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ARTICLES

The Case for an Advanced Stability Operations Course in the Canadian Army

"United We Stand, Divided We Fall": Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces Logistics Branch

Canadian Military Design in 2015: Thinking Outside the Box by Designing with Semiotic Squares

The Philippine–American War of 1899–1902: A Case Study in Adherence to the Fundamental Principles of Counterinsurgency Warfare

Re-Imagining the Close Range Anti-Tank Fight

Counterinsurgency in Iraq: Lessons from British Strategic Planning and Integration During Operation TELIC



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EDITORIAL: LIVES LIVED: LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ROMAN JOHANN JARYMOWYCZ, OMM, CD, PHD



Brigadier-General
David Patterson, MSM, CD

The intellectual firmament of the Canadian Army lost one of its brightest stars with the recent death of Lieutenant-Colonel (Retired) Roman Jarymowycz, OMM, CD. A stalwart supporter of *The Canadian Army Journal*, this armour officer, historian, artist and bon vivant was a true Renaissance man whose influence on a generation of Reserve Force leaders is beyond measure. I knew Roman for almost forty years, from the Montreal Garrison, to the Army Staff College, to working on his magisterial history of the Canadian Black Watch. This brief essay will attempt to chart the impact of Roman's life on the Army he so dearly cherished.

Roman was born in Vienna, Austria, in January 1945 to Ukrainian refugee parents; he spent his early years in a displaced persons camp before emigrating from Europe to Montreal via Chicago. His military career started in the Loyola College Canadian Officer Training Corps, where he trained as a signals officer and honed his skills as a debater under the stern tutelage of the Jesuit faculty. The military, and debating, would continue as passions for the remainder of his life. Finishing university, he, unlike most Canadian Officer Training Corps officers, remained in the Militia when he started teaching at Saint Thomas High School in 1968. Abandoning his dalliance with the Signals Corps, Roman joined the Royal Canadian Hussars at *Côte-des-Neiges* Armoury in Montreal. Roman's commitment to his regiment and his concern for the promotion of the cavalry spirit were put to the test when he assumed command of the Royal Canadian Hussars in 1979. The Regiment had had a series of commanding officers parachuted in to the appointment from elsewhere over the previous decade; as a result, the cavalry traditions of the unit had been allowed to fade. Roman resolved to be, as the French say, "*plus catholique que le Pape*" [more Catholic than the Pope] in order to reassert the cavalry spirit and bolster unit pride. The wearing of patrol dress was re-emphasized, and the Balaclava Dinner, which some people might now believe has been around forever, was invented by Roman to highlight the Royal Canadian Hussars' alliance with the British cavalry regiments that had charged on that fateful day. Balaclava traditions such as the singing of *Viola* (first by

Colonel Bjorn, a Second World War veteran of the unit, then by Roman, and now by Lieutenant-Colonel [Retired] Marc Leblanc), reciting Tennyson's famous poem, and conducting the "Ride" were all concoctions of Roman's design to reanimate the cavalry spirit in the Regiment. Professional development nights for officers and senior non-commissioned officers became *de rigueur*, with war games featured prominently. His influence extended beyond the unit, as his professionalism and high standards raised the level of tactical discussions on District command post exercises and tactical exercises without troops. Many an unsuspecting subaltern, who perhaps had not taken the exercise as seriously as Roman, found themselves, on the receiving end of a barrage of questions that would prompt better preparation the next time.

Throughout his service, Roman complemented his skills as a soldier and educator with those of an artist. Beginning while he studied at Loyola College, Roman became an accomplished cartoonist and caricaturist. His weekly cartoons in the student newspaper were awaited eagerly and managed to skewer faculty, administration and student life equally, doing so with little (or perhaps just a little) malice. Roman carried on his cartooning in the military, illustrating his lectures and documenting life in the Royal Canadian Hussars. Most notable were his three books of cartoons, describing the early RENDEZVOUS (RV) series of exercises, published in 1981, 1983 and 1985. While employed as an umpire on RV 81, Roman recorded the humorous side of the exercise, and a collection of those cartoons was published by Mobile Command. Many of the cartoons were used for a generation to illustrate lectures or hung in a place of honour on countless office walls. To be caricatured by Roman was a double-edged honour, as he invariably exposed some aspect of one's personality that one would rather keep hidden. Some of the most prized examples of his art were the annual group caricatures he created of his Staff College syndicates. Replete with inside jokes, many at his own expense—but mostly at that of the students'—they vividly documented the intense two-week experience that was Tutorial III of the Militia Command and Staff Course.

Roman's term as Commanding Officer of the Royal Canadian Hussars ended in 1984, when he transitioned to the Directing Staff of the Militia Command and Staff Course, now called the Primary Reserve Army Operations Course. It was there, within the walls of historic Fort Frontenac, that he would have his greatest influence. He arrived at the College at a propitious moment, as the curriculum was being totally revised by the new Director, Colonel Michael Barr. Mandated by the Commander of Mobile Command, Lieutenant-General Charlie Belzile, to update the Militia Command and Staff Course and harmonize it more closely with the Regular Force course, Colonel Barr brought



Source: Author's collection

a much greater emphasis on tactical acumen and battlegroup staff work to the course. In that environment, Roman thrived and became the acknowledged leader of the directing staff, a *de facto* status made *de jure* by his appointment as dean of the course, the first reservist to be so honoured. Each July, during the two-week residential portion of the year-long course, Roman took a diverse group of students from across the country, and from allied nations, and forged a capable, highly integrated team. Some would say that they united in self-defence against the relentless assault Roman delivered on their tactical skills! Woe betide the unsuspecting yeomanry major from the United Kingdom, presenting his solution to the first tactical problem, who casually leaned on his desk and stated that he was a “big hand, small map” kind of officer who did not treat with trifling details. Soon enough, after a scathing rebuttal, he was studying the characteristics of the Chimera tank destroyer! Roman’s status as dean also involved the training of new members of the directing staff. He, along with Colonel Barr, would put them through their paces in what was, for some, a wakeup call to the standard expected. Both inveterate and incorrigible actors, they would concoct elaborate skits to put the fear of God into the directing staff as they rode out to the tactical exercise without troops rehearsals in Colonel Barr’s staff car, nicknamed the “Black Maria.” Arriving at the rendezvous, they would leap from the car cursing and swearing at each other, with Colonel Barr threatening to fire Roman on the spot—psyops before it became a thing. When Roman retired from the military in 2000, he could confidently say that he had influenced a generation of soldiers and officers, raised the level of tactical discourse in the Army Reserve Force, and maintained very high standards of professional development from the unit to the Staff College.

Roman’s other vocation was historian. He taught history at the high school level in Montreal for over thirty years, and he also became a recognized and published authority on cavalry, armour and doctrine. His PhD thesis was later published as *Tank Tactics*, a thorough review of Canadian, American and British armour doctrine and its development in the inter-war and Second World War period. Anyone reading this book will hear Roman’s voice clearly in its humorous anecdotes and untranslated snippets of Russian, German and French. A later book,



This is the spot we chased those dumb bears...
C'est ici qu'on a effarouché ces pauvres ours!

Source: Rendezvous 81/DND Canada

Cavalry from Hoof to Track, charted the evolution of the cavalry and rise of the Armoured Corps. In his later years, he became involved in two epic efforts in regimental history. The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada engaged him initially to bring their regimental history, which had left off in 1962, up to date. This project increased dramatically in scope when it was decided to completely rewrite the entire history—

a two-volume effort of over 700 pages. Years of research and writing followed, with Sandy, Roman’s wife, providing a steady hand on the editor’s tiller, and Major (Retired) Michel Boire, a former Canadian Officer Training Corps colleague and old friend, helping Roman with the unit book committee. Due for release in the spring of 2017, it is indeed sad that Roman will only be there in spirit. In particular, his chapter on the ill-fated attack by the Black Watch on Verrières Ridge during the Normandy campaign is meticulously researched, with reference to all the latest scholarship, and cogently presented. It will likely become the standard interpretation of the event, which continues to stir strong emotions. His last project was to be a history of the Royal Canadian Hussars; now partially complete, it will be finished by engaged, dedicated, members of the regimental family.



They're on the next ridge. We'll support from here. Good luck!
Ils sont sur la prochaine colline. On va vous supporter d'ici... Bonne chance, hein!

Source: Rendezvous 81/DND Canada

In the pages of *The Canadian Army Journal*, or its predecessor *The Army Doctrine and Training Bulletin*, Roman was a committed doctrinal nationalist. His three articles highlighted his disdain for doctrinal *arrivistes*, and his concern that Canada’s Army have a Canadian doctrine.¹ As he recounts in “Doctrine and Canada’s Army,” his views were shaped by an exchange with a New Zealand student on the Militia Command and Staff Course. The student’s question as to whether any country could adopt another’s doctrine, given that doctrine is supposedly a reflection of national culture, permitted Roman to ruminate on, and challenge, the prevailing (in 1999) acceptance of manoeuvre warfare doctrine *totus porcus*. Ever the doctrinal purist, he reviewed the origins of manoeuvre warfare doctrine, and its Russian, German and American genesis, in subsequent articles. Throughout, his concern was that Canadians should look to our own history and tradition, our own dabblings in the operational art, to define a Canadian way of war. In his quirky, humorous, witty way, Roman was most concerned that the Army he loved so dearly not lose its way and become merely a dim shadow of another military. His untimely death removes a passionate voice from the debate. Any soldier who takes their profession seriously should mourn his passing, none more so than those who were privileged to know him as a friend and mentor. *Non nobis sed patriae*. Make much of your horses.

Brigadier-General David Patterson, MSM, CD

1. “Doctrine and Canada’s Army: Seduction by Foreign Dogma: Coming to Terms with Who We Are” in ADTB Vol. 2, No. 3, August 1999. “On Doctrine: A Brief Comment,” in ADTB Vol. 4, No. 3, Fall 2001. “The Operational Art – Definitions and Interpretations: Does Size Matter” in CAJ Vol. 13, No. 2, 2010.

GUEST EDITORIAL: 1 WING COMMANDER, COLONEL SCOTT N. CLANCY, OMM, MSM, CD, BA, MDS



Colonel Scott N. Clancy,
OMM, MSM, CD, BA, MDS

When I assumed command of 1 Wing, I did what most of us do when faced with command opportunities. Rather than write down my vision and guidance for the formation (which I had already done), I wrote some orders to myself. This self-reflective guidance included items such as: “Listen. No, don’t just get ready to talk—really listen.” I also had a personal goal for myself. It was a lesson learned in the deployment to Afghanistan: “Don’t let another generation of Army leaders want to deploy without tactical aviation.”

Ensuring that this enduring requirement for tactical aviation persisted was part of a comprehensive approach across RCAF, Canadian Army and CANSOF chains of command. It was centred on three tenets, or “vectors,” as I term them: integration, combat effectiveness, expeditionary focus.

The first among equals in this group of vectors is combat effectiveness. It is the centre of gravity for 1 Wing. A lack of it usurped Canadian Army faith in the tactical aviation capability of 1 Wing prior to Afghanistan, and our prowess once deployed was what gained it back. To a large extent, the lack of faith in 1 Wing’s capability came alongside a belief that the CH-146 was not a capable airframe. The weapons systems and the sensor capabilities that we began using during our time in Afghanistan have gone a long way to dispelling that belief among the next generation of Army aviation users. However, that has not been my focal point. As Commander 1 Wing, I have blatantly plagiarized the Commander Canadian Army’s vision concerning his soldiers. My version of it is as follows:



My focus has centred on being well led and well trained. That has led directly to a steadfast participation in the Army Managed Readiness Plan and the integration of our training needs. This mutual dependency is actually at the heart of all things joint.¹ 1 Wing tactical aviators know that being combat effective means knowing our job inside and out and knowing the army business in order to ensure that the use of our capability, our airframes, and our airpower flexibility is maximized. The idea of professionalism within the Wing has become synonymous with being tactically excellent.

But this cannot stop with merely integration at collective training events. In fact, it must begin at a more basic level. The soldiers of the Canadian Army must see the benefit of their aviation capabilities. Their exposure to tactical aviation must foster in them a belief that the airframes and aviators create wins for them on the battlefield, not just a respite from a long walk! Both airframes have risen to this task.

The CH-146 Griffon has come into its own as a premier battlefield ISR platform. Its ability to stand off beyond threats and enable brigade recce to focus on contacts, or to move with speed of action as they identify enemy-free spaces, is directly contributing to the Army’s move towards what Adaptive Dispersed Operations (ADO) envision. The CH-147 Chinook remains a resource that we are exploring together in its potential. It has an obvious benefit in the conduct of airmobile or air assault operations. However, both the Canadian Army and the RCAF struggle with the use of the Chinook in logistics support and with how to logistically support an aviation unit that now has this capability deployed within it.

This leads us to a key lesson on integration: the importance of the brigade. For the US and many of our allies, the division is the “unit of manoeuvre” for aviation. Our doctrine even states that aviation shall be grouped at that level that has a continuous requirement. Many of my tactical (Army) aviation counterparts tell me, “Brigades cannot keep Chinooks busy.” I tell them that an ADO-capable brigade *must* keep chinooks busy! It is the lessons we are learning in our integrated approach to training at the brigade level that have enabled us to understand why the CO of the supporting aviation unit is actually the chief advisor to the brigade commander on aviation and needs to be involved at the same time and on the same level as his gunner and engineer are during the formation of his intent. This concept is realized organizationally at each CMBG now as the CO 450 THS is re-established as the aviation advisor to the Commander 2 CMBG for the first time since 427 oriented itself on the special operations aviation (SOA) mission.

The final piece that 1 Wing has most recently put in place is reorganizing the Wing around a Force Employment Concept (FEC). The FEC embodies the 1 Wing expeditionary focus vector. The Wing is structured, trained and focused on expeditionary operations in Canada and abroad. We have the pleasure of deploying in short order with our own first-line logistics backed up by RCAF or Canadian Army close support or second-line logistics. Although this

1. I have long believed that dependence is a key criterion for being joint. Without it, forces are merely “joint at the seams.”

is trained for at the high end of the spectrum of conflict, it provides us with a level of agility sought after for operations throughout the spectrum, especially for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and national relief operations within Canada. This expeditionary focus is what keeps 1 Wing aviators strong.

The result of this integrated focus on training and expeditionary operations, in order to achieve a high level of combat effectiveness, is a comprehensive understanding of how important being well led and well trained is. Those two elements allow us to make the most of the equipment that we have and inform the force development of capabilities into the future. In turn, I feel that we are developing young leaders and soldiers who know what right looks like and who want tactical aviation fighting alongside them as they deploy.

Colonel Scott N. Clancy, OMM, MSM, CD, BA, MDS

A tactical helicopter pilot by trade, Colonel Scott Clancy took command of 1 Wing in June 2014. He has completed numerous operational deployments, both at home and abroad, including commanding the air component that deployed to Haiti in support of humanitarian operations following the 2010 earthquake.



Source: Combat Camera



THE CASE FOR AN ADVANCED STABILITY OPERATIONS COURSE IN THE CANADIAN ARMY

Lieutenant-Colonel David Hill

INTRODUCTION

The Canadian Army, in reconstitution from a decade of operations in Afghanistan, is re-emphasizing war-fighting in its training systems. This model has been argued to be effective, especially since the end of the Cold War. Many professionals and academics alike have suggested that the 'train for war, scale back for Stability Operations' model is the best fit for the Canadian Army. Although it has worked, it is sub-optimal. With the *Future Security Environment* indicating that operations in failed and failing states will continue, and an operational trend analysis demonstrating that Stability Operations will likely continue to be the norm for the Canadian Army, it is prudent to re-assess the best model to prepare for the full spectrum of possible future operations. From a training perspective, this essay argues that there is an option that could improve this balance *without compromising* the Army's war-fighting capability. The development of an Advanced Stability Operations Course would institutionalize lessons learned and develop cognitive capacity for key stability skill sets. This initiative would be scalable and evolutionary with the advantages disproportionately greater than the cost. This recommendation is aligned with public perception on the Army's role, increases 'qualitative' readiness, improves current training orientation to key doctrine (specifically *Land Forces 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations*), enhances key soldier skills and would facilitate the institutionalization of stability lessons learned from the 1990s to the present.

The consensus was that the successful counter-insurgency operations [in Afghanistan] looked more like peace-building operations such as in Bosnia. Rebuilding government and restoring basic services were more effective than destroying the opponent.

—Lee Windsor, *Kandahar Tour*¹

There is presently a gap in the Army's Individual Training (IT) system. On the 'soft power' end, there exists a series of Peace Support Training Centre-established courses that focus on

skills required for specific theatres of operation. Conversely, 'hard power' is incorporated into all leadership training and most occupational specialization training. However, there is limited IT that generically addresses the murky nuances of Stability Operations. Using current doctrine, and as cross-referenced to alliance partners, Stability Operations will be defined in this essay as all operations along the spectrum of conflict from traditional Peacekeeping to counter-insurgency, inclusive.² An Advanced Stability Operations Course would fill this gap. Is this required? Are the skill sets suitably unique from either end of the spectrum? Do the Peacekeeping courses at the Peace Support Training Centre meet this goal? This essay argues that an Advanced Stability Operations Course would provide the appropriate level of IT to an area that is undertrained at this time, as was identified in the joint and coalition lessons learned reflection of 2012:

Conventional warfare approaches often were ineffective when applied to operations other than major combat, forcing leaders to realign the ways and means of achieving effects.³

According to the same source, the way ahead involves institutionalizing non-conventional warfare, updating education and training, leveraging knowledge management and reassessing force alignment.

It is imperative to enable junior leaders to operate in this environment. It is important to note here that the author supports the wisdom that Canada's Army must remain combat capable—it is for this reason that IT is being assessed in order to have no impact on full spectrum Collective Training (CT). This would ensure primacy of a combat capability. Although an easy short-term alternative solution would be to simply pay the tuition fee and load x number of Canadians on a foreign course, there are five advantages to generating and managing an internal Canadian course.⁴

First, we retain Canadian ownership over a key skill that has been identified as a probable operating construct under *Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations* and the *Future Security Environment*.⁵ This is reinforced in the *Army Operating Framework* as well as *Waypoint 2016* and should therefore be of importance in the Army Systems Approach to Training as more than simply an 'afterthought' in CT for privileged units.⁶ The current model focuses most stability-specific IT to reservists of the Influence Activities Task Force or to Regular Force personnel deploying on a named Operation as mission-specific training. This limits baseline stability exposure to high-readiness CT—from which the capability development will be cursory and potentially counter-productive since the complexity of Stability Operations requires specialized skill sets.⁷

Second, having formal IT would necessitate a small investment in professionalizing the instructor cadre. This is important because the most important resource in the Canadian Army is its people—to make a long-term investment in its human capital will pay dividends throughout people's careers and by extension to the institution. Offering a broader audience a specialized course in stability IT will increase the ability of Army units to conduct stability missions without detracting from combat-oriented CT. Specifically, it does not mean that the Army needs to compromise its war-fighting focus; the recommended IT augments

a combat focus without a major restructure. The counter-argument is that Canadian Armed Forces resource limitations cannot sustain new increases and there exists a zero-sum game for initiatives; however, based on priority of likely threats and probable operations, investing in a small cadre of 4-10 full/part-time Regular/Reserve staff in a Centre of Excellence would be reasonable. A scalable example of how a similar capability was successfully developed was the creation of an Advanced Persistent Surveillance Course by the instructor cadre at the Infantry School in 2008–2011 while remaining person-year neutral. This course was built from scratch in one year and was then delivered to units deploying to Afghanistan.⁸ After-action reports indicate that it was a significant enabler.⁹ Small investments can have disproportionate impacts.

Third, the CoE cadre can be leveraged to provide advice to the Chain of Command when required. This could inform decision-makers at all levels and enhance inter-agency co-operation. The training element could be flexible to surge (for training or operations) as required; an absence of such a training capacity means that there is no surge option. Also, an exchange could be considered in order to train other ABCA+ participants with reciprocal training of Canadians at their institutions in order to consolidate the lessons and training of key partner states. This would facilitate information sharing with our allies, promote good offices and develop invaluable relationships as well as facilitating tactical development.

Fourth, since the Army has cut specializations during the past decade, especially for the infantry, a specialization opportunity in Stability Operations would allow for soldiers to take pride in their role as advisors, trainers and leaders within their unit. Although the Peace Support Training Centre offers courses related to stability, they focus on pre-deployment training and Reserve training, not building a baseline through systemic IT. In short, these courses could be leveraged, but at present they are focused on the Reserve Influence Activities Task Forces; this paper argues that the knowledge base needs to be decentralized throughout the Regular Force. A direct comparison can be drawn to the Urban Operations Instructor Course, which similarly develops a unit's specialization capability through IT. This breadth of capability required for stability is acknowledged in doctrine for Adaptive Dispersed Operations:

Operating across the continuum of operations within a Joint Interagency Multinational and Public (JIMP) context will present commanders, from the very junior to the very senior, with a volume and diversity of information that will require robust skills and high levels of aptitude in order to comprehend, associate holistically and manage it.¹⁰

However, the means to acquire these 'robust skills and aptitudes' is not defined. This stability-specific course would address it directly.

Finally, it is germane to take stock nationally of the opportunity to leverage such a training opportunity in order to inject Canadian-specific lessons learned—especially those from Afghanistan and the Balkans—into grassroots training. The Canadian Army paid a large price for the lessons it has learned over the past several decades. By augmenting the training system in this manner, flexibility and capacity are reinforced in relation to the complex problem of Force Generating for unknown missions. The following example of an Advanced Stability Operations Course describes how this could be incorporated.¹¹

A conceptual template would begin with a selection element to ensure that the right people apply and are chosen. The unit chain of command and Base Personnel Selection Officer team could manage this. These types of operations are personality dependent, given the networks of human interactions: local civilians, security forces, government leaders, allied forces, Other Government Departments, Non-Governmental Organizations, etc.¹² Therefore, attracting 'people people' would be important, not unlike the manner for selecting snipers or human intelligence operators.¹³ The course could be owned by the Peace Support Training Centre, Tactics School, Infantry School, Canadian Army Enablers Group or Military Police Academy, depending on institutional issues (chain of command direction, staff capacity, course emphasis, stakeholder considerations, etc.). The target audience would be Lieutenants-Captains and Corporals-Sergeants of all Army military occupations, but focusing on combat arms and with opportunity for partner participation (RCMP or other). The training content would mostly overlap for all ranks, but there would be scope for officer- and non-commissioned member-specific training to ensure appropriate knowledge coverage (e.g., detailed non-lethal weapons training for non-commissioned members versus human terrain mapping for officers). The timeframe would be about eight weeks of training; this would be a natural fit into the spring/fall National Training Calendar based on a platoon-sized course (24–38 personnel with approximately a 1:6 staff/student ratio).¹⁴ The format would be a combination of distributed learning, classroom and field skills. The end-state output would be an Army Training Authority-approved throughput of candidates to see a critical mass of qualified personnel in all Regular



Source: Sgt Marc-André Gaudreault, Valcarver Imaging Services

Force combat arms units and in the institutions.¹⁵ Using the template of other advanced course qualifications in line units, a reasonable end-state would be 2 to 8 qualified members in each combat arms unit and 1–4 across the remaining line Army units.¹⁶

Key content to include is identified at Figure 1. The author developed this conceptual curriculum for an eight-week template course based on Stability Operations doctrine, other nations' courseware and lessons learned from Canadian Operations.¹⁷

This course would directly influence junior leaders on the importance of stability-winning tactics that would enable the chain of command should a Warning Order to conduct a similar task be received.¹⁹ John Nagl's introduction to the US COIN manual comments

Topic	Officer - specific 8 hr day	NCM - specific 8 hr day	Officers & NCMs - specific 8 hr day	TOTAL 8 hr days
Stability Lessons Learned	.5	.5	1	
Non-Lethal Force / Weapons	1	10		
Interpersonal Capabilities (CQ/EQ)	.5		1	
Influence Activity / Info Operations	1		.5	
ROE Theory and Use of Force			.5	
Close Quarter Battle (AM PT)			AM PT	
Urban Environment Awareness (FSE Outlook)	1.5		1	
Urban Range		2		
Mine/IED Awareness			1.5	
Security Sector Reform Ops	2	1.5	.5	
Emergency Driving		2		
Conduct After Capture (Level B)			1	
P3I (See footnote) ¹⁸	1	1	.5	
Case Study Analysis	4		1	
CAF Joint/Unique Enablers	3		.5	
External WoG Enablers	1.5		.5	
Strategic Communications			.5	
Detainee Management	1	.5	.5	
Biometrics Awareness	.5			
Elections Management			.5	
Distributed Learning Read-In Package	2	2	3	
Confirmation FTX			5	
Course Admin			1.5	
Total days	19.5	19.5	20.5	40

Figure 1: A conceptual curriculum breakdown for an Advanced Stability Operations Course

that “The story of how the [U.S.] Army found itself less than ready to fight an insurgency goes back to the Army’s unwillingness to internalize and build upon the lessons of Vietnam.”²⁰ This framed the context of the US quagmire in Iraq, but it is worthwhile to reflect on the content. Has the Canadian Army assimilated the lessons learned during the Peacekeeping Operations of the 1990s?²¹ Is it remembering the lessons of Afghanistan despite a well-intentioned reversion to war-fighting operations in CT? The following paragraphs break down some of the key concepts that could be included in an Advanced Stability Operations Course.

Given the fundamental importance of de-escalating violence, training on non-lethal options would be invaluable, to include: posture, presence, de-escalation, non-lethal weapons and close-quarter combat.²² Specific non-lethal weapons systems such as pepper spray, the collapsible baton, bean-bag/rubber ball ammunition for shot guns, water cannons, crowd control equipment, the laser dazzler, distraction devices, CS gas and Tasers are all options.²³ There are currently trials and war-stock for these systems available, but there is very limited training given on these, since the primary focus on use of force is lethal. In Stability Operations, much operational and strategic damage can come from the application of lethal force, even if it is tactically justified.²⁴ Brigadier-General Pepin, the Deputy Commander of the International Security Assistance Force, commented that “When both kinetic and non-kinetic were options, there was a tendency from both Canadian and US military forces to focus more on the kinetic.”²⁵

Enabling operators with a knowledge of these weapons systems could allow units to train specialists in order to manage violence with non-lethal force in circumstances where they could choose between that or a lethal option. This is a campaign enabler. In comparison, if we assess our domestic police against the forces on Stability Operations, police are equipped with both lethal and non-lethal options. This allows them the ability to avoid deadly force in favour of non-lethal options. A counter-argument is that due to the non-lethal effects of the weapons, they can be abused. Stephen Coleman argued that despite the value of non-lethal weapons to provide an alternative option to the use of lethal force, police organizations have used them when lethal force was not an option.²⁶ This fundamentally altered the intent: instead of reducing lethal force incidents, it increased the overall number of people that were on the receiving end of police-applied force.²⁷ However, knowledge is power, and having the option is better than not having it. With training, these types of weapons could provide option space to reduce lethal applications of force.²⁸ Given the importance of Information Operations in today’s age of real-time media, minimizing lethal force is a desirable end state; would it not be better to give a soldier the option of throwing a distraction device into an insurgent’s house instead of a fragmentation grenade?

Interpersonal capabilities and awareness such as negotiating skills, cross-cultural and emotional intelligence are critical to successful Stability Operations. Dr. Sarah Meharg commented that 4 out of 5 military personnel fail at cultural awareness.²⁹ American studies reinforce this.³⁰ A basic understanding of cross-cultural awareness could be delivered with an emphasis on generic interpersonal skills.³¹ This links directly to emotional intelligence, or the ability to understand how to interact with other people.³² This is a more generic skill set that is more easily transferable across cultural boundaries without specific cultural bias.³³

This issue is further complicated in that security forces routinely deal with people suffering from mental disabilities;³⁴ this is easily extrapolated to a Stability Operation, clearly underscoring the importance of soldiers using appropriate interaction techniques in complicated situations—a specialization that general purpose soldiers presently lack.³⁵

A component of historical case studies, operational lessons learned and doctrinal review would be necessary. An intellectual understanding of the root causes and conditions for insurgencies would be necessary, as is indicated in the US COIN manual:

This training is as much intellectual as it is physical. Not only do specific units and sub-units have to undertake skill training in preparation for the likely tasks (stability activities such as urban presence patrolling, cordon and search and vehicle check points) but they have to be trained in the principles as well...³⁶

Finally, there are a number of tactical skills that form a narrow slice of Battle Task Standards that are highly relevant to Stability Operations. These include: urban operations awareness, counter-IED/mine tactics, civil-military affairs, security sector reform, emergency driving, conduct after capture, austere elections management, biometrics screening, etc.³⁷ Significant situational awareness to current policies and sensitivities on detainee operations would also be paramount. Additionally, Information Operations would facilitate the tactical awareness of strategic effects; it is very easy in a stability construct to allow tactical victories and short-sightedness to usurp the strategic campaign. Other tactical capabilities could be included, but this proves the point that there are numerous precise tactical skill sets that, if trained together in a course such as this, would enhance a specialist’s ability to operate, advise and train in a Stability Operation. These capabilities would most effectively be validated in a short Field Training Exercise that challenges the leaders in rank-appropriate positions and deals with complex Adaptive Dispersed Operations problems, validating the training, not unlike the ‘longest day’ scenario exercised at the Canadian Manoeuvre Training Centre during High Readiness CT.³⁸ These skills will be in high demand, especially in the mid-to-long term when the current corporate memory is eroded due to attrition.

Furthermore, IT has much deeper impacts on cognitive development in comparison to CT.³⁹ A course such as this would enable the reality of the *Future Security Environment* to be studied in detail by the leaders that will subsequently advise commanders and build appropriate future campaigns. Without a doubt, a full Training Needs Analysis following the Army Systems Approach to Training would be required to determine the precise content and production numbers. This necessity to invest in a leader’s understanding of complex environments is expressed by Colonel Howard Coombs:

I believe practitioners and theorists like Pratt, Sewall and Kitson are correct in that military officers must be prepared and enabled to orchestrate all types of non-military activities. These efforts, aimed at reconstruction, development, and governance are necessary to achieve success in the low-intensity conflicts that we have been fighting over the past decade, and will continue to fight into the foreseeable future.⁴⁰



There are four key benefits to the development of an Advanced Stability Operations Course. First, this initiative is aligned with the public's interest in their Army—Canadians overwhelmingly want their soldiers to be Peacekeepers; be this myth or reality, the perception is real. By facilitating a small tranche of specialists to embrace Stability Operations, this maintains civil-military alignment between the public and the Canadian Armed Forces.⁴¹ Secondly, it directly enhances the Army's 'qualitative' readiness, as indicated by the investment in professional development and the development of cognitive warriors. Although this cannot be measured as the quantitative metrics of equipment, vehicles and personnel positions, the quality of our leaders is our strength and has always been—this should continue to be reinforced. Third, this improves the Army's alignment with the keystone doctrine of *Land Operations 2021: Adaptive Dispersed Operations*. This reference is grounded in a future environment where complexity and Stability Operations will be the new norm; if this is our doctrine, then we should strive to train hand in glove with its precepts. Finally, this concept provides a means of institutionalizing key stability lessons learned.

In summary, operations for the Canadian Army over the next horizon cannot be predicted with any certainty, but it is prudent to be the 'least unprepared.' By developing an Advanced Stability Operations Course, the Canadian Army will improve its potential for success in the undoubtedly complex Stability Operations that will transpire. The end result of this training would be a cadre of experts and advisors that could facilitate the planning and management of complex stability operations—those which the *Future Security Environment* indicates the Army will execute for the mid-to-long term. By investing in the intellectual capacity and development of future leaders, the Army will best posture itself to deal with future shock and 'unknown unknowns.'⁴² This is especially germane in that this capability can be implemented in an evolutionary manner without any major structural overhauls or budgetary realignment. Since human lives



Source: Sgt. Marc-André Gaudreault, Valcarver Imaging Services

are at stake, those of both our soldiers and the civilians of the affected nation, it is incumbent that the Army prioritize its resources to ensure that it is best prepared for mission success in the Stability Operations of the future. Canada's Army can remain capable of combat while developing this specialization of a small tranche of leaders in Stability Operations. Developing an advanced course, institutionalized under the Army Training Authority, would be an investment whose dividends would greatly outweigh the costs. The lessons learned since the end of the Cold War could be directly imparted to leaders without eroding the Army's war-fighting capability. If action is not taken, the Canadian Army risks atrophy to its stability capability based on the reality of eroding corporate knowledge. Is an Advanced Stability Operations Course not a worthwhile consideration, given the likelihood of future Stability Operations and the Army's centre of gravity being operational excellence? 🌸

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Lieutenant-Colonel Hill is a plans officer working in Force Development at the Canadian Army Headquarters. A career infantry officer, he has served with the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the Royal Canadian Regiment in line command and staff capacities as well as instructing leadership and specialized courses at the Infantry School. LCol Hill has deployed to Haiti and Afghanistan and has trained extensively with coalition partners. A recent graduate from the Canadian Forces College, he has received a B.A. in Politics and Economics, an M.A. in War Studies and an M.A. in Defense Studies all from the Royal Military College of Canada.

ENDNOTES

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
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14. This is based on the student and staff numbers that are consistent with the advanced series of courses run from the Infantry School.
15. Advisory capacity in HQ and training institutions
16. This ratio is based on the current manning in combat arms units of specialized qualification such as Complex Terrain Instructor, Advanced Winter Warfare Instructor or Urban Operations Instructor.
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CBC News. Why it's 'really important police understand mental illness,' <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/hamilton/news/why-it-s-really-important-police-understand-mental-illness-1.2074894> (accessed on 14 April 2014).
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MCpl Melanie Morissette (left) of 2 Svc Bn, Petawawa, moves in with the reach pendant to hook the cargo up to the CH-146 Griffon helicopter while MCpl Natalie Finnigan, also of 2 Svc Bn, keeps a vigilant lookout. This took place under the watchful eye of MCpl Michael Milrod, Instructor at the Canadian Forces Land Advanced Warfare Centre (CFLAWC).

“UNITED WE STAND, DIVIDED WE FALL”:

Unification of the Canadian Armed Forces Logistics Branch

Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Normand Marc Parent, CD, MSM (US), MDS

A house divided against itself cannot stand.

