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NOTE TO READERS

As a bilingual journal, readers should take note that where citations are translated from their original language, the abbreviation [TOQ] at the end of the note, which stands for “translation of original quote”, indicates to the readers that the original citation can be found in the published version of the Journal in the other official language.
Welcome to the Spring 2018 edition of the Canadian Military Journal. As I pen these words, my wife has just informed me that she is seeing a flock of 15 robins attempting to find worms through our snow-covered backyard… in late-January. Our winter has been crazy in the Great White North this year. Apparently, even our feathered friends are confused…

This issue’s cover is graced with a stunning tribute by Montréal artist Charles Vinh to the venerable Sikorsky CH-124 Sea King helicopter, just recently retired from the Royal Canadian Navy’s east coast fleet after 54 years of distinguished maritime service in Canada’s armed forces. Bravo Zulu to the aircraft, and to all who crewed and maintained her over the years.

Quite an eclectic scope of offerings this time out. Taking the point, Dr. Jim Barrett, who has a long and distinguished career at the Royal Military College of Canada, examines the synergistic interaction that exists between the military culture and the substantially-different academic culture at our military colleges. In his words: “Time and again, when events move too fast… the military turns to the academe for understanding. For this reason alone it is interesting to ask: What is the military-academic common ground, and what, if any, are its universal and abiding features? What resists cultural collaboration, and, above all, what sustains it?”

Next, logistics officer Major Gordon Bennett introduces three models of command presently taught at the Canadian Forces College that form the basis of Canadian command doctrine. Bennett, however, “…upon closer inspection of the models and their applications [suggests] there appear to be unanswered questions regarding the holistic nature of command.” With that in mind, Bennett provides a holistic command model that, building on the work of existing models but with distinct differences, “…better encompasses the nature of command. This new model will be termed the ‘Balanced Command Model,’ as it balances four key successful areas of command.”

In a continuation of the examination of Canada’s Search and Rescue (SAR) shortcomings introduced in the last issue, Major Jean Leroux, a highly-experienced Search and Rescue aircrew member, suggests that while the current system is working, there is certainly room for improvement. “While the tactical delivery of SAR across the elements of the National SAR Program is effective and powerful, attention needs to focus upon the strategic level, as historical coordination deficiencies at this level have undermined the performance of the system as a whole.”

Moving right along, Major Martin Rivard, a communications officer with a wealth of staff and command tours in the Army and in the Joint world in the Materiel and IM Groups, suggests that “…The Department of National Defence is highly susceptible to procurement failures, due to the way it is organized, and the manner by which it processes strategic decisions.” After introducing a number of factors and issues that are at the root of these failures, Rivard discusses “…alternatives and mitigation techniques that could possibly help solve some of these issues.”

In our last major article, Andrew Fraser, a lawyer and writer who also holds graduate degrees in history and international affairs, maintains that “…the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan has generated not only a determined insurgency, but also the extraordinary emergence of suicide bombing as a method of warfare in the region.” Fraser points out that since 2004, Canadian ISAF forces alone have been the targets of nearly 40 of those suicide bombings. He also suggests that there is a significant connection between the Afghan Taliban and well-established Pakistani militant organizations, who he believes predominate as recruiters for the suicide missions. However, due to “…the conservative and sometimes-reactionary order that reigns in the area, and its traditionally-deep suspicion of outsiders, international efforts to train local security organizations… are unlikely to succeed.” He concludes that curbing the appeal of the recruiters can only work if such an initiative comes from inside the affected communities themselves.

Two very different opinion pieces in this issue… Leading off, Reservist infantry officer and civilian police officer Captain Peter Keane submits that “…there have been direct links established between resilience and the ability to overcome the effects of combat.” In his short article, Keane argues “…that the development and promulgation of an ethics regime contributes directly to a soldier’s resilience in combat, and it is because of this that existing CAF training in this area needs to be expanded, with a focus upon those in leadership positions.” In the second opinion piece, Lieutenant (N) Padre Éloi Gunn critically examines the process of religious radicalization, as well as the violent extremism that frequently accompanies that radicalization process. To that end, he will advance “…some potential solutions for preventing radicalization and achieving de-radicalization in the face of radical Islamist propaganda.”

Next, our dedicated defence commentator, Martin Shadwick, tracks the history of the current Government’s initiatives with respect to Peace Operations, and how they have evolved from an initially-enthusiastic stance to one that is somewhat more reflective, realistic, sophisticated, and nuanced with respect to the inherent risks and costs.

Finally, we close with a book review essay by Don Graves of some recent literary efforts dealing with the Normandy Campaign in 1944, particularly with respect to Canadian Army operations, and Don’s essay is followed by a brace of book reviews on very disparate Second World War subjects, which we hope will pique our readership’s interest.

Until the next time.
Dr. Jim Barrett spent most of his working life in military academe. He is a graduate of the Royal Military College of Canada, and King’s College, University of London, and he holds an honorary doctorate from the Royal Military College of Canada. He has served as a navigator with 405 Squadron of the RCAF, as a Dean and Vice-Principal of the Royal Military College, and as Director of Learning Innovation at the Canadian Defence Academy. He is also a Professor Emeritus of the Royal Military College.

“To understand the world and to change it have traditionally been thought different endeavors. Who contemplates does not act, and he who acts must abandon contemplation.”

~ Kenneth R. Minogue

Introduction

Military culture and academic culture are worlds apart— the university’s ivied towers are a long way from Iraq’s dusty battlefields. Nonetheless, a useful working partnership has persisted for centuries at least, and there is a well-established and enduring common ground. Significant military-academic interaction takes place primarily in military academe, by which we mean the military college, the national defence college, and, in what might be termed military science. Although close interaction with scholars is but a small fraction of military life, and the classroom is hardly symbolic of martial spirit, military academe is a vital piece of the military enterprise. Time and again, when events move too fast, when the news “gets inside the institutional OODA loop,” the military turns to the academe for understanding. For this reason alone it is interesting to ask: What is the military-academic common ground, and what, if any, are its universal and abiding features? What resists cultural collaboration, and, above all, what sustains it?

Idealized scholars and idealized soldiers stand at opposite ends of the contemplation-action spectrum. They have different ingrained responses— where the soldier feels the need to act, the scholar feels the need to reflect. When faced with a question without a clear answer, a problem without a clear solution, the soldier’s reflex is to find, or if need be, to contrive an answer, devise a solution, and then act on it. The scholar’s reflex is to keep looking. Between these two extremes are those—military and academic—who must together govern military academe. It is here, in the provision of military education, that the deep and muscular roots of the cultures grate against each other. The relationship between the military and academic elements is necessarily a restless one, with periods of relative
harmony alternating with times of fractious discord. That friction and tension are important – they give military academe its vitality, and thereby give soldiers the capacity to respond to events as yet unimagined. To govern a military academic institution is to see the potential in this fractious partnership, and to realize that potential.

This article has four sections, sandwiched between this Introduction and a Conclusion. The first of these sections explores the cultural roots of scholars’ and soldiers’ attitudes towards each other. The second one looks at the different rhythms that govern the daily work of scholars and soldiers. The next two sections highlight some features of leadership and governance that are unique to military academe, and some of the practical consequences. The Conclusion sums up, and argues the importance of looking beyond our own borders to see the potential embodied in global networks of military academe.

Cultural Imperatives

In war, many scholars have made fine soldiers. Military academe, however, employs scholars, not as warriors, but for scholarly attributes very different from conventional military strengths. The motivation for engaging with scholars might be found in this quote from the gifted British historian and military theorist Sir Basil Liddell-Hart:

“[Clausewitz’s] theory of war was expounded in a way too abstract and involved for ordinary soldier-minds, essentially concrete, to follow the course of his argument…”

One might wonder, though, on reading the following description of one scholar, furnished by the distinguished French-American historian and philosopher of education Jacques Barzun, as to why an academic disposition is the remedy for “concrete minds:”

“He hates clearness- clear formulas, clear statements, clear understandings … He shrinks with an instinctive terror from any explanation that is definitive and irrevocable, and hence comes to say and do things that leave an avenue to retreat- at bottom it is connected with timidity in him- as a dreamer he is bold; when it comes to acting, he-wills-and wills-not … He has too complicated a mind!”

The scholar’s presence may not be welcomed by the soldier, as the political scientist and advisor to John F. Kennedy on Vietnam, Dr. Roger Hilsman, writes:

[The man whose main work is conducting operations] “...looks on intellectual brilliance, which questions assumptions that are felt to be beyond question, with a doubt that is probably tinged with fear.”

Military academe, then, would seem to be asking scholars with too-complicated minds who are afraid to make decisions, and soldiers with concrete minds who fear intellectual brilliance to make common cause- harmonious relations that would not seem to be automatic. These are caricatures, of course, but ones that find too easy resonance, in large measure because both the military and academic communities view the other as a flawed echo of its own culture. Misunderstanding begins with an assumption that the other culture shares one’s ideals and standards, and with a failure to grasp where and by how much those ideals and standards differ. To understand how the core beliefs that motivate the two cultures diverge, it is helpful to imagine idealized military and academic models. Where the ideal military enterprise employs authority and deadlines to achieve quick and decisive action, the ideal academic enterprise is structured to seek the best answer the evidence will permit, unhampered by authority or deadlines. An academic “finding” is never a finished product. Unlike a commander’s directive, it is ever open to questioning, refinement, and eventual replacement by a better result. Where military thinking is in the expectation of “action,” academic thinking is in pursuit of “truth.” Military goals are achievable, at least in principle; an academic goal is never more than a way station en route to a new understanding. Scholarly activity, at least in this ideal world, does not seek utility. If research leads to a practical result, then that is a collateral benefit. In contrast, if military activity is not in pursuit of an achievable, practical result, it is seen as pointless.
In the real world, these idealized descriptions are frequently compromised: scholars are often practical, and soldiers can be reflective. All universities, especially since the Second World War, are engaged in a struggle between the traditional view of “academic” and increasing pressures to emphasize the “practical.”\textsuperscript{10} Engineering and other professional faculties actively seek practical results, a professional focus that can lead to tension with the sciences and the humanities. Successful universities find a workable balance but it is in the military university where the battle lines are most sharply drawn, not least because the scholarly and military constituencies compete for the attention of the same student body. In the military university, the struggle between practical and scholarly is played out as a constant undertone of military-academic tension. That military-academic tension is ground truth at any military education institution worthy of the name.

Those distinctly different ideals, and their associated goals and standards, are clearly not easy companions: if a decision is needed now, then the time for questioning is done, but if the assumptions are flawed, the decision clearly does not meet an academic standard. The academic quest for truth thus stands in stark contrast to the military push for action. The lines are not always so sharply drawn, but from these cultural roots have grown two distinct governance structures, both of which are visible in military academe. The structured hierarchy of military command and control is vastly different from the system of collegial influence that governs the academy. Both systems have proven their value over years of long practice, but neither one, on its own, is adequate for the governance of military academe. Of necessity, then, military academe is a collaborative enterprise. This appears to be an almost universal principle. What does vary, from institute to institute, is the degree to which one constituency is subordinate to the other. The spectrum, which ranges from “military-dominant” to “academic-dominant,” is thoroughly discussed by RMC’s Professor David Last, a conflict management specialist.\textsuperscript{11}

Cycles and Rhythms

C adet academies, staff colleges, and war colleges typically have a working faculty of permanent academics that includes civilian professors and transient soldier-instructors, many with recent operational experience. In this working world, the military-academic divide is generally narrower than at the cultural extremes, but those cultural extremes are deeply rooted and so, when disputes arise, polarization tends to set in quickly and the cultural friction can become extreme.\textsuperscript{12} If, as can happen, the leadership cadre lacks academic administrative experience, or, which can also occur, it lacks sympathy with either military or academic objectives, the outcome can be significant institutional damage.
Daily life in military academe is peppered with small skirmishes—some of them justified—over priorities for students’ time, or perhaps between military superficiality and academic pedantry. Epic battles can arise over such minor events, if one side sees the other violating one of its sacred principles. Real trouble can erupt if one constituency attempts to establish its cultural imperatives as institutional doctrine. Then, each side boldly hoists its cultural banners: military requirements and command ethos on the one hand, and academic freedom and intellectual rigour on the other. These large struggles may be in defence of the highest professional values, but are seldom concerned with the practicalities of either military efficiency or academic integrity. There is considerable irony here, as all parties can, in principle, subscribe to all these values. They are not necessarily incompatible. But, as explained by the American journalist, author, and sociological activist Jane Jacobs, the underlying systems of values, or ‘moral syndromes’, are not compatible. Jacobs describes different value systems, each of which exhibits internal consistency and integrity, but which conflicts with the other. When forced to make a difficult choice between “loyalty” and “truth,” for example, a soldier might find reasons to choose “loyalty.” The scholar’s ethos would suggest “truth” over “loyalty.” These conflicts play out for lesser issues as well. A soldier would be expected to sacrifice academic rigour for timeliness, while no scholar could easily sacrifice intellectual rigour for the sake of a deadline. Maintaining good military-academic relations can be a serious challenge in military academe.

Surprisingly, there is common structural ground to be found in the cyclical processes that govern the working lives of both communities. For a scientist, that operative cycle consists of observation, hypothesis, and test. Experimental observations must be explained, and the explanation tested in a new experiment. It is much the same in all academic disciplines. Academic work can be described as a slowly repeating cycle of questions and answers in which new questions are generated by the shortcomings of the previous answers. New understandings derived from new observations are tested by critical debate and peer assessment. On a larger, slower scale, we find the cycles defined by the American historian, physicist, and philosopher of science Dr. Thomas Kuhn. Scholars and others interpret their observations in the light of an accepted paradigm, until such time as the prevailing theories and understandings fail to describe reality. The resulting paradigm shift marks the beginning of a new Kuhn cycle.

The soldier might recognize in these academic cycles the familiar footprint of the OODA Loop: Observation, Orientation, Decision, Action. Military strategist and USAF fighter pilot Colonel John Boyd, the author and apostle of the OODA Loop, himself realized clearly that these military and academic cycles have the same underlying structure. The apparently simple structure of the OODA Loop embodies principles of great generality, and with remarkable economy. What differentiates the military and academic variants are the expected outcome, and the pace. For the soldier, the cycle is applied to achieve an expected end-state, but for the scholar, the cycle is never ending. Every theory or understanding can and will be challenged, refined, and eventually supplanted by a better theory or understanding. Academic work is open-ended, and there is no end state. Military activity, from combat to routine management, is framed in the language of action: a campaign, an operation, a mission, to achieve a defined goal. The OODA loop, originally conceived for fighter pilots, is to be executed with the greatest pace possible, to “…get inside the opponent’s decision cycle.” Certainty and rigour are often sacrificed to maintain that pace, for survival itself can depend upon it. The academic cycles, on the other hand, owe no allegiance to the clock or the calendar. What is sacrificed in this cycle is time. Academic time and military time are therefore very different— to a soldier, the academic is sluggish, even moribund, while to an academic, the soldier is hurried, superficial, and often careless. These assessments are both wrong, and they arise because it is near-impossible for the one culture to “see” at the accustomed rhythm of the other.

In military academe, soldiers and scholars make common cause, in spite of sometimes irreconcilable value systems. It is, at its base, a pragmatic arrangement that persists because of a shared commitment to education in matters of security and defence. It is, however, a metastable collaboration, subject to disruption from a misstep in the military-academic cultural minefield.
Leading Military Academe

During the late-1940s and the 1950s, there was little military-academic friction at the Royal Military College of Canada (RMC). The College had just re-opened after the War, and was building anew with a new faculty and military staff. Many of the civilian professors had seen active service, and there was an easy camaraderie between the members of the Academic and the Military Wings. There was a shared vision of the new military university that ‘old RMC’ would become. “Those were,” said one professor, “large days, large days.” But civilian faculty and military staff do not age at the same rate; professors grow old in place, while young officers are continually refreshed. Through the years of the Cold War, the two communities drifted, ever so slowly, apart. Older civilian faculty slowly came to dominate teaching and research, while mixed recreational sports increasingly became the domain of the younger officers and NCOs. Corporate memory rests with old professors, and the eagerness for change with young officers. Almost seventy years after the College reopened, maintaining a common vision has become hard work.

It is not just a matter of balancing internal military and academic pressures. There are always the external pressures, real and imagined, arising from perceived military and academic norms. Comments from the old guard that the military training is not sufficiently vigorous worries the military leadership, while intimations that the academic focus is not sufficiently rigorous will touch academic sensitivities. The curative for such insecurities is a distinct institutional culture that exhibits strong resonances with both military culture and academic culture, and also stands in opposition to both. It stands in opposition to scholarly aversion to the practical, and in opposition to military disinclination for intellectual reflection. Sustaining this unique culture is the first duty of the two individuals who lead the military-academic partnership. Sustaining institutional culture means being alert to subtle changes in internal dynamics, but also demands an ear tuned outward to the national temper, since the balance between military and academic will, over time, respond to national attitudes about the military.

Success, as a military training institution and as a respected university, depends critically upon the Commandant-Principal alliance. The relationship is a complex one. The Commandant is the appointed head of the institution. The Principal has a clear responsibility to the Commandant, and an equally clear responsibility to preserve the academic integrity and academic excellence of the institution; judgement on these matters is not given by the military chain of command. The Commandant and Principal are two individuals of roughly equivalent stature, each a respected leader in his own domain. Their alliance is, of necessity, more of a negotiated partnership than is a typical command-control relationship, one that offers an extraordinary opportunity for learning and cross-fertilization. Few general or flag officers are given the opportunity to observe the inner workings of a university, and to appreciate the fundamental values of the academic culture. Similarly, the Principal can glimpse, through the agency of the Commandant, the machinery of defence management, and see first-hand how the academic community can best meet the needs of the military enterprise, and of the country.
The result of an effective military-academic partnership is inevitably a distinct institutional culture that is both military and academic, inevitably a culture that will be seen by some outsiders as less-than-military and less-than-academic. A very real challenge for leadership is to maintain an active and visible connection to national military and academic communities. It is all part of maintaining a delicate balance between the military and academic pressures through external links to key authorities and bodies.

On the military side, this means engagement with the chain of command. This takes some work, as the higher headquarters will have little time or energy to expend on academic issues, but can, sporadically, become seized of an educational issue or propose radical change. On the academic side, the institution needs to maintain good standing with the national academic councils of the civilian universities. Failing to attend to either of these duties will inevitably lead to diminishing one or the other culture of the institution, and will diminish the institution itself.

These thoughts can be distilled into a few suggestions for collaborative oversight:

1) Learn the business of military education, locally but also more broadly. Military academe is more complex- and interesting- than most soldiers and scholars imagine it to be. Over time, it is more influential in shaping and managing the military institution than is generally understood.

2) Respect the chain of command, but recognize its subtleties. No one doubts that the captain of a ship is in command, but the captain does not invade the domain of the chief engineer. The relationship between the commandant and the principal/dean is perhaps even more nuanced.

3) Study the culture, the modes, and the rhythms of the both the military and academic communities. Learn what makes them tick, and how fast they tick- the slow moving wheels are as important to a clock as the fast-spinning ones. Take pains to explain how the cultures, modes, and rhythms are alloyed into a unique institutional culture that unifies the ideologies of the disparate communities, and, most important, helps resolve the apparent dichotomy they present to students.

4) Insist on mutual respect between military and academic communities.

5) Recognize that “everything the institution does is military,” and that some activities will look less military than others. While military training in its broadest sense is what sustains the warrior ethos of military academe, the military relevance of much of the academic curriculum may not be immediately apparent. All of it is important.

6) Ensure that routine administration is in the hands of competent authorities for both military and academic affairs, and that these authorities collaboratively manage the daily business. Effective collaboration at this level is the best mechanism to resolve most academic-military problems.

7) Exploit the experience and insights of those with roots in both communities: soldier scholars and civilian professors with military service are a living cultural bridge. Draw deeply from the wisdom and experience of retired commandants and principals. These individuals have had the opportunity to observe the institution for an extended period, with privileged insight that comes from a unique experience. Many have reflected deeply about that experience, and they are a rich source of advice.

8) Maintain strong formal and informal ties with national military authorities and national education authorities.

These suggestions are neither a recipe for success nor a cure for institutional ailments. They might, perhaps, be of help in creating and maintaining a respectful, collaborative, and productive environment.
Governing Military Academe

There are books about university governance and there are doctrines for military training. Neither says anything about the peculiarities of a military university. Spared some of the trials of a conventional university, military academe is challenged from within by the way soldiers and scholars see each other, and from without by the opinions and prejudices of higher command. Texas A & M University’s Dr. Brian McAllister Linn, in his instructive book *Echoes of Battle*, identifies three cultures within the US Army: the “Warriors” (which he calls the “Heroes”), the “Engineers,” and the “Managers.” The distinctions may not be so clear in smaller nations, but these strains, representing the three fundamental elements of military activity, can be found in any modern military, and their influence has long been evident to military educators. Military academe daily faces pressures from all these three constituencies, never able to satisfy them all: every model of military education is bound to leave someone unhappy.

The critical test is meeting the needs of the “Warriors,” the constituency that best embodies traditional military ethos and the source of most “not military enough” concerns. Some years ago, at the annual meeting of the NATO/Partnership for Peace (PfP) Conference of Commandants in Rome, the new Commander of the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom made the interesting comment that the Conference paid insufficient attention to killing. If Lieutenant General Kiszely’s comment was meant as a reminder not to become so absorbed with the business of military education as to forget the hard business of military combat, the point was well-taken. Whatever his intent, the general’s remarks serve to highlight one of military academe’s persistent challenges. It is undeniable that to most soldiers, an institution of military education does not “feel” very military. It is almost a ritual for a new college commandant to pronounce that “there is a real need to put the ‘military’ back into this college.” Sometimes this represents a genuine desire to restore balance, but such sentiments can also be pushed by admirals and generals who would rather spend the money on ships and tanks. The new commandant often finds himself or herself caught in a no man’s land, questioning institutional ethos, while at the same time, defending it to higher authority. Some have argued that academic achievement has little or no impact on success at the tactical or operational levels of warfare, arguments that can be difficult to dispute.

When serious criticisms are leveled at the military education institution, they are often distilled into the accusation that general officers ‘lack context.’ The challenge for military academe is...
to prepare officers for their more complex, strategic, futures at a
time when they do not see that education as especially relevant.
The root fact is that the military institution is, for the most part, a
closed system.28 Leaders and managers are developed “in house.”
Military academe is a system that takes callow youths–cocky,
aggressive privates and arrogant lieutenants–and from this raw
material develops mature leadership cadres. And while the imme-
diate aim must always be to give soldiers the skills, knowledge,
and attributes to carry out the next mission, the development
of long-term institutional leadership must begin from the day
of recruitment. 29 In this sense, then, the training and education
objectives demand parallel, co-operating and often competing
structures. Much of the business of military academe consists
of designing and managing those structures, their mandates and
protocols, and, not least, their curricula.

Military academe can only be justified if it bridges the
military-academic cultural divide. Perhaps the most troublesome
gap to be bridged is that between training and education.30 Training
is fundamental for the military community, but the academic
community has little respect for “mere training.” There have been
many fruitless arguments about the distinction. It is important
for civilian academics to understand that the military training at
their military university is not just an incidental supplement, but
provides the bedrock of the institutional ethos. It is not simply
parade ground drills, or learning to re-assemble a machine gun
in the dark. It is rather the deep embedding of core reflexes and
instincts that will kick in when the pressure increases, and when
reason is overwhelmed by stress and fear. Those reflexes and
instincts are the deep and abiding center of a soldier’s identity,
including that of the “Engineers” and “Managers.” Training is not
a trivial thing. But it is not the only thing. Training vs education
arguments are fruitless because it is not one or the other. Both
are essential for the development of the complete soldier, 31 and
the emphasis shifts as the career progresses and rank increases.

The changing nature of the soldier’s learning path was cap-
tured long ago in the 1969 Rowley Report32 (see Figure 1). As
leadership and diversity expert Dr. Alan Okros of the Canadian
Forces College points out, this is unlike the learning path of any
other profession, in that advancing in the profession implies not
just an increase in specialization and sophistication but an effective
change in academic discipline. The equivalent of two master’s
degrees better describes a fully educated soldier than a Ph.D.33
Military academe might do well to structure its programs so that,
in terms of substance and depth, this dual masters approach could
have the academic prestige of a doctorate. This is advanced educa-
tion with an emphasis on breadth, rather than depth.

