




♦ A BATTLEFIELD STUDY GUIDE ♦

# THE BIRTH OF THE RANGER TRADITION

IRREGULAR WARFARE DURING THE LAKE CHAMPLAIN  
THEATRE OF OPERATIONS, 1754-1760

Colonel (Retired) Bernd Horn, PhD with Dr. Emily Spencer

# The North American Theatre of Operations 1754-1760





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Colonel (Retired) Bernd Horn, PhD  
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# FOREWORD



I am delighted to introduce *The Birth of the Ranger Tradition: Irregular Warfare During the Lake Champlain Theatre of Operations, 1754-1760. A Battlefield Study Guide*. This publication is intended to provide individuals with background readings that help to explain the context and detail to the irregular warfare campaign that transpired on the Lake Champlain / Richelieu River invasion corridor during the French & Indian War in North America between 1754 and 1760. It is also designed to be a companion to the battlefield study that the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) Education and Research Centre (ERC) conducts retracing significant components of the campaign from Lake George, New York to Quebec City, Quebec.

Battlefield studies are an important educational and training tool to help military professionals, as well as those interested in military art and science, or just military history enthusiasts, to better understand operations, decision-making, time / space conundrums, the impact of terrain and the human dimensions of conflict. Through the analysis of events, from the intangibles of morale, cohesion, personalities and leadership / command styles, to the effects of weather and terrain, to specific tactics and actions taken, one can draw lessons and understanding of the complexities of conflict.

Specifically, the study of the Lake Champlain / Richelieu River theatre of operations during the French & Indian War provides insights into:

1. The importance of polycstrategy decisions at the highest levels and the impact on operational campaign planning/execution;
2. The timeless applicability of asymmetric tactics and the importance of offensive operations;
3. The impact of terrain on operations, particularly with regard to irregular warfare;



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4. The importance of cultural intelligence/human terrain;
5. The impact of combat motivation/leadership on irregular warfare operations; and
6. A host of specific tactical/operational problem sets and how they were overcome.

Although the battlefield study looks at a conflict that took place more than 250 years ago, the lessons that can be drawn and the knowledge that can be gained are timeless. As the readings indicate, many of the challenges, problems and barriers to military operations, as well as the enablers to success, cross the time / space continuum. As philosophers have often articulated, “study the past, if you wish to divine the future.”

As always, our intent at the ERC is to provide interesting educational material that will assist individuals in the Command, as well as those external to it, learn more about human behaviour, special operations, and military theory and practice. I hope you find this publication informative and of value to your operational role. Please do not hesitate to contact the ERC should you have comments or questions on this publication.

Dr. Emily Spencer  
Director  
CANSOFCOM ERC

# INTRODUCTION



The struggle between France and Great Britain for colonial North America is an immensely interesting period regarding military operations. The harsh back-water of the New World challenged conventions of the day, required adaptation of military tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), necessitated working with indigenous forces, both Native Americans and colonials, all set in rugged, difficult terrain and climate. Although the contest for control of North America dragged on for over a century, this battlefield study handbook focuses on the French and Indian War, which was part of the larger Seven Years' War (1756-1763).

The Seven Years' War was a major global conflict. Battlefields spanned Europe, North America and India, with maritime operations reaching out over the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, as well as the Mediterranean and Caribbean Seas. Its genesis was inspired by the deep concern of Austria, France, Russia, Sweden and Saxony over the growing strength and territorial expansion of Prussia under Frederick the Great. As a result, these countries formed a coalition designed to defeat Prussia. Predictably, England, already involved in a colonial and maritime struggle with France, thus entered into an alliance with Prussia.

In North America, the conflict (often termed the French and Indian War) actually began two years earlier in the late spring of 1754. The growing competition for the rich lands of the Ohio Valley proved the catalyst for the latest round of conflict between the French and English colonies. Robert Dinwiddie, the Governor of Virginia, concerned with the news that the French and Canadians were solidifying their claim to the Ohio Valley by constructing a series of forts, dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel George Washington with a detachment of militia to build a fort of their own on the forks of the Ohio River.

Not surprisingly, a confrontation soon ensued. Washington and his party were subsequently defeated by the French at Great Meadows (Fort Necessity) and pushed back over the Allegheny Mountains. A second attempt by Major-General Edward Braddock was made the following summer, but his force was ambushed near Fort Duquesne and virtually annihilated. The North American theatre eventually

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became part of the greater conflict. Initial French victories and English set-backs in the early years of the French and Indian War were reversed by 1758, due to the British decision to focus their strategy and resources on the wilderness campaign. A virtual naval blockade, in concert with an infusion of more than 20,000 British regular troops, turned the tide in favour of the English. The capture of the Fortress of Louisbourg and Fort Frontenac in 1758, forced the French to adopt a defensive posture centered on Montreal and Quebec.

The change in French disposition, to one of defense, as well as their lack of resources, also resulted in the defection of a large number of their Native allies. By 1759, the British began to roll up the remaining French forts on the frontier. One army captured Fort Niagara, and another marched up the Lake Champlain / Richelieu River corridor, while a third invested Quebec. The siege of Quebec ended in September 1759, with the British victory on the Plains of Abraham. The remnants of the French Army and their Canadian militia, as well as the few remaining Native allies, withdrew to Montreal in hopes of recapturing Quebec in the spring. Although almost successful, as a result of their victory in the Battle at Ste. Foy and subsequent siege of Quebec in April 1760, the subsequent appearance of the Royal Navy in the St. Lawrence below the fortification of Quebec forced the French to return to Montreal where they later surrendered on 8 September 1760. The Seven Years War was formally ended in 1763 by the Treaty of Paris, which ceded virtually all of New France to the British.

Of particular interest to many Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel in the French and Indian War was the irregular warfare that was carried out on the Lake Champlain theatre of operations. Key to the French strategy was the practice of *la petite guerre* by the French-Canadian raiders and their indigenous allies. Developed by necessity of the harsh climate, unforgiving terrain and intractable and savage Iroquois enemies, the French Canadians developed a form of warfare that demonstrated an intellectual and tactical agility that made them unsurpassed in raiding and scouting operations. Their emphasis on stealth, speed, violence of action, physical fitness and courage, as well as operations with indigenous allies, created a force that successfully wreaked havoc on their enemy.

This capability, much to the misery of the English, was consistently displayed as the two competing European powers increasingly fought for control of North America. Quite simply, the French consistently relied on the outnumbered Canadians to hold



## INTRODUCTION

onto French territory through their proficient execution of their distinct Canadian way of war, specifically small parties of experienced *coureur de bois* and partisans who conducted dangerous scouts, ambushes and raids in English territory.

As such, devastating strikes against English settlements during a succession of wars from 1688 to 1760 provided proof of the effectiveness of the French Canadian raiders who specialized in the conduct of lightning strikes behind enemy lines. Everywhere the Canadians and Natives would appear as phantoms in hit and run attacks leaving in their wake smouldering ruins and the mutilated bodies of the dead and dying. Despite their small numbers, they consistently inflicted an unproportionally high number of casualties on the enemy. The end result had a paralyzing effect on the English combatants and colonists alike.

The unmitigated success of the French Canadian raiders forced the British to develop a similar capability of their own. One of the first efforts was in 1744, in the North American theatre of operations, as part of the larger War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748). During this conflict the British presence in the Maritimes was once again prey to the marauding Abenakis and Micmac Native war parties that were aligned with the French. As a result, an “independent corps of rangers,” also known as the corps of Nova Scotia Rangers, was raised in New England. Two companies were recruited and deployed to Annapolis, Nova Scotia in July 1744 to reinforce the garrison.

In September, a third company arrived led by Captain John Goreham. Goreham’s Command composed of 60 Mohawks and Metis warriors. Familiar with the Native way of war, they swiftly engaged the French and their Native allies. Massachusetts Governor William Shirley commended Goreham and his Rangers for their success, stating that “the garrison is now entirely free from alarms.” The majority of the companies later returned to Massachusetts where they originated leaving Captain Goreham and his company to patrol Nova Scotia alone from 1746-1748. Their success was such that Shirley wrote, “the great service which Lieut. Colonel Gorham’s Company of Rangers has been of to the Garrison at Annapolis Royal is a demonstration of the Usefulness of such a Corps.”<sup>1</sup>

Goreham’s Rangers continued to serve on the volatile frontier. Prior to the onset of the French and Indian War, Goreham’s rangers were used to protect the British settlements in Nova Scotia against Native raids. However, with the official outbreak

## INTRODUCTION

of the War, they became increasingly involved in military operations specifically because of their expertise at irregular warfare.

Despite their success, by 1756 Goreham's Rangers were eclipsed by another British effort aimed at matching the effectiveness of the French Canadian raiders in the strategically important Lake Champlain theatre of operations, namely, Rogers' Rangers. In the early stages of the War, when fortunes seemed to be against the British, Robert Rogers' knowledge and experience with the "haunts and passes of the enemy and the Native method of fighting" soon brought him to the attention of his superior, Major-General William Johnson. By the fall of 1755, Rogers was conducting dangerous scouts deep behind enemy lines. Rogers' efforts soon earned him an overwhelmingly positive reputation. These efforts also led Major-General William Shirley, then the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army in North America, to argue:

*It is absolutely necessary for his Majesty's Service, that one Company at least of Rangers should be constantly employ'd in different Parties upon Lake George and Lake Iroquois [Lake Champlain], and the Wood Creek and Lands adjacent...to make Discoveries of the proper Routes for our own Troops, procure Intelligence of the Enemy's Strength and Motions, destroy their out Magazines and Settlements, pick up small Parties of their Battoes upon the Lakes, and keep them under continual Alarm.<sup>2</sup>*

In March 1756, Major-General Shirley, ordered Rogers to raise a 60 man independent ranger company that was separate from both the provincial and regular units. As such, it was titled His Majesty's Independent Company (later Companies) of American Rangers. His unit was directed to scout and gain intelligence in the Lake Champlain theatre, as well as "distress the French and their allies by sacking, burning and destroying their houses, barns, barracks, canoes, battoes...to way-lay, attack, and destroying their convoys of provisions by land and water."<sup>3</sup>

Without doubt, Rogers' Rangers, as they became universally known, brought to life the ranger tradition in North America and ensured it would forever endure. Their deeds and prowess have with time become legendary, even if not fully deserved. Nonetheless, the Rangers, led by the very adventurous, courageous, and exceptionally tough Robert Rogers, created a very romantic image that seemed to both symbolize, as well as define, the strength of the American Ranger.

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Ironically, throughout the “cat and mouse” campaign that was fought mainly on the Lake Champlain theatre of operations, Rogers was repeatedly bested by his Canadian counterparts and normally suffered heavy casualties. Generals Jeffrey Amherst and Thomas Gage considered the Canadians, owing to their skill and discipline, superior to the American Rangers. Ultimately, the Canadian and American rangers, in essence, established a tradition that depicted an adventurous, if not daring, attitude that was overly aggressive and always offensively minded. The ranger tradition that was created also embodied the concept of individuals who were seen as mavericks to the conventional military institution and mentality, men who were adaptable, robust and unconventional in their thinking and war fighting; men who could work well with indigenous forces; and men who could persevere the greatest hardships and, despite an inhospitable environment and merciless enemy, achieve mission success.

This publication is intended to capture the essence of, and provide a primer for, the irregular warfare campaign on the Lake Champlain theatre of operations. Part I comprises a number of stand-alone background readings that provide context to, and examples of, the conflict. Part II lays out the sequence and sites of the battlefield study and furnishes a brief background to each location in order to better prepare individuals for the actual visit on the ground. Together, this publication enables individuals to best take advantage of the Battlefield Study itself.



# PART I



## BACKGROUND READINGS



# PREFACE TO CHAPTER 1



Chapter 1 is foundational to the Battlefield Study. It provides the over-arching explanation of how the French, arguably the French Canadians, developed their strategy for countering the threats faced by New France. Importantly, it describes how the emphasis on *la petite guerre* and the raiding concept began, how it evolved into a distinct Canadian way of war and the impact it had on the English colonies to the south. In addition, Chapter 1 also expounds on the tensions between the French military commanders and the Canadian born political leadership and how, and why, the old tried raiding strategy and reliance on the Canadian way of war was replaced by a strategy that relied on a defence, centered on the defence of Quebec.







# CHAPTER 1

## *LA PETITE GUERRE –* A STRATEGY OF SURVIVAL<sup>4</sup>



Experience is a powerful force, and historical experience, can be even more so. Its influence is pervasive. It is often the driving factor behind the behaviour and actions of individuals, institutions, nations and cultures. In short, we are all, to some degree or another, prisoners of our own experience. Within this context, arguably, it was the brutal struggle for survival in New France that developed a distinct Canadian strategy of survival that was based on circumstance, geography and political will.

From necessity, the intrepid leaders and settlers of New France realized that survival lay in the adoption of a number of fundamental principles. First, alliances for economic benefit and military cooperation were critical to counter-balancing economically and / or numerically superior antagonists and neighbors. They were fundamental for survival in a hostile world. Secondly, subordinate stature as a distant wilderness colony in a large empire limited its population and resource base. As result, these circumstances determined how much of its treasury France was willing to deplete in defence of its “untamed” colony. This situation meant that New France would largely live or die by its ability to protect itself.

These realities quickly dictated a distinct approach to war: adapt to the surroundings and circumstances of the colony and utilize those methods that would ensure survival and maintain the balance of power within North America, or die. The approach was largely tactical in focus. Strategic decisions and initiatives were quite simply beyond the scope and ability of New France. Additionally, from the French perspective war was to be on the cheapest possible footing since New France was a distant theatre and the limited Canadian economy could not afford a protracted conflict, nor would its inhabitants tolerate one. Moreover, as circumstances eventually bore out, France was unwilling to risk its position on the European Continent,

or any of its more lucrative colonies, in defence of New France.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, outside support and resources would be, and were, exceedingly limited.

As a result, the inhabitants of New France focused on, and practiced, a way of war that was borne from their experience and driven by necessity. It was one that also had to be limited and cost effective, both fiscally and in regards to resources and manpower, particularly in respect to casualties. Furthermore, *les habitants* conducted war in a manner that was distinct to their abilities and temperament, and one which counter-balanced their weaknesses. In short, they adopted *la petite guerre*. Although not unique to North America or its Native peoples, the wilderness, terrain and weather etched a distinct New World meaning to the concept.

*La petite guerre* was in essence small scale irregular warfare.<sup>6</sup> Key to its success was the selection of limited objectives that could be easily overcome. Stealth and surprise were of the utmost importance. As such, ambushes and raids were the preferred method of attack. Lightning strikes were always succeeded by immediate withdrawals. There were no follow-on attacks or campaigns, and rarely were any of the tactical operations capable of achieving a larger strategic value other than pre-empting, delaying, or disrupting possible enemy offensive action.

This form of warfare became ideally suited to the Canadians. For much of their early history they had been the target of Iroquois war parties who were highly adept at this form of war making. But, for an equally long period of time, the colonists were the eager apprentices of their Native allies. They learned how to dress, fish, hunt, travel, navigate and flourish in the North American wilderness from their native friends. Moreover, survival necessitated that they also learn the Native manner of fighting. The Canadians soon became skilled practitioners of the art. In later years, the practice and methodology of *la petite guerre* became as much identified with the Canadians as it did their Native allies. In the end, it became a strategy for survival.

This approach was rooted in a bitter struggle of survival and conflict that transcended generations. It was the result of hard won, if not bloody, experience and adaptation to a hostile savage environment. The harsh climate, seemingly impenetrable wilderness and bellicose Natives, most notably the Iroquois, proved too much for most Europeans. Initially, very few settlers ventured to the New World. By the middle of the seventeenth century there were only approximately 2,500 people in New France. Many of whom were explorers, fur traders and missionaries.

Nonetheless, the lure of freedom, opportunity and especially wealth was enough of an impetus to spur growth and the French established settlements and a series of forts, predominately for fur trading.<sup>7</sup>

From L'abbé Casgrain, *Les Français au Canada*. Québec: Maison Alfred Mame et Fils, undated).



**A French Canadian partisan and his Indian allies.**

Economic prosperity, if not survival, however, necessitated alliances. For this reason, Samuel de Champlain, the first Governor of New France, entered into treaties of friendship and trading partnerships with a number of northern tribes


(e.g. Abenakis, Algonquin, Huron, Montagnais, and Outaouais). Notably, many of these tribes were already locked in conflict with the far more aggressive Iroquois confederacy.<sup>8</sup> Champlain was cognisant that his choice of allies would alienate the Iroquois and possibly cause conflict. Yet, he actively supported the war efforts of his newly found friends. On 20 July 1609, Champlain led the first combined French, Algonquin and Huron force against the Iroquois at a site near present day Ticonderoga, New York. Armed with an arquebus, Champlain felled two Iroquois chiefs and injured a third warrior with his first shot. His two French companions, also equipped with firearms, then opened fire from the flank. This onslaught, particularly because of the novel weaponry involved, caused panic among the Iroquois and they fled the field of battle.

The following year, in June 1610, Champlain accompanied another expedition that expelled an Iroquois war party from the Richelieu Valley.<sup>9</sup> These humiliating defeats inflicted on the Iroquois were not soon forgotten. Indeed, the consequences of these events rocked the colony for generations. The Iroquois confederacy became the intractable enemies of the French. “Between us and them,” an intendant of New France conceded, “there is no more good faith than between the most ferocious animals.”<sup>10</sup>

In 1615, the repulse of Champlain and his Algonquin and Huron allies in their ill-fated bid to invade Iroquoia buoyed the confidence of the Iroquois and they now carried the war to the northern tribes, as well as to the French. A bitter war of annihilation ensued that lasted almost a century and at its peak threatened the very survival of New France. By 1627, the Iroquois had become a constant terror to the settlers in Canada. “Conscious of their strength, the natives became daily more insolent; no white man could venture beyond the settlement without incurring great danger,” one early Canadian historian penned. As such, “Buildings languished, and much of the cleared land remained uncultivated.”<sup>11</sup>

From 1648 to 1649, the Iroquois mounted a major offensive that culminated in the destruction of Huronia.<sup>12</sup> Subsequently, they focused their attacks on the French settlements along the St. Lawrence Valley. “They are everywhere,” one French governor wrote, “They will stay hidden behind a stump for ten days, existing on nothing but a handful of corn, waiting to kill a man, or a woman.” He lamented that “it was the cruellest war in the world” and that the Iroquois “were not content to burn the houses, they also burn the prisoners they take, and give them death only after torturing them continually in the most cruel manner they can devise.”<sup>13</sup>





Champlain and his Indian allies defeat an Iroquois war party at Ticonderoga, New York, 30 July 1609.

Library and Archives Canada (LAC), C- 6643.

The Iroquois war parties were extremely effective. They forced the colonists to remain barricaded in cramped stockades and only venture out to tend their fields in large armed groups, which even then were no guarantee of survival. "The Iroquois used to keep us closely confined," one Jesuit missionary revealed, "that we did not even dare till the lands that were under the cannon of the forts."<sup>14</sup>

Even the anemic infusion of colonial troops from 1604 to 1663, did little to ease the perpetual menace. Although they provided limited garrisons in some locations, they were too few to cover the entire colony and incapable of matching the Iroquois on their own terms.<sup>15</sup> The Iroquois control over the French was such that one Sachem boasted, "We plied the French homes in the war with them that they were not able to go out a door to piss."<sup>16</sup> His taunt was no idle bluster. "The Iroquois," King Louis the XIV decried, "through massacres and inhumanities, have prevented the country's population from growing."<sup>17</sup>

The constant hardship and terror inflicted on the Canadians shaped their collective experience and outlook. It tempered in them a stoicism and courage, if not contempt for danger, as well as a ruggedness and fortitude that enabled them to withstand the rigors of the North American wilderness. It also ingrained in them a level of ferocity and savageness in conflict that recognized no mercy and gave no quarter. The Canadians adopted a Native manner of making war. It was a very tactical outlook that was dependent on the clever use of ground and cover, the element of surprise, sudden ambushes and swift raids and engagement in combat only when the likelihood of success was high and the possibility of casualties was low.

This was an evolutionary process that was borne from necessity. The tutelage by Native allies, as well as a study of their enemy, provided the necessary knowledge to overcome the problem. Pierre Boucher, the Governor of Trois-Rivières studied the Iroquois manner of war and concluded that they were very competent at war fighting and always demonstrated a preference for quick hit and run attacks that enabled them to achieve maximum shock and surprise against their unsuspecting victims.<sup>18</sup> He also deduced that they would never fight if they were outnumbered, or if they could not achieve a decisive advantage. Boucher additionally recognized that the Canadians could only survive if they themselves were capable of taking the initiative and fighting on the same terms. He argued that the only way to destroy the Iroquois was to take offensive action with the assistance of a large force of 800-900 regular soldiers.<sup>19</sup>

Although for decades the pleas for relief from the Iroquois scourge in New France fell largely on deaf ears at the Royal Palace and Ministry of Marine in France, eventually some respite was promised. In 1664, the French court informed the leaders in the colony that “The principal menace to the inhabitants being the Iroquois, who at all moments attack the French ... and massacre them cruelly...the King has resolved, if it is necessary, to send next year some regular troops to the country.”<sup>20</sup> Subsequently, in the spring of 1665, approximately 1,200 men of the Carignan-Salières Regiment departed La Rochelle for New France.<sup>21</sup> In addition, Lieutenant-General Alexandre de Prouville de Tracy and a further 200 soldiers were dispatched from Guadeloupe also for Quebec to assist in vanquishing the Iroquois menace.

It took Tracy less than a month to decide on a plan of action. After determining the details of the threat and the Native manner of making war, he decided the first step was to deny the Iroquois, most notably the Mohawks, access to the vital waterways that led into New France. As such, he decided to build forts at strategic locations to close off the Richelieu Valley from Lake Champlain to the St. Lawrence River.<sup>22</sup> Once completed, these forts served a multitude of functions. Firstly, they filled an important economic and political purpose. The fortifications controlled access to major waterways and acted as trade outlets. In this vein, they reinforced French territorial claims and power, as well as providing a presence within the wilderness that was recognized and accessed by the various Native nations. As such, fortifications became a key component of the French hold on their Native allies.

Secondly, the strategic locations of the fortifications denied the Iroquois easy access into New France, particularly the use of the Richelieu Valley waterway. By manning these positions, they could possibly intercept Iroquois war parties to, or from, their forays against the colony. As a minimum, they would force the enemy to seek alternate routes by either land and / or water, thereby, extending the distances that had to be traveled and, subsequently, the time needed to execute attacks on the settlements. In essence, they represented the first line of defence for New France, a defence that was based on fighting on the outer frontier of the colony or beyond it.

Finally, the forts provided the French forces with a secure forward operating position. They could now function more easily at a distance from the settled areas and attempt to contain the violence and destruction to the frontiers. More importantly, the forts acted as launching pads to conduct offensive operations. They provided assembly points and supply depots prior to setting off into enemy territory. At long

last, the French and Canadians could conduct war elsewhere, meaning they could fight away to protect their home.

Instead of just suffering war through grueling and demoralizing defensive war with all of the human and material destruction it meant while hoping to beat off the Iroquois, Canadians could now make war. The offense could now be practiced as the most effective form of defense. It was a positive activity and a psychological sign that something more could be done. Moreover, by ensuring the enemy was preoccupied with defending their own territory, they would have little time or resources available to strike at New France. By fighting elsewhere, the Canadians hoped to finally find some peace and stability for their settlements. Additionally and importantly, the initiative no longer rested solely with the enemy.

Theory and practice did not take long to converge. By January 1666, Tracy authorized the first French expedition to attack the Iroquois in their own territory. Here began a tradition that would be ruthlessly practiced by the succeeding leaders in New France. The seminal decision was not without risk. It was launched in the height of the vicious North American winter. The 300 regular troops may not have been inured to the difficulty, but they were accompanied by approximately 200 Canadians and a number of friendly Natives who were. In fact, Daniel de Rémy de Courcelle, the Governor of New France and leader of the expedition, became deeply impressed by the abilities and fortitude of the Canadians. He quickly realized that they were at home in the woods and capable of the Native method of war.<sup>23</sup> He made great use of them, notably, as the vanguard during the approach, and as the rearguard during the return to French territory. In subsequent expeditions, as a point of principle, large contingents of Canadians were always included.

Nonetheless, Rémy de Courcelle's expedition did not attain the lofty aims intended. It failed to destroy or humble the Iroquois.<sup>24</sup> Its brief and inconclusive encounter with Mohawk warriors actually occurred on the outskirts of the Dutch-Anglo settlement of Schenectady, the sovereign territory of another European power. In addition, French casualties were quite heavy due to the severe winter conditions and they were exacerbated by the poorly equipped regular troops who did not have adequate clothing, shoes or supplies and who were not versed in survival in the bitterly cold North American wilderness.





French Canadian militia.

LAC, C-630.

Nonetheless, the excursion represented a turning point. It demonstrated that expeditions, even at the worst time of the year when operations were normally never conducted by either side, were possible. Moreover, elements of the French expedition, namely the Canadians, proved to the French leaders and regulars, as well as

the Iroquois, a mastery of traveling, surviving and fighting in the trackless forest. Of significance to all, the Iroquois became the hunted. The sanctity of their territory had been violated. The initiative no longer rested with them. And no doubt spirits among all in New France were given a boost by the fact that war could be carried to the enemy.

The next French foray took place in the autumn of the same year. Peace overtures were suspended when a continuing series of Iroquois raids in the spring and summer of 1666 killed a number of French soldiers. Tracy was now intent on another expedition. The inclusion of Canadians necessitated a fall operation since the harvest was of primary importance and no-one could be spared until this critical task was completed. This time the force was substantially larger, made up of approximately 600 regulars, an equal number of Canadian volunteers and about 100 Natives.<sup>25</sup>

It was also more successful. Although the two month operation failed to bring the Mohawks to decisive battle, it did march a large force into the heart of Mohawk territory and destroy four villages, their crops and stored foodstuffs estimated at sufficient quantities “to nourish all Canada for two entire years.”<sup>26</sup> The French action condemned their enemies to a possible slow death by starvation and exposure over the winter, or the humiliating prospect of begging for subsistence from other tribes, or their English allies. Importantly, the net effect was achieved: the bold strikes brought their enemies to the peace table and allowed for an era of prolonged peace.<sup>27</sup>

In sum, the expeditions had an important psychological effect on the Iroquois and the French. Both realized the initiative had irrevocably changed. Their larger resources, string of fortifications, discipline, firepower, and willingness and ability to fight in the wilderness now made the French and Canadians a more imposing foe. The expeditions also underlined to the Canadians the importance and effectiveness of offensive action. They also inculcated volunteers with military experience and regulars with wilderness indoctrination. Of greatest consequence, the expeditions highlighted the inherent strength of utilizing the Canadians who were adept at living, traveling and fighting in the Native fashion in North America. In short, it was the practical and functional aspect that gave the Canadians a martial value, as well as their acquired field skills.



Iroquois warrior.

LAC, 3165.





PD 585, Parks Canada.

**Canadian militiaman.**

Not surprisingly, in April 1669, King Louis XIV ordered Governor Courcelles to organize a Canadian Militia and to ensure that the men between 15 and 60 years of age “always be well armed and always have the powder, lead, and fuses necessary to use their arms when needed.”<sup>28</sup> With the Iroquois threat quelled, the Carignan-Salières

## PART I – BACKGROUND READINGS

Regiment was redeployed to France in 1668. The defence of New France was once again largely left in the hands of a few scattered regular and colonial troops and the French Canadian settlers. This time it was different, however. First, confidence and experience provided strength. Jacques de Meulles, the Intendant of New France in 1683 wrote, “They [Iroquois] have two thousand six hundred good soldiers, and are well seasoned for war. But our youth is hardened and quite used to the woods.” He added, “Besides, we make war better than they do.”<sup>29</sup> Second, a core of regulars chose to remain in Canada.<sup>30</sup> The benefit was enormous. It provided a nucleus of military experience, which when added to exposure and knowledge of the Native way of war created unrivaled irregular fighters for *la petite guerre*.

This capability was increasingly demonstrated, much to the misery of the English and to some degree their Iroquois allies to the south. Raids against the English in Hudson’s Bay in 1686, the Seneca in New York in 1687, the Iroquois in 1693 and 1696, and a number of devastating strikes against English settlements such as Casco, Deersfield, Haverhill, Salmon Falls and Schenectady during a succession of wars from 1688 to 1748 refined the French Canadian practice of *la petite guerre*.<sup>31</sup>



The destruction of Schenectady.

LAC, C-6007.

Many French and Canadian leaders, particularly those with extended exposure to the North American manner of war, or those born and raised in Canada, came to believe that the optimum war fighting strategy was achieved by a mixed force that included the military strengths of regulars (e.g. courage, discipline, tactical acumen) with those of the volunteers and Natives (e.g. endurance, familiarity with wilderness navigation and travel, marksmanship) who relied more on initiative, independent action and small unit tactics than on rigid military practices and drills. In simple terms, the Native way of war.

The Native way of war was fundamental to the practice of *la petite guerre* in North America.<sup>32</sup> It was distinctly and diametrically opposed to the conventions of warfare at the time. It was conducted in stark contrast to the European emphasis on mass, rigid discipline and volley fire. Conversely, it placed great reliance on guile, stealth, the use of cover and especially marksmanship.<sup>33</sup> “So stealthy in their approach, so swift in their execution, and so expeditious in their retreat that one commonly learns of their [Natives] departure before being aware of their arrival,” a Jesuit observed.<sup>34</sup>

Colonel Henry Bouquet, a recognized expert at the time on light infantry tactics and Native fighting, concluded that Native warriors were “physically active, fierce in manner, skillful in the use of weapons, and capable of great guile and stealth in combat.” He considered them formidable opponents. “Indian tactics in battle,” Bouquet explained, “could be reduced to three principles: surround the enemy, fight in scattered formation, and always give ground when attacked.”<sup>35</sup> Colonel Isaac Barre, another officer who served in colonial North America, felt that the Natives were as enemies “the most subtle and the most formidable of any people upon the face of God’s earth.”<sup>36</sup>

The Native manner of warfare also took full advantage of the Natives’ innate mobility and knowledge of the terrain and forests. “The woods,” wrote Jesuit missionary Pierre Roubaud, “are the element of the Savages; they run through them with the swiftness of a deer.”<sup>37</sup> They used cover to its fullest benefit, deliberately choosing not to make themselves an obvious target. According to the Natives themselves, they gained great advantage because they “always took care in their marches and fights not to come too thick together; but the English always kept in a heap together [so] that it was as easy to hit them, as to hit a house.”<sup>38</sup> Similarly, prisoners released from native capture reported that “their [Native] young men from their past

observations express no very respectable opinion of our manner of fighting them, as, by our close order, we present a large object to their fire, and our platoons do little execution as the Natives are thinly scattered, and concealed behind bushes or trees.”<sup>39</sup>

The effectiveness of their method was clearly evident. “In all the time,” one lucky survivor of Major-General Edward Braddock’s defeated force at the Monongahela in 1755, recounted, “I never saw one nor could I on Enquiry find anyone who saw ten [Natives] together.” He added, “If we saw five or six at one time [it] was a great sight.”<sup>40</sup> Another soldier at the same battle reported, “The Indians ... kept an incessant fire on the Guns & killed y<sup>e</sup> Men very fast. These Natives from their irregular method of fighting by running from one place to another obliges us to wheel from right to left, to desert y<sup>e</sup> Guns and then hastily to return & cover them.”<sup>41</sup> Years later, during a small skirmish, an English captain conceded, “It is estimated that though they [Natives] were but five, they killed about 20, not counting the wounded.”<sup>42</sup>

Much of this success derived from the emphasis placed on achieving tactical surprise, mobility and, equally important, on marksmanship. Some contemporary writers felt that it was the unerring fire of the Natives that made them such a threat.<sup>43</sup> Although initially their proficiency with weapons was superior on the whole to that of the Europeans, very soon the colonists, particularly those who engaged in war, became equally adept. As a point of principle, they aimed at single targets, specifically at officers who were easy to identify by their dress and position on the battlefield.<sup>44</sup>

The Canadians very ably practiced the Native way of war and adopted many of the cultural and philosophical aspects as well. In fact, during the contest for North America between the French and the English the practice of the Native way of war, or *la petite guerre*, was associated as much with the Canadians as it was with the Natives. The English often referred to their opponents as “...our cruel and crafty enemy the French...”<sup>45</sup> One participant conceded to his diary, “I can’t but take notice of y<sup>e</sup> cruel nature of our Indians, I look on’m not a whitt better than y<sup>e</sup> Canadians.”<sup>46</sup> One American summed up the sentiment of many when he wrote, “Canadians delight in blood; and in barbarity exceeding if possible, the very savages themselves.”<sup>47</sup>

The skill and effectiveness of the Canadians was also recognized. British Major-General James Wolfe felt, “Every man in Canada is a soldier.”<sup>48</sup> Other contemporary



English accounts echoed with the lament that the Canadian woodsmen and *coureur de bois* “are well known to be the most dangerous enemy of any ...reckoned equal, if not superior in that part of the world to veteran troops.”<sup>49</sup> Even the French regulars, who despised the Canadians and Natives, had to concede that they contributed distinct skills and capabilities to campaigns. “God knows,” Colonel Louis Antoine de Bougainville wrote, “we do not wish to disparage the value of the Canadians...In the woods, behind trees, no troops are comparable to the natives of this country.”<sup>50</sup> The official journals kept by Major-General Louis-Joseph de Montcalm’s Army also revealed, “The Canadians ...certainly surpass all the troops in the universe, owing to their skill as marksman.”<sup>51</sup>

The Canadian’s distinct North American manner of fighting should not be surprising, however. It was borne from harsh reality and bitter experience. Furthermore, it suited their circumstances, their resources, their alliances, and their temperament. Moreover, the Canadian strategy and method of warfare continually proved itself both efficient and effective. It bestowed on New France greater influence and power than its actual military strength would warrant. This strength was once again demonstrated on 9 July 1755. Faced by the imminent attack of a much larger English force, the Commander of Fort Duquesne in the distant Ohio Valley decided to practice the methodology of *la petite guerre* in an effort to pre-empt the strike against him. With a force of 36 officers and cadets, 72 colonial regulars, 146 Canadian militia and 637 Natives, Captain de Beaujeu, a colonial officer of *Les Troupes de la Marine*, engaged approximately 1,200 British regulars and 800 provincials.<sup>52</sup> Although Beaujeu was killed in the opening moments of the battle, his force inflicted a crushing defeat on the English that seemed to exemplify the effectiveness of the Canadian way of war.

