

_____ **Research Report** _____

**Ways Forward: Applying Lessons
Learned in the Management of
Radicalized Offenders to Canadian
Federal Corrections**

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**Ways Forward: Applying Lessons Learned in the Management of Radicalized Offenders
to Canadian Federal Corrections**

Yvonne Stys

Rick McEachran

&

Marsha Axford

Correctional Service of Canada

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Executive Summary

Key words: *radicalization, violent extremists, security threat group, terrorism.*

Over the last four years, the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) has been engaged in a program of research which aims to build a more comprehensive understanding of radicalization in the correctional context. As a summary for the *Mitigating the Threat* research program, this report reviews CSC's research findings to date and recommends, based on research evidence and identified best practices, organizational opportunities for ways forward in the effective management of radicalized offenders.

In reviewing the evidence to date, four global research findings are presented for consideration: radicalized offenders differ from non-radicalized offenders; it is important to consider motivation; there is opportunity to more accurately measure, and intervene with, radicalization; and there is merit in identifying those that may be susceptible to radicalizing influence. Findings are then contextualized in a summary of current operational approaches to the management of CSC's radicalized offender population and situated within the larger milieu of Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

Next, national and international approaches, guidelines, and research evidence surrounding the effective management of radicalized offender populations are summarized. These include the results of two CSC-led international consultations on best practices in the management of radicalized offenders, as well as summaries of the significant international guiding documents in this area.

Based on knowledge to date and operational priorities for CSC, the following opportunities for ways forward in the effective management of radicalized offenders are proposed:

1. Provide staff awareness training on radicalization
2. Pilot assessments and interventions specific to radicalized offender populations
3. Facilitate reintegration success by strengthening community partner engagement
4. Intensify and reinforce information sharing mechanisms
5. Consider the implementation of a strategic management model
6. Support continued evidence-building as it pertains to radicalization

Finally, the feasibility of implementing the recommendations for ways forward are discussed in light of contextual, political, and societal factors and challenges.

Table of Contents

| | |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Acknowledgements | ii |
| Executive Summary | iii |
| Introduction..... | 1 |
| Federally-Incarcerated Radicalized Offenders: What Do We Know?..... | 2 |
| Finding 1: Radicalized offenders differ from non-radicalized offenders | 2 |
| Finding 2: It is important to consider motivation | 3 |
| Finding 3: There is opportunity to more accurately measure, and intervene with, radicalization..... | 4 |
| Finding 4: There is merit in identifying those that may be susceptible to radicalizing influence..... | 4 |
| Federally-Incarcerated Radicalized Offenders: What Do We Do?..... | 6 |
| Radicalized offenders are not new to CSC | 6 |
| Accommodation aim is to fully integrate | 7 |
| Detection through staff awareness and partner relations | 7 |
| Correctional management practices are equally applied | 8 |
| Evidence-based correctional interventions | 9 |
| Religious service provisions | 9 |
| Assessing risk of ideologically-motivated violence | 10 |
| International Approaches to the Management of Radicalized Offenders | 12 |
| Federally-Incarcerated Radicalized Offenders: An Evidence-Based Way Forward | 16 |
| References | 26 |
| Appendix A: Summary of CSC’s current intergovernmental collaborative relations pertaining to National Security, Terrorism Prevention and Countering Radicalization to Violence | 29 |

Introduction

Our observations suggest that these offenders are often different than the vast majority of our population, with different motivations and different needs, and we intend to be proactive in exploring new approaches and best practices for better managing these offenders in the interest of public safety and effective rehabilitation. (Commissioner Don Head, Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, 2015, pp. 17:98-99)

As a leader in evidence-based correctional practice, the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) has a rich tradition of conducting research in order to ensure that its policies, programs, and practices are responsive to the individual needs of all offenders (Motiuk, 1997, 1998). Continuing in that tradition, CSC has, in recent years, been engaged in a program of research which aims to build a body of evidence to support effective correctional policy and practice in relation to its radicalized offender population.

Through participation in the *Chemical, Biological, Radiological-Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) Research and Technology Initiative (CRTI)* and leading the *Mitigating Threats from Violent Extremist Offenders in Correctional Institutions and Communities* research program, CSC has built a more comprehensive understanding of radicalization in the correctional context. It has examined the attributes of offenders under its jurisdiction who are radicalized or may be susceptible to a radicalizing influence and garnered staff feedback on radicalization in Canadian federal corrections (see Stys, Gobeil, Harris, & Michel; 2014). It has more closely examined the needs and motivations of its radicalized offender population (Stys & Michel, 2014) as well as the interventions that have been utilized with this sub-population (Michel & Stys, 2014). It has also looked to correctional partners nationally and internationally in order to gather best practices in the management of radicalized offender populations (Axford, Stys, & McEachran, 2015; CSC, 2015).

As a summary for the *Mitigating the Threat* research program, this report aims to review CSC's research findings to date and identify, based on research evidence and identified best practices, organizational opportunities for ways forward in the effective management of radicalized offenders.

Federally-Incarcerated Radicalized Offenders: What Do We Know?

Significant work has been completed by CSC's Research Branch over the last four years in an effort to gain an understanding of the federally-incarcerated radicalized offender population in Canada. This work has allowed for a greater appreciation of this group as a distinct population, while facilitating more informed, evidence-based decision making in the management of radicalized offenders. This section summarily reviews the pertinent findings in these examinations in an effort to contextualize the recommended next steps.

Finding 1: Radicalized offenders differ from non-radicalized offenders

Initial efforts at understanding CSC's radicalized offender population focused on determining if differences existed between the radicalized and non-radicalized offenders under federal jurisdiction. Research by Stys, Gobeil, Harris, and Michel (2014) compared radicalized and non-radicalized offenders on a wide variety of variables which could be measured using administrative data collected by CSC. There were a number of areas where radicalized offenders were found to differ from other offenders. Radicalized offenders were found to be more educated and more likely to be employed upon admission to a federal institution. They were less likely than non-radicalized offenders to have a substance abuse history, and most had never had any previous dealings with the criminal justice system. They were also less likely to demonstrate mental health needs upon admission, and were significantly less likely to have had a history of being prescribed psychotropic drug. Consequently, they were significantly more likely than non-radicalized federal offenders to be rated as having a high-reintegration potential.