Conclusion – Looking Outward

This article has examined the ‘oil and water’ mix of cultures
that underpin the strongly developing field of military
academe.34 At its centre, military-academic tension is a reflec-
tion of the tension between “academic” and “practical” that
perplexes any modern university. Military academe undeniably
functions primarily in response to practical military demands,
but preserves within itself a house of military intellect, 35 a
space for careful analysis and thoughtful consideration that
is not predominant in military culture. Despite fundamental
differences that resist absorption or domination of one culture
by the other, it is possible to build a productive collaboration
that offers both practical utility and a capacity for detached
reflection. Indeed, military academe is virtually the only avail-
able space for such strategic contemplation of the profession.
The article has examined some features of leadership and
governance of the military strain of academia, and touched
upon military academe’s need to create a distinct, blended
culture. There are many other features of military academe
that deserve greater attention, for instance, institutional pres-
tige and reputation, research, standards processes, and so
on. This article has barely scratched the surface, but should be seen as an attempt to stimulate, in both scholars and soldiers, an interest in the broader culture of their institutions, and to highlight the need for military academe itself to be aware of the substantial and critical part it plays in the military enterprise.

The narrow view of military academe is that it exists to teach soldiers what they need to know, full stop. Military academe is, of course, much more than that, but makes little effort to explain itself, or to make plain the deep value it provides for the security and defence enterprise, and most especially, for the military. In consequence, there exists a persistent bias that to maintain a four-year university to produce a few officers is hugely expensive, that scholarly research brings little of value to national defence, that academics constitute a pampered and inefficient work force, and other similar claims. This is short term and shallow thinking, but it must be admitted that the academic culture does little to counter such claims. It falls therefore to the leadership of military and academic military academe to explain its function, to justify its program, and to defend its existence. If they are to do that well, they need to look beyond the relatively narrow confines of national military scholarship. Access to that enormous brain trust is gained through the respected and recognized scholars in our own community. Scholars speak to scholars, often in arcane and obscure language. Military academe serves as one of the best universal translators for meaningful conversations with outside experts in the vast global network of colleges, universities, and institutes of advanced study. Within the network, discourse is easy; for an outsider, it is awkward at best. An important and underrated subset of that global network is the collection of military institutions of advanced learning and advanced study. Participation in this military academic network has many benefits, not least recognition, the benchmarking of standards, and access to new approaches. Beyond knowledge of narrow interest to military academe itself, the military academic network establishes personal and institutional links that extend throughout the global military enterprise.

“A wise military will invest in its capabilities for observing and assessing developments in the world, and for developing policy recommendations informed by rich understanding of the military world and recognized scholarly expertise.”

The author thanks Dr. David Last for a critical reading of this manuscript, and also for scholarly insights and practical suggestions.
13. Jane Jacobs, Systems of Survival (New York: Random House, 1992). This short book gives an interesting view of incompatible moral syndromes, and how they may usefully be applied to the military and academic communities. We can think of ‘moral syndrome’ as ethos-the collection of prioritized principles upon which a group bases its actions.
17. The United States Military Academy at West Point and the Canadian military college at RMC Kingston display many similarities, but there are significant differences that can readily be seen as echoes of national differences.
18. This is not to assume a Canadian model. The presumption is that the institution has both a military and an academic community. “Commandant” and “Principal” should be understood as representative of the individuals who lead those military and academic communities, irrespective of governance structure or reporting relationship.
19. It would be most interesting to assess the impact of RMC’s War Studies program on the quality of Canadian Forces leadership during the operations of the last quarter-century. It would be equally interesting to assess the influence of Canadian military education in professional development systems of other nations, particularly the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
21. Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). In this context, “Engineer” and “Manager” have somewhat different definitions than those used in common speech. Morris Janowitz applies the same broad categories in The Professional Soldier.
23. See David Lipsky: 2003, Absolutely American: Four Years at West Point, (New York, Random House, Vintage edition 2004), p. 231. At the U.S. Military Academy, the phrase ‘M back to M’ has become a common weapon. One Principal, himself a retired senior officer, felt obliged to make the pointed rejoinder, “Everything we do here is military.”
24. In Canada, this debate has resulted in more than a dozen studies of military education: each and every one has been driven, in part, by the sentiment, “we don’t really need this education nonsense.” All, repeat, all these studies have endorsed education and recommended improvements, but reform had to await the traumatic experiences in Rwanda and Somalia. See Bernd Horn and Bill Bentley, Forced to Change: Crisis and Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces (Toronto: Dundurn, 2015), Kobo ePub, accessed from Kobo.com.
26. Joan Johnson-Freese, Educating America’s Military, Chapter 1. In the United States, this perceived deficiency of very senior officers provided much of the justification for the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. See also Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier, p. 13. For Canada, the most substantial case for reform can be found in the four appendices to Minister of National Defence Doug Young’s 1997 Report to the Prime Minister.
27. This is the case for most Western professional militaries.
28. Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Leading the Institution This manual and other Canadian Forces Leadership Manuals can be obtained by applying to: cda.cfll-ilc@forces.gc.ca.
29. This is the case for most Western professional militaries.
30. R.G. Haycock’s definition provides a useful distinction: training aims to develop a predictable response to a predictable situation—the right reflexes under fire; education seeks to develop a reasoned response to an unpredictable situation-critical thinking in the face of the unknown.
32. Alan Okros, personal communication.
33. See, for example, David Last, “SSR 2.0 Brief: Picking Leaders for Professional Military Education;” “Irritants to Pearls: Military Education, Epistemic Communities, Communities of Practice and Networks of Learning.”
Modelling Command from a Balanced Perspective

by Gordon Bennett

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Introduction

Current models of command employed in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and taught at the Canadian Forces College form the basis of Canadian command doctrine. The first model taught is referred to as the Pigeau/McCann Model and was developed by renowned Canadian command and leadership researchers Ross Pigeau and Carol McCann. These researchers focus upon competency, authority, responsibility, and intent. The second model used in the CAF was formulated by the David Alberts and Richard Hayes, who are researchers with significant involvement in the Command and Control Research Program in the US, as well as being known internationally for their work on command. Their model, the Alberts and Hayes Model, describes a Power to the Edge organization founded on agility, focus, and convergence. The third model used in Canadian command doctrine is the Cohen and Gooch Model developed by Eliot Cohen and John Gooch. Cohen is an internationally-esteemed professor and former Counselor of the US Department of State, while Gooch is an Emeritus Professor of History from the University of Leeds. These experts focus on failure to learn, anticipate, and adapt. Students who have been or are attending the Canadian Forces College, as well as academics involved in command research, should well recognize these models, as their principles permeate CAF doctrine. However, upon closer inspection of the models and their applications, there appear to be unanswered questions regarding the holistic nature of command.

Aim

The aim of this article is to provide a holistic command model that better encompasses the nature of command by building upon the existing models. This new model will be termed the ‘Balanced Command Model,’ as it balances four key successful areas of command. It will build upon the work of the existing models, but with three distinct differences. First, the Balanced Command Model will act as a guide for commanders to develop themselves and their subordinates as future commanders. Second, it will look at various factors that affect command, and how those components need to be balanced in order to achieve favorable command results that are neither substandard nor dangerous. Third, the Balanced Command Model will provide a holistic approach to command, rather than...
looking at a particular or specialized element of command in isolation. This discussion is not designed to detract from those models presently used, but rather, to provide a wider breadth of practical application for contemporary commanders.

Background

To determine how the Balanced Command Model fits into contemporary command theory, it is best to do a quick review of current Canadian command doctrine. The three models currently used in command theory provide an alternate point of view with respect to command for comparison and learning purposes. The intent of this quick review is to familiarize the reader with the basics of the models, and encourage further discussion and study by the reader, since all the models have merit.

The Pigeau McCann Model highlights three key aspects of command: Competency, Responsibility, and Authority, the CAR aspect of their model. These elements are combined to create what these researchers refer to as a Balanced Command Envelope. If authority is high, responsibility is high and competency is high, Pigeau and McCann argue that command will be effective. A dangerous command situation or incompetent command situation develops when these three elements are not aligned.

Competency in this model includes: Physical, intellectual, emotional, and interpersonal components. Authority is both legal and personal and Responsibility includes extrinsic and intrinsic command abilities. The use of responsibility then enables varying levels of mission command and the application of intent without defining an optimal level of mission command.

The Alberts and Hayes Model looks at command as a series of systems. These systems are comprised of agility, focus, and convergence. Agility in this case refers to flexibility across the spectrum of operations. Focus is the ability of a commander to see the bigger picture and to target efforts on an intended goal using mission command—a tie directly to the Canadian Army’s Advancing with Purpose Strategy. The convergence element defines outcomes as a situation develops. In this model, the ideal organization employs command with a high allocation of rights, broad dissemination of information, and unconstrained interaction. These elements are then moulded into a Power to the Edge organization, which seeks to employ decentralized command in order to provide a flexible response to a variety of complex situations. This model places a heavy emphasis upon information and decentralized action.

The Cohen and Gooch Model looks at failures. These include a failure to learn, failure to anticipate, and failure to adapt. Command failures are then analyzed against these three traits from the strategic to the tactical level, to determine how command should have acted in a given situation.

Each of these command models bring unique perspectives with respect to command that can be useful in a variety of circumstances. However, there are still several research questions that these models do not answer. If these models were used exclusively as a doctrinal tool, the following questions would still remain:

What should the CAF be doing to develop future commanders?

Are all elements of command suitability captured in these models?

Is there a larger, more complex system that makes a commander a commander?

How should various command factors be balanced against each other at different command levels?

The Balanced Command Model

The Balanced Command Model determines the elements that create and sustain commanders, and it looks at how those factors grow as commanders progress from low level command billets to commanding the institution.

There are four components to this model. The first is the internally controlled elements noted by the diamonds. The second are the four black arrows illustrating the outward focus of the commander on external stakeholders. The third element is

Figure 1 – The Balanced Command Model.
the communication flow and response, which is an internal and external flow coupled with information synthesis and learning. Finally, command is not complete without the fourth element of responsibility. The colored rings move from low-level tactical command to ultimately institutional command at the outside as the commander’s abilities widen over time with training and experience, balanced with the other factors.

The Balanced Command Model is designed to integrate the essential characteristics of effective commanders. As noted by Alberts and Hayes, simplicity in conceptual modelling is important if the model is to be effectively applied. The Balanced Command Model fulfils this requirement.

**The Importance of Balance**

The importance of balance in command cannot be overstated, and it is a concept yet to be captured by contemporary command theories. Commanders that exhibit strong traits on one area may not be suitable for command at higher levels due to a lack of balance. An expert tactical commander that lacks personal attributes or the ability to synthesize information in increasingly complex environments will not be a suitable commander.

Asian, particularly Confucian thought with respect to balance has an effect upon the development of this model. Practitioners who have even a limited background in Asian thought on harmony and balance will find similar themes with this model. Additional reading on Asian leadership using balance is encouraged in order to provide a wider perspective on command balance.

The current methods of selecting commanders through succession planning boards generally imply that balance is sought, and yet, the succession planning methodology arguably does not often formalize, perennially fix, or create in-depth doctrine regarding what characteristics are needed, yet alone against what they should be balanced. Current selection methodologies and criteria can vary from year-to-year, vary between elements, or differ between trades.

In Canada, the PER system looks at some of the personal factors for promotion. The Balanced Command Model can better formalize what elements should be sought for in command positions, which may well differ from those used for promotion. This model can serve as a basis for succession planning when senior staff are selecting commanders, since it formalizes and standardizes what factors create commanders, rather than necessitating annual changing criteria. Creating a balance between the four parts of this model can help better select future commanders.

Alberts and Hayes, in their modelling of command and control, highlight the quality elements of command. The Balanced Command Model assumes that quality is sought in all aspects of command, whether those are self-directed or externally projected. Quality in the Balanced Command Model is generated by focus upon the commander’s personal abilities and the institution’s inputs, which are designed to develop and refine the commander. The commander’s development and abilities are driven by the individual, but enabled by the institution through orientating potential commanders to what is expected in command, and by providing training and opportunities for commanders and potential commanders to practice. Opportunity creates practical experience. This is seen in the accompanying figure.

**Internal Factors**

The internal factors form the heart of the model and upon which the other elements must rest. These factors are based upon the internal looking qualities of the individual. Without a strong personal basis, command would simply crumble. Internal characteristics are under the direct influence of the commander and controlled by him or her, but enabled by the institution, which helps mould and develop them. These personal factors include: Ethics and Values, Competence, Personal Attributes, and Direction and Intent.

Holding ethics below the expected norms will result in a dangerous command situation, even if all other elements in the model are superior. Balance is therefore required. Without a foundation of ethics and values, responsibility cannot be issued from a higher commander without potentially having negative consequences and dangerous command decisions. General Giáp of Vietnam held a significant level of Communist values and enforced those values on others. While the West may not agree with his values and the existing organizational norms, his superiors did so, resulting in them giving Giáp significant responsibility and authority.

Competence derives from training, experience, and innate skill. These elements balance with the personal attributes of an ability to learn, and help form a response to information flows, which will be
discussed later. Without competence, the outward reaching elements of leadership, authority, delegation, and use of specialists with responsibility cannot function. As with the other core factors, competence limits the level of command a commander can exercise effectively.

Personal attributes include: Emotional intelligence, self-mastery, foresight, humility in command, fairness, empathy, social intelligence, learning habits, intelligence, and looking the part that is expected of him/her by the home culture and organization. A complete discussion of these elements can be found in other literature and it is too extensive for this article. Therefore, this list will only be briefly mentioned herein.

Direction and intent are noted in the model as being key elements to the personal nature of the commander. The level of intent communicated by the commander may vary from commander to commander. Intent includes how much implicit intent the commander expects to be understood, and how much explicit intent is required, and the balancing act between the two. Mission command will be based upon how the implicit and explicit intents are given and received, hence the direction component. Commanders that leverage personal factors in communicating intent, forming a culture of shared understanding, will have an easier time implementing mission command. US Army doctrine on intent and direction states, “…it is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of Unified Land Operations.”

Direction is required for delegation, leadership, and the use of specialists, and it is predicated upon the ability to collect and respond to information using the other personal factors to filter and react to the changing nature of a given situation.

The internal factors need to be balanced in order to create an effective command situation. If a commander has high competence but low ethics, for example, that commander could create a dangerous command situation in that actions taken by that commander are not aligned with societal or institutional culture, resulting in disrepute for the organization and possible operational level failure even if there are tactical wins. Commanders that employed torture in the Battle of Algiers fell into this category. Rommel’s actions in North Africa were initially successful due to tactical competence in the short term. He was heralded by Hitler due to his personal attributes and former successes using tactical competence. However, his ‘rock star’ image was not balanced with the use of specialists, and his misuse of authority to pursue the Allies against direction and advice from higher authority ensued. The unbalance between personal attributes internal to Rommel, championed by Hitler himself, and external elements with respect to the use of specialists and authority led to a command failure.

Likewise, if a commander cannot express clear direction or intent, his/her subordinates will be paralyzed to act unless under their own auspices, in spite of having a technically-competent commander with strong personal attributes. A failure to provide a clear intent will result in subordinates either taking action into their own hands at the risk of not understanding the higher-level situation, or a paralysis of the organization.

A balance within the personal attributes category is needed to avoid internal conflict with subordinates. Arrogance in command, or an inability to employ emotional intelligence or interpersonal skills will create unnecessary friction, a lack of trust between commanders and subordinates, a distain and subsequent lack of support for the commander, or through following the commander’s direction to the ‘letter of the law,’ but no further.

This balance between the four internal personal factors is essential for command success. Failing to recognize a balanced approach with internal factors will result in one of several potential problems, including: A dangerous command situation, inaction when action is needed, action by subordinates without benefit of a ‘big picture view,’ disregard for orders, or even mutiny.
Additionally, the internal factors need to be balanced against the other three elements of the model. For example, the ‘rock star’ status of a commander can be a benefit for propaganda or messaging purposes if balanced with the other three elements of the model. If it is not balanced, the commander and chain of command may face significant problems in the future with errors in judgement at the operational level or a situation that creates a rogue or dangerous command situation, somewhat represented by the Rommel example.

Learning and Adaptation and the Role of Information

Learning and adaptation is the bridge between information, communication, and the personal factors of the commander. Information flows are a two-way street, with the commander emitting information and information being collected from external and internal sources. As new information is collected, the commander must assimilate that information by either decoding or acting upon it, or by discarding it. To either decode the meaning of the information or reject it requires personal factors, such as competence, which can be amplified through experience. Once decoded, the commander must learn the significance of that information, adapt his/her actions accordingly, and then communicate a response through direction and intent.

The process of collecting information, learning and adapting, and responding bares a semblance to the US Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action (OODA) Loop decision making methodology when looking at tactical level situations. However, at the strategic level, or when looking at procurement or long-term planning, speed in decision making is not paramount as much as is making sense of information and learning for long-term adaptation. The requirement for speed at a particular level differs from the OODA loop system, but a practitioner can easily nestle the OODA loop system within the model as it pertains to command. Further validation between the model’s components and the OODA loop system is an area for further investigation, but it is beyond the scope of this article. General Giáp, it could be argued, used both a short-term decision making cycle similar to the OODA Loop cycle, while at the same time using a longer decision-making cycle as he built his forces. He learned how the Japanese and French were operating and responded quickly, using OODA Loop methodologies. However, he concurrently sought to forge legitimacy in conjunction with Ho Chi Minh over the long term, initially with the OSS and the Chinese. His tactical actions against the Japanese and French were similar to following an OODA Loop cycle while his long-term planning as a commander at the operational and strategic levels bears a greater semblance to the long-term view in this model, in that force build up and strategic wins took much longer than tactical actions, and they required greater patience and persistence. This example serves as an excellent case of learning and adaptation with direction and intent balanced with personal attributes.

Learning is fed by information and communication, with behavior being adapted accordingly. Professional development and training are designed to improve personal factors, including competence, ethics, communication, and personal attributes.
Learning and adaptation to the information available is critical. An unbalanced commander fails to be able to collect, synthesize, and adapt to a given situation, based upon the information available. Even if the commander exhibits internal factors in a balanced fashion, a lack of ability to filter and respond to information and its flows internally and externally and balancing what is vital, key, and unimportant results again in several problematic outcomes. The first outcome is a dangerous command situation as the commander is unable or unwilling to accept and analyze internal or external information. A dangerous command situation also ensues if the commander refuses to learn and adapt. Adaptation runs counter to the ‘same as last year’ mentality. Adaptation in this case is similar to the Cohen and Gooch model.

The second outcome sees the commander becoming overloaded with information, and being unable to filter and synthesize it, he/she moves into a paralytic decision state or formulates decisions based upon only one manageable piece of data. Information overload could also cause panic in an inexperienced commander which could be leveraged by the opposing force. Decision paralysis or requesting continual clarification from a higher headquarters to ‘RFI or assume away’ the problem can also arise. Information overload is now becoming a significant issue with improvements in technology resulting in information filtering problems or delays waiting for better information. The commander’s ability to manage information flows and synthesize it is becoming increasingly difficult, but it is necessary. This problem is being researched by other writers, and therefore, it will not be discussed in detail here.

The third risk with information is that of overcomplicating the situation. The ability to look at a complex situation, break it down into component parts, attack each part, and reassemble the situation with an adapted overarching response, and then to communicate that response is challenging, and it runs on the opposite end of the spectrum of analytical paralysis or filtering issues. The interaction between the commander’s ability to collect and process information and to provide an educated and adapted response is the subject of a research paper in itself, as there are a plethora of means to do this, coupled with insufficient space herein to provide specifics on the ‘how’ and accompanying caveats.

Examples of commanders successfully balancing information with learning and adaptation include successful insurgent commanders such as General Giáp, the British in Malaya in the 1950s, the intelligence misinformation campaign against the Germans in preparation for D-Day, and General Schwarzkopf during Operation Desert Storm.

**Responsibility and Levels of Command**

Responsibility in a command situation is required. Without responsibility within the bounds established at a particular level of command, the commander could become a dangerous commander. A lack of responsibility is essentially a ‘blank cheque’ written by a state. Responsibility increases over time as the commander, from a junior level, demonstrates the personal factors necessary to progress and the ability to synthesize externally oriented factors and outward influences.

Command development begins at a low level, a platoon or equivalent unit for officers. As that commander’s experiences and training develop, he/she is granted increasingly-higher levels of responsibility exemplified by the Pentagon to use an American analogy, pushing on the concentric circles of command levels.
The core personal factors grow as well but are still founded in the individual. As the commander grows in level of command so does his/her level of responsibility. However, in order to train new commanders, levels of responsibility must occasionally reach into the next level of command. There are two reasons for this. First, as commanders are replaced in the battlespace for a variety of reasons, the next level commander down must be ready to assume those responsibilities. Examples in garrison include the Executive Officer replacing the Commanding Officer during periods of absence, or officers being given responsibility over unique projects that push their limits. In the battlefield, it could mean replacement due to casualties in the chain of command. Informally, commander development occurs in Western militaries when acting commanders are assigned a temporary post or lead special projects.

In order for commanders to prepare future commanders, junior commanders are required to step up into the next level of command and demonstrate competencies of a higher-level commander. Future commander development comes with responsibilities that exceed the current level of command. Therefore, responsibility does not align directly with a level of command, but it stretches outward past current responsibilities. This stretching of responsibilities is a formative opportunity for a junior commander, and an evaluation opportunity for the current commander of a subordinate.

While history teaches of a few noteworthy junior commanders being highly successful, this is arguably not the norm. Giving too much responsibility to a commander without a balanced ability to employ outward elements, synthesize information flows, or demonstrate a balanced level of internal factors suitable to the level of command will result in a dangerous or incompetent commander. Will a commander that is too junior learn? Probably, and likely quickly, but this shortcut risks coming at a great cost in blood and treasure when balance is not both initially present and suitable for the level of command.

**Outward Elements of Command Success**

The four influences of Authority, Delegation, Leadership, and Power, and the Use of Specialists are categorized as outward influences, due to their nature in affecting external entities. The effects and use of these elements widen as the commander is promoted into higher roles.
of responsibility. A Chief of the Defence Staff or elemental commander will have a wider breadth of functions to draw upon than a tactical level platoon commander. Junior commanders are granted little authority to act since they are still in development and have a narrow tactical scope to their employment. Commanders at the elemental level have significantly more authority to act. Therefore, it is reasonable to illustrate the widening of authority as levels of command increase.

Leadership and power is required by a commander. Ideally, transformational leadership is employed.15 Leading starts with leading people and progresses to leading the institution. Power can be both informal and formal.16 Positional power of a commander is also necessary. Positional power is one reason why militaries have change of command parades—to demonstrate tangibly who is in the command position. However, the ability of a commander to use other forms of power creates a more balanced commander in that he/she is able to adapt to the power situation using leadership and power methods—again an emphasis upon balance.

As commanders progress to increased responsibility, they are required to increase their use of specialists. The commander of a joint command will rely significantly more upon legal advice, policy advice, assistance from other government departments, contractors, and others than will a company commander. Rommel failed logistically in North Africa. Part of his failure was the result of ignoring logistics advice from higher authorities against stretching the lines of communication.

In similar form to relying upon specialists, the use of delegation by commanders is required. A commander cannot command without subordinates and higher numbers of subordinates requires the use of delegation through the personal factor of direction and intent, resulting in mission command. A commander that is unable to delegate will burnout or be ineffective. Delegation requires follow-up, and this comes with delegated authority and responsibility.17

Finally, authority needs to be balanced with the use of delegation, power, and specialists. Without authority, specialists will be reluctant to act. Without authority, the commander cannot effectively order subordinates or delegate tasks, as there is no mechanism other than personal power to follow-up with tasks given or to ensure maintenance of discipline and task completion. Formal authority delegated from higher is the legal means to execute command.

Personal authority in this model is not applied here, as it is implied by competence and personal attributes, and is not the sole purview of a commander, but can be attributed to anyone in the organization. A Private that is highly competent in his/her trade and possesses high personal attributes can have personal authority as an expert in a particular field, but that does not make that member a commander. Personal authority in a similar fashion to the Private will enhance the commander’s formal authority, but personal authority is not exclusive to the commander, as is formal legal authority.

Caveats

This model comes with several caveats. First, there is the influence of national and military cultures. Some cultures do not delegate as much as Western mission command-oriented militaries. These cultures will see narrower levels of authority and responsibility in decision making. Additionally, leadership and power taught in some nations will not be transformational-based leadership. The debate over which style of leadership fits which cultural context is outside the scope of this article, but should be considered before applying this model across all nations and cultures.