It also proved to be a fatal lesson on warfare in North America for Major-General Braddock. His forty-five years of service had, predictably, endowed him with a deep-rooted comprehension of warfare that was reinforced by his own experience. He accepted as truth that the more disciplined and well-drilled force would normally emerge victorious. In fact, Benjamin Franklin, writing fifteen years after the event, recorded that Braddock dismissed the threat posed by irregular troops or Natives. “These savages may, indeed, be a formidable enemy to your raw American militia,” Braddock declared, according to Franklin’s writing, “but upon the King’s regulars, it is impossible they should make any impression.”<sup>53</sup>



He was, it turned out, sadly mistaken. Lieutenant William Dunbar recounted the harrowing slaughter of Braddock's forces. "We had not marched above 800 yards from the River," he wrote, "when we were alarmed by the Indian Hollow [battle cry], & in an instant, found ourselves attacked on all sides, their methods, they immediately seize a Tree, & are certain of their Aim, so that before the Genl [General] came to our assistance, most of our advanced Party were laid sprawling on the ground." Dunbar revealed:

*Our Men unaccustomed to that way of fighting, were quite confounded, & behaved like Poltrons, nor could the examples, nor the Intreaties of their officers prevail with them, to do any one what was ordered. This they denied them, when we begged of them not to throw away their fire, but to follow us with fixed Bayonets, to drive them from the hill & trees, they never minded us, but threw their fire away in the most confused manner, some in the air, others in the ground, & a great many destroyed their own Men & officers. When the General came up to our assistance, men were seized with the same Pannic, & went into as much disorder, some Part of them being 20 deep. The officers in order to remedy this, advanced into the front, & soon became the mark of the Enemy, who scarce left one that was not killed or wounded.<sup>54</sup>*

Another British officer conceded, "By the particular disposition of the French and Indians it was impossible to judge of the numbers they had in the field that day."<sup>55</sup>

Conversely, the French forces had excellent fields of observation and fire. From their covered positions they stealthily advanced very close and observed that the British ranks reloaded to ordered drumbeats and orders. Therefore, they carefully sniped the officers and drummers creating even greater confusion and panic. They then continued to pour an unrelenting fire that mercilessly cut swaths into the British ranks.

Braddock's failure, or inability, to adjust his European mode of combat resulted in the destruction of his Army. In the end, Braddock's courage and steadfast belief that inevitably the undisciplined, motley opponents that faced his troops would break, combined with the training and discipline of his regulars to stand their ground regardless of the chaos that engulfed them, led to their ruin. Once ambushed, the closely packed troops were impossible to miss and they suffered horrendous casualties. Ironically, the provincials, particularly the Virginians, immediately

Braddock's defeat, 9 July 1755.



From James Grant, *British Battles on Land and Sea* (London: Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1899)

sought cover and began to return fire against their phantom antagonists. Their actions provided some hope of staving off defeat. However, Braddock, incensed at this lack of courage and discipline, ordered them back into line using both oaths and the flat of his saber.<sup>56</sup> It was for naught.

The contrast in dialectic between the European and Native way of war was never sharper. Tom Faucett, a bitter veteran who served with the Provincials, scathingly reminisced, “We was cowards, was we, because we knowed better than to fight Injuns like you red-backed ijits across the ocean is used to fight: because we wouldn’t stand up rubbin’ shoulders like a passel o’ sheep and let the red-skins made sieves outen us!”<sup>57</sup>

Consequently, despite the exhortations of the officers and the discipline of the regulars, as the ranks were continually thinned by a steady and deadly fire, from an antagonist that could not be seen, the regulars lost their steadiness and eventually succumbed to an uncontrollable panic. “And when we endeavored to rally them,” George Washington, then a young officer assigned to Braddock’s staff, recounted, “it was with as much success as if we had attempted to stop the wild bears of the mountains.”<sup>58</sup> The cost of the debacle was enormous. The French lost approximately five per cent of their engaged force. The British lost seventy per cent of theirs, including sixty out of eighty-six officers.<sup>59</sup>

Although the British regulars on the whole were slow to appreciate the wilderness tactics, the victory over Braddock, in the eyes of the French and Canadians, seemed to underscore the superiority of their manner of combat. They also had a pragmatic reason to support it: they were economically and numerically inferior to the British in regular military forces, civilian population, and material wealth and resources. This stunning victory by such a small irregular force against a much larger regular army at a great distance from home and at such low cost, validated the practice of *la petite guerre*.

Not surprisingly, this latest success reinforced the Governor of New France’s, Canadian born Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil’s, belief in the Canadian way of war. He continued the traditional policy, a series of fortifications on the frontiers of the colony to control access to waterways leading into New France. As mentioned, these strategically positioned forts were symbols of power, as well as economic centres and, more importantly, they were imposing barriers that provided a buffer



between hostile territory and the French settlements. Their strategic locations allowed a relatively small force to be capable of delaying, or stopping altogether, a much larger and stronger antagonist. In addition, these wilderness sentinels also forced would be invaders to lengthen their lines of communication and supply and, thus, expose themselves to constant attack by irregulars.

They were also key to Vaudreuil's strategy of pre-emption and terror by acting as springboards for offensive action.<sup>60</sup> Although many French officers felt that Vaudreuil and the rest of the Canadians believed that the English would not dare, or at least were incapable of, conducting operations against New France, they failed to realize that the Governor did not base his perception on hope. He clearly understood the hard earned lesson, rooted in generations of struggle, that an opponent who is focussed on defending his home is less apt and less able to conduct mischief elsewhere.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, Vaudreuil knew that he could mobilize a series of devastating raids faster than the English could organize an invasion.

As such, the fortifications located at strategic points on the fringes of French territory were key.<sup>62</sup> They were important economic, political and social centres that cemented Native alliances. Equally significant, they also acted as staging posts for offensive strikes deep into the territory of their enemies. The forts allowed for forward defence, namely, a fight away policy. From these bastions, raiding parties could be sent to devastate the New England frontier and strike terror in the hearts and minds of their antagonists. "It was from this place [Fort Saint-Frédéric]," wrote Major-General William Shirley, a former commander-in-chief of British forces in North America:

*that all those parties which during the late war ravaged and laid waste to many towns and settlements upon the Frontiers of New York and the Massachusetts Bay were fitted out; and so great was the influence which the French had over the Five Nations of Natives by means of this fort, so great were their apprehensions of the mischief, which it was in the power of the French to do them, that it was not till late in the war and not even without great difficulty and still greater expense that they were prevailed upon to take up the Hatchet.*<sup>63</sup>

Major-General Jeffery Amherst concurred with the assessment of the importance of the French fortifications. Upon hearing of the capture of Fort Niagara, he wrote, "His Majesty's subjects on the Mohawk River will be thereby as effectually freed

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from all inroads and scalping parties of the enemy as I may say the whole country ... is by the reduction of [Fort] Ticonderoga....”<sup>64</sup>

Notably, in keeping with the theory of *la petite guerre*, the savage tactical manner of warfare that the Canadians and Natives practiced against their enemies from these strategic positions was not intended to seize strategic points or terrain. The objective was not to capture territory or destroy the enemy’s army. Rather, it was intended to terrorize the enemy population into seeking peace as the only alternative, as well as to disrupt and pre-empt the abilities of the English to invade or strike at New France. It was a cost effective strategy to maintain the balance of power in North America and protect the French settlements from the ravages of war.



Pierre Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil, Governor of New France.

It was a strategy that was born from a relative position of weakness. However, the weakness was mitigated by the clever, as well as ruthless, manner of fighting. As such, raids were central to the Canadian way of war. “Nothing,” Vaudreuil wrote, “is more calculated to discourage the people of these [English] colonies and make them wish for the return to peace.”<sup>65</sup> The Canadians and Natives earned a reputation for barbarity and savageness. The English targeted Vaudreuil himself as the architect of their wanton violence.<sup>66</sup> Regardless, the Governor’s strategy was entirely effective.

The deep strikes into English territory during the Seven Year’s War consistently disrupted British campaign plans and kept them on the defensive from the summer of 1755 until 1758. Moreover, they ravaged frontier settlements, economies and public morale. “We are under the utmost fear and consternation,” one English colonist complained, “upon accounts of the Natives having again began their murders and massacres in the province of Pennsylvania, upon the River Delaware adjoining to this province...These fresh depredations have so terrified us that we dare not go out to our daily labour, for fear of being surprized and murdered by the Indians.”<sup>67</sup> Similarly, an English officer angrily decried, “nothing is to be seen but desolation and murder, heightened with every barbarous circumstance, and new instances of cruelty – They [Natives], at the instigation of the French with them, burn up the plantations, the smoke of which darkens the day and hides the mountains from our sight.”<sup>68</sup> These laments were widespread.

As distasteful as it was, it was a strategy that was carried out year round, and one that was both inexpensive and extremely successful. It was clearly an economy of effort. Small parties of Canadians and Natives, who demonstrated a distaste for the European manner of war, could in their own manner make an effective contribution to the war effort.<sup>69</sup> The raids terrorized the frontier and tied down large numbers of troops for rear security. The plight of the English colonists could not be ignored by their political leaders. The incursions into Virginia alone caused the governor there to raise 10 militia companies, a total of 1,000 men, for internal defence. Similarly, Pennsylvania raised 1,500 provincial troops and built a string of forts extending from New Jersey to Maryland in an attempt to try and impede the raiders.<sup>70</sup>

Moreover, the English militiamen were reluctant to undertake campaigns when they felt their families were at risk. The destruction of settlements, farms and livestock, as well as the murder or capture of settlers, ate away at the economy of the English colonies. Crops could not be sown or harvested. Grains could not be stored

for the winter, or be used to feed the army on campaign. These circumstances created privations for both soldier and citizen alike. The impact on the frontier was quite simply devastating.<sup>71</sup> Although an effective strategy for the out-numbered French, it was only successful as a delaying action. It did not, as Vaudreuil had hoped, bring the English to the peace table.

Nonetheless, of great importance, raiding was effective and more importantly relatively cheap. It required limited resources. Small parties of tactically competent warriors, led by French or Canadian officers and consisting of Natives and militia skilled in the Native way of war could wreak havoc far in excess of their size and tie up considerably larger enemy forces committed to protecting settlements from enemy incursions. But, much like the early Canadian experience, to surrender the initiative and remain on the defensive is inefficient and condemns a people to suffer war as it is near impossible to protect everyone, everywhere, all the time. “What can one do against invisible enemies who strike and flee with the rapidity of light?” Bougainville questioned rhetorically. “It is,” he asserted, “the destroying angel.”<sup>72</sup> Critical for the Canadians, they could choose when and where to strike, thus, tying down large enemy forces while still ensuring that their manpower was present during the critical fall harvesting period.<sup>73</sup>

Equally important to Vaudreuil’s, or the entire Canadian strategy, was strong alliances with the various Native tribes. This realization permeated the Canadian philosophy from the beginning. Social and economic ties were instrumental in ensuring the survival and growth of New France.<sup>74</sup> As early as 1667, the French secretary of state for the colonies, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, instructed the Intendant of New France, “You must try to draw these [Native] peoples, and especially those who have embraced Christianity, into the neighborhood of our settlements and, if possible, intermingle them there so that, with the passage of time, having but one law and the same master [King] they will form thereby a single people of the same blood.”<sup>75</sup> This attitude, bolstered by the large number of *coureur de bois* and soldiers serving at frontier outposts intermingling and often living with the Natives, fostered an acceptance and tolerance to the Natives and their culture that did not exist between the English and the Amerindians.

Quite simply, a reliance on alliances was a cornerstone for New France’s long term policy and survival. Its small population base put them at a distinct disadvantage. With a population of only 60,000, New France faced the danger of being engulfed

by its larger neighbor to the south, namely the English colonies that numbered approximately 1,500,000.<sup>76</sup> As such, the Native alliance represented an effective means of making up manpower. Moreover, they were proficient practitioners of *la petite guerre*, expert bush fighters that were at home in the wilderness and knew its myriad of trails and waterways.

For the French and Canadians, the Natives became a vital source of strength. In 1710, mission Natives alone could provide the French with 600 skilled warriors.<sup>77</sup> Forty years later, the number of warriors in tribes North of the Ohio River friendly to the French numbered approximately 16,000.<sup>78</sup> This pool of manpower provided Vaudreuil, who fully appreciated how terrified the English were of the Natives, with a powerful weapon to keep the English off balance and on the defensive. When conflict loomed, Vaudreuil never failed to unleash raiding parties that were always readily available because of the historical alliances, the provision of presents and supplies, as well as the promise of plunder.

Remarkably, through this strategy and methodology of warfare, the French and Canadians were able to maintain a balance of power and influence greater than their military or economic power should have warranted.<sup>79</sup> Their distinct approach to war differed dramatically from the accepted European model. The influx of a relatively large number of French regular soldiers as a result of the commencement of the Seven Years War, and the eventual arrival of Major-General Montcalm in 1756, as the Field Commander of French forces in North America, exacerbated the clash in cultures.<sup>80</sup>

Although Major-General Montcalm was subordinate to Governor Vaudreuil, his contempt for the Governor, the Canadians, the Natives and the Canadian way of war was very pronounced.<sup>81</sup> It was also shared by his French officers. Montcalm known as a vain, opinionated and stubborn officer with a quick temper, believed that the Canadians were an undisciplined rabble of little to no military value who had an inflated opinion of themselves. “The Canadians thought they were making war,” he quipped, “when they went on raids resembling hunting parties.”<sup>82</sup> Bougainville’s disdain for the Canadian approach is also clearly discernable in his journal where he observed, “To leave Montreal with a party, to go through the woods, to take a few scalps, to return at full speed once the blow was struck, that is what they called war.”<sup>83</sup>



Montcalm and his officers neither hid their prejudices, nor did they conceal their criticisms of Vaudreuil's strategy and method of war fighting. Quite simply, the Canadian way of war was anathema to them, particularly Montcalm. His predisposition to the European model of warfare caused him to often complain of the "petty means" and "petty ideas." He contemptuously discounted the value of taking "a few scalps and burning a few houses." Montcalm quickly discerned that the Canadian method of warfare could not inflict a lasting defeat on the English. He was convinced that against British regulars the only hope lay in a static defence. He believed that the dispersion of scarce manpower among the western outposts was perilous. As such, Montcalm was adamant that the only hope of saving New France was to concentrate as much force as possible at the critical point, at Quebec.<sup>84</sup>

This divergence of ideas could not have been greater. These differing views on strategy was exacerbated by the petty jealousy over authority and the desire for recognition and reward. Perhaps it also entailed a touch of national jealousy and disdain: Vaudreuil was Canadian born, Montcalm was French. Vaudreuil by virtue of his position was the senior appointment. As such, he maintained his strategy of extended defensive lines and he was intent on "contesting the ground on our frontiers inch by inch with the enemy."<sup>85</sup> Vaudreuil relied on the ingrained lesson learned that offensive was the only practical defense for New France. "The Marquis de Montcalm," an exasperated Vaudreuil wrote in September 1758, "is not ignorant that superiority of numbers being on their side, I dare not promise myself any success unless I can surprise them by an attack in the inclement season."<sup>86</sup>

Vaudreuil's approach was logical. It had also proven to be a successful in the past. In addition, the traditional policy allowed him to utilize to the best advantage the varied troops at his disposal. For as he claimed, the Canadians and colonial troops of La Marine "knew how to make bloody war on the British, while Montcalm's French Regulars fought in too gentle a manner."<sup>87</sup> In addition, in what would become a recurring theme in Canadian history, Vaudreuil also informed Paris that the Canadians and the savages did not operate with the same confidence under the command of officers of the French regular army as they did under the control of their own Canadian officers.<sup>88</sup>

Fatefully, the struggle between the two rival leaders and their oppositional philosophies, if not cultures, took a fateful turn. Montcalm's stunning victory at Fort Ticonderoga on 8 July 1758 became a catalyst for dramatic change. Outnumbered

almost four to one, with only 3,600 troops, primarily French regulars, Montcalm routed Major-General James Abercrombie's British Army of 6,000 regulars and 9,000 provincials, the largest force ever assembled in North America to date.<sup>89</sup> "This brilliant victory," a jubilant Brigadier-General François-Gaston Chevalier de Lévis wrote, "saved Canada."<sup>90</sup> Once again, any English hope of launching an invasion against New France was thwarted in the distant backwaters of the wilderness.



Courtesy Fort Ticonderoga Museum.

### Victory at Ticonderoga, 8 July 1758.

Montcalm used his latest victory, one that was achieved without the assistance of Canadians or Natives, to make his point that a concentration of force in the heart of the colony was the best strategy to defeat the British. His representations to Paris carried by letter and an envoy (Bougainville) in the Autumn of 1758, bore fruit. The French Government was in disarray and already skeptical of the regime in New France.<sup>91</sup> Not surprisingly, after such a convincing victory at Ticonderoga, Montcalm was promoted to lieutenant-general, a grade that out-ranked that of a colonial governor. As a result, Montcalm was given the command of all military forces in Canada. More importantly, Montcalm's strategy was accepted. The Ministers of War and the Marine hoped for an encore performance of Ticonderoga, but this time at the gates of Quebec.<sup>92</sup>

And so, when the British resumed their offensive in 1759, the French frontier forts pulled back as they came under pressure. Montcalm now achieved his desire and he concentrated his forces in Quebec. In addition, to alleviate his manpower crisis he also drafted colonial troops and the fittest of the Canadian militia into his line battalions.<sup>93</sup> As far as Montcalm was concerned, war would now be fought as he knew it in Europe.

In the early morning hours of 13 September 1759, Montcalm was given his wish. Wolfe had managed a surprise landing at l'Anse au Foulon and mere hours later had approximately 4,500 troops on the Plains of Abraham just outside the fortified walls of Quebec. Montcalm rashly rushed those troops immediately available to him out onto the plain, fearing, incorrectly, that any delay would only serve to strengthen the British. The French deployed towards the British lines, and once within range began to fire volleys. However, the deployment became ragged as Canadians recently drafted into the Regular ranks, with little training and a stronger inbred experience with their own way of war, threw themselves to the ground to reload. Others, bolted for the cover of trees to join other Canadians who had been kept as irregulars to snipe from the flanks. The Canadians used to swell the ranks of the regulars, Captain Pouchot complained, are "only suited to *petite-guerre*... [and they] were a hindrance to the operation." He explained that their "little experience of European tactics," notably the British volley, "shook the nerve of the Canadians, who had little experience of being under fire without cover [and] they broke ranks & fled."<sup>94</sup> Needless to say, these actions caused disarray and confusion in the French ranks.<sup>95</sup> And if the deadly British volley had not been enough, the subsequent battle-cry and sight of British regulars with gleaming bayonets and kilted Scotsmen with Claymores, turned confusion into utter panic as the French streamed from the battlefield hotly pursued by the British.

Ironically, it was the very troops, the Canadians, who were chastised for their "cowardice" and failure to maintain formation during the initial confrontation that now saved the French regulars from complete annihilation. Fighting as they had always practiced, from behind cover as irregular fighters, their courage and marksmanship came to the fore. Their galling fire, necessitated that the British redirect their focus to clear the woods of the Canadians. This action relieved pressure for the escape of Montcalm's regulars, albeit at great cost in Canadian blood.<sup>96</sup>



The British charge at the Plains of Abraham, 13 September 1759.

LAC, C-20756.



Despite the Canadian efforts, the battle, if not the contest in North America, had already been determined. By the following spring, the remaining French forces in North America were defeated and control of Canada fell to the British.

Would a continuation of Vaudreuil's strategy of *la petite guerre* have made a difference? Quite simply, no. Although an effective strategy for generations and one that maintained the balance of power in North America, by 1758, it was only a matter of time. The British, under the stewardship of William Pitt, the Secretary of State, had decided to make the contest in North America their primary focus. As a result, as opposed to the French, they now made the necessary resources available.<sup>97</sup> The Royal Navy controlled the seas, as well as the St. Lawrence River, and the British Regular Army was assembled in numbers hitherto unheard of in North America.<sup>98</sup> No amount of raids or pre-emptive strikes could hold off the avalanche of force that was arrayed against Canada on so many fronts.

The outcome of the contest should not detract from the Canadian experience that was etched through generations of conflict and toil. Major-General Amherst later wrote, "the Canadians are a hardy race of people and have been accustomed to arms from their infancy ... those people are certainly the properest kind of troops to be employed in an Indian War."<sup>99</sup> Ironically, although now under a different King, many of the same problems that faced New France did not go away. Arguably, not much had changed. Canada was still a distant subordinate colony, a small player in a much larger Empire, engulfed by a southern neighbour that would soon be hostile once again. Not surprisingly, the Canadian way of war would once again become relevant and continue to burn itself into the psyche of Canadians.

Quite simply, Canadians became a product of their experience and circumstances. They were but one small and very junior component of a larger Empire. As such, they could expect only limited assistance. Resources, particularly manpower and defence spending, were always at a premium. Debate over responsibility for defence, specifically British regulars or Canadian Militia, was always a sore point. Militarily Canada was always in a position of relative weakness. As a result, military operations had to be limited. In essence they were largely tactical, most often attempting to capitalize on economy of effort and alliances to achieve an influence greater than Canada's military, economic or political strength would normally allow. In many ways, for decades *la petite guerre* allowed the Canadians to gain a strategic end by a tactical means. Those principles that served New France so well would continue to resonate throughout the Canadian military experience.



# PREFACE TO CHAPTER 2



Chapter 2 is an important background reading because it provides insight into both the relationship between the Europeans and the indigenous people, as well as the difference in their war fighting philosophies. Both the French and English experienced somewhat strained relations with the Natives. The French, due largely to the French Canadians, maintained closer more amicable relations with the Natives than did the English. Nevertheless, both French and English continually criticized and castigated their erstwhile allies. Yet, both sides worked very hard at winning the Natives over, or as a minimum, keeping them neutral. As such, this chapter explores the relationships, as well as the strategical importance of the Natives as allies.







# CHAPTER 2

## QUESTIONABLE ALLIANCE: THE NATIVES AS ALLIES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR NORTH AMERICA, 1754-1760<sup>100</sup>



The morning stillness was suddenly shattered by the crack of a musket being fired. The British officer, mounted on his horse looked down at the round blackened hole in his tunic. The scarlet of his uniform was turning a dark crimson red at an ever-expanding rate. As if on cue, as the officer fell dead from his horse, the musket fire from the trees now picked up and more men fell. The British soldiers, although somewhat bewildered formed platoons to respond with volley fire of their own. The volleys were fired blind, however, because no one could discern the phantoms that were decimating the British ranks seemingly at will.

Dead and dying bodies littered the ground. Dense clouds of smoke hung in the forest clearing. The small French party and their Native allies soon sensed victory. Gliding from cover to cover and well hidden by trees and brush, they continued to pour fire into the English. It soon became too much. Deprived of their officers who had largely been killed by the accurate fire of their opponents, the British soldiers became paralyzed by fear. The piercing war cries of the savages soon pushed them to panic.

Incredibly, a small French force of 254 colonial troops and Canadian Militia, supported by approximately 600 Natives routed the British force of over 2,000 soldiers, many of which were regulars. Within a few short hours, the British commander, Major-General Edward Braddock, was mortally wounded and his Army in complete disarray. Those not killed or mutilated by the Natives stampeded to the rear abandoning all of their equipment, as well as their wounded colleagues.

The wounding of Braddock.



“The wounding of Braddock,” by Robert Griffing, Paramount Press.

This early morning 9 July 1755 battle on the Monongahela River had dramatic consequences for the British. In the eyes of the Natives, it reinforced the perception of British ineptness and pushed any Natives who were wavering in regards to their loyalty to the French cause. It also reinforced a myth of Native strength and martial prowess. After all, a small force of largely irregulars and “savages” had soundly defeated a significantly larger British force composed of predominately regular troops.

This episode was not the first exposure to the Native way of war in the forests of North America for either the English or French. Over time, both European colonizing powers developed a begrudging recognition, if not fear, of the Native way of war. In fact, the conventional wisdom held by those familiar with combat in the wilderness of the New World, dictated that the support of the Natives, who were masters of hit-and-run warfare, was instrumental to success. The Native knowledge of the terrain, their ability to navigate through the dense forests, as well as their guile and tactical ability made them formidable warriors. Nonetheless, both the English and the French loathed them and complained bitterly about their Native allies. After all, the Natives proved to be fiercely independent, devious and atrociously unreliable. Yet, paradoxically, both the English and the French competed fiercely to gain their cooperation, or at a minimum their neutrality. Faced with this set of circumstances, the question must be asked, exactly how significant was the contribution of the Natives in the struggle for North America?

Braddock’s crushing defeat at the Monongahela River is an appropriate departure point for this discussion. Major-General Braddock, chosen by the Duke of Cumberland for this particular campaign because of his “courage and military discipline,”<sup>101</sup> set out with a force of approximately 1,200 regulars and 800 provincials, to capture Fort Duquesne, a strategic western outpost held by the French. Braddock was extremely confident that his force of regulars could easily accomplish the task. Despite the protests of the resident British Native Agent, George Croghan, as well as the admonitions of George Washington, Braddock’s aide de camp, the General did not seek counsel of the Native chiefs loyal to the British Crown. “We have a General most judiciously chosen for being disqualified for the service he is employed in, in almost every respect,” William Shirley, Braddock’s secretary, wrote, “I am not greatly acquainted myself with Indian Affairs, tho’ enough to see that better measures with regard to ‘em might and ought to have been taken, at least to the Southwd.”<sup>102</sup>

In the end, Braddock was convinced that the more disciplined and well-drilled force would emerge victorious. Although Braddock did meet with a Native delegation loyal to the Crown and received their assurances of support for the campaign, most departed with their gifts and never returned. His haughty manner and failure to elicit their participation or counsel in planning the campaign seemed to alienate his erstwhile allies. When Braddock actually marched on Fort Duquesne, he had only eight Native warriors with him.<sup>103</sup>

When battle was entered on the early morning of 9 July, the contrast between the European and North American manners of warfare had never been starker. Braddock's steadfast belief that inevitably the ill-disciplined, motley opponent that faced his well trained and disciplined regular troops would break, led to his ruin. Once ambushed, the closely packed troops were impossible to miss and they suffered horrendous casualties.

Lieutenant William Dunbar lamented, "Our Men unaccustomed to that way of fighting, were quite confounded, & behaved like Poltrons."<sup>104</sup> Dunbar was not alone in his frustration. George Washington recounted, "And when we endeavoured to rally them, it was with as much success as if we had attempted to stop the wild bears of the mountains."<sup>105</sup> Washington later wrote his brother, "We have been most scandalously beaten by a trifling body of men."<sup>106</sup>

Washington's choice of words, or more aptly the nuance, however, was misplaced. The "trifling body of men," although not overwhelming in numbers, were skilled combatants and exacted a heavy toll. The scale of the debacle was enormous. The French lost approximately five per cent of their engaged force. The British lost seventy per cent of theirs, including sixty out of eighty-six officers.<sup>107</sup> Arguably, the deciding factor in the engagement was the presence of a large Native contingent assisting the French. "I am of the opinion that had we had fifty Natives instead of eight," George Croghan lamented, "that we might in a great measure have prevented the surprise, that day of our unhappy defeat."<sup>108</sup>

The fact that the French force was predominately Native is not overly surprising. The Natives in fact had a preference towards the French. A key pillar of the French Canadian strategy was strong alliances with the various Native tribes. This realization permeated the Canadian philosophy from the beginning. Social and economic ties were instrumental in ensuring the survival and growth of New France.



In fact, from the start, the large number of *coureur de bois* and soldiers who served at frontier outposts lived closely with the Natives. This proximity fostered an acceptance and tolerance to the Natives and their culture. This acceptance did not exist between the English and the Natives. Rather, the English tended to look down on the Natives. One scholar noted that the English “paid no heed to Indian laws or customs or traditions; and ruthlessly imposed their own laws, customs, and religious ideas with no apparent thought of their intolerance and injustice. They mostly looked upon the Indians as heathen.”<sup>109</sup>

For their part, the Natives were impressed with French military prowess and capability. “Look about you and see!” exclaimed a Native chief to an English officer:

*You have no fortifications; no, not even in Quider [Albany]. It is but a step from Canada hither, and the French may come and turn you out of doors... Look at the French; they are men! They are fortifying everywhere. But you are all like women, bare and open, without fortifications!*<sup>110</sup>


The latest catastrophic defeat for the English simply reinforced Native perceptions. In fact, Native activity and boldness of attacks increased dramatically in the aftermath of Braddock’s crushing defeat.<sup>111</sup>

The question nonetheless remains: if the Natives were so instrumental to success why were they consistently castigated by their White allies? One reason is the cultural and philosophical divergence in the comprehension of how war should be waged. The Native way of war was in complete contrast to the European emphasis on mass, rigid discipline and volley fire. Conversely, the Natives placed great reliance on guile, stealth, the use of cover and especially marksmanship. To the Europeans, this behaviour was ghastly – regulars found it cowardly and reprehensible, wholly without honour.

For example, Edward Abbot, a Lieutenant-Governor of Vincennes during the colonial period remarked, “It is not people in army’s that Indians will ever daringly attack; but the poor inoffensive families...who are inhumanely butchered sparing neither woman or children.”<sup>112</sup> The memoirs of one French soldier revealed, “Of them [Iroquois] it has been said, they came like foxes, attacked like hares, and fled like birds.”<sup>113</sup> Jeffrey Amherst, a senior British officer assessed, “The cowardice of these barbarians is so great & their little arts in war so easily prevented from taking place, that it is astonishing they should ever have had an advantage over us, as

## PART I - BACKGROUND READINGS

in Mr. Braddock's affair." He added, "Their whole dependence is upon a tree or a bush. You have nothing to do but to advance, & they will fly. They never stand an open fire or an attack."<sup>114</sup> Colonel Henry Bouquet agreed. "You may be sure that all the Indians on the continent would not dare to attack you in earnest." He insisted, "Surprise is their only shift, and that will always fail with you."<sup>115</sup> A Jesuit missionary concluded, "None are more courageous when no resistance is offered them, and none are more cowardly when they encounter opposition."<sup>116</sup>



Courtesy The Old Guard.