Radicalized offenders were also found to have quite different criminogenic need profiles than their non-radicalized counterparts. Assessment of criminogenic needs via the Dynamic Factors Identification and Analysis (DFIA), and its revised version (DFIA-R), revealed that a high proportion of radicalized offenders were identified to have needs in the associates, attitudes, and personal/emotional domains and a low proportion were identified to have needs in the areas of substance abuse and community functioning. Operationally, this demonstrated that in order to most effectively assist in the rehabilitation and reintegration of radicalized offenders, efforts should focus not on education, employment, or substance abuse needs, but on providing interventions that address criminogenic needs related to associates, attitudes, and the personal/emotional domain.

Stys and Michel (2014) also attempted to determine if there were unique violent extremist-specific needs, which are not routinely assessed in a correctional environment, that could be detected through an intensive file review process. The most common violent extremist specific needs identified in the file review included possessing a lack of pro-social integration (associates aspect), presenting attitudes that justify offending, keeping associates (friends) that support extremist offending, and the identification of a target in response to a perceived injustice.

Finding 2: It is important to consider motivation

Acknowledging that the motivations of radicalized individuals to commit violent acts may not be the same as those held by non-radicalized offenders, efforts have been made to identify the specific motivations driving violent extremist behavior (Cook and Lounsbury, 2011; Helmus, 2009). In a review of CSC's radicalized offender case files, Stys and Michel (2014) found that 30% of radicalized offenders had purely ideological motives for their actions, 17% were purely motivated by criminal (non-ideological) drivers, and 53% held both ideological and non-ideological motivations for their crimes. The most common ideological motivations included a desire for political change and a desire to respond to a group grievance. Non-ideological motivations were most frequently identified as the desire for material gain and the desire for friendship.

Interestingly, motivation was also a distinguishing factor when examining areas of need and degree of involvement in violent extremist activity. As previously noted, radicalized offenders were identified to have needs in the associates, attitudes, and personal/emotional domains, with a low proportion identified to have needs in the areas of substance abuse and community functioning. These needs were found to be especially salient for those with ideological motivations, especially those who were assessed by the DFIA-R. Results also highlighted that those radicalized offenders who committed the more serious criminal acts included in CSC's definition of radicalized offender (commit or conspire to commit a violent act) as well as those who were categorized as leaders of the group were more frequently identified as having purely ideological motivations.

Operationally, the fact that 30% of those found in the radicalized offender group did not hold any ideological motivations, as per the definition of "radicalized offender", could lead to unintended impacts on rehabilitation and reintegration efforts as a result of being labeled as radical. This, coupled with the finding that motivation types vary within the group of radicalized

offenders themselves, beseeches further consideration regarding the assessment of motivation upon admission to a correctional institution.

Finding 3: There is opportunity to more accurately measure, and intervene with, radicalization

Research to date (Michel & Stys, 2014) suggests that the criminogenic needs of Canada's federally-incarcerated radicalized offenders are generally being met through the intervention strategies provided to them by the CSC, however less so for those assessed by the DFIA-R (post 2009). In fact, for those assessed as having a need in the associates domain by the DFIA-R (92.3%), none received an intervention to address this need. While this could be a result of many operational and individual factors, it could also be that these programs are simply not appropriate for radicalized offenders. Indeed, Michel and Stys (2014) found in their review of offender records that initial referrals to a program were often made based on risk and overall assessed need in a particular domain, but upon further investigation of these needs, the program was deemed to be unsuitable for the specific needs of the radicalized offender. Consequently, it remains that there is opportunity to improve the interventions aimed at targeting needs in the radicalized offender population.

The starting point of effective intervention, of course, is accurate assessment of need and risk. Needs assessment has been a central part of the Offender Intake Assessment (OIA) conducted by CSC for the last 20 years (Motiuk, 1997, 1998). The OIA assesses for seven need domains, including attitudes, associates, family/marital, education/employment, community functioning, personal/emotional, and substance abuse (Brown & Motiuk, 2005). While these domains measure evidence-based traditional criminogenic needs, there is an awareness that the needs of radicalized offenders may be different for those who are ideologically motivated to engage in violence for a cause (Silke, 2008; Axford, Stys, & McEachran, 2015). Michel and Stys (2014) were able to code for specific violent extremist needs in their extensive file review, however no standardized or systematized examination, assessment, or recording of unique violent extremist needs is routinely completed as part of CSC's offender assessment or case management process.

Finding 4: There is merit in identifying those that may be susceptible to radicalizing influence.

Despite evidence to suggest that those who adopt a radical ideology while in a

correctional setting rarely participate in a violent act motivated by that ideology upon release (Hannah, Clutterbuck, & Rubin, 2008; Hamm, 2013; Veldhuis, 2015a), correctional agencies are nevertheless entrusted to prevent the spread of radicalizing ideologies (and potentially catastrophic violent acts) while individuals are in a carceral setting. For CSC, these prevention efforts would include the identification of those who may be susceptible to radicalizing influence. Focus group consultations with CSC staff identified two distinct groups of offenders who were seen as susceptible to recruitment by a radicalized individual: the weak and vulnerable offenders (for the completion of typical prison “dirty work”) who would also be tempted by the protective benefits of gang membership, and a more targeted recruitment of educated, skilled individuals for “true”, long-term membership (Stys, Gobeil, Harris, & Michel; 2014).

As a first step in examining the idea of susceptibility more concretely, Stys, Gobeil, Harris, and Michel (2014) attempted to identify constructs in the literature that could be related to susceptibility to radicalization within the prison context, and to determine whether there are any indicators or variables within CSC’s administrative data to measure these constructs. Principal component analysis identified the following basic constructs as ones which could, theoretically, be measured by administrative data to assist in the identification of those susceptible to radicalization: limited attachment skills, poor family support, violent attitudes and negative attitudes toward conventional society, disorderly life, family violence, grievances, and employment.