The size of some militaries and their national roles may see less reliance upon the use of specialists, as some specialist functions seen in Canada and the United States may be performed by other government departments or simply may not exist in other nations (i.e., Psychological operations, civilian military co-operation, and so on). Ethics in this model is not debated as to what is ethical and what is not. Ethical norms will vary from nation to nation, and in some nations, they may be discounted significantly. However, it could be argued that every nation and military has a set of values. Communist nations have significantly different values than the West, which has significantly different values from some African countries or Asian cultural norms. However, military leaders in all of these situations are expected to follow or exceed their organizational values. Will one set of values win out over another, creating a stronger force when contact is made between two groups of opposing values? Perhaps, but that is not needed for the model, and it is a topic for further exploration. As for Western militaries, the current ethics taught will satisfy this factor. For all militaries, humane treatment of others should form at least a foundational base for command.

Pigeau and McCann highlight physical competency as part of their CAR model. This has been discounted with the Balanced Command Model as physical ability is expected by all soldiers and is not exclusive to commanders. Additionally, physical aspects in appearance are also limited since cultural physical norms differ between nations and cultures. A tall, ‘dashboard-warrior’ image may be well accepted in some cultures whereas a ‘well fed’ commander may be seen as materially successful in another culture. Fitting the expected norm is part of the model, as it contributes to personal credibility, but there is no one physical appearance that covers all situations and cultures.

The Balanced Command Model should not be considered a holistic method to determine who future commanders will be. It should form the basis for the criteria against which to judge potential commanders, but it should also encompass information collection systems, such as 360 degree feedback.
Language profile is intentionally omitted from the model. The reason for this is that language skills are job, not command, specific. Additionally, many nations, including Canada’s allies, have commanders that speak only one language and still possess excellent commanders. Some allied commanders speak three-or-more languages and are excellent commanders. Language profile does not a commander make. Multilingual skills will add to job and situation specific skills. Using a second language profile as a command pre-requisite would assume that allied commanders that are unilingual are somehow inferior to Canadian commanders in a Western context. This is simply not the case. Multilingual ability is a tool for a position, not a command forming criteria.

Some commanders will learn and grow faster than others, thus age should not be a factor in commander selection. Commanders can come with experience from outside their trade, outside their element, and potentially, even from outside the military. Experience outside the norms of succession planning can bring diversity to an organization and result in organizational success. Selection should be based upon the ability of the commander to have mastered balance between and within the four elements of the Balanced Command Model rather than exclusively assessing abilities based upon time in rank, or experience in one elemental stream or trade.

Command Development

The Balanced Command Model serves as a command development tool for practitioners. By breaking down the components of successful command into component parts, commanders can more easily visualize what elements need development in their subordinates and themselves in preparation for future positions. Although the model does not provide a step-by-step means to detail how to develop subordinates into future commanders, it provides the appropriate categories for development. A step-by-step outline is simply too exhaustive for this study, but could assist future research in a more profound setting.

Conclusion

The Balanced Command Model overcomes existing problems with contemporary command models, and it clarifies understanding of command skills. It creates a foundation that can form doctrine, be used for succession planning, demonstrate developmental areas, and aid in mentoring future commanders.
This article has put forward four key areas that merge to form the model. These components centered around four personal factors developed within the scope of responsibility of the member. The outward-looking elements of specialists, leadership and power, authority, and delegation project outward from this base. Contributing to this are commanders who capitalize upon information and communication flows, synthesize this information, and form an adapted response.

Adoption of the Balanced Command Model will aid existing leaders to mentor and evaluate potential commanders, while helping future commanders prosecute self-development. The need for balance in command will help prevent poor commanders from taking command, based upon expertise in select areas at the exclusion of other factors. Using the Balanced Command Model as a tool for succession planning and command appointments will help standardize the process for command selection taking out the guess work or potential biases that could exist from year-to-year between individuals and between trades. Standardization of command selection is provided by this model.

This article has sought to fill the voids left by current doctrinal command models by providing a command methodology that is balanced, and one which can be immediately applied to command development. While there exists more work to be done in generating specifics in the model, this writer believes the discussion has contributed to the body of command knowledge with an aim to being relevant and practical.

NOTES

2. David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes. “Power to the Edge: Command and Control in the Information Age,” in Information Age Transformation Series, Chapter 8 – Agility (pp. 123-159), Chapter 9 – Power and the Edge (pp. 165-177), and Chapter 12 – The Power of “Power to the Edge” Organizations (pp. 213-221).
7. Alberts and Hayes.
8. Designing Canada’s Army of Tomorrow, p. 48.
10. Specialists in this case would include logistics commanders at a bare minimum. Rommel’s failure to use and understand logistics operations was a great contributing factor to his failure in theatre.
11. Many command situations during the First World War could be attributed to this problem. The result was massive, unnecessary casualties.
12. Looking at panic and experience in this perspective could aid in attacking less formalized and experienced commanders and soldiers including in insurgent type settings. Intentional information overload, or the perspective of an overwhelming force, as viewed during Operation Desert Storm arguably helped the allied forces quickly displace Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Many historical battles talk about being routed by overwhelming force, the sight of opposing forces, or information. The principle is the same whether it is sight or information, and it lends itself well to information operations.
15. A-PA-005-000/AP-003 Leadership in the Canadian Forces: Doctrine.
17. The term ‘authority’ is used here, as higher authority may not be a military commander. Civilian ‘commanders’ work in certain organizations, such as the UN and the MFO.
18. General Sir Arthur Currie serves as an example of an outstanding commander that came with militia and civilian experience, not full-time active duty experience.
Canadian Search and Rescue Puzzle: The Missing Pieces

by Jean G.R. Leroux

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Introduction

Shortly past midnight on a stormy night in February 1982, a mayday was sent from the oil platform Ocean Ranger on the Grand Banks of Newfoundland. Minutes later, the Ocean Ranger sank with its entire crew of 84, all onboard perishing. Immediately following the tragedy, a royal commission was convened. The commission highly criticized the integration of SAR services. A key finding stated that “the stubborn fact remains that there is no single functioning agency with the mandate to knit together the several components into a comprehensive national SAR program.”

Fast forward 30 years... A report from the Auditor General of Canada evaluating the Canadian Search and Rescue (SAR) system echoed similar comments: “In spite of the many reports and recommendations for a national SAR policy, we found that there is still no such policy…. [T]he National Search and Rescue Secretariat (NSS) has made efforts over the years to establish a governance framework, but it has not been successful.”

The take-away from these reports is that while the current system is working, steps can be taken to improve it. Canada’s uniqueness in size, geography, and resources requires a multi-agency approach, as no single agency has the resources and qualifications to solve the SAR equation by itself. In fact, SAR in Canada is not delivered or executed by a single organization, but is rather a combination and cooperation of multiple federal, provincial, municipal, and volunteer organizations. This holistic approach is a ‘system of systems.’ Despite the best efforts of all involved in the delivery of the service, the SAR system ‘puzzle’ is missing some important pieces. A careful
analysis needs to be conducted to identify what they are. While the tactical delivery of SAR across the elements of the National SAR Program is effective and powerful,⁴ attention needs to focus upon the strategic level, as historical coordination deficiencies at this level have undermined the performance of the system as a whole.

SAR’s major issues emerged as a by-product of two levels working in parallel instead of working jointly. The tactical level has consistently overshadowed strategic deficiencies, making the system acceptable as a whole. Yet, the government failed to produce a coordinated force, so the system evolved as a relatively-maladjusted collaboration. The central thesis of this article is that the performance of the Canadian SAR system can be improved by fixing the coordination issues at the strategic and operational levels. It seeks to find practical solutions, based upon evidence and analysis, to bridge the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

**Canadian SAR Policy and Strategy**

Baseline knowledge of how the system is built is crucial for understanding coordination challenges. The SAR structure is divided into three distinct levels, as follows:

a. **Strategic**: This level sets out fundamental principles that guide SAR forces in Canada, laying out the intent and expectations of the government, and establishing a framework for the effective use of resources.

b. **Operational**: This level applies the principles of strategic intent to actions by describing the use of resources as distinct objectives and responsibilities.

c. **Tactical**: This level is concerned with planning and directing resources on the ground and engagements and/or activities within a sequence of operations to achieve operational objectives. The tactical level is the ‘hands’ reaching out to the victims.⁵

The broadly-accepted ultimate function of government is to protect the safety and well-being of its citizens. Governments listen to population concerns and develop responses through policies, which become intents on a specific subject. Policy on Search and Rescue at its infancy can be traced back to the very birth of Canada. The Constitution of 1867 dictates that everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security.⁶ The current SAR policy is extracted from the 2004 Canadian National Security Policy: Protecting Canada and Canadians at home and abroad.⁷

Policy is enabled by a strategy, which is a bridge between the policy and the execution of operations. The SAR strategy as we know it today emerged from a 120-year process, mostly due to a series of incidents that caused the loss of lives. In 1977, due to this increase of obligations and activities, the federal government appointed the Minister of National Defence as the Lead Minister. The Lead Minister for SAR is the single spokesperson for the federal government on overall SAR matters.⁸ Also during the
same year, the Interdepartmental Committee on Search and Rescue (ICSAR) was created. The ICSAR represents the federal group that directly influences, informs, and advises the Lead Minister. In the late-1980s, the government decided to provide a clear strategy on SAR called the National Search and Rescue Program (NSP).

The NSP is a Canada-wide horizontal framework that integrates all organizations and resources involved in the provision of search and rescue services on Canadian territory. The NSP strategy is: “A Canada where the critical importance of Search and Rescue is reflected in a multi-jurisdictional approach to promote individual, collective and organizational behavior that minimizes the risk of injury or loss of life.” The NSP (SAR strategy) is currently embedded in the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. The strategic enabler is an organization called the National Search and Rescue Secretariat (NSS), established in 1986 by a Cabinet Decision to provide a strategic platform to its SAR policy. The role of the NSS is coordinating Canada’s search and rescue with federal, provincial, and territorial partners, and fostering interoperability and coordination within the SAR community and its 18,000 trained specialists.

The NSS is housed in the Department of Public Safety, but reports directly to the Lead Minister for SAR, the Minister of National Defence. The NSS is comprised of the federal elements of ICSAR, elements of the Provincial/Territorial emergency management, the Search and Rescue Volunteer Association of Canada (SARVAC), the Civil Air Search and Rescue Association (CASARA), and the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary (CCGA).

SAR Operational Level

There are three types of distress: aeronautical, marine and land. While the system is made to act as a whole, basic responsibilities are precise.

The Department of Public Safety dictates that:

- The Canadian Armed Forces are responsible for aeronautical incidents,
- The Canadian Coast Guard is responsible for marine incidents, and
- Provincial and territorial governments are responsible for SAR on land.

The overall responsibility for land and inland water SAR rests with the provinces, territories, and municipalities. Typically, this responsibility is delegated to the police force of jurisdiction, which is the RCMP in all provinces and territories except Ontario and Quebec, and in various municipalities.

Search and Rescue technicians collaborate with local law enforcement as part of a training exercise during Search and Rescue Exercise 2017 (SAREX 2017) on 24 September 2017 in Hamilton, Ontario.
The operational level of SAR consists of every element participating in the National SAR program (NSP). Members of the NSP keep their own jurisdiction, authorities, control, and responsibilities. SAR in Canada is truly a shared workload. Some of the organizations, like SARVAC and CASARA, are dedicated solely to the cause, while others, such as the RCMP, Canadian Coast Guard, and DND, embrace SAR as one duty among others. The effectiveness of every component is strong and well-established. The RCAF has been training and conducting SAR since 1970, and the Canadian Coast Guard has had SAR as a mandate since 1950. The members of ICSAR, provincial emergency teams, and volunteer organizations are some of the best-trained in the world. Moreover, the leadership and effectiveness of each organization taken separately is very high. The units of the SAR system all have their unique skill sets, and their roles and responsibilities are clear. The main agencies have their own primary focus, but they also have secondary responsibilities that are often as important as their primary responsibilities. For example, the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) is responsible for aeronautical SAR anywhere within Canada, but it also provides air assets to the Coast Guard for maritime incidents. The military is often called upon as a last-resort resource to assist provincial/territorial governments for inland SAR. The Canadian Rangers may also routinely be asked to assist in ground SAR operations in the Arctic, as they provide SAR specialists with invaluable knowledge and advice on the terrain, weather, and conditions in a given search area. The operational level can be summarized as a group of agencies with distinct responsibilities that assist each other when required.

**SAR Tactical Level**

The tactical level is the ‘razor-sharp’ end of SAR delivery in Canada. Regardless of the organizations to which they are subordinate, the people of the SAR community are trained professionals that put their lives on the line to save others. Even more unique is the military SAR element, which is one of the military branches in the CAF that ‘never sleeps:’ it is continuously on operations ‘24/7.’ The SAR system is called upon more than 15,000 times a year to assist people in distress. Tactical coordination can be divided into two main categories of provincial and federal assets. Each province and territory possesses a number of Ground SAR (SARVAC) units across their regions, for a total of 300 GSAR units and 9,000 volunteers. The RCMP and provincial police agencies responsible for SAR at the provincial level are also divided in regions and districts to cover SAR. The RCAF has five primary SAR Squadrons with fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter assets spread across Canada. It can also dig into its entire arsenal of aircraft to support SAR, if required to do so.

The federal government divided its responsibility into three distinct Search and Rescue Regions (SRR): Victoria SRR, Trenton SRR, and Halifax SRR (Figure 1). The divisions have been created to provide a balanced coverage with the resources available. Each region is managed ‘round-the-clock’ by a Joint Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) staffed with members of the RCAF and the CCG. A process called SAR timeline (Figure 2) is launched when an emergency situation arises. Alerting agencies, such as 911, contact JRCC for marine and aeronautical incidents or they contact the provinces’ emergency management organizations for inland incidents.
Shortfall #1: The current framework and resources allocated to the National SAR Secretariat (NSS) prohibit an effective connection between the strategic level and the operational elements of the SAR system.

Canada’s first challenge in SAR coordination emerges from its geography. With the second-largest land mass and the longest coastline in the world, Canada boasts a terrain that ranges from the frozen Arctic, to towering mountain ranges, to vast expanses of plains. Added to this geographical diversity is the element of weather, which consists of four distinct seasons with average temperatures ranging from -30 to +30 °C. Together, these features create a coordination challenge that requires a multi-agency approach. Being able to tap into various organizations is vital, and it supports the holistic approach put forward in the NSP’s vision.

The challenge faced by the National SAR Program is bringing all the independent systems together without having control over them. Every partner has its own objectives, doctrine, and funding. It is important to note that the organizations comprising that system also have their own command and control structure. The lack of command and control structure in the current organizational system is highlighted at the strategic level by a non-existent link between the head of the SAR delivery agencies, and the NSS.21 For example, British Columbia’s Provincial Emergency Program (PEP) is the lead agency for all inland SAR in British Columbia. They deliver their program through GSAR units and the RCMP. While they do have a ‘symbolic’ position at NSS, nobody is permanently sitting at the NSS roundtable to represent them. The flow of command and control is strong and well-established, leading upward to the head of the PEP. However, it stops there, instead of carrying on to the strategic level of the NSS, with a senior advisor representing PEP. This missing link is mainly due to the lack of human resources allocated to the NSS by the government. The intent of the SAR program is a flow of continuity from the policy to the worker. At the moment, the downward flow effectively stops at the NSS and skips to the operational elements.

This lack of leadership flow makes strategic coordination very problematic, as it is largely left up to the individual organizations to integrate and cooperate with each other. At present, the SAR system is comprised of exceptional groups with well-defined responsibilities, but it does not properly connect at the strategic level to empower the SAR system as a whole. The lack of maturity in our strategic sphere is not caused by inexperience or incompetence but simply by not having the human resources allocated to it. The best representation of the NSS is the analogy of picturing a maestro with no access to the great musicians of the tactical world.

Shortfall #2: The SAR agencies are often operating parallel to each other with no genuine coordination linking them together.

Unlike most other governmental operations, SAR missions are unpredictable and unique. Even though an average can be predetermined and an alerting posture established, SAR missions cannot accurately be predicted.22 The location and type of distress is only known as it occurs, and so, a reactive response is the only course of action.

As described in the previous section, organizations such as the CAF, RCMP, or CCG are activated to answer the call of duty. Each organization has a specific area of responsibility, and the appropriate elements react to the distress situation. The problem with this concept is that another element of the SAR system could be better positioned to assist, but is unaware of the distressed. The circulation of information on a specific distress is not maximized. For example, if a hunter is lost in Labrador, the provincial emergency system (RCMP) will be activated, while the CCG and CAF will be unaware unless the RCMP decides to request assistance from one of these organizations. This lack of ‘side-by-side’ coordination among federal and provincial elements may result in the degradation of SAR services, and ultimately, the loss of lives. The Auditor General report highlighted that “…the SAR departments do not have a common set of principles for coordination with other levels of government on a national scale.”23 Operational coordination exists in some locations due to local initiative but is slow, often delayed, and its survival is dependent upon the people in place. Time and communication are the essence in SAR, and ad hoc protocols take time to unfold.

Many examples can highlight this lack of overall coordination reliability. On the night of 23 December 2010, a 23-year-old man stranded on a steep side of Hat Mountain in Cypress Provincial Park, British Columbia, called for assistance. The provincial emergency management and the RCMP responded to the call by activating the North Shore Rescue volunteer organization. After multiple rescue attempts that were unsuccessful due to avalanche risk and darkness, the team lead decided to reach out to JRCC Victoria for military assistance. Shortly thereafter, the hiker was safely evacuated via rescue hoist by members of a SAR helicopter crew from the RCAF’s 442 Squadron.24 While this example showcases excellent inter-agency operations, it puts the onus for decision-making and coordination initiation upon a local volunteer team leader.
Nearly six years later, on 12 December 2016, two skiers were caught in an avalanche while skiing out of bounds near Cypress Hill in British Columbia. The situation bore numerous similarities to that of 2010, but the persistent lack of established side-by-side coordination from federal-provincial organizations produced a different decision-making process. The North Shore Rescue team was not able to access the pair, and decided to leave them overnight without assistance. The team leader stated: “…we really had our fingers crossed for these guys that they were going to survive the night and fortunately, they did.”

This article is not intended to be judgmental either to the people in distress, or to the team lead on the ground, but the reality is that 442 Squadron had a full helicopter SAR crew ‘24/7’ that could have been there within minutes and evacuated the pair by hoist under night-vision goggles. That this rescue scenario did not take place is not the fault of North Shore Rescue or of 442 Squadron. Rather, the blame lies squarely with the lack of a reliable framework for coordinating the passing of information to the appropriate agency at the right time. A representative from the RCMP (lead agency for Ground SAR in British Columbia) could have been sitting next to his/her military counterpart in the same operations room and could have asked for military assistance when the provincial asset was unable to proceed with the rescue. Instead, the distress call became yet another close call for disaster coordination, and had the pair succumbed to the elements overnight, our citizens would have required answers as to why the military SAR specialists were not activated.

Not all operational coordination is problematic, as is evidenced by the strong working relationship between the CAF and the CCG. Both agencies have members on watch ‘24/7,’ located in Joint Rescue Coordination Centers across Canada. These members are ready to assist each other when the SAR system is activated. For example, if a boat is sinking off the coast of Newfoundland, the CCG will be alerted as the lead agency. Simultaneously, the RCAF Air Coordinator located in the same room will work with its CCG counterparts to assist with RCAF air assets as required. This operational coordination is instantaneous and highly effective.

**Shortfall #3:** Even though the NSP’s vision calls for SAR coordination integrated in a multijurisdictional approach, the operational level is a cooperation that is constantly challenged by federal-provincial relationships.

The main coordination in SAR is between federal and provincial governments. The ineptness of the NSS to bring those multi-jurisdictional organizations together was proven earlier, leaving each of the elements to coordinate among themselves along the lines of a cooperation principle. Cooperation is always easy,
and is seen as successful until problems arise and create pressure on each side. There are numerous examples of cooperation working towards the same goal and common interest, but instituting a permanent structure for a cooperation model is problematic. Dr. Martin Painter of the University of Sydney is a specialist in government interdepartmental relations, and he writes extensively on Canadian dynamics. He highlights that, in SAR instances where a joint response is expected from the public, the two government levels will play together. Painter also specifies that “…they will co-operate; but so long as the competitive dynamic operates, governments will remain answerable to their own electorates rather than merely to each other in the deals that they strike.” SAR cooperation at the operational level instead of SAR coordination is a prime example. Each jurisdiction understands the main objectives of SAR and is willing to cooperate, but “…the principles underlying the Canadian division of powers are based on jurisdictional distinctions between various subject matters. The result is a system of parallel rather than interlocking governments.”

The federal government appointed a SAR Lead Minister in 1986. Moreover, the Canadian Emergency Management Act clearly states that the coordination and responsibility for the NSP resides within Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. This battle of powers is fairly transparent to the general public until their cooperation is put to test.

In 2012, a young boy named Burton Winters left the small Labrador community of Makkovik on a snowmobile, and he was found deceased three days later. The general public blamed the federal government for its lack of effective involvement in the case. In February 2012, then-Minister of National Defence, Peter McKay, called for a DND internal investigation of the case. Shortly thereafter, the Minister declared that the federal answer with respect to the event was qualified as “satisfactory.” According to the NSP doctrine, the Minister was correct; the provincial authority had a clear line of responsibility for the case. While the doctrine supports the federal answer, the
public still ‘pointed a collective finger’ at the federal government with respect to their role as SAR coordinator in Canada. After reflecting upon this national debate and outburst on SAR, author and reporter Michael Friss Johansen wrote a book about Burton Winters’ final journey. His final chapter describes the events as “…jurisdictional confusion and inter-governmental squabbling.”

The NSP openly promotes to the general public that its core is based upon multi-jurisdictional coordination, but the reality is that it is more a cooperation model.

**Shortfall #4: The lack of coordination produces erroneous expectations of the SAR system from the population.**

SAR is a very emotional topic in general, and this is understandable due to the nature of the mission. When lives are at stake, people expect emergency services to deploy all available forces. Unfortunately, Canada does not have the resources to launch its entire SAR arsenal for every case. Canada has approximately 15,000 SAR incidents a year, so it would be inconceivable to have all elements of the National SAR Program (NSP) reacting to so many thousands of missions.

The population of Canada has never gained a clear understanding of the current SAR system’s web. Instead, the reality makes room for a more biased vision of what the population should expect in time of crisis. It is safe to assume that, through this unguided process, every citizen lost in the woods or at sea hanging on for their lives expects a yellow helicopter to come to the rescue. Does the RCAF conduct land rescues? The answer is yes, they conduct more than 150 a year. One can ask why the RCAF is conducting land rescues while their primary responsibility is air incidents. The answer is simply because they can do so when other agencies cannot. However, that they do conduct land rescues on certain occasions does not necessarily imply that this capability should be expected in every situation. The RCAF has a secondary SAR role to support the provinces and territories when required. For instance, British Columbia has 1,350 cases of land rescues a year, and the RCAF’s 442 Squadron covering the West Coast simply does not have the resources to act in all these cases.

The entire SAR system is essentially a victim of its own success. The RCAF might play a heroic role in the rescue of hikers stuck on the side of a cliff, even though it is not their primary responsibility. This ‘can-do attitude’ makes sense to the professionals involved, but the media then takes the stories and pub-
lishes them with good intent (‘feel-good’ stories sell). From this, expectation seeds are planted in the population, so that if somebody gets lost, the expectation is that the CAF should respond just as they did for someone else previously. The trend poses a problem for the military role in SAR, where the military is perceived as overreaching in what is seen as a “man on a white horse”. Unfortunately, the lack of strategic leadership body is not in place to align expectation and educate the population on the reality of SAR resources. The above-delineated approach is simplistic but nevertheless well-anchored in Canadians’ minds. The SAR system would readily trade the ‘pat on the back’ for an educated public on SAR areas of responsibilities.

Potential Solution #1: Empower the National SAR Secretariat (NSS) to its original purpose of being the central agency of SAR representatives.

Martin Shadwick is a professor of Canadian Defence policy at York University. He commented on the Auditor General Report of 2013 on SAR, saying:

The [report] devotes more space to prevention activities and emergency beacons than governance, even though one could argue that deficiencies in governance have for decades been at the root of Canada’s search and rescue problems…. Also intriguing is the degree to which the governance component critiqued the tiny National Search and Rescue Secretariat. Those criticisms are technically correct, but it would have been helpful to fully acknowledge that the NSS has consistently lacked the structure, authority and resources to fulfill its stated mandate.

The missing link is between the strategic and operational levels. The policy and strategy for SAR is established, and the National SAR Secretariat (NSS) has a clear mandate but no connection to the operational capabilities. No effective coordination can be established if strategic and operational levels do not connect. The void between the NSS and the SAR agencies is the main detractor of the entire SAR system, so the leadership of the SAR delivery agencies need to establish a legitimate connection to the NSS.

