

**DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE**

**DEFENCE POLICY REVIEW**

**PUBLIC CONSULTATION  
ONLINE REPORT**

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Ce rapport sommaire est également disponible en français

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A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Darrell Bricker', with a small '2.' written above it.

**Darrell Bricker**

CEO, Global

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# 1.0 INTRODUCTION

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The Defence Policy Review (DPR) was undertaken to refresh Canada's national defence strategy. Consultations with a wide range of stakeholders were conducted to support the development of a new defence policy for Canada, in addition to other inputs which will also support the development of the policy. As part of the DPR process, the Department of National Defence (DND) commissioned Ipsos Public Affairs to conduct two parts of the consultation: Defence Expert Roundtables and an Online Public Consultation.

This report presents the findings of the **Online Public Consultation**. It is a synthesis of feedback collected by Ipsos via eWorkbooks, an online forum, and social media discussions, as well as mail and e-mail submissions received from the Canadian general public between April 6 and July 31, 2016.

The Minister of National Defence announced on April 6th a four-month public consultation process that would help shape Canada's defence policy. The announcement was followed by a social media promotion campaign through Facebook and Twitter totaling 42 Facebook posts (22 EN, 22 FR) and 139 tweets made by the Department of Defence (67 EN, 71 FR).

During this period, we heard from over 4,708 contributors through the online portal who made a combined total of over 20,325 submissions. On social media, over 18,615 comments/mentions were received to the defence policy review from Twitter, Facebook, news sites, blogs and online forums/boards. Additionally, 97 mail and e-mail submissions were received. Areas of discussion centred around the role of Canada as a whole internationally, the role of the Canadian Armed Forces both at home and abroad, equipment and procurement.

The Department of National Defence (DND) will use the results of the roundtables and the public consultation, as well as its consultation with Canada's allies, Parliament and input from the Defence Policy Review (DPR) Advisory Panel, to develop the policies that will guide the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) going forward.

The summary of the discussion presented in this report is not representative of Canadians' views but offers a thematic overview of what was submitted by contributors.



# 2.0 CONTEXT

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## 2.1 Background

The Minister of National Defence's mandate letter tasked him to “conduct an open and transparent review process to create a new defence strategy for Canada.” The 2015 Speech from the Throne further emphasized the government’s commitment to a defence review noting that, “to keep Canadians safe and be ready to respond when needed, the Government will launch an open and transparent process to review existing defence capabilities, and will invest in building a leaner, more agile, better-equipped military.”

**The Minister of National Defence has also emphasized the need for an “open and transparent” process** that is supported by robust, relevant and credible consultations with defence stakeholders, including the public, Parliament, defence experts (industry, commentators and academics), as well as defence allies and partners.

The CAF is a national institution with a critical mandate at the heart of the government’s most fundamental responsibility: protecting Canadians, defending Canada and promoting Canadian interests. A renewed defence policy will outline the government’s priorities and objectives for national defence and the CAF, forming the basis for complex decision making across all levels of the Defence Team. It is therefore critical that the review process be informed by the diverse perspectives of a broad range of defence stakeholders.

## 2.2 Objective/Purpose

The objective of the consultation exercises was to engage with defence stakeholders and the public in an open and transparent way so that their views could be considered as an informational input to DND’s upcoming policy renewal process. However, it should be noted that the nature of open consultations is such that they may attract interested individuals and/or parties with a vested interest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Canadian public as a whole. It should also be noted that the reader will not see majority views or consensus perspectives as contributors had the ability to select and contribute to themes of their choice. Opinions were wide and varied.



### ***2.3 Summary of Defence Consultation Paper***

In Spring 2016, DND published a Public Consultation Paper to be used as the basis for the consultations. This Paper includes a brief exploration of the defence-related trends, challenges and opportunities facing Canada and solicits input through a series of targeted questions. While input from the public was sought on a number of topics, the general themes of the questions relate to:

- domestic and international trends, threats and challenges facing Canada;
- the role of the military in responding to these trends; and,
- how the military should be resourced to carry out these tasks.

To view the Public Consultation Paper, please visit:  
<http://dgpaapp.forces.gc.ca/en/defence-policy-review/index.asp>





# 3.0 RESPONSES TO THE CONSULTATION

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## 3.1 Reading this Report

This report is based on ideas, opinions and perspectives as submitted by contributors to the online public consultation via eWorkbooks, an online forum, and social media discussions, as well as mail and e-mail submissions. This is a summary of the discussion across these events, as one component of the larger Defence Policy Review. It is not reflective of the overall review process, to be completed in Spring 2017. More information about the full review process is available in the Appendix.

While the contributions and feedback received during the consultation are shown throughout this report in graphical format (as frequency counts), the summary of the discussion presented in this report is not representative of Canadians' views and does not reflect the perspectives of the broader general public, but offer a thematic overview of the content that was submitted throughout the consultation process. Individuals who participated in the online consultation by submitting comments to the eWorkbook or participating in a discussion forum are referred to in this report as either "contributors" or "participants."

## 3.2 Analysis of Discussion

Discussion included in this report is derived from a variety of feedback mechanisms which facilitated Canadians' participation in the public consultations. These included:

- **Questions for Canadians eWorkbook** – One-way feedback opportunity for Canadians to react to the DND Public Consultations Paper and submit feedback through an online form within specific thematic areas, which included both closed-end and open-end questions.
- **Online Engagement Forum** – An online bulletin board style discussion platform, open to the public and other stakeholders, designed, moderated and hosted by Ipsos.
- **Social Media Analysis** – To provide some additional context and support for the DND review, Ipsos conducted an analysis of social media channels where Canadians provided further input to the defence policy review using the hashtags #DefenceConsults and #ConsultationsDefense as well as broader discussions of Canada's approach to defence.




- **Bespoke responses** – Letter mail and e-mail feedback received.

### 3.3 Format of Consultation Materials

The eWorkbook and online forum consultation instruments included 10 key questions taken from the DND Public Consultation Paper. Each question was available for consideration and response for the full four-month consultation period. These questions focused on several key themes, each of which are explored within this document.

1. Are there any threats to Canada's security that are not being addressed adequately?
2. What roles should the Canadian Armed Forces play domestically, including in support of civilian authorities?
3. How should Canada–United States cooperation on defence of North America evolve in the coming years?
4. What form should the CAF contribution to peace support operations take? Is there a role for the CAF in helping to prevent conflict before it occurs?
5. Should the size, structure, and composition of the Canadian Armed Forces change from what they are today?
6. How can DND and the CAF improve the way they support the health and wellness of military members?
7. Should Canada strive to maintain military capability across the full spectrum of operations? Are there specific niche areas of capability in which Canada should specialize?
8. What types of investments should Canada make in space, cyber, and unmanned systems? To what extent should Canada strive to keep pace and be interoperable with key allies in these domains?
9. What additional measures could DND undertake, along with partner departments, to improve defence procurement?
10. What resources will the CAF require to meet Canada's defence needs?





# 4.0 KEY THEMES



## 4.0 KEY THEMES

In responding to the Consultation questions, a number of key themes emerged:

- Most contributors supported increased spending to improve the CAF, primarily focused on the acquisition and updating of equipment and attention to personnel;
- The procurement process is perceived as ineffective and in need of an update to allow the CAF to operate with flexibility;
- The approach to defence needs to take into account Canada's ability to act independently as well as cooperate with our allies and partners;
- Addressing the changing nature of threats was identified by participants as a particularly important need, given the increased challenges to Arctic sovereignty, cyber security and threats from terrorists and non-state actors;
- Cooperation in the defence of North America was identified as called for within the submissions, with a strong number supporting an increased need for NORAD and NATO cooperation in protecting Canada's Arctic sovereignty;
- Peacekeeping and Canada's role internationally in assisting those in need was another common theme discussed, with many participants supporting a return to these principles and their connection to addressing the root causes of armed conflict and instability.