Given the relatively low number of radicalized offenders under CSC’s jurisdiction and the overlap between those susceptible to gang or radicalizing influence, ongoing exploratory work in this area focuses on the idea of susceptibility on a more broad level: susceptibility to group-based influence. In this way, susceptibility to radicalizing or gang influence may be assessed in the future in order to guide in effective population management practices in the prevention of group-based violence in general.

Federally-Incarcerated Radicalized Offenders: What Do We Do?

Canada's exposure to radicalization and violent extremist activities has been limited in relative comparison to its foreign partners (e.g. USA, UK, France, etc.). Moreover, CSC's radicalized offender population currently represents a very small fraction of those persons identified as belonging to a Security Threat Group (STG). This is not to suggest that the existing potential of this threat stream is not being taken seriously, rather, CSC anticipates that the number of offenders convicted of terrorism offences is likely to increase over the mid to long-term. It readily acknowledges that this sub-population poses a unique threat to CSC, their departmental responsibilities, and the safety and security of our staff and offender population; and therefore, active engagement is essential. The following section provides an introduction and overview to CSC's current operational practices and policies governing the management of radicalized offenders within the Canadian federal correctional context.

Radicalized offenders are not new to CSC

CSC has, throughout its history, held radicalized offenders under its jurisdiction. As a result, the organization is acutely aware of the challenges linked to radicalization and violent extremism within the correctional environment. These include persons from a wide range of political and cultural ideological underpinnings, including members of the Doukhobors, Squamish 5, Quebec Liberation Front – FLQ, and the Armenian Revolutionary Army. While these offenders were not subject to a criminal conviction under the *Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act* (see Department of Justice, 2015 for a summary of this Act), they posed unique management challenges from risk assessment and intervention perspectives.

Although no one ethnic or cultural group or religious denomination is more likely to be involved in violent extremism than another, examples of offenders charged under the *Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act* for attempting to commit violent acts in support of extreme political, religious or ideological purposes, objectives or causes include those involved in such acts as global jihad, terrorist financing, and extreme political militancy. In 2013, further to extensive consultation, CSC developed and implemented a national working definition for radicalized offenders that is directly applicable to the correctional realm. The Service defines radicalized offenders as “*ideologically motivated offenders, who commit, aspire or conspire to commit, or promote violent acts in order to achieve ideological objectives*” (CSC, 2012). This definition is

designed as to not place focus on any specific ethnic or cultural group or religious denomination, appreciating that violent extremism can and does materialize from all walks of life, and is predominantly rooted in an ideological motivation.

Accommodation aim is to fully integrate

Discussions surrounding the most effective approach to accommodating radicalized offenders within a custodial setting often contain contrasting viewpoints, and there is no absolute approach that addresses the competing needs and interests of the various sub-populations often found within a prison at any given time. However, in an effort to ensure that CSC's practices respected human rights legislation and maintained the security of the institution and safety of staff and offenders, extensive international consultation was conducted to determine the most appropriate placement practices. Informed by these consultations, CSC chose and supports the use of an 'Integration-Separation' model which aims to integrate radicalized offenders in the general inmate population while permitting the physical or geographical separation of certain radicalized offenders from other radicalized offenders when circumstances necessitate.

Separation may be achieved through placement of a radicalized offender within a different living unit at the same correctional facility, or via placement at a different institution or correctional setting. The latter is reserved for those cases where security information indicates that the direct association of two or more radicalized offenders pose a threat to the offender, institution, or staff.

In need of emphasis is that an offender's behaviour and needs remain the focus of CSC's current radicalized offender accommodation strategy. Managing this sub-population consistently with other types of offenders who pose a security threat avoids providing unwarranted status onto the radicalized offender and defuses any potential 'recruitment / radicalization' power base. To date, CSC's model has proven effective in managing the accommodation needs of this sub-population. It is designed to address both the placement needs of male and female offenders and to provide for their familial, religious and cultural needs.

Detection through staff awareness and partner relations

Detection is, in large part, achieved through front line staff observations and associated reporting. They are the 'eyes and ears' in the operational environment that are witness to offender behaviour which may be associated with radicalization or violent extremism. CSC does not currently possess formal national security awareness training, or that which directly pertains

to the topic areas of radicalization and violent extremism. Frontline staff are provided training on Security Threat Group (STG) identification and management, which includes content on the identifiers and behaviours of individuals and groups that pose a risk to the Service's operations. Additionally, CSC's Security Intelligence Officer (SIO) and Analyst (SIA) cadre has received assistance and instruction from partner agencies in identifying and disrupting radicalization and recruitment efforts.

CSC's facilities, both institutional and community-based, are secure environments where offender behaviour is routinely observed, monitored, supervised, and reported. Radicalized offenders have, on a few occasions, been identified at CSC facilities across the country, either through internal observational reporting or external partner information notification. These are two of the primary ways in which CSC identifies persons of potential 'national security' concern, the other being those convicted of terrorism offences under the criminal code.

Information sharing agreements (i.e. Memoranda of Understanding, or MOUs) between CSC and criminal justice and law enforcement partners (e.g., RCMP, CSIS, CBSA, OPP, Provincial/Territorial Corrections, etc.) allow for the sharing of information on persons believed to be radicalizing, under the influence of a radicalized individual, or mobilizing to committing an act of violent extremism. These agreements also support the respective agencies' operational and criminal investigations, and are considered essential to the detection and identification of individuals that pose a risk of radicalization and/or violent extremism. External partner information sharing arrangements have and will continue to be paramount to the Service's success in the area of detection and identification of persons that pose a risk.

