes for the group.

Lipman-Blumen provides a typology of unintentional and intentional toxic leaders.⁴ This typology underlines the assumption that not every toxic leadership act is “bad” or “evil” in the common sense of the word, but that these acts have to do with personal deficits that may appear in a certain setting or be due to a variety of factors. She also points out that not all toxic leaders demonstrate the same levels of destructive behaviour and that they may

* The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Military Academy or the Swiss Armed Forces.

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act more positively in other situations. This means that we cannot identify a toxic leader based solely on personality traits, but can identify them by virtue of actual performance when put to the test under certain circumstances. Some potential toxic leaders may have one or more negative personality traits linked to toxic leadership which may only emerge under particular circumstances, while others might never be identified because their actions are not considered toxic by their subordinates. In the worst case, highly toxic leadership can arise from a borderline personality disorder, which can ultimately lead to a dysfunctional organization.⁵

The paradox of toxic leadership is that subordinates often accept being led in a toxic manner, remain loyal to their leaders and are willing to resist change. This can occur even though toxic leaders leave the organization in a worse condition than it was before they arrived.⁶ Lipman-Blumen described this reaction to toxic leadership as the result of a psychological need for safety in a social community. According to her, the fact that followers stick to toxic leaders is a complex psychological phenomenon with some followers seeing toxic leaders as their heroes, while others cannot cope and leave the organization. There is more than one reason why subordinates behave the way they do. Some factors are internal to the subordinate's personal psychology; others lie in their external environment and the social interactions with their environment. This means that the potential manifestation and negative outcomes of toxic leadership are not only bound to the leader but also to the subordinates who are, despite knowing better, willing to let toxic leadership happen within their group. Nevertheless, the ultimate responsibility for the group lies in the leader's sphere of influence: leaders represent the structures they have been put in charge of by their organizations; otherwise, they are not successfully exercising leadership.⁷

In terms of the definitions of leadership, there is a wide range of possible interpretations and frameworks to use. Some say that there are as many definitions as there are scholars concerned with leadership;⁸ Reed points out that leadership is more easily described than defined.⁹ In a military context, the concept of leadership (and toxic leadership) may be more accessible and tangible due to the formal and hierarchical nature of a leadership-follower relationship. A military definition of leadership could thus be:

Anyone who by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals. Army leaders motivate people both inside and outside the chain of command to pursue actions, focus thinking, and shape decisions for the greater good of the organization.¹⁰

If an army leader is basically responsible for the greater good of the organization and has a motivating and inspiring effect on subordinates, then a toxic army leader would be someone who works to promote themselves at the expense of subordinates without considering negative long-term effects on their unit, subordinates and profession as military personnel.¹¹ Reed uses the term destructive leadership interchangeably with toxic leadership.¹² Toxic leadership may be the more precise term: the leadership of a toxic leader tends to destroy the unit in the long term. Furthermore, toxic leadership is a phenomenon that happens not only on lower levels in the chain of command but also to high-ranking officers who have had a successful career. Therefore, the assumption that toxic leadership often goes unnoticed over years in organizations may have some truth. Nevertheless, we can assume that the problem can be identified more easily within the lower ranks of a military organization because the performance of small combat units can be more easily quantified. Lower ranking military members are more directly involved in leader-follower relationships, while at higher levels the leader-follower relationship is more formal and has less identifiable performance outcomes.

A wide range of work exists that deliver a quantitative approach to measuring toxic leadership. Reed and Bullis observed an inverse relationship between toxic leadership and job satisfaction in their quantitative research, having also linked this satisfaction to variables like pay grade or military rank.¹³ As Lipman-Blumen points out,¹⁴ followers often succumb to toxic leaders because they are in need of safety and comfort to fulfill their essential needs, like having a job and income, or to obtain further benefits as part of an organization:

The real tragedy of the human condition is not that we all must die, but, rather, that we choose to live by grand illusions, rather than to face our fears. Hence, we fall into the clutches of toxic leaders who promise us the moon, knowing full well they cannot deliver. In the worst of all cases, toxic leaders fall under the spell of their own grand illusions and believe that they can.¹⁵

The visions and goals of non-toxic and toxic leaders can be divided into two categories: noble visions and grand illusions.¹⁶ While the former are realistic aims that are hard to achieve, the latter are unrealistic goals which toxic leaders think only they can achieve. The problem is that some followers are willing to believe these grand illusions because they are in need of safety, success, certainty or even immortality, but no toxic leader is capable of living up to the promised illusions.