# 5.0 SYNTHESIS OF SUBMISSIONS

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Submissions from contributors generally focused around the 10 key questions designed to explore a number of themes within the Defence Consultation Paper. Analysis of the submissions revealed the interrelated nature of the many topics involved in the discussion, ranging from defence resources, capabilities, personnel, and procurement, to Canada's ability to confront threats, both at home and abroad, and the CAF's role and history. Themes further explored the notion of sovereignty, the Arctic, threats from non-state

actors and terrorism, as well as peacekeeping, partnerships with allies, humanitarian actions and disaster response.

On social media, many of the mentions were focused on promoting the Consultation; however, text analysis of the discussions identified a variety of themes and topics which centred around the DPR as highlighted within this document.


**Analyzed number of DPR social media mentions by Theme**



Source: IBM Watson – Number of snippets (mentions within documents) by Themes

There were also many ongoing discussions during the DPR period relating to the CAF and Canada's National Defence but not necessarily explicitly connected to the DPR by direct reference. These included a focus on Canada's relationship with international organizations, defence equipment, and general conversations relating to the defence review.

### Volume of social media mentions of key themes (beyond DPR specific)



Source: IBM SMA – Number of snippets (mentions within documents) by Themes

For the sake of brevity, this report explores the submissions as a collective response from the public, by theme.



## 5.1 Canadian Approach to Defence

Being broad and general, the opening topic of the current Canadian Approach to Defence generated a considerable amount of submissions, and engaged a high level of participation, with long and detailed conversational threads on the online discussion forum. The submissions provided valuable insight into the topics that participants considered to be particularly important and those which garnered a high level of engagement.

In particular, topics such as threats to Canadian security, equipment, procurement and spending appeared to receive a depth and breadth of response with several participants engaging in technical and detailed discussions, such as about specific types of equipment that should be acquired to suit particular capabilities, and contributors often offering a historical perspective for their recommendations:


*Former CDS Rick Hillier argued for “big honking ships”. In my view he was right. We have an Army that can’t get where it needs to go when it needs to get there. **In the 1980s we were a NATO focused, forward deployed force. Today, we are domestically based force that lacks the strategic mobility to deal with the threats far from our shores.** 5 x C-17s can sustain forces, but they are insufficient to rapidly deploy forces, and airpower can never deploy Army combat units due to weight. That is why many nations - Australia, Singapore, Japan, Britain, France, Italy, Thailand, Spain, Egypt etc, have fielded Landing Helicopter Dock ships, with supporting ships, to give their forces strategic mobility. Many, many serving officers have silently advocated for this capability for decades. One day, maybe, we will figure it out. Other nations have long ago figured this out, it would be nice if Canada grew up, recognized its strategic position and needs, and field the equipment needed by a modern, first world country”.*

*Over the past 4 years Russia has commissioned 12 new fast Corvettes, 3 cruisers and various other warships. China has commissioned about 16 major warships in the last 2 years... The US NAVY has a continuous shipbuilding program which allows them to have modern warships on a regular basis... but CANADA has this problem of building any warships or procuring any Military equipment until its realized that it can no longer go to sea or fly in the air... It’s called the “boom and bust” process. **We built the St Laurent Class Destroyers in the 50’s and 60’s, then in the 70’s the Tribal Class Destroyers, and in the 90’s the CPF’s. It is now 2016 and our oldest ship is 44 years old and should not be going to sea... parts are no longer in the system for repairs. The CPF’s just went through a FELEX refit to extend their operational life to 2025-2030 which would make them 40+ years old....**”*



*For a number of decades now, I've listened to one party in power after another complain how much they would love to do more for national defence, but that they just can't afford to. To me, it seems that the military has become the government's favourite whipping boy. It doesn't help when those who are high up in the command structure don't have the guts to stand up and say "enough is enough!". We were supposed to have funding set aside for some of the many big ticket procurement projects. But now, things have been placed on hold with the current government issuing what seems to me some very lame excuses. **Years back, Canada acquired 130+ CF-18 jets. Now the government is planning to order only 65 jets. Even so, it wouldn't be long until that number is whittled down to an even smaller number (how many of the original CF-18s do we have now?).** Perhaps the worst example is the Navy. The loyal men and women in that service have bravely tolerated some of the floating rust buckets that should have been decommissioned a long time ago. I could go on and on about how our people have had to make do with a lot less, but I think you get the general idea. So what about Canada not being able to afford more for defence? Again, it just goes on for year after year. Interesting thing is, Canada has an economy that is generally ranked somewhere between 10th and 12th in the world. Australia has a population, a geographical size and an economy that is slightly less than ours. Yet consider what they are doing to look after their own defence. All major political parties there are supporting the expansion of their military potential to better deal with some of the many international threats and crises which have arisen in recent years. While some of you might say that Australia isn't the same as Canada, I'd agree. But I'd also point out that Canada isn't the United States either and that we should not be relying on our neighbours for such heavy protection. In other words, Canada can and should be doing more to protect its own shores, air space and arctic regions. It should also be participating more in NATO and move in the direction of a budget that will be on or close to 2% GDP. If Australia can do it, we should be able to as well. Maybe the government should be looking more closely at some of the hugely expensive and wasteful programs in other departments...although some of them are political sacred cows. In closing, I don't buy the argument that we can't afford to do more...and I mean a LOT MORE...for national defence. We can, we should and we must. What we need is the political will to make it happen."*

**There are a number of possible areas where the Government of Canada could focus the efforts of the Canadian Armed Forces. Which of the following areas do you think should be the TOP priority of the Canadian Armed Forces?**



Source: EN & FR Contributors to DefenceConsultations.ca / Consultationsdefense.ca – FINDINGS ARE NOT REPRESENTATIVE (Counts)

When asked to consider the areas that should be the TOP priority of the Canadian Armed Forces, many participants indicated that all areas, including a focus on domestic defence, defence of the North American continent, and involvement in international engagements, should all be areas where the Government of Canada could focus the efforts of the CAF (Chart 1). This finding is consistent with the submissions received which detailed the interrelatedness of these three areas, among others; for example, the CAF's role in both domestic and global contexts, such as that of defending Canada's coastlines and providing disaster relief, as well as commitments to allies and partners to provide common security.


## 5.2 The Security Environment

### Purpose of Defence and Threats to Security

The topic of the purpose of defence was perhaps the most all-encompassing. Undoubtedly, the individual contributors' overall understanding of and opinions about the general purpose of defence were most reflected in their views of specific defence areas such as capabilities, threats, personnel, equipment, and international alliances. Contributors' overall sense of the purpose of defence was also likely to inform their impressions about the current state of the world today.

Reflecting upon the sentiment that the world is safer today than it was a decade ago, many participants disagreed (Chart 2) – a point of view that was consistent with and supported by the volume and nature of participants' submissions.

***“The world is safer today than it was a decade ago.”***



Source: EN & FR Contributors to DefenceConsultations.ca / Consultationsdefense.ca – FINDINGS ARE NOT REPRESENTATIVE (Counts)

## Nature of Threats

While some of the submissions within this theme referred to Canada's contribution to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, as well as disaster relief at home and abroad, most of the submissions concerned current threats to Canadian security. The general perception among participants was that the threats have evolved and are quite different from those of the past. Threats now include not only those presented by nations such as **Russia and China**, whose territorial incursions were viewed by some as aggression, but also the activities of rogue states. Threats presented by **terrorism and non-state actors** were a key theme emerging from the eWorkbook submissions in particular. Participants expressed concerns about addressing the roots of these issues and combatting these threats abroad, as well as here in Canada. Some were also concerned with the perceived radicalization of Canadians domestically, and also expressed concern about Canada's policies with regard to immigration and refugees.

Threats posed by weapons were also mentioned within the theme of Threats to Security. In addition to the more traditional threats of nuclear weapons, participants mentioned the emergence of other threats stemming

from new technology, such as **cyber threats**. Some identified this as an area in which Canada needed to be more active. Some also felt that Canada should explore cyber offence capabilities.

