



## **Two Crowd Control Case Studies**

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Defence R&D Canada
Centre for Operational Research and Analysis

Central Operational Research Team





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# **DRDC – Centre for Operational Research and Analysis**

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#### **Abstract**

The Operational Research (OR) Team in Defence Research Development Canada (DRDC) Valcartier has begun work on a research project on modeling and simulating of crowd behaviour. This technical note reports on two crowd behaviour case studies. The intent of this report is twofold: the data collected on these two case studies will be utilized by the researchers to validate a crowd behavior/control model; and, the lessons learned from gathering and extracting data can be utilized by researchers at a later date when other crowd behaviour case studies are completed.

#### Résumé

L'èquipe de Recherche Opérationnelle de Recherche et développement pour la défense Canada - Valcartier a commencé le travail dans un projet de recherche sur la modélisation et la simulation du contrôle des foules. Cette note technique documente deux études de cas. La motivation pour ce travail comporte deux volets : la collection de données sur ces deux études de cas servira plus tard à d'autres chercheurs appelés à valider le modèle de contrôle des foules ; et, les leçons apprises suite à la collection de données et l'extraction de l'information utile de ces données, pourraient s'avérer utiles dans des exercices futurs de collection de données reliées aux situations de contrôle des foules.

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#### 1 Introduction

The Operational Research (OR) Team in Defence Research and Development Canada Valcartier is currently conducting a three year research project entitled, "Crowd Control Modeling and Simulation Capability" [1]. To aid in this multi-year research effort, one of the authors [SD], a social scientist from the Central Operational Research Team (CORT), was asked to gather and extract data for two crowd control case studies using a variety of sources.

This technical note will report on:

- gathering the data;
- extracting the data;
- the actual data for both case studies; and,
- recommendations for gathering and extracting data on other crowd control case studies in the future.

The actual crowd control case study data presented in this technical note will be utilized at a later date by one of the authors [IT] involved in the technology investment fund (TIF) research project to validate a crowd behaviour/control model.

#### 2 Method

This technical note reports on work conducted on gathering and extracting data. Palys [2] states that researchers should always do a pilot test or trial run before going out and doing the research "for real". There are things the researcher takes for granted, and there are surprises the researcher might never consider when conducting the research. The time to catch these difficulties is before committing major resources to the research. The intent of this study was first, to gather and extract data that can be used to validate a model created by the TIF researchers, and, second, to report on the process of gathering and extracting data so that the TIF researchers might encounter less difficulties when they gather and extract more data for the project.

## 2.1 Gathering Data

This effort is essentially made up of the analysis of two case studies. The first is the Standoff that occurred in Oka, Quebec in 1990. The second is the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit protest that occurred in Vancouver, British Columbia in 1997. These case studies were chosen from a list of several crowd control incidents because of their significance yet diversity.

The main differences between the two case studies are:

- the reason for the crowd forming;
- the duration of the event;
- the control forces (provincial police, RCMP, or military); and
- the use of non-lethal weapons.

The data on these case studies was obtained from secondary sources, including books, film documentaries, and from news/media sources. The researcher intended to use journal articles but could not find any relevant journal articles for either case study. Because the events being examined occurred some time ago, the data collection process was not conducive to primary sources.

#### 2.2 Extracting Data

The data on these case studies will be used as input into a crowd behaviour/control model. Unfortunately, the model was in early development at the start of the data collection. Therefore, the intent was to extract as much information as possible from the data sources to understand: who, what, where, why, when, and how. The goal was to determine:

- the size of the forces on both sides throughout the period, if they changed substantially during the period and when.
- the significant incidents that occurred during the period, the time the incidents occurred, the actions of both sides, the types and effectiveness of the weapons used by both sides in each incident, and the potential gains or losses from each incident from the point of view of both sides.

A further note is also required with regards to the protocol that was employed in the extraction of data. The various data sources covered the same factual events. There was little controversy about what happened in Oka and APEC (who did what, when, etc.). When there was congruence, more value was attached to these "facts". When there were disagreements between the sources, the extraction process was subjective and based on an interpretation of the potential biases in the sources. Materials were sampled across different sources until the point of diminishing returns was reached.

#### 3 Data

The data extracted from the secondary sources for the Oka Standoff and the APEC Summit are summarized below.