—Abraham Lincoln

INTRODUCTION

The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) Logistics Branch has been considered the “Fourth Service”¹ in support of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and Canadian Army (CA); however, it has continued to be a multi-environmental branch with a loose and fragile governing structure. The notion of creating a separate and independent support service/environment reporting directly to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was discussed as early as 1968 and continues to be a topic of discussion, although not executed nor completely dismissed by Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) leadership. These initial discussions were part of the implementation of the CAF unification bill C-243, which was in fact an effort to reduce defence spending in line with the fiscal environment, as well as the Defence White Paper published in 1964.² According to J.L. Granatstein, Minister of National Defence (MND) Paul Hellyer basically dismissed with CAF unification the traditions and service identities as “buttons and bows” not related to efficiencies.³ Completely unifying the Logistics Branch under one service is associated with operational effectiveness rather than Hellyer’s efficiency goals. This important paradigm shift⁴ of breaking away from old traditions (e.g. “every service has its own Logisticians”) and ways of thinking (e.g. “I need my Logisticians to be a sailor/aviator/soldier to be able to support my operations”) would be for certain military leaders very provocative and disheartening indeed. In R.M. Farley’s 2014 book *Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force* on the other hand, the author advocates the complete abolishment and decentralization of the United States Air Force-based organizational structures and culture, as well as changes to the security and policymaking environments in the post-9/11 era to improve military effectiveness in the new reality of the joint operational environments.⁵

History has demonstrated over the past centuries that a sound military campaign inside or outside a sovereign state’s borders is dependent on the organization of its “logistics tail.” Without it, combat ineffectiveness and inefficiencies risk negating any technological or informational advantages a state’s military may have in comparison to its foe or possible foes. Military logistics entail more than structures and processes and must be agile to adjust and overcome operational and transformational challenges associated with current and future security environments.

This article will demonstrate that full unification of the CAF Logistics Branch under one service/champion would improve its operational effectiveness. The concepts and ideas in this article originate from the author’s Master of Defence Studies thesis. Throughout this article, the term unification is defined as the process of unifying two or more military services as a single service in terms of uniform, governance, system, personnel, etc.



Source: Public Affairs, 5 CMBG

5 Svc Bn Logisticians of all three environments being inspected by 5 CMBG Cmdt in June 2014.

The first section will analyze three key unification periods, which brought considerable transformation woes to the CAF. The key periods analyzed will be the 1968 unification, the 2005–2012 operational effectiveness transformation and the on-going 2013 Defence renewal (DR) efficiency initiatives. The following section will review the historical and organizational structure of the CAF Logistics Branch. By using an organizational analysis model, the third section will seek to expand on the previous and support the increased effectiveness associated with full unification under one environment.

UNIFICATION CONCEPT IN THE CAF: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

The notion of unifying the Logistics Branch has been discussed both before and after the 1968 CAF unification process, as well as since the services returned to pre-unification status in the 1990s. These discussions and lack of consensus are deeply rooted in the emotionally charged accepted wisdom of its leadership and constituents, which is centred on traditions, loyalties and service identity.⁶ The opponents of integration often remark that the Glassco report used as the basis for Hellyer's "crusade" for reorganizing the CAF did not specifically recommend integration of either CAF services or its branches.⁷ This section will identify the key ideas and principles of the 1968 reorganization act, the 2005 CAF transformation and, ultimately, the CAF Defence Renewal Team's desired outcomes, as they relate to the identification of possible solution sets for the Logistics Branch to increase its effectiveness through unification.

1968 UNIFICATION OF THE LOGISTICS BRANCHES

The Logistics Branch was unified on 1 February 1968 through Bill C-243.⁸ The three environmental branches and their sub-branches were amalgamated under the one branch to minimize and eliminate what Hellyer describes as a system with "... little effective cooperation

between the services when each concentrated almost exclusively on its own interests."⁹ Furthermore, the climate between the three environments' service chiefs was confrontational, given the fact the three environmental requirements were completely distinct, not synchronized and in direct competition, without any concerted link to national defence program or priorities. As the MND, Hellyer saw "open competition among the services and constant political manoeuvring, as each service chief exercised his right of direct access to the Minister."¹⁰ The unification of the three branches was to increase effectiveness and "... was a sensible posture for the comparatively small size of the CAF."¹¹ The opponents of unification focused on a perceived dissatisfaction of the members in the services and the argument that the change was a too one-dimensional organizational model to impose on the institution.¹² Even though the unification did cause negative impacts and discord (real or perceived, could be debated), four key principles as they pertain to the Logistics Branch were introduced: (1) the "Fourth Service" creation/discussion; (2) meeting military operational demands; (3) economy of scale and effort; and (4) employment motivation. The 1963 Glassco report on government discussed the creation of a "Fourth Service" for military support/logistics services and its benefits for CAF effectiveness. This "Fourth Service" would centralize, for all intents and purposes, all the logistics services considered triplicate under one independent authority reporting to the CDS at the same level as the Navy, Air Force and Army Chiefs of Staffs.¹³ Internal to the Logistics community of the time, the Logistics Branch Advisor (LBA) (e.g. senior Logistics advisor) to the CDS was also of the same mindset and open to the idea of creating this independent service:

... while it is desirable to have logisticians who specialize within a particular environment, and while continued employment within the environment is something to be encouraged, such employment patterns are not cast in concrete—there can be no absolute barriers to transfers between environmental commands.¹⁴

A military force's *raison d'être* is ultimately to be able to meet its country's operational requirements. Unification allows increased agility and adaptability so that the CAF can prepare, deploy and redeploy for the current and future security environment. The military logistics system is critical in all of the previous transition phases. Environmental divides for a force of 66,000 Regular Force and 30,950 Reserve Force personnel¹⁵ need to be minimized in order to achieve governmental intent and missions. Furthermore, the higher loyalty to the overall Logistics Branch that presents itself with unification is linked to meeting those operational demands. No longer can specific environments dictate operational objectives that would require jeopardizing the overall limited logistics support architecture to the defence of Canada.

The third principle, associated with the 1968 unification, was the economy of scale and effort in unifying the Logistics Branch. The requirement to have three distinct support apparatuses was, and still is, uneconomical for the CAF. The centralization of human resource procedures, the reduction and consolidation of depots (be it equipment or ammunition), career management and reductions in overhead leadership are but some possible examples of the economies of scale achieved through unification. Furthermore, unification "... ensures policy coherence, increases coordination, reduces waste and overhead costs, and realizes greater administrative efficiencies in the end."¹⁶

The final principle of unification included in the documents concerned the employment and retention of Logisticians. The unification into one environment/service allowed better management of its personnel: "... a unified service ... permit[s] them to advance across old service barriers and so provide greater avenues for service and greater opportunities for personnel ..."¹⁷ Environmental divides based on the environmental uniform a sailor/aviator/soldier wears should not be interfering and making a difference in completing technical responsibilities. The goal should always be to assign the right person with the right technical acumen to the right position. Environmental acumen can be learned in a "just-in-time" process and requires limited time compared to the common technical training personnel receives. The artificial barriers created by the three environments need to be taken down and removed in order for the CAF to benefit from having cross environmentally trained support personnel.¹⁸ As indicated previously, a major counter-argument to unification relates to individual loyalty to the Navy, Air Force or Army, and to corps and regiments, ships and squadrons, which was vital in 1968.

2005 CAF TRANSFORMATION'S QUEST FOR EFFECTIVENESS

In 2005, General Rick Hillier led the CAF through an organizational transformation process, which resulted in, among other initiatives, the creation of Canadian Operational Support Command (CANOSCOM) to deliver operational support. The Leslie transformation report of 2011 identified CANOSCOM as a

... very laudable quality of extending upon the extremely potent operational focus that characterizes the success of the CANOSCOM model, which in turn reflects the positive and enduring impact of the 2005 Transformation on the CF organizational culture.¹⁹

Interestingly enough in 2012, this same organization was dismantled and its personnel integrated inside a new operational level command called Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC).²⁰ Unfortunately, the logistical roles and responsibilities that had been centralized in CANOSCOM have been decentralized, sometimes without "Authority-Responsibility-Accountability (ARA)," throughout the CAF structure making the management and coordination of the Logistics Branch even more difficult. This new transformation period in CAF Logistics was not a completely distinct initiative nor a revolution in organizational change but more of an evolutionary development.²¹ The 2005 transformation built upon the foundations of past transformation initiatives, including the 1968 unification, the implementation of the Vance Report²² and the Management Command and Control Re-Engineering Team (MCCRT) initiative established to streamline organization and administration to improve efficiency and maintain effectiveness.²³ But the concepts included in Bill C-243 were still relevant and communicated in General Rick Hillier's strategy:

Our first loyalty is to Canada. Beyond this fundamental imperative, all service personnel must look past environment, component or unit affiliations to most closely identify with the CF. The greater good of Canada and the CF will, in every instance, take precedence over considerations of service, component or unit affiliation.²⁴

2013 DEFENCE RENEWAL QUEST FOR EFFICIENCIES

Further evolution and pursuit of CAF efficiencies, which in turn are believed to increase effectiveness, materialized with the 2013 Defence Renewal Charter and its follow-on plan. Some organizational initiatives exist, but no specific logistics organizational initiative exists as a stand-alone. The objectives of the 6.1 Lean HQ initiatives could enable better logistical operational outputs. This would/could in turn identify "clear career paths, resulting in improved employee morale."²⁵ Results, impacts and feasibility will not be known until the completion of the project in 2018. C. Davies' 2014 Vimy Paper identified the dangers associated with finding and applying too rapidly what the 2011 Leslie Report identified as a need to reduce the CAF "tail":²⁶

... the risk remains that the current Defence Renewal initiative will culminate much the same as most previous efficiency and cost reduction efforts—required savings are extracted and victory is declared without actually delivering and institutionalizing the promised systemic improvements that were supposed to minimize or avoid the negative impacts of the reductions.²⁷

The analysis of the 1968, 2005 and 2013 change initiatives as they relate to unifying the Logistics Branch allows the identification of key arguments and challenges pertaining to unifying CAF Logistics under one "champion." The actual organizational models of the Logistics Branch and the CAF "balanced force"²⁸ principle are no longer sustainable in terms of governance and operational effectiveness: "In a tiny military with limited funds, divisive strategic concepts and a wasteful organization are simply intolerable."²⁹



CAF Cook serving hot meals to 5 CMBG soldier during Ex MAPLE RESOLVE 2015.

Source: Corporal J. Legree, Public Affairs, 5 CMBG

THE CAF LOGISTICS BRANCH

The essence of what constitutes military logistics is defined and understood by most strategists and militaries.³⁰ Its function toward military forces and/or campaigns remains an "... art rather than a science."³¹ Many examples of the importance of logistics in military campaign successes and failures are also well documented in historical accounts and war diaries. The tactical acumen required is also standardized at the tactical and operational level through detailed doctrine and procedures located in the environmental commands, but not specifically at the national level, that is, the Logistics Branch. The CAF organizational framework on how to maintain the overall military logistics institution's relevance and the institutionalization of gateways in order to force generate capabilities now and in the future has unfortunately not received as much attention in the past decade. An analysis of the Logistics Branch's organization and governance structure is required in order to ascertain how the Branch achieves what the Royal Commission on Government Organization of 1968 identified as the key role if not *la raison d'être* of the Canadian military:

... the test of each component of the Forces is its ability to perform its wartime task virtually without notice. The structures and procedures of the headquarters establishment must therefore be such as to enable it to discharge its responsibilities in the most economical and efficient manner consistent with its obligations to the combat formations under operational conditions.³²

The total number of Logisticians in the CAF has ebbed and flowed over the years but has remained relatively stable since the Force Reduction Program of the 1990s, and the Logistics Branch remains the biggest CAF branch, representing 14% of the entire military force. Figure 1 identifies the total number of Logisticians in the CAF as 13,707 members divided by occupation, environment (e.g., Land, Sea and Air) and component (e.g. Regular Force or

	Regular Force			Regular Force Total	Reserve Force			Reserve Force Total	Grand Total
	Air	Land	Sea		Air	Land	Sea		
Logistics Officer Air	476			476	88	3		91	567
Logistics Officer Land		696		696	1	338		339	1,035
Logistics Officer Sea			257	257			93	93	350
Ammunition Technician		180		180				0	180
Cook	171	481	285	937	22	136	132	290	1,227
Mobile Equipment Operator	390	1,099		1,489	95	535		630	2,119
Postal Clerk		129		129				0	129
Resource Management System Clerk	935	1,471	523	2,929	275	908	242	1,425	4,354
Supply Technician	560	1,482	365	2,407	107	436	84	627	3,034
Traffic Technician	462	209		671	37	4		41	712
Grand Total	2,994	5,746	1,431	10,171	625	2,360	551	3,536	13,707

Figure 1: CAF Logistics Branch Manpower by Occupation
Source: CAF Monitor Mass System. Logistics Branch Occupations. Accessed 28 April 2015

Reserve Force). Of this total, 59% of Logisticians wear the Land environment uniform. Even though every effort is made to keep personnel employed inside their environment throughout their career, based on operational requirements and manning shortfalls, Logisticians do work in other environmental or "purple" commands (e.g. CJOC, ADM Fin CS, NDHQ³³), as demonstrated in Figures 2 through 4.

RCN	Air	Land	Sea	Grand Total
AMMO TECH		2		2
COOK	23	48	302	373
LOG – AIR	2			2
LOG – LAND		3		3
LOG – SEA			122	122
LOG – SEA NAV RES			88	88
MSE OP	24	58		82
POST CLK		1		1
RMS CLK	90	108	414	612
SUP TECH	49	75	292	416
TFC TECH	15	10		25
Grand Total	203	305	1,218	1,726

Figure 2: Logisticians Assigned in the RCN
Source: CAF Monitor Mass System. Logistics Branch Occupations. Accessed 28 April 2015

RCAF	Air	Land	Sea	Grand Total
AMMO TECH		4		4
COOK	65	78	26	169
LOG – AIR	308			308
LOG – LAND	1	5		6
LOG – SEA			1	1
MSE OP	247	254		501
POST CLK		6		6
RMS CLK	506	173	54	733
SUP TECH	291	205	38	534
TFC TECH	317	108		425
Grand Total	1,735	832	120	2,687

Figure 3: Logisticians Assigned in the RCAF
Source: CAF Monitor Mass System. Logistics Branch Occupations. Accessed 28 April 2015



5 Svc Bn's Change of Command parade in July 2015. Logisticians from all three environments are present in this Regular Force Canadian Army unit.

directly reports to the CDS and the MILPERSGEN to the CMP, coordinating and executing training requirements for over 38 other support trades that are not “combat arms”⁴² in the three environments.⁴³ Thus, in order to influence and guide the development of future Logisticians responding to the operational requirements of the department, the LBI and LBA must coordinate with the different environments, as well as with CMP staff, which are all outside their chain of command and influence. For example, the CMP’s Director of Personnel Generation Requirements, with much input/guidance from LBI staff, is the coordinator of the annual Logistics Branch Strategic Intake Plan (SIP) that dictates required recruitment numbers based on attrition forecasts of the Branch. The recruitment centres that execute and strive to meet the SIP also fall under the CMP. This paradigm could see the TA, during departmental funding restrictions, reduce training outputs by lowering qualifications standards of the occupations without having analyzed institutional impacts and without having to obtain approval from the environmental chiefs or the Logistics Branch. This potential situation would be a dangerous prospect for the Logistics Branch and, ultimately, the environmental commanders.

At its core, the Logistics Branch comprises seven different Non-Commissioned Member (NCM) occupational trades, subdivided into eight different specialties reflective of the NCM occupations/trades, and three Officer career paths based on environmental lines. The CAF Logistics Training Centre⁴⁴ (CFLTC) in Borden, Ontario, is the central training centre. Further complicating the management of the Branch for the LBA/LBI, the CFLTC is but one of six training centres under the MILPERSGEN Training Group at CFB Borden, which is a MILPERSGEN subordinate command. For fiscal year 2014/2015 and 2015/2016,

the CFLTC conducted an overall average of 250 courses⁴⁵ across all specialties and qualifications with an estimated 50%⁴⁶ of these being filled by Land Logisticians. For the NCMs, apart from “just-in-time” environmental and leadership training specific to sea/land/air, all logistics specialty training duration and content were similar in order to reach the Occupation Function Point (OFP), as shown in Figure 6. The differences between the developmental periods can be quantified in terms of days and are strictly related to environment realities (i.e. actions on a ship/vessel, airbase procedures, etc). Any Logistician could complete the environmental training of the other two environments to be employed in that other environment’s establishment without changing environmental uniform.

	Development Period Duration (BMQ + BMQ-L/S/A + QL3)
Cook	90 + 96 days
Postal Clerk	90 + 26 days
Supply Technician	90 + 37 days
Ammunition Technician	90 + 112 days
Traffic Technician	90 + 88 days
Mobile Support Equipment Operator	90 + 88 days
Resource Management Services Clerk	90 + 49 days

Figure 6: CAF Logistics NCM Duration to Attain OFP

Source: Hervé, B.D. Director Canadian Army Logistics Annual Brief to CCA, DOCA and ASM, 28 March 2014



Logisticians manning a tactical POL point during Ex MAPLE RESOLVE 2015.

LOGISTICS BRANCH OCCUPATIONS, SPECIALTIES AND ENVIRONMENTS

As shown in Figure 7, the Distinctive Environmental Uniforms (DEU) allocation is different depending on the authorized operational requirement levels communicated by the three environments. Some occupations are strictly landcentric but are nonetheless employed throughout the environmental commands. During a Logistics NCM/Officer's career, an individual may transit from one command to another without ever changing his/her environmental uniform. The generalized argument for the change of uniform is for what some have called "credibility through appearance" from the combat arms components of the environmental command. This hypothesis has not been studied or analyzed academically. No documentation could be found supporting or discounting the value of the argument, and the logic seems to be emotionally based and charged. The environmental uniform change does not affect an individual's occupational qualifications (or the leadership skills) for which she/he was ultimately chosen to occupy new assignments. Interestingly enough, the 2002 CANFORGEN⁴⁷ on change of Distinctive Environmental Uniforms (DEU) explicitly states that (1) change of DEU is not an entitlement; (2) it can only happen once in a career; (3) it has nothing to do with operational effectiveness;⁴⁸ and, more importantly, (4) "posting personnel in the CAF will continue to be based on selection of the person best suited for the position."⁴⁹ It could then be argued that a Logistician's DEU should have nothing to do with career progression, appointment to key positions, assignments or employability. As stated in the CAF policies and the Logistics Branch capstone documents, Logisticians must be "... technically competent professionals that are operationally responsive and adaptive to the CAF mission requirements."⁵⁰ Furthermore, the emotional attachments/arguments relating to the "right-coloured uniform" should be disregarded, based on having the right person with the right skill set (qualification and leadership) in any CAF organization. Environmental feuds as they pertain to the Logistics Branch need to cease for the benefit of operational effectiveness, in order to respond to the missions while demonstrating that Logisticians are professionals and technically advanced military warriors.

	DEU		
	Maritime	Land	Aviation
Log Officer	18%	47%	35%
Cook	31%	51%	18%
Postal Clerk	0%	100%	0%
Supply Tech	21%	56%	23%
Ammunition Tech	0%	100%	0%
Traffic Tech	0%	28%	72%
MSE Op	0%	65%	35%
RMS Clerk	25%	50%	25%

Figure 7: CAF Logistics Branch DEU Allocation
Source: Hervé, B.D. Director Canadian Army Logistics Annual Brief to CCA, DOCA and ASM. 27 April 2015

ROYAL CANADIAN ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL ENGINEERING (RCEME) CORPS

Due to its size in terms of personnel, it is difficult to compare the Logistics Branch to any other branch based on the total number of personnel alone. Nonetheless, a key comparison factor is the presence of the Logistics Branch across all environment/command lines,⁵¹ which does apply to some other CAF branches/corps (i.e. RCEME and Royal Canadian Corps of Signals). For this article, the RCEME Corps will be used to justify the unification requirement of the Logistics Branch. The RCEME is a 100% land-DEU-centric organization, which stood up as distinct and independent in 1944 from its origins in the Royal Canadian Ordnance Branch. Through the years of transformation and the integration/unification phases, the RCEME has seen its name change (e.g. LORE), and some capabilities come and go (e.g., RCAF radar technicians), but its primary mission through the different and sometimes rapid technological advancements of military equipment/materiel has remained the same: "To provide high quality leadership and land equipment management that will enable and sustain successful CAF operations."⁵² All of the land equipment/materiel under the stewardship of the RCEME is present in all environments. The four RCEME NCM occupations and one Officer occupation remain under the CA in terms of governance and stewardship. The governance of the RCEME is controlled through the Commander of the CA (CCA) approved governance framework reaching across the different environments and commands.⁵³ Based on the Corps' employment model, it remains under the control and supervision of one "champion" (i.e. the CA). Contrary to the Logistics Branch, the RCEME OA⁵⁴ is the CCA, and the TA⁵⁵ is the Commander of the Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Centre (CADTC) under the authority of the CCA. Furthermore, RCEME members are present in non-land environmental command parades, exercises and operations without impact on operational readiness or emotional angst from non-Army leadership. The structure and organizational framework of the RCEME allows it to have unity of command, unity of effort, maintenance of aim and a clear operational focus, which are not attainable by the Logistics Branch under its current organizational construct.



Ukrainian Armed Forces students and Canadian instructors of Joint Task Force – Ukraine practice vehicle recovery at the International Peacekeeping and Security Centre in Starychi, Ukraine during Operation UNIFIER on 20 October 2016.



Source: Corporal Nathan Moulton, Ops Svc GS 2 CA DW

CSS soldiers (including Logisticians) during Ex INTENDANT TACTIQUE 2016

ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS BRANCH

The work of an organization is never done, and the structure has to be continually adapted to new and anticipated conditions.

—Ralph J. Cordiner

In combination with the information collected from the previous sections, this section intends to apply the McKinsey 7s organizational analysis model to the Logistics Branch. This model was initially developed between 1977 and 1982 by three business writers/researchers/consultants working for McKinsey & Company. The authors identified that the old business theories and paradigms that revolved around structure, systems and strategy⁵⁶ were no longer adaptive to the changing business markets continually adjusting to the early stages of globalization. Ultimately, they identified seven key factors that allow both organizational effectiveness and the capability of rapidly adjusting to the market, if correctly balanced. The alignment of all seven factors allows an institution/organization to successfully adapt to internal and external environments. Figure 8 illustrates the model and demonstrates the interdependency of each factor in terms of management and organizational effectiveness.

MCKINSEY 7S FACTORS – CAF LOGISTICS BRANCH

STRUCTURE

The Logistics Branch governance, accountability, roles and responsibility structure as illustrated in Figure 5 could be qualified as what P.T. Barton describes as a porous structure.^{57, 58} Due to its size and complexity, the Logistics Branch cannot adapt quickly to overcome external challenges. The level of decentralization under which the Logistics Branch currently functions also creates




Figure 8: McKinsey 7s Framework

Source: Peters and Waterman, *In Search of Excellence*, 10.

misalignments in vision, mission and effectiveness. For example, the Logistics Branch OAs are different from the TAs, which reside in a different CAF organization than the LBA/LBI. Secondly, the number of hierarchical levels between the LBA and Logisticians is further complicated by the different official and unofficial sub-governance structures. The creation of the Strategic J4 in 2014 is assessed as key and an important enabler for synchronizing roles and responsibilities among the multiple levels of governance, which in turn may increase effectiveness of the Logistics Branch. The current structural complexity and its multiple levels limit the Logistics Branch's flexibility to empower its Logisticians and increase the probability that senior leadership's messaging and plans are distorted.⁵⁹ The unification of the Logistics Branch under one of the environmental chiefs would in fact allow the Logistics Branch to synchronize and align the different aims currently present in the Branch, reduce the number of governance levels and, ultimately, increase effectiveness of Logisticians in support of operations. Just as it was mentioned for the RCME, unification of roles and responsibilities under one environment would create unity of effort and unity of intent.

STRATEGY

The most current Logistics Branch campaign plan is very recent (previous version dated back 2013⁶⁰) and was published on 11 April 2016⁶¹. A. Chandler, a former professor of business history at Harvard Business School and Johns Hopkins University, declared that "...structure follows strategy." As stated previously, the McKinsey 7s model, on the other hand, refutes this tenet by advocating interconnectedness among the seven factors. It became clear from the research conducted for this paper that past, as well as current, Logistics Branch strategy is lacking or was developed by a very limited number of logistics leaders and never came to fruition inside or outside the Logistics Branch. Furthermore, few indications were found demonstrating that the environmental chiefs had reviewed and brought environmental requirements forward or ultimately given their formal support to a Logistics Branch strategy.

The failure to implant a strategy by Branch members could also be due to a lack of knowledge and comprehension of the existence of the former. At its core, a strategy needs to "... transform an organization from the present position to the new position described in the objectives, subject to constraints of the capabilities."⁶² The Logistics Branch is influenced not only by external, but also by internal, factors and must be able to anticipate and overcome demands from its supported environments based on the current and future security environments. The unification of the Logistics Branch under one "champion" would require an enormous organizational change⁶³ in order to improve the effectiveness of the entire organization but would ensure a cohesive Branch and the recognition of the importance of Logistics to the profession of arms in Canada. The importance of a sound, relevant, affordable and achievable Logistics Branch strategy is critical in maintaining its institutional credibility towards the CAF, operations and the Canadian Government.

SYSTEMS

The Logistics Branch is administratively recognized in the CAF administrative orders and other directives in terms of managing the production of personnel (i.e. force generation), as illustrated by Defence Administrative Orders and Directives (DAOD) 5070-0⁶⁴ and 5070-1.⁶⁵ The CA is the only environment, through its Logistics director and officially supported by the CCA, to have instituted a formal management system. This resulted in a regional governance system identifying key appointed senior officers and NCMs responsible for managing and advising regional chains of commands with respect to career management, talent management and force generation of Logisticians for operations. The other environments have internal governance and generation systems, but they are not officially recognized by their environmental chiefs. As discussed in the *strategy* factor, the actual Logistics Branch *system* is very internally oriented to its different sub-sets or is limited to its logistical sphere. As with market-oriented civilian businesses, the Logistics Branch and its components cannot be a self-perpetuating system. It exists to enable military operation sustainability, not only through time (i.e. period) but also in space (i.e. location). The *system* forming the management of the Logistics Branch has ebbed and flowed since the initial unification of 1968 but has never reached a true unity of effort with its current division under three environments. Centralizing the Logistics Branch *system* through unification under one environmental chief would bring synchronization and, hopefully, a change from its perceived paradigm of self-perpetuation towards increased adaptability to evolving external opportunities (e.g. creation of new military capabilities) and/or threats (e.g. force reductions).

SKILLS

The Logistics Branch is the only entity in the CAF responsible and accountable for the sustainment of military operations in Canada and overseas. No other branch has the skill set or the training to deliver logistics effects. Secondly, based on the education, training and experience gained not only at the CAF Logistics Training Centre but also in civilian and allied nation learning institutions during their career, CAF Logisticians are recognized as members of the profession of arms as well as civilian professional orders/designations (i.e. CMA, P Log, etc). The attainment of these skills is centralized and consolidated under a single logistics training system, which ensures control measures are in place so as to maintain relevance with new technological advances and processes. Dividing the CFLTC



Logisticians operating MHE during Ex MAPLE RESOLVE 2015.

into the three environments, as it was prior to unification in 1968, would desynchronize training milestones and possibly make Logisticians less versatile and/or relevant in regards to the future security environment and less flexible for employment across the full spectrum of CAF operations. However, it is vital that the actual Logistician skills always meet the requirements of the environmental chief(s) and that these be periodically reviewed for their relevance. A process without which the Logistics Branch may quickly become irrelevant to CAF operations, institutional support and ultimately possibly have these skill sets open to be replaced by non-logistics trades as secondary duties or by alternate delivery methods (e.g., civilian contractors). This would in turn negatively impact military combat power.

STYLE

How the senior leadership of the Logistics Branch interacts not only within its own environment, but also how it influences and reacts to external challenges (e.g. allied nations, Government of Canada), is a profound and complex dynamic to analyze as it relates to this paper. As a supporting element of the CAF, the Logistics Branch is required to be open and self-motivated in understanding not only the current and future needs of military operations being developed by force-generating environments (e.g. RCN, RCAF and CA) but also those of force employers (e.g. CJOC and CANSOFCOM).

Very little hard and concrete documentation was found pre-2014 that would allow the level of Logistics Branch *style* to be ascertained. Since the beginning of 2014, it would appear, based on memorandums, initiative papers and presentations to senior members of the CAF, that the LBA, the senior CAF Logisticians Representative and the Strategic J4 are relying on their relationships and shared future goals to influence both logistics institution stakeholders and membership. The danger identified with this McKinsey factor

is that *style* is greatly influenced by personalities of the leading individuals, and in the CAF, these change every two to four years. Further compounding this are the structural realities associated with the Logistics Branch trichotomy and the lack of environmental oversight with actual accountability to the CDS and the MND for the effectiveness of CAF Logistics. This continual change of environmental personalities in the Logistics Branch leadership adversely affects not only the internal workings of the Branch, but also its credibility in the eyes of the environment chiefs that look to their sustainment chain for stability and reliance. The 1982 Report on Integration and Unification identified the challenges:

This brings home the truism that organizations drawn on charts in tidy lines can only be made to work if the personalities, the skills and willingness to cooperate exist between the people within the organization.⁶⁶

STAFF

The personnel that comprises the Logistics Branch and CAF is the cornerstone of the organization, over and above the information technologies, weapons systems, structures and systems that compose it. The Branch cannot directly hire into positions of responsibility, they must promote from within. The military apparatus, which the Logistics Branch is part of, requires individuals to be indoctrinated and follow a more rigid set of rules and conduct than most organizations. Individuals in the CAF understand the commitments and individual sacrifices required by the military system, and they progress accordingly. Logistics Branch specialties and occupations are comparable to the rest of the CAF in terms of age, years of service and average rate of attrition and are composed mostly of the Baby Boomer and Generation X generations.



Logisticians going through delivery-point and tactical-road-move battle procedure during NATO EX TRIDENT JUNCTURE 2015.

Source: Corporal Jordan Legros, Public Affairs, 5 CMBG

In J.N. Hyler's 2013 case study, as well as in studies by other countries (e.g. US Navy 2014 *Retention Study*), indicators demonstrate that the biggest upcoming human resource challenge facing western militaries and national security will be the entry of the Millennial Generation into military institutions. Using the Wilcox Millennial Culture Model (presented here in Figure 9), J.N. Hyler identified three key findings that could have major impacts on the Logistics Branch *staff* factor in its present three-environment construct: (1) the biggest competitor to military recruiting is the completion of graduate education;⁶⁷ (2) Millennials value personal freedom very highly and many do not see the military as an activity that would provide them with an acceptable, comfortable level of autonomy;⁶⁸ and (3) Millennials are more concerned with extrinsic/tangible benefits (e.g. travel, pay incentives) than intrinsic/intangible benefits (e.g. serving a greater cause).⁶⁹

It is assessed that the unification of the Logistics Branch under one "champion" could in fact position it for success and increase its retention effectiveness of incoming Millennials. As discussed previously, the goal and foundational tenets of the CAF career management system are not based on having the right colour uniform in the right environment. The intent is to have the right person with the right competencies in the right position, whatever their environmental uniform colour. The present career management construct of the Logistics Branch could be a major dissatisfier for Millennials who recognize promotion on merit, not political environment games:

The career managers [pre-unification] in attempting to fill a land logistics requirement where promotion was involved would be forced to go down the list to find the most highly rated soldier of that environment, perhaps by-passing others who by merit list [based on performance and potential factor] were more deserving of promotion.⁷⁰




Figure 9: Wilcox Millennial Culture Model

Source: Hyler, *Millennial Generation Opinions of the Military: A Case Study*, 12

The unification of the Logistics Branch would be more palatable to the new generation of Logisticians who have been joining the CAF over the past few years since (1) “a unified service [environment] will permit them [personnel] to advance across old service barriers and so provide greater avenues for service and greater opportunities for personal advancement;”⁷¹ (2) it will inspire higher loyalty to the CAF and the Logistics Branch; and (3) “... artificial barriers created by the three services [environments] and the need for representation on staffs by service will be eliminated.”⁷²

SHARED VALUES

The Logistics Branch is composed of and managed through a complex system of governance, control measures and reporting apparatuses, which were discussed in the previous six McKinsey 7s framework factors. Closely associated with the concept of culture, the McKinsey factor of *shared values* is fundamental to an organization's survival and, more importantly, to its competitiveness. The challenge to the Logistics Branch in not having well-established *shared values* was verbalized by E. Martins and F. Terblanche in their own research: “... organizations with weak values and goals find their employees following their own personal goals that may be different or even in conflict with those of the organization or their fellow colleagues.”⁷³

In C. H. Builder's book *The Masks of War – American Military Styles and Strategy Analysis*, the author analyzes the three different environmental personalities of the US Air Force, Navy and Army. Accordingly, one of the main challenges of the Logistics Branch is the environmental Logisticians' argument that to succeed, Logisticians of an environment must be of that environment's belief. This ultimately is detrimental to the shared values factor of the Logistics Branch. The environments' personality derivatives and comparatives extracted from Builder's book are interesting to bring forward and demonstrate that the Branch's trichotomy divide is not operationally effective from a *shared values* perspective. The Navy Logisticians are the most opposed to complete Branch unification as the Navy institution is marked by two strong senses of self: its independence and its stature.⁷⁴ RCAF Logisticians are influenced by the RCAF's beliefs that it is the embodiment of an idea, a concept of warfare, a strategy made possible and sustained by modern technology.⁷⁵ Lastly, the Army Logisticians are influenced by seeing themselves as supporting “... the essential artisans of war ... divided into their traditional combat arms but forged by history and the nature of war into a mutually supportive brotherhood of guilds.”⁷⁶ Furthermore, of the three environments, the CA would be considered to be the “...most supportive of unification and jointness.”⁷⁷

The Logistics Branch does follow the CAF profession of arms culture and is integrated into the overall warrior ethos defined in CAF publications and doctrine. Unfortunately, no “Logistics culture,” defined and assimilated by the Logistics Branch, exists. In further exploring the concept of culture, Armstrong and Daft determined that organizations can be characterized as one of four categories of culture depicted in Figure 10.

The authors categorization brings to the forefront that the Logistics Branch culture system is divided into three sets of culture categories. The first group would be the LBI and training system, which seem to be functioning with a “bureaucratic culture” mindset as efficiencies are

key considerations in their workings and they are not quickly adaptable to changing situations. The second culture group would be composed of the different environmental logistics advisory groups. This group is considered to function under the “clan culture” as the focus is not on the Logistics Branch specifically as a whole, but more on the survival and adaptability of its core membership. This reality has been demonstrated to be challenging as it encourages unhealthy competition between sub-groups and ultimately creates dangers of not always being aligned with the overall Branch goals, vision and mission. Finally, the third culture group that seems to be demonstrating positive development and re-invigoration is the Logistics Senior leadership, which is striving to become a “mission culture.” The existence of these three culture groups compound the misaligned *shared values* factor associated with the Branch, thus creating important organizational challenges. The desired end state to be achieved by the Branch should be an overall and holistic mission culture throughout all its components. The actual three environmental constructs of the Logistics Branch will not be able to (1) fully achieve the required culture synchronization and thus attain operational effectiveness; (2) integrate its membership of aviators, sailors and soldiers and create interdependence among them; or (3) help the Logistics Branch adapt to its external environments (e.g. environmental chiefs, the CAF, allied military, national industry base).

