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The Soldiers of Isle Royale, 1720-45

by Allan Greer

Abstract

This paper is an essay in the social history of the 18th century military. Some aspects of the life and circumstances of non-commissioned members of the Isle Royale garrison are examined for the period between the founding of the colony in 1713 and the first fall of Louisbourg in 1745. The topics considered include military organization, the conditions under which men entered and left the garrison, the role of the soldiers in building the fortress of Louisbourg, and the exploitation they suffered at the hands of their officers. A description of the mutiny of 1744 is, in some senses, the focal point of the work since, it is argued in the concluding chapter, the event can only be properly understood in terms of the unique characteristics of military life in the colony outlined in the earlier chapters.

Submitted for publication 1976, by Allan Greer, York University, Toronto.

Preface

As much as it was a fishing station and commercial entrepôt, Isle Royale was a military stronghold in the 18th century. Soldiers (enlisted men and non-commissioned officers but not commissioned officers) made up approximately 12.4 per cent of the colony's total population, but they were concentrated in the capital and formed about one quarter of Louisbourg's population when a census was taken in 1737. Fifty years earlier, a roughly equivalent proportion of the population of Canada was made up of soldiers, but the troops there were rather more dispersed and nowhere in the St. Lawrence valley would their presence have been felt so strongly as it was in Louisbourg.[1] Thus a study of the men of the Louisbourg garrison seems justified; however, since many of the topics with which the present report deals (recruitment and discharge for example) can only be examined at the level of the colony's garrison as a whole, the title "The Soldiers of Isle Royale" was chosen.

My purpose will be to describe and analyze the Isle Royale soldiers as a group. The military organizational framework into which they fit and an evaluation of their numbers are delineated in the chapter "Organization and Numerical Strength." "Recruitment" and "Discharge" are concerned with the processes by which men became and ceased to be members of this group. Their economic position and especially their roles as workers and the exploitation they suffered at the hands of their officers are the subject of "Economics," while "The Swiss" is devoted to an examination of the peculiar characteristics of one element in the garrison, the Swiss mercenaries. Perhaps the most dramatic and, in my view, the most interesting incident in Louisbourg's history was the mutiny of 1744. "The Mutiny" is an attempt to reconstruct the events of the mutiny and the rest of the report is intended to serve partly as background information helping to explain why it happened where and when it did. The concluding chapter is designed to interpret the mutiny and outline its causes. In the process, information from earlier sections of the report is reviewed and put into perspective.

The position of the soldiers was by no means uniform throughout the period of French rule in Cape Breton and the

differences between the periods that preceded and followed the interlude of British occupation in 1745-49 are significant. In order to make the inquiry manageable, only the 25 years that preceded the first siege will be treated. This quarter century is the most stable period in the colony's history and the most relevant to an understanding of the mutiny. Information and examples from outside these chronological limits are given only when nothing else is available.

The main sources for this study were the French National Archives Archives des Colonies B and $C^{11}B$ series which are composed mainly of correspondence between the Ministère de la Marine and the colonial governors and commissaires-ordonnateurs although the latter series also contains some valuable court-martial records, hospital and ration accounts as well as other miscellaneous documents in the G^2 series, Section Outre-Mer. The records of trials involving soldiers were helpful, as were "dossiers personnels" in the Archives des Colonies E series and the Archives de la Marine C^7 series. The archives of the port of Rochefort in the Archives Maritimes provided some useful information on recruits and recruitment. The most precious source for a quantitative study of 18th-century soldiers is the "controles de troupes" of which André Corvisier made such good use in his monumental study of the army in ancien régime France.[2] Unfortunately there are no controles for the colonial troops. As a poor substitute for these systematic listings of soldiers' backgrounds and military service, I collected all the biographical data available on the approximately 75 men described in the documents because they deserted or married or appeared in court as witnesses or accused between 1720 and 1745. Most of these men were called upon to sign their names or make their mark and to state their place of birth; in many cases, the physical stature, age, profession and family background is also given. The sample is a small one and there is no reason to assume it is representative; moreover, the data on age, profession and height in each case are certainly imprecise and possibly inaccurate. Nevertheless, I believe it can help to suggest some of the characteristics on the soldiers as a group as long as its limitations are kept in mind. The information presented in Figure 1 and in notes 2 and 37 in "Recruitment" were taken from this collection.

Organization and Numerical Strength

The Garrison

The Compagnies Franches de la Marine, formed in the 17th century, supplied the nucleus of the Isle Royale garrison throughout the French occupation.[1] Six to eight companies served there before 1745 and 24 during the second period of French rule. They were stationed there permanently and were never replaced as a unit although a few officers and men were transferred to or from other colonies or ports.

Between 1722 and 1745 these companies were supplemented by 50 to 150 men of the Karrer Swiss regiment employed by the Ministère de la Marine. The Swiss enjoyed certain special privileges and the affairs of the contingent that served at Isle Royale were administered separately from those of the French companies. The extent and nature of this special status was frequently the subject of violent debate and it will be considered in detail in a subsequent chapter. In the present context it is sufficient to note that the Swiss contingent, regardless of its size, apparently operated as a single company. It was led by two to four officers and its commanding officer, usually a capitaine-lieutenant, was subordinate to the Louisbourg commandant where garrison duties were concerned, but responsible directly to Karrer, his colonel in France, for supply, recruitment and most matters of internal administration. The correspondence between Karrer and his officers at Louisbourg has not been located and so we know much less about the Swiss than about the French soldiers. One of the most fruitful sources for a study of the latter is the letters and reports of the governors and other officials of the colony, but these are often silent where the Swiss are concerned. The discussion of military life in the chapters that follow will therefore necessarily concentrate on the men of the Compagnies Franches.

The Swiss did not return to Isle Royale when the colony was returned to France in 1749. In 1755, however, the French marines were joined by two battalions of regular infantry, one from the Artois and the other from the Bourgogne regiments. Three years later, on the eve of the

second siege, a battalion of Volontaires Etrangers and one from the Cambis regiment arrived.[2]

In the first period, all French military personnel were attached to one of the companies, except the commander (who was, in most cases, also governor of the colony) and the town major and his staff, officers in charge of the garrison as a whole. The commander was, of course, the highest military authority and he communicated directly with the minister of Marine on matters of general military policy. Under the commander's supervision, the major was responsible for the daily routine of administering the garrison. He was assisted by the adjutant (aide-major) who in turn had one or two garçons-major to help him. Together they organized drills and inspections, assigned officers and men to guard duty, supervised military justice and discipline and kept records of the officers and men of the companies and of any changes in their composition.

The Companies

The Compagnies Franches were not organized into regiments and each company was fairly autonomous. They were normally composed of 45 to 65 soldiers, two sergeants, two corporals and one drummer (after 1741 there were two drummers per company[3]). The corporals were generally the oldest and most senior men in a company. More care was taken in the selection of sergeants, who were appointed from among the soldiers, often at an early stage of their military career, on the basis of merit and potential ability.[4] These non-commissioned officers supervised the daily routine of the company and reported to the officers. Because a corporal or sergeant was required at each guard post, they probably spent a great deal of time on guard duty. Originally, the officers of a company consisted of a captain, a lieutenant and an ensign, but after 1723 they were joined by a sub-ensign.[5] The captain commanded the company, administered its affairs and was responsible for its welfare. He did not belong to a company; rather, the company belonged to the captain and was named after him. The lieutenant assisted him and took command in his absence. The ensigns were the junior officers of a company.

The Artillery Company

In addition to the normal Compagnies Franches was the canoniers-bombardiers company established in 1743. There were always artillery experts at Isle Royale, but it was not until shortly before the first siege that they were organized into a separate unit. In an effort to form a nucleus of specialists, Governor Saint-Ovide had in 1735 appointed two soldiers from each French company to be trained by the master gunner.[6] These men, judged most

apt to profit by such instruction, remained attached to their companies but devoted their days to the maintenance of Louisbourg's batteries and to learning to aim and fire cannons. An extra six livres per month was added to the cannoneers' pay since they had no time to earn money working on the construction of the fortress or elsewhere as their comrades did.[7] Thus, their artillery service before 1743 was, in a sense, simply a "job" outside their normal duties.

In 1739, plans were made to set up a special company but it was four years before they were put into effect. In the meantime, an artillery school was set up in the barracks, an officer was placed in charge of artillery and 11 experienced cannoneers were sent from France for three years. When the artillery company was finally established it was to be composed of 13 canoniers, 12 bombardiers, one drummer, two corporals and two sergeants, led by a lieutenant and a captain. (There seems to have been no distinction between the functions of a bombardier and those of a canonier; the difference was in salary, the bombardiers being paid more than the others in order to encourage competition and reward excellence.[8]) The men were given a higher salary than members of the other companies and they had the opportunity of earning cash prizes for good marksmanship.[9] The artillery company was given its own barrackrooms and a distinctive uniform and marched in the place of honour at the head of the garrison. It was, in fact, an elite unit quite separate from the rest of the garrison and when the soldiers mutinied in 1744, the cannoneers did not take part in the revolt.

Cadets

Cadets enjoyed a special status which made their lives quite different from those of the ordinary soldiers who are the main subjects of this report. In the early years of the colony the category "cadet" was an informal one with no official sanction. It was applied to any boy or young man who served in a company as training for a future career as an officer. In practice, the cadets at Isle Royale were almost always sons of officers of the garrison.

To some extent, especially in the early period, officers used the custom of admitting cadets to enroll their sons at a tender age (five years, for example), so that they themselves could collect an extra salary and rations.[10] In 1717 the admission of officers' children under the age of 14 was prohibited but this did not stop the abuse.[11] Obviously such small children contributed nothing to the service but their names. It is more difficult to determine what sort of life the older cadets led, what their duties were and to what extent they shared the lot of the ordinary soldier. There is one reference in 1725 to cadets doing

guard duty in the summer only, but we know nothing more about their activities before the 1730s.[12] In any case, there were two or three cadets in each company - 16 in all the Compagnies Franches in 1726[13] - and they existed generally outside the soliders' society.

In 1732 an ordinance established the position of cadet on a formal and regular basis.[14] There were to be two cadets chosen by the governor in each of the French companies at Isle Royale. These cadets à l'aiguilette had distinctive decorations on their soldiers' uniforms and were paid slightly more than ordinary soldiers. They had some authority over the latter but they were under the corporals and sergeants. One cadet, for example, was given the job of supervising the soldiers who were employed to work in the governor's garden.[15] At least two others were sent to live at an Indian mission in order to learn the native language in preparation for their future duties as officers.[16] These cadets were apparently being prepared for a specific military career, that of an officer of the Isle Royale garrison.

Most of the cadets à l'aiguilette were born in the colony, the sons of officers of the Compagnies Franches, and they were destined to become officers in the same garrison. Occasionally, a young man who came to Louisbourg as a soldier would be given a vacant cadet's position if he was of noble birth or if his family had sufficient influence with the minister of Marine, but generally the institution of cadet served to preserve the French officer corps of Isle Royale as a closed caste.

Strength

The wealth of records kept by the 18th-century bureaucracy makes it deceptively simple to determine how many men served at Isle Royale in any particular year. Over the years, the number of companies assigned to the colony and the size of each company were altered by royal ordinances. Table 1 shows these organizational transformations and the total number of men they assigned to the garrison.[17] However, the Isle Royale companies were chronically under-strength. Fortunately we have access to documents which indicate the number of men who were assumed, for payroll and other purposes, to have actually served in the colony for every year from 1719 to 1743.

Table 2 displays the official strength of the garrison (including both French and Swiss troops) for each year. It is based on figures obtained from two related series of sources - reviews and ration lists. The reviews are the records of an event held at least once a year and usually on the first day of November, when the entire garrison would be assembled in front of the military commander and the civilian commissaire-ordonnateur who would inspect it and

mark down the number of men present in each company. A copy was sent to France for the guidance of the minister in remitting wages and ordering recruits; those covering the years 1719 to 1730 have been preserved.[18] Although reviews for the 1730s and forties seem to be missing, their absence is more than made up for by the much more interesting ration lists.[19] These are the accounts drawn four times a year by the functionary in charge of the government storehouse. For each quarter they indicate the number of men supplied with rations in each company and in the Swiss contingent. These figures were no doubt obtained from reviews but they were kept up to date. Thus the lists note the dates at which the rations allotted to a company increased because new recruits were inducted, or decreased because of losses through death, desertion or discharge.

The official figures give a better indication of the numerical strength of the Isle Royale garrison than do the ideal figures laid down by the ordinances, but unfortunately they are flawed by careless accounting procedures and intentional deception. First of all, these statistics lack internal consistency. If one adds the recruits recorded on one quarterly ration list and subtracts the losses from the garrison total, the result should be the total for the following quarter, but in fact, this is not always the case. Moreover, we know that it was a common practice in the 18th century for captains to keep missing or dead soldiers on the company rolls in order to draw extra pay and rations.[20] At Isle Royale, the ordonnateur and his subordinates, civilians with no apparent interest in allowing such abuses among the military officers, were supposed to keep track of the number of soldiers actually serving, mainly by conducting reviews. But, even laying aside any suspicion of collusion between these watchdogs and the officers, it is unlikely that they discharged this aspect of their duties perfectly.

Only the soldiers stationed at Louisbourg could actually be counted, but an important section of the garrison was stationed elsewhere in the colony. Furthermore, at any given time a number of soldiers would be absent from the town hunting or gathering materials for construction of the fortifications. Since the officers did not bother issuing formal leaves for such absences and since rations were distributed in a rather disorganized fashion, the ordonnateur was generally obliged to accept the captains' accounts of the whereabouts of soldiers not present at reviews. One ordonnateur refers to soldiers who had been counted present although they had not been seen in Louisbourg for 12 or 15 years and he implies that the captains were using the pretext of service at the outposts to exaggerate the strengths of their companies.[21]

We may conclude that the figures given for official strength in Table 2 are probably greater than the actual

number of men who served at Isle Royale in each year. It is impossible to say how much they exaggerate the real strength but they are nevertheless not without value. They at least set an outside limit on real strength and their variations, from year to year and from quarter to quarter, probably reflect similar changes in the actual number of soldiers.

Detachments

Of course, all these figures relate to the Isle Royale garrison of which the Louisbourg garrison was only a part. In the early years of the colony, the troops were distributed among the posts of Louisbourg, Port Toulouse (modern St. Peter's) and Port Dauphin (St. Ann's) in varying proportions. As Louisbourg became better established in the 1720s, they were concentrated there, but detachments were always maintained at the other two posts and at Isle Saint-Jean (Prince Edward Island) which was attached to the colony. In the 1730s and early forties when the system was relatively stable, the official figures show that there were normally about 40 men with two or three officers stationed at Isle Saint-Jean, 25 men and two officers at Port Toulouse and seven or eight men at Port Dauphin.[22]

These outposts were all manned by members of the Compagnies Franches. In some cases, the entire garrison of an outpost would be drawn from one company, but more often it would be composed of a few men from each of the French companies. Generally, it was considered a hardship to serve at the outposts where the lodgings were poor, where there was little opportunity to earn extra money and where there were even fewer facilities for amusement than in Louisbourg. Captains often sent undesirable soldiers from their companies to serve there and, although they were supposed to be rotated every year, the outpost garrisons were generally left in place indefinitely.[23] The result was a high rate of desertion and a very low level of morale among men who often felt they had been left to rot in a forgotten corner of a remote colony.[24]

The Swiss

The Karrer Regiment

The Karrer Regiment was founded in 1719 by Franz Adam Karrer, a Swiss officer in the service of the king of France. It began as a battalion of three companies and 600 men employed by the Marine ministry which planned to use it to garrison Port Louis in Louisiana.[1] A written contract (capitulation) set down the terms of the agreement between the ministry and Karrer who promised to maintain a certain number of officers and men in exchange for money and other benefits and privileges. The terms of the original contract were occasionally revised but its basic characteristics did not change.[2] Karrer had full control over the internal affairs of the regiment: he was responsible for choosing the officers, recruiting the men and providing them with pay, uniforms, food and equipment. He could offer prospective recruits whatever wages, period of engagement and other conditions he thought fit, although he was to follow the usages of other Swiss troops. In return, Karrer would receive 16 livres per month for each soldier as well as additional payments to cover recruiting expenses. The regiment was to be kept separate from French troops; the men would be drilled and disciplined only by their own officers and would even be judged by Swiss officers according to Swiss custom if they were accused of a crime. It was as a group that the Karrer regiment served the king of France; its individual members owed no direct allegiance to France and, in theory, had contact with French authorities only through their colonel.

In the summer of 1720, the entire regiment was sent to Louisiana. It stayed there only a year, losing many men through disease, before being transferred to the French ports of La Rochelle and Rochefort which would remain its home base.[3] A new capitulation was signed in June 1721 and it referred to the Swiss regiment's duties as "le service de la Marine, soit dans les Ports, dans les Colonies ou sur les vaisseaux...."[4] Such diverse functions required that the regiment be divided into detachments and, in the years that followed, small groups of officers and men were stationed at Isle Royale and in the Caribbean colonies

of Louisiana, Martinique and Santo Domingo while the rest remained at La Rochelle and Rochefort.

The first contingent of 50 Swiss was sent to Isle Royale in 1722. It was composed of 46 soldiers, one drummer, two sergeants and only one officer, an ensign.[5] Before forming this first detachment, Karrer warned his employers that the majority of his soldiers were not at all inclined to serve in the colonies, preferring to serve on the ships of His Majesty's navy (perhaps a result of their unpleasant experiences in Louisiana).[6] The Conseil de la Marine showed little interest in the soldiers' preferences and instead recommended that Karrer select for Isle Royale those men best suited for work.[7] Like the unwillingness of the Swiss to serve at Isle Royale, this recommendation of the French authorities is significant in the light of the subsequent history of the Karrer regiment. In fact, the letter which communicated the advice to Karrer refers to "le détachement des 50 Suisses qui doivent passer a l'Isle Royalle sur la fregatte le Paon pour y travailler aux fortifications de Louisbourg," making it clear that the Swiss were originally sent to Isle Royale not to fight an enemy but to build a fortress.

The Swiss had not been at Louisbourg long before it became clear that Saint-Ovide, the governor, also wished these unwilling reinforcements had stayed in France. He complained that they were rebellious and inclined to drunkenness; they were difficult to handle as there were not enough Swiss officers and the men would not obey the French officers; they could not be sent to the outposts; some of them were Protestants and therefore an unhealthy influence in a new colony, and they were not good workers.[8] In a letter written late in 1723, Saint-Ovide outlined his reasons for preferring French to Swiss troops:

> Nous avons eu l'honneur de vous representer que les compagnies françoises convenoit infiniment mieux dans Ce pays que les Suisses ou il n y a qu un seul officier pour commander Cinquante hommes, ce qui cause une infinité de difficultés Lors qu on est obligé de les detacher, ne voulant point obeir aux officiers françois, feignant de ne pas les entendre, en second Lieu, sy Lon manque a Leur fournir exactement La Ration ordinaire; il ne veut plus travailler ni monter La Garde, Les farinnes ayant manqué au mois de mai dernier dans les magasins du Roy Lon a esté obligé de faire manger du biscuit aux troupes, ce que les Suisses ont Refuser de Recevoir, on a eté obligé den punir [par] La prison une vinteine de plus seditieux, a L egard du travail Lon ne peut disconvenir Le soldat francois L emporte Infiniment au dessus du Suisse.[9]

Maurepas, the new minister in charge of the Marine department, was not convinced by Saint-Ovide's arguments.

Explaining that he considered the Swiss better workers than the French, he sent another 50 men from the Karrer regiment in 1724.[10] Until 1741, that is, during most of the period the regiment was represented in the Isle Royale garrison, the ideal strength of the Swiss contingent remained at 100 including officers. It should have been composed of one capitaine-lieutenant, one lieutenant, one second lieutenant, four sergeants and 93 soldiers.[11] In 1741 another 50 Swiss were sent as a "temporary measure" to strengthen the Isle Royale garrison during a period of international tension.[12] On the eve of the first siege there were 143 Swiss at Louisbourg: 121 Swiss soldiers, four drummers, eight corporals, six sergeants and four officers commanded by capitaine-lieutenant Schönherr.[13] A year later 123 Swiss boarded ships to return to France after the fall of Louisbourg.[14]

Table 3 shows the official strength of the Swiss contingent as given by the yearly reviews and quarterly ration accounts. A comparison between these figures and those contained in Tables 1 and 2 will make it apparent that the difference between the ideal and the official strengths of the Swiss detachment is much smaller than the gap between similar figures for the garrison as a whole. In other words, the Swiss were not under-strength to the same extent that the French companies were and the Isle Royale garrison was therefore composed of a greater proportion of Swiss than intended. Moreover, a certain number of French soldiers were always detached to the outposts whereas the Karrer soldiers remained at Louisbourg, so the Swiss were a numerically important component of the military element of the capital's population. The percentages listed in Table 3 were calculated on the assumption that 75 French soldiers would be stationed outside Louisbourg at any time from 1730 to 1745 and this is an underestimate if anything. Before 1730 the number of men sent out on detachments fluctuated greatly from season to season and cannot be estimated with any precision. It is certain that, at least during the winter seasons of this period, the men of the Karrer regiment were proportionally much more numerous than they were at any time in later years. According to Saint-Ovide, the Swiss actually outnumbered the French soldiers at Louisbourg on many occasions.[15]

Swiss Rights and Privileges

Because of its capitulations and because of the customary status accorded all Swiss troops serving the French crown, the Karrer regiment enjoyed a number of special privileges, some of them vague, some of them precisely defined, which separated it from the Compagnies Franches. However, the autonomy and rights of the regiment were one thing and the status of a detachment serving alongside French troops in a

colonial fortress was quite another. Naturally the Swiss serving at Isle Royale would have to be subject to the control of local military authorities, all the more so as they were too far from their colonel for rapid communication. The officials at Isle Royale were often ignorant (perhaps willfully) of the exact nature and extent of the privileges of the Karrer regiment. Insofar as they were aware of the terms of Karrer's capitulations, they often found them ambiguous or difficult to implement in the institutionally and economically primitive colony. Thus, treaty rights had to be interpreted and adapted to local conditions. Not surprisingly, disputes arose. The French governors naturally wished to bring the Swiss under their control as much as possible and they often had the support of the minister of Marine. Karrer's officers were equally intent on preserving and even extending their autonomy. The Swiss soldiers were inclined to limit their enthusiasm for regimental privileges to cases where their own interests were involved.