Some viewed potential threats as stemming from environmental disasters, which, in turn, could create waves of refugees through mass migration of displaced people. Further to this, growing concern about **global climate change** was seen as a source of potential threat as interest in Canada's natural resources may increase. Similarly, economic instability, leading to civic unrest and a potential increase in illegal activity, was also considered by some to pose a potential threat.

In addition to providing observations, participants sometimes made recommendations and suggestions.

The nature of the threats to security were viewed as directly affecting issues such as training and resources. There was widespread recognition that national security is not limited to only DND, but also involves other agencies such as the RCMP, the Coast Guard, and CSIS. Suggestions therefore included a **"whole-of-government approach"** in policy-making, particularly one that would involve domestic agencies, as well as Global Affairs Canada.



*“The world isn’t what we wish it to be: it’s what it is. Peacekeeping has its place in that world, but peacekeeping should never be allowed to rise above its traditional third place in Canadian Defence Policy formulation.”*

*“As a long-term project the CAF should endeavour to contribute significantly to international peacekeeping operations. UN sanctioned missions should be given priority but this need not be exclusive.”*


*“There are constant threats in the world. From the threat of proliferation and smuggling of chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear weapons to unconventional weapons that could easily get into the hands of terrorists, militias, criminal elements, rogue states and intelligence agencies, and other extremists elements.”*

*“Two major issues, which may be of some concern within the future. Patrolling out national waters and developing better outposts in the Canadian North may be something we wish to look into- our resources are only going to be of greater geo-political importance in the future, especially with global warming and environmental degradation occurring throughout much of the world. Secondly, perhaps a minor concern, but we should also consider more of a domestic task force for dealing with things such as organized crime & potential civil emergencies and unrest. The secondary concern is perhaps one which is less pressing, as Canada is a very orderly nation typically; however, on the subject of our arctic waters & northern territories, if competition should emerge, we will be dealing with Russia, Denmark, Norway, and several other arctic core nations over who has certain rights over the resources within the arctic, and as it will be a major concern- it’s best if we got a head start on things like a better patrol force or even some outposts today rather than fall behind in the race and be caught with our pants down tomorrow.”*

*“Cyber Crime has evolved into cyber terrorism, the threat of a cyber-attack crippling and creating a nuclear meltdown is very real and needs to be taken very seriously, critical infrastructure attacks as a result of cyber-attacks is very real, likewise, cyber-terrorism could easily result in attacks taking down mission control systems, communication satellites, space assets and surveillance systems. NORAD needs to be staffed to defend the North American homeland and assist our NATO allies. With the threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction, a detonation of any weapon would shift global patterns and result in natural disasters occurring around the world, it is crucial that we develop the capability to protect against natural disasters, man-made disasters and the climate effect of the use of weapons of mass destruction. DND’s budget needs to be significantly increased, many of our allies spend close to 2 percent or 2 percent on defense and it is essential we try to do the same to protect our country and maintain our commitments to our allies.”*

When analyzing the social media—based on the intersections between international organizations, other actors and threats to Canada—discussions of Arctic sovereignty were most commonly tied to NATO, NORAD and Canada’s allies in general. Mentions about domestic defence were more closely tied to discussions of terrorism.

### Connection of Threats with key Themes in Social media



Source: IBM SMA – Number of snippets (mentions within documents) by Topics as they relate to Topics within Threats Theme




### 5.3 Defending Canada and North America

#### Importance of Asserting Sovereignty and Countering Threats

The most important roles of the CAF domestically included protecting the Arctic and responding to terrorist threats (Chart 3). This is consistent with submissions that considered the leading threats to Canada's security as those related to sovereignty and to terrorism, including perceptions of domestic threats.

Much of this discussion online revolved around the need to secure sovereignty in the North, and the need to protect the Arctic because of its perceived emerging status as a trade route. The Arctic was the most common theme; specifically, its importance as a trade route and as establishing a presence to counter that of Russia.

**Three most important roles of the Canadian Armed Forces at home**



Source: EN & FR Contributors to DefenceConsultations.ca / Consultationsdefense.ca – FINDINGS ARE NOT REPRESENTATIVE (Counts)

*[...] Canada cannot fall behind countries in the Arctic, especially Russia, which is violating the sovereignty of other nations. Russia already has military bases and troops stationed in the Arctic. Canada needs to do the same so we can protect our resources, but also our territorial integrity. RCAF needs a greater presence in the north and in the Arctic."*

*"Increase our arctic sovereignty commitments. The north is opening up and [other] arctic states are trying to or have established a footprint there. There will an increase in trade and a rush to exploit natural resources."*

The CAF's role in responding to natural disasters and in performing Search and Rescue operations was considered somewhat less important overall, relative to protecting the Arctic and responding to terrorist threats. Fewer considered assisting law enforcement and other partners or assisting in the prevention of illegal drug smuggling as one of the most important roles of the CAF at home.

Participants suggested a range of options to support the CAF in this capacity, including upgrading infrastructure to protect against cyberattacks; procuring equipment; expanding facilities and bases; establishing a domestic task force; increasing patrols of the Arctic; and reviewing training of Reservists and the Rangers. As in other areas, specific equipment, such as amphibious ships, submarines, and icebreakers were also mentioned. Participants were generally of the view that the CAF should work with civilian authorities, with some viewing it as a good idea to have greater public exposure to the military. There was also general agreement about the role of the CAF in supporting civilian authorities in disaster response and search and rescue.

*"The military and civilian agencies need to work together, there is no option for not having them cooperate, especially with aspect to Terrorism, disaster response, and search and rescue. There needs to be constant communication and cooperation between military and civilian*



*agencies to ensure they are aware and able to jointly respond to constant threats. With aspect to terrorism many of the tactics used by terrorists has some elements of military training and you can't expect civilian agencies to handle the terrorism file without support and cooperation with the military. Likewise, with disaster response, there are so many agencies such as provincial emergency management organisations, search and rescue, and law enforcement agencies that rely on constant cooperation and communication with the military, especially with natural disasters such as wildfires. It just isn't feasible to not have a relationship between military and civilian agencies."*

### Trilateral Defence Cooperation

Most participants supported an expansion of trilateral defence cooperation between Canada, the U.S., and Mexico (Chart 4). However, the submissions revealed a wide range of opinions regarding the extent and nature of continued cooperation, particularly with the U.S.

This debate was often being framed within the broader context of Canada's obligations to allied partners and collective security, alongside the importance of maintaining the nation's sovereignty. While many noted the importance of being an equal partner in protecting the continent, some stressed the importance of Canada guarding its own interests, and even developing its own technology.


Continued, or greater, cooperation with the U.S. was seen as having the potential to provide better procurement opportunities (leading to cost savings from joint purchases), joint training opportunities, and greater compatibility in defence capabilities. Given the geographic proximity, some held the view that, as allies, it is in the interest of both countries to cooperate.

However, a differing view held that the possible risk of greater cooperation with the U.S. to Canada's sovereignty, and more specifically the CAF's defence capabilities, as well as to Canada's reputation on a global

level, necessitated limitations on this cooperation. The discussion raised the question of where to draw the line on how independent the two forces should be.