Culture Category	Definition
1. Adaptability Culture	Is characterized by strategic focus on the external environment through flexibility and change to meet customer needs
2. Mission Culture	Emphasis on a clear vision of the organization's purpose and on the achievements of the goals
3. Clan Culture	Primary focus on the involvement and participation of the organization's members and on rapidly changing expectations from the external environment
4. Bureaucratic Culture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Have an internal focus and a consistency orientation for a stable environment These organizations succeed by being highly integrated and efficient Not very flexible

Figure 10: Organizational Culture Categories
Source: Armstrong and Daft, *Organization Theory and Design*, 360–363.

Four main inferences can be extrapolated from the McKinsey 7s model. First, the current Logistics Branch construct does not allow the institution to create, communicate and operate on shared Logistics Branch values. Second, the lack of clear guidance in terms of a relevant and socialized campaign plan (e.g. *strategy* factor) in the past few years has created a lack of focus inside the Logistics Branch organization, as well as a lack of operational effectiveness for the environmental chiefs. However, current Senior Logistics leadership intend to correct this misalignment. Third, the Logistics Branch *style* factor is negatively impacted due to its ever changing personalities (e.g. every two to three years) and a seemingly self-perpetuating limitation as to how the Logistics Branch supports the environments and operations.



Source: Sergeant Sébastien Fréchette, Public Affairs, 5 CMRG

Logisticians in charge of CBRN DECON site during Ex SOLDAT PROPRE 2015

This in turn draws into question the accountability factor of the Logistics Branch: “when everyone is in charge, no one is in charge.” Lastly, the Logistics Branch analysis results do not seem to indicate that the current trichotomy of being divided into three environments under several champions is conducive to operational effectiveness, nor does it create synergy among the McKinsey factors, since so much of the organization is independent in thought and processes. The results of the deductions as they pertain to the chosen analysis framework are depicted in Figure 11.⁷⁸

CONCLUSION

The main objective of this paper was to determine how the CAF Logistics Branch organizational structure achieves effectiveness. Underlying the main objective were several sub-objectives: to determine how the different environmental service cultures impact the Logistics Branch; to identify the impact of the current Logistics Branch organization on stakeholders’ operational effectiveness; to encourage “top to bottom” discussions in the CAF as well as academia on the actual effectiveness of the Branch; to determine how the RCEME was structured in support of CAF environments; and to determine the historical and operational effectiveness reasoning for a potential alignment under one “champion.”

The first section reviewed three major transformation initiatives as it relates to unification. The analysis of the initiatives identified follow-on implications for the Logistics Branch: (1) the “Fourth Service” creation/discussion; (2) meeting military operational demands; (3) economy of scale and effort; and (4) employee motivation. Ultimately, the CAF Logisticians’ strong service loyalties to their occupational specialties were deemed incompatible with any desire to have/create a holistic and relevant CAF Logistics vision/strategy.




Figure 11: McKinsey 7s Logistics Branch Model Comparison

Source: Marc Parent, Extrapolation from Peters and Waterman, *In Search of Excellence*, 10

The review of the Logistics Branch historical/current processes and roles in the second section resulted in six key deductions. First, that the Logistics Branch by its governance structure has a decentralized authority, responsibility and accountability structure dispersed throughout the different levels of the CAF organization, which results in a lack of well-defined ownership. The misalignments of certain reporting and control measures (e.g. LBI) were also addressed and actually re-emphasized the need for a single “champion” for the Logistics Branch. The challenges of maintaining cohesiveness and focus in the largest proportion of the CAF (i.e. 14% of the CAF) were also identified in terms of a yet-to-be-published Logistics Branch Strategic Campaign and Communication Plan. The fifth determination was that based on the reviewed documentation, no formal and decisive interaction with the environments chiefs exists, ultimately making the Logistics governance structure somewhat incestuous and self-perpetuating. Finally, the analysis of the structure and governance of the RCEME demonstrated the actual feasibility of having the Logistics Branch under one “champion” but continuing to serve/support all of the environments.

The organizational analysis of the Logistics Branch in section three determined that the actual division of the Logistics Branch among the three services is not the most effective means of management. Furthermore, the analytical framework demonstrated a lack of balance and dis-synchronization among the seven factors. The two factors identified as requiring major attention were the *strategy* factor, being developed by the 2015–2016 Logistics Branch leadership, and the *shared values* factor, disparate among the different Logistics groups and sub-groups. Finally, four main inferences were made: (1) the current Logistics Branch construct does not allow the institution to create, communicate and operate on shared Logistics Branch values, which would in turn create effectiveness; (2) the lack of clear guidance from a published and institutionalized campaign plan has been detrimental to Logistics Branch organization and cohesion, as well as to its operational effectiveness; (3) the ever changing

leadership personalities and the seeming self-perpetuation of Logistics Branch experiences towards the support of the environments and operations are counter-intuitive to its effectiveness goals; and 4) the current Logistics Branch trichotomy is not conducive to operational effectiveness nor does it create operational synergy or effect.

The intent of this article was to demonstrate that full unification of the CAF Logistics Branch under one service/champion would improve its operational effectiveness. Based on the analysis, it is argued that the initial assertion of this article is valid and should be further developed in order to maintain the Logistics Branch's relevance, credibility and operational effectiveness towards its "supported command."

The Logistics Branch is a complex and fluid organization created in 1968 by the unification and reorganization of the CAF. The division of this important institution among the three environments in relation to the size (number of personnel, defence budgets, etc.) and operational reach of the CAF is no longer sustainable if the Logistics Branch's goal is to be a relevant and operationally effective/efficient organization (i.e. Defence Policy Review of 2016). Although many recommendations were identified in this article, there is one critical recommendation that needs to be executed: the full unification of the Logistics Branch under the CCA with all ARAs associated with the governance of the Branch. 🍁

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CANADIAN MILITARY DESIGN IN 2015:

Thinking Outside the Box by Designing with Semiotic Squares¹

US Army Major (Retired) Ben Zweibelson

Design thinking and design applications continue to develop in emerging and novel ways across much of the Anglo-Saxon world because of their implementation in military activities and associated practices.² Most recently, the Canadian Armed Forces set up a design module at the Canadian Forces College (CFC) in Toronto during the Spring 2015 academic year. In thinking and scope, the design module started out as an experiment, and the CFC faculty invited leading design experts from a range of fields to come to the College to give four design seminars for Field Grade-level students in May 2015, as well as a subsequent two-week design exercise in June that would be the capstone event for the new design approaches.

As one of the design experts invited to teach, I had an opportunity to take students through an eight-hour seminar on design theory, following which I structured the formal design vignette portion by experimenting with a different method of organizing design teams to produce superior design deliverables. This article is an examination of that approach, and an explanation of why the interdisciplinary crossroads of philosophy, sociology and military science help explain the utility of semiotic squares as a heuristic tool for innovation beyond current design doctrinal approaches. Lastly, this heuristic tool should not be misapplied or integrated into doctrine as a checklist methodology for “doing design” for an organization. Rather, design approaches need to retain the tailored and transformative nature of what often remains tacit, subjective and temporary. Some design teams may find great value in the semiotic square, while others should instead create entirely new heuristic models for other contexts and yet-to-be-seen conditions.

CURRENT ANGLO-SAXON DESIGN APPROACHES: WHY SO MUCH FRUSTRATION?

Design continues to be a controversial topic within the military profession in many armed forces and countries. The Israelis migrated away from the original “Systemic Operational Design” (SOD) first developed in the 1990s, although minority elements continue to implement approaches based on SOD.³ The American military moved from design to “Army Design Methodology” and are still developing the process because of conflict within the organization over language, concepts and interaction with traditional planning models. The Australian military produced “Adaptive Campaigning” and continue to develop subtle changes in design, operational design and traditional planning constructs.⁴ The British Ministry of Defence in June 2011 published their “Decision-Making and Problem Solving: Human and Organisational Factors” that loosely addressed much of the design debate, while avoiding the formulaic American approach.⁵ Even the Royal Netherlands military began teaching and experimenting with design concepts in the fall of 2014 in their Field Grade education system as well as in strategic-level think tanks.⁶ In the spring of 2015, the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) shifted from a SOD-focused design towards various design applications covered in the recently established courses given at the Joint Special Operations University.⁷ Lastly, the Canadian military began design education at their war college institutions starting in 2013, with their field grade institutions tackling design this



Members of B Company, 1st Battalion, Royal 22^e Régiment, discuss how to attack a fictitious enemy with Master Gallet, of the French Navy ship Le Mistral's Beach Reconnaissance Team, on board the ship off the coast of Gaspé, Quebec during Exercise LION MISTRAL 2014.

academic year as well. This reinforces the notion that design as a military approach to complexity is a growing field replete with variety, debate and emerging ideas. No single group has ownership of “how to do design.” If anything, what we as members of a global military profession consider design today may be entirely inadequate for explaining what design will become within ten years. This level of uncertainty and institutional transformation can produce anxiety and frustration, as reflected in many of the ongoing design debates in our profession today.

One major frustration is that many design approaches describe the “what” but not the “how” of practising design. Current design doctrine fails to help professionals create innovative deliverables, exercise necessary self-editing within design teams, and produce useful deliverables to encourage higher-quality organizational planning. The problems are so significant within the United States Army that the latter funded several projects at the Army Research Institute (ARI) to determine why design is failing to integrate into the larger profession.⁸ Many of the ARI findings are appropriate in addressing language barriers, conflicts in organizational structure and academic tensions within the U.S. Army culture by and large. However, the conclusions do not offer many options for developing novel or innovative methods (beyond doctrine) in order to adapt to these barriers and propel design teams in unexpected directions.⁹ Consequently, many people might shrug off design entirely and instead refocus their efforts on somehow improving traditional linear planning or insist that “we have always done ‘design’, but now we are just using a new term for it and confusing the force.”¹⁰

What design requires is a way for thinking outside the box (beyond our preferred paradigms) and developing truly novel and emergent processes.¹¹ An important distinction needs to be made here between what some organizational theorists refer to as the tension between acts of innovation and inferior “acts of fancy.”¹² As an example of an act of fancy, Karl Wieck cites Pegasus from classical mythology. Not to be confused with true innovation, the concept is simply the fusing of two known concepts: a “horse” combined with “wings.” Acts of fancy are those that recycle existing concepts into new, fanciful outputs that nonetheless are not examples of novel innovation. For a better example of human innovation (thinking outside the box) than Pegasus, we might look instead at the glider drawings of Leonardo Da Vinci or the creative balloon innovations of the Montgolfier brothers in the 18th century. Military designers need examples of innovative design; however, Anglo-Saxon design doctrine is replete with examples of fanciful planning where traditional concepts, language and form are combined.¹³ We want novelty, but we only try to obtain it by “sticking wings on horses.” Design needs heuristic devices to break out of conventional thinking.

THE SEMIOTIC SQUARE: USING A BOX FOR THINKING OUTSIDE THE BOX

Although once used by Aristotle and later philosophers as a purely heuristic device for logical ponderings and highly conceptual discussions, the semiotic square has been resurrected in recent times in sociological disciplines for a variety of organizational knowledge and complexity theory applications. For designers to apply the square effectively, the design team must have a thorough understanding of paradigms, as well as a familiarity with the sociological/philosophical notions of ontology (what is and is not knowledge), epistemology (how we know

how to do something) and methodology (the rules, principles and procedures nested within the implicit ontological and epistemological choices of the home paradigm).¹⁴ For this article, we might use a simpler example to illustrate the basic functions of the semiotic square.




Figure 1: The semiotic square: a heuristic device for designing

Replace the more cumbersome term “paradigm” with the generic term “construct” (where a group implicitly agrees on theories, methods, instruments and values) and consider the following.¹⁵ Construct A in Figure 1 is associated with a highly centralized military hierarchy, such as the hierarchy in most Anglo-Saxon professional and conventional forces. Construct B, which is in tension with A, is a decentralized and “bottom-up” organization, such as many criminal and terrorist networks, some guerrilla and special operations elements (particularly in long-term unconventional warfare environments), and emergent movements and radical groups that rely upon crowdsourcing, flash mobs and other highly decentralized organizational processes.

The semiotic square comes into play by allowing a design team to establish emergent Constructs C and D from Constructs A and B. Construct C is a hybrid fusion of elements of Constructs A and B that introduce novel combinations, yet may still only produce “fanciful” outputs, such as more Pegasus creations. Construct D, however, cannot draw from Construct A or B. Instead, the design team must create Construct D from neither, and instead ponder what an organization that is not centralized, not decentralized and not a hybrid of both might be. Construct D is often the most arduous and challenging to develop, but also, as the Canadian students experienced, the most organizationally liberating, while also being highly reflective.

STRUCTURING A DESIGN GROUP TO APPLY THE SEMIOTIC SQUARE HEURISTICALLY

The Canadian Forces College invited four design experts with dramatically different design approaches to teach four seminars on design team building and the establishment of design theoretical constructs, and how to guide design teams through the process of delivering an operational approach complete with a narrative and a rich picture.¹⁶ In this environment, the author along with the participants in Canadian Seminar 8 applied the semiotic square in an iterative design approach on the second day, without revealing the entire process until after two groups had produced Constructs A and B.

As a practical vignette for the group to prepare for the two-week design capstone exercise, the seminar participants were asked the following question: “What approach should the Canadian military as part of a larger coalition adopt to combat the emerging threat of the Islamic State?” For our seminar, three teams of five officers each were assembled to produce three initial design approaches. Of these, the instructor chose the two that seemed most in conflict (or dissimilar) in order to continue the semiotic square construction. After the groups spent several hours completing their first design efforts and presenting them, they were informed that Team 1 and Team 3 would see their design concepts become “Construct A” and “Construct B.” Having covered the importance of narrative and metaphor in design theory earlier, Team 1 used a “multiheaded hydra” mythological metaphor in their narrative and rich picture. Team 3 used a physical, game-based metaphor involving the coffee table game “Jenga” as its conceptual metaphor for the Islamic State problem.

When the instructor re-assembled the teams into two groups, Team 1 and Team 3, with equal numbers on both sides, these new and larger eight-person design groups re-engaged with one another in a new design effort. Team C had to develop a design approach combining the best fusion of Construct A with Construct B, but avoided the obvious aspects of fanciful knowledge production, such as a hydra holding a Jenga game. Instead, Team C had to construct something novel that drew upon the useful aspects of the previous design efforts. Team D had the more difficult challenge of contemplating an Islamic State design approach that drew nothing from Construct A and Construct B. Most of both constructs included associated whole-of-government, direct action and deliberate foreign policy approaches that are part of the traditional Anglo-Saxon military toolbox.

Team C developed a hybrid design in which strong elements from both A and B were included in innovative combinations that collectively produced greater value than the original separate designs. Team D, while professing discomfort with the challenge of creating well beyond all of the familiar frames of reference, came up with several striking and interesting innovative concepts. Once the semiotic square exercise was complete, the instructor then applied the final design editing element by re-assembling the entire class into a single design team. Once again, the team was given the task of crafting one final design effort. Yet by this time, the team had done several iterations of design thinking, and subsequent efforts prevented them from retaining much of their initial design efforts or ignoring other novel perspectives. The team could either draw upon previous A, B, C or D designs or invent alternatives. Three key elements were applied to the design approach in this case that are often muddled or entirely absent from traditional design doctrine.

Firstly, the designers were challenged to “kill their babies” in that, despite the graphic metaphor, it is often human nature for us to become attached to projects and ideas as we create them. The first design efforts are often (but not always) the first steps on what needs to be a far longer cognitive journey. Letting go of those first efforts is a necessary self-editing exercise to prevent the curtailing of creativity and critical thinking. The semiotic square as a heuristic tool forces the team to make repeated efforts to come up with a novel design as well as carry out necessary self-editing.

Secondly, the semiotic square as a heuristic device helps the design team consider different types of knowledge production and start contrasting acts of fancy with acts of innovation. Not all innovative acts are superior to acts of fancy, nor are they even potentially useful. Yet when we limit our design thinking to just a single paradigm, or expect innovative design while confusing it with fanciful design, we increase the likelihood of design failure.¹⁷ The semiotic square helps the design team engage in what sociologists call “reflective practice” where the team critically examines the deeper ontological and epistemological choices and institutional values within the organization’s socially constructed reality. The semiotic square itself is not “design”; rather it is a heuristic tool that designers might use in some situations or discard in order to try other approaches. This is just one of countless other design methods (and inspiring novel adaptations yet to be seen). Planners might count the seeds in a single apple, while designers using heuristic aids such as the semiotic square are contemplating the emerging potential apples within a seed.¹⁸




Figure 2: Progressing the semiotic square through design iterations

Thirdly, only the final design deliverable was presented to the senior decision-maker after the semiotic square was employed as a heuristic device in iterative closed-door sessions. Beyond the design group, the semiotic square should not be the subject of a briefing or confused with the outputs. The purpose of this heuristic device is to make the design team members' cognitive thinking more flexible, help them be creative and later help them self-edit so as to generate a superior design deliverable. Although Michelangelo said he could see a statue within a block of stone, when he completed the sculpture he did not give his many piles of chips and marble shavings to the customer. A design team cannot confuse heuristic aids and their internal design journey with the final deliverable, nor should they forget that the language and concepts that assisted them in their discovery may not be at all useful or appropriate for the larger organization awaiting their design.

CANADIAN STUDENT REACTIONS

The Canadian Forces College provided questionnaires to the seminar participants who put the design semiotic square into practice. Eight students replied and a selection of their comments is provided below. Although this constitutes too small a population for anything but a qualitative research approach, the CFC has other design groups using semiotic squares in subsequent design exercises that may constitute a larger pool for future studies.¹⁹

When asked about the difference between their first and second design deliverables while in either Group C or D, the students' reactions were overwhelmingly positive. They said that there was a notable difference between their first and second deliverables, that the process resulted in some additional considerations that would probably not have come up, and that it encouraged opposing viewpoints and that it provided the social licence to break with group conformity norms.²⁰ One participant with a minority viewpoint critical of the semiotic square said, "I found it hard to reconcile how to move forward to planning after [using] the semiotic square."²¹ This is an important observation for design in general, irrespective of the semiotic square. It reinforces the importance of design teams having to produce viable design deliverables that are "plannable" for the larger force. Otherwise, even the use of heuristic aids such as the semiotic square may still result in unusable design outputs and be a source of frustration for organizations.

The students were asked about whether the heuristic and iterative aspects of the semiotic square helped them design more creatively, compared with the standardized "frame the environment, frame the problem, develop an operational approach" model.²² A large majority said that the semiotic square fostered greater group discovery and creativity. "In fact," one student said, "there were things that the group [would have] never discussed that only came up because of the "semiotic square" approach."²³ Another student said that the approach "certainly generated some discussion and consideration of additional factors that had not been considered in the initial design process."²⁴ One student who participated in Group D using the semiotic square approach said, "We were forced to develop a completely new idea; it was very different from the original one. It works well to examine "outside the box" options."²⁵ The students thought that using the heuristic aid as a cognitive thinking tool "helped participants to understand and frame a problem ... [it] facilitated out-of-the-box thinking and elevated the discussion and perspective."²⁶ On combining various design

iterative outputs into the final design approach, one student said that "What it did was create a whole new approach that we could use to fuse parts of the original work if desired."²⁷ At the time of writing, the Canadian Forces College held its June 2015 capstone design exercise during which the semiotic square approach was used in at least one additional seminar. Observations from that exercise may enhance the reliability of these initial findings.

CONCLUSIONS

If the semiotic square is useful for teaching design and developing innovative approaches for complex military situations, should it be used at all times? This creates a tension between objectivity and subjectivity, as well as a tension between tacit (impossible to fully describe) and explicit (easy to describe) knowledge.²⁸ Military organizations seek to indoctrinate best practices and provide universal checklists to promote objective strengths within largely explicit means.²⁹ Design does have some explicit elements, but appears to be far more subjective and tacit, whereas tailored approaches do not work when reapplied to the next similar problem. Designers tend to find it difficult to explain exactly how they achieved a highly critical or creative approach. Just as artists or professional athletes cannot explain "how" they are successful, military designers face similar challenges. Heuristic aids, as shown in the figure below, encourage designers to use alternative ways of thinking to come with innovative solutions. Ultimately, if designers wish to be involved in military planning immediately, they will only be able to construct limited design deliverables that are basically the shells of plans. Successful design deliverables are not plans, but "plannable" design outputs produced by persons with a higher level of understanding and organizational awareness (thinking about our thinking).




Figure 3: Tension of Heuristic Aids such as Semiotic Squares and Design Indoctrination

The design approach as experimented with in the Canadian Forces College is one of many heuristic models that design teams can use in future projects. While this should not result in the next version of a design doctrine featuring a semiotic square figure and rigid steps to be followed in subsequent design iterations, it might be a useful heuristic model for organizations to use within the greater context of complex design problems. Design will always be up against the continuing paradox whereby successful design efforts are recycled into formal organizational processes (doctrine) with the expectation that future problems may be solvable with old ideas. The semiotic square is an example of a heuristic aid that should be used to meet requirements outside those of doctrine and to achieve a high level of customization and flexibility. Complexity and design involve many paradoxes; so for an organization to think outside the box, it might use a heuristic model of a box to accomplish this cognitive thinking feat. ✳

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Major (Retired) Ben Zweibelson is a PhD candidate at the Australian National University School of Philosophy, as well as director of the design course for the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) at the Joint Special Operations University in Tampa, Florida. He is also a retired US Army infantry officer with over 21 years of service, including combat tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan. His research and published works are currently used in many American War Colleges and advanced strategic programs. Zweibelson has consulted the Canadian Army and the Royal Netherlands Army on design theory as well as independent strategic think tanks. He and his family live in the Tampa, Florida area.


Major (Retired) Zweibelson has Master's degrees from Louisiana State University, the US Air Force Command and Staff College, and the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies. He also has an undergraduate degree in graphic design from the University of Connecticut.

ENDNOTES

1. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Department of Defence, the United States government, the United States Army, or associated organizations. Major Zweibelson was a guest lecturer on design theory for the Canadian Forces College in May 2015, where he gave a seminar on semiotic square applications. Dr. Paul T. Mitchell, professor at the Canadian Forces College, oversaw this project and invited all of the guest lecturers.
2. Over the past decade or more, the armed forces of Israel (through Systemic Operational Design), the United States (through Army Design Methodology), Australia (through Adaptive Campaigning), the Netherlands (through 2014 activities similar to American doctrine) and the United Kingdom (Joint Doctrine Note 3/11) have all developed various design and complexity theory-based approaches within their practices and doctrines.
3. Based on the author's personal correspondence with Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) planners and consultants in 2015. There is still considerable debate and disagreement within the IDF on design applications, not unlike similar debates within the American Army.
4. As an example of breaking with American doctrine, recent Australian Army operational design doctrine has shifted from linking "Centers of Gravity" as essential to all lines of effort (as recommended in current U.S. Army design doctrine such as ADRP 5-0). See Australian Defence Force, Australian Defence Force Publication (ADFP) 5.0.1—*Joint Military Appreciation Process*, 2nd ed. (Canberra, Defence Publishing Service, 24 February 2015); for COG analysis see p. 3.6-3.17. See also: Trent Scott, *The Lost Operational Art: Invigorating Campaigning into the Australian Defence Force* (Canberra: Land Warfare Studies Centre, February 2011), pp. 41–45. In contrast to Scott's position, see also: Michael Evans, "Centre of Gravity Analysis in Joint Military Planning and Design: Implications and Recommendations for the Australian

Defence Force," *Security Challenges*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Winter 2012), pp. 81–104. For the latest American design approach, see: Department of the Army, *Army Doctrine Reference Publication 5-0, The Operations Process* (Washington DC, Department of the Army, May 17, 2012) pp. 2-4 to 2-11.

5. Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Development, Concepts and Doctrine), United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, "Joint Doctrine Note 3/11; Decision-Making and Problem Solving: Human and Organisational Factors" (Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, June 2011), p. iii. The aim of JDN 3/11 is "to improve our decision-making... by better understanding the factors that influence the way that we think and behave." JDN 3/11 does not contain the sequential framing structure present in American doctrine, such as Army Design Methodology.
6. The author was invited by the Royal Netherlands military in the summer of 2014 to give a series of guest lectures to the Land Warfare Centre as well as to a Dutch strategic think tank group (the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies). The Dutch have implemented a design program aimed at Field Grade officers and blends aspects of design, operational design and the NATO operational planning process (OPP) in a classroom environment. The semiotic square was briefed to the Dutch students during the presentations as a heuristic aid.
7. The author is a visiting lecturer for USSOCOM in the JSOU design programs. The author helped design and prepare faculty in March 2015 and is now assigned as the primary "design theory instructor" for Module 1 of the JSOU program. The author produced all of the presentation material and lesson plans, and provided extensive source material and original work to both the program and the faculty to assist in the design development. The semiotic square approach has been incorporated into the JSOU design program as one of several heuristic tools.
8. Anna Grome, Beth Crandall, Louise Rasmussen and Heather Wolters. "Incorporating Army Design Methodology into Army Operations: Barriers and Recommendations for Facilitating Integration," U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, (Report Number: 1954, 2012.) pp. 1–32. See also: Anna Grome, Beth Crandall, Louise Rasmussen and Heather Wolters, "Army Design Methodology: Commander's Resource", *U.S. Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences*, (Research Product 2012-01, 2012) pp. 11–16.
9. Ben Zweibelson, "An Awkward Tango: Pairing Traditional Military Planning to Design and Why it Currently Fails to Work", *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* (Vol. 16, No. 1, 2015).
10. This hypothesis is repeated frequently by design critics. On organizations clinging to existing cognitive processes as they outstrip their past experiences, see: Karl Weick, "The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: The Mann Gulch Disaster," *Administrative Science Quarterly* (Vol. 38, No. 4, December 1993) p. 636.
11. On emergence, see: Paul Lewis, "Peter Berger and His Critics: The Significance of Emergence", *Springer Science and Business Media* (online publication for a symposium on Peter Berger's Achievement in Social Science; April 1, 2010), p. 210. Antoine Bousquet, Simon Curtis, "Beyond Models and Metaphors: Complexity Theory, Systems Thinking and International Relations", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* (Vol. 24, Issue 1, 2011), p. 46.
12. Karl Weick, "The role of imagination in the organizing of knowledge", *European Journal of Information Systems* (Volume 15, 2006), pp. 447–451.
13. M. Ann Welsh and Gordon Dehler, "Combining Critical Reflection and Design Thinking to Develop Integrative Learners", *Journal of Management Education* (Vol. 37, No. 6, 2012) p. 777. The authors use the term "cookie cutter" and "reductionist" for the standardized approach in design thinking. See also: Ben Zweibelson, Grant Martin, Christopher Paparone, "Frame Reflection: A Critical Review of US Military Approaches to Complex Situations" (OODA.com, September 13, 2013). Last accessed on June 4, 2015 at <http://www.oodaloop.com/featured/2013/09/12/frame-reflection/>.
14. George Rizer, *Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science* (revised ed.), (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1980), p. 7. See also: Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (3rd ed.), (Chicago, University of Chicago, 1996), p. 5-15. On ontologies, see: Mary Jo Hatch and Dvora Yanow, "Methodology by Metaphor: Ways of Seeing in Painting and Research", *Organization Studies* (Vol. 29, No. 1, 2008) pp. 24, 28 and 30. See also: Michael Reed, "Reflections on the 'Realist Turn' in Organization and Management Studies", *Journal of Management Studies* (Vol. 42, No. 8, December 2005) p. 1623. Werner Stark, *The Sociology of Knowledge* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958) p. 13.
15. For more on paradigms, see: Majken Schultz, Mary Jo Hatch, "Living with Multiple Paradigms: the Case of Paradigm Interplay in Organizational Culture Studies", *Academy of Management Review* (Vol. 21, No. 2, April 1996) pp. 530–533. See also: Marianne Lewis and Mihaela Kelemen, "Multiparadigm inquiry: Exploring organizational pluralism and paradox", *Human Relations* (Vol. 55, No. 2, 2002) p. 252. Marianne Lewis and Andrew Grimes, "Metatriangulation: Building Theory from Multiple Paradigms", *The Academy of Management Review* (Vol. 21, No. 4, October 1999) pp. 673–675.
16. Aside from the author, the other design facilitators were two retired Colonels and former directors of the U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies, and a graduate-level researcher from the Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto. The other design groups did not conduct a semiotic square, and developed other unique design approaches.



17. On breaking out of single-paradigm perspectives, see: Dennis Gioia and Evelyn Pitre, "Multiparadigm Perspectives on Theory Building", *The Academy of Management Review* (Vol. 15, No. 4, 1990). See also: Majken Schultz and Mary Jo Hatch, "Living with Multiple Paradigms: The Case of Paradigm Interplay in Organizational Culture Studies", *Academy of Management Review* (Vol. 21, No. 2, April 1996) pp. 530–533. Marianne Lewis and Andrew Grimes, "Metatriangulation: Building Theory from Multiple Paradigms", *The Academy of Management Review* (Vol. 21, No. 4, October 1999) pp. 673–675.
18. Donald Schön, "The New Scholarship Requires a New Epistemology" *Change* (Vol. 27, No. 6, 1995) pp. 27–29. See also: Donald A. Schön, "The Crisis of Professional Knowledge and the Pursuit of an Epistemology of Practice" in *Teaching and the Case Method, Instruction Guide*, ed. Louis Barnes, C. Roland Christensen and Abby J. Hansen (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1987). Karl Weick, "Reflections: Change Agents as Change Poets – On Reconnecting Flux and Hunches", *Journal of Change Management* (Vol. 11, No. 1, March 2011).
19. Dr. Paul T. Mitchell of the Canadian Forces College facilitated the questionnaire activity with the students. Student responses are kept anonymous and are referred to in this article as "Student 1-8." Digital copies of their responses will be kept in the author's private records for a period of five years from the date of publication.
20. The student comments cited in order are those of Student 1, Student 2 and Student 4.
21. Student 5 expressed some criticism of the semiotic square method, but also said that "the concept is interesting in getting people to think about new and novel approaches." Student 6 expressed similar comments, while the comments of the other six students polled were mostly positive.
22. Army Design Methodology currently employs this sequential model. However, much of the criticism leveled against ADM in published doctrine centers on the lack of guidance or examples on accomplishing design in practice. See: Grant Martin, "Tell Me How to Do This Think Called Design!", *Small Wars Journal* (April 8, 2011). Last accessed on June 4, 2015 at: <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a546441.pdf>. See also: Ben Zweibelson, "Seven Design Theory Considerations", *Military Review* (November-December 2012). Last accessed on June 4, 2015 at: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20121231_art013.pdf.
23. Student 2's comments.
24. Student 3's comments.
25. Student 7's comments.
26. Student 8's comments.
27. Student 2's comments.
28. Donald A. Schön, "Educating the Reflective Legal Practitioner," *Clinical Law Review* (Fall 1995, Vol. 2:231), p. 243. See also: Maria Gondo and John Amis, "Variations in Practice Adoption: The Roles of Conscious Reflection and Discourse" *Academy of Management Review* (Vol. 38, No. 2, 2013) p. 232.
29. Antoine Bousquet, *The Scientific Way of Warfare; Order and Chaos on the Battlefields of Modernity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009) pp. 56–60. See also: Haridimos Tsoukas, *Complex Knowledge: Studies in Organizational Epistemology* (London: Oxford University Press, 2005) p. 171; Henry Guerlac, "Vauban: The Impact of Science on War", in *Makers of Modern Strategy; From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986) p. 67; and Haridimos Tsoukas and Kevin Dooley, "Introduction to the Special Issue: Towards the Ecological Style: Embracing Complexity in Organizational Research", *Organization Studies*, (Vol. 32, No. 729, 2011), p. 730.



THE PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR OF 1899-1902:

A Case Study in Adherence to the Fundamental Principles of Counterinsurgency Warfare

Captain J. Kye Eadon and Dr. William N. Holden

Introduction

In the study of war in recent years, there has been a shift in focus from *interstate* warfare to *intrastate* warfare, with particular attention being paid to within-state violence perpetrated by both state and non-state actors.¹ This emphasis on intrastate violence has occurred in a world where policymakers tasked with determining a new security agenda are faced with terrorism, insurgency, piracy, and failed states.² The last great bout of writing on insurgency occurred during the 1960s, much of it inspired by the Vietnam War.³ Today, however, conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa have inspired a new cohort of insurgency warfare scholars.⁴

One of the best examples of a successful counterinsurgency campaign is the United States Army's actions during the Philippine-American War of 1899-1902. The term "Philippine-American War" is used in this article for two reasons: first, it indicates that the war was between the Filipinos and the forces of the United States; second, the term "Filipinos" describes the Christianized and Hispanized residents of the Philippines and does not include the Muslim, or "Moro," residents of the southern Philippines, against whom the United States waged war between 1903 and 1913. The frequently used term "Philippine Insurrection" is not employed

17th Infantry head for action in the Philippines.

here because, as Benjamin Beede notes, “this term connotes that the United States was the governing authority in the Philippines and that the Philippine nationalists were rebelling against it.”⁵

According to United States Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, the Philippine–American War was that Army’s “most successful instance of counterinsurgency theory and practice.”⁶ “The success of the U.S. counterinsurgency effort was due,” writes Max Boot, “to paying attention to the rudiments of counterinsurgency.”⁷ Brian McAllister Linn, who has been called “the foremost American historian studying the Philippine–American War,”⁸ states that the conflict “offers a treasure trove of lessons on counterinsurgency procedures.”⁹ Indeed, Linn goes so far as to characterize the Philippine–American War as “the most successful counterinsurgency campaign in U.S. history” and “the logical starting point for the systematic examination of military interventions, civic action, and pacification operations.”¹⁰

CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND: INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE

INSURGENCY WARFARE

France’s Lieutenant Colonel David Galula defines insurgency as “a *protracted struggle* conducted methodically, step by step, in order to attain specific intermediate objectives leading finally to the overthrow of the existing order.”¹¹ The United States Army and Marine Corps defines it as “an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”¹² According to the United States Army and Marine Corps, a variant of an insurgency is a *resistance movement*, which occurs “when insurgents seek to expel or overthrow what they consider a foreign or occupation government.”¹³

A crucial dimension of insurgency is its protracted nature. “Revolutionary wars,” writes Robert Taber, “are generally, of necessity, wars of long duration.”¹⁴ Insurgents are often capable of continuing their struggle indefinitely¹⁵ and they have nothing to lose and everything to gain by doing so.¹⁶ Indeed, the insurgents often have nothing to gain and everything to lose by giving up.