VISUAL NARRATIVES OF TOXIC LEADERSHIP

Movies can provide an approach to understanding theoretical concepts of social and human sciences. As a cultural product, a movie can depict common sense concepts of human behaviour in an artistic way and break down complex phenomena to simpler representations. A wide range of military and war movies feature narratives dealing with how military leaders can or should lead their subordinates, with specific situations that observers can relate to and about which they can draw conclusions concerning their own leadership. The use of film in leadership studies is an academic field that delivers an interdisciplinary approach to both social and cultural study-related frameworks. Recent research has used film to explain the leadership effectiveness model,¹⁷ to teach ethical leadership¹⁸ and for interactive learning in online-classes.¹⁹

However, there has not been much research on toxic leadership in movies – especially in military or war movies. A recent study dealt with the movie, *The Dark Knight*, and its ability to explain “bad or toxic leadership”, but considering this is an adaption of a comic book with little realistic background, the idea of teaching the concept of toxic leadership with such a cinematic selection could be too much of a stretch for a military audience.²⁰

Central to many cinematic narratives is the depiction of toxic leaders as an anti-hero or villain, acting as an antagonist to alleged forces of good or to a stable social order. Toxic leaders usually have a hero as a counterpart, who can also fall from grace or make mistakes and have to deal with the consequences. These and related story structures are common in war as well as in military movies and are often artistic representations of authentic source material or historical facts. Selected narratives and scenarios can help identify toxic leadership and its consequences, especially if we focus on the inspiring nature of a good storyline or cinematic representation.

Consistent with the idea that the outcomes of toxic leadership are dependent on various factors inherent in leaders’ and followers’ personalities, we well as external factors or particular circumstances, movies which depict the interactions between leaders-followers, leaders-leaders and followers-followers are a powerful means for understanding the effects and dynamics of toxic leadership. For example, Oliver Stone’s *Platoon*, from 1986,²¹ is suitable on various levels: it follows the storyline of a young soldier, Private Chris Taylor (Charlie Sheen), who volunteered for the Vietnam War and finds himself in “green hell,” being completely dependent on his leaders and more experienced comrades. The character of Taylor serves as a guide to the spectator,

being the central figure and also the narrator of the story (represented by constant voice-over commentary by Taylor). Like the spectator, Taylor is an empty vessel at the beginning of the movie that gets slowly filled with the realities of war: “Somebody once wrote, ‘Hell is the impossibility of reason.’ That’s what this place feels like. Hell.”

The platoon he joins is an infantry unit led by two sergeants. Soon he realizes that there are two separate groups in his platoon. One group is led by Sergeant Elias Grodin (Willem Dafoe; referred to in the film as Elias) and basically consists of the “potheads” and a large number of Afro-Americans and Latin-Americans; the other group is led by Staff Sergeant Bob Barnes (Tom Berenger) and is mainly redneck “white trash.” Both groups have in common that they belong to the lower classes of American society. These two groups represent the divided society of the 1960s:

Staff Sergeant Barnes and his squad represent the old-fashioned American values: sexists, boozers, and unapologetically male. Led by the young Sergeant Elias and Private Chris Taylor, the contrasting faction within the platoon exemplifies the new values of the youth. As the film progresses, the divided groups of soldiers begin to fight each other instead of the real enemy. If new values are to prevail, the young squad must destroy the father figure, Barnes, who describes himself as ‘reality.’ The polarization that Oliver Stone dramatizes in *Platoon* wisely shows that the tension went deeper than politics – to a struggle over such fundamental principles as the meaning of citizenship, life styles, and gender roles.²²

There is not much friction between the two groups in the beginning, as the common scapegoats are basically represented by the batch of new soldiers, the “fresh meat”. Taylor sums his initial impression up in this commentary:

Well, here I am, anonymous, all right. With guys nobody really cares about. They come from the end of the line, most of them, small towns you never heard of: Pulaski, Tennessee; Brandon, Mississippi; Pork Bend, Utah; Wampum, Pennsylvania. Two years high school’s about it. Maybe if they’re lucky, a job waiting for them back in a factory. But most of ‘em got nothing. They’re poor. They’re the unwanted. Yet they’re fighting for our society and our freedom. It’s weird, isn’t it? They’re the bottom of the barrel, and they know it. Maybe that’s why they call themselves grunts, ‘cause a grunt can take it, can take anything’. They’re the best I’ve ever seen, Grandma. The heart and soul.