The empowerment of the NSS is crucial. For the NSS to be a key player in the delivery and coordination of SAR, every member of the NSS needs physical representation ‘around one table.’ More people representing the whole spectrum of SAR delivery need to work side-by-side under the NSS to improve the strategic coordination (Figure 3). Furthermore, the NSS needs to employ representatives of every National SAR Program elements, and the head of every organization involved, i.e., the Chief of the Defence Staff from the CAF, needs a connection that sits at the NSS table permanently. A flow of continuity from the SAR Policy to the delivery of SAR is the key to SAR coordination challenges. Resources allocation to the National SAR Secretariat (NSS) would resuscitate its original purpose of being the ‘one-stop shop’ for SAR matters in Canada. Moreover, in an effort to increase the leadership construct, consideration should be given to transfer the appointment of the Lead Minister for SAR. The Lead Minister for SAR was appointed in 1976 following an increase in offshore oil exploration and advances in commercial fishing. The Minister of National Defence was a logical choice, due to the involvement of the Department in these activities at the time. Above and beyond being the overall Lead Minister for SAR, The MND has a clear and natural line of duty when it comes to the delivery of aeronautical and marine SAR through the CAF.

The movement of re-allocating the NSP coordination has already started. In 2003, the NSP found a new home under the auspice of Public Safety Canada. In 2015, the government announced improvements to the SAR system and decided to move the NSS from the DND to Public Safety Canada. The next logical step would be to transfer the SAR lead from the MND to Public Safety Canada. Through the Emergency Management Act, the Minister of Public Safety is already empowered to coordinate emergency management activities among government institutions and in cooperation with the provinces and other entities. The move of the Lead Minister for SAR would help in streamlining strategic SAR within Public Safety and avoid the detour to the MND office.

Potential Solution #2: Augment current Joint Rescue Coordination Centers (JRCCs) with the RCMP, relevant police agencies and Ground SAR (SARVAC) to make them multi-jurisdictional centers of operational coordination for all types of SAR incidents in Canada – land, marine, and air.

While the importance of an improved representation of all elements of the SAR system in the NSS cannot be underestimated, the main centre of gravity for tangible results remains at the operational level. The idea here is to have a ‘911-type’ organization for all SAR incidents. As previously stated, the participants of the NSP are among the best in the world, and they deliver their respective capabilities in a very effective and professional manner. The issue encountered is the inability to interact in a timely fashion to ensure that the appropriate resources are dispatched at the appropriate time. The great operational coordination between the CAF and the CCG was given as an example of excellent coordination. The CAF and CCG members are co-located in three Joint Rescue Coordination Centres (JRCC) across Canada, and their effectiveness is the envy of other nations. The proposed solution is to build on the proven CAF-CCG model and have a physical presence of the Provincial/Territorial Emergency Element (the RCMP, in most provinces and territories) and a GSAR representative working within the JRCCs. The best place to empower our strong Ground SAR volunteer organization (SARVAC) is to give them a seat in the JRCCs. The JRCCs would then house all operational elements of the NSP, (see Figure 4). In fact, the JRCCs would effectively become the only centers required for operational coordination of all three types of SAR missions (land, marine and air) This solution calls for the current construct to be augmented with appropriate representatives of the current provincials lead agencies as depicted in Figure 4.
This would enable a true operational coordination of the appropriate resources at the appropriate time. Issues with time-sensitive delays due to cumbersome protocols would be eliminated, and cases like the tragic loss of Burton Winters would become unlikely. Practically, all SAR emergencies would be directed to the JRCCs for true operational coordination among NSP players.

The government does not have to look very far for a successful model similar to the one presented in this solution. The Marine Security Operations Centers (MSOCs) emerged from a direction of the 2004 National Security Policy. MSOCs have staff from DND, the RCMP, the Canada Border Services Agency, Transport Canada, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) and the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), making it a unique example of multi-agency integration. Departmental mandates, lines of authority, and communications structures are maintained by each agency within the MSOCs. The expertise of each element working physically side-by-side enables a coordinated interdepartmental approach to fulfilling National Policy.

Conclusion

Throughout the history of the Canadian SAR program, historical deficiencies at the strategic level have undermined the performance of the whole system. The coordination shortfalls have been in sharp contrast to the successes of the tactical delivery of SAR by its various agencies, and therefore, the SAR
puzzle has remained acceptable despite missing key pieces. A shared responsibility among civil and military is pivotal to a coordinated SAR execution. Due to a failure of the system to think strategically, the tactical level, also referred as the ‘pointy end’ of SAR, has slowly become the foundation. This situation has created an inverted pyramid. Even though the balancing act has endured over time, actions are required to correct the situation. The answer that will provide a lasting impact in the coherent SAR delivery is a strategic framework fueled by coordination. The need to synchronize the actions of the joint SAR force with a wide range of government and non-governmental agencies, including elements of civil society, will become an increasingly important part of the strategic level. At the operational level, the coordination function will be dominated by the need to achieve unity of effort across the joint force. Two solutions were proposed: first, a representation of every SAR agencies at the NSS table to enable a strategic core and flow from policy to operations, and finally, an increase in JRCCs staffing to include agencies responsible for SAR inland that will bring everyone under the same roof operating effectively and efficiently. The only way to predict the SAR system ten years from now is to put in the effort required to improve it today. Canadians are fortunate to be able to count on one of the best SAR forces in the world. But, like every other governmental mission, attention and resources need to be allocated to sustain this capability that is described at all levels as a ‘no fail’ mission.
Decision Making in the Capability Development Process: Organizational Issues within the Department of National Defence

by Martin Rivard

We have seen many times in the media various failed or controversial defence procurements, the CF-18 Hornet replacement, the procurement of four Upholder Class submarines, and the replacement of the Canadian Army’s logistical trucks, to name just three. While these examples are somewhat extreme, there is a far larger number of projects that fail or are in extreme difficulty, and they do not receive any media scrutiny. We historically tend to ‘point the finger’ at the individuals who were managing these programs, the project managers and the project director, but what if it was the organization itself that was the cause of these failures? The Department of National Defence (DND) is highly susceptible to procurement failures, due to the way it is organized, and the manner by which it processes strategic decisions, such as the cases with respect to the aforementioned threesome.

There are a number of factors that are at the root of these disappointing results. The first deals with the ability to innovate and learn; DND apparently can do neither. It does not appear to matter how hard and loud leaders, both military and civilian, discuss this shortcoming, the organization and its processes are not designed for innovation. The second factor has to do with the disconnect between our strategy and our procurement processes. Part of the problem resides in the lifespan of our systems versus our strategies. Most of our fleets are in service for fifteen-to-twenty years [or longer – Ed.], while our strategies tend to last generally for the duration of a specific government in power, if a strategy is even published. Lastly, the rational decision methods used for DND’s capability development program are greatly impacted by
non-rational factors. For each of these adverse cause factors, the context and problem space will be defined, and this article will discuss alternatives and mitigation techniques that could possibly help solve some of these issues.

On Innovation

As stated earlier, DND does not appear to be organized in a manner to favor innovation with respect to the procurement of new capabilities. This lack of innovation applies to what is procured and how it is procured. This article will demonstrate the point by first identifying what constitutes an innovating or learning organization, and then pointing out the differences between such an organization and the Department of National Defence.

What is a learning organization? It is one where the elements are organized in a horizontal fashion in order to facilitate the flow of work and information, rather than in a vertical fashion. This type of organizational model enables the organization to continuously experiment, improve, and increase its capability. The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) are currently organized into a number of Level One organizations, with the Canadian Army, Royal Canadian Navy, and Royal Canadian Air Force being directly accountable to the Chief of Defence Staff, while a number of other Level One organizations are directly accountable to the Deputy Minister, with the Assistant Deputy Minister (Information Management), Assistant Deputy Minister (Materiel), and Assistant Deputy Minister (Corporate Services) being key functionaries in the procurement process. Each of these Level Ones is responsible for a specific functional area within DND. The Department follows the efficiency model proposed by the American mechanical engineer Frederick Winslow Taylor in the 19th Century, who sought to improve industrial efficiency through a model that became the basis for the modern assembly chain found in the auto industry. This model is a vertically-integrated model with high central control. It favors the formalization of the workplace, coupled with the specialization of work, and a hierarchy of authority. The formalization of the workplace is embodied in the personnel appraisal system that dictates the formats of work descriptions and appraisals. The other two elements exist in the procurement and financial system, where specific positions and rank levels have the authority to approve spending, based upon the authorities delegated by the Deputy Minister.

A vertically-integrated organization is not necessarily incapable of innovation. It can form task forces or multifunctional teams in order to solve an issue that it cannot solve as it is presently organized. Thereafter, it can integrate and formalize that particular issue into one of its Departmental functions.

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Figure 1 – IPCP/IPCI Approval Process for PB (ID).
However, in the case of the DND, it is, in fact, this very process that renders innovation almost impossible. Applications for the acquisition of new capabilities are submitted via the Investment Plan to the Treasury Board on a three-year cycle in order to obtain governmental approval. Any new requirement will normally take three years to be included for consideration in the 20-year plan contained in the Canada First Defence Strategy (CFDS), or any subsequent defence policy. To that end, a current technology that could be considered to fill a given requirement would be passed over twice in the time needed to get the requirement considered. In the area of command and control or intelligence and surveillance systems, this is critical as these systems are highly dependent upon information technologies. Thus, this can also be viewed as a missed opportunity to fill a critical need. Even if the requirement is considered for inclusion in the Departmental Investment Plan, it is still not funded. In order for that to occur, a multiple-step process is required. Figure 1 depicts the overall capability investment process, with the investment plan process highlighted in orange. It depicts the methodology and organizations involved in the needs identification process. At this stage, a limited number of organizations are involved; the sponsor, represented by the project director (PD) and the project leader (PL, who is the first level of senior management involved), and the first organizations with no vested interest in filling the need. Chief of Programme (C Prog), represented by Director Defence Programme Coordination (DDPC) and Director Defence Force Planning (DDFP), are responsible to ensure that the projects abide by specific processes and provide specific documents for review prior to endorsement or approval by the decision bodies. In that role, they are the assigned guardians of the logic of appropriateness for capability investment in DND. The members of these organizations view the maintenance of this logic as their way of being ‘good stewards’ of the taxpayers’ money.

The Investment Plan Change Proposal/Investment Plan Change Impact Analysis (IPCP/IPCIA) approval process for Project Brief Identification [PB (ID)] endorsement of the Chief of Program sub-process requires 30 days for completion, and a basic submission requires more than 100 days before the involvement of outside agencies, such as Treasury Board or Cabinet, are even factored in.

In industry, the required speed of innovation is normally associated with getting products to markets faster than competitors, or by reducing costs more than competitors. In the case of DND, this translates into developing capabilities, both technical and personal, faster than its potential adversaries. Most peer competitors are other nation states, also with vertically-integrated militaries. In this case, the slow process is not as much of a factor preventing innovation, since other nation states develop their capabilities in a similar fashion, and with varying degrees of success. This becomes an issue when considering non-state actors making use of new and emerging technologies to disrupt how conflicts are fought. This is of particular concern in the area of intelligence and cyber warfare, as demonstrated by the market penetration of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These organizations have historically been built around cells organized in a similar fashion to multi-functional teams found in innovative organizations, where functional structures have been dismantled in favor of a matrix or hybrid model.

Each box in Figure 1 represents a functional unit responsible for specific actions and authorities in the approval process. All proposals must be approved at each gate in order to proceed further. Even when project teams are formed to include members from other functional areas, authorities are retained by the functional areas and are not delegated to representatives on the project teams. This makes the project team susceptible to non-rational factors, which will be discussed later. The vertical integration of the Department of National Defence also means that capability improvement decisions are retained by senior management. Table 1 outlines some of the responsibilities of senior managers towards the capital procurement program. Figure 2 shows a simplified governance model of investment decisions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manager</th>
<th>Does</th>
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| **MND** | Presents fiscal and financial recommendations to colleagues and Treasury Board as required  
Advises colleagues of the intentions of the DM and CDS as required  
Presents PAA and IP proposals to colleagues and the Treasury Board as required  
Provides policy guidance and direction to DM/CDS |
| **DM/CDS** | **DM/CDS co-chair Defence Strategic Executive**  
Financial framework for the IP and funding changes  
Financial Allocations  
Financial Re-allocations  
Corporate Strategy and Plan  
IP approval  
Manage the strategic plan  
PAA  
Programmatic changes to the IP |
| **VCDS** | **VCDS chairs Project Management Board**  
Manage the approved DSP  
Recommend changes to the DSP (& IP)  
Manage future expectations  
Recommend the Force Capability Plan  
Recommends PAA changes to DM/CDS |
| **L1s** | ADM (Fin CS) in role as CFO is advisor to the DM at IRMC and to VCDS at PMB  
All L1s advise VCDS at PMB |

Table 1 – Responsibilities of Senior Management
Most of these boards and committees meet a limited number of times a year, and most capability initiatives must be discussed at each of these sessions before they can be authorized to move forward. In the case of the Project Management Board, it is all projects that need to be discussed. The Department operates in a ‘top-down’ direction with respect to guidance; the Deputy Minister and the Chief of the Defence Staff have the lead roles in determining what needs to be done, and in approving plans to reach Departmental objectives.

Innovative organizations also make use of idea-finding programs or systems in order to involve the collective knowledge of all its members. This was experimented with by the US Army with the establishment of ArmyCoCreate. The site was set up to make use of crowd sourcing in order to accept ideas from members of the US Army at all levels, and also from outside agencies. This would enable capability development to procure or develop technologies in areas of high demand from front-line workers. In the case of DND’s capability development, ideas from front-line operators need to be validated by intermediaries from the unit levels all the way to the L1/Environmental Command level before they may even be considered for inclusion in the plan. Another practice of innovative organization is the promotion of innovation as an organizational value, and also by making it part of leadership development.

The slow, methodical process used by DND to acquire new capabilities cannot support innovation. This is primarily due to its formal functional organization built for efficiency. It is also extremely different from a highly innovative organization due to its lack of promotion of innovation, and by not having creativity as part of its core culture. The top-down approach used by DND differs also from innovative organizations that tend to rely upon and reward front-line workers for their innovation and creativity. Unless DND is willing and enabled to revamp its capability development processes, it is unlikely that it will become an innovative organization.

On Strategic Disconnection

The strategy statement should be regarded as the keystone document of an organization. Along with the mission statement and the vision, it defines the raison d’être of the organization. It is this link that makes high level decisions become a strategy, or “…when a sequence of decisions in some area exhibit a consistency over time, a strategy will be considered to have formed.” There is also a time component to identify a strategy versus another type of high-level decision. This time component provides a link to the military strategy, which is historically focused upon what needs to be done ‘to win the war,’ whereas the tactical level is concerned with ‘winning the battle.’ Therefore, the Government of Canada (GoC) sets the national security policy, and in doing so, it determines how the CAF will be employed.
The CFDS meets the criteria defined above as it identifies how the CAF will be employed, and it outlines long-term security ambitions and matching capital equipment procurement. The CFDS is based upon the GoC’s vision for defence, as well as upon threat analysis. It also identifies the military capabilities that are needed to meet the identified threats. Found in the CFDS are three major objectives and six core missions, these missions provide more details as to what the operational and tactical activities should be. In order to be in-line with the strategy, capital equipment should be procured to meet one-or-more of the missions.16

The CFDS goes on to identify particular programs that will procure new major equipment. It also links itself to procurement programs already in the process of delivering capital equipment. Some of these procurements came from recommendations tabled by the Manley Report on Afghanistan (2008), i.e., CH-47 Chinook helicopters,17 but most are replacements for rusting-out capabilities (CC-130H Hercules and Standard Military Pattern trucks).18 By linking the strategy to capital procurements that were not designed to fit in the strategy, the GoC runs the risk of having future programs procure equipment with little-to-no linkage to the government’s strategic goals. Under the new fleet replacements, the CFDS identifies five new fleets.19 Surface ships, fighter aircraft, and the Land Combat Vehicles and Systems (LCVS) will be discussed further herein.

In its strategic design publication, the Canadian Army aligns its role with the CFDS and identifies it as a design constraint.20 While acknowledging its fit inside the CFDS, it further focuses itself upon international operations, as these tend to be more demanding, and the capabilities developed for these operations can be used in meeting the other core missions.21 The Canadian Army’s capability development program is normally held against meeting these constraints. While capital equipment procurement programs are held against the Army’s strategic vision, the linkage back to the CFDS is often weak, or even non-existent.

The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) strategy links itself well to the three main themes of the CFDS.22 In its role of protecting Canada and exercising sovereignty in home waters, it links to the procurement of Arctic Patrol vessels.23 With its role in preventing conflicts and strengthening relationships, it supports the justification for the procurement of destroyers and frigates identified in the CFDS. However, there is no evidence that the RCN links its capital equipment programs to its strategy.

The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) also has a strategy publication that acknowledges the overall role of the CFDS.24 The RCAF Campaign Plan offers a more detailed linkage between the RCAF strategy and the CFDS by identifying NORAD as a key element for the delivery of air power.25 This links back to the first two themes of the CFDS identified earlier. However, again, neither publication links the RCAF capital equipment procurement program to the CFDS.

Of the three services, only the Canadian Army links its capital equipment program directly to its strategy, and indirectly to the CFDS. By not linking their own strategy to their procurements, the RCN and the RCAF run the risks of procuring equipment that will not meet the needs of the GoC strategy, nor were they identified by it. This is embodied in the Fixed Wing Search and Rescue aircraft, which was identified in the CFDS, to be delivered starting in 2015, and the fighter aircraft, to be delivered in 2017.26 Identified in the CFDS are the Land Combat Vehicles and Systems (LCVS), while the Canadian Army refers to this capital program as the Family of Land Combat Systems (FLCS).27 The FLCS is a framework developed to assist in designing the requirements for the platforms with reference to each other. The Canadian Army identifies the vulnerability of combat support platforms as a key issue to be resolved with the combat platform not after their delivery.28 The preliminary business case for the Armoured Combat Support Vehicle (ACSV) project has been completed, and it does acknowledge that the CFDS pledged to modernize the CAF, but it does not link the capability to any of the core themes.
or the six missions identified in the CFDS. The CFDS clearly identified the FLCS as a major fleet replacement, and yet, the project has not moved beyond the identification stage of DND’s project approval process. This means that it is still unfunded. If the project was properly linked to the CFDS, we would expect it to move forward and deliver capabilities in line with the strategy. The project expects to deliver a platform with a service life from 2020 to 2050. But this means that the first platform would not be delivered until at least 12 years after the proclamation of the strategy. During this time frame, the ruling Government could change three times, each with its own foreign and defence policy…

Another fleet replacement identified in the CFDS is the fighter aircraft. The business case for the Next Generation Fighter Capability Project goes further than the ACSV by linking service objectives to CFDS core missions. The Departmental approval process also acknowledges the primacy of the CFDS by noting the commitment of the GoC to maintain an aerospace effect capability, and it endorsed the acquisition of a multi-role capability to address the phase-out of the CF-18 in the 2017-2020 timeframe. However, the linkage unravels itself when considering time and space. When the Joint Capability Requirement Board endorsed the replacement in 2008, it did not consider technological issues in terms of the maturity of fifth generation fighters, nor that delays with the US program would not enable the procurement in time for the planned phase-out of the CF-18. In the case of this particular program, it is more the strategy that becomes irrelevant, due to the change of government and its new priorities.

The RCN projects bring a different set of issues. Its platform replacement projects were identified before the CFDS was published, including the replacement of destroyers that were identified in the CFDS as a “New Major Fleet Replacement.” The Destroyer Replacement Project was formally identified on 12 July 2007, or about a year before the CFDS was brought forward by the government. This is also the case for the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship (AOPS) project (19 June 2007), and the Joint Support Ship (JSS) to replace the fleet oilers (12 May 2004). In the case of the RCN projects, it would seem that the projects directed the strategy.

One of the major reasons for the absence of a strong enabling link between the strategy and the capital program is the fact that the equipment listed in the strategy are, for the most part, replacing existing capabilities. The CFDS does not indicate any major changes in the roles and responsibilities of DND or the CAF. Without any major changes in what it needs to accomplish, the CAF will continue to procure equipment based upon requirements identified before the implementation of the CFDS. It could be argued that operations in Afghanistan had more influence on capital equipment procurement than the

“Another issue is the temporary nature of elected governments versus the length of time needed to deliver these major equipment fleets.”

A CH-147F Chinook helicopter over Hazen Lake, Ellesmere Island.
CFDS, and the procurement of CC-177 Globemaster III strategic transports and CH-47F Chinook heavy-lift helicopters constitute excellent examples of this.

Another issue is the temporary nature of elected governments versus the length of time needed to deliver these major equipment fleets. A majority government mandate is five years, whereas a major capital project lifecycle is normally at least ten-to-fifteen years from identification to close-out. Therefore, a GoC defence strategy could change three times in the span that it would take to deliver a capability identified by an earlier government. In the case of the CFDS, the RCN projects are good examples of this phenomenon.

Another cause of this disconnect comes from what is considered a priority for a Department at a given time. When looking at defence priorities from 2014 to 2018, the procurement of capital equipment is not listed. The priorities align themselves with the pillars found in the CFDS, except for equipment. By not considering the capital equipment as part of the priorities, the senior management of the Department is effectively disconnecting procurement from the CFDS.

On Bureaucracy

There are numerous views in terms of defining a rational decision-making process. For the purpose of this article, we will focus upon decisions made by organizations, rather than individuals. The analyses of the US national security organization made by political scientist Graham Allison, public affairs specialist Philip Zelikow, and an acknowledged expert on US foreign and public policy, Morton Halperin, offer excellent approaches with respect to how to look at decisions made in this organizational context. They looked at the interaction between the different branches of the military with respect to capability development, and during the Cuban missile crisis. In the bureaucratic political model, the decision maker is not a single unitary actor, but a conglomerate of governmental organizations and their leaders, with political leadership residing on top. This model takes into account the differences stemming from an organization being composed of a number of individuals with sometimes-opposing agendas. Participants make choices in accordance with various conceptions/perceptions of national security, organizational interests, or even personal interest. A phrase often employed in DND that exemplifies this approach is ‘being a good steward of the taxpayer’s money.’ It is defined by to which element of the bureaucracy one belongs. For some, it will be to minimize spending, while for others, it will be to maximize the outcome for those they represent. The latter consideration is of particular interest when talking about military organizations, as this often relates to their specific roles or ‘essences.’

One of the key differences rests in the logic involved in arriving at a decision. In the case of individuals, one generally considers the outcome when deciding upon its logic and rationality. In the case of organizations, the manner by which a decision was derived takes precedent. This has been characterized as the logic of appropriateness, where actions are chosen by recognizing the situation and applying the matching response. This is of particular importance when analyzing DND’s capability development program, as will be covered later with respect to organizations with a mission, often self-appointed, of being ‘good stewards.’

The acquisition and development of capabilities (people, processes, and technologies) in DND and the CAF is defined under the Project Approval Directive. It describes the standard project framework used in the DND and the general process for identifying, developing, and implementing investment projects within the policy framework issued by the Treasury Board. All projects within the Department are implemented under this directive. Figure 3 shows the process that must be taken for capital projects of more than five million dollars. This particular process will be used for this article as it is more susceptible to non-rational effects than the one used for smaller projects.
At each of these steps, a number of organizations within DND are involved, from the sponsor who identifies the need, to the implementer, who procures or develops the solution to respond to the identified need. These two organizations are the main stakeholders in the decision to acquire or replace capabilities. A number of other organizations are also involved in the decision process. Officially, these organizations exist to support the strategic decision makers with respect to the readiness of the project to move to the next phase.

The Defence Capability Board (DCB) and the Programme Management Board (PMB) are the collective decision makers when it comes to procuring new military capabilities, either equipment or facilities, and consist of the top executives of DND (service commanders, and the various Assistant Deputy Ministers), and they are chaired by the Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS). It is within these two bodies that the first surfacing of a non-rational reaction, based upon a fundamental essence of the RCAF, namely, flying aircraft, one could hypothesize that it is unlikely that the RCAF would propose or accept the procurement of autonomous unmanned air combat vehicles to replace a manned fighter force at this time, even if it could provide a long-term strategic advantage to Canada in terms of technology or economics. This differs from the US Navy’s approach that, for example, is considering replacing its airborne-refueling capabilities with unmanned aircraft.45

The outcome of the process at Figure 1 is the commitment by DND of resources, people, and money, to the development of a new capability.46 Depending upon the nature of the acquisition, political leaders might need, or feel the need, to get involved. This is particularly important when the capability gap is not covered, either under current government policy, or the Departmental framework under the National Defence Act.