**Mohawk warrior.**



The consistency of the commentary does not necessarily reinforce its validity. What it does, however, is clearly demonstrate the lack of understanding, as well as the deep chasm that existed, between the European comprehension of war and that of the Natives. It was this cultural and philosophical component that proved to be an irritant for both sides. “Instead of stealing upon each other, and taking every advantage to kill the enemy and save their own people, as we do,” a Native veteran explained, “they [Whites] marched out, in open daylight, and fight, regardless of the number of warriors they may lose!” He added, “After the battle is over, they retire to feast, and drink wine, as if nothing had happened.”<sup>117</sup>

From the Native perspective, the quintessential victory was that which was won with the minimalist of casualties. Once this victory was achieved, and the individual warriors had gained proof of their martial prowess through prisoners, scalps or plunder, which also carried a significant economic benefit, the Natives were satisfied to end the campaign lest they push their luck.<sup>118</sup> Furthermore, they saw themselves as allies and not as levies. Therefore, if they felt a plan or maneuver was ill-advised they simply chose not to participate. For the Native warriors “taking up the hatchet” or more simply put, going to war, was largely a personal endeavor. It was meant to prove a warrior’s courage and skill and to obtain prestige through achievement in combat.

In essence, the individual warrior was subordinate to no other. The Natives saw neither shame nor dishonour in abandoning the field if the odds of easy success were against them.<sup>119</sup> Moreover, if individuals tired of the campaign or simply failed to support a plan of action, their peers seldom condemned their departure.<sup>120</sup> They were not interested in a fair fight, but only one in which they could achieve their aims with a minimum of casualties. Ambush, raids and terror were the preferred methods of conducting war. In short, the Natives practiced what the Europeans contemptuously called the “skulking way of war.”<sup>121</sup>

Notably, the Natives did not see it as that and some were able to recognize this gap. “The art of war,” Tecaughretanego, a Kahnawake chief, declared, “consists in ambushing and surprising our enemies, and in preventing them from ambushing and surprising us.”<sup>122</sup> Similarly, Jesuit Missionary Father Nau, observed that “Their mode of warfare is but stratagem and surprise.”<sup>123</sup> Abbe H.R. Casgrain, the prominent nineteenth century French Canadian chronicler of the Seven Years War, explained that “For them, withdrawal was not a flight, nor a disgrace, it was a means of falling back to occupy a better position.”<sup>124</sup>



LAC, C-3163.

Iroquois Warrior.

Moreover, the Native definition of success diverged dramatically from that of the Europeans. For the Natives, a victorious campaign was gauged, as already noted, by the accumulation of tangible trophies. The Natives deemed a campaign successful when a victory, regardless of how inconsequential, was won.<sup>125</sup> “Even if there are three hundred of them & they were to take only one or two scalps,” Captain Pouchot complained in his journal, “they would not begin another operation, even were they capable of devastating an entire territory and killing other men.”<sup>126</sup>

This reality consistently vexed the French Commander-in-Chief Lieutenant-General Louis-Joseph de Montcalm. The consistent departure of the Natives after the smallest of victories, Montcalm assessed, ensured that they would never inflict a lasting defeat on the English. The British shared this observation. “I have never heard,” John Campbell Loudoun, the British Commander-in-Chief in North America in 1756, acknowledged, “of any instance of Natives remaining of either side, after they have either lost any people, or got any booty, but have constantly returned home.”<sup>127</sup>

In essence, the European benchmarks of success and victory, as well as acceptable losses were all meaningless to the Natives. The capture of territory, forcing an enemy to abandon a strategic fortification or postponing an opponent’s planned offensive simply did not resonate with the Natives. Furthermore, to the Natives casualties were totally unacceptable. It was only through tangible actions such as the accumulation of prisoners, scalps or plunder, that individual warriors could show their achievement in battle. Additionally, these items were valuable. For instance, in 1747, bounties set by Massachusetts paid out £35 for the scalp of a male Native or Frenchman and £10 for that of a woman. Almost ten years later, in July 1756, De Lévis offered 150 livres for an English scalp upon his arrival at Carillon.<sup>128</sup> Even Braddock himself issued an order that promised a £5 bounty to any member of his expedition who brought a Native scalp into camp.<sup>129</sup> Notably, however, an even higher price was paid for prisoners brought in alive. A male would fetch £40 and a woman or boy under twelve, £25.<sup>130</sup> The French normally paid 30 francs worth of trade goods for a scalp and provided even larger ransoms to buy back English prisoners.<sup>131</sup>

Not surprisingly, with these monetary inducements, there was very little incentive to risk one’s life for strategic gains of a European power, or to fulfill a code of honour that was completely alien to the Native understanding of war. Amazingly, this

perspective was apparently missed by the military commanders who saw Native refusal to participate in attacks or campaigns as a lack of the requisite discipline and courage needed of soldiers. As such, they often wrongly perceived the Natives to be cowards and wholly without honour.

The conflict in cultures went beyond the theoretical understanding and practice of waging war. The Whites also railed critically about the unreliability of, and difficulty in controlling, the Natives. Tribalism, the influence of Sachems, superstition, and personal and band rivalry created tensions between the Europeans and their Native allies. “They gather together in mobs, argue among themselves, deliberate slowly,” Louis-Antoine Comte de Bougainville, a member of Montcalm’s staff, complained. He added:

*Between the resolution made and the action taken there passes considerable time, sometimes one nation stops the march, sometimes another. Everybody must have time to get drunk, and their food consumption is enormous. At last they get started, and once they have struck, have they taken only a single scalp or one prisoner, back they come and are off again for their villages. Each one does well for himself, but the operation of the war suffers.*<sup>132</sup>

Similarly, Brigadier François-Gaston chevalier de Lévis, the Marquis de Montcalm’s second-in-command, criticized to Governor Le Marquis de Vaudreuil in a letter, “Upon leaving, the savages always promised a lot, however, I found that they do not keep their promises.”<sup>133</sup>

European commanders, whether English or French, characterized the Natives as an unwanted burden, if not a nuisance. “They drive us crazy from morning to night,” one senior French officer exclaimed, “There is no end to their demands.” He concluded, “in short one needs the patience of an angel with these devils, and yet one must always force himself to seem pleased with them.”<sup>134</sup> Bougainville bemoaned, “One must be the slave to these savages, listen to them day and night, in council and in private, whenever the fancy takes them, or whenever a dream or a fit of vapors, or their perpetual craving for brandy, gets possession of them; besides which they are always wanting something for their equipment, arms, or toilet.”<sup>135</sup>

In an attempt to not aggrieve the Natives the most wanton outrages were often accepted. One French officer decried the tolerance shown to their Native allies.

“You could see them running throughout Montreal,” he recorded, “knife in hand, threatening and insulting everyone.”<sup>136</sup> Governors of New France, particularly Vaudreuil, were constantly criticized for their leniency towards the Natives. Of seventy-six Natives accused of disorderly conduct, assault, or murder in the Montreal District alone from 1669 to 1760, only one was actually prosecuted. The rest were released without charge. The rationale was simple, albeit unpalatable for the French and Canadians. In essence, the authorities feared that the application of the harsh justice demanded by the French criminal code would alienate the Natives and cause them to defect to their enemies.<sup>137</sup>

The behaviour of the Natives on campaigns was perceived as little better. Montcalm confided to his journal, “[the Natives] feeling the need we have of them, are extremely insolent; they wish our fowls this evening. They took with force some barrels of wine, killed some cattle, and it is necessary to endure all.”<sup>138</sup> French officers claimed that it proved very expensive to maintain their Native allies because they “exhausted so much provisions” and “could not be stinted to allowance taking everything at pleasure and destroying three times the Quantity of Provisions they could eat.”<sup>139</sup> The Natives had no sense of rationing and would consume a week’s allocation of provisions in three days and demand additional replenishment. For example, on the march to besiege Fort William Henry in 1757, the Natives were dissatisfied with the salted meat that was provided so they slaughtered all the beasts of burden on the expedition, which consequently slowed down by three days the placement of cannon.<sup>140</sup> One senior French officer complained that the Natives “take all their [French] provisions” and they can do nothing. He lamented, “It is necessary to watch them, say nothing, and reduce oneself to bacon and water.”<sup>141</sup> Consistently, the Europeans denounced the Natives as disruptive to their campaigns and a drain on valuable resources. “One is a slave to Indians in this country,” Bougainville lamented, “[but] they are a necessary evil.”<sup>142</sup>

A further cause of great consternation to the Whites during the French and Indian Wars was the torture and cruelty shown to prisoners, whether military or civilian, and regardless of gender or age. This inability to control the Natives after a battle was fought, or surrender negotiated, permeated almost the entirety of the conflict. This problem was exacerbated when alcohol was involved. No exhortations by either the English or the French were entirely effective, but then again, the European entreaties ran counter to the Natives’ expectations of waging war.





LAC, C-46282.

**Natives torturing a prisoner by fire.**

The brutality and torture the Natives practiced was not an aberration of this conflict. The early writings of the Jesuits portray the shock and horror they felt when they witnessed the display of scalps, the torture of victims and the practice of cannibalism. Champlain's observation of his Native allies torturing and subsequently drinking the blood and eating the hearts of their victims in 1609, caused him a similar revulsion and horror.<sup>143</sup> These actions continued right up to, and including, the Seven Years War. "The cruelties and the insolence of these barbarians is horrible," Bougainville complained, "their souls are as black as pitch. It is an abominable way to make war; the retaliations is frightening, and the air one breathes here is contagious of making one accustomed to callousness."<sup>144</sup> A French priest wrote, "They kill all they meet, "and after having abused the women and maidens, they slaughter or burn them."<sup>145</sup> Women were often forced to burn their husbands and watch their babies roasted over slow fires. Prisoners were normally forced to endure running the gauntlet, beatings, slow-death by torture, and burning at the stake.<sup>146</sup>



Both English and French consistently protested, with an element of truth, that they were unable to control their Native allies. However, the exploits of the Natives, particularly the terror they instilled in their enemies, undeniably assisted the efforts of their White allies.

As irritating and unsettling as the previous complaints were, a far more serious menace was the perceived duplicity of the Natives. The Natives habitually sided with the power they felt most likely to win the contest. Moreover, they often switched allegiance if momentum or success swung to the opposite side. The noted Canadian historian, W.J. Eccles, stated that the Native nations, impressed with the French show of strength, specifically the dispatch in 1753 of 2,000 troops to Lake Erie to build a road to the headwater and a chain of forts at strategic points, began to sever their trade connections with Anglo-Americans.<sup>147</sup> The subsequent success of French arms over then Major George Washington's force at Fort Necessity in July 1754, and Major-General Braddock's Army a year later, merely reinforced the Native proclivity to support the French. In fact, after Braddock's defeat, the Natives rejected British overtures to remain neutral and one replied, "It is not in our power to comply with it, for the French & we are one blood, & where they are to dye we must dye also."<sup>148</sup>

These noble sentiments, however, were mere rhetoric. As the fortunes of war shifted, so too did the loyalty of the Natives. "An offensive, daring kind of war," Major-General James Wolfe wrote to his Commander, "will awe the Indians and ruin the French." He added, "Blockhouses and a trembling defensive encourage the meanest scoundrels to attack us."<sup>149</sup> He was right. As the British swung to the offensive, bringing their massive advantage in economic, naval and military power to bear, the last sinews of French strength began to wane. The destruction of Fort Frontenac and Fort Duquesne in 1758, representing two of France's most strategic fortifications, was a major watershed in the fealty of the Natives to the French.

By the summer of 1759, the Natives actively conspired to assist with the capture of Fort Niagara. For instance, Native guides deliberately led the French officer responsible for the resupply of the Fort into an ambush. Although they remained neutral during the initial engagement, once the supply column collapsed, the Natives "fell on them like so many Butchers."<sup>150</sup> Furthermore, Captain Pouchot, the Commandant of Fort Niagara, was assured by his Native allies, "if we learn that the Englishman is plotting anything against you, we shall inform you immediately, so that you are not taken by surprise."<sup>151</sup> Yet, in little over a month an entire British

army passed through the Iroquois territory and appeared without warning before the fortress. To add further insult, once the Fort had fallen, the Natives, most well-known to the French garrison, swarmed in to pillage and plunder the contents of the Fort, even attempting to strip the French soldiers, their former compatriots, of their arms and possessions.<sup>152</sup> Natives, wrote one bitter soldier, were “villains, and always side with the strongest.”<sup>153</sup>

This opportunistic choosing of sides proved to be the case. As New France crumbled and the English noose tightened around Quebec those few Natives who remained loyal to the French took advantage of the situation. “The savages...are a scourge for the inhabitants,” Abbe Jean-Félix Recher confided in his journal, “...they kill [inhabitants] with impunity and pilfer all types of foodstuffs from their homes, take their animals, especially the oxen, cows, sheep, poultry, and horses.”<sup>154</sup> Abbe Casgrain, would later write that the Natives were “more to be feared [by the Canadians] than even the enemy.”<sup>155</sup> By August 1759, as the English siege of Quebec continued, Montcalm wrote “we have a few savages, [we are] almost all alone.”<sup>156</sup>

The wavering nature of the Natives’ allegiance, however, had other implications that irritated the Europeans. Because no-one wished to offend their putative allies, they were given unrestricted access to both camps. The Natives, in turn, used this freedom of movement to spy and report on the preparations and plans of a belligerent to their respective enemy. Braddock was visited by two Mohawk warriors during his approach to Fort Duquesne. Although he was well aware that their intent was to spy, he allowed them to leave. When they departed, Braddock learned that one of his eight Natives had defected.<sup>157</sup>

The information gained was normally rendered for payment and / or to demonstrate fidelity to a given side. “The Five Nations ambassadors who descended to Montreal,” Montcalm recorded in his journal, “...came here as English spies rather than ambassadors.”<sup>158</sup> Montcalm’s second-in-command, de Lévis, reached a similar conclusion observing that the ambassadors who came to provide information on British preparations had also likely come to conduct a reconnaissance on those of the French.<sup>159</sup> For this reason, Montcalm and de Lévis consciously disseminated false information and plans among the Natives.<sup>160</sup> Even the Governor of New France, Le Marquis de Vaudreuil, who normally praised the Natives, wrote to the Ministry of Marine and conceded that there was no doubt that the Natives spied on their supposed French allies.<sup>161</sup>

The British perspective was no different. Major-General Jeffery Amherst, who was appointed the British Commander-in-Chief in 1759, wrote, “If the Indians know them [operational plans] the French will have it; it is their business to give intelligence to both sides.”<sup>162</sup> Years later he revealed, “My faith in the Indians has always been so small that this behaviour of theirs [uprising in 1763] does not much surprise me.”<sup>163</sup>

Despite these constant recriminations both the English and French vied aggressively for the allegiance of the Natives and both sides showered them with lavish gifts of equipment and food. Major-General William Shirley, Chief of His Majesty’s Forces in North America in 1755, actively lobbied the War Office to support a policy of luring the Natives to the British, or at a minimum securing their neutrality. He requested the appointment of commissioners for each of the western provinces, and money to defray the cost of the treaty obligations and inherent presents that would be required. For instance, he promised to build a fort at an Onondago Castle and then was required to pledge the same for the Oneidas, including a garrison and artillery pieces. In addition, the Cayugas demanded men to plough their lands and gunsmiths to repair their weapons. Furthermore, Shirley stipulated that the treaty must include that the Natives would be “supplied with arms, accouterments, clothes, provisions and pay...[and] that they shall have besides these a reward for every prisoner or scalp taken from the enemy and every other reasonable encouragement all which to be ascertained to their satisfaction.”<sup>164</sup> His order even made allowances for the Native warriors to bring their women and children who would be fed and protected by the British.

The English efforts to gain the allegiance, or at least neutrality, of the Natives was not lost on the French. “The governors of Virginia and Pennsylvania,” Montcalm penned in his journal, “put all their efforts in luring the savages [away from the French] and obtaining, at least their neutrality.”<sup>165</sup> He further observed that the English used every means possible, including the provision of supplies and alcohol, to win over the Natives. Similarly, Le Chevalier Le Mercier warned the French ministry of Marine that failure to supply the Natives would result in their deserting the French cause.<sup>166</sup>

In sum, the Natives were an important component of the successful prosecution of war in the colonies for a considerable period of time. Their participation, or even neutrality, often represented the difference between victory or defeat during

campaigns. There are several reasons for this influence. The first is answered by Montcalm's rhetorical question, "what good are the savages?" He correctly identified, "not to have them against you."<sup>167</sup> It was a simple question of security.

Fully cognizant of the Natives' capabilities, colonial governors of New York consistently warned of the danger. One stated that the loss of the Natives as allies would "...tend to the utter Ruin of all the English settlements on the Continent."<sup>168</sup> Another admonished, "the loss of them [Natives] must be the loss of all the King's interest on this continent."<sup>169</sup> One colonial governor in 1754 worried, "Should the Indians of the Six Nations at this conjuncture desert our alliance, and go over to the French how fatal an influence must such an event have upon the English interest."<sup>170</sup>



From George Bodge, *Soldiers in King Phillip's War* (Boston: The Rockwell and Churchill Press, 1906).

### Native raid on a village.

The consequences for the French were similar. "If we can get but the Indians," one British assessment noted, "we shall easily find a method to manage the French."<sup>171</sup> Bougainville concurred, "What a scourge! Humanity shudders at being obliged to make use of such monsters." However, he assessed, "without them the match would be too much against us."<sup>172</sup>

These assessments were based on the Natives' martial abilities on the battlefield. They possessed many strengths that bestowed dramatic advantages. "They are an active hardy People, capable of fatigue, hunger, and cold and know perfectly the use of arms," one officer wrote, "And tho' their number nor their valour may not make

them a formidable enemy, their little wood skirmishing, and bush fighting will always make them a very troublesome one.”<sup>173</sup> George Washington, in the aftermath of Braddock’s defeat, declared, “without Indians we shall never be able to cope with those cruel foes to our country.”<sup>174</sup> He maintained, “500 Indians would prove more troublesome on the frontier than ten times as many regulars.” He added, “Indians are the only match for Indians; and without these, we shall ever fight upon unequal Terms.”<sup>175</sup> John Askin, an experienced frontiersman, declared that in the forests one Native warrior was equal to three White men.<sup>176</sup> Similarly, “Here in the forests of America,” one journalist opined, “we can no more do without them [Natives] than without cavalry on the plain.”<sup>177</sup>

Martial prowess aside, it was also a question of numbers. They provided manpower, particularly for the French. With only a population of 60,000, New France faced the danger of being engulfed by the southern English colonies that numbered approximately 1,500,000.<sup>178</sup> Native allies represented an effective means to make up this shortfall of combatants. Moreover, they were extremely effective when allowed to practice their style of warfare. As bush fighters they were largely unsurpassed. They were able marksman and possessed remarkable fieldcraft skills such as concealment, mobility and stealth. Casgrain wrote that they “...glide from tree to tree, stump to stump.”<sup>179</sup> They would appear as phantoms in either ambushes or in hit and run attacks, and despite their small numbers would often inflict an unproportionally high number of casualties on the enemy. “What can one do against invisible enemies who strike and flee with the rapidity of light?” questioned Bougainville rhetorically. “It is,” he asserted, “the destroying angel.”<sup>180</sup> The result was an utterly paralyzing effect on the opposing combatants. For instance, after a brief but bloody engagement with Natives, a frontier veteran recalled, “...at night there was a Hundred men upon gard or more for feare of there [Natives] coming a Gain in the Night.”<sup>181</sup> Quite simply, soldiers hated to go into the woods for reconnaissance or foraging because of the fear of being killed and scalped by the Natives.

Their prowess in the woods also made Natives adept at flank security, acting as an economy of effort force by creating diversions, or pinning down other forces and most importantly, cutting off the enemy’s lines of communication. The Natives were continually so successful at this endeavor that even Montcalm, normally a strong critic of the Natives, praised them on this point. During the attack on Oswego, in August 1756, the Natives had isolated the garrison to such a degree that Montcalm called it “brilliant and decisive.”<sup>182</sup> Another noteworthy example occurred during

the siege of Fort William Henry when the Natives intercepted a courier with a message for the beleaguered Fort Commandant. Montcalm subsequently handed the missive to Lieutenant-Colonel Monro, the Fort's Commander, with conditions of capitulation.<sup>183</sup>

These examples were not the exceptions. Movement for the English was so constrained that they could neither gather intelligence, nor ensure communications between their forces. "It is not possible to conceive the situation and danger of this miserable country," Washington deplored, "such numbers of French and Indians are all around that no road is safe."<sup>184</sup>

As such, the Natives developed a fierce reputation among the both the White soldiers and colonists. What the Natives lacked in strategic acumen they made up for in tactical skill. Their abilities in the woods, combined with their brutality and cruelty, soon paralyzed their opponents. The mere presence of Natives, or the sound of their war cry, created a prodigious panic in the enemy ranks. "We have seen that our regulars do not fight well in woods," conceded one British officer, "The Indian yell is horrid to their ears, and soon throws them into confusion."<sup>185</sup> The Duke of Cumberland was so concerned of this fact that he ordered a letter be sent to Braddock to warn him "to be particularly careful that they [regular British troops] be not thrown into a panic by the Indians, with whom they are yet unacquainted, whom the French will certainly employ to frighten them."<sup>186</sup>

His assessment was very accurate. Montcalm counseled his subordinates to ensure in the event of a general attack to have a few Natives everywhere since the English are "devilishly afraid" of them.<sup>187</sup> Governor Vaudreuil reveled in this obvious advantage. "The cries, threats, and hideous howlings of our Canadians and Indians," he boasted, "made them [British] quickly decide [to surrender]." At the prelude to the attack on Fort William Henry, the ambush of a resupply flotilla met with the same fate. "Terrified by the sight of these Monsters [Natives], their agility, their firing, and their yells," Bougainville recalled, "they [the British] surrendered almost without resistance."<sup>188</sup>

Overwhelmingly the mere thought of battling the savages unsettled both the British regulars and the American militia. "The men from what storys they had heard of the Indians in regard to their scalping and Mawhawking," a British officer wrote in his journal, "were so pannick struck that their officers had little or no command



over them.”<sup>189</sup> George Washington recounted an escort from Winchester to Fort Cumberland. At the first firing from the Indians, he stated, the men broke and ran back to Winchester, with less than half the force even stopping to fire a shot.<sup>190</sup> In the immediate aftermath of the defeat of Braddock’s Army, men in the rear “hearing of our defeat, were extremely frightened, so much so, that upon seeing 2 or 3 of our own Natives returning, the greatest part began to run away.”<sup>191</sup> Years later, even the stout Highlanders were overcome by the “appalling yells of the Canadians and Indians” at Fort Duquesne in 1758 and broke away in a wild and disorderly retreat.<sup>192</sup> “We have seen that our regulars do not fight well in woods,” a British official to the Prime Minister wrote, “the yell is horrid to their ears, and soon throws them into confusion.”<sup>193</sup>

The advantage of Native allies in the tactical battles for the wilderness was clear. And, there was still another essential role that they performed. Their unsurpassed skills in the woods, combined with their knowledge of the country, made them indispensable as guides, scouts and gatherers of intelligence. They were often the only ones who could penetrate the deep wilderness of the frontier successfully. Indeed, Vaudreuil on more than one occasion instructed the leaders of his expeditions against the English that if the Natives abandoned the foray, they were to return to Canada without completing the mission.<sup>194</sup>

Equally important, was the void of similar services to the enemy. The lack of Native allies, or the effectiveness of the opponent’s Natives in shutting out hostile reconnaissance parties repeatedly had a calamitous effect on the British. “I am ashamed,” one British colonel confided, “that they have succeeded in all their scouting parties and that we never have any success in ours.”<sup>195</sup> This state of affairs continually blinded the British Command and deprived them of intelligence of French preparations or plans. Understandably, this lack of intelligence, often led to poor and untimely decisions laden with unfortunate consequences, whether the ambush of a British column or the loss of a strategic fort.<sup>196</sup>

The final role that the Natives filled, very adeptly, and with great import to the successful prosecution of the war for the French, at least initially, was that of frontier raiding. New France, having endured such a plague during its early years, was fully versed in its affects. “The Iroquois,” Louis XIV stated in 1666, “through massacres and inhumanities, have prevented the country’s population from growing...”<sup>197</sup> An Iroquois Sachem, touted, “We plied the French homes in the war with them that

they were not able to go out a door to piss.”<sup>198</sup> The French now turned this manner of war against the English colonies. It provided a successful means of diverting British attention and draining resources that if not focused on ensuring their own security would most likely be aimed at attacking Canada. Governor Vaudreuil was very clear on his aim. “Nothing is more calculated to disgust the people of those colonies,” he explained, “and to make them desire the return to peace.”<sup>199</sup>

Artwork by Katherine Taylor.



**Raiding on the frontier.**

It was a strategy that was carried out year round, was cost effective and merciless. It was clearly an economy of effort. Small parties of Canadians and Natives, who demonstrated a distaste for the European manner of war, led by French or Canadian officers, could in this manner make an effective contribution to the war effort. The Native raids terrorized the frontier and tied down large numbers of troops for rear security. The plight of the settlers and colonists could not be ignored. The incursions into Virginia alone caused the governor there to raise 10 militia companies, a total of 1000 men to try and halt the deadly incursions. Similarly, Pennsylvania raised 1,500 provincial troops and built a string of forts extending from New Jersey

to Maryland in an attempt to try and impede the raiders.<sup>200</sup> Moreover, militiamen were reluctant to undertake campaigns when they felt their families were at risk.<sup>201</sup> In addition, the barbarity of the raids further fueled perceptions and added to the psychological impact the Natives had on their opposition, who, as already mentioned, often fled or surrendered at the mere sign of a Native presence. Furthermore, their destruction of settlements, farms and livestock, as well as the murder or capture of colonists, ate away at the economy of the thirteen colonies. Crops could not be sown or harvested. Grains could not be stored for the winter or to feed the army on campaign. This situation created privations for both soldier and citizen alike. Quite simply, the impact on the frontier was devastating.<sup>202</sup> “The frontiers were laid waste for above three hundred miles long, and generally about thirty broad, excepting some that were living in forts and many hundreds, or perhaps thousands, killed or made captives, and horses, and all kinds of property carried off,” one British officer mourned.<sup>203</sup>

The ferociousness of the raiding was such that it created an impression of the Natives that would stain the perception, if not the relationship, between the Whites and Natives for generations to come. Although an effective strategy for the out-numbered French, it was only successful as a delaying action. It did not, as Vaudreuil had hoped, bring the English to the peace table.

So in the end, the role of the Natives in the French and Indian War for a short while was substantial. In many cases their participation, or neutrality, in a campaign was the difference between success and failure. Their effectiveness as “bush fighters,” compounded by the reputation they earned for cruelty and savagery made them an opponent that inspired fear and panic in their enemies – both English and French. They performed many critical tasks, such as scouting and intelligence gathering, cutting enemy lines of communication, providing support to major attacks through skirmishing and attacks on the opponent’s flanks. In addition, they conducted deep penetration raids that inflicted economic, physical and psychological damage to the enemy. However, as Montcalm accurately assessed, they did not, nor could they, because of their numbers, dependence on Whites for technology and war materials (e.g. muskets, gun power, lead), as well as their cultural and philosophical understanding of war, impose a lasting defeat on their enemies.<sup>204</sup>

Furthermore, the rigidity of the European method of war slowly seeped into the consciousness of the regular force military commanders. As a result, they adopted a

degree of pragmatism. “It is absolutely necessary for his Majesty’s Service,” extolled William Shirley, “that one Company at least of Rangers should be constantly employ’d in different Parties upon Lake George and Lake Iroquois [Lake Ontario], and the Wood Creek and Lands adjacent...to make Discoveries of the proper Routes for our own Troops, procure Intelligence of the Enemy’s Strength and Motions, destroy their out Magazines and Settlements, pick up small Parties of their Battoes upon the Lakes, and keep them under continual Alarm.”<sup>205</sup> Similarly, Major-General James Wolfe explained, “...Our troops must be employd in a very different manner from what has been the Practice hitherto.” He added, “They must learn to live in the Woods as the Indians do - keep ‘em in a continual apprehension of being attack’d to acquire a perfect knowledge of the Lakes & Rivers, & Hunting Grounds of the Savages.”<sup>206</sup>



Courtesy the Fort William Henry Corporation.

**A member of Rogers Rangers.**

As a result, companies of Rangers, the most famous being Rogers’ Rangers, led by the intrepid Major Robert Rogers, were raised as a direct answer to the British lack of Native allies. In addition, in 1756, the Royal Americans, 60th Foot, were

organized as light infantry to provide the British with a means of combating the Natives. The Regiment was intended to combine the qualities of the scout with the discipline of the trained soldier. Moreover, uniforms and tactics were adjusted to the reality of the wilderness setting of North America. Musket barrels were made blue or brown to “take off the glittering.” The coats of the light infantry were simple and plain based on the premise that “the less they are seen in the Woods the better.”<sup>207</sup> One of the Highland Regiments gave up their kilts for breeches and many officers gave up wearing gorgets and sashes. In fact, some even went to such unheard of extremes as to wear the same tunic as those worn by privates.<sup>208</sup>

The change in philosophy was also noted in the manner in which the Europeans adapted their tactics. Rangers and scouts were always included in the advance party of any moving force. Furthermore, Wolfe, in his instruction to his Army, embedded many of the lessons learned. He directed that all detachments and outposts fortify their camps by either entrenching or building palisades. Sentries were never to be placed in musket range of woods unless hidden behind rocks or trees themselves and he cautioned his commanders never to halt, encamp or pass through openings without first examining the area for a potential ambush or subsequent attack.<sup>209</sup>

Although slow in adapting, once the Whites adjusted to the Native way of war, the significance of the Natives as allies and combatants was substantially reduced. Despite the martial prowess and skill of the Native warriors, the superior discipline and organization, as well as technology of the Whites, in the long-term prevailed. And so, as already stated, although the participation or neutrality of the Natives often impacted on the success or failure of a particular campaign, they did not, nor could they, influence the final outcome of the Seven Years War in North America.





# PREFACE TO CHAPTER 3



Chapter 3 takes another approach to examining *la petite guerre* and the Canadian way of war. Specifically, it focuses on two of New France's most renowned French Canadian leaders at irregular warfare, namely, Joseph Marin de La Malgue and Jean-Baptiste Levrault de Langis Montegron. Both Marin and Langis, as they were commonly known, were revered by their countrymen and feared by their enemies. Their martial feats were legendary. As such, this chapter furnishes some insight into how New France developed its young warriors and the role they played in using tactical actions to achieve strategic effect in North America.





# CHAPTER 3

## MARIN AND LANGIS: MASTER PRACTITIONERS OF *LA PETITE GUERRE*<sup>210</sup>



The human race has always shown itself to be incredibly versatile and adaptable. The intrepid leaders and colonists of New France were no different. From the beginning, their survival depended on ingenuity and adaptability. Circumstances dictated a pragmatic approach as a result of realities that could not be avoided. First, New France's status as a distant wilderness colony in an overtly hostile land limited its population and resource base. The constant menace posed initially by the Iroquois and later by the English created difficulties in recruiting colonists, and often resulted in the death of those adventurous enough to voyage to the New World. Exacerbating the problem was the fact that New France was not a priority for the motherland, which further limited the amount of national treasure that France was willing to spend on the colony's development and security. This constraint meant that New France would largely live or die by its ability to protect itself.