Insurgents are heavily reliant upon the local population, which may be thought of as the sea in which the insurgents are the fish.¹⁷ The insurgent relies on the population for recruits, logistical support, and intelligence about government forces. Wing Commander Sir Robert Thompson of the Royal Air Force explains the importance of the population to the insurgency by drawing a distinction between “jungle bases” and “popular bases.”¹⁸ Jungle bases are areas where insurgents can rest, train recruits, and store ammunition, food and other supplies. In contrast, popular bases represent the population from which the insurgency acquires its supplies and recruits. Thompson further differentiates the two types of bases using a naval analogy; jungle bases represent forward ocean bases, while popular bases represent a navy’s home port from which it acquires its supplies. The loss of an ocean base would inflict no permanent damage on the fleet’s

operating capabilities, but the loss of a home port would greatly diminish its operating endurance. Accordingly, an insurgency will suffer no great harm if it loses a jungle base, but it will be gravely threatened if it is denied access to the population.

Insurgents often acquire funding and weapons from sympathetic governments, or people in adjacent states.¹⁹ If, however, an insurgency is occurring in an insular state that lacks land borders, funding can be obtained by extorting local businesses and by ambushing government troops and taking their weapons.²⁰ Insurgencies thrive in areas with forest cover and complex terrain such as mountains.²¹ Rough terrain makes it difficult for a numerically superior opponent to move against an insurgent, and forest cover provides concealment. As Galula notes, “mountains, forests, and swamps are not obstacles for the insurgent but rather his favorite ground.”²²

COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE

The United States Army and United States Marine Corps defines counterinsurgency as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.”²³ The first (and most obvious) requirement for counterinsurgency success is that the counterinsurgent must be able to defeat the insurgent when the two engage in battle. In firefights with the insurgent, the counterinsurgent should always prevail; “the military defeat of the enemy must come first.”²⁴ While this is a *necessary* condition for defeating an insurgency, it is by no means a *necessary and sufficient* condition, and the ability to defeat an insurgent in battle is only about 20 percent of what is required if the counterinsurgent is to be victorious.²⁵

A crucial aspect of successful counterinsurgency is the development of high-quality junior officers; a counterinsurgency campaign is a junior officer’s war.²⁶ As the United States Army and United States Marine Corps put it, “The dynamic and ambiguous environment of modern counterinsurgency places a premium on leadership at every level, from sergeant to general.”²⁷ Counterinsurgency is small-scale war with fleeting opportunities that must be seized instantly.²⁸ All officers involved in a counterinsurgency campaign must not only have the necessary tactical skills to command their troops, they must also be able to make prompt decisions, delegate authority and make ethical judgments.²⁹ The United States Army and United States Marine Corps have this to say about preparing leaders:

Young leaders often make decisions at the tactical level that have strategic consequences. Senior leaders set the proper direction and climate with thorough training and clear guidance; they then trust their subordinates to do the right thing. Preparation for tactical-level leaders requires more than just mastering service doctrine; they must also be trained and educated to adapt to their local situations, understand the legal and ethical implications of their actions, and exercise initiative and sound judgment in accordance with their senior commander’s intent.³⁰

Successful counterinsurgency places a premium on troop *quality*, not troop *quantity*. A common misunderstanding in counterinsurgency is that the counterinsurgent must outnumber the insurgent by a ratio of at least ten to one.³¹ According to Thompson,

this is “nonsense and rates as one of the myths of counterinsurgency.”³² Thompson goes on to say that it is not the *quantity* of the counterinsurgents that matters, but rather their *quality*, because counterinsurgency requires “a small, elite, highly disciplined, lightly equipped and aggressive Army.”³³


Intelligence is vital in counterinsurgency because an insurgency is based on the actions of individual people who are engaged in it, and it is essential that the counterinsurgent identify those individuals. Defeating an insurgency requires a delicate intelligence-gathering machine staffed by well-trained and highly experienced intelligence officers.³⁴ Nagl describes counterinsurgency as “a task more akin to breaking up a Mafia crime ring than dismantling a conventional enemy battalion or brigade.”³⁵ Counterinsurgency requires “patient work developing intelligence sources in the local population.”³⁶ Stathis Kalyvas emphasizes the importance of intelligence.

The advantages guerrillas and terrorists may possess in opposing the far greater resources of the government can largely be countered if the government has adequate intelligence. Whatever advantages of mobility, surprise, and *esprit de corps* the guerrilla possess can usually be more than offset if the government has the crucial intelligence at the right moment.³⁷

Arguably the most important requirement for a successful counterinsurgency campaign is separating the insurgent from the population. “Victory in counterinsurgency,” writes Galula, is “the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population.”³⁸ For Thompson, it is essential “to isolate the insurgent both physically and politically from the population.”³⁹ Only when this isolation is effected will counterinsurgency operations achieve a lasting result. According to the United States Army and the United States Marine Corps:

By applying resources to separate insurgents from the population, commanders and planners can more effectively focus their efforts on making the insurgency feel isolated. Insurgents may then believe that their causes for conflict are not supported by the population. Once the insurgent leaders and members feel isolated from the population, peaceful efforts can be made to influence insurgents to surrender, return, and be reintegrated into society.⁴⁰

Separating the insurgents from the civilian population is a stark process in which members of the population are forced to determine which of the two competing sides (insurgent or counterinsurgent) offers them a better chance of survival. If members of the population feel they are more likely to live if the insurgent succeeds, they will support the insurgency; conversely, if they feel they are more likely to live if the counterinsurgent succeeds, they will support the counterinsurgency. “The population’s attitude,” Galula notes, “is dictated not so much by the relative popularity and merits of the opponents as by the more primitive concern for safety.”⁴¹ The side providing the best protection, and appearing to be the least threatening, will receive the population’s support. Counterinsurgency warfare doctrine is clear:



Source: The Authors, 2015

for people living in an area affected by an insurgency, neutrality is not an option. They can support either the insurgent *or* the counterinsurgent, but not *both*. Counterinsurgents must not tolerate neutrality; they must force the population to choose which of the two sides to which it will be loyal. One of the best ways for a counterinsurgent to acquire popular support is to have a physical presence among them, thus providing them with security.⁴²

THE PHILIPPINE-AMERICAN WAR

THE PHILIPPINES: A FRAGMENTED NATION WITH A TUMULTUOUS PAST

The Philippines are an archipelago of 7,100 islands in Southeast Asia. The fragmented territorial morphology of the Philippines resembles the fragmented nature of Philippine society. The archipelago is inhabited by a number of diverse ethnic groups and the islands’ society is anything but homogenous. From 1565 to 1898 the archipelago was a colony of Spain, and Spanish rule was what Luis Francia calls “the centripetal force” that bound the different islands

and ethnic groups together.⁴³ Without Spanish rule, the islands might have become independent states or incorporated, in whole or in part, into a neighbouring nation such as Indonesia or Malaysia.⁴⁴

The Spanish colonial era was by no means tranquil; it was marked by numerous peasant uprisings. For example, the Spanish lost complete control of the island of Bohol from 1744 until 1829, when peasants established mountain communes and openly defied them.⁴⁵ However, during the late nineteenth century, the conditions faced by the peasantry began to worsen. As Linn notes, “By the 1890s much of the Philippines was in severe distress, plagued by social tension, disease, hunger, banditry and rebellion.”⁴⁶ In 1896, the Philippine Revolution broke out, largely under the leadership of Andres Bonifacio, a man of lower-middle-class background, and his Katipunan society.⁴⁷ In 1897, a wealthy landowner named Emilio Aguinaldo had Bonifacio killed and took over the leadership of the revolution.⁴⁸ Then, in December 1897, Aguinaldo and forty of his followers reached an agreement with the Spanish to go into exile to Hong Kong in exchange for \$800,000: half to be paid in advance and the other half upon their arrival in Hong Kong.⁴⁹

THE UNITED STATES ACQUIRES THE PHILIPPINES

On 25 April 1898, in a conflict of very ambiguous origins, the United States and Spain went to war. On 1 May 1898, the United States Navy destroyed the Spanish fleet at the Battle of Manila Bay.⁵⁰ With the end of Spanish control appearing imminent, Aguinaldo returned to the archipelago on 19 May 1898 to resume the revolution, and on 12 June 1898 the independence of the Republic of the Philippines was declared.⁵¹ However, two weeks after the Filipinos declared their independence, a contingent of United States Army soldiers arrived in the Philippines and it soon became apparent that the Americans intended to retain the archipelago as a colony of their own.⁵² There were many reasons behind the American retention of the Philippines: a partial list includes access to Asian markets, particularly in nearby China; concerns that another European power might acquire the islands if the Americans departed, concerns accentuated by the presence of German warships near the islands; and simply the prestige associated with having an overseas colony.⁵³ Notwithstanding the opaque motives for keeping the Philippines, one thing was clear. Tension was building as Filipino nationalists surrounded Manila while the city was occupied by the Americans. Eventually, on 4 February 1899, conflict broke out between the two forces.

PHASE	WHAT THIS ENTAILED
February 1899 to November 1899	Conventional warfare between the United States Army and Filipinos under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo.
November 1899 to March 1901	Insurgency warfare conducted by the Filipinos under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo against American forces.
March 1901 to July 1902	Localized insurgency conducted by the Filipinos without any centralized leadership.

Figure 1: The Three Phases of the Philippine–American War

Source: S.C. Sarkesian (1994), “Philippine War (1899–1902),” in *The War of 1898 and US Interventions 1898–1934: An Encyclopedia*, ed. B.R. Beede (New York: Garland Publishing), pp. 424–428.

The conflict between the Americans and the Filipinos went through three distinct phases. From February 1899 until November 1899, the Filipinos under Aguinaldo attempted to engage in conventional warfare against the well-equipped and highly trained United States Army. However, it soon became apparent that this was a futile exercise, and on 13 November 1899

Aguinaldo ordered his forces to switch to guerrilla warfare, which continued under Aguinaldo’s leadership until his capture by the Americans in March 1901, and after that as a highly fragmented and localized insurgency until July 1902. The Americans, by negotiating a treaty with Sultan Kiram II, the Sultan of Sulu, were able to avoid (or ultimately postpone) conflict with the Moros of the Sulu islands and western Mindanao while fighting the Filipinos in the rest of the archipelago.⁵⁴ In the Kiram-Bates Treaty (referred to as such since it was signed by Brigadier General John Bates on behalf of the United States), the Moros recognized the sovereignty of the United States over the Sultanate of Sulu in exchange for retention of their traditional Islamic customs, including polygamy and slavery.⁵⁵ The Kiram-Bates Treaty ensured that the United States would not become involved in a two-front war, until it was unilaterally abrogated by the United States in 1904.⁵⁶

THE PHILIPPINE INSURGENCY: A PROTRACTED PROCESS

Once the switch was made to insurgency warfare, Aguinaldo’s strategy was one of protraction; he aimed to draw the war out and erode the morale and will of the United States Army.⁵⁷ As Susan Brewer notes, “The Filipino strategy aimed to wear out the Americans and make their occupation too costly to continue.”⁵⁸ Unable to defeat the Americans militarily, the Filipinos hoped the Americans would conclude that subduing their insurgency was not worth the cost and withdraw.⁵⁹ In the province of Batangas, Miguel Malvar (one of the most formidable guerrilla commanders of the conflict) focused, not on defeating the Americans, but on convincing them that their occupation would require interminable warfare.⁶⁰ In the words of Scott Kirsch:

Filipino resistance incorporated a range of tactics designed to drag out the war with the Americans. These included an emphasis on raids and ambushes, efforts to engage in combat only when guerrillas possessed clear superiority, and the reliance on small units that could strike and disperse.⁶¹

THE AMERICAN COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGN: A DIFFICULT PROCESS

The Americans, fighting in mountains and jungles more than 11,000 kilometres from home, found the conflict extremely difficult. The islands of the archipelago are mountainous, with abrupt changes in relief, and at the time of the conflict consisted of almost 70 percent forest cover. Andrew Birtle describes the Philippines as “a labyrinth of rice paddies, mountains, jungles, and dense stretches of towering cogon grass pierced only by rough



United States soldiers fording river in Philippines

Source: United States Library of Congress Reproduction Number: LC-USZ61-9568

trails and few primitive roads.”⁶² A day’s operations could begin in sweltering heat and choking dust, involve steep climbs, fording of rivers, and passing through razor-sharp grasses, and end in a quagmire of mud caused by torrential rains.⁶³

As if the differences occasioned by physical geography were not enough, the social differences were almost overwhelming. American soldiers, having little or no knowledge of Filipino culture, regarded the inhabitants of the archipelago as strange and alien⁶⁴ and could not distinguish between civilians and insurgents.⁶⁵ An important contributor to the difficulty faced by the Americans in suppressing the Philippine insurgency was the close ties between the insurgents and the population. From December 1899 until April 1900, most American personnel were oblivious to the extent of the local political infrastructure developed by the insurgents, and the insurgents were able to acquire supplies and recruits right under the noses of United States Army garrison commanders.⁶⁶ There were, essentially, two categories of guerrillas.⁶⁷ First, there were approximately 25,000 full-time insurgent fighters who maintained base camps in the jungles and mountains of the archipelago; these people operated in scattered bands of roughly 15 to 200 and would periodically come down from the mountains to conduct raids and obtain supplies from the towns. Second, there were thousands of part-time insurgents who lived in towns under American control; they constituted a dense mass of sympathetic people speaking Philippine languages which remained incomprehensible to the Americans.⁶⁸ Although they publicly supported the American occupation, Filipino town and village officials were in reality loyal to the revolution, and this loyalty was near universal.⁶⁹

The insurgents would raise funds by levying “taxes” on businesses, specifically on hemp merchants. Vicente Lukban, the leader of the insurgents on the island of Samar, was a highly effective leader of the insurgency against the United States.⁷⁰ On Samar there were trading houses engaged in the hemp trade; Lukban would levy “taxes” on these hemp merchants, who, after paying, were allowed to continue purchasing hemp.⁷¹ The insurgents also proved adept at seizing weapons from American troops. American soldiers were given strict orders that, if they were unable to save both fellow soldiers and their rifles, their rifles were to take priority.⁷²

CHANGE IN STRATEGY TO A TERRITORIAL OCCUPATIONAL SYSTEM

The American counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines went through two profoundly different operational schemes. When the Filipinos began to engage in insurgency warfare in November 1899, the Americans initially responded by engaging in what today would be called “search and destroy operations” or “cordon and sweep operations.”⁷³ American soldiers would enter an area where insurgents were believed to be operating, attempt to capture or kill them and disrupt their operations and sources of support, then leave the area and return to Manila. From November 1899 until May 1900, the Americans refrained from attempting to hold territory, and after every operation the insurgents would return and reestablish themselves in the very area the Americans had just claimed to have cleared.⁷⁴ Then, in May 1900, the United States Army changed its organizational structure to a territorial occupational system.⁷⁵ The archipelago was divided up into four Departments: Northern Luzon, Southern Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. Within each Department were a number of Districts, and responsibility for eliminating the insurgency

was assigned to Department Commanders, District Commanders within each Department, and garrison commanders within each District, down the chain of command.⁷⁶ This caused the number of American garrisons to grow, on average, by 10 percent a month between November 1899 and December 1901.⁷⁷ Isolated from higher-echelon control, these small garrisons lived and worked in communities where they eliminated insurgents, established rapport with the population, gathered intelligence, and performed civil works.⁷⁸ Commanders in the various locations applied their own experience and understanding of the local area to develop tactics best suited to that particular area, and the Americans made their permanence clear in each location where they established a garrison.⁷⁹

THE ROLE OF JUNIOR OFFICERS

With all levels of the chain of command assuming responsibility, the role of junior officers became extremely important. The territorial occupation system of organization relied heavily on the judgment of individuals on the spot, and it placed tremendous responsibility on the captains, lieutenants and sergeants running the small garrisons.⁸⁰ In Linn’s view, “The Philippine war overwhelmingly confirms the absolute necessity of having officers of character, initiative, and humanity in guerrilla conflicts.”⁸¹ Policies were promulgated by the high command in Manila, but their implementation was the responsibility of junior officers living among, and dealing with, the population on a daily basis.⁸² As John Gates observes:

In military units widely dispersed through the islands, junior officers often found themselves shouldering great responsibilities. In addition to their military duties, they might be expected to supervise the municipal governments and local police, organize schools, collect customs and internal revenues, act as provost judges, and see that the towns were kept clean and orderly.⁸³

THE IMPORTANCE OF HIGH-QUALITY SOLDIERS

In the Philippines, the United States Army used a low *quantity* of high-*quality* troops. At no time during the Philippine–American War were there more than 70,000 American soldiers in the Philippines, and for most of that time troop levels were closer to 40,000.⁸⁴ At the highest point of American involvement there was 1 American soldier for every 107 Filipinos; in Vietnam, by contrast, the ratio was 1 to 13.⁸⁵ The insurgents probably outnumbered the Americans by a 2 to 1 ratio for most of the war.⁸⁶ As Linn points out, “What gave the edge to American military forces was not their numbers but their effectiveness.”⁸⁷ During the early 1890s, the United States Army had implemented a series



United States soldiers occupying native huts

Source: United States Library of Congress Reproduction Number: LC-USZ62-57093

of reforms placing a heavy emphasis on the small-unit tactics and weapons ideal for irregular warfare, and the American soldiers were much better trained and equipped than the Spanish soldiers the Filipinos had encountered before the arrival of the Americans.

A SKILFUL USE OF INTELLIGENCE

The United States Army skilfully exploited intelligence in suppressing the insurgency, and American military intelligence went through three distinct phases. Initially, intelligence activities were sporadic and uncoordinated; during this phase the Army created the Bureau of Insurgent Records (BIR) to compile data on the insurgents.⁸⁸ Then, on 5 May 1900, Major General Arthur MacArthur (father of Douglas MacArthur) took command of American forces in the Philippines and ordered all officers to devote their full attention to rooting out the insurgent infrastructure.⁸⁹ On 13 December 1900, MacArthur reorganized the BIR into the Division of Military Intelligence (DMI) and shifted its focus from collecting documents toward disseminating information to field commanders.⁹⁰ MacArthur emphasized acquiring intelligence on Filipinos suspected of helping the insurgents; this would enhance the Army's knowledge of how the insurgents were organized.⁹¹ The third phase of intelligence occurred when Major General Adna Chaffee replaced MacArthur on 4 July 1901 and ordered all garrisons to appoint a designated intelligence officer to be tasked with the collection and transmission of all military intelligence to the DMI.⁹²

PHASE	WHAT THIS ENTAILED
Mid-1898 to early 1900	Intelligence activities were sporadic and uncoordinated.
Early 1900 to mid-1901	Individual garrisons developed their own intelligence networks.
Mid-1901 to July 1902	A reciprocal system of data collection and distribution between headquarters and field garrisons emerged.

Figure 2: The Three Phases of Military Intelligence in the Philippine–American War

Source: B.M. Linn (1994), "Intelligence in the Philippine War," in *The War of 1898 and US Interventions 1898–1934: An Encyclopedia*, ed. B.R. Beede (New York: Garland Publishing), pp. 233–235.

Intelligence played a crucial role in one of the most notorious events of the Philippine–American War: the Balangiga massacre on the island of Samar. In May 1901 Pedro Abayan, the Mayor of Balangiga, wrote to Chaffee requesting troops to protect Balangiga from Muslim pirates operating out of the Sulu islands.⁹³ Consequently, on 11 August 1901, Company C of the 9th Infantry Regiment was deployed to Balangiga. Then, during that same month, Abayan wrote to Lukban advising him that the residents of Balangiga would pursue a fictitious policy with the Americans upon their arrival and, when the time was right, would attack them.⁹⁴ On the morning of Sunday, 28 September 1901, while the men of Company C were having breakfast in their mess tent, this plan came to fruition and insurgents attacked them with bolos.⁹⁵ Both officers and 46 enlisted men were killed; 22 other soldiers were wounded and only four soldiers emerged unscathed.⁹⁶ The survivors of the attack, many of them badly wounded, staggered to the beach, boarded boats, and fled to Basey, on the west coast; all along their route they were harassed and attacked at any attempted landfall. As Linn notes, the massacre at Balangiga

"revealed the failings of an appallingly unprofessional intelligence organization."⁹⁷ Balangiga demonstrated an egregious intelligence failure in two ways: first, the Americans should have detected the ruse inherent in Abayan's request for troops to protect Balangiga from Muslim pirates, as such attacks had become practically nonexistent over the preceding fifty years; second, in August 1901, American soldiers captured the letter sent by Abayan to Lukban advising him of the plan to attack the American troops in Balangiga.⁹⁸ However, after that letter wound its way up the intelligence chain of command, it ended up 300 kilometres away at the Department of the Visayas, in Iloilo City, where it remained until being discovered in October 1901—*after* the Balangiga Massacre!⁹⁹

After the intelligence failure at Balangiga, much of the intelligence activity on Samar was directed by Major Edwin Glenn, the Judge Advocate of Brigadier General Jacob Smith's Sixth Separate Brigade (a unit created to pacify Samar after the debacle at Balangiga), who made it his priority to locate the leaders and supporters of the insurgency.¹⁰⁰ Using Navy gunboats, Glenn raided coastal towns, seeking evidence that the inhabitants were engaged in smuggling supplies to the insurgents. Glenn's arrests of merchants and municipal officials, and the subsequent gruelling interrogations, soon uncovered the names of contributors, smugglers, and couriers. Glenn's relentless pursuit of information eventually inflicted mortal wounds on the civilian support base of the insurgency. Similarly, in Batangas, Brigadier General Franklin Bell depended greatly on intelligence in defeating the insurgency led by Malvar. As Keith Haynes points out, "Bell relied heavily on sophisticated, thorough military intelligence and an extensive network of spies so that the United States military command could target individual subversives, their families, their clandestine political organizations, and their services for supply, information, and communication."¹⁰¹

THE CARROT AND THE STICK: THE POLICY OF ATTRACTION AND CHASTISEMENT



Burning of homes during Philippine–American War

The Americans, drawing from their long tradition of frontier warfare against Native Americans (and from their experiences in the reconstruction of the southern states after the Civil War), implemented a series of policies to reward those who cooperated with them and punish those who did not.¹⁰² This policy was referred to as "attraction and chastisement"¹⁰³ or, more bluntly, "the carrot and the stick."¹⁰⁴ To convince the population that failing to

cooperate with them would entail costs, the Americans destroyed crops, engaged in forced relocation of civilians, exiled insurgent sympathizers to Guam, and executed people.¹⁰⁵ In Batangas, Bell ordered entire towns to be burned to the ground and Bell also ordered a prisoner of war to be executed as retaliation for every assassination carried out by the insurgents.¹⁰⁶ To convince people that cooperating with them would provide rewards, the Americans provided a gamut of civic action projects including municipal governments, local police forces, schools, improved roads and bridges, and public health programs.¹⁰⁷ In Batangas, Bell appreciated the use of “public diplomacy, economic reconstruction projects, and public health campaigns to win the hearts and minds of the local population.”¹⁰⁸ Gates observes that “The American policy of benevolence and the many humanitarian acts of the Army throughout the war played a much more important role in the success of the pacification campaign than fear did.”¹⁰⁹



American soldier feeding Filipino children

Source: United States Library of Congress Reproduction Number LC-USZ62-113939

EXPLOITING ETHNIC DIVISIONS IN PHILIPPINE SOCIETY

The Filipino nationalists, who had led the revolt against Spain and then the insurgency against the United States, were led by Tagalogs from Central and Southern Luzon. The United States Army exploited extant seams in the archipelago's society by recruiting members of ethnic groups traditionally antagonistic to Tagalogs to serve the American cause.¹¹⁰ One of the most prominent of these ethnic groups was the Macabebes, “the ancient and hated enemies of the Tagalogs,” from Macabebe, Pampanga, on the island of Luzon.¹¹¹ The Macabebes were long-time servants of the Spanish and they despised Tagalogs. Early in the Philippine–American War they offered their services to the Americans, and by 1902 up to 5,000 of them were serving the United States as armed scouts under the leadership of American officers.¹¹² Macabebe scouts could speak Filipino languages and were able to penetrate the countryside in small numbers and defeat insurgents on their own terms.¹¹³ Paramilitary forces recruited from among ethnic groups antipathetic to the predominantly Tagalog leadership of the insurgency provided excellent sources of intelligence.¹¹⁴ Filipino scouts were also recruited from among other ethnic groups and from economic classes that stood to be hurt by a continuation of the war. “On Samar,” Linn observes, “the Americans raised a scout unit from among the hemp merchants who were losing both economic and political power as a result of insurgent exaction.”¹¹⁵ Lukban, the insurgent leader on the island of Samar, was captured by a company of scouts recruited from the adjacent island of Leyte.¹¹⁶



Church celebration of the enlistment of Macabebes into the US Army

Source: United States Library of Congress Reproduction Number LC-USZ62-80719

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES NAVY

The Army benefited tremendously from the United States Navy's assistance. The Navy prevented the insurgents from receiving external aid, it prevented the insurgents from moving their forces between the islands, and it provided the Army with inter-island mobility.¹¹⁷ Because of the Navy's assistance, the insurgents had no inter-island freedom of manoeuvre while the Army's was unhindered. In an archipelagic country, the importance of this freedom cannot be overstated. The Navy cooperated very well with the Army, facilitating amphibious operations, and even provided intra-island mobility for troops. This was often necessary, as thick jungles, rugged terrain, poor roads and long rainy seasons all made water transportation around the perimeters of many islands much easier than attempting to move through their interiors. Accordingly, the Army came to rely heavily on the Navy for troop movements and logistical support.¹¹⁸ The Navy also provided members of the Marine Corps as troops. By the fall of 1901 there was a brigade of two Marine Corps regiments serving in the Philippines, and a battalion of Marines was assigned to the Sixth Separate Brigade.¹¹⁹

SEPARATING INSURGENTS FROM THE POPULATION

Arguably the most important aspect of the United States Army's counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines (and certainly the best example of how the Army complied with the rudiments of counterinsurgency warfare) was the way it separated the insurgents from the population. According to United States Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Bruno, the Americans attempted to "drive a wedge between the insurgents and the peaceful natives."¹²⁰ This process began with MacArthur's assumption of command on 5 May 1900. MacArthur was of the view that a new pacification policy was in order, and all garrisons were tasked with the mission of coercing those who aided the insurgents and protecting those who collaborated with the Americans.¹²¹ MacArthur appreciated that victory could be achieved only by ending support for the insurgents in the towns and villages of the archipelago, for it was there that they obtained their information, supplies and sanctuary. Without that support, they would be unable to operate and the war would end.¹²² The goal of this new policy would be to isolate the insurgents from their popular bases in the villages and sever the alliance between the village and the insurgents' jungle bases.¹²³ To implement this policy, a concentration camp system was set up to separate the insurgents from the general population.¹²⁴ Today the term "concentration camp" is pejorative, but at the time of the Philippine–American War it simply meant that civilians were being separated into "protected zones" outside of which everyone was regarded as an enemy.¹²⁵ In areas where insurgent activity was exceptionally strong, the Army relocated all members of the population from outlying areas into protected zones and then destroyed all crops and buildings remaining outside those zones so as to deny them to the insurgents.¹²⁶ The eminent historian Alfred W. McCoy estimates that up to 451,000 people were relocated into concentration camps on the islands of Luzon and Samar—more than ten percent of the population of those islands.¹²⁷

In Batangas, Bell vigorously implemented a concentration policy. The area outside the concentration camp was deemed enemy territory, and all property would be subject to confiscation or destruction. All males were to be arrested and, if they attempted to escape, they were to be shot.¹²⁸ In Richard Welch's words:

Bell instructed his junior officers to herd the civilian population into concentration centers, to burn all crops and slaughter all cattle that might furnish sustenance to the guerrilla force under Malvar, and then to undertake an unrelenting chase of the guerrillas through the Batangas highlands. Any able-bodied male who left his garrisoned compound after sundown without permission would be shot; prisoners of war would be executed in retaliation for any acts of murder and assassination on a one-to-one basis; and each officer was encouraged to make existence so 'insupportable' for the disloyal population of Batangas that no rational man would wish for the war's continuance.¹²⁹

The Americans (in textbook counterinsurgency form) acted to separate the insurgents from the population by implementing a strict policy of non-neutrality. Neutrality was not to be tolerated; people were either active friends of the United States or they were active enemies,¹³⁰ and any member of the population refusing to swear allegiance to the United States was to be immediately considered an insurgent supporter.¹³¹ The Americans also made it abundantly

clear that fear of insurgent reprisals was no excuse for anyone furnishing assistance to the insurgents.¹³² Protection from the insurgents was the responsibility of the United States Army, and it would come via the protected zones and the garrisons defending them. In exchange for that protection, all members of the public would be responsible for supporting the Army and denying aid to the insurgents.

THE END OF THE CONFLICT

Cut off completely from outside aid, denied inter-island mobility, with their movements and locations detected by Army intelligence, and (most importantly) cut off from the population, the insurgents could no longer continue. By the summer of 1902, Filipino resistance to American rule ceased. On Samar, Lukban surrendered on 18 February 1902,¹³³ and in Batangas, Malvar surrendered on 16 April 1902.¹³⁴ Although unrest continued until 1915, carried out by what McCoy describes as "guerrilla remnants, an urban underground, messianic peasants, tribal warriors, and Muslim separatists,"¹³⁵ the insurgency contesting American control of the Philippines had been defeated.

THE COSTS OF THE CONFLICT

The end of this conflict came at a significant cost. The Americans suffered 4,234 killed and 2,818 wounded, and spent \$600 million (approximately \$7.54 billion in 2015 prices).¹³⁶ The insurgents suffered estimated battle losses of between 16,000 to 20,000, which pales compared to the several hundred thousand people who died from a "catastrophic outbreak" of cholera near the end of the war.¹³⁷ The cholera outbreak was caused by cramming thousands of people together in the concentration camps without adequate hygiene and sanitation. In the words of David Silbey:

The unsanitary conditions often combined with a lack of sufficient food, as farmers were unable to bring in their crops for want of field hands to harvest them or because the crops were destroyed by American units. The result was a tightly packed, somewhat malnourished, population with severe sanitation problems and compromised immune systems, a perfect situation for an epidemic.¹³⁸

CONCLUSION: LESSONS UNLEARNED?

In many ways, it can be argued that the insurgents contesting American rule during the Philippine–American War were predestined to fail. In addition to their lack of outside aid, their lack of inter-island mobility, the detection of their movements and locations by Army intelligence, and their inability to access their popular bases, Glenn May argues that the insurgents did almost everything wrong in waging an insurgency. "From a purely military perspective, the U.S. victory in the Philippines was due more to the mistakes of the enemy than to the cleverness of the U.S. command."¹³⁹ "The Americans," according to May, "had the good fortune to be fighting a people with virtually no experience in resisting alien rule. Although there were scores of rebellions during the three and one half centuries of Spanish rule, they were, on the whole, small-scale uprisings."¹⁴⁰ The Filipinos suffered substantially from poor leadership while fighting against the West Point-educated officers of the United States Army, many of whom had substantial combat experience fighting Native Americans during the last thirty years of

the nineteenth century.¹⁴¹ Aguinaldo, in particular, is described by Donald Chaput as “at best, a mediocre military man, with little political vision.”¹⁴² In May’s view, Aguinaldo made an immense mistake by not immediately engaging in insurgency warfare and instead attempting to first fight the Americans by conventional methods in fixed battles.¹⁴³ Aguinaldo could have—and according to May *should* have—engaged in insurgency warfare from the outset, drawn down the strength of the Americans, built up his forces, and then switched to conventional warfare (although it is difficult to see how this could have been done given the inability of the Filipinos to import military supplies into the archipelago while it was blockaded by the United States Navy).¹⁴⁴

Nevertheless, notwithstanding these criticisms of the Filipinos, it is clear that the Americans did many things right in their counterinsurgency campaign during the Philippine–American War. They switched from search-and-destroy operations, which made no effort to hold territory, to a strategy based on territorial occupation, establishing numerous garrisons throughout the archipelago from which they could act to eliminate the insurgency locally. With numerous garrisons located on the islands, substantial discretion was given to junior officers who, freed from micro-management by a distant headquarters, were left to prosecute the war as they saw fit based on the conditions in their areas of responsibility. A small number of high-quality troops were sent to the Philippines; they were well-trained soldiers who were highly disciplined and able to adjust quickly to the fluid situations they encountered in the islands. The Americans (with the notable, and important, exception of the catastrophe at Balangiga) made skilful use of intelligence. By the end of the conflict, they made sure that it flowed both up and down the chain of command so that it could be centralized, processed, and then redistributed to other units in different parts of the archipelago. A policy of attraction and chastisement was implemented to bestow benefits on those supporting American rule and impose costs on those opposing it. Despite the fact that the Philippines initially appeared to be a strange and alien land where all Filipinos seemed the same as each other but uniformly, and profoundly, different from them, the Americans were shrewd enough to notice the extant ethnic seams in Filipino society and to skilfully exploit those ethnic divisions to suppress the insurgency. The United States Navy isolated the insurgents from outside aid, denied them any inter-island freedom of manoeuvre, and provided the Army with unlimited inter-island and intra-island freedom of manoeuvre, something highly necessary given the rough terrain, heavy forest cover, and poor roads of the archipelago. The Army and the Navy put aside petty inter-service rivalries and coordinated their activities with amphibious operations and the assignment of Marine Corps units to Army commands. All of this occurred approximately 45 years before the creation of a unified Department of Defense and at a time when the Department of War and the Department of the Navy were completely separate entities within the United States government. Lastly, the Americans separated the insurgents from the population. Once this occurred, the insurgents could no longer recruit new members, acquire information, or procure supplies, and they were ultimately doomed. Given all of these factors, it is not surprising that Boot describes the Philippine–American War as “one of the most successful counterinsurgencies waged by a Western Army in modern times.”¹⁴⁵

Unfortunately, the lessons of the Philippine–American War never became institutionalized within the United States Army. “The current American academic orthodoxy, promulgated in textbooks, journals, and television documentaries,” Linn notes, “is that the war was little more than an early exercise in racism, cruelty, and perhaps even genocide.”¹⁴⁶ The hard-won lessons of the campaign were quickly lost to the belief that such wars were not the true business of the Army and, after World War I, became submerged by the lessons of a large war fought with conventional tactics against a conventional opponent.¹⁴⁷ The valuable counterinsurgency lessons of the Philippine–American War should have been entrenched into the institutional memory of the United States Army and incorporated into American military strategy. Instead, they were forgotten.¹⁴⁸ Although the Army played the “lead role” in the Philippine–American War, it forfeited the small wars mission to the Marine Corps in the years after World War I and never developed a coherent service doctrine for counterinsurgency.¹⁴⁹ Failing to remember the “small war” lessons of the Philippine–American War came back to haunt the United States in Vietnam, where what should have been approached as a small war was approached with “a campaign of firepower and attrition.”¹⁵⁰ By Vietnam, the Army had become so imbued with conventional ideas of conflict that it was unable to recall, much less implement, the lessons it had learned so many years ago in the Philippines.¹⁵¹ As the twenty-first century progresses, and as small wars continue, other armies will do well to heed the lessons of the Philippine–American War. 🍁

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Young's Scouts, including Marcus W. Robertson (2nd from right, front row squatting) and Richard Moses Longfellow (4th from right, front row squatting), Medal of Honor recipients. Picture taken in the Philippines.