As the project moves along, more and more organizations are involved in the decision to assign more resources to meeting an earlier-identified need. Figure 4 depicts the evolution of this process. At this stage, DND commits substantial resources in the form of capital funding versus using the budget assigned to the various Assistant Deputy Ministers, who might need, or feel the need, to get involved. This is particularly important when the capability gap is not covered, either under current government policy, or the Departmental framework under the National Defence Act. This involvement is normally done through a Memorandum to Cabinet, whereby the Department requests the authority to proceed. The process could also trigger a non-rational reaction, based upon organizational 'essence,' if Cabinet should direct a shift in the role of the CAF, or one of the services, in favour of another government Department.48

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sponsoring it. The DND Chief Financial Officer (CFO) organization gets involved in confirming the capability costing proposed by the project office in the form of a cost validation. It also confirms the availability of funds to execute the project and to sustain the capability until it is discontinued. While the question of affordability is not different from other organizations (can we afford it?), when coupled with a qualitative review of the project costs, it can lead to serious issues with the potential to jeopardize the investment. As a specific example, in the case of the Net C2 ISAC project, this review led to a forecast cost increase of over thirty million dollars to implement the capability.\footnote{A cost increase due to a revision could mean that a needed capability is no longer affordable unless other capabilities are set aside. If the need is important enough for DND or the CAF, it has the potential to threaten capabilities favored by other services and lead to non-rational reactions, based upon the ‘essence’ of the services, unless this would jeopardize their respective positions. Again, hypothetically, this could result in certain activities mandated by NDHQ (i.e., ethics, diversity training, fisheries patrol) being curtailed or de-emphaticized in order to maintain core activities, such as field training and flight operations.}

The approval process to enter definition brings about the first official political involvement with the production of a corporate submission. This document is required in every instance where the Department will seek an authority from the MND or Ministers collectively (such as at the Treasury Board or Cabinet). The document, templates, procedures, and the corporate submission process are the purview of Director Corporate Submissions and Financial Arrangements (DCSFA) in the CFO group.\footnote{The submission can only be submitted to the Minister if endorsed by the CFO. This means that the CFO now has the power over how the information about the capability is presented to political decision makers. If the CFO, or his staff, feels threatened by the capability being proposed, or are in a political confrontation with the capability sponsor, the project could be derailed until the ‘political game’ is completed. As before, if any of the services or group principals perceives a threat to their ‘essence,’ they can once again affect the outcome of the project. This entire process is repeated again to implement the project. At this stage, the approval process becomes even stricter, in spite of the fact that it follows the same steps, and this is because once the implementation stage is reached, it is almost impossible to stop as no more decision gates are in place, and there is little incentive to create any in all echelons of the organization.}

It is during the approval to enter definition that other government Departments get involved in military procurement. Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED) is a key Department impacting upon how a capability is implemented. It works with Canadians in all areas of the economy and in all parts of the country to improve conditions for investment, to enhance Canada’s innovation performance, to increase Canada’s share of global trade, and to build a fair, efficient, and competitive marketplace. Under its mandate, it can direct other Departments to award contracts to businesses for the purpose of regional development and industrial benefits.\footnote{An example of this would be giving preference to a company that will build a plant in a province having high unemployment, or for the purpose of balancing the aerospace industry across the country instead of just favoring Quebec and Ontario. This can lead to the CAF procuring a less desirable, sub-optimal solution to meet its needs, due to many factors, such as the lack of experience of a selected contractor.}

As we have seen, DND’s capability development process can be the victim of non-rational effects in the form of ‘political games’ played between the various services and group principals. How can these be eliminated or at least mitigated in order to maintain the effectiveness of the CAF? The decision process is supposed to perform like a fluid decision process, that is steadily paced, formally channeled, and speedy, but it appears to perform in a more sporadic manner, and is also both informal and protracted.\footnote{Even though armed forces are a service provider rather than a goods manufacturer, they need to procure equipment in order to provide defence services. In a similar way to a car manufacturer who procures machinery to build the cars that they sell, the CAF buys aircraft, tanks, and warships in order to support Canadian government foreign policy that requires military action.}

One way to reduce the ‘political games’ could be to apply a more constricted process with respect to investment decisions made below the highest level.\footnote{One of the main reasons for the approval process is to properly capture and document the decision-making up to the political level.} Once it has been determined that the CAF needs a particular capability at DCB, this level of senior decision makers should perhaps not be involved in further decisions with respect to how to implement/satisfy that need. While still making use of similar levels of information and experts downstream, the room/need for negotiation would be reduced, making for easier decisions. This would be more in line with processes used in industry to decide upon capital investment for upgrades to equipment.\footnote{This change in methodology would be best applied to the replacement of existing capabilities, for example, by CF-18 replacement with another manned fighter, it could also be used with respect to the insertion of new capabilities. Such capabilities have the potential to dramatically change the role and design of the organization, again, for example, by replacing the CF-18 with unmanned air combat vehicles, and they would therefore require more room for negotiation before the senior leaders could remove themselves from the process. However, the formal organization could still be reduced by removing steps in the approval to only two, steps answering the following questions. Do we still need this to meet our obligations as defined in GoC policy? Can we afford it or can we afford to not replace it? The first question should be answered by approval from the DCB, while the second question could be answered by endorsement from the Investment and Resource Management Committee (IRMC).}

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occurrence, occurring once every ten-to-fifteen years at the earliest for a specific capability. It is also very difficult to view the replacement of frigates the same way as a tank replacement, or fighters for police cars. That said, this could perhaps be accomplished by foregoing Canada’s industrial offset policy to military contracts. Offsets are a part of trade agreement where the supplier agrees to have some level of the value of the contract performed in a location warranted by the buyer. 56

Conclusion

There is no easy solution to improve DND’s ability to deliver new capabilities. Part of the solution falls within a given Department, but a huge part resides in government. Competition for resources, and the self-appointed roles based upon what each group believes to be its responsibilities towards the national interest will always influence what is procured, how it is manned, and to a lesser extent, how it is acquired. But there are steps that can be taken to improve the situation.

By streamlining the decision process for the replacement of existing capabilities, DND could improve its ability to deliver effects to foreign policy with more impact, due to better capabilities delivered in a better fashion. Accepting the fact that the replacement of capabilities is not linked to GoC strategy would also improve the speed and effectiveness of the delivery of capability by removing another layer of ‘political games’ from the decision-making process, or by having a strategy that will survive a change of government. Achieving this would require serious negotiations, not only with the sitting government, but with elected officials from the opposition to ensure at least some level of bipartisanship for a long term solution. We need to demonstrate seriousness and maturity in our capability development process in order to remain relevant as an allied nation that can be counted upon, and an adversary to be taken seriously.

“\textit{It is also very difficult to view the replacement of frigates the same way as a tank replacement, or fighters for police cars.}”

HMCS Windsor transits Halifax harbour with the MacDonald Bridge in the background in preparation for the Canadian Leaders at Sea Program, 14 December 2017.

DND photo by Chief Petty Officer 2nd Class Shawn M. Kent

HMCS Windsor transits Halifax harbour with the MacDonald Bridge in the background in preparation for the Canadian Leaders at Sea Program, 14 December 2017.
NOTES

1. Failed is used here in its widest meaning to include still-born projects, cost overruns, requirements not met, missed acquisition/implementation schedules, and detrimental appearances in national media.


6. Ibid.


9. Ibid.


14. Ibid.


19. Ibid.


28. Ibid, p. 56.


30. This fact was identified using a search in the Capability Investment Database on the Capability Investment Database on 21 December 2016.

31. Ibid.


33. Ibid, p. 10.


40. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, p.143.


42. Ibid, p. 146.


47. Ibid, p. 20.


49. This is firsthand knowledge as I was the project director for the project; the project is currently in the process of moving from Option Analysis to Definition.


51. Ibid, p. 74.


54. Ibid.

55. Ibid, p. 381.

Introduction

The resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan has generated not only a determined insurgency, but also the extraordinary emergence of suicide bombing as a method of warfare in the region. Beginning in 2004, Canadian ISAF forces alone were the target of nearly 40 suicide bombings. The identities of those who annihilate themselves in the service of suicide warfare, along with the question of who the Taliban really are, remains shaded in mystery. However, a survey of accounts from international writers offers disturbing insight into not only the rise of suicide warfare in Afghanistan, but also the insurgency itself.

In a lonely corner of northwestern Pakistan, generations of militancy, combined with ethnic rage, xenophobia, and Islamist views of martyrdom, all buttressed by a sophisticated recruiting operation by traditional Pakistani militant organizations, have drawn young men to the heat of an arid battleground far away in southern Afghanistan, many never to return. What emerges is an intimate human story chronicling the lives and motivations of young men who volunteered themselves to die in suicide attacks against Canadian military personnel in Afghanistan.

The story of Shabqadar has far-reaching implications in understanding both the re-emergence of the Taliban, and the future of international operations in Afghanistan. The rise of the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, beginning in the mid-2000s, coincides with sophisticated recruitment efforts in Pakistan. According to
the villagers, the recruiters were not members of the Afghan or Pakistani Taliban, but instead, came from traditional Pakistani militant organizations that although in some cases are officially outlawed, they have long-served as instruments of the Pakistani military and intelligence establishment. They were deployed as weapons of Pakistani foreign policy, waging a brutal insurgency against the Indian Army in Kashmir. They have also been implicated in the abuses against domestic opponents in Pakistan, but until now, their participation in the Taliban insurgency has gone largely unexplored. It is something that would have been unlikely to ever take place without some level of official collusion in Pakistan. Given that the government in Kabul and its Western backers have impaired Islamabad’s long-term goal of securing a high level of influence over Afghans’ affairs, it would not be surprising if the Pakistani government was, at the very least, ‘turning a blind eye’ to Afghan Taliban recruitment in Pakistan.

Additionally, the findings of those who have visited Shabqadar suggest that plans the United States has articulated at varying points to train and equip regional security entities are very risky, and have only limited likelihood of long-term success. Those organizations are made up of men who come from areas of Pakistan that are generally hostile to outsiders, and far more likely to sympathize with the Taliban.

Finally, the events in Shabqadar underline that there is likely little the United States and its allies can do to curtail the appeal of the Pakistani militant recruiters who trawl the rural Pashtun areas of northwestern Pakistan, tempting young men with promises of brotherhood, adventure, and heavenly paradise. To be effective, the solution to militant recruitment must come from within and not be imposed by foreign powers, who are generally looked upon with deep suspicion by those who reside in the region. More broadly, the only solution likely to bring lasting peace to the region must accommodate Pakistan’s longstanding goal of achieving security by gaining a high level of influence in Afghanistan.

Shabqadar

Several voyages by writers into the Pashtun-dominated hinterlands of western Pakistan shine a ray of light on the murky questions surrounding who the Afghan Taliban really are. A number of those excursions passed through Shabqadar, a Pashtun town of 70,000 in the North West Frontier Province. Shabqadar rests in the Charsadda District, 30 kilometers from the Afghan border, bounded by the rugged hills of the Mohmand tribal agency to the west, and the green Doaba countryside to the east.

The Swat and Kabul Rivers flow respectively to the north and south of the village, forming an aquatic vice that sustains the area’s traditional agriculture industry, before merging and joining the Indus River. In 1921, British engineers constructed the Munda Headworks, a massive network of irrigation trenches that remain a central element of the regional irrigation system that has helped cement the region’s reputation as the breadbasket of the North West Frontier Province.

In the past, visiting writers have varyingly characterized Shabqadar as the archetype of a Pashtun frontier town, emblematic of others scattered throughout the region, and a traditional village sitting on the edge of a vast, pockmarked moonscape of rugged hills surrounded by plains that resemble the colour of frozen milk chocolate. For centuries, the region was the gateway for invading armies. Elsewhere in Pakistan, Shabqadar is best known for its...
historic fort built in the mid-1830s under the rule of Maharajah Ranjit Singh, whose Sikh army conquered the region in the early-19th Century, ending 1,000 years of Muslim rule. Pashtun tribesmen famously laid siege to Shabqadar Fort in 1897 during a bloody revolt against British rule.

Village life in Shabqadar has long been built around the town’s central market. The region’s gateway status made Shabqadar a trading post, something that continued through generations of Sikh, British, and finally Pakistani rule. Despite the economic opportunity of a market town and a strong tradition of agriculture in the region, the town has struggled economically. Although better off than many communities in rural Pakistan, unemployment and inadequate government services remain vexing problems in Shabqadar.

By 2006, Shabqadar was emerging as the site of a different kind of revolt. Militants were recruiting locals to fight for the Taliban in Afghanistan, fostering a situation that had repercussions for both the village, and for the NATO intervention in Afghanistan. Associated Press writers Riaz Khan and Matthew Pennington found a mixture of both anguish and delight for the many young local men killed or left missing on the battlefields of Afghanistan. They chronicled the stories of three families from the area who reported that their sons had ventured into Afghanistan in search of combat and martyrdom.
Aminullah

One of them was a 22 year-old paramilitary police officer in the Frontier Constabulary Force named Aminullah, who, like many Pashtun in the region, used only a single name. Aminullah had once served in Islamabad, guarding foreign embassies. His final posting was in Balakot, in Mansehra district, a picturesque region of the North West Frontier Province that was shattered by the terrible earthquake of October 2005. Nestled in the foothills of the Himalayas, Mansehra district has a long-standing reputation as a focal point for militant activity. The hills and the thick forests that blanket much of the surrounding terrain offer an isolation that made the region an ideal location for numerous training camps, where many militants passed through en route to previous campaigns in Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir. However, how many of the camps were still in existence during Aminullah’s time in the area is unclear.

Sometime in the spring or early-summer of 2006, he left his post and disappeared, likely into wilds of Waziristan, the autonomous tribal area 300 kilometers south of Shabqadar. He reportedly told his family that he was journeying off to spend time in the company of a popular Muslim revivalist movement that sends preachers throughout the region. As far as his family was concerned, it was something that fit the character of the pious Aminullah. By his father’s account, the family did not know what was transpiring until shadowy figures handed him a letter as he was leaving a mosque written by the aspiring martyr in blue ink, stating his intent to die in Afghanistan. Based upon information the militant associates of the young policeman channeled to the family, Aminullah resurfaced in Kandahar province in mid-summer and blew himself up in an attack on a NATO convoy.

In his suicide note, he cited a religious duty to battle infidel invaders, and declared that he had chosen to carry out a suicide bombing of his own free will. He asked his family not to mourn, and expressed a parting wish that other relatives would follow his lead. He claimed that his pursuit of martyrdom was the culmination of a lifelong dream and he wrote with rhetorical effusion about his desire to finally embrace it. “Had Allah given me one thousand lives, I would have sacrificed it—a thousand times” he reportedly proclaimed.

The family specified that the attack occurred in late-July 2006 in Kandahar province. As noted by the correspondents, there is little doubt that Aminullah was one of the two bombers who blew themselves up in an attack on a massive Canadian convoy on 22 July as it returned to the Kandahar Airbase from combat operations west of the city.

Two soldiers were killed in the initial explosion, and eight others injured. Within an hour, the second bomber arrived on foot and blew himself up, killing five Afghan bystanders and injuring many others.
Among those killed in the attack was Corporal Frank Gomez, a career soldier from the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, and a distinguished veteran of the Canadian Airborne Regiment who had previously served in Bosnia, Somalia, and Cyprus. Also killed was Corporal Jason Warren, a reservist from the Black Watch, the Royal Highland Regiment. Abdul Qodus, a 25-year-old cameraman for the private television station, Aryana, arrived to cover the initial attack and was killed by the second explosion.

The late-bomber’s father, Janat Khan, a 62-year-old retiree who spent his career as a junior paramilitary officer, expressed satisfaction over Aminullah’s decision to perish in Afghanistan, and proclaimed that he would proudly send his three surviving sons on the same path. Khan professed that the United States had conquered Afghanistan and enslaved its people. By his account, Aminullah’s decision to sacrifice himself had won the retired paramilitary officer the respect of his fellow villagers.

One of Aminullah’s cousins offered a more sobering chronicle of the chain of events. About two weeks before the attack, Aminullah had telephoned his family from Quetta, the capital of Balochistan province that borders southern Afghanistan, and informed them that he would not be coming back to Shabqadar. His tearful mother begged him to return, as did his sisters. According to his cousin, whatever danger Aminullah was placing himself in, no one in his family imagined that he would ever carry out a suicide bombing. In the words of his astonished cousin, “...he was not the type.”

Until only a few months before his death, Aminullah had been a serving officer in the Frontier Constabulary Force, a paramilitary police organization that was founded under British rule in the early-20th Century. The Constabulary, and the more-militarized Frontier Corps, were given the mandate of controlling instability and suppressing banditry in the Pashtun tribal areas after the revolts of earlier years. The duties of the Frontier Constabulary gradually expanded beyond the Pashtun tribal belt to include guarding diplomatic and commercial
locations elsewhere in the country. The Frontier Corps has a similar mandate. It also has a history of interfering in the politics of the region at the behest of powerbrokers in Islamabad. The Pakistani government used the Corps to provide material assistance to both the anti-Soviet resistance in Afghanistan in the 1980s and the Taliban in the 1990s.20

Both the United States and Britain have experimented with the idea of training and equipping the Frontier Constabulary Force and the Frontier Corps as part of a plan to suppress militant elements in the area.21 The number of American and British advisors working with the Frontier Corps was initially limited, but between January 2009 and July 2010, they trained over 1,000 members of the Corps.22 Given that many of the officers who make up both organizations hail from villages like Shabqadar, many of them would no doubt share similar world views as those expressed by Aminullah and his family, which are shaped by the history and culture of the region. These historic and cultural influences include Islamic conservatism, tribal loyalty, and a disdain for foreign invaders that have accumulated over hundreds of years. These influences are likely to forge attitudes that are vastly divergent from Western goals in the region.

Aminullah Hakim

The visitors also met with local resident Abdul Hakim, who reported that one of his sons, 18 year-old Aminullah Hakim, had blown himself up in an attack in Afghanistan. By contrast, Hakim’s father was angry, complaining that he had been left penniless and unable to support his seven surviving children.23 The teenager’s father commented mournfully that he had no idea what his son had been thinking.24 He blamed the one-time paramilitary policeman Aminullah, who, he claimed, had misled his son towards the path of becoming a suicide bomber.

In an expanded discussion with Pakistan’s Daily Times, Abdul Hakim reported that his son had been a student at a local madrassah, and that he had become transfixed with the notion of becoming a martyr.25 His father remembered how the teenager had spoken excitedly about the many brides who awaited him in paradise. Abdul Hakim claimed that he had tried to nudge his son in another direction, first attempting to place him in an arranged marriage, and then trying to find work for him at a shoe factory run by relatives. However, the younger Hakim would have none of it. He refused the marriage, and claimed he could not work at the shoe factory with his relatives, citing their lack of religious piety.26 The elder Hakim reported that his son had vanished in April 2006 while supposedly on a trip to Rawalpindi, 200 kilometers away, to find work.

About 20 strangers had arrived at the family home in mid-September 2006 and informed Hakim that his son had blown himself up in Helmand Province on 28 August.27 There was indeed a particularly deadly suicide bombing in Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand Province, west of Kandahar on the date specified by the visiting militants. The blast occurred in a market and apparently targeted a former police official, killing him and 16 others, all of them Afghan civilians.28

View of Sunehri Masjid, located at the Sunehri Masjid road in Peshawar, Pakistan.
Bahar Ali

In an earlier journey to Shabqadar, Isambard Wilkinson and Ashraf Ali, both writing for *The Telegraph*, met 65 year-old local resident Bahadur Ali, who, only days earlier, had received word that his 23 year-old son Bahar had blown himself up in a suicide attack in Afghanistan. About a dozen members of the Pakistani militant group Hizbul-Mujahideen came to the Ali residence and broke the news on a late-August morning. For Ali, shock purportedly quickly gave way to pride and elation. In his words, the family had been blessed with a martyr. However, a Pakistani journalist who paid a visit to the village noted that Ali was desperately trying to conceal a crushing burden of grief. The day after the visiting militants broke the news to his family, the newspaper *Mashriq*, an Urdu-language daily in Peshawar, reported on its front page that “...Bahar son of Bahadur” from the Shabqadar-area had been martyred in a recent suicide attack in Kandahar province. The newspaper reported that he had actually gone to fight in Afghanistan against the wishes of his parents. 

The visiting militants specified to the bomber’s family, on 25 August 2006, that the attack had taken place two weeks earlier in Kandahar province. As *The Telegraph* reporters observed, the only attack that coincides with such a description was a bombing that took place on 11 August in Spin Boldak, the important border town southeast of Kandahar City. The attack, which according to witnesses resulted in a particularly powerful explosion, targeted a passing Canadian convoy. The force of the detonation hit a G-Wagon light utility vehicle. A raging fire quickly devoured the lightly-armored jeep. Corporal Andrew Eykelenboom, 23, a medic from One Field Ambulance, was killed in the inferno. Several months earlier, he had risked his life to save a badly wounded Afghan interpreter.

Eykelenboom was the first medic from the Canadian Army to be killed in action since the Korean War over half a century earlier. Two other soldiers in the wrecked vehicle escaped, reportedly without injury. The Taliban, for their part, identified the bomber under the name, Mohammad Ilyas. It was a common name that was very likely meant to disguise the true identity of the bomber.

Bahar Ali was an experienced labourer who previously had left Shabqadar in search of a job in Saudi Arabia. After six months in the kingdom, he returned to the village in 2002 and continued to apply himself as a labourer.
return to Shabqadar, the ever-solitary Ali fell increasingly under the spell of radical Islamic fundamentalists. Until about 2003, Hizbul-Mujahideen ran an office in the town, and Bahar Ali made contact with their members after they gave a recruitment presentation in the village.38 Thereafter, his family and the lone other villager whom Ali considered a close friend remembered seeing him often in the company of its members.

A teenaged cousin commented that beginning around that time, a discernable change manifested itself in Bahar Ali’s personality.39 He showed increasingly less interest in the future, and often openly contemplated the wondrous world of life after death. As he grew closer to the militants, his family remembered him growing progressively angrier towards the United States, declaring at one point that he was prepared to die in order to exact retribution for the deaths of civilians in the region.40 The elder Ali claimed that his son had previous experience as a militant fighter, having done a stint in Indian-ruled Kashmir in 2004.41 He maintained that Ali had returned after six months in Kashmir, only to disappear again. According to his father, the family rarely had contact with him thereafter.

Despite the pride expressed by some of those they interviewed in the village, the visiting writers also found a lingering sense of tragedy in Shabqadar. By the estimate of one local shopkeeper, about 100 local men and boys from the community were missing and feared to have vanished into the battlefields of Afghanistan, including one of his own teenaged cousins.42

The visiting correspondents were able to substantiate that the recruiters were trawling about 25 Pashtun villages in the region in search of impoverished and uneducated young men, and tempting them with visions of paradise.43 In many ways, those who went to Afghanistan in search of combat or martyrdom were continuing a well-established tradition. The clarion call to war in the name of expelling the infidels is a familiar one in places such as Shabqadar. A generation earlier, young men from the area volunteered to go to Afghanistan to do battle with the Soviet military. Prior to the American invasion of Afghanistan, militants recruited local men in the region to fight in the Indian-ruled portion of Kashmir, or to go to Afghanistan to support the Taliban in its campaigns against the Northern Alliance.44 And generations before that, Pashtun tribesmen in the region had rebelled against the British.

There was never a shortage of potential recruits for the militants to entice. In 2004, the Pakistan Press International news agency described Shabqadar as a neglected and economically desolate community where citizens were forced to make due with ramshackle health, education, and communications services. At the time, Shabqadar’s Civil Hospital had not been significantly renovated in decades, and it was taking on a decided aura of neglect, despite its role as the principal heath care facility for the community of 70,000, as well as its surrounding area.45

In April 2006, a regional news publication lamented the plight of “bad luck Shabqadar” where, among many other difficulties, access to both potable water and medical services is limited.46 In 2003, a national survey placed the overall literacy rate in Charsadda District at 31%, making it 58th of the 101 Pakistani districts surveyed.47 This is not surprising, considering that Pakistan spends only about 2% of its GNP on education, ranking below Nepal and Bangladesh, despite Pakistan being the beneficiary of massive influxes of international aid.48

In fact, the Pakistani state has been so derelict in the realm of education that in poor villages, often the only education option are privately-run madrassahs that have also been proving grounds for predatory militant recruiters looking to tempt young men with enthralling visions of adventure, duty, and paradise that are to be found fighting for the Taliban in Afghanistan. A one-time neighbour of the paramilitary policeman Aminullah conceded to the visiting correspondents that despite the local enthusiasm for the town’s fallen bombers, many in the village were really just worried about their jobless sons.49

The situation in the nearby Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs) is even direr. The majority of its residents live in poverty. The literacy rate is estimated to be about 15%, and the infant mortality is as high as 0.6%.50 It is commonly cited that the Pakistani state has limited overt control
in the FATAs. However, the Pakistani state also invests only a relative pittance in the region. Its six-to-seven million residents equal about 4% of the Pakistani population. However, Islamabad invests only about 1% of the federal budget on the region. A volatile mix of bored young men with limited job prospects and a yearning for belonging creates a fertile environment for militant recruiters.