Correctional management practices are equally applied

All federal offenders entering CSC's jurisdiction are admitted to a CSC institution for assessment. The results of these assessments, as well as case-specific information (such as documents from the police, courts, family, etc.), are examined and analyzed to determine the appropriate security level required for each offender. More specifically, as with the application of assessment tools applied to the general population, radicalized offenders are subject to the same measures in determining their risk level, needs, and reintegration potential that are conducted as part of the Offender Intake Assessment (OIA) process. Offenders can be assessed as high, medium, or low risk, and are rated to the extent of their need in seven primary domain areas: employment/education, marital/family, associates, substance abuse, community

functioning, personal/emotional, and attitudes.

With the OIA as the basis for assessment, CSC then aims to tailor offenders' Correctional Plans according to the risk principle, that is, risk assessments completed by the offender's case management team are directly relevant to assessing the offender's institutional progress, release plans, and his/her performance under community supervision. In essence, the Correctional Plan serves as the blueprint that guides an offender's sentence and is used to measure his/her progress towards their correctional goals, such as commitment to participate to programs. The correctional plan also outlines a risk management strategy for each offender, including restrictions on movement and associations.

Evidence-based correctional interventions

CSC has implemented evidence-based correctional programs that aim to reduce crime. These cognitive behavioural interventions target violence and the influence of antisocial associates. All CSC correctional programs have clearly-defined goals and objectives, structured dynamic indicators of program impact, as well as a rigorous program evaluation framework. The Service's cadre of correctional programs are geared towards enhancing public safety by making offenders accountable for their behaviour, changing attitudes and beliefs, and teaching skills that can be used to monitor and manage problematic behaviour following release.

As it directly pertains to the radicalized offender population, there is currently no offering of any specific or tailored programming. Rather, CSC has instead chosen to address the criminogenic needs of radicalized offenders with the current roster of correctional programming and interventions. As with other offenders, the program referral process is based on the individually-assessed need and risk. The Service's correctional programs are founded on cognitive-behavioural theories in order to directly address identified problem behaviours, and do not, at this juncture, discern between the motivating factors behind the criminal behaviour, whether those be criminal, ideological or a combination thereof, in origin.

Religious service provisions

In addition to correctional programs, the Service also provides for a range of diverse reintegration services such as education programs, social programs, employment and employability programs, and mental health services. One key area of intervention as it relates to the prevention of, and intervention in, religiously-based forms of violent extremism, is CSC's

national offering of faith-based services, such as counselling provided by Chaplains. These contracted personnel have been security screened and accredited by an independent community service provider, and serve as officially-recognized faith representatives in institutions. An important element of institutional chaplaincy services is assisting CSC to meet its *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* obligations to protect the freedom of religion.

While the ‘Statement of Work’ for Chaplains does not include a specific requirement to engage in counter-radicalization strategies among any particular group, Chaplains are an integral part of CSC’s effort to actively encourage and assist offenders to become law abiding citizens. These objective is to help offenders examine their behaviours and decisions and discover new ways of living. This can help offenders accept responsibility for their actions, which in turn contributes to their safe reintegration into Canadian communities. Religious interpretation of faith practitioners is a topic that regularly surfaces when it comes to the services offered to offenders within a custodial setting; however, CSC has instituted numerous checks and balances to ensure that Chaplains and volunteers promote moderate approaches to faith practices. Specifically, this involves consulting faith communities about specific obligations relative to religious accommodation when the security of CSC institutions and the health and safety of persons are also at issue.

Assessing risk of ideologically-motivated violence

As previously referenced, offenders identified as radicalized and those convicted of terrorism-related offences are subject to the same intake assessments as all other non-ideologically motivated offenders. Risk assessments are considered a core component of CSC’s operational management framework, and are completed by an offender’s supervising Parole Officer at various stages throughout their sentence. CSC utilizes a number of empirically-supported standardized risk assessment instruments to accurately determine offenders’ institutional progress, release plans, and his/her performance under community supervision in relation to the objectives outlined in their individualized correctional plan. This Service-approved toolbox of assessments also includes those designed to determine risk in various domains including escape, institutional behaviour, and reintegration success potential. Although CSC does not presently use an assessment instrument tailored specifically to radical offenders, the applicability of specialized assessments for radical or violent extremist offenders has been evidenced by CSC’s cited research. Specifically, the assessment of offender motivations is

considered highly relevant to accurate assessment of risk and the associated stream of intervention referral. The prospect of implementing such measures within CSC's present resources is under review as part of CSC's ongoing research and external partner consultation on the most effective management practices for this population of offenders.

International Approaches to the Management of Radicalized Offenders

As part of the *Mitigating the Threat* program of research, CSC undertook two studies aimed at determining international approaches to the management of radicalized offenders. The first initiative, an international consultation questionnaire, sought to understand, on a global level, how various aspects of radicalized offender management were operationalized in other correctional jurisdictions, and to identify “best practices” in the management of radicalized offenders¹. The second initiative, an international roundtable, gathered expert delegates from eight countries with experience in managing radicalized offenders in an effort to discuss, in a more detailed and targeted manner, the management of radicalized offender populations². Of particular interest in both studies were the following key areas of management: accommodation, recruitment/susceptibility, assessment, intervention programs (including the provision of religious services), reintegration and aftercare (including community interventions), and staff training and awareness.

The majority of participants indicated that their jurisdiction utilizes the same intake and assessment procedures for their radicalized offenders as non-radicalized offenders. However, it was noted that the absence of specialized assessments and intake procedures were not out of lack of necessity, but often a result of specific challenges related to the development of these items. These included the ability (or inability) to quantify a belief or ideology, the implications for intervention options if specialized assessments were developed, and the inability to reliably validate such assessments due to a low base rate of occurrence. Those who used standard offender assessments for their radicalized offender population questioned whether they were suited to measure the unique needs of a radicalized population, but due to data limitations, had no evidence to the contrary that they were, in fact, ineffective.

Similarly, specialized programs, treatments and interventions for radicalized offenders were not common among participating jurisdictions. For those that have them, the focus tends to be on disengagement and addressing identity-related needs rather than de-radicalization. Participants discussed and emphasized the importance of developing trusting personal relationships with all offenders (including radicalized offenders), which required both a respect for their personal ideologies and a desire to disengage them from violent actions.