Source: Combat Camera

RE-IMAGINING THE CLOSE RANGE ANTI-TANK FIGHT

Major Julien Chaput-Lemay, CD, BA, MBA

My first moment of action was when I was marker tank in the Tobruk breakout and a very brave German jumped on my back flaps armed with a molotov cocktail and a crowbar ... I must admit that ever since then I've suffered a certain amount of "infantry terror."

—Brigadier General Simpkin¹

In recent years, Canada has been involved in numerous conflicts in which it has had to destroy enemy main battle tanks (MBT). From the war in Kosovo to the one in Iraq, from the fight against Daesh to the fighting in Libya, the Royal Canadian Air Force has been tasked with destroying enemy armoured vehicles. In those conflicts, the decision to use air strikes to guarantee the destruction of the enemy was based mostly on strategic considerations. Key concerns today continue to be to eliminate friendly military casualties, avoid a national decisive engagement and control the national image.

Canada's strategic objectives and the geopolitical situation have favoured the military engagement of our armed forces within coalitions. In those conflicts, our forces were opposing adversaries who were often isolated, both politically and militarily, and the adversary was always unable to maintain even air parity.

Although Canada is not contemplating engaging in conflict with powers capable of maintaining air superiority, there is a high likelihood that we will have to face, at least within a limited time or space,

an enemy whose capabilities are roughly the same as ours: a near peer. That reality will force us to solve more complex tactical problems than would require a conflict against a sub-par enemy and will therefore require better-quality training. Unfortunately, the tactical scenarios used during training events are often constructed so as to withdraw the air component from the battlespace or are based on the assumption that we are dominant in the air. Obviously, the ability to manoeuvre on the battlefield against a near-peer enemy is completely different when we no longer assume that we can control the air. In that situation, the destruction of armoured vehicles, particularly main battle tanks, must be carried out by our ground forces, in which case it is a problem for the tactical aviation, artillery, armour and infantry.

Modern anti-tank combat often begins at the operational level, in the “shaping the battlespace” phase. It is also often conducted by means of precision aerial bombardment. During that phase of battle, we attempt to destroy the enemy’s operational capabilities in order to facilitate the ground combat to follow. While operational level objectives will aim to neutralize enemy armoured formations, all anti-armour engagements are considered to be made at the tactical level. This article will focus on tactical-level anti-armour combat. We will consider three engagement bands in the anti-armour close fight:

- 4,000 metres or more: task carried out by the air force, tactical aviation and artillery;
- 500 metres to 4,000 metres: task carried out by tactical aviation, artillery, armour and infantry equipped with medium- and long-range anti-armour weapons (e.g., tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided [TOW] missiles, MILAN, Javelin); and
- 0 metres to 500 metres: infantry task equipped with short- and medium-range weapons (e.g., 84-mm Carl Gustav, M72, rocket-propelled grenade launcher [RPG]).

The distances shown here are determined based on the weapons’ ranges, detection capability and the average footprint of the formations that control them.

For some time, the Canadian Army has been reflecting on regaining its capability for anti-armour combat on the battlefield and on ways to do so. The decisions made have significant financial impact and commit the Canadian Army for a number of years. Although Canadian doctrine on the subject is not totally inadequate, we cannot claim to adequately cover the three engagement bands with the equipment at our disposal. A capability development experiment was conducted in 2011 (CDX 2010) to imagine the Army of Tomorrow and the employment of the family of land combat systems in the future operating environment (FOE). Several observations emerged from the experiment that confirmed the need to equip the Canadian Army with the capability to destroy armoured vehicles.

[A]ll elements are vulnerable to the appearance of unexpected threats and must have either integral or rapidly accessible defeating capabilities in order to survive within the battlespace. The only anti-armour capability available to the [battle group]



Source: Combat Camera

other than LEO II, were either [fighter ground attack] or the 84-mm.... It is recommended that the Army re-invigorate a portable handheld medium range (2,000 m+) anti-tank capability for [battle group] subunits inclusive of [combat service support elements]. It is also recommended that the Army investigate a platform mounted long range (4,000 m+) anti-tank capability at Formation and unit level to reinforce its low density LEO II anti-armour capability.²

Since the TOW under armour (TUA) disappeared from the mechanized battalions’ arsenals, we have lost the ability to maintain freedom of movement in a unit’s area of responsibility and, of even more concern, we have weakened the officers’ and non-commissioned officers’ tactical knowledge of anti-armour combat. Although the equipment entitlement for medium- and long-range anti-armour weapon systems should be reconsidered, I believe that those systems will be used under different tactical conditions than those necessitating short-range weapons.

We must consider that short-range combat would probably be used if we did not have numerical superiority in armour and aviation. We must also consider that overlapping of engagement bands can quickly go wrong in the event of an enemy breakthrough. Finally, when faced with a rapid push by the enemy, an infantry soldier will find the distinction between combat at 400 metres and combat at 4,000 metres moot.

In its simplest form, anti-armour fight is done in an open field where armoured columns would be destroyed as they progressed through successive engagement bands by different types of weapons. Unfortunately, infantry units have rarely been faced with an enemy senseless enough

to role blindly into killing zones in that manner. Instead, they have confronted armour units that manoeuvre with purpose and firepower. Hence, they learned to fight them on grounds that are chosen to maximize the effects of each weapon system. They learned to fight in defiles, in open ground and in built-up areas. That, in turn, required the development of different tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) to match weaponry and ground characteristics.

My belief is that, currently, Canadian infantry is not ready to fight against an armoured threat because the weapon allocation is inadequate and because infantrymen have forgotten how to fight the anti-armour close fight. This article will explore the need for anti-armour weapon systems and, more specifically, the use of those systems in close contact with armour forces. I will focus on the 0- to 500-metre band that an infantry company might have to fight during a conflict. I believe there is a capability gap that fortunately has not yet come to light in the recent conflicts in which Canada has participated. I think that an increase in the equipment entitlement and improvement of the TTP for the employment of short-range anti-armour weapon systems would bridge the capability gap, making close anti-armour combat a serious, effective option in future operations.

Therefore, the purpose of this article is to define the principles of anti-armour combat and to contribute to current thinking about the critical role of infantry in short-range anti-armour combat. I will begin by examining the problem through the lens of a manoeuvre warfare approach. I will then see how the tactical challenges of short-range anti-armour combat have been handled in recent conflicts. Last, I will examine the development of anti-armour capability within an infantry company.



Source: Combat Camera

SHORT-RANGE ANTI-ARMOUR COMBAT AND THE APPROACH TO MANOEUVRE WARFARE

The Canadian Army has adopted the manoeuvre warfare approach; it “seeks to defeat the enemy by shattering his [sic] moral and physical cohesion.”³ It tries to destroy that cohesion by exploiting the enemy’s actual or potential weaknesses. “Where possible, existing weak points are exploited. Failing that, they must be created.”⁴ The manoeuvrist approach also seeks out combat with the adversary when and where the adversary does not want it. The enemy’s cohesion can be undermined in three ways: preventive operations, dislocation and disorganization. Those three approaches are clearly defined in the manual *Conduct of Land Operations – Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*. I will pay particular attention to dislocation as a manoeuvrist approach.

There are two types of dislocation: positional and functional. According to Leonhard, “Dislocation is the art of rendering the enemy’s strength irrelevant.”⁵ Positional dislocation means striking the enemy in a place where it cannot defend itself or sending the enemy to fight in a place where it will not be effective. The use of feints may be one way to divert combat power or the enemy’s perceptual capability. Functional dislocation attempts to render the enemy’s weapons, organizations or tactics useless by using different technologies or TTP. Conducting operations at night against an enemy that lacks night vision capability is a way of functionally dislocating the enemy’s weapon systems. The enemy will be effectively incapable of using them because their detection and target acquisition capabilities will have been neutralized.

Practitioners of manoeuvre warfare aim to draw the enemy into unbalanced combat. They attempt to defeat the enemy by using their own strengths against the enemy’s weaknesses. However, any combat that merely pits the strengths of both parties against each other is generally a failure of tactical engineering.⁶ The consequence of that failure will be a dangerous conflict where only superior training and equipment, plus considerable luck, will determine the victor. When it is time to go into battle, soldiers have the right to expect more from their superiors.

Unfortunately, training for anti-armour combat in the Canadian Army is often conducted on open ground, the favoured location for armour. We rarely put favourable conditions in place for functional dislocation of enemy armour. We often consider the best destroyers of enemy tanks to be our own tanks, but that is only possible on open ground. However, that type of ground is generally not what the infantry—especially dismounted infantry—is looking for. Tactics and weaponry are often intertwined. To understand how Canadian soldiers apply their tactics I believe it is necessary to start with the descriptions of the weapons they have available.

The anti-armour weapon systems currently available to the infantry are the 25-mm autocannon for the LAV III and its variant, the LAV 6; the TOW; the C-16 automatic grenade launcher; the Carl Gustav (84 mm); and the M72. Of these five weapon systems, only two are capable of destroying a MBT: the TOW and the Carl Gustav.

The TOW is a wire-guided missile with a minimum range of 200 metres and a maximum range of 4,500 metres.⁷ It can be employed in dismounted mode, but its weight constitutes a severe handicap to mobility. Recently, the Commander Canadian Army has ordered its reinstatement by the Infantry Corp, and the new TOW improved target acquisition system has been distributed in both mechanized and light infantry battalions. Its future employment concept still needs to be defined. That being said, the TOW was formerly incorporated into a platoon or a company and was usually part of an infantry battalion. In addition, it was generally mounted on the frame of an armoured personnel carrier (APC). Because it cannot be handled by untrained troops, this weapon system requires a team of specialized infantry.

During offensive operations, groups of TOW are generally tasked with guarding, screening and flank protection. During defensive operations, they are employed in covering forces, delay battle forces and guards. For the main battle, they are generally assigned tasks involving destruction in long-range engagements and counter-attack forces. The fundamental role of a TOW platoon or company is to preserve the infantry's mobility in its area of responsibility, within the 500- to 4,000-metre engagement band, and to thereby give its soldiers a chance of survival against enemy MBT. That tactical role is essential on the modern battlefield and, although it is not the subject of this article, I believe that TOW (or its eventual replacement) must be retained as part of the battalion commander's arsenal.



Source: Combat Camera



Source: Combat Camera

The second weapon system capable of destroying a MBT is the Carl Gustav (84-mm). It is a crew-served weapon that can project various types of ammunition. "The Carl-Gustaf System offers various types of tactical ammunition reaching from armour penetration and anti-personnel, to ammunition for built-up areas as well as special features like smoke and illumination."⁸ Its maximum range is 700 metres, and its maximum effective range is 500 metres against a fixed target and 400 metres against a moving target. In addition, thanks to anti-personnel ammunition, the Carl Gustav can engage unprotected troops at up to 1,000 metres.⁹ It has the advantage of being able to engage short-range targets thanks to a very short activation distance. One of its weaknesses has long been its large backblast. However, Saab, the Swedish company that manufactures it, recently designed a high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) weapon that generates only a small backblast. That technical advance means that the weapon can be used in confined spaces such as built-up areas.

Four Carl Gustavs are issued to each infantry company: one per platoon and one for the company's weapons section. Conceptually, this weapon offers the capability to destroy MBT. Unfortunately, if we take into account the latest improvements in anti-armour weapon countermeasures, doubts arise concerning the Carl Gustav's real efficiency. That being said, it is still the cornerstone of anti-armour defence at the company level.

TACTICAL CHALLENGES OF SHORT-RANGE ANTI-ARMOUR COMBAT IN RECENT CONFLICTS

After the fall of the USSR in 1991, many satellite states claimed their independence. Chechnya, following a coup d'état, declared its independence on 2 November 1991. After a few years of political unrest in the country and the violent expulsion of people who belonged to the Russian-speaking minority, Russia mounted a surprise attack in Chechnya. On 11 December 1994 the Russian ground forces launched what was later referred to as the First Chechen War, which would last until 1996. From the beginning, there was low morale and resistance among the Russian forces and the war quickly degenerated into a quagmire comparable to Afghanistan. Although Russia was able to destroy the Chechen Air Force in the first hours of the conflict, the Chechen ground forces were still motivated, prepared and well equipped. During the first assault on the city of Grozny, which started on 31 December 1994, the Russian forces met a bitter defeat.

Despite heavy shelling of the city by Russian artillery the 131st Motor Rifle Brigade was devastated by the Chechen resistance which waged exemplary anti-armour combat. The brigade suffered major losses of personnel and the destruction of 22 T-72, 45 BMP-2 and 37 light vehicles.¹⁰ The Chechens' modus operandi was to canalize the armoured columns into the killing zones where they engaged the first and last vehicle from multiple positions using various weapon systems.¹¹

The Chechens fielded anti-tank hunter-killer teams, equipped with "massive amounts of antitank weapons", which keyed upon the engine noise from Russian armoured vehicles. Once these hunter-killer teams had converged upon Russian armour, they would volley fire RPG-7 and RPG 18 anti-tank missiles from above, behind, and the sides. Russian armoured vehicles had trouble dealing with these forces for a variety of reasons (e.g., poor visibility from the vehicles and insufficient elevation/depression of on-board armament).¹²

The Chechens used their attacks to maximize the effect of functional dislocation on the tanks by positioning themselves at short range, in high places and in building basements. That meant that the range of motion of the guns on the T-72 and BMP-2 was insufficient to reach the enemy's firing positions, making it impossible to return fire. The problems caused by the tanks' inability to return fire in built-up areas forced the Russians to deploy self-propelled anti-aircraft guns,¹³ which had the range required to hit elevated targets.

The use of multiple weapon systems saturated the Russian tanks' ability to react. The combination of small arms fire and several anti-armour weapons forced the Russian crews to operate their vehicles with hatches down. Operating the vehicles in those conditions drastically reduced their situational awareness, and it made it impossible to neutralize all the anti-tank threats without deploying an escort consisting largely of infantry soldiers, thereby exposing the Russian columns to heavy losses. It took too much time for crews to acquire and engage one of the Chechen anti-armour weapons and the vehicle's occupants would be killed by the two other anti-armour weapons that had targeted them.

The Russian defeat in that battle could be attributed to the soldiers' lack of training (many of them were conscripted), the lack of planning at headquarters, the army's flagging conviction and the glaring absence of coordination, all weaknesses exploited by the Chechens. In turn, the exploitation of those weaknesses, combined with the excellent use of terrain and an understanding of the vulnerability of tanks within the Chechen terrain, allowed the Chechens to destroy Russian moral and physical cohesion, thereby leading to Russian defeat.

That modern example of anti-armour tactics is part of a tradition that goes back to the First World War. Ever since then, infantry have fought tanks while attempting to balance their own need for safety with the need to destroy the enemy. In the Great War, soldiers used phosphorus grenades, fragmentation grenades and K bullets.¹⁴ In the Second World War, they were equipped with shaped charge warheads such as the Panzerfaust or the bazooka.

A common thread in World War II anti-armor experiences is the tactic of closing with tanks to take advantage of blind spots and maximize the effects of light weapons. A further consistency is the use of stealth and surprise to engage tanks from the flanks and rear.¹⁵

The RPG (or rocket launcher) and its many variants are examples of modern anti-armour weapons that have been used for the past 70 years. What all of those weapon systems have in common is that they have been tested in combat and must be used at short range.



Source: Public Domain

ANTI-ARMOUR COMBAT IN AN INFANTRY COMPANY

Destruction of tanks at the infantry company level can be designed into all types of operations. One of the most common ways to use dismounted infantry in an anti-tank role is in tank-hunting teams. During offensive operations, those teams are tasked with flank protection, tank hunting during the fight-through, controlling possible counter-attack approaches and tank hunting in the enemy's rear areas. In defensive operations, they are tasked with guarding tank approaches, flank protection, ambushes, secondary approach screening, mobile covering fire for obstacles and reserve.¹⁶

In Canadian doctrine, the tank-hunting team is based on the infantry section and the decision to deploy such teams is the responsibility of the battalion commander.¹⁷ In my opinion, that model should not necessarily be followed rigidly but rather should be considered when developing any tactical plan. It would be possible to create tank-hunting teams the size of a detachment or a platoon. The teams could be coordinated by the higher HQ—that of the platoon, the company or even the battalion.

It is important to remember that the infantry company is also able to contribute to anti-armour combat within larger formations during all types of operations. It does so by carrying out raids on command and control facilities, ambushing armoured convoys, conducting reconnaissance, setting up observation posts or carrying out diversionary manoeuvres. We must also recognize that, in such a role, it should ideally be augmented with combat engineer elements and supported by artillery.

When operating in close terrain with non-continuous lines of communication, as might be the case during anti-armour combat, commanders must be prepared to assume very high levels of risks. Furthermore, commanders must be ready, if the operation fails, to deal with dislocated friendly forces, both functionally and positionally. Also, the difference in firepower and mobility between the dismounted and armoured forces will have to be offset by the choice of battle conditions. Generally, that choice is the privilege of the defending force.

The choice of the time, place and range of the engagement is critical and must be made in accordance with manoeuvrist principles. The centre of gravity must be identified before it can be defeated.

It requires a flexible and positive attitude of mind by commanders, who must seek opportunities to exploit enemy vulnerabilities while maximizing their own strengths. The focus is the enemy's centre of gravity—the source of their freedom of action, physical strength or will to fight—and how best to attack, neutralize or destroy it. The approach exploits the vulnerabilities of an enemy strength rather than attacking the enemy head-on.¹⁸

The critical vulnerabilities of an armoured force will vary depending on the situation. The makeup of the force: the type of vehicle; the weapon system; the shielding; command and control; logistical support; TTP; interoperability of the various arms (armour, infantry, artillery, etc.); and morale are the factors that will assist in discovering weaknesses to exploit.

There are also a number of vulnerabilities that will always apply to armoured forces:

- limited zones of fire and zones of observation near the vehicle or in close terrain (buildings or vegetation);
- low mobility on rough ground;
- low situational awareness when hatches are closed;
- relative vulnerability of the wheels or tracks;
- dependence on radio communication systems; and
- dependence on resupply systems.

The infantry can leverage those critical vulnerabilities. With the advantage of mobility on close and rough terrain, infantry soldiers are able to get close to the tanks. They are able to conceal themselves and, when properly equipped, have significant firepower. Lastly, the infantry's flexibility and imagination make them formidable enemies.



Source: Combat Camera

There are three ways of developing anti-armour capability: through tactics, techniques and weapons.

TACTICS

In order to develop their tactical ability, soldiers and leaders in an infantry company must be able to imagine combat against an armoured force in their area of operations. They learn to do that by studying previous battles, by training specifically for close anti-tank combat, and by conducting tactical exercises with and without troops. The plans must incorporate the approaches of manoeuvre warfare, the tools available and a fair bit of imagination. For anti-tank battles fought by dismounted infantry the three manoeuvrist approaches should be the foundation for developing any tactical plan.

Preventive operations take the form of raids on the command and control or logistics support facilities. For example, airborne and airmobile forces are able to act before contact with the main group by striking behind enemy lines and significantly reducing the enemy's ability and will to fight. Reconnaissance and the other forms of observation will provide precious information before the battle and aid in understanding the enemy's intent. One way of contributing to victory is to slow or stop the enemy's OODA loop (observation–orientation–decision–action).¹⁹

Positional dislocation can be achieved by choosing where engagements will take place or by preventing the enemy's strength to be brought to bear on our main effort. It is usually obtained through deception. Armoured forces will generally seek to dominate open ground and will prefer to operate in them. The tactician facing an armoured threat should therefore attempt to move its center of gravity away from that ground or entice the enemy to a place where they become irrelevant.

Functional dislocation will result in an imaginative use of terrain and the employment of combined arms forces. To fight an enemy who has greater firepower and mobility it is important to take advantage of the characteristics of the terrain and the vulnerabilities of the adversary. In that sense, shaping the battlespace becomes critical for the tactician. The barrier plan must use natural obstacles (defiles, wood lines, built-up areas, uneven ground, etc.), limit the firing and observation zones, and force the enemy onto rough ground (anti-tank ditches, craters, abatis, debris, etc.). In that way the battlespace will disrupt the formation of armoured organizations by separating them into small groups or individuals so that they can be destroyed in small killing zones.

The infantry plan must follow what Leonhard describes as the Alcioneus principle. The mythical giant Alcioneus was immortal as long as he stayed in his own kingdom, but Hercules defeated him by knocking him down and dragging him outside of his territory. That principle can be summed up as moving enemy onto terrain where it is vulnerable.²⁰

Armour has a natural advantage on open ground and an effective tactical plan will force them onto ground that is inhospitable for it. Once on that ground it will have no choice but to deploy

its infantry, who will then become fragile targets for artillery or mortar fire, or machine-guns used in the indirect fire role (C6 and C2 sight). The fire plan (direct and indirect) will also contribute to the functional separation of infantry and enemy tanks.

An example of functional dislocation could be seen during the Battle of the Hedgerows in France's *bocages* in June and July 1944. The Germans took advantage of a terrain that was inhospitable for MBT, slowing them and making them vulnerable to defilade fire. *Bocages* are rural areas in France where fields are surrounded by berms planted with hedgerows ranging from 1 metre to 20 metres in height. Thus, both cultivated and fallow land was covered with obstacles at regular intervals, in effect reducing the mobility advantage inherent to MBT. In that challenging terrain, the element of chance and the German defence plan forced the Allies to exercise caution, innovate and make heavy sacrifices to pursue their offensive.

TECHNIQUES

A set of techniques was developed for the specific purpose of enabling infantry to destroy tanks. In Canadian infantry units those techniques were often taught by the anti-tank platoons. They involved rolling under a moving tank, climbing on its top to throw a grenade through the hatch, use of anti-tank mines, etc. Innovative techniques must be introduced, reevaluated and distributed to the target audience. They are essential for maintaining the morale of infantry soldiers engaged in anti-tank combat.

Also, the combat engineering contribution should not be neglected in this type of operation. Combat engineering techniques focus on the use of anti-tank mines, traps and other obstacles. Their contribution to shaping the battlespace is well known, as is their capacity for destruction. That is evidenced by the widespread employment of improvised explosive devices during the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq over the past ten years and by Hezbollah infantry's use of anti-tank mines.²¹

WEAPONS

The battle between those who make weapons and those who counter them is neverending. The evolution of anti-armour weapons and their countermeasures appears to be accelerating quickly. If reports from Eastern Europe are true, it is also likely that Russian countermeasures currently have the upper hand against NATO's weapons.²² In this article I will not contribute to the technical debate about how to best the newest countermeasures but instead will consider certain factors that have an impact on the choice of tactics. Those factors should be considered when developing, acquiring and distributing anti-armour weapons.

In the matter at hand, size doesn't matter; "Consideration of the range, weight, and lethality trade-offs indicates that we continue to purchase long range at the expense either of weight (resulting in very heavy systems) or in lethality (resulting in light systems that can't kill tanks)."²³ Leonhard's statement still rings true to a Canadian soldier 20 years after it was written. Indeed, currently the TOW improved target acquisition system is that cumbersome heavy system while the 84-mm and M72 are the light systems that cannot kill modern MBT.

Also, the possible engagement range of anti-armour weapons is of crucial importance. Again Leonhard expresses the idea very well; “Simply put, long range poisons the otherwise good common sense of an infantry leader... The problem is that every leader, when contemplating his battle plan, thinks in terms of weapon ranges. He will consciously or otherwise attempt to emplace his weapons in such a manner as to allow them to fire at their maximum effective range... three-thousand-meter range of his TOW... Thereby he is driven from his best terrain (woods, cities, defiles, etc.) into tank country.”²⁴

Moreover, the allocation of anti-armour weapons is currently insufficient to allow the tactical commander to truly build viable plans against numerous MBT. An infantry company currently has four Carl Gustavs as part of its normal allocation. I believe it to be completely insufficient and a regular allotment should provide for at least two anti-armour weapons per section or tank hunting teams. That will allow for their use in pairs for mutual support and to insure better odds of success.

To recapitulate on the issue of weapon characteristics and distribution, future weapon systems must be light enough so that they can be carried easily on the battlefield, should allow for engagements of tanks at very close range (down to a few metres), and should be available in sufficient amount to permit the development of an imaginative tactical plan respecting the principle of mutual support as well as permit the infantry to saturate an area with its firepower.

CONCLUSION

In this article I have tried to present certain concepts pertinent to anti-armour combat within the framework of manoeuvrist doctrine. Disorganization, dislocation and disruption must serve as the basis for reflection on the subject. I presented the example of a dismounted force's success against a heavily armoured adversary and showed how the battle of Grozny fits into the historical evolution of the antagonistic relationship between tanks and infantry. I explained the critical role played by the infantry in short-range anti-armour combat and how its tactical plans must focus on armour's critical vulnerabilities. I then discussed the tactical principles regarding employment of an infantry company in an anti-tank role. The discussion revealed that our doctrine includes good conceptual tools, but that we need to better imagine the anti-armour fight at close range to employ them effectively.

Last, based on the arguments advanced in this article, my recommendations are as follows:

- Training and maintenance of skills in anti-tank combat techniques and tactics must be developed.
- The Canadian Army must acquire weapon systems capable of exploiting the weaknesses of armoured vehicles in the 0- to 500-metre engagement band.
- The Canadian Army must be equipped with anti-tank weapons that are flexible and scalable to the task.²⁵

It is important to emphasize that in this article I have not attempted to define a strategic and operational doctrine that would accord more importance to anti-armour combat. In the late 20th century that question was the subject of much research (under the names of “air-land battle” or “non-offensive defence”), which put anti-armour combat into a concrete strategic context: that of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. Therefore, the analysis of our real tactical needs should precede current intentions.²⁶ That reflection will certainly take place within the Army Operating Framework and the force employment concept of adaptive dispersed operations,²⁶ but it must take into account the particularity that, for Canadian soldiers, anti-tank combat occurs in an expeditionary setting.

In short, an infantry company cannot fight an effective battle against MBT because the equipment entitlements are insufficient and because infantry company leaders have lost the reflex of imagining this type of battle within a horizon of less than 500 metres. It is therefore imperative that infantry soldiers have the material and conceptual capability to fight in the battlespace where they are the masters. They need to reconnect with their primary role in combat: to close with and destroy the enemy. 🌸

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COUNTERINSURGENCY IN IRAQ:

Lessons from British Strategic Planning and Integration During Operation TELIC

Major Jonathan Cox, CD, BA, MA

“In Iraq, we called for the regime to change, removed it and put in troops to try to rebuild the country. But intervention proved very tough and today the country is at risk again.”¹ In addressing the recent crises in the Middle East, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair referred to the difficulties in securing and reforming Iraq following the removal of Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime in 2003 during Operation TELIC.

Operation TELIC, running from 2003 to 2009, was the United Kingdom's contribution to United States-led Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in Southern Iraq.² The invasion into Iraq initially had three objectives outlined as “security and elimination of weapons of mass destruction; the delivery of humanitarian aid; and the conditions for the reconstruction of Iraq.”³ The analysis below will deal most directly with the third objective while not commenting on the justification to go to war. It will focus on how the coalition, specifically the United Kingdom, went about establishing a democratic government and its attempts to create peaceful conditions within Iraq. Throughout the conduct of Operation TELIC the lack of an integrated approach to planning coupled with a poor understanding of the nature and motivations of the local population led to a more complex insurgency hindering successful counterinsurgency operations in Southern Iraq.

These hindrances will be demonstrated through a brief analysis of the effectiveness of British counterinsurgency strategy in

Southern Iraq during Operation TELIC. By touching on the history of Iraq and the British tradition of counterinsurgency, and contrasting it with insurgency in the 21st century, we will show how reliance on that model, although effective in the past, did not provide the United Kingdom with a canned blueprint for success. That is not to say that the traditional counterinsurgency approach is now irrelevant, for there are a number of tenets that are still equally important today. The problem in Iraq was that the United Kingdom demonstrated a tendency to rest on its laurels and did not properly apply those principles, thus clouding its judgment and detracting from its performance in the country. Given the history of British counterinsurgency operations, coupled with previous campaigns in Iraq, the United Kingdom should have been better prepared for the challenges faced following the invasion in 2003 and more accepting of its role in the conflict.

Being a junior partner to the United States in the overall operation has been cited as a limiting factor in the British operations. The United States, as the lead nation, did have a large amount of influence on British operations, but as an occupying power, the United Kingdom was none-the-less responsible for its area of operations in the South and should have been more willing to accept that responsibility at the strategic level.

More rigorous analysis of the tribal and religious history of the South should have been applied to the post-conflict operations to rebuild and stabilize the country. Had that been better coordinated and planned, the United Kingdom would have had a better understanding of the militias and insurgent groups that filled the void created by the abrupt removal of the Baath Party as well as the challenges faced in the development of Iraqi Security Forces. Additionally, a lack of integrated planning between the military and other government departments and overall political guidance exacerbated the problems by delaying or neglecting key reconstruction tasks that would have been beneficial to overall stability.

Acknowledging these pitfalls, three recommendations will be made to inform the conduct of successful counterinsurgency operations in the future. These recommendations call for a re-centring of political primacy and strategic oversight, increased training and education for the military, and a reliance on an integrated approach to planning and coordination. The goal of those recommendations is problem recognition. Once the lessons are identified, each must be studied in depth and applied according to individual national polices and structures—or force the creation of new ones—if they are to carry us into future conflicts.

HISTORY AND TRADITION

MESOPOTAMIA AND THE WEST

The coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003 was not the first British foray into modern-day Iraq.⁴ The United Kingdom had initially taken an interest in the area formerly known as Mesopotamia in the 19th century.⁵ Mesopotamia joined forces under the Ottoman Empire in the First World War and fell once the British Army, commanded by Lieutenant-General Sir Stanley Maude, liberated Baghdad from control of the Turks in 1917.⁶



Sir Frederick Stanley Maude leads the Indian Army into Baghdad

With the collapse of the Ottoman provinces, the United Kingdom aimed to absorb them as protectorates as a method of protecting oil supplies for British use.⁷ With no desire for foreign occupation or rule, the Iraqi people began an uprising in 1920 that sparked a violent response from the United Kingdom involving the use of aircraft and bombs with support from India to restore order.⁸

The cause of the sudden revolt remained unclear to the British, as they had assumed that there was no desire for an Arab government and that Iraq would accept British rule.⁹ That was the first evidence of British contempt for the cultural beliefs of the region and shows how the Iraqi desire to govern their own land as an independent entity remained a strong driving factor in their actions.

The theme of Arab revolt in Iraq continued even after Iraqi independence in 1932. There followed a coup during the Second World War requiring another British deployment to the area to quell the violence. Further turmoil, beginning in 1958, resulted in the eventual ousting of the previously pro-British Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qasim in 1963. Even recent history foreshadowed likely Iraqi behaviour following western intervention with the widespread looting following the United States intervention in the Gulf War in 1991 as the Iraqi Army was pushed out of Kuwait. This brief history of the 20th century demonstrates the consistent Iraqi disdain for Western influence in the region as well as what should have been the expected reaction to its presence. Iraq is a unique country and, while united against foreign occupation, has a history of vicious internal conflict that adds to the complexities of the nation and its people.

INTERNAL STRIFE

The problem with Iraq is not linked solely to outside intervention. From 1970 onward there was a deep history of political and religious infighting between the Sunni-dominated Baath Party and the continually fragmented Dawa Party representing the majority Shia population. Under Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party, membership in the Dawa Party became illegal; that resulted in the executions of leading Shia figureheads and caused an ideological split within the Dawa Party. One branch evolved into the Organization of the Martyr Sadr (OMS), which worked to build a youth movement throughout the poor Iraqi South. The other branch, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), harnessed the support of exiles and continued to attempt to influence Iraq from across the border in Iran. SCIRI gained support by becoming a proxy for Iranian policy and formed a militant wing known as the Badr Brigades that was a key player in the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. Both parties, while Shia-based, maintained their own separate goals for a reformed Iraq and continued to fight against the ruling Sunnis.

The Shia South was constantly disadvantaged by the Baath Party, which actively strove to create poorer conditions through actions such as draining the marshlands along the Iranian border.¹⁰ Those actions forced rural inhabitants to move, resulting in a major influx of Shias into urban places such as Basra. That rapid urbanization widened the divide between wealthy and poor Iraqis. The OMS recognized that growing gap and, using its network of young clerics, targeted the poor population to continue its messaging and develop its support base against the Baath Party.



Partisans, northern Iraq, 1980s

Source: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Ansar_\(Iraq\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Al-Ansar_(Iraq))

That divide was further broadened by the mainly patronage-based system imposed by the Baath Party. One method used to cement Baath primacy in the South was to appoint major political players such as provincial governors and police chiefs, who had been centrally trained, as a means to further exert influence. It was that patronage that provided access to most resources or employment for the southern Iraqis and ensured conformity to Baathist norms.

Understanding that history helps to identify the problems faced by the coalition forces following the 2003 invasion, while highlighting a brutal but effective method of rule in Iraq. Saddam understood the threat from the Shia population and “focussed his attention on the Shias, partly because of the size of their community but also because their clerics were more practised in mobilising their followers than the Sunni clergy.”¹¹ While the actions and treatment of Iraqis by the Baath Party remain inexcusable, there was value in the method used by Saddam to run Iraq, particularly in the South. It served to create a relatively stable structure within which all Iraqis knew, where they sat, and how to navigate the political and religious landscape. Most importantly, it demonstrated Saddam’s understanding of Iraqi culture and how to manage it to avoid large and threatening uprisings. Some of that information, if better understood by coalition forces, could have been harnessed to gain popular support or, at the very least, enhance security immediately following the invasion. The United Kingdom did not fully harness the lessons from that example and tended to rely on what it knew from past successes in counterinsurgency or colonial operations.

BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY TRADITION

Based on previous counterinsurgency operations in places such as Northern Ireland, Malaya and Oman, there are many claims that the British approach to counterinsurgency is the model to ascribe to when developing a strategy. This deference to British thinking was prevalent enough to influence parts of the United States Army and Marine Corps *Counterinsurgency Field Manual* published in 2006.¹² During and shortly after the Iraq War there was a sense of British pre-eminence in counterinsurgency operations shared by many British military officers that served to spur the critique of the American approach to the Iraq War by British leaders such as Brigadier Nigel Alywin-Foster.¹³ That signals the overall failure of the United Kingdom to be introspective and to identify the key lessons to be learned from Iraq and previous operations. The United Kingdom’s hubris toward its own ability to conduct counterinsurgency clouded its judgment with regard to its own performance and negatively influenced the conduct of post-combat operations. The United Kingdom did not fully account for the nature of the insurgency in Iraq or the political landscape in which it was operating.

Iraq was different from previous British operations and showed that, in the conduct of counterinsurgency, experience does not necessarily equate to excellence.¹⁴ Despite past successes, an effective counterinsurgency strategy must be progressive and implemented according to the nuances of the theatre in which it is employed. In places such as Malaya, “the British were able to exploit a functioning colonial administration and security apparatus.”¹⁵ In Iraq, there was little to no functioning government infrastructure, and only a very cursory understanding of the country by coalition forces.¹⁶ That, despite previous experiences in the region, should have more heavily influenced their conduct.

Soldiers from the Queen's Dragoon Guards depart from a camp in the Kuwait desert under the evening sun for a possible conflict with Iraq.



Counterinsurgency strategy must evolve just as the nature of insurgency has evolved in the 21st century. It no longer strictly fits a Maoist structure of revolutionary war, moving through the three phases of insurgency.¹⁷ Iraq “represents a multiplicity of sources of varying ideologies and, even more importantly, differing goals—not all of which are limited to or even principally directed at changing the state in Iraq.”¹⁸ The United Kingdom was faced with multiple opponents in the form of insurgent groups, criminals and tribal militias, in a very urbanized setting.¹⁹ A major problem with British doctrine was that it was “based on a monolithic version of insurgency that failed to recognize several decades of evolutionary pressures.”²⁰ The United Kingdom was unable to defeat that new type of insurgency using its old methods. The limits of its success served only to increase the overall violence and reduced the effectiveness of stabilizing the region. The primary focus of Operation TELIC was the conduct of conventional combat operations. The post-combat efforts which came next were not as fully developed, and created problems for security and stabilization following the invasion.

OPERATION TELIC

OPERATIONAL PLANNING

The combat phase of the operation was well planned, and rapidly and successfully carried out.²¹ There were no major issues with the integration of British forces into the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force as the assault crossed the border from Kuwait. The ineffectual and rapid dispersal of the Iraqi Army aided in the quick sweep from the South into Baghdad, and the security situation was such that the British had begun to transition to stability operations within four days of the launch of the invasion, with combat operations ultimately ending on 1 May 2003.²²

The planning of post-combat operations, however, was not as in-depth as that for the combat phase. It was improperly focused and based on poor assumptions. In relation to the post-combat planning, some very bold and ultimately incorrect assumptions were predicated on a wave-top analysis of the religious and cultural make-up of the South. Bush and Blair maintained a very binary understanding of the South, thinking that since the Shia wanted Saddam gone, “support for liberation would guarantee support for occupation.”²³ In looking at Iraq’s history depicted above, one can see how a very cursory review should have led, at the very least, to a basic understanding of its complexities and its religious and tribal make-up. Once in Iraq in 2003, “almost every issue that confronted the new occupiers had arisen generations before under the British.”²⁴ That was not the United Kingdom’s first involvement in Iraq, and it should have been better prepared to face similar challenges.

Prior to the invasion, the British government was more concerned with the creation of a United Nations Security Council resolution aimed at weapons of mass destruction rather than a race for power should the regime fall.²⁵ Because of the desire not to prejudice British actions, by making it appear that a military invasion was the only option, very little government-wide, integrated planning was done prior to the invasion.²⁶ The planning that was completed in the early stages was very compartmentalized and controlled by the Cabinet Office, with very few people in the Ministry of Defence or other government departments being aware of what those plans entailed.²⁷

The lack of comprehensive and fully integrated planning highlights one of the major problems faced in Iraq. “On a United Kingdom government-wide basis, the nature and size of the post-conflict task was extremely difficult both to predict and to plan for. There were gaps in both the coordination of the planning and in the capability to do more in the short and medium term.”²⁸ The inability of the civilian administration to be forward-looking, and to identify problems and develop solutions, created confusion and lags in service on the ground. In terms of planning, the main focus and preparations were aimed at the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the control of refugees following the invasion. As it happened, the Iraqi Army did not put up much resistance and the invasion quickly rolled into Baghdad.

In preparation for the invasion, based on a desire to support its ally, the United Kingdom fell victim to American planning timelines and guidance. The American influence on planning and conduct did play a factor in the overall conduct of British operations, and emphasis on the status as a junior coalition partner has been proffered as a limiting factor in British operations. Exacerbating British struggles was the allocation of both the human and physical terrain. The United Kingdom made up approximately six percent of the coalition, while being given control of an area that comprised almost 23 percent of the entire surface area of Iraq and contained just over 18 percent of the Iraqi population.²⁹ The sheer size of the British area of responsibility ended up being more than could be managed with the size of the assigned British contingent.



A soldier serving with Number 1 Company 1st Battalion, Irish Guards, looks for possible Iraqi enemy positions, as Royal Engineer technicians prepare to cap one of the burning oil wells within the city of Basra.

However, being a junior coalition partner is no longer a new concept for the United Kingdom, for that has “become a strategic norm for Britain in the post-Cold War, as demonstrated in the First Gulf War and again in Kosovo and Afghanistan.”³⁰ Being the junior partner does not

absolve the British from the responsibility to take a vested interest and make decisions within their own areas of influence, nor does it fully excuse the United Kingdom from its duties as a named occupying power.³¹ Furthermore, it should not have precluded the United Kingdom from conducting its own critical analysis and attempting to shape post-combat operations within its own area of responsibility in the South.³²

Following the invasion, the United States installed the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) under the control of Ambassador L. Paul Bremer. Soon after its creation, the CPA implemented a number of key mandates such as CPA Orders Number One and Two, which called for the de-Baathification of the top three layers of all government institutions, and the dissolution of the Iraqi Army, police forces and other entities.³³ Those decisions did have directly negative effects on British operations by hindering the United Kingdom's ability to create stable and secure government institutions and services early on. However, the South was not a primary concern for the CPA, and with the proper resources and effort from the British Government those challenges could have been worked through and overcome.

Despite CPA oversight, the United Kingdom did have an opportunity to shape operations in the South. Bremer and the CPA were more closely focused on stabilizing the Sunni Triangle centered on Baghdad.³⁴ In order to extend its reach and influence into the 18 provinces of Iraq, the CPA created a number of governorate coordinators, and Hilary Synnott, a British diplomat, was appointed as the senior regional coordinator for the South. His area of responsibility mirrored that of the military command of the Multi-National Division (South East) headed by the British Army's Major-General Andrew Stewart. There was much value in having both leaders from the same nation as it "facilitated analysis, prioritisation and coordination" between the two entities.³⁵ Yet, in contrast to those perceived strengths, Synnott felt that the United Kingdom was also disadvantaged by that relationship as the CPA tended to let the "British sort the problem out for themselves" as the other occupying power.³⁶ While that may mean that the United States did not provide as much oversight as in other regions, it did give the United Kingdom freedom of action and reinforced its responsibility for Southern Iraq. The onus was squarely placed on the British government to fill the void left by the Americans. Unfortunately, the United Kingdom, as a whole, did not fully accept that responsibility in the conduct of post-combat operations.

POST-COMBAT OPERATIONS

By the time the United Kingdom began post-combat operations, it had already started on a downward slope that would solidify the perception of the mission as "one of the greatest strategic errors of recent times."³⁷ In the period immediately following the invasion, the British forces did enjoy relative peace and stability and began to conduct operations in the manner to which they were accustomed. In an attempt to win over the population, "they took off their helmets and flak jackets, dismounted from their armoured vehicles and began to mingle with the crowds" as in previous low intensity operations.³⁸ With proper goals, resources and messaging, that relative stability could have been harnessed to create positive results. However, the opportunity was fleeting and ultimately missed.

The first problem was that the British were seen as occupiers by the local Iraqis. There was a perception that the British were not there to help restore a national Iraqi government, but rather, to install a western-friendly one with its own aims. Iraq's history was not lost on the Iraqis. The British presence in 1917, when they were 'liberated' from the Ottoman Empire, still lingered in their collective memories. "The Iraqis were thus familiar with the fragility of Western promises even before recent disasters."³⁹ This helped to reinforce flawed assumptions. Although the Iraqis were certainly happy to have Saddam removed by the coalition forces, they were not as enthralled when those same foreign soldiers remained in their country.⁴⁰

In the early stages after the invasion, that perception should not have been unexpected. The problem was the United Kingdom did not fully accept its role as an occupying power and the responsibilities that came with that role. It replaced a strong dictatorial regime and abruptly changed the way local Iraqis understood their world. The Iraqis' new-found freedom provided the opportunity for a variety of responses from a number of different groups, for which the British were not prepared.

The United Kingdom was initially more concerned with making friends than giving the Iraqis the security and structure they so desperately needed. Like previous British conflicts, that was an approach designed to win the 'hearts and minds' and one that "rejects the idea of a 'purely' military approach" to winning.⁴¹ However, as stated by Hew Strachan, winning 'hearts and minds' "is not about being nice to the natives, but about giving them the firm smack of government."⁴² This goes beyond the physical security of a nation and its people and includes the structures, guidance and resources to rebuild and run a nation. It is about demonstrating the capability and stability provided by a competent government. Inherent in that is the primacy of governmental strategic oversight, making it a political battle rather than a purely military one.

The difficulty of providing a competent governing force at the early stages was exacerbated by the speed at which the invasion took place. The tactical execution was so quick that planning, and thus resourcing, was unable to keep up. A prime example of that are the orders to secure the city of Basra, which was under British control by 7 April 2003.⁴³ A divisional fragmentary warning order was issued by the 1st Armoured Division on 2 April, resulting in warning orders being issued by the 7th Armoured Brigade to its battle groups indicating that an order would be issued on 7 April for operations not before 8 April—too late, as British forces had already entered the city. Furthermore, divisional orders for post-combat operations in Basra were not issued until 21 April.⁴⁴ So while tactical operations took place quickly, the needed guidance from higher headquarters, including from the strategic level at home in the United Kingdom, was issued too late to provide context and drive these operations, creating confusion and stymying any possible synergies on the ground.

To their credit, the commanders of those tactical operations did not simply wait for the orders to come; they acted on what information they had and did what they thought best. However, this hindered the implementation of a unified and consistent approach to post-combat operations. The uncertain and ambiguous environment created near perfect



Source: IMA, <http://www.ima.org.uk/collections/item/object/205215558>

The advance into the city of Basra. The bound hands of an Iraqi prisoner

conditions for a breakdown in security and allowed for widespread looting and violence.⁴⁵ The United Kingdom was unable to secure everything, causing a prioritization of places to secure and projects to complete. In most cases, that prioritization was understood by local commanders in line with their own interpretation of British goals. Those were not always the same priorities as those of the local Iraqi population, pounding the wedge deeper between the two sides early on in the operation.

First impressions are important. That was the first glimpse the Iraqi people had of what British forces were willing or able to do. Because they did not immediately create a secure environment, Iraqis were living in fear of violence, and concern about the coalition's failure to provide security continued to grow.⁴⁶ That problem of security is certainly a military one, but can only be dealt with if the military is given the proper mandate, guidance and resources from its political masters to accomplish the necessary tasks. In the case of the South, the number of coalition forces alone was a major contributor to the inability to provide proper security.

The initial invasion into Iraq was carried out by a force of 26,000 troops. Within the summer months following, that number was reduced to 9,000, giving the British a force ratio of one soldier to 370 Iraqis in places like Basra.⁴⁷ That ratio is a far cry from what is required in these types of intensive stability operations which is estimated to be 1 to 50, or 10 times that needed in normal or tranquil policing.⁴⁸ The fact of the matter was that British soldiers could not be everywhere at all times, and that created security voids and provided opportunities for belligerents or criminals to operate relatively unhindered.

The inability to provide the required stability and governance early on is “when the war was lost by the British. During the summer of 2003 and into 2004, they failed to build

a government for the city that might forestall the radical Shia militias, which were gradually to take control over the next two years.”⁴⁹ In response to the inability to provide adequate security, many divergent groups—from criminals, to former Baathists, to militias based on sectarian or tribal lines—began to form.

SECURITY

A lack of troops and an unwillingness to get deeply involved in Iraq's domestic affairs created a vacuum that “gave hostile elements the opportunity to organize, and the poorly designed and slowly implemented reconstruction plan provided the insurgents with a large pool of unemployed Iraqis from which to recruit.”⁵⁰ As soon as the opportunity presented itself, militias such as the *Jaysh-Al Mahdi* (JAM),⁵¹ a militia wing of the OMS, began to seize power. With coalition forces initially focused on de-Baathification, these Shia-based groups used intimidation and violence to begin to establish a presence at institutions like hospitals and universities.⁵² These militias began to enforce repressive Islamic norms and generate support, based on fear, in an attempt to posture themselves for future control of the country.

It was not only local militias that were actively trying to fill the void. Foreign entities such as SCIRI became involved through some of their affiliates, by funneling resources from Iran to assist in removing coalition forces. Iran, uneasy with coalition forces operating along its borders, began to provide weapons, explosives and technical support to those Iraqis willing to accept them. Most Iraqis were critical of Iran, but in a pragmatic vein accepted its assistance to achieve their most immediate goal of removing coalition forces.⁵³ The increase in armed and violent militias caused a change of force posture for the British troops. Once roadside bombs and direct fire attacks began, British forces quickly donned their body armour and began to travel in armoured convoys, further alienating themselves from the Iraqi public whose ‘hearts and minds’ they were supposed to be winning.

The United Kingdom needed help in securing the South, as it was clear they were unable to achieve this on their own. In addition to not having enough manpower, they did not have an “effective ‘framework’ intelligence system such as operated in Northern Ireland... the British had very little idea of what was actually happening on the streets and in the buildings.”⁵⁴ Attempting to bolster their security posture and force ratio, the British quickly reconstituted the Iraqi police force, something that was not considered in pre-war planning.⁵⁵ The use of local police forces is a traditional and important component of British counterinsurgency strategy, as indigenous police forces often have a nuanced understanding of their own region. However, under Saddam, key figures such as chiefs of police had all been centrally appointed and the de-Baathification and dissolution orders from the CPA served to reduce the initial effectiveness of these forces.

Additionally, the police, being recruited from the local areas, were susceptible to local and tribal authorities, and in most cases were influenced by tribal power brokers. Moreover, what the United Kingdom failed to consider was that prior to the invasion it was not the police that provided the strong arm of authority under Saddam; rather, it was the Baath intelligence services that were the real muscle.⁵⁶ The United Kingdom was stuck with an impressionable police force that was empowered to use force against the local population. Looting was no

longer the only security issue faced by the British as “‘hundreds’ of murders of former Ba’athists were taking place every month, and many of them perpetrated by the same police.”⁵⁷ What made matters worse was that those types of acts, being perpetrated by a force created by the British, only made the tepid popular support for British forces degrade even further.

As time progressed and as those militias gained more strength and resources, the United Kingdom was less able to combat the threats posed. The British ended up negotiating with the militias, both as a means to quell the violence against the local population, and to ensure their own safety. By 2007 the “JAM was the only militia, indeed the only real power (apart from the British) in town. It and the OMS dominated the social, political and religious landscape.”⁵⁸ As the JAM tightened its grasp on Basra and the South, the United Kingdom did not have much choice, especially as it was entering its draw down phase for eventual withdrawal from the country, but to relinquish control.⁵⁹ For the British, reducing “insurgent violence in Basra came, initially, at the price of ceding control of the city to the Mahdi Army,”⁶⁰ which also facilitated the withdrawal of their headquarters from inside Basra to the airport (where they remained until their final departure in 2009). The United Kingdom ultimately lost the security battle, which further hindered their success on the essential services front.

ESSENTIAL SERVICES

The problems in Iraq did not only revolve around security. More important than the security of individuals are their physiological needs.⁶¹ The British inability to restore essential services, such as water or electricity, to an adequate level, played against those needs and added to Iraqi disdain. The Iraqi people had become accustomed to a certain level of service even under the Saddam regime, and while they may not have fully welcomed the coalition, they did have an expectation of “the superpower that had toppled Saddam to be able to get electricity and public services going again quickly.”⁶² As an occupying power the United Kingdom had a responsibility to restore those essential services to an adequate level following the initial shock of combat. That was not achieved despite the resources that were available through various different organizations.

The United Kingdom was not alone in terms of resource provision, and funding was not a limiting factor. The United States had taken responsibility for all major life support⁶³ as well as a number of projects by external contractors managed through the CPA.⁶⁴ “At no time between the end of the conflict and the end of formal occupation in June 2004 was available funding fully spent.”⁶⁵ What was lacking was in-depth involvement of other British governmental departments as well as separate British funding to restore essential services in accordance with the priorities of the South.

The United Kingdom did not shoulder the requisite amount of responsibility for reconstruction in the South. With the CPA primarily focused on the Baghdad region, it is not unexpected that there would be lags or gaps in the reconstruction operations elsewhere in the nation. What the United Kingdom failed to do was fill that void with its own resources. In terms of British commitment to the area, “British resources, even if they had been significantly increased, would never have been sufficient to meet the challenges.”⁶⁶

In addition to a lack of funding or activities, was the absence of a robust coordinating function to wade through the bureaucratic process of organizing these relief operations. The British experienced many difficulties in prioritizing and organizing what few projects existed across military and civilian agencies. Even when the above resources were available, problems with close liaison and coordination between military and civilian organizations arose. A large part of the problem in restoring and managing utilities was the difficulty of “getting British agencies to deploy and then coordinate with the military.”⁶⁷ This problem continued throughout the tenure of the United Kingdom where entities like the Foreign Commonwealth Office and Department for International Development, which maintained a small consulate, conducted little useful coordination on the ground with the military staff.⁶⁸ Additional involvement of those organizations would have strengthened British operations in the South by bolstering the military planning and ability to conduct reconstruction tasks.

The linchpin in the provision of that type of relief lies in the early identification of potential issues and proper resourcing to accomplish the necessary tasks. In the absence of robust civilian efforts, the military began to fill this gap, but the resources, both in equipment and expertise, resident in a purely military force are limited in capacity and time. As has already been acknowledged by the British Army “the military themselves cannot take on interim government and reconstruction tasks in the post-combat phase for more than a short period.”⁶⁹ While the military cannot conduct those activities indefinitely, as the initial authorities on the ground they will have a large influence on their ultimate success.

The possibility of success will be increased if the military has the proper knowledge and guidance on how to accomplish reconstruction tasks. Military officers must receive adequate education and training in those types of non-traditional tasks in order to achieve the political aims of their nation. Additionally, a solid understanding of how those functions work and their strategic relevance will better enable the military to advise their political masters on how they can best be employed, or the resources needed to meet the aims. That could have been achieved if a closer working relationship existed between the various British departments, and leads us to segue to a number of lessons that must be learned in order to avoid those obstacles in the future.

RECOMMENDATIONS

POLITICAL PRIMACY AND GUIDANCE

The first lesson is the requirement for clear identification and pursuit of strategic aims. There must be a re-centring around the Clausewitzian maxim of war as a “continuation of political intercourse, with the addition of other means.”⁷⁰ In an insurgency there will not be a “purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily a military activity.”⁷¹ Military objectives must be limited in scope and used to support the political ends. That must be synthesized by an overall political strategy. Simple military victory is not an end in itself. The military objectives must support the geostrategic objectives of a nation.⁷² In the case of Iraq, the military victory was quite easily achieved, but the strategic success has been judged using the stabilization efforts in the post-combat phase.



Source: © Crown copyright. IWM (HQMNDISE-06-046-081)

Counterinsurgency operations in Basra, 2006. British soldiers, supported by other members of the Multi-National Force, carry out a night search and arrest operation in a house in the city of Basra. The search revealed a cache of arms, ammunition and bomb-making equipment. Fourteen suspected insurgents were arrested.

Planning for Iraq shows there was a disproportionate amount of planning placed on combat operations when compared to post-combat operations. Operational planning needs to be heavily guided by the strategic aims and end state of the political masters, then planning should flow backwards from that critical point.⁷³ There needs to be more political oversight and involvement from other government departments. That will help to ensure that the military is properly resourced and given sufficient guidance to develop viable supporting operational plans in order to accomplish its mission in accordance with clear strategic intent. That strategic intent must be used to inform the necessary skills and capabilities of those that will be trusted to achieve it.

TRAINING AND EDUCATION

The second recommendation centres on the capabilities of the military. If military leaders are to be trusted to develop accurate operational plans to achieve those political goals, they need to be able to act effectively in non-traditional ways. The military must be prepared to expand the scope and types of operations it conducts in the early stages of reconstruction and stabilization. That is because they are likely to be the only entity capable of operating effectively amid the lingering threats of a non-permissive or semi-permissive environment.

To do that, a nation has responsibility to focus on the preparation and training of its military. Military officers are often well versed in the conventional conduct of war, however, “COIN requires a much higher degree of education within the military as to the distinctive threat posed by this form of conflict. This education must engender a heightened level

of historical consciousness pertaining to past strategic and tactical successes and failures in COIN, and it must increase understanding of the contemporary insurgent threat.”⁷⁴ Military officers must be “taught how to put a campaign together using a combination of civil and military measures to achieve a single government aim.”⁷⁵ As in the case of Iraq, military commanders must be prepared to run a wide variety of institutions such as a central bank or nursing operations.⁷⁶ While not traditional tasks for the military, those will be critical to the success of future operations.

As seen early on in Iraq, the military shouldered a majority of reconstruction efforts and military commanders made good use of funding allotted for quick impact projects aimed at the development of immediate, short-term relief. If that is to be applied to future cases like Iraq, part of that education must be aimed at the specific aspects of counterinsurgency, as a number of officers in Iraq were “unaware of important operational and strategic aspects of COIN that were having an immediate effect in MND (SE).”⁷⁷ If the military is to be trusted and empowered to conduct those types of operations, they must be prepared to competently perform them. Once capable, the military must be properly supported by, and connected to, other governmental agencies and departments.

INTEGRATION

The third recommendation speaks to the requirement for an integrated and comprehensive approach to planning, which can be viewed as an essential by-product of the first two recommendations. “The political and military sides of counterinsurgency must be ‘completely and utterly interrelated.’”⁷⁸ As the military is normally the first on the ground, close relationships during the planning will allow all to gain a common understanding of what needs to be achieved and how that should happen. It is not expected that military leaders will become expert city managers, but they must have the proper resources to critically analyze municipal needs at the outset of reconstruction. This will be better achieved by subject matter experts from other government departments and will set the stage for the restoration of normal living conditions and assist in prioritizing reconstruction efforts. Next there will be the requirement for follow-on agencies to take up the torch and continue on with what the military started. If proper strategic guidance is provided at the outset and reinforced through joint planning and coordination, there should be a near seamless transition between the two and their actions will continue to be mutually supporting. It is no longer sufficient to develop security or restore essential services separately. The two must go hand in hand, and associated planning must happen that way as well.

These lessons have begun to be integrated at the tactical and operational levels. The British Army has established that the Army and Defence have an onus to provide comprehensive counterinsurgency education for its leaders, recognizing the fact that these leaders may be required to take on the tasks of many civilian organizations within a non-permissive security environment.⁷⁹ Those recommendations drawn from the British experience during the Iraq War—where a comprehensive approach was not fully achieved in the South—reinforce that the British General Officer Commanding Multi-National

Division (South East) and the Regional Coordinator should have been more firmly entrenched under a common and formal construct to allow for constant coordination, and should have received unified direction from the British Government.

The British Government has already rightly identified this lesson as a result of Iraq and the difficulties experienced in handing over to civilian agencies following hostilities. It has recognized that the government must ensure “full, early and continued consultation between all interested governmental, non-governmental and civilian agencies and contractors.”⁸⁰ The goal now is to internalize and learn these lessons. Doing so will help to ensure that each agency is working in harmony so that, when the civilian experts arrive, there is a synchronous, albeit initial, state for them to then carry on the in-depth and detailed work of reconstruction.

CONCLUSION

Despite the United Kingdom's historical experience in counterinsurgency operations, it was unable to evolve its methodology to meet the demands of operating in Iraq following the coalition invasion of 2003. There is an over-emphasis on American shortcomings in this campaign, yet the United Kingdom is not without blame. The British Army has already acknowledged some of its shortcomings and identified that, from the outset of the operation, where an occupying power has “a responsibility for a Zone of Occupation or an area of responsibility, it has a moral and a pragmatic incentive, as well legal obligations to ensure that *all* lines of operation are properly resourced even if, in overall coalition terms, the area is not assigned priority as the Main Effort.”⁸¹ Beyond the responsibility for its own area of operations, an integrated approach to operations at the strategic levels will serve to increase national influence on other nations. If the operations of individual government departments were properly synthesized by the Cabinet Office then the United Kingdom would have been better able to influence the United States when it came to operations in the South. This comes with an additional responsibility for political leaders to use this information and exert influence in the international arena when needed, so as to enable their own governmental agencies in the achievement of the overall aim. This clearly did not happen in Iraq, and the United Kingdom has no one to blame but itself.

Absent from the beginning, was a unified and integrated approach to planning guided by one strategic vision. Low troop numbers and minimal civilian effort in the reconstruction meant that militias and criminal elements were able to operate in the South with relative impunity. Without robust civilian involvement in reconstruction, the military had to fill the gaps, yet despite its best efforts, was not always fully prepared or resourced to do so. In our examination of Operation TELIC, those pitfalls help to identify a number of lessons and begin to inform the development of solutions for future conflicts.

A number of recommendations have been made for avoiding those dangers in the future. The first is a re-centring on military action within political aims. Second, is a reinforcement of the need for the military to have an understanding of post-conflict operations and how to implement initiatives that are required outside the traditional military context.

Third, is the importance of an integrated approach to planning, which sees a tightly woven team with similar planning processes at all levels to ensure political aims and implementation in the early stages, all properly knit together and working toward the same goals.

At this point it is not simply a matter of learning these lessons. The issue is still one of problem recognition. All of the recommendations at this stage are to be taken as general or universal. Each needs to be developed in more detail and will be influenced heavily by individual nations, based on their own mandates and policies, as to how this is to be achieved. The lessons can be further divided into domestic and expeditionary veins, as attaining that approach within an extant political system is likely to prove difficult enough. When the time comes to expand that approach into expeditionary roles in future counterinsurgency theatres, the ability to quickly create and staff each necessary department, and instill sound planning and implementation practices, becomes more difficult. The first step is to figure out what requirements exist in those instances and develop the relationships and processes to support that type of operation.

There is not a requirement for a complete redesign of how strategic planning for, or conduct of, counterinsurgency should be carried out. The recommendations are based on a number of tenets and principles that have been previously identified throughout history. What has changed is how and where those principles are applied. So, while those are not necessarily new concepts, the debacle in Iraq demonstrates the need to re-focus on those lessons in light of the evolving nature of the threat and obstacles to stability in the 21st century. 🇨🇦

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COMPTROLLERSHIP IN THE CANADIAN ARMY

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INTRODUCTION

As the financial advisor to commanders and organizations, the comptroller, in garrison, at headquarters or deployed, is key to ensuring sound internal controls and the financial integrity of systems and information, delivering timely and accurate accounting and reporting, and providing financial services to all aspects of DND/CAF business at home and abroad. In addition to these roles and responsibilities, a comptroller is expected to adopt the tenets of modern comptrollership with an emphasis on strengthening the stewardship of public resources.

Modern comptrollership encompasses a broad set of principles designed to foster sound management of resources and effective decision-making. It involves a shift from a previous, primarily transactional focus, to a wider financial/resource management perspective. Modern comptrollership requires comptrollers to employ integrated financial and non-financial performance information in decision-making, adopt a mature approach to risk management, employ appropriate control systems, and embrace a shared set of values and ethics.

The challenge function, the creation of controls and the enforcement of rules and regulations remain very important aspects of comptrollership, but do not represent the full extent of modern comptrollership requirements. Comptrollership has evolved from a focus solely on controls and enforcing rules and regulations to also adding value by synthesizing financial and non-financial information to better inform the decision-making process. Commanders at all levels rely on comptrollers to add value by offering timely, integrated and fact-based information to assist in making the most efficient and effective use of entrusted resources.

Canadian Army (CA) comptrollers operate in a dynamic environment. Unlike their civilian counterparts, as military personnel they share an unlimited liability with those they serve. They must be prepared to deploy and must ensure the force generation of those financial specialists that will deploy. On operations, comptrollers must be capable of providing a full suite of comptrollership services and maintain the skills necessary to operate in a deployed setting, a critical requirement of a military comptroller.

This document will highlight the requirements and general expectations of comptrollers from L1 to the lowest level as well as specific roles and responsibilities for L1 to L3 comptrollers. It will provide practical considerations as well as advice to commanders on what they should expect from a comptroller. Stewardship of resources is everyone's business and the comptroller community plays a pivotal role in the provision of financial management and financial services, while championing and facilitating fiscally responsible and well-informed decisions.

ARMY COMPTROLLERSHIP FRAMEWORK

The *Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces Code of Values and Ethics* forms the basis of what is expected of all its members. These values and ethical principles provide a foundation to guide the actions of all members of DND. Providing overarching

functional direction from a Government of Canada perspective, the following five pillars of modern comptrollership outlined by Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) reinforce the critical requirements of Army comptrollership:

- a. understand the financial implications of decisions;
- b. manage financial risk;
- c. track and account for financial decisions;
- d. protect against fraud, negligence and violation of regulations; and
- e. use the functional authority's advice and provide a robust challenge function.

The following four critical requirements for Army comptrollership stem from the base provided by the *DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics* and the overarching direction on comptrollership provided by TBS:

1. **Challenge/Advise.** Comptrollers must provide a robust and informed challenge and advisory function for all financial and resource management issues. Proficiency in this function comes via practical experience and rotations of sufficient duration through comptroller positions at various levels inside and outside the Army, as well as a solid educational background in finance/business or accounting. Experience in command positions and deployments increases the credibility of comptrollers through development of personal relationships and the practical application of the art of war.
2. **Provide Assurance.** Comptrollers must be the focal point for providing appropriate levels of assurance to commanders on the existence and effectiveness of a local financial management control framework, the processes and systems to ensure sound financial management practices, the accuracy of accounts and the integrity of financial processes. The comptroller, through the Regional Departmental Accounting Office (RDAO), is directly responsible for ensuring compliance with policies, regulations and procedures at the tactical level.
3. **Provide Financial Services.** Comptrollers must provide a range of financial services at static locations. This can include working capital fund (WCF) management, cashier, claims, accounts payable, revenue accounting, maintenance of access and integrity of data provided in the Defence Resource Management Information System (DRMIS), precise monitoring of provision of service agreements, financial oversight of the write-off process, delegations of authorities, service level agreement (SLA) / memorandum of understanding (MOU) review, costing, budgeting, governance, business planning support and non-public funds (NPF) oversight.
4. **Prepare for Operations/Deployment.** Comptrollers must maintain core competencies (military and financial) for deployment while employed at static locations and must

ensure subordinates receive sufficient training to deploy. All domestic aspects of comptrollership are replicated on a deployment but the complexity of WCF management, particularly the handling of multiple currencies and a large emphasis on the use of cash, is unique to a deployment. Additionally, management of accounts payable, revenue and multinational arrangements, as well as NPF, figure more prominently on deployed operations. Comptrollers must make every effort to provide opportunities to develop these skills in Canada.

Ultimately, adherence to the *DND and CF Code of Values and Ethics*, adoption of the five pillars of modern comptrollership, and an in-depth understanding and appreciation of the four critical requirements of a Canadian Army military comptroller will greatly assist with the maintenance of professional competency—a comptroller's centre of gravity.




Figure 1: Army Comptrollership Framework

WHAT A COMMANDER SHOULD EXPECT

Comptrollership is a command responsibility. Consequently, commanders should expect to receive professional and timely advice on matters of financial management, financial policy and procedures, financial services and NPF. Depending on the complexity of the issue, financial advice should demonstrate qualitative as well as quantitative analysis. The provision of expenditure reports and basic reporting is a financial manager's job at the sub-unit level. Going beyond the numbers to take into account multiple variables and direct and indirect effects of financial decisions is the realm of a professional comptroller. Numbers can always

assist with telling a story; whether it is trend analysis, costing, business plan validation, or other functions, each can support or invalidate an argument. However, a comptroller should not be solely a numbers person. To truly contribute, a comptroller will thoroughly understand the business of the organization.

A comptroller can be expected to find ways to fund unplanned or unscheduled initiatives and a way to say yes to legal and achievable demands by finding/identifying funding options to meet operational requirements. Commanders support the comptroller by making compromises and reprioritizing activities to achieve their desired end state in a resource-constrained environment. A comptroller will provide a series of options to achieve the commander's desired end state along with a quantitative and qualitative assessment of each.

A comptroller will have an intimate understanding of an entity's activities based on his/her close relationship with senior leadership and his/her involvement in the operating/business plan process. Commanders should expect comptrollers to fully support their intent, mission and vision, and continually strive to employ their expertise to improve efficiency and effectiveness.

When required, comptrollers will be able to explain financial information in plain language. Not unlike the technical aspects of any function, the terminology for financial management and financial services can be difficult to understand for those not involved in their day-to-day delivery. Comptrollers will have sufficient understanding of the complex aspects of their job so as to explain the impact of these issues in laymen's terms.



Source: Combat Camera

Comptrollers will be aware of the larger financial picture by being connected to higher level HQ and having an in-depth understanding of their organization's operations. They will maintain a network of functional expert contacts for all public and NPF financial matters.

WHAT COMPTROLLERS NEED FROM THEIR COMMANDERS

To facilitate the provision of relevant and accurate advice, comptrollers need timely awareness of issues that may have financial implications. Comptrollers must be able to provide unfettered advice to senior leadership by having direct access when required. Access to senior leadership may involve the Chief of Staff or Deputy Commander in some organizations or the Commander directly in others depending upon the structure. Often, financial decisions are time-sensitive and can have far-reaching implications for an organization. Additionally, most operational decisions have financial aspects or policy dimensions that comptrollers should identify and integrate into the organization's planning and decision-making cycles. Given that the ultimate liability for these decisions rests with commanders, comptrollers must have direct access to ensure the provision of appropriate advice.