The Militants

Hizbul-Mujahideen is well known for its involvement in the battle against Indian rule in Kashmir. Another Pakistani militant group, the banned Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, which also has a long standing reputation for recruiting militants for the separatist insurgency in Kashmir, had a discernable presence in Shabqadar as well. They maintained a formal office in a two-room building near the town’s central market. A local citizen in his mid-20s, who purported to have fought for the Taliban in Afghanistan under the nom de guerre Abu Hamza, shared with the visiting Associated Press correspondents that he had recruited a number of locals on behalf of the latter militant group. He recounted offering them wondrous promises about the heavenly paradise that awaited them after they martyred themselves. Once they had been enticed, he recounted, local enlistees were sent to the tribal badlands in Waziristan for training before their final journey into Afghanistan.

Based upon what the visitors were able to discern, it would appear that sometime after the heavy fighting that further scarred Afghanistan’s south in the late-summer and early-fall of 2006, the hospitable atmosphere that the militant recruiters enjoyed in Shabqadar began to sour. With so many dead or missing on the arid battlefields in Afghanistan, pressure emerged from within the village for the recruiters to scale back their operations. Pakistani authorities were also under pressure from the United States to take action to stem the flow of recruits coming across the border.

Police in the region reported that they closed the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen office in Shabqadar in November 2006. When the Associated Press writers published the account of their visit to the town in early-2007, they reported that the office was...
still unoccupied. According to the recruiter, by late-2006, locals had largely stopped volunteering, prompting a career change for the militant who took to selling groceries at a neighbourhood shop.53

In addition to pressure from both the authorities and from villagers themselves, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen’s efforts were apparently hampered further by the reported battlefield deaths of several of its senior members. This coincides with the ferocious fighting that raged between Canadian forces and insurgents in western Kandahar province in August and September 2006.

Pakistan

T he central role that locals ascribed to Pakistani militant organizations, both in recruiting the bombers, and in informing their families after they had blown themselves up, suggests a connection between well-established Pakistani militant organizations and the Afghan Taliban. This issue has largely gone unexplored in discussions surrounding Afghanistan. Although some are officially outlawed in Pakistan, these groups have long standing ties to Pakistan’s powerful intelligence services. Islamabad often employed such groups both as a relatively inexpensive foreign policy instrument to fight the Indian Army in Kashmir, and as a corrosive tool of domestic policy to intimidate opponents on the home front.54

Pakistan played a central role in molding the Taliban into an effective fighting force in the mid-1990s after Islamabad lost confidence in its existing proxies in Afghanistan. Support came not only from the intelligence services, but also from the Pakistani Army and the civilian political elite. Islamabad was an unstinting supporter of the Taliban regime, encouraging other nations to recognize it as the Afghan government after it gained control of Kabul in 1997.

on its western flank and gaining a substantial level of control over Afghan affairs, are long-standing goals of Pakistani foreign policy going back to the Partition.

The American-led intervention in 2001, and the emergence of Afghanistan’s post-Taliban government, limited Islamabad’s ability to project its influence across its western border. Islamabad saw the post-Taliban government in Kabul as dangerously vulnerable to Indian influence. It was a government that also commanded dwindling influence outside of the capital. Islamabad and its intelligence apparatus were left with no apparent standard bearer to represent Pakistan’s fundamental interests in Afghanistan. The most prominent exception was the Taliban, then regrouping in the country’s south. Although Pakistan officially abandoned its Taliban surrogate after 11 September 2001 at the insistence of the United States, who showered Islamabad with both overt and covert aid, it would be naïve to expect that the decades of Pakistani strategic thinking that led to Islamabad’s deadly embrace of Afghanistan’s Taliban would simply disappear.

A Return to Shabqadar

A s militant violence within Pakistan grew, suicide bombers moved progressively closer to Shabqadar. In 2007, as Pakistan dealt with a dramatic rise in suicide bombings, Charsadda district was the scene of some of the bloodiest attacks. On two occasions, suicide bombers in the district attempted to assassinate one of the area’s most famous living sons, outgoing Pakistani Interior Minister Aftab Khan Sherpao. He survived both attempts on his life, but as many as 87 people were killed in the attacks.55 In February 2008, a suicide bomber blew himself up in a gathering hall just outside Shabqadar where a political rally for the Awami National Party, a secular party which had once dominated politics in the region was taking place, killing more than two-dozen people.56

Pakistan dangles precariously between two sometimes-interconnected forces that it perceives as a threat to its very existence. To the one side is its grand enemy India, while to the other is Afghanistan, a nation whose explosive instability has often left Pakistan perilously vulnerable. The possibility of expanded Indian influence in Afghanistan puts Pakistan at the intolerable risk of being encircled by hostile forces.

Supporting the Taliban was also beneficial to Pakistan because the organization rejected Pashtun nationalism. The Taliban come from Afghanistan’s largest ethnic group, the Pashtuns. If Pashtun ethnic nationalism were to spiral out of control in Afghanistan, it could stoke potentially-destructive nationalist impulses among Pakistan’s large Pashtun minority. This could, in turn, create an incendiary flashpoint along Pakistan dangerous ethnic fault lines. It can therefore be of little surprise that achieving “strategic depth” on its western flank and gaining a substantial level of control over Afghan affairs, are long-standing goals of Pakistani foreign policy going back to the Partition.

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A young member of a Muslim political party wears a headband with the name of the front line Khasmiri militant Hizbul Mujahiddin group during an anti-American protest in the eastern Pakistani city of Lahore.
The residents of Shabqadar were also left to deal with ominous developments in the nearby Mohmand tribal agency. Long considered among the most stable and peaceful agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, by 2007, Mohmand was increasingly falling under the influence of Taliban-linked fanatics. In September 2008, after a series of kidnappings for ransom in the Shabqadar area, hundreds of armed locals staged a protest march against the rising militant influence in the area. Later in the fall, a suicide bomber using a motorized rickshaw blew himself up in an attack on the security forces in Shabqadar, leaving five people dead.


Smoke billows from a suicide car bomb attack in Kandahar, 22 August 2006, after a suicide bomber hit a NATO convoy there, wounding four soldiers and a passer-by.
In the summer of 2010, a devastating suicide bomb attack near the home of a political official in the Mohmand Agency left Shabqadar’s Civil Hospital flooded with scores of dead and injured. Suicide attackers again set upon the area on 13 May 2011 in an attack targeting new recruits to the Frontier Constabulary as they streamed out of Shabqadar Fort, and more than 80 were killed. The insidious phenomenon of suicide warfare had come home to Shabqadar.

Conclusion

Mystery still surrounds the identities of many of the suicide bombers who have perished in attacks against the Canadian Army in Afghanistan. Yet, a series of excursions by writers into a tiny region in northwestern Pakistan has revealed the apparent identities of two of those bombers. One was a paramilitary policeman named Aminullah, who by his own writings, appears to have been both seduced by a vision of martyrdom, and compelled by rage over the presence of international forces in the region. The other was Bahar Ali, a quiet and reserved labourer who had gradually fallen under the sway of local militant groups, whose members had come to form the bulk of his social circle. At some point, after finding himself jobless, he had disappeared into a murky world of violent militancy which, by the accounts of his family and local media, included spells fighting for the separatists in Kashmir and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The militants who recruited the bombers in Shabqadar were not members of the Afghan Taliban, but were instead members of well-established Pakistani militant organizations that are better known for fighting the Indian Army in Kashmir. Such militant groups, although sometimes nominally outlawed, are also long-standing assets of the Pakistani state. Given the limited control that the Afghan government has outside of Kabul, and its negative disposition towards Islamabad, Pakistan has no reliable ally to accomplish its longstanding goal of securing a high level of influence in Afghanistan. Therefore it is not surprising that militants with official ties in Pakistan would be implicated in widespread recruiting in places like Shabqadar just prior to heavy fighting in southern Afghanistan.

Given the conservative and sometimes-reactionary order that reigns in the area, and its traditionally-deep suspicion of outsiders, international efforts to train local security organizations, such as the Frontier Constabulary Force, and the more-militarized Frontier Corps, are unlikely to succeed. In fact, any international effort to curtail the appeal of the recruiters in places like Shabqadar will almost inevitably be frustrated for the same reason. Curbing the appeal of the recruiters is something that can only work if it comes from inside the communities themselves.

The fathers of two of Shabqadar’s bombers expressed joy at their final, violent acts of self-destruction, and there were strong indications that many in the area shared the feeling. However, what the bombers’ left behind is more complicated. Members of their extended family spoke only of shock, grief, and bewilderment. Tensions over the many missing young men from the area who were thought to have volunteered for battle or martyrdom in Afghanistan began to boil over in late-2006. The climate in the area rapidly became less hospitable to the militant recruiters. Aminullah, Bahar Ali, and Aminullah Hakim apparently left the Shabqadar for an arid war zone 600 kilometers away. Although they found martyrdom in southern Afghanistan, in Shabqadar, they left behind an ambiguous legacy of bitter grief, supposed joy, and terrifying violence, as well as profound implications for the outside world’s understanding of the Taliban and its war in modern Afghanistan.
1. The Northwest Frontier Province has since been renamed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK).


9. Calle, "Les zones tribales pakistanaises se ‘tali­banisent.’"


11. Ibid.


An Exposition of the Links between Resilience, Ethics, and Leadership

by Peter Keane

Introduction

As the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) move further into the 21st Century, the demands placed upon the soldiers that deploy continue to change. Asymmetrical warfare continues to be the dominant type of conflict to which soldiers are predominantly deployed. In this type of environment, adversaries operate all along the spectrum of conflict. The threats posed therein exist both in the physical and the psychological planes, where victories on the ground are often difficult to translate into strategic gains. CAF doctrine identifies chaos and uncertainty as the enduring characteristics of war; these are hallmarks of the contemporary operating environment. It is within the confines of this paradigm that leaders must come to terms with the effect that war can wreak, not only on the body, but upon the mind as well. Broadly, these can be defined as Operational Stress Injuries (OSIs), and perhaps the best known lie within the subset, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Although these areas of study are relatively new, there have been direct links established between resilience and the ability to overcome the effects of combat. This brief article will argue that the development and promulgation of an ethics regime contributes directly to a soldier’s resilience in combat, and it is because of this that existing CAF training in this area needs to be expanded, with a specific focus upon those in leadership positions. It is these positions that carry an inordinate amount of influence when it comes to establishing the tone and behaviour of those under their command. In order to accomplish this task, this article will first define key terms, and then identify the links that have been established between resilience and mental health. Finally, in culmination, I will suggest ways to mitigate the effects of combat, with a specific focus upon the benefits of a robust ethics regime promulgated by leadership within the chain of command.

Discussion

Defining resilience can in and of itself be a difficult task. There are a number of competing definitions that can create confusion when establishing a frame of reference for the problem at hand. Paul Bartone, a psychologist at the National...
Defense University in Washington D.C., defines resilience as a quality of personal hardiness, one where those exposed to adversity can overcome it with minimal long-term effects. This definition is expanded upon by senior behavioral scientist Lisa Meredith and her colleagues in a position paper for the RAND Corporation, when they state, “Psychological resilience typically goes beyond individual personality traits. It is a process that involves interaction between an individual, his or her past experiences, and current life context.” Both of these definitions, when combined together, provide a much more compelling definition with which to work. In addition, resilience is determined by a set of personal attributes, such as hardiness, positive thinking and realism. These attributes, if applied to Meredith’s definition, take significant influence from the surrounding environment. This can be applied in both a positive and a negative context. For instance, those individuals that are predisposed to a certain level of resilience may find themselves being worn down psychologically if they are not in an environment that is conducive to resilience. Furthermore, if resilience is only an internal quality, programs designed to build resilience will be one-dimensional and they will fail to take into account the ongoing role that leaders play in this process. Thus, it is important to view resilience as being tied to external factors.

The goal of military resilience and mental health training is twofold. The first objective is to create soldiers that are mentally fit, and the second objective is to lessen the burden upon health care on a long-term basis. Success with respect to the first criterion will lead to success with the second. By inoculating soldiers to the rigours of combat on a psychological level, they will be able to deal with war and its after-effects much more effectively. “A resilience approach is particularly salient for military culture because it may address the ever-present concerns about the stigma of needing help for psychological or behavioral problems.” This approach is also preventative in nature, and by giving this type of training pre-deployment, it can be used to help prevent the onset of PTSD and other OSIs.

With research showing that resilience is influenced by external factors, a link must also be established between receiving resilience training and a change in the level of resilience by an individual, if this training is to be beneficial. This was the outcome of a study conducted by defence scientists Kerry Sudom, Jennifer Lee, and Dr. Mark Zamorski of the Canadian Forces Directorate of Mental Health in 2014 for the Department of National Defence, “…evidence that resilience characteristics can change over time would suggest that efforts to enhance it or, conversely, to prevent its decline have some promise.” The authors go on to say that
those soldiers that are deployed are more likely to build lasting social bonds that can increase resilience. Both these links taken together point to the benefits of resilience training that seeks to establish stronger bonds between those within a group. This does not mean that resilience training is a catch-all approach that will stop the onset of PTSD. However, it could decrease the instances of this occurring. This research was also narrow in scope, with a small sample size. From a scholarly perspective, this could limit its application, and it speaks to the need for more research in this area. However, practically speaking, if steps can be taken by the CAF to increase resilience, then other benefits, such as effectiveness during operations, will be reaped and second-order effects, such as a decrease in PTSD, could be captured as well.

Directing resilience training at leadership is an effective way to build forces that are better able to withstand adversity. Bartone states:

“In a small group context, leaders are in a unique position to shape how stressful experiences are understood by members of the group. The leader who, through example and discussion, communicates a positive construction or reconstruction of shared stressful experiences, may exert an influence on the entire group in the direction of his or her interpretation of experience.”

If this is held to be true, the focus of training should be directed to all levels of leadership. The Junior Officers and Senior NCOs are the ones that have the most direct contact with soldiers, and yet, the example must be set all through the chain of command so that leaders at every level treat hardship in much the same way, so that it is framed in a positive manner. By doing so, this type of positive environment will work its way through all rank levels contributing to a resilient and robust fighting force.

The need for leaders to set the example is reflected in the instances of PTSD occurring in those that have recently deployed. Epidemiologist David Boulous and Dr. Mark Zamorski published a wide-ranging paper in the Canadian Medical Association Journal that notes, based upon a study of over 30,000 soldiers who deployed to Afghanistan, the instances of PTSD and other deployment-attributable mental health disorders were more predominant in those at the lower rank levels.8 This correlates with earlier data that was discussed where the link between external factors and resilience were demonstrated. If resilience is tied to external factors such as belonging and group cohesion then a possible link could be established between those new members to the group and a lack of preparedness for combat. In effect, there could be a lack of resilience. If this is the case, there is a ‘delta’ that exists between the maximum effectiveness of a fighting force and the level at which it is currently operating. To overcome this gap, training needs to be created so that leaders can understand their roles and responsibilities to bring new soldiers into a team concept. This could be expected to increase operability and decrease the instances of PTSD experienced post-deployment.

This is where the development of an ethics program is of particular importance. If resilience contributes to a more effective fighting force, then ethics is one of the hallmarks of a resilience promotion program. This is identified by Meredith et al. as the creation of a positive command climate. Essentially, the role of the leadership is to set the conditions within which the fighting force operates. This includes positive role modelling, and building pride and support for the mission. At its core, this means leaders need to ensure that the right decisions are made for the right reasons. By doing this, soldiers can take pride in their actions and know that they are part of a profession of arms which provides the moral foundation for difficult decisions they will have to make. By taking this approach, ethics permeates through all aspects of military operations. It can assist soldiers with making sense of the chaos of combat, and additionally, it can provide them with standards and norms upon which they can base their behaviour.

This is supported by the work of Bartone, who identified stressors that contribute to a loss of resilience. He identified ambiguity with Rules of Engagement (ROE) and standards of conduct as one of the major external stressors that soldiers face. This included feeling powerless to intervene or to provide help in certain situations, and uncertainty about when and how to engage the enemy.10 These stressors can be directly mitigated by the promulgation of an ethics regime. If leaders are providing firm direction with respect to the standards of conduct that are expected and required, soldiers are less apt to feel unsure of their respective roles. This is also needed when dealing with feelings of powerlessness. As mentioned earlier, when leaders are able to frame adversity in a positive light, then those under their command will be better able to view hardship in a positive light as well.

With this plethora of evidence supporting the benefits of resilience and ethics programs within the military it should be self-evident that these programs need to be disseminated to all ranks. Further, those in leadership roles need to understand the expanded role that they play in contributing to the mental well-being of their soldiers. However, there is evidence to support that certain types of training are more beneficial than others. Meredith et al. analyzed over 20 resilience programs within the United States military, and found that the majority were conducted both during and after a deployment.11 This runs counter-intuitive to the data regarding resilience levels. If resilience is something that can be changed, the training should be conducted during pre-deployment training in order for it to be effective. One of the barriers to training that was identified was a lack of buy-in by those in leadership roles. Instead of resilience training, they chose to focus upon other more traditional military skills.12 As these programs become common, this would be expected to change. There are very real benefits that those at the tactical level command positions should be able to see, specifically, soldiers more confident in their jobs, and better able to deal with whatever type of adversity is at hand.

One of ways of combating these shortcomings would be to implement ethics and resilience training into more military exercises. If operations are complex and riddled with ambiguity and feelings of powerlessness, the training would be well-served by trying to mimic these same conditions. This would combat many of the issues that were raised by Meredith et al. Engaging training would be offered that contributes, not only to resilience, but also to military skill. Further, leadership would also be exercised in these types of training environments. This would create a holistic method of resilience and ethics training that goes beyond simply sitting in a classroom or lecture hall and speaking about ethics devoid of realism. This approach is supported by Allison Howell, who is a professor of Political Science at Rutgers University. She is also a noted security policy analyst. In the US Army, ‘Master Resilience Training’ is given to those who train new recruits. This
training is meant to provide NCOs with the tools to get recruits to reframe problems using tools that are meant to promote resilience. This type of training is meant to permeate all aspects of training, and is not just applicable during a resilience training seminar. There are limits on the returns provided by these programs. For instance, the recruiting system should play a role in selecting those that are predisposed to hardiness. Although this is difficult to predict, training cannot be expected to overcome underlying issues that were in place before enrollment. Further, there is a lack of scholarly research that has tested the success rates of resilience programs that are in place. Subjectively, it seems to make sense that if resilience is tied to a positive correlation with mental health, a promulgation of resilience training will positively affect the occurrence of PTSD rates. Objectively, there is a lack of data to back up these claims. If ethics and resilience programs are to be expanded, research needs to expand accordingly so that these programs are grounded in data that shows that they are reaching their desired end state.

Conclusions

These shortcomings do not take away from the central tenets of this article, which argue that there is a strong link between resilience training and lower levels of PTSD. Additionally, there is research that identifies linkages between leadership and resilience. Here, leadership is based upon strong ethical principles that seek to lead by example and remove ambiguity from a complex battlespace. This, in essence, is leading towards the development of a robust ethics program that is known and understood by all rank levels. Once soldiers are able to establish a frame of reference within which they can operate, they should be much more comfortable with their taskings. This is why one of the central arguments put forward in this article is for the expansion of ethics and resilience training, so that it permeates all aspects of military training so that it can be adopted as the de facto method for addressing the uncertainty of modern combat. If this approach is taken, the expected end result should be a professional fighting force where those in leadership roles are responsible for the development of a resilient, ethical, fighting force.

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NOTES

12. Ibid, p. 49.
Fundamentalist Religious Discourse in the Process of Radicalization to Violence

by Éloi Gunn

Introduction

Current events and vox populi [the voice of the majority of the people – Ed.] have inspired me to learn more about the process of religious radicalization and the violent extremism that often accompanies it. This article summarizes my personal journey of reflection in three phases.

Primo, I compiled first-hand information (through testimonies and interviews). I went to Strasbourg, France to meet with moderate Muslims. I visited mosques and I spoke with Muslims, most of whom were of Maghreb origin and belong to the first and second generation of immigrants. I went to soccer fields in certain underprivileged neighbourhoods and I visited to social housing projects. I went to the Maison des adolescents de Strasbourg, which helps youth between the ages of 12 and 21 who are facing life issues.

Secundo, I reviewed current scientific literature about this phenomenon, including books by Dounia Bouzar, a French anthropologist who specializes in Islamic radicalization in France; Pierre Conesa, a former senior official in France’s Defence Department; and Montasser AlDe’eme, a young Belgian-Palestinian Ph.D candidate at the Université d’Anvers who took the risk of entering Syria clandestinely and spending two weeks there.

Tertio, I had the privilege of attending the colloquium on radial Islam in Canada, which was held at the Royal Military College Saint-Jean on 15 April 2016. The wealth of information shared by a number of high-profile speakers, including Fatima Houda-Pépin and Benoît Blanpain (chief of a police division in Belgium), broadened my limited knowledge.

I will share my reflections as follows: after defining radicalization from a socio-anthropological point of view, I will attempt to understand the process by focusing upon the content of radical Islamist rhetoric. To conclude, I will put forward some potential solutions for preventing radicalization and achieving de-radicalization in the face of radical Islamist propaganda.

What is radicalization?

Generally speaking, religious radicalization is the process by which an individual or group of individuals push a religious ideology to the extreme. On the sociological level, that extremism takes the form of the individual’s or group’s exclusion or self-exclusion from the majority of the religion’s believers, and, as a consequence, from mainstream society. Thus, Dounia Bouzar defines a radical as “any individual who uses religion to exclude him/herself or others from society, or to exclude others.” [Translation.]
Espousing a radical religious ideology, in and of itself, is not harmful to society. Martin Luther, the father of Protestantism, was a radical in his time. The Wesley brothers, who founded the Methodist movement, could also be seen as religious radicals. Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., the fathers of political-religious pacifism, also fall into that category. Radicals move society forward. That being said, any radicalization that incites physical and psychological violence is destructive and endangers values. Clearly, Islamic radicalization as preached by the Daesh (“Islamic State”) is detrimental to the well-being of modern societies. It is a form of radicalization that is violent or that incites violence; it “uses violence to disseminate or defend its convictions.”2 [Translation.] 

In recent years, experts on radicalization have generally agreed that it is a gradual process given that there are multiple causes. While in some cases individuals have become radicalized in a few days, the process generally requires months or even years. It takes time for radical discourse to have an effect on an individual and for the “group phenomenon” to draw a young person into radicalization. As in the case of the Molenbeek neighbourhood in Brussels, the place where an individual lives is a determining factor in his or her radicalization. We once thought, incorrectly, that young people from disadvantaged backgrounds were more susceptible to radicalization. Although we now question that, the fact remains that some environments are more fertile ground for radicalization than others.

Rhetoric in the process of radicalization to violence

1. The form of the rhetoric

The process of radicalization begins with radical rhetoric. It may be heard in places of worship, on the Internet, among friends in a neighbourhood or in the school yard. In mosques, the emergence of radical clerics—such as Mohamed Hammami, the Tunisian-born imam of the Omar mosque in Paris’s 11th arrondissement, and Shayh Alami, an imam of dual Dutch and Moroccan nationality in Dison, Belgium—aids the spread of radical ideas. In fact, according to the Courrier de l’Atlas, French Minister of the Interior, Manuel Valls, addressed the accusations against Imam Mohamed Hammami as follows: “During his prayers, the imam made comments that were openly hostile to the values of the Republic. He promoted jihad, made anti-Semitic remarks and justified the use of violence and corporal punishment against women.”3 [Translation.] What is more, the imam “is accused of [disseminating] Salafist propaganda and of fomenting violence and holy war.”4 [Translation.]
Jihadists are adept at social media and are using it to their advantage. The propagandist speeches and videos on the Internet rely on two main symbolic strategies: (1) borrowing accepted cultural codes that are rooted in the collective memory of Western society (fire or flames) and (2) the symbolic norms of Al Qaeda’s jihad (the attacks of 11 September 2001). Genres are being mixed in a way that blurs the boundaries between fiction and imagination. More than ever, jihadi rhetoric is transgressing traditional family codes by invading homes, both physically and through online and other media. The state and parental gatekeeping process has been breached and circumvented.