¹ See Axford, Stys, & McEachran (2015) for a comprehensive summary of this study.

² See CSC (2015) for the proceedings resulting from this event.

The results of these studies highlighted challenges related to managing a radicalized offender population. An extensive number of factors are considered by population managers when choosing accommodation strategies for this group, including the types of radicalized offenders in a particular population and the presence of charismatic leaders or proselytizers. Although the concentration and dispersion/integration approaches³ are most often employed, it was deemed critical that accommodation strategies remain fluid and dynamic. It was also stressed that the effective management of radicalized offenders requires an international, national, and multi-systemic approach to the collaborative, open, and reciprocal sharing of intelligence information. Likewise, the management of recruitment attempts was reportedly most effectively achieved through intelligence gathering/sharing and movement of key radicalized offenders to other locations, however it was noted that while some individuals do take up radical causes while in the institution, true “radicalization” in a prison environment was a very low base-rate event.

Participants reported a lack of support structures for radicalized offenders being reintegrated into the community; however this may be associated with the reportedly low number of releases from correctional institutions as a result of lengthy prison sentences for these offenders. It was agreed that the effective management of offenders in the community requires a multi-agency, collaborative approach wherein notification and information sharing are key elements.

The importance of training staff, at all levels, regarding radicalization was a management practice that was recommended by national and international participants alike. As the level of staff awareness impacts all aspects of institutional and community correctional management, it was stressed that staff in all positions should be trained on what radicalization is, when it is problematic, how to identify it, and what their responsibilities are in terms of reporting and intervention.

The results of the international roundtable and consultation questionnaire illustrate that, on an international scale, correctional systems are attempting to maximize their ability to effectively manage this population of offenders. In an attempt to inform and support systems in successfully accomplishing this goal, several expert groups have documented guidelines for the

³ See Axford, Stys, and McEachran (2015) and CSC (2015) for descriptions of these and other approaches to offender accommodation.

management of radicalized individuals in carceral settings. Experts from the UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) and the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - The Hague (ICCT) formed the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF), publishing the *Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders* (2012a). As a follow-up, the *Sydney Memorandum: Challenges and Strategies on the Management of Violent Extremist Detainees* (GCTF, 2012b) draws on the experiences of South East Asian countries to outline best practices and lessons learned with regard to the development of countering violent extremism (CVE) programs. Subsequently, additional documents were published aiming to provide more comprehensive guidance on two specific areas of consideration in the *Rome Memorandum*: the role of psychologists/psychology and the role of religious scholars/ideological experts in rehabilitation and reintegration programs (Hedayah & ICCT, 2013; UNICRI & Government of Spain, 2013).

More recently, recommendations developed based on insights and feedback gained during two expert-level meetings of the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law (IIJ) were published in the *Prison Management Recommendations to Counter and Address Prison Radicalization* (IIJ, 2015). In addition, the Council of Europe (2015) recently approved *Draft Guidelines for Prison and Probation Services Regarding Radicalisation and Violent Extremism*. Globally, the recommendations in these guiding documents share commonalities with the findings and insights offered in the international consultations conducted by CSC, including:

1. The need for specialized assessments and interventions tailored to the needs of radicalized individuals and those susceptible to a radicalizing influence.
2. The need for dynamic security measures that are informed by the open and ongoing sharing of intelligence information.
3. The need for comprehensive awareness training for staff in order to ensure effective identification and population management.
4. The need for additional research regarding radicalization in institutional settings and rigorous empirical evaluation of interventions utilized with radicalized and susceptible populations.

Work in this area is ongoing. For example, in December 2015, CSC was included among 40 international experts in a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) panel which aimed

to develop the first comprehensive United Nations publication on the management of violent extremist prisoners (UNODC, 2016).

Many of the guidelines imparted by these international bodies are heavily informed by experts and scholars in the area of radicalization – academics who have also provided insight and advice on effective approaches related to management of, and interventions with, radicalized prison populations. Experts repeatedly note that effective management and rehabilitation of radicalized offenders requires the consideration of specialized assessments and interventions that are empirically based and continuously evaluated (Hamm, 2013; Silke, 2014; Veldhuis & Kessels, 2013)⁴. In her 2015 occasional paper on the reintegration of violent extremist offenders, Veldhuis summarizes some of the most relevant research on radicalization in prisons and outlines lessons learned as well as policy questions for those responsible for the administration of carceral sentences (Veldhuis, 2015b). She notes that the focus has shifted away from the debate over de-radicalization versus disengagement to a conversation regarding how to best rehabilitate and reintegrate violent extremist offenders. In order to do so, it is asserted that assessments, accommodations, and programs require clear scoping, precise definition, and repeated measurement.

⁴ See Stys, Gobeil, Harris, & Michel (2014), Stys & Michel (2014), and Michel & Stys (2014) for more comprehensive summaries of the literature surrounding radicalization in the prison context.

Federally-Incarcerated Radicalized Offenders: An Evidence-Based Way Forward

Taken together, the information presented in the previous chapters summarizes what is known about Canada's federally incarcerated radicalized offenders, how they are currently managed, and what other correctional jurisdictions are doing to most effectively manage their radicalized offender populations. The recommendations for effective management, in many ways, echo CSC's priorities in the area of radicalized offenders. In his appearance before the Senate Standing Committee on National Security and Defence (2015), the Commissioner of CSC, Don Head, highlighted the opportunity for CSC to be proactive in its management of this particular sub-population:

The threat posed by security threat groups and incompatibilities is an ongoing concern and one which extends far beyond the issue of radicalized offenders. Through research projects and ongoing consultations with international partners, it is our goal to produce comprehensive findings and recommendations on this subject and, ultimately, to pursue whatever changes may be necessary to address any concerns which have been identified. Although radicalized offenders only represent a small fraction of the inmate population at this time, we want to be proactive and to ensure that the most effective policies, interventions and training are in place. (p. 17:100)

Moreover, Commissioner Head noted CSC's intention of modernizing its training programs for all staff in an effort to raise evidence-based awareness in the area of radicalization in general and radicalized offenders specifically. He also reiterated the importance of a partnership approach to the management of radicalized individuals, highlighting that a constant dialogue with law enforcement, government agencies, and other correctional jurisdictions is essential to effective correctional practice. While some of the referenced best practices are addressed through CSC's current policy framework, there continues to be areas which need be strengthened, while others require the consideration of newly devised approaches to the management of radicalized offenders. In order to meet these organizational goals in a manner that is consistent with the current body of research and the associated best practices in the

management of radicalized offender populations, recommendations in a number of areas are offered.