PRACTICAL COMPTROLLERSHIP GUIDELINES

ADDING VALUE BEYOND ENFORCEMENT OF RULES AND REGULATIONS

Too often commanders have referred to their comptrollers as the individual who keeps them out of jail. Although often said in jest, this comment speaks to the fact that the majority of the interface between comptrollers and commanders has involved the enforcement of rules and regulations. While this is an important part of what a comptroller does, it should not monopolize his/her time. Rather, modern comptrollership principles require that the majority of a comptroller's time be spent analyzing and synthesizing financial and non-financial information to best inform decision makers.

MAINTAINING A BROAD UNDERSTANDING OF THE ORGANIZATION'S OPERATIONS

Comptrollers must expand their professional knowledge beyond job-specific roles and responsibilities. To add value, comptrollers need an in-depth understanding of the organization's operations and, if applicable, subordinate formations' operations and those of the higher HQ. One can nurture this understanding through direct and close involvement with the organization's business planning process. Involvement will afford the opportunity to see linkages between the organization's mission and vision and its ultimate outputs. A thorough understanding of the processes and resources required to produce an organization's outputs is critical for comptrollers to provide a full consideration of the financial implications of decisions. Furthermore, as activities and priorities change throughout the year, comptrollers must proactively engage with internal and external organizational stakeholders to keep abreast of changes that may have a material effect on resource requirements and to update forecasts as required. From a functional perspective, comptrollers should, at minimum, maintain a monthly dialogue with budget managers. Even more interaction may be required when working with inexperienced managers. Additionally, understanding an organization's operations extends into the non-public domain as well. A comptroller must be capable of providing an independent assessment of the organization's NPF financial statements as well as policy advice regarding the use of public versus non-public funds.

UNDERSTANDING TWO LEVELS DOWN

Another aspect that facilitates the provision of high-quality, professional advice is an understanding of the challenges and issues facing subordinate formations. Similar to the benefits derived from understanding one's own organization, reading and questioning a subordinate formation's business plan submission will greatly assist comptrollers in understanding their operations. Physically visiting each location can also help provide a clearer perspective. Comptrollers should take advantage of the comptroller inspection schedule, accompanying the inspection team on visits when feasible. During the visit, comptrollers should meet the leadership team to discuss their concerns and sit in on discussions at the working level to gain a broader understanding of the challenges and successes. The comptroller should debrief the leadership teams on the findings, both positive and negative, ensuring to discuss with the subordinate formation any areas where the comptroller can better assist them in the accomplishment of their mission.

UNDERSTANDING ONE LEVEL UP

Understanding the environment one level up helps ensure an organization's plans are aligned with higher-level intent and facilitates unity of purpose. From a comptroller's perspective, knowledge of the various challenges at higher levels will greatly assist in informing decision-making, and regular interaction enables a common understanding of the fiscal climate, including the context for certain decisions. Comptrollers can save time and effort when they understand what may, or may not, be supported at a higher HQ from a financial perspective. Also, the provision of advice on risk acceptance is better informed by an understanding of a higher HQ's challenges. There are several ways to maintain currency regarding superior HQs. First, maintaining good communications on the functional net with senior level comptrollers is essential for situational awareness and the establishment of credibility and trust. Additionally, knowing the contents of a superior HQ's business plan can provide valuable insights and context for decision-making.

ENSURING PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCY

Knowledge is the currency of credibility. To be credible, comptrollers must have excellent financial literacy to communicate and operate effectively in multiple environments. They must be well-versed in all aspects of public finance and must have, as a minimum, a good working knowledge of NPF. Practical experience with rotations of sufficient duration through comptroller positions provides the foundation for professional development. Additionally, a professional accounting designation or post-graduate studies in business combined with a business/finance/accounting background provides the ideal education to facilitate this literacy.

Precision in the execution of the comptroller function is also critically important. Comptrollers are in the details business, and financial advice should be firmly based on historical and/or trend analysis combined with excellent situational awareness of their subordinate formations' operations, their own organization's operations and the operations of one level above. Facts are important; comptrollers must be prepared to delve into minute detail to properly execute their function. There are many examples of extensive fraud uncovered by comptrollers and their staff paying attention to minutia.

The unwavering requirement to balance a working capital fund to the penny and meticulously verify invoices against original contracts are just two examples of how attention to detail will protect the department from needless losses of public funds and potential embarrassment. Additionally, a comptroller's advice can prove to be advantageous when opportunities for additional funds arise or when unexpected reductions occur within a fiscal year. Having in place predefined plans and priorities in executing these scenarios will, in the long run, optimize resource management by using on and off ramps and reducing the need for unnecessary spending and acquisitions at year-end, which can seriously undermine credibility.

PROVISION OF ACCURATE AND TIMELY COSTINGS

Attention to detail is a key component of a comptroller's activities. Nowhere is the need for thoroughness more evident than in a cost estimate. Cost estimates represent the quantification of a future demand for government resources, be it a capital procurement project, an operational estimate or a unit-level training exercise. The accuracy and timeliness of a cost estimate is critical; estimates set expectations, frame resource allocations and are viewed as tests of professional competence by Parliament, the Office of the Auditor General, the press and the Canadian public. Nearly all financial aspects of a business plan originate with a cost estimate; regardless of the complexity of the requirement, the same six fundamental steps guide the generation of this estimate: develop a cost plan; establish the known information and assumptions; develop the cost model; collect data and populate the model; review for accuracy and completeness; and communicate the results. Standard templates and other tools are available to assist financial staff in implementing the six steps, but there is no substitute for experience when providing cost estimates, and comptrollers should seek assistance from functional experts and higher HQ staff to ensure their assumptions, rates and data are valid, they are including the right elements, and they are communicating the results effectively and clearly. Costing involves estimates, contingencies, assumptions and choices, and because of this, it is as much an art as a science, and significant variances are possible when just a few factors change. Ensuring that the steps are followed by those completing the costings and that the audience understands what has been included and what level of uncertainty exists are key to success.

NEVER SAYING NO, SAYING, "YES, BUT ..."

Only a commander has the right to say no; a comptroller's job is to provide advice. A situation may arise wherein the commander will propose funding an item or activity that has merit and will benefit the organization but does not appear to be financially viable. Comptrollers are to do their utmost to find a viable means to support the decision and, if need be, provide the necessary caveats required to say yes. Finding a viable means may result in the requirement for a wholesale assessment of the impact of doing so and an option analysis (i.e. "Yes we can do it but the following items will have to go unfunded and this is the impact on the organization.").

The only time a comptroller should automatically say no is when asked to do something perceived as unethical and/or illegal (wrongdoing). On the rare occasion that this might occur, a comptroller should first seek a clear understanding of the question and highlight

any initial concerns. Should comptrollers continue to be pressed to do something that in their opinion would constitute wrongdoing, the rationale for not supporting the request should be provided to the chain of command and fully documented. To support this rationale, a comptroller should consult with functional experts, including the senior level comptroller, as well as the unit ethics coordinator / CAF legal advisor if applicable. The CAF disclosure process provides additional guidance regarding the types of activities that are considered wrongdoing and how to properly report it.

PROVISION OF FINANCIAL INPUT WHEN REQUIRED

Good leaders understand the importance of asking subject matter experts for their perspective on issues, but not every issue has obvious financial implications. Sometimes this results in a leader not seeking a comptroller's input. Maintaining situational awareness and a good understanding of an organization's operations will help a comptroller keep abreast of issues that would benefit from the addition of a financial perspective. When aware of an issue that has a financial nexus that is not being considered, a comptroller has a duty to pass the details on to the chain of command. Failure to do so will result in commanders having only a partial appreciation of the consequences of a decision. This could be disastrous for an organization and potentially embarrassing for the commander.

APPROPRIATE USE OF THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

With sufficient experience, many comptrollers will intuitively know when to involve the chain of command. That said, commanders will have differing levels of comfort regarding resource management, financial decisions and financial risk. Early in every comptroller's tenures, they should have a discussion with their respective commander regarding risk thresholds. Comptrollers will conduct the majority of the day-to-day work on the staff net, but there will be times when they must advise/consult with a commander. In particular, comptrollers should gauge when it is appropriate to notify a commander of a financial issue, taking into consideration dollar value, organizations involved, complexity, or if it involves a decision that only the commander can make by virtue of delegated authorities.

Commanders must be engaged and their direction sought on resource allocation decisions. Staff will provide advice and assistance, but where and how money is allocated is a commander's prerogative. Commanders must review and issue funding models and business plans that articulate this direction. Additionally, the chain of command must address poor financial performance. A comptroller can highlight concerns to ensure commanders are aware of issues, but ultimately it is a commander's responsibility to hold subordinate commanders accountable for lapses in performance.

ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY

Due to the hierarchical nature of our organization, the financial reports submitted beyond the lowest level are naturally informed by subordinate formations. Incomplete or inaccurate estimates by these formations are compounded when aggregated at higher levels. Left unchecked or unchallenged, one can understand how the Department's submissions could be misrepresented to government. The act of holding an organization or individual accountable is a leadership function and must be exercised by the chain of command.

A comptroller's role is to thoroughly review all financial submissions from subordinate formations, challenge all questionable aspects of the return, and assess the level of risk with the submission. The same level of scrutiny must then be applied to a comptroller's own return before submitting higher. Where possible, report formats should be standardized for consistency, comparability and ease of use. Weaknesses in reporting must be dealt with promptly and assistance provided whenever possible to increase the accuracy and dependability of a subordinate's return. Commanders must be engaged when reporting is consistently weak and inaccurate, as the multiplicative effect of poor reporting can diminish the efficiency, effectiveness and credibility of the entire Canadian Army. As the demands for accountability increase, comptrollers must be prepared to assist commanders with explaining how and why money was spent on various activities. It is no longer acceptable merely to indicate that all allocated monies were spent as a metric of success. This simple output measurement does not take into account any measure of value for money or efficiency and only serves to diminish the organization's reputation for strong financial stewardship.

DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION

Military comptrollers must be prepared to deliver a full suite of comptroller services, including financial management, financial services and NPF accounting on a deployed operation. In addition to the normal Army readiness requirements, comptrollers must maintain currency on the financial skills required for deployment and establish mechanisms for their subordinates to do the same. While most aspects of domestic finance are replicated on a deployment, the requirement for comptrollers to conduct NPF accounting and use cash as a method of payment is largely unique. Despite these deployed requirements,



Source: Combat Camera

training in NPF accounting for military finance personnel and the domestic use of cash have greatly diminished over recent years. There are several ways comptrollers can maintain knowledge and currency in NPF. First, all CA messes have a finance representative as part of the mess executive. Comptrollers should ensure their junior finance officers occupy the position on a rotational basis for officer messes and a suitable RMS clerk does so for junior and senior NCO messes. Appointed officers and NCOs should take this opportunity to work with NPF accounting and local Personnel Support Program managers to understand financial statements and the rules and regulations that govern NPF. Secondly, in concert with Canadian Forces Morale and Welfare Services (CFMWS) director of accounting services for NPF, the CA is developing a program to provide the basics of garrison and deployed NPF to comptrollers. Still being refined, this course will eventually be mandatory for all CA finance officers.

The use of cash to reimburse claims, pay advances or settle invoices is seldom seen domestically. As a result, clerks and finance officers are often hesitant to use cash and are uncomfortable holding and issuing large sums of money for fear of miscalculation or an imbalance. On the vast majority of deployments, cash is the preferred method of payment, resulting in comptrollers having to hold multiple currencies for all local transactions and in some cases those between nations. It is imperative that comptrollers find ways to have their personnel become accustomed domestically to handling and accounting for cash transactions. This can be done by offering pay parades for deploying troops and offering cash as an option for all low-level cashier payments.

THE ROLE OF THE ARMY AND DIVISION COMPTROLLER (L1 & L2)

As senior advisors to the Army's leadership, Army and division comptrollers' focus is less on the direct provision of financial services and more on financial management. This includes the provision of expert advice and assurance to the chain of command and the facilitation of functional advice and assistance to prepare comptrollers and their staffs for deployments. The following roles are pertinent to an Army or L2 comptroller:

- a. participating and advising on the financial aspects of business planning, including the coordination, implementation and approval processes;
- b. providing budgetary controls that assist in monitoring resource consumption and providing comprehensive accountability reports that accurately present how allocated resources have been used in terms of clients, processes, accountabilities and results;
- c. monitoring and reporting financial performance related to both assigned and custodial funds and providing recommendations and advice that allow commanders to better understand and manage financial risk;
- d. providing financial policy interpretation and advice to facilitate proper implementation of compliance with regulatory requirements;

- e. developing, coordinating and implementing a sound financial framework that supports resource managers in making sound financial decisions;
- f. providing leadership and mentorship through sound functional direction and guidance, career advice and professional guidance throughout the functional chain to subordinate comptrollers, finance officers at all levels of the organization, and divisional J8 staffs in conjunction with the chain of command;
- g. analyzing and integrating financial and human resource information with non-financial program information to provide decision support;
- h. providing an objective, independent and constructive challenge function for all proposals with resource implications, addressing risk and identifying financial options and areas of opportunities, and acting as an advocate/facilitator for comptrollership initiatives;
- i. establishing the necessary processes to ensure that all leaders and managers are aware of their financial accountabilities and the manner in which they are to manage the resources entrusted to them;
- j. facilitating internal audit and review services, and supporting external reviews and assurance studies to enhance performance management;
- k. conducting or arranging comptroller inspections and staff assistance visits with an emphasis on verifying public funds (the working capital account and the Receiver General transfer account), the efficiency and effectiveness of the L3 verification processes, and the effectiveness of the decision support provided to commanders;
- l. liaising with L0 staff to maintain situational awareness of relevant issues that may affect CA operations as well as keeping L0 informed of pertinent CA issues;
- m. working with the CAF comptroller on succession planning and career management of CA finance officers and the larger CAF/DND financial community;
- n. providing operational level advice to the CAF comptroller and CFO to support strategic level decision making; and
- o. supporting CAF force generation requirements by facilitating the provision of deployable finance personnel for deployment.

THE ROLE OF CANADIAN DIVISION SUPPORT GROUP AND BASE COMPTROLLERS

A comptroller must provide commanders with an appropriate level of assurance on the existence and effectiveness of a local financial management control framework. This includes

the establishment of processes and systems to ensure sound financial management practices, the accuracy of accounts and the integrity of financial information. To provide commanders with appropriate assurance, comptrollers at the Canadian division support group and base level must fulfill the following key functions:

- a. oversee and offer guidance on the availability, development and retention of individuals and the collective skill sets needed to effectively support the comptrollership function;
- b. force generate finance personnel when required for deployments;
- c. monitor and verify expenditure and revenue management, the financial attestation process and Delegation of Financial Authorities;
- d. manage and oversee the acquisition card program, including post payment verifications;
- e. act as the public funds accounting officer;
- f. control and oversee cashier operations, the working capital account, and Receiver General deposit facility operations;
- g. provide costing services as required;
- h. advise on and monitor provision of services agreements;
- i. deliver and oversee the claims process;
- j. provide independent cashier verifications and daily reconciliations;
- k. control and manage local and regional access to DRMIS, CLAIMS-X and ACS;
- l. prepare and review event and hospitality requests and disseminate related policies;
- m. advise on the appropriate use of public and non-public funds (NPF);
- n. exercise an active challenge function for NPF, including independent analysis of NPF financial statements;
- o. provide financial policy interpretation and advice to facilitate the proper implementation of and compliance with regulatory requirements;
- p. control and manage the RDAO function;

- q. manage the accounts payable function, including invoice processing where necessary, compliance and verification for integral and lodger units, contracting oversight, and proper Delegation of Financial Authorities and Payable at Year-End (PAYE) management;
- r. provide financial management for both in and out year as well as contribute to the business plan process;
- s. coordinate local financial training, including annual resource manager and administrator training, with an emphasis on Delegation of Financial Authorities requirements; and
- t. provide functional career management and mentoring to all finance officers resident within the Canadian support group/base.

CONCLUSION

The Canadian public has rightly demonstrated considerable interest in the government's ability to efficiently and effectively manage resources. As expectations of accountability and the demand for resources by all government departments increase, so has the scrutiny of how these resources are managed. The CA has embraced the need for strong comptrollership as a means to better inform decision-makers, manage risk and provide for sound stewardship of its resources. Added benefits of strong comptrollership include an increased ability to demonstrate what the CA has accomplished with the funding it receives, and enhanced credibility in the eyes of our defence partners and the Canadian public. Understanding financial rules and regulations is still an important function, but comptrollers must also be prepared to demonstrate mission focus, leadership, professionalism, innovation and determination to meet the demands of modern comptrollership. As the business of defence and the government becomes increasingly complex, the Army will benefit greatly from comptrollers who embrace and embody modern comptrollership principles. Armed with an excellent understanding of how their organization fits within the larger strategic context as well as an ability to synthesize qualitative and quantitative information, comptrollers are well situated to support the CA's continued success. 🍁

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Colonel Richard Goodyear, MSM, CD, MBA, CPA, CMA, graduated from the Royal Military College in Kingston in 1996 with a Bachelor of Commerce. As a junior officer, he served as the Pay Accounting Officer, Management Services Officer and 2 CMBG Comptroller in Petawawa before being posted to Ottawa as the finance desk officer and budget manager for all deployed operations. Col Goodyear was the 3 ASG Comptroller in Gagetown, he was a Company Commander in 2 Svc Bn, Petawawa, Command Comptroller for CEFCOM, Base Commander CFB Shilo, and since July 2014 he's been the Canadian Army Comptroller. Col Goodyear has deployments to Kosovo in 1999 and Afghanistan in 2006. He is a Certified Management Accountant and has a Master's of Business Administration from the University of Quebec at Montreal.

REVISITING THE ROLE OF THE CANADIAN MILITARY ENGINEERS

Major Ian McGregor, CD

The Canadian Military Engineers are the only branch in the Canadian Armed Forces with a role that spans from combat arms through to combat support and service support. Functions include combat engineering, construction engineering, geospatial engineering, fire protection services, environmental management, back-up infantry, and more. Despite that vast spectrum of responsibility, it is possible to concisely define the role of the Canadian Military Engineers. It is also possible to define the role in such a way as to unify the branch around a common purpose, to delineate the responsibilities of the branch from those of other branches, and to provide a focus for force development.

The role of military engineers is currently defined in a handful of publications, and it varies at least slightly from one publication to the next (as presented in Figure 1). More or less, the publications usually present that the role is *to assist friendly troops to fight, move and live, and to deny the same ability to the enemy*. That definition succeeds in reflecting the scope of responsibility in the branch, but it fails to provide that unifying focus that separates military engineers from the collective mass of combat support and service support branches.

A-JS-007-003/JD-001, *CUSTOMS AND TRADITIONS OF THE CANADIAN MILITARY ENGINEERS*, 30 JUNE 2003

The mission of the Canadian Military Engineers is to contribute to the survival, mobility, and combat effectiveness of the Canadian Forces. Roles are to conduct combat operations, support the Canadian Forces in war and peace, support national development, provide assistance to civil authorities, and support international aid programs. Engineers serve wherever the need arises, proud of the motto *Ubique* (Everywhere).

B-GL-361-001/FP-001, *LAND FORCE ENGINEER OPERATIONS, VOLUME 1*, 17 APRIL 1998

The Primary Role. To assist friendly troops to fight, move and live, and to denying [*sic*] the same ability to the enemy; and **The Secondary Role.** To fight as infantry.

B-GL-321-005/FP-001, *BATTLE GROUP IN OPERATIONS*, 20 AUGUST 2012

The role of engineers is to assist the land force to live, move and fight within the battlespace and to deny the same to the enemy. With limitations, engineers may also be employed as infantry when required.

B-GG-005-004/AF-015, *MILITARY ENGINEER SUPPORT TO CANADIAN FORCES OPERATIONS*, 06 JUNE 1999

The role of military engineers in operations is to assist friendly forces to live, move and fight, and to deny the same ability to the enemy. Land force engineers have the secondary role of fighting as infantry when required.

Figure 1: The Role of Military Engineers

In fact, the entirety of the service support branches work *to assist friendly troops to fight, move and live*. Through the delivery of ammunition, fuel and rations, the Logistics Branch works to those three ends. Through the maintenance of weapons and vehicles, the Royal Canadian Electrical Mechanical Engineering Corps works to those three ends as well. Even Health Services is contributing to friendly troops living and fighting through saving lives, preventing illness, and returning the formerly injured to their units. It is clear that “*to assist friendly troops to fight, move and live*” is not a unique role of military engineers (and therefore, neither is it a sufficient role upon which to define the branch).

The defined role of the Canadian Military Engineers does differ from the collective service support branches, as no service support branch also seeks *to deny the same ability to the enemy*. Instead, that additional component of the role is shared with many combat support branches. The Royal Canadian Corps of Signals works to allow friendly forces to freely communicate and to gain information through the detection and interception of enemy communications while simultaneously opposing those abilities of the enemy. Military police, through traffic control and security operations, *assist friendly troops to move and fight while denying the same ability to the enemy*.

To find what makes engineers unique, one needs to look beyond Canadian definitions to where NATO doctrine expands on the definition of military engineering. A critical element of the NATO definition is that military engineers shape the physical operating environment. That particular detail is what sets military engineers apart from service and support branches. That is the detail missing from the defined primary role. Military engineers influence the natural and constructed physical environment in order to achieve the currently defined role of assisting friendly forces.

NATO PUBLICATION MC 0560, *MILITARY COMMITTEE POLICY FOR MILITARY ENGINEERING*, 1 APRIL 2008

Military engineering is that engineer activity undertaken, regardless of component or service, to shape the physical operating environment. Military engineering incorporates support to manoeuvre and to the force as a whole, including military engineering functions such as engineer support to force protection, counter-improvised explosive devices, environmental protection, engineer intelligence and military search. Military engineering does not encompass the activities undertaken by those “engineers” who maintain, repair and operate vehicles, vessels, aircraft, weapon systems and equipment.

Military engineers assist friendly troops to live by making the environment more hospitable through the creation of camps and the provision of utilities. Resources, such as clean water and lumber, are drawn from the environment. Hazards (such as mines, IEDs or persistent chemical weapons) are tracked, marked and removed. Going beyond a hospitable environment, military engineers will shape the environment to protect friendly occupants with fortifications, CBRN-protected infrastructure and other protective works.

Conversely, military engineers turn the environment against the enemy by the emplacement of mines and booby-traps, the breaching of enemy protective works, and the destruction of infrastructure usable by the enemy.

Military engineers assist friendly troops to move by manipulating the environment to that end. Forests are made traversable through the creation of roads, rivers are crossed through the erection of bridges or ferries, and minefields become passable through breaching or clearance. To deny the same to the enemy, the environment is made less passable and potentially lethal. Roads and bridges are destroyed. Minefields, barriers and other obstacles are emplaced.

Finally, military engineers assist friendly troops to fight by making the environment more productive toward the conduct of operations. Prairie or woodland is turned into an airfield to support flying operations. Commanders are advised on options to exploit the natural and constructed environment to achieve tactical or operational ends. Fields of fire are cleared and obstacles are placed to funnel enemy movements and overwhelm enemy military engineering capability. Military engineers accompany friendly combat troops directly into the fight to overcome natural barriers and works of enemy engineers designed to oppose the friendly advance.

While that definition of shaping the physical environment is obviously inclusive of construction and combat engineering, it is also inclusive of fire protection services and geospatial engineering. The act of shaping the physical environment to support friendly forces not only consists of changing the environment; it also includes preserving, maintaining and protecting those aspects of the environment that are desirable. As such, firefighters directly contribute to shaping the environment through the protection and preservation of physical infrastructure (the constructed environment). Similarly, shaping the environment requires knowing the environment, advising commanders on how to exploit the physical environment for operational ends, and communicating information about the physical environment to all users. Geospatial engineering falls squarely within military engineering in that respect.

The defined role that military engineers *assist friendly troops to fight, move and live, and deny the same ability to the enemy* is accurate but insufficiently specific enough to differentiate military engineers from the collective mass of support and service arms. The key factor that sets military engineers apart is that we act upon the physical environment in order to perform the functions described in the official role. There is flexibility to debate if the verb should be shape, manipulate, influence, control, transform or change. What is necessary is that the role be redefined to include reference to acting upon the physical environment.

The recommended role is that *military engineers shape the environment to assist friendly troops to fight, move and live, and to deny the same to the enemy*. 🍁

ABOUT THE AUTHOR...

Major Ian McGregor, CD, is the Engineer Observer Controller at CMTc, having just served as DCO of 1 Combat Engineer Regiment (1 CER). He is an alumnus of the Army Technical Staff program and has previously written for the *Canadian's Army Journal*.

Gunner Trace Rasmussen of the 20th Independent Field Battery, Royal Canadian Artillery, based in Lethbridge, Alberta, fires a round from his C3 Howitzer during Exercise BISON WARRIOR at CFD Dundurn, Saskatchewan, 13–21 August 2016.

STRENGTHENING THE PRIMARY RESERVES – THE ROYAL CANADIAN ARTILLERY PERSPECTIVE

Major O.M. Wing and Captain N.E. Kaempffer

Supporting the Canadian Army (CA) through the provision of firepower, surveillance target acquisition, air defence and air space coordination, The Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery (RCA) is committed to the strengthening and integration of the Primary Reserves. With the Regular Force close support regiments, the General Support Regiment and the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery School, the RCA is leading the way through bold initiatives that are increasing interoperability and Corps capability. This article will briefly summarize some of the issues, actions, history and successes in the ongoing efforts to strengthen the RCA Primary Reserve.

While training, retention, and force generation concerns are common across all Corps within the CA, the RCA faces unique challenges due to the demands of firepower. It is important to note that the organization of the three Regular Force close support artillery regiments comprises 20% Primary Reservists, which are an integral part of their establishment. There are three streams within the RCA (field artillery, surveillance target acquisition [STA], and air defence); however, field artillery is the predominate stream within the Artillery Reserves. Therefore, augmentation to the Regular Force is generally limited to field artillery. However, under the recent Army Reserve Establishment (ARE) review, the RCA is boldly moving forward to introduce STA as an entirely new stream for Primary Reserves, which will maintain symmetry between the Regular and Reserve Forces. This initiative will also allow Primary Reserves to support 4th Artillery Regiment (General Support), Royal Canadian Artillery (RCA), in their mandate.

Equipment differences and the consequential training disparities between the Regular and Reserve Forces are another area where identified issues are being aggressively minimized through divisional partnerships. For example, whereas the Regular Force has transitioned to the 155-mm M777 howitzer, the Artillery Reserves continue to use 105 mm guns, creating a delta in terms of capability, capacity and training. 4th Canadian Division, under Operation REINFORCEMENT, is leading the way in strengthening the Primary Reserves, as 2nd Regiment, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, is working with their Primary Reserve counterparts to run conversion courses. This training enables the Primary Reserve to provide gunners that can potentially deploy as ROTO 0 augmentees, far above and beyond the mandated ROTO 1 role they currently fulfil.

The Chief of Defence Staff, through an initiating directive, identified strengthening the Primary Reserve as a critical component of the Canadian Armed Forces' ability to contribute across the full spectrums of operations, with Public Duties listed as a required capability. Further, the Commander of the CA has determined that his element will take the lead in establishing a self-sustaining, year-round Public Duties capability in the National Capital Region (NCR). In this vein, 30th Field Artillery Regiment, RCA, located in Ottawa, Ontario, continues to operate a high-visibility program that positively

frames gunners as an integral part of national events and celebrations. With an aim of continuing current and identifying additional potential Public Duties, the RCA is well poised to maintain pan-Canadian awareness of the Primary Reserve, with high school co-op programs as a growth market. 42nd Field Artillery Regiment (Lanark and Renfrew Scottish), RCA, in Pembroke, Ontario, has capitalized on the potential of this program, as they have set and met ambitious recruitment targets and serve as a model for other RCA units to follow.

It is clear that despite some of the aforementioned challenges, the Canadian Armed Forces, Canadian Army and Corps leadership are taking bold action to strengthen the Primary Reserves and close the divide between the Regular Force and the Reserve Force. Further, both the recent history and institutional makeup of the RCA has demonstrated the ability of gunners to surmount equipment and training issues. Artillery Reserve units across Canada successfully reinforced the Regular Force close support regiments during the war in Afghanistan, providing over 20% of gunners deployed on expeditionary duty. These augmentees were imperative to mission success and returned to their home units replete with new experiences, qualifications and abilities. Institutionally, the RCA is supported by

the Royal Regiment of Canadian Artillery School (RCAS), which, as a centre of excellence, provides world-class individual training to both the Regular and Reserve Force gunners. The RCAS, in conjunction with the Canadian Division training centres, ensures that artillery soldiers across Canada receive relevant, common and realistic instruction to enable mission success and operational excellence. Further, the RCAS offers trimestral employment opportunities to Primary Reservists, who provide vital support to National Calendar training by augmenting W Battery. Upon their arrival at Base Gagetown, these gunners are qualified on the M777 howitzer and receive other unique experiences and qualifications that they are able to bring back to their respective home units.

Ultimately, the RCA depends upon a family of Regular and Reserve artillery soldiers to deploy and sustain operationally effective artillery units. While the high-readiness Regular Force components of the RCA span a broad spectrum of capability, they depend upon a well-trained, well-equipped Primary Reserve force to provide vital augmentation. Therefore, the strengthening of the Primary Reserve is a vital component of ensuring the sustainability of the RCA for success during enduring missions. Strengthening the Primary Reserve continues to provide additional capacity in the training of a competent and capable Reserve Force that provides vital fire support, STA and air defence to the Canadian Army. 🍁

Integration in Action: W Battery of the Royal Regiment of Artillery School qualified both Regular Force and Primary Reserve augmentees on a recent Gun Detachment Second-in-Command course.





MARSHAL K.K. ROKOSSOVSKY: The Red Army's Gentleman Commander

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

SOKOLOV, Dr. Boris. Solihull, UK: Helion Publishing, 2015, 493 pages.
Photographs/Maps: 23/11, ISBN: 978-1-909982-10-9

Reviewed by Major Chris Buckham, CD, MA, Air Logistics Transport Officer, A5, 1st Canadian Air Division.

History is replete with biographies of American, Canadian, British and German Commanders from the Second World War; however, there is a pronounced dearth of in-depth studies of commanders from the Russian perspective that have not been skewed through the Soviet lens. Marshal Rokossovsky is a case in point: his life and career are a microcosm of the good and bad potential of the Soviet Union. He began his military career as a cavalryman in 1916

and became one of the finest Commanders of the Second World War. He was a Pole who considered himself Russian but was never truly trusted or accepted by either Poles or Russians. He was also a Bolshevik and a victim of Stalin's purges. A humble yet driven commander, he lacked a formal higher education, but was an avid student of the martial arts. He was deeply involved throughout the Barbarossa Campaign, starting as a Corps Commander in June, 1941, and ending the war as a Front Commander in 1945. At the end of his career, he was Chief Inspector of the Soviet Army and Deputy Minister of Defence.

Sokolov is very forthright in saying that he holds Rokossovsky in the highest regard as both an officer and a man. He was the only Marshal in the Russian Army who did not resort to threats or intimidation or directly order the execution of any subordinates. He was a driven Commander who held the lives of his soldiers in the highest regard. Nevertheless, the author is balanced in his appraisal of the Marshal and does not hesitate to highlight weaknesses as well as strengths. In his assessment of Rokossovsky as a strategist and warfare manoeuvre specialist, he makes it clear that, while competent, he was not a master of his craft; rather, his strength lay in his leadership and motivation of his soldiers and officers, his ability to draw upon their skill sets, and his willingness to accept risks and make decisions.


To write this book, Sokolov did not have a great deal of available source material left behind by Rokossovsky; so he drew upon primary sources in the Russian archives, the recollections of former subordinates, colleagues and family members, and histories. The material reflects the challenges of separating the chaff from the wheat in terms of written reminiscences from the Soviet era. Typical of this period was a tendency of commanders to embellish their reports to cast them in a better light. Sokolov has done an excellent job of identifying instances of embellishment and using alternative sources to draw attention to these inconsistencies. He has provided insight into his subject's strengths and weaknesses through an in-depth analysis of the challenges that Rokossovsky faced during his career. Consistent throughout

were four themes: his love of family, his struggle with his Polish/Russian identity, his loyalty and responsibility to the soldiers under his command, and his avoidance of any criticism of Stalin despite his horrible experiences at Stalin's direction.

Stuart Britton, once again, has provided an excellent translation from the original Russian, and Helion, the publisher, has produced a book of the highest quality. Sokolov deserves high praise for his work and the attention he has brought to a little-known but outstanding Russian Commander. His writing style is quite different from that of traditional Western authors in that it reverts periodically to an almost spoken text; however, this only requires getting used to and does not take away from the quality of the research. He also provides a selected bibliography, although, unfortunately for Western readers, it refers primarily to Russian sources. A very interesting and engaging read. 🍷



Georgi Zhukov (middle) and Konstantin Rokossovsky (right), greeting Bernard Montgomery (back to the camera) at the Brandenburg Gate, Berlin, Germany, 12 July 1945.



ARDENNES 1944, THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE:

Hitler's Last Gamble

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

BEEVOR, Anthony. New York: Viking, 2015, 451 pages.
ISBN: 978-0-670-025312

Reviewed by Major Thomas Fitzgerald, MA, LL.B, Senior Counsel with the Ontario Office of the Crown Attorney.

Anthony Beevor's latest literary effort, *Ardenne 1944, Battle of the Bulge*, follows his tried and true formula, a superb narrative style and a book crammed with a myriad of facts and vignettes. It may still disappoint, however. To be sure, *Ardenne 1944* is a compelling read. It recounts the origins of HERBSTNEBEL or, as it is more commonly called in the West, the "Battle of the Bulge", when three German armies

stormed out of the snow and fog and moved west. It was Hitler's vain hope that splitting the American and British armies in two and driving on to the ports of Antwerp and Brussels would create rifts in the western coalition and give Hitler time to turn on the Red Army and deal it a decisive defeat. For a number of reasons, *Wacht am Rhein* was, after some initial successes, doomed to ultimate failure.