*"I think it is important for us to maintain our own multi-role, combat capable military. There should certainly be friendly cooperation with the US and other allies, but we need to be free to make our own decisions. Although we are geographically closest to the US, we are closer to Europe in values & attitudes. I don't want to see a joint military or to see us become just a provider of specialty services. If we have to depend on others for defence, we are not free."*

### Should Canada, the United States, and Mexico expand trilateral defence cooperation?



Source: EN & FR Contributors to DefenceConsultations.ca / Consultationsdefense.ca – FINDINGS ARE NOT REPRESENTATIVE (Counts)

*"Although Canada is the United States closest ally, we need to be able to assist the Americans in the event of an emergency. Heavy reliance on the United States for defense and security is creating a system wherein we expect them to be able to protect us, but when they need us, we will be ill-equipped to be able to handle the responsibility of protector of North America or*

*stand by then in defense of North America. I disagree about Canada sharing resources with the United States, we are our own sovereign country and we should be able to handle our resources the way we want to.”*

*“I agree our military is too intertwined with the United States to the extent where American defense and foreign policy directly affects us. I would like to see the Canadian military have less of a reliance on the United States. Canada has the capability to have and maintain our own multi-role, combat capable force, what’s standing in the way is political red tape and a lack of adequate funding to the military to not only fulfill their mandate, but to replace old and outdated equipment and machinery. We should not be relying on other countries for defense, instead our defense should be of mutual cooperation with the U.S, where Canada is able to adequately help the United States defend itself and vice-versa. Our sovereignty and our ability to make decisions is heavily reliant on the United States and we should seek to change that.”*

The suggestion of buying equipment solely from the U.S. was a topic of intense debate among some participants, thereby expanding collaboration between the two nations. Others also suggested that partnering with the U.S. for procurement could allow for efficiencies. The question of participation in ballistic missile defence was also debated with views supporting greater integration across the CAF and increased, cross-border cooperation with the United States. By contrast, there were considerably fewer specific mentions of cooperation with Mexico.

*“Our formal defence cooperation is NORAD and we need to remain a true partner. It’s our territory, our territorial waters and our airspace. The US will indeed defend it if they perceive a threat to their security or interests, but we will have no say when or how they do it. Our partnership needs to evolve by being a partner in funding any necessary upgrades*

*to land and space based surveillance but also to airborne surveillance and possibly missile defense if that is deemed necessary. I don’t accept that cooperation with the US means we have to buy all our kit from them. So long as they are operationally compatible, and many are thanks to NATO standards and others, that’s all that is required. There are many options to being able to be compatible with the US without selling our souls to the US defence industry.”*

## 5.4 Contributing to Global Peace and Security

### Commitments and Partnerships

The most important roles of the Canadian Armed Forces internationally were considered in almost equal proportions to be combat operations and contributing to coalition efforts in regional security operations, followed by peace support and stabilization operations (Chart 5).

Comments within this theme highlighted the importance of collective defence given Canada’s geographic location next to the U.S., similar to those described when discussing continental defence. Other frequent topics of discussion included Canada’s relationship with the UN, NATO, and NORAD, the relevance of such commitments and the effectiveness of such organizations in the face of current threats; however, at times this was a polarizing issue with proponents seeking increased cooperation with allies, while others advocated that Canada distance itself to focus on its own interests.

Other allied nations were sometimes cited as a benchmark or comparator for Canada’s level of defence spending, as well as Canada’s personnel and equipment. As seen from discussion within other themes, many felt that Canada was not living up to its NATO commitments with regard to spending (2% GDP). Participants also expressed a level of concern about how Canada is perceived by its allies, particularly the U.S., and by other nations.

*“The government needs to decide if it wants to defend Canada or merely claim it wants to. If the government merely wants to make the claim, stay the course. If the government wants really defend Canada, the Arctic, respond to domestic threats, respond to domestic disasters, respond to international disasters, deliver humanitarian aid abroad, influence positive change around the globe, deploy peacekeepers, deploy combat troops to security missions with our allies to support global security, or any other future mission the government needs to increase the Defence Budget to the NATO recommended 2% GDP, procure the equipment to do the job (lowest bidder and Canadian only is not a best practice) and enlarge the number of troops ready to support those missions.”*

### Peacekeeping

There were mixed views in terms of peacekeeping as a principal role of Canada. On the online forum, participants engaged in lengthy exchanges regarding Canada's history of peacekeeping and the effectiveness of UN missions. While many perceived Canada's international role to be that of peacekeeper and felt that Canada should continue to be a leader in this area, some questioned the historical accuracy of the perception of Canada as solely peacekeepers. Others noted that traditional peacekeeping, or peacekeeping as it has been traditionally viewed, was no longer possible in many contexts.

*“While I am not the first to make this observation, it must be recognized that “peace-keeping” as we understand is not viable in current 21st century conflicts. Peacekeeping could be argued to work well in areas of conflict between states that have ratified the Geneva Convention, however, when dealing with militant forces that are in no way bound to the Geneva Convention, peacekeeping exposes our troops to danger without them having the ability to readily retaliate if need be. If peacekeeping were to become a focus of the Canadian military,*

*I’d like to see a change in the UN Charter regarding peacekeeping. However, as this would more than likely be unlikely, Canada could take a role in providing peacekeeping from an operational perspective without the blue helmets. This though would require significant investment from our current government in addressing the equipment needs and operational needs of all three branches. Even if we were to commit to more UN missions, the Canadian military is spread too thin and is not receiving the support it needs. Finally, the Canadian military is renowned for its training, professionalism, and history around the world. While this is the case, I don’t think Canadians quite realize how proud they should be of our small, but extremely effective, compassionate, and hard-working, military is. This should be reflected in our government’s commitment to our forces, but I struggle to see this in many of the previous governments.”*

*“Certainly there is a role for Canada in Peace Keeping (PK) but the Government of Canada and, frankly, the people of Canada, have to get past this myth that Canada’s military tradition is that of peacekeeper. Every military historian disputes that. It ignores Canada’s military history prior to the Suez Canal Crisis (defence against American invasion during the Revolutionary war, War of 1812, Boer War, WW1, WW2, Korea) as well as the role non-peacekeeping role Canada has played in the years since the establishment of PK (defence of western Europe during the Cold War, Gulf War 1, Kosovo, 9/11, Afghanistan, Iraq) [...] PK [Peacekeeping] is one type of mission that the CF can do, but it should not be the only one. The CF must be able to carry out the widest possible range of combat operations, and that requires a well equipped and robust force.”*

Humanitarian and diplomatic goals were also common suggestions for the role of Canada and the Canadian Armed Forces internationally. Many participants talked about prevention of further disasters and conflict being a main focus for the CAF, and that Canada should aim to be a world leader in this area. Some participants even considered peacekeeping as Canada's sole purpose for interventions abroad, and emphasized that such interventions should be undertaken solely with a UN mandate, and generally only for humanitarian and disaster relief purposes.


Regardless of participants' positions on the extent to which peacekeeping should be a leading role for the CAF internationally, there were nevertheless some commonalities on the importance of having a clear mandate established prior to committing to a UN mission. In addition, some submissions that included discussions of historical Canadian peacekeeping referred to Canadians being under-equipped in previous missions.

*"The days of Pearson-era 'peacekeeping' may well be behind us. I may be wrong but I can't think of a single current theatre where conditions for a UN Chapter 6 peacekeeping would apply: both belligerents must be recognized states and agree to the mission; the force must be lightly armed and must be*

*completely neutral. Even if such a situation did exist, we should not participate unless the ROE [Rules of Engagement] allow us to staff, equip and execute the stated mission effectively as the situation evolves. Rules like 'I can't shoot at you unless you shoot first' or 'I can't shoot you if you shoot that other person' have put our personnel in untenable positions, made a mockery of the mission and endangered out personnel. Commanders that have pushed the mission limits have been criticized - commanders that haven't, have also been criticized. Peacekeeping has evolved from the days of a blue helmet and a friendly smile. Canada has a professional military - if the world wants us, it should be on our terms [...]."*

*"Peace support operations should only be undertaken with the understanding that Canadian [Armed] Forces will have full support and be deployed fully armed. Our forces must never again find themselves in the position they did in Rwanda. Canada has a responsibility to help maintain peace and security around the globe. Guidelines must be created on which types of conflicts Canada should involve itself in and exit strategies should always be in place before deployment."*

### Three most important roles of the Candian Armed Forces internationally



Source: EN & FR Contributors to DefenceConsultations.ca / Consultationsdefense.ca – FINDINGS ARE NOT REPRESENTATIVE (Counts)

## Threats

Defending Canada and other nations against global threats, such as ISIS, ISIL, and other forms of terrorism, and to a lesser extent, threats from Russia and the Middle East, was another common theme in the discussion of contributing to global peace and security. As seen elsewhere, other topics that emerged within this context included those related to alliances with the U.S., the importance of global surveillance, not selling arms to certain states, avoiding nuclear proliferation, and climate change as a cause of instability.