1. Provision of Staff Awareness Training on Radicalization

Staff training in the area of radicalization, violent extremism, terrorism, and the threat posed by these issues to Canada's National Security is of paramount importance to CSC's overall efforts in meeting its mandate. Based on the previously cited evidence, it is recommended that this training apply to all staff, in various degrees of relevance to their specific roles and responsibilities. The training model needs to equip front line personnel with an overall general awareness of these issues, and provide for specific knowledge and associated tools to allow them to adequately and ethically identify the changes in behaviour associated with radicalization to violence processes. Given the nature of this particular security issue and the domestic and international scope, there exists a requirement for staff to have a realistic and current appreciation and understanding of the Service's position and role in countering the threat. Moreover, there are significant cultural, socio-political and religious elements to this matter which require that related training provide for more generalized, cultural, social, politically-balanced awareness. In essence, there is a need for staff to possess a holistic understanding and broader based working knowledge of these issues, specifically as they pertain to the relationship between their work and security implications on an organizational, domestic and international level.

To achieve these aims, it is recommended that CSC develop national training in consultation with its key law enforcement and criminal justice partners, which may include Public Safety agencies, as well as international and provincial/territorial correctional departments. This training needs to be security-oriented and tailored to CSC's operational realities in order to support front line correctional personnel in adequately identifying the changes in behaviour associated with radicalization and violent extremism in all its forms. Furthermore, in order to ensure that all staff receive training based on their assessed level of need and specific job requirements (i.e. observational reporting, risk assessment, intervention referrals, transfer and release decision making, etc.), a tiered approach is recommended. Specifically, staff with more direct 'face-to-face' dynamic and static security, and case management relations with the offender population (i.e. Correctional and Security Intelligence

Officers) would receive more general observational awareness and associated reporting requirement knowledge. At a second tier, or more advanced level; training can be tailored to those personnel with security threat-risk assessment and associated decision making responsibilities (i.e. Parole and Program Officers, Security Intelligence Analysts, Psychologists, and Parole Board members). While online or 'E-learning' is a logical and accessible option for Tier 1 training, staff consultation suggests that online learning is not as desirable as in-person, classroom-based, facilitator-led learning.

While the development and implementation of in-house training is an option, these efforts could be replaced or complimented by leveraging training which is currently offered (or under development) by key law enforcement partner agencies. CSC's departmental position within the Public Safety portfolio (as a supporting agency in terms of National Security and Counter-Terrorism responsibilities), facilitates its ability to partner and collaborate with those currently identified as the authority in nationally-standardized training, namely the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Fostering a training partnership with the RCMP would provide for federal partner collaboration and consistency in the application of training. While consultations between CSC and the RCMP have begun in order to assess the utility of a training collaboration, no formalized decision or agreement has yet been reached.

2. Piloting of Assessments and Interventions Specific to Radicalized Offender Populations

As has been indicated, CSC does not presently possess tools specifically designed to assess those offenders that are ideologically, rather than criminally, motivated. Previously summarized CSC research has demonstrated a specific need in this area, which is supported by a number of correctional departments in other countries. The application of an instrument specifically fashioned to predict the potential for ideologically-motivated violence, precisely for those offenders exhibiting such inclinations or histories, could serve to supplement and strengthen existing risk assessment applications.

Front-line correctional personnel, including correctional, parole and program officers, are tasked with observing and reporting on offender behaviour and activities as part of their daily duties. CSC would therefore be well served to provide risk assessment tools that measure ideological motivation and the threat posed by this construct, so that staff are both capable of, and proficient at, assessing risk. These risk assessment tools need not only be able to determine

risk related to radicalized offenders, but at identifying those that are vulnerable to radicalizing influence. In order to achieve this aim, CSC must set out to determine whether our current measures for predicting criminal risk sufficiently assess the potential for ideologically-motivated criminality. Subsequent to this, it is advised that CSC compile a comprehensive inventory of available tools, and based on a preliminary evaluation of these, select one or more analogous instruments to be tested by way of piloting exercise(s) within federal correctional settings. This would directly allow for user consultation feedback and the evaluation of validity and reliability in the Canadian federal corrections context.

In terms of determining next steps in establishing interventions to address radicalization to violent extremism, it is recommended that CSC start by examining the institutional and community-based interventions that have traditionally been utilized with radicalized offenders. By doing so, CSC can gain a more comprehensive understanding of how the current treatment options address the needs of this sub-population. Consistent with the recommendations above for risk assessment tools, a stream of intervention options need be established, based on their correlation to principles (i.e. risk and protective factors) found with the risk assessment. In other words, the methodologies and objectives of the risk assessment-interventions approach need be complementary. Risk assessment outcomes can then inform intervention referrals for radicalized offenders, and this should include those offered institutionally, during the transition period in the community, and in after-care.

3. Facilitating Reintegration Success by Strengthening Community Partner Engagement

The eventuality in the majority of federally-sentenced offender cases is that they will be transitioned back into the community under a term of supervised conditional release. The safe management of eligible offenders during their transition from the institution to the community, and while on supervision, is one of CSC's strategic priorities. Determining success in this area goes well beyond the measurement of recidivism, with elements of community re-engagement and support, including a network of positive, trusting role models, being just as important. Offender reintegration, specifically the direct involvement and empowerment of local community players, needs to be a core consideration and component in managing the radicalized offender population.