2. The theological scope of the jihadist narrative

2.1 “Pure” Islam

The jihadist narrative claims to guide Muslims and non-Muslims back to “true Islam.” It promotes a return to the source. Therefore, it follows that modern-day Islam must be cleansed of all its imperfections in order to achieve the Salafist ideal. “Pure” Islam has allegedly been corrupted by the culture and customs of Western society. Those who adhere to this “pure,” “true” Islam will be part of a small group of elect that believes they possess the truth. They believe themselves to be superior to other believers and to non-believers (kafirs). As the distinguished French anthropologist, writer and educator Dounia Bouzar notes, the use of the notion of group purity in jihadist propaganda is an ominous sign.6

The sociological function of “group purity” is to create two separate worlds: the pure and the impure; us and them. The notion of purity ‘de-culturalizes,’ excludes and re-creates a globalized Islam. Consequently, “true” Muslims define themselves through their connection to this new group of “pure” Muslims who no longer identify with Western culture, a specific country, or nationality, but only with Salafist fundamentalism.

This type of discourse is nothing new; it is based on strategies employed by sectarian groups or new religious movements driven by revivalism. One thing Salafism and American Protestant fundamentalism have in common is that “both reject culture, philosophy and even theology in favour of a scriptural reading of the sacred texts and an immediate grasp of the truth.”7 [Translation.]

2.2 Eschatology and jihad8

The notion of purity in Salafist discourse is coupled with an eschatology which takes a more tangible form with the creation of an “Islamic State.” According to the self-proclaimed jihadist expert Montasser AlDe’emeh, the end of time is an additional motivating factor for young people who join a radical Islamic movement. He states that many of the young people who have travelled to Syria to fight “believe it is an honour to take part in the apocalyptic combat between Islamic fighters and the unbelievers. In their eyes, the war in Syria is a prelude to the coming of a messianic figure who, according to some Islamic sources, will bring justice in the world.”

It would be a mistake to ignore or minimize the weight of this eschatological message [doctrine of death, judgement, heaven and hell – Ed.] in the radical discourse of Islamic State. If young
people can be convinced that they are participating, in real time and in a real place, in the coming of the Mahdi, that belief gives their lives meaning. For those among them who are disillusioned with politicians or our capitalist society of consumerism, the eschatological perspective of the jihadist narrative makes sense. For many of these young people, the proclamation of the Islamic State is a light at the end of their existential tunnel: at last, they can play a useful role in a decaying society. According to the narrative, although it may appear as though humans are in control, the reality is that Allah make the laws, not corrupt politicians.”

Writing in the second person, historian and former senior French defence official Pierre Conesa describes the eschatological vision of a young radical in these terms: “This corrupt world cannot survive: there are too many injustices, too many unconscionable wars, too many massacres committed with impunity, too much depravity…. This decadent society is a return to Sodom and Gomorrah, to Sumer and Babylon, wallowing in lust, usury, incest, sodomy and the cult of idols…. The imminent divine punishment will destroy this society, as it destroyed Rome and Byzantium. The final battle will be fought in the city of Dabiq, in Syria, as the Prophet has foretold.”

With this eschatological vision, every young person who is in the process of becoming radicalized is convinced that he or she will participate in the birth of a new world in Syria. Some will go even farther and compare themselves to, or take themselves for, the Madhi. They may reason that the city of Dabiq is occupied right now by the caliphate and cite Abu al-Darda’s declaration concerning the physical location where the Madhi will appear: “The best garrison of Muslims on the day of the Mahama [Armageddon] will be located in Ghouta, near a city called Damascus, one of the best cities in Sham [Syria].”

The eschatological illusion of the new Islamic movement known as Daesh is not unique in the history of religions. Some Jewish groups in the time of Jesus of Nazareth—the Zealots—believed that they were contributing to the coming of the Messiah. Our contemporaries, the Jehovah’s Witnesses (a Christian group), had predicted that the “time of the Gentiles” would end in 1914. They believe that we are living, as per the Book of Daniel (Chapter 12), in “the end times,” after which Christ will reign for a thousand years and free the world from its suffering (putting an end to war, famine and injustice). According to them, a “little flock of 144,000” will form the new humanity, which will dominate Earth according to divine law and, in 1,000 years, will restore pre-lapsarian perfection.

A quick comparison between the eschatological discourse of the Islamists in the Daesh movement and that of the Jehovah’s Witnesses reveals two theological thrusts: the imminent end of this unjust world, and the formation of a privileged group of the elect and the introduction of religious law in order to bring humanity closer to the divine. The only difference is that, unlike Daesh, the Jehovah’s Witnesses do not use physical violence to disseminate their religious ideology. But, like Daesh, the Jehovah’s Witnesses are able to separate their believers from the rest of society.
Since the first goal of religious radicalization to violence is to separate young people from society and recruit and indoctrinate them into a new “family of the enlightened,” the process of de-radicalization or de-indoctrination requires that the radical discourse be deconstructed. The process of deconstruction will identify the rhetorical elements that have persuasive power and make it possible to construct a more positive discourse aimed at convincing the recruits to free themselves from their “slavery.”

**Toward a de-radicalization of religious discourse:**

Understanding the rhetoric of commonplaces or *topoi*

The persuasive effect of the discourse of religious radicalization to violence is heightened by the use of certain rhetorical elements, notably *topoi*, or commonplaces. It seems to me that both the prevention of radicalization and the process of de-radicalization must be grounded in an understanding of these rhetorical commonplaces, so that we can be more aware of their persuasive power at the outset.

1. **Definition**

These *topoi* are so deeply rooted in the society and culture from which they emerge that we can refer to them as socio-cultural commonplaces. According to the ancient philosopher Aelius Théon, socio-cultural commonplaces can be defined as certain or probable assertions derived from an ensemble of forms of knowledge, values and social conventions. A commonplace is used to construct a line of reasoning based on an amplified description of an action. Islamist rhetoric of radicalization to violence contains a number of *topoi*, including the Ummah (an ideological concept of a global Muslim community), retribution, death and resurrection, and the end of time. To simplify and focus my argument, I will examine a single *topos*: the Ummah.

2. **The Ummah commonplace**

The socio-cultural *topos* is the most fundamental one in Islamist radicalization to violence. The conflicts in the Middle East, the confrontations between Israel and Palestine, and the conflict in Syria are also rallying cries for the creation of a virtual global Muslim community. Radical discourse uses the Ummah commonplace to intensify the sense of belonging to Islam by ignoring individual nationalities. One extremist had this to say about the banning of the Islamic veil in Belgium:

> How many stories have we heard of women who were forced to remove their hijabs, while Muslim men were there and did nothing? Guys, it’s your responsibility! You must stand up for your sisters.... We are a community. We have to stand up for our sisters.16

As we can see, the author, writing from the perspective of the Ummah commonplace, emphasizes what he perceives as a fault: the pacifism of Muslim men (wherever they are) while Muslim women living in Western countries are suffering. Here, this *topos* is used to label as guilty those who fail to act. The message resonates with young Westerners, especially when they have grown up in a culture that encourages people to take action against social injustices. This is analogous to the Canadian Armed Forces’ Operation Honour, in which a program was implemented to counter the psycho-social phenomenon known as the bystander effect. No one in our society wants to be the witness who sees the next Kitty Genovese raped and murdered on a New York Street and does nothing. Similarly, those who want to help women and children who have been traumatized by war are susceptible to becoming drawn into Daesh. In this context, the Ummah commonplace, amplified by guilt and its psycho-social parallel, the bystander effect, becomes a mirror in which people undergoing radicalization see and interpret the injustices which Daesh claims to stand up against.

3. **Countering the Ummah commonplace: Deconstruction**

How can we counter the persuasive force of this *topos*?

We must simply begin by deconstructing it. But before we can do that, there is something we must understand: the Ummah commonplace is based on a myth in the service of a religious ideology. Contrary to what the Ummah seems to offer—one global Muslim...
family—the reality is that the Arab–Muslim community is not as tight-knit as Daesh would like young people to believe. As Pierre Conesa writes, “The Ummah is actually a mythology. Every day, there are more massacres and religious solidarity is weakened. In the past, we have seen proletarian solidarity, which was supposed to unite all the workers of the world. It was compelling and intoxicating, but no less deadly for all that. Today, the Ummah is experiencing the same crisis.”19 [Translation.] The war in Syria and its casualties are evidence of that. In the Arab–Muslim world, there are clashes between the different factions. The economist and philosopher Guy Sorman describes the situation in the online newspaper L’Hebdo:

In Kabul, the Taliban attack a hotel frequented by Afghans; in Pakistan, Ismaili pilgrims, a Shiite sect, are assassinated by Sunnis; in Yemen, an internal conflict pits local Shiites supported by Iran against Sunnis armed by the Saudis, who are followers of Wahabi. In Syria, the Alawis, who are affiliated with the Shiites, massacre Sunnis and Kurds.20 [Translation.]

To believe in the myth of the Ummah, one must ignore the internecine warfare between the various branches of Christianity which have marked its history. The long war between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland or the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, a country with a Christian majority, are just two examples. In short, it is no secret that there are many divisions between different movements within the same religion. Of course, the ideal of all religions is harmony. But in light of the religious history of humanity, we are forced to recognize that harmony is just a utopia. To believe in, or persuade others to believe in, the Ummah is to believe in and promote a grandiose myth.

Conclusion

Fundamentalist religious discourse that incites violence contributes to radicalization of young people from all social classes and all walks of life. Often, we focus on the phenomenon of radicalization from a political and social point of view while paying little attention to the message itself. In this short article, we have shown, through a few selected examples, the importance of the topos, or commonplace, in the persuasive power of rhetoric.

The prevention of radicalization and the process of de-radicalization should both begin with a systematic analysis of the rhetoric used in the fundamentalist religious discourse of radicalization to violence. We must identify the commonplaces and find a rhetorical counterweight for each. Then, we must create a realistic, convincing narrative supported by concrete action on social, economic and political issues. The war against any religious extremist ideology is often, first and foremost, rhetorical: “In the beginning was the Word.”

Lt(N) Éloi T. D. Gunn, chaplain, was ordained as a minister in the United Church of Canada in 2005. After serving in several civil parishagues, he enrolled in the Canadian Armed Forces in 2011. He served as chaplain for 12 RBC, 5 RALC and 5 Svc Bn in Valcartier (Quebec) before he was posted to the Canadian Forces Chaplain School and Centre in Borden, where he currently serves as course director. He earned a Ph.D (Th.) from the University of Ottawa, a Doctor of Ministry from Saint-Paul University as well as a two-year undergraduate diploma in sociology from the University of Lomé (Togo).
5. In her speech (“Mythes et enjeux du discours terroriste à l’ère du numérique”) to the colloquium on radical Islamism in Canada, held on 15 April 2016 at Royal Military College Saint-Jean, Lily Gramaccia highlighted the role of online media in disseminating terrorist discourse.
8. There are two types of jihad. Greater jihad is the struggle of personal self-improvement against self’s base desires and lesser jihad, which is defined as a military struggle to defend Islam.
10. Ibid., pp. 145–146.
12. The Madhi is the name given to the Prophet’s descendant, who, at the end of time, will help Christ establish order and justice.
14. Aelius Théon defines *topos*, or commonplace, as “an amplifying speech about a wrong or a brave act. For the commonplace is double: one commonplace is against those having acted wickedly … whereas another one is on behalf of those who have accomplished something virtuous…” J.R. Butts, *The Progymnasmata of Theon: A new text with translation and commentary* (Claremont: UMI Dissertation Services, 1986), p. 403.
17. Operation Order signed by the Chief of the Defence Staff on 14 August 2015; the mission was to “Eliminate harmful and inappropriate sexual behaviour within the CAF.” http://www.forces.gc.ca/assets/ FORCES_Internet/docs/en/ caf-community-support-services-harassment/cds-op-order-op-honour.pdf, consulted on 10 January 2017.
18. Kitty Genovese, a young waitress, was murdered by a serial killer in 1964 in Queens, New York. Approximately 30 witnesses are thought to have seen the crime and heard the victim screaming for help, but none of them came to her aid. A number of psychologists later tried to determine the reason for the witnesses’ inaction. In 1968, researchers John Darley and Bibb Latané demonstrated what is now called the “bystander effect.” For more information, see Didier Decoin, *Est-ce ainsi que les femmes meurent?* (Paris: Grasset, 2009).
Canada and Peace Operations: Walking Back, Looking Forward

by Martin Shadwick

The number of Canadian military personnel deployed on United Nations peacekeeping and peace operations remains well below the levels typical of the Cold War and early post-Cold War eras (and spectacularly below the high-water marks of 1963-1964, 1974-1975 and the early-1990s). But it would be churlish, irrespective of one’s views on the utility and usefulness, or otherwise, of contemporary peace operations, to deny the Liberals at least some credit for their repeated—if, argued critics, naïve and over-zealous—pronouncements on the need for a renaissance in Canadian support for UN peace operations. The pattern started early. From the outset of the 2015 Federal election campaign, the Liberals pummeled the Conservative government of Stephen Harper for diminishing Canada’s “influence and presence on the world stage,” and pledged to “restore Canada as a leader in the world.” In partial fulfillment of that goal, the Liberals promised to “recommit to supporting international peace operations with the United Nations,” make “our specialized [emphasis added] capabilities—from mobile medical teams to engineering support to aircraft that can carry supplies and personnel—available on a case-by-case basis,” provide “well-trained personnel that can be quickly deployed, including mission commanders, staff officers, and headquarters units,” and lead “an international effort to improve and expand the training of military and civilian personnel deployed on peace operations.”

The quest for a resuscitated and reinvigorated Canadian role in UN peace operations figured prominently in Prime Minister Trudeau’s Mandate Letter to defence minister Harjit Sajjan. It also surfaced in the April 2016 Public Consultation Document that formed part of Ottawa’s defence policy review process. The Public Consultation Document was understandably lacking in detail, but reaffirmed the government’s commitment to “renewing Canada’s contribution to peace operations,” and invited public input on how the Canadian Armed Forces should “help increase Canada’s contribution to peace operations.”

In August 2016, and again at the London Peacekeeping Defence Ministerial in September 2016, the Trudeau government pledged that up to 750 personnel—600 military and 150 civilian police—would be made available for UN peace operations. These, noted Professor Walter Dorn, would be in addition to the 112 military and civilian personnel already deployed on UN
missions, for a combined military-civilian total of approximately 860 Canadian personnel. Although some specificity on numbers was welcomed, the Trudeau government continued to draw fire from analysts, retired military personnel, and editorial writers for the lack of a decision on specific commitments to specific UN operations, for perceived deficiencies in Canada’s ability to provide the necessary logistical support—particularly given existing or projected non-UN commitments in the Middle East and Europe—and for the perceived politicization of Canada’s UN commitments in an era of ever-heightening risk. “The Liberal spin doctors,” declared a Globe and Mail editorial of 15 August 2016, “want something they can brand ‘peacekeeping.’ The government should be very careful about using and misusing that label, lest it end up deceiving the public, and itself.”

The Trudeau government’s June 2017 defence policy statement, Strong, Secure, Engaged, declared that “Canada is fully committed to renewing its engagement with the United Nations and increasing its contribution to United Nations peace operations. The United Nations has a critical role to play in shaping the rules-based international order and makes important contributions to global stability, conflict prevention and the protection of civilians. Doing our part to contribute to United Nations’ efforts to promote and sustain global peace and security directly serves Canadian interests.” The document acknowledged that “the evolution of UN peace operations over the last three decades reflects the changing nature of the conflicts to which these operations respond. The majority of UN missions are being deployed into complex political and security environments. They operate in difficult conditions and with robust, multi-dimensional mandates. Indeed, two-thirds of peacekeepers now operate in active conflict zones. As such, peace operations are now regularly tasked with using force to protect populations at risk and helping to bring about the conditions for ending conflict.”

“Operating in this context,” noted the policy statement, “has brought new challenges. UN missions too often lack the means required to deliver on their mandates. Canada is well-placed to help fill these gaps. Our specialized capabilities and expertise can play a critical role in strengthening the effectiveness of missions on the ground, supporting peace processes and post-conflict peacebuilding, and improving the training available to other contributing countries. Canada can also help improve the overall management of peace operations by enhancing the UN’s capacity to provide senior leadership and direction from headquarters.” Canada would consequently “focus on four core elements, undertaken as a whole-of-government effort,” by: (a) “providing Canadian personnel and training for United Nations peace operations;” (b) “strengthening Canadian support for conflict prevention, mediation, and peace building efforts;” (c) advancing the role of women and youth in the promotion of peace and security;” and (d) “supporting United Nations reform efforts to make peace operations more effective.” These measures foreshadowed some elements of the Canadian pledges.
An RCAF CH-146 Griffon helicopter lands on Olotayan Island, Philippines, 30 November 2013, during Operation Renaissance.

CC-130J Hercules.
made at the subsequent Peacekeeping Ministerial in Vancouver, hosted by the Government of Canada, in mid-November 2017. Still, for a 113-page document—and even allowing for Ottawa’s presumed desire to withhold potentially ‘meatier’ details until the Vancouver Ministerial—Strong, Secure, Engaged was not exactly dripping with references to peace operations, or to specific Canadian contributions.

Widely interpreted—but not necessarily criticized—as a ‘walk back’ from earlier Liberal declarations on reinvigorating the Canadian role in United Nations peace operations, the package of initiatives presented at the November 2017 Peacekeeping Ministerial in Vancouver rested upon the premise that the context for modern peace operations had “changed”—involving “conflicts that are intractable, more dangerous, and more complex”—and thus demanded “new solutions” and “innovative approaches.” For Canada, these would include “providing the specialized capabilities” required by the United Nations, increasing the participation of women in peace operations, and enhancing the protection of children.

For Canada’s armed forces, this translated into pledges to provide “tactical airlift support for up to [twelve] months to help the UN address critical gaps around being able to transport troops, equipment, supplies, and food to support ongoing missions and the rapid deployment of UN forces,” an Aviation Task Force of “medium utility” helicopters—presumably an unorthodox reference to medium transport Chinooks—and “armed [i.e., Griffon] helicopters for up to [twelve] months,” and a “Quick Reaction Force [QRF] that includes approximately 200 personnel and accompanying equipment.” The QRF would be field-based, either attached to one specific UN mission, or, as some observers speculated, be deployed to a central overseas location and thus available to support a number of UN peace operations in the specified region. In announcing these initiatives, Canada would seek to promote “a ‘Smart Pledge’ approach when contributing to peace support operations in order to provide the UN with the predictability it needs to more effectively plan its operations and training.” ‘Smart Pledges’ encourage better coordination of contributions to peacekeeping missions from partner countries, helping to eliminate critical gaps and ensuring that contributions can be deployed on a rotating basis. We are currently in talks with the UN and potential host countries to identify locations where Canada’s military capabilities can bring the most value to UN peace support operations.” An initial step was expected to include the deployment of a CC-130 Hercules to the UN’s Regional Support Centre in Entebbe, Uganda.

Training support for foreign troop-contributing countries—clearly a core element of the Trudeau government’s peace operations agenda—would include a new “Canadian Training and Advisory Team to work with a partner nation before—and importantly, during—a deployment to enhance the partner nation’s contribution to a given mission,” as well as “activities to meet UN needs in various training centres and schools, as well as contributions to mobile training teams.” The Canadian Armed Forces would also help to “enhance the overall effectiveness of UN operations, including through support for the Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations.” A separate component of Canada’s new peace operations policy—named for Canadian women’s rights pioneer and groundbreaking female aeronautical engineer Elsie MacGill (1905-1980), the Elsie Initiative sought to “support the development of a systematic approach to deploy more women in peace operations,” and to “design tailored technical assistance support for countries that contribute peacekeepers to ensure the right conditions are in place for the deployment of women.”

The Vancouver pronouncements drew intriguingly similar, and essentially positive, media reaction. A Globe and Mail editorial of 16 November 2017, for example, argued that ever since making its promise to seek a renaissance in Canadian peacekeeping, “the Trudeau government has been trying to figure out how to fulfill it. It has spent two years delaying and fudging, and [on 15 November 2017] with the Prime Minister announcing vague, and small, commitments to future UN peace operations, the fudging continued. For that, Canadians should be thankful. We come not to bury Justin Trudeau’s policy of peacekeeping prevarication, but to praise it. This is not a case of moving from the idealism of opposition to the cynicism of power. On the contrary, it looks more like an evolution from a cynical campaign fantasy to a more honest assessment of objective reality.” On the same day, a somewhat similar note was struck by a Toronto Star editorial, which concluded that “Ottawa is right to backtrack and proceed with a more modest plan.” The “Trudeau government will come in for criticism for changing course on peacekeeping, and some of that will be deserved. For too long the government talked a good line about getting Canada back into peace operations, but kept its allies waiting for a concrete commitment that never came.”

The “reality is that there is no obvious place where Canada could make a significant difference, and some of the most-discussed possibilities (like the UN operation in Mali) amount more to counter-insurgency campaigns than to peacekeeping. It’s far better for Canada to commit to a more realistic plan and stick to it than to make overly ambitious declarations and then balk at actually carrying them out.”

Similarly, a National Post editorial of 18 November 2017 noted that the Liberals “needed to figure out how to climb down from a bad idea with something approximating dignity. Now that they have, however, there’s no reason not to support [the Vancouver] version of the plan. It’s a good use of our military forces. Transport planes and helicopters, a rapid-reaction force of well-equipped troops, and training for UN troops and officers are modest but real commitments that have the potential to make a difference in helping people around the world. Meanwhile, the limited nature of the mission largely removes us from the most repulsive realities of UN missions.”

Such media perceptions are not unimportant. The perceived Liberal ‘walk back’ from the initially-enthusiastic, even heady, pro-UN peace operations declarations and pronouncements—be it attributable to the gradual emergence of a more sober, more sophisticated and more nuanced understanding of the strengths, weaknesses, and risks of contemporary peace operations, a height-
ened sensitivity to the prospect of Canadian casualties, a fuller appreciation of the potential financial costs of a ‘full-court press’ approach to peace support operations, or to the realization that an undue fixation on peace support operations could divert some vital political and diplomatic attention from, for example, the managing of Canada-U.S. relations in the Trump era—does not appear, at least at the time of writing, to have inflicted noteworthy public, political, or media damage to the Liberal brand, let alone to the prospects for re-election. Indeed, in dialing back its earlier pronouncements on Canadian involvement in peace support operations, the Liberals may have managed, quite unintentionally, to help disabuse Canadians of at least some of the national myth-making and mythology surrounding Canada and peacekeeping. Most Canadians are, rightly, proud of Canada’s many decades of service to UN peacekeeping and peace operations, but it is about time that something more thoughtful than the stereotyped, romanticized vision of Canada as “a peacekeeping nation” took root.

That said, is there a case to be made for the argument that Ottawa walked the country’s involvement in UN peace operations back a little too far? Some nations, it is true, utilize Peacekeeping Ministerials to pledge veritable laundry lists of military hardware, units, and resources that may, or may not, have all that much to do with the most pressing or important requirements of UN peace operations…but was the most recent Canadian list—tactical airlift support, an aviation task force and a quick reaction force—plus a variety of important training and other initiatives—not unduly modest? True, not every Canadian military resource or capability has a role in UN peace operations, but a few inspired additions to the Vancouver list would probably have been welcomed.

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More than seven decades after it was fought, the Normandy campaign continues to attract the attention of military historians. Three recent titles offer new insights into one of the most important and hard-fought campaigns of the Second World War.

Beginning with Stout Hearts: The British and Canadians in Normandy 1944, the author, Ben Kite, is a serving officer in the British Army Intelligence Corps. His book is an attempt to enable the reader, particularly the general reader, “...to understand the battle of Normandy rather better, but also the Second World War more generally,” by describing the “...equipment, tactics and procedures and how tired, frightened servicemen used them.” (p. 18). Kite attempts to do this by analyzing and assessing each arm and service separately, first summarizing the applicable doctrine, and then illuminating it through the personal experiences of Normandy veterans. He begins with an introductory campaign overview and continues with chapters devoted, not only to the major arms, but also to the engineers, intelligence, and medical corps, and, finally, the air and naval forces. He includes an excellent chapter on the soldier’s life in Normandy that discusses food, drink, and
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recreation. Useful appendices contain orders of battle for land, air, and naval forces, as well as tables of organization, weapons capabilities, and samples of a typical fire plan, an intelligence report, and an operation order. The result is basically a manual on how the British army worked in Normandy, (p. 406), “…highlighting the complexity of land operations as well as the organizational efficiency required to make an Army operate effectively.”

Unfortunately, it is very clear that, when Kite refers to “an Army,” he is talking about the British army, not the Canadian army as, despite its title, there is very little Canadian content in this book. Kite quotes from about 150 eye-witnesses, but only three or four are Canadians. It is evident from his bibliography that he neither interviewed nor corresponded with a single Canadian veteran, nor does he seem to have consulted the manuscript papers or memoirs of any Canadian veterans in the archives and institutions at which he researched. Kite certainly did not research in the Library and Archives of Canada in Ottawa, although he made abundant use of the LAC’s image collection, which is available online. The author does list several books by Canadian historians in his bibliography, but he does not seem to have made much use of them.