## Spending

Military and security spending was a polarizing topic which in some ways related to participants' view of the purpose and roles of the CAF. Those who supported an increase in spending wanted to see more equipment, training, aircraft, ships, and recruitment to respond to the global threats mentioned. Others advocated that funding be shifted to focus on either domestic issues, or to helping other countries respond to their own humanitarian needs.

Some participants held the view that Canada should play a less active role in global security and should focus on protecting our own borders, coastline and

citizens. A common argument against sending troops abroad was related to outdated gear, equipment, and infrastructure, which could result in sending the CAF into conflict at a deficit. Overall, many participants appear to support Canada and the CAF's involvement in global security; however, the extent and nature of such involvement emerged as a key point of debate.


## 5.5 Defence Capabilities and the Future Force

The interrelated topics of capabilities, specific equipment, personnel and procurement generated much discussion among participants and featured in other submissions. It should be noted that many of the submissions also touched on training, and defence spending in general, as well as how Canada should spend more in each of these areas.

### Size, structure, and composition of CAF

Many participants felt that the size of the CAF should be increased, or at the very least, not reduced (Chart 6). Some argued that increasing the size of the CAF was important to counter fatigue and burnout among members. Many also mentioned defence spending in relation to this topic.

**The Canadian Armed Forces**



Source: EN & FR Contributors to DefenceConsultations.ca / Consultationsdefense.ca – FINDINGS ARE NOT REPRESENTATIVE (Counts)




*[...] the Armed Forces are far too small to adequately serve the needs of a nation of 35 Million. Small numbers of personnel deploying over and over again, as in Afghanistan, is a great model for future problems with PTSD, Stress and Burn Out. Structure. We have too many HQ's. Parliament should pass laws that regardless of how big the Canadian [Armed] Forces is, only a certain maximum percentage of the overall strength should be allowed to be employed in HQs above unit level. The basic Army, Navy, Air Force and Special Forces structures should remain, however, there needs to be more authority by the CDS to direct and control overall Joint Priorities. The services hinder this, but do have the expertise within their domains. The CDS should be able to set strategic priorities to solve a problem, decide which roles the services should play in those overall Joint Priorities, and then task the services to deliver their part of the capability. Right now the services drive the major projects from the bottom up, and that is a problem."*

*Yes the size of the CF needs to change. We cannot do what we need to do with the force the size it is now. We are spending less than most of our NATO allies on defense. We are supposed to spend and have been asked to spend around two percent of GDP on defense yet we haven't done so in years."*

### Balance and Organization of Regular and Reserve Forces

There was a perceived imbalance between the Regular and Reserve Forces within the CAF, as illustrated in Chart 7. This topic generated much discussion, with a particular focus on the purpose, training, size and structure of the two Forces. Many of the submissions provided insight into this view as contributors advocated for various changes to the Reserves (such as expanding the size of the Reserve Force, aligning the training of the Reserve with the regular forces, and additionally, focusing training on the development of specialized capabilities/skill sets), to bring it more in line with the Regular Force. This topic also prompted related discussions about recruitment and retention, occasionally including suggestions of incentives. The importance of up-to-date training was also mentioned, generally alongside the need for new equipment; indeed, a number of submissions contained the argument that up-to-date equipment would require up-to-date training.

### Do we have the right balance between the Regular and Reserve Force?



Source: EN & FR Contributors to DefenceConsultations.ca / Consultationsdefense.ca – FINDINGS ARE NOT REPRESENTATIVE (Counts)

*“I believe that the Reserves can have a role in the future, and they especially can bring some unique skills to the table during operations. However, large Reserve Armies are a model of the past, and for good reason. Modern military operations are highly complex - even an infantry soldier in the 21st Century takes years to train. Operating modern military equipment takes repeated and constant practice. If you don't do this, because you are a part time soldier, you become the 1991 Iraqi Army - huge, but totally outclassed by highly trained professional forces.”*

A number of submissions contained suggestions for re-allocation of members within the CAF, such as restructuring and relocating units. Many submitted detailed recommendations regarding proposed changes to the structure and size of the CAF. While too varied and detailed to be captured in this summary, it can be said that these submissions included very specific recommendations regarding the size and locations of units, the type of equipment the CAF should have, and new capabilities that keep pace with emerging threats, etc.

Other mentions included:

- Expanding or changing the role of the Rangers, particularly in relation to the North;
- Increasing the number of Special Forces;
- Amalgamation of Reserve regiments, platoons, companies, battalions and brigades to create a viable fighting force;
- Restructuring of the forces to reduce bureaucracy and bloat at the top levels and expand the frontline;
- Standardization of equipment to maintain skill sets of personnel;
- Harnessing the skills and potential of the Reserve Force to provide specialist skills in the areas where the Regular Force may be weak (e.g. linguistics, working with civilian populations, etc.).


## Capabilities and Equipment

Participants exchanged views on the merits of capabilities in light of threats, many of which were viewed as having changed from those of the past, and the capabilities required to confront them. The importance of **combat capability** was also mentioned in numerous submissions. Related to capability were discussions on **specific** equipment that should be replaced, as well as detailed recommendations on the specific type and quantity of equipment that the CAF needs, by branch of service, with some occasionally relating it to their own experience or expertise in this domain. Related considerations that were discussed include the capabilities of various equipment to confront contemporary threats; for example, there was some discussion regarding the importance of having vessels with ice-breaking capabilities to protect the Arctic. Other topics included adaptations that would need to be made to certain equipment, if purchased; whether equipment should be developed and/or acquired domestically; the training and maintenance required for such equipment; international commitments; and, perhaps most importantly, the length of the procurement process.

*“If you decide not to have a particular capability, then you are betting on the fact that for the next 10 years or so (the minimum time it takes to buy any major capability) you won't need it. Time and again that has proven incorrect.”*

## Health and Welfare

There were mixed views regarding whether the CAF does a good job of looking after military personnel (Chart 8). It should be noted, however, that most opinions were moderate, indicating that the CAF was doing either a somewhat good job or somewhat poor job, rather than polarized, and that there were comparatively fewer submissions on this topic specifically in the Forum.

***CAF do a good job of looking after  
military personnel***

Source: EN & FR Contributors to DefenceConsultations.ca / Consultationsdefense.ca – FINDINGS ARE NOT REPRESENTATIVE (Counts)

This topic is unique in that it was an area in which participants of differing philosophical perspectives, in terms of the defence policy, nevertheless shared a common view that Canada should take care of and support veterans. The importance of providing various types of support was mentioned, including support for mental health, with particular reference to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and post-deployment support. Other comments related to pay and benefit issues, as well as the importance of supporting families.