Essential to the success of CSC's efforts to manage an offender's risk at this critical point

in their sentence are the contributions from, and collaboration with, community-based partners, both from within the government and the private sector. It is therefore recommended that CSC conduct a strategic review of existing public support and community-based resource relationships, with the objective of leveraging and strengthening existing relationships, while developing new and diverse partnerships. More specifically, such may be achieved through established community resource collaboration arrangements, participation on ‘multi-agency’ social service and law enforcement networks or hub models, and contributions to initiatives designed to mobilize and empower local civil society members.

As an extension to the above recommendation, particular focus should be placed on community partner ‘capacity’ and relationship building at the local institutional and area parole office levels. Individuals in these offices, organizations and local services are best positioned to understand the local climate as it relates to risk and threat trends and leverage trusted working partnerships based on long-standing relationships. Ultimately, the stronger CSC’s approaches in risk assessment and intervention of this sub-population becomes, the more crucial it is that it is complimented by a community support system aligned to these same risks and needs.

4. Intensify and Reinforce Information Sharing Mechanisms

As noted by many national and international correctional experts, the success of the aforementioned community partner relations is dependent on open and reciprocal information sharing. CSC possesses information sharing agreements with the vast majority of law enforcement and criminal justice organizations, yet in terms of national security cases and potential threats of violent extremism, these warrant review with the possibility of strengthening these agreements through enhancements and extensions that permit vetted sharing with non-government actors. The need for enhanced sharing on matters related to national security situational awareness is also prevalent within CSC, as a need for more open and ongoing intelligence sharing, from national headquarters to the regional and site-level staff, was identified via internal CSC consultation. This can be addressed through existing CSC Security Branch all-staff bulletins and associated staff notification mechanisms. In order for staff to have a greater appreciation of the organizational realities presently faced by the threat of radicalization and violent extremism, the Service needs to make a concerted effort to keep staff routinely informed on the Service’s stance, approach in responding, and any initiatives fashioned to increase

departmental resiliency in the face of radicalization.

Additionally, there are key government partners that require a supplementary level of information to be shared between them and CSC based on the respective nature of their business requirements which are deemed critical to their collective success in addressing issues governing radicalized offender management and potential threats to national security. An example includes provincial/territorial correctional partners and the Parole Board of Canada (PBC). The sharing with these partners needs to range from the overarching departmental approaches to the management of radicalized offenders, including behavioural change indicators, risk assessments, and interventions; down to proactive case information briefs and transfer, release, and risk management plans.

At the federal government level, direction governing CSC's sharing of information related to national security incidents and cases has recently been enhanced through the introduction of the '*Security of Canada Information Sharing Act- SCISA*' (Public Safety Canada, 2015). Implemented on August 1, 2015, the SCISA was instituted to ensure the effective and timely access to government information, across federal departments, for national security purposes. The SCISA does not replace existing information sharing protocols between government departments. Rather, it serves to fill legislative gaps by providing clear authority to share information based on a 'non-exhaustive' list of activities assessed to undermine the security of Canada. Although CSC is not listed as a designated recipient institution within the annex of the SCISA, it has been identified as a department having legal authority to disclose national security-related information to designated recipient agencies (i.e., those having jurisdiction of, or responsibilities pertaining to, an activity that undermines the national security of Canada). The SCISA, along with existing information sharing protocol, will serve as the guiding legislative principles in bolstering CSC's internal mechanisms surrounding the dynamic and reciprocal sharing of radicalized offender information with other government partners.

5. Consider the Implementation of a Strategic Management Model

Based on evidence to date, work is currently underway at CSC to develop a comprehensive national model aligned to, and in consideration of, the above referenced recommendations. Envisioned as a Service-wide responsibility, the model, which is presently in the initial phases of development and stakeholder consultation, recognizes that the effective

management of the radicalized offender population depends on the coordination and cooperation of numerous correctional departments and divisions at National Headquarters (NHQ), within the regions, and at local institutional and community sites. Of paramount importance is that the strategy should be designed in direct relationship to, and consideration of, CSC's recent research recommendations outlining the most effective approaches to managing radicalized offenders. The concept would place significant emphasis on the safety and security of our staff, offenders, and the Canadian public by providing tools to assist in identification, risk assessment, intervention and reintegration of radicalized offenders and those persons vulnerable to such influences.

It is recommended, based on current research findings and referenced international best practices, that the model includes a strong foundation of core principles which serve to guide objectives, policies, responsibilities and expected outcomes. In direct reference to Canada's Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Public Safety Canada, 2011), CSC's program should be formulated based on the four mutually-reinforcing elements of *Prevent, Detect, Deny* and *Respond*. These guiding principles correspond with the core elements of the criminal-correctional lifespan which includes pre-criminal investigation, post sentence incarceration, and particular emphasis on the last stage of community reintegration. Moreover, given the uniqueness of this population, serious consideration for the creation of a national policy (a Commissioner's Directive, or CD) on Managing Radicalized Offenders is warranted. This could include supporting guidelines, which provide for specific instruction and staff support on properly identifying and reporting observations of changes in behaviour associated to radicalization and violent extremism. Guidelines would also serve as an appropriate location for awareness, detection, and risk assessment tools tailored to the needs of this population and the correctional staff that manage them.

6. Support Continued Evidence-Building as it Pertains to Radicalization

The above-noted recommendations and efforts to address all matters associated to radicalization, violent extremism, and national security are grounded in CSC's body of evidence surrounding the federally-sentenced radicalized offender population. While the gains in this area have been significant, and place the organization in a strong position to directly confront and manage these issues, it is recognized that the field of research related to radicalization and

violent extremism is in its relative infancy. It is therefore recommended that CSC support continued research that is directly aligned with the above recommendations and that which would contribute to the safety of the Canadian public by better-equipping CSC and its partner agencies to manage the risk posed by radicalized individuals. Specifically, CSC's research should be targeted to the areas of a formalized radicalized offender management strategy and staff training initiatives, pilots of potential specialized assessment instruments and/or intervention strategies, and continued work in the detection of susceptible offenders.