As a result, the inhabitants and leadership of New France developed a way of war that reflected their environment, their capability and their temperament. They could not afford a long protracted conflict, nor could they tolerate large casualties. Therefore, they quickly learned the Native way of war from their Native allies, as well as enemies, and thus, became skilled practitioners of *la petite guerre*. This methodology, which focused on guile, stealth and surprise and relied on speed and skillful use of terrain, allowed them to overcome their bitter war of annihilation with the Iroquois and later punch above their weight and fend off the encroachment of the larger more resource rich English colonies for far longer than otherwise would have been possible.

The successful execution of *la petite guerre* was not accomplished through chance. Rather, its effectiveness was directly attributable to the leadership of the

French Canadian partisan leaders that led their fellow Canadians and Native allies on the grueling raids that forced the Iroquois to peace terms and later paralyzed the English colonies. As such, Joseph Marin de La Malgue (known as Marin) and Jean-Baptiste Levrault de Langis Montegron (known commonly as Langis, or in English as Langy) represented the epitome of the French Canadian partisan (i.e. guerilla) leaders that allowed New France to defy the odds as long as it did.



Photo Art by Silvia Pecota.

## Raiding Party.

Expert partisan leaders such as Marin and Langis were the product of New France's tenuous circumstances. Simply put, it was a question of adapt or die. The exceedingly harsh climate in comparison to European standards, seemingly impenetrable wilderness and belligerent natives, most notably the Iroquois, proved too much for most Europeans.<sup>211</sup> Not surprisingly, economic prosperity, if not survival itself, necessitated alliances. However, alliances were often fraught with consequence. For instance, the French decision to ally with a number of northern tribes (e.g. Abenakis, Algonquin, Huron, Montagnais, and Outaouais) resulted in an antagonistic relationship with the far more warlike Iroquois confederacy. In the end, this adversarial rapport led to almost a century of conflict and at its peak threatened the very survival of New France.

This state of affairs was not entirely surprising. The Iroquois war parties were extremely effective. They forced the colonists to remain barricaded in cramped stockades and only venture out to tend their fields in large armed groups. Even then,

there was no guarantee of survival. Even the infusion of colonial troops from 1604 to 1663, did little to ease the perpetual menace. Although they provided limited garrisons in some locations, they were too few to cover the entire colony and incapable of matching the Iroquois on their own terms.<sup>212</sup> “The Iroquois,” King Louis the XIV declared, “[it is] through massacres and inhumanities, have prevented the country’s population from growing.”<sup>213</sup>

Although the Iroquois attacks stunted the growth of New France, they did harden the population to war. The Canadians quickly adapted to the situation and environment and mimicked the Native way of making war. They became adept at using ground and cover, emphasized surprise and became exemplary practitioners of the ambush and raid.

Predictably, honing this expertise was an evolutionary process that was borne from necessity. The tutelage by Native allies, as well as a study of their enemy provided the necessary knowledge to overcome their weakness. The arrival of regular soldiers from the Carignan-Salières Regiment, who finally deployed to Canada in 1665, provided the catalyst for offensive expeditions to strike the Iroquois on their own terms, in their own territory. The first attack, conducted in the winter of 1666 proved to be a dismal failure.<sup>214</sup> However, the Governor of New France quickly realized the strength and value of his Canadians. As a result, in subsequent raids he made great use of them.

This first excursion represented a turning point. It demonstrated that expeditions, even at the worst time of the year when operations were normally never conducted by either side, were possible. Moreover, the French Canadians proved themselves to be masters at traveling, surviving and fighting in the trackless forests. The Governor of New France launched a second expedition that autumn with a substantially larger force composed of approximately 600 regulars, an equal number of Canadian volunteers and about 100 Natives. This raid achieved the desired effect. It brought the Iroquois to the negotiating table and ushered in an era of prolonged peace. Not surprisingly, due to their apparent impact, these raids set the pattern for future operations.

The template was seemingly set. It now fell to the French Canadians and their Native allies to mount the raids that would be the centre piece of the new aggressive, offensive strategy. As expert practitioners of *la petite guerre* their ambushes

and lightening swift raids, followed by swift withdrawals consistently left their opponents paralyzed with fright and indecision. As a result, the enemies of New France became more concerned with defence than they did with plans for invading northward. Lightning strikes were always succeeded by immediate withdrawals. There were no follow-on attacks or campaigns, and rarely were any of the tactical operations capable of achieving a larger strategic value other than pre-empting, delaying, or disrupting possible enemy offensive action.

In essence, the two early expeditions against the Iroquois had an important psychological effect on the French Canadians. The raids demonstrated the importance and effectiveness of offensive action. They also inculcated volunteers with military experience and regulars with wilderness indoctrination. But of greatest consequence, the expeditions provided self-confidence in respect to the martial skills of the Canadian colonists, as well as demonstrating their aptitude and capability in fighting in the North American wilderness. Not surprisingly, King Louis XIV ordered Governor Courcelle to organize a Canadian Militia in April 1669. As a result, all males between the age of 15 to 60, were required to bear arms to defend the colony.

Of immense importance to New France and, France for that matter, was the strategic value of the practice of *la petite guerre*.<sup>215</sup> By focusing on aggressive offensive action, the French were able to seize the initiative and paralyze their enemies, who became focussed on the defence. In essence, the French Canadians realized that they could conduct waves of devastating attacks faster than the English could organize an invasion.

An integral component of this strategy was maximizing the effectiveness of the raiding parties. Experience demonstrated that blending the discipline and tactical acumen of Regular soldiers with the innate qualities, such as endurance, familiarity with wilderness navigation and travel, marksmanship, of the French Canadians and their Native allies, optimized results. Importantly, the raiding parties shunned the rigidity of military thought and practice of the period and rather emphasized initiative, autonomy and agility of action. In essence, stealth, deception, speed and an emphasis on marksmanship were paramount.



The French Canadians learned quickly from their Native mentors. Not surprisingly then, the practice of *la petite guerre* was associated as much with the Canadians as it was with the Natives. Their skill and effectiveness was recognized by both their English opponents, as well as by the French regulars. Major-General James Wolfe felt that “Every man in Canada is a soldier.”<sup>216</sup> Other contemporary English accounts echoed with the lament that the Canadian woodsmen and *coureur de bois* “are well known to be the most dangerous enemy of any ... reckoned equal, if not superior in that part of the world to veteran troops.”<sup>217</sup> One anonymous source noted that the Canadians and Natives travelled without baggage, maintained themselves in the woods and did “more execution ... than four or five time their number of our men.”<sup>218</sup>

The expertise of the Canadians and Natives, who were generally despised by Montcalm and his officers and troops, still conceded that the Canadians and Natives contributed distinct skills and capabilities to campaigns. “God knows,” Colonel Louis Antoine de Bougainville wrote, “we do not wish to disparage the value of the Canadians...In the woods, behind trees, no troops are comparable to the natives of this country.”<sup>219</sup> Additionally, the official French Army campaign journals for New France revealed, “The Canadians ...certainly surpass all the troops in the universe, owing to their skill as marksman.”<sup>220</sup>

Paradoxically, French Canadians themselves could not lead troops, even on raids. Command of soldiers and operations was a privilege and responsibility left to French regular officers or officers of *Les Compagnies Franches de la Marine* (colonial regular troops).<sup>221</sup> Unfortunately, however, the regular officers, including the majority of those in *Les Compagnies Franches de la Marine* were incapable of leading the raiding parties. Their unfamiliarity with the terrain, lack of endurance and inability, or reluctance, to understand and effectively work with the Natives, necessitated an alternate solution.

It was for this reason that Governor Vaudreuil repeatedly informed the Royal Palace at Versailles that the Canadians and the “savages” did not operate with the same confidence under the command of officers of the French Regular Army as they did under the control of their own Canadian officers.<sup>222</sup> This observation should not be surprising. After all, military theorist De Jeney, in 1759, explained that a good partisan leader should possess:

*An imagination fertile in schemes, ruses and resource;*  
*A shrewd intelligence, to orchestrate every incident in an action;*  
*A fearless heart in the face of all apparent danger;*  
*A steady countenance, always confident and unmoved by any token of anxiety;*  
*An apt memory; to speak to all by name;*  
*An alert, sturdy, and tireless constitution, to endure all and inspire all;*  
*A rapid and accurate glance, to grasp immediately the defects and advantages,*  
*obstacles, and risks presented by a terrain, or by anything it scans; and*  
*Sentiment that will engage the respect, confidence, and affection of the whole corps.*<sup>223</sup>

These qualities were not always present in the regular French officers, particularly when dealing with colonials and Natives.

As such, a solution was found by tapping into the very capable and now experienced French Canadians. Increasingly, Canadians began to serve as officers in *Les Compagnies Franches de la Marine*. The restricted organization of these colonial troops offered little upward mobility for regular French officers since each independent company was commanded by only a captain and there was no room for advancement. Therefore, positions were often difficult to fill. Vacancies were given to individuals from the Canadian gentry or to families of French officers who remained in Canada.<sup>224</sup>

Over time, many French Canadians, such as Marin and Langis, became officers in *Les Compagnies Franches de la Marine* and, thus, were capable of leading their fellow citizens and Native allies on raids that terrorized and paralyzed the English colonies. Their skill and knowledge of their surroundings, the art and science of war in North America, as well as their sound understanding of the temperament and capabilities of their Native allies, who in turn identified with and respected them, made Marin and Langis master practitioners of *la petite guerre*. Even Lieutenant-General Montcalm recognized their talent. “Langy excellent - Marin brave but foolish,” he wrote, “all the rest not worth mentioning.”<sup>225</sup> In the end, their leadership and feats of arms were an important component of New France’s ability to stave off the inevitably English onslaught.



Parks Canada, PD 511.

*Soldier of Les Compagnies Franches de la Marine.*

The ability of Marin and Langis, and ultimately their success, was rooted in their background and experience. Joseph Marin de La Malue was born in Montreal in 1719, into a family steeped in martial tradition. His grandfather, was an officer in

the colonial regular troops and his father, Paul Marin de la Malgue, was also an officer of the colonial regular troops who became renowned for his diplomatic, trading and warfighting skills.<sup>226</sup> Marin the elder, at the age of 30, took command of Chagouamigon (near present day Ashland in northern Wisconsin on Lake Superior). This appointment carried the customary monopoly of the region's fur trade, but his primary responsibility was to ensure and maintain the alliance between the Native nations and France. A famous partisan leader in his own right, it was no surprise that the young Marin from an early age was brought up on stories and the reality of fighting in the wilderness of North America.

It was within this setting, and under the tutelage of his father who was greatly feared and respected by the Natives, that the younger Marin learned his trade. In 1732, at only 13 years old, Marin's father sent him to explore the *pays d'en haut*.<sup>227</sup> For the next thirteen years, as a cadet in the colonial regular troops, he remained in the northwest. This experience was critical in his development. It provided him an understanding of the complexities of the fur trade and more importantly he gained a sound knowledge and skill at wilderness travel, native culture and temperament. In fact, he became fluent in Sioux and several Algonquin dialects. In addition, he also gained military experience during the campaign against the Chickasaws in 1739-1740, and he earned his diplomatic spurs when he made peace and trade agreements with the Sioux west of Baie-des-Puants (present day Green Bay, Wisconsin).<sup>228</sup>

In 1745, Marin and his father, like many others working in the Northwest, were recalled to the East to assist with the war against the British raging in Acadia and Cape Breton Island. Although his influence was minimal at the time, this latest exposure to war provided experience. It was Marin who brought the news to Montreal on 1 August that the key French strategic fortress of Louisbourg had fallen to the English.<sup>229</sup>

Later that year, Marin, under his father's command, participated in a large scale raid against the English, which devastated Schuylerville and neighbouring areas in New York. During the next two years, 1746-1748, Marin was busy in Acadia, Grand-Pré, Cape Breton Island and the New York frontier, learning and plying the deadly craft of *la petite guerre* under such mentors as François-Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil and Nicolas-Antoine Coulon de Villiers. He was promoted to the rank of second ensign at the end of the conflict in 1748.

The following year the Governor of New France, La Jonquière, gave Marin command of the post at Chagouamigon. Marin now found himself not only in his father's trading network but also in his father's old command.<sup>230</sup> In addition, he was also assigned the responsibility of making peace with the Sioux and Ojibwas who were locked in conflict with themselves, as well as the French. Significantly, he succeeded. His knowledge and skills in dealing with Natives combined with his ability to earn their respect became evident.

In 1750, Marin was promoted full ensign and his father, with the support of the Governor, attempted to have him reassigned as the Deputy Commander in Baie-Des-Puants, but Marin's popularity in Chagouamigon was such that the inhabitants there insisted that he stay. Nonetheless, in 1752, after a sojourn in the garrison in Quebec, Marin was dispatched to Baie-Des-Puants to take command of the very influential and powerful post from his father. He was also entrusted by the Governor to search for a route to the "western sea" and to increase the number of Native tribes allied to the French. He was once again largely successful. Although he did not find a route to the Pacific, he did expand French influence and presence in the Northwest. Furthermore, he strengthened the French alliance with the Natives, and between the various tribes. As such, he was a key component of the negotiated truce between the Crees and the Sioux in 1752, and he was directly responsible for averting a potential conflict between the Ojibwas and the Sioux the following year.

For New France continuing peace with and within the Native tribes was critical. They represented a force multiplier for the French. Out-numbered and unable to compete with the resources of the southern British colonies, the Natives represented badly needed manpower. Moreover, they possessed the martial skills required for conducting *la petite guerre* so critical to New France's ability to fend off the inevitable English invasion. Marin continually proved capable and successful in maintaining the French interest in the Northwest.

Marin was once again recalled to Quebec as a result of the latest contest between the French and English, namely, the Seven Years War. Marin arrived in Montreal on 11 July 1756, with a large contingent of Native warriors.<sup>231</sup> Now a lieutenant, Marin plied his craft much to the dismay of the English frontier settlements. Later that summer, he participated in the successful campaign to capture the British fort at Oswego where he and his command of Menominee warriors continually bested larger British detachments.





"A Warning for Braddock," by Robert Griffing, Paramount Press.

In August, he led a force of approximately 100 on a raid against Fort William Henry on Lake George, New York and defeated a force of approximately equal size. His constant raids, particularly because of the brutality and savage nature of the French Canadians and Natives, terrorized both the garrisons of the frontier forts, as well



as the settlements at large. “It is an abominable way to make war,” Bougainville lamented upon hearing a recital of a raid by Canadians and Natives led by Marin. “The retaliation is frightening,” he added, “The air one breathes is contagious of making one accustomed to callousness.”<sup>232</sup> This unrelenting pressure, as brutal as it was, created fear within the English, who continually delayed campaigns due to concern for home defence, or due to smoldering war stock that was stolen or destroyed as a result of successful raids.

In December 1756, Marin led a force of 500 French Canadians and Natives on another raid that tore a path of destruction through New York. Six months later, in July 1757, Marin led a small reconnaissance party to the vicinity of Fort Edwards, in New York. Once again, his expertise became evident. He not only made his way close to the Fort, but he also annihilated a ten-man patrol, and then a fifty-man guard. Finally, totally overwhelmed by British reinforcements, he expertly held them off for an hour and then withdrew. In total, the action cost him only three men. A missionary with the Abenakis reported, “Here the valor of the Canadians has so often multiplied them that we would not be astonished to see them repeated more than once in the course of a campaign.”<sup>233</sup> He added:

*It was Monsieur Marin – a Canadian Officer of great merit – who was returning glorious and triumphant from the expedition with which he had been charged. At the head of a body of about two hundred savages, he had been detached to scour the country about Fort Lydis [Fort Edward, New York]; he had had the courage with a small flying camp to attack the outer entrenchments, and good fortune to carry a chief part of them. The savages had only time to cut off thirty-five scalps from the two hundred men whom they had killed; their victory was not stained with a single drop of their own blood and did not cost them a single man. The enemy, numbering three thousand men, sought in vain to have revenge by pursuing them in their retreat, but it was made without the slightest loss.*<sup>234</sup>

André Doreil, the financial commissary of wars, exclaimed it a “most daring expedition.”<sup>235</sup>

The next major engagement for Marin occurred in August 1758. It pitted him against his arch nemesis, Major Robert Rogers, whose Rangers were a direct result of the British inability to effectively counter the French superiority in *la petite*

*guerre*.<sup>236</sup> Carelessness on the part of Rogers and the British force of about 530 men alerted Marin and his outnumbered raiding party.<sup>237</sup> Marin quickly deployed his Canadians and Natives and skillfully sprung an ambush that caught the enemy completely by surprise. Although inflicting heavy casualties and capturing several prisoners, the remainder of the British force reacted well and the battle soon settled into a bitter battle of attrition. Marin was caught behind enemy lines, between a large force and an even larger pool of reinforcements only hours away. As a result, he broke his command up into small groups and they melted away. Marin had once again bested the British.

This latest exploit added to Marin's reputation. Doreil again commented on Marin's performance referring to him as "a Colonial officer of great reputation."<sup>238</sup> Not surprisingly, he was promoted to captain in January 1759, and spent the first part of the year conducting raids against the frontier settlements in Pennsylvania and Maryland. That summer he joined a relief effort to raise the British siege of Fort Niagara (near current day Youngstown New York). However, his force was ambushed and he was taken prisoner. Not surprisingly, his capture was announced as a great triumph in the English colonies.<sup>239</sup>

The other great French Canadian partisan leader was Jean-Baptiste Levrault de Langis Montegron. He was born in 1723 and, like Marin, was part of a family tradition of serving in the colonial regular troops. As such, he followed the footsteps of his father and three older brothers.<sup>240</sup> He began his military career on Cape Breton Island and, in 1755, as an ensign, participated in the unsuccessful defence of Fort Beauséjour (near current day Sackville, New Brunswick). Upon its capture, he returned to Quebec. During this campaign his superiors already identified him as "an extraordinarily brave officer."<sup>241</sup>

This strength, as well as his ability to lead, much like Marin, would become even more pronounced during the final contest for North America during the Seven Year's War. His intelligence, tactical acumen, and expert knowledge of the wilderness quickly earned him the respect and trust of his superiors, as well as the French regulars. Moreover, his ability to effectively motivate and lead Natives and his fellow Canadians made him indispensable. One senior French officer, Louis de Courville, described him as "an officer who distinguished himself by his bravery – he is active, vigilant, always ready to go on campaign."<sup>242</sup> Even Lieutenant-General Montcalm, who disliked the Canadians and their way of war, wrote to Governor Vaudreuil

to state, “Sieur Langis de Montegron has never ceased being used for the most interesting of scouting, also the most laborious, and who has always distinguished himself.”<sup>243</sup>

Langis became a key player on the Lake Champlain – Lake George campaign front. He was continually employed raiding, scouting and gathering intelligence. His forays took him deep into enemy territory where his attacks left the British unnerved and consistently on the defensive. One contemporary journal account reflects the terror: “at night there was a Hundred men upon guard or more,” a colonial soldier revealed, “for feare of there [Canadians and Natives] coming a Gain in the Night....”<sup>244</sup>

The information Langis brought back on enemy fortifications and / or their intentions (drawn from prisoners) kept the French well-informed. His control of the wilderness also ensured that movement for the English was so constrained that they could neither gather intelligence, nor ensure communications between their forces. “It is not possible to conceive the situation and danger of this miserable country,” a young George Washington lamented, “such numbers of French and Natives are all around that no road is safe.”<sup>245</sup> One British colonel confided, “I am ashamed that they [French] have succeeded in all their scouting parties and that we never have any success in ours.”<sup>246</sup> As such, the efforts of Langis and Marin contributed in large part to the French advantage of situational awareness and initiative – and the English lack of the same skills.

Even the infamous British guerilla leader, Major Robert Rogers, was unable to match Langis. In March 1758, Rogers and his force of 175 Rangers and eight British regulars ambushed a French Force of approximately 96 Canadians and Natives. Successful, the Rangers rushed in on the defeated French forces to scalp the dead and pursue those attempting to escape. However, Langis who was following up the French vanguard force, heard the gunfire and immediately deployed his troops and quickly led a counter attack that routed Rogers and left three quarters of the British force dead. Major Rogers himself only narrowly escaped leaving behind his rucksack and tunic (which had his commission scroll inside).<sup>247</sup> This latest feat prompted Montcalm to write to the French Minister of War, stating that Langis understood “petty war the best of any man.”<sup>248</sup>

Throughout the spring of 1758, Langis was constantly in the field attempting to determine the English intentions. Although seizing many prisoners, no useful

information was discovered. Then, in June, Langis captured seventeen Rangers who revealed an impending attack against the strategic Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga to the English). On 4 July, Montcalm, demonstrating his confidence in the Canadian partisan leader, entrusted Langis with a vital scouting mission “to go observe the location, number, and the movements of the enemy.”<sup>249</sup> Montcalm also called on French officers to volunteer to serve under Langis for the task. The response was so overwhelming that the number of volunteers had to be restricted. Bougainville, an aide to Montcalm, noted in his diary that “a captain and seven lieutenants of our regulars march under the orders of an ensign.”<sup>250</sup> Such was the reputation and stature of Langis.

Langis’ force departed and returned the following night with news that the British invasion force was en route. As a result, Montcalm ordered his troops to take up defensive positions. Langis’ role, however, was not yet complete. He deployed once again to monitor the British advance and, on 7 July, had a chance encounter with the British advance guard. In the ensuing bloody clash, both sides suffered substantial casualties. However, the loss of Brigadier, Lord Howe was of the gravest consequence to the English. “He it was,” Bougainville revealed in his journal, “who had projected the enterprise against Canada and he alone was capable of executing it.”<sup>251</sup> Bougainville’s assessment seemed accurate. Outnumbered almost four to one, with only 3,600 troops, primarily French regulars, Montcalm routed Major-General James Abercrombie’s Army of 15,000, which was composed of regular and provincial troops.<sup>252</sup> Montcalm’s second-in-command, Brigadier-General Lévis, assessed that Montcalm had “saved Canada.”<sup>253</sup> Once again, any English hope of launching an invasion against New France in 1758, was thwarted in the distant backwaters of the North American wilderness.

In the months following the French victory, Langis continued his forays against the English. However, despite the critical victory at Ticonderoga, the tide of the war was clearly changing. British Prime Minister William Pitt had decided to settle the matter of North America once and for all and sent overwhelming naval and land forces sufficient to blockade, invade and seize Canada. By late 1758, the French became increasingly hard pressed both militarily and economically. The outcome seemed to be a forgone conclusion. Firstly, France was hard pressed to send regular troops to reinforce Canada. They were needed on the continent and elsewhere, and moreover, the British Royal Navy controlled the seas, and sending troop transports was a risky proposition. Secondly, Montcalm was convinced that the only hope

against British regulars lay in a static defence. He believed that the dispersion of scarce manpower among the western outposts was perilous. As such, Montcalm was adamant that the only hope of saving New France was to concentrate as much force as possible at the critical point - Quebec. His recent victory at Ticonderoga convinced the French leadership at Versailles. Therefore, as the British began their march North in 1759, the French abandoned their frontier forts and withdrew to Quebec.

Despite the new strategy, and the apparent rejection of *la petite guerre*, Langis and others maintained what pressure they could. In spite of Montcalm's virulent dislike for Governor Vaudreuil, the Canadians, Natives and guerilla warfare, he did see the usefulness of harassing the enemy. He believed that successful raids, particularly while besieged at Quebec, lowered enemy morale, bolstered that of the Canadians, and maintained the offensive spirit in his troops. Langis did not disappoint him.

Langis was instrumental in harassing the English forces, particularly the British Rangers who had begun burning homesteads of *les habitants* during the siege of Quebec. He also crossed swords with Major Rogers on two more occasions. On the first, he discovered whaleboats that were used by Rogers and 142 Rangers for their raid on the Abenakis Native village of St. Francis. The subsequent pursuit ended with 69 Rangers dead or captured and the others narrowly escaping with their lives.<sup>254</sup>

The second encounter was even more successful. Despite the fall of Quebec in September 1759, Langis, operating from *Île aux Noix* (near Montreal), continued his aggressive raids. In February 1760, as Rogers was en route to Crown Point from Albany, his convoy of sleds was ambushed by Langis. Recognizing Rogers in the first sled, Langis focused his attack on the lead sled that carried the British Ranger leader. The initial volley killed the horses and Langis' force pounced on Rogers and his 16 recruits. In the ensuing melee, Rogers and seven others escaped to Crown Point. The other nine Rangers were killed or captured. Langis also seized thirty-two brand new muskets, 100 hatchets, fifty-five pairs of moccasins, and £3,961, the payroll for the troops at Crown Royal.<sup>255</sup>

His final raid was conducted six weeks later, once again near Crown Point. Representative of his skill and daring, Langis was able to capture two British regular officers, a Ranger officer and six troops without a firing shot. His luck, however, had

run out. Shortly after his return to Montreal with his prisoners, he drowned while trying to cross the St. Lawrence River in a canoe. Captain Pierre Pouchot noted the news in his journal, commenting that Langis was “the best leader among the colonial troops.”<sup>256</sup> An English paper also reflected that assessment. “Mons. Longee, a famous partisan, fell through the ice sometime and was drowned,” it reported, “his loss is greatly lamented by all Canada, and his equal is not to be found in that country.”<sup>257</sup>

In the end, the efforts of Marin and Langis, as well as the other French Canadian partisan leaders, failed against the concerted effort of the British. The strategy of *la petite guerre* that served New France so well for so long was, as Montcalm recognized, incapable of achieving a decisive strategic victory. However, it was, as it proved, an effective and cost efficient form of warfare that enabled New France to punch above its weight and give it greater military power than circumstances should have allowed. It turned the balance in the war of attrition against the Iroquois and it held at bay the English longer than should have been possible.

These achievements were only possible through the expert leadership and tactical capabilities of the French Canadian partisans who had an intimate knowledge of the North American wilderness and its methods of travel, survival and warfare. Their ability to conduct raids deep in enemy territory continually struck terror in the English frontier settlements and consistently disrupted, unbalanced and pre-empted English intentions and campaigns. They ensured the initiative, despite the disadvantage in resources, remained with the French for the greater part of the Seven Years War.

Moreover, these leaders had a sound understanding of the culture and temperament of their fellow Canadians, as well as the natives. As such, they were capable of leveraging the strengths of these irregulars and closing the disparity in numbers that existed in the military forces of the opposing sides. The deep strikes into English territory during the Seven Year’s War consistently disrupted British campaign plans and kept them on the defensive from the summer of 1755 until 1758. Moreover, it ravaged frontier settlements, economies and public morale. “We are under the utmost fear and consternation,” one English colonist complained, “upon accounts of the [French and] Natives having again began their murders and massacres in the province of Pennsylvania, upon the River Delaware adjoining to this province... These fresh depredations have so terrified us that we dare not go out to our daily



labour, for fear of being surprized and murdered....”<sup>258</sup> Similarly, an English officer angrily decried that “nothing is to be seen but desolation and murder, heightened with every barbarous circumstance, and new instances of cruelty - They, at the instigation of the French with them, burn up the plantations, the smoke of which darkens the day and hides the mountains from our sight.”<sup>259</sup>

The strategy was carried out year round, and it was both inexpensive and extremely successful. It was clearly an economy of effort. Small parties of Canadians and Natives terrorized the frontier and tied down large numbers of troops for rear security. The plight of the English colonists could not be ignored by their political leaders. The incursions into Virginia alone caused the Governor there to raise ten militia companies, a total of 1,000 men, for internal defence. Similarly, Pennsylvania raised 1,500 provincial troops and built a string of forts extending from New Jersey to Maryland in an attempt to try and impede the raiders.<sup>260</sup>

Moreover, the English militiamen were reluctant to undertake campaigns when they felt their families were at risk. The destruction of settlements, farms and livestock, as well as the murder or capture of settlers, ate away at the economy of the English colonies. Crops could not be sown or harvested. Grains could not be stored for the winter, or be used to feed the army on campaign. These shortages created privations for both soldier and citizen alike. The impact on the frontier was quite simply devastating.

In the end, however, it did not bring the English to the peace table. Nonetheless, this does not diminish the contribution of the French Canadians, particularly the intrepid partisan leaders, to the defence of New France. Their daring, expertise and tenacity was critical to both the economic and military vitality of the colony. Their knowledge and intimate interface with the native peoples provided the conduit through which trade, territorial expansion and alliances prospered. In times of war, these relationships translated into military power. The French Canadian partisan leaders could not only call on the tribes they had befriended, they could also lead them because they understood their culture, language and temperament. As such, Marin and Langis symbolize the epitome of the great French Canadian partisan leaders. Their efforts on behalf of the survival of Canada represent a proud martial legacy of duty and valour to their country.



# PREFACE TO CHAPTERS 4 & 5



The following two chapters diverge from the previous three. Chapters 4 and 5 are less academic and research orientated. Rather, they are more descriptive and action orientated. The first three chapters set the context and foundation for understanding the French and Indian War and the role of irregular warfare therein. The next two chapters describe two particular actions between French Canadians and their indigenous allies against Major Robert Rogers and his rangers. These chapters capture the difficulties and challenges of operating in the harsh environment, as well as the brutal, savage combat that occurred. They provide additional detail to the study of irregular warfare during the conflict, as well as a degree of human drama.





# CHAPTER 4

## HOLLOW OF DEATH: ROGERS' RANGERS DESPERATE FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL, 21 JANUARY 1757.<sup>261</sup>



Despite the cold January rain, Captain Robert Rogers was sweating profusely. He knew time was of the essence. He and his men were in a precarious position caught between two major French garrisons at Fort Saint-Frédéric and Fort Ticonderoga. Their survival lay in evading the French before they could muster a pursuing force capable of destroying the Rangers.

Rogers set a grueling pace and his Rangers made good time. However, his instincts, which had never betrayed him before, gnawed at him incessantly. “Keep spread out,” he cautioned to his men. Then, a thunderclap of muskets shattered the damp winter air. Rogers felt a sting of pain as a shot glanced across his forehead. His worst fear was now realized.

The “scout” gone bad had initially promised to be not only an adventure but yet another daring raid by the intrepid Robert Rogers and his Rangers. Ordered to conduct a scout by Major Sparks, the Commanding Officer of Fort Edward, Captain Rogers assembled a hand-picked team of experienced woodsmen comprised entirely of volunteers.<sup>262</sup> On 15 January 1757, Rogers, Lieutenant Stark, Ensign Page, as well as 50 Rangers departed Fort Edward for Fort William Henry at the head of Lake George, New York. There they prepared supplies and constructed snowshoes while they waited for reinforcements.

Two days later they were joined by Captain Speakman,<sup>263</sup> his officers, Lieutenant Kennedy, Ensign Brewer and fourteen of his men, as well as Ensign James Rogers

and fourteen men from Captain Hobbs' Ranger Company. The men were issued rations for two weeks (consisting of dried beef, sugar, rice and dried peas and corn-meal held in a shoulder knapsack slung over the shoulder and diluted rum in their canteen), sixty rounds of ammunition (ball and powder) and blankets which they draped over their heads and fastened to their waist belts.

Prior to sunset, that same day, they set off on their mission. They were tasked, as per normal, to reconnoiter to gain intelligence on the French garrison, specifically their strength and intentions, as well as cause as much "mischief" as possible, in order to disrupt, harass and destroy enemy forces, equipment and morale. Rogers chose to travel on the ice of Lake George to avoid the rugged, trackless mountainous terrain that framed the Lake George / Lake Champlain corridor. Traveling in "Indian File," they made good time despite the adverse weather conditions and halted for the night on the east side of the first narrows. The next morning Rogers discovered that eleven men had been injured because of the strenuous march. He immediately sent them back to Fort William Henry. His war party was now only seventy-four strong.

They continued twelve miles down the lake hugging the shoreline to avoid detection and encamped on the west side. The following day, after a final three miles on the lake, Rogers decided it was too dangerous to stay in the open and led his group off the ice. Strapping on snowshoes, they now took to the frozen forest. Progress was slow as they trudged through the deep snow and forced their way through the pines overburdened with snow. By 20 January, Rogers was parallel to the western side of Lake Champlain about three miles inland. Well behind enemy lines, the Rangers were on their guard as they penetrated even further into French dominated territory.