*Right now, there is not nearly enough support in place for our CAF members, and past members. Closing down all of the Veteran's buildings throughout Canada is not a good idea. We need these buildings, and the staff within them. They know how to deal with PTSD and its affects on those with dementia. We need to dedicate an area of the Veteran's hospitals to an inpatient unit that can treat mental illness as well. We also need to better support the military families. They move as families, which is extremely difficult. The spouse of the member often has to quit their job for the move, and can have great difficulty finding a job in the new posting area. The cost of living is absolutely ridiculous, especially if you are dealing with one spouse working and the other unable to find work because they were posted away from their job. The cost of military housing should be lower to reflect what postings do to families and their income. Postings are not just about the military member."*

*I do believe that what should occur is there needs to be a joint discussion with the military and the medical community on how best to serve soldiers medical needs, especially when it comes to all health issues, not only mental health. The government needs to develop a health strategy that encompasses recommendations from the medical community, with the strategy, specifically tuned to aiding soldiers recover from mental health issues and ensure there is a removal of stigmas pertaining to mental health. This will allow for soldiers to come forward when they need mental health assistance and reduce the amount of suicides in the military."*

*The military actually does a decent job of supporting the member. There are issues that can be handled better. But on the whole, it's better than it's been in years. Our families though? Hardly any support at all. And this actually impacts retention. The military does not help spouses find work. It does not help*

*families find a new family doctor (or provide medical care to them). And when you get posted, the military will not help you find daycare for your children. Even the daycare on base may not necessarily prioritize military families. The family issues are a real drag on any move. And it's what discourages members from serving even longer."*

On a related note, some participants discussed the importance of caring for injured members, and called for a reconsideration of gainfully employing injured service members, rather than releasing them.

*This is a difficult topic, but perhaps there needs to be a way to keep some injured CAF personnel gainfully employed rather than medically discharging them. I realize that there is the concept of 'universality of service' and that "there are no light duties in the military" but in reality, a member with, for example only, a partial amputation or manageable medical condition such as diabetes, could well be able to successfully fulfill many roles, even in deployment. It would have the added benefit of demonstrating that the DND is committed to its staff."*

### Full Spectrum and Niche Capabilities

Opinion was divided on this topic; while many advocated for a full spectrum capability, others felt that, given the limited resources or budget, a niche capability might be a better option. The specific areas in which such specialization could be offered was sometimes interpreted as Search and Rescue, and the North. Some also argued that the pursuit of niche capabilities, or of specialization, was also one way in which Canada could offer support to Allies.

*We should maintain general combat capabilities across as broad a range of the spectrum of conflict as we can afford. If we specialize, we will inevitably have the wrong capabilities when a particular situation arises. Specialization is*

*NOT the Answer. It is often proposed that the Canadian [Armed] Forces should specialize and let our allies cover any capabilities Canada does not own. "Special Forces are all we need" state some of the proponents of this strategy. In reality, military problems span the spectrum of conflict, and any one tool is only suitable for a particular problem [...]. It is certain that if Canada over specializes we won't have the right tool for future scenarios. Think of the military toolbox. Some times you need a hammer (say a tank) and other times you need a scalpel (special forces, for example). My advice to government would be to focus 70%-80% of your equipment investments into broadly useful, general-purpose capabilities, with the remaining into specialized niche capabilities."*

*"Canada has too small a military [military] to afford to specialize in anything. We need to generalize in everything, or excel at as much as possible. Our CAF members should be able to be dropped into any situation and be able to acclimate to it whenever required. We can't do that by specializing. Give our members the equipment and training to allow them to be the "best of the best."*

While a balance between the two was suggested, some participants also felt that the pursuit of niche capabilities should not supersede that of ensuring basic capabilities.

*"It's important to maintain our own full-spectrum military. If we're dependent on others for our defence, we're not really free. We can develop specialties & niches in addition to the full-spectrum, but not instead."*

## **Investment in Space, Cyber, and Unmanned Capabilities**

There was general agreement among many participants that cyber-related threats do exist and that having the capabilities to confront them is important. However, as seen in the debate regarding full-spectrum versus niche capabilities, some argued that having conventional warfare capabilities was also important, and that funding should not be diverted from this basic capability to what could be described as niche capabilities such as cyber, with space being viewed as particularly costly. On a related note, submissions containing suggestions of specific capabilities or equipment sometimes included a recognition that funds were limited.


*"Cyber threats, space capabilities etc. There are lots of places that Canada can expend lots of money. However, at the end of the day it's the ships, planes and soldiers that form the heart of the Canadian ARMED Forces. The military is the tool that applies force in support of government policy objectives, when necessary. Or, sometimes, the threat of force. This means weapons and military hard power, and the people schooled in the use of force. Its not that we should ignore the softer capabilities that a government needs, but they should not come at the expense of what the military fundamentally is."*

Some expressed concern about the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), specifically their use in combat, as well as violations to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that could result from their use. The importance of having satellite communications in the Arctic, as noted in the Public Consultation Paper, was also mentioned. There was also general agreement that being interoperable with Allies, including the U.S., was important, and even necessary. Another theme of particular importance in the discussion of capabilities was that of the involvement of agencies such as the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment of Canada (CSEC).

*“An organisation like CSEC in my opinion is best suited to take on these responsibilities. It is crucial that we develop new ways of securing our vital systems, mission control systems so that hackers will not break through... we can't afford to be behind other nations, hackers and organisations in cyber security, if not we will be vulnerable to their tactics and will result in the loss of life, damage to industry, property and the economy. We need to be regularly checking our defences for vulnerabilities and removing them as soon as they are detected; using old systems, old mission control systems and old critical infrastructure increases that vulnerability and allows an aggressor to exploit it for their motives.”*

### Improving Procurement

Most participants did not agree that the Canadian Armed Forces has the equipment/capabilities it needs to do its job (Chart 9). This was consistent with the viewpoints expressed in submissions by participants, namely the widely-held perception that the amount of defence spending was inadequate and that the CAF was under-resourced. Similarly, most participants **strongly disagreed** that purchases of military equipment are well-planned and well-managed (Charts 10 and 11). This was consistent with the sense of frustration that permeated many of the submissions relating to improving procurement.



Source: EN & FR Contributors to DefenceConsultations.ca / Consultationsdefense.ca – FINDINGS ARE NOT REPRESENTATIVE (Counts)

Indeed, very few submissions characterized the procurement process in positive terms; the commonly held view was that there were many issues with the current procurement process, including delays and lengthiness of the process, with the consequence of equipment becoming obsolete by the time it was procured. Issues were also raised with respect to the involvement of other departments, viewed as slowing down the process, and the perceived politicization of procurement decisions, with some noting that the cancellation of contracts in the past contributed to a negative view of the process. There was also a general sense among some that the requirement to “buy Canadian” also creates delays, and that in general, the process is overly bureaucratic.

Some felt that obtaining the best equipment in a timely manner should be the paramount consideration in procurement. Several common suggestions to improve procurement included buying off-the-shelf; obtaining the best value; involving the military (particularly those who would actually use the equipment) in the procurement process; ending the involvement of other departments, such as Public Works and Government Services Canada or other departments; not selecting the lowest bidder; having a dedicated agency or committee in charge of procurement; ensuring that procurement and defence contracts were not subject to change as a result of elections; imposing penalties on contractors who miss deadlines, and for some, having planned replacement cycles. Partnering with the U.S. for savings was also mentioned.

*[...]. Our forces need to modernize but our procurement system is broken. You can't treat defense like just another government department. We need new helicopters and we needed them twenty years ago. We still haven't got them. [...] The military is apolitical, quit being political about procurement. Give the CF the manpower and equipment it needs to do the job we want it to do. If we don't we are letting the CF down and they won't be able to be there when we need them to be. I guess it comes down to, "I'd rather have it and not need it than need it and not have it."*

*The current procurement system is locked. Our politicians need to look more at the long term, instead of just the time they are in office. The idea of general purpose equipment is a great place to start. I'm not sure how viable an option it would be at this point, with the state of our military. But, if the government could focus on replacing the equipment we have then we could implement this idea. I think the biggest hurdle at the point are the companies that make the military equipment within Canada. It is taking far too long, and costing far too much. If new frigates, planes, helicopters, etc. can be made outside of the country faster and cheaper, we should really consider outsourcing those items. I know that we need to keep jobs within Canada, but right now our military is falling apart because the equipment is falling apart. It will take too long to replace it, and fixing it over and over again is not working any more. The equipment is too old."*

*Replacing our whole navy every 30 years is NOT a good way of doing business. In fact, while we make defence procurement in Canada seem extremely difficult, in reality its actually pretty straight forward. When you buy a ship, its end service date is predictable and you can plan for its replacement. Sure, it will take some work to define the future requirement, but let's be real - a frigate of today will be replaced by a frigate of tomorrow. Same with a truck, an armoured fighting vehicle, a plane etc., etc. You can lay it all out in a spread sheet, yet amazingly, this is not how we do it. We have to justify the replacement, explain why its needed in [voluminous] detail, etc., etc.*

## 5.6 Defence Budget


Contributors overwhelmingly indicated that they thought the “Canadian Armed Forces are not adequately resourced to meet current roles and responsibilities” (Chart 12). This is consistent with the responses to questions regarding the procurement process and



spending discussed above, as well as the general view that defence spending should be increased, with some specifically suggesting that Canada reach the NATO target of 2% of GDP. Comparisons with the levels of spending by Canada's allies, or by other G7 nations, were also referenced. Considerably fewer advocated reductions in spending. The level of expenditure was also viewed as relating to the public's willingness to spend on the military.