Still worse, it appears that Kite does not understand the major difference between the British and Canadian soldier—that every Canadian soldier who fought in Normandy was a volunteer, because Canada did not send conscripts overseas until the last months of the war. The Canadian soldier may have worn a similar uniform to his British counterpart (although of better cut and cloth), he may have nominally spoken the same language and used the same weapons and doctrine, but to say that the Canadian fighting man “…brought in to the Army the cynicism of the factory floor” is to do him a grave disservice. I could go on in this vein at some length. I could, for example, talk about the 632 CANLOAN junior officers who served in 63 different British combat units and suffered a 75-percent casualty rate during the war. I could point out that recent research (based upon a British army source, I hasten to add) demonstrates that the two Canadian infantry divisions in Normandy spent more time in “intense combat” conditions than their British counterparts in 21st Army Group, and they suffered correspondingly heavier casualties. I could emphasize that Kite seems unaware that three of the twenty-one Canadian infantry battalions that fought in Normandy were francophone, a type of unit that was not found in the British army. I could do all these things—and a lot more—but the purpose of a critical book review is not to smite an erring author with the jawbone of an ass, but gently, to point out the errors or weaknesses in his or her work. In sum, the contents of Stout Hearts: The British and Canadians in Normandy 1944 do not accurately reflect its title because it really is a book—and a good one despite my comments above—about how the British army made war in 1944, and I recommend it to readers interested in that subject.

The criticism of ignoring the Canadian contribution to the Normandy campaign cannot be leveled against Stephen Napier, a Briton living in Australia who devoted, he tells us, five years to working on his subject. The result is The Armored Campaign in Normandy, a title that covers the tank units of all combatants with the objective (p. 8) of discussing operations, “…from the perspective of the armored units and their generals, commanders and tank crews.” In my opinion, Napier admirably accomplishes his objective. Following an introductory chapter on the experience of tank crews on D-Day, he continues with a most interesting and informative chapter on “Fighting the Tank.” He then surveys Normandy operations in chronological order and they are all there—Perch, Goodwood, Epsom, Cobra, Totalize, and the rest. Napier takes particular pains to analyze British tank losses in the ill-fated Operation Goodwood, and reduces the number considerably from the oft-quoted figure of 400-500 vehicles lost. It is encouraging to see that Napier, unlike Kite, actually seems to have done research in this country, and has used Canadian operational orders, quartermasters’ returns, and intelligence summaries, as well as a number of recent and reliable secondary sources.

The result is that the Armored Campaign in Normandy is a succinct overview of that aspect of the campaign. It will be useful for Commonwealth readers who are not as familiar with armoured operations in the American sector of the beachhead as they are with those in the eastern sector. Concerning the Commonwealth sector,
I noted with interest that Napier reproduces (p. 178) a terrain “going” map created by First U.S. Army, which describes the ground south of Caen as, “...generally less favorable for the employment of large armored units.” Actually, that assessment is not accurate, as the ground south of Caen is very good tank country, but, unfortunately, what is good tank country also happens to be good anti-tank country, as British, Canadian, and Polish tank crews discovered to their sorrow. Napier’s conclusion on the campaign (p. 427) is, in my opinion, very apt. Although he gives credit to “the bravery and sacrifice” of the tank crews, as well as the soldiers of other arms, Napier feels that victory, “…came to the Allies in the end through their dominance of the air and their superiority in firepower, numbers, logistics and code breaking skills.” I agree with that assessment, but I think that perhaps firepower—in the form of a superb artillery arm—should receive more credit than is perhaps emphasized by the author. The best testament to that assertion is provided by those who were ‘on the receiving end.’ Consider the comments of Generalmajor Heinrich von Lüttwitz, commanding 2nd Panzer Division, who stressed in a report on his formation’s battle experiences in July 1944, that:

The incredibly heavy artillery and mortar fire (of the enemy) is something new, both for the seasoned veterans of the Eastern Front and the new arrivals from the reinforcement units...... The average rate of fire on the division sector per day is 4,000 artillery rounds and 5,000 mortar rounds. This is multiplied many times before an enemy attack...... The Allies are waging war regardless of expense.4

I do have one criticism of The Armored Campaign in Normandy, and that is that Napier’s maps are inadequate. This book is largely concerned with the operational and tactical levels of war, levels where good, clear, and detailed maps are absolutely necessary. Unfortunately, the book fails in this respect, and I was forced several times while reading it to consult better maps in other publications to fully comprehend his text. I did note (with no little amusement) that the best maps in the book are from the Canadian official history, The Victory Campaign. Napier states that these maps were “adapted” from the originals, but I can see no evident “adaptation” or changes from the coloured versions in the official history, and, in fact, Napier’s versions of these maps appear to be rather crude black-and-white scans.

Angelo Caravaggio, the author of 21 Days in Normandy, Maj. Gen. George Kitching & The 4th Canadian Armoured Division, was inspired to write this book after being present on an April 1990 battlefield tour of Normandy organized by 4 Tactical Air Force. Three prominent veterans were on that tour: Major-General (ret’d) George Kitching of the Canadian army; Air Vice-Marshal (ret’d) J.E. ‘Johnnie’ Johnson of the RAF, and Sturmbannführer (colonel and definitely retired) Hubert Meyer, in 1944 the chief of staff of the 12th Waffen SS Panzer Division. I was one of the DND historians on that tour, and although I do not recall meeting Caravaggio, I must have done so.5 I did, however, get to know George Kitching better, as I interviewed him a number of times for my book, South Albertas: A Canadian Regiment at War. I may have been the last historian to interview Kitching, or it may have been Caravaggio. For this reason, I was interested in 21 Days in Normandy, which really has two subjects: Major-General Kitching, and the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, which Kitching commanded in Normandy.

Let us start with the 4th Armoured Division… It was initially raised as an infantry division in June 1940, and for the next two years, it was scattered in garrisons across Canada, with the composition of its brigades undergoing constant change. Finally, in December 1941, it was concentrated at the Debert Military Camp in Nova Scotia, but severe winter weather hampered training efforts above the unit level. In February 1942, Major-General Frank Worthington assumed command, and he began to convert the 4th into an armoured division, but a shortage of vehicles and instructors prolonged the process, and the new tankers had only reached the level of crew training by August 1942, when the division was deployed for the UK, leaving its tanks in Canada. Unfortunately, it was nearly four months before a trickle of AFVs began to reach the division, but, just as the first tanks arrived, the formation underwent a major re-organization which resulted in two of its six “armoured” regiments being stripped from it, while a third was converted into a new entity called the “armoured reconnaissance regiment,” about which nothing was known. A full complement of Ram tanks did arrive by the spring of 1943, but a shortage of facilities again restricted training to the unit level throughout most of the following summer. It was not until October and November 1943 that the 4th Division carried out brigade and divisional level exercises, culminating in a two-day battle with the 9th British Armoured Division. It resumed unit training over the following winter, which not only saw the division receive new tanks (Shermans and Stuarts), but also experience a change of command, as Kitching replaced Worthington. Unfortunately for Kitching, he did not get an opportunity to do any serious formation training, as in May 1944, his division was ordered to waterproof its vehicles, after which they could only be moved short distances. And that was the sum of the division’s preparation for battle… When it landed in Normandy in late-July, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division—just over four years after it had been raised, and 27 months after it had been converted to armour—had undergone exactly five days of brigade and divisional-level exercises!
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The exclamation point is warranted, because knowing the 4th Division’s preparation for battle (or lack thereof) is necessary to understanding the problems it experienced during its first three weeks in action—the 21 Days of Caravaggio’s focus. The author gives a very good account of how the formation operated during that period at the staff and senior command level, but perhaps less so at the unit level. As Caravaggio notes (p. 191), this inexperienced formation and its leadership, “…were placed under significant stresses,” but, eventually, “…proved resilient to these stresses, allowing them to function effectively in very difficult circumstances.” The 4th Armoured Division, the last Canadian formation to enter battle, has often been derided as the ‘poor step-sister’ of the wartime army. Historians have been critical of its uneven performance in Normandy without balancing that criticism with a discussion of how well the division performed after it had “…shaken down,” and its component parts began to work effectively. One might well add that, compared to the record of this raw Canadian formation, the veteran 7th British Armoured Division of North Africa fame, did not do all that well in Normandy. The result was that the commanding officers of both divisions were relieved.6

This brings us to Major-General George Kitching and the circumstance surrounding Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds’s decision to relieve him of command. Caravaggio takes care to point out that many of the factors that eventually led to Kitching being fired were beyond that officers’ control, and not a few of them were actually the result of decisions made by Simonds himself. The author stresses the fact that, after Brigadier E.L. Booth was killed on 14 August, Simonds delayed his replacement with Brigadier Robert Moncel for a crucial five days, and thus, is more than a little responsible for the 4th Armoured Brigade’s rather variable record during that time. Caravaggio suggests that Brigadier H. Lane, the CRA of 4th Division, might have replaced Booth, but that Kitching did not want to remove “effective leadership” from his artillery units (p. 188).

Actually, an ideal replacement for Booth was available in the form of Lieutenant-Colonel G.D. de S. Wotherspoon of the South Alberta Regiment, under command of the 10th Infantry Brigade. Wotherspoon was one of the most ‘armour-minded’ officers in the army. He had graduated from the Royal Armoured Corps’ Senior Officers’ School at the top of his class in 1942, and had then joined the directing staff until Worthington handpicked him to take over and train the new armoured reconnaissance unit in the 4th Division. Kitching had actually raised the question of having Wotherspoon replace any senior officer casualties in the 4th Armoured Brigade, but had backed off after Brigadier J.L. Jefferson, commanding 10th Brigade, had strongly resisted losing the man. Being the divisional commander, perhaps Kitching should have been more insistent, but George Kitching was a true gentleman, as well as an officer, and he let it go.

Unfortunately, Kitching was working for a general who was considerably less sensitive to the wishes of his subordinates. Never mind the fact that Simonds constantly interfered with Kitching’s division during those crucial three weeks. Never mind that Simonds ordered most of the 4th Armoured Division away from the actual Falaise Gap, allowing a considerable portion of the trapped German armies to escape. The fact was that Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds conceived perfect plans, and, if they did not work, it was never his fault, but that of his subordinates, who failed to execute them properly. Whether Kitching was at fault or not – and Caravaggio makes a very strong case that he was not – Simonds was not going to take the blame for failures. “Someone,” Major General Stanislaw Maczek of the 1st Polish Armoured Division remarked, “had to pay for the broken pots,” and George Kitching got the bill.7

Although the reader may find that the author’s inclination to staunchly defend Kitching lacks objectivity, 21 Days in Normandy is an important book. It reveals a great deal about the intricacies of higher command in the wartime army, and it emphasizes the operations of a single division. We need this type of analysis, and this one can take its place in a constantly-growing body of historical literature about Canadian soldiers in Normandy, alongside such recent efforts as Marc Milner’s Stopping the Panzers, and Brian Reid’s No Holding Back. I recommend it to all readers interested in our army’s operations in Normandy.

Donald E. Graves is the co-author, with W.J. McAndrew and M.J. Whitby, of Normandy 1944; The Canadian Summer, and the editor of Blood and Steel: The Wehrmacht Archive: Normandy 1944. He has also written three regimental histories that cover in detail the experiences of a Canadian armoured regiment, artillery regiment, and infantry battalion in the Normandy campaign.

NOTES

2. Those francophone units being Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal, Le Régiment de la Chaudière and Le Régiment de Maisonneuve. I should add that the 4th Medium Regiment, RCA, was also a francophone unit, while the Sherbrooke Fusilier Regiment (CAC) was largely francophone.
3. Napier, however, puts more faith in Canadian unit war diaries than I do. In one armoured regiment that fought in Normandy, and with which I am very familiar, bringing the war diary up to date was a standard punishment for erring junior officers. For this reason, its accuracy cannot be entirely trusted.
5. When not occupied with my official duties, I spent much of my time on this tour with Meyer because I speak some German. I was also frequently called upon to ‘corral’ the numerous CF-18 pilots with us, as they were frequently led (quite willingly) astray by “Johnnie” Johnson, the top-scoring Commonwealth fighter ace of the Second World War.
6. The new commander of 7th Armoured Division was, in turn, also relieved of his command for the poor performance of his formation.
THE HISTORICAL DEBATE

The historical debate over the decision by the American President to employ atomic weapons against the Japanese Empire in the Second World War has, until the 21st Century, been dominated by those who either revile the decision on moral grounds; believe there were a variety of sinister and nefarious American motives for the decision; apologists for Imperial Japanese and even Nazi behaviour; or those who ‘bought into’ Cold War Soviet-supported anti-nuclear information operations. The arguments employed to critique the decision boil down to the belief that there were viable alternatives to end the war in Japan that did not involve strategic air warfare.

A key pillar of that argument was that casualty estimates for an Allied invasion of the Japanese home islands were grossly exaggerated, thus implying that an invasion was a viable alternative. This debate eventually moved from narrow historical venues into public policy debate in 1994-1995, when a new Smithsonian Institution display of the Enola Gay B-29 bomber was accompanied by distorted data that reflected this view. That event lead to a robust veteran’s response and the subsequent sacking of some Smithsonian personnel.

The original 2009 edition of this book was, in part, a response to that debate, and its author, Dennis Giangreco, was subsequently impugned from several quarters by those whose arguments were later proven false or irrelevant. Although the original argument was sound and soundly supported, substantial new information has become available since the initial publication that dramatically augments and enhances it. Hell to Pay is the result of these labours, and it establishes new high ground in this ongoing debate.

As an historian who has written about the importance of battles that did not happen, I am in complete sympathy with Giangreco’s approach. Discarding Operation DOWNFALL (the planned invasion/occupation of Japan), and its sub-operations, OLYMPIC (the assault on the southernmost Home Island, Kyushu), and CORONET (the planned 1946 attack 500 miles north into the industrial heartland), and the detailed Japanese defensive plans, such as KETSU-GO, as merely-unexecuted contingency plans for the invasion and defence of Japan is narrow-minded, and it denies us a significant and crucial vantage point with which to view larger arguments related to strategic air warfare and its effectiveness, war termination, and longer-term effects on the Cold War. What would the impact upon the post-war world order have been of a besieged but undefeated Japan, and an exhausted America? With the British Empire bankrupt, there would have been no NATO, and Western Europe would have been dominated by Stalin and his successors. Perhaps those who retroactively oppose the atomic bomb use against Japan are subtly engaged in a form of ‘lost cause’ nostalgia.

Giangreco’s approach is multi-faceted, but each point relates to the nature of the war that would have been fought in Japan. The horrendous casualty estimates, central to the debate (estimated 700,000 Allied combat deaths, 10-to-15 million Japanese deaths), are re-examined in light of new numbers, including Japanese estimates and better contextualization of those numbers. But that is not the only area where the work shines. It rests in Giangreco’s examination of the operational and tactical aspects of the projected invasion campaign, and the Japanese defensive measures that provide overwhelming support to those estimates. The most important revelations relate to the incorrect US intelligence assessments of Japanese airpower, particularly strategic fuel stocks, and the effectiveness of the Special Attack Forces (Kamikazes) mustered to repel DOWNFALL. Indeed, Giangreco’s uncovering of the Japanese understanding that light wooden aircraft operating at night were impervious to radar, as well as the overlooked trio of successful attacks conducted by them against USN destroyers in the last days of the war, is notable.

Critical to the argument is that the Japanese leadership carefully assessed American public opinion in 1944-1945, and concluded from media analysis that the American population was weary of further casualties. The KETSU-GO defensive plans specifically included new doctrinal terminology that translates into “blood letting operations.” One wonders if the North Vietnamese took a page from the Japanese book…
The crucial aspects of terrain, weather, season, and time, things overlooked by almost all other examinations of this subject, give one pause, especially Giangreco’s terrain analysis. OLYMPIC would have been Okinawa replayed on a large scale, while CORONET would have looked like Korea crossed with Vietnam. Indeed, the use of nine atomic bombs against operational- and tactical-level Japanese targets was planned for CORONET.

Importantly, the unsung support services, overlooked in many histories, are examined herein, as they are crucial to the narrative. *Hell to Pay* provides details on the extensive medical support planned for DOWNFALL, including ships converted to blood plasma refrigerators; salvage plans with specialized ships to open ports defended by hold-outs on half-sunken ships; and Project IRONHORSE, a Mulberry Harbour planned for CORONET.

This work completely demolishes the body of scholarship revolving around assertions that strategic bombing was ineffective. It dissolves the *papier mache* argument that the Japanese were already beaten, and that a ground invasion would have been a ‘cake walk.’ It detonates the assertions that the atomic bombs were dropped to intimidate Stalin: there was massive American materiel and logistical support for Soviet forces in the Far East to help them defeat the Kwangtung Army in China, and then assist them with assaulting Hokkaido. We are finally moving away from the ideologically-driven and emotionally-tainted history dominated by the anti-Vietnam, anti-nuclear movement in the 1970s-1980s, and into a new era where properly contextualized primary sources provide us with a dramatically improved and detailed perspective with respect to issues related to strategic air warfare and nuclear weapons, particularly their use in 1945.

Giangreco’s updated work is a superb example for future historians in this regard, as it hits square at the *Schwerpunkt* [Centre of Gravity – Ed.] of the critics’ arguments, arguments that continue to proliferate virtually unchallenged in mediums such as Netflix, the Internet, and through those who continue to distort history ‘in the service of peace.’ It is an increasingly-unavoidable truth that is inconvenient for some: the atomic bombing of Japan saved millions of lives. And among them would have been Canadian lives from the 6th Canadian Division, and RCAF Tiger Force Lancaster crews committed to Operation OLYMPIC.

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**Mission at Nuremberg: An American Army Chaplain and the Trial of the Nazis**

*by Tim Townsend*


400 pages, $34.00

ISBN: 0061997196

**Reviewed by Harold Ristau**

**Mission at Nuremberg: An American Army Chaplain and the Trial of the Nazis** by Tim Townsend follows the story of two US German-speaking army chaplains, one Roman Catholic and one Protestant, who were tasked with the mission of offering spiritual care to the highest ranking Nazis incarcerated at Nuremberg facing trial for atrocities committed during the Second World War. These chaplains’ new congregation consisted of twenty-one convicts, including Hermann Goering, Albert Speer, Wilhelm Keitel, Hans Frank, and Ernst Kaltenbrunner, primary orchestrators of one of the worst genocides in modern history. Based upon scrupulous research through various documentations, including formerly classified material, eyewitness accounts, journal entries, and letters only recently made available, renowned journalist Tim Townsend provides fascinating insights into the minds and souls of these criminals, and, in some cases, by tracking the kinds of psychological and spiritual transformations undergone by these key players in the Nazi party between their capture and execution. Although the Roman Catholic chaplain, Father Sixtus (Richard) O’Conner, is referred to throughout, the book follows primarily the Lutheran chaplain, fifty-year old Henry Gerecke, who lost three sons to death or wounds in the battlefield, and his own personal journey of faith as he wrestles with the ethical and moral conflicts tied to the task set before him. Yet, this intriguing biography of a chaplain is not only of interest to religious leaders, but to any professional or lay student of history, military logistics, and political science, as well as those interested in exploring the darkest spheres of human psychology, and courageous enough to ask some of the most significant questions regarding morality and spirituality. The book is especially relevant to military personnel in light of current international conflicts in which similar motivations, world views, and justifications steering the Nazi mindset underlie our enemies today. For example, one of the incarcerated Nazis who had shown remorse explains the intricate logistical considerations of the extermination camps in order to maximize efficiency and dehumanize the victims. The frightening rationalizations underpinned by a mechanistic world view serves as a warning to us all of the dangerous repercussions of an ethos driven by a military mindset that has forgotten that it *serves*, and *consists of*, a society of people created in the image of God. Written by a journalist who is clearly not anti-religious, but as to what his religious or spiritual convictions are is unclear, provides a factual account, with a minimum of editorial bias.
Townsend provides a window into the hearts, minds and souls of, not only the criminals struggling with end of life issues in light of personal guilt and responsibility for their sins, but also the moral and ethical conflicts undergone by the chaplains. For instance, initially when assigned with the task, an obvious crisis of conscience developed as to whether or not these criminals should have access to a chaplain, either because they were beyond redemption, or because they did not deserve it: “…why preach the Gospel of mercy to those responsible for such atrocities?” The author notes how many Americans wanted to deprive the convicts of any spiritual counsel as part of their punishment. However, the general religious sentiment driving the deployment of these two chaplains was that even the worst of people, no matter how evil the crimes, still have value before God. The belief was that even all criminals should be offered the opportunity to repent and receive the forgiveness of sins, and even comfort for their souls, from their Maker in heaven while still undergoing the consequences of their crimes by the State on earth. The notion was in accordance with the Christian principle that all humanity is created in the image of God, and that Christ, believed to be sent by God as the savior of the world, gave his life for all people without discrimination—even the most wicked among us. Thus, in their minds, the battle and war was as spiritual as it was physical. The Bible passage, “For we do not wrestle against flesh and blood, but against the rulers, against the authorities, against the cosmic powers over this present darkness, against the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly places,” (Ephesians 6:12) provided the fuel for these chaplains’ ministry despite even their own personal doubts at times. After all, the concept of extending forgiveness to such criminals committing crimes of such a caliber is neither intuitive nor “reasonable.” These sentiments and troubling moral questions were complicated by the inevitable pastoral relationships created between the chaplains and these murderers, since many of the Nazis began attending a chapel reserved specifically for them, faithfully and regularly, as they underwent their trials, which they knew full well would end in their execution. These chaplains were priests shepherding a congregation of Nazis, and walking with them to their death. In the end, none of these criminals remained neutral in their faith convictions; while some displayed sincere remorse, others totally rejected God and love for humankind.

But what I, as a Lutheran military chaplain myself, found most surprising was the repentance shown by many of the criminals, and without any wish or desire to avoid the punishment sought by justice. For each one, the reader is forced to decide to what extent their ‘conversion’ was a result of personal disillusionment of the Nazi party and fear of the afterlife, or true repentance and profound horror for their deeds. The chaplains seemed to be just as surprised by the results of their ministry, to the point of even being reluctant at first to offer the Sacrament of Holy Communion to any of them, since, for Lutherans and Roman Catholics, the Lord’s Supper is believed to be the main method of reconciliation between God and man. Naturally, the chaplains wondered whether or not the criminals had alternate motives, or may have been trying to manipulate them towards other ends. They could be likened to a doctor trying to determine the remedy when the symptoms are unclear. The book also delves into the emotional involvement of these chaplains, and even the prison guards, who were practically confined to living as a community with these prisoners over the course of two years of trial, as well as the challenging ministry to the convicts’ wives and children by conveying messages, leading prayers, and providing counsel. One powerful theme throughout the book involved the relationship developed between Chaplain Gericke and the key Nazi, Hermann Goering, who Gericke hoped would repent in order to escape what he believed to be an eternal damnation, and his disappointment when the Nazi showed very few signs of remorse for his sins, nor faith in a good and merciful God.

While the book follows in incredible detail the last days, hours and minutes of the escort of prisoners towards the gallows, including the particularities of last meals, timings, preparations, etc., it more interestingly records the vast mixed reactions of all those who died: final words, facial expressions, prayers, cries, pleads, and even a final sign of “Heil Hitler” in the case of one of the unrepentant. For history buffs fascinated by politics in the aftermath of the Second World War, a sub-theme of the book revolves around the unique political considerations surrounding the trials. For instance, the author explores some of the unsurprising oddities of how the criminals were executed, such as deliberate, though illegal, loose nooses, and the logistical and political considerations of disposal of bodies, due to the impact it may have had on any Nazi sympathizers, to name a few.

My only criticism of the work was the author’s lack of insight into several theological summaries, which greatly oversimplified Christian doctrines. For most laity, the inaccuracies by no means hinder the advancement of the plot, nor would they be all that noticeable. But without delving further into some of the theological concerns, they tend to deprive the reader of the depth of some of the deeper complexities of matters at hand. But overall, as an historical non-fiction work, accompanied by unique photos, written in a simple and accessible style, but with the pace of an action novel, this book is definitely a thought-provoker for CAF officers and NCMs alike.

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Captain Skye Simpson, a pilot from 436 Transport Squadron, 8 Wing Trenton, prepares to fly the CC-130J Hercules in response to a simulated mass casualty scenario during Exercise RIMPAC 16 at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, 14 July 2016.

Three helicopters from 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron were deployed to Iraq in May 2016 to provide essential tactical helicopter transportation as part of Op Impact.