Some aspects of this special status were straightforward and uncontroversial. The monthly pay of 16 livres per man was paid out of the colony's military budget directly to Karrer's agent at Louisbourg (presumably the senior Swiss officer). The officers and men were all issued rations like those given to the French soldiers, but the cost of these provisions was deducted from the pay. It was up to the Swiss officers, under orders from their colonel, to pay their men's salaries and the French officials were instructed not to meddle in these affairs.[16] Sick and wounded men were treated free in the hospital at Louisbourg. Karrer was responsible for providing his men with arms and all necessary supplies (except rations), but the king of France transported them from Rochefort in his ships and paid the rent of the building where they were stored at Louisbourg. The soldiers were also given free passage to the colony and were returned to Rochefort when their service was completed. In order that the men should not be without washerwomen who understood their language, the king even allowed a few of them to bring their wives and gave them free passage and 45 livres for travel expenses.[17] The Swiss had their own sutler who presumably operated a canteen where the soldiers could drink. They may also have had a barber-surgeon as they were exempted from the deduction taken from the French soldiers' pay to support a surgeon.[18] Although the capitulations do not mention housing, the Swiss were given rooms in the Louisbourg barracks.

The Karrer regiment's independence in justice, discipline and military formalities caused a number of problems. On the subject of justice, the capitulations specified only that it should be administered on the same basis as in other Swiss troops employed by the king of France. In practice this meant that Swiss soldiers accused

of military crimes such as desertion were tried by a court-martial composed exclusively of officers from their own regiment. The formal procedures of the Swiss courts-martial seem to have been the same as those followed by the French. The Karrer detachment's autonomy in matters of ordinary criminal justice was rather more ambiguous. A case that arose five years after the Swiss first arrived at Isle Royale seemed to establish their independence of the regular courts of law. In 1727 a butcher named Dupré laid charges with the Superior Council against sergeant Leopold Reintender who had beaten and severely wounded him.[19] The council began criminal proceedings against the sergeant but soon received a protest from de Merveilleux, the Swiss commandant, who claimed the right to try the accused. Unsure of its authority in this regard, the Superior Council suspended proceedings and requested guidance from Versailles. The minister of Marine replied that de Merveilleux was perfectly justified in demanding to hear the case himself. As a general rule, he continued, Swiss soldiers accused of crimes should always be turned over to their own officers for trial. In the case of a dispute between a Swiss soldier and a French civilian, the soldier must be imprisoned and interrogated by a Swiss officer while the Frenchman is interrogated by, and held in the prison of, the appropriate civilian judge.[20]

This precedent established, the French authorities left the Swiss officers in charge of their jurisdiction, at least until the 1740s. As a result, the archival sources, all of them French, tell us nothing about how the Swiss exercised their judicial privileges. There is, however, one statement made in 1742 by the commissaire-ordonnateur, Bigot, who argued that the special legal position of the Swiss was "un grand abus" since the officers invariably acquitted soldiers accused of theft, no matter how overwhelming the evidence of their guilt.[21] This statement was made in a context that gave Bigot no interest in minimizing the abusive nature of such autonomy. The governor had recently quarrelled with the commander of the Karrer detachment and Swiss privileges generally were coming under heavy attack. The minister had ordered that Swiss who injured civilians or stole should be tried by ordinary courts of the colony and Bigot accordingly handed over three Karrer soldiers, accused of stealing cod from a fisherman, to the baillage court for trial.[22] The situation seems to have been somewhat confused in the heat of the dispute but the minister's final orders to Bigot in 1743 were to undermine Swiss judicial privileges by allowing the officers to try only minor cases while turning over Swiss soldiers accused of serious crimes to the civilian courts. At the same time, he was to avoid direct confrontation and make it appear that nothing was being changed even though, the minister might have added, this policy violated the capitulations.[23]

Swiss privileges in the areas of military discipline and ceremony were more often the subject of open conflict than was the Karrer regiment's judicial autonomy. In 1727 Saint-Ovide referred to a "petite difficulté" he experienced with the Swiss officers who refused to lead their troops in the Corpus-Christi procession.[24] No further incidents seem to have occurred until after the arrival of Captain Cailly as commanding officer of the Karrer detachment in 1731. Cailly, who had earlier killed a cousin of Saint-Ovide in a duel at Santo Domingo, does not seem to have enjoyed a close personal relationship with the governor as his predecessor, de Merveilleux, had.[25] Soon after he began his service in the colony, a minor dispute arose over the style of drumming to be used when Swiss officers were mounting guard.[26] The minister supported Cailly in this case and, despite Saint-Ovide's objections, ordered that the Swiss fashion of drumming be used when a guard was commanded by a Swiss officer.[27]

It was not until after Saint-Ovide's death in the early 1740s, when Duquesnel was commanding officer at Isle Royale, that the most serious disputes between Cailly and the French authorities occurred. Duquesnel attempted to reduce Swiss autonomy by increasing the control of the town major over the discipline of the foreign troops. He would not let Swiss soldiers live outside the barracks or return to their quarters late as they had done in the past with the permission of their officers. Duquesnel also began the practice of having a Swiss sergeant check the barrackrooms after retreat and report to the sergeant of the guard, informing him if any men were absent.[28] These measures could perhaps be justified as matters of security and therefore responsibilities of the major, but they irritated Cailly and led him to insist strenuously on his regimental privileges. Furthermore, Duquesnel and the civilian commissaire des troupes began hearing complaints from the Swiss soldiers against their officers. Cailly, who was apparently exploiting his men and keeping them in the colon y after the terms of their enlistment had expired, denounced this as another affront to the privileges of his nation.[29]

It was in this context that matters came to a head in September 1741 when three deserters, two of them French and one Swiss, were court-martialed and executed. The French and Swiss were tried separately but, when Duquesnel ordered the entire garrison assembled to witness the execution of the French soldiers, Cailly forbade the Swiss drummers to signal the general assembly. It was customary for all the men in a garrison to be gathered together to witness executions but it is not clear whether the Swiss had attended these spectacles in the past. In any case, Cailly refused to allow his men to obey a direct order from the garriosn commander and Duquesnel, claiming that Cailly had previously threatened violent action, considered this a serious revolt.[30] Maurepas,

the minister of Marine, was equally outraged when he learned of the incident and he ordered Cailly retired from the service immediately. He informed Duquesnel that the major was indeed authorized to see that the Swiss returned to their quarters on time. That officer was also to command their movements at reviews and prescribe their battle order.[31] Whatever the rights and wrongs of a particular case might be, the Swiss were not to be treated as an independent unit and their officers must be subordinate to the French commandant.[32]

Soon after Cailly's confrontation with Duquesnel he was replaced by Gabriel Schönherr (or "Chener" as the French usually misspelled his name). Schönherr had not been at Louisbourg long before he ordered the Swiss sergeants to discontinue the practice of reporting each night to the guardhouse. Duquesnel was disturbed by this unilateral action of which he had not even been informed in advance ("cela sent l'esprit de Revolte"), but once the incident had passed he seems to have had relatively harmonious relations with Cailly's successor.[33]

In conclusion, three observations may be made about the special position of the Swiss detachment at Isle Royale. First of all, the nature of this special position was never clear and precise. It was defined over the years partly by adapting the written provisions of the capitulation to the Isle Royale environment and partly through improvisation in response to practical considerations. For example, the custom of exempting the Swiss from service in the outposts originated in this latter way. Secondly, the most important phase in the evolution of the special status occurred in the early 1740s when the privileges of the Swiss at Isle Royale came under attack. There can be little doubt that Bigot and Duquesnel, with the blessing of Maurepas, attempted to limit these privileges and to undermine the autonomous position of the Karrer detachment as far as was possible within the terms of the capitulation and outside it as well. Thirdly, although the Swiss soldiers may have had a special status within the Isle Royale garrison, the Swiss privileges discussed in the preceding paragraphs were attached in theory to the Karrer detachment as a body and in practice they affected the Swiss officers most directly. The disputes mentioned above were not simply between Swiss and French; they were between Swiss officers and French authorities, each struggling to gain greater control over the Swiss troops. The soldiers themselves were certainly active in protecting their own interests but, when it came to conflicts over parade-ground formalities, they were not so much participants as they were the prize at issue.

The Swiss Soldiers

The adjective "Swiss" used in connection with the officers

and men of the Karrer regiment is misleading. The Marine ministry assumed that Karrer would do as much of his recruiting as possible in Switzerland, but the original capitulation stipulated only that he form his companies with men of nationalities allowed in the other Swiss units serving the king of France.[34] The capitulation of 1731 is more precise.

> Les dites quatre Compagnies dudit Regiment seront composées principalement de Suisses, Grisons & alliez des Cantons Suisses; il pourra cependant estre engagé par le dit Sieur Karrer pour servir dans icelles, des Allemands, Danois, Suedois, Polonois, des hommes du Pays de Luxembourg, du Comté de Chiney, de la Province d'Alsace, Lorraine-Allemande & de la Savoye comprise dans l'Eveché de Geneve, & des hommes du Baillage de Gex.[35]

Already in 1722, within three years of founding the regiment, Karrer had found that he could not find enough recruits in Switzerland alone and asked for permission to seek them elsewhere.[36] In 1739 it was alleged that there were more non-Swiss than Swiss among the officers and men of the regiment, in violation of the capitulation.[37] We have an indication of the place of birth of nine Swiss soldiers who served at Isle Royale and of these only four were born in Switzerland while most of the rest were from Germany. Figures of this magnitude, of course, are of no statistical value, but they do lend some support to the contention that not all, probably not even the majority, of the "Swiss" soldiers of the Karrer regiment were born in Switzerland.

Little is known about the system of recruiting or the conditions of enlistment in Karrer's regiment. Recruitment was the colonel's responsibility and, in the early years at least, two of his officers and two sergeants were employed full-time in that activity.[38] Apparently they did not bother to record any of the promises they made to candidates or the enlistment bonuses they offered. The men who came to Isle Royale with the first contingent of Swiss were on three-year terms but, in 1726, Maurepas asked Karrer to send to the colony only men who would serve six years.[39] Many soldiers, however, were probably forced to remain after they had served their full period and there were complaints to this effect in 1740.[40]

There is some evidence that more care was taken in selecting men for the Karrer regiment than was exercised by the recruiters who supplied the Compagnies Franches. The Swiss seem to have been rather more robust than the French. They were less likely to be sent to the Louisbourg hospital and generally stayed there for shorter periods (see Table 4).[41] Most testimony agrees that the Swiss were, on the whole, better workers and better soldiers than the French.

Saint-Ovide was certainly not of this opinion in 1724 but subsequent governors, who were often no more pleased with the Swiss presence, complained only of the turbulence and rebelliousness of the officers and men. In 1741 Cailly showed that the Swiss soldiers earned much more per capita working on the fortifications than did the French and he complained that deductions taken from the wages of the soldier-workers to pay the men who mounted guard resulted in a substantial net loss to the Swiss contingent.[42] As for the martial abilities of the men of the Karrer, Governor Duquesnel himself conceded that, in contrast to the French soldiers, they could at least perform the basic military movements and duties.[43] This is not surprising since it appears that many of the Swiss soldiers had already seen service elsewhere, in the Karrer regiment or in any of the armies of Europe, before coming to Isle Royale. The first groups had been sent in the 1720s primarily to assist in the construction of the fortress but Maurepas must have felt the regiment could provide good fighters as well as good workers as he sent 50 Swiss in 1741 at a time when construction was almost finished and international tension was severe. Late in 1744 when the Louisbourg garrison was in a state of mutiny, Bigot, who had seen the troops in action and had no motive for misrepresentation, testified most strikingly to the military valour of the Swiss. There were approximately 450 French soldiers in Louisbourg at the time but, even if they could have been brought under control, wrote Bigot, they would have been no match for the Swiss, who would have been outnumbered three to one.[44]

In fact, the French and the Swiss soldiers did cooperate in 1744 but before that time contact between the two groups was limited. Those Karrer soldiers who did guard duty would have shared a guardroom with French soldiers, often under the command of a French officer. There are cases of Swiss soldiers fleeing with a group of French deserters. Thus, trust and friendship between members of these two elements of the garrison was not unknown. Moreover, there were apparently no cases of open conflict between Swiss and French as there were between members of the various infantry regiments that were stationed at Louisbourg in the mid-1750s. Nevertheless, the Swiss and the French soldiers led, on the whole, separate though not antagonistic lives. A number of factors kept them apart. The Swiss had distinctive uniforms and equipment and were housed in their own barrackrooms. Some of them were native French speakers and many of the others probably learned French in the colony, but most of the Swiss apparently spoke German. The Karrer detachment had its own washerwomen, its own canteen and its own administrative routines. The testimony of Abraham Dupaquier, one of the Swiss soldiers who led the revolt in 1744, indicates how little contact there was between the Swiss and French. When his comrades

decided to assemble in protest, they chose Dupaquier to go and secure the cooperation of the men of the Compagnies Franches, "puisque vous Connoisses les françois."[45] This qualification, that is, knowing the French soldiers and not just their language, apparently made Dupaquier unique among the Swiss.

If the Swiss soldiers had only limited contact with their French colleagues, their contact with the rest of the Louisbourg community was even more restricted. In general, the soldiers of Isle Royale shared little with the civilian population in terms of background, experiences and material interests and this divergence was particularly pronounced where the soldiers of the Karrer regiment were concerned. The language of the Swiss must have kept them further removed than the French soldiers from the civilian life of Louisbourg and so, to some extent, did their religion. This last factor was not as important as one might suppose, however, as the regiment was not completely or even predominantly Protestant. Marcel Giraud, writing of the Karrer's early service in Louisiana, suggests that the majority of the men were probably Catholic.[46] Many Swiss came to Isle Royale as Lutherans or Calvinists but they had no clergymen to guide them and at least 20 converted to Catholicism between 1722 and 1745.[47] It seems likely that there were more Catholic than Protestant Swiss in Isle Royale but even the Catholics did not all participate fully in the religious life of the community because of language problems.[48] According to parish records, only three Swiss soldiers and one officer were married to local girls at Louisbourg. Very few settled in the colony after they were discharged. Although the number of marriages of French soldiers was proportionately no greater, more veterans of the Compagnies Franches chose to remain at Isle Royale. Moreover, many of the French soldiers served in the colony for such long periods that they could qualify as permanent residents whereas the Swiss remained for more than six years only under exceptional circumstances.

The two or three officers that Karrer maintained at Isle Royale were the only "group" that came close to sharing the mixed religious and linguistic background of the Swiss soldiers. In some instances, they and their men were allies in the common struggle against the French authorities. There was, for example, an incident in 1723 when the soldiers, with the active support of Ensign Berthelot, protested the substitution of biscuit for bread in their rations.[49] In 1741 and 1743 the Swiss commander resisted the governor's and major's moves to subject his men to a more restrictive policy on leaves of absence. Nevertheless, the interests of the Karrer soldiers by no means coincided with those of their officers. The latter pocketed their men's wages and even kept much of the money

they earned working on the fortifications. Of course, the French officers also benefited by their control of the earnings of their soldier-workers, but the Swiss, thanks to the special status of the Karrer regiment, managed to exploit their men starting from an earlier date and with greater efficiency.

Recruitment

The archival sources do not permit anything resembling a complete account of the process by which men in France came to be soldiers at Isle Royale but they do give some clues about the recruitment practices of the Compagnies Franches.[1] Between 1720 and 1745 more than 1,000 men came to the colony to fill vacancies created by deaths, desertions or discharges in the French companies or through expansion of the garrison. About 400 Swiss arrived during the same period. The task of determining the number of recruits likely to be needed, of raising men in France and sending them to Rochefort to be loaded aboard the "king's ship" which sailed for Louisbourg each summer was an annual routine. There were a few years when no recruits were sent and one year (1741) when 139 embarked but, on the average, about 40 men were required every year and all of them had to be found in France.[2]

Recruitment for Isle Royale competed with that of other elements of the armed forces for the same pool of eligible young men under the same basic conditions and rules, but it did have a number of original characteristics. Most important was its impersonal nature. In the regular army, a captain was responsible for maintaining his company at strength and he or another company officer, perhaps aided by one or two of his men, would often personally perform the necessary recruiting. André Corvisier calls these "natural recruiters" and he shows that, year after year, many of them returned in search of men to one local area where they and the prospective recruits would probably be known to one another.[3] In many cases, the family seigneurie provided a captain with a steady supply of replacements. No doubt many men who joined the army in this way were subjected to unfair pressure, but just as often it seems they agreed to serve a particular officer because of a genuine and longstanding attachment to him or to his family. Corvisier argues that this type of recruitment was an important factor promoting cohesion in many companies of the French army where there was a personal bond between some of the officers and some of their men.[4] If any such paternalistic relationships existed in the Isle Royale garrison, it was certainly not the result of recruitment practices, which

were entirely impersonal. Only in 1730, when the garrison was expanded and two newly appointed captains, de Gannes and d'Ailleboust, went to France to find men for their companies, were soldiers recruited by the officers who would later lead them.[5] Otherwise, recruitment for the colony was performed by professional recruiters whose only interest was in the money payment they received for each body delivered and who were stigmatized with the pejorative term, "Racoleurs." Men who came to Louisbourg as soldiers had not joined any particular company; in fact, until 1730 at least, they could not have known in advance that they were to be sent to Isle Royale, as recruits were raised for all the American colonies together.

Racolage was certainly not an uncommon method of supplying the needs of the regular army. Georges Girard and André Corvisier have shown that the officers who gathered up men to "sell" to other companies and the military and civilian embaucheurs who acted as sub-contractors often made a mockery of the laws specifying that all enlistments must be voluntary.[6] All that was generally required for a man to be bound to a military unit was his acceptance of an enlistment bounty in any form and his signature or mark on a contract of engagement. Alert young men who wished to join would negotiate in order to obtain as large a bounty as possible. They could also insist that a limited period of service be specified in the engagement. Six years was generally the minimum but if no period was specified, there was no limit to the time a man could be made to serve. Many unfortunates however were tricked or forced into signing away their liberty and the stories of the violence and deception of 18th-century racoleurs are legion. One example concerns a boy who was on an errand in a town near his village when he met a stranger who asked him to deliver 12 livres that he owed to the priest of the boy's village. The victim took the money and made his cross on what he believed was a receipt. In fact, he had signed an engagement in his father's name and the racoleur had him thrown in jail in order to force the father to report for duty.[7] Although there is little positive proof, the circumstantial evidence indicates that the most unappealing forms of racolage were probably employed to induce men to join the colonial Compagnies Franches.

Most of the recruiting for the colonies was done in Paris, one of the "lieux de prédilection du racolage."[8] The officially appointed recruiters (at least before 1730) were usually colonial officers in need of extra money to make up for the salaries they lost while on leave in France. One of these, a Lieutenant Amariton attached to the marine troops in Canada, had a contract in 1716 to raise recruits for the colonies and to conduct them to the port of Rochefort. He was paid 30 livres plus travelling expenses for each body delivered to the port of Rochefort and the

contract stipulated that he was responsible for paying enlistment bounties and embaucheur's fees.[9] It seems significant that mention was made of embaucheurs, those anonymous agents whose business it was to find men and get them to sign. Amariton would have had no interest in examining very closely the methods these people employed to land their fish. He and other recruiters would likely have been more concerned about having their merchandise accepted by the inspectors at Paris and Rochefort and about the difficult task of getting the men to the port without too many losses.

The military authorities in France or in the colonies could reject recruits on a number of pretexts. In theory, no one under the age of 16 could join (Maurepas tried to raise the minimum age for colonial service to 18), but I know of no recruits who were rejected on these grounds.[10] All soldiers were supposed to be at least 5 pieds 1 pouce in height (ever the optimist, Maurepas hoped at one time to have only men who measured 1 pouce above this limit sent to the colonies).[11] This rule was not enforced strictly but some candidates were sent home because they were too short. Recruits were to be physically fit to serve. It was this article that was the cause of most of the rejections. Men chosen for Isle Royale above all, were to be strong and capable of sustaining hard labour.[12] In 1732 ten men found to be suffering from gall-bladder ailments were removed from a ship about to sail for Louisbourg and transferred to a contingent destined for Louisiana.[13] Nevertheless, although the Isle Royale recruits were supposed to be healthier than the soldiers sent to other colonies, they might not have been considered superior physical specimens compared to any other reference point.