*It's clear that Canada currently spends too little on defence. Unserviceable equipment is rife throughout the Forces, and a lack of adequate funding compounded with a broken procurement system means that replacements are years in arriving. Infrastructure requires major improvements. Cutbacks to national procurement accounts mean that there are inadequate spare parts, ammunition, fuel and other supplies - this has led to inadequate training, poor readiness, and an inability to sustain deployed troops in the field. There is barely any part of the Forces, Regular or Reserve, that has not seen its capabilities decline due to lack of money. Unfortunately, this is not a recent phenomenon but has been occurring for decades. Moreover, the Forces are too small in terms of manpower given the size of the country, and lack many modern capabilities (integral sealift, long-range UAV's for surveillance, armed helicopters to name just three) that smaller allies who are more serious about defence possess. What they do have is often insufficient to make them truly "multi-purpose and combat-capable" (e.g. indirect fire, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons). As a result, at the present, the Canadian [Armed] Forces can only make a token or niche contribution to any mission, foreign or domestic."*

***Are the Canadian Armed Forces adequately resourced to meet current roles and responsibilities?***



Source: EN & FR Contributors to DefenceConsultations.ca / Consultationsdefense.ca – FINDINGS ARE NOT REPRESENTATIVE (Counts)

As reflected in the responses to the topic of the Canadian Approach to Defence, many of the comments within this theme reflected the perception that there have been spending cuts over the years that were detrimental to the military and resulted in its weakened state, with participants sometimes referring specifically to subpar and outdated equipment, as well as over-worked personnel.

*Spending on new ships, planes, personnel carriers etc. has been put off for so many years that almost all of the equipment is now in a state of disrepair. Instead of keeping up with replacing on a schedule, now everything has to be replaced at once. Our CF-18s are lucky to still be in the air, we have no replenishment ships, I could go on and on. Instead of spending disgusting amounts of money keeping this equipment barely working. Let's invest in equipment that will keep Canada safe, allow us to respond to natural disasters, terrorist attacks, plane crashes, violations of Canadian sovereignty, etc."*

Other submissions under the theme of the Defence Budget often included comments on the procurement process (similar to those described in previous sections), as well being mindful of Canada's international commitments to its allies. Comments regarding expenditures sometimes included an acknowledgement of the public's willingness to spend money on Defence, and sometimes also referred to political will.


*“Canada can and should be doing more to protect its own shores, air space and arctic regions. It should also be participating more in NATO and move in the direction of a budget that will be on or close to 2% GDP. If Australia can do it, we should be able to as well.”*

*“The reality is that the Canadian government ... simply will not spend significant sums while threat perceptions remain low. Despite terrorism, rogue states, nuclear proliferation, climate change, etc., Canadians and their politicians do not see, or do not want to see, a growing threat against our territory.”*

### Procurement

Most participants indicated that it was more important for the Government to prioritize purchasing the best equipment required by the Canadian Armed Forces, regardless of cost (Chart 13). This is consistent with submissions by contributors which characterized the procurement process as problematic, time-consuming and ineffective. The relationship between protecting personnel and maintaining equipment, so as not to place our troops in danger, was also underscored.

### ***When purchasing military equipment, is it more important for the Government to prioritize purchasing:***



Source: EN & FR Contributors to DefenceConsultations.ca / Consultationsdefense.ca – FINDINGS ARE NOT REPRESENTATIVE (Counts)

The subject of expenditures also emerged once again in the discussion on Procurement, with many commenting on the need for this to be increased as a percentage of GDP, while others felt that such an increase was unlikely and instead based their recommendations for equipment and personnel on the assumption that funding would remain at current levels. Views were mixed in terms of the perceived importance of the benefits to Canadian industry as a consideration in procurement, although a few did frame Canadian sourcing as an important element of maintaining sovereignty and ensuring security.

*“...rethink the procurement strategy if its Canadian good but just make sure its quality, that it doesn't take ten years to produce, and that they will be able to allow our soldiers to perform efficiently and effectively in the field.”*

In addition to calls for increased spending, suggestions were made for specific types of equipment, including aircraft (such as fighter jets), maritime vessels (such as frigates and ice-breakers), and land vehicles, as well as improved gear for personnel. Capabilities of various vessels were discussed, such as the Super Hornet vs. the F-35. Other debates included the need for an amphibious vehicle and whether an ice-strengthened hull was needed, etc.

An obstacle identified within the theme of Procurement was the impossibility of building equipment quickly, again relating to the challenges of modern warfare compared to the past. As within other topics, Australia was cited as an example to follow in Procurement. Also documented previously, some wondered whether Canada should partner with other countries to buy equipment in order to achieve efficiencies.


*Defense Procurement must be a strategy that can sustain itself through election cycles. Australia is a good example. We can't look to America in this respect because they operate at a totally different level than we do."*

*"I agree also Defense Procurement needs proper time, planning and execution. It needs a range of individuals with varying expertise in public policy, industry procurement and the amount of time and resources it takes to accomplish construction tasks, research expertise, and expertise from academia. Canada should absolutely look to Australia for guidance, support, and instruction on how to develop a proper defense procurement program. Australia not only has the expertise and talents to get procurement projects done, but understands it's procurement capabilities and weaknesses, and knows when to contract foreign companies to develop equipment and resources that domestic companies are incapable of doing. Canada should replicate the Australian approach and should seek expertise from them as to how we should restructure and redevelop our program. The Navy's procurement program*

*needs to be restructured especially; the Navy cannot be functional with only one functional destroyer. Canada needs to understand when it's appropriate to contract domestic companies and when to outsource projects to foreign companies, for example, France. Canada should instead purchase highly capable French Mistral Warships for the Canadian Navy and restructure the procurement program to produce fleets that complement the Mistral's role."*

*"Recently Australia has realized that they must modernize and be adaptable on the world stage and have begun a rebuilding program for their Military. They have purchased F18 super Hornets to replace older F18's ..., building the Hobart Class AA Destroyers, OPV's, new SSK submarines, and have just recently announced they are contracting offshore for new AOR's because they need them now...not 10 years from now. They understand that by spending money now will benefit them later. Canada should have been looking at this model years ago and the cost would have been much less spread out over 10 years."*





# 6.0 NATURE OF FEEDBACK RECEIVED



# 6.0 NATURE OF FEEDBACK RECEIVED

The discussion forum revealed a wide range of submissions, both in terms of the themes and topics discussed as well as the depth to which they were explored. Some submissions resembled comprehensive essays, with historical perspectives of Canada's defence, while others were more narrative in their structure and tone; many of the submissions and comments were contributions made to emerging, organic conversations.

The general tone of the submissions, whether comments on the discussion forum or submissions in another form, was respectful. Participants from a variety of philosophical perspectives expressed their appreciation for the opportunity to contribute their views and welcomed the opportunity to participate in the process. The degree to which participants considered the process to be important can be gleaned from the length and detailed nature of a number of submissions in different media, as well as the degree of engagement in the online discussions.