The next morning was ushered in on an ominous note. It was raining steadily. The Rangers dried their muskets under covered fires in pits dug out of the snow about three feet deep. Once this task was accomplished, they set off. They now changed course and stealthily marched due east under the dripping trees until they reached the ice of Lake Champlain. They were now approximately halfway between the French strong points of Fort Ticonderoga and Fort Saint-Frédéric (known as Crown Point by the English). It appeared as if good fortune was once again favouring the intrepid bush fighter and his men. Upon reaching the lake, as if on cue, the French were seemingly delivering a huge bounty to their antagonists.





Courtesy the Fort William Henry Corporation.

**A member of Rogers' Rangers in winter dress.**


Earlier, Sieur de Lusignan, the Commandant of Fort Ticonderoga dispatched a sergeant and fifteen men to escort a group of empty sleighs to Fort Saint-Frédéric to pick up badly needed supplies, namely fodder and rum. As the French soldiers bundled up against the wet cold and whipped their horses to begin their task, few, if any, had any idea of the danger that lurked ahead. The sleighs lumbered through the deep wet snow and quickly began to spread out as each team and driver settled into a comfortable pace.

Back at the edge of the lake, the Rangers immediately spied the lead sleds. Rogers quickly determined a plan of action. He ordered Lieutenant Stark with twenty men to cut off the lead sled, while he personally led another group to backtrack and act as a block should the sleighs try to retreat. He left Captain Speakman in the center with the remainder of the party. As Rogers hastened to get into position his heart suddenly sank. They had miscalculated their prey. There were an additional eight to ten more sleds than they had at first realized. Rogers quickly sent word to Stark to stay hidden.

The horses were the first to sense the intruders. The driver buried in his blankets and furs squinted into the distance as the cold rain lashed at his face. He noticed the threat too late. Although he tried to stop the sled and turn it around, the Rangers that poured onto the ice proved to be too agile, too quick and too many.

Rogers witnessed Stark and his group dash from the trees across the slippery snow to intercept the first sled. It became obvious that he had not received the warning. They were now committed. There was no turning back. Rogers reacted instantly and personally led his group into the fray. In fact, he captured the first prisoner as the lead sleigh tried to avoid Stark's men. Despite the frantic efforts of the Rangers, the rear-most sleds careened wildly away and back to the safety of Fort Ticonderoga. Pursuit was hopeless. In all, the Rangers captured three sleds, six horses and seven prisoners.

Their apparent dilemma did not elude Rogers or his men. However, not prone to panic, Rogers calmly interrogated his prisoners. The news, although not surprising, was unsettling. It appeared that 200 Canadians and forty-five Natives, all experienced in wilderness warfare, in the art of *la petite guerre* (ambuscades, raids, scouting and individual forest combat), had just arrived in Ticonderoga. An additional fifty Natives were also expected from Fort Saint-Frédéric any day now. All this added to an existing garrison of 600 French regular troops at Fort Saint-Frédéric and 350 at Fort Ticonderoga. Further to the distressing news was the admission by the prisoners that the magazines at the forts were well-stocked in preparation for a spring offensive against the English forts. The most disturbing revelation was the fact that the newly arrived reinforcements were well-equipped and "in a condition to march upon any emergency at the least notice."



The Lake George / Lake Champlain theatre of operations.

Having learned everything he needed to know, Rogers wasted no time. He knew that it was now a race for survival. He ordered his group to assemble and expeditiously marched through the wet, dripping pines to his camp from the previous night. This was a calculated risk. Although Rogers himself preached and adhered to the principle that one must never use the same route twice, particularly to return home after a sortie in enemy territory, he concluded in this instant that it was unavoidable. It was necessary first to return to their last campsite to rekindle their fires

to dry their guns in anticipation of combat with the French. Furthermore, as speed was now critical, he also believed that following a beaten path would expedite their escape, particularly in the wet snow and driving rain. It was not lost on any of the Rangers that the hunters had now become the hunted.

Meanwhile, back at Fort Ticonderoga the Rangers worst fears were quickly realized. As the first sleds came back into sight, the alarm was raised. The most inexperienced French soldier knew that there was only one reason for the unexpected return of the obviously terrorized sleigh teams - Rogers! Lusignan immediately sent off approximately 100 regular soldiers and colonial troops under the command of Captain Basserode. He was also fortuitous enough to have with him the experienced Ensign of *Les Troupes de la Marine*, Charles de Langlade, who led the Natives and Canadian volunteers, which numbered about ninety.<sup>264</sup> Together they hoped to intercept the English on their return to Fort William Henry.

As the Rangers dried their muskets, Rogers assembled his officers. Although many disagreed with Rogers' decision to retrace their steps, he overruled them and ordered them to prepare their soldiers for the march. As the rain continued to fall, the Rangers, with their muskets and powder carefully tucked under their blankets, which they wore as overcoats, set out in single file. Rogers and Lieutenant Kennedy were at the front, Captain Speakman in the center and the reliable Lieutenant Stark at the back. Sergeant Walker commanded the rear guard. The Rangers advanced approximately half a mile over broken ground in this formation when they reached a deep valley. The terrain was unforgiving and Rogers was extremely apprehensive.

Most of the other Rangers, however, were less preoccupied. Fatigued, wet and cold, they trudged along trying to keep up with the pace Rogers was setting. Most stared at the ground directly to their front. Knowing Rogers was at the lead brought a sense of security and confidence. His reputation as a bush fighter was only surpassed by his innate ability at navigation through the forbidding wilderness.

The Rangers were not the only soldiers marching expeditiously in the rain. The French sortie quickly departed the relative comfort of Fort Ticonderoga and boldly struck out to intercept the insolent English troops. Langlade and his Canadians and Natives broke trail as they were the sole personnel with snowshoes. Moreover, this was their type of war.

Langlade quickly deduced the route Rogers had taken. The rugged inhospitable terrain narrowed the options of approach and passage through the Adirondacks. He was soon rewarded as they came upon the Rangers' earlier path. The French followed this path until they came to a suitable ambush site. The constant rain and wetness had made their flintlocks unreliable. Therefore, they needed a spot where they could quickly fall upon and overwhelm the English interlopers.

At mid-afternoon, after marching only approximately a mile and a half, as the lead elements reached the top of the west side of yet another ravine, the sudden solitary roar of a musket discharging was quickly drowned out by a thunderclap of explosions as the nearly 200 Frenchmen, Canadians and Natives, deployed in a semicircle around the valley, unleashed their fire on the unsuspecting Rangers. Luckily, the volley was less than effective due to the wetness of the muskets. However, the French arrayed a mere five to thirty yards from the Ranger column now fell upon them with tomahawks and bayonets.

Despite the obvious disadvantage, the Rangers reacted quickly. The opening volley killed two and wounded several others, including Rogers, but instinct, as well as an ingrained sense of survival, took over. Rogers, known for his courage and coolness under fire, ordered his men to return fire and withdraw to the ridge on the far side. Lieutenant Stark and Sergeant Brewer seeing the crisis unfolding immediately formed up the rear of the column, approximately forty men, into a defensive posture on the high ground and prepared to cover the retreat of their comrades.

The struggle was desperate. The forward most Rangers became embroiled in savage hand to hand combat. Not all could break away. Those who could were hotly pursued and only reached the safety of the far hill as a result of the brisk fire from Stark's group which beat the French pursuers back. Not before several others had been killed or taken captive, however.

Rogers now deployed his remaining force. Lieutenant Stark and Baker held the center. Ensign Rogers and Sergeants Walter and Phillips were moved into a position in reserve to watch the enemy's movement and prevent the Rangers from being flanked. Both sides continued to exchange fire. Darkness was now the Rangers' only hope. Outnumbered, inundated with wounded, and low on ammunition, the Rangers were in a precarious position. Moreover, Rogers was unsure if French reinforcements were at this moment moving toward the battlefield.

The Rangers, however, were not the only ones in a precarious situation. Their seven prisoners faced an uncertain future. Unbeknownst to them their escort was ordered by Rogers to “knock them on the head” and kill them should the Rangers come under contact with the enemy to avoid having potential foes lurking amongst them if the situation became untenable. At the back of the column the prisoners could not see what was happening but, by the volume of gunfire, they rightly surmised that a French rescue party had arrived. Their good fortune was short lived. The Ranger guards quickly went about dispatching their charges so that they could move forward and assist unencumbered with the battle. For some unexplainable reason, only three of the captives were actually killed, the other four in the end were recovered by their French comrades.<sup>265</sup>

That was only one small drama of many that played itself out in the depth of the North American wilderness on that sodden January afternoon. No sooner had Rogers completed positioning his troops when the cry went up that the French were attempting to flank them on the right. Ensign Rogers and Sergeants Walter and Phillips quickly led the reserve in a quick counter attack and delivered a volley that beat back the French sortie. However, the French were not to be cheated of their prize and pressed an attack on the center. Fortunately for the Rangers, sheltered by large trees, they were able to keep up a steady accurate fire which inflicted substantial casualties on their antagonists forcing them to retire once again.

Tenaciously, the French attempted to flank the Rangers yet again, but were unable to do so because of the swift and effective response of Roger’s reserve force. This final defeat broke the spirit of the French. The regulars with no snowshoes were limited in their ability to manoeuvre floundering in the knee-deep wet snow. Furthermore, they were unaccustomed to this type of individualist combat. As a result, the French now settled into exchanging a steady, and not altogether ineffective, fire with the Rangers. Mr. Baker was one of several who was killed and Rogers himself sustained another wound taking a musket ball through his wrist which disabled him to such an extent that he was unable to load his musket. Fearing the impact on morale as a result of his latest wound, Rogers sent word by runner to his officers that he was fine and that all should keep up a diligent fire and hold their positions.

Rogers was not the only individual to sustain multiple wounds. Thomas Brown, a sixteen year old Ranger private was one of those wounded in the initial discharge with Rogers. Although he was able to make it back to the center of the Ranger



position and join in the firefight, his musket was soon disabled by an enemy ball that cut it off at the lock. He then took a ball in the knee and as he tried to withdraw to the rear of the position took another ball in the shoulder.

As the woods echoed with the clap of constant fire, darkness started to seep into the already overcast sky. Sensing their chance of capturing the “forest runners” was slipping away, the French attempted various stratagems to try and induce the Rangers to surrender. First they threatened them with dire consequences if they refused to submit, warning that a large number of reinforcements was on the way which would “cut” the Rangers “to pieces without mercy.” Other times, they flattered and cajoled them, “declaring it was a pity so many brave men should be lost.” This was always followed by a guarantee that upon surrender they would “be treated with the greatest compassion and kindness.” Rogers was singled out by name and given “the strongest assurances of their [French] esteem and friendship.”

As the light finally disappeared, both sides stopped firing. The cloak of darkness could not have come sooner. The Rangers had a large number of severely wounded who could not travel without assistance and their ammunition was almost exhausted. Moreover, their proximity to Fort Ticonderoga gave the enemy a distinct advantage. They could easily deploy additional forces and simply overwhelm the hard-pressed Rangers during night or at first light. Rogers decided to use the night to make his escape. He issued his orders expeditiously and those capable of marching set off.

The French stayed on the battlefield throughout the night attempting to track down the Rangers. During this period they received a reinforcement of twenty-five men, a convoy of food and munitions, as well as a surgeon and chaplain.<sup>266</sup> Although unable to come to grips with Rogers and his main body, the French were able to capture several of those too wounded to escape.

As such, for the seriously wounded, the night harbored no safety. Brown later explained that Captain Speakman, Baker and himself, all badly wounded had withdrawn to the rear of the position and built a small fire to keep warm. In the dark, they suddenly realized that they could no longer see or hear any of their men. Speakman called out to Rogers but received no reply. They now realized those Rangers capable of flight had departed. Thomas could barely walk and the other two “could scarcely move.” Therefore, the three decided to surrender to the French.



Courtesy the Fort William Henry Corporation.

**A member of Captain Spikeman's Company.**

Their plan, however, was not to be. Thomas spied a Native coming toward the small group huddled around the fire. He crawled away from the fire so that he could not be seen, although he was able to witness the horror that was about to unfold. “The Indian came to Captain Spikeman, who was not able to resist,” Brown explained, “and stripped him and scalped him alive.” Baker, who was lying next to Spikeman pulled out his knife and tried to kill himself but the Native stopped him and carried him away.

Witnessing this atrocity, Brown decided to attempt to escape as best he could. As he crept along, he passed the corpse of a Ranger. Not having shoes or leggings any longer, he stopped long enough to pull off the stockings, as he had no shoes, and he needed to protect his own legs. By now the French had become aware of the Ranger withdrawal and had made a fire and deployed large numbers of sentries on the Rangers' path. Brown, without shoes and with great loss of blood, despite his pain and agony, was able to elude capture until the next day.

At about noon, he heard shouts of Natives behind him and within minutes four of them came running toward him. Struck with fear, he threw off his blanket and

quickened his pace. Suddenly he heard the cocking of muskets. The Natives told Brown to stop. He refused, hoping for a quick death by being shot rather than the fate that befell Captain Speakman. The Natives soon overtook him but, surprisingly, did not kill him. They quickly rifled through his pockets and took his money. They then took some dry leaves and put them in his wounds. They then turned about and ordered Brown to follow them into captivity.<sup>267</sup>

That same morning the other surviving Rangers reached Lake George approximately six miles south of the French pickets. Once on the lake travel was somewhat easier. Rogers immediately dispatched Lieutenant Stark with two men to make best speed to Fort William Henry to arrange sleigh transport for the wounded.

Remarkably, Sergeant Joshua Martin, another one of the seriously wounded who was left behind because of a shattered hip and a stomach wound, refused to die. Dragging his injured body through the freezing cold snow, he limped and crawled in pursuit of the Ranger main body. On the morning after the battle, unlike Brown, he caught up with the others on the ice of Lake George.<sup>268</sup>

The following morning, 23 January 1757, a party of fifteen men and a sled under command of Lieutenant Buckley of Hobbs' Company of Rangers met the ragged column at the first narrows. That night, the survivors, forty-five effective and nine wounded, arrived at Fort William Henry.

The grim, bitter wilderness struggle was exceedingly costly. The Rangers suffered fourteen killed, six wounded and six captured - a total of twenty-six of seventy-four participants, or a casualty rate of thirty-five per cent. Rogers' estimates of French dead, which he claimed to be forty in his report to General Abercrombie and 116 in his later published journal, were both overly optimistic. French accounts revealed a toll of fourteen killed and twenty-four wounded.<sup>269</sup>

In what was not an unusual circumstance, both sides claimed a victory. However, each side interpreted the actions of their commanders in a different light. Rogers and his Rangers received praise for their bold strike at the French. At this juncture of the war, and particularly in this region, the Rangers represented the only real successful offensive strikes at the enemy. Their feats proved good for public morale. The high casualty toll was accepted by Rogers' superiors as the inevitable cost of such ventures.

As for the French, although the courage and efforts of the soldiery were commended, Lusignan, the Commandant of Fort Ticonderoga, actually earned censure from Louis-Antoine Comte de Bougainville, an aide to Lieutenant-General Montcalm. Despite the relative success of the French sortie, Bougainville criticized Lusignan for “having weakened his garrison considerably and thus running the risk of being taken [Fort Ticonderoga] by a surprise attack.”

The savage struggle at la Barbut Creek on that wet January afternoon never proved to be a critical tactical engagement of the war. Rather, it represented just another of a continuing series of “cat and mouse” engagements that framed much of how conflict in the North American wilderness was waged during the early years of the French and Indian War. Nonetheless, the contest was important. Constant scouts and raids served many vital functions. They provided intelligence and attacked the enemy, thus, depleting his physical and material strength, as well as his morale.

Rogers’ strike behind enemy lines, despite his close escape, proved important if for no other reason than to let the French and their Native allies know that they no longer owned the forests. Nonetheless, for the Rangers, the nondescript ravine in the Adirondacks became a hollow of death where they fought savagely for their survival.

# CHAPTER 5

## DEADLY ENCOUNTER AT WOOD CREEK, 8 AUGUST 1758.<sup>270</sup>



Tha-boom! The musket shot reverberated through the Adirondack wilderness shattering the morning stillness. Within seconds two more shots rang out and echoed through the forest.<sup>271</sup> Captain Joseph Marin, the veteran French Canadian partisan leader froze immediately. The enemy was close, very close. Marin quickly, but quietly, arranged his war party of 500 Canadians, *coureur de bois* and Natives into a crescent shaped ambush on the edge of the forest clearing. Within minutes the large force virtually vanished as they melted into the thick brush and awaited their unsuspecting prey.

Joseph Marin de la Malgue was no stranger to the English, particularly Rogers' Rangers. They had played a deadly game of "cat and mouse" for years and Marin was usually the victor. He was once again leading a war party against the British hoping to further demoralize the English by striking them at Fort Edward and Albany. They were emboldened by the French victory at Fort Ticonderoga a month earlier, on 8 July 1758, when Major-General Louis-Joseph De Montcalm's force of 3,600 turned away Major-General James Abercrombie's Army of 15,000. Although no immediate follow-up was taken by Montcalm, the arrival of more Canadians and their Native allies allowed the French to mount an active raiding campaign to keep the English off balance.

The emphasis on scouting and raiding was integral to the French strategy. For most of the war, the French owned the forests and their skilled Canadian and Native raiders bottled up garrisons and terrorized settlements tying down large forces in a defensive role. For instance, on 28 July, just three days earlier than the current impending showdown between Marin and Rogers, another French Canadian,

## PART I - BACKGROUND READINGS

La Corne, with 300 Canadians and Natives massacred a convoy of 116 men and women between Fort Edward and Half-way Brook. Upon hearing of the outrage, Major-General Abercrombie immediately ordered Major Robert Rogers and Major Israel Putnam with a combined force of 1,400 men to run down the impertinent La Corne. Despite their haste, they reached the narrow of Lake Champlain too late. La Corne just narrowly missed their noose. However, the stage was now set for yet another encounter between Marin and his nemesis Rogers.



Courtesy the Fort William Henry Corporation.

**Rogers' Ranger in green uniform.**

Three days later, on 28 July, eleven Rangers patrolling the Wood Creek approach from Fort Ticonderoga stumbled upon fresh tracks of a large Native war party. They pursued the trail for four miles where they decided to halt for a meal. Suddenly, the tables were turned and the hunter became the prey. The Rangers were surrounded and attacked by fifty Natives. In the desperate and savage struggle eight Rangers and seventeen Natives were killed and two Rangers were captured. Only one Ranger, Sergeant Hackett escaped. Ominously, on his flight to Fort Edward, he discovered additional fresh tracks of an even larger enemy war party apparently heading in the direction of Fort Edward and Albany.



Upon receiving the latest report, Abercrombie devised a plan to intercept and destroy the unidentified French raiding party. He sent a dispatch to Rogers and Putnam, who were currently still in the field, to take 700 chosen men and ten days of provisions and “sweep all that back country” of South Bay and Wood Creek to Fort Edward.

On the night of 31 July, Rogers and Putnam and their force camped on Sloop Island. The next day was spent preparing the expedition and on 2 August, Rogers and Putnam set off with separate groups to set ambushes at the junction of Wood Creek and East Bay and South Bay respectively. This expedition proved to be unproductive. Four days later Rogers and Putnam rejoined forces and marched to the decaying ruins of Fort St. Anne where they camped on the night of 7 August 1758.

Little had been accomplished to date. Other than the near capture of an enemy canoe with six warriors, there had been no sign of enemy forces. As such, vigilance began to slip. Already 170 soldiers were released and they returned to Fort Edward. Rogers’ command now numbered approximately 530 as they settled in for the night.

As the sun began to rise over the hills, Rogers and Putnam prepared for the westward march to Fort Edward. Inexplicably Rogers, the author of the famous “Standing Orders of Rogers’ Rangers,” which articulated rules on light infantry warfare in North America, demonstrated a lethal lapse of judgment. A friendly argument fueled by strong egos developed between Rogers and Ensign William Irwin of Gage’s Light Infantry Regiment in regard to who was the more skilled marksman. Words soon led to action and then a series of what would prove to be fatal shots rang out as they fired at marks to prove who was the better shot.<sup>272</sup>

As the thunderclaps echoed through the forests, not too far away, Marin’s reaction was instantaneous. His trained eye surveyed the ground and he quickly spotted an ideal ambush site. Equally swift, he developed a plan and deployed his forces. Between him and the unknown hostile force lay a clearing that was choked with alder and brush. It was dissected by a single narrow trail that led directly into the forest where Marin had positioned his men. The dense cover would allow the enemy to unwittingly walk right into Marin’s ambush location, literally the jaws of death without knowing it. By the time they realized the threat, it would be too late.

## PART I - BACKGROUND READINGS

Major Putnam led the column with his 300 Connecticut Provincials in the van. Behind him followed Captain James Dalyell with detachments from the 80<sup>th</sup> and 44<sup>th</sup> Regiments. Rogers brought up the rear with his Rangers and the remaining Provincials. Putnam marched right into the ambush. Lieutenant Tracy and three soldiers were suddenly overwhelmed and dragged into the thick brush. Then the French Canadians and their Native allies unleashed a lethal volley on the unsuspecting English troops caught in the open clearing. “The enemy rose as a cloud and fired upon us,” recorded one participant, “the tomahawks and bullets flying around my ears like hailstones.”<sup>273</sup>



Courtesy the Fort William Henry Corporation.

**Provincial soldier.**

Putnam immediately ordered his men to return fire and a deadly melee began in the thick alder brush and forest. But the odds were against them. “The enemy discovering them,” Dr. Caleb Rea recounted, “ambushed’m in form of a Semi Circle which gave the Enemy a great advantage of our men.”<sup>274</sup> The Provincial troops quickly broke and fell back behind the Regulars who were led forward by Captain Dalyell.

The battle now centred around a huge fallen tree. Marin pounded the British with four volleys of fire before the “Red Coats” managed to flank the tree and engage the

enemy in hand-to-hand combat. At this point, the momentum of the battle began to turn in favour of the British. Major Rogers was at the back of the column with his men. He quickly moved his forces to the sound of battle. The antagonists were now evenly matched and the action raged on for another hour.

The thick bush and alder at the edge of the forest turned the battle into a series of very personal battles as the close terrain prevented much group action. At one point, a monstrous Native chief who stood six feet, four inches tall, jumped upon the large fallen tree and killed two British Regulars who tried to oppose him. A British officer attempting to come to the aid of the stricken soldiers struck the giant with his musket to no avail. Although drawing blood, he only enraged the Native who was about to dispatch the officer with his tomahawk when Major Rogers proved his marksmanship and shot the Native Chief dead.

Marin now tried to outflank the British, by turning their right flank. He made four valiant attempts, however, Rogers and his Rangers were obstinate and gave no ground. As the inferno raged around him, Rogers sensed the flow of battle and reversed the initiative. He now began to shift his Rangers right in a bid to out-manoeuvre the French Canadians. Some Canadians began to break. Then, the Rangers charged. Half the Rangers would fire, while the other half would reload. In this manner they kept up a constant fire and movement forward. Under this constant fire and pressure, the remainder of the French Canadians gave way.

Marin was no novice in bush warfare, however. Realizing the situation, he avoided a rout and destruction of his force by dividing his surviving force into small parties and taking different withdrawal routes. The groups reunited later that night and made their bivouac in a secluded location surrounded by impenetrable swamp.

The British chose not to pursue. Rather they stayed on the battlefield and buried their dead. As always, the casualty figures vary. However, it appears that friendly losses added up to 53 killed, 50 wounded and four taken prisoner. The French suffered approximately 77 killed.<sup>275</sup>

Although, Rogers was partly responsible for creating the ambush due to his careless discharge of firearms, he received credit for driving the French Canadians away. One veteran believed that Rogers displayed “heroic good conduct” and that he “surrounded the enemy and obliged them to quit the field with the loss of their

chief and 200 men killed and missing, 80 left upon the field and three prisoners.”<sup>276</sup> Dr. Rea’s account was similar in its praise of Rogers. “As soon as the Enemy perceived Rogers Party flanking upon’m,” Rea explained, “they [French and Natives] retreated carrying off their dead and wounded what they could, our men pursued them not but took care of their Dead & wounded & came off so that it seems rather a Drawn Battle than either party victorious.”<sup>277</sup> Captain Dalyell later informed Major-General Abercrombie that Rogers “acted the whole time with great calmness and officer like.”<sup>278</sup> The accolades continued as Abercrombie reported back to British Prime Minister Pitt that “Rogers deserved much to be commended,” thus, increasing the fame of Rogers and his Rangers in Europe.<sup>279</sup>

Once the dead were buried, Rogers and his party continued their march for Fort Edwards carrying their wounded on litters made of strong branches with blankets strung over them. En route, a relief force of 400 soldiers under Major Munster, which included an additional forty Rangers, as well as a surgeon, met the column. Rogers then encamped for the night.

Although Rogers and his surviving force reveled in what they considered a victory that night, the encounter still proved potentially deadly for Major Putnam. After discharging his musket several times, his close proximity at the head of the column put him in a desperate position. Unable to reload, without support and confronted by the enemy, Putnam surrendered. He was unceremoniously tied to a tree, while his captors fought the remainder of Putnam’s column. During the course of the battle as it surged to and fro, Putnam found himself in the line of fire – musket balls whistling through the air close to his body. Some thudded into the tree to which he was bound.

The errant musket balls were not his only concern. Behind the enemy’s skirmish line Putnam became the centre of attention on a number of occasions. First, a young warrior took time from the battle to test Putnam’s nerve or his own accuracy or perhaps both. Repeatedly, the Native threw his tomahawk attempting to get as close to Putnam as possible without actually hitting him. Escaping harm, just barely on a number of throws, Putnam next had to deal with a French officer who attempted to discharge his musket into the prisoner’s chest. Fortuitously, the weapon misfired, and deaf to Putnam’s pleas for quarter, the Frenchman butt stroked Putnam across the jaw.

As the momentum of the battle began to swing in favour of the British, some Natives untied Putnam and dragged him along as they withdrew. A short distance away

from the battlefield, the Natives stopped and stripped Putnam of his belongings. He lost his coat, vest, stockings and shoes. And, in turn, he was loaded with as many of the packs of the wounded as could be piled upon him. Strongly pinioned and with his wrists tied as closely and tightly as possible so that he could be led by a cord, he was marched off into the wilderness at a quick pace.

Putnam's agony is not hard to imagine. His hands swelled from the tightness of his ligature causing him great pain. His bare feet ripped and torn from the hard terrain and brush bled openly. Exhausted, in pain and succumbing to the weight thrust upon him, Putnam deplored the Natives just to kill and scalp him now and get it done with it. A French officer intervened and ordered his hands untied and some of the weight removed. However, his respite was only temporary.

As the march continued, Putnam was continuously abused, and at one point a deep wound was inflicted on his cheek with a tomahawk. Worse yet, upon reaching the site where the French would encamp for the night, Putnam recoiled in horror as he realized what was about to happen. The Natives now stripped him naked and tied him to a tree. Enraged by the day's events and their lost comrades, the Natives had decided to roast Putnam alive. As the rope bit into his flesh, he could feel the rough bark of the tree dig into his back. To the accompaniment of high pitched screams, the Natives piled dry brush and sticks in small piles at a short distant from Putnam. Then they set the piles alight.

A sudden downpour doused the flames. However, not to be cheated, the Natives quickly nursed the piles of kindling until a fierce fire raged. Putnam soon felt the scorching heat and he squirmed his body from side to side in a futile attempt to avoid the searing heat. His discomfort and impending doom fuelled the excitement of his antagonists.

Putnam had resigned himself to his fate when a sudden commotion caught his attention. A French Canadian officer, who turned out to be no-one other than Marin himself, bullied his way through the crowd and kicked the burning piles aside. He then untied Putnam and castigated Putnam's tormentors. Marin stayed with Putnam until he could hand him over to the Native who had actually taken him prisoner. The worst was over. Upon arrival at Fort Ticonderoga, Putnam was interviewed by Major-General Montcalm and then escorted to Montreal by a French officer who "treated him with the greatest indulgence and humanity."<sup>280</sup>





# PREFACE TO CHAPTER 6



Chapter 6 differs from the remainder of the chapters as it is simply the reproduction of Major Robert Rogers’ “Rules or Plan of Discipline.” Major Rogers continually drilled his rangers at Rogers Island, adjacent to Fort Edward. He was a firm believer in training his men so that they would be as expert at irregular warfare as possible. Much of their survival would depend on their stealth, fieldcraft and fighting skills. As a result, he created a set of “rules,” arguably doctrine, which he expected his Rangers to know and follow. The 29 rules of ranging are as applicable today as they were when they were penned. They are provided with the original spelling and grammatical errors.





# CHAPTER 6

## MAJOR ROBERT ROGERS’ “RULES OR PLAN OF DISCIPLINE”<sup>281</sup>



I. All Rangers are to be subject to the rules and articles of war; to appear at roll-call every evening on their own parade, equipped, each with a firelock, sixty rounds of powder and ball, and a hatchet, at which time an officer from each company is to inspect the same, to see they are in order, so as to be ready on any emergency to march at a minute’s warning; and before they are dismissed the necessary guards are to be draughted, and scouts for the next day appointed.

II. Whenever you are ordered out to the enemies forts or frontiers for discoveries, if your number be small, march in single filed, keeping at such a distance from each other as to prevent one shot from killing two men, sending one man, or more, forward, and the like on each side, at the distance of twenty yards from the main body, if the ground you march over will admit of it, to give the signal to the officer of the approach of an enemy, and of their number, & c.

III. If you march over marshes or soft ground change your position, and march abreast of each other to prevent the enemy from tracking you (as they would do if you marched in a single file) till you get over such ground, and then resume your former order, and march till it is quite dark before you encamp, which do, if possible, on a piece of ground that may afford your centries the advantage of seeing or hearing the enemy some considerable distance, keeping one half of your whole party awake alternately through the night.

IV. Some time before you come to the place you would reconnoitre, make a stand, and send one or two men in whom you can confide, to look out the best ground for making your observations.

V. If you have the good fortune to take any prisoners, keep them separate, till they are examined, and in your return take a different route from that in which you went out, that you may the better discover any party in your rear, and have an opportunity, if their strength be superior to yours to alter your course, or disperse, as circumstances may require.

VI. If you march in a large body of three or four hundred, with a design to attack the enemy, divide your party into three columns, each headed by a proper officer, and let those columns march in single files, the columns to the right and left keeping at twenty yards distance or more from that of the center, if the ground will admit, and let proper guards be kept in the front and rear, and suitable flanking parties at a due distance as before directed, with orders to halt on all eminences, to take a view of the surrounding ground, to prevent your being ambuscaded, and to notify the approach or retreat of the enemy, that proper dispositions may be made for attacking, defending, & c. And if the enemy approach in your front on level ground form a front of your three columns or main body with the advanced guard, keeping out your flanking parties, as if you were marching under the command of trusty officers, to prevent the enemy from pressing hard on either of your wings, or surrounding you, which is the usual method of the savages, if their number will admit of it, and be careful likewise to support and strengthen your rear-guard.

VII. If you are obliged to receive the enemy's fire, fall, or squat down, till it is over, then rise and discharge at them. If their main body is equal to yours, extend yourself occasionally; but if superior, be careful to support and strengthen your flanking parties, to make them equal to theirs, that if possible you may repulse them to their main body, in which case push upon them with the greatest resolution with equal force in each flank and in the center, observing to keep at a due distance from each other, and advance from tree to tree with one half of the party before the other then or twelve yards. If the enemy push upon you, let your front fire and fall down, and then let your rear advance thro' them and do the like, by which time those who before were in front will be ready to discharge again, and repeat the same alternately, as occasion shall require; by this means you will keep up such a constant fire, that the enemy will not be able easily to break your order, or gain your ground.

VIII. If you oblige the enemy to retreat, be careful, in your pursuit of them, to keep out your flanking parties, and prevent them from gaining eminences, or rising grounds, in which case they would perhaps be able to rally and repulse you in turn.

IX. If you are obliged to retreat, let the front of your whole party fire and fall back, till the rear hath done the same, making for the best ground you can; by this means you will oblige the enemy to pursue you, if they do it at all, in the face of a constant fire.