To date, CSC's support for collaborative working arrangements between members of its Security and Research Branch personnel has paid huge dividends, as evidenced by the body of operationally-relevant research products. It is recommended that CSC continue to foster and encourage organization-wide partnership on this file given the important role that many areas serve to play in providing sound and practical advice on effective approaches to managing this population, not only today, but long into the future.

Ways Forward: Feasibility Considerations

The feasibility of implementation for previously-identified ways forward should be considered in light of contextual, political, and societal factors and challenges. Across Canada, various organizations, both government and private sector alike, have developed and implemented initiatives that are both promising and principled in the effort to build resilience to the threat of terrorism. However, these efforts have yet to culminate into a cohesive, sustainable, national direction on radicalization to violence. This is an important consideration as it relates to CSC's operational activities, specifically in relation to the areas of enhanced information sharing, risk assessment and intervention, and community reintegration. Making the appropriate decisions governing CSC's policies and practices on confronting radicalization and violent extremism is in large part dependent on those being utilized by its closest partners, and the national government direction that supports and endorses these efforts as a whole. Consistency amongst the key government players in the spheres of public awareness and education, prevention approaches (particularly in the pre-criminal space), as well as the most appropriate and effective forms of 'community-oriented' intervention; are fundamental to achieving success. As it relates to federal correctional responsibilities, international best practices in the area of radicalized offender management have underlined the intrinsic value in the collective approach to information disclosure practices, tailored risk assessment tools supported by evidence, and intervention

focused on disengagement from violence over de-radicalization from an ideology. A nationally standardized and recognized strategy which specifically ratifies the most effective approaches, and strongly encourages cooperation and compliance is needed.

Additionally, Canada's current national security policies are heavily weighted toward "hard security" approaches. Although the current national policy direction (Public Safety Canada's Countering Terrorism (CT) Strategy; 2011) does possess a "prevent" pillar, it offers limited direction and support in the area of countering radicalization to violence (CRV). National coordination in this area is currently limited, and would benefit greatly from the development of a CRV strategy to compliment the CT strategy in order to strike a balance in the application of hard and soft security tools. This, again, is a very important discourse for CSC to be considering given its impending decisions surrounding the most appropriate and effective approaches to managing a radicalized offender population. Namely, from the perspective that CSC's strategic priorities place a priority on striking a balance between secure and firm security based measures that aim to protect the public, and those that are more dynamic, open, and rehabilitative in nature.

Therefore, while CSC's provisions needs to safeguard against possible security incidents, and provide for the overall safety and security of the institution; they also must be able to provide for the accurate identification of individual offender's risk and needs and address these through effective, evidence-based programs and interventions. More precisely, federal-level coordination and direction on the most effective methods of identification, mitigation and intervention for the 'at-risk' or vulnerable to radicalization population would more effectively equip government departments like CSC to modernize its policies and procedures in-line with softer, community-oriented disengagement and pro-social re-engagement measures.

As with any other large-scale federal government initiative, financial and resource implications are prevalent. The comprehensive and effective development, support and evaluation of tools, management strategies, and institutional and community-based initiatives require significant initial and continued government and public will, appropriate resource allocation, and sustainable funding.

Conclusions

The primary objective of CSC's prospective operational and strategic initiatives in the

management of radicalized offenders was to bolster organizational resilience to the threat of violent extremism. As per the Service's current strategic priorities, work to date strove to ensure that operational policies and practices directly contribute to the safety and security of the public, victims, staff, and offenders in the institutions and in the community. Consideration of the results of the comprehensive program of research and the resulting recommendations for ways forward would meet this and all other organizational priorities, while respecting recent and future changes in criminal legislation. While the foundational components of the proposed strategy are consistent with Canada's CT Strategy, they would go beyond models of deny and deter to further the Service's practices in the areas of prevention, intervention and community engagement. These efforts are based on the recognition that Canada's national security program is currently progressing towards a more comprehensive model, one which places particular emphasis on softer, preventive, harm reduction and community-oriented approaches.

CSC's way forward in the area of radicalized offender management is becoming increasingly clearer, specifically in acknowledging that the integration of the best practices gleaned from its internal research better situate the organization in the effective management of radicalized offender populations and the associated threat of ideologically-motivated violence. The Service needs to remain mindful that this particular security issue is in a constant state of flux, and therefore CSC's continued involvement in Canadian government initiatives, international partner consultations and capacity-building collaboration on matters related to research and operational management practices of radicalized offenders are central and integral to its success in achieving its objectives.

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**Appendix A: Summary of CSC's current intergovernmental collaborative relations
pertaining to National Security, Terrorism Prevention and Countering Radicalization to
Violence**

1. Global Counter-Terrorism Forum's (GCTF) – Detention & Reintegration Working Group (DRWR).
2. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) – Expert Working Group – 'The Management of Violent Extremist Offenders and the Prevention of Radicalization to Violence in Prisons'.
3. Program Consultation on the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI's) – Indonesian Prison Project (DFATD – ASEAN).
4. Public Safety Canada's – Countering Radicalization to Violence - Interdepartmental Working Group (CRV).
5. Membership and Participation on the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) – Counter-Terrorism & National Security Sub-Committee (CTNS) and CTNS – Countering Violence to Extremism Working Group.
6. Joint Intelligence Analysis and Assessment – CSC's partners include the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the United States Bureau of Prisons (BOP).
7. Active Memoranda of Understanding (MOU's) with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), in addition to numerous provincial/territorial/ municipal police and correctional departments.
8. Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre's (ITAC) – A CSC employee secondment placement and an active agreement between our respective departments allows for the sharing of ITAC assessments with CSC's – Preventive Security & Intelligence Division (PSI). This includes the sharing of reports from 'five-eye' international intelligence fusion centers.