Desertion along the road from Paris to Rochefort was common but replacements could sometimes be found along the way or at the destination.[14] The recruits were normally held at the nearby Ile d'Oleron where desertion was difficult. They were given some basic training by the resident sergeant until the ships were ready to take them across the Atlantic. Until the 1730s, the assignment of recruits to specific colonies took place at Oleron. Some effort was made to send the strongest and those who professed a useful trade to Isle Royale ("Il ne faut absolument que de bons hommes," wrote the minister, ordering inferior recruits sent to Canada.[15]) In later years, recruitment for each of the colonies was separate and it is even possible that men who ended up at Louisbourg may have known their destination at the time they enlisted. Still, there was always a certain amount of shuffling and mixing at Rochefort and Oleron so that a man intended for one colony could easily end up in another.[16]

Service in the colonial troops had little to recommend itself and it is difficult to understand at first why anyone would volunteer for it. If a man contemplated adopting the career of soldier, one would expect him to prefer the regular army which would not take him so far from his home and family. Certainly the enlistment bounties offered by the colonial recruiters, (which must have been less than the 30 livres the latter received) could not have lured many candidates away from the regular army where much more substantial sums were offered.[17] The term of enlistment was not an attractive feature either. In the 18th century most men joined the army on six-year engagements limités.[18] The Swiss at Isle Royale apparently served on limited terms but most of the French soldiers in the garrison were on engagements perpetuels; that is, they served until the king saw fit to discharge them. In the 1720s and the thirties some men came to the colony on six-year terms, but the authorities wished to avoid these limited engagements in order to avoid the expense of equipping, training and transporting soldiers who would only stay for a relatively short time and because their presence was injurious to morale.[19] It was, no doubt, the predominance of enlistments that did not limit the period of service that produced what one governor referred to in 1753 as "le préjugé que l'on a en france que lorsqu'un soldat y est engagé, il ne peut plus revenir."[20]

Why then would a man join the Isle Royale garrison? Two or three soldiers were asked just that when they were examined on charges of petty theft. One of these was Thomas Beranger dit LaRosée who had been a gardner in Saintonge in 1730 when he was involved in a drunken brawl in which a peasant was seriously injured. LaRosée had reason to fear he might be arrested and so he fled to Rochefort and joined the Compagnies Franches.[21] It is impossible to determine how many soldiers came to Isle Royale as fugitives from justice but it is quite possible that many men could find no better way of escaping prosecution than to give a false name to a complacent recruiter and disappear from France without a trace. Many of these fugitive recruits were probably deserters from the French army.[22]

Nicolas Lebegue dit Brulevillage was from Franche-Comté and he earned his living driving cattle with his father and brother from his native province to Paris. During one sojourn in the capital when he was about 22 years old, Lebegue got drunk and was separated from the other two who returned home without him. Alone in Paris without money or friends, he quickly signed up with Captain d'Ailleboust who would have provided the new recruit with food and lodgings from the day of his engagement.[23] Joseph Lagand dit Picard was 15 or 16 years old and had not finished his apprenticeship as a cooper when his father died in 1732. The orphan was unable to support himself so he

left his home in the northern town of Noyon and travelled to Paris where he encountered a recruiter named de la Fresilière and enlisted in the Isle Royale troops. Lagand had scurvy when he arrived at Louisbourg and he was continually sick for the next two years. By rights, he should have been discharged as physically unfit but the same indigence and helplessness which led him to enlist made him desperately anxious to remain a soldier. Thus, when the subject of a discharge arose a touching scene ensued:

> étant toujours attaqués de l'escorbut son capitaine voulu le congedier, mais que le Repondant qui pour lors n'avoit qu'environ seize a dix sept ans se mit a pleurer, disant que s il etoit congedié il ne sauroit que faire pour gagner sa vie ...[24]

It seems quite likely that many of the men who agreed to join the Isle Royale garrison were, like Lebegue and Lagand, alone in the world and incapable of supporting themselves (even if only through lack of initiative). Since it was the material security of military life that they found most attractive, they would presumably have been less concerned than other prospective soldiers about factors such as enlistment bounties and length and location of service. Moreover, as they were often in desperate circumstances, they would have been easy game for the first recruiter they encountered who could as easily have been working for the Isle Royale troops as for any other military unit.

It is one thing to speculate about why some men would choose to join the Isle Royale companies, but quite another matter to determine how many of the colony's soldiers came as a result of anything resembling a free decision. Leaving aside the problem of the extent to which volunteers were aware at the time of enlistment which colony they would be assigned to and ignoring for lack of evidence the possibility that men may have bound themselves to serve in Isle Royale under the mistaken impression that they were joining some other military organization,[25] it is still quite certain that many recruits came to the colony against or regardless of their will. The numerical importance of these soldats malgré eux cannot even be estimated but it is possible to enumerate some of the practices by which they were victimized. There is first of all, the famous lettres de cachet and the sources mention three men who were a sufficient nuisance to their families to be forced by such writs to serve as soldiers at Isle Royale.[26] Convicts from the prisons were also sent; 30 were ordered in 1720 when no "volunteers" could be found and another 25 were sent in 1723.[27] There is no indication as to what sort of prisoners these were but there was one category of criminals that supplied an important number of recruits to the colonia troops, at least before 1720. These were soldiers who were convicted of deserting from the regular army and were spared the death sentence on condition of serving in America.[28]

These examples of forcible enlistment were all taken from th 1716-26 period. From the early 1730s until the fall of Louisbourg, the available sources unfortunately make almost no mention of recruitment practices and it is therefore impossible to determine whether these abuses persisted into the decades immediately preceding the mutiny and the fall of Louisbourg.

Many "men" came to Isle Royale at rather a tender age and it is the tendency of the colony's recruiters to accept underage recruits which explains perhaps as well as anything else their success in keeping the garrison up to strength or close to it. In fact, they were officially encouraged to look for candidates who were "jeunes et d'esperance," that is, not yet fully grown.[29] After all, the younger a soldier was on arriving in the colony, the more years of productive service he could be expected to give. One governor commented favourably on the "jeunes gens d'Esperance" who were 15 to 16 years old and constituted the majority of the 40 recruits of 1726.[30] The regular French army was not above admitting boys who had not attained the minimum age of 16 but the colonial recruiters and inspectors seem to have ignored the ordinances on this point in a more systematic fashion.

Isle Royale recruiters were also extremely lax about enforcing height restrictions. Of 21 men who appeared in court or deserted and were therefore described in judicial records or in other documents, four were below the minimum height of 5 pieds 1 pouce. Officers in the regular army had a strong prejudice in favour of tall men and they accepted very few recruits who were even slightly under the minimum.[31] They would not have fought with the Isle Royale recruiters for the right to enlist Jean Lafargue, who measured 4 pieds pouces, or Jean-Baptiste Tomasein, 4 pieds 9 pouces.[32]

Of course it was understood that colonial troops were anything but elite units.[33] Even the level of education of the men of the Isle Royale garrison seems to have been inferior to that of soldiers in France. Of 65 men of the Compagnies Franches who were asked to sign legal documents or parish registers, only 27 (41.5 per cent) were able to draw or write their names.[34] Whatever meaning this may have in terms of the various definitions of literacy, it does indicate (albeit in an inconclusive way since the sample is small) that the Isle Royale troops were generally more ignorant than the infantry regiments where Corvisier found about 70 per cent of the soldiers able to sign in 1763.[35]

The conventional view in the 18th century held that army recruits came from the "scum of the cities" and although this is far from accurate, it could probably be applied more fairly to the Isle Royale soldiers than to the metropolitan troops. Corvisier finds that in 1737 28 per cent or 32 per cent of the latter were born in towns and cities, a



1 Birthplaces of 75 soldiers of the Compagnies Franches stationed at Isle Royale, 1720-45. A total of 31 men were born in towns or cities; 36 men were born in rural parishes. Birthplaces are not localized within the dioceses. Also, five soldiers were born in France in unidentified parishes or dioceses and three were born outside France: one in Acadia, one in Ireland and one in Switzerland. (Drawing by S. Epps, from the map by Dom Dubois, "Les diocèses de France des origines à la Révolution," Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisation, Vol. 20, No. 4 [July-Aug. 1965].)

disproportionate level of urban representation in a country where perhaps five-sixths of the population was rural.[36] Of the 61 Isle Royale soldiers whose places of birth can be determined, however, 31 (46 per cent) were born in cities and 12 of them were natives of Paris (see Figure 1). Whether they were born in town or village, most of the colony's soldiers enlisted in a city, particularly Paris and Rochefort. The map of birthplaces shows that a majority of this small sample group were born in Paris, in the region surrounding Rochefort and in the area between the capital and the port through which the gangs of recruits would have passed. Nevertheless, a sizable number were born in the east and the north. Since there is almost no data on the residences of the recruits when they joined, we cannot know how many of these men born in the more remote areas may have been permanently established in Paris by the time they enlisted. It seems significant that the three soldiers mentioned earlier who left some account of the circumstances of their recruitment all came to Paris or Rochefort straight from their native town or village and signed up upon arriving.

The urban character both of recruitment for the colonial garrison and of the background of so many of its members is quite striking. Unfortunately, there are no sources that would allow the inquiry to be extended into a systematic study of the social or economic status of the recruits and their families. All that is possible is cautious speculation based upon a few remarks and examples scattered through the official correspondence and judicial records. Mention has already been made of those who joined the Compagnies Franches because they were indigent and of the convicts, deserters and libertines who were forced to become soldiers. This was the element that writers had in mind when they spoke of "la lie des villes," but it would be a mistake to assume that it predominated in the Isle Royale garrison. Of those soldiers mentioned in the doucments, many had had training in a trade and many of these practiced their craft in the colony. We know the professions of some of the men's fathers and although most were artisans, one was listed as a wine merchant, one was a stationery merchant and another was "garde des instruments de Musique de la Chapelle du Roy."[37] These examples come mostly from court records, a source which cannot be expected to favour the more respectable elements of the garrison. The only conclusion they seem to justify is that the soldiers of Isle Royale came from diverse sections of the French population.

Discharge

Raising recruits and transporting them to Isle Royale was a very difficult and costly business and it was the consistent policy of the Marine ministry to control this expense as much as possible by keeping the number of discharges to an absolute minimum. Year after year governors were admonished to allow only soldiers who could become useful settlers or men whose upkeep cost the government more than they were worth to leave the service. "Il ne doit estre accordé aucun congé," a typical dispatch reads, "à ceux qui sont en estat de servir, a moins qu'ils ne fussent [habitants]."[1] Nevertheless, although discharges were never distributed freely, many men were released from their obligation to serve the king on grounds other than these two.

Most of the soldiers sent back to France from Isle Royale were officially described as invalids. When more particulars were given, it appears that some of these men were deaf or partially blind; a number were epileptic; many were described simply as "paralitique," "insensé" or "impotant."[2] Most striking among these invalids are the large numbers who suffered hernias, broken limbs and other injuries while working on the fortifications.

> ...congedié ayant une descent qui luy est venue aux traveaux des fortifications.[3]
>
> ...a eu la Jambe Cassée par un Eboulement de terres aux traveaux des fortifications et se trouve Estropié.[4]
>
> ...ayant ete Enterré sous une mine en travaillant aux fortiffications il luy Reste un incommodité.[5]

Many others were simply exhausted, "crevés par les penibles travaux qu'ils sont obligés de faire pour le service du Roy."[6] In the 1720s and thirties especially, the governors explained the numerous discharges of invalids as a result of the dangers and hardships of the soldiers' work in construction.

These invalids were generally given free treatment in the Louisbourg hospital until they died or embarked for France. Otherwise they caused the Marine ministry little expense or inconvenience since very few of them received pensions. One of the incidental results of this policy of

discharging the crippled and the seriously ill and leaving them to fend for themselves was the unusually low mortality rate among Isle Royale soldiers who seldom died while still soldiers except by sudden accidents or brief but fatal diseases. An attempt was made at Ile Royale to emulate a policy that had helped to develop and people Canada by encouraging soldiers to take wives and settle on the land. As early as 1718, instructions were given to discharge any married men in the Compagnies Franches who intended to establish themselves in the colony.[7] A royal ordinance in 1725 went further, ordering the governor to discharge one man from each of the six French companies and two Catholic Swiss every year on condition that they not leave Isle Royale.[8] These soldier-settlers were to receive free grants of land and could collect their soldier's pay and rations for three years. The ordinance remained a dead letter until the 1750s, however, and during the period that preceded the first fall of Louisbourg only a handful of soldiers ever left the service with the discharges it offered. This was partly the fault of the colonial administrators who were less than lukewarm in their encouragement of military settlement. They argued that the few soldiers who were given the opportunity to become farmers generally spent three years hunting and fishing with government sponsorship, then found an excuse for returning to France when free supplies were cut off.[9] In fact, given the poor quality of Cape Breton soils and the absence of established agricultural communities that the solider-settlers might have fitted into, it is unlikely that this programme would have been successful even if it had received more support. Whatever its causes, the failure of the military settlement system accounts for an essential difference in the prospects of the soldiers of Canada, who could leave the service with relative ease if they were willing to marry and remain in the colony,[10] and the men of the French companies at Isle Royale, who could look forward to few alternatives to indefinitely prolonged service except a crippling injury.

Of course, the soldiers of the Karrer detachment and a minority of the French troops enlisted on the express condition that they serve a term of only six years.[11] Even so, the state did not consider itself bound to discharge them as soon as they had fulfilled their obligations. If too many men had terms which expired in one particular year, the governor could make half of them stay for a seventh year rather than allow the garrison to drop too far below strength.[12] Some volunteered for subsequent terms and received a ten-livres bounty.[13] There may have been other factors which encouraged reenlistment. If any coercion or pressure was employed, the official correspondence does not mention it, but there is a

reference to a man who stayed on because he was in debt to his captain.[14]

Occasionally - at least 24 such cases occurred between 1722 and 1741 - the minister of Marine ordered the discharge of a soldier whose family had requested his return to France. Pierre Giraud, a 70-year-old peasant in the province of Saintonge, for example, petitioned the minister and obtained the discharge of his son Jean, "afin qu'il puisse repasser en france pour soulager son Pere dans sa Vieillesse."[15] It is impossible to know how many of these requests for discharge on compassionate grounds were refused, but it is clear that the successful ones generally had to be accompanied by a payment of 150 livres to the Marine treasury to offset "part" of the costs of replacing the soldier.[16] The money payment alone was not enough to free a man from his obligation to the king, however, and the governor and ordonnateur at Louisbourg were forbidden to accept such sums directly from the soldiers. These congés par ordre could only be issued on the authority of the minister and only "par des considerations particuliers."[17] No soldier could benefit by them unless he still had relatives in France who maintained contact with him, were concerned enough about him, sufficiently experienced with the bureaucracy to request his discharge and rich enough to pay for it.

Soldiers who did not receive any of the forms of discharge listed above could only retire from the service when they qualified for one of the few congés d'ancienneté that were distributed in most years to the men who had served the longest periods. There are references in the official correspondence to an "established custom" of awarding one such discharge per year to the senior man in each company.[18] In fact, there were many years when deaths, desertions and discharges of other sorts reduced the garrison strength to the point where the governor did not feel he could allow any congés d'ancienneté. Thus, each desertion, each 150-livre discharge, reduced the chances that an aged veteran would be sent home. The governors were aware of this and not without sympathy for the latter. They frequently pleaded for more recruits to enable them to discharge the old men who had served, they claimed, 40 years and more.

> Nous en avons encore cinq ou six a peu pres de cette Entienneté [40 years] quy meriteroit Bien destre Congediez, Sy vostre grandeur Veut bien me permetre de leur accordés L année prochaine Cella donnera Une consolation a tous les autres soldats qui se Croyent ici sans Esperance den sortir, ce qui oblige quelques uns a la Desertion.[19]

The ordonnateur Mézy was exaggerating somewhat when he referred to the extended periods of service as "un Espece

d'esclavage."[20] In one way or another a sizable proportion of the colony's soldiers managed to leave the Compagnies Franches without having to wait the 30 to 40 years required for a congé d'ancienneté. There is even reason to suspect, as Maurepas apparently did, that some of the many men discharged as invalids may have been healthy individuals who had the sympathy of colonial officials.[21] They may also have been troublesome "mauvais sujets" the officers wished to be rid of. In any case, discharges were never awarded on a systematic or regular basis and none at all were allowed from 1743, with war was expected, until after the fall of Louisbourg.[22] To the French soldier of the Isle Royale garrison, the prospect of receiving a discharge must have appeared remote and uncertain.

Most discharges occurred at the end of August, after the arrival of the yearly supply of recruits. Very few of the recipients chose to remain in the colony. The vast majority took advantage of the free passage to France that was accorded them. During the several weeks that intervened before the departure of the king's ship, they were maintained at government expense, in the hospital if necessary, or in the Dauphin Bastion where the healthy ones were confined, away from their former comrades, in order to prevent disorder.[23] On arriving at Rochefort they were given a travel allowance of two sols per lieue to allow them to return to their homes.[24] Some could also hope eventually to draw a pension of six livres per month (eight livres for corporals and 12 for sergeants) if they had served an extended period and had surgeons' certificates to prove they had been disabled in the course of their duties.

Economics

In theory, soldiers of the Isle Royale Compagnies Franches were paid nine livres per month to serve the king.[1] However, it is important to bear in mind that 18th-century military pay was largely an accounting abstraction. The greatest part of this wage was retained to cover the cost of food, clothing and a few necessary articles such as needles and combs that were issued to each man. Only one and one-half livres per soldier per month were transferred to the colony's military treasury but it is unlikely that very much of this net pay ever reached the soldier in the form of cash. Additional deductions at Louisbourg - for example, three livres per year taken from each man's wages for the support of the surgeon's assistant[2] - consumed part of this meagre sum while the balance generally went straight into the pockets of the captains to repay the debts of the men in their companies.[3] Wage rates in the Karrer regiment were apparently somewhat higher than in the Compagnies Franches, but it seems safe to assume that they also bore little relation to any actual money payments to the Swiss soldiers.[4]

Taken together, the military pay, rations and allowances which the French soldiers actually received would be enough for a bare subsistance at best.[5] However, most of the men, French and Swiss, were able to supplement their soldier's wages. Those who simply did guard duty in the summer received 27 to 30 livres a season from a fund created by a five-per-cent tax on the earnings of working soldiers who were exempted from guard duty.[6] Many men found employment in Louisbourg, building houses for private parties, exercising a specialized craft or performing odd jobs,[7] but by far the most important employer of military labour was the construction of Louisbourg's fortifications. Building a European-style fortress in a sparcely populated colony was an ambitious undertaking and one of the greatest problems facing the Marine ministry was in securing an adequate labour supply.[8] Since civilian artisans and labourers were reluctant to come to Isle Royale, most of the work fell to the troops. In fact, throughout most of our period and until shortly before the first siege, the authorities in France apparently felt that

one of the primary purposes of maintaining a garrison in the colony was to provide workers for the construction project. The season or "campaign" lasted about six months from May to October and in 1724, when there were less than 430 soldiers in the colony, 236 (together with 17 civilians) were employed full-time working on the fortifications.[9]

The construction of Louisbourg's fortifications was not administered directly by the crown but rather farmed out to a private contractor who was responsible, among other things, for paying the soldier-workers. The state nevertheless took an active part in the project, partly through the chief engineer, a military officer independent of the colony's military command, who superintended the works and was in charge of the discipline of the work force. The engineer and the contractor usually cooperated closely but the governor also had some authority over the works and he and the other staff and company officers also exercised authority over the men. Thus the administration was complicated and in the 1720s, when the soldier-workers still received their wages directly from the contractor, they were often able to take advantage of the fact that the engineer together with the contractor was often at odds with the governor and the officers and neither party was able to claim their undivided obedience.

Although theoretically free agents in the labour market, physically fit soldiers who were not required for duty in the outposts and guardrooms were often obliged to work. One of their primary tasks was excavating and moving earth for the massive ramparts and ditches and they worked as day labourers or, more frequently, on a piece-work basis in gangs led by a chef d'attelier who was apparently himself a soldier.[10] The workers were allowed to negotiate pay scales collectively with the contractors and, in the early years, they occasionally staged demonstrations and refused to work in order to force their employer to raise the rates.[11] The governor could intervene in case of deadlock and, since he was not directly interested in keeping down construction costs but was concerned about morale and about the difficulties of keeping the soldiers at the fortifications at a time when a boom in private construction provided them with a lucrative alternative source of employment, he often settled the issue in favour of the men.[12] As the only substantial work force in the 1720s when public works in the colony were particularly extensive, the soldiers were in a relatively strong position and one that was in some ways strengthened by their military status, which meant that their subsistence was secure and their physical welfare the responsibility of their company captains. It is difficult to determine how much money the soldier-workers earned as a result but the minister of Marine concluded from the reports of strikes and émeutes

that they were becoming rich and consequently insubordinate.[13]

It was one thing to establish pay rates, however, and another to collect the actual wages. Because of delays in forwarding funds, the contractor frequently found himself unable to pay the men in cash and resorted to the expedients of distributing notes which could only be redeemed at a discount, or paying in goods, especially wine. When funds were available, the workers were paid every two weeks, after which the majority went straight to the taverns and did not reappear for several days.[14]

The soldier-worker's position as a wage earner may have been a good one but, as a consumer, he was extremely vulnerable. Since soldiers were not allowed to buy from merchants on credit, the custom was established from the earliest years of the colony's existence of giving each captain a monopoly on sales to the men of his company.[15] This commerce was considered a duty as well as a privilege as it consisted mainly of essential items such as shoes and stockings (the standard military issues of these articles were never sufficient) as well as tobacco, liquor and extra food.[16] The officers provided these fournitures at greatly inflated prices and, in order to collect their debts, simply had the 30 sols per month that remained of their men's military wages after deductions paid directly into their hands. This monopoly was not complete, however, and in the 1720s the captains frequently complained of the contractor's practice of increasing his profits by advancing goods to the workers in lieu of wages.[17] Furthermore, these officers claimed, the soldier-workers consumed much more merchandise than their military pay would afford and although they had to be given clothing to protect them from the winter, they quickly squandered any cash they received from the contractor in the summer and neglected to repay their officers.[18] Thus, captains and contractors struggled for a greater share of the soldier-worker's earnings through catering to his wants and needs.

In the early years, the contractor had the advantage of being supported by the Marine ministry but the captains had the backing of the colonial governor. The officers scored their first victory in 1721 when they obtained permission for a sergeant to be present at paydays in order to compel workers in need of new clothing to purchase it on the spot.[19] The contractor successfully resisted this maneouvre, however, and in 1727 the French officers complained that their men were being paid mostly in merchandise and in advance. They asked that the wages soldiers earned working on the fortifications, like their military wages, be turned over from the contractor to the company captains who could deduct the value of each man's debts and pay him the balance in cash.[20] This was apparently already the practice in the Swiss contingent but

it was not until some time in the 1730-35 period that the officers of the Compagnies Franches gained such complete control over the fruits of their men's labour. How or why they defeated their opponent is not clear but it is certain that, from that time until 1744, the captains derived a substantial portion of their total incomes from the profits they made from their soldier-workers and they were not negligent in searching for ways to increase these.