X. If the enemy is so superior that you are in danger of being surrounded by them, let the whole body disperse, and every one take a different road to the place of rendezvous appointed for that evening, which must every morning be altered and fixed for the evening ensuing, in order to bring the whole party, or as many of them as possible, together after any separation that may happen in the day; but if you should happen to be actually surrounded, form yourselves into a square, or if in the woods, a circle is best, and if possible, make a stand till the darkness of the night favours your escape.

XI. If your rear is attacked, the main body and flankers must face about to the right and left, as occasion shall require, and form themselves to oppose the enemy, as before directed; and the same method must be observed, if attacked in either of your flanks, by which means you will always make a rear of one of your flank-guards.

XII. In general, when pushed upon by the enemy, reserve your fire till they approach very near, which will then put them into the greatest surprize and consternation, and give you an opportunity of rushing upon them with your hatchets and cutlasses to the better advantage.

XIV. When you encamp at night, fix your centries in such a manner as not to be relieved from main body till morning, profound secrecy and silence being often of the last importance in these cases. Each centry therefore should consist of six men, two of whom must be constantly alert, and when relieved by their fellows, it should be done without noise; and in case those on duty see or hear anything, which alarms them, they are not to speak, but one of them is silently to retreat, and acquaint the commanding officer thereof, that proper dispositions may be made; and all occasional centries should be fixed in like manner.

XV. At the first dawn of day, awake your whole detachment; that being the time when the savages chuse to fall upon their enemies, you should by all means be in readiness to receive them.

XVI. If the enemy should be discovered by your detachments in the morning, and their numbers are superior to yours, and a victory doubtful, you should not attack them till the evening, as then they will not know your numbers, and if you are repulsed, your retreat will be favoured by the darkness of the night.

XVII. Before you leave your encampment, send out small parties to scout round it, to see if there be any appearance or track of an enemy that might have been near you during the night.

XVIII. When you stop for refreshment, chuse some spring or rivulet if you can, and dispose your party so as not to be surprised, posting proper guards and centries at a due distance, and let a small party waylay the path you came in, lest the enemy should be pursuing.

XIX. If, in your return, you have to cross rivers, avoid the usual fords as much as possible, lest the enemy should have discovered, and be there expecting you.

XX. If you have to pass by lakes, keep at some distance from the edge of the water, lest, in case of an ambuscade or an attack from the enemy, when in that situation, your retreat should be cut off.

XXI. If the enemy pursue your rear, take a circle till you come to your own tracks, and there form an ambush to receive them, and give them the first fire.

XXII. When you return from a scout, and come near our forts, avoid the usual roads, and avenues thereto, lest the enemy should have headed you and lay in ambush to receive you, when almost exhausted with fatigues.

XXIII. When you pursue any party that has been near our forts or encampments, follow not directly in their tracks, lest they should be discovered by their rear-guards, who, at such a time, would be most alert; but endeavour, by a different route, to head and meet them in some narrow pass, or lay in ambush to receive them when and where they least expect it.

XXIV. If you are to embark in canoes, battoes, or otherwise, by water, chuse the evening for the time of our embarkation, as you will then have the whole night before you, to pass undiscovered by any parties of the enemy, on hills, or other places, which command a prospect of the lake or river you are upon.



XXV. In paddling or rowing, give orders that the boat or canoe next the sternmost, wait for her, and the third for the second, and the fourth for the third, and so on, to prevent separation, and that you may be ready to assist each other on any of emergency.

XXVI. Appoint one man in each boat to look out for fires, on the adjacent shores, from the numbers and size of which you may form some judgement of the number that kindled them, and whether you are able to attack them or not.

XXVII. If you find the enemy encamped near the banks of a river or lake, which you imagine they will attempt to cross for their security upon being attacked, leave a detachment of your party on the opposite shore to receive them, while, with the remainder, you surprize them, having them between you and the lake or river.

XXVIII. If you cannot satisfy yourself as to the enemy's number and strength, from their fire, conceal our boats at some distance, and ascertain their number by a reconnoitring party, when they embark, or march, in the morning, marking the course they steer, when you may pursue, ambush, and attack them, or let them pass, as prudence shall direct you. In general, however, that you may not be discovered by the enemy on the lakes and rivers at a great distance, it is safest to lay by, with your boats and party concealed all day, without noise or shew, and to pursue your intended route by night; and whether you go by land or water, give out parole and countersigns, in order to know one another in the dark, and likewise appoint a stations for every man to repair to, in case of any accident that may separate you.

# “STANDING ORDERS ROGERS’ RANGERS”



A modernized abbreviated version of Robert Rogers’ “Rules or Plan of Discipline,” captures a rustic charm and pragmatism that is used to help modern day soldiers with patrolling. Notably, they are a modern creation and are not the original rules set by Major Rogers. Nonetheless, they have been posted on the modern day United States 75<sup>th</sup> Ranger Regiment website.<sup>282</sup> The “Standing Orders of Rogers’ Rangers” are given as:

1. Don’t forget nothing.
2. Have your musket clean as a whistle, hatchet scoured, sixty rounds powder and ball, and be ready to march at a minute’s warning.
3. When you’re on the march, act the way you would if you was sneaking up on a deer. See the enemy first.
4. Tell the truth about what you see and what you do. There is an army depending on us for correct information. You can lie all you please when you tell other folks about the Rangers, but don’t ever lie to a Ranger or officer.
5. Don’t never take a chance you don’t have to.
6. When we’re on the march we march single file, far enough apart so one shot can’t go through two men.
7. If we strike swamps, or soft ground, we spread out abreast, so its hard to track us.
8. When we march, we keep moving till dark, so as to give the enemy the least possible chance at us.
9. When we camp, half the party stays awake while the other half sleeps.

## PART I - BACKGROUND READINGS

10. If we take prisoners, we keep'em separate till we have had time to examine them, so they can't cook up a story between'em.
11. Don't ever march home the same way. Take a different route so you won't be ambushed.
12. No matter whether we travel in big parties or little ones, each party has to keep a scout 20 yards ahead, 20 yards on each flank, and 20 yards in the rear so the main body can't be surprised and wiped out.
13. Every night you'll be told where to meet if surrounded by a superior force.
14. Don't sit down to eat without posting sentries.
15. Don't sleep beyond dawn. Dawn's when the French and Natives attack.
16. Don't cross a river by a regular ford.
17. If somebody's trailing you, make a circle, come back onto your own tracks, and ambush the folks that aim to ambush you.
18. Don't stand up when the enemy's coming against you. Kneel down, lie down, hide behind a tree.
19. Let the enemy come till he's almost close enough to touch, then let him have it and jump out and finish him up with your hatchet.



# PART II



## THE BATTLEFIELD STUDY



# THE LAKE CHAMPLAIN BATTLEFIELD STUDY



Many historians have called the Lake Champlain / Richelieu River valley an invasion corridor. The reason is simple. The waterway makes a direct connection between the St. Lawrence River, on which Montreal and Quebec in New France were located and the northern extremities of the British colonies. As such, a potential invader would need access to this “water highway” in order to attack their enemy.


Both the French and the English fortified their respective territories. The French built Fort Saint-Frédéric and Fort Ticonderoga at strategic points along Lake Champlain to control access to New France and to prevent an enemy from moving north to attack Montreal or Quebec. Similarly, the British built Fort William Henry on the shore of Lake George and Fort Edward further in-land to stop any aggressor from attacking south into the British Colonies. This strategically important terrain became known as the Lake Champlain theatre of operations and was a deadly battleground.

Since the waterways were the most efficient means of moving large numbers of troops and equipment to launch an attack, both sides were actively scouting and patrolling in an effort to discover what the enemy was planning, and, if possible, to launch attacks that would destroy and disrupt enemy plans. Not surprisingly, it became the battleground for the French Canadian raiders and Rogers’ Rangers.

During the French and Indian War period there were countless scouts, raids, ambushes and skirmishes between the irregular forces of both the English and French on these contested grounds. As such, the Lake Champlain battlefield study touches on a wide variety of topics of importance and interest to the military professional.



# The North American Theatre of Operations 1754-1760



Map by Chris Johnson


# DAY 1



## STOP 1

The Study begins in Lake George, New York. The first stop is the site of the Battle of Lake George, on 8 September 1755. This landmark engagement witnessed a British force of 1,500 colonial troops under Major-General William Johnson, reinforced by 200 Mohawk warriors led by King Hendrick, defeat a French force of 1,500 under Baron de Dieskau, the French Commander-in-Chief, at Lake George after a particularly bloody battle. Johnson's intention was to advance on the French Fort Saint-Frédéric at the narrows of Lake Champlain. In an attempt to pre-empt the British attack, Dieskau decided to launch a raid on Fort Edward, where Johnson was staging. They eventually fought an engagement near the present day site of the village of Lake George. It was after this engagement that the British decided to build Fort William Henry as their northern most outpost as a block to the French. The French, who withdrew to Lake Champlain, commenced to build Fort Carillon, or Fort Ticonderoga as it was called by the English, as their southern-most fortification along the Lake Champlain theatre of operations.


LAC, C-6488.



The Battle of Lake George.

## STOP 2

Not surprisingly then, the next place of interest is the historic site Fort William Henry. The Fort was named after Prince William, the younger son of King George II and Prince William Henry, a grandson of King George II. Its main purpose was to act as a staging post for an eventual attack against the French at Fort Ticonderoga and Fort Saint-Frédéric. As such, it was a strategic location on the frontier between the English colonies and New France. The Fort itself was of wooden construction with bastions on the corners. Its walls were 9.1 metres thick, with log facings around an earthen filling. A dry moat surrounded three sides of the Fort. The fourth side sloped down to the lake itself. Access to the Fort was limited to a bridge across the moat. Within the Fort were two storey high wooden barracks, a magazine and a hospital. The Fort could house approximately 400-500 men. Additional troops were quartered in an entrenched camp about 700 metres southeast of the Fort.



Source: *Mémoires Sur le Canada* (Québec : Imprimerie de Middleton & Dawson, 1873).

The Fort itself is of great value to study and this landmark is also used to discuss the Fort William Henry massacre. In late July 1757, Lieutenant-Colonel George Munro, the Commander of Fort William Henry, learned that the French were planning to attack. He received reinforcements and his command swelled to 2,300 troops who began to prepare to defend the Fort and surrounding fortifications. However, conditions in the Fort were poor and there was an outbreak of smallpox. As expected, Montcalm and his attacking force of 8,000, which consisted of 3,000 regular soldiers, 3,000 militia and 2,000 Natives, arrived on 3 August and began siege

operations and bombarding the Fort immediately. After several days, the British had suffered hundreds of casualties and had lost a number of their heavy canons and mortars. In addition, the Fort walls were breached in a number of locations. With no hope of reinforcement, Munro surrendered on 9 August 1757, to very generous terms. Montcalm allowed Munro to march out of the Fort with colours flying and his troops were allowed to keep their weapons and officers their baggage. However, all British personnel were not to engage in the war for 18 months and all French prisoners captured since 1754 were to be released within three months.



**Fort William Henry.**

Fort William Henry Museum.

The following morning the British garrison formed up to march south to Fort Edward, 22 kilometres away. As they were making their preparations Natives entered the fort and surrounding buildings and killed and scalped wounded British soldiers who were unable to make the march. They also began to loot stores from the buildings. They then began to swarm the column and snatch weapons, clothing and individuals. Those who resisted were killed or dragged away. As the column began to march away, the Natives attacked its rear elements. Montcalm and other French officers attempted to stop their allies but met with limited success.



## PART II - THE BATTLEFIELD STUDY

Under constant attack the column disintegrated as individuals attempted to escape. In the end, British casualties have been estimated at approximately 200. However, the Natives suffered from their actions as well. They killed and scalped sick and wounded individuals, as well as dug up graves of those who died to retrieve scalps. In addition, they took clothing and blankets from the British. Many of those items, as well as scalps, were infected with smallpox, a disease to which the Natives had no immunity. As a result, the disease cut a swath of death through numerous Native villages.



MONTCALM TRYING TO STOP THE MASSACRE.

US Library of Congress.

In the end, the event strained relations between Montcalm and his Native allies. It also enraged the British who held Montcalm and the French responsible for the atrocities committed, since Montcalm had promised Munro protection. As a result, when the French capitulated at Montreal, in 1760, the British refused to grant them the honours of war, specifically the right to keep their regimental colours, because of the events at Fort William Henry.

# DAY 2



## STOP 1

Rogers Island and the Rogers Island Visitor Centre. Rogers Island, which was adjacent to Fort Edward, was the northern most British fortification on the Lake Champlain / Lake George theatre of operations up until the construction of Fort William Henry. Between the years 1756 to 1759, Robert Rogers used the island for his barracks, as well as a training ground. The Rogers Island Visitor Centre, located on Rogers Island, houses background information on Robert Rogers, as well as archeological exhibits on the excavation of Rogers Island.



Monument to Rogers Rangers on Rogers Island.

## STOP 2

Landing site of the British attack on Fort Ticonderoga. On 6 July 1758, the British under Major-General James Abercrombie conducted an unopposed landing at the north end of Lake George. This stop exams the landing, the difficulty of the terrain and the approach march to Fort Ticonderoga and sets the stage for the next stop.

### STOP 3

The site of the death of Lord George Howe. After the landing, French forces under Captain Trépezet, who were observing the approach of the British invasion flotilla attempted to return to French lines. However, they became disoriented and in the area of Bernetz Brook they ran into British troops that were led by Brigadier-General Howe and Major Robert Rogers, who were conducting a reconnaissance. During the skirmish Lord Howe, who Major-General James Wolfe described as “the best officer in the British Army,” was killed. Lord Howe is credited with the creation of light infantry and his reforms in North America had a dramatic effect on tactics and dress, and as a result, the effectiveness of British infantry in North America. He was the “brains” behind Abercrombie’s Army and with his death the attack against Fort Ticonderoga was doomed to failure.

### STOP 4

Mount Defiance. This stop provides a panoramic view of Fort Ticonderoga and the Battle of Ticonderoga. Additionally, it is vital ground that was used during the American War of Independence to lay siege to Fort Ticonderoga.



View of Fort Ticonderoga from Mount Defiance.



## STOP 5

Battle of Ticonderoga. The Battle of Ticonderoga was fought on 8 July 1758, about one kilometre from Fort Ticonderoga itself. The French force of approximately 4,000 men, under Major-General Montcalm, dug entrenchments on high sloping ground on the approach to the fort itself, which Montcalm felt was more defensible ground. His opponent, Major-General Abercrombie, had a force of 17,000 men, the largest seen to date in North America. Confident of success due to his numbers, Abercrombie launched frontal assaults against the French breastworks, which were strengthened by the use of abattis. Abercrombie attacked without the assistance of artillery because he feared delaying the attack to wait for the artillery to be dragged forward would provide more time for the French to prepare.

As a result, the attack began at noon. The British launched no fewer than six assaults against the entrenchments. For the attacking British troops, all they could see was the end of the hats and musket barrels of the French. By seven o'clock that night the British soldiers finally gave up and withdrew to their landing place. Many of the troops were completely demoralized and continued the withdrawal back to Fort William Henry. The French defenders were exhausted and did not pursue the retreating British forces. They cleaned their muskets and slept in the entrenchments expecting another series of attacks in the morning. On 10 July, not having seen any sign of movement from the British, Montcalm sent out a reconnaissance party which confirmed that Abercrombie's Army had disappeared. The French had won a decisive victory. Historians estimate that the British suffered approximately 2,500 casualties, the French 377. This became a turning point for French strategy in North America.

The Battle of Ticonderoga.



From James Grant, *British Battles on Land and Sea* (London: Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1899)

## STOP 6

Fort Ticonderoga, originally called Fort Carillon by the French, was built in 1755 at the mouth of the La Chute River, which connected Lake George and Lake Champlain. The Fort was designed to control the portage between the lakes. The Fort is completely rebuilt and provides an outstanding showcase to the period through its amazing displays, exhibits and rebuilt fortifications.



Fort Ticonderoga.





Fort Ticonderoga.

# DAY 3



## STOP 1

Fort Saint-Frédéric / Crown Point. This location is the site of the ruins to both the French Fort Saint-Frédéric and the ruins of the British fortification known as Crown Point. The site highlights the strategic importance of the terrain. At this point Lake Champlain narrows to such an extent that any transit can be easily interdicted. Construction on Fort Saint-Frédéric began in 1734. The French built the Fort to control the frontier between New France and the British colonies to the south. The Fort was never directly attacked. During the British advance in 1759, the French destroyed the Fort and withdrew to Montreal and Quebec.



Fort Saint-Frédéric.

Artwork by Ted Zuber.





**Ruins of Fort Saint-Frédéric.**

The British, realizing the value of the strategic piece of ground began to build their own massive fortification approximately 100 metres southwest of the French ruins, in 1759. Having conquered New France, the British left only a skeletal force at Crown Point after the war. In 1775, the fort was quickly captured by revolutionary forces, but was later abandoned to the British in 1777 after the failed invasion of Canada. In 1780, the British abandoned the fort.



**Ruins of Crown Point.**

## STOP 2

Fort Chambly. Originally built of wood in 1675 as one of five forts to protect the outer frontier of New France from Iroquois depredations, it was burned by the Natives in 1702. Although rebuilt in the same year, nine years later it was rebuilt of stone to act as a block to any invasion from the southern colonies. However, once Fort Saint-Frédéric was built, Fort Chambly became redundant and was subsequently used as a staging point and warehouse for operations to the south. The Fort remains an important marker of the French strategy in North America.



Fort Chambly.





# DAY 4



## STOP 1

Île d'Orléans. It is located in the St. Lawrence River approximately five kilometres east of Quebec City. Major-General James Wolfe used it as a major encampment during the siege of Quebec in 1759. The location provides a spectacular opportunity to view Wolfe's vantage point while he was planning his attack on Quebec. It also furnishes a clear view of the challenges facing the British at Quebec, Beauport and Montmorency Falls.



View from Île d'Orléans.

## STOP 2

Montmorency Falls. This scenic location, boasting the highest water falls in the province of Quebec, was named by Samuel de Champlain in 1613. The ground to the east, was also the location of a fortified camp that Major-General Wolfe built

## PART II - THE BATTLEFIELD STUDY

on 9 July 1759, from which he could observe and bombard the French positions in Beauport. On 31 July, Wolfe attempted a major amphibious operation at Beauport, adjacent to Montmorency Falls, in an attempt to capture French entrenchments and thereby outflank and draw out his opponent Lieutenant-General Montcalm. The attack was a costly failure for the British. British entrenchments are still visible on the east bank of the Montmorency River.



**Montmorency Falls.**



**View of Beauport from Montmorency Falls.**



## STOP 3

L'Anse-au-Foulon, also known as Wolfe's Cove, is located approximately two and a half kilometres west of Quebec City. This is the site where British forces landed and scaled a steep trail to gain access to the Plains of Abraham.




LAC, C-000788.

The landing at L'Anse-au-Foulon.

## STOP 4

Plains of Abraham are currently part of the Battlefields Park in Quebec City. This historic location is where the pivotal battle was fought between Wolfe and Montcalm on 13 September 1759, which would eventually go on to decide the fate of North America. The plains are believed to be named after a river pilot and fisherman, Abraham Martin who moved to Quebec in 1635 and was subsequently granted 32 acres of land by the Company of New France. The property was divided between the lower town and the promontory west of the Citadelle of Quebec. A battlefield interpretation centre, as well as numerous site markers allow for a very in-depth understanding of the battle, the challenges and the eventual outcome.



Parks Canada Exhibit.

Battle lines, 13 September 1759.





The battle of the Plains of Abraham.

LAC, C-139911.





# DAY 5



## STOP 1

The day is dedicated to exploring the Old City (i.e. old Quebec City). The Citadelle, Artillery Park, The Fortifications of Quebec museum(s), Montcalm's residence, the walled city itself, as well as other historic buildings, sites and monuments. This exploration allows for a complete understanding of the strategic value of Quebec, its evolution and its important place in Canadian military history.



Artillery Park.



Period homes in the Old City.

# RECOMMENDED READING



Anderson, Fred. *The War That Made America. A Short History of the French and Indian War*. New York: Viking, 2005.

----- *Crucible of War*. New York: Vintage Books, 2001.

Brumwell, Stephen. *Redcoats. British Soldiers and War in the Americas, 1755-63*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2002.

Horn, Bernd. *Battle Cries in the Wilderness: The Struggle for Colonial North America*. Toronto: Dundurn, 2011.

Leckie, Robert. *A Few Acres of Snow. The Saga of the French and Indian Wars*. Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1999.

Loescher, Burt Garfield. *The History of Rogers Rangers. Volume I - The Beginnings Jan 1755 - 6 April 1758*. Bowie, Maryland: Heritage Books, Inc., (1946) reprint 2001.

----- *Genesis Rogers Rangers. Volume II - The First Green Berets*. San Mateo, California, 1969. Reprint - Bowie, Maryland: Heritage Books, Inc., 2000.

----- *The History of Rogers' Rangers. Volume IV. The St. Francis Raid*. Bowie, Maryland: Heritage Books, Inc., 2002.

MacLeod, D. P. *Northern Armageddon. The Battle of the Plains of Abraham*. Toronto: Douglas & McIntyre, 2008.

----- *The Canadian Iroquois and the Seven Years' War*. Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1996.

## RECOMMENDED READING

- Nester, William R. *The French and Indian War and the Conquest of New France*. Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2014.
- Preston, David. *Braddock's Defeat*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Ross, John F. *War on the Run*. New York: Bantam Books, 2009.
- Snow, Dan. *Victory or Death. The Battle for Quebec and the Birth of Empire*. London: Harper Press, 2009.
- Stacey, C.P. *Quebec, 1759. The Siege and the Battle*. Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, reprint 2002, Donald Graves, ed.
- Steele, Ian K. *Betrayals. Fort William Henry & the Massacre*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Weidensaul, Scott. *The First Frontier*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012.

# ENDNOTES



## INTRODUCTION

- 1 *Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Vol III, 1741-1770* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), 261.
- 2 John R. Cuneo, *Robert Rogers of the Rangers* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 33.
- 3 *Ibid.*, 32-33.

## CHAPTER 1

- 4 A version of this chapter was first published in Bernd Horn, “*La petite guerre*: A Strategy of Survival,” in Bernd Horn, ed., *The Canadian Way of War. Serving the National Interest* (Toronto: Dundurn, 2006), 21-56.
- 5 For example, in 1758, Colonel Louis-Antoine de Bougainville was dispatched to Versailles by Pierre Rigaud de Vaudreuil, the Governor of New France, and Major-General Louis Joseph de Montcalm, the French Field Force Commander in Canada, to plead the case for a large number of reinforcements. However, the Minister of Marine, reflecting the dire strategic situation of France at the time, bluntly told him, “When the house is on fire, you don’t worry about the stables.” Edward P. Hamilton, ed., *Adventures in the Wilderness. The American Journals of Louis Antoine de Bougainville, 1756-1760* (University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 322-323 [Hereafter *Bougainville Journal*].
- 6 The literal translation is small war. European understanding of ‘petite guerre’ is “carried on by a light party, commanded by an expert partisan ... separated from the army, to secure the camp or a march; to reconnoiter the enemy or the country; to seize their posts, convoys and escorts; to plant ambushes, and to put in practice every stratagem for surprising or disturbing the enemy.” M. Pouchot, *Memoirs on the Late War in North America between France and England* (originally Yverdon, 1781- reprint Youngstown, NY: Old Fort Niagara Association, Inc., 1994), 242. See also Hew Strachan, *European Armies and the Conduct of War* (New York: Routledge, 1983), 30-37; and Ian McCulloch, “Within Ourselves...The Development of British Light Infantry in North America During the Seven Years’ War,” *Canadian Military History*, Vol 7, No. 2 (Spring 1998), 44-45.
- 7 The allure of the wilderness and the freedom it ingrained in the inhabitants remained a constant irritant to French administrators and regular officers. The Canadian traits criticized the most by French administrators were idleness, indiscipline and insubordination. Peter N. Moogk, *La Nouvelle France. The Making of French Canada - A Cultural History* (East Lansing: University of Michigan Press, 2000), 144. Bougainville stated, “In all ways they are, most of them, more undisciplined, more lazy than the Indians.” He added, “...Canadians, breathing an air permeated with independence, work indolently.” *Bougainville Journal*, 51, 195, 259.
- 8 Bruce G. Trigger, “The French Presence in Huronia: The Structure of Franco-Huron Relations in the First Half of the Seventh Century,” *The Canadian Historical Review*, Vol 49, No. 2 (June 1968), 118. The Iroquois confederacy (Five Nations) consisted of the Cayuga, Oneida, Onondaga, Mohawk and Seneca tribes. The Tuscarora joined the confederacy in the first quarter of the

eighteenth century. The Huron viewed the Iroquois as “devil men, who needed nothing, and were hard to kill.” George T. Hunt, *The Wars of the Iroquois. A Study of Intertribal Trade Relations* (Milwaukee: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 93. See also William R. Nester, *The Great Frontier War. Britain, France, and the Imperial Struggle for North America, 1607-1755* (Westport: Praeger, 2000), 96; Robert A. Goldstein, *French-Iroquois Diplomatic and Military Relations, 1609-1701* (Paris: Mouton, 1969), 29-47.

9 W.J. Eccles, *The French in North America 1500-1783* (Markham, ON: Fitzheny & Whiteside, 1998), 21-23; and Marcel Trudel, “Samuel de Champlain,” in George Brown, ed., *Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Vol 1* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), 186-199. See also W.J. Eccles, *France in America* (Markham, ON: Fitzheny & Whiteside, 1990), 103; and Goldstein, 48-54.

10 Statement by Jean Talon in 1667, Cited in Hunt, 135. Jesuit missionary Jean de Lamberville wrote in 1682, that the Iroquois “are ready to fall upon Canada on the first occasion that shall be given to them.” Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents. Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France, 1610-1791, Vol 62* (New York: Pageant Book Company, 1959), 14.

11 *The Conquest of Canada*, Vol II (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1850), 93.

12 Hunt, 92; Trudel, 31; René Chartrand, *Canadian Military Heritage, Vol 1, 1000-1754* (Montreal: Art Global Inc., 1993), 55-56.

13 Letter, Vaudreuil et Raudot au Ministre, 14 November 1708, Cited in Eccles, *The French in North America*, 41. There were major similarities in torture between most Native tribes - running the gauntlet, slow burning, application of a necklace of hot tomahawks, piercing of flesh, slicing pieces of flesh for consumption / cannibalism, feeding a captive his own fingers and ears, mutilation, sticking burning torches into flesh, scalping prisoners before death, pouring live coals and hot sand onto scalped head, dissection of body after death, fastening to a stake, and torture of both sexes and all ages. See Raymond Scheele, “Warfare of the Iroquois and their Northern Neighbours,” unpublished PhD (Political Science) Thesis, Columbia University, 1950, 100-101; Charles Hamilton, ed., *Braddock’s Defeat. The Journal of Captain Robert Chalmley’s Batman; The Journal of a British Officer; Halkett’s Orderly Book* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1959), 30; Frederick Drimmer, ed., *Captured by the Indians. 15 Firsthand Accounts 1750-1870* (New York: Dover Publications Ltd., 1961), 9-104; Andrew Gallup, ed., *Memoir of a French and Indian War Soldier* [Jolicoeur Charles Bonin] (Bowie, Maryland: Heritage Books, Inc., 1993), 115-17; Letter, Father Pierre Roubaud, Missionary, 21 October 1757, in Thwaites, Vol 60, 123-128; Letter from Father le Petit, Missionary, 12 July 1730, Thwaites, Vol 68, 167 & 169; Letter, Father Jean de Lamberville, in Thwaites, Vol 62, 71-77; Captain John Knox, *An Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North-America for the Years 1757, 1758, 1759, and 1760. Vol 1* (London: 1769), 232; and William M. Osborn, *The Wild Frontier* (New York: Random House, 2000), 37.

14 W.J. Eccles, *Canada Under Louis XIV* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1964), 46. From 1633 until the end of the century the Canadians realized less than 15 years of peace. Between 1608 and 1666 - 191 settlers were killed by the Iroquois out of a population that numbered 675 in 1650 and 3,035 in 1663. Eccles, *The French in North America*, 40-41.

15 Drafts normally numbered between 50-200 at a time for short durations.

16 Cited documents, display, Fort Chambly National Historic Site of Canada, Chambly, Quebec. Accessed 23 August 2001.



17 Ibid.

18 See Pierre Boucher, *Histoire véritable et naturelle des moeurs et productions de la Nouvelle-France vulgairement dite le Canada* (Paris: Florentin Lambert, 1664), National Library of Canada, Rare Books Collection. See also Michel Wyczynski, "New Horizons - New Challenges: The Carignan-Salières Regiment in New France, 1665-1667," in B. Horn, ed, *Forging a Nation: Perspectives on the Canadian Military Experience* (St. Catharines: Vanwell Publishers, 2002), 18-19.

19 Wyczynski reveals, "The information provided by Boucher and by others was regrettably never passed along to the French administrators overseeing the outfitting phase of the Carignan-Salières Regiment. Many factors contributed to this lack of foresight: winter warfare was not part of the French Army's doctrine; the cost factor to provide winter clothing and required equipment was prohibitive; both the French and New France administrators were operating with limited budgets; and since the King had agreed to send a regiment, it was expected that the colony provide supplies and equipment during the troops operations in the colony." Wyczynski, "New Horizons," 18-19.

20 Matthew Dennis, *Cultivating a Landscape of Peace. Iroquois-European Encounters in Seventeenth-Century America* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), 212.

21 See Jack Verney, *The Good Regiment. The Carignan-Salières Regiment in Canada, 1665-1668* (Montreal: McGills / Queens Press, 1991), 3-17; Wyczynski, 21; and Goldstein, 90-91. The colony's newly appointed Governor, Daniel Rémy de Courcelle, and the Intendant, Jean Talon, both sailed with the Carignan-Salières Regiment to New France. Chartrand, *Canadian Military Heritage, Vol 1*, 54.

22 This was not the first fort to be built on the Richelieu River. In 1642, Governor Montmagny, with a recently arrived contingent of 40 soldiers built a fort at the mouth of the Richelieu River in the present day city of Sorel. See Chartrand, *Canadian Military Heritage, Vol 1*, 54.

23 See Verney, 42-43; Chartrand, *Canadian Military History, Vol 1*, 68; and Goldstein, 93-95.

24 They failed to locate any Mohawk villages and only destroyed a few outlying cabins. Furthermore, they only killed four and warriors and wounded six others at the cost of approximately 400 of their own. An approximate casualty count is given as 400 by Verney. Most of these are attributed to hypothermia and starvation. Only 7 French were killed and 4 wounded in the skirmish with the Mohawks. Verney, 50, 52; Goldstein, 98-99.

25 Thwaites, Vol 50, 140; Verney, 43, 72; and Dennis, 217. This reality demonstrates one characteristic of *la petite guerre*, namely the citizen / soldier make-up is closely wedded to the land and to civilian needs. It is both a great strength and weakness. But it also shows the very "practical" and "functional" characteristic inherent in how these people think.

26 Thwaites, Vol 50, 143; Dennis, 217; and Verney, 79. For a detailed account of the expedition see Verney, 71-84 and Wyczynski, 33-36.

27 Conquest of Canada, Vol II, 290; Hunt, 135; and Verney, 90; and Edward P. Hamilton, *Fort Ticonderoga. Key to a Continent* (Ticonderoga, NY: Fort Ticonderoga, 1995), 33.

28 Eccles, *France in America*, 73; and Chartrand, *Canadian Military Heritage, Vol 1*, 74. All men between the ages of 16-60 who were fit to bear arms were compelled to join the Militia. Companies were based on the same framework as a regular company - each was commanded by a captain, assisted by a lieutenant and an ensign, as well as a number of non-commissioned officers (corporals and sergeants) and a body of soldiers. The companies were approximately 50 man strong. Each parish provided a company, or more depending on its size.

29 Letter, De Meulles to Seignelay, 1683, in Richard A. Preston and Leopold Lamontagne, *Royal Fort Frontenac* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958), 147; and Eccles, France in America, 95.