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After initial humiliations, Taylor gains the group's respect with more experience on duty and performance on the battlefield. As Taylor is in need of guidance, he looks up to his leaders. He is initially impressed by the hard-boiled Staff Sergeant Barnes, who is very experienced in combat and has a nihilistic view on life and death in a war zone. His main concern is the performance of the unit and not the individual soldier. Despite his lack of emotionality, he is successful in action and his men respect him, although some of this respect is built on fear of his brutal leadership. After Taylor gets wounded, he gets rewarded by his comrades and is asked to join the "potheads" led by Sergeant Elias. Elias has a completely different style of leadership: he is charismatic and concerned about the well-being of the inexperienced soldiers, and quickly becomes sort of a father-figure for Taylor. Elias is just as experienced in combat action as Barnes, but enjoys a different sort of respect from his men, mainly built on his positive personality traits and charismatic manner.

The friction in the platoon starts when one of the soldiers is kidnapped and brutally killed by the Vietcong enemy while on a patrol in the jungle. The rest of the men are shocked to find the corpse of their comrade and soon feel a lust for revenge. At this point, only Barnes is with the platoon as Elias is away on a scouting mission. Barnes takes the lead when the platoon reaches a local village in search of the killers. The men, seeking revenge, head towards a downward spiral:

The village, which had stood for maybe 1,000 years, didn't know we were coming that day. If they had, they would have run. Barnes was at the eye of our rage. And through him, our Captain Ahab. He would set things right again. That day, we loved him.

After they enter the village, the hostile feelings quickly escalate. Civilians get killed or raped and many men from both groups willingly join the violence. At this point, Taylor is still convinced that this mission is justified and Barnes is the appropriate leader for such a task, but it changes when Barnes kills an old woman in front of her daughter, showing no compassion or remorse for the Vietnamese civilians. This moment changes the platoon and consolidates the cleavage in the platoon: some of the soldiers engage in rape and murder, while others are shocked and stand apart, unable to stop Barnes and his men. But the platoon as a whole is unable to act. Even the soldiers who do not engage in unlawful actions and lust for revenge are paralyzed by the ferocious nature of Barnes. Worst of all, even the platoon's leader, Lieutenant Wolfe, stands by and watches what his subordinate Barnes is doing. The situation ends when Elias comes back from his scouting mission. He confronts Barnes about his unethical and unlawful conduct which escalates into a physical

fight in front of their men, who are cheering on their respective leaders. After Lieutenant Wolfe (finally) intervenes, the two groups separate and the conflict is put on hold. Still, Wolfe does not acknowledge Barnes' mistake and ignores Elias's accusations of not having intervened before civilians got killed.

This moment in the storyline is crucial to what defines Barnes as a toxic leader. He is narcissistic to the point that his personal agenda is more important than the laws of war governing dealings with civilians. His negative personality comes to light when being put to the test in a situation that requires calm and rationality. After the mission, the two groups are again back in the camp and, in a quiet moment, Elias and Taylor reflect on the episode and Barnes' behaviour. Elias concludes:

Barnes believes in what he's doing. What happened today was just the beginning. We're gonna lose this war. [...] We've been kicking other people's asses for so long, I figured it's time we got ours kicked.

This statement underlines Elias as a non-toxic leader. Of course, he does not know for sure that the United States will lose the war; due to our historical knowledge, we as spectators already know that he will be right. He is a leader who follows a noble vision instead of a grand illusion and tries to fulfill his mission as a platoon leader in a moral manner for both his men and the enemy he is obliged to fight. Taylor summarizes the conflict in the platoon in another commentary:

Day by day I struggle to maintain not only my strength but also my sanity. It's all a blur. I have no energy to write. I don't know what's right or wrong anymore. The morale of the men is low, a civil war in the platoon. Half the men with Elias, half with Barnes. There's a lot of suspicion and hate. I can't believe we're fighting each other, when we should be fighting them.

The storyline continues with the next mission, where the platoon has to go into a battle in enemy territory. Lieutenant Wolfe is unable to solve the dispute between Elias and Barnes and takes the argument to his Captain. This is an opportunity for Barnes to get rid of Elias: he cold-bloodedly shoots him in the jungle while away from their men, figuratively hidden in the overall uncertainty and chaos of the 'fog of war'. As they see Elias wounded but still alive fleeing from the Vietcong soldiers, it soon becomes clear to Taylor (and some of his closer comrades) that he did not die in battle with the enemy as Barnes claims. This situation leads to another crucial moment where Barnes is clearly revealed as a toxic leader. When Taylor and his comrades reflect

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about what had happened, Barnes confronts them with his point of view and challenges them to stand up to him:

Talking about killing? Y'all experts? Y'all know about killing? I'd like to hear about it, potheads. Why do you smoke this shit? So as to escape from reality? Me, I don't need this shit. I am reality. There's the way it ought to be. And there's the way it is. Elias was full of shit. Elias was a crusader. Now, I got no fight with any man who does what he's told, but when he don't, the machine breaks down. And when the machine breaks down, we break down. And I ain't gonna allow that in any of you. Not one. Y'all love Elias. Oh, you wanna kick ass. Yeah. Well, here I am, all by my lonesome, and ain't nobody gonna know. Six of you boys against me. Kill me. Huh. I shit on all of you.