The administration of the Isle Royale garrison was never very orderly before 1745 and there is no indication that the captains were obliged to keep close accounts or to report to anyone on how they disposed of the workers' wages with which they were entrusted. They soon began paying the men their cash balances only once a year at the end of the construction season, thereby all but eliminating the possibility that any of them could stay out of debt.[21] In view of the limited demand for shirts and shoes, they apparently expanded their merchandising facilities, concentrating on an institution called the canteen. In the 1730s and forties, each captain operated a canteen where his men could drink wine and spirits on credit and at exorbitant prices. Complaints about the canteens and their effects on drunkenness and absenteeism multiplied around 1740 when there were even allegations that officers forced working soldiers to spend their earnings on drink.[22] When the newly appointed governor Duquesnel arrived in the colony, he reported that the soldier-workers generally received no money whatsoever and he identified this situation as "un viel mal."

> Il faut attaquer les fournitures qu'on fait aux soldats et les Cantines, qui font que quelque travail que fasse un travailleur, il ne voit jamais un sol on luy fait tout Consommer, de la livrongnerie et le degout pour le travail, auquel ils ne vont de forcés.[23]

In the late 1730s and early forties, the minister of Marine in France manifested a concern over "abuses" in the Louisbourg garrison that indicates he thought matters were more serious there than in Canada where the officers' routine appropriation of the military pay of working soldiers had been tolerated for years.[24] He had received reports about the confiscation of soldier-workers' pay and about other forms of exploitation, such as the captains' practice of taking the uniforms from the bodies of dead soldiers and selling them to new recruits.[25] Two new governors were appointed from outside the colony, Forant in 1739 and Duquesnel in 1740, and instructed to remedy the situation. The officers were threatened with exemplary punishment unless they began treating their men more fairly and the minister actually went so far as to suspend the awarding of the Croix de Saint-Louis in the garrison in 1742.[26] Neither the minister nor the governors,

however, could effectively oppose the firmly entrenched interests of the officers who convinced them that their salaries were not sufficient to support a family in a difficult and expensive environment like that of Isle Royale. Thus no fundamental change was made in the system of exploitation which left a captain free to dispose of his men and their income as he saw fit.[27] Still, the governors apparently exerised some restraining influence over the officers and when Duquesnel died in October 1744 and the command was assumed by Duchambon, a veteran of the Isle Royale officer corps, the latter's former colleagues seem to have abandoned any inhibitions that limited their profiteering at the soldiers' expense.

The Mutiny

From the spring of 1744 Isle Royale suffered from a shortage of supplies. Harvests were poor in Canada, where much of the colony's food was grown, and in France, another major supplier, merchants hesitated to send ships across the Atlantic where they could easily be lost, now that war had been declared, to New England privateers. The situation was not improved in the summer and autumn when Louisbourg had to feed some 300-500 English prisoners captured during the Canso raid and by the privateers.[1] More than most other groups, however, the soldiers of the garrison, both French and Swiss, were sheltered from the effects of shortages of this kind. In return for a constant deduction from their pay that was unaffected by market fluctuations, the men received rations from the large stocks of flour, salt pork and other staples that the government maintained for their consumption. Occasionally, in times of food shortages, they would be given reduced rations or biscuit instead of bread so that the authorities could distribute supplies from the king's storehouse to needy civilians. Often the problem was one of food quality rather than quantity and soldiers frequently complained when their bread was made of rotten flour mixed with good.[2] It was not an unprecedented development therefore, when, late in 1744, the commissaire-ordonateur Bigot ordered the sale of foodstuffs from the government storehouse and the soldiers, whose rations were still not reduced, found themselves issued inferior provisions.

The event that pushed the garrison to revolt was the fortnightly issue of "vegetables" (the dried peas and beans which constituted the major element of the soup that was the soldiers' evening meal) that was distributed about a week before Christmas and was so rotten as to be completely inedible. Some men apparently became ill from eating them but those who simply did without and ate only their bread ration and their spruce beer were in no danger of starving.[3] What infuriated the troops was the knowledge that there were good vegetables in the storehouse but these were being sold to the townspeople; meanwhile, they received swill which they were obliged to pay for through wage deductions. A deputation of Swiss soldiers therefore

attempted to return the bad vegetables in exchange for good ones but was rebuffed by the keeper of the royal storehouse.[4] Complaints were made to the commanding officer of the Karrer detachment, Gabriel Schönherr, but they had no effect.[5]

About 22 or 23 December, a petition addressed to Louis Du Pont Duchambon, the acting garrison commander, was drawn up (see Appendix A). Some Swiss soldiers visited the barrackrooms of the Compagnies Franches and secured support of some of the French troops.[6] Thus the petition read "Un grand nombre de soldats françois et suisses vous supplient tres respecteusement" although it seems that only the Swiss, and especially Abraham Dupaquier, Joseph Renard and Laurent Soly, played an active role at this stage. Soly, of unknown nationality, had previously served in the Spanish army and elsewhere. He was killed or captured early in the siege of 1745 and therefore was never brought to trial.[7] Renard was 33 years old, a Catholic and was born in German Lorraine.[8] Most active of the three, it seems, was Dupaquier, a 25-year-old native of Neuchatel. His family background was not of the most humble and his father had been lieutenant colonel in a Swiss regiment in the service of the king of Sardinia.[9] Two years before the mutiny, Dupaquier had abjured Calvinism under the influence of one of the Recollets who cared for him in the Louisbourg hospital.[10] It was apparently he who was chiefly responsible for composing the petition. Fortunately a copy has been preserved and a reading of it makes it evident that rotten vegetables were not the only issue that annoyed the soldiers. In a deferential yet somewhat menacing tone, this document begins with complaints about the vegetables, then proceeds to allude to a number of other grievances after the general observation, "vous sçavez Monsieur que l'Injustice regne a touttes mains en ce pays."[11]

This petition was not handed over to the commandant immediately, no doubt because the soldiers did not expect it would have any more effect than had the complaints to Schönherr if it were submitted in the regular way. Instead, plans were made for a peaceful assembly where it would be presented and the authorities would be forced to take notice. Joseph Renard testified at his court-martial that there was no question of assembling at the time the petition was drawn up and he and Dupaquier insisted that the idea of bringing the troops out in a mass only occurred to them on the evening before the mutiny; however, their testimony seems suspect. They had every reason for portraying their actions as a relatively sudden outburst (all the less culpable since they had been drinking the night of 26 December) rather than as a premeditated plot and yet the Swiss sergeant Christophe Jout admitted that Soly and Renard had spoken the day before Christmas of plans for a peaceful

protest gathering.[12] The judges who later tried these men did not consider it necessary to establish the existence of a plot before the twenty-sixth in order to convict them and showed no interest in pursuing this matter. Thus the sources leave us free to speculate idly as to how elaborate the plot was in the day or two before and after Christmas, how many soldiers were privy to it, whether the French were involved and whether a decision was made to bear arms at the projected assembly. In view of subsequent events and in the light of the meagre testimony, it seems probable that there was little contact with the French and that few Swiss besides the three principal conspirators knew what was planned until the night before the uprising.

Whenever the plot was hatched, it was during the evening of 26 December that Soly, Renard and Dupaquier went from room to room in the Swiss section of the barracks asking the men to join them, "pour s'assembler le landemain afin de demander a leurs off.rs de leur procurer Justice sur les Vivres qui leurs Etoient dus."[13] Some of the men were sleeping but Renard made a list of the names of those who agreed to participate. (Naturally, the list was subsequently lost.) Afterwards, Renard and Dupaquier were nominated to go to speak with the French soldiers who occupied adjoining rooms.[14] Dupaquier admitted to having communicated only with a few men in two of the eight French companies and he claims that he merely informed them of the Swiss plans for an assembly. The three leaders then returned to their room and remained awake for the rest of the night.

Next morning (27 December), at about six o'clock, the Swiss began assembling behind the barracks building in the courtyard enclosed by the King's Bastion. The sergeants did not appear (most of them had their own dwellings in the town), but a corporal named du Croix, who had apparently not been involved in the plans, took charge and arranged the men in their ranks, ordered the drummers to beat out the signal for the assembly and returned to the barracks to order those who had not yet appeared to fall in.[15] Normal military procedures and discipline were maintained at this stage. Du Croix even overruled one of the leading organizers, Joseph Renard, and ordered him to return to his place when the latter began to take some initiative. Dupaquier and Renard later declared at the court-martial that they had not intended to carry arms but had changed their minds when all the others went for their guns after a voice in the crowd had urged them to "give more weight to their just demands." They may well have been lying. In any case, the officer who was eventually fetched by the first sergeant found himself facing almost the entire Karrer detachment armed and in battle formation.

Schönherr was sick at the time and it was Ensign Rasser, the second Swiss officer, who first met the

rebellious troops.[16] When the drumming ceased, Rasser asked for an explanation and was handed a note which outlined the men's grievances.[17] He examined this, then spoke with a few individual soldiers, one by one, about their complaints. When the ensign recalled the scene eight months later, he remembered the troops' orderly and respectful behaviour and their assurances that they had no intention of committing violent actions or of neglecting their duties to their superiors; they wished only "de Reclamer leur Justice des Vexations qu'on leur Faisoit Journellement."[18] Rasser mentioned three specific grievances in his affidavit and prominent among them was the problem of the rotten vegetables. There was also a complaint about work the soldiers were forced to perform without wages for the king's service and for private individuals. Lastly, the men asked for compensation for work they had done on an expedition against Canso earlier in the year and for the pillage they had been promised but never received.[19]

The complaint about unpaid labour was not a new one for the Swiss who were even more attached than were the French to the notion that a soldier should not be given any tasks outside his strictly military duties (duties such as mounting guard) unless he is given extra pay. In 1727 they had contested the custom of piquoit duty by which the état-major made soldiers coming off guard duty spend a few hours cleaning the barracks or at chores in the government storehouse.[20] The practice persisted, however, and Joseph Renard complained of having to fetch wood and clean the governor's latrine.[21] Men were often obliged to work without remuneration for their own officers as well.[22] Both Renard and Dupaquier declared at their court-martials that such "ouvrages extraordinaires" were a major source of dissatisfaction.

The treatment of the soldiers who took part in the Canso raid was a specific case of flagrant injustice that aroused the anger of both French and Swiss troops. Soon after war broke out between England and France in the spring of 1744, plans were made to capture this nearby English fishing post. In its aims and its organization, the Canso expedition bore more resemblance to a privateering venture than to a military campaign.[23] It was largely financed by merchants and government officials and was composed of soldiers from the Louisbourg garrison as well as over 200 sailors, all under the command of the opportunist Duvivier, an influential officer in the Compagnies Franches. Duquesnel, the colony's governor, convinced 80 French soldiers and 37 Swiss to volunteer for the mission with the promise that they would have a share of the booty.[24] A small fleet left Louisbourg 20 May and quickly captured Canso and a British naval sloop after a short exchange of cannon fire.[25] The soldiers saw no action until they

landed and were ordered to load quantities of codfish, government stores and the private effects of the British inhabitants into the boats. When some hesitated, they were roughly treated by their officers: "Le moindre des Miserables seroit mieux traitté parmi des barbares," according to the men who served on board one of the boats.[26] As soon as the victorious party returned to Louisbourg, the ships' officers and sailors and the garrison officers who had accompanied them made off with most of the plunder before anything was turned over to the courts to be distributed as lawful prize. In the end, the soldiers received nothing for their trouble. Governor Duquesnel, who had promised them a share of the spoils, died on 9 October and although one group of soldiers addressed a petition to the ordonnateur in November, they received no satisfaction.[27]

Rasser listened to all these grievances in the courtyard of the citadel. He promised no more than to communicate them to his superior, Schönherr. Then, warning the men not to repeat their demonstration, he made them present arms, before ordering them to return to the barracks and stay there. This done, the ensign rushed to Schönherr's bedside and reported the disturbance. The senior officer ordered Rasser to ask de la Perelle, the town major, to order the bad vegetables replaced. But already it was too late. As he emerged from Schönherr's house, the drums were again beating. This time it was the French sounding the general alarm. After their officer had left, it seems, some Swiss soldiers had gone to the other side of the barracks and reproached the French as cowards for not joining in the demonstration. The men of the Compagnies Franches may have been slow to act but once they took up the challenge they were far less restrained than the others. With their intervention the relatively mild protest was transformed into a serious revolt.

Soldiers, both French and Swiss, poured out into the courtyard equipped for battle. The drummers continued to beat the générale and, as their comrades assembled, they marched out of the citadel[28] surrounded by an escort with bayonets fixed. As this body passed through the streets of the town, the garrison officers, who for the most part lived in private houses, were roused by what must have sounded like a signal that the fortress was under attack. Coming to the citadel to investigate, they found themselves facing the muskets of men who threatened to "blow their heads off" if they entered the enclosure.[29] These were the ten soldiers who had spent the night on routine guard duty at the entrance to the fort under the command of Christophe Jout, the Swiss sergeant. Soly and Renard had spoken with him three days earlier about their plans for a demonstration and on the morning of the mutiny Jout ordered his sentries not to allow any officers or civilians to pass.

As the party of drummers marched by the guard post, he was heard to say, "Les françois commencent a s animer et ils font mieux les choses que les notres Etant armés Bayonette au Bout fusil."[30]

Eventually a number of officers managed to elude the sentries and gain entrance to the courtyard. Among them was Ensign Rasser who described the scene inside as one of tumult and disorder. The soldiers talked openly of killing all the officers and burning the town. The officers present tried desperately with bravado and cajoling to regain control of their companies. According to Rasser, he brought the Karrer contingent to obedience first, while the French were still pointing guns at their officers and threatening to shoot if their demands were not met.[31] Meanwhile, Major de la Perelle was following the drummers and their escort through the town vainly ordering them to halt. At one point he attempted to stand in their path but was picked up roughly and carried 30 paces.[32] Giving up at length, he went to the citadel where by now the atmosphere had cooled somewhat. The officers had apparently agreed to accept all the rebels' demands and the men showed their willingness to recognize de la Perelle's authority by following, more or less, his parade-ground commands.

Before the major's arrival, it seems that Acting Governor Duchambon, the supreme military authority in the colony, had appeared at the fort and surrendered to the troops' demands. Duchambon had no alternative but complete capitulation. His garrison, almost to a man, was in open revolt.[33] At the best of times, help from France or Canada would take months to arrive but given the war and British command of the seas, the colony was particularly isolated in 1744. Moreover, there was no alternative force within the colony - the Isle Royale militia, unlike its Canadian counterpart, was small and ineffective - that could dream of opposing the rebels. The promise to redress all grievances quelled the violence but the soldiers remained uneasy. Duchambon and Bigot, writing to the minister of Marine four days later (see Appendix B), declared that the complaints of the French and the Swiss were identical, but the specific demands they mentioned as having come from the French troops were not the same as those presented to Rasser by the Swiss. The situation was confused and a great variety of demands were apparently put forward. The governor and ordonnateur recorded three of them: (1) an increase in the issue of firewood and the return to the soldiers of five cords of wood confiscated for theft; (2) the immediate distribution of the rations that some of the men had missed because they were away participating in the Canso attack and in a later expedition against Port Royal, and (3) the reimbursement of the clothing deduction that had been taken from the wages of more than 100 French recruits

who had arrived in 1741 but never received the uniforms it was supposed to pay for.[34]

The second demand in Duchambon's and Bigot's list was not repeated in any other document. It is possible that, in reporting to the minister, they may have misinterpreted or misrepresented much more serious complaints about the treatment of volunteers during and after the Canso raid. At any rate, the only contemporary account of the mutiny not written by an observer directly involved, considered injustices committed against the Canso volunteers to be the major grievance of all the soldiers.[35] The complaint about the missing uniforms was a uniquely French affair but it had much in common with the rotten vegetables problem which aroused the anger of both French and Swiss troops. The soldiers had often endured with patience delays and shortages in the issue of military rations and allowances, but they became irritated when wage deductions that supposedly paid for these supplies were not adjusted accordingly.

The demand for more firewood has an interesting background. In the early years of the colony's history, the soldiers had to obtain all their own fuel. By the 1720s, the scrubby spruce forest had been stripped from all the country within three miles of Louisbourg. It was reported that each winter several men contracted frostbite and injured themselves stumbling over the brush and stumps in order to fetch a few logs of what was in fact a poor quality of firewood.[36] The authorities in France were eventually persuaded to allow wood to be purchased for the garrison, but only at the rate of one half cord per man even though about twice that quantity was required to last through the long Cape Breton winter.[37] Thus the men were still obliged to cut and transport half their wood and this apparently constituted a severe hardship, particularly for the many who did not have adequate clothing. The exceptionally cold winter that had arrived earlier than usual in 1744 must have made the mutineers' demand for an adequate fuel supply especially emphatic.[38] As for the confiscation before Christmas of five cords of "stolen" wood, the soldiers' petition to Duchambon alluded to this event in rather different terms. It seems that a group of soldiers returning to the town with a load of firewood were met by some officers claiming to own the land where it had been cut. The officers ordered them to turn over the wood, them broke the sledge they had used to carry it.[39]

All the recorded grievances that were brought up by both the French and the Swiss soldiers can be seen as essentially complaints about losses they had suffered at the hands of cheating officers and colonial officials. Consequently, the redress the men sought was in the form of material compensation. One of the rebels' first acts was to make use of the established sentry posts in the town to

secure control of the government storehouses and the house of Bigot, the ranking civilian administrator and guardian of the colonial treasury.[40] They were never so bold as simply to sieze what they wanted, however, in spite of their repeated threats to do so. Instead, after the officers had promised to meet all demands and partial calm had been restored during the morning of 27 December, a deputation, apparently led by Dupaquier, went to call on Bigot to arrange for the fulfillment of this promise. From this point on, most of the documentary sources dry up leaving Bigot himself as almost our only informant. Representatives of the soldiers met with him several times on the twenty-seventh, on the next day and on several occasions throughout the five months that followed. They presented him with accounts of the sums they felt were due the men for injustices committed over the past few years and Bigot did all he could to avoid paying. Alternately flattering the deputies, exercising his moral authority and "les amusant de belles promesses," he stalled and prevaricated until frightened by veiled threats against his life into giving the deputies partial satisfaction.[41] His tactics must have been successful as the official accounts for 1744 indicate that only 3,000 livres (out of a total budget of 547,436 livres) were given to the rebels to be distributed among almost 500 men.[42]

As a violent confrontation and complete defiance of authority, the soldiers' revolt apparently lasted no more than an hour or two. During the days that followed, however, the atmosphere was extremely tense. There were apparently incidents of taxation populaire at this time as soldiers threatened merchants with their swords and forced them to sell goods at what they considered a just price.[43] The civilian population was terrified and the officers did not dare oppose their men. The soldiers had no intention of destroying the established hierarchy. They nevertheless knew they would have to exploit their advantage in order to secure the limited concessions they had been promised and so they kept a close watch on the military and civilian administrators, reinforcing the latters' fears by periodically threatening massacres. When Bigot and Duchambon wrote to the minister four days after the initial outburst, the situation was anything but peaceful. In fact, their letter had a tone of urgency verging on panic: "Nous sommes icy leurs Esclaves."[44] Bigot later described the elaborate precautions he took to keep this letter and its destination a secret, precautions he felt necessary since he was convinced that the troops would sack the town and turn it over to the English if they knew he was requesting that an armed force be sent from France to punish the rebels.[45]

Years later when Bigot was outlining his past services to the state in order to obtain a promotion and later to defend himself against charges of corruption, he described the period

that extended for five months until the appearance of the English invaders in May 1745 as a time of smoldering rebellion during which his life was frequently in danger.[46] In the absence of any corroborating testimony and in view of Bigot's obvious interest in over-dramatizing the mutiny and his own role in handling it, some historians have concluded that the revolt was completely terminated by the end of December.[47] The evidence will not sustain any certain conclusion on this point, but it seems unlikely that military life in Louisbourg could have returned to normal by the spring of 1745. After the open threats of massacre and destruction in December, the officers and men could only have viewed one another with intense mutual hostility and suspicion. Bigot was probably not exaggerating when he suggested that those in positions of authority treated the soldiers with great care and refrained from employing "le ton de leurs places."[48]

When the New Englanders landed to lay siege to Louisbourg 11 May 1745, Duchambon assembled the garrison and urged the troops to forget the past and unite with the officers and townspeople in facing the enemy. The men demured at first and asked for a guarantee that no one would be punished for taking part in the mutiny. Naturally the governor consented and, together with Bigot, he solemnly promised a complete pardon in the name of the king.[49] In the subsequent 50-day siege the troops acquitted themselves well according to all reports.[50] At no time had they ever questioned or attempted to evade what they considered to be their duty as soldiers. Still, when they were called upon to repair the fortifications that were damaged by enemy cannon fire, they would only work for double the normal labourer's wages and with immediate payment in cash.[51] Perhaps 20 or 30 soldiers were killed before the town surrendered at the end of June [52] and among the first casualties was Laurent Soly, one of the principal Swiss instigators of the mutiny.

After the surrender of Louisbourg, the garrison was evacuated and most of its members arrived at the French port of Rochefort in August 1745. The French companies were later sent back to Isle Royale in 1749 when the colony returned to French rule; however, probably no more than half the French soldiers who had experienced the mutiny and the siege returned to Louisbourg. In the confused situation that followed the garrison's arrival at Rochefort, 159 men deserted from the Compagnies Franches and a large number of those who remained fell ill and died.[53] No detachment from the Karrer regiment ever went back to Isle Royale as Duchambon and Bigot were successful in convincing Maurepas, the minister of Marine, that it was the Swiss who had not only initiated the mutiny but also led the French soldiers in the days that followed the first outbreak.[54]

Although aware that the garrison had fought well, Maurepas was convinced that news of the soldiers' discontent

had induced the English to attack Louisbourg and he tended to blame the mutiny for the fall of the fortress.[55] Perhaps a certain desire to identify a scapegoat for the loss of Isle Royale accounts for the minister's insistence on the need for severe punishment in order to restore discipline among the colonial troops. In August 1745 he instructed de Barrailh, the governor of Rochefort, to make discreet inquiries on the subject of the Louisbourg mutiny and to arrest those identified as ringleaders by the colonial commander and ordonnateur. When courts-martial were organized late in the fall, Maurepas ordered them to look into the soldiers' complaints against their officers.[56] There was no excuse for open rebellion but Maurepas, who was well aware that irregularities had long been common in the Isle Royale garrison, apparently intended to take some disciplinary action against those officers whose unfair treatment of the men had been particularly flagrant. The documents give no indication that any officers were ever actually punished. In fact, de Gannes and Duhaget, probably two of the garrison's most grasping captains, were quickly promoted to the position of town major in the early 1750s.