### 3.1 Summary of the Oka Standoff Case Study

The Oka Standoff occurred between 11 Mar 90 and 26 Sep 90 in Kanesatake, near Oka, Quebec. Events relating to the Oka Standoff also took place during this time frame at the

Kahnawake reserve and in the towns of Oka and Chateauguay. On 11 Mar 90, an unknown number of Mohawk Indians set up barricades to prevent the expansion of a nine-hole golf course into an eighteen-hole golf course that was built on sacred grounds owned by the Mohawks [3]. On 11 Jul 90, 100 Quebec Provincial Police, Sûreté du Quebéc (SQ), were called in and set up their own barricades. On 29 Aug 90, 2,400 Canadian Forces troops were called in to relieve the SQ. The Mohawk Warriors fired guns, destroyed 6 police vehicles, seized a bulldozer, and a SQ officer was shot and killed. The SQ and the Canadian Forces tried to control the crowd using tear gas, firing shots, using tripwires, razor wire, light towers, cutting phone lines, setting up road blocks, using concussion grenades, and beating a Mohawk Warrior. On 26 Sep 90, the Mohawk Indians surrendered. Annex A provides a table describing the main incidents that occurred during the Oka standoff.

#### 3.2 Summary of the APEC Summit Protest Case Study

The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit was held on 25 Nov 97 at the Museum of Anthropology on the University of British Columbia (UBC) campus in Vancouver, British Columbia. One thousand five hundred protesters and activists turned out to protest "the absence of human rights on the APEC agenda and the presence of atrocious human rights abusers like China's Jiang Zemin and President Suharto of Indonesia," [4]. Five thousand police officers were brought into Vancouver to assist with APEC security. Prior to 25 Nov 97, the protesters set up a tent city on campus, created signs, and raised flags and banners. On 25 Nov 97, protesters displayed signs, held a large rally, tore down a section of a chain link fence separating the police from the protesters, walked into the police line, and created roadblocks by standing and sitting on three roads leading to the UBC museum. The police and RCMP attempted to control the crowd by arresting protesters, removing signs, flags, and banners, and using pepper spray. Annex B provides a table listing the main incidents that occurred during the APEC Summit protest.

### 4 Recommendations and Conclusions

During the gathering and extracting of data from secondary data sources for these two crowd behaviour/control case studies, many lessons were learned.

In the data gathering phase, it became apparent that the sources used in this study had their advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of the internet is the speed at which it can be searched and quantity of information that can be found. The disadvantage is that the quality of the information must be scrutinized. One way to improve the quality of information provided on the internet is examine reliable news/media sources. The advantage of film documentaries is the visual capture of the event and the ability to collect data on the nonverbal element. The disadvantage is that one can only see what is captured from the angle and vantage point at which it is being filmed. The advantage of books can be the in-depth narrative detail. The disadvantage is that they can be time-consuming to digest. In this study, no journal articles were available on the Oka or APEC case studies.

The authors would recommend that when gathering data in the future on other cases, the researcher consider contacting and interviewing individuals who were in the crowd and individuals who were trying to keep the crowd under control. Interviews involve an exchange of information which other data sources do not offer. Also, through the connections made during interviews, further sources of information might be uncovered (e.g. police reports, raw film footage).

In the data extraction phase, it was realized that there were two types of data sources: those that gave an overview of the entire event; and those that concentrated on more detailed information on some of the main incidents that occurred within the larger event. Because the the crowd behaviour/control model was still under development during the data extraction process, a great deal of time was spent on getting a sense and understanding of the overall event. It was then easy to summarize "who, what, where, when, why, and how" the significant incidents took place when they were examined in more detail. It was found that creating chronological tables was the easiest way to organize and present the data on the main incidents. It was a challenge to obtain information on the effectiveness of non-lethal weapons and the perceived gains or losses of the two sides which were questions the TIF modelers specifically asked. Unless a source gave some indication of the effectiveness of a particular non-lethal weapon or stated that an incident was perceived as a gain or loss by one side in the conflict, only subjective answers to these questions were possible.

It is recommended that when extracting data in the future for crowd behaviour/control cases, multiple researchers should be used to analyze the data to control for bias. Also, knowing the details of the crowd behaviour/control model will be helpful in the parameter extraction data phase in the future.