30 Of the 1,200 members of the Carignan-Salières Regiment that landed in 1665, 446 settled in Canada and 200 returned to France. Wyczynski, 37. Intendant Jean Talon stated, “integrate the soldiers and the settlers so that they can teach each other how to farm and help defend themselves in times of need. Letter, Talon au ministre, Québec, 27 October 1667, Library Archives Canada (LAC), MG 1, Series C11A, Vol. 2, folio 308, microfilm F-2.

31 Notably: King William’s War (War of the Grand Alliance), 1688-1697; Queen Anne’s War (War of the Austrian Succession), 1740-1748; and King George’s War (War of the Austrian Succession), 1740-1748. See Robert Leckie, *A Few Acres of Snow. The Saga of the French and Indian Wars* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1999) and Ian K. Steele, *Guerillas and Grenadiers* (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1969); and Goldstein, 148-154. For example, on 25 January 1693, 100 Troupes de la Marine, 200 Natives and 325 Canadians left Montreal to strike at the Mohawk. They torched three villages, destroyed their winter food supply and took 300 prisoners. W.J. Eccles, “Frontenac’s Military Policies, 1689-1698 A Reassessment,” *The Canadian Historical Review*, Vol 37, no. 3, September 1956, 208. The infamous attack on Deerfield, Massachusetts, on 16 March 1704 by 200 Natives and 50 Canadians destroyed the town, killed 47 inhabitants and resulted in 111 others being carried away as captives. Dale Miquelon, *New France, 1701-1744* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1989), 40.

32 The use of Natives, however, had its drawbacks. Tribalism, the influence of Sachems, superstition, personal and band rivalry, the practice of torture and barbarity, and the cultural difference in the methodology in conducting war all created tension between the Europeans and their Native allies. Bougainville confided to his journals, “They gather together in mobs, argue among themselves, deliberate slowly . . . Between the resolution made and the action taken there passes considerable time, sometimes one nation stops the march, sometimes another. Everybody must have time to get drunk, and their food consumption is enormous. At last they get started, and once they have struck, have they taken only a single scalp or one prisoner, back they come and are off again for their villages. Each one does well for himself, but the operation of the war suffers, for in the end they are a necessary evil.” *Bougainville Journal*, 59-60.

33 This is not surprising, traditionally, these attributes were required to be successful on the hunt. To ensure game was killed required exceptional fieldcraft skills. The more clever and stealthy the hunter, the greater were his chances of success. Firearms merely provided a more efficient and lethal weapons technology with which to kill. Clearly, all these skills were transferable to war making.

34 K.L. Macpherson, *Scenic Sieges and Battlefields of French Canada* (Montreal: The Valentine & Sons Publishing Company, Limited, 1957), 4.

35 Charles E. Brodine, “Henry Bouquet and British Infantry Tactics on the Ohio Frontier, 1758-1764,” in David Curtis Skaggs and Larry L. Nelson, eds., *The Sixty Years’ War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814* (East Lansing: University of Michigan, 2001), 46. Another contemporary officer wrote, “They are an active hardy People, capable of fatigue, hunger, and cold and know perfectly the use of arms. And tho’ their number nor their valour may not make them a formidable enemy, their little wood skirmishing, and bush fighting will always make them a very troublesome one.” Canada Archives, *The Northcliffe Collection* (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1926), 70. [Hereafter *Northcliffe Collection*].

36 Cited in *The Conquest of Canada*, Vol II, 18.

37 Letter, Father Pierre Roubaud, Missionary, 21 October 1757, in Thwaites, Vol 60, 121.

38 Thomas Church, *The History of Philip's War* (Exeter, NH: J & B Williams, 1829 - reprint Bowie, Maryland: Heritage Books Inc, 1989), 108-109. One survivor of Braddock's defeat reported "They continually made us Retreat, they haveing always a large marke to shoute [shoot] at and we having only to shoute at them behind trees or on their Bellies." Hamilton, Braddock's Defeat, 28-29.

39 Jeremy Black, *War. Past, Present & Future* (New York: St Martin's Press, 2000), 127.

40 Hamilton, *Braddock's Defeat*, 29; and Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War* (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 100. The veteran also recalled that "...they Either on their Bellies or Behind trees or Running from one tree to another almost by the ground." At the battle at Lake George, in early September 1755, Baron Dieskau's French regular officers and men, who remained in the open, suffered horrendous casualties against the New England men that fired from behind logs. They lost nearly all their officers and approximately half of their soldiers. Conversely, the French Canadians and Natives on their part remained behind cover and suffered negligible losses. Anderson, 158-159.

41 Hamilton, *Braddock's Defeat*, 50.

42 *The Northcliffe Collection*, 216.

43 Carl Benn, *The Iroquois in the War of 1812* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 71; and Patrick M. Malone, *The Skulking Way of War* (Lanham, Maryland: Madison Books, 1991), 59-60.

44 The Natives often carved grooves into the stock of their weapons so that they could take better aim by being able to align their eyes along the barrel of their musket and in line with their target. This requirement was because neither the French Charleville .69 caliber musket, nor the British .75 caliber "Brown Bess" musket had rear sights as the Europeans felt rear sights were unnecessary due to the perceived inaccuracy of the smooth bore musket and the reliance on volley fire. The North Americans believed otherwise. A Native veteran observed that in combat "the right men [Native leaders] concealed themselves, and are worst clothed than the others." Leroy V. Eid, "American Indian Military Leadership: St. Clair's 1791 Defeat," *Journal of Military History*, Vol 57, January 1993, 81.

45 Letter to *Boston Gazette*, 13 June 1757, Cited in Armand Francis Lucier, ed., *French and Indian War Notices Abstracted from Colonial Newspapers*, Vol 2: 1756-1757 (Bowie, Maryland: Heritage Books Inc., 1999), 256. During King William's War, a Canadian scouting party ran into English troops and fought like Natives. The "New England men taunted them as cowards who would never fight except under cover." Journal extract Cited in Steele, *Guerillas and Grenadiers*, 30.

46 "The Journal of Dr. Caleb Rea written during the Expedition against Ticonderoga in 1758," *Historical Collections of the Essex Institute*, Vol 43, April-January 1881, nos. 4-6, 109.

47 Cited documents, display, Fort Chambly National Historic Site of Canada, Chambly, Quebec. Accessed 23 August 2001. "Some of the French subjects," one English colonist wrote, "always go with the Natives, on these incursions, and are both privy in, and instigators of, their robberies and murder." Letter, gentleman in Virginia to friend in Annapolis, 16 January 1754, Cited in Lucier, Vol 1, 1.

48 Letter, Major-General James Wolfe to William Pit, Cited in A. Doughty, *The Siege of Quebec and the Battle of the Plains of Abraham*, Vol I-VI (Quebec: Dussault & Proulx, 1901), 65.

49 Impartial Hand. *The Contest in America Between Great Britain and France with Its Consequences and Importance* (London: Strand, 1757), 128. The writer also notes that the Natives and Canadians who travel without baggage, support themselves with stores and magazines and who maintain themselves in the woods "do more execution ... than four or five time their number of our men." Ibid., 138.

50 *Bougainville Journal*, 333. Even Montcalm, who particularly disliked the Canadians wrote after his victory at Fort Ticonderoga in July 1758, "The colonial troops and Canadians have caused us to regret that there were not in greater number. Chevalier Levy under whose eyes they fought speaks highly of them." Cited in Andrew Gallup and Donald F. Shaffer, *La Marine. The French Colonial Soldier in Canada, 1745-1761* (Bowie, Maryland: Heritage Books, Inc., 1992), 42. One early Canadian historian concluded, "For scouting harassing the enemy, fighting under cover of wood or earthworks, the undisciplined native American soldier whether French or English could not be equalled by any regulars." Doughty, 52.

51 Cited in Abbé H.R. Casgrain, *Wolfe and Montcalm* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 196-197. Casgrain, a renowned expert on this period of North American history wrote "These Canadians seasoned and skillful hunters, do not waste a single bullet and create gaps in the ranks of the enemy." Ibid., 60.

52 Paul E. Kopperman, *Braddock at the Monongahela* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1977), 30; George F. Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers. The Military History of an Unmilitary People* (Toronto: The Macmillan Company of Canada Limited, 1960), 65; Noel St John Williams, *Redcoats along the Hudson. The Struggle for North America 1754-63* (London: Brassey's Classics, 1998), 76; Anderson, 96-97; and Strachan, 28. Brumwell gives the British strength at 1,469. Stephen Brumwell, *Redcoats. British Soldiers and War in the Americas, 1755-63* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2002), 16. Increasingly, Canadians began to serve as officers in *Les Compagnies Franches de la Marine*. The colonial troops offered little upward mobility for regular French officers (since each company was commanded by only a captain). Therefore, positions were often difficult to fill. As such, vacancies were given to individuals from the Canadian gentry or to families of French officers who remained in Canada. See Chartrand, *Canadian Military Heritage, Vol 1*, 84-85; and Eccles, *The French in North America*, 173-174.

53 Benjamin Franklin, *Autobiography* (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co. Inc., 1937 ed.), 168. See also Anderson, 95; and Thomas Fleming, "Braddock's Defeat," *Military History Quarterly*, Vol 3, No. 1, Autumn 1990, 90. Captain Pouchot later reflected, "If, on terrain without real problems, such a disaster could happen to brave & well-disciplined troops, through an inability to direct fire & ignorance of the nature of the enemy they were engaging, then this provides a good lesson that these two aspects of warfare should receive close attention." Pouchot, 83.

54 John Keegan, *The Book of War* (London: Penguin Books, 1996), 92-93.

55 Letter from an officer, dated Fort Cumberland, 18 July 1755, in Lucier, Vol 1, 251.

56 Francis Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe* (New York: The Modern Library, 1999), 111 and 117-118; Leckie, 284-285; Anderson, 102-103; and Kopperman, 79.

57 Kopperman, 139 and Annex E.

58 Stanley, 66; and Kopperman, 70.

59 Strachan, 28; Anderson, 105; and Stanley, 66. Actual numbers vary. Pouchot recorded in his journal that the casualties were approximately 1,300 for the English and 11 killed and 29 wounded for the French. Pouchot, 82-83. A more accurate count of the English casualties is given at 977 men, 500 of which were killed. French losses were 23 dead (3 officers, 2 men, 3 militiamen, and 15 Natives) and 16 wounded. Chartrand, *Canadian Military Heritage, Vol II* (Montreal: Art Global, 1993), 20. Benjamin Franklin gave the English casualties as 63 out of 86 officers killed or wounded, and 714 men killed out of 1100. Franklin, 170. Brumwell states that two thirds of the 1,469 British troops or approximately

979 were either killed or wounded. Brumwell, 16. William Weir places them at 456 killed and 421 wounded of 1,459 engaged for the English and 8 French or Canadians killed, 6 wounded and 27 Natives killed or wounded. William Wier, *Fatal Victories* (Hamden, Conn: Archon Books, 1993), 111.

60 One contemporary commentary stated, "They are in possession of all the frontiers of our colonies, and can at any time pour in their irregulars, *Coureurs de Bois*, and Natives into them; by which our people dare not stir nor march to Crown-Point, or anywhere else but are obliged to stand upon their defence at home." Impartial Hand, 125.

61 Louis de Courville, *Mémoires sur le Canada depuis 1749 Jusqu'à 1760* (Québec: Imprimerie de Middleton and Dawson, 1873), 116.

62 Vaudreuil believed that the French regular troops should be used to garrison the forts and the Canadians and their Native allies should be used for raids against the English colonies.

63 "Remarks on the Fort built by the French at Crown Point in North America," LAC, Colonial Office (CO), Microfilm B-25, Vol 13, 157. In 1758, Johnson wrote to Abercrombie, "the inactivity of that year's [1757] campaign on our side not only produced additional dread of the enemy upon the afore said nations but greatly cool'd what ardor there was towards our cause in the rest of the Six Nations." Letter, William Johnson to Major-General Abercrombie, 17 March 1758. National Archives [UK] (NA), WO 34/39, Amherst Papers.

64 Letter, Amherst to Brigadier-General Gage, Camp at Crown Point, 14 August 1759. NA, WO, 34/46a.

65 Cited in Stanley, 72.

66 Horace Warpole confided to his diary, "Had he [Vaudreuil] fallen into our hands our men were determined to scalp him, he having been the chief and blackest author of the cruelties exercised on our countrymen." George M. Wrong, *The Fall of Canada. A Chapter in the History of the Seven Years' War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 59.

67 Extract from a letter dated 28 April 1757, Cited in *Lucier*, Vol 2, 233. By the spring of 1756, raids by Canadians and Natives organized by Captain Dumas had resulted in 700 deaths or captures. By the end of the summer operations had extended as far south as the Carolinas. One report noted, "All these provinces are laid waste for forty leagues from the foot of the mountains, in the direction of the sea. The number of prisoners in these territories since last April [1756] is estimated at about three thousand - men, women and children, in addition to thirteen hundred horses." Steele, *Guerillas and Grenadiers*, 97-98. In the spring of 1758, in an approximate three month period, raiding parties delivered to Fort Duquesne alone 140 prisoners or scalps. H.R. Casgrain, ed., *Journal du Marquis De Montcalm durant ses Campagnes en Canada de 1756-1759* (Québec: L.J. Demers & Frère, 1895), 357.

68 Letter from an officer, dated Fort Cumberland, 6 October 1755, in *Lucier*, Vol 1, 329. The effect was clearly explained in yet another letter, "The barbarous and bloody scene which is now opened it the upper parts of Northampton County, is the most lamentable that perhaps ever appeared...There may be seen horror and desolation; populous settlements deserted; villages laid to ashes; men, women and children cruelly mangled and massacred." *Ibid.*, 353.

69 This functionalism is what gave the contemporaries relevance and most likely kept Paris involved in faraway Quebec. In later years "making yourself useful" becomes a Canadian way both in war and diplomacy. It is associated with functionalism - a long time Canadian practice only overtly articulated by McKenzie King in World War II.

70 Letter from General Shirley to Major-General Abercrombie, 27 June 1756, NA, War Office 1/4, Correspondence, 1755-1763.

71 Claude-Godefroy Coquart, a priest, wrote his brother, "Our Indians have waged the most cruel war against the English...Georgia, Carolina, Marrelande, Pensilvania, are wholly laid waste. The farmers have been forced to quit their abodes and to retire into the town. They have neither plowed nor planted." Robert C. Alberts, *The Most Extraordinary Adventures of Major Robert Stobo* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company Boston, 1965), 152. See also Anderson, 637; Leckie, 101; Letter From William Shirley (New York) to Principal Secretary of War, 20 December 1755, NA, War Office 1/4, Correspondence, 1755-1763; H.R. Casgrain, ed., *Lettres du Chevalier De Lévis concernant La Guerre du Canada 1756-1760* (Montreal: C.O. Beauchemin & Fils, 1889), 75; Steele, *Guerillas and Grenadiers*, 24; Casgrain, *Journal du Marquis De Montcalm*, 110-111; Le Comte Gabriél de Maurès de Malartic, *Journal des Campagnes au Canada de 1755 A 1760* (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1902), 52-53; Kopperman, 232; Gavin K. Watt, *The Burning of the Valleys* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1997), 73; and Don R. Gerlach, "The British Invasion of 1780 and 'A Character...Debased Beyond Description,'" *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol 14, No. 5, Summer 1984, 311.

72 *Bougainville Journal*, 191.

73 Ensuring the Canadians returned from campaigns in time to harvest their crops was critical to the economy of New France. It was often a point of contention between Vaudreuil and Montcalm. H.R. Casgrain, ed., *Lettres du Marquis De Vaudreuil au Chevalier de Lévis* (Québec: L.J. Demers & Frère, 1895), 52. See also A. Doughty, *The Siege of Quebec*, Vol I, 158.

74 Scholar Fred Anderson in his seminal work *Crucible of War* concluded, "France maintained its empire in America for more than a century despite the steady increase of British power and population because the governors of Canada had generally sponsored cordial relations with the Native peoples of the interior. Trade was the sinew of these intercultural relationships, which in time of war became the military alliances that made the frontiers of the British colonies uninhabitable and rendered a successful invasion of the Canadian heartland impossible." Anderson, 454.

75 Cited in Moogk, 21.

76 Stanley, 61; Eccles, "French Forces," xx; Leckie, 103; Doughty, Vol I, 158; Nester, *The Great Frontier War*, 54; and Fleming, 87. The scale of the threat was enormous. During the French and Indian War, the English colonies outnumbered New France in manpower by nearly 25 to one. The supply of foodstuffs appeared limitless. In 1755, the Governor of Pennsylvania asserted that he alone could produce food for an army of 100,00 men. In addition, the colonial iron industry was able to compete effectively with that of Britain. See Steele, *Guerillas and Grenadiers*, 74. "What a scourge!" Bougainville exclaimed, "Humanity shudders at being obliged to make use of such monsters. But without them the match would be too much against us." *Bougainville Journal*, 191.

77 Moogk, 42.

78 Steele, *Guerillas and Grenadiers*, 66.

79 This effect was so only as long as the Americans were unwilling to overcome their parochial regional interests and bickering - which consistently resulted in a failure to present a unified front against the French. It was also a function of the unwillingness and / or inability to permeate in numbers through the Appalachian Barrier into the Ohio Valley. That is what happened by 1754, and the Anglo-Americans and British were increasingly unrelenting in their will to occupy that new territory.



80 Six of France's 395 existing infantry battalions were dispatched to Canada to bolster French garrisons at Louisbourg, Cape Breton Island, and Quebec in May 1755. These troops were under the command of Major-General Baron Jean-Armand Dieskau who was subordinate to the Governor of New France. However, his defeat and capture at the hands of Major-General William Johnson's forces at Lake George on 8 September 1755, necessitated his replacement, Montcalm who arrived on 13 May 1756. Montcalm, like Dieskau, was subordinate to Vaudreuil in everything. He was responsible only for the discipline, administration and internal ordering of the army battalions. He was strictly the Commander in the field and was responsible for obeying the orders of the Governor. See *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, Vol III, 1741-1770 and Vol IV, 1771-1800, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974 / 1979), 458-459 and 660-671.

81 Throughout the text the rank of Montcalm may be given as Major-General or Lieutenant-General based on context and the time period. Montcalm was promoted to lieutenant-general following the 8 July 1758 victory at Ticonderoga.

82 Cited in C.P. Stacey, *Quebec, 1759. The Siege and the Battle* (Toronto: Robin Brass Studio, reprint 2002, Donald Graves, ed.), 33.

83 *Bougainville Journal*, 252.

84 See H.R. Casgrain, ed., *Lettres et Pièces Militaires. Instructions, Ordres, Mémoires, Plans de Campagne et de Défense 1756-1760* (Québec: L.J. Demers & Frère, 1891), 45; Anderson, 346; Steele, *Guerillas and Grenadiers*, 108-110; Eccles, *The French in North America*, 210-211; Pouchot, 171; Martin L. Nicolai, "A Different Kind of Courage: The French Military and the Canadian Irregular Soldier during the Seven Years' War," *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol 70, No. 1, 1989, 59-64; and Preston, and Lamontagne, 277. Despite Montcalm's virulent dislike for Vaudreuil, the Canadians, Natives and guerilla warfare, he did see the usefulness of harassing the enemy. He believed that successful raids, particularly while besieged at Quebec, lowered enemy morale, bolstered that of the Canadians, and maintained the offensive spirit in his troops.

85 Cited in Steele, *Guerillas and Grenadiers*, 109.

86 Vaudreuil's Observations on Montcalm's Memoir on Lake Ontario, Montreal 12 September 1758, document included in Preston and Lamontagne, 277.

87 Cited in Gallup, *La Marine*, 16. Vaudreuil complained that Montcalm and his "troops of the line wish only to preserve their reputation and return to France without having experienced a single check; they think more seriously of their private interests than of the safety of Canada." Cited in Steele, *Guerillas and Grenadiers*, 109-110.

88 Letter, Vaudreuil to Ministry of Marine, 30 October 1755, *Extraits des Archives des Ministères de la Marine et de la Guerre A Paris - Canada - Correspondence Générale - MM. Duquesne et Vaudreuil Gouverneurs-Généraux, 1755-1760* (Québec: L.J. Demers & Frère, 1890), 107.

89 The British suffered 1,944 casualties, 1,610 of those regulars. The French suffered only 377. See René Chartrand, *Ticonderoga 1758 - Montcalm's victory against all odds* (London: Oxford, 2000); *Dictionary of Canadian Biography*, Vol III, 462; St John Williams, 143-145; and Anderson, 240-249.

90 H.R. Casgrain, *Lettres du Chevalier De Lévis*, 199. Brigadier-General Lévis was Montcalm's second-in-command.

91 See Leckie, 319-331; Anderson, 237-339; Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 359-360. Approximately 400 Canadians and Natives were present, however, they were positioned to cover Montcalm's right flank and played no significant role in the actual defeat of the British. In fact, at one point, they refused orders to sally forth and attack the attacking British forces.

92 The French government was neither willing, nor able to spare French regulars for North America. The control of the seas by the Royal Navy alone reasoned against the gamble of sending scarce troops away from the continent. In addition, Montcalm's own defeatist analysis of the situation in Canada argued against investing further resources. Anderson, 239; Stacey, *Quebec, 1759*, 39-40; and Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 346.

93 The French officer Malartic stated that each line battalion had received a draft of 108 Canadians. As the Canadian historian, George Stanley, asserts that "no battalion at the Plains had more than 350 men the proportion of Canadians was undoubtedly high." Stanley, 91.

94 Pouchot, 242.

95 Doughty, *The Siege of Quebec*, Vol III, 159. See also Leckie, 363; and Nicolai, 69.

96 Doughty, *The Siege of Quebec*, Vol III, 126. One account is telling from the Extract of a journal kept at the army commanded by the late Lieutenant-General de Montcalm. As cited in Doughty: "The rout was total only among the regulars; the Canadians accustomed to fall back Indian fashion and to turn afterwards on the enemy with more confidence than before, rallied in some places, and under cover of the brushwood, by which they were surrounded, forced divers corps to give way, but at last were obliged to yield to the superiority of numbers." Ibid., 165. Townshend's report on the Battle of the Plains of Abraham stated, "The enemy lined the bushes in their front with 1,500 Natives and Canadians & daresay most of their best Marksmen which kept up a very hot tho' irregular fire upon our whole line." *The Northcliffe Collection*, 419-420. See also Eccles, *The French in North America*, 229; *The Conquest of Canada*, Vol II, 218-219; and Nicolai, 69.

97 Anderson, 219-231.

98 By 1758, Britain's total forces for their offensive campaigns numbered 44,000 - half of which were British regulars. This compares to 11,000 troops in 1755, one in seven a British regular. Steele, *Guerillas and Grenadiers*, 114 and 123.

99 Letter, Abercrombie to Amherst, 10 January 1764. Cited in Chartrand, *Canadian Military Heritage*, Vol II, 49.

## CHAPTER 2

100 A version of this chapter was first published in Bernd Horn, "'A Necessary Evil?' Indians as Allies in the Struggle for North America, 1754-1760," in P. Whitney Lackenbauer and Craig Leslie Mantle, eds., *Aboriginal Peoples and The Canadian Military: Historical Perspectives* (Kinston: CDA Press, 2007), 1-28.

101 Will H. Lowdermilk, *Along the Braddock Road from Cai-uc-cu in 1728 to Braddock's Expedition in 1755* (Lewisburg, Pennsylvania: Wennawoods Publishing, reprint 2005), 100.

102 Ibid., 129.

103 See "A Selection of George Croghan's Letters and Journals," in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed. *Early Western Journals*, 1748-1765 (Lewisburg, PA: Wennawoods Publishing, 1998), 98-99; and Lowdermilk, 27.

- 104 Keegan, *The Book of War*, 92-93. Another officer wrote, "Our troops yielded ground, chiefly owing to the consternation the Indian method of fighting threw the British men into, and the want of officers, most of them being either killed or wounded by that time, very soon after giving way, the panic became so great and general, that notwithstanding the utmost effects of the few remaining officers, to rally and return to the charge." Letter from an officer fighting in the Ohio, 25 August 1755, in Lucier, Vol 1, 278.
- 105 Stanley, 66. See also Kopperman, 70.
- 106 Letter reprinted in Lowdermilk, 180.
- 107 Pouchot, 82-83; Anderson, 105; and Stanley, 66.
- 108 George Croghan's journal to the Ohio, extract reprinted in Winthrop Sargent, *The History of an Expedition Against Fort Du Quesne in 1755* (Lewisburg, PA: Wennawoods Publishing, reprint 2005), 408.
- 109 George M. Bodge, *Soldiers in King Philips War* (Boston: The Rockwell and Churchill Press, 1906), 25 and 189.
- 110 Extract from response by Six Nations to a speech by the Lieutenant-General of New York, at Albany, 2 July 1755, in Lucier, Vol 1, 272; and Pichon's "Memoires du Cap Breton, 1760," Cited in Gerald E. Hart, *The Fall of New France, 1755-1760* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1888), 10.
- 111 One letter captured the general sentiment after Braddock's defeat. "We are now in the utmost confusion not knowing what hand to turn to being more afraid of the Indians than the French," one colonist wrote, "Our back settlers are in general fled, and are likely to be ruined for the less of their crops and summer's labour." Letter from Carlisle, 22 July 1755, in Lucier, Vol 1, 253 and Vol 2, 14.
- 112 Jack M. Sosin, "The Use of Indians in the War of the American Revolution: A Re-assessment of Responsibility," *The Canadian Historical Review*, Vol 46, No. 2, June 1965, 120.
- 113 Sylvester K. Stevens, Donald H. Kent and Emma E. Woods, *Travels in New France by J. C. B.* (Harrisburg, PA: The Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1941), 25.
- 114 Jeffrey Amherst, *Journal of William Amherst in America, 1758-1760* (London: Butler & Tanner Ltd., 1927), 15-16.
- 115 Letter, Colonel H. Bouquet to Lieutenant Blane, 14 June 1763, in Mary C. Darlington, ed., *History of Colonel Henry Bouquet and the Western Frontiers of Pennsylvania 1747-1764* (New York: Arno Press, reprint 1971), 160.
- 116 Cited in Wier, 112.
- 117 Carl Benn, *The Iroquois in the War of 1812* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 67.
- 118 For example, a group of Indians having successfully executed an ambush that yielded both supplies and prisoners, without incurring any casualties then decided to return home. "The Master of Life has favoured us," they explained to the French Commander, "here is the food, here are the prisoners, let's return." D.P. MacLeod, *The Canadian Iroquois and the Seven Years' War* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1996), 35-36.

119 Colonel Bouquet observed, "They seldom expose themselves to danger, and depend entirely on their dexterity in concealing themselves during an engagement, never appearing openly, unless they have struck their enemies with terror, and have thereby rendered them incapable of defence." *Warfare on the Colonial American Frontier: The Journals of Major Robert Rogers & An Historical Account of the Expedition Against the Ohio Indians in the year 1764, Under the Command of Henry Bouquet, Esq.* Reprinted from an original 1769 Edition (Bargersville, IN: Dreslar Publishing, 2001), "Bouquet's Account," 52.

120 See Nester, *The Great Frontier War*, 91; and Robert F. Berkhofer, "The French and Indians at Carillon," *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol 9, No. 6, 1956, 137-138 & 147; MacLeod, 21; Benn, 82; and Nicolai, 60.

121 For example, Lieutenant-General Jeffrey Amherst described them as "These little skulking men." Amherst, *Journal of William Amherst*, 20. Captain John Knox described them as "these skulking wretches," although he did include that they "are so hardy, that scarce pass one day [in February 1758] without scouring the environs of this fortress." Knox, 102.

122 MacLeod, 34-35.

123 He added, "Their encounters are mere attempts at assassination. They fight bravely then only when they know that the sole alternative lies between victory or death." Letter from Father Nau, missionary, in Thwaites, *The Jesuit Relations*, Vol 68, 275.

124 H.R. Casgrain, *Montcalm et Lévis - Les Français au Canada* (Québec: Maison Alfred Mame et Fils, undated), 43.

125 See Nicolai, 59; Benn, 53; Casgrain, *Journal du Marquis De Montcalm*, 374-375; MacLeod, 30-31 & 69; Doughty, Vol I, 208-9; H.R. Casgrain, ed., *Guerre du Canada. Relations et Journaux de Différentes Expéditions*. Québec: L.J. Demers & Frère, 1895), 174; Maurice Sautai, *Montcalm au Combat de Carillon, 8 Juillet 1758* (Paris: Librairie Militaire R. Chapelot, 1909), 13, 18 & 80; Casgrain, *Lettres du Chevalier De Lévis*, 21 & 75; Nicolai, 60; Ian K. Steele, *Betrayals. Fort William Henry & the Massacre* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 49-50, 73; Anderson, 151; and Pouchot, 115. In addition see George F. Stanley, "The Indians in the War of 1812," *Canadian Historical Review*, Vol 31, No. 2, June 1950, 153; and Benn, 82 (During the War of 1812, at the battle of Queenston Heights, under fire 50 percent of the warriors deserted, and at the subsequent Battle of Fort George, 70 percent of the Natives deserted); and George F. Stanley, "British Operations in the American North-West, 1812-15," *Army Historical Research*, Vol 22, 1943-44, 95-6.

126 Pouchot, 477.

127 Steele, *Betrayals*, 126.

128 Berkhofer, 157; and Anderson, 112.

129 Brumwell, 184.

130 See Letter William Shirley to British War Office, 22 December 1755, New York. NA, War Office 1/4, Correspondence, 1755-1763; "John Henry Lydius, Fur Trader at Fort Edward," *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol 11, No. 5, December 1964, 272-273; and Benn, 54. See also Proclamation, June 1755, in Lucier, Vol 1, 197.

131 Gallup, *Memoir of a French and Indian War Soldier*, 108.

- 132 *Bougainville Journal*, 59-60. Bougainville was an aide to Lieutenant-General Montcalm.
- 133 Casgrain, *Lettres du Chevalier De Lévis*, 75.
- 134 Doughty, Vol II, 202; *Northcliffe Collection*, 138; and Berkhofer, 146.
- 135 *Bougainville Journal*, 133.
- 136 Courville, 97; and Benn, 136.
- 137 See Moogk, 43-45; and Gallup, 142. The Native perspective on these killings did not assist in their resolution. They contended that the respective individual was not to blame, rather it was the "alcohol" that had caused the offence.
- 138 Casgrain, *Journal du Marquis De Montcalm*, 385.
- 139 Steele, *Betrayals*, 132-133; Berkhofer, 156; and Robert S. Allen, *His Majesty's Indian Allies* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1992), 144.
- 140 "Journal of the Expedition Against Fort William Henry," New York Colonial Document, Cited in Berkhofer, 164.
- 141 *Bougainville Journal*, 243. See also Letter, Montcalm to Bourlamaque, Montreal, 14 May 1756 and Letter, Montcalm to Bourlamaque, Fort St. Jean, 30 August 1757. LAC, microfilm C-362, Bourlamaque Collection, Montcalm Letters, 25 June 1756-22 September 1759.
- 142 *Bougainville Journal*, 171.
- 143 Malartic, 130; Leckie, 75; Anderson, 197; Brigadier R.O. Alexander, ed., "The Capture of Quebec. A Manuscript Journal Relating to the Operations Before Quebec From 8<sup>th</sup> May, 1759, to 17<sup>th</sup> May, 1760 Kept by Colonel Malcolm Fraser," *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, Vol 18, 1939, 141; and Doughty, Vol II, 200. Jacques Cartier also witnessed scalping in 1535. See Samuel de Champlain, (Edward G. Bourne, ed.) *Algonquins, Hurons and Iroquois. Champlain Explores America 1603-1616* (Dartmouth: Brook House Press, reprint 2000), 103-105, and 205.
- 144 *Bougainville Journal*, 41.
- 145 Cited in Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 168. Although they normally showed no mercy to anyone regardless of age or gender, this description is somewhat misleading. The Natives almost never raped women on campaigns. They believed intercourse enfeebled them and would offend the great spirits. See Alberts, 152; and Gallup, *Memoir of a French and Indian War Soldier*, 109.
- 146 For a sampling of the abundant documentary evidence see Thwaites, Vol 60; Letter, gentleman in Virginia to friend in Annapolis, 16 January 1754, reproduced in Lucier, Vol 1, 3; Ross Brian Snyder, "Algonquin Warfare in Canada and Southern New England 1600-1680," Unpublished M.A. (History) Thesis, University of Ottawa, 1972; Pouchot, 480; Leckie, 158; Scheele, 44; Casgrain, *Les Français au Canada*, 182-183; and Kopperman, 91-92. See also Drimmer, 19 & 9-104; and Steele, *Betrayals*; and *Bougainville Journal*. Although there was an element of entertainment involved with the torture, it also fulfilled a spiritual and emotional need. Torture was often seen a consolation for the death of a relative or a means of quieting the soul of the deceased. It also provided a means of allowing an enemy to display his courage. When an opponent did so in a gallant manner, his heart was often eaten because of a belief that it would render those consuming it more courageous.