Because of the special status of the Karrer regiment, the Swiss mutineers could only be tried by a court-martial composed of their own officers. These were held in the second half of November 1745. A number of those accused were released but five men were convicted and sentenced to death.[57] Of these, one died in prison and another, Abraham Dupaquier, escaped. Bigot was furious when he learned that this "premier chef" of the rebels had escaped the noose. "Si celuy de qui dependoit sa sûreté eut été pendant six mois à la discrétion de ce misérable, comme je l'ay été," he wrote, "Il seroit encore en prison."[58] Maurepas was also displeased, all the more so as there were hints that Colonel Karrer and his officers may have intentionally presented Dupaquier with an opportunity to flee.[59] Some of Dupaquier's comrades were not so fortunate. Joseph Renard and Corporal du Croix were hanged on 7 December and their bodies were left on the gallows at Rochefort all day, "afin de servir d'exemple a un chacun."[60] Two days later, Christophe Jout was decapitated hours after appearing before the court-martial where he expressed the hope that he too would be an example to others.

> Il savoit bien qu'il alloit perdre la Vie...mais que son Exemple devoit apprendre aux [officiers commandants] pour le Roy de tenir la main a ce que le soldat ne fut point Vexé et que Luy fut distribué bons [conformement] a l'intention de sa majesté les Vivres payés sur leur solde.[61]

The courts-martial of the French mutineers were delayed for a time when the accused brought up the pardon they had been promised by Duchambon and Bigot. Maurepas quickly intervened, however, declaring that the king could not be bound by the promise since he had had no knowledge of it and insisting that examples be made of some of the men of the Compagnies Franches. We have no accounts of the French courts-martial but other records indicate that at least eight men were condemned. Five of these were hanged, one died in prison and two were sentenced to life terms as galley slaves.[62] In all, eight men were executed as a result of the Louisbourg mutiny.

Conclusion

In attempting to explain the Louisbourg mutiny, historians have tended to emphasize two casual factors, the officers' exploitation of the men and the soldiers' miserable living conditions.[1] The preceding account makes it clear that the mutineers certainly did feel that they had been cheated by their officers but nowhere in the documents concerned with the mutiny is there any hint (beyond the reference to a demand for more firewood) that they revolted because they were "digusted with their living conditions."[2] It is true that the material conditions of life were very hard for the men of the Louisbourg garrison, but generally they were no worse, and in many respects they were better, than those to which other 18th-century soldiers were subjected. A Louisbourg soldier did not always receive his rations in the prescribed amounts or qualities but he could easily supplement his diet by hunting and scrounging and never went hungry as his counterparts in France often did when they were in the field or in peacetime when sudden rises in food prices would occasionally make them unable to subsist on their fixed money allowance.[3] His annual issue of clothing was often defective and sometimes was not delivered for years in a row. Still, he was no worse off than soldiers in the French infantry and he could consider himself blessed in comparison to the men of the Albany garrison in 1700 who were, according to the governor of New York, in a "shameful and miserable condition for the want of cloaths that the like was never seen in so much that those parts of 'em which modesty forbids me to name, are expos'd to view."[4] He was not given an adequate supply of firewood and, although this did not make him unique among soldiers of the period, he may have suffered more from it than men who served in France because of the severe climate of Isle Royale. As for the "squalid and oppressive barrack conditions" that supposedly "led to the mutiny,"[5] the Louisbourg barracks were certainly not luxurious accommodation but they were probably more comfortable than the stuffy and disease-ridden barracks at Aix and less crowded than those in Marseille where 30 or 40 men lived in a room with seven beds, "comme du bétail dans une écurie."[6] In fact, the soldiers' rooms were repaired

and the bedding improved in the early 1740s so that they would likely have been more comfortable in 1744 than they had been in earlier periods.[7] In general, the notion that the men of the Louisbourg garrison were particularly wretched by contemporary military standards seems difficult to accept in view of their exceptionally low mortality which averaged about 19.6 per thousand for each year from 1730 to 1740 inclusive (see Table 5), while a typical French infantry regiment had an annual death rate of 80 per thousand (34 per thousand if wartime years are excluded) at about the same time.[8]

Misery and hardship were the common features of the life of all soldiers in the 18th century - and of a great many civilians as well. Their presence does not explain why the Louisbourg soldiers mutinied when others were more miserable nor does it explain why they waited until 1744 to mutiny when, in some respects, they were better off materially then they had ever been in the past. Rather than dismiss the revolt simply as an émeute de misère, therefore, it would seem preferable to attempt to understand it as the reaction of a group of men with a particular outlook to a particular set of circumstances. Explaining the outbreak of the mutiny requires an examination of the soldiers' mentality and the objective situation they encountered at Louisbourg with a view to determining not only why they undertook aggressive action as a group but also how they were able to do so.

The chapter "Economics" describes the system of exploitation through which the officers controlled the wages their men earned as soldiers and as workers. This exploitation seems to have been worse in the Isle Royale garrison than in other military units and it increased in severity in the years that preceded the mutiny, becoming particularly blatant after the death of Governor Duquesnel in October 1744. The resentment that resulted was, on one level, the cause of the revolt; the mutineers' complaints and their obvious hostility to the officers bear this out. Just as important, however, was the system of recruitment and discharge outlined in the chapters "Recruitment" and "Discharge."

The prevalence of unlimited engagements in the Compagnies Franches of Isle Royale must have had a negative effect on morale in the garrison, but it also encouraged a collective rather than individualistic response to discontent. More than a continental French soldier who was likely to be on a six-year term and more than a man attached to the Canadian troops who could exchange the military musket for the colonist's axe with relative ease, the Isle Royale soldier had a permanent stake in his position as a soldier. He could not expect to be promoted into the officer corps.[9] Unlike his counterparts in France, he could not desert easily since the nearest haven was the

Acadian settlements at Beaubassin which could only be reached by a perilous journey of 250 miles through the wilderness or across the water.[10] There were always a few doors by which soldiers could leave the Louisbourg garrison but they were extremely narrow and after 1743 when discharges to both French and Swiss were suspended because of the threat of war, the largest exit was completely barred. Since individual evasion of the military was much more difficult here than elsewhere, collective action within the system was more likely.

Several characteristics of military life in Louisbourg encouraged the formation of cooperative habits and a group spirit among the soldiers. To begin with, almost all of them were housed in one large barracks building. In the first half of the century, barracks were still a novelty and in many French garrison towns and throughout Canada troops were dispersed and billetted in the homes of civilians.[11] In Louisbourg, by contrast, every man was in close contact with his comrades and especially with the 15 or 20 who shared his room and who together formed a group called a chambrée. The men of a chambrée were generally of one company and they were under the leadership of a corporal or a sergeant. Besides sharing common living and sleeping quarters, they ate together and cooked common meals in one large pot. They also tended to spend a great deal of their leisure time together and the barrackroom was a favorite spot for drinking, conversation and lounging.[12] Not only was the chambrée an important unit in a soldier's life (Renard, Soly and Dupaquier, the three principal instigators of the mutiny, apparently lived in the same room), but also the barracks environment, where officers seldom entered, was well-suited for the discussion of grievances and for conspiracies and plans for concerted action. The frequency of mutinies among naval forces has often been explained in terms of the solidarity bred by life in the fo'c'sle.[13] Similarly, the Louisbourg revolt can be seen partly as a result of the barracks situation which helped to foster a sense of community and also provided an environment favourable to secret organizing. The accounts of the mutiny show that the leaders took good advantage of its potential.

Outside the barracks, the men of the garrison, like soldiers everywhere, were in constant contact with their fellows while engaged in such activities as guard duty and drills. What made the Louisbourg soldiers unique, however, was the fact that so many of them spent half of every year as construction workers. Many men who served in the Compagnies Franches in Canada also worked but most of them were employed by private individuals and their work, like the Canadian system of billetting, had the effect of dispersing the colony's soldiers.[14] Some Isle Royale soldiers found employment with civilian parties but generally the massive labour demands of state-financed

construction tended to concentrate them at one place under one employer. The physical proximity and the common economic interests of the soldier-workers could only have reinforced their sense of solidarity. Thus before 1730 the men frequently joined together to strike for higher wages or to protest cuts in food rations.[15] At that time the soldier-workers had frequently come into conflict with the contractor but, in the decade or so that preceded the mutiny when the officers had control of their wages, the men were much more inhibited about confronting opponents who held positions of such power and prestige.

If there were factors promoting a certain group feeling among Louisbourg's soldiers, there were nevertheless some divisions within the garrison that precluded the formation of a completely unified outlook. First of all, non-commissioned officers wielded considerable authority over the men in their daily affairs and received higher wages. The 30 members of the elite artillery company were also better paid than their former comrades in the Compagnies Franches. Because of their specialized duties, the cannoneers did not work on the fortifications and they were further isolated from the others by their special barrackrooms and distinctive uniforms. Most importantly, both the cannoneers and the French sergeants owed their special positions to the officers' appreciation of their superior merit. Not surprisingly, they declined to participate in the mutiny.

The most significant complicating factor in the Louisbourg garrison, however, was the division between Swiss and French. Language, religion and regimental pride kept the two groups somewhat aloof from one another but by 1744 they could not have been complete strangers. For over 20 years they had shared a barracks building, served together in guard details and worked together on the fortifications. There is no evidence of quarrels between individual Swiss and French soldiers. The two groups lived separately but apparently without a great deal of mutual suspicion or hostility. Thus, they acted independently in the early stages of the mutiny but their differing tactics were aimed at achieving essentially similar, though not exactly identical, objectives.

Although they did not form a completely cohesive group, the men of the Louisbourg garrison were quite aware of their distinct identity as soldiers and the judicial records occasionally give indications of the importance they attached to the external signs of the warrior's profession. In one case two men were convicted of breaking into a house and stealing a few items of little value. One of their prizes was a piece of ribbon which they had a tavern keeper's wife fashion into 15 cocards so that they and their comrades could wear these specifically military adornments in their hats.[16] Another incident resulted from a

dispute between a butcher named Dupré and a Swiss soldier who wished to sell some partridges he had shot. At one point the soldier threatened to hit his opponent with the butt of his musket but the butcher managed to wrestle the weapon away from him. Hurling insults behind him, the vanquished soldier retreated towards the barracks but returned later, accompanied by two Swiss armed with sticks, and demanded the return of his gun. When the butcher refused, the three attacked him, calling him "bougre" and shouting, "Tu desarme un soldat." They beat him savagely, stabbed him in the chest, and finally left him in the street, unconscious and seriously injured.[17] The accounts of the victim and witnesses give no hint that any national or religious animosity was involved in this incident. Instead, the brutal actions of the Swiss can best be interpreted as revenge against what they considered to be a serious offense on the part of a civilian who deprived a soldier of his weapon, the distinguishing mark of the military estate. Similarly, anger over the treatment of the volunteers who participated in the Canso expedition - anger which contributed to the violence of December 1744 - should be seen as stemming from the traditional notion that a victorious warrior ought to receive a share of the fruits of conquest.

The Louisbourg troops were not of a particularly high quality by 18th-century standards and it may seem paradoxical that they should have been so proud of their military profession in view of the fact that they devoted so much of their time to working as labourers and so little of it to military training and combat. Nevertheless, the practice of bearing arms - an essential if not an exclusive attribute of the soldier - gave a certain prestige that was derived from the medieval belief that the right to carry warlike weapons properly belonged to the nobility alone.[18] "Dupuis qu'il porte le mousquet et l'épée," wrote Albert Babeau of the ancien régime soldier in general, "il se croit bien au-dessus du commun peuple dont il sort."[19] The civilian inhabitants of Louisbourg had little reason to envy the lot of the men of the garrison, but it is quite misleading to speak of "public contempt for their [the soldiers] station in life."[20] More likely the townspeople had a certain respect tinged with fear for the soldier's military bearing and uniform and for his proclivity for violent behavior. The butcher Dupré who dared to display his contempt for one soldier must have regretted his impudence later. The officers too failed to handle the men in a way the latter felt soldiers ought to be treated. Of course, the officers enjoyed a great deal of prestige and authority and they had at their disposal the military system of discipline and punishment. Thus a great deal of provocation was required before the troops overcame their deferential attitudes and took action, and they did so

only when the declaration of war and British naval supremacy strengthened their relative position by reducing the officers' chances of calling in outside assistance.

The soldiers rebelled because they felt they were being treated unfairly. Despite the fact that much of their activity was quite unmilitary, they apparently saw themselves as armed men who received the king's money and his bread in order to fight his enemies and protect his possessions. When they were given bad rations without what they considered legitimate reason, they felt not only deprived but also insulted. Being made to work at unsoldierlike tasks without extra remuneration was also galling. Work in itself was not unacceptable as long as it was considered quite independent of a man's duties and status as a soldier and was paid for as such. What incensed the mutineers especially, it seems, was having their officers treat them as mere labourers rather than men-at-arms who occasionally worked for extra money. When Joseph Renard was asked at his court-martial if he had any complaints against his officers, he replied:

> qu'il avoit grievemt. lieu de se plaindre des Torts a luy arrivés par la mauvaise qualité des Vires qui faisoient partie de sa solde ainsy que de tous les ouvrages qu'on l'avoit forcé de faire a la descent de la garde et cela sans salaire quoique ces ouvrages Etoient Indépendans de son Service et de son devoir.[21]

What the soldiers sought in 1744 was justice and the word itself recurs frequently in the courts-martial and other records of the mutiny. On the surface, the injustices they complained of were material and they therefore demanded monetary compensation. On another level, however, it seems fair to say, they demanded to be treated with the respect appropriate to a soldier. Their aims were exceedingly limited. They did not ask for higher wage rates or more comfortable barracks; they did not demand that unpopular officers be replaced or that the systems of discipline and punishment be made less severe; certainly they did not suggest that the hierarchical military structure of the garrison be modified. They only insisted that actual procedures be consistent with official policy and that the soldier's rights and duties as a paid warrior be preserved. From the mutineers' point of view, it seems, it was the officers who had subverted the military system over the years and the soldiers who were obliged to restore a proper balance. Since milder measures had no effect, the men resorted to a display of strength. Their procedures, as they assembled behind the barracks to the beat of the drums and under the supervision of the corporals, were eminently soldierlike and consistent with their limited objectives. Nonetheless, if the soldiers' planning and tactics reflect a

large measure of dispassionate rationality, their actions during the confrontation with the officers also suggest intense anger and hostility; if their behaviour was relatively restrained, it could also have easily changed to violence and resulted in bloodshed. The mutiny was still a mutiny and the men who participated must have been aware that they were guilty of a crime for which the military ordinances prescribed the death penalty. In its aims if not its means, however, the mutiny was fundamentally conservative and can best be interpreted as a soldiers' revolt in defense of the soldiers' traditional position in the military system.

Was the mutiny a success? On the short term the men's limited objectives were apparently achieved. They were given compensation for unfair wage deductions (admittedly, the sources do not make it clear whether the soldiers were ever completely satisfied on this point) and the officers and government officials treated them with respect. Trusting the authorities' promises of amnesty, however, they were defeated in the end. With eight executions, the Louisbourg mutiny was more severely punished than any of the revolts Corvisier mentions in his study of the French army between 1700 and 1763.[22] It is possible that matters might have ended differently had the garrison not had the bad luck to be conquered six months after the first uprising and sent to France where the soldiers' power relation with the officers was reversed. A few men might have been saved from the hangman in this case and the officers might have been more restrained in their profiteering as long as the mutiny lived in their memories, but the economic and power position of the soldiers would not have changed in any fundamental or enduring way. The mutineers did not intend to alter or "re-form" the system - the sources do not even record any instance of the soldiers challenging the officers' right to control their military and workmen's wages - they simply wished to force a readjustment in the existing power configuration.

The mutiny was not without lasting results, however. The minister of Marine had attempted to reform the abuses in the Isle Royale garrison from as early as 1739 but, when the colony was reestablished as a French possession in 1749, the recollection of the violence of 1744 must have added some urgency to his campaign to reform the military administration. Although nothing was altered in a major way, the result was that the officers' exploitation of the men was controlled and systematized,[23] and no further outbreaks of organized resistance occurred at Louisbourg. Nevertheless, although captains were limited to profits of 25 per cent on purchases made by their men, the engineer Franquet still observed "un Esprit de Sedition et de revolte" among the soldier-workers in 1750.[24]

Appendix A. The Soldiers' Petition, December 1744.[1]

a Monsieur
Monsieur duchambon Lieutenant du Roy commandant pour sa Majesté a Louisbourg,
Monsieur

Un grand nombre de soldats françois et suisses vous supplient tres respectueusement d'avoir la Bonté s'il vous plaist d'examiner dans quelle situation ils sont reduit aujourd'huy par les légumes que l'on nous a donné cette quinzaine qui ne sont point capables d'entre dans le corps de l'humanité au quel par votre respect les pourceaux n'en voudroient pas manger; il est disgracieux Monsieur que nous avons deja vu un grand nombre de soldats malades a l'hopitale et nous croyons que la seulle cause n'est produit que de ces mauvais vivres il seroit Monsieur, plus apropos de donner de bonnes légumes puisqu'il nanat [?] dans le tems ou nous sommes pour pouvoir etre utiles au service du prince de qui nous sommes detenues si en cas l'occasion se presentoit que non pas de nous voir tous malades, vous sçavez Monsieur, que toutes une garnison a toujours eu une grande confiance en vous par les Bonté que vous avez toujours eux pour elle aux qu'elles vous reconnoissant tous pour leur pere, a leur secours aussy espere telle encore car il est assuré si la bonté de dieu et le secour de votre personne ne produit point la Justice que nous vous demandons cela pourroit causer un triste spectacle parmy la trouppe car vous sçavez Monsieur que l'Injustice regne a touttes mains en ce pays, Jusqu'a un tronc qui a eté volé au quel l'on a fait payer dix sols a chaque soldat, vous sçavez M^r^. que le bois est d'une longeur extreme qui dit au proche une lieu que nombre de soldat sepuise au ménagent pour en avoir leur provision de l'anné et qu'il s'y trouve des officiers de cette garnison qui dans le chemin même leur font quitter leur bois disant que c'est leur terrain et leur casse leur traine et en grand risque d etre maltraités aussy bien que ceux qui sont obligé dy aller sur leurs epaulles, Monsieur, nous vous prions tous en generale de nous pardonner si nous avons pris la liberté de vous marquer ce qui est cy dessus, vous sçavez Monsieur que ça n'est que trop juste et nombres d'autres chosses.

Appendix B. The First Account of the Mutiny, 31 December 1744.[1]

Copie de La Lettre Ecritte a Mr. le Comte de Maurepas par Mrs. Duchambon et Bigot a Louisbourg le 31^{e} x^{bre} 174 Monseigneur
Nous profitons de deux Batimens qui sont les Seuls qui restent icy et qui sont a L'Amerique pour vous apprendre La facheuse et déplorable Scituation ou Nous Nous trouvons, ainsy que la Colonie, par la Revolte des trouppes francoises et Suisses; elles prirent les armes le 27^{e} de ce mois pour se rendre maistre de la ville et la livrer aux Enemis le primptems prochain, Sous pretexte qu'on lui avoit fait mil injustice, qu'ils avoient patientés pendant la paix, mais que la guerre leur donnoit lieu de s'en vanger. voicy la façon dont ils s'y prirent sans qu'aucun officier en ait Eu aucune Connoissance.
Le 27^{e} de ce mois a la pointe du Jour les Suisses prirent les armes et se mirent en Bataille dans la Cour du fort. l'officier Suisse qui y couche les fit Rentrer dans leurs chambres apres leur avoir promis tout ce qu'ils demanderent; au lieu de Rester tranquils, ils furent dans celles des francois leur Reprocher leur lacheté, qu'ils leurs avoient promis de En suivre et qu'ils n'avoient faits aucun mouvement. Ce Reproche les anima, ils se mirent en Bataille tous avivés dans la Cour du fort, et firent Battre par force aux Tambours la generalle dans la ville en les faisant Conduire par 30 fusilieres la Bayonette au Bout du fusil; tous les officiers se rendirent sur le champ, au fort ou ils n'entrerent que par Ruze et suplication, n'ayant pu ebranler l'Epée a la main les sentinels que les troupes avoient mis a l'avancée pour en deffendre l'Entree qui leur mettoient la Bayonette sur l'Estomac en les Couchant en Joue: Ce fut un Coup du Ciel de ce qu'il ne portit pas un Coup de fusil, tant par maladresse que par volonté, si Ce Malheur fut arrivé tout Ces officiers auroient été tues, etans chacun Couches en Joue par les Revoltés. M. De la perelle major fut aussitot audevant des Tambours dans la ville pour les arrester, il ne pût y parvenir, les fusiliers le tenoient en Joue et le Couvroient de Bayonette, de sorte qu'il ne pouvoit remuer il le presserent Meme si fort en le mettant entre eux qu'ils le souleverent pendant trente pas,