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# Annex A The Main Incidents that Occurred During the Oka Standoff

Table A.1: Significant Incidents in the Oka Standoff

Date	Description of Incident	Gain or Loss
11 Mar 90	Kanesatake Mohawks set up a blockade in an effort to stop	Blockade - effec-
	the town of Oka from expanding a golf course on land the	tive for Mohawks.
	Mohawks claimed contained a cemetery. [5] and [6, p. 42]	
11 Jul 90	The SQ police are called in [6, p. 43]. Just before dawn	Tear gas - not ef-
	the SQ arrived in rental cars and vans. The SQ fires tear	fective for SQ. Gun
	gas after asking to speak to a Mohawk spokesperson and	battle - effective for
	are not satisfied when a woman says she is the spokesper-	Mohawks. De-
	son. There are more than 100 officers and Mohawks fear	stroying police cars
	more are to come. So they build a wall of tires and set them	and seizing a bull-
	on fire to prevent other SQ officers from arriving. The SQ	dozer - effective for
	officers begin to move forward using tear gas and concus-	Mohawks. Mercier
	sion grenades. A gun battle starts. Hundreds of rounds are	Bridge blocked -
	shot but the battle lasts no more than a few seconds [7].	effective for Mo-
	SQ Marcel Lemay is killed [8], [9], and [10]. Raphals [11,	hawks.
	p. 414] recounts, "The SQ officers launched an ill-planned	
	attack on the Mohawk barricade at Kanesatake. Their own	
	tear gas blew back in their faces, one police officer was shot	
	and killed - perhaps by his own side - and they were forced	
	to retreat. In the aftermath the Mohawks fortified their bar-	
	ricade with crushed SQ cruisers, topping it off with a sign	
	reading, 'They came, they saw, they ran.' " The SQ had	
	retreated, leaving most of their vehicles near the barricade.	
	The Mohawks destroyed police cars and took control of	
	a bulldozer to reinforce their barricade. The SQ watched	
	the Mohawks for the rest of the day from a helicopter [7].	
	Mohawk Warriors at the Kahnawake reserve 29 km south-	
	west of Montreal set up a blockade at the Mercier bridge in	
	the morning in support of the Kanesatake Mohawks. The	
	bridge is used by up to 60,000 commuters every day from	
	South Shore communities to Montreal [6].	
Jul 90	The Mohawk Warriors join the Kanesatake Mohawks at the	SQ barricades - ef-
	barricades. The Quebec government orders the SQ to erect	fective for SQ.
	its own barricades on the roads leading to the municipality	
	of Oka and the Kanesatake reserve [8]. The police set up	
	roadblocks 5 km outside of Oka [6].	

Table A.1: Significant Incidents in the Oka Standoff (Continued)

Date	Description of Incident	Gain or Loss		
Jul 90	Both sides play games of intimidation during the night.	Night intimidation		
	They send men into the woods. Sometimes officers or			
	Mohawks go in silence to spy and other times they create			
	noise to let the other side know they are watching. The po-			
	lice have greater resources and always have fresh crews to			
	watch the barricade. The Warriors have limited resources			
	and begin to suffer sleep deprivation [7].			
16 Jul 90	SQ stop food shipments at the roadblocks they have set up	Blocked food ship-		
	[10]. The circulation of food and medical supplies to the	ments - effective		
	community of Kanesatake experience some delays. Some	for SQ. Throwing		
	Mohawks, are refused access, and leave the food they had	eggs at SQ - not		
	brought for their family at the barricades. The Mohawks	effective for Mo-		
	ask for a team of observers from human rights groups	hawks.		
	across Canada to be present at the barricades, to prevent			
	the police from violating their rights [7] and [12]. The Red			
	Cross goes behind the barricades and identifies 200 people			
	needing special attention. Complaints against the police			
	are lodged with the Human Rights Commission accusing			
	the police of harassment, making racial slurs and gestures,			
	and detaining people. These incidents make natives afraid			
	to cross the barricades to buy food or seek medical supplies			
	[6]. The Mohawks are seen throwing eggs at the SQ which			
	seems strange given the Mohawks were complaining that			
	they were not getting enough food [9]. It is alleged that			
	strip searches were conducted at the roadblocks [9].			
26 Jul 90	The police report that the bullet that killed Cpl. Lemay on			
	11 Jul 90 did not come from a police weapon [7] and [13].			
7 Aug 90	Many Mohawks leave Kanesatake [10]	Mohawks leave -		
		effective for SQ		
14 Aug 90	Chief of Defence Staff announces the deployment of units	Army coming - ef-		
	to Kanesatake and Kahnawake relieving SQ [5]. The	fective for SQ.		
	Canadian Forces announce that as many as 4,400 soldiers,			
	backed by armored personnel carriers and heavy weapons			
	would be deployed [7].			