This quote shows how Barnes' reality is defined. His expertise in killing defines him as a military leader and his unquestioned skills in combat make him a role model leader for his soldiers. But his perception is flawed, which can be observed throughout the movie. He is indifferent to subordinates he does not perceive to be tough, as can be seen, for instance, when he sends the clearly inexperienced Taylor and another freshly arrived soldier on a night ambush at the beginning of the movie. Despite Elias' admonition to not use inexperienced men for such a mission, Barnes ignores this advice, resulting in a disastrous operation with Taylor's comrade dead and several other soldiers wounded when the platoon fails to react in time to an enemy patrol. Barnes puts the blame on Taylor, who fell asleep while on watch, when it was in fact Barnes' own responsibility and failure. He also has no sense of the political reality behind the war, unlike Elias, who is sure that the Vietnam War will be a national failure.

Barnes' grand illusion is that only he knows how war works, only he knows how to successfully lead the platoon and that everyone who is not as tough as him does not deserve to survive the war. This indifferent narcissism becomes visible the moment he kills Elias, eliminating the harshest critic of his leadership style and authority without any remorse or moral obligation to his platoon. The fame he won on the battlefield, as well as the fact that he was wounded several times in combat but never killed, gives him the aura of invincibility. However, the grand illusion that he is bigger than death itself will in fact be shattered when he is later killed by a soldier he regards as the antithesis to his own personality as a combatant. In some way, Taylor completes Barnes' nemesis when he follows the footsteps of Elias.

Following the confrontation scene, the group is perplexed and paralyzed by Barnes' frightening appearance. Apart from a short and unsuccessful attempt at physical intervention by an emotionally enraged Taylor, no one questions Barnes' statements to his face. This shows that followers prefer to stay with toxic leaders instead of challenging them. This resigned status is summed up by one of Taylor's comrades: "Barnes been shot seven times and he ain't dead. Does that mean anything to you, huh? Barnes ain't meant to die. The only thing that can kill Barnes is Barnes." Taylor, on the other hand, is not willing to accept this leadership as he postulates:

It's the way the whole thing works. People like Elias get wasted. People like Barnes just go on making up the rules any way they want. So what do we do? Sit in the middle and suck on it. We just don't add up to dry shit, King.

Private King replies in a manner that can be interpreted as an existential need for survival in such an extraordinary setting: "Whoever said we did, man? All you got to do is make it out of here, and it's all gravy. Every day, the rest of your life, gravy." From this moment on, the platoon is clearly divided into the followers of Barnes and those who belonged to the group of the deceased Elias, which are now unofficially represented by Taylor. Unable to work as a whole, the platoon's performance in battle is ineffective and results in the ultimate disintegration of the unit during the final heavy combat at the climax of the movie. The men who follow Barnes may not be confident about his unethical and amoral leadership, but the statement of Private Bunny (one of Barnes' followers and probably the most despicable and narrow-minded character in the movie) shows that despite better knowledge, followers stay under toxic leadership:

You know, Junior, some of the things we done, man... I don't feel like we done something wrong. But sometimes, man, I get this bad feeling. I told the Padre the truth, man. I like it here. You get to do what you want. Nobody fucks with you. The only worry you got is dying. And if that happens, you won't know about it anyway. So what the fuck, man.

As the story progresses, even the most loyal subordinates of Barnes get worried about their fate when they prepare for the final battle. Sergeant O'Neill, who was always loyal to Barnes and has a tendency to "brown-nose" his leader, wants to get a holiday from duty to meet his girlfriend. He formulates his worries shortly before the battle: "Bob, I got a bad feeling on this one, all right? I mean, I got a bad feeling. I don't think I'm gonna make it out of here. You understand what I'm saying to you?" Barnes is not willing or able

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to listen to his “friend” and answers in a fatalistic manner: “Everybody got to die sometime, Red.” At this point, Barnes’s grand illusion crumbles into dust before O’Neill’s eyes. He realizes that he has been following a toxic leader who has no concern for his subordinates but only follows his own private war, despite the high probability of the total disintegration of the platoon.