cette action passa devant les fenestres de M Bigot ou il
était, il fait temoin qu'il hazarda faire pendant ce tems la
etant continuellement couché en Joue et qu'il fit tout au
monde ce qu'on peut faire, soit par menace ou par douceur
pour en faire cesser de Battre; il prit enfin le parti de
les laisser ce de se rendre au fort apres qu'ils y furent
rentré il trouva pour lors que les officiers avoient enfin
Engagé les soldats a former leurs Compagnies par ordre de M
Duchambon, qui s'y étoit Rendu et apres leur avoir fait dire
qu'ils le Connoissoient pour leur major ils suivoient son
Commandement tant bien que mal: M Duchambon leur demanda
les Raisons qu'ils avoient pour manquer si essentiellement
au Roy, ils disent que c'etoit pour avoir une demie Corde de
Bois d'augmentation, qu'ils demandoient les cinq cordes
qu'on leur avoit retenu pour vol qu'ils avoient fait de
pareille quantité, qu'on leur donna leurs Rations dues
pendant le voyage qu'ils avoient fait a Canceau et a
L'Acadie et qu'on paye aux Recrus de 1741 leur habillement
il n'en n'avoit point ete Envoyé pour les dix hommes
d'augmentation dans les Compagnies on leur promit ce qu'il
voulurent et M Bigot des le lendemain a commencé a leur
faire payer ce qu'ils demandoient. les Suisses quoiqu'ils
fussent Rentré dans leur chambres leurs officiers leur ayant
promis de Remplir leurs demandes, qui etoient les mêmes que
celles des francois, Ressortirent avec leurs armes a la
suitte des francois et l'officier ne put jamais obtenir
d'Eux de S'en aller a leurs chambres. Ils ne veulent point
reconnoitre M chener pour leur Commendant, il les
Connoissoit Extremement mutins, ce qui le Rendoit attentif a
les bien discipliner; il est malade depuis un mois, Ce qui
l'a empeché de se Rendre aux Cazernes le Bue de cette
Revolte, Ce cy est certain plusieurs soldats l'ayant dit
dans l'Action étoit de se Rendre maistre des magazins, du
Tresor et de livrer la place au primptems a l'Enemy, qu'ils
veulent le seroit etant ennuyé du service francois. Cette
idée de Rebellion n'eut point appaissée, quoi qu'on leur ait
donné tout ce qu'ils ont demandé, on scait a n'en point
douter que leur dessein est toujours le même et que ce sont
les Suisses qui Entretiennent les francois dans ces
sentimens.
Nous sommes icy leurs Esclaves, ils font tout le mal qu'ils
veulent, se font donner par les marchands et aux prix qu'ils
le Jugent a propo ce qu'ils acheptent en les menacant de ne
pas les Epargner dans l'occasion les bourgeois et marchands
qui ne sont point armés et en trop petit nombre n'étant que
40 ou 50 pour pouvoir s'assembler sont plus morts que vifs
et pensent tout a passer en france l'automne prochaine s'ils
peuvent sauver leur vie cet hiver, il ne s'agit pas moins
par les discours du soldat, que d'estre tous passé au fil de
l'Epée, apres quoy il se rendront a l'Ennemy. vous voyez
Monseigneur, notre scituation nous n'avons pas besoin de
vous suplier d'y Remedier etans persuadués que vous le ferez

aussitot que vous le pouvez pour y parvenir, nous pensons qu'il faut Relever sur le champ les Suisses; il ne doit jamais y en avoir En garnison dans la Colonie apres une action pareille Cauzée par eux, qui ne s'oubliera Jamais; il n'y a pas de secours icy a attendre [des] habitants, Comme a la Martinique et a St. Dominigue cent cinquante Suisses sont en assez grand nombre pour faire faire aux francois tout ce qu'ils voudront. Les trois quarts de ces derniers etant des miserables capables de tous crimes. il conviendroit aussy de faire remplacer ce nombre de Suisses par deux ou tois Compagnies de la Marinne qui contiendroient les autres francois sur les quels on prendroit quinze ou vingt des plus mutins pour en faire un example icy ou en france. Ce secour Monseigneur doit estre prompt pour sauver cette place au Roy et peut estre la vie de ses sujets. Le desordre est au dessus de toutte expression et nous ne croyons pas qu'il y ait Jamais eu d'example d'une Revolte aussy Complette, n'y ayant pas un seul soldat exempt et peu de Caporeaux La Compagnie des Canoniers n'a pas Branlé ainsy que les sergents francois, touttes les truppes luy en veulent un mal infini, les Coporeaux et Sergents Suisses ont soutenus leurs soldats. Nous n'avons pas osé envoyer les deux Batimens qui vont a la Martinique en france, de crainte que le premier navire qui seroit venu de france n'eut appris icy leur arrivée. La garnison pour lors, voyant que nous aurions demandé du secours auroit tout sacagé ensuite passée a l'Ennemy; on ne peut doutter de leur sentiment puis qu'ils disent dans les Rues hautement que toutte la Colonie unie ensemble ne peut leur Resister et qu'ils sont les seuls maistres. il n'y a pas en effet dans toutte la Colonie 600 hommes. Nous prions Messieurs de Champigny et Bauché de faire partir aussitot nos lettres Recues, deux ou trois Batteaux pour vous apprendre notre scituation et sauver la Colonie au Roy.

Nous avons l'honeur d'estre avec un tres profond Respect.
Monseigneur
vos tres humbles ce tres
obeissants serviteurs
Signée
Duchambon et Bigot

Post Scriptum

Nous avons l'honeur d'observer a Monseigneur qu'il n'y a eu aucune plainte de la part des soldats francois Contre leur Capitaine: les Suisses sont les seuls qui ayant fait Contre le leur, mais sans aucun fondement. Nous aurons l'honeur de Rendre a Monseigneur un Compte plus Circonstancié de tout ce qui s'est passé et se passera de la part des Revoltés. ils se font payer tant de la part des francois que des Suisses tout ce qu'ils peuvent imaginer leur estre du par le Roy et les paroitre depuis 5 ou 6 ans, nonobstant les ordonances que les gouverneurs cy devant, avoient Rendu a ce sujet

enfin les inquiétudes les prennent a tout moment comme des phroenesiés. Je suis obligé de finir mes moments Jours et nuits etant observés ainsy que ceux des officiers.

Champigny

pour copie
Bauché

Appendix C. Transcript of the Court-Martial of Abraham Dupaquier, 9 December 1745.[1]

Dupaquier

Copie — Cejourdhuy Vingt Cinquieme Novembre mil Sept Cent quarante Cinq Au Nom Et par Ordre de Mr. Louis Ignace de Karrer Colonel du Regiment suisse de son Nom a Eté pris Information par nous Amedée de Chasseur Cape. Lieut Reformé En cette quallité grand Juge du Regiment Suisse de Karrer En presence de Mrs. Lesd. Officiers Sousignes Contre le nommé Abraham Du Paquier Soldat dudit Régiment.

Interrogé — sur son Nom, Son Age, Le lieu de sa naissance, Et Sur sa Religion.

Repondu — Qu'il S appeloit Abraham Dupaquier fils du Mr. Abraham Dupaquier cy devant Lieutent Colonel du Regiment de guibert suisse au service de S.M. Leroy de Sardaigne qu'il Etoit Agé de Vingt Six ans, Et natif De neufchatel en Suisse de la Religion Catholique Apostolique Et Romaine ayant il y a deux ans abjuré le Calvinisme.

Interrogé... — Pourquoy il est dettenu dans les prisons.

Repondu — Qu'il croyoit que c'ettoit pour s'etre trouvé dans l'assemblée que luy Et une partie de la Troupe avoient faitte a Louisbourg Ille Royalle Pour se plaindre a leurs Officiers des mauvaises Légumes qui leurs etoient donnes.

Interrogé — Comment Cette assemblee sétoit faitte.

Repondu — Que le Lendemain de noel dernier Vingt Sixieme Dexembre etant le soir aux Casernes a boire une Bouteille d'eau de vie avec les nomes Renard Et soly ses Camarades Ce premier avoit commencé a se plaindre des mauvais vivres, Et de la retenue de ceux qui leurs manquoient De La derniere quinzaine que Soly prit sur cela la parolle En disant qu'il avoit Servy en Espagne Et ailleurs ou pareilles Injustices ne se commettoient

point qu'en tout Cas on s'assembloi pour se plaindre que la dessus d'une commune voix Ils convinrent que le Lendemain au mattin Il falloit en faire autant pour demander les dits vivres, qu'ensuitte Renard dit qu'il falloit aller en fair la proposition dans les Chambrées Et tenir une Liste de ceux qui y consentiroit que Soly Sur cela prit une Chandelle Et sen fut dans les Chambres avec Renard que luy les avoit Suivy dans quelques unes.

Interrogé Ce qui se passa entre eux trois etant de retour dans leur Chambre.

Repondu... Que Renard adressa la parolle a luy Dupaquier Et dit puisque vois Connoiser Les françois vous devrier vous promener dans leurs Chambres pour les avertir que nous nous assemblons Demain. Et qu'ils ne s ettonnent pas de cela qu'il est question seulement de demander les vivres Surquoy je luy dis que j'y consentois pouvu qu'il voulut venir avec moy, ladessus nous fumes tous les deux premierement dans une des Chambres de la Compagᵉ de Villejoin ou aÿant trouvé tout le monde couché Et pour toutte lumiere la Lueur du feu de la Cheminée J'adressay la parolle a un des Soldats de laditte Compagnie Et Chambrée dont pour le present je ne me rappelles pas le nom mais que je promets déclarer dès que je me le rappelleray au quel je dis que demain nous devions nous assembler pour nous plaindre, Et prier que l'on nous donne nos vivres je ne parlay a personne autre De Laditte Chambre, Et de la nous fumes dans unne des Chambres de la Comᵉ De Duhaget ou nous rencontrames aussy presque tout le monde couché a l'exception de deux ou trois hommes qui etoient aupres du feu A nôtre arrivée on aluma de la Chandelle après quoy parlant tous les deux aux soldats trouves aupres du feu Renard Et moy leur dimes égallement que nous devions nous assembler dans les mêmes termes que je l'avois proposé dans la Chambre de la Compᵉ de Villejoin protestant aussÿ ne pouvoir quand a present dire le nom des deux ou trois soldats rencontrés auprès du feu. Cela fait nous retournames dans nôtre Chambre.

Interrogé... Sy en comuniquant aux Soldats françois le projet formé de s'assembler le lendemain au

mattin Il ne les a pas exhortes a en faire autant Et quelle Reponce les dits Soldats ont fait sur les discours qu'il leur a tenus.

Repondu qu'ils se sont contentés d'avertir les dits Soldats de leur projet d'assemblée sans les avoir incittes a en faire autant Et que les dits Soldats leur ont repondu Laisser faire nous en parlerons a nos Camarades.

Interrogé Puisqu'a la sortie des Chambres des françois Ils sont rentres dans la leur Il doit dire Ce qu'ils ont faits pendant la Nuit Et puis Le Lendemain de grand mattin pour faire assembler le monde.

Repondu... Que de retour dans sa Chambre Il etoit convenu avec Renard Et Soly de veiller toutte la nuit, que pendant quelques tems Il s'est jetté tout habillé sur le Lit qu'a son reveil Il avoit dit a ça Il ne faut pas sassembler comme des Enfans, Lors qu'il arivera un Officier qui Luy parlera Le premier. Sur Cela Soly Et Renard luy dirent qu'il falloit faire un escrit pour exposer leur raisons ce qu'il fit en composant le Billet qui fut remis Le Lendemain a Mr. Rasser par le Tambour Stökly Et dont Il presentoit encore le double, que le Lendemain Vingt Sept.e X.bre quelqu'un envoya Chercher Les Tambours pour qu'ils rapellassent, qu'il Ignoroit Le nom de celuy que les avoit cherché qu'il se rapelle qu'ensuitte le monde sortit les uns par surprise, les autres sçachant le sujet de l'assemblée Et qu'on semit en Bataille sur La Place du Quartier.

Interrogé Pourquoy n'ayant été question entre eux trois que de sassembler pour demander Justice Ils lavoient fait avec les armes.

Repondu Que d'abord Il n'avoit point été question de s'armer, mais qu' une voix parmy la foulle ayant dit que puisque l'on faisoit rapeller les Tambours pour qu'il vint un officier Il couvenoit que l'on prit les armes et que cela donneroit plus de poid même a leurs Justes plaintes qu'au surplus Il luy seroit impossible de nommer le Soldat qui a proposé la chose ainsy, Le tumulte Et l'obscuritté l'ayant empeché de le distinquer.

Interrogé... Sy ayant remarqué qu'il ne sortoit pas de nôtre quartier autant de nos Soldats qu'ils l'avoient compté Il n'a pas été dans les Chambres pour les y engager Et même pour les

y forcer en cas de refus Et sy pour cela il n'est pas entré dans quelqune des Chambres La Bayonnette au bout du fusil.

Repondu... Que S'ettant assemblés sur la place et voyant que nos soldats ne sortoient point trois ou quatres fusillers Se détacherent effectivement avec le caporal du Croix qu'il etoit du nombre de ceux qui y furent mais qu'il n'est point entré dans les Chambres qu'il s'est contenté de se tenir au bas de l'escalier et que le caporal fut dans les Chambres, que le monde sortit ensuitte mais que luy n'avoit nullement La Bayonnette au bout du fusil.

Interrogé... Ce qu'il a fait etant sous les armes s'il a eu Connoissance que quelqu'uns de nos sergents sçavoit Le sujet de leur assemblée Et s'il s'en étoit trouve quelques uns a la tette de leur mouvement.

Repondu qu' etant sous les armes Il s'est tenu dans les rangs comme les utres en attendant l'arrivée d'un officier, qu'il n'a rien du tout dit et qu'il n'a eu aucunne Connoissance que nos sergents ayent sçu leur projet d'assemblée qu'il proteste n'en avoir vû aucun a la tette de leur mouvement qu'apres l'arrivée de Mr. Raser qui les fit appeller et envoya chercher.

Interrogé... S'il a eu connoissance que les françois devoient batrre la generalle.

Repondu... Qu' il n'en a eu auccune non plus que personne de ses Camarades

Interrogé... Sy Lorsque Mr. Raser a renvoyé la trouppe Il n'a pas après cela retourné dans les Chambres des françois pour les engager a prendre les armes, ou s'il ne les y a pas exittes pas des reproches en leur disant qu'ils n'avoient pas le coeur d'en faire autant qu'eux ou s'il n'a pas entendu quelqu'un de nos Soldats faire ces sortes de reproches, qu'il doit naturellement avoüer sy dans l'Intervalle que nôtre trouppe fut renvoyée par son officier Jusqu'a la generalle Il ne s'est point de son propre mouvement ou a l'instiguation de quelqu'un entretenu avec quelqu'un des trouppes françoises au sujet de cette affaire.

Repondu... Que dabord après le renvoy de nôtre trouppe par Mr. Rasser il est rentré dans sa chambre qu'il n'a parlé a aucun françois ny par exhortation ny par reproches qu'il n'a ouy aucun Soldat suisse être tombé dans ce

Cas Et qu'il n'a sorty de la Chambre que pour se rendre sur la place lorsque la generalle avoit été battu Et que ses propres officiers avoit fait sortir la trouppe pour la mettre en Bataille.
Surquoy nous avons fait Comparoitre devant nous Et en presence dudit Dupaquier Le nommé Joseph Renard Et luy avons par Confrontation comuniqué l'aveu dudit Dupaquier Comme quoy le Vingt six X.bre au soir après avoir fait la tournée dans nos Chambres Ils ont été ensemble dans celles des Compagnies de villejoin et duhaget pour communiquer aux françois le projet formé de sassembler le lendemain mattin. Et après avoir exhorté le dit Renard a nous accuser la véritté sans S'opignatrer par des négatives qui etoient des plus deplacées lors qu'un fait est aussy averré, Il nous a repondu qu'il convenoit avoir Eté avec Dupaquier dans les dittes deux Chambres des Compe de villejoin et de duhaget, que dans cette derniere Il croyoit avoir parlé au nommé Dubois Caporal de la ditte Compe qu'il ne sçavoit pas le nom de celuy a qui on avoit parlé de la Compe de villejoin attendu que dans icelle c'est Dupaquier qui a proposé le fait, qu'au surplus touttes les Circonstances alleguées au Sujet par le dit Dupaquier sont Conformes a la veritté a l exception Cependant qu'il croit que Dubois le Caporal a repondu qu'il ne se soucioit pas de cella que quoy que les Legumes leurs manquoient qu'il en parleroit et que l'on verroit a Cella.

Interrogé — S'il ne sçait pas que toutte asemblée illicitte est defendue par nos Ordonnances millitaires sous peine de la vie.

Repondu — Qu'il ne l'ignoroit pas mais qu'il navoit jamais crû que celle cy fut de cette natture D'autant plus qu'ils n'avoient manqués ny a leurs officiers naturels ny a qui que ce soit d'autres ayant toujours été dans une parfaitte obeissance Et n'ayant demandé que justice sur les mauvaises Legumes qui leurs etoient distribuées quoy que le prix Leur en fut retenu sur leur solde.

Interrogé... — S'il avoit lieu de se plaindre contre aucun de ses hauts ou bas officiers qu'il devoit le faire en Confiance que même pour luy en facillitter les moyens ou feroit retirer Mrs Les officiers Commisaires qui

pouroient luy être Suspects, qu'il devoit déclarer aussy s'il n'a pas Exactement reçeu son Prêt, son habillement, Et son Decompte.

Repondu... Qu'il ne pouvoit en Consience se plaindre contre aucun de ses hauts et bas officiers qu'il avoit régulierement touché tout ce qui dependoit de son habillement, de son Décompte Et de sa solde, a l'exception des vivres qui avoient été l'originne de l'assemblée qu'il etoit vexé aussy par bien des ouvrages extraordinaires auxquels on les avoit obligé sans nulle retribution Et bien d'autres griefs dont le précis devoit être Contenu dans la requette presentée a Mr. Du Jambon qu'il avoit a adjoutter encore que le pillage de Canseau leur avoit été promis par Mr. Duquesnel défunt Et que bien loin dela après avoir fait leur devoir en braves soldats on les a obligé d'enlever et embarquer les effets des Anglois sans avoir reçeu le moindre salaire qu'au contraire Ils avoient été maltraites dans cet ouvrage forcé non pas a la veritté par leurs propres officiers.
Lecture faitte audit Dupaquier de toutte la teneur de la present Information Il a Déclaré quelle Contenoit veritté, qu'il demandoit très humblement grace et a signé Les presentes fait a Rochefort Le jour Et an que Dessus signé

Abraham Dupaquier

VandenVelden; Rasser, de Lesperance, Morel. De Chasseur Cape Lieut. Reformé En cette qualité grand juge.

Ce jourdhuy 9e X.bre 1745 Le nommé Abraham Dupaquier a été condamné par le Conseill De Guerre par Contumance a être Décappitté, Et son Efigie attachée a la Potence sans la grace de Mrs Le Colonel Lieut Colonel Et de Mrs les Cape Juges du Conseil Supperieur a Rochefort Le jour Et an que dessus.

Signé De Chasseur grand Juge

Mrs Le Colonnel, Lieutent Colonel, Et Led. Cape Juges du Conseill Supperieur remercient Le Louable Conseill de Guerre de la Sentance qu'il a rendu contre le nomé abraham Dupaquier Et Ils le prient

de la faire mettre en exécution a Rochefort
Le 9e X.bre 1745.

DeKarrer

De Merveilleux, Gignoux, Cailly, Schönher

Endnotes

Preface

1 William John Eccles, "The Social, Economic and Political Significance of the Military Establishment in New France," Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 (March 1971), p. 5. About 1685 there were apparently 600 to 800 soldiers and 1,500 to 2,000 civilians in and around Montreal (Louise Dechêne, Habitants et marchands de Montréal au XVII^{e} siècle [Paris: Plon, 1974], p. 83), but this high concentration covered a region and not a town; moreover, it lasted for only a few years.

2 André Corvisier, L'armée française de la fin du XVII^{e} siècle au ministère de Choiseul; le soldat (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1964), 2 vols.

Organization and Numerical Strength

1 For background information on the Compagnies Franches de la Marine, see C.J. Russ, "Les Troupes de la Marine, 1683-1713" (MA thesis, McGill Univ., Montreal, 1971), p. 23.

2 John Stewart McLennan, Louisbourg from its Foundation to its Fall, 1713-1758, 3rd ed. (Sydney: Fortress Press, 1969), pp. 195, 244-5.

3 France. Archives Nationales. Archives des Colonies (hereafter cited as AN, Colonies), C^{11}B, Vol. 23, fol. 104v, Bigot to minister, 19 Oct. 1741.

4 Ibid., Vol. 21, fol. 55v, Forant to minister, 2 Oct. 1739.

5 Ibid., A, Vol. 1, fol. 5, ordonnance, 9 May 1723.

6 Ibid., C^{11}B, Vol. 17, fol. 10v, Saint-Ovide and Le Normant to minister, 22 Oct. 1735.

7 Ibid., Vol. 20, fol. 58-8v, Bourville and Le Normant to minister, 21 Oct. 1738.

8 Ibid., Vol. 26, fols. 236-8, ordonnance, 20 June 1743.

9 Prizes totalling 150 livres were awarded in 1744 with six or 12 livres going to each of the successful competitors. AN, Colonies, C^{11}B, Vol. 26, fol. 182v, bordereau, 9 Nov. 1744.

10 Ibid., Vol. 1, fols. 209-10, Ligondès to council, 12 Jan. 1715.

11 Ibid., B, Vol. 39, fols. 287-95v, "Memoire du Roy," 26 June 1717. See Robert J. Morgan, "A History of Block 16, Louisbourg: 1713-1768," (manuscript on file, National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, Louisbourg, 1975), p. 60, for the case of Ensign Loppinot who, in 1741, had his eight-year-old son enrolled as a cadet.
12 AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 7, fols. 204-9, Saint-Ovide to minister, 21 Dec. 1725.
13 Ibid., D^2C, Vol. 47, Saint-Ovide, Mézy, Sabatier, Bourville to minister, 1 Nov. 1726.
14 Ibid., B, Vol. 57, fols. 786-7, "Ordonnance pour l'Etablissement de deux cadets dans chacun des Compagnies des Troupes de l'isle Royale," 19 June 1732.
15 France. Archives Nationales. Section Outre-Mer (hereafter cited as AN, Outre-Mer), G^2, Vol. 184, fol. 376, "Noyade du soldat Louis Pancaud dit S. Louis....," 25 July 1737.
16 AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 17, fol. 10-0v, Saint-Ovide and Le Normant to minister, 22 Oct. 1735.
17 Here and elsewhere in this report, the word "men" denotes private soldiers (fusiliers), corporals, sergeants, drummers and cadets.
18 AN, Colonies, D^2C, Vol. 47, passim. A few reviews for the 1730-45 period can be found scattered through the AN, $C^{11}B$ series.
19 Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vols. 11-25, passim., "Etat de la recette et consommation des vivres faittes dans les magasins du Roy a l'isle Royalle...subsistance des trouppes...."
20 Lee B. Kennett, The French Armies in the Seven Years' War; A Study in Military Organization and Administration (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1967), p. 81.
21 AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 20, fols. 119-20, Le Normant to minister, 25 Oct. 1738.
22 Ibid., Vol. 21, fol. 59-9v, Forant to minister, 14 Nov. 1739.
23 Ibid.; ibid., B, Vol. 68, fol. 348v, Maurepas to Forant and Bigot, 26 May 1739.
24 Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 17, fols. 269v-71v, de Pensens to minister, 18 Oct. 1735. It must be admitted that the high desertion rate at Port Toulouse and Isle Saint-Jean cannot be attributed entirely to low morale. The fact that desertion was easier from these posts than from Louisbourg was probably a more important factor.