Table A.1: Significant Incidents in the Oka Standoff (Continued)

Date	Description of Incident	Gain or Loss
20 Aug 90	The arrival of the army. Thirty-three reconnaissance troops arrive around 0800. The army moves one of the SQ barricades 400 meters closer to the Mohawks to improve the barricades strategic value to the army. The Mohawks apparently misunderstand this as an act of aggression. The negotiations are fragile and every time the army pushes the barricades closer, the talks break off. When the SQ was in Oka, the barricades were sometimes separated by as much as 1.5 km. Now, at some points the barricades are as close as 5 meters from each other [7]	Barricades moved closer - effective for Army.
24 Aug 90	Four smoke bombs are set off by the Canadian Forces in the morning [6].	
1 Sep 90	"At 1:00 pm some soldiers climbed over the north, east, and west perimeter and made their way into the pines. This was a very tense time. Warriors were trying to provoke the soldiers into firing the first shot. It was only strict discipline that prevented this situation from ending in a bloodbath. The Warriors would not retreat. They were ready to stand their ground. It was finally decided that they would retreat into the treatment center. The night remained tense. The Warriors took turns guarding the entrance of the treatment center. The area was illuminated with high-powered searchlights from across the road. A cacophony of eerie war whoops amplified through Mohawk loud speakers, helicopters hovered above, flares going off only increased the tension on both sides" [7].	Warriors retreat into Treatment Center - effective for Army.
2 Sep 90	Barricades are brought down at Kanesatake [5].	Barricades brought down - effective for Army
6 Sep 90	Mercier Bridge is re-opened by the Army after 62 days of Mohawk occupation. The Army completely surrounds the Mohawks at the Treatment Center in Kanesatake using razor wire [5].	Mercier Bridge re- opened - effective for Army. Razor wire surround Mo- hawks in Treatment Center - effective for Army.
8 Sep 90	An incident occurred when four soldiers crossed the razor wire scouting a Mohawk in the forest. They stumbled upon a warrior asleep in a trench. A battle erupted and two soldiers are wounded. The warrior is overwhelmed and beaten [7].	Beating of Mohawk - effective for Army.

Table A.1: Significant Incidents in the Oka Standoff (Continued)

Date	Description of Incident	Gain or Loss
13 Sep 90	The phone lines are cut. The only line the Warriors had	Phone lines cut and
	was the Hot Line to the negotiation office of the Army.	light towers used
	Light towers are set up to see the Mohawk side of the razor	- not effective for
	wire at night [7]. Warriors put up blankets in the woods	Army.
	so the Army cannot see what they are doing [7]. Soldiers	
	shine powerful lights into the detox center from 110-foot	
	towers. The army steadily pushes its side of the barriers	
	forward, tightening their circle of control; they jam the cel-	
	lular phones of journalists inside. The Warriors direct loud-	
	speakers at the troops, the music alternating between tradi-	
	tional native songs and the Rolling Stones: "Wild horses	
	couldn't drag me away" [11] and [7]. Later the War-	
	riors find a place where cellular phones are not effected by	
	the blackout and call it the 'Phone Booth' [7]	
Sep 90	One night a Warrior reached over the razor wire with a	Set off tripwires -
	long hook and yanked on the army's tripwires, setting off	effective for Mo-
	flares. The soldiers thought a mass breakout was starting.	hawks. Water fight
	The army was not about to see this situation get any worse.	- not effective for
	They hooked up a fire hose to a water main and shot water	either side. Army
	into the woods. The Warriors thought this was funny and	locks and loads -
	started throwing water filled condoms back. A water fight	effective for Army
	erupted and laughter was heard on both sides of the razor	
	wire. An officer then gave an order to "lock and load" and	
	shortly after a shot was fired in the air [7]	
26 Sep 90	At the local detox center in Kanesatake, the twenty War-	Mohawks sur-
	riors and their families who had been making a last stand,	render - effective
	lay down their arms and turn themselves in [11]. The last	for Mohawks and
	barricades are taken down [8]. The Mohawk Warriors burn	Army.
	two fires when they surrender [7].	