147 Eccles, *The French in North America*, 201; and “Unrest At Caughnawaga or The Lady Fur Traders of Sault St. Louis,” *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol 7, No. 3, December 1963, 155. A similar mentality existed during the War of 1812. The initial British successes at Michillimackinac and Detroit induced a large number of tribes and nations of Indians to rally to the British standard. See Stanley, “British Operations in the American North-West,” 93-94; Allen, 138, and Benn, 49.

148 Theodore Burnham Lewis, Jr., “The Crown Point Campaign 1755,” *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol 13, No. 1, December 1970, 37; and Courville, 90.

149 Casgrain, *Wolfe and Montcalm*, 74-75. The concept of strength is a critical one - the Natives considered weakness, or being a weakling, the greatest of all insults. Preston and Lamontagne, 206.

150 Letter from Albany of 6 August 1759, published in *Pennsylvania Gazette*, 23 August 1759, cited in Pouchot, 231. See also Malartic, 268.

151 Pouchot, 183.

152 Ibid., 229-231.

153 See “A Journal of the proceedings of the Seamen (a detachment), ordered by Commodore Keppel to assist on a late expedition to the Ohio, from the 10<sup>th</sup> of April, 1755,” reprinted in Sargent, 386.

154 Jean-Félix Récher, *Journal du Siège de Québec en 1759* (Québec: La Société Historique de Québec Université Laval, 1959), 36.

155 Casgrain, *Wolfe and Montcalm*, 130-131 & 203.

156 H.R. Casgrain, ed., *Lettres de M. De Bourlamaque au Chevalier de Lévis* (Québec: L.J. Demers & Frère, 1890), 339. See also Pouchot, 231; Parkman, 332; Preston and Lamontagne, 269; *Impartial Account of Lieut. Col. Bradstreet's Expedition to Fort Frontenac*, 8-9; and Sautai, 42. During Bougainville's retreat to Montreal through the forests in late August 1760, he counted on Natives as guides but they deserted a losing cause and, without guides, he lost his way imposing delay and hardship as the French forces plodded through swamps and trackless forest. Wrong, 208.

157 See Lowdermilk, 127; and Sargent, 171.

158 Casgrain, *Journal du Marquis De Montcalm*, 88.

159 Casgrain, *Journal Des Campagnes du Chevalier De Lévis*, 174-175.

160 Casgrain, *Français au Canada*, 63; Berkhofer, 136 & 141; and Nicholas Beyard, *Journal of the Late Actions of the French at Canada by Col. Nicholas Beyard and Lieut. Col. Charles Lodowick* (New York: Joseph Sabin, 1868), 41.

161 H.R. Casgrain, ed., *Extraits des Archives des Ministères de la Marine et de la Guerre A Paris - Canada - Correspondence Générale - MM. Duquesne et Vaudreuil Gouverneurs-Généraux, 1755-1760* (Québec: L.J. Demers & Frère, 1890), 72-73.

162 St. John Williams, 197.

163 Letter, Amherst to Sir William Johnson, 22 June 1763. NA, WO 34/38. Amherst Papers.

164 Letter, Major-General William Shirley, Chief of His Majesties Forces in North America, to British War Office, 22 December 1755; Letter, Major-General William Shirley, to Principal Secretary



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of War, 20 December 1755; Letter, "Additional Instructions to Major-General William Johnston relative to the Indians of the Six Nations under his care," from William Shirley, 13 January 1756. NA, WO 1/4, Correspondence, 1755-1763.

165 H.R. Casgrain, François Gaston Chevalier de Lévis Collection des Manuscrits, *Journal du Marquis de Montcalm Durant Ses Campagnes en Canada De 1756 à 1759, Vol VII* (Québec: L.J. Demers & Frère, 1895), 335. See also Casgrain, *Lettres Du Chevalier de Lévis*, 144.

166 Casgrain, *Extraits des Archives*, 150.

167 Casgrain, *Journal du Marquis De Montcalm*, 335.

168 Ibid., 591.

169 W.J. Eccles, "Frontenac's Military Policies, 1689-1698. A Reassessment," *The Canadian Historical Review*, Vol 37, No. 3, September 1956, 204. Lord Bathurst, the British Secretary of War in 1812, correctly assessed, "If not retained as our friends, they will act against us as enemies."

170 Governor's Speech to the General Assembly of the State of Massachusetts-Bay, 2 April 1754 in Lucier, Vol 1, 40.

171 Letter from a British officer, 21 January 1755, in Ibid.

172 *Bougainville Journal*, 191.

173 *Northcliffe Collection*, 70.

174 Silcox, 65.

175 Letter, Washington to John Robinson, Winchester, 7 April 1756, cited in Brumwell, 209.

176 Benn, 64.

177 Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 241; and Anderson, 189.

178 Stanley, *Canada's Soldiers*, 61; W.J. Eccles, "The French forces in North America during the Seven Years' War," in *Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Vol III, 1741 to 1770* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), xx; Leckie, 103; and Doughty, Vol I, 158.

179 Casgrain, *Français au Canada*, 87.

180 *Bougainville Journal*, 191.

181 "Amos Richardson's Journal, 1758," *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol 12, No. 4, September 1968, 278; and Governor Murray's *Journal of the Siege of Quebec, from 18<sup>th</sup> September, 1759 to 25<sup>th</sup> May, 1760* (Toronto: Rous & Mann Ltd, 1939), 14. See also Casgrain, *Journal du Marquis De Montcalm*, 252; "Fragments of a Journal in the Handwriting of General Wolfe, 1759 (Wolfe's Journal 19 June - 16 August 1759). Held in Royal Military College of Canada Library, Rare Book Collection, 17, 25, and 27 July; *The Northcliffe Collection*, 216; Thomas Haynes, "Memorandum of Colonial French War A.D. 1758," *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol 12, No. 3, October 1967, 8; Pouchot, 118; and Doughty, Appendix, Part I, 261.

182 Casgrain, *Français au Canada*, 91.

183 Anderson, 194; and Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 250.

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184 Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 168. See also Extract of a letter from Sir William Johnson to General Shirley, 10 May 1756, NA, WO 1/4, Correspondence, 1755-1763. The tight grip on movement was also effective in catching deserters. See Malartic, 217; and Pouchot 136.

185 Letter, Beckford to Pitt, December 1758, Cited in *The Conquest of Canada*, Vol II, 153.

186 A Letter Written by Colonel Napier and sent to General Braddock by Order of the Duke of Cumberland, 25 November 1754, reprinted in Sargent, 399.

187 "The yells of our Indians," Montcalm wrote to his mother, "promptly decided them [English garrison at Oswego]. They yielded themselves prisoners of war to the number of 1,700, including eighty officers and two regiments from England." Casgrain, *Wolfe and Montcalm*, 35; Anderson 102; and Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 207.

188 Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 241.

189 Walter O'Meara, *Guns at the Forks* (Pittsburg: University of Pittsburg Press, 1965), 147.

190 Ibid., 177.

191 Hamilton, *Braddock's Defeat. The Journal of Captain Robert Cholmley's Batman*, 53.

192 Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 333.

193 Conquest of Canada, 153. See also Casgrain, *Wolfe and Montcalm*, 117; and Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 112.

194 Casgrain, *Lettres et Pièces Militaires*, 50; and MacLeod, 25. See also Berkhofer, 136; Pouchot, 476; and Malone, 84.

195 O'Meara, 85.

196 Memoir on the Defense of the Fort of Carillon," *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol 13, No. 3, 1972, 200-1; Steele, *Betrayals*, 96; and Anderson, 187.

197 Cited documents, display, Fort Chambly National Historic Site of Canada, Chambly, Quebec. Accessed 23 August 2001.

198 Ibid.

199 Anderson, 151; and Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 214. See also *Conquest of Canada*, 93.

200 Letter from General Shirley to Major-General Abercrombie, 27 June 1756, NA, WO 1/4, Correspondence, 1755-1763.

201 This condition of not wanting to leave families behind in fact could work both ways. From 1757-1759 the British sponsored a series of raids by their Cherokee and Catawba allies against Algonquian towns on the Ohio River. These raids destroyed substantial quantities of food supplies, forced hunters to remain close to their villages to protect their families, and left Native women reluctant to venture into their fields to plant crops. See Matthew Ward, "Microbes of War: The British Army and Epidemic Disease among the Ohio Indians, 1758-1765," in David Curtis Skaggs and Larry L. Nelson, eds. *The Sixty Years' War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814* (East Lansing: University of Michigan, 2001), 73.

202 Anderson, 637; and Leckie, 101. By the spring of 1756, raids by Canadians and Natives organized by Captain Dumas alone had resulted in 700 deaths or captures. By the end of the summer operations

had extended as far south as the Carolinas. One report noted, "All these provinces are laid waste for forty leagues from the foot of the mountains, in the direction of the sea. The number of prisoners in these territories since last April [1756] is estimated at about three thousand - men, women and children, in addition to thirteen hundred horses." Steele, *Guerillas and Grenadiers*, 97-98. In the spring of 1758, in an approximate three month period, raiding parties delivered to Fort Duquesne alone, 140 prisoners or scalps. Casgrain, *Journal du Marquis De Montcalm*, 357. See also Letter From William Shirley (New York) to Principal Secretary of War, 20 December 1755, NA, WO, Correspondence, 1755-1763; Casgrain, *Lettres du Chevalier De Lévis*, 75; Casgrain, *Journal du Marquis De Montcalm*, 110-111; Malartic, 52-53; Kopperman, 232; O'Meara, 161; and Watt, 73.

203 Colonel James Smith, "An Account of the Remarkable Occurrences in the Life and Travels of Col. James Smith During his Captivity with the Indians," in Archibald Loudon, ed. *Loudon's Indian Narratives* (Lewisburg, PA: Wennawoods Publishing, 1996), 247.

204 In the summer of 1758, when William Johnson was asked how he managed to marshal 450 Natives for a campaign he replied, "that it was owing to the French having neither provisions, nor presents to give them." Letter, Mr. Appy to Robert Wood, Albany, 2 July 1758. LAC, CO 5/50, Microfilm B-2113. Similarly, the next summer a Native chief loyal to the French arrived at Fort Niagara after its capture and incredulously demanded, "We are asking you for gunpowder & shot for hunting, and also for garments," he declared, "but we have not come to form an alliance with you; as we are still under the wing of our father." He conceded, "We are at war with you but necessity forces us to solicit our needs from you." Pouchot, 285.

205 Cuneo, 33.

206 *Northcliffe Collection*, Vol IX, 110.

207 "Monypenny Orderly Book," *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol 13, No. 2, June 1971, 170.

208 Anderson, 410; Leckie, 309; and St. John Williams, 79 & 143.

209 *General Wolfe's Instructions to Young Officers: Also His Orders for a Battalion and an Army* (London: J. Millan, 1780), 72-73.

## CHAPTER 3

210 A version of this chapter was originally published in Bernd Horn, "Marin and Langy - Master Practitioners of *la petite guerre*," in Bernd Horn and Roch Legault, eds., *Loyal Service: Perspectives of French-Canadian Military Leaders*. Toronto: Dundurn, 2007, 53-86.

211 Initially, very few settlers ventured to the New World. By the middle of the seventeenth century there were only approximately 2,500 people in New France. Many of these were explorers, fur traders and missionaries. Nonetheless, the lure of freedom, opportunity and especially wealth was enough of an impetus to spur growth and the French established settlements and a series of forts, predominately for fur trading. Moogk, 144.

212 Drafts normally numbered between 50-200 at a time for short durations.

213 Cited historical documents, display, Fort Chambly National Historic Site of Canada, Chambly, Quebec. Accessed 23 August 2001.

214 The expedition actually failed to attain its optimistic objectives, namely, it failed to destroy or humble the Iroquois. They failed to locate any Mohawk villages and only destroyed a few outlying cabins. Furthermore, they only killed four warriors and wounded six others at the cost of approximately 400 of their own. Most of these are attributed to hypothermia and starvation. Only seven French were killed and four wounded in the skirmish with the Mohawks. Verney, 50, 52; Goldstein, 98-99.

215 Notably: King William's War (War of the Grand Alliance), 1688-1697; Queen Anne's War (War of the Austrian Succession), 1740-1748; and King George's War (War of the Austrian Succession), 1740-1748. See Leckie, and Steele, *Guerillas and Grenadiers*; and Goldstein, 148-154. For example, on 25 January 1693, 100 *Troupes de la Marine*, 200 Indians and 325 Canadians left Montreal to strike at the Mohawk. They torched three villages, destroyed their winter food supply and took 300 prisoners. W.J. Eccles, "Frontenac's Military Policies, 1689-1698 - A Reassessment," *The Canadian Historical Review*, Vol 37, No. 3, September 1956, 208. The infamous attack on Deerfield, Massachusetts, on 16 March 1704, by 200 Indians and 50 Canadians, destroyed the town, killed 47 inhabitants and resulted in 111 others being carried away as captives. Miquelon, 40.

216 Letter, Major-General James Wolfe to William Pit, Cited in Doughty, Vol I, 65.

217 Impartial Hand, 128.

218 Ibid., 138; and Eccles, *French in North America*, 208. Captain Pouchot, the last French Commander of Fort Niagara, observed, "The Canadians are well built, very robust & active, with an admirable capacity to endure hard work & fatigue, to which they are accustomed through long & arduous journeys connected with their trading activities, in which a great deal of skill & patience are required. . . . They are brave, fond of war and very patriotic." Pouchot, 183.

219 *Bougainville Journal*, 333.

220 Cited in Casgrain, *Wolfe and Montcalm*, 196-197.

221 The colonial regular troops were infantry soldiers raised in company strength to guard naval ports in France and serve overseas in the French colonies. They were under the control of the Ministry of Marine rather than the Ministry of War to circumvent the rampant abuses present in the regimental system of the army. For this reason they were independent companies and not components of existing regiments. Commissions in *Les Compagnies Franches de la Marine* were not purchased but earned by merit (albeit they were also affected by influence). Each company was commanded by a captain, and consisted of a lieutenant, a brevet ensign, a second ensign, two cadets, two sergeants, three corporals, two drummers and 41 soldiers. In 1756, the strength of the non-commissioned ranks per company was increased to 65. Eccles, "The French forces in North America during the Seven Years' War," xvii.

222 Letter, Vaudreuil to Ministry of Marine, 30 October 1755, Extraits des Archives des Ministères de la Marine et de la Guerre A Paris - Canada - Correspondence Générale - MM. Duquesne et Vaudreuil Gouverneurs-Généraux, 1755-1760 (Québec: L.J. Demers & FrPre, 1890), 107.

223 Walter Laquer, *Voices of Terror. Manifestos, Writings and Manuals of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and other Terrorists from around the World and Throughout the Ages* (New York: Reed Press, 2004), 217.

224 See Chartrand, *Canadian Military Heritage, Vol 1*, 84-85; and Eccles, *The French in North America*, 173-174.

225 Letter Montcalm to De Lévis, Casgrain, *Lettres du Marquis De Montcalm au Chevalier De Lévis*, 35.

226 See “Marin de la Malgue (la Marque), Paul,” in *DCB, Vol III, 1741 to 1770*, 431-432. Although amassing a sizeable fortune in the fur trade in the northwest, particularly at Baie-des-Puants (present day Green Bay, Wisconsin), Marin the elder was considered an able officer. In 1746, he led a war party on a raid that destroyed Schuylerville (present day Saratoga New York) and ravaged the surrounding region. In 1752, when the Governor Duquesne decided to deploy a large force of 1,500 men to claim control of the Ohio Valley and dislodge the American advances in the region, he chose Marin the elder to command. Now 61, Marin drove himself and his troops relentlessly. Hundreds died of due to sickness brought on by exertion and poor diet. Marin himself became deathly ill but refused to retire to rest. In September he was awarded the cross of Saint-Louis, but he died of illness on 29 October before it actually arrived. “The King loses an excellent subject who was made for war,” wrote Governor Duquesne upon hearing of his death. He added, “I had formed the highest opinion of that officer.” *Ibid.*, 432.

227 The *pays d'en haut* refers to the northwest – the region of the upper Great Lakes basin.

228 See “Marin de la Malgue, Joseph,” in *DCB, Vol III, 1741 to 1770*, 512-514. This is the single most comprehensive history of Marin. See also Bob Bearor, *Leading by Example, Vol III* (Bowie: Heritage Books, 2004), 161-173.

229 Subsequently Marin traveled to Quebec where on 20 September he married the daughter of Joseph de Fleury de La Gorgendière. This nuptial is of significance as he now became related to Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil – the future governor of New France.

230 Marin senior was the Commander at Baie-Des-Puants and La Jonquière at this time. Due to his connection with the Governor and Intendant (Bigot), Marin senior was virtually in control of the Northwest.

231 Marin actually returned to Quebec in 1754, but was once again sent to the Northwest by Governor Dusquesne the following year.

232 *Bougainville Journal*, 41.

233 Letter from a Missionary to the Abenakis, in Thwaites, *Vol 70*, 107. He added, “Such deeds are surprising in Europe.”

234 *Ibid.*, 111.

235 *DCB, Vol III*, 513.

236 Robert Rogers remains one of the legendary colonial heroes to emerge from the French and Indian War. His bold forays against the French were tonic to a beleaguered public that was under constant attack by Native depredations on the New England Frontier. During a time where neither the British regulars, nor the colonial militia seemed empowered to strike at the enemy or even defend the settlements, Rogers and his Rangers represented fearless offensive action. By the fall of 1755, he was conducting scouts behind enemy lines and his efforts soon earned him an overwhelming reputation. “Captain Rogers whose bravery and veracity,” Johnson wrote, “stands very clear in my opinion and of all who know him...is the most active man in our Army.” By the winter of 1756, the bold forays behind enemy French lines were regularly reported in newspapers throughout the colonies. In March 1756, Major-General Shirley, Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in North America, ordered Rogers to raise a 60 man independent Ranger company that was separate from both the provincial and regular units. His unit was directed scout and gain intelligence in the Lake Champlain theatre. As of 6 April 1758, Major-General Abercrombie, now the Commander-in-Chief of British forces in North

America, awarded Rogers a formal commission as a captain of a ranger company and as “Major of the Rangers in his Majesty’s Service.” Although referred to by Montcalm and others as “elite,” Rogers was consistently bested by both Marin and Langis. See Cuneo, *Robert Rogers of the Rangers* and Burt G. Loescher, *The History of Rogers Rangers. Volume I - The Beginnings Jan 1755 - 6 April 1758* (Bowie, Maryland: Heritage Books, Inc., (1946) reprint 2001) and *Genesis Rogers Rangers. Volume II - The First Green Berets* (San Mateo, California, 1969. Reprint - Bowie, Maryland: Heritage Books, Inc., 2000); Timothy J. Todish, *The Annotated and Illustrated Journals of Major Robert Rogers* (Fleischmanns, NY: Purple Mountain Press, 2002); and *Warfare on the Colonial American Frontier: The Journals of Major Robert Rogers & An Historical Account of the Expedition Against the Ohio Indians in the year 1764, Under the Command of Henry Bouquet, Esq.* Reprinted from an original 1769 Edition - Bangersville, IN: Dreslar Publishing, 2001 [Henceforth *Rogers’ Journal*].

237 He was once again leading a war party against the British hoping to further demoralize the English by striking them at Fort Edward and Albany after their humiliating defeat at Fort Ticonderoga on 8 July 1758, when Montcalm repulsed Major-General Abercrombie’s invasion attempt. Although no immediate follow-up was taken by Montcalm, the arrival of more Canadians and their Native allies allowed the French to mount an active raiding campaign to keep the English off balance.

238 DCB, Vol III, 513.

239 Marin was imprisoned and sent to England where he was eventually released to France. Marin’s home in Quebec would fall to the same fate as that of the English colonists he preyed on – it was plundered and burned. He estimated his loss at more than 60,000 livres. DCB, Vol III, 513.

240 See “Levrault de Langis (Langy) Montegron, Jean-Baptiste,” in DCB, Vol III, 399-400.

241 Cited in Bearor, *Leading by Example Vol III* (Bowie: Heritage Books, 2004), 181.

242 See Courville, *Mémoires sur le Canada depuis 1749*.

243 Cited in Bearor, *Leading by Example*, 183.

244 See “Amos Richardson’s Journal, 1758,” *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, Vol 12, No. 4, September 1968, 278; and *Governor Murray’s Journal of the Siege of Quebec, from 18<sup>th</sup> September, 1759 to 25<sup>th</sup> May, 1760* (Toronto: Rous & Mann Ltd, 1939), 14.

245 See Extract of a letter from Sir William Johnson to General Shirley, 10 May 1756. NA, War Office 1/4, Correspondence, 1755-1763; Parkman, *Wolfe and Montcalm*, 168; and Doughty, Vol I, 167.

246 O’Meara, 85.

247 See Loescher, Vol 1, 247-262; Pouchot, 130; and Toddish, 105-112.

248 Bob Bearor, *The Battle on Snowshoes* (Bowie, Maryland: Heritage Books Inc., 1997), 93.

249 *Bougainville’s Journal*, 224.

250 Ibid., 224; and DCB, Vol III, 400.

251 *Bougainville’s Journal*, 229. “The fall of this noble officer,” Major Robert Rogers wrote, “seemed to produce an almost general languor and consternation through the whole army.” Major Thomas Mante, another contemporary officer, wrote, “In Lord Howe the soul of General Abercrombie’s army seemed to expire. From the unhappy moment the General was deprived of his advice, neither order



or discipline was observed, a strange kind of infatuation usurped the place of resolution.” The famous colonial historian Francis Parkman noted, “The death of one man was the ruin of fifteen thousand.” Francis Parkman, *The Battle for North America* (New York: Phoenix Press, 2001), 632-633.

252 The British suffered 1,944 casualties, 1,610 of those regulars. The French suffered only 377. See Chartrand, *Ticonderoga 1758*; *Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Vol III*, 462; St John Williams, 143-145; and Anderson, 240-249.

253 Casgrain, *Lettres du Chevalier De Lévis*, 199. See also Parkman, *The Battle for North America*, 627-628, 630-632.

254 Langis waited in ambush at Missisquoi Bay where the whale boats were found in hopes Rogers would return. Durantaye, another partisan leader, led the overland pursuit. See *Rogers' Journal*, 137-144; Stephen Brumwell, *White Devil* (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 2004); Cuneo, 101-116; and Loescher, *Genesis*, 58-66.

255 See Loescher, *Genesis*, 83-84.

256 Pouchot's journal, Cited in Bearor, *Leading By Example*, 195.

257 Lucier, Vol 4, 183.

258 Extract from a letter dated 28 April 1757, Cited in Lucier, Vol 2, 233. By the spring of 1756, raids by Canadians and Indians organized by Captain Dumas alone had resulted in 700 deaths or captures. By the end of the summer operations had extended as far south as the Carolinas. Steele, *Guerillas and Grenadiers*, 97-98; and Casgrain, *Journal du Marquis De Montcalm*, 357.

259 Letter from an officer, dated Fort Cumberland, 6 October 1755, in Lucier, Vol 1, 329.

260 Letter from General Shirley to Major-General Abercrombie, 27 June 1756, NA, War Office 1/4, Correspondence, 1755-1763.

## CHAPTER 4

261 A version of this chapter was originally published as Bernd Horn, “Hollow of Death: The Desperate Fight for Survival by Roger's Rangers, 21 January 1757,” in Bernd Horn, ed., *Show No Fear: Daring Actions in Canadian Military History* (Toronto: Dundurn, 2008), 65-78.

262 The following sources were used to prepare this chapter: Russell P. Bellico, *Chronicles of Lake Champlain. Journeys in War and Peace*. New York: Fleischmanns, 1999, 143-147; *Bougainville Journal*, 81-82; Casgrain, *Journal du Marquis De Montcalm*, 147-148; Cuneo, 45-51; *Dictionary of Canadian Biography, Vol IV, 1771-1800* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), 679-682; John D. Lock, *To Fight with Intrepidity...The Complete History of the US Army Rangers 1622 to Present* (New York: Pocket Books, 1998), 31-40; Loescher, *The History of Rogers Rangers. Volume I - The Beginnings Jan 1755 - 6 April 1758*, 111-140, 325-350; Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 222; Todish, 57-64; and *Warfare on the Colonial American Frontier*, 35-41.

263 Captain Speakman is often misspelled as Spikeman in contemporary accounts.

264 The exact numbers are difficult to ascertain. Rogers gives a figure of 250 French in his journals, although it is largely agreed that this number is somewhat inflated. Bougainville states that 100 French regulars were dispatched but does not quantify the number of Natives or Canadians. Parkman, quotes

the Governor of New France, Philippe de Rigaud de Vaudreuil, as stating that the French sortie against Rogers totaled 89 regulars and 90 Canadians and Natives. Loescher gives the number as 115 (inclusive of Regulars, Canadians and Natives) at one point, but later states the number could be anywhere from 145-250.

265 The fate of the prisoners is also contentious. Rogers does not mention his orders to kill the prisoners, nor does he state what happened with them. Nonetheless, the Rangers did not return to Fort William Henry with prisoners or scalps. Cuneo and Loescher state the prisoners were killed. Bougainville states four were recovered.

266 At 8:00 p.m. two Canadians arrived at Fort Ticonderoga with a message that the French forces were low on ammunition. As a result, a detachment of twenty-five men to carry powder and rations (biscuits), as well as a surgeon and priest were dispatched. "Relation de l'action lancé contre les anglois ce les frontier, 21 Janvier 1757 (Carillon)," LAC, Microfilm C-362, Bourlamaque Collection, Vol IV, 11 March 1756-18 April 1760, 310.

267 See Cuneo, 49 and Loescher, 331-340 for a description of Brown's subsequent captivity.

268 Martin actually recovered and went on to serve with the Rangers for the remainder of the war.

269 Again, exact numbers are difficult to nail down. Bougainville gives the French total at eleven killed, twenty-seven wounded of which three later died. Lieutenant-General Montcalm's account concedes only nine killed and eighteen wounded (some of which he states later died of wounds). Parkman quotes Vaudreuil as giving total casualties at thirty-seven. Bellico states that French casualties amounted to nineteen killed and twenty-seven wounded of which twenty-three later died and Loescher puts them at eighteen and twenty-seven. Bougainville and Montcalm assigned to the Rangers forty-two dead, and eight captured.

## CHAPTER 5

270 A version of this chapter was originally published as Bernd Horn, "Deadly Encounter at Wood Creek, 8 August 1758," in Bernd Horn, ed., *Fortune Favours the Brave: Tales of Tenacity and Courage in Canadian Military History*. Toronto: Dundurn, 2009, 19-40.

271 This account is based on the following sources: Pouchot, *Memoirs on the Late War in North America Between France and England*; Doct. Thomas Haynes, "Memorandum of Colonial French War A.D. 1758," *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, September 1966, Vol 12, No. 2, 150-157; *Bougainville Journal*; Casgrain, *Journal du Marquis De Montcalm*; Cuneo, 88-90; Lock, 74-76; Loescher, *Genesis*, 12-20, 208-211; Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe*, 222; Todish, 57-64; and *Warfare on the Colonial American Frontier*, 35-41.

272 Varied literature tends to try and excuse the colonial legend's carelessness by offering different versions of the cause of the shots or by playing down the seriousness of the misjudgment. Loescher does both. Cuneo clearly attempts to portray Rogers as the victim of jealousy. He simply states, "Vigilance relaxed: three muskets were discharged – some later said at game; others, at marks." Cuneo, 89. However, contemporary accounts describe the events in a very uncompromising manner depicting Rogers as careless. One participant wrote, "Rogers and one Lieut. of the light infantry laid a wager to shoot at a mark and discharged their pieces at an old tree." Haynes, 153. Similarly, another account stated, "it seems, at least Rogers party, grew careless, some firing at Turkeys others at marks." "The Journal of Dr. Caleb Rea, Written During the Expedition Against Ticonderoga in 1758," (hereafter Rea Journal) in *Historical Collections of the Essex Institute*, Vol 18, Nos. 4-6, April, May, June 1881, 179. Finally, two Militia captains, Stephen Maynard and Andrew Giddings publicly stated that the

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carelessness that led to the ambush was the fault of the Rangers and the 80<sup>th</sup> Regiment. "On the morning of the ambush" they wrote, "the officers were so little apprehensive of an enemy near, that Major Rogers and a Lieutenant of the Light Infantry, upon a wager, fired their pieces several times at marks." Pouchot, 162, endnote 449.

273 Cited in Cuneo, 89.

274 Rea Journal, 179.

275 See Loescher, *Genesis*, 18; Haynes, 154; Rea Journal, 180; and Extract of Colonel Humphrey's *Life of General Putnam*, in Archibald Loudon, ed. *Loudon's Indian Narratives* (Lewisburg, PA: Wennawoods Publishing, 1996), 114. The number was based on bodies supposedly found on the ground. Bougainville notes in his journal that they (French) suffered thirteen dead (five of them Natives) and ten wounded. *Bougainville Journal*, 261. Captain Pouchot states in his journal that the English suffered 100 killed, while the French suffered only four Natives killed and four wounded, and six Canadians killed and six wounded. Pouchot, 162. Two militia captains who were participants admitted that the English losses were five captured, forty-nine killed, and forty wounded. Pouchot, 162 editor's endnote 449. Another contemporary witness wrote, "at night mager Rogers came in: and Brought nues how it was: thay got fifty two scalps and two prisoners and thay killed a good menney more which thay did get: and thay reken that all the men of ouirs that was keld, wouned and twock was aBought ninty: and thay reken that thay keld two to won of the French and ingens: and mager putmun was taken and one Lt. Tennet which we have heard of and some more privets." Amos Richardson's Journal, 1758, reprinted in *The Bulletin of the Fort Ticonderoga Museum*, September 1968, Vol XII, No. 4, 282.

276 Haynes, 153-154.

277 Rea Journal, 179.

278 Cited in Loescher, *Genesis*, 20.

279 Ibid., 20.

280 See "Extract of Colonel Humphrey's *Life of General Putnam*," 111-118. The British learned of Putnam's capture and safe arrival at Fort Ticonderoga on the evening of 11 August when Dr. Stakes, captured by the French at Oswego earlier in the year, arrived at Fort Edward under a flag of truce. The initial message was an offer of an exchange of prisoners – Putnam for a French officer taken during Abercrombie's failed assault on Fort Ticonderoga earlier that summer. See Rea Journal, 180.

## CHAPTER 6

281 These rules are taken from his journal as reprinted in: *Warfare on the Colonial American Frontier*, 55-64; and Todish, 72-78.

282 Taken from the 75<sup>th</sup> Ranger Regiment website at <http://www.soc.mil/75thrr/75thrrorders.shtml>, accessed 5 January 2001.



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# THE CANSOFCOM EDUCATION & RESEARCH CENTRE

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The mission of the Canadian Forces Special Operations Forces (CANSOFCOM) Education and Research Centre (ERC) is to support the professional development framework within the Command in order to continually develop and enhance the cognitive capacity of CANSOFCOM personnel.

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
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1. Develop educational opportunities and SOF specific courses and material to enable CANSOFCOM professional development (PD);
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3. Conduct focused research and provide advice on seeking additional research capacity for CANSOFCOM best practices and force development;
4. Record CANSOFCOM's classified history;
5. Coordinate the publication of CANSOFCOM educational material; and
6. Support CANSOFCOM's "up and out" Communication Strategy.







FORT TICONDEROGA