The Swiss

1 France. Archives de la Guerre. Service Historique de l'Armée (hereafter cited as ASHA), Xi, capitulation, 15 Dec. 1719; ibid., Laffiland, "Memoire concernant le Regiment Suisse de Karrer....," 18 May 1749.

2 Ibid., capitulations of 15 Dec. 1719 and 9 June 1721; France. Archives Nationales. Archives de la Marine (hereafter cited as AM), A^1, art. 69, pièce 33, capitulation, 25 Sept. 1731; ASHA, Xi, "Projet de Renouvellement de la Capitulation pour le Regiment Suisse de Karrer," 1741.
3 Marcel Giraud, Histoire de la Louisiane française (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1958-66), Vol. 3, pp. 278-9.
4 ASHA, Xi, capitulation, 9 June 1721.
5 Ibid., "Extrait de la Revue," Sept. 1722.
6 AN, Colonies, F^2C, art. 3, fols. 168-70, Karrer to council, 1 April 1722.
7 Ibid., B, Vol. 45-1, fols. 50-1, council to Karrer, 9 April 1722.
8 Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 7, fols. 14-9v, Saint-Ovide to minister, 16 Nov. 1724.
9 Ibid., Vol. 6, fols. 217-21, Saint-Ovide to minister, 12 Dec. 1723.
10 Ibid., B, Vol. 47, fol. 1272, Maurepas to Saint-Ovide, 26 June 1724.
11 Ibid., Vol. 49-2, fols. 741-3v, "Ordonnance pour le reglement des Compagnies Suisses du Regiment de Karrer," 5 Feb. 1726.
12 Ibid., Vol. 72, fol. 431-1v, Maurepas to Duquesnel and Bigot, 17 May 1741.
13 ASHA, Xi, "Extrait de la Revue du Regiment Suisse de Karrer," 30 Sept. 1744.
14 France. Archives Maritimes. Port de Rochefort (hereafter cited as Port de Rochefort), IR, Vol. 47, fol. 12, "Détachement Suisse de Karrer....," 16 Aug. 1745.
15 AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 7, fols. 14-9v, Saint-Ovide to minister, 16 Nov. 1724.
16 Ibid., B, Vol. 45-2, fols. 1138-41, council to Saint-Ovide and Mézy, 13 May 1722.
17 AM, A^1, art. 69, pièce 33, capitulation, 25 Sept. 1731.
18 AN, Colonies, B, Vol. 49-1, fols. 190v-92, Maurepas to Karrer, 16 April 1726.
19 AN, Outre-Mer, G^2, Vol. 179, fols. 462-502, "Procedure Criminelle a l'Encontre de Reintender Sergeant Suisse....," 11 Sept., 20 Oct. 1727.
20 AN, Colonies, B, Vol. 52-2, fols. 572-3, Maurepas to Saint-Ovide and Mézy, 12 June 1728.
21 Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 24, fols. 163-4v, Bigot to minister, 14 Nov. 1742.
22 Ibid.; ibid., B, Vol. 74, fol. 590-0v, Maurepas to Duquesnel, 15 June 1742.
23 Ibid., B, Vol. 76-2, fol. 491v, Maurepas to Bigot, 27 June 1743.

24 Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 9, fol. 87v, Saint-Ovide to minister, 16 Dec. 1727.
25 Ibid., Vol. 12, fol. 44-4v, Saint-Ovide to minister, 25 Nov. 1731.
26 Ibid., fols. 267v-68, Saint-Ovide to minister, 15 Nov. 1732.
27 Ibid., B, Vol. 56, fols. 327v-28, Maurepas to Karrer, 30 Dec. 1732.
28 Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 9, fols. 98-9, Cailly, "Memoire à presenter a Monsieur de Karrer des difficultés qu'on me fait....," 24 Oct. 1741.
29 Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 23, fols. 82-3, Bigot to minister, 18 Jan. 1741.
30 Ibid., fols. 60-3, Duquesnel to minister, 19 Oct. 1741.
31 Ibid., B, Vol. 74, fol. 590-0v, Maurepas to Duquesnel, 15 June 1742.
32 Ibid., Vol. 73, fol. 324-4v, Maurepas to Karrer, 15 Dec. 1741.
33 Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 23, fol. 78-8v, Duquesnel to minister, 23 Nov. 1741.
34 ASHA, Xi, capitulation, 15 Dec. 1719, article 8.
35 AM, A^1, art. 69, pièce 33, capitulation, 25 Sept. 1731, article 11.
36 AN, Colonies, F^2C, art. 3, fols. 323-6v, Karrer to minister, 29 June 1722.
37 ASHA, A^3, art. 80, fols. 6-7, _____ to Karrer, 8 June 1739.
38 AN, Colonies, F^2C, art. 3, fols. 323-6v, Karrer to council, 29 June 1722.
39 Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 7, fols. 167-71, Mézy to minister, 7 Dec. 1725; Port de Rochefort, IE, Vol. 108, fol. 118, Maurepas, 30 July 1726.
40 AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 23, fols. 82-3, Bigot to minister, 18 Jan. 1741.
41 Ibid., Vols. 12-9, passim., "Extrait des registres de l'hopital Royal de Louisbourg....," 1733-38. (See Table 4).
42 AN, Colonies, $C^{11}C$, Vol. 9, fols. 98-9, Cailly, "Memoire....," 24 Oct. 1741.
43 Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 22, fol. 95-5v, Duquesnel to minister, 1 Dec. 1740.
44 Ibid., Vol. 26, fols. 231-4, Duchambon and Bigot to Maurepas, 31 Dec. 1744.
45 Ibid., E, dossier 157, dossier Abraham Dupaquier, transcript of the court-martial of Abraham Dupaquier, 9 Dec. 1745 (hereafter cited as Dupaquier Court-Martial).
46 Marcel Giraud, op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 278.
47 AN, Outre-Mer, G^1, Vols. 406-7, Louisbourg parish registers. Many of these conversions took place in the Louisbourg hospital under the influence of the Frères de la Charité. At least one of these cases was an obvious deathbed conversion.

48 AN, Colonies, B, Vol. 67, fol. 36, Maurepas to P. Maurice Godefroy, 9 April 1738.
49 Ibid., C^{11}B, Vol. 7, fols. 39-45, Mézy to minister, 15 Nov. 1724.

Recruitment

1 See "The Swiss" for the little that is known about recruitment for the Karrer regiment.
2 See below for the number of recruits arriving in the colony each year, 1720-45.

	Compagnies Franches	Karrer Detachment
1720	0	-
1721	-	-
1722	15	50
1723	81	3
1724	1	50
1725	23	-
1726	40	30
1727	40	5
1728	35 (40 sent)	12
1729	30	-
1730	84	17
1731	0	13
1732	107	10
1733	57 (60 sent)	9
1734	28	18
1735	41 (49 sent)	10
1736	42	10
1737	52	26
1738	53	20
1739	2	18
1740	50	12
1741	139	62
1742	57	8
1743	60	20
1744	0	0
1745	0	0
Total 1720-45:	1036	403

Recruitment within the colony was prohibited as detrimental to the fishery. When news reached Versailles that two engagés employed by a fisherman had enlisted at Louisbourg, they were ordered discharged, but other cases may have gone unnoticed. AN, Colonies, B, Vol. 57-2, fol. 761-1v, Maurepas to Saint-Ovide, 19 June 1732.
3 André Corvisier, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 163-78.
4 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 355.
5 AN, Colonies, B, Vol. 54-2, fol. 520, "Ordre du Roy au sr. de Gannes pour levée de Soldats," 7 March 1730. D'Ailleboust was born in Canada and de Gannes in Acadia,

therefore it is unlikely that either had any prior contact with the men they recruited.

6 Georges Girard, Le service militaire en France à la fin du règne de Louis XIV. Racolage et milice (1701-1715) (Paris: Plon, Nourrit et cie, 1922), pp. 75-161; André Corvisier, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 189-95.

7 André Corvisier, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 190.

8 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 186. Early in the 18th century Rochefort and the surrounding area was the most important centre of colonial recruiting, but the authorities in Louisbourg preferred men from Paris. See, for example, AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 15, fol. 73-3v, Saint-Ovide and Le Normant to minister, 24 Oct. 1734.

9 AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 1, fol. 489-9v, Amariton, 21 Feb. 1716.

10 AM, A^2, art. 24, pièce 40, ordre du roi, 1 March 1717; Port de Rochefort, IE, Vol. 106, fol. 31, Maurepas, 6 July 1725.

11 AN, Colonies, B, Vol. 64, fol. 287v, Maurepas to Beauharnois, 24 Dec. 1736.

12 Port de Rochefort, IE, Vol. 87, fols. 415-7, council, 22 April 1716.

13 Ibid., Vol. 117, fols. 65-6, Maurepas, 29 July 1732.

14 Of 56 recruits who left Paris in 1718, 24 deserted en route. AN, Colonies, F^2C, Vol. 1, fols. 174-5, council to de la Gallissoniere, 9 July 1718. Cf. ibid., B, Vol. 58, fols. 167v-8, Maurepas to de la Croix, 13 July 1733.

15 Port de Rochefort, IE, Vol. 86, fols. 361-5, Pontchartrain, 4 April 1715.

16 In 1732, for example, 13 men were sick when their ship sailed for Quebec. They were left at Rochefort, then sent to join the Isle Royale garrison after they recovered. Port de Rochefort, IE, Vol. 116, fol. 404, Maurepas, 10 June 1732.

17 André Corvisier, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 328-9.

18 Ibid., Vol. 1, p. 303.

19 AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 18, fol. 48-8v, Saint-Ovide to minister, 7 Nov. 1736; ibid., B, Vol. 69, fol. 68, Maurepas, 22 Feb. 1739. The only surviving muster roll comes from outside our period. It shows that of the 1,067 men serving in the Isle Royale companies in 1752, only 59 (5.5 per cent) were on six-year terms. The rest presumably had engagements perpetuels. Quebec (Diocese). Archives du Séminaire de Québec, Fonds Surlaville, poly. 55, no. 8, "Signallement général des trouppes de l'Isle Royale," 13 March 1752.

20 AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 33, fols. 89-91v, Raymond to minister, 12 Oct. 1753.

21 AN, Outre-Mer, G^2, Vol. 182, fol. 215, "Conseil Superieur. Procedure criminelle...a l'encontre du nommé

Nicolas LeBegue dit Brulevillage et Thomas Berranger dit La Rosée soldats acusés de vol.," 3 March - 2 June 1733.

22 In 1749, after the colony had been returned to French control, it was claimed that half the soldiers in the reestablished garrison were deserters. AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 28, fols. 60-1v, des Herbiers and Prévost to minister, 27 Nov. 1749.

23 AN, Outre-Mer, G^2, Vol. 182, fols. 195-6, "Conseil Superieur. Procedure criminelle....," 5 March 1733.

24 AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 17, fols. 296-315, court-martial of Joseph Lagand dit Picard, accused of desertion, 24 Oct. 1736. Lagand's trials were only beginning at this point. His captain agreed to keep him on, but sent him to France on a six-month leave to take treatment at the Rochefort hospital. Through administrative confusion and the hardheartedness of the Rochefort intendant, he was refused admission to the hospital. Confused and penniless, the young man began walking to Paris, selling articles of his uniform along the way to feed himself. After arriving in the capital he naturally turned again to the military for salvation, but this time the first recruiter he encountered was from the Choiseul regiment. He served in that infantry regiment for a year, always in and out of the hospital, until one day he learned to his astonishment that he was being pursued as a deserter since he had not returned to Isle Royale in time. He was put in prison, then carried in chains to Louisbourg where a compassionate court-martial acquitted him and ordered him to resume service in the d'Ailleboust company.

25 It was not unusual for 18th-century racoleurs to trick men into signing an engagement for an infantry company by telling their victims they were joining the cavalry or some other elite branch. Georges Girard, op. cit., pp. 76-8.

26 Port de Rochefort, IE, Vol. 106, fols. 65-6, Maurepas, 20 July 1725; AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 8, fols. 55-64v, Saint-Ovide to minister, 20 Nov. 1726; AN, Colonies, B, Vol. 59-2, fol. 565v, ordre du roi, 12 May 1733.

27 Port de Rochefort, IE, Vol. 95, fols. 59-67, conseil, 10 July 1720; ibid., Vol. 101, fols. 617, 621-2, de Morville, 31 May 1723.

28 André Corvisier, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 720; Port de Rochefort, IE, Vol. 87, fols. 645-51, council, 28 May 1716; AN, Colonies, F^2C, Vol. 1, fols. 174-5, council to de la Gallissonniere, 9 July 1718.

29 AN, Colonies, B, Vol. 60, fols. 28v-9, Maurepas to Duval, 6 April 1734.

30 Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 8, fols. 55-64v, Saint-Ovide to minister, 20 Nov. 1726.

31 André Corvisier, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 640-1.

32 AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 14, fol. 74-4v, "Signalement de sept soldats de la compag^{e}. de M de Lavalliere qui ont deserté," [1735]; AM, C^{7}, dossier 324, congé absolu de Jean Baptiste Anri Tomasein dit Lagloire, 16 Oct. 1735.

33 "Je nay jamais vu de si mauvais soldats," complained one newly arrived governor who was consequently chastised for judging his men by metropolitan standards of size and appearance. AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 21, fol. 53-3v, Forant to minister, 25 Sept. 1739; ibid., B, Vol. 70, fol. 389-9v, Maurepas to Forant, 7 May 1740.

34 This sample includes a disproportionate number of criminals and deserters (12) who had a low signature rate. These are almost offset by the eight sergeants, of whom six signed. Excluding these two groups, one is left with 45 soldiers who married or appeared in court as witnesses. Eighteen of them (40 per cent) signed.

35 André Corvisier, op. cit., Vol. 1, pp. 533-42.

36 Ibid., pp. 390, 394.

37 AN, Colonies, B, Vol. 84-1, fol. 170v, Maurepas to Poitier, 21 Sept. 1746; ibid., Vol. 57-2, fol. 755v, Maurepas to Saint-Ovide, 19 June 1732.

Professions claimed by some Isle Royale soldiers, 1720-45, are: weaver, carter, butcher, farmer, shoemaker, vine-grower (vigneron), farmer (laboureur), gardener (2), glazier, tailor, cooper, joiner and tanner. These examples are taken from the judicial records. They must be used with caution as there was nothing to prevent the men from misrepresenting their occupations. The cooper, for example, was only an apprentice. The soldier who styled himself laboureur (a prestigious title normally reserved for the richest section of the peasantry) was in fact employed as a gardener before he enlisted.

Professions of the fathers of some Isle Royale soldiers, 1720-45, are: farmer (laboureur) (2), gardener, mason, baker, cooper, butcher, shoemaker, collier, master wheelwright, master blacksmith, footman, wine merchant, stationery merchant, "controlleur de machines," "loueur de carosse," "procureur" and "écrivain."

Discharge

1 AN, Colonies, B, Vol. 50-2, fols. 573-5v, Maurepas to Saint-Ovide and Mézy, 10 June 1727. The word "congé" is used here in place of the more exact term, congé absolu (discharge). In another context, it could mean congé limité or congé de semestre (leave).

2 Ibid., $D^{2}C$, Vol. 47, "Liste des soldats congediés morts ou desertes....," 1736.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., List of discharged soldiers who request half-pay, 3 Dec. 1730.
5 Ibid., List of invalids discharged, 20 Dec. 1732.
6 Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 9, fols. 72-8v, Saint-Ovide to minister, 21 Nov. 1727.
7 Ibid., Vol. 3, fols. 139v-40, memoire du roi, 18 July 1718.
8 Ibid., F^3, Vol. 50, fols. 161-2v, ordonnance, 26 June 1725.
9 Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 20, fols. 317-7v, "Troupe," unsigned, undated mémoire, [1738].
10 C.J. Russ, op. cit., pp. 106-8; Louise Dechêne, op. cit., pp. 80-8.
11 See "Recruitment."
12 AN, Colonies, B, Vol. 70, fol. 389-9v, Maurepas to Forant, 7 May 1740.
13 Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 21, fol. 111-1v, Bigot to minister, 4 Nov. 1739.
14 Ibid., Vol. 22, fols. 139-40v, Bigot to minister, 18 Jan. 1740.
15 Ibid., B, Vol. 53, fol. 581, Maurepas to Saint-Ovide, 15 March 1729.
16 Ibid., Vol. 65, fol. 12v, Maurepas to de Siougeat, 4 Feb. 1737.
17 Ibid., Vol. 74, fol. 563v, Maurepas to Bigot, 6 June 1742.
18 Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 21, fol. 55, Forant to minister, 2 Oct. 1739.
19 Ibid., Vol. 7, fol. 19, Saint-Ovide to minister, 16 Nov. 1724; cf. ibid., Vol. 20, fol. 317-7v, mémoire, [1738].
20 Ibid., Vol. 7, fols. 267-71, Mézy to minister, 7 Dec. 1725.
21 Ibid., B, Vol. 53, fols. 583-7, Saint-Ovide and Mézy to minister, 22 May 1729; ibid., Vol. 74, fol. 556, Maurepas to Duquesnel and Bigot, 1 June 1742.
22 Ibid., Vol. 76, fol. 50-0v, "Ordonnance du Roy....," 30 March 1743.

Soldiers leaving Isle Royale Garrison, 1720-45:

	Compagnies Franches: Discharges	Karrer Detachment: Men Returned to France
1720	-	-
1721	25	-
1722	-	-
1723	23	1
1724	22	4
1725	-	-
1726	23	-
1727	-	-
1728	28	-
1729	24	-
1730	17	14
1731	9	3

1732	19	-
1733	35	2
1734	26	-
1735	21	-
1736	34	3
1737	43	19
1738	35	18
1739	1	14
1740	37	11
1741	29	11
1742	29	-
1743	0	-
1744	0	-
1745	0	-

23 AN, Colonies, C^{11}B, Vol. 20, fols. 294-5, Duhaget to minister, 3 Dec. 1739.

24 Ibid., B, Vol. 51, fol. 117, Maurepas to Beauharnois, 13 Jan. 1728.

Economics

1 Blaine Adams, "The Construction and Occupation of the Barracks of the King's Bastion" (manuscript on file, National Historic Parks and Sites Branch, Parks Canada, Louisbourg, 1971), p. 79.

2 AN, Colonies, B, Vol. 49-2, fols. 713-6v, Maurepas to Saint-Ovide, 25 June 1726.

3 Ibid., C^{11}B, Vol. 7, fol. 12-2v, de Pensens et al. to Saint-Ovide, 28 Oct. 1724.

4 Port de Rochefort, IE, Vol. 101, fols. 753-5, de Morville, 9 June 1723.

5 AN, Colonies, C^{11}B, Vol. 5, fol. 380, Saint-Ovide to council, 29 Nov. 1721.

6 Ibid., Vol. 12, fols. 251v-3, Saint-Ovide to minister, 11 Nov. 1732.

7 Blaine Adams, loc. cit.

8 F.J. Thorpe, "The Politics of French Public Construction in the Islands of the Gulf of St. Lawrence, 1695-1758" (PhD diss., Univ. of Ottawa, Ottawa, 1973), pp. 232-62.

9 AN, Colonies, C^{11}B, Vol. 7, fol. 156-6v, de Verville, "Etat des ouvriers, Employes pour les travaux au Port de Louisbourg et ailleurs pendant le mois de 7^{bre}. 1724," n.d.

10 The sources shed little light on the organization and function of these gangs and only mention the chefs d'atteliers occasionally and incidentally. Ibid., B, Vol. 99, fols. 245-9, "Instructions pour le s^{r}. franquet D^{eur} des fortiffications de la N^{lle}. france sur les ouvrages que le Roy veut être executées à l'isle Royale," 12 May 1754.

11 The engineer and contractor reported these "contestations tumultueuses" and émeutes without

providing details. Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 5, fols. 235-7, de Verville to council, 19 June 1720; ibid., Vol. 6, fols. 127-30, Isabeau to council, 30 Nov. 1722.

12 Ibid., Vol. 7, fols. 142-50, de Verville, mémoire, [1724].

13 "Les travaux que l'on fait dans cette isle donnant l'occassion au soldat de gagner de l'argent l'aysance qu'elle leur [sic] procure le rend delicat et difficule." Ibid., B, Vol. 52-2, fols. 574v-7, Maurepas to Saint-Ovide, 18 June 1728. In 1719 the engineer estimated that a man could earn five livres per day and 465 livres in a season. Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 4, fols. 66-8, de Verville to council, 24 Jan. 1719.

14 Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 5, fol. 136v, Saint-Ovide and Mézy to minister, 10 Nov. 1720.

15 Ibid., Vol. 1, fols. 73-6v, l'Hermitte to council, 3 Nov. 1714; ibid., B, Vol. 88-1, fol. 175-5v, Maurepas to Guillet, 15 Oct. 1748.

16 Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 12, fol. 252, Saint-Ovide to minister, 11 Nov. 1732.

17 Ibid., Vol. 5, fols. 386-8v, Saint-Ovide to minister, 30 Nov. 1721.

18 Ibid., Vol. 4, fol. 285-5v, petition of de Rouville to the Comte de Toulouse, 1719.

19 Ibid., B, Vol. 44-2, fol. 569v, council to Saint-Ovide, 1 July 1721.

20 Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 9, fols. 72-8v, Saint-Ovide to minister, 21 Nov. 1727.

21 Ibid., Vol. 23, fols. 88-90v, Bigot to minister, 15 Oct. 1741; ibid., Vol. 29, fols. 306-15, Franquet to minister, 13 Oct. 1750.