The problem with *Ardenne 1944* is that it adds little to the existing literature of the battle. There is no new analysis. Beevor recounts the origins of the German offensive and puts it in its proper context by reviewing the battles that preceded it, Arnhem, Aachen and the Hurtgen Forest. The usual villains and personalities are identified. The author writes about the German operational discord that ultimately led to the initial blunting of the German offensive by the 2nd Armoured Division at Celles and its eventual roll back. General Omar Bradley, commander of the 12th Army Group, is held out for special criticism for allowing the "ghost front" of four divisions to hold an eighty mile line and thus become overextended. Beevor lauds General Eisenhower for recognizing by the second day when others did not: that the HERBSTNEBEL was not simply a spoiling attack but a full on offensive. Field Marshal Montgomery's military reputation, suspect in previous works by Beevor, experiences a modest rehabilitation in *Ardenne*. Montgomery managed to set aside his megalomaniacal tendencies and work in cooperation with the Americans. The internecine conflict among various senior commanders and senior intelligence officers, which led to the Allies' overall failure to appreciate the capabilities of the *Wehrmacht*, is re-examined by Beevor but with little editorial comment. If the Ardenne campaign teaches the student of military operations anything, it is to focus on *what the enemy can do, not what it cannot do*.


Ardenne suffers from its failure to look at the "big picture". Unlike Toland (1985), Dupuy (1995), Atkinson (2013) and Caddick-Adams (2015), Beevor concentrates on the German thrusts by the 5th and 6th Panzer armies but has little to say about the operations of General Brandenburger's 7th Army and General von Zangen's 15th Army, whose missions



Ardenne offensive, German soldiers in a Schützenpanzer (Sd.Kfz. 250 / Sd.Kfz. 251)

were to block the expected counter-offensives by General Patton's 3rd Army in the south and the Anglo-Canadian army in the north respectively. His treatment of the German encirclement of St. Vith and Bastogne also suffers from an absence of context and detail, which results in an uneven examination of the entire campaign. Even when Beevor does turn his attention to German operations, he focuses primarily on the operations of Joachim Peiper's ruthless 1st SS Panzer Division *Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler* and the 1st SS Regiment (*Kampfgruppe*), and the atrocities at Malmedy (Baugenez) and Honsfeld. Atrocities were not limited to the German forces. After Malmedy, it became common knowledge across the battle space that American troops were increasingly involved in the murders of both SS and *soldaten die soldaten*, actions implicitly condoned by senior commanders. As Beevor points out, by the time the conflict ended in 1944, the act of war, with its extensive and indiscriminate use of phosphorous shells and heavy bombing, had been industrialized to such a degree that both sides could justifiably be accused of committing atrocities.

One is left with little doubt after reading *Ardenne 1944* that there was courage and cravenness, stupidity and audacity, in abundance on both sides of the battle field. To muster and launch an offensive of the scope of HERBSTNEBEL and manage to keep it secret certainly defied the odds, particularly when one considers how close run thing the campaign was. That said, the tenacity of the American forces, and their refusal to yield ground unless ordered to, attests to a perseverance and resilience that ultimately led to the defeat of Hitler's last gamble. 🍁



HUBRIS:

The Tragedy of War in the Twentieth Century

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

HORNE, Alistair. New York: HarperCollins, 2015, 382 pages.
ISBN: 978-0-06-239780-5

Reviewed by Major Thomas Fitzgerald, MA, LL.B, Senior Counsel with the Ontario Office of the Crown Attorney.

Noun: *hubris, excessive pride or self-confidence, arrogance, conceit, haughtiness, hauteur, pride, self-importance. In Greek tragedy, excessive pride or defiance of the gods which leads to nemesis.*

In his most recent book, *Hubris: The Tragedy of War in the Twentieth Century*, Sir Alistair Horne, noted military historian and prolific author, asserts that the folly of military and political leaders is, having won a great victory, to overreach themselves and imbue their progeny with overwhelming, uncritical national confidence and arrogance leading almost, inevitably, to catastrophe. Hubris begets peripeteia as pride precedes a fall.

Drawing on six well-known and lesser-known battles in the latter half of the 20th century—Tsushima (1905), Nomonhan (1939), Moscow (1941), Midway (1942), Korea (1950) and Dien Bien Phu (1954)—Horne argues, somewhat convincingly, that these battles were a combination of racial prejudices, poor military intelligence, overweening military ambition and myopic strategy that coalesced into disasters of epic proportions. It cannot be denied that military history is full of examples of hubristic behaviour. However, Horne has skilfully selected these six battles for their wider and longer-term consequences rather than merely for the totality of the associated victories or defeats.

The almost complete annihilation of the Russian Second Pacific Squadron in the Straits of Tsushima following the Squadron's epic 18,000-mile odyssey presaged the rapid decline of the Tsarist Empire. The genesis of the Russian defeat stemmed from the view that the Japanese Navy was technologically inferior and captained by "little yellow people." The Russian defeat fostered an illusion of invincibility among the Japanese military leading, in turn, to the Japanese Army's own defeat by the Red Army at the battles of Nomonhan and Khalkhyn Gol and subsequently at the Battle of Midway. These two battles effectively forced Japan to turn south away from Manchuria and Russia and towards the Pacific to face eventual defeat by the United States Navy at Midway.

Hitler's early campaigns in Poland, the Low Countries and France set the hubristic stage for his invasion of Russia. His failure to properly clothe his soldiers for a winter campaign, believing that the Russian campaign would last a short six weeks, his dithering over German invasion routes during the early campaign, and his inexplicable declaration of war on the United States four days after Pearl Harbour are held up by Horne as acts of supreme hubris leading to ultimate defeat.


Horne concludes his book with an analysis of the overconfidence exhibited by General MacArthur following his successful landing at Inchon and subsequent pursuit of the Korean Peoples' Army (PKA) to the Yalu River with eventual disastrous results. Four years later, the French army was defeated at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. The battle sought to eradicate the memory of the 1940 debacle and resurrect and restore the lost glory of Verdun. These two battles, Horne asserts, are a clear manifestation of the generational effects of hubris, as the subsequent rise of China and Viet Nam attest.

Hubris is not without its weaknesses. The author does not consider the friction or fog of war as reasons for the defeat of commanders, nor does he allow superior tactics, improved technology or simple luck to be reasons for success. In *Hubris*, he stops short and ends with Dien Bien Phu. There is no mention of the Soviet adventure into Afghanistan and the Soviets' subsequent drubbing by the *mujahedeen*. The American imbroglio in Iraq is left unmentioned. *Hubris* is a big power analysis. There is little discussion of medium- or small-scale war dynamics, and certainly there was hubristic behaviour on the part of the commanders in these latter-day wars. Horne poses but does not satisfactorily answer the ultimate question arising from his book: When does a good commander know when or where to stop? When is the culminating point?

Hubris is an outstanding effort and an enjoyable read for both the specialist and general reader of military history. However, there is really nothing new in *Hubris*. What is novel is Horne's ordering of his subject matter and intricate and thoroughly enjoyable writing style. If Horne teaches us anything, it is that in military matters, there is a fine line between prudence and recklessness and between the Scylla and Charybdis of hubris and peripeteia, and that potential nemesis awaits those unable to navigate adroitly between them. 🍁



Captured French soldiers escorted by Vietnamese troops walk to a prisoner-of-war camp in Dien Bien Phu.



THE LAST EMPIRE: The Final Days of the Soviet Union

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

PLOKHY, Serhii, New York: Basic Books, 2014, 489 pages plus a new foreword by the author. ISBN: 978-0-465-04671-3

*Reviewed by Lieutenant-Colonel N. Anthony Kaduck, CD, BA, MA,
Canadian Army Land Warfare Centre Future Concepts Team Leader*

The demise of the Soviet Union was predictable: as Paul Kennedy has demonstrated, empires and great powers eventually fail if they continually devote excess wealth to military procurement at the expense of more productive investments. While its “guns and butter” policies may account for the downfall of the world’s last great empire, the timing of its collapse has not been adequately explained. How did it transpire that in late 1991

the Soviet Union, the world’s largest country, with enormous and powerful armed forces and vast natural resources, simply vanished, “not with a bang but a whimper”?

Drawing on a wealth of primary sources, including personal discussions with several of the key players, Serhii Plokhy has provided a compelling account of how this event—described by Vladimir Putin as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th Century—came to pass. His book focuses on the five crucial months in 1991 that started with the failed coup against Mikhail Gorbachev in August and ended with the dissolution of the Union on December 25th.

Plokhy thoroughly dismisses the commonplace narratives that see the Soviet Union succumbing to the unbending will of Ronald Reagan, the threat of Star Wars (SDI) or the inexorable lure of the free market. In his analysis, the causes lie entirely within Russian politics. While the failure of Perestroika to reverse economic decline set the stage for an eventual collapse, the proximate causes can be found in rising ethnic nationalism, power struggles (especially over the assets and liabilities of the USSR) between Russia and the other republics, personal animosities, and the manoeuvring of key individuals for political advancement, all exacerbated by the impact of a newly-enfranchised electorate.

In Plokhy’s view, Ukraine was the linchpin. Ukraine was the second most populous republic and supplied most of the food produced within the Soviet Union. Moreover, for Russians, Ukraine, along with White Russia (Belarus), was an essential element of the Slavic core of the Union and provided a counterbalance to the Asian republics of the East. From the Russian perspective, a union or federation that did not include Ukraine was unthinkable.

Plokhy argues that Russia, and later the Soviet Union, never managed to integrate Ukraine. Ukrainian nationalism has deep roots, and Ukrainians suffered grievously under Stalin’s reign. The addition of Kyiv and the large formerly Polish territories in 1945



Russian President Boris Yeltsin speaks atop a tank outside the Russian White House in defiance of the August 1991 coup.

Source: Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0, <https://commons.wikimedia.org>


strengthened its sense of being separate and different from Russia and its dislike of Russian domination. Under the later Soviet Union, a modus vivendi was reached under which Ukraine supported the central government and in return was largely left alone to run its own affairs. But when Perestroika failed and the time came to renegotiate the Union Treaty or form a new federal state, it was the unwillingness

of Ukrainians to join a Russian-dominated federation that ultimately led to the complete breakup of the Union.

As for the commonly-held view that US leadership facilitated the liberation of the republics from the Soviet yoke, Plokhy provides a detailed account of how the George H.W. Bush administration tried up until the end to support Gorbachev, preserve the Union and discourage its members, especially Ukraine, from seceding.

This book is everything one wants of a historical work: it is original, well researched, well argued and highly readable. Its publication also came at a fortuitous moment—on its first release in May 2014, Russia’s “ambiguous war” against Ukraine was reaching its peak. In this context, Plokhy’s description of the events of August 1991 is most enlightening. On the 24th, Ukraine declared its independence and set the date for a secession referendum. Three days later, the Russian republic held a press conference stating that in the event of secession by any republic Russia would reserve the right to reopen the issue of borders. When his press secretary was asked which republics Boris Yeltsin had in mind, he replied that the contested areas were territories that had formerly belonged to Russia, and he specifically mentioned Crimea and the Donetsk region of Ukraine.

This book will be essential reading for anyone with an interest in the Soviet Union. I would further recommend it to anyone looking for a compelling, readable account of one of the major events of the 20th Century, with the caveat that some general knowledge of late Soviet history, especially the events of the Gorbachev reign, will be helpful. The paperback edition is the best option as it includes a foreword in which the author offers an insightful analysis of the events leading up to the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict. 🍁



MISSION AT NUREMBERG:

An American Army Chaplain and the Trial of the Nazis

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

TOWNSEND, TIM. New York: HarperCollins, 2014, 400 pages.
ISBN: 0061997196

Reviewed by Major Harold Ristau, PhD

Mission at Nuremberg: An American Army Chaplain and the Trial of the Nazis (Harper Collins, 2014) by Tim Townsend recounts the story of two US German-speaking army chaplains, one Roman Catholic and one Protestant, who were assigned the mission of offering spiritual care to the highest ranking Nazis awaiting trial at Nuremberg for the atrocities of World War II. The chaplains' new congregation consisted of twenty-one convicts,

including Hermann Goering, Albert Speer, Wilhelm Keitel, Hans Frank, and Ernst Kaltenbrunner, the orchestrators of one of the worst genocides in modern history. Basing his account on scrupulous research into various caches of material, including formerly classified documents, eyewitness accounts, journal entries and letters only recently made available, esteemed journalist Tim Townsend provides fascinating insights into the minds and souls of these criminals and, in some cases, tracks the psychological and spiritual transformations undergone by these key players in the Nazi party during the period between their capture and execution. Although there are references throughout the book to the Roman Catholic chaplain, Father Sixtus (Richard) O'Conner, the work tends to focus on the Lutheran chaplain, 50-year-old Henry Gerecke, whose three sons were either killed or wounded on the battlefield, and his own personal journey of faith as he wrestles with the ethical and moral conflicts tied to the task before him. Yet this intriguing biography of a chaplain will be of interest not only to religious leaders but to any professional or lay student of history, military logistics and political science, not to mention readers interested in exploring the darkest spheres of human psychology and courageous enough to ask some of the most momentous questions relating to morality and spirituality. Military personnel will find the book especially thought-provoking given our present global climate of instability, which sees the motivations, worldviews and justifications that informed the Nazi mindset inspiring our enemies today. For example, one of the incarcerated Nazis who did show remorse describes the intricate logistical systems of the extermination camps that were designed to maximize efficiency and dehumanize their victims. Such frightening rationalizations, underpinned by a mechanistic worldview, serve as a warning to all of us and shows the dangerous repercussions of a military ethos that has forgotten that it serves, and consists of, a society of people created in the image of God. Written by a journalist who is clearly not anti-religious but whose religious or spiritual convictions are unclear, the book provides a factual account with a minimum of editorial bias.



Lutheran chaplain, 50-year-old Henry Gerecke

Townsend offers us a window into the hearts, minds and souls of criminals struggling with end of life issues that are complicated by personal guilt and responsibility for their sins and, just as important, the moral and ethical conflicts undergone by the chaplains. For instance, when initially assigned the task, the chaplains suffered a clear crisis of conscience surrounding the right of these criminals to have access to a chaplain, asking whether they were beyond redemption or might not deserve it: "Why preach the Gospel of mercy to those responsible for such atrocities?" The author notes that many Americans wanted

to deprive the convicts of any spiritual counsel as part of their punishment. However, the general religious sentiment behind the deployment of these two chaplains was that even the worst of the worst, irrespective of their crimes, still had value before God. The belief was that even criminals should be offered the opportunity to repent and receive forgiveness for their sins, and comfort for their souls, from their Maker in heaven, even while being punished for their crimes by the State on earth. This concept was in accordance with the Christian principle that all people are created in the image of God and that Christ, believed to have been sent by God as the saviour of the world, gave his life for all of us, even the most wicked among us, without discrimination. In their minds, therefore, the battle was both physical and spiritual in nature. The biblical passage, "For we do not wrestle against flesh and blood, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the cosmic powers over this present darkness, against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly places" (Ephesians 6:12), provided the fuel for the ministry of these chaplains, even though they were sometimes beset by personal doubt. After all, the idea of extending forgiveness to criminals who had committed such heinous crimes is neither intuitive nor "reasonable." These sentiments and troubling moral questions were complicated by the inevitable pastoral relationships that developed between the chaplains and these murderers, since many of the Nazis began faithfully and regularly attending a chapel specifically reserved for them as they attended trials that they knew full well would end in their execution. These chaplains were priests shepherding a congregation of Nazis and walking with them to their death! Ultimately, none of these criminals remained neutral in their convictions; while some displayed sincere remorse, others totally rejected God and love for humankind.



Source: Wikimedia Commons

Nuremberg trials. Defendants in their dock, circa 1945–1946 (front row, from left to right): Hermann Göring, Rudolf Heß, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Wilhelm Keitel (second row, from left to right): Karl Dönitz, Erich Raeder, Baldur von Schirach, Fritz Sauckel

What I found most surprising, as a Lutheran military chaplain myself, was the repentance shown by many of the criminals and the absence of any wish or desire to avoid the punishment sought by the court. The reader is driven to question the degree to which their “conversion” stemmed from their personal disillusionment with the Nazi party and fear of the afterlife, or from true repentance and profound horror for their deeds. The chaplains seemed to be equally surprised with the results of their ministry, to the point where they are initially reluctant to offer the sacrament of Holy Communion to any of them since, for Lutherans and Roman Catholics, the Lord’s Supper is believed to be the primary means of reconciliation between God and man. Naturally, the chaplains wondered whether the criminals had other motives or may have been trying to manipulate them toward other ends. They could be likened to a doctor who is trying to determine a remedy when the symptoms are unclear. The book also delves into the emotional involvement of the chaplains, and that of the prison guards, who were practically confined to living communally with these prisoners over the two years of the trials. The chaplains also addressed the challenge of ministering to the convicts’ wives and children by conveying messages, leading prayers and providing counsel. One powerful theme throughout the book concerns the relationship that developed between

Chaplain Gericke and the prominent Nazi, Hermann Goering, whom Gericke hoped would repent in order to escape what he believed would be eternal damnation, and his disappointment when the Nazi showed scant signs of remorse for his sins or faith in a good and merciful God.


While the book recounts the last days, hours and minutes of the prisoners’ progress toward the gallows in painstaking detail, including the particularities of last meals, timings, preparations, etc., it also, and more interestingly, records the wide-ranging reactions of all those who died: their final words, facial expressions, prayers, cries, pleas, and even a final sign of “Heil Hitler” from one impenitent Nazi. For history buffs fascinated by politics in the aftermath of World War II, a subtheme of the book revolves around the unique political considerations surrounding the trials. For instance, the author explores some of the strange, but unsurprising, details of the executions, including deliberate, though illegal, loose nooses, and the logistical and political issues surrounding the disposal of the bodies, owing to the possible impact on Nazi sympathizers.

My only criticism of the work was the lack of insight shown in some summaries of theological issues, which greatly oversimplified Christian doctrines. For most lay readers, these inaccuracies will not be noticeable nor interfere with their enjoyment of the book. But without delving further into some of these theological concerns, I have to say that they tend to deprive the reader of insight into the deeper complexities of the issues under discussion. Overall, however, this work of historical non-fiction, accompanied by unique photos, is written in a style that is simple and accessible but has the pace of an action novel. CAF Officers and NCMs alike will definitely find it thought-provoking. 🍁



Source: United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration, College Park

The main cell block in the Nuremberg prison, where defendants standing trial before the International Military Tribunal are being incarcerated. One guard has been posted at the entrance to each of the defendant’s cells in order to prevent suicide attempts.



NATIONAL SERVICE: Conscription in Britain, 1945–1963

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

VINEN, Richard. London: Allen Lane, 2014, 640 pages.
ISBN 978-1-846-14387-8

Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, jrcsp, Army Lessons
Learned Centre

Unlike in Canada, Britain's victory over the Axis powers in 1945 did not signal the end of mandatory military service for its citizens. Instead, in order to cling to its increasingly precarious status of Empire, the United Kingdom extended its wartime *National Service (Armed Forces) Act of 1939* into the postwar era with a revised *National Service Act* first passed by the recently elected Liberal government in 1947.

This updated Act allowed the government

to continue conscripting all British subjects between the ages of 17 and 21 for military service lasting up to two years. As a result of this policy, nearly two million conscripts—most of whom were paid just over a pound a week—served in the British armed forces between the end of the Second World War and the final rescindment of national service requirements for British citizens in 1963.

Richard Vinen's award winning book, *National Service: Conscription in Britain, 1945–1963*, puts the often overlooked subject of Britain's mandatory Cold War era military service back at the center of British modern history. Drawing from rich sources both quantitative and qualitative, Vinen weaves together an engaging and insightful narrative of the subject that dispels many of the legends and myths that have since surrounded this extraordinary period in modern British history.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Britain faced an uncertain future as it struggled to maintain its shrinking global empire. The manpower requirements alone to garrison its colonies were massive, even as great possessions such as India were to soon slip from the bonds of British Imperialism, forcing the already war-weary British government to impose further mandatory military service on its citizenship. Beginning in 1946, the Liberal government realized that Britain had a need for a larger armed force than what voluntary recruitment would provide. As a result, it passed a *National Service Act* in July 1947 with a view to institutionalizing mandatory military service for all British citizens by 1949. Using a wide variety of primary sources including an extensive collection of veterans' memoirs, Vinen dispassionately paints a picture of postwar military Britain far different from many previous accounts.

In his research, Vinen discovered that national service, far from acting as a system of discipline and reformation for Britain's 'bad lads,' was in fact believed by many officials at the time to have actually exacerbated delinquency in British youth as their lives were put



New recruits of the Scots Guards clean their rifles and boots in their barrack room at Pirbright training camp.

on hold while they waited for the inevitable call up. Young men, having finished school, found that they couldn't get on with their apprenticeships, scholarships, or relationships as they waited to be conscripted and sent to outposts overseas. The result was a generation of young men 'put on hold,' and who as a result would recall their national service more as an interruption or annoyance in their lives rather than a fond memory. Additionally, far from being egalitarian or a great mixing up of Britain's class system, national service did not break down traditional barriers in Britain's ever class-conscious society. Many of the British Army's 'smart' regiments (i.e. the Household Division, Cavalry, Guards, etc.) recruited their national service men exclusively from Britain's top public schools. Thus, it was unlikely that a grammar school boy might find himself posted into a Guards regiment. Equally, there was little chance one would find an Etonian serving in the Royal Army Service Corps.

Beyond the considerable discussion over how class affected national service, Vinen explores the experiences of a wide range of national service men in Britain's many early Cold War era conflicts. Chapters are devoted to Korea, the Suez Canal, and other imperial emergencies such as Malaya, Kenya, and Cyprus. His investigations into the lives, and in some cases deaths, of national service men are sure to give the reader pause for thought. Vinen very evenly offers both positive and negative portrayals of experiences overseas. While the positive experiences are informative, it is often the negative experiences that for many readers will be more insightful into the hardships of conscripted soldiering. Among the many campaigns Vinen covers, several key incidents



Source: Wikimedia Commons

King's Own Scottish Borderers on patrol in Malaya

in British military history on which he focuses—such as the Scots Guards massacre at Batang Kali in December 1948 during the Malayan emergency, the Griffiths court martial for shooting unarmed civilians in July 1953 during the Mau Mau Rebellion in Kenya, and the bloody British Army retribution against the Greek Cypriots for the murder of Mrs. Catherine Cutcliffe (a British soldier's wife) in Cyprus in August 1958—are sure to arouse interest and perhaps further debate on the history of national service in a broader political context.

Beyond the political, military, and disciplinary aspects of British national service, Vinen also explores a number of other important topics such as religion, education, gender, and sexuality. With regard to the education and class discussions, readers unfamiliar with British society would do well to gain some basic understanding of how class and education work in order to get the most from this book. The hereditary divisions of class in early Cold War era Britain may seem foreign to Canadian readers, but it was then and in many ways even today remains a critical influence in all aspects of British society. So, for example, who one's father was and where one went to school greatly influenced both whether or not one might become an officer and also what regiment one might expect to serve in. For those who went to public schools—essentially what in Canada might be considered private schools—chances were good one might obtain a commission in a Guards or smart county regiment. For those who were grammar


school graduates or less—in Canada those who graduated from the public school system or perhaps not at all—chances were greater of ending up in the Royal Artillery or the Pioneer Corps. Similarly, Vinen's insights into how national service dealt with religion, sexuality and gender identity may surprise some readers. Far from being abusive or punitive, the British Army was widely tolerant of a soldier's religion, conscientious objection, and sexuality preferences (or lack thereof) and often turned a blind eye to subjects such as pacifism, communism, and even homosexuality at a time when the rest of British society did not.

In each case, Vinen has treated the subject admirably, leaving the reader with little doubt as to why *National Service: Conscription in Britain, 1945–1963* was awarded the prestigious Templer Medal book prize for outstanding research in British military history. Highly recommended for students of Britain's military past and the wider societal impacts of the early Cold War era, this book easily merits a place on the bookshelves of scholars and practitioners alike. 🌸



World map showing areas of operation for national servicemen 1947–1963

Source: British National Army Museum, <https://www.nam.ac.uk/explore/malayan-emergency>



THE WEIGHT OF COMMAND: Voices of Canada's Second World War Generals and Those Who Knew Them

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

GRANATSTEIN, J.L., Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2016, 295 pages. Illustrations, ISBN 978-0-7748-3299-1

Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, jrcsp, Army Lessons Learned Centre

In history, timing is everything, and the same axiom often holds true for the historians exploring that history. In the early 1990s, Canadian military and political historian Jack Granatstein undertook a new research project that eventually led to the publication of his well-received book: *The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War*. Employing a large number

of interviews with former officers and their families to create a comprehensive and detailed collective biography, this volume has since become a standard, if not essential, reference for any serious student of the Canadian Army's experience in the liberation of Nazi-held Europe. As impressive as *The Generals* was, however, its real achievement was in its timing. By 1990, many of the central actors that led Canada's wartime army had already passed on, but Granatstein, through no small effort, managed to track down and interview at length just about every single person who was part of that community of leadership and was still alive. As a result, he captured an invaluable body of information just in time, preserving the personal observations, insights, and judgments of the remaining cadre of Canadian wartime army senior leadership; that body of information is priceless, both for scholars and for posterity.

Often referred to by established scholars in this field simply as "the Granatstein interviews," the interviews could be found in the bibliography of just about every work on the topic. Yet as an unpublished resource, the interview summaries remained somewhat hidden and accessible to only a select few—mainly a handful of scholars and practitioners who knew the author or one of his graduate students. The publication of *The Weight of Command* forever changes that paradigm, however, and, with the inclusion of additional context, the author and the university press have done a great service by making the interviews readily accessible to a much wider audience.

This book is best read as a companion to *The Generals*, but it is not necessary to be familiar with the author's previous study in order to enjoy this book on its own. As the title suggests, *The Weight of Command* presents, with minimal introduction and editing, no less than 70 interview summaries. Separated into four loose groups—generals, fighters, staff, and families—the list includes figures such as Bert Hoffmeister, George Kitching, Harry Leston, Bruce Matthews, Robert Moncel, Denis Whitaker, and Geoffrey Walsh, to name but a few, as well

as several other key players such as Frank Lace, Ernest Côté, Robert Raymont, and George Pangman. The list of interviewed family members is similarly long and includes the relatives of Hertzberg, Vokes, Pope, Worthington, and more.

The summaries themselves consist of a brief introduction of the person being interviewed followed by topic subheadings of the various events and personalities that were discussed. As the author was after particular information in the course of his research for *The Generals*, certain subjects and issues are inevitably more prevalent than others. For example, Guy Simonds, who had passed away in 1974, was a frequent topic of discussion, as were key events such as the Battle of Ortona, D-Day, and operations in Normandy. That is useful, for it allows readers to gain not just biographical insight but also critical perspectives on key events that took place during the war. The book is further supported with essential appendices on appointments and terms of rank, as well as a useful essay on selected readings related to Canada's Second World War experience. Not surprisingly, the book is fully indexed, further facilitating its use as a scholar's reference.

Unlike the armies of its allies, the Canadian Army has not done a very good job of making its own historical primary sources, key documents, and letters beyond the regimental level easily available to researchers and historians. Jack Granatstein's *The Weight of Command: Voices of Canada's Second World War Generals and Those Who Knew Them* will hopefully change that record as the first of many more such collected works to come through the Studies in Canadian Military History Series. This book is a welcome companion to *The Generals* and, either in conjunction with that work or on its own, is strongly recommended for both scholars and general readers alike. 🍀



Seated from left: Stanislaw Maczek (Polish Army), Guy Simonds (II Canadian Corps), Harry Crerar (First Canadian Army), Charles Foulkes (I Canadian Corps), Bert Hoffmeister (5th Canadian (Armoured) Division); Standing from left: Ralph Keefer (3rd Canadian Infantry Division), Bruce Matthews (2nd Canadian Infantry Division), Harry Foster (1st Canadian Infantry Division), Robert Moncel (for Chris Vokes) (4th Canadian Armoured Division), S.B. Rawlins, (British 49th Infantry Division)

Source: K. Beil / Library and Archives Canada/DND/PA-137473



ZOMBIE ARMY:

The Canadian Army and Conscription in the Second World War

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

BYERS, Daniel. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2016, 344 pages. Illustrations, maps, ISBN 978-0-7748-3052-2

Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, jrcsp, Army Lessons Learned Centre

As a major partner to Britain during the Second World War, Canada committed itself to providing substantial land, sea, and air forces in support of the Allies as they waged their deadly struggle against Nazi Germany. This resulted in the political requirement for conscription at home, invoking a system that eventually put thousands of Canadian men into uniform and provided them with military

training in preparation for possible deployment to operations overseas. While the politics of Canada's wartime conscription has been an often debated topic amongst scholars and practitioners, the actual machinations of wartime military mobilization itself have received far less detailed attention from historians. In his new book, *Zombie Army: The Canadian Army and Conscription in the Second World War*, Laurentian University historian Daniel Byers offers a fresh perspective on Canada's wartime conscription plan through an examination of its political genesis, organizational details, and military execution, providing a much needed new look at its overall effectiveness.

Byers' study of Canada's Second World War conscripts—who were pejoratively referred to as “zombies” because of their perceived similarity to the mindless creatures of 1930s movies—is the first detailed study of the subject in nearly four decades. The book is organized into five parts, and the author examines the following: the origins of the *National Resources Mobilization Act* (NRMA) and its influence on the creation of Canada's wartime military; the organization and composition of the Home Defence, NRMA, and General Service soldier communities; the wartime experiences of conscripted soldiers; and the ultimate impact of conscription on the size, organization, and legacy of the wartime military itself. This thematic approach to the subject lends itself well to analysis as it allows the reader to digest an otherwise complex topic with considerable ease. The study of human resource management is not the most exciting of topics even at the best of times, so Byers is to be commended for his ability to engage the reader effectively in that regard.


Going beyond earlier scholarship on the topic, *Zombie Army* breaks considerable new ground in its analysis thanks to Byers' efforts to mine many new and previously underused sources. The results are revealing, especially with regard to the role of Quebec and Canada's francophone community in the war. Contrary to earlier interpretations that mythologized Quebec's participation as minimal and only grudgingly so, Byers offers a very different conclusion, as the evidence presented suggests. Not only were Quebec's politicians



Unidentified members of the 13th Infantry Brigade Group taking part in Operation COTTAGE, the invasion of the island of Kiska, the Aleutian Islands, Alaska, July 1943

and media generally supportive of the NRMA, francophone soldiers were not underrepresented in training or in volunteering for overseas duties. Though barriers such as language remained, overall Byers argues that the experience was far more positive than previous studies have allowed for. Beyond the politics of the subject, Byers has also done good work to highlight other lesser-known aspects of the NRMA soldier's wartime experience. For example, *Zombie Army* examines both the training centres as well as the training curriculum in some detail, offering a portrait of conscript life during the war that previous studies on the subject have tended to gloss over. Additionally, he offers considerable detail regarding the operational employment of the NRMA-sourced 13th Canadian Infantry Brigade at Kiska during the Aleutian Islands campaign, an often-overlooked aspect of their wartime experience.

When military historians in Canada raise the term “conscription,” it is almost always in reference to the country's Great War crisis. Dan Byers' *Zombie Army: The Canadian Army and Conscription in the Second World War* offers a welcome juxtaposition to Canada's First World War experience, making it a valuable resource on this tremendously important subject for both students and scholars. More broadly, *Zombie Army* adds yet another important study to the large codex of Canadian Second World War literature, adding new life to a topic that has not been investigated in detail for many years. 🍁



THE DEFENCE OF SEVASTOPOL 1941-1942:

The Soviet Perspective

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION:

Donnell, Clayton. Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books, 2016, 248 pages.
Illustrations, maps, ISBN 978-1-78346-391-6

Reviewed by Major Andrew B. Godefroy, CD, PhD, jrcsp, Army Lessons
Learned Centre

In 1941, as Germany's forces fought their way into the Soviet Union, the German 11th Army along with its Romanian and Italian partners was ordered to encircle and capture the vast fortress of Sevastopol on the Crimean Peninsula. Soviet forces had been using the region to launch air raids against Romanian oil fields, destroying resources vital to the German war effort. As a result, Hitler issued a

directive to his generals to launch an assault directly against the Crimea and crush all Soviet presence there. The punishing land, sea, and air campaign that followed lasted from 30 October until the beginning of July 1942, with the Axis powers ultimately suffering just over 70,000 casualties. Soviet losses in the campaign were similarly high, with almost the entire Crimean garrison of 118,000 men being killed, captured, or wounded. In his new book, *The Defence of Sevastopol 1941-1942: The Soviet Perspective*, historian and military fortress expert Clayton Donnell offers a fresh look at the Soviet defence of the Crimean peninsula, paying particular attention to the geography and fortification of the battlefields.

In the eight-month campaign, the Germans were required to launch three successive assaults against the Soviet defenders in order to capture the peninsula and its prize, the port city of Sevastopol. The first German assault, lasting the month of November 1941, slowly reduced the Soviet perimeter on the peninsula, but that came at considerable cost to the attackers. The Soviet defences and fortifications were extensive, and the Russians, though often disorganized, had shown their toughness. Every hill and valley was laced with concrete bunkers, guns, and strongpoints, and the Germans were forced to pay dearly for every inch of ground. The weather had also turned by then, bringing cold temperatures and substantial rain. Snow and frost bit at the morale of soldiers while rain turned every clay road into an impassible morass. Still, the German Army mounted a second assault on 17 December, much to the surprise of the Soviets, who thought they had insufficient resources to do so. That was followed about a week later by a Soviet countermove on the eastern end of the peninsula at Kerch. The Russians hoped to draw enemy forces away from the effort against Sevastopol, but their landings had a limited effect. Still, the Soviets continued to apply pressure on the Germans through a series

of counter-offensives lasting from January to May 1942, even though the attacks were generally disorganized and costly to the Russians. Most historians often overlook those other events, Donnell notes, as they occurred at the same time as the main fighting at Kerch. Instead, their attention always returns to the Sevastopol battle when the third and final German assault against the city began in June 1942.

Donnell, a retired US Air Force officer and historian, has published extensively on military fortifications in Europe, and that expertise is readily evident in this latest work. Taking the reader from the initial contact between German and Soviet forces right through to the final defeat of the defending Sevastopol garrison, Donnell misses little in his detailed examination of the extensive series of defences that the Soviets prepared in order to deny the Germans victory. While the information provided in the text tends to be dry and follows what is by now a well-explored historical narrative, it is the use of maps and illustrations that really make this work a valuable reference. Donnell offers a very good explanation of the geography and its use by the Soviets to create their network of defences, and his descriptions of fortifications are accompanied by an extensive array of maps and technical drawings. As a technical study of fortifications, the book is a complete success, and, given the current focus on the region, Canadian Army officers and noncommissioned officers will find much of interest in this work. Donnell's *The Defence of Sevastopol 1941-1942: The Soviet Perspective* is a worthy addition to the current soldier's tactical library and is similarly recommended for both students and scholars of the Eastern Front war. 🇷🇺



Destroyed Obukhovskii 12"/52 Pattern 1907 twin turret, Fort Maxim Gorky, Sevastopol, Russia

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