After the climactic battle and the chaos surrounding it, Taylor survives and finds a heavily wounded Barnes crawling in the mud before him. After Barnes mocks Taylor’s hesitations to either help or shoot him, Taylor kills Barnes in revenge for Elias. Having been wounded twice, Taylor is sent home and reflects about his time in Vietnam in the final shot of the movie:

I think now, looking back, we did not fight the enemy, we fought ourselves, and the enemy was in us. The war is over for me now, but it will always be there, the rest of my days. As I’m sure Elias will be, fighting with Barnes for what Rhah calls ‘possession of my soul’. There are times since, I’ve felt like a child, born of those two fathers. But be that as it may, those of us who did make it have an obligation to build again. To teach to others what we know, and to try with what’s left of our lives to find a goodness and a meaning to this life.

LESSONS LEARNED

In *Platoon*, the toxic leadership of one leader figure can dissolve a military unit to the point of complete disintegration because the soldiers start fighting each other instead of the enemy. While there is a higher ranking leader in the platoon, he is incompetent and does not address the conflict, allowing it to destroy the unit. There are subordinates who address the toxic leader and report him to a higher headquarters, but if the higher authority does not act in time, the noble vision that motivates them is of no use. In this case, the conflict in the platoon was delayed because there were tasks of higher importance. Also, the problem of false loyalty and the existential need for survival impedes the platoon’s ability to act as a whole and address their concerns. This demonstrates that toxic leadership is not only the fault of a flawed leader figure, but also the responsibility of the subordinates to act as a team against internal negative dynamics:

Military cultural norms dissuade Soldiers from complaining about their supervisors, and for good reason. Loyalty is also an Army value. Yet, despite the very real possibility of retribution, Soldiers who conscientiously and courageously report toxic leaders do their fellow

Soldiers a great service. Watchdog agencies and inspector generals of-fices should be prepared not only to receive and respond to issues of command climate, but also to protect the whistleblowers.²³

Obviously, the problem of toxic leadership cannot be solved by watching movies, but film can help to demonstrate how a toxic leader can paralyze and divide a subordinate team. *Platoon* is a fictional story describing a disastrous outcome for a combat unit. In reality, such scenarios are rare. Still, movies like *Platoon* can help one to reflect on their own behaviour and that of military leaders in one's own unit. To avoid the destruction of one's own unit, conflicts have to be addressed by a higher authority instead of being taken into the battlefield. The use of movies should be used with military students as it is a powerful resource for reducing complex and difficult concepts like leadership and toxic leadership to simpler ideas. The universal language of a great movie is something most people can relate to and also serves as a basis of discussion.

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GLOSSARY

ADF	Australian Defence Force
ADFA	Australian Defence Force Academy
ADFIS	Australian Defence Force Investigative Service
ASA	Attraction, selection, attrition
B-Scan	Business-Scan
BOI	Board of Inquiry
CAF	Canadian Armed Forces
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CPD	Continuous Professional Development
CPI	California Psychological Inventory
CR	Conditional reasoning
CSE	Core Self-Evaluation
CWB	Counterproductive work behaviour
DART	Defence Abuse Response Taskforce
DEP	Defence Ethics Program
DLB	Destructive leadership behaviour
DLE	Defence Leadership and Ethics
DLQ	Developmental Leadership Questionnaire
DSM	Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
DT	Dark Triad
FFM	Five Factor Model
HDS	Hogan Development Survey
JR	Junior Recruiting
LDF	Leader Development Framework

GLOSSARY

LDS	Leadership Development System
LVI	Leadership Versatility Index
M&A	Mergers and acquisitions
MLI	Military Leadership Incompetence
MSLP	Multi-Source Leadership Feedback
NA	Norwegian Army
NAF	Norwegian Armed Forces
NCO	Non-commissioned officer
NMA	Norwegian Military Academy
NZDF	New Zealand Defence Force
OA	Organizational anorexia
OET	Outdoors Experiential Training
OG	Organizational greediness
ON	Organizational narcissism
OR	Other ranks
PID	Personality Inventory for the DSM-5
PULSE	Profile of Unit Leadership, Satisfaction and Effectiveness
RMC	Royal Military College
SANDEF	South African National Defence Force
SEM	Structural equation modelling
SJT	Situational judgement tests
SOF	Special operations forces
SOL	State of Leadership
SOLD	State of Leadership Development
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure
US	United States
VUCA	Volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous

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