22 See, for example, ibid., B, Vol. 68, fols. 347-8v, Maurepas to Forant and Bigot, 26 May 1739.

23 Ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 22, fol. 93v, Duquesnel to minister, 1 Dec. 1740.

24 C.J. Russ, op. cit., pp. 181-3. In Canada even this relatively mild form of exploitation aroused the indignation and opposition of the bishop and clergy. If Canadian officers were more restrained in this regard than were their Isle Royale counterparts, the difference can be explained partly in terms of the more complex public elite of the St. Lawrence colony which was not so completely dominated by the military. The greater ease with which Canadian soldiers could leave the service and the officers' consequent concern about morale may have been more important.

25 AN, Colonies, B, Vol. 68, fols. 347-8v, Maurepas to Forant and Bigot, 26 May 1739.

26 Ibid., Vol. 74, fol. 592-2v, Maurepas to Duquesnel, 15 June 1742.

27 Although Duquesnel claimed that he abolished the canteens in 1741 (ibid., $C^{11}B$, Vol. 23, fols. 24-9,

Duquesnel and Bigot to minister, 20 Oct. 1741), subsequent correspondence shows that he did no more than limit their operations (ibid., Vol. 24, fol. 52-2v, Duquesnel to minister, 7 Oct. 1742).

The Mutiny

1 AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 26, fol. 156-6v, Bigot to minister, 16 Nov. 1744.
2 See, for example, ibid., Vol. 20, fols. 104v-5, de Bourville to minister, 24 Dec. 1738.
3 Three years earlier they had gone without vegetables for an extended period although their bread ration was reduced at the same time. Ibid., Vol. 24, fols. 87-9v, Bigot to minister, 18 June 1742.
4 AHSA, Xi, "Deposition juridique recue par ordre de Monsieur de Karrer...de Mrs. les officiers des detachements de la compagnie colonelle...en garnison cy devant à Louisbourg...à l'occasion de l'émeute à l'Isle Royale au mois de decembre 1744," 29 Aug. 1745 (hereafter cited as Rasser Deposition). The French may also have participated; the document is not precise on this point.
5 Ibid.
6 AM, C^7, art. 272, dossier Joseph Renard, transcript of the court-martial of Joseph Renard, 7 Dec. 1745 (hereafter cited as Renard Court-Martial); ibid., copy of the petition of a number of soldiers addressed to Duchambon, [22-23?] Dec. 1744 (hereafter cited as Soldiers' Petition), see Appendix A.
7 Renard Court-Martial.
8 Ibid.
9 Dupaquier Court-Martial. See Appendix C.
10 AN, Outre-Mer, G^1, Vol. 407, registre I, fol. 77.
11 Soldiers' Petition.
12 AN, Colonies, E, dossier 233, dossier Christophe Jout, transcript of the court-martial of Christophe Jout, 9 Dec. 1745 (hereafter cited as Jout Court-Martial).
13 Renard Court-Martial.
14 Dupaquier Court-Martial.
15 AN, Colonies, E, dossier 145, dossier Jean-Baptiste du Croix, transcript of the court-martial of Jean-Baptiste du Croix, 7 Dec. 1745 (hereafter cited as du Croix Court-Martial).
16 Rasser Deposition.
17 Renard Court-Martial; Dupaquier Court-Martial. The testimony does not make it clear whether this was the same petition to Duchambon that was written several days earlier. Dupaquier testified that he wrote a note outlining grievances the morning of the demonstration. He may have been lying in order to be consistent with his story that there was no plot before 26 December.

Since the specific complaints that Rasser recalled were not the same as those listed in the petition to Duchambon, it is quite possible that Dupaquier drew up a second petition shortly before the mutiny began.

18 Rasser Deposition.

19 These are the same three complaints that Renard and Dupaquier later mentioned at their courts-martial.

20 AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 9, fols. 72-8v, Saint-Ovide to minister, 21 Nov. 1727.

21 Renard Court-Martial.

22 Antony Steur seems to have been in this case when he passed the winter of 1739 at Spanish Bay hunting partridges for the benefit of Cailly, the Swiss commander (AN, Outre-Mer, G^2, Vol. 185, fols. 379-424, trial of Jean Larue dit le Gascon, accused of murder, 16 March - 30 April 1739). For evidence of similar illicit practices in the French companies, see AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 11, fols. 61-8, Mézy to minister, 4 Dec. 1730.

23 Antonio de Ulloa, A Voyage to South America...., trans. and notes John Adams, 4th ed. (London: Printed for J. Stockdale, 1806), Vol. 2, p. 380.

24 AN, Colonies, F^3, Vol. 50, fol. 415, an account of the Canso expedition, n.s., n.d. [1744].

25 George A. Rawlyk, Yankees at Louisbourg (Orono: Univ. of Maine Press, 1967), pp. 3-5.

26 AN, Outre-Mer, G^2, Vol. 188, fols. 304-5, Requette à M. Bigot de Marin Halest et 25 autres volontaires, 8 Nov. 1744.

27 Ibid.

28 The King's Bastion and the barracks building formed an enclosed citadel usually referred to in French as the "fort." The "fortress," on the other hand, was the town together with the entire system of fortifications.

29 Rasser Deposition.

30 Jout Court-Martial.

31 Rasser Deposition.

32 AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 26, fols. 231-4, "Copie de la Lettre ecritte a Mr. le Comte de Maurepas par Mrs. Duchambon et Bigot a Louisbourg le 31^{e} X^{bre} 1744," [31 Dec. 1744] (hereafter cited as Duchambon and Bigot Letter). See Appendix B.

33 Duchambon and Bigot reported that only the French sergeants and the 30 men of the elite artillery company (see 'The Artillery Company' in "Organization and Numerical Strength") refused to join in the mutiny. Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 George McKinnon Wrong, ed., Lettre d'un Habitant de Louisbourg (Toronto: Printed for the University by Warwick Bro's & Rutter, 1897), p. 34.

36 AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 8, fols. 21-7, Saint-Ovide and Mézy to minister, 1 Dec. 1726.
37 Ibid., Vol. 23, fols. 13-4v, Duquesnel and Bigot to minister, 10 Oct. 1741.
38 Antonio de Ulloa, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 375.
39 Soldiers' Petition.
40 Mémoire pour messire François Bigot, ci-devant intendant de justice, police, finance & marine en Canada, accusé: contre monsieur le procureur-général du roi en la commission, accusateur (Paris: de l'imprimerie de P. Al. LePrieur, 1763) (hereafter cited as Memoire pour Bigot), Vol. 1, pp. 7-9.
41 Ibid.; AN, Colonies, E, dossier 32, dossier François Bigot, "Extrait d'une lettre," n.s., [1775].
42 AN, Colonies, $C^{11}C$, Vol. 12, fol. 167, "Bordereaux de la recette et dépense faitte à l'Isle Royalle pendant l'année [1744]," 2 April 1746. (To give a point of reference, Bigot's annual salary was 4,800 livres.)
43 Price-setting of this sort was a common feature of 18th-century insurrections, especially bread riots, in England and France. (See George Rudé, The Crowd in History; A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730-1848 [New York: Wiley, 1964], especially pp. 19-32; E.P. Thompson, "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," Past and Present, No. 50 [Feb. 1971], pp. 76-136.) Only one account of the mutiny (Duchambon and Bigot Letter) reports any manifestation of this type of behavior. The other documents mention vague threats to sack the town but they give no evidence of hostility on the part of the soldiers directed specifically against the merchants.
44 Duchambon and Bigot Letter.
45 Ibid.; AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 27, fols. 7-9v, Bigot to Maurepas, 27 April 1745.
46 AN, Colonies, E, dossier 32, dossier François Bigot, "Extrait d'une lettre," [1755]; Mémoire pour Bigot, Vol. 1, pp. 7-9.
47 George A. Rawlyk, op. cit., p. 74.
48 Mémoire pour Bigot, Vol. 1, p. 8.
49 Ibid., p. 9.
50 Ibid.; AN, Colonies, $C^{11}C$, Duchambon to minister, 23 Sept. 1745. Two Swiss deserted and one French soldier was executed for treason during the siege, but this is not a sign of excessive disaffection by 18th-century standards.
51 AN, Colonies, F^3, Vol. 50, fol. 378v, Bigot, "Sur la prise de Louisbourg," 1 Aug. 1745.
52 One list of casualties reported a total of 50 deaths on the French side but this includes civilians as well as soldiers. Ibid., Vol. 50, fol. 407, n.d., n.s.

53 Ibid., D^2C, Vol. 48, "Liste des Soldats des Troupes servant ci devant a L'Isle Royale désertés à Rochefort," n.d., n.s.; ibid., B, Vol. 84-2, fol. 289, Maurepas to de Serigny, 10 Feb. 1746.

54 Duchambon and Bigot Letter; AN, Colonies, B, Vol. 82-2, fol. 377, Maurepas to Karrer, 14 Sept. 1745.

55 AN, Colonies, B, Vol. 82-2, fol. 369, Maurepas to de Barrailh, 20 Aug. 1745; ibid., fol. 377, Maurepas to Karrer, 14 Sept. 1745. In fact, news of the mutiny could not have reached New England in time to effect the plan to attack Louisbourg; however, reports in the summer and fall of 1744 of low morale in the garrison did encourage the New Englanders to attempt the invasion.
George A. Rawlyk, op. cit., pp. 27-57.

56 AN, Colonies, B, Vol. 82-2, fol. 403, Maurepas to de Barrailh, 23 Nov. 1745.

57 Ibid., $C^{11}C$, Vol. 9, fols. 118-21, Bigot to Maurepas, 11 Dec. 1745.

58 Quebec (Province). Archives, Collection de manuscrits contenant lettres, mémoires, et autres documents historiques relatifs à la Nouvelle-France (Quebec: A. Coté, 1883-85), Vol. 3, p. 271, Bigot to minister, 2 Dec. 1745.

59 AN, Colonies, B, Vol. 82-2, fol. 412, Maurepas to Karrer, 10 Dec. 1745; ibid., fol. 415, minister to de Barrailh, 15 Dec. 1745.

60 Du Croix Court-Martial.

61 Jout Court-Martial.

62 AN, Colonies, D^2C, Vol. 53, "Isle Royale. Rolle général des Troupes françoises commencé en 1739," n.d., n.s.; ibid., B, Vol. 84-2, fol. 273, Maurepas to Ricouart, 18 Jan. 1746.

The following soldiers were condemned for mutiny (AN, Colonies, D^2C, Vol. 53):

Swiss

Joseph Renard: hanged, 7 Dec. 1745
Jean-Baptiste du Croix: hanged, 7 Dec. 1745
Christophe Jout: decapitated, 9 Dec. 1745
Abraham Dupaquier: escaped, 1 Dec. 1745

French

Martin Le Maistre dit Sanschagrin: hanged, 5 Jan. 1746
Jean-Louis Le Grené dit Frape d'abord: hanged, 7 Jan. 1746
Silvain Desbois dit Jolycoeur: hanged, 7 Jan. 1746
Jean-François Vilbert dit La Terreur: hanged, 7 Jan. 1746
Jean La Londe dit Sanschagrin: sentenced to galleys, 7 Jan. 1746
Antoine-Simon Granger dit Brindamour: sentenced to galleys, 8 Jan. 1746

(One other French soldier whose name is not known was executed.)

Conclusion

1 Guy Frégault, François Bigot, administrateur français (Montreal: L'institut d'histoire de l'Amérique, 1948), Vol. 1, p. 207; George A. Rawlyk, op. cit., pp. 71-2; Robert J. Morgan and Terrence D. MacLean, "Social Structure and Life in Louisbourg," Canada, An Historical Magazine, Vol. 1, No. 4 (June 1974), p. 66.

2 George A. Rawlyk, op. cit., p. 71.

3 André Corvisier, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 834-6.

4 Quoted in William John Eccles, "The Social, Economic and Political Significance of the Military Establishment in New France," Canadian Historical Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 (March 1971), p. 6.

5 Robert J. Morgan and Terrence D. MacLean, loc. cit. Cf. Guy Frégault, loc. cit.

6 Albert Arsène Babeau, La vie militaire sous l'ancien régime (Paris: 1889), Vol. 1, pp. 85-8.

7 Blaine Adams, op. cit., pp. 56-7.

8 The figures for Isle Royale were derived from the ration lists (see "Organization and Numerical Strength"). They do not include soldiers who may have been discharged because they were sick and died subsequently. However, the French statistics, which are for the Vivarais-Infanterie regiment in the 1716-48 period, are likely subject to the same sort of distortion.

9 Only one man from the ranks, Jean Loppinot, received a commission in the colony's Compagnies Franches before 1745 (AN, Colonies, D^2C, Vol. 47, "Isle Royalle - Officiers de guerre," 8 May 1730). Loppinot was an exceptional case, having come with many of the original officers of the Isle Royale garrison from Acadia where his family was politically prominent (Robert J. Morgan, op. cit., p. 59).

10 Between 1721 and 1742 there were 43 reported deserters, both French and Swiss. Most of these fled from Port Toulouse and Isle Saint-Jean, closer to the mainland than Louisbourg, and about half of them were caught or were known to have perished. Some desertions may not have been recorded. A common abuse in the regular French army consisted of reporting desertions as though they were deaths but the low rate of reported deaths at Isle Royale suggests that this form of deception was not prevalent.

11 André Corvisier, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 94; William John Eccles, Frontenac, The Courtier Governor, 2nd ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), p. 220.

12 See, for example, AN, Outre-Mer, G^2, Vol. 197, dossier 134, pièce 10, testimony of Antoine Lemoine dit St. Amand.
13 Thomas Henry Wintringham, Mutiny; Being a Survey of Mutinies from Spartacus to Invergordon (London: S. Nott, [1936]).
14 William John Eccles, Frontenac, The Courtier Governor, 2nd ed. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), pp. 215-8; C.J. Russ, op. cit., pp. 95-8.
15 AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 6, fols. 127-30, Isabeau to minister, 30 Nov. 1722; ibid., fols. 217-21, Saint-Ovide to minister, 12 Dec. 1723.
16 AN, Outre-Mer, G^2, Vol. 182, fols. 148-357, "Conseil Superieur. Procedure criminelle...a l'encontre du nommé Nicolas leBegue d^t. Brulevillage, et Thomas Berranger d^t. La Rosée soldats acusés de vol.," 3 March - 2 June 1733.
17 Ibid., Vol. 179, fols. 462-502, "Conseil Superieur - Procedure Criminelle a l'Encontre de Reintender Sergent Suisse et deux autres Complices accuses de vol. [sic]," 11 Sept. - 20 Oct. 1727.
18 Albert Arsène Babeau, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 235.
19 Ibid., p. 240.
20 Robert J. Morgan and Terrence D. MacLean, op. cit., p. 65.
21 Renard Court-Martial.
22 André Corvisier, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 883.
23 AN, Colonies, $C^{11}B$, Vol. 28, fols. 44v-6, des Herbiers and Prévost to minister, 21 Oct. 1749.
24 Ibid., Vol. 29, fols. 313v-4, Franquet to minister, 13 Oct. 1750.

Appendix A. The Soldiers' Petition, December 1744.
1 Soldiers' Petition.

Appendix B. The First Account of the Mutiny, 31 December 1744.
1 Duchambon and Bigot Letter.

Appendix C. Transcript of the Court-Martial of Abraham Dupaquier, 9 December 1745.
1 Dupaquier Court-Martial.

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A^{3} Fonds divers
X Archives des corps de troupe

France. Archives Maritimes. Port de Rochefort.
IE Dépêches de la Cour aux intendants, 1672-1763.
IR Correspondance du commissaire général pour les colonies....

France. Archives Nationales. Archives des Colonies.
A Actes du pouvoir souverain
B Lettres envoyées
$C^{11}B$ Correspondence générale, Ile Royale, 1712-62
$C^{11}B$ Amérique du Nord
$D^{2}C$ Troupes des colonies
E Dossiers personnels
$F^{2}C$ Colonies en général
F^{3} Collection Moreau de Saint-Méry

France. Archives Nationales. Archives de la Marine.
A Actes du pouvoir souverain
C^{7} Personnel individuel

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G^{2} Greffes des tribunaux de Louisbourg et du Canada, Conseil superieur et baillage de Louisbourg

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Tables

Table 1. Ideal Garrison Strength, 1718-58

Date	Compagnies Franches			Cannoneers			Swiss Officers and Men	Infantry			Total
	Companies	Men Per Company	Men	Companies	Men Per Company	Men		Battalions	Men Per Battalion	Men	
1718	7	50	350								350
12 May 1722	6	50	300				50				350
9 May 1723	6	60	360				50				410
1724	6	60	360				100				460
25 March 1730	8	60	480				100				580
17 May 1741	8	70	560				150				710
20 June 1743	8	70	560	1	30	30	150				740
28 March 1749	24	50	1200	1	30	30					1230
10 April 1750	24	50	1200	1	50	50					1250
1755	24	50	1200	1	50	50		2	525	1050	2300
1758	24	50	1200	2	50	100		4	520 (2 bat.) 680 (2 bat.)	2400	3700

Table 2. Official Strength According to Reviews and Ration Lists, 1719-43

	Present at Review	Strength According to Quarterly Ration Lists			Ideal Strength
		Min.	Max.	Av.	
1719	301				350
1720	317				350
1721	257				350
1722	330				350
1723	386				410
1724	430				460
1725	448				460
1726	450				460
1727	448				460
1728	451				460
1729	448				460
1730		512	579	529	580
1731		486	502	496	580
1732		478	545	513	580
1733		536	560	550	580
1734		550	554	552	580
1735		540	563	551	580
1736		531	539	536	580
1737		529	565	543	580
1738		539	578	551	580
1739		538	557	546	580
1740		540	568	552	580
1741*		545	707	599	710
1742		662	702	683	710
1743*		699	701	700	740
1744					740

* Partial data.

Minimum, 1730-40: 478; maximum, 1730-40: 579; average, 1730-40: 538.

Table 3. Proportion of Swiss in the Isle Royale and Louisbourg Garrisons

	Swiss Stationed at Louisbourg	Total Garrison Strength, Isle Royale	Proportion of Swiss in Isle Royale Garrison	Approx. Strength of Louisbourg Garrison	Proportion of Swiss in Louisbourg Garrison
1722	49	330	14.8%		
1723	50	386	13.0%		
1724	99	430	23.0%		
1725	98	448	21.9%		
1726	101	450	22.4%		
1727	95	448	21.2%		
1728	98	451	21.7%		
1729	97	448	21.7%		
1730	100	512-579	17.3-19.5%	437-504	19.8-22.9%
1731	96-100	486-502	19.8-19.9%	411-427	23.3-23.4%
1732	95-98	478-545	18.0-19.9%	403-470	20.9-23.6%
1733	95-98	536-560	17.5-17.7%	461-485	20.2-20.6%
1734	96-100	550-554	17.5-18.0%	475-479	20.2-20.9%
1735	98-100	540-563	17.8-18.1%	465-488	20.5-21.1%
1736	92-101	531-539	17.3-18.7%	456-464	20.2-20.6%
1737	96-120	529-565	18.1-21.2%	454-498	21.1-24.5%
1738	97-118	539-578	18.0-20.4%	464-503	20.9-23.5%
1739	96-114	538-557	17.8-20.5%	463-482	20.7-23.7%
1740	99-111	540-568	18.3-19.5%	465-493	21.3-22.5%
1741*	98-158	545-707	18.0-22.3%	470-632	20.9-25.0%
1742	145-155	662-702	21.9-22.1%	587-627	24.7-24.7%
1743*	143	699-701	20.4-20.5%	624-626	22.8-22.9%

*Partial data.

Table 4. Hospitalization, 1732-37

Period	Men in Hospital (Total)	Days in Hospital (Total)	Days Per Man	Man-Years (Days/365)	Men in Hospital (Swiss Only)	Days in Hospital (Swiss Only)	Proportion of Swiss in Louisbourg Garrison (See Table 3)
Jan.-Sept. 1732	152	3496	23	15.9	19 (12.5%)	322 (9.2%)	21-24%
Oct.-Dec. 1732	120	2315	19.3		8 (6.7%)	175 (7.6%)	
Jan.-Sept. 1733	263	6373	24.2	22.8	27 (10.3%)	407 (6.4%)	20-21%
Oct.-Dec. 1733	85	1960	23.1		13 (15.3%)	206 (10.5%)	
Jan.-Sept. 1734	174	7383	42.2	24.0	32 (18.4%)	1284 (17.4%)	20-21%
Oct.-Dec. 1734	66	1363	20.7		4 (6.1%)	216 (15.8%)	
Jan.-Sept. 1735	275	6290	22.9	24.0	45 (16.4%)	1075 (17.1%)	20-21%
Oct.-Dec. 1735	114	2470	21.7		19 (16.7%)	306 (12.4%)	
Jan.-Sept. 1736	245	6711	27.4	23.4	53 (21.7%)	1214 (18.1%)	20-21%
Oct.-Dec. 1736	75	1829	24.4		16 (21.3%)	311 (17.0%)	
Jan.-Sept. 1737	221	5283	23.9	22.4	41 (18.6%)	602 (11.4%)	21-26%
Oct.-Dec. 1737	141	2877	20.4		37 (26.2%)	748 (26.0%)	

Table 5. Death Rates of Isle Royale Soldiers, 1721-42

	Number (See Table 2)	Deaths	Mortality (Per Thousand)	
1721	286	4	14.0	
1722*				
1723	386	4	10.4	
1724	430	8	18.6	
1725*				
1726	450	11	24.4	
1727	448	4	8.9	
1728*				
1729	448	6	13.4	
1730	529	3	5.7	
1731	496	8	16.1	
1732	513	12	23.4	(smallpox)
1733	550	17	30.9	(smallpox)
1734	552	9	16.3	
1735	551	8	14.5	
1736	536	18	33.6	
1737	543	5	9.2	
1738	551	15	27.2	(unspecified disease)
1739	546	12	22.0	(unspecified disease)
1740	552	9	16.3	
1741*				
1742	683	6	8.8	

*Insufficient data.

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