Offering different forms by which participants could submit their comments also proved valuable in terms of eliciting a wide range of submissions. While the online forum permitted exchanges among participants, many of whom engaged in lengthy discussions, the paper and email submissions were particularly varied, in terms of the authorship and form, as well as the level of engagement displayed across various themes, and the depth to which topics were explored. Submissions ranged from single-focus submissions, to individual responses, forum questions, and personal narratives.

Overall, contributors had varying levels of familiarity with DND and Defence Policy. They ranged from the average Canadian, to experts, stakeholders, peace advocates, and industry members with an interest in Defence Policy. Contributions from current and former members of the Canadian Armed Forces were welcomed by the Department of National Defence.



## CONTRIBUTIONS (SUBMISSIONS)

Workbooks (which required contributors to register and submit responses to set questions)	<b>14,152</b>	SOURCE: EngagementHQ
Forum (Comments made on a bulletin-board style online discussion forum around set questions)	<b>1,411</b>	SOURCE: EngagementHQ
Forum (Total - Comments + Likes)	<b>6,173</b>	SOURCE: EngagementHQ
<b>Subtotal online portal</b>	<b>20,325</b>	
Facebook (reactions)	<b>4,804</b>	SOURCE: DND Page Facebook Analytics
Twitter (tweets incl RTs)	<b>2,382</b>	SOURCE: Sysomos MAP
News	<b>6,529</b>	SOURCE: Sysomos MAP
Blogs	<b>4,631</b>	SOURCE: Sysomos MAP
Forums	<b>269</b>	SOURCE: Sysomos MAP
<b>Subtotal Social Media</b>	<b>18,615</b>	
E-mail and Mail	<b>97</b>	SOURCE: Correspondence Counts
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>39,037</b>	




## 6.1 Online Portal

The online portal received 20,325 submissions through the forum and workbooks.

In terms of timing, the number of page views, visitors, and visits were particularly high on the days surrounding the launch, and for a week or so immediately afterwards. Smaller peaks (defined as over 1,000 page views, visits, and visitors combined) were observed in late April and mid-late May, as well as towards the end of May and early June. Increased activity was also observed during the last week of the Consultations (June 26, 2016 – July 31, 2016).

**Number of Visits by Day**




Source: EN & FR Engagement HQ Platform

Over eight in ten (85%) participants were return visitors; while 15% were one-time visitors.


In terms of level of engagement, 13,284 participants had visited at least one page on the online portal and could be described as “Aware.” In total, 7,246 participants were “Informed” about the consultation, having visited multiple pages or documents in the online portal. Those who were particularly “Engaged” contributed to the eWorkbook, the online Forum, or both (4,708).

**Type of Visitor**



Source: EN & FR Engagement HQ Platform

**New vs. Returning Visitors**



Source: Google Analytics

Out of 4,708 engaged participants, 3,441 selected to complete either the consultation profile questions and/or the Forum registration. The responses to this profile illustrate the broad spectrum of audiences who participated. The discussion attracted participants from across the country, in proportion with the regional distribution of the Canadian population. While the Forum was dominated by expert audiences, self-identified

members of the general public were more likely to respond to the online eWorkbooks.


The nature of the comments and contributions received suggests that participants came from among the general population as well as from among present and former members of the CAF who demonstrated a depth of knowledge about DND and the CAF organization.

## CONSULTATIONS PROFILE


Participants were given the opportunity to anonymously self-identify their demographic profile.




### AUDIENCE




### AGE



### PROVINCE



### GENDER



Source: EN & FR Contributors to DefenceConsultations.ca / Consultationsdefense.ca who provided demographic information – FINDINGS ARE NOT REPRESENTATIVE (Counts)

## Forum Contributions

A high level of familiarity and personal experience was demonstrated by contributors. The exchange of opinions was successful in creating an ongoing dialogue among participants on the online discussion forum. The general tone of the submissions received was respectful and the comments thoughtful, with some passionately held views.

A two-stage monitoring of forum comments was applied to ensure that impolite comments and improper language did not appear. The first stage was an automated word filter built into the Online Discussion Forum that did not allow any comments with improper language to be posted. The second stage was live monitoring that included 24/7 review of comments posted.

Overall, 290 individuals participated in the Forums, submitting 1,411 comments and posts in total, across the 10 key consultation questions. In addition to comments, these contributors also provided reactions to each other's comments through 4,762 Agree/Disagree voting buttons.

Between the six themes, the greatest number of Forum contributions were those within the Canadian Approach to Defence theme, which saw not only the highest volume of Comments (545), but also the highest volume of engagement from the community of online contributors via Agree/Disagree votes.

Participants were generally more likely to express agreement with the contributions of others, particularly on the questions relating to improving the health and wellness of military members, and improving procurement.

By contrast, the question relating to whether the size, structure and composition of the CAF should change generated a polarization of agreement, as did the question regarding the roles that the CAF should play domestically.

## Workbook Contributions

The tone and language in the eWorkbook submissions tended to be more candid than those in the Forum or on social media, perhaps reflecting the degree of comfort participants felt in expressing their views anonymously and not publicly.

Overall, 4,538 individuals participated in the eWorkbooks, submitting over 14,152 contributions across the six themes and consultations profile questions.


The themes that generated the highest levels of contributions in the eWorkbooks were those related to the Canadian Approach to Defence (3,067 contributions), followed by the Defence Budget (2,228 contributions), and Defence Capabilities and the Future Force (1,637 contributions).

## 6.2 Social Media and other Online Contributions

Over the course of the consultation exercise, the Department of National Defence promoted the Defence Policy Review through its social media channels. While overall engagement on Twitter was higher than the Ipsos Social Media Norms for public discourse, a large proportion remained retweets, primarily building awareness of the DPR. News sites tended to have more thematic discussions of the Defence Policy Review and sustained reporting over the course of the consultation window.



### Volume of online mentions over time





Source: Sysomos MAP - Volume online in Canada, 8,754 total mentions between January 1st and August 27th, 2016; Reach on Twitter in Canada between April 6th and July 31st, 2016

### Overall Engagement

Engagement has been calculated based on posts per user.


2095 mentions  
924 users



of Twitter mentions were retweets of others messages

Many of the social media submissions (made using #DefenceConsults and/or #ConsultationsDefense) were focused on building awareness of the Defence Policy Review, and generally consisted of information about the launch of the DPR and solicitations for input. Other common submissions included caption-type responses to various DPR events, information about the topics being discussed by speakers at events, etc. There were relatively few authored submissions directly posted in social media, in which comments or ideas were articulated, and even fewer comments on such submissions. However, many linked to articles and information posted elsewhere.


### How many documents by source?



Source: IBM Watson for SMA – Volume of documents online mentioning search terms in Canada by source

Beyond the tagged discussions of the DPR, conversations about the Canadian Armed Forces and defending Canada continued throughout the consultation period online. These occurred primarily beyond the most popular social media spaces (Twitter, Facebook etc. . . .) such as discussion boards/forums and blogs.

### How many snippets within each theme were identified? By source



Source: IBM SMA – Number of snippets (mentions within documents) by Source

## 6.3 Bespoke Responses

Some respondents chose not to use the online consultation platform and instead submitted bespoke written comments via letter, email and other formats. Participants using the online platform were directed to the Public Consultation Paper and answered specific questions about the Defence Policy Review.

While many bespoke responses responded to and built upon the questions from the Consultation Paper, it is not known to what extent respondents were aware of or had read the Public Consultation Paper. Submissions also included:

- Long form mail/e-mail letters
- Letter campaigns
- Stories/narratives
- Opinion/position papers
- Journal and news articles
- Essays

Bespoke responses coming from Defence Industry Companies were shared separately with the Department of National Defence for review and inclusion in their internal analysis.

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