# Annex B The Main Incidents that Occurred During the APEC Summit Protest

Table B.1: Significant Incidents in the APEC Summit Protest

Date	Description of Incident	Gain or Loss
Week of 17	Students begin 'laying siege' for the summit by building	Arrests - effective
Nov 97	a tent city outside the student union building. Named	for RCMP.
	'Democracy Village', it becomes part of the security zone	
	for the summit [4]. The eleven students, who set up a tent	
	city, write slogans on windows and rearrange rocks to spell	
	out a message. The students are warned that if they do not	
	leave they will be arrested. Seven students leave and the	
	remaining four are charged and arrested [14].	
21 Nov 97	The graduate students' union at UBC raises the Tibetan na-	Flags raised - effec-
	tional flag, a symbolic image of independence, atop its stu-	tive for protesters.
	dent centre and hangs two anti-APEC banners. The RCMP	
	removes the flag on the morning of 25 Nov 97 [4] and [15].	
24 Nov 97	A protester, Law student Craig Jones, places paper signs	Signs raised
	reading 'Free Speech', 'Democracy', and 'Human Rights'	- effective for
	on fences surrounding Green College. At midnight, police	protesters.
	remove the signs [15].	
25 Nov 97	At 0750, Craig Jones displays signs that say 'Free Speech',	Signs and banner
	'Democracy', and 'Human Rights' on the sidewalk on two	removed - effective
	coat racks in view of the motorcade route that will be trans-	for RCMP. Craig
	porting the APEC delegates to UBC [15]. An RCMP offi-	Jones arrested - ef-
	cer immediately orders the protester to move the signs off	fective for RCMP.
	the sidewalk and onto the grass 12 feet behind the secu-	
	rity fence. The protester complies. After approximately	
	10 minutes, the same officer informs the protester that the	
	signs cannot remain but he can. The protester doesn't re-	
	move the signs and the signs are grabbed from him. He	
	is handcuffed and arrested [14]. At approximately 0830,	
	Mike Thoms, a doctoral student in history, briefly displays	
	a textile banner. Police tell him he can't do this and the	
	police seize the banner [15]. Police tell other individuals	
	wishing to display signs on the Green College side of the	
	security fences that they are not allowed [15].	

Table B.1: Significant Incidents in the APEC Summit Protest (Continued)

Date	Description of Incident	Gain or Loss
25 Nov 97	A massive rally on campus at 1230 is broken up in a	Rally - effective
	melee of pepper spray and arrests [4]. It is alleged	for Protesters.
	that individuals carrying cellular telephones or amplify-	Pepper spray and
	ing equipment were arrested and that women, but not men	arrests - effec-
	were strip searched by RCMP officers [15] and [16]. At	tive for RCMP.
	1240, protesters reached the 12-foot fence separating them	Bringing down
	from the wide secure zone around the museum. Several	part of chain link
	protesters grabbed the chain link and tore a section down.	fence - effective for
	The falling fence caught a group of activists and media un-	Protesters.
	derneath before waiting police moved in with pepper spray	
	and police bikes, beating back the protesters. Shortly after	
	the security fence is repaired, a group of about 40 activists	
	risk arrest by forming ranks of four and walking slowly into	
	the police line. The police douse the first rank with pepper	
	spray and they spray the substance over protesters heads	
	and into the crowd. Police then threw two-dozen empty	
	bottles back over the fence. The confrontation ended after	
25 Nov 97	about a one-hour standoff [4].	D 11.1 CC
25 Nov 97	Activists moved on to block the three routes leading away	Roadblocks - effec-
	from the UBC museum. With little warning, the police	tive for Protesters.
	break up one of the roadblocks by pepper spraying the 50	Pepper spray - effective for RCMP.
	activists, as well as onlookers and the media, forcing the crowd about 100 meters from site of the motorcade route.	Arrests - effective
	Along the same route the APEC motorcade had taken in the	for RCMP.
		101 KCIVIP.
	morning, some 30 protesters sat on the pavement. Another 200 protesters and onlookers stood on the median in the	
	road, offering support. By days end, 49 people are arrested.	
	Police also search and release four men with Indonesian	
	accreditation who were photographing protesters. [4].	
	decreatation who were photographing protesters. [4].	

## List of symbols/abbreviations/acronyms/initialisms

APEC Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation

CORA Centre for Operational Research and Analysis

CORT Central Operational Research Team
DND Department of National Defence

DRDC Defence Research and Development Canada

OR Operational Research

RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police

SQ Sûreté du Quebéc

TIF Technology Investment Fund UBC University of British Columbia

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	The Operational Research (OR) Team in Defence Research Development Canada (DRDC) Valcartier has begun work on a research project on modeling and simulating of crowd behaviour. This technical note reports on two crowd behaviour case studies. The intent of this report is twofold: the data collected on these two case studies will be utilized by the researchers to validate a crowd behavior/control model; and, the lessons learned from gathering and extracting data can be utilized by researchers at a later date when other crowd behaviour case studies